More than 230,000 foreign-born children were adopted into US families in the past decade. The number of children adopted into families that do not share their race, ethnicity, and national origin has steadily increased as families in developed states have turned to foreign countries for children to adopt. Why do states allow foreigners to adopt their vulnerable children, and what explains the timing of such decisions across the international system? I argue that the spread of intercountry adoption is a process of policy diffusion: states learn from the experience of other states that intercountry adoption is an effective solution for a domestic child welfare problem. I find that intercountry adoption is diffusing throughout the international system over time. This diffusion is not spurious; domestic political characteristics do not impact the likelihood that a state would allow intercountry adoption. Rather, the policy is diffusing across states with varying political characteristics. Furthermore, my analysis shows that states’ economic, demographic, and religious characteristics determine their threshold for learning from other states’ experience.
Introduction

US citizens have adopted more than 230,000 foreign-born children in the past decade (USDOS 2010). Scholars estimate that these adoptions represent between fifty and eighty percent of all adoptions in the global system, meaning that the global adoptions in the same time could be up to twice that many (Selman 2009; Menozzi and Mirkin 2007; Engel et al. 2007). These children have crossed political, ethnic, social, and linguistic boundaries to migrate to new families in new states. Intercountry adoption, the legal flow of children across borders, is a form of migration that should interest scholars of international politics for several reasons. First, the children flowing across borders through intercountry adoption are the most vulnerable of a state’s citizens, not just because they are children, but because they lack parents to advocate for their protection. Their protection falls within the primary responsibility of the state. Second, intercountry adoption is a practice characterized by the coordination of legal systems across borders. Adoptions must be processed in the origin state of the child such that the child can legally be transferred to another family in another state. Third, complications in intercountry adoption are increasingly becoming international incidents that are negotiated at the state level. In fact, the United States and Russia recently concluded over a year of negotiating a bilateral adoption treaty due to several high profile intercountry adoption incidents.

Despite the importance of intercountry adoption as a matter of international politics, there is little political research investigating the factors that enable or inhibit intercountry adoption. But if scholars are to investigate the phenomenon of intercountry adoption, we must understand why a state would allow foreigners to adopt its children in the first place. This is the foundational puzzle of the practice of intercountry adoption. Most puzzling is the fact that states with similar child welfare problems make different choices regarding whether or not they will
allow foreigners to adopt those children. Take Ethiopia and Rwanda for example. The states share a region and have similar child welfare crises. Both states initially allowed intercountry adoption in the late 1980s, evidenced by children starting to flow out of the states. Ethiopia has taken steps to build a robust intercountry adoption program and is one of the top sending states of children; Rwanda has only started to implement the legislation that allows foreigners to adopt children, and they have sent out very few children over the past two decades. What explains the difference in state behavior?

Because we know little about why states allow foreigners to adopt their children, and what explains the timing of that decision, we have little traction on understanding the type of political phenomena that intercountry adoption represents. Is intercountry adoption a domestic political process, in which states independently decide to allow foreigners to adopt children? Or are state choices regarding participation in intercountry adoption interconnected in some way? If state choices are interconnected, what is the mechanism through which they are interdependent, and how do the domestic characteristics of states matter for the decision?

I argue that the spread of intercountry adoption is a process of policy diffusion: states learn from other states’ experience that intercountry adoption is an effective solution for domestic child welfare problems. As more states in the international system allow intercountry adoption, the increasing power of this “lesson” alters other states’ perception of the effectiveness of intercountry adoption as a policy solution. Thus, states’ choices to allow intercountry adoption are interconnected through a learning process that drives the diffusion of intercountry adoption.

But a diffusion finding does not preclude the possibility that domestic political factors are really driving the fact that more and more states are allowing intercountry adoption. For
example, the decision to allow intercountry adoption could be disaster-driven. States that face similar crises, like drought or famine, could simply decide to allow intercountry adoption at the same time because they have the same underlying cause of their child welfare problem (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Franzese and Hays 2008). On the other hand, it is possible that intercountry adoption is a policy preference for states with certain political characteristics (Simmons and Elkins 2004). In both these cases, state choices might seem interdependent when in fact the diffusion is spurious.

Even if a policy is diffusing and state choices are interdependent, the domestic characteristics of states should serve as a filter through which they learn from other states’ experience (Brooks 2007:702). But which domestic characteristics matter for the diffusion of intercountry adoption? The existing political science research on intercountry adoption has not definitively answered this question. I argue that states’ domestic characteristics impact the threshold for learning from other states’ experience. For some states, the threshold is relatively low, and they are more likely to allow intercountry adoption regardless of what other states in the system are doing. But for other states, the lesson must be much stronger before the perceived effectiveness of intercountry adoption is high enough that they can cross the threshold and allow intercountry adoption (Gilardi and Luyet 2009:550-551).

In the first section of this paper I provide an overview of the mechanics of intercountry adoption. In the second section I present the diffusion theory of intercountry adoption and generate expectations of state behavior. In the third section I present data to answer three interconnected questions. Is intercountry adoption diffusing through the international system? Is the observed diffusion spurious? How do domestic characteristics shape the diffusion of intercountry adoption? I use a discrete-time hazard model to analyze original data on state
choices in intercountry adoption to answer these three questions. The fourth and final section interprets the findings and situates them within the larger diffusion literature.

The evidence shows that intercountry adoption is diffusing throughout the international system over time. As the number of states in the system that allow intercountry adoption increases, so does the likelihood that any one state in the system would allow intercountry adoption. Additionally, the evidence shows that this diffusion is not spurious; domestic political characteristics do not impact the likelihood that a state would allow intercountry adoption. Rather, the policy is diffusing across states with varying political characteristics. Finally, my analysis shows that the economic, demographic, and religious characteristics of states determine their threshold for learning from other states’ experience.

**What is Intercountry Adoption?**

Intercountry adoption is the adoption of a child across state borders; that is, the citizens of one state adopt a child that is a citizen of another state. The adoption must be legally processed in the child’s origin state in a way that allows the child to be legally processed into another state as a citizen of the new state and a member of a new family. Though this seems straightforward, intercountry adoption is a complex process, as any parent who has adopted internationally has experienced firsthand. As a consequence, even the question of whether or not a state “allows” intercountry adoption is quite complicated and difficult to measure. Even more problematic is identifying when that state moved from being a “no” to being a “yes.” If we are going to classify state choices in intercountry adoption, it is crucial to understand two complimentary dimensions of intercountry adoption: the legality of adoption and the logistics of adoption.

**TABLE 1 HERE**
Legally, even if a state allows foreigners to adopt children within state borders, that adoption is not an intercountry adoption unless the new legal status can travel to the receiving state of the child. Even the US Department of State website on Intercountry Adoption stresses this fact by reminding parents that even if a child is adopted in their origin state, the adoption does not automatically qualify the child to receive a US visa for immigration. The child must meet qualifications both within the origin state and within the destination state in order for the citizenship to transfer across borders. Incongruence in adoption laws and visa regimes can complicate the adoption process to the point that a child can be legally adopted by a foreign family but unable to enter those adoptive parents’ state as a citizen.

There are three categories of types of states that I consider to legally allow intercountry adoption. First, there are the states that have legislation providing for intercountry adoption. For example, China’s adoption law of 1991 specifically states that foreigners can adopt Chinese children under certain circumstances (Gates 1999). States with intercountry adoption laws usually have robust intercountry adoption programs, and often have implemented the provisions of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption (HCICA), the multilateral treaty governing the process. For these states, intercountry adoption laws are specifically formulated so that an adoption in the origin state of the child is also legal in the receiving state of the child, and children usually receive citizenship upon entering the destination state. These states legally facilitate intercountry adoption and are usually committed long-term to the practice.

Second, there are states that do not legally facilitate intercountry adoption by transforming their legal system to provide for such adoptions, but they have no laws prohibiting the practice. Foreigners can adopt children within the state, and there is no prohibition against the adopted child immigrating to another state. These adoptions are often processed differently
than the first category; the child often must be readopted in their destination state. Some of these states have intercountry adoption programs, but they are unwilling or unable to absorb the cost associated with transforming their laws. Belize and Bangladesh are states that fall in this category.

Third, there are states that allow a foreigner to become the legal guardian of a child within its state then allow that child to migrate to another state. The legal identity of the child does not change within its state of origin, but in the destination state, the child is adopted and given a new legal identity. These adoptions, while possible, are often legally complex. For example, several Muslim states have guardianship provisions because there is no category for adoption in Sharia law.¹

**TABLE 2 HERE**

The second dimension of intercountry adoption is the logistics of adopting a child from that state. Even states that legally allow foreigners to adopt children can have such stringent requirements that it becomes logistically impossible to process an adoption. There are three categories of logistical impediments to consider. First, states have different requirements regarding the role of foreign adoption agencies. Most states with robust intercountry adoption programs allow foreign adoption agencies to operate within country, and these agencies are experienced at navigating the legal requirements for adoption within that state. This facilitates strong networks between foreign families and sending states, because it reduces uncertainty in the intercountry adoption process. Other states require foreign adoption agencies to operate through a domestic mediator, such as a lawyer, and do not give foreign adoption agencies

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permission to operate as a separate entity within country. In these states, foreign adoption agencies usually develop strong relationships with a mediator in-country, and this mediator handles all the details of the adoption in-country, while the adoption agency handles all the details of the adoption within the receiving state. Finally, there are states that do not allow adoption agencies to operate in any capacity. In these states intercountry adoptions are only handled by domestic attorneys. Foreign adoptive families can only process adoptions at considerable time and cost. The adoptive families must travel to orphanages themselves, identify an adoptable child themselves, and find a domestic lawyer themselves to facilitate the adoption. Logistically this makes adoption unfeasible, unless the family is in the position to spend several years navigating the process, with a considerable amount of that time spent in the origin state of the child.

Second, states have varying levels of requirements concerning the identity of the adoptive parents. Some states, especially states in the Middle East and Africa, require that the religions of the adoptive parents and the child match. Other states require that adoptive parents who are citizens of a foreign state must share the ethnicity or nationality of the child being adopted. Foreigners that are permanent residents of the state from which they are adopting are often eligible for an intercountry adoption in states that otherwise restrict adoption. Additionally, some states require that the adoptive family has no existing children in order to be eligible to adopt a child.

Third, states also have requirements that are not based on the identity of the individual(s) seeking to adopt. Residency requirements vary across states; some states require that you travel to meet the child, while other states require that you live with the child for a period of time

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2 Because infants and small children are often too young to claim a religious affiliation, the religion of the child is determined either by the religion of the child’s birth parents or by the religious affiliation of the orphanage housing the child.
(sometimes up to a year) before the adoption process can start. Some states have residency requirements of up to two years for adoptive parents. Beyond residency requirements, states can allow intercountry adoption but have few children that are available for adoption. Other states specify that children can only be adopted if there are no domestic solutions for the child. Other logistical complications are connected with the institutionalization of the process in the state; some states have regulations that vary across districts within the state. The process can also lack institutionalization to the point that it is close to impossible to navigate an adoption as a foreigner.

**TABLE 3 HERE**

In sum, for a state to be classified as allowing intercountry adoption, it must be legally possible and logistically feasible for the child to be adopted both in the sending and receiving states of the child. For legality, the state must either have laws that provide for intercountry adoption, or at least have a structure that allows a child to be processed out with a legal guardian for the purposes of migrating to another state. For logistics, the state must be free of restrictions in at least one of the logistics categories (agencies, identity-based, non-identity based). And finally, adoptions must have happened in the past five years in any capacity for me to consider the state as allowing intercountry adoption.³

³ There are three exceptions to the rule. First, some states do NOT fit the above qualifications, but are still classified as allowing ICA because there is a substantial flow of children out of that country. Sometimes this is because of a special relationship between a sending and receiving country. Other times it is because the identity requirements are stringent enough that they do not fit the logistically possible criteria, but the requirement is still overcome frequently. For example, one identity based requirement can be that adoptive parents cannot have biological children. Though a stringent requirement, this is actually quite common among parents who are adopting their first child. Second, there some states that DO fit the above qualifications, but are still classified as not allowing ICA because even though there is an outflow of children on a limited level, it is due to some specific circumstance and does not indicate a favorable government policy to ICA. Third, in some states, it is technically possible to adopt children (based on both legality and logistics), but the process is inhibited by restrictions that make it unlikely or exceptionally difficult. These states either 1) do not consciously allow ICA but have not yet adjusted their laws to close loopholes that make it technically impossible, or 2) allow ICA but the severe restrictions show discomfort with the policy and the likelihood that it will be further limited in the future.
Even when considering these two dimensions of intercountry adoption, it is difficult to
determine a date at which states moved from being a “no” to a “yes.” For some states, I use the
date at which children started flowing out of the country. I got this information from 1)
immigration data, or 2) news reports of Americans or Canadians adopting those children. This
accurately captures when states start to allow intercountry adoption because if children are
leaving the state they are permitted to leave by their government and allowed to leave in a way
that they can be processed into a new state as a citizen. For other states, I use the date at which
they passed the legislation that made the practice legally possible. This is the second best option
for the states for which I could not find information on the flow of children. This also accurately
captures “allowing” intercountry adoption. Even if children were not flowing out at that time,
the government consented to the practice legally.

A Diffusion Theory of Intercountry Adoption

When China took steps to allow intercountry adoption in 1991, it became the 56th state in
the world to allow foreigners to adopt children. Since 1943, when Mexico became one of the
first states to adopt legislation providing for foreign adoption of children, 96 other states have
followed their lead in allowing intercountry adoption. Figure 1 shows the stark difference
between how many states allowed intercountry adoption in 1985 compared to the number of
states that allowed intercountry adoption in 2005. How can we explain this trend? Although
there are numerous studies identifying why the citizens of receiving states pursue adoptions from
Selman 2009), there are few studies that identify why the sending states of these children allow
foreigners to adopt vulnerable them. The two existing political evaluations of intercountry
adoption serve as a foundation for my examination of intercountry adoption, because they
identify factors that influence the restrictiveness of states’ intercountry adoption laws (Breuning and Ishiyama 2009; Breuning 20XX). But their data does not show that intercountry adoption is *diffusing*; i.e. that the choices of one state regarding participation in intercountry adoption impact the choices of another state. Rather, they identify the impact of factors at one point in time across multiple states. My analysis builds on these existing works to show how the spread of intercountry adoption is a process of policy diffusion and to identify how the domestic characteristics of states shape that diffusion process.

**FIGURE 1 HERE**

If intercountry adoption is diffusing, we should observe certain patterns in states’ choices regarding participation in intercountry adoption across space and time. At the most basic level, as the proportion of states in the system that allow intercountry adoption increases, so should the likelihood that any one state allows intercountry adoption (Shipan and Volden 2008:842). This effect should remain strong even when controlling for the fact that intercountry adoption is a process unfolding over time. In other words, the diffusion of intercountry adoption is not just a matter of the group of states that allow the process gets bigger throughout time, but the pressure on any one state to allow the policy increases as more and more states in the system allow intercountry adoption.

Establishing diffusion patterns in the spread of intercountry adoption does not establish the mechanism through which this diffusion is taking place. Specifically, I distinguish between two mechanisms: learning and coercion. If the diffusion of intercountry adoption is taking place

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4 Policy diffusion research has identified patterns of interdependent policy choices both within and across states in substantive issue areas like democracy promotion (Gleditsch and Ward 2006), education policy (Meyer and Rowan 1977), human rights (McNeely 1995; Boli and Thomas 1999; True and Minstrom 2001; Wotipka and Ramirez 2007), and economic liberalization (Simmons & Elkins 2004; Guillen, Zelner, and Henisz 2004).

5 Recent policy diffusion studies have identified at least four potential mechanisms that could cause policies to diffuse across borders: coercion, competition, learning, and social emulation (see Dobbins, Simmons, and Garrett 2007 for an overview of the literature on these mechanisms).
through learning, it means that states are making their choices in light of other states’ experiences. If the diffusion of intercountry adoption is taking place through coercion, it implies that powerful states are taking advantage of child welfare crises in less powerful states. It is, therefore, very important to assess how the process of diffusion is taking place.

Learning drives policy diffusion by altering the perceived effectiveness of the policy through the provision of information (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Dobbins, Simmons, and Garrett 2007:459-461; Brooks 2007). This information can come from two sources: policymakers can observe the experience of other states that have tried the policy before them (observational learning), or they can learn more about the policy from state and non-state actors who are advocating for the policy (interactive learning). Observational learning is often superficial; it can serve as a shortcut for policymakers faced with a problem that other states have faced (Simmons and Elkins 2004:175; Boehmke and Witmer 2004:40). If policymakers observe that other states that allow intercountry adoption are able to reduce the population of vulnerable children; this observation, even without evidence of a link between the policy and the desired outcome, can be sufficient to change policymakers’ perception of the effectiveness of intercountry adoption (Simmons and Elkins 2004:175). Interactive learning, on the other hand, is transmitted through networks of state and non-state advocates for the policy. Instead of serving as a shortcut for policymakers, networks of advocates convey information about the policy that effectively limits the choice set of policymakers (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982) by making adoption seem like an accessible policy solution instead of merely an effective policy solution.

But it is also possible that intercountry adoption is instead diffusing because powerful states and/or international institutions impose the policy on weaker states. It is especially important to investigate this possibility because intercountry adoption is by nature an unbalanced
exchange; the states adopting children are all well-developed states, while most of the states allowing foreigners to adopt their children are developing states. The diffusion patterns might look the same, but coercion drives diffusion through altering the *payoffs* associated with allowing a policy instead of impacting the perceived effectiveness of the policy (Simmons and Elkins 2004:172-173; Guillon, Zelner, and Henisz 2004:33; Gleditsch and Ward 2006:919-920; Braun and Gilardi 2006:310).

Dobbins, Simmons, and Garrett (2007:456) claim that this coercion can take the form of the conditionality of some good that a state desires. Take for example the spread of reforms across states seeking EU membership. The European Union requires that states meet certain development standards to gain EU membership. Thus, the European Union can impose policies on states seeking EU membership by indicating that these policies will be considered evidence of reform. A policy can then diffuse across states seeking EU membership because the payoffs for allowing the policy are so high that the perceived effectiveness of the policy matters much less.

How would diffusion through coercion look for intercountry adoption? The United States is the receiving state of most intercountry adoptions; scholars estimate that the US share of global adoptions is between fifty and eighty percent (Selman 2009; Menozzi and Mirkin 2007; Engel et al. 2007). One way to investigate the possibility of coercion is to examine how the aid that a state receives from the United States, especially aid that impacts the quality of life for children, impacts the likelihood that the state would allow intercountry adoption. If coercion is the mechanism driving the diffusion of intercountry adoption, I expect that a state’s aid relationship with the United States will impact the likelihood that they would allow intercountry adoption.
The core of my theory is that intercountry adoption is more likely to spread through learning than coercion because intercountry adoption by nature spreads at the micro-level, which is more consistent with learning than with coercion. In fact, for many of the states that allow intercountry adoption, children flow out of the state long before the government of the state responds with legislation to regulate the practice. Adoptions are not initiated by states; they are initiated by individuals wanting to adopt a child from another state. These individuals are made aware of children who need families most often through indirect contact with children from the state. Though there has been relatively little systematic empirical work examining the initiation of intercountry adoption programs, anecdotal evidence suggests this contact often happens through missionaries and non-faith-based aid workers who run orphanages. These missionaries and/or non-faith-based aid workers become agents of learning in two directions. First, they transmit information about the vulnerable children back to the states from which they came. This information generates interest in adopting the vulnerable children. Second, they transmit information about adoption as an accessible option back to the states in which they are operating. States then regulate these initiated adoptions by choosing to coordinate or not coordinate legal systems and visa regimes.

If intercountry adoption is spreading because it is imposed on states through coercion we would expect to see states allowing intercountry adoption because of negotiations at the state level; for example the United States or some other receiving state of children making openness to intercountry adoption a condition of aid or some other benefit to the sending state. On the other hand, if intercountry adoption is spreading because states are learning about the benefits of the policy we would expect to see networks of advocates making the policy an accessible option to
policymakers, and states responding by allowing children to flow out of the state and responding to this flow with legislation regulating the practice.

In my empirical tests, I will distinguish between these mechanisms by showing two trends. First, as the proportion of states in the system that allow intercountry adoption increases, so does the likelihood that any one state will allow intercountry adoption. This measure captures observational learning because as more states allow intercountry adoption there are more and more examples of the policy’s effectiveness from which to learn. Other states’ experience makes intercountry adoption seem like a more effective option for states considering the policy. The measure also captures interactive learning because as the policy spreads through the international system there are more agents advocating for the policy at the micro-level.6 This advocacy makes intercountry adoption a more accessible option for states considering the policy. Second, I will show that this trend holds even when controlling for aid. Combined, these two analyses show that states are not allowing intercountry adoption because it is imposed as a condition of aid. Rather, intercountry adoption is spreading through states learning from each others’ experience that it is an effective policy, and learning from networks of advocates that it is an accessible policy.

Even if we identify diffusion patterns in the spread of intercountry adoption, and isolate learning from other potential mechanisms, there is still the possibility that these patterns are not due to states learning from other states’ experience, but rather due to similar types of states having similar policy preferences. In that case, we are not observing that intercountry adoption is diffusing, but rather the choice to allow intercountry adoption is a domestic political process. This is a phenomenon known as spurious diffusion: states make similar but independent

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6 For example, adoption agencies can seek to diversify the states from which they can process adoptions and start working within new states to develop intercountry adoption programs.
decisions about intercountry adoption based on their domestic characteristics (Simmons and Elkins 2004:172; Braun and Gilardi 2006:299). If the observed diffusion is spurious and the choice to allow intercountry adoption is a domestic political process, I expect that states’ domestic political characteristics will impact the likelihood that they allow intercountry adoption. Finally, if I can identify diffusion patterns, isolate mechanisms, and eliminate the possibility of spurious diffusion, it is important to understand which domestic characteristics influence the likelihood that states will learn from other states’ experience with intercountry adoption. Braun and Gilardi (2006:306) argue that while the perceived effectiveness of the policy is important for the likelihood that policymakers’ accept the policy, there are domestic factors that impact the costs of allowing the policy and the payoffs for allowing the policy. Domestic characteristics form a threshold that determines how many other states must allow a policy before the perceived effectiveness of the policy is strong enough to tip the state toward allowing the policy (Braun and Gilardi 2006:303).

Which state characteristics are relevant for intercountry adoption? I examine the impact of three types of domestic characteristics: economic characteristics, demographic characteristics, and religious characteristics. For economic characteristics, I expect that poorer states are more likely to allow intercountry adoption because the revenue generated from the practice will have more of an impact on the state’s economy. Brooks (2007) argues that poorer states are also more likely to learn from other states’ experience because they have fewer resources for researching multiple policy options. I argue that the earning potential of adults in the state is a more relevant operationalization of poverty than GDP per capita for intercountry adoption. States can earn several thousand dollars per child for every adoption transaction in the adoption fees alone, not including the revenue generated by the adoptive parents’ required travel and donations to
orphanages. This might not seem significant for a state like China whose GDP per capita was over $8000 in 2009 (Heston et al 2011). But if you consider that the earning potential of the average adult in China in that same year was just a little bit over 500 dollars, then $3000 per child seems much more significant (WSP 2011; Selman 2009:590).

For demographic characteristics, I focus on how fertility rates impact the likelihood that a state allows foreigners to adopt children. Almost every demand-side analysis of intercountry adoption begins with the assumption that low fertility rates in Western states are driving the growth in international adoption.\(^7\) In fact, all the top ten receiving states of children for intercountry adoption have total fertility rates below 2.0 (Selman 2002:219). It seems logical that states with high fertility rates might be more likely to allow intercountry adoption because the sheer numbers of children in the state could increase the likelihood that families are unable to care for the children in their family as well as the children of relatives that might need care. It also stands to reason that states with low fertility rates, especially those under replacement fertility rate,\(^8\) would be less likely to allow intercountry adoption because it would be politically unpopular to release children to foreign families when the domestic population is declining. Selman (2002:219) notes however that several of the states that allow intercountry adoption have fertility rates lower than those of the major receiving states of children. For example, in 1998 the total fertility rates of at least eight of the major sending states of children were below replacement fertility rate of 2.1.\(^9\)

Finally, for religious characteristics, it is well-documented that states with large Muslim populations, especially states with Muslim influences on their government structure, are less

\(^7\) Selman (2009) mentions that fertility rates likely impact whether or not a state allows foreigners to adopt children, but does not provide empirical analysis confirming the impact.

\(^8\) Total fertility rates under 2.1 are considered to be below replacement fertility rate (Craig 1994).

\(^9\) Sending states with total fertility rates under 2.1 included Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Poland, Ukraine, Thailand, and China in 1998.
likely to allow intercountry adoption (Bartholet 2005; Roby and Shaw 2006; Breuning 20XX).
This is most likely due to the legal structure of such states; Sharia law does not allow for adoption as Western states conceive of the practice (Breuning 20XX:7; USDOS 2010). But as I note earlier in this section, that restriction does not preclude the possibility that foreign citizens could become the guardians of a child for the purposes of migration (Bargach 2002; UN 2009; USDOS 2010). In fact, Breuning (20XX) finds that the percentage of the population that is Muslim has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a state will be more open in their intercountry adoption laws. Because this finding is quite counterintuitive, I am curious to see if it holds with my data formulation and a different model for analysis.

In sum, in my empirical analysis, I will assess the following propositions:

• As the proportion of states in the system that allow intercountry adoption increases, so does the likelihood that any one state will allow intercountry adoption.

• As the amount of aid a state receives from the United States increases, so does the likelihood that the state will allow intercountry adoption.

• States’ domestic political characteristics will impact the likelihood that they allow intercountry adoption.

• States with lower GNI per capita will be more likely to allow intercountry adoption.

• States with high fertility rates will be more likely to allow intercountry adoption.

• Muslim states will be less likely to allow intercountry adoption.

Data and Tests: Investigating the Questions

I use original time-series cross-sectional data to analyze state choices in intercountry adoption. I examined and recorded the specifics of the legal framework for adoption in every state, the state’s history of participation in intercountry adoption, and the mechanics for adopting
a child from that state. I then classified states along the two dimensions of intercountry adoption: the legal possibility of adoption and the logistic feasibility of adoption. Relying on this classification, I determine whether or not a state allows intercountry adoption and recorded the year that they moved from being a “no” to a “yes.” My data start in 1941, at the beginning of the decade in which intercountry adoption started to become a phenomenon as we now know it (Selman 2009).\footnote{Before this decade, cross-border adoptions were still processed. But most of these adoptions were familial adoptions, where the citizens of one state adopted their relatives’ children in another state.} State choice is recorded for each year from 1941-2012.\footnote{Some states like Romania, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and Cambodia (just to name a few) have periods where they allow intercountry adoption, and then they stop allowing the practice. My data accounts for these trends (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998:1271).} It is reasonable to expect that a state’s decision to allow or not allow intercountry adoption in one year is likely related to that state’s history of allowing intercountry adoption in the other years.\footnote{See appendix for a list of states included in the analysis, their classification regarding intercountry adoption, and the dates of change in policy.}

Braun and Gilardi (2006:314-315) argue that the most effective way of modeling diffusion is to use a model that can capture both how the threshold that states have for allowing the policy and how the interdependencies among actors can impact the likelihood that a state will allow the policy. I use a discrete-time hazard model (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) to accomplish this objective. This model is particularly well-suited for my data and research for several reasons. First, it allows me to account for state choices while controlling for the fact that there are temporal dependencies in the data. This prevents misspecification and inflated results (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). I use Carter and Signorino’s (2010) method of accounting for time dependence in such models, because this method simplifies both the measurement and interpretation of such dependencies.\footnote{Carter and Signorino (2010) recommend using a cubic polynomial of the time it took a country to switch from “no” to “yes” (i.e., t, t\textsuperscript{2}, and t\textsuperscript{3}) as temporal dependence controls instead of the time dummies or splice techniques that Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) recommend.} Second, the hazard rate, or the likelihood that a state would allow intercountry adoption, is measured as a function of the independent variables, which
in this case are the state characteristics that form that threshold I seek to capture (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998:1264). Third, by including an independent variable that measures the percentage of other states in the system that allow intercountry adoption at each discrete point in time, I can capture how the perceived effectiveness of intercountry adoption, based on observations of other states’ experience with the policy, also impacts the likelihood that a state will allow intercountry adoption at that point in time. With a relatively simple model I can capture both how the independent state characteristics and the interdependent system characteristics impact the likelihood that a state will allow intercountry adoption.

It is important to understand how my data, measurement, and method of analysis differs from the other two studies that investigate the restrictiveness of state adoption policies. First, my data is more expansive than either studies; I collected data on 170 states.14 Breuning and Ishiyama (2009) examine regional adoption polices (38 Sub-Saharan African states), and Breuning (20XX) examines adoption policies for 112 states globally. Second, the measurement of the dependent variable in my study differs from the other two studies. In both Breuning and Ishiyama (2009:93) and Breuning (20XX:11) the dependent variable is measured as an ordinal scale of state restrictiveness of intercountry adoption policy at one point in time. My dependent variable is measured as a binary time-series, cross-sectional so I can assess both states’ decisions to allow intercountry adoption and the timing of these decisions. Though their dependent variables capture greater variation in the restrictiveness of state policies within that one point in time, my dependent variable captures more variation in state choices across time. Third, both studies use ordinal logit to analyze the data (Breuning and Ishiyama 2009:94-96; Breuning 20XX:14-15), while I use the discrete-time hazard model to analyze my differently structured data.

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14 The only currently states not included in my study are those with a population smaller than 250,000 in 2010.
Is Intercountry Adoption Diffusing through the International System?

My central argument posits that state choices regarding participation in intercountry adoption are interdependent; the choice of one state to allow intercountry adoption influences the choices of other states. To evaluate this claim, I use a model that includes the proportion of other states in the system that allow intercountry adoption at the time that the state allows the policy (Learning) as the only independent variable. I also run a model with Learning as the independent variable and a state’s GDP per capita (Heston et al 2011) and democracy score (Marshall and Jaggers 2006) as controls, as well as controls for time dependency. These variables control for the possibility that the implementation of a policy of intercountry adoption is a function of political and economic development. Finally, these models cluster the standard errors by state to control for the dependencies in the data across time for each individual state.

TABLE 4 HERE

The results in Table 4 show that intercountry adoption is diffusing throughout the international system. The coefficient on the variable measuring learning is positive and significant. This result is robust even when controlling for the type of state and temporal dependencies in the data. Model 2 shows that the lower the GDP per capita of a state, the more likely that the state will allow intercountry adoption, and also that states with higher democracy scores are more likely to allow intercountry adoption than states with lower democracy scores. Figures 2-6 show the substantive impact of the learning variable. For an average state, with a GDP per capita around $8000, a democracy score around 1, and around 20 years without allowing intercountry adoption since 1941, the probability is about 0.005 that this state would allow intercountry adoption when no other states in the system allow the policy. This shows that it is difficult for an average state to become a policy innovator. But the probability increases to
about 0.03 when more than 50 percent of the states in the system allow intercountry adoption. That is, the odds of switching from “no” to “yes” are six times as large when 50% of the countries in the world have instituted the policy of intercountry adoption.

**FIGURES 2-6 HERE**

The impact is even more remarkable when we consider different types of states. For democracies the probability goes from about 0.01 to 0.04, while the probability only increases to 0.02 for autocracies. So though there is little difference between the probabilities for democracies and autocracies when no other states allow intercountry adoption, they are significantly greater for democracies than autocracies once more than 50 percent of the states in the system have allowed intercountry adoption. This shows that intercountry adoption is a more popular policy choice for democracies than for autocracies. For rich states, there is no difference between the probabilities of allowing intercountry adoption, regardless of the proportion of other states allowing intercountry adoption. But for poorer states, the probability increases from 0.01 to almost 0.05 when more than 50 percent of the states in the system have allowed intercountry adoption. These results provide strong support for the argument that states’ choices regarding their participation in intercountry adoption are dependent upon the choices of other states.

Before I can claim that observational learning is driving the diffusion of intercountry adoption, it is important to eliminate the possibility that intercountry adoption is diffusing because powerful states are coercing weaker states to allow the policy as a condition of aid. To investigate my second hypothesis, Model 3 (in Table 4) includes a variable that measures the amount of Child Aid each state received from the United States in the years of the study,
normalized by the GDP of the state (USAID 2012). The results show that the aid variable has no statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a state allows intercountry adoption. This finding confirms that states are not pressured to allow intercountry adoption as a condition of receiving aid from the United States; rather, states are learning about the effectiveness of intercountry adoption by observing the experience of other states that allow the practice.

Is the Observed Diffusion Spurious?

My third hypothesis addresses the possibility that the observed diffusion patterns are not evidence of learning-driven diffusion at all, but rather spurious diffusion driven by domestic characteristics. To evaluate the hypothesis, I run a series of models for domestic political variables that could impact the likelihood that a state allows intercountry adoption, controlling only for GDP per capita and time dependencies in the data. I also cluster the standard errors by state to control for the dependencies in the data across time for each individual state. We already know from the first set of models that more democratic states are more likely to allow intercountry adoption. But there are other domestic political characteristics that could make it more likely that a state allows intercountry adoption.

First, I include a measure of the percentage Women in Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2005). Breuning (20XX:15) finds that states with more women in the legislature are more restrictive in intercountry adoption policy. Second, I include a variable that indicates whether or not the party of the executive has control over all lawmaking bodies (Executive-Legislative Unity) (Keefer 2005). If the party of the executive has control over lawmaking bodies then it is

---

15 I repeated this model using different types of aid including 1) global health and child survival, 2) Food for Education, 3) Development Assistance, and 4) Peace Corps, and 5) military aid. The results were robust across all formulations of aid from the United States.

16 I ran another model including the learning variable and the child aid variable. The learning variable remained significant, and child aid was still not statistically significant.

17 I include one variable at a time because I am concerned with the individual impact of each variable, not the joint impact. I control for GDP to ensure that we are not observing an economic factor instead of political factors.
much easier to push through policy change (Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis 2002; Braun and Gilardi 2006: 302). Third, I include the International Risk Guide indicator from the Quality of Governance dataset (Quality of Governance) (Teorell et al 2011). This variable is an index that serves as a proxy for the institutional quality of a state. States with higher institutional quality are less likely to view the costs of allowing intercountry adoption as prohibitive. These costs can include things like adjusting the family law system, and creating institutions responsible for processing adoptions. For states with higher institutional quality, these responsibilities can be absorbed by existing institutions. Fourth, I include a measure of the tenure of the political system (Tenure of Current System). States that have recently undergone transitions could be more susceptible to accepting new policies (Keefer 2005).

**TABLE 5 HERE**

The results in Table 5 show that the decision to allow intercountry adoption is not a domestic political process. None of the four variables measuring domestic characteristics has a statistically significant impact on the probability that states allow intercountry adoption. This finding holds across multiple types of domestic political characteristics that could make intercountry adoption more attractive, in both directions. Having more or less female representation in government, party monopoly on decisionmaking bodies, more or less institutional quality, and the absence or presence of political transition does not have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a state would allow intercountry adoption. Rather, intercountry adoption is diffusing across states with varying domestic political characteristics. The only political characteristic that consistently impacts the likelihood that a state would allow intercountry adoption is the democracy score of that state.

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18 The index measures three concepts: state corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality.
How Do Domestic Characteristics Shape the Diffusion of Intercountry Adoption?

The last three hypotheses address the argument that the domestic characteristics of states shape the diffusion process; domestic economic, demographic, and religious characteristics shape the threshold of a state for learning from other state’s experience with intercountry adoption. To evaluate these last three hypotheses, I use a series of models that test the learning variable with each domestic characteristic, and then conclude with a model that includes all three characteristics. First, I include a measure of the GNI per capita of the state (GNI per capita) (UN 2011), normalized by GDP (Heston et al 2011). This measure shows how the economic characteristics of the state impact the likelihood that the state learns from other states’ experience.\(^{19}\) Second, I include a measure of the fertility rate of the state (Fertility Rate) (UN 2011). This measure shows how the demographic situation in the state impacts the likelihood that the state learns from other states’ experience. Third, I include a measure of religion in the state, broadly conceived of as Christian, Muslim, or other,\(^{20}\) based on the majority religion of the state (Religion) (CIA 2009).

TABLE 6 HERE

The results in Table 6 show that states’ economic, demographic, and religious characteristics form a threshold impacting the likelihood that they learn from other states’ experience with intercountry adoption. In the series of models including learning and one other explanatory variable, all the explanatory variables are significant and learning maintains its significance for all models.\(^{21}\) These results hold in the model including all variables as well.\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\) For this analysis, I do not control for GDP per capita, because the GNI per capita is normalized by GDP. In the multivariate model I include the GDP per capita control, and it does not impact the statistical significance of the GNI per capita variable.

\(^{20}\) “Other” includes Jewish states, Hindu states, Buddhist states, and states where the majority of the citizens profess no religious affiliation (like North and South Korea for example).

\(^{21}\) The only exception is that learning’s statistical significance drops below the 0.05 level in the model including fertility rate only. It does, however, remain significant at the 0.08 level.
States with lower GNI per capita are more likely to allow intercountry adoption. This is consistent with my expectation that states will find it more economically beneficial to participate in intercountry adoption when the earning potential of the average adult in the state is lower.

States with higher fertility rates are less likely to allow intercountry adoption, which moves in the opposite direction of conventional wisdom about fertility rates and confirms Selman’s (2009) observation that states with lower fertility rates do participate in intercountry adoption. This could possibly be explained by literature that shows how in some developing states families have more children as insurance against economic uncertainty (Portner 2001). If this is the reason families are having more children, it is less likely that such families would give up these children for adoption.

Finally, Muslim states are less likely to allow intercountry adoption than Christian states. This is consistent with my expectation about the impact of religion, and is likely due to several dynamics. First, as I mention in the theory section, Sharia law does not have a legal category for adoption as Western states understand the practice, making adoptions from Muslim states logistically complicated even if they are legally possible through guardianship. Second, Muslim states are more likely to require that the religions of the child and adoptive parents match than Christian states. This requirement reduces the pool of individuals requesting adoptions from those states. Third, anecdotal evidence supports that in many states the practice of intercountry adoption is initiated by missionaries who run orphanages and facilitate interest in adoption through religious networks. Muslim states are more restrictive of the role that Western Christian missionaries can play in child welfare institutions.

\[ \text{When included in the multivariate model, learning’s significance goes back up to 0.01.} \]
Conclusion

If scholars of international politics are to understand the politics of intercountry adoption, we must understand why states allow foreigners to adopt children in the first place. Why do some states with vulnerable children allow foreigners to adopt those children when others do not; and what explains variation in the timing of these decisions? There is little research that can give us traction on answering these foundational questions about intercountry adoption. I have argued that the spread of intercountry adoption is a process of policy diffusion: states learn from other states’ experience that intercountry adoption is an effective solution for domestic child welfare problems. As more states in the international system allow intercountry adoption, the increasing power of this “lesson” alters other states’ perception of the effectiveness of intercountry adoption as a policy solution.

I found that intercountry adoption is in fact diffusing, and that states’ domestic characteristics serve as a lens through which they learn from other states’ experience with intercountry adoption. Politically, the only characteristic impacting states threshold for allowing intercountry adoption is their democracy score; more democratic states are more likely to allow intercountry adoption. Economically, states with lower GDP and lower GNI per capita are more likely to allow intercountry adoption. Demographics also matter; states with lower fertility rates are more likely to allow intercountry adoption that states with higher fertility rates. Finally, religion impacts the threshold for allowing intercountry adoption; Muslim states are less likely to allow intercountry adoption than Christian states.

My findings challenge some of the findings in Breuning and Ishiyama (2009) and Breuning (20XX). First, both studies found that a state’s level of democracy had no impact on the openness of the state’s intercountry adoption laws, while my study finds a robust statistically
significant effect for that variable. Second, unlike Bruening (20XX:15), I found that the proportion of women in parliament does not impact state choice regarding intercountry adoption. Third, both studies found that religion did not matter for openness to intercountry adoption, while I found that Muslim states are less likely to allow intercountry adoption. I suspect that our contradictory findings are due to the differences in our data, methods, and questions as outlined earlier in this article. But the differences in these findings are surprising and should encourage additional research on the conditions under which these identified factors matter more or less for state choices regarding participation in intercountry adoption. My findings also contradict the conventional wisdom about the impact of demographic factors on intercountry adoption, and should prompt further research to identify why populations with larger fertility rates are less likely to allow intercountry adoption.

Finally, states’ learning process for intercountry adoption needs to be explored at a deeper level. In particular, future research needs to identify the agents of learning in the diffusion of intercountry adoption. My analysis showed evidence for the presence of observational learning and interactive learning states observe that increasingly more states allow intercountry adoption and thus they also allow intercountry adoption, either because they observe those states’ experience or because this dynamic increases the number of advocates for the policy at the micro-level. But future research should identify whether this learning is happening at a deeper, more interactive level. For example, who are the state and non-state agents that are making intercountry adoption accessible to policymakers, in addition to the perception that the policy is effective? These dynamics must be identified through comparative case studies examining the learning experience across a variety of contexts.
In the next chapter, I take a step to assess how learning impacts state behavior once they allow intercountry adoption by examining the coevolution of states partner choices for intercountry adoption and those same states’ commitment to the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, the multilateral treaty regulating intercountry adoption. This treaty represents one avenue through which states can learn both from the experience of other states and from state and non-state agents advocating for intercountry adoption.

As more and more vulnerable children are adopted across state borders, scholars must investigate the political factors enabling or inhibiting the global flow of children. My research has identified why states allow foreigners to adopt vulnerable children, and what explains variation in the timing of that decision. Answering these foundational questions about the origins of state choice in intercountry adoption facilitates further research on how states decide on intercountry adoption partners, whether or not they choose to cooperate through multilateral treaties on intercountry adoption, and how state behavior facilitates or inhibits intercountry adoptions.
Works Cited

http://adoption.state.gov/about_us/statistics.php


Breuning, Marijke. 20XX. “What Explains Openness to intercountry adoption?” *Social Science Quarterly*. Accepted for publication 6/12/2012.


Tables and Figures

Table 1: Legality of Intercountry Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Legality</th>
<th>Legally Facilitate</th>
<th>Do Not Facilitate but Do Not Prohibit</th>
<th>Legally Complex but Still Possible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisions</td>
<td>Have laws providing for intercountry adoption; adoption is finalized in origin state of child and legal status travels to receiving state.</td>
<td>Do not have laws prohibiting intercountry adoption; adoption is often finalized in receiving state of child.</td>
<td>Child’s legal status is only changed in the receiving state of the child, adoptive parents are only guardians in sending state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Logistics of Intercountry Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Logistics</th>
<th>Adoption Agencies</th>
<th>Identity-Based</th>
<th>Non-Identity-Based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisions</td>
<td>Legal role of adoption agencies: either allowed to operate in-country, through a mediator in-country, or legally prohibited.</td>
<td>Religious-matching, ethnicity-matching, nationality-matching. Presence or absence of children in family.</td>
<td>Residency requirements, domestic conditions, varying levels of institutionalization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Dimensions of Intercountry Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of Intercountry Adoption</th>
<th>Only one category of logistics restrictions</th>
<th>Only two categories of restrictions</th>
<th>All three categories of restrictions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legally Possible (one of the three categories)</td>
<td>Allow intercountry adoption</td>
<td>Allow intercountry adoption</td>
<td>Do not allow intercountry adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Legally Possible (none of the three categories)</td>
<td>Do not allow intercountry adoption</td>
<td>Do not allow intercountry adoption</td>
<td>Do not allow intercountry adoption</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 4: Learning Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning</td>
<td>.038 (.012)*</td>
<td>.028 (.010)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child aid from United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.229 (.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>.045 (.019)*</td>
<td>.054 (.019)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed</td>
<td>-.249 (.061)*</td>
<td>-.249 (.061)*</td>
<td>-.315 (.058)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed2</td>
<td>.010 (.003)*</td>
<td>.010 (.003)*</td>
<td>.012 (.002)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed3</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model Fit

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>6686</td>
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<td>4821</td>
</tr>
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<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-419.773</td>
<td>-342.378</td>
<td>-368.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2</td>
<td>(4) 50.89</td>
<td>(6) 52.23</td>
<td>(6) 44.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.0511</td>
<td>0.0724</td>
<td>0.0767</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Significant at 0.05
### Table 5: Domestic Political Model

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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women in Parliament</td>
<td>.004 (.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive-Legislative Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.178 (.420)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.08 (1.102)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure of Current System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.017 (.014)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed</td>
<td>-.352 (.081)*</td>
<td>-.255 (.077)*</td>
<td>-.225 (.089)*</td>
<td>-.302 (.068)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed^2</td>
<td>.013 (.003)*</td>
<td>.009 (.003)*</td>
<td>.007 (.003)*</td>
<td>.011 (.003)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed^3</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Model Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Observations</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Log Likelihood</th>
<th>Wald chi²</th>
<th>Prob&gt;chi²</th>
<th>Pseudo R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2956</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>-244.136</td>
<td>(5) 39.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2620</td>
<td>124</td>
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<td>(5) 14.14</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.063</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1707</td>
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<td>-155.204</td>
<td>(5) 12.19</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3186</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>-292.858</td>
<td>(5) 27.87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.066</td>
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*Significant at 0.05
### Table 6: The Role of Domestic Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learning</td>
<td>.048 (.010)*</td>
<td>.032 (.010)*</td>
<td>.017 (.010)</td>
<td>.030 (.013)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita</td>
<td>-.003 (.001)*</td>
<td>-.002 (.001)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion (Muslim compared to Christian)</td>
<td>-.944 (.321)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.798 (.326)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.314 (.099)</td>
<td>-.233 (.114)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Controls**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-000 (.000)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Score</td>
<td>.027 (.019)</td>
<td>.031 (.020)</td>
<td>.032 (.021)</td>
<td>.028 (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed</td>
<td>-.231 (.071)*</td>
<td>-.259 (.061)*</td>
<td>-.221 (.066)*</td>
<td>-.220 (.072)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed^2</td>
<td>.009 (.003)*</td>
<td>.010 (.003)*</td>
<td>.009 (.003)*</td>
<td>.008 (.003)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time elapsed^3</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
<td>-.000 (.000)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Model Fit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>3564</td>
<td>4763</td>
<td>4273</td>
<td>3564</td>
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<td>Number of Countries</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-298.974</td>
<td>-337.394</td>
<td>-315.024</td>
<td>-288.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald chi2</td>
<td>(6) 45.68</td>
<td>(8) 57.42</td>
<td>(7) 49.70</td>
<td>(10) 51.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob&gt;chi2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at 0.05

### Table 7: Dates When States Allowed Intercountry Adoption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Allowing Intercountry Adoption (Other Variables at Mean)
Figures 3-6: Predicted Probabilities of Allowing Intercountry Adoption

- Top left: Probability of Allowing CA, Domestic
- Top right: Probability of Allowing CA, Adopted
- Bottom left: Probability of Allowing CA, Rini Countries
- Bottom right: Probability of Allowing CA, Per Countries

- Predicted probability
- 95% upper limit
- 95% lower limit