

## Why Do Asian Americans Identify as Democrats? Testing Theories of Social Exclusion and Intergroup Commonality

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### ABSTRACT

Why are Asian Americans overwhelmingly likely to identify as Democrats? Addressing this question is important given the increasing presence of Asians in the American electorate. We focus on two explanations: social exclusion and intergroup commonality. According to the first hypothesis, social exclusion arises from Asian Americans' perceptions that they are viewed as less "American," and associate these feelings with the Republican Party. The second hypothesis is that Asian Americans exhibit intergroup commonality; they believe they have shared interests with other ethnic minorities that already support the Democratic Party. As a result, Asian Americans align themselves politically with these minority groups rather than with whites. Using a mixed-method approach (a large-scale representative survey, a laboratory experiment, and a survey experiment), we find empirical support for both hypotheses.

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# Why Do Asian Americans Identify as Democrats? Testing Theories of Social Exclusion and Intergroup Commonality

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## **Abstract**

Why are Asian Americans overwhelmingly likely to identify as Democrats? Addressing this question is important given the increasing presence of Asians in the American electorate. We focus on two explanations: *social exclusion* and *intergroup commonality*. According to the first hypothesis, social exclusion arises from Asian Americans' perceptions that they are viewed as less "American," and associate these feelings with the Republican Party. The second hypothesis is that Asian Americans exhibit *intergroup commonality*; they believe they have shared interests with other ethnic minorities that already support the Democratic Party. As a result, Asian Americans align themselves politically with these minority groups rather than with whites. Using a mixed-method approach (a large-scale representative survey, a laboratory experiment, and a survey experiment), we find empirical support for both hypotheses.

In the 2012 U.S. presidential election, Barack Obama garnered 73% of the Asian American vote, exceeding his support among Hispanics (71%) and women (55%) (Wilkinson 2012). Survey data also suggests that Asians are much more likely to identify as Democrats than Republicans (e.g., Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011). Why? Despite the growth of subfields of American political behavior that study the political views of minority groups such as African Americans, Hispanics/Latinos, and women, there are few systematic studies of the partisan identification of Asian Americans.<sup>1</sup>

This omission is unfortunate because Asian Americans are the nation's fastest-growing racial/ethnic group (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). Among places of origin, Asia recently surpassed Latin America as the main source of documented immigration to the U.S.; according to the latest Census data, about 36% of all new immigrants in 2010 were Asian compared to 31% who were Hispanic (Barrera 2013). People of Asian descent constitute 5% of the U.S. population and are projected to comprise approximately 9% by 2050 (File 2013). Of 16 million Asian Americans, 3.9 million voted in the 2012 elections, accounting for nearly 4% of all voters (a 500,000-person increase from 2008). In some states, they make up a considerably higher proportion of the electorate; for instance, 11% of California voters are Asian American (Baldassare et al. 2013). Since 1996, the number of Asian American voters has increased by 105%, in contrast to a 13% increase of white voters (File 2013).

This increasingly politically relevant demographic group disproportionately votes for Democratic candidates and self-identifies as Democrats. In the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, Obama received 64% and 73% of the Asian American vote share, respectively. This general Democratic orientation is confirmed in other large surveys. The 2012 Pew Research Center Study of Asian Americans found that 51% identify with the Democratic Party versus 27% with the Republican Party. According to the 2008 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies (CCES), which have national samples of U.S. adults with large numbers of Asian Americans interviewed, Asians are significantly more likely than whites to exhibit liberal responses to survey items on party identification, ideology, and vote choice. Their responses are much more similar to Blacks

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<sup>1</sup>This article describes Asian Americans as those persons living (permanently) in the United States and whose ancestry can be traced to East Asia (e.g., China, Japan, and Korea), Southeast Asia (e.g., Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam), and South Asia (e.g., Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka).

and Hispanics than whites with respect to these variables (see Figure A.1 in Online Appendix A).

Such demographic and political patterns underscore the need to better understand the bases of Asian American partisanship and political behavior. Relative to the voluminous and well-developed literatures on the partisan orientation and voting patterns of other minorities such as African-Americans and Hispanics, the theoretical and empirical literature on Asians remains relatively limited. The paucity of research on Asian American partisanship and voting behavior is unfortunate as this minority group is rapidly increasing in political, cultural, and economic influence. Besides the obvious substantive interest of the question, exploring Asian American political identity also contributes insights relevant to theories of political parties and partisan identification.

We address this question of why Asian Americans are more likely to vote Democratic by proposing two related explanations: *social exclusion* and *beliefs about common intergroup interests*.<sup>2</sup> According to the first explanation, Asian Americans view the contemporary Republican Party as excluding them from society and perceiving them as foreign. This social exclusion arises from a perception that they are different and distinct from the majority white racial group and not part of the “natural” U.S. social fabric. Awareness of exclusion makes Asian Americans feel that the Republican Party does not represent their interests. The second explanation, which is not mutually exclusive, is that Asian Americans believe they have common interests with other ethnic minority groups that have been longstanding constituencies within the Democratic Party, and thus align themselves with these groups rather than with whites.

These accounts are not inconsistent with other explanations for why Asian Americans identify as Democrats. For instance, Asian Americans might be more Democratic because they are less likely to be evangelical Christians (Pew Research Center 2012). Additionally, as Asians are more likely to live in Democratic-leaning states and urban areas, they might be influenced by the surrounding political environment (Junn, Lee, Ramakrishnan, and Wong 2011). Finally, they may base their party identification on agreement with the Democratic Party on policy issues. However, recent evidence suggests that issue positions are more likely to be derived from party identification rather than vice versa (e.g., Lenz 2012). We do not view understanding Asian American political identity as a horse race among myriad explanations. Rather, we focus on those explanations that have

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<sup>2</sup>For expositional simplicity, we refer to “beliefs about common intergroup interests” as “intergroup commonality” throughout the paper.

yet to be systematically tested, and that can be experimentally manipulated so that we can assess their causal effects on political attitudes and identification. In the discussion section, we lay out pathways for future investigation of these additional explanations.

We test the two explanations using various sources of data. We begin by analyzing observational data from the highest quality nationally representative survey of Asian Americans to date (Ramakrishnan et al. 2008). We document consistent, positive correlations between Democratic partisanship and (1) reported racial victimization, which proxies for feelings of social exclusion, and (2) feelings of commonality with other ethnic minorities as opposed to whites. Our main studies use two experiments to test causal hypotheses validating the correlations in the observational data. The experimental treatments exogenously manipulate our two independent variables of interest and assess downstream effects on identification with and support for the Democratic Party. We leverage a mixed-method approach, using diverse sources of evidence with unique strengths and limitations. While large-scale surveys are highly representative, laboratory studies allow for precise control, randomized intervention, and personal interaction; survey experiments draw upon the advantages of both approaches. Reassuringly, our hypotheses are supported by different methodological approaches.

The first study is a laboratory experiment that captures the exogenous impact of exclusion-based racial microaggressions; we find that Asians who are randomly subjected to a seemingly innocuous exclusionary cue are more likely to believe that Republicans do not represent their interests and identify with the Democratic Party. If social exclusion causes Asian Americans to support the Democratic Party (and if they believe that the Republican Party makes them feel less “American”), then priming such exclusion in an experimental setting should cause Asian Americans to adopt more pro-Democratic positions.

The second study is a survey experiment of a large, diverse, national sample of Asians living in the U.S., where we manipulate feelings of intergroup commonality by framing immigration as a policy where Asians have shared versus competing interests with Hispanics. We find that increasing intergroup conflict with a minority group that is traditionally a Democratic Party constituency makes Asians more sympathetic to Republicans, while increasing feelings of shared interests with Hispanics generates opposition to Republicans.

Our results also have implications for understanding the contemporary nature of American elec-

toral politics. A prominent theory of political parties forwarded by Bawn et al. (2012) conceptualizes them as coalitions of policy-demanding groups (e.g., business, labor, religious denominations). In the American context, other relevant groups could be those based upon ascriptive characteristics such as race and ethnicity. Zaller (2012) suggests that voters may attach themselves to parties on the basis of ethnicity (or attachments to ethnic groups), but notes that there is not strong empirical evidence supporting this conjecture. Our results are consistent with Zaller’s theoretical account. We find that feelings of social exclusion due to race and ethnicity, as well as beliefs about shared interests with other minority groups, lead Asian Americans to prefer the Democratic Party. As such, Democrats may have an advantage retaining this group going forward. The Democratic Party has attracted a fast-growing, increasingly politically engaged constituency, and we argue that this is based partly on not being tied to exclusionary policies and rhetoric. Further, as we note in the conclusion, the Republican Party may have limited ability to emphasize and frame issues in a manner such that they create cleavages between Asians and other ethnic minority groups.

An important caveat is in order. Due to constraints on sample size in the experiments, we did not have the statistical power to run analyses separately for different subgroups of Asian Americans. However, this is less important for our specific research questions, given that we theoretically expect social exclusion and intergroup commonality to affect Asian Americans as a whole. This is not to say that the effects are equivalent across all ethnic subgroups. Future research should delve into the obvious diversity of the Asian American community.

The paper is organized as follows. We first review the literature on Asian American political behavior and provide a theoretical overview of our main hypotheses. We then describe observational data motivating our experimental research. Next, we discuss the methodology and findings of two experimental studies that illustrate the importance of social exclusion and beliefs about intergroup interests as causal explanations of Asian American party identification. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings and pathways for future research.

## **Existing Literature and Theoretical Overview**

The study of Asian American political identity does not fit neatly within existing paradigms of American political behavior and potentially challenges them. For instance, immigrant political integration is not well explained by theories that conceive of party identification as largely a product

of early socialization or parental attitudes (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2002; Jennings and Niemi 1968). Nor is it well informed by the school of research that views party identification as the result of individuals assessing competing party platforms and electoral performance over long periods of time (e.g., Bartels 2000; Fiorina 1981). Consequently, we provide alternative explanations of the sources of party attachments.

The literature on the partisan identification of Asian Americans is scant; few studies since the establishment of Asians as a distinct minority or clear Democratic constituency theoretically focus on the partisan identity of Asians alone. This scarcity contrasts with the substantially larger literature on the political integration and partisan identification of other immigrant minorities, primarily Hispanics/Latinos (e.g., De la Garza 2004; Fraga et al. 2006; Nicholson and Segura 2005; Uhlaner and Garcia 2005). A few studies use theoretical constructs to jointly explain political participation and attitudes of both Hispanic/Latino and Asian immigrants (e.g., Wong 2008), but this research does not theorize about the political orientation of Asians as a distinct immigrant/ethnic group in the U.S. Moreover, the existing scholarship that focuses solely on the political behavior of Asian Americans mainly examines questions related to political participation, as opposed to identification with the Democratic Party (e.g., Lien 2001; Lien et al. 2001; Wong 2008; Wong et al. 2011).

A smaller, recent literature has begun to explore Asian American partisan affiliation; however, this body of work addresses the question of what explains whether Asians have any type of partisan identification at all rather than focusing on Asians' selection of a particular political party. This agenda is a variant of previous research on political engagement. Hajnal and Lee (2011) provide a general account of why ethnic minorities and white Independents select a political party. Wong (2000), studying Asian American and Latino immigrants, finds that length of time in the U.S., citizenship status, and English proficiency—which allow for greater assimilation—are correlated with developing a partisan identification. This work builds on much older surveys using more localized samples (e.g., Southern or Northern California only), such as by Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner (1991), which found that Asian Americans were more likely to be Republicans than Latinos, and that foreign policy concerns drove such dispositions.

When examining Asian American political behavior, two trends emerge. First, Asians are less likely to participate in politics than other ethnic groups. Second, even if they participate, Asians are less likely to align with a political party. Consequently, it is unsurprising that much research on

Asian Americans has focused on these two empirical patterns. However, given that Asian American political participation has been increasing and an overwhelming majority of today’s Asian American voters are rejecting candidates from the Republican Party, we build upon the extant literature to focus on the less-explored question of why Asian Americans align more with the Democratic Party.

Other empirical work that uses larger, nationally representative or diverse samples of Asian Americans and that examines partisan orientation more directly does confirm that Asian Americans are currently more likely to identify with the Democratic Party (Hajnal and Lee 2011; Wong et al. 2011). Extant studies draw upon previous assimilation models to argue that Asians who have lived in the U.S. longer, are wealthier, and are more educated should be more likely to be Republican, without explaining the current pattern of Asian American party identification. Moreover, the few studies that do discuss the role of ethnicity or group-related variables in explaining political behavior do not specify the importance of social exclusion and intergroup commonality, which we elaborate on below. Further, these studies are generally less attentive to testing causal relationships between these variables and partisan affiliation.

We build on these accounts and draw on theories relevant to partisan identification for other minority groups to test a set of underexplored explanations for why Asian Americans today are more likely to be Democrats. One should cautiously apply theories relevant to other ethnic minorities to explain Asian American party identification for several reasons. As Lien (2001) argues, Asian immigrants have naturalized earlier and at faster rates than other immigrants, but have lower voter registration rates than any other immigrant group. Further, as many scholars of minority political behavior emphasize, social context shapes the impact of individual-level variables on political identification, and this context may be unique for Asians. A key aspect of this context is that Asians as a group are perceived differently from other minority groups, and this perception shapes group consciousness and interactions (Kim 2000; Lien 2000; Wong 2000). For instance, while viewed as a “model minority” with desirable traits (Chou and Feagin 2008), Asians are also perceived as less “American” and therefore perhaps unequal citizens, whether due to stereotypes based on their physical appearance (as they have great difficulty “passing” as stereotypical white Americans), or due to other visible or cultural characteristics such as accent, dress, food, language, religion, and the like (e.g., Devos and Banaji 2005; Sidanius et al. 1997). This is in contrast to African Americans and Hispanics/Latinos, who have longer histories of residence in the U.S., and with respect to the



latter group, more geographic proximity to the U.S.

We first outline our argument for why *social exclusion* affects partisan affiliation. Individuals who perceive exclusion based on their ethnic background may link such behavior to exclusion of their ethnic group as a whole. Such feelings of social exclusion can be unrelated to public policies and may be individualistic. Nonetheless, individuals who feel that one party excludes them from the social fabric are less likely to perceive the party as serving their group's interests, and therefore should be less likely to support or affiliate with the party. Because the Democratic Party is largely viewed to be the party with a policy agenda more beneficial for ethnic minority groups (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Lee 2002), individual-level feelings of social exclusion should be linked to greater support for Democrats.

Our hypothesis that social exclusion plays a role in Asian American party identification also builds upon the social psychological literature that notes the importance of “everyday” discrimination for feelings of social exclusion among minority groups. This literature documents how commonplace the sense of social exclusion may be for people of color. Asians in the U.S. are more likely than whites to be victims of racial microaggressions, which are defined as brief and commonplace verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities. Such aggression can communicate negative racial slights, leading to perceptions of exclusion (e.g., Sue et al. 2007).

The premise that social exclusion matters strongly for Asians is consistent with qualitative work in political science. Chang (2004) shows how the reaction of the U.S. public to the 1996 “Asian Donorgate” campaign finance controversy—where Asian Americans were depicted as outsiders attempting to buy influence with U.S. politicians on behalf of foreign governments—conveys its perception of Asian Americans as perpetually foreign. Kim (2000, 16) finds that Asians are often viewed more positively by white Americans than other minority groups, and yet are “...permanently foreign and unassimilable.” This attitude toward Asians acts as a barrier to political participation (Kim 2007) and leads to the exclusion of Asians from civic membership (Kim 2000).

The significance of social exclusion as a determinant of Asian political behavior is also motivated by findings in psychological research that document white citizens' conflation of “American” with “whiteness,” and their perception that Asian Americans are less American. This research finds that whites are more likely to be viewed as Americans than Asians (Devos and Banaji 2005; Sidanius

et al. 1997; Smith and Zarate 1992; Stroessner 1996).<sup>3</sup> Other studies using an array of methodological approaches similarly observe that Asians face among the strongest social barriers to social assimilation (Devos and Ma 2008; Devos and Heng 2009; Liang, Li, and Kim 2004; Yogeewaran and Dasgupta 2010). This difficulty persists in spite of the “model minority” stereotype and successful economic assimilation (Chou and Feagin 2008). Although Asian Americans are perceived as less American, Asian Americans themselves are just as likely as white Americans to identify themselves as American and have explicit and implicit patriotic attitudes (Cheryan and Monin 2005; LaFrombroise, Coleman, and Gerton 1993; Sidanius et al. 1997). The impact of such microaggression on exclusionary feelings can be magnified in other political contexts, such as advertisements, political rhetoric, and policy positions on issues related to Asians. To the extent that the Democratic Party is seen as less exclusionary, we theorize that greater feelings of exclusion from the U.S. make Asian identification with the Democratic Party more likely. This can be due to perceptions of exclusionary behaviors by Republican political elites as well as Republican identifiers in the mass public.

We posit a complementary theory of why Asians are predominantly Democrats that focuses on *intergroup commonality* (i.e., perceptions of shared interests among groups). As Bawn et al. (2012) argue, political parties can be viewed as coalitions of different interest groups, including groups based on shared ethnicity or nationality. If the dimensions of politics that are salient to Asian Americans place them in political coalitions with Blacks and Hispanics, then they are also likely to perceive themselves as being in alliance with political parties within that coalition. Individuals in a minority group with more perceived common interests with ethnic groups that are already traditional constituencies of a party should be more likely to affiliate with that party. This theoretical expectation also follows from the argument of Blumer (1958), who argues that racial and ethnic conflict can be a manifestation of group conflict over scarce resources. Different ethnic or racial minority groups may align with the political party that better serves general minority interests and against the party perceived to serve the majority group interests, as political competition can be viewed as a zero-sum game for resources in “group” terms.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>See also Junn and Masuoka (2013) for a discussion of the importance of racial hierarchy in the U.S. in explaining attitudes toward immigrant groups.

<sup>4</sup>For this theoretical expectation, strong within-group commonality is not a necessary condition. All that is required is the belief that one’s groups’ interests are aligned with another group(s)’ interests.

Recent work on immigrant political behavior does examine the role of discrimination and group-oriented explanations for party identification. However, few studies specifically isolate the variables of social exclusion and beliefs about intergroup interests, and none have done so with Asian Americans. Further, we propose research designs that allow us to better estimate causal effects of such studied variables. Existing observational approaches that use diverse samples of Asians do show some correlations between perceptions of social exclusion and intergroup commonality and Democratic partisan identification, giving us some *prima facie* evidence for our suppositions. But such studies remain vulnerable to concerns about omitted variable bias and reverse causation, raising the possibility that such correlations might be spurious. For instance, political orientation itself may predict whether people are sensitive to social exclusion or believe they have shared interests with other minority groups. Additionally, variables such as education or cosmopolitanism could be related to both party identification and exclusion/belief in shared interests. Our experimental research designs build upon observational findings by isolating exclusion and beliefs about common minority interests and showing the impact of exogenous changes in such variables on party identification.

## Observational Evidence

Before presenting the causal tests of our hypotheses from experimental data, we first assess whether there is correlational evidence in a high-quality, probability sample. We analyze the 2008 National Asian American Survey (NAAS), which interviewed a nationally representative sample of Asians (Ramakrishnan et al. 2008).<sup>5</sup> This is among the most detailed data on Asian American political preferences to date, consisting of a telephone sample of 5,159 Asians. The majority of the sample were U.S. citizens (76%), and 11% were born in the U.S. The average household in the study reported an income in the \$50,000-\$75,000 range. The two largest groups were of Chinese or Taiwanese descent (26%) and of South Asian descent (22%).

The dependent variable of interest for these analyses is party identification.<sup>6</sup> Approximately

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<sup>5</sup>This observational analysis partially replicates similar analyses reported in Chapter 6 of Hajnal and Lee (2011), although we focus explicitly on the choice of Asians to identify with the Democratic Party. See Lee (2008) for a discussion of data collection and for further details on the demographic composition of the NAAS sample.

<sup>6</sup>Respondents were asked: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, some other party, or do you not think in these terms?” where the order of Republican and Democrat in this question

39% of the sample identified with the Democratic Party; 19% identified with the Republican Party (these figures include self-reported Independents who lean toward a party). A third of the sample reported “not thinking in these [partisan] terms,” and 9% reported “don’t know” or refused to answer the party identification question. A striking feature of this distribution is the plurality of respondents who do not select one of the two major political parties. Other research has explored this empirical pattern; we extend this literature by examining determinants of choice among identifiers. Party identification is measured on a six-point scale (strong Democrat, not strong Democrat, lean Democrat, lean Republican, not strong Republican, strong Republican). We rescaled the party identification measure to lie between 0 and 1, with higher values representing Democratic identifiers. We describe below how we handle missing values on the dependent variable.

To proxy for feelings of social exclusion, we construct a binary measure indicating whether a respondent reported that he or she has been a victim of racial discrimination.<sup>7</sup> Respondents reported whether they had ever been racially discriminated against in each of the following situations: (1) unfairly denied a job or fired; (2) unfairly denied a promotion at work; (3) unfairly treated by the police; (4) unfairly prevented from renting or buying a home; (5) unfairly treated at a restaurant or other place of service; or (6) been a victim of a hate crime. Nearly 40% of the sample reported being a victim in at least one of these situations.<sup>8</sup> The racial incidents in these categories can be plausibly argued to temporally precede the dependent variable and therefore the social exclusion variable can be considered exogenous. In other words, the variable does not represent self-reported

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was randomized (response options: “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Independent,” “Other party (Specify),” “Do not think in these terms”). Those who answered “Republican” or “Democrat” were then asked “Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or not a strong Republican/Democrat.” Those who answered “Independent” were asked the follow-up question: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republicans or the Democrats?”

<sup>7</sup>The text of the preamble to the questions reads: “We are interested in the way you have been treated in the U.S., and whether you have ever been treated unfairly because of your race, ancestry, being an immigrant, or having an accent.” Respondents were then asked: “Have you ever been unfairly denied a job or fired?” (response options: “Yes” or “No”). A similar wording followed for the remaining five discrimination questions.

<sup>8</sup>About 18% report being a victim in one of these categories; 10% report having been a victim in two of these categories; 7% report having been a victims in three or more categories. We also included these levels as dummy variables and did not observe any significant differences between those coefficients, leading us to collapse responses in a binary fashion.

attitudes on *feelings* of discrimination but rather recollections of specific incidents. Of course, people may misremember or misreport experiences based on their political attitudes, but the survey item likely obviates the inferential problems involved with correlating two attitudes measured in the same survey with each another. Nevertheless, we address potential issues of causal inference below via an experiment in which we exogenously increase feelings of social exclusion.

To proxy for beliefs about shared interests with other minority groups, we use responses to questions on how much the respondent feels that Asian Americans have in common with African Americans/Blacks, Hispanics/Latinos, and whites regarding issues of political power and representation. This question was coded on a four-point scale (response options: “a lot in common,” “some,” “little,” “nothing at all in common”).<sup>9</sup> Responses were recoded to lie between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating nothing in common and 1 indicating a lot in common. We then calculated the difference in reported commonality with whites from the following three measures: (1) reported commonality with African Americans/Blacks; (2) reported commonality with Hispanics/Latinos; and (3) the average of the respondent’s scores for feelings of commonality with African Americans/Blacks and Hispanics/Latinos to create a proxy for feelings of commonality with minorities overall (each of the the resulting commonality scores are rescaled to lie between 0 and 1).<sup>10</sup>

We control for standard demographic and political variables that are associated with partisan identification, as well as additional variables possibly relevant for Asians: gender, income, education, age, percentage of time spent living in the U.S., religiosity, citizenship status, and liberal-conservative ideology.<sup>11</sup> Gender, religiosity, and citizenship status are all binary indicators; all other

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<sup>9</sup>The text of the question is, “Thinking about government services, political power and representation, would you say Asian Americans have a lot in common, some, little in common, or nothing at all in common with [ethnic category]?”

<sup>10</sup>Feelings of commonality with African American/Blacks and Hispanic/Latino are highly correlated ( $r = 0.63$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Consequently, there is a multicollinearity problem with including both measures in one specification as it interferes with our ability to accurately compare the effects of commonality with African Americans/Blacks and Hispanics/Latinos separately. We therefore do not include these two variables together in the same regression model.

<sup>11</sup>Due to missing data in the independent variables, we present models that include binary indicators of missing data and recode individuals missing on each of the control variables as 0 on those variables. This allows us to not list-wise delete any data, while allowing for an intercept shift for respondents who did not answer various questions.

demographic variables are linear transformations coded to lie between 0 and 1.<sup>12</sup> By recoding both the dependent and independent variables in this manner, we can interpret a regression coefficient as representing a  $100*\beta$  percentage-point increase in the dependent variable associated with moving from the lowest to highest possible value of the independent variable. Summary statistics for the variables of interest can be found in Online Appendix B (see Table B.1).

[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 reports results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the six-point measure of party identification. Many respondents did not respond to the party identification question that constitutes the dependent variable. We conducted the analysis in various ways to address missing data on party identification. Models (1)-(3) display the results from list-wise deleting respondents who did not answer the question; this approach eliminates approximately 42% of the sample. Models (4)-(6) display results of the same OLS estimations by coding respondents who did not identify with a party as the midpoint of the scale (0.5). Both of these approaches make different assumptions about non-respondents, and the fact that the results are similar across model specifications increases confidence in our results. Further, we estimated multinomial logit models where refusal to answer the question is treated as a unique response category (see Table B.2 in Online Appendix B). We also imputed missing values for party identification (see Table B.3 in Online Appendix B). These alternative analytical approaches yielded similar results.

Both reported racial victimization (a measure of social exclusion) and perceived commonality with other ethnic minorities (as opposed to whites) are positively correlated with Democratic Party identification.<sup>13</sup> Across all models, racial victimization (our proxy for social exclusion) is positively correlated with greater identification with the Democratic Party by 3 to 4 percentage points depending on specification (see Table 1). We also find substantively large effects for our measure of intergroup commonality with other minorities. A unit increase in intergroup commonality

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<sup>12</sup>Education is coded on a five-point scale: did not graduate from high school, high school graduate, some college, college degree, postgraduate degree. Income is coded on an eight-point scale representing increasing income categories (see Table B.1 in Online Appendix B for the income categories). Religious is coded as 1 if a respondent chooses a religion, and 0 otherwise. Political ideology is coded on a six-point scale with higher values corresponding to being liberal. Percentage of time spent living in the U.S. is coded as the fraction of a person's age spent in the U.S.

<sup>13</sup>Given that our hypotheses are directional, we employ one-tailed hypothesis tests throughout.

with African Americans/Blacks, Hispanics/Latinos, and both minority groups increases Democratic identification by 4 to 7, 4 to 5, and 10 to 15 percentage points, respectively.

We also estimated an alternate specification where the dependent variable is identification with the Democratic Party in binary terms (coded as 1 if the respondent leans towards the Democratic Party, is a not-strong Democrat, or a strong Democrat, and 0 otherwise). The results of the logistic regressions can be found in Online Appendix Table B.5. Whereas the previous analyses took into account the extremity of association with a party, this analysis solely predicts an individual crossing the cut point from being a Republican to being a Democrat. This represents a strong test as we are predicting switching from one party to another, not simply being more attached to a particular party. The coefficients on social exclusion and commonality with other minorities remain positive and significant. The estimated marginal effect of being a victim on the probability of identifying as a Democrat is about 7 percentage points. The estimated marginal effect of a unit change in perceived shared interest with African Americans/Blacks, Hispanics/Latinos, and both ethnic minority groups is 6, 6, and 12 percentage points, respectively.

We find that these effects of exclusion and commonality do not vary across income within the Asian population; we find no interaction effect between income and our victimization and intergroup commonality measures (see Table B.6 in Online Appendix B). Also, we did not observe heterogeneity with respect to country of origin, consistent with our theoretical expectation that the effects of social exclusion and intergroup commonality affects Asian Americans broadly speaking. This suggests it is appropriate to pool across different ethnic groups given our theoretical focus.

In sum, we have presented initial evidence in support of the hypotheses that feelings of social exclusion and intergroup commonality with other minorities can partially account for why Asian Americans are more likely to support the Democratic Party. Studies 1 and 2 causally test the two hypotheses using experiments where we manipulate the two independent variables of interest.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Given the large share of respondents who identify with neither party, we also conducted an analysis predicting party non-identification. We find that our measure for social exclusion is not associated with non-party identification ( $p = 0.47$  to  $0.50$ ), regardless of specification. We also find that our intergroup commonality measures are uncorrelated with non-party identification ( $p = 0.15$  to  $0.45$ ). Results are available in Online Appendix B (see Table B.7).

## **Study 1: Impact of Social Exclusion**

In this study we exogenously manipulated feelings of social exclusion by randomly exposing individuals to a “real world” cue designed to make them feel as if they are not welcome in the U.S. We tested whether making Asians feel this way made them less likely to support Republicans as they might associate the party with these negative feelings. If social exclusion is a causal factor that can explain party affiliation, then manipulating it should increase positive views of the Democratic Party and identification with it.

Below, we demonstrate through various outcome measures that the experiment captures this theoretical pathway. Asian respondents who were exogenously made to feel socially excluded based on their Asian background were more likely to view the Republican Party as exclusionary (as their feelings of exclusion were linked to their views of the party), and consequently less likely to exhibit positive feelings for the Republican Party. Our study builds upon a voluminous literature in political and social psychology on priming (Bargh 1982). In a plethora of laboratory and survey contexts, a range of subtle, external interventions have been shown to activate hypothesized behavioral outcomes and attitude changes. We draw on previous findings that show how primes can unconsciously activate specific personality traits, change task performance (physical and cognitive), affect stereotypes and attitudes towards out-groups, and change political attitudes (e.g., Berger, Meredith, and Wheeler 2008; DeMarree, Wheeler, and Petty 2005; Lodge and Taber 2005). The mechanisms linking primes to specific outcomes depend on the outcome of interest, but we focus on testing the specific prime of a racial microaggression on social exclusion, which has been shown to occur in other laboratory contexts.

### **Procedures and Design**

We executed a laboratory experiment where the measured political outcomes were both survey-based and behavioral. The study was conducted in the behavioral lab of a major research university; subjects were paid \$10 for participating. This study had to be conducted in-person in the laboratory (as opposed to with a more general sample over the Internet) because the experimental manipulation requires interpersonal contact. We opened the study to Asians and whites based on demographic background data of the respondents collected well before the experiment took place. Subjects were told that they were participating in a study about current events. The study was conducted between



November 26–December 7, 2012. 114 subjects participated; 61 were of self-reported Asian descent and 53 described themselves as white. Upon entering the facility, a white female research assistant welcomed the subject and was instructed to privately assess and document whether the subject was of Asian descent.<sup>15</sup> The subject was then guided to a computer by the assistant. The experimental protocol proceeded as follows: (1) the assistant was provided with a list of which subjects were randomly assigned to be in the treatment condition and receive a racial microaggression; and (2) the assistant was instructed to say the following to each subject assigned to the treatment condition before he or she began the survey, “I’m sorry; I forgot that this study is only for U.S. citizens. Are you a U.S. citizen? I cannot tell.” If the subject was a U.S. citizen, the assistant was instructed to say “OK, go ahead” and have the respondent start the survey; if the subject was not a U.S. citizen, the assistant was instructed to pause and then say, “It’s OK, go ahead.” This procedure was also applied to white respondents so that we could assess any baseline effect of the treatment unrelated to racial microaggression (e.g., simple rudeness).

The racial microaggression employed in the study was a microinvalidation—verbal comments or behaviors that exclude, negate, or nullify the psychological thoughts, feelings, or experiential reality of a person of color” (Sue et al. 2007, 278). The invalidating question asked by the assistant to treated subjects is similar to commonplace questions such as: “Where are you *really* from?”; “Where were you born?”; “You speak good English.” In other words, Asian participants assigned to the treatment condition were made to feel like foreigners in their own country. White participants should not have had a similar reaction, making them an important benchmark for comparison.<sup>16</sup> This intervention builds on and is a modification of social exclusion or racial microaggression interventions in other laboratory contexts (e.g., Cheryan and Monin 2005). It also accurately captures a common interaction in daily life among some Asians when they interact with other individuals who do not assume Asians are either citizens or “American” (Sue et al. 2007).<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>The research assistant’s assessment of respondents’ ethnicity matched respondents’ self-reports in all cases.

<sup>16</sup>We also expect non-citizens to feel excluded by the treatment. Even though they are not citizens, they may feel singled out given the presumption of their citizenship status based on their physical appearance. We found no significant difference in treatment effects between citizens and non-citizens; the differences in the treatment effects between citizens and non-citizens were substantively small and did not achieve standard levels of statistical significance ( $p = 0.16$  to  $p = 0.44$ ).

<sup>17</sup>Subjects were debriefed afterwards that the interaction with the research assistant was part of the study design.

## Outcome Measures

Subjects then completed an online survey that measured political attitudes. All measures were coded such that higher values reflect negative views of the Republican Party relative to the Democratic Party. Descriptive statistics of our outcome measures can be found in Table C.1 of Online Appendix C.<sup>18</sup>

*Closed-minded.* Study participants were asked: “How well does the term ‘closed-minded’ describe [Republicans/Democrats]?” (response options: “very well,” “somewhat well,” “slightly well,” and “not well at all”). To develop a measure of how much more closed-minded the respondents felt Republicans were relative to Democrats, the response to the Democratic item was subtracted from the response to the Republican item. This resulting difference measure is a seven-point scale, recoded to range from 0 (meaning that Democrats are viewed to be maximally—with respect to the measure’s range—more closed-minded than Republicans) to 1 (meaning that Republicans are viewed to be maximally more closed-minded than Democrats).

*Ignorant.* Respondents were asked: “How well does the term ‘ignorant’ describe [Republicans/Democrats]?” (response options: “very well,” “somewhat well,” “slightly well,” and “not well at all”). As with the closed-mindedness question, we create a measure of how much more ignorant a given participant felt Republicans were relative to Democrats by differencing out a participant’s response to the question on Democrats from the response to the question on Republicans. This measure is again a seven-point scale, recoded to range from 0 (meaning that Democrats are viewed to be maximally more ignorant than Republicans) to 1 (meaning that Republicans are viewed to be maximally more ignorant than Democrats).

*Represent Interests.* Study participants were asked: “How well do you think the [Democratic/Republican] Party is likely to represent the interests of people like yourself?” (response options: “very well,” “somewhat well,” “slightly well,” and “not well at all”). Again, we subtract a participant’s response to the question when asked about the Republican Party from the response to the same

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The study was approved by a university institutional review board (IRB). Given that the treatment is language we expect subjects to encounter in the real world, we viewed the study as posing little to no risk and the IRB agreed.

<sup>18</sup>In Table C.1, we also report demographic characteristics of respondents. As shown in the appendix, while most respondents were college students, the sample was diverse with respect to gender and religiosity. 88% of respondents were U.S. citizens.

question asked about the Democratic Party. This difference measure is a seven-point scale, ranging from 0 (meaning that the Republican Party is viewed to be maximally more representative of people like them than the Democratic Party) to 1 (meaning that the Democratic Party is viewed to be maximally more representative of people like them than the Republican Party).

*Net Likes.* The net likes measure is a combination of the following task questions: (1) “Is there anything in particular you like about the [Democratic/Republican] Party?”; and (2) “Is there anything in particular you dislike about the [Democratic/Republican] Party?” Each of the four questions was followed by the following directive: “Please list as many responses as you like, listing each response in a separate field. If there is nothing that you like about the [Democratic/Republican] Party, just skip ahead.” Respondents were given up to ten fields to enter likes/dislikes. The net likes measure is a difference-in-difference measure. For each party, we compute a net likes measure by assessing how many more positive traits are listed as opposed to negative traits. We then take the difference between the net likes listed by a participant for the Democratic Party and that of the Republican Party. This measure is rescaled to be between 0 and 1, such that a higher number means that, compared to when thinking about the Democratic Party, the respondent listed fewer things they “liked” about the Republicans relative to “disliked” about the Republicans. This task required a great deal of effort on the part of respondents, and therefore can be interpreted as a behavioral manifestation of liking or aversion toward a political party.

*Feeling Thermometer.* We asked respondents to report their warmth to the parties on feeling thermometers: “On a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents a completely negative opinion and 100 represents a completely positive opinion, how would you rate the [Republican/Democratic] Party?” We assess how much more negative a participant views the Republican Party relative to the Democratic Party by differencing out a participant’s response to the feeling thermometer question about Republicans from the response to the identical question about Democrats. This new measure is rescaled to lie between 0 and 1, ranging from 0 (meaning that the respondent has a maximally positive opinion of Republicans relative to Democrats) to 1 (meaning that the respondent has a maximally positive opinion of Democrats relative to Republicans).

*Party Identification.* Participants’ party identification was measured through a sequence of questions, where participants were first asked: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” (response options: “Republican,” “Democrat,”

“Independent,” and “Other”). Those who answered “Republican” or “Democrat” were then asked the follow-up question: “Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat/Republican]?” (response options: “strong” and “not very strong”). Participants who answered the first question with either “Independent” or “Other” were subsequently asked: “Do you think of yourself as CLOSER to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?” (response options: “Republican Party” and “Democratic Party”). Responses were combined to create a six-point scale, which is recoded to lie between 0 and 1, where higher values reflect stronger identification with the Democratic Party.

*Pro-Democratic Party (PDP) Index.* We averaged the six outcome variables into a single additive index reflecting a latent variable of pro-Democratic attitudes. The advantage of this averaged measure is that it nets out measurement error associated with any one of the index components.

*Manipulation Check.* As a manipulation check, subjects also completed a behavioral task where they listed as many U.S. politicians they could think of. The logic of the measure is that if the racial microaggression offends Asians, they may desire to compensate by showing how much they know about American politics in an attempt to feel less excluded and prove themselves as more “American.” Consequently, they should also spend more time answering this question. This procedure follows from what was found in similar microaggression interventions in other laboratory contexts (e.g., Cheryan and Monin 2005). The goal of the manipulation check is to ensure that the treatment is properly manipulating the theoretical construct of interest (i.e., feelings of exclusion).<sup>19</sup>

## Results

We present regression results predicting the outcome variables with a dummy for the microaggression treatment, a dummy for whether a respondent is Asian, and the interaction between these two dummy variables (see Table C.2 in Online Appendix C).<sup>20</sup> We use the white respondents as a baseline group to observe the effect of the microaggression *per se*. The quantity of interest, which is captured in the interaction term and plotted in Figure 1, is the difference between Asians and whites in their response to the microaggression treatment on the various outcome variables.

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<sup>19</sup>We did not ask an explicit post-treatment question about feelings of victimization or racial identity because this would prime respondents and inflate treatment effects.

<sup>20</sup>Due to space constraints, full regression results are reported in the Online Appendix. However, because this is a randomized experiment, the results can be easily summarized with figures and with verbal description.

The treatment effect among whites allows us to determine the causal effect of the experimental manipulation, netting out any direct effect of the treatment *unrelated* to social exclusion based on ethnicity (e.g., perceived rudeness or awkwardness of the research assistant’s statement). More formally, the estimand of interest is  $(\bar{Y}_{ta} - \bar{Y}_{ca}) - (\bar{Y}_{tw} - \bar{Y}_{cw})$  where  $\bar{Y}$  represents the average of the outcome variable, and the subscript denotes whether respondents were assigned to the treatment ( $t$ ) or control ( $c$ ) groups, and whether the respondent was Asian ( $a$ ) or white ( $w$ ). We also report the experimental results separately for Asian and white subjects (see Table C.3).

[Figure 1 about here]

Before delving into the main results, we note that the manipulation check was successful. Compared to white respondents, Asians responded to the racial microaggression treatment by listing 5.78 more U.S. politicians vis-à-vis the control group. This difference is statistically significant ( $p = 0.02$ ). Further, the effect of the treatment on the time Asians took to complete the survey was 88 seconds more than the treatment effect among whites ( $p = 0.02$ ).<sup>21</sup>

The treatment affected Asian respondents’ views of the Republican Party compared to whites, generally increasing their negative views of the party (see the third row of Table C.2). The simple intervention of making an Asian subject feel excluded with respect to “Americanness” and being suspected of not being a U.S. citizen increased negative dispositions towards the Republican Party and increased positive views of the Democratic Party compared to the baseline treatment effects among white respondents. The microaggression treatment reduced affinity toward the Republican Party as measured by the Pro-Democratic Party (PDP) Index (13 percentage points,  $p = 0.02$ ). The results indicate a clear association between a sense of exclusion and positive feelings toward the Democratic Party at the expense of the Republican Party.<sup>22</sup>

When examining the components of the index separately, we again see consistent, positive effects on pro-Democratic attitudes as a result of the treatment, although some are larger than others. Compared to their view of Democrats, Asians in the treatment group viewed Republicans to be

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<sup>21</sup>To reduce skewness in the completion time variable, we took its natural log. The  $p$ -value from the test examining the difference-in-difference in the non-normalized measure was  $p = 0.02$ .

<sup>22</sup>The difference-in-difference, as hypothesized, is driven by the effect of the treatment on Asian respondents. We find that the treatment generally increased negative affect toward Republicans among Asians and consistently had no effect among whites (see Table C.3 in Online Appendix C).

more closed-minded (13 percentage points) and more ignorant (14 percentage points). This suggests that priming social exclusion activates latent associations respondents had between the Republican Party and negative traits associated with racial discrimination. Accordingly, Asians in the treatment condition are 18 percentage points less likely to believe that the Republican Party represents their interests. Also in response to the treatment, Asians listed fewer things they “liked” about Republicans (10 percentage points) and rated Republicans 11 percentage points less favorably than Democrats on the feeling thermometer. These negative associations led Asian respondents to have more negative feelings toward the Republican Party. All of these effects produced lower Republican identification among Asian respondents in the treatment condition. Asian respondents in the treatment group are 10 percentage points more Democratic on the six-point partisan identification scale, more than half a response category. The treatment effects on the feeling thermometer and party identification outcomes do not quite achieve standard levels of statistical significance given that these are fairly rigid and enduring political dispositions. Nonetheless, the other, stronger results demonstrate that the perceptions of the parties (i.e., the *ingredients* of party identification) were affected by making respondents feel socially excluded.<sup>23</sup> Overall, this study provides evidence of a causal link between social exclusion and orientation towards the Democratic party.<sup>24</sup>

## Study 2: Impact of Intergroup Commonality

We next assess the causal effect of beliefs about shared intergroup interests on Asian American party identification. We examine the effect of framing an issue such that it emphasizes that Asians and Hispanics have common interests versus a framing that divides Asians from Hispanics. We conducted a second study between May 23–30, 2013 using a nationally diverse sample of Asians. The sample of 689 Asian respondents was provided by Survey Sampling International (SSI) and consisted of 82% citizens and 50% U.S.-born individuals.<sup>25</sup> This dataset is unique given the difficulty

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<sup>23</sup>The variables closed-minded, ignorant, represents interests, and net likes are all strongly and significantly ( $p < 0.001$ ) positively correlated with the feeling thermometer and party identification measures.

<sup>24</sup>There was no treatment effect of social exclusion on partisan non-identification when estimating a linear probability model ( $p = 0.27$ ) or logit model ( $p = 0.25$ ). Results are available in Online Appendix C (see Table C.4).

<sup>25</sup>Online Appendix D reports demographic characteristics of respondents. The sample is diverse with respect to education, age, gender, and religiosity (see Table D.1).

of recruiting the Asian American population for survey research.

## Procedures and Outcome Measures

We embedded an experiment in the survey to measure whether exogenously manipulating partisan endorsement of policies that have obvious intergroup commonality-inducing or intergroup conflict-inducing consequences for Asians vis-à-vis other U.S. minorities affects Asian support for the Democratic versus Republican Party. We chose the policy area of immigration, as it has been a salient political issue that citizens and minority immigrants (including Asians) care about. Further, it is an issue where intergroup commonality as well as intergroup conflict (between Asians and other minority immigrant groups) is plausible, depending on what aspects of reform or specific immigration policies are emphasized. Each of the two main political parties is also associated with different aspects of immigration reform.

Accordingly, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a control group where an article about a popular TV show was read prior to the questions of interest; and one of two treatment groups, each of which consisted of a short fictional *USA Today* newspaper article.<sup>26</sup> The news articles on immigration were designed to explicitly cue commonality or conflict with Hispanics. In Treatment Group 1, the article describes Arizona SB 1070, the law that was invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court requiring police officers to ascertain people’s immigration status. The article indicates that such laws target both Asians and Hispanics (due to their foreign appearance), and that Democrats oppose such policies while Republicans support them. The article in Treatment Group 2 cues intergroup conflict and Republican endorsement of Asian interests by summarizing how immigration reform proposals could hurt Asians and benefit Hispanics, as Asians constitute much of the high-skilled immigrant population and Hispanics much of the low-skilled immigrant population. The article emphasizes that Republicans tend to support high-skilled immigration while Democrats support low-skilled immigration. In the popular media reporting of the possibility of immigration reform, the Republican and Democratic parties are associated with these positions (Beadle 2012; Schultheis 2012).<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>The full text (screenshots) of the treatments are available in Online Appendix D. Respondents were debriefed after the survey that the article they read was not actually from *USA Today*, but was similar to articles that had appeared in the publication.

<sup>27</sup>Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, when speaking to high technology industry advocates pushing for immi-

We purposely included the party positions on the issues in each condition for two reasons. The first reason was theoretical. Our goal was to observe how shifting the salience of the immigration issue from the economic to the social dimension (and therefore changing the coalition cleavage from whites/Asians/Republicans against Hispanics/Democrats to whites/Republicans against Hispanics/Asians/Democrats) affected respondents’ political attitudes and partisan dispositions. Because the nature of political conflict involved the parties aligning themselves on one side of the cleavage for one dimension of the issue, and parties aligning themselves on the other side of the cleavage for the other dimension, we provided this information to respondents. The second reason was to enhance ecological validity. We based our experimental stimuli on real-world articles on immigration, and nearly all of them explained party positions on the issue in addition to racial impact (e.g., Gomez 2013). In future work, it would be interesting to vary whether respondents receive party cues to assess the impact of such political information.<sup>28</sup> In sum, we employ a compound treatment varying both the coalitional structure and the issue dimension (social versus economic) because these features are necessarily linked in the real world.

We then measure the same post-treatment attitudes and behaviors asked in Study 1, and code differences in party evaluations in the same way, such that higher values represent more negative views of the Republican Party versus the Democratic Party. Descriptive statistics for all outcome measures of interest can be found in Online Appendix D (see Table D.1). As a manipulation check, respondents were asked: “Thinking about government services, political power, and representation, would you say Asian Americans have a lot in common, some, little in common, or nothing at all in common with Hispanics or Latinos?” (response options: “a lot in common,” “some,” “little,” “nothing at all in common”). The question wording was taken from the 2008 NAAS. Again, the purpose of this manipulation check was to ensure that the treatment information in the article was

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gration reform that lifts the cap on the number of H-1B visas the U.S. gives to high-skilled foreigners, noted the following: “If there’s an attempt to just try and pass high-end, high-tech immigration, guess who will be furious? The Hispanic community” (Sasso 2013). H-1B reform would disproportionately help Asian immigrants; in 2011, over 75% of H-1B visas were granted to individuals from Asian countries (USCIS 2012).

<sup>28</sup>Given the immense expense of gathering a sufficiently large Asian American survey sample, we did not have the statistical power to layer this additional randomization into the design as it could have substantially decreased statistical efficiency.



shifting the theoretically relevant construct of interest (i.e., commonality/conflict with Hispanics).

## Results

The results of Study 2 are presented in Table D.2 in Online Appendix D, where we predict the outcome variables with dummy variables representing the intergroup commonality condition and the control group. Our estimate of interest (represented by the coefficient estimate on “Intergroup Commonality Treatment” and plotted in Figure 2) is the difference between the two treatment groups, as this recovers the difference in the political cleavage structures described above. As such, our omitted category is the intergroup conflict treatment where Asians are in conflict with Hispanics. The difference between the treatment groups represents the shift from the commonality coalitional structure to the conflicting one. The control group is useful as a baseline, but it does not actually present a coalitional structure to respondents. Therefore, only comparing the conflict and cooperation treatments to the control group does not allow us to infer the impact of framing issues as cooperative versus conflictual.

[Figure 2 about here]

We first note that the manipulation check was successful, which supports the theorized relationship between issue framing and belief about common interests. Compared to the article which highlighted conflict between Hispanics and Asians over the issue of immigration, the article stressing common interests between the two ethnic groups increased respondents’ reported closeness with Hispanics by 0.17 units on the four-point scale, a statistically significant effect ( $p = 0.02$ ). The effect size represents about one-fifth of a standard deviation in the dependent variable. The successful manipulation check demonstrates that the treatment properly manipulated the theoretical construct of interest (commonality with Hispanics) that is linked to changes in political attitudes.

Framing the immigration issue to make Asians feel as if they have common interests with Hispanics (as opposed to competing interests) increased negative dispositions towards the Republican Party and increased positive views of the Democratic Party. The Hispanic commonality treatment decreased affinity toward the Republican Party as measured by the PDP Index (5 percentage points,  $p = 0.003$ ; see Figure 2). This experimental result indicates that increasing perceptions of shared interests with another minority group that is a traditional Democratic constituency (Hispanics) can increase support for the Democratic Party.

When we examine each component of the PDP Index separately, we observe consistent, positively signed effects. The intergroup commonality treatment caused Asians to view Republicans (relative to Democrats) as more closed-minded (6 percentage points) and more ignorant (3 percentage points). Consistent with these negative traits, Asians in the commonality treatment condition are 7 percentage points less likely to believe that the Republican Party represents their interests. These negative associations led Asian respondents to exhibit negative feelings toward the Republican Party. In response to the commonality treatment, Asians listed fewer things they liked (and more things they disliked) about Republicans relative to the Democrats (1 percentage point) and rated Republicans 5 percentage points less favorably than Democrats on the feeling thermometer. All of these effects yielded lower Republican identification among Asian respondents in the intergroup commonality condition. Overall, Asian respondents in the commonality treatment group are 5 percentage points more Democratic on the six-point partisan identification scale.<sup>29</sup> The results of this study provide evidence that feelings of shared interests with other minorities can affect partisan dispositions among Asians.<sup>30</sup>

It is also informative to compare the treatment conditions to the control group since this indicates whether commonality or competition is the more important factor. In Table D.2, the difference between the control group and the conflict condition is represented by  $\beta_2$  while the difference between the control group and the commonality condition is represented by  $\beta_1 - \beta_2$ . First, Democratic support in the control condition is in between support in the conflict and commonality conditions, which is exactly what we expect theoretically and suggests that the design is working as intended. However, the largest difference is between the commonality treatment and the control group. The difference in the PDP Index score between those who receive the commonality treatment and those who receive the control group message was 3 percentage points ( $p = 0.05$ ), whereas the difference in the PDP Index score between those who received the competition treatment and the control message was -2 percentage points ( $p = 0.12$ ). The difference in these effects yields the 5

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<sup>29</sup>The treatment effect for all outcome variables achieved standard levels of statistical significance except the ignorant and net likes measures.

<sup>30</sup>We find that our intergroup commonality treatment is not correlated with partisan non-identification when considering a linear probability model ( $p = 0.41$ ) or a logit model ( $p = 0.41$ ). Results are available in Online Appendix D (see Table D.3).

percentage point effect referenced above. The commonality treatment having a stronger effect than the competition treatment may be due to the fact that it is harder to convince Asian Americans that their interests are not aligned with Hispanics on immigration. Another plausible reason why the commonality treatment has a larger relative effect is because the treatment is about common interests regarding the social issue of racial discrimination (as opposed to the economic issue of labor market skills), an issue that may be particularly sensitive to Asians, and an issue about which Asians likely feel greater shared interests with other racial minorities. It is not clear whether this asymmetry would arise in other policy domains and is worth further exploration in future research.

## Discussion

As Wilkinson (2012) writes, “If you were a black-haired Buddhist from Taipei or a brown-skinned Hindu from Bangalore, which party would instinctively seem more comfortable?” This glib statement in our view does capture some aspects of Asian American party identification. The role of social exclusion and intergroup commonality have been suggested in previous literature on the political identities of U.S. minorities; however, they have not been systematically tested on specific Asian-only samples in a way that allows for identifying causal effects. Using laboratory and survey experiments, we find evidence for both propositions.

There are several opportunities for research building. We focused on social exclusion in a laboratory context to mimic a racial microaggression or exclusionary interactions that Asian Americans might receive from the daily political environment. Other studies might simulate other types of microaggressions, or more overt aggression in an explicit political context (such as campaign advertising), and do so in a broader survey context. Another possible extension is to highlight other issues that would alter intergroup commonality and competition. Additionally, we have focused less on the issue of “linked fate” concerns *within* the Asian ethnicity, though there is a rich body of literature that hypothesizes that Asians who identify more with their own ethnicity (whether it be a “pan-Asian” or specific Asian ethnicity) are more likely to be politically active. However, such theoretical work remains ambiguous about the proposed partisan direction of such attitudes (Lee 2008). Studies that manipulate the level of in-group solidarity or heighten “Asian” identity salience (as opposed to negative social exclusion regarding American belonging as we have done) might be instructive about the degree and impact of “linked fate” within the Asian community.

In Study 2 we illustrated the effects of intergroup commonality via the issue of immigration, but traditional economic issues related to redistribution could also be reframed as policies that benefit other minorities at the expense of higher-income Asian Americans. The fluidity of support of certain ethnic groups for the two major U.S. parties based on the structure of policy issues represents potential support for theories of parties as coalitions of social groups (Bawn et al. 2012). The ease of framing other policies in a way such that Asians would be more supportive of Democrats (due to common interests with other minorities) would be an intriguing topic for future research. Our experiment suggests that it might be difficult for Republicans to frame issues such that they divide ethnic minorities, but more evidence is needed to assess the generalizability of this result.

Also, because our two theoretical mechanisms of interest were predicted to apply to Asian Americans broadly, we have collapsed all “Asians” into a single ethnic category. Nonetheless, this is obviously an oversimplification given the immense diversity within the Asian American population. However, considering the difficulty of obtaining such targeted samples, this research offers a starting point. Future studies can explore whether and why the effects are stronger or weaker within various subpopulations of interest. Finally, subsequent scholarship can investigate the effects of social exclusion and intergroup commonality on policy attitudes, which may mediate the influence of the treatments on party identification.

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


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Table 1: OLS Regressions Predicting Asian American Partisan Identification


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Exclusion	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Intergroup Commonality with Blacks	0.07*** (0.02)	—	—	0.04*** (0.01)	—	—
Intergroup Commonality with Hispanics	—	0.05** (0.02)	—	—	0.04** (0.01)	—
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	—	—	0.15*** (0.05)	—	—	0.10*** (0.03)
Female	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Income	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Education	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Age	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.05 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	0.10 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)
Percentage of Life Spent in US	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Religious	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
US Citizen	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Ideology	0.36*** (0.02)	0.36*** (0.02)	0.36*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)
Constant	0.33*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.03)
Observations	2,993	2,993	2,993	5,159	5,159	5,159
Adjusted $R^2$	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.09	0.09

*Notes:* Dependent variable is partisan identification (0 (Strong Republican)  $\rightarrow$  1 (Strong Democrat)). Regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed). Columns (1)-(3) report models excluding respondents who did not report a party identification. Columns (4)-(6) report models recoding missing values on party identification as the midpoint.



*Notes:* The figure displays effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 1: Study 1 Results




*Notes:* The figure displays effect sizes with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2: Study 2 Results

## Online Appendix

*Why Do Asian Americans Identify as Democrats? Testing Theories of Social Exclusion and Intergroup Commonality*

# A 2008 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study



Source: 2008 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)

Figure A.1: Party Identification, Ideology, and Vote Choice by Race, 2008 and 2012 (with 95% confidence intervals)

## B Observational Study

Table B.1: Summary Statistics of Observational Study

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Party Identification	2993	4.01	1.74	1	6
Identification with the Democratic Party	5159	0.39	0.49	0	1
Social Exclusion	5159	0.39	0.49	0	1
Intergroup Commonality with Blacks	5159	0.33	0.32	0	1
Intergroup Commonality with Hispanics	5159	0.35	0.33	0	1
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	5159	0.34	0.24	0	1
Female	5159	0.46	0.50	0	1
Income: Up to \$20,000	3235	0.13	0.34	0	1
Income: \$20,000 to \$35,000	3235	0.12	0.32	0	1
Income: \$35,000 to \$50,000	3235	0.12	0.32	0	1
Income: \$50,000 to \$75,000	3235	0.17	0.38	0	1
Income: \$75,000 to \$100,000	3235	0.14	0.34	0	1
Income: \$100,000 to \$125,000	3235	0.12	0.32	0	1
Income: \$125,000 to \$150,000	3235	0.06	0.24	0	1
Income: \$150,000 and over	3235	0.14	0.35	0	1
Did Not Graduate from High School	4917	0.09	0.29	0	1
High School Graduate	4917	0.17	0.37	0	1
Some College, but No Degree (Yet)	4917	0.11	0.32	0	1
4-year College Degree	4917	0.35	0.48	0	1
Postgraduate Degree	4917	0.28	0.45	0	1
Age	4223	56.61	15.61	22	100
Percentage of Life Spent in the U.S.	5159	0.42	0.31	0	1
Religious	5159	0.74	0.44	0	1
US Citizen	5159	0.76	0.43	0	1
Ideology	3821	3.28	1.43	1	6

Table B.2: Multinomial Logit Explaining Asian American Partisan Identification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>0 (Missing)</i>					
Social Exclusion	-0.08 (0.08)	—	—	—	0.04 (0.09)
Intergroup Commonality with Blacks	—	0.08 (0.14)	—	—	—
Intergroup Commonality with Hispanics	—	—	-0.10 (0.14)	—	—
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	—	—	—	1.14*** (0.31)	0.99** (0.34)
Constant	0.72*** (0.05)	0.59*** (0.07)	0.65*** (0.07)	0.06 (0.15)	0.48 (0.35)
<i>2 (Democrat)</i>					
Social Exclusion	0.40*** (0.08)	—	—	—	0.31*** (0.09)
Intergroup Commonality with Blacks	—	0.48*** (0.13)	—	—	—
Intergroup Commonality with Hispanics	—	—	0.36** (0.14)	—	—
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	—	—	—	1.33*** (0.31)	1.11*** (0.32)
Constant	0.51*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.07)	0.56*** (0.07)	0.12 (0.14)	-1.12*** (0.35)
Observations	5159	5159	5159	5159	5159
Pseudo $R^2$	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.13
Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes

*Notes:* Dependent variable is partisan identification (Baseline category: 1 = Republican). Regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed). Controls for gender, income, education, age, percentage of life spent in the U.S., religiousness, citizenship status and ideology are included in specification (5).



Table B.3: OLS Regression Explaining Asian American Partisan Identification (Multiple Imputation Using Chained Equations Approach)

	(1)
Social Exclusion	0.03** (0.01)
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	0.16*** (0.04)
Female	0.04*** (0.01)
Income	-0.02 (0.03)
Education	0.12*** (0.02)
Age	-0.07 (0.13)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.01 (0.15)
Percentage of Life Spent in the U.S.	0.14*** (0.03)
Religious	-0.05*** (0.01)
US Citizen	-0.05*** (0.02)
Ideology	0.36*** (0.02)
Constant	0.2*** (0.05)
Observations	5159

*Notes:* Dependent variable is partisan identification (0 (Strong Republican) → 1 (Strong Democrat)). Missing values for party identification are imputed. Regression standard errors are in parentheses \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed).

Table B.4: OLS Regression with In-Group Commonality Control

	(1)	(2)
Social Exclusion	0.04** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	0.15*** (0.05)	0.10*** (0.03)
In-Group Commonality	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Income	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)
Education	0.12*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.01)
Age	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.08)
Age <sup>2</sup>	0.04 (0.15)	0.09 (0.09)
Percentage of Life Spent in US	0.14*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.02)
Religious	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
US Citizen	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)
Ideology	0.36*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.01)
Constant	0.27*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.03)
Observations	2993	5159
Adjusted $R^2$	0.13	0.09

*Notes:* Dependent variable is partisan identification (0 (Strong Republican)  $\rightarrow$  1 (Strong Democrat)). Missing values for party identification are recoded as the midpoint in column (2). Regression standard errors are in parentheses \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed).

Table B.5: Logistic Regression Explaining Asian American Identification with the Democratic Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social Exclusion	0.29*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)
Intergroup Commonality with Blacks	0.24* (0.11)	—	—
Intergroup Commonality with Hispanics	—	0.27** (0.11)	—
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	—	—	0.53* (0.25)
Female	0.11* (0.06)	0.10* (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)
Income	0.17 (0.14)	0.17 (0.14)	0.17 (0.14)
Education	0.60*** (0.11)	0.60*** (0.11)	0.62*** (0.11)
Age	-1.08 (0.69)	-1.08 (0.69)	-1.05 (0.69)
Percentage of Life Spent in US	0.88*** (0.15)	0.88*** (0.15)	0.91*** (0.15)
Religious	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
US Citizen	0.02 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)
Ideology	1.90*** (0.13)	1.92*** (0.13)	1.90*** (0.13)
Constant	-2.13*** (0.23)	-2.16*** (0.23)	-2.31*** (0.25)
Observations	5159	5159	5159
Pseudo $R^2$	0.10	0.10	0.10

*Notes:* Dependent variable is a binary indicator of partisan identification with the Democratic Party. Logistic regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed).

Table B.6: OLS Regression Explaining Asian American Partisan Identification with Income Interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Social Exclusion	0.07*** (0.02)	—	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	—	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Social Exclusion X Income	-0.05 (0.04)	—	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	—	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	—	0.17** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)	0.14** (0.06)	—	0.10** (0.04)	0.10** (0.04)	0.07* (0.03)
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups X Income	—	0.06 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)	—	0.07 (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Income	0.04* (0.02)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04** (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Female	—	—	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	—	—	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Education	—	—	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	—	—	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Age	—	—	-0.29* (0.14)	-0.11 (0.13)	—	—	-0.22** (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)
Age <sup>2</sup>	—	—	0.18 (0.15)	0.04 (0.15)	—	—	0.17* (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)
Percentage of Life Spent in the U.S.	—	—	0.13*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	—	—	0.10*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Religious	—	—	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.01)	—	—	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
US Citizen	—	—	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	—	—	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Ideology	—	—	—	0.36*** (0.02)	—	—	—	0.28*** (0.01)
Constant	0.56*** (0.01)	0.52*** (0.03)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.01)	0.51*** (0.02)	0.50*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.03)
Observations	2993	2993	2993	2993	5159	5159	5159	5159
Adjusted $R^2$	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.13	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.09

*Notes:* Dependent variable is partisan identification (0 (Strong Republican)  $\rightarrow$  1 (Strong Democrat)). Regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed). Columns (1)-(4) report models excluding respondents who did not report a party identification. Columns (5)-(8) report models recoding missing values on party identification as the midpoint.

Table B.7: OLS and Logistic Regressions Predicting Lack of Partisan Identification

	LPM			Logit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Exclusion	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)
Intergroup Commonality with Blacks	0.01 (0.02)	—	—	0.03 (0.10)	—	—
Intergroup Commonality with Hispanics	—	-0.03 (0.02)	—	—	-0.11 (0.10)	—
Intergroup Commonality with Minority Groups	—	—	0.01 (0.06)	—	—	0.03 (0.24)
Female	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Income	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.13)
Education	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.11)
Age	0.01 (0.15)	0.01 (0.15)	0.01 (0.15)	0.04 (0.67)	0.04 (0.67)	0.04 (0.67)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.86 (0.73)	-0.88 (0.73)	-0.87 (0.73)
Percentage of Life Spent in US	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)	-1.01*** (0.15)	-1.01*** (0.15)	-1.02*** (0.15)
Religious	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.47*** (0.07)	-0.46*** (0.07)	-0.47*** (0.07)
US Citizen	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.23** (0.07)	-0.23*** (0.07)	-0.23*** (0.07)
Ideology	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.03)	-0.38*** (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.12)
Constant	0.79*** (0.05)	0.81*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.06)	1.28*** (0.21)	1.34*** (0.22)	1.29*** (0.24)
Observations	5159	5159	5159	5158	5158	5158
Adjusted or Pseudo $R^2$	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05

*Notes:* Dependent variable is a binary measure of lack of party identification. Linear Probability Model (LPM) (see columns (1)-(3)) and logistic regression (see columns (4)-(6)) standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed).

## C Study 1

Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Study 1 Outcome Measures

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Pro-Democratic Party Index	114	0.65	0.16	0.11	0.93
Closed-Minded	114	0.60	0.24	0	1
Ignorant	114	0.56	0.24	0	1
Represent Interests	114	0.69	0.21	0	1
Net Likes	114	0.55	0.17	0	1
Feeling Thermometer	114	0.69	0.21	0	1
Party ID	114	0.71	0.25	0	1
Time Taken (logged millisecond)	114	4.56	0.87	2.78	6.49
Names Listed	114	6.25	7.30	0	50
<i>Demographic Variables</i>					
White	114	0.46	0.50	0	1
Asian	114	0.54	0.50	0	1
Female	114	0.59	0.49	0	1
Some College, but No Degree (Yet)	114	0.55	0.50	0	1
4-Year College Degree	114	0.30	0.47	0	1
Postgraduate Degree	114	0.11	0.32	0	1
Age	114	20.93	4.44	17	52
Religious	114	0.54	0.50	0	1
US Citizen	114	0.88	0.33	0	1
Ideology	114	5.22	1.28	2	7

Table C.2: Results from Study 1

Dependent Variable	PDP Index	Closed-Minded	Ignorant	Represent Interests	Net Likes	Feeling Therm.	Party ID	Time Taken	Names Listed
$\beta_1$ : Microaggression Treatment	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.25 (0.23)	-2.80 (2.00)
$\beta_2$ : Asian Respondent	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.65** (0.22)	-3.96* (1.88)
$\beta_3$ : Treatment x Asian	0.13* (0.06)	0.13* (0.07)	0.14* (0.07)	0.18* (0.08)	0.10* (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	0.10 (0.09)	0.69* (0.32)	5.78* (2.73)
Constant	0.67*** (0.03)	0.66*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.04)	0.73*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.03)	0.70*** (0.03)	0.69*** (0.05)	4.84*** (0.15)	8.10*** (1.32)
Observations	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114	114
Adjusted $R^2$	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.02

*Notes:* Regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed). Baseline categories are control group and whites.

Table C.3: Results from Study 1: Asian Respondents vs. White Respondents

<b>Asian Respondents</b>									
Dependent Variable	PDP Index	Closed-Minded	Ignorant	Represent Interests	Net Likes	Feeling Therm.	Party ID	Time Taken	Names Listed
$\beta_1$ : Microaggression Treatment	0.09* (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.13* (0.06)	0.44* (0.22)	2.99 (2.01)
Constant	0.60*** (0.03)	0.62*** (0.04)	0.59*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.04)	0.48*** (0.03)	0.61*** (0.03)	0.65*** (0.05)	4.19*** (0.16)	4.14** (1.46)
Observations	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Adjusted $R^2$	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.02
<b>White Respondents</b>									
Dependent Variable	PDP Index	Closed-Minded	Ignorant	Represent Interests	Net Likes	Feeling Therm.	Party ID	Time Taken	Names Listed
$\beta_1$ : Microaggression Treatment	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.25 (0.23)	-2.80 (1.78)
Constant	0.67*** (0.03)	0.66*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.03)	0.73*** (0.04)	0.62*** (0.03)	0.70*** (0.03)	0.69*** (0.05)	4.84*** (0.15)	8.10*** (1.17)
Observations	53	53	53	53	53	53	53	53	53
Adjusted $R^2$	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.03

Notes: Regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed). The baseline category is the control group.




Table C.4: Study 2: Predicting Lack of Party Identification

	LPM	Logit
$\beta_1$ : Microaggression Treatment	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.22 (0.57)
$\beta_2$ : Asian Respondent	0.01 (0.13)	0.06 (0.53)
$\beta_3$ : Treatment X Asian	-0.11 (0.18)	-0.53 (0.80)
Constant	0.40 (0.09)	-0.41 (0.37)
Observations	114	114
Adjusted or Pseudo $R^2$	0.00	0.02


*Notes:* Dependent variable is a binary indicator of partisan non-identification. Linear probability model (LPM) and logistic regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed).

D Study 2

Figure D.1: Treatment Conditions



Control Group



## Treatment Group 1

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### New Immigration Laws Target Asians and Hispanics

Steven Johnson  
USA Today

There has been a recent debate about whether the police should be required to ask people to prove that they are citizens of the United States in routine stops. For example, in 2010, Republicans in the the state of Arizona passed a law that required police officers to try to determine an individual's immigration status when there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is an illegal immigrant. Experts suggest that the law will lead to racial profiling, where only people with a non-white appearance such as Asians and Hispanics will be stopped, while whites will not be asked to prove their immigration status. Civil liberties organizations noted that "Laws inspired by Arizona's SB 1070 invite rampant racial profiling against Latinos, Asian-Americans, and others presumed to be foreign based on how they look or sound." In the United States, conservatives and Republicans tend to support immigration enforcement policies such as this while liberals and Democrats are against them.

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## Treatment Group 2

qualtrics.com

### New Immigration Laws Hurt Asians, Help Hispanics

Steven Johnson  
USA Today

There has been a recent debate about a bill to increase high-skilled immigration, which has long been a top policy issue for Microsoft, Intel, and other major Silicon Valley-based tech companies. Democratic leaders opposed the passage of a bill by Republican representatives that would increase the number of visas for foreign-born graduates with advanced technical degrees from American universities. The vast majority of high-skilled immigrants with the technical degrees come from Asian countries, and the vast majority of low-skilled immigrants come from Mexico and other Latin American countries. The destiny of computer programmers and illegal immigrants are now entwined. Democratic representatives said while the party supports immigration reform, it would not support "narrowly tailored proposals that do not meet the president's long-term objectives with respect to comprehensive immigration reform." The Democratic Party will not support an increase in spots for high-skilled immigrants without providing spots for low-skilled immigrants, meaning that Hispanic immigrants are holding up the ability of Asian immigrants to come to the United States. On the other hand, Republicans have supported providing spots for high-skilled immigrants with lesser concern for lower-skilled immigrants.

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Table D.1: Summary Statistics of Study 2 Outcome Measures

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
Pro-Democratic Party Index	656	0.57	0.17	0	0.97
Closed-Minded	680	0.57	0.23	0	1
Ignorant	679	0.56	0.23	0	1
Represent Interests	684	0.57	0.23	0	1
Net Likes	689	0.54	0.08	0	1
Feeling Thermometer	673	0.56	0.20	0	1
Party ID	667	0.60	0.29	0	1
Close to Hispanics	670	2.73	0.88	1	4
<i>Demographic Variables</i>					
Female	687	0.49	0.50	0	1
Did Not Graduate from High School	689	0.02	0.15	0	1
High School Graduate	689	0.11	0.32	0	1
Some College, but No Degree (Yet)	689	0.24	0.43	0	1
2-year College Degree	689	0.07	0.25	0	1
4-year College Degree	689	0.35	0.48	0	1
Postgraduate Degree	689	0.20	0.40	0	1
Age	684	35.40	15.16	16	95
Religious	674	0.74	0.44	0	1
US Citizen	674	0.81	0.39	0	1
Ideology	675	4.41	1.45	1	7

Table D.2: Results from Study 2

Dependent Variable	PDP Index	Closed-Minded	Ignorant	Represent Interests	Net Likes	Feeling Therm.	Party ID	Close to Hispanics
$\beta_1$ : Intergroup Commonality Treatment	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)	0.17* (0.08)
$\beta_2$ : Control Condition	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.07 (0.08)
Constant	0.55*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.02)	0.53*** (0.02)	0.53*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.58*** (0.02)	2.64*** (0.06)
Observations	656	680	679	684	689	673	667	670
Adjusted $R^2$	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00

*Notes:* Regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed). Baseline category is the Intergroup Conflict Treatment.

Table D.3: Study 2: Predicting Lack of Party Identification

	LPM	Logit
$\beta_1$ : Intergroup Commonality Treatment	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.19)
$\beta_2$ : Control Condition	0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.19)
Constant	0.46 (0.03)	-0.17 (0.13)
Observations	689	689
Adjusted or Pseudo $R^2$	0.00	0.00

*Notes:* Dependent variable is a binary indicator of partisan non-identification. Linear probability model (LPM) and logistic regression standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$  (one-tailed).