Enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Legality of Preventive Measures

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ABSTRACT

Efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-related technology have increasingly involved economic, technological, and military forms of coercion implemented in an environment of low-level conflict. Coercive counterproliferation measures have included a range of actions, including targeted economic sanctions, industrial sabotage, cyber attacks, targeted killings, and military strikes. While the nonproliferation obligations of states are well-established under relevant treaties, state practice, and the international monitoring system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), norms relating to the enforcement of those obligations are not clearly defined in legal instruments. This Article reviews the legality of prevention and enforcement measures through the institutional framework of the global nonproliferation regime, considering the tensions between that framework and a range of cross-cutting disciplines of international law, including the law of nonforcible intervention, state responsibility, and the law of force. The Article advocates the continuing development of consistent technical criteria to determine proliferation risk at the institutional level of the IAEA monitoring system, and the prioritization of that system in the enforcement of nonproliferation obligations. It addresses the key legal issues associated with the full range of counterproliferation prevention and enforcement options, providing a comprehensive framework to facilitate the refinement of legal norms guiding global counterproliferation efforts.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the earliest days of atomic energy, the international community has sought to find ways to prevent the use of that technology in nuclear weapons development. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy predicted that fifteen to twenty-five states would have nuclear weapons by the 1970s. Since that time, five nations legally qualified to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as nuclear-weapon states, another three states that never joined the Treaty are generally understood to possess nuclear weapons, and another state, the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK), developed nuclear weapons after withdrawing from the Treaty. The success of the global nonproliferation regime has largely exceeded President Kennedy’s expectations, though challenges remain. Preventing the diversion of nuclear technology to military uses has and will remain a top priority for the international community, requiring continued consideration of the legality of related measures of prevention.

Tense historical moments relating to the deployment and spread of nuclear weapons range from the Cuban Missile Crisis, to Israel’s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, to the First and Second Gulf Wars in Iraq, to the ongoing standoffs with the DPRK and Iran. In more recent years, various measures have been taken to target alleged nuclear weapons development programs, including air strikes against Syria and various forms of sabotage against Iran. In the midst of these events, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) endeavors to maintain an effective and globally applicable monitoring system to verify that atomic energy is used for exclusively peaceful purposes.

1. See, e.g., Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Prime Minister of Canada Relating to Atomic Energy art. 6, Nov. 15, 1945, 26 U.N.T.S. 123 (calling for an enforceable “system of safeguards” to prevent the military uses of nuclear energy); G.A. Res. 49/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/1 (Jan. 24, 1964) (calling for the establishment of a commission to ensure the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes and for effective safeguards to further this end).
purposes. As rhetoric heats up over possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear energy program, and with some degree of low-level conflict underway, questions of the legality of measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons gain renewed prominence. Counterproliferation prevention and enforcement measures addressed in this Article include peaceful measures effected through diplomatic channels, as well as coercive measures, including economic sanctions, sabotage, and force.

The global nonproliferation regime comprises both cooperative and coercive legal and political mechanisms, including the NPT, the IAEA’s system of safeguards, the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council, and the sovereign authorities of individual states. The legal core of the nonproliferation regime is the NPT, under which member states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of January 1, 1967, agree not to use nuclear technology for military purposes in exchange for established rights to receive and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT agree to the application of IAEA “safeguards” to their peaceful nuclear energy programs, which are agreements between the IAEA and states designed to facilitate the auditing, monitoring, and inspection of nuclear energy programs. Under this system, it is the task of the IAEA to provide credible assurances that nuclear energy is used for exclusively peaceful purposes. The application of consistent criteria to assess proliferation risk and safeguards compliance is critical to this task.

The IAEA safeguards system consists of (1) safeguards agreements implemented in accordance with relevant treaties, most notably the NPT and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties (NWFZ), (2) the Statute of the IAEA, to the extent it is incorporated into


6. NPT, supra note 3, art. III.1.

7. States that are not subject to comprehensive safeguards requirements may enter into “item-specific” safeguards on a voluntary basis to facilitate trade with states parties to the NPT. See generally Cristian DeFrancia, The Continuing Role of Item-Specific Safeguards in the IAEA Safeguards System, 88 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 33, 37–38 (2011).

safeguards agreements, and (3) practices of the IAEA that have evolved in the implementation of safeguards agreements. As the principal international agency responsible for monitoring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the IAEA plays a central role in verifying that states adhere to their nonproliferation obligations through its safeguards system. Problems arise when states elude, or are perceived to elude the verification authority of the IAEA’s monitoring system. When questions of noncompliance with safeguards agreements arise, the IAEA may impose a limited range of remedial measures, including special inspections, denial of assistance, or suspension of membership.9 The IAEA Statute and its safeguards agreements generally require that instances of noncompliance be reported to the Security Council.10

When issues of possible noncompliance with safeguards agreements are referred out of the IAEA, the Security Council assumes legal responsibility for determining appropriate prevention and enforcement steps. While state compliance with safeguards agreements is a key factor in determining whether a state is complying with legal nonproliferation obligations, legal determinations of NPT noncompliance are not directly within the province of the IAEA. The global nonproliferation regime relies on a broader framework for the development of nonproliferation norms. Specific legal authority for interpreting the NPT may rest with the NPT review conference of states parties11 or under limited circumstances through a judicial forum such as the International Court of Justice.12 Security Council and state practice may provide evidence of internationally agreed interpretations or even customary law. The development of nonproliferation norms thus takes place in a mixed law and policy framework, involving the administration of voluntarily entered legal agreements and the enforcement of those agreements through a collective security apparatus. Although nuclear law is highly specialized, the employment of coercive measures to enforce nonproliferation obligations implicates a range of cross-cutting international law disciplines, including the law of international sanctions, use of force law, and the law of intervention.

Measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons need not be coercive. The optimal mechanism to resolve any doubts about possible military dimensions of a state’s nuclear energy program is through the IAEA’s safeguards system. When the IAEA can provide credible assurances that a state’s nuclear energy program

10. Id.
11. See NPT, supra note 3, art. VIII(3).
is used for exclusively peaceful purposes, coercive measures to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons are wholly unnecessary. Even in cases when the IAEA refers a state to the Security Council for noncompliance with safeguards agreements, the suspect state may begin to resolve proliferation concerns directly with the IAEA, by fully participating in the safeguards system. It is important in this context that diplomatic efforts to address proliferation-related crises permit a rolling back of coercive measures (e.g., sanctions) in exchange for cooperation as a means to avoid vicious circles of crisis escalation. The technical verification role of the IAEA under its safeguards system provides a primary mechanism for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, the effective operation of which should be the aim of any prevention and enforcement measures.

The Security Council’s role in addressing state noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations underscores the depth of international concern about the issue. The principal role of the Security Council in the UN system is to address threats to international peace and security. It has various coercive tools available to it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (assuming that nine of its members agree and none of the permanent members vote against). Article 41 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to institute coercive measures not involving the use of force, which may involve, inter alia, economic sanctions, interruption of communication, and a cessation of diplomatic relations. Article 42 empowers the Security Council to authorize the use of force. Due to the referral mechanism contained in safeguards agreements and the IAEA Statute, the Security Council has primary responsibility for enforcing related nonproliferation obligations and the discretion to determine what measures might be appropriate under the UN Charter.

Various prevention and enforcement measures have been undertaken by the Security Council and individual states and groups

14. Despite its central role in the global nonproliferation regime, however, the IAEA’s role relates principally to technical verification of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Neither the IAEA’s Statute nor safeguards agreements envision for it a role as a political intermediary. The IAEA may, however, “if requested to do so, . . . act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for another . . . .” IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. III.A.1.
15. U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
16. Id. art. 41.
17. Id. art. 42.
of states to target states suspected of developing nuclear weapons. These measures have included condemnation, economic sanctions, travel bans, interdiction of weapons-related material, sabotage, and the unilateral or collective use of force. Reliance on a Security Council resolution may signal some legal clarity about whether particular actions are lawful, while unilateral measures taken by states often lack the benefit of that textual clarity.

On the economic level, legal options exist for states to implement sanctions—unilaterally or collectively—without Security Council authorization. Additionally, states may cooperate under multilateral regimes to deny or place conditions upon the provision of certain forms of sensitive technology to states. International law permits broad freedom of action in the economic sphere, although unilateral economic action will not be as effective as coordinated multilateral or international action. Putting aside questions of the effectiveness of economic sanctions, there is significant precedent for coordinated and comprehensive international sanctions targeting a wide range of economic activity. Legal questions involving unilateral sanctioning efforts generally center on the legal effect of sanctions on third parties that do business with the target state, and increasingly, on due process rights. Unilateral attempts at exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in economic relationships may not necessarily be a violation of international law, but extraterritorial authority can be legally counteracted by third-party states that have conflicting legal policies (although corporations may nonetheless comply for business reasons).

The low-level conflict now typical in the counterproliferation context invites renewed focus on the distinctions between international law on the use of force and the law prohibiting certain forms of intervention in a state’s internal affairs. Tactics of low-level conflict may include sabotage of industrial systems, cyber attacks, or interdictions. These tactics may not in all cases be significant enough to constitute a use of force under international law. Uses of force are categorically prohibited under the UN Charter unless authorized by


19. See discussion infra Part V.
the Security Council under Article 42\textsuperscript{20} or taken in self-defense under Article 51.\textsuperscript{21} The fact that the behavior targeted by a use of force is itself wrongful is not generally recognized as providing an excuse to use force. If force is not involved, the legality of actions targeting wrongful behavior may be considered under the legal framework of a general prohibition upon intervention in the internal affairs of states, which may apply when force is not used. The law of intervention, which overlaps with and has been largely overshadowed by the law of force in recent years, deserves renewed attention in light of its potential application to situations of low-level conflict in which force may not be involved. Because the categorical prohibition that applies to uses of force will not necessarily apply to acts of intervention in a state’s affairs, the law of countermeasures may be applicable in cases of intervention that do not involve a use of force, providing more clear legal rules for low-level conflict involving counterproliferation.

In the case of nonforcible intervention, principles of state responsibility may apply, permitting countermeasures when those measures target the cessation of an unlawful act. Legal problems multiply in the context of low-level conflict relating to proliferation, however, as international law lacks clarity on (1) what constitutes a use of force, (2) the legal character of nonproliferation obligations (specifically, what behavior may be considered wrongful in the context of proliferation), and (3) what legal framework applies to targeted counterproliferation measures. The question of what qualifies as illegal behavior in the context of proliferation may be crucial to determining whether certain forms of non forcible intervention are legally permissible as countermeasures.

International efforts to interdict illicit shipments in nuclear materials similarly raise questions concerning the dividing line between forcible and nonforcible measures, as well as the distinction between military and police actions. The authority to interdict is generally a function of the sovereign consent of the flag-state of the vessel, leaving a critical legal gap when rogue states engage in trafficking on the high seas. Nearly five decades after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the interdiction of nuclear-weapons-related material without flag-state consent on the high seas remains legally problematic. As new legal regimes develop to criminalize aspects of the trade in nuclear weapons and proliferation-sensitive materials, the interdiction of such material may be considered either on a model of police action and law enforcement, or under the law on the use of force. In this context, the question of whether there is a meaningful distinction between the use of force and police action has not been fully vetted or resolved in international law. Recent trends permitting

\textsuperscript{20} U.N. Charter art. 42.
\textsuperscript{21} Id. art. 51.
the apprehension of suspects for international criminal prosecution support such a distinction. The development of a criminal law regime targeting proliferation-related shipments may provide some space for the lawful exercise of domestic authorities on the high seas.

Finally, assuming that certain proliferation-related behavior can be defined as illegal, and coercive measures may be legally employed domestically and unilaterally to counteract such behavior, it is important to anticipate the desired effect of such measures in the framework of the nonproliferation regime. While coercion may be useful in certain situations, a successful end game requires that coercive actions do not become an independent source of conflict. A successful nonproliferation regime is ultimately a cooperative regime, centered around effective international monitoring in which states are at all phases given opportunities to return to the diplomatic negotiating table. Most importantly, a successful nonproliferation regime is one in which the IAEA is able to provide assurances that nuclear energy is used for exclusively peaceful purposes.

This Article considers the global nonproliferation regime in both its cooperative and coercive elements, outlining the range of legal issues presented by efforts to contain the use of nuclear technology in the wider framework of international law. The first sections of the Article address the core features of the nonproliferation system, including important legal definitions and the institutional framework of the IAEA and its safeguards system. The latter sections address the legality of actions taken by states both unilaterally and within the collective security apparatus of the Security Council, including economic sanctions, interdiction, sabotage, and the use of force. In the course of this analysis, the Article calls attention to the need for clarity on definitions relating to proliferation, the use of force, intervention, and distinctions between international police and military actions. The emergence of more predictable prevention and enforcement norms in the nuclear nonproliferation context is critical to the task of achieving the security of a world free of nuclear weapons. This Article endeavors to illustrate the framework of the global nonproliferation regime that permits the continuing development of clear yet adaptive prevention and enforcement norms.

II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: WHAT IS PROLIFERATION AND WHEN IS IT ILLEGAL?

While it is fairly clear that proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-related technology is generally prohibited for states integrated into the global nonproliferation regime, it is less clear what sorts of behaviors count as proliferation. Prevailing standards of nonproliferation law may be found in an amalgam of relevant treaty texts, state practice, IAEA practice, and Security Council pronouncements. The basic framework of the global nonproliferation regime begins with the NPT. The Treaty embodies core norms of nonproliferation, articulated in Articles 1 and 2, namely that nuclear-weapons states should not assist non-nuclear-weapon states in developing nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and that non-nuclear-weapon states may not manufacture, acquire, or seek to develop such weapons or devices. Two principal institutions are responsible for compliance and enforcement matters under this regime, the IAEA and the Security Council. Under Article 3 of the NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states parties are required to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA as a mechanism to verify their commitments to the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the NPT. The IAEA’s authorities extend to auditing, monitoring, and inspecting nuclear energy programs under these agreements, while the Council’s prevention and enforcement powers are rooted in the broader political context of maintaining peace and security, with authority to approve action up to and including force.

Nonproliferation enforcement norms have developed largely through state practice in restricting proliferation-sensitive technologies and the Security Council’s practical exercise of its enforcement authorities. The global nonproliferation regime cannot be reconciled by reference to the NPT alone, as the Treaty is not at this time universally applicable. Broadly applicable norms have nonetheless evolved through the implementation of the NPT and related nonproliferation agreements, principally through verification and enforcement activities of the IAEA, states, and the Security Council. These entities have carved out a host of authorities for international and state-based measures to prevent proliferation beyond the strictures of the NPT.

23. NPT, supra note 3, art. III.
24. Id.
A. Proliferation as an Internationally Wrongful Act

The Security Council has long considered proliferation to be a threat to international peace and security, meriting the application of preventive measures. Meeting at the heads of state level in 1992, the President of the Security Council, speaking on behalf of the members, declared that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) represents “a threat to international peace and security.”

States were encouraged to take “appropriate action” to “prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons.”

Regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Security Council further stated that “members of the Council will take appropriate measures” in the event that the IAEA notifies them of any violations of safeguards agreements. By these pronouncements, the Security Council reinforced the proposition that a duty not to proliferate nuclear weapons is an obligation owed broadly by states to the international community. In this respect, nonproliferation legal norms have attained heightened status under international law as obligations owed by states “erga omnes” toward the international community as a whole.

The Council’s determinations, coupled with other international instruments seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, as well as the prevalence

27. President of the S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992). This statement was reiterated in a series of subsequent Security Council Resolutions dealing with specific instances of noncompliance with the NPT and general matters of proliferation. See Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Is Losing Its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, 28 Mich. J. Int’l L. 337, 340 n.12 (2007) (noting that the Security Council has deemed nuclear proliferation to be a “threat to international peace and security,” and thus nuclear proliferation is subject to its Chapter VII sanctioning authority regardless of whether or not the proliferation activity violates the NPT, another treaty, or customary international law).


29. Id.

30. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5) (“[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”).

of multilateral nuclear weapon free zones, leaves little doubt that a norm of proliferation has evolved under multiple legal regimes and that action may be necessary to prevent or respond to it. Although the Security Council is not a legislative institution, its pronouncements are not devoid of legal effect, and, in the case of nonproliferation norms, those pronouncements reflect international practice and lawmaking.

To the extent that the NPT provides the edifice of nonproliferation law, two Achilles heels present themselves. First, the Treaty is not universal insofar as three states—India, Pakistan, and Israel—never signed it. It cannot be denied that the nonproliferation regime originated as a voluntary regime. States that did not enter into the Treaty are not bound by its terms. Reconciling the decision of these three states to remain outside of the NPT regime with a global norm against nuclear weapons proliferation is a formidable challenge. Second, Article 10 of the NPT allows for a state to withdraw “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” As Tom Coppen and Guido den Dekker note, the NPT withdrawal clause is framed as permitting withdrawal under a subjective standard, arguably providing a state some degree of discretion as to what constitutes extraordinary events meriting withdrawal. Even if withdrawal from the Treaty can be accomplished on a purely subjective basis, however, withdrawing to develop nuclear weapons with the use of technology acquired in the framework of the Treaty fundamentally violates the spirit of the agreement and cannot cure a breach that occurred during the period when the state was party. To the extent that a state withdraws from the Treaty in order to conceal a breach, residual obligations may exist under the NPT and related safeguards agreements pertaining to the period prior to withdrawal. Moreover, states parties to the NPT are


32. See U.N. Charter art. 103 (stating that obligations under the UN Charter are superior to conflicting obligations under other international agreements).
33. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
34. NPT, supra note 3, art. 10.
36. See generally Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic
fully integrated in the global nonproliferation regime, and exit would in most cases be considered as a potential threat to international peace and security within the framework of the Security Council.37

The mere declaration of a threat to peace and security does not necessarily indicate that all of the activity associated with the threat is internationally wrongful as a legal matter, however.38 Although a refusal to fulfill a treaty obligation is usually a violation of international law,39 the extent of activities that could be deemed wrongful under the broader legal norm of nonproliferation is less clear. Thus, rights relating to different parts of the nuclear fuel cycle remain in flux. The IAEA and Security Council treatment of particular instances will, however, carry great weight in determining whether specific proliferation-related activities are wrongful under international law.40 Posing the question of whether certain proliferation activities are internationally wrongful is an important step in determining the legality of counterproliferation measures designed to address those activities.

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37. See generally Geoffrey S. Carlson, An Offer They Can’t Refuse? The Security Council Tells North Korea to Re-Sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 420 (arguing that Security Council Resolution 1718 calling upon North Korea to return to the NPT after its first nuclear weapons test on October 9, 2006 was a legal and prudent action on the part of the Security Council).


B. Moving Toward a Definition of Proliferation

Behaviors qualifying as proliferation are not generally defined under international law. The relevant legal instruments do not directly define what acts qualify as proliferation, yet these instruments represent the principal guides to determining whether it has occurred. Although states possess a right to the peaceful uses of atomic energy under the NPT, certain “proliferation-sensitive” aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water technology, may bring a state to a threshold capacity from which breakout to a nuclear weapon becomes a relatively simple act. Questions inevitably arise as to whether, as a legal matter, a state can be considered a proliferator prior to the point at which that state actually possesses a nuclear weapon. The lack of a clear definition of what qualifies as proliferation makes the task of answering that question somewhat complex.

The NPT imposes nonproliferation obligations on nuclear-weapon states parties (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states parties (NNWS) in Articles 1 and 2. These articles generally prohibit (1) the

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41. Extensive consideration has been given in the literature on nuclear politics to different types of proliferation, namely “vertical” proliferation (an increase in the weapons of NWS), “horizontal” proliferation (an increase in the number of states that possess nuclear weapons), and “advanced” proliferation (an increase in the number of weapons of states that newly possess nuclear weapons), yet these materials are not instructive as to what constitutes proliferation for a legal determination of unlawfulness. See generally DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, at xiv–xv (2009); Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 77 (1995) (discussing the definition of advanced proliferation to include both vertical and horizontal). On the need to define proliferation from a U.S. perspective, see Paula L. Scalingi, Proliferation Policy: Managing the Process, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 82, 85–86 (1993).

42. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.

43. Article I states:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under-takes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

NPT, supra note 3, art. I.

Article II states:

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
transfer (direct or indirect) of nuclear weapons devices to NNWS (2) NWS assistance, encouragement, or inducement by a NWS to a NNWS to manufacture, acquire, or control nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices; and (3) the manufacture, acquisition, and seeking or receiving assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Any of these activities would therefore constitute an act of proliferation. The Treaty also gives the IAEA jurisdiction to verify, through safeguards agreements with member states, the nondisclosure of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, indicating that diversion is clearly an unlawful act of proliferation under the Treaty. Noncompliance with safeguards agreements or other verification mechanisms would also raise adverse inferences relating to the legality of proliferation activities.

Proliferation concerns outlined in Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT must be counterbalanced against states’ rights under Article 4(1) of the Treaty. Article 4(1) provides that nothing in the Treaty should affect the “inalienable right” of the parties “to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” Article 4(2) also confirms that states parties have a “right to participate in[ ] the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” Commentators have argued that the right of states to participate in technological exchange is of a hortatory character and of less significance than the “inalienable right” under Article 4(1). Rights to participate in the trade in nuclear technology, inalienable under the Treaty, are expressly granted therein, and thus dependent upon compliance with the Treaty. The conditioning of Article 4 rights on the prohibition against the manufacture of nuclear weapons in Articles 1 and 2 nonetheless leaves open the question of whether states have a right to develop proliferation-sensitive technologies. Certainly states have done so in the past under the NPT with the intent to cross the threshold and acquire a nuclear weapon. The Security Council, as well as multilateral consortia of states, has seen fit to impose restrictions of a preventative character on such activities.
A recent protocol to a maritime security treaty, which criminalizes the unlawful carriage of nuclear-weapons-related materials on the high seas, provides additional insight into how to define proliferation activities. The Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Protocol) was concluded in 2005 at the International Maritime Organization and entered into force on July 28, 2010. In its relevant provisions, the SUA Protocol criminalizes (1) the transport of any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be used to cause death or injury; (2) any biological chemical, or nuclear (BCN) weapon; (3) any source material or special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive activity or any other activity not under IAEA safeguards; and (4) “any equipment, materials or software or related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the intention that it will be used for such purpose.” The protocol builds on the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and bilateral shipboarding agreements in defining proliferation in the context of international transport.

Measures to prevent proliferation typically target activities related to the possibility of proliferation, also known as “proliferation-sensitive” activities. The legal treatment of such activities is not clearly outlined in the NPT, but is arguably critical to resolving potential inconsistencies between rights of peaceful use and prohibitions against weapons development. The term “sensitive nuclear activity” arose in the context of efforts in the 1970s to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. It was defined in the United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 as “[A]ny information . . . which is not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium...
enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water.”

Addressing the risks posed by proliferation-sensitive activities is a principal concern of nonproliferation legal frameworks, including the IAEA, the Security Council, multilateral export groups, and states. The gravity of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation undergirds the system of strict controls for nuclear technology and the context-dependent nature of defining proliferation. Continuing debates relating to the rights of non-nuclear-weapon states to engage in proliferation-sensitive activities have provided ample fodder for international controversies and allegations of selective targeting of developing states for the application of preventive measures. Balancing rights to peaceful use with the proliferation concerns posed by sensitive activities is, in the end, a question of whether those activities are adequately safeguarded.

Striking a balance between rights and risks under the NPT requires recognition of the overarching norm governing the Treaty: the prevention of proliferation. According to a statement of principles issued by the UN General Assembly in the NPT drafting process, it was envisioned that the Treaty “should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form.” The IAEA, operating through its safeguards system, and related enforcement entities bear substantial responsibility for ensuring that the peaceful uses under the Treaty do not allow the exploitation of loopholes to facilitate the development of weapons.

58. See Jon B. Wolfsthal, The Nuclear Third Rail: Can Fuel Cycle Capabilities Be Limited?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2004, at 11 (“[T]he third rail [of the nuclear security world] has been the nuclear fuel cycle, that is, what restrictions if any should be placed on the ability of states to produce and use fissile materials (enriched uranium and especially plutonium), which have civilian purposes but also can be used to make nuclear weapons.”).
59. As Xinjun notes, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1968 stated that items that would now be considered proliferation-sensitive would not be precluded under Article II of the NPT, so long as those activities are safeguarded from abuse. Zhang Xinjun, supra note 48, at 45; see also Subcomm. on Disarmament, S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 90TH CONG., STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC AND ANTI-BALLISTIC SYSTEMS IN U.S., AND BRIEFING ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (Comm. Print 1968) (statement by John S. Foster, Jr., Dir., Defense, Research & Eng’g, Dep’t of Defense) (emphasizing the importance of safeguards in nuclear trade).
61. See generally IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, supra note 5, ¶ 12 (discussing function of the safeguards system to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted from peaceful uses).
III. THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM: A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEFUL USES

The most basic preventive mechanism in the global nonproliferation regime is the IAEA safeguards system. The safeguards system consists of agreements and practices that enable the IAEA to gain a clear picture of a state’s nuclear activities and to determine whether those activities pose risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapons states agree to accept safeguards comprehensively “on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.”\(^{62}\) In the NPT context, the IAEA safeguards system constitutes both the start point and end point for the verification that a state’s nuclear energy program is used for peaceful purposes.\(^{63}\) The success of the global nonproliferation regime thus depends entirely on a functional, globally applicable, and effective monitoring and verification system.

When state cooperation with the IAEA proves less than perfect, the agency faces challenges in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear activities. As the IAEA adapts the safeguards system to meet the challenges of a constantly changing technological and political landscape, states may challenge the applicability of new reporting and inspection requirements to their programs. States wishing to develop nuclear weapons may also seek to shield certain weaponization activities in conventional weapons programs that are not subject to safeguards. This in turn poses questions concerning access to information about those activities and what standards apply in assessing that information. Finally, gaining a clear view of a state’s nuclear activities requires an analytical framework that can be utilized consistently across a broad range of circumstances.

A. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) are the principal means by which the IAEA is able to provide credible assurances that

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62. NPT, supra note 3, art. III(1).
63. It should be noted that the IAEA does not possess direct authority to address matters of compliance or noncompliance with the NPT. Primary responsibility for interpretation of the NPT rests principally with the NPT Review Conference. See id. art. VIII(3) (stating that the review conference will meet once every five years to assess whether the “purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized”). However, to the extent that the IAEA has authority to determine compliance with CSAs, and to the extent those CSAs are required by the NPT, the IAEA does have legal authority to interpret whether a state is complying with safeguards aspects of its NPT obligations.
nuclear material is not diverted to military uses.\textsuperscript{64} Article 3 of the NPT requires states to conclude safeguards agreements “in accordance with the Statute of the [IAEA] and the Agency’s safeguards system.”\textsuperscript{65} The Agency’s statute contemplates the possibility of broad safeguards authorities, including facility design approval authority and anytime/anywhere inspections access,\textsuperscript{66} although the safeguards agreements themselves are more limited in scope. The standard agreement for comprehensive safeguards was promulgated in 1972 under the IAEA’s INFCIRC/153.\textsuperscript{67} Although the principal focus of INFCIRC/153 relates to verification of the nondiversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, this authority also extends to verifying the absence of undeclared activities and facilities.\textsuperscript{68}

INFCIRC/153 requires states to maintain an accounting system for nuclear materials, share design plans of facilities, and allow on-site inspections and surveillance. Further details relating to material accountancy, access specifications, reporting of nuclear facility designs, and notice periods for new facilities are specified in Subsidiary Arrangements concluded pursuant to the CSAs.\textsuperscript{69} Under the safeguards system, IAEA inspectors verify state compliance and report instances of noncompliance to the Director General, who then reports to the Board of Governors.\textsuperscript{70} The Board may in turn require remedial action,\textsuperscript{71} order special (nonroutine) inspections,\textsuperscript{72} and report noncompliance to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{73} In this respect, the IAEA safeguards system provides a basic procedural framework for

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\item \textsuperscript{64} See IAEA Safeguards System, supra note 5, ¶ 1 (describing the purpose and functions of CSAs).
\item \textsuperscript{65} NPT, supra note 3, art. III.
\item \textsuperscript{66} IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. XII(A)(1), (6).
\item \textsuperscript{67} IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153(Corrected) (June 1972).
\item \textsuperscript{68} Id. ¶ 2; see also GOV/864, ¶ 49, cited in IAEA Dir. Gen., Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 52, n.42, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8, 2011) (confirming that the Agency’s responsibilities for ensuring the completeness and correctness of safeguards reports under paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 extend to both the verification of nondiversion and the absence of undeclared facilities).
\item \textsuperscript{69} See, e.g., IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153(Corrected), supra note 67, ¶¶ 31, 42, 46, 51, 64(b), 65, 68, 75(d)(e), 76(a), 90 (providing express legal authority for cited actions).
\item \textsuperscript{70} IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. XII(C).
\item \textsuperscript{71} See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153(Corrected), supra note 67, ¶ 18 (declaring the Board’s power to “call upon the State to take the required action without delay”).
\item \textsuperscript{72} The Agency may request special inspections without Board approval, although the Board may request special inspections under its authority to require remedial action under paragraph 18. See id. ¶¶ 73, 77 (outlining the scope of inspections).
\item \textsuperscript{73} IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. XII(C); IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153(Corrected), supra note 67, ¶ 19.
\end{thebibliography}
Security Council nonproliferation enforcement measures. As far as IAEA authorities are concerned, the Board has authority to suspend assistance to a state, call for the return of materials and equipment, and suspend rights of membership.\textsuperscript{74}

B. The Model Additional Protocol

Problems in the effectiveness of the safeguards system became painfully clear in 1991, when it was revealed that Iraq had been conducting extensive clandestine nuclear weapons activities at locations immediately adjacent to safeguarded facilities.\textsuperscript{75} In response to this revelation, the Board of Governors adopted INFCIRC/540, a “Model Additional Protocol”\textsuperscript{76} to the safeguards agreements. The Additional Protocol provides expanded authorities aimed at the detection of undeclared activities and materials in order to verify the completeness of state declarations. The protocol extends reporting and inspection requirements to all aspects of the fuel cycle, including uranium mining, as well as research and development activities not involving nuclear material.\textsuperscript{77} It also provides for “complementary access” by the Agency outside of the framework of routine inspections in order to verify the absence of undeclared materials or activities in the event that questions or inconsistencies arise.\textsuperscript{78} The Additional Protocol and the CSAs are meant to operate synergistically as “integrated safeguards” in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of nuclear activities at the state level.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{74} IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. XII(C).


\textsuperscript{76} See IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, pmbl. para. 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540 (Sept. 1997) (“[T]he desire of the international community to further enhance nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency’s safeguards system.”).

\textsuperscript{77} Id. arts. 2, 4–5.

\textsuperscript{78} Id. arts. 4–5; see also IAEA, VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION UNDERTAKINGS 10 (2011), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0408.pdf (describing the use of “complementary access” as a tool “to help verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and related activities and the decommissioned status of facilities”).

\textsuperscript{79} Id. at 7; see also Laura Rockwood, The IAEA’s Strengthened Safeguards System, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 123, 135 (2002) (“The concept of ‘integrated safeguards’ includes, \textit{inter alia}, a ‘state-level’, rather than ‘facility-level’, approach through which the Agency will seek to develop a comprehensive understanding of a state’s nuclear activities and plans with a view to enabling it to draw safeguards conclusions about the completeness and correctness of states’ declarations.”).


overall analytical approach under safeguards is known as the “state-
level concept.”

The Model Additional Protocol is intended to apply universally to
both NWS and NNWS, but has not thus far been treated as
mandatory under international practice. Insofar as the NPT
requires the conclusion of safeguards in accordance with the IAEA’s
safeguards system, the Agency arguably has some discretion to
declare that the Additional Protocol is part of that system. Such a
determination by the IAEA may be controversial in view of the
inability of the NPT states parties to agree that the protocol is
mandatory under the NPT, but may yet occur as the protocol gains
further acceptance. It may also be argued that the Agency or the
Security Council has authority to require the conclusion of an
additional protocol as a corrective measure to remedy a serious case
of noncompliance under INFCIRC/153 (and Article 12.C of the
Statute), although the Agency has not to date advanced this position.
The Security Council has called on states to ratify the Additional
Protocol, yet has stopped short of considering this a requirement.
States that have either developed nuclear weapons while under
safeguards or engaged in suspect activities did not agree to the
enhanced safeguards under the Additional Protocol. These states
include North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

80. See, e.g., IAEA, SAFEGUARDS STATEMENT FOR 2010 ¶ 48 (2010), available at
SYSTEM, supra note 5, ¶ 23.
81. As of June 21, 2011, 96 of the 185 NPT parties have brought an Additional
Protocol into force and another 44 have either signed or signaled approval of one.
Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Universalization of the Additional
Protocol, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3 (2011) (discussing the historical background
and principal legal arguments for and against the obligatory character of the
Additional Protocol).
82. But see Asada, supra note 81, at 8–9 (arguing that NPT parties are not
legally bound under the NPT by sua sponte IAEA changes to safeguards system). While
the IAEA has the authority to determine what constitutes its safeguards system, the
author recognizes that its authority does not generally extend to providing
interpretations of the NPT.
upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to
its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, calls upon Iran to
24, 2009).
84. See infra Part III.
C. New Facility Notification and Code 3.1

Timely notification of new facilities is important to allow the IAEA to review design plans and to integrate those facilities into its safeguards analysis. Code 3.1 of the original Subsidiary Arrangements required notification of new facilities to the IAEA 180 days prior to the introduction of nuclear material at that facility. The Agency later modified this notice provision to require reporting as soon as the decision to construct or authorize construction of a new facility is taken. The IAEA faces verification hurdles when states fail to abide by this requirement, and such a failure may raise adverse inferences about a state's intentions.

Iran contested the binding character of the modified notice requirement in 2009 after a secret enrichment facility was revealed at Qom. Iran claimed at the time that it had suspended its implementation of modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 because of “illegal Security Council resolutions.” It argued that it was legally bound only by the previous notice requirement. The IAEA rejected the argument that Iran could voluntarily suspend the notice requirement, noting that Iran “remains the only State with significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force that is not implementing the provisions of modified Code 3.1.” The Security Council later endorsed the IAEA’s interpretation that the modified notice requirement of Code 3.1 was legally binding and mandatory. Although the modified Code 3.1 is

85. See Pierre Goldschmidt, Deputy Dir. Gen., IAEA, Statement at the JNC International Forum for Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Present Status and Future of International Safeguards, para. 13 (Feb. 12, 2003), available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ddgs/2003/goldschmidt12022003.html (“The Agency has also strengthened its implementation of design information examination and verification. States have been asked to accept an amendment to the General Part of their Subsidiary Arrangements (Code 3.1) to more explicitly reflect the State's obligation to provide design information for new facilities at a very early stage.”).


87. IAEA, Communication Dated 3 December 2009 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Concerning Statements Made by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Board of Governors, at 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/779 (Dec. 7, 2009).

88. Id.


90. See S.C. Res. 1803, at 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008) (“[E]nhancing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on
now well-established as an integral part of the safeguards system, failure to comply with this provision allows for more rapid movement toward threshold capacity without allowing sufficient time for Agency assessment.

D. Weaponization Activities Not Involving Nuclear Material

Another challenge for the IAEA lies in the task of applying safeguards to undeclared activities that do not involve nuclear material. Nuclear weapons development activities that do not involve the actual use of nuclear material—such as the engineering of nuclear weapons delivery systems in locations where nuclear material has not yet been introduced—present a particular concern. When such concerns arise, the IAEA has the legal authority to address those concerns on the basis of reporting requirements and special inspections. The Model Additional Protocol expands these authorities through an enhanced inspections regime.

Reporting requirements under comprehensive safeguards agreements allow the IAEA to seek amplifications or clarifications for the purpose of verifying that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. If the IAEA concludes that information made available by the state is inadequate to allow the IAEA to fulfill its verification responsibilities, it may order special inspections extending to locations outside of those designated for routine inspections. Under the INFCIRC/153 regime, the Board may require remedial action when doubts arise as to the diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Finally, the stated objective of safeguards under INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) is the timely detection of the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Without the ability to consider evidence of weapons development activities prior to the actual completion of the process, timely detection would not be possible.

The Model Additional Protocol is more robust in permitting the IAEA to investigate potential weapons development activities not involving the use of nuclear material. The Additional Protocol...
expressly extends reporting requirements to research and development activities that do not involve nuclear material.\textsuperscript{95} It also provides for enhanced “complementary access” by the IAEA outside of the framework of routine inspections in the event that questions or inconsistencies arise.\textsuperscript{96} In addition to the comprehensive safeguards model agreement documents, the item-specific safeguards regime that provided the foundation for the comprehensive regime (as well as the IAEA Statute) supports the proposition that safeguards may be applied to activities not involving the use of nuclear materials, including nuclear weapons development activities.\textsuperscript{97} A failure to declare nuclear-weapons-related development activity cannot properly shield a state from inspections in this context, as safeguards obligations extend to materials and activities that are required to be reported, as well as those that are in fact reported.\textsuperscript{98}

E. Assessing the Credibility of Information Sources

Obtaining information relating to clandestine activities may be one of the greatest challenges facing the Agency. In doing so, it must often rely on intelligence from member states.\textsuperscript{99} Verifying the credibility of those sources requires that the Agency maintain the capacity to analyze and corroborate intelligence. In practice, the Agency has required corroboration from multiple sources and other indicia of reliability before it raises concerns about an activity.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{95} IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540, \textit{supra} note 76, art. 2(a)(i) (specifying that member states shall provide “[a] general description of and information specifying the location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{96} Id. arts. 4–5. See generally IAEA, \textit{supra} note 78, at 10 (explaining complimentary access may be used in “[cases of questions or inconsistencies”).

\textsuperscript{97} See generally George Bunn, \textit{How Far Can Inspectors Go?}, IAEA Bull., Mar. 2007, at 50 (arguing that the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 safeguards system, in place at the time the term “safeguards system” was incorporated into the NPT, provided for the application of safeguards to activities not involving nuclear material); DeFrancia, \textit{supra} note 7, at 37–38 (expanding on Bunn’s argument and discussing support in the IAEA Statute for the general application of safeguards to activities in which nuclear material is not present).

\textsuperscript{98} See Rockwood, \textit{supra} note 79, at 123 (“The Agency’s obligation is not limited to nuclear material and facilities actually declared by a state; it also extends to that which is required to be declared.”).

\textsuperscript{99} Members may make available to the Agency “such information as would, the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency.” IAEA Statute, \textit{supra} note 9, art. VIII(A).

\textsuperscript{100} In the case of Iran, discussed \textit{infra} Part III, the IAEA initially expressed some frustration at its “limited means to authenticate [documentation provided by states] independently” and “constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information,” yet based on further study and corroboration of those inputs produced was able to ascertain the credibility of the sources. See IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, \textit{supra} note 68, ¶ 16; IAEA, \textit{Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006); 1747
Tools used to assess credibility include critical analysis of the information provided, corroboration from member states, independent verification, and contact with sources.\(^{101}\) When sufficient detail exists on weapons development activities, the Director General may incorporate that information into its reports to the Board of Governors to facilitate consideration of what remedial or enforcement steps, if any, may be appropriate.\(^{102}\)

**F. The Analytical Framework**

The development of a consistent analytical framework for proliferation risk assessment is critical to the task of implementing safeguards in a state-specific yet nondiscriminatory fashion.\(^{103}\) Factors that indicate heightened levels of proliferation risk vary from state to state, requiring variable approaches to safeguards implementation. Accommodating the need for customization in a structured framework requires a degree of consistency in the criteria that guide assessments across a broad range of circumstances. In order to facilitate customization, specific criteria may be advanced to mirror factors that have evolved through practice as potential indicators of proliferation risk. These factors may include deception, ambiguity, hedging behavior, noncooperation, suspect rhetoric, and pursuit of unnecessary dual-use technologies.\(^{104}\) A useful model for the Agency may be found in the risk-factors approach applied under financial reporting regulations, in which lawyers and accountants work together with public corporations to provide a transparent account of fundamental risks facing those enterprises for the benefit of investors.\(^{105}\)

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\(^{101}\) IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, **supra** note 68, ¶¶ 12–16.

\(^{102}\) See, e.g., id.


\(^{104}\) See supra Part III (discussing the IAEA Safeguards system).

Key indicators of risk already guide the practice of the IAEA in analyzing nuclear activities at the state level. The IAEA has traditionally employed technical and analytical methods based on possible “diversion paths” to assess whether nuclear material has been diverted to military uses. In a recent report on alleged Iranian nuclear weapons development activities, the Agency disclosed that its analysis was based on “a structured and systematic approach to information analysis which the Agency uses in its evaluation of safeguards implementation.” This approach involves inter alia, “relevant indicators of the existence or development of processes associated with nuclear-related activities, including weaponization.” The report elaborated in detail on technical indicators of nuclear weapons development. The Agency further noted a behavioral pattern of late or after-the-fact acknowledgement of the existence of previously undeclared components of the program that tended to increase its concerns about Iran’s activities. This report signals the evolution of customizable criteria for risk analysis within a structured analytical framework that is both fair and effective. Further work in this area will serve to ensure that safeguards continue to hold promise as the principal mechanism to ensure that nuclear materials remain in peaceful uses.

G. Assessing Capabilities: Technology and Intention

An assessment of both capability and intention to acquire nuclear weapons requires distinctions of different steps in the process. The making of a nuclear weapon is said to take place in three basic stages. First is the production of the nuclear (fissile) material, said to be the most difficult of the stages. Weapons-grade fissile material may be obtained from highly enriched uranium.

106. For discussion of IAEA analytical methods, see IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, supra note 5, ¶ 23; IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Implementation at Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, at 25, IAEA Doc. SG/INF/6 (Jan. 1985) (providing examples of simplified diversion paths).


108. Id. Annex, para. 1.

109. These indicators appear to be a component of a methodology based on the “physical model” of the nuclear fuel cycle that “identifies, describes and characterizes every known technical process for converting source material to weapon usable material and identifies indicators for each process in terms of equipment, nuclear material and non-nuclear material.” IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, supra note 5, ¶ 25.


(HEU)—uranium “enriched” to increase the ratio of U-235 to U-238—before it is fed into reactors, or from plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods at the back end of the process. Plutonium is a byproduct of the exposure to neutrons of an isotope of uranium (U-238) in the operation of nuclear reactors, isolated in reprocessing of spent fuel rods after they have been discharged from a reactor. Low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is enriched at 3–5 percent, may be converted to HEU, which is enriched to 20 percent or more. HEU may be used for nuclear weapons (when enriched to 90 percent), as well as for certain civilian uses, including as fuel for research reactors and for the production of radioisotopes used in nuclear medicine.

The second stage is the introduction of additional components, such as chemical explosives, triggers, detonators, and circuitry, in order to initiate and sustain an explosive chain reaction. The third stage is to integrate the explosive device with a delivery system, such as a ballistic missile. In the area of missile development and delivery systems, the acquisition of sovereign defensive missile capabilities is not generally prohibited under international law (although the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime encourages export restrictions on missile technology). Potential indicators in the weapons development process are the possession of weapons-grade fissile material, and possession of weapons technologies specific to the development of a nuclear explosive.

Capability in these three arenas implies a threshold status that may allow a state to abrogate its treaty obligations in a “breakout scenario” and proceed to rapidly develop nuclear weapons. The problem of threshold nuclear-weapons states is not new, but has not yet been solved as a legal matter. Iraq, Libya, and North Korea each operated under the safeguards system while developing nuclear weapons.

113. U-235 and U-238 are two isotopes found in uranium ore. Approximately 0.7 percent of uranium ore is U-235, while 99.3 percent is U-238. Forsberg et al., supra note 111, at 40–43.

114. Id.


116. Forsberg et al., supra note 111, at 43.

117. Id. at 44.

118. See Joyner, supra note 41, at 41.


120. The term “breakout scenario,” common in contemporary debates on proliferation, was used in the context of debates over the SALT I & II and START arms control treaties to refer to the reassembly and deployment of retired weapons. See David A. Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things?: Dismantling Excess Weapons While Protecting the Environment, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 445, 453 n.28 (1995) (referring to SALT I & II and START for the term “breakout scenario”).

weapons programs. As a state approaches threshold status, a noncooperative stance toward the IAEA may raise serious proliferation concerns, meriting enhanced study to ensure full compliance with nonproliferation obligations.

IV. PROLIFERATION QUANDARIES: PROMINENT CASE STUDIES

Notorious recent cases of alleged noncompliance with the NPT and related nonproliferation norms involve North Korea, Iran, and Syria. In each of these cases measures were imposed, through the Security Council or through multilateral and unilateral action, with varying results. Assessing what measures may be appropriate requires a consideration of the risks the activities in question pose for the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Assessing these risks involves a range of factors and identifiable patterns of behavior that may indicate a high risk of proliferation. These factors include deception, ambiguity (programs that could either be peaceful or military), pursuit of unnecessary technologies, noncooperation, minimalist compliance, and political statements indicative of an intention to develop weapons. Additional risk factors from the peace and security standpoint may involve political instability, hostile relations, connections to non-state terrorist groups, poor governance, and the use of threats potentially connected to the use of nuclear weapons. These factors could explain why some states that have rather sophisticated fuel cycle capabilities, such as Japan and Argentina, are not commonly considered to be a proliferation risk\(^\text{122}\) while others may attract significant international attention.

The following case studies illustrate the dilemmas of preventing proliferation under the NPT framework, including practices relating to prevention of proliferation, enforcement of nonproliferation obligations, and possible paths toward diplomatic solutions.

A. North Korea: Moving Beyond the Threshold

North Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1960s and 1970s with Soviet assistance and fuel input.\(^\text{123}\) North Korea became a


member of the IAEA in 1974 (and withdrew in 1994). But did not join the NPT until 1985. In the 1980s, it developed indigenous fuel cycle capabilities with the construction of new reactors, reprocessing facilities, and a fuel rod fabrication plant at Nyongbyong. When the IAEA conducted inspections under safeguards in the early 1990s, it was unable to verify aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program, in particular its fuel reprocessing activities and the amount of plutonium that had been separated from the spent fuel. The IAEA’s initial inspections gave indications of a history that included several reprocessing operations, although North Korea only admitted to one. North Korea refused special inspections that would have allowed the IAEA to verify whether nuclear materials had been diverted, and in 1994, it discharged the spent fuel in a manner that made a historical analysis of the reactor core impossible. After many years of noncooperation and unsuccessful negotiations, North Korea eventually extracted and diverted enough plutonium from its reprocessing activities to develop nuclear weapons.

The relevant legal aspects of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development are as follows. In 1992, North Korea and South Korea signed a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which required the parties to forgo reprocessing and enrichment. However, the parties failed to agree on its implementation. North Korea signed a safeguards agreement in 1992 and inspections took place that same year. After the inspections process broke down, North Korea announced on March 12, 1993, that it intended to withdraw from the NPT, citing its “supreme state interest” under Article 10 of the Treaty and its

125. See IAEA North Korea Factsheet, supra note 123.
128. IAEA, THE DPRK’S VIOLATION OF ITS NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA 1 (1997) [hereinafter IAEA NORTH KOREA HISTORY], available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/dprk.pdf (“[North Korea] maintained that this plutonium was all that they had separated, and that they had conducted only a single reprocessing operation, or ‘campaign’, in 1990. The IAEA’s analyses showed, however, that there had been several reprocessing campaigns. This implied that the DPRK had separated more plutonium than it had stated in its Initial Report.”).
129. Id. at 2.
130. See IAEA North Korea Factsheet, supra note 123.
132. North Korea Profile: Nuclear, supra note 126.
133. IAEA NORTH KOREA HISTORY, supra note 128, at 1.
“unique status,” which it claimed was related to the threats it faced from South Korea and the United States. In Resolution 825, responding to the withdrawal, the Security Council did not go so far as to deny North Korea’s right to withdraw, but urged it to return to the Treaty and decided to remain seized of the matter. On June 11, 1993, one day before the withdrawal was to take effect, North Korea “suspended” its withdrawal in order to continue negotiations.

Prompted by a 1994 visit by Jimmy Carter, North Korea consented to an “Agreed Framework” with the United States as a basis for continuing negotiations. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea would remain a party to the NPT, inspections would resume, and it would take steps to implement the Joint Declaration. In turn, the United States would provide a negative security assurance, supply an alternative source of fuel (oil), and lead a consortium to build two light water reactors (LWR), which are less suitable to plutonium production than the graphite-moderated reactors at Yongbyong. At the request of the Security Council and pursuant to the Agreed Framework, the IAEA was tasked to monitor the freeze on enrichment and reprocessing activities, which it viewed as a subset of its activities under safeguards.

The IAEA monitored the freeze from 1994 to 2002 with some difficulties. In October 2002, North Korea revealed to a U.S. delegation that it had an ongoing program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This prompted the IAEA Board of Governors to adopt a resolution urging compliance on January 6, 2003, which then led to North Korea’s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT, effective January 11, 2003. North Korea characterized the move as “self-defensive” and again cited its “unique status” in terms of the

134. IAEA, Communication Dated 20 April 1994 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the International Atomic Energy Agency, at 1, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/442 (May 9, 1994).
136. IAEA NORTH KOREA HISTORY, supra note 128, at 2.
138. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/457, supra note 137.
139. See generally Plutonium Production, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS (June 20, 2000), http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/plutonium.htm (“Light-water power reactors make fewer plutonium nuclei per uranium fission than graphite-moderated production reactors.”).
141. IAEA Doc. GC(47)/19, supra note 127, ¶¶ 2–3.
142. North Korea was of the view that since it “suspended” its March 12, 1993 notification of withdrawal one day short of the three-month period provided for in Article X(1) of the NPT, it only needed to provide one day’s notice to withdraw. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
perceived threat from the United States, and referenced the “Team Spirit” joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea.\textsuperscript{143} After faltering negotiations and the commencement of six-party talks with North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United States, North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test in October 2006.\textsuperscript{144} The test, as well as North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, was condemned in Security Council Resolution 1695. Resolution 1695 required states to exercise vigilance “to prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred” to North Korea’s missile or WMD program, and further required states to prevent the procurement of missile-related items and the transfer of any financial resources involving North Korea’s WMD programs.\textsuperscript{145}

After more faltering talks and a temporary resumption of inspections, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. In Resolution 1874 of June 12, 2009, the Security Council reiterated its earlier resolutions and demanded that North Korea return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.\textsuperscript{146} The resolution expanded upon sanctions relating to military and nuclear equipment, luxury goods, and financial assets connected to the nuclear program. Travel restrictions were imposed on persons involved in the program, and a committee was designated to implement and make recommendations relating to the sanctions.\textsuperscript{147}

The case of North Korea exhibits vulnerabilities in the NPT safeguards system, while confirming the existence of legal nonproliferation norms outside of the framework of the NPT. While North Korea was initially able to signal withdrawal from the NPT without penalty in 1993, its actual withdrawal from the Treaty and swift acquisition of a nuclear weapon triggered a demand of the Security Council to return to the Treaty. These events demonstrate that exiting the Treaty does not cure noncompliance with the NPT under broader standards of nonproliferation.\textsuperscript{148} Neither the negotiation framework nor the inspections system was sufficient in this case to prevent North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.


\textsuperscript{144} North Korea Profile: Nuclear, supra note 126.


\textsuperscript{148} In this regard, the NPT cannot be said to be a self-contained regime with regard to the law on proliferation. See generally Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006).
The problem is no longer one of preventing proliferation, but one of enforcing the prohibition on North Korea’s acts of proliferation.

B. Iran: The Problem of Ambiguity

Concerns relating to possible weapons development aspects of Iran’s nuclear program relate principally to its enrichment activities. According to the IAEA, Iran possesses advanced capabilities in nearly all aspects of the front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including “uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy water production, a light water reactor, a heavy water research reactor and associated research and development facilities.”149 Its decision to pursue enrichment capabilities was undertaken in 1985 at a time of heightened vulnerability during its war with Iraq (during which Iraq used chemical weapons against it).150 It was later revealed that, during this time period, Iran received assistance and materials for its enrichment program from a clandestine network run out of Pakistan by A.Q. Khan and affiliates.151 Documentation from those early arrangements includes instructions involving weaponization techniques and other signals of possible military dimensions.152

151. The IAEA has publicly confirmed that the source of components of Iran’s enrichment program and documents relating to weaponization came from Pakistan, but specific allegations involving the Khan network are indicated through other sources, including Khan’s own statements. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Rep. of the Director General, ¶ 11, IAEA Doc. GOV/2008/4 (Feb. 22, 2008); R. Jeffrey Smith & Joby Warrick, Pakistani Scientist Khan Describes Iranian Efforts to Buy Nuclear Bombs, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2010, at A14; see also MOHAMED ELBARADEI, THE AGE OF DECEPTION: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN TREACHEROUS TIMES 167 (2011) (“The first known transaction of the Khan network occurred in 1987, when two of Khan’s associates and three Iranians had agreed, in a meeting in Dubai, on the terms of a sale for centrifuge components and designs.”).
Iran’s nuclear program dates back to at least 1957, when it signed a cooperation agreement with the United States for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. 153 The agreement put a ceiling of six kilograms on the amount of HEU that could be in the custody of Iran at any time via related transfers. 154 In 1960, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) established the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC). 155 In 1967, a 5MWt research reactor was constructed at Tehran University, which was originally fueled by small amounts of 93 percent HEU, provided from the United States. 156 The reactor, known as the TRR (originally operated by Tehran University and later under the control of AEOI), supplied radioisotopes for nuclear medicine, among other things. 157 The enriched uranium required to fuel the TRR continues to serve as a basis for Iran’s claim to need indigenous enrichment capabilities, and thus remains a subject of dispute in current debates. 158

In 1968, Iran signed the NPT. Its facilities were subjected to safeguards in 1974. During the 1970s, Iran also began construction on a nuclear power plant at Bushehr under contract with a subsidiary of Siemens, 159 which was temporarily abandoned after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In 1975, Iran also commenced plans for extensive nuclear research facilities at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) under contract with a French company. 160 This project was completed in 1994 with the assistance of the Chinese. 161 The ENTC is

153. Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Iran Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, U.S.-Iran, Mar. 5, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 733. This five-year agreement was renewed multiple times until it expired without renewal in April 1979. See Agreement Amending the Agreement of March 5, 1957, U.S.-Iran, Mar. 18, 1969, 18 U.S.T. 205.


158. Id.


currently the site of three research reactors (one of which has been decommissioned), a uranium conversion facility, and related laboratories and facilities.  

Heightened concerns of nuclear weapons proliferation resulting from India’s 1974 test of a nuclear weapon triggered increased scrutiny over nuclear cooperation arrangements in the following years, affecting the United States’ support of Iran’s program. Because India’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon was achieved with plutonium acquired through reprocessing capabilities provided by the United States and Canada, the key concern in negotiating for continuing assistance to Iran’s already ambitious nuclear energy plans in the 1970s was to limited reprocessing capabilities. The United States thus pressed for the establishment of a multinational reprocessing center to meet Iran’s reprocessing needs. In part responding to information about India’s manipulation of the fuel cycle to acquire the bomb, the United States passed the Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which required that transfers of nuclear material and equipment involve strict adherence to IAEA safeguards and that exports involving HEU receive heightened scrutiny. Due to increased political sensitivities, in 1977 the United States began to delay export license requests for HEU pending the ongoing negotiations for a new cooperation agreement. Any exports from the United States were effectively foreclosed after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.
After the Islamic Revolution, the status of Iran’s contracts for nuclear development was cast into doubt.\textsuperscript{170} The new Iranian government, the Islamic Republic of Iran, continued to seek fuel for the operation of the TRR.\textsuperscript{171} In 1987, it arranged a contract with Argentina for the reconfiguration of its reactor core to run on 20 percent HEU and for the supply of the uranium.\textsuperscript{172} Iran also sought to resume work on its declared facilities at Bushehr and Esfahan. In 1992, Iran concluded a contract with Russia to complete work on its nuclear power plant at Bushehr.\textsuperscript{173} In the early 1990s, China assisted Iran in establishing new reactor facilities at the ENTC in Esfahan.\textsuperscript{174}

According to representations made by Iran to the IAEA, a decision was made in 1985 to expand Iran’s nuclear capabilities, including planning facilities for enrichment.\textsuperscript{175} Iran claimed that it made this decision in order to meet its growing energy needs and to build on investments already made in the nuclear industry.\textsuperscript{176} Iran maintains that its inability to obtain nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad led to its decision to seek supplies for those products on the black market.\textsuperscript{177} According to the IAEA, Iran sought and obtained these materials through the 1990s from a “clandestine supply network”\textsuperscript{178} (widely understood to be the proliferation

\textsuperscript{170} According to Iran, contracts amounting to approximately $10 billion with France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States went unfulfilled in the post-Revolution period. IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58, supra note 152, ¶ 4. For a publicly available accounting of some of the resulting disputes, see Nuclear Chronology: Iran, 1957–1985, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Mar. 2012), http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1825.html (detailing disputes over Iran’s uranium enrichment program).

\textsuperscript{171} See Iran v. United States, 8 Iran-U.S.Cl. Trib. Rep. 63 (1985) (rejecting Iran’s request for interim measures to halt the sale of nuclear fuel by General Atomic Company in the United States).


\textsuperscript{173} World News Briefs; Russia Spells out Pact with Iran for A-Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1985, at A9.

\textsuperscript{174} Research Reactor Details—ENTC MNSR, supra note 161.

\textsuperscript{175} IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58, supra note 152, ¶ 4.

\textsuperscript{176} Id.

\textsuperscript{177} Id. ¶ 5.

\textsuperscript{178} Iran and Pakistan allegedly concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement in 1986, although this has not been publicly verified. See, e.g., Farzad Bazoft, IRAN SIGNS SECRET ATOM DEAL, LONDON OBSERVER, June 12, 1988, at 1; Jack Boureston & Charles D. Ferguson, SCHOOLING IRAN'S ATOM SQUAD, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May–June 2004, at 31, 32, (discussing a 1987 deal that allegedly called for at least six Iranians to be trained in Pakistan). The IAEA confirmed that Iran and Pakistan conducted secret negotiations and equipment supply arrangements during the time period 1987–1996 in
masterminded by A.Q. Khan, the “father of Pakistan’s bomb”).\textsuperscript{179} Although Iran assured the IAEA that no military institutions were involved in the decision making or implementation of the centrifuge enrichment program,\textsuperscript{180} most of the workshops involved in the domestic production of Iran’s centrifuge components were owned by military industrial organizations.\textsuperscript{181}

Iran’s centrifuge enrichment program proceeded without the knowledge of the IAEA from 1985 until late 2002, when an Iranian dissident group revealed the existence of undeclared enrichment facilities at Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran and in Natanz, as well as a heavy water construction plant in Arak.\textsuperscript{182} Responding to this information, the IAEA made numerous requests, leading to disclosures in 2003 of undeclared nuclear facilities, including radiological laboratories and waste handling facilities at the TNRC, a centrifuge enrichment research and development center at the state-owned Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, enrichment facilities at Natanz, a dismantled pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab’ad, plans for new reactor facilities and a heavy water plant at Arak, and additional waste disposal sites.\textsuperscript{183} On September 21, 2009, Iran declared it was building another centrifuge enrichment facility on a military base in Qom, known as the Fordow facility.\textsuperscript{184} In November 2009, Iran publicly announced that it intended to build ten new enrichment facilities and had identified five potential locations.\textsuperscript{185} In response to an IAEA query on the accuracy of those reports, Iran stated that it would “provide the Agency with the required information if necessary.”\textsuperscript{186}


\textsuperscript{180} See IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58, supra note 152, ¶ 10 (“In response to the Agency’s enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-making process or the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.”).

\textsuperscript{181} Id. ¶ 18 (citing IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, ¶ 37, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/11, (Feb. 24, 2004)).


\textsuperscript{183} Id.


\textsuperscript{185} David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, A Defiant Iran Vows to Build Nuclear Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009, at A1.

In February 2010, Iran reported to the IAEA that it would begin enriching uranium to 20 percent at Natanz. The IAEA indicated in response that Iran had given insufficient notice under its safeguards agreement for the Agency to adequately adjust its safeguards and understand the original purpose of the facility. As of October 28, 2011, the Natanz facility was estimated to have enriched a total of approximately 79.7 kilograms of uranium at 20 percent. Iran announced in June 2011 that it planned to triple its production of uranium-235 enriched up to 20 percent. Iran justifies its production as necessary to provide fuel for the TRR. Although it does not currently have the technology to manufacture fuel from this enriched uranium, Iran is in the process of creating such a capability in its fuel manufacturing plant at Esfahan. The expansion of Iran's enrichment at 20 percent raises concerns relating to its ability to produce enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. The capacity to enrich to 20 percent would also allow Iran to swiftly enrich to 90 percent, facilitating a plausible breakout scenario to acquire nuclear weapons. As of November 1, 2011, the IAEA reported that Iran had produced at total of 4922 kilograms of LEU, from which Iran could produce roughly four bombs at a slower pace. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that with approximately 172 kilograms of uranium enriched at 20 percent, Iran could produce in three-week period the necessary 25 kilograms of 93 percent weapons-grade uranium-235 to manufacture a nuclear explosive device.

187. Id. ¶ 8.
188. Id. ¶¶ 34, 48.
191. See IAEA, Communication Dated 1 March 2010 Received from the Resident Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Regarding Assurances of Nuclear Fuel Supply, at 1–2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/785 (Mar. 2, 2010) (discussing Iranian historical difficulties in obtaining fuel supply for its research reactor).
192. See IAEA Doc. GOV2011/65, supra note 68, ¶¶ 32, 36–37 (noting the existence of a fuel manufacturing plant at Esfahan and the start of nondestructive testing). Fitzpatrick notes that Iran's plans to fabricate fuel for the TRR will require prolonged testing, may be unsafe, and in any event the TRR may no longer have sufficient power for this testing by the time the fuel is ready for testing. See THE INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, IRAN'S NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES: A NET ASSESSMENT 121 (Mark Fitzpatrick ed., 2011).
193. Id. at 72–73.
194. Id. In addition, Iran produced 6 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium in a six-week period at Natanz. IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68, ¶ 15.
195. THE INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, supra note 192, at 74.
196. Id.
In November 2011, the IAEA released a report providing extensive detail relating to possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear energy program. The report largely reiterated concerns previously expressed regarding possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear energy program. These concerns include outstanding questions relating to possession of a document from Pakistan providing instructions on the conversion of weapons-grade uranium into a hemispheric metal device suitable for use as a weapon, known as the “Project Green Salt”; evidence relating to “work alleged to have been performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab-3 missile reentry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead”; alleged administrative interconnections between the “Green Salt” project and the “project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead”; a letter published by the Chairman of Iran’s Expediency Council in September 2006 that references possible acquisition of nuclear weapons; additional information relating to the history of Iran’s nuclear program, including the extent of contacts with the Khan network and the origination of those efforts at a high-level meeting in 1984 on reviving Iran’s prerevolution nuclear program; and evidence that Iran conducted experiments involving the explosive compression of uranium deuteride, another component process of weaponization. The Agency has also indicated that it was in possession of evidence that “some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.”

Efforts to resolve doubts about Iran’s nuclear program have involved multiparty negotiations, three IAEA referrals to the Security Council, seven Security Council Resolutions, and state-authorized economic sanctions programs. The existence of a covert program

199. Id. ¶ 17.
200. Id. ¶ 21.
201. Id. Annex B.2.
202. Id.
204. IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68, ¶ 45.
may also be presumed, considering the reports of computer malware targeting Iran’s centrifuge program, industrial sabotage, and targeted killings of Iranian scientists.

On the negotiation side, talks with the “EU-3” (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) initially produced an agreement for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment. However, the talks broke down when it was revealed that Iran was continuing its preenrichment conversion of uranium. In 2004, Iran agreed to a more stringent suspension of its enrichment-related activities, and several proposals were exchanged in the 2004–2005 period on issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program, regional security cooperation, and export issues. Iran expressed dissatisfaction with the talks in August 2005, however, and exercised its purported “inalienable right to resume its legal enrichment activities.”

In June 2006, China, Russia, and the United States joined the negotiations, which became known as the “P5+1” group. The group offered Iran the prospect of two light water reactors, fuel guarantees, and technical and agricultural cooperation, yet the talks remain stalled as Iran continued to refuse to suspend its enrichment. In May 2008, as the P5+1 was revising its proposal for continuing negotiations, Iran outlined multiple steps, or “modalities” leading to full negotiations, although that proposal did not specifically address the outstanding concerns relating to Iran’s nuclear program. In June 2008, the P5+1 presented its revised proposal, offering the prospect of a normalization of trade relations, support for Iran to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), cooperation on Afghanistan


211. Id.


213. See Helene Cooper, U.S. Is Offering Deals on Trade to Entice Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A1 (discussing the collaboration of Britain, China, France, Russia, United States and Germany in resolving the nuclear crisis with Iran).


and the drug trade at the borders, and assurances regarding the nonuse of force.\textsuperscript{216}

In 2009, the P5+1 and Iran agreed to a “fuel swap” as a confidence building measure, in which Iran’s representatives in Vienna agreed that Iran would send 1,200 kilograms of its domestically produced LEU—which at the time represented most of its supply—to be enriched to 20 percent in Russia and converted to fuel in France.\textsuperscript{217} Iranian officials sought to modify that fuel swap arrangement, leading to its effective rejection.\textsuperscript{218} Turkey and Brazil later tried to revive the fuel swap deal, but that effort faltered in May 2010.\textsuperscript{219} The proposal ultimately went nowhere, in part because Iran had at that point doubled its stockpile of LEU.\textsuperscript{220} The P5+1 held additional negotiations in late 2010 and early 2011, which were ultimately unproductive.\textsuperscript{221} Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resumed in April 2012.\textsuperscript{222}

The Security Council addressed the Iranian nuclear situation in one presidential statement (March 2003) and six subsequent Security Council resolutions.\textsuperscript{223} In addition to endorsing and reinforcing the negotiation framework of the EU-3 and P5+1, the resolutions authorize a wide range of measures affecting Iran’s economic interests under Article 41 if the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{224}

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\textsuperscript{216} Communication Dated 25 June 2008 Received from the Resident Representative of the United Kingdom to the Agency Concerning a Letter and Offer of 12 June 2008 Delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/730 (July 1, 2008).


\textsuperscript{218} See Interview with Ali Bagheri, Deputy Secretary, Iran’s Supreme Nat. Sec. Council (Apr. 18, 2010), available at http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_view.asp?code=218880.


\textsuperscript{220} See IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/28, supra note 89, ¶¶ 6–13.

\textsuperscript{221} Joby Warrick, \textit{Nuclear Talks with Iran Edge Toward Collapse}, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2011.

\textsuperscript{222} Steven Erlanger, \textit{At Nuclear Talks in Turkey, Iran and Six Nations Agree to Meet Again in Iraq}, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, at A13.


\textsuperscript{224} Article 41 states:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
The most stringent measures to date are contained in Security Council Resolution 1929, which included or authorized the seizure of items relating to sanctioned activities;\(^{225}\) targeted financial measures against Iranian shipping lines;\(^{226}\) extended sanctions against Iran’s Revolutionary Guards;\(^{227}\) and a halt to the provision of financial services, including insurance and reinsurance, related to any activities that could be proliferation sensitive.\(^{228}\) While earlier resolutions relating to the sale, supply, or transfer contained language restricting these measures to the territorial jurisdiction of the enforcing state, Resolution 1929 appears to lift this territorial restriction in the context of Iran’s ballistic missile program. Specifically, the Council authorized member states to take “all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to [activities concerning ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons].”\(^{229}\) Such necessary measures cannot be considered to include force, however, as all authorized action was taken under the express authority of Article 41 of the UN Charter.\(^{230}\)

The apparent lack of a territorial restriction regarding measures addressed to Iran’s ballistic missiles program appears to permit extraterritorial actions (not amounting to a use of force) to interfere with Iran’s receipt of such items. The seizure provisions of the Resolution 1929 are also wide-ranging, extending to items related to enrichment activities, reprocessing, heavy water production facilities, armaments, certain dual-use technology, combat equipment, and ballistic missile technology.\(^{231}\) Seizures under the resolution must be

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postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

U.N. Charter art. 41.

225. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83, ¶ 16.

226. Id. ¶ 19.

227. Id. app. II.

228. Id. ¶ 21.

229. Id. ¶ 9.

230. Id. pmbl.

231. The seizure provisions cross-reference previous resolutions calling upon members to prevent the supply, sale or transfer “directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft.” The relevant provision reads as follows:

[The Security Council] \(\textit{decides}\) to authorize all States to, and that all States shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8 or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs 14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution
made in a manner consistent with Security Council Resolution 1540, which encourages the application of domestic controls to prevent proliferation.\textsuperscript{232}

Although Iran continues to deny an intention to build a nuclear weapon, it is fast-approaching threshold capability and has effectively asserted a right for itself to develop that capability. Iran’s President recently reiterated Iran’s ambiguous position that it did not intend to build a nuclear weapon, but that “if we want to make a bomb, we are not afraid of anybody.”\textsuperscript{233}

Addressing concerns relating to the supply of fuel for Iran’s nuclear reactors will no doubt comprise a key ingredient in resolving the current stalemate over Iran’s nuclear program. One possible means of addressing issues relating to past and potential fuel supply agreements could involve the negotiation of a fuel guarantee for those reactors in exchange for Iran’s agreement to scale back its enrichment program. Under such a scenario, the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal in The Hague could serve as a venue for the expedited arbitration of any disputes over new fuel supply or nuclear cooperation agreements. The existence of a mechanism for expedited arbitration of any new agreements may provide additional security that those agreements will be enforceable. Incorporating the Tribunal into such a fuel guarantee arrangement would provide an opportunity for the parties to address differences relating to prior contracts and perhaps broader issues, while restructuring that Tribunal in order to streamline its work.

The successful resolution of outstanding issues related to Iran’s nuclear program will require persistent efforts at both the diplomatic level and within the IAEA safeguards system.

\textbf{C. Reconciling Treatment of Non-NPT States with a Prevention Regime}

The existence of nuclear-weapons states outside of the NPT framework puts strains on the already unequal system institutionalized in the NPT, complicating the business of developing consistent legal standards for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons development. There are two categories of outlier states in this regard. The first category was addressed above, and includes

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and decides further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts.
  
  Id. ¶ 16.
  
  232. Id.; see infra Part V.A.
  
\end{itemize}
states who ratify the NPT and either do not comply or seek to withdraw in order to cross the nuclear threshold. The second category comprises those states that have not signed the NPT but emerged as nuclear weapons powers at a later time. The principal actors in the latter group are India, Pakistan, and Israel, none of whom ever signed the NPT (although each joined the IAEA in 1957). States that have already been integrated into the global nonproliferation regime based on their consent to the NPT cannot so easily reverse the clock to qualify as non-NPT states. When states seek to withdraw from the NPT, a host of legal and political issues will complicate their efforts to do so. Non-NPT party states occupy a distinct legal status, which is in many ways a throwback to the world that existed before the NPT, where ad hoc alliances and power relationships took precedence.

The NPT outliers are not bound by the specific provisions of the NPT, but are bound by customary nonproliferation legal norms. It can be argued that the non-NPT states that chose not to join the regime were legally entitled to develop nuclear weapons, so long as they did not benefit from technology shared in violation of treaties and state practices that restrict the trade in proliferation-sensitive items. Attempts to apply nonproliferation norms to non-NPT states are complicated by the inherently unequal nature of the nonproliferation regime, which contemplates differential treatment of states that are permitted to have nuclear weapons and those that are not. The inequalities institutionalized in the NPT are, however, premised on a system that provisionally prioritizes the security of a world in which nuclear weapons do not proliferate, free trade in nuclear technology so long as it is used for peaceful purposes, and a long-term nuclear disarmament framework.

To the extent that nonproliferation law has developed based on a norm of security among nations and centered on the long-term goal of disarmament, then disarmament would be the logical soft law norm to apply in guiding policy decisions on the outlier states. International treaties, state practice, and Security Council pronouncements more specifically prohibit the non-NPT states from engaging in proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Even if the

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234. See, e.g., NPT, supra note 3, art. 1.

235. See generally Joseph Nye, *The Logic of Inequality*, 59 FOREIGN POL’Y 123, 125–26 (1985) ("Even though superpower compliance with Article VI of the NPT has been inadequate, many states will continue to adhere because they believe their security will be diminished if more states—particularly their regional rivals—obtain nuclear weapons.").

non-NPT states can be said to legally possess nuclear weapons, this does not entitle those states to distribute proliferation-sensitive items and knowledge to states that are fully integrated into the global nonproliferation regime.

The global nonproliferation regime cannot be said to be a universally applicable legal system so long as outlier states choose not to participate in that regime. The outlier states nonetheless operate in a world in which that regime dominates the international legal landscape, affecting their ability to trade in nuclear technology. Applying nonproliferation norms to outlier states without the benefit of a clearly defined legal regime may involve fact-based assessments designed to address concerns that the outlier states will serve as resources for proliferation to states that do participate in the nonproliferation legal system. Indicators that may present high levels of proliferation risk in this context could include, for example, political instability, evidence of clandestine proliferation networks, and connections to groups that may have an interest in proliferating military technologies for military purposes. Such analysis is relevant to maintenance of an effective verification system for the NPT states while further integration of the outliers into the global nonproliferation regime is pending.

V. ECONOMIC COUNTERPROLIFERATION MEASURES

The Security Council and states may institute a variety of measures to address perceived threats to international peace and security. Peace and security measures designed to affect the behavior of states may fall into one of three principal legal categories. The first category involves actions that may be taken as a function of the exercise of sovereign rights that do not violate general principles of international law (i.e., retorsion). The second category involves measures that may otherwise violate international law that could possibly be justified as countermeasures, but do not involve the use of force. The third category involves the use of force. Unilateral economic measures generally fall into the first of these categories, posing legal limitations in the area of extraterritorial effect.

Even where unilateral sanctions may apply extraterritorially, gaps in trade can be easily filled by nonparticipating entities. More effective sanctioning tools include the use of multilateral regimes or Security Council action under Article 41 of the UN Charter, which allows for the fullest legal expression of internationally coordinated economic action.237 The effect of those sanctions will also be determined by their scope, which may extend to the entirety of a

237. U.N. Charter art. 41.
state's economic activity. Current international sanctions addressing proliferation activities have targeted only selected activities and industries, far from the full scope possible under Article 41.

The term “sanction” carries a broad connotation, but is most often used in the context of restrictions on trade and commerce. Economic sanctions are a subset of trade controls targeted to influence the behavior of a state, and in the context of international law, to ensure compliance with international rights and obligations. They may also be considered as countermeasures under the regime of state responsibility if they qualify as a response to specific wrongful behavior. Legal restrictions in the context of the law of state responsibility would include a requirement of proportionality, taking into account the gravity of the targeted wrongful act. Even under the regime of state responsibility, however, economic countermeasures may cause a disproportionate economic impact when they are gauged to enforce an important legal principle. Humanitarian law, human rights concerns, and due process concerns may also affect the legality of sanctions under certain circumstances.

A. Extraterritoriality: Jurisdictional Impediments to Effective Prevention

Unilateral economic sanctions fall within the purview of sovereign authority and thus do not generally require specific justification under international law. The authority to regulate economic conduct within a state’s jurisdiction is incident to its

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238. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1459 (9th ed. 2009) (defining sanction under international law as “[a]n economic or military coercive measure taken by one or more countries toward another to force it to comply with international law”); Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 29, 32 (defining sanctions in the generic sense as “coercive measures taken in execution of a decision of a competent social organ, i.e., an organ legally empowered to act in the name of the society or community or community that is governed by the legal system”).

239. See generally Calamita, supra note 40 (arguing that states retain the right “to take unilateral countermeasures in response to wrongful acts”).


241. Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1978) (holding that suspension of all Air France flights from Los Angeles and Paris was proportional to allow an American carrier on the same route to route through London due to the importance of the issue “in the general framework of . . . air transport policy.”). See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration—or Both? The 1978 United States–France Aviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 785, 791 (1980) (“[In France’s view the economic consequences of the Pan Am service and the Air France service were grossly disproportionate.”).

242. See discussion infra Part V.B.
sovereign powers and is not subject to review under international law. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed in the Nicaragua cases that economic measures directed at other states do not violate the customary international principle of nonintervention in the internal or external affairs of a state. Economic measures are not within the ambit of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of force. In some cases, unilateral sanctions may violate trade agreements, but most such agreements permit exceptions for national security matters. The principal legal questions relating to unilateral economic sanctions relate to their extraterritorial effect, underscoring jurisdictional impediments to the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions. Recent European case law also illustrates that courts may accord due process rights to sanctioned individuals when targeted sanctions are unsubstantiated and impinge on fundamental rights, such as the right to be heard, the right to property, and the right to an effective legal remedy.

243. U.S. export control is based on the premise that there are no rights to export, only privileges. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends 35 (2d ed. 1983); see also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 509 (6th ed. 2003) (“State measures, prima facie a lawful exercise of powers by government, may affect foreign interests considerably . . . . Thus foreign assets and their use may be subject to taxation, trade restrictions involving licenses and quotas, or measures of devaluation.”).

244. See Iran v. United States, 38 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 197, 262–64 (2009) (holding that the United States’ exercise of the sovereign right to deny export of defense articles owned by Iran did not constitute interference with Iran’s ownership or property rights); Iran v. United States, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 273, 292 (1988) (“The President’s exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by . . . the [Arms Export Control] Act . . . is the exercise of a sovereign right which is not subject to review by an international tribunal.”).

245. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27) (“The Court has merely to say that it is unable to regard such action on the economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the customary-law principle of non-intervention.”); Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 362 (1963) (“Whilst it is correct to assume that paragraph 4 applies to force other than armed force, it is very doubtful if it applies to economic measures of a coercive nature.” (footnotes omitted)).

246. See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1445, 1463 n.89 (1985) (“The record of the San Francisco Conference is quite clear that article 2(4) was intended to refer to military rather than political or economic force.”); see also United Nations Conference on Int’l Org., Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334 (Apr. 25, 1945); United Nations Conference on Int’l Org., Doc. 215, I/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 559 (Apr. 25, 1945) (rejecting Brazilian amendment to include “the threat or use of economic measures” within the ambit of Article 2(4)).

247. See Lowenfeld, supra note 243, at 446 (noting that products would not be entitled to most favored nation treatment in the context of mandatory UN sanctions).


States issuing unilateral sanctions do not actually regulate the conduct of the targeted state, but the conduct of those within the sanctioning state’s jurisdiction that are doing business with the targeted state. International law distinguishes between primary and secondary boycotts in this regard. Under primary boycotts, a state regulates conduct in its own territory or over its own nationals. Secondary boycotts are “extraterritorial” insofar as their effect is to exercise jurisdiction over third-country foreign nationals for conduct that takes place outside of the sanctioning state’s territorial jurisdiction. Commonly accepted extraterritorial export controls include restrictions on the reexport of sensitive goods and know-how based on country of origin. Extraterritorial sanctions do not affect the jurisdiction of the targeted state, and thus could violate no jurisdictional obligations toward that state. Issues of legality are therefore matters to be addressed between the sanctioned state and affected third-party states.

A variety of principles have been used to justify departures from the basic norm that jurisdiction applies only on the basis of nationality or territorial control. Scholars have disagreed as to whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is in fact a violation of international law. While the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction may or may not be considered legal, the third state whose sovereignty is allegedly impinged need not recognize the validity of such jurisdiction and may affirmatively exercise its sovereign rights to

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250. LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 314.
251. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 429–30 (1996). Secondary boycotts are not new. Prominent cases include sanctions against companies doing business with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the “Arab Boycott” against Israel, and sanctions against Iran in current disputes with the United States. See id. at 429.
252. These include (1) the protective principle to protect state security interests; (2) the principle of universality applicable, for example, to crimes against humanity; (3) the passive personality principle, which looks at the victim of a crime; (4) the effects doctrine relating to the effects the targeted behavior is likely to have in the originating state; and (5) the universality principle for crimes that are universally unlawful. Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 439, 445 (1935).
253. For contrasting views in the context of the Helms-Burton Act, see Lowenfeld, supra note 251, at 413–33 (“It would be very sad indeed if conflicts over an exorbitant and unreasonable piece of U.S. legislation were to divert attention from the deplorable events occurring in Cuba, and were even to attract sympathy for the Castro regime . . . .”); Brice M. Clagett, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, Continued: A Reply to Professor Lowenfeld, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 641, 614–44 (1996); Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with International Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 434 (1996).
counteract extraterritorial actions. This was the case when the United States enacted antiboycott legislation to penalize any companies that complied with the Arab boycott of Israel.\textsuperscript{254} It was also the case in the French court decision in \textit{Fruehauf v. Massardy}, in which American sanctions interfered with the business operations of a French company.

\textit{Fruehauf} illustrates the challenges faced when interests conflict among multiple jurisdictions. The case was triggered from U.S. prohibitions on trade by U.S.-controlled foreign corporations with China and North Korea during the Cold War (under the Trading with the Enemy Act).\textsuperscript{255} In 1965, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered Fruehauf Detroit, the parent company of S.A. Fruehauf-France, a French company, to either cancel a contract it had executed to supply a large order of semitrailers destined for the People’s Republic of China, or face criminal penalties.\textsuperscript{256} Facing severe economic consequences from the prospect of cancelling a major contract with a client comprising 40 percent of the company’s business, the French directors of the corporation sought an order appointing a temporary administrator to manage the company and carry out the contract.\textsuperscript{257} The French court accepted the request and held that the management of the company could carry out its order for the semitrailers, safeguarding the interests of the corporation under French law.\textsuperscript{258}

When faced with the declaration of the French court, the United States decided not to pursue the matter further. Respect for the principle of comity among nations prevailed in this instance, possibly

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{254} See Lowenfeld, supra note 243, at 322 (“Extraterritorial application of [the U.S. antiboycott legislation] is a side effect—albeit an important one—designed for the most part to prevent evasion of primary restraints on activity by Americans in the United States; the Arab boycott, in contrast, is in very large measure extraterritorial, in that it is designed in the first instance to affect activity carried on abroad by non-Arab persons or firms.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{255} Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 14e ch., May 22, 1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965, 2, 86 (Fr.), discussed in \textit{French Court Decision on Jurisdiction over Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporations}, 5 I.L.M. 476, 476 (1966). Corporate nationality under international law tends to favor the nationality of the state of incorporation. See, \textit{e.g.}, Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 34 (Feb. 5) (“Municipal law determines the legal situation not only of such limited liability companies but also of those persons who hold shares in them. Separated from the company by numerous barriers, the shareholder cannot be identified with it.”); \textit{Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law} § 213 (1987) (“For purposes of international law, a corporation has the nationality of the state under the laws of which the corporation is organized.”); see also Cedric Ryngaert, \textit{Extraterritorial Export Controls (Secondary Boycotts)}, \textit{7 Chinese J. Int’l L.} 625, 628 (2008) (discussing \textit{Barcelona Traction} and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917).
  \item \textsuperscript{256} Cour d’appel, Gaz. Pal. 1965 at 476.
  \item \textsuperscript{257} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{258} \textit{Id.}; see also Lowenfeld, supra note 243, at 91–105; Ryngaert, supra note 255, at 629 (“A . . . French appeals court heard the case and decided that the contract should indeed be honoured . . . .”)
\end{itemize}
due to a desire on the part of the United States not to directly challenge the French court’s exercise of its own jurisdiction within its own territory.\footnote{259} The \textit{Fruehauf} case does not necessarily imply that extraterritorial measures are illegal, but serves as a reminder that there is no guarantee they will be recognized by the third country, the jurisdiction of which can be said to take priority.

Applying the \textit{Fruehauf} approach to more recent examples, the question of competing jurisdictions comes into sharper focus. When the United States enacted sanctions affecting third-country nationals doing business with Iran and Cuba in 1996,\footnote{260} complaints emerged regarding the extraterritorial reach of those laws.\footnote{261} The Helms-Burton Act, in addition to imposing sanctions on third-country nationals for doing business with Cuba, went so far as to create a new cause of action against those nationals to expose them to U.S. expropriation claims in the event that third-country nationals were “trafficking” in expropriated goods.\footnote{262} European countries similarly complained about the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), which outlined penalties to be imposed on third-country nationals that invested more than $20 million in Iran’s energy sector,\footnote{263} building on earlier executive orders that extraterritorially prohibited reexportation to Iran of goods and technology originating in the United States.\footnote{264}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote[259]{See Note, \textit{Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction}, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1310, 1322–23 (1985) (“When the United States asserts jurisdiction over activities occurring within the territory of another sovereign, its action may well be perceived as intrusive and perhaps even unlawful. In order to allay such perceptions, extraterritoriality doctrine should respect the principle of comity among nations.” (citation omitted)).}


\footnote[262]{Helms-Burton Act § 302.}

\footnote[263]{See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 4(d)(1) (permitting an enhanced sanction in order to hinder Iran’s energy programs).}

As a response to the U.S. legislation, the European Council enacted “Blocking Legislation” (Council Regulation 2271/96) declaring the unenforceability of and forbidding compliance with U.S. extraterritorial laws. The European Council also filed suit with the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, challenging the legality of the Helms-Burton Act under the security exemption of Article 21 of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The United States and the European Union reached an “Understanding” with the European Council that the WTO case would be dropped and the United States would seek waivers under the Helms-Burton Act and ILSA. Although some domestic courts have addressed the legality of extraterritorial controls, their legality was ultimately not considered by an international body, and the United States did not undertake a legal commitment to waive the legislation.

The extraterritorial provisions of the ILSA were not applied until 2010, when the Act had been revised and supplemented by the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA). CISADA institutes comprehensive sanctions by the United States that more aggressively target financial transactions and investments relating to Iran's use of refined petroleum products. In contrast to the milder language of earlier legislation addressing Iran's proliferation activities, CISADA declares that Iran's illicit nuclear and weapons development activities "represent a threat to the security of the United States, its strong ally Israel, and other allies of the United States around the world." CISADA was enacted shortly after the Security Council issued Resolution 1929 and was followed by European sanctions that placed restrictions on investments in Iran's energy sector and prohibit the provision of banking, financial, and insurance services to Iranian companies. Since the change in policy among European nations coincided with the objectives of U.S. laws, there has been little, if any, protest from European quarters regarding the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws on this subject. New unilateral sanctions targeting Iranian banking and oil interests, as well as the possibility of targeting Iran's ability to conduct electronic funds transfers, could dramatically impact Iran's financial interests. Even where states protest the legality of extraterritorial sanctions, they may still be effective because corporations may nonetheless comply for business reasons.

The fundamental lesson emerging from this narrative is that parity on the level of multilateral and international action will
supersede legal problems of extraterritoriality when the enforcement of sanctions is concerned. Indeed, Security Council resolutions under Article 41 provide direct enforcement authority to states to carry out those sanctions. In the context of proliferation, the resolution of jurisdictional conflicts is best effected through the advancement of international norms that oblige states to take preventive action when necessary, within a coordinated and harmonized international framework.

B. Crippling Sanctions: Approaching a Pre-Force Maximum

Although references to “crippling” sanctions are common in reference to proliferation-suspect states, current international sanctions against such states are targeted, as opposed to comprehensive, and have not fully targeted the most sensitive aspects of the economy. Crippling sanctions may be designed to inflict pain more broadly than sanctions targeted at regime leaders, causing the type of economic breakdown that cannot be sustained by a nation as a whole. In the context of Iran, crippling sanctions are generally meant to refer to a full embargo on imports of refined petroleum products. The United States and Europe have enacted sanctions to that effect, yet those sanctions do not prevent nationals of other states from providing those products, to the extent they are willing to risk the loss of business with Western financial institutions. International sanctions on Iran and North Korea largely relate to financial transactions and trade in areas that are broadly connected to

278. See also id. at 1257 (arguing that increased diplomatic power at the level of the European Union lessens the need for the EU to resort to international legal protests in the context of extraterritorial U.S. laws).

279. See, e.g., United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(d) (2006). To the extent that a state acts beyond the ambit of Security Council Resolution, it may be considered as acting under its inherent sovereign authority.


281. See id. Iran is said to rely on imports for approximately 40 percent of its refined petroleum needs, although it claims to be swiftly increasing its domestic refining capacities. Iran is the fourth largest crude oil exporter, and so the most severe economic measure against Iran would be to cut off its exports, thereby depriving it of 80 percent of its export revenues and 60 percent of its overall budget. See Country Analysis Brief: Iran, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf (last updated Feb. 17, 2012); Iran Oil Exports Top 844mn Barrels, PRESSTV (June 16, 2010), http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/130736.html (Iran).

282. The United States has sanctioned third country national corporations under CISADA, but the effect of those sanctions on Iran's oil imports has yet to be seen. See Jonathan S. Landay, New U.S. Sanctions Hit Iran's Gasoline Imports, McCLATCHY—TRIB. NEWS SERV. (May 24, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/24/v-print/114682/new-us-sanctions-hit-iran-gasoline.html.
military-industrial needs.\textsuperscript{283} Despite the difficulties these sanctions pose to Iran and North Korea, from a historical and legal perspective they do not reach the level of the full-scope economic denial that is possible under Article 41 of the UN Charter.

Sanctions may range from a prohibition on trade in certain strategic goods, such as missile technologies, to a focus on economic sectors such as oil or finance, to a comprehensive ban on all trade. The most comprehensive international economic sanctions in modern times were applied in Rhodesia and Iraq, although the Iraq sanctions were accompanied by a humanitarian exception known as the “Oil for Food” program.\textsuperscript{284} Although the success of those sanctions may be a dubious proposition, as historical examples, they demonstrate the lengths to which the international community may go in imposing full-scope economic measures to prevent and restrict behavior that is considered to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

The case of Rhodesia offers a textbook example of how sanctions may incrementally target an entire economy. In 1965, the white-minority government of Southern Rhodesia, after refusing to extend voting rights to nonwhites, unilaterally declared independence from England, gaining international pariah status.\textsuperscript{285} The Security Council expressly invoked its authority under Chapter VII\textsuperscript{286} for the first time, declaring Rhodesia a threat to international peace and security and imposing an embargo on oil and gas.\textsuperscript{287} When the embargo was violated at the port of Beira, the Security Council authorized the United Kingdom to use force to interdict shipments at that port,\textsuperscript{288} allowing it to legally maintain a blockade of that port for ten subsequent years.\textsuperscript{289} As the situation failed to improve, the Security Council, in Resolution 253, instituted comprehensive sanctions against Rhodesia, prohibiting all trade, banning investments, and imposing a travel ban on regime members (with an exception for humanitarian aid).\textsuperscript{290} Resolution 253 authorized action to the full extent possible under Article 41, encouraging states to “take all possible further action under Article 41” of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{291} The question arose in Security Council debates as to whether a total ban

\textsuperscript{283.} See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83 (identifying sanctioned industries in Iran); S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 145 (identifying sanctioned industries in North Korea).


\textsuperscript{285.} See Lowenfeld, supra note 243, at 427–35.

\textsuperscript{286.} Id. at 444–45.


\textsuperscript{289.} See generally James Kraska, Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime International Law of Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 31 (2010) (discussing the economic sanctions enforced against Rhodesia).


\textsuperscript{291.} Id. ¶ 9.
on communications was required under Resolution 253, but states resisted the imposition of a total ban on the basis of human rights concerns. 292 The Security Council also authorized the United Kingdom, as the administering power of Rhodesia, to take “all effective measures” to put an end to the uprising, arguably inclusive of forcible measures. 293

The Rhodesia sanctions were plagued by implementation deficiencies and did not prevent Rhodesia from achieving 6.5 percent average growth rate in its GDP from 1966 to 1975. 294 The denial program is instructive, however, in that the Security Council authorized states to take the full range of action permissible under Article 41, and even authorized the United Kingdom to take limited forcible action to enforce the sanctions. Assuming a blanket authorization under Article 41, the question inevitably arises as to what the limit is on measures to achieve a “complete or partial interruption of economic relations.” 295 Considering that Article 41 specifically excludes measures involving the use of force, the answer to this question will depend on whether an action rises to that level. 296 However, in the context of full-scope Article 41 action, the range of possibilities for extraterritorial action is far greater than it would be in the absence of such authorization. 297 Whether the application of extraterritorial measures to “interrupt” economic relations is permissible within the ambit of a blanket Article 41 authorization remains unclear. None of the sanctions targeting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to date have provided blanket authorizations under Article 41.

The Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions in Iraq in 1990 that endured essentially until 2003. 298 The sanctions were modeled on the Rhodesian sanctions, prohibiting all trade, investment, and the making available of funds to Iraq for anything

294. See Lowenfeld, supra note 243, at 441.
295. U.N. Charter art. 41.
296. See id.
297. There is some support for the proposition that extraterritorial enforcement of national laws that do not conflict with public international law are legal. In the Lotus case, for example, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that it was not a violation of international law for Turkey to try the French officer of a ship that collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 16 (Sept. 7) (“Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their country, [international law] leaves them a in this respect a wide measure of discretion.”).
other than humanitarian or medical purposes. The Security Council later authorized a blockade to enforce its original sanctions resolution. The sanctions were widely understood to have had a disproportionate impact on the people of Iraq, as opposed to its rulers, but may have also served as an effective form of containment.

Humanitarian concerns related to the imposition of comprehensive sanctions have led to sanctions targeting specific activities and persons in order to avoid causing unneeded strife to populations. As a legal matter, the outer limits of comprehensive sanctions are contained in what is arguably a \textit{jus cogens} prohibition against denying a people basic subsistence, a prohibition contained in multiple international instruments. Indeed, a European court recently reviewed legislation implementing Security Council sanctions on the basis of \textit{jus cogens} or peremptory norms, and ultimately nullified implementing legislation on the basis of European human rights law.

UN sanctions against North Korea and Iran have authorized the inspection and seizure of banned proliferation-sensitive items and have called upon flag states to cooperate with inspections on the high seas, but they have not gone so far as to provide for extraterritorial interdiction or blockade. However, Security Council Resolution 1929, which deals with Iran, does appear to provide selective Article 41 blanket authority, insofar as it requests states to take “all necessary measures” to prevent the transfer of technology or

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textbf{299.} See id.
    \item \textbf{303.} \textit{Jus cogens} is a norm of international law from which there can be no derogation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also Prinz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1184–85 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (discussing the role of \textit{jus cogens} in a hierarchy of international law norms, violations of which theoretically preempt the application of treaty-based immunities).
    \item \textbf{305.} See Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649, para. 226.
    \item \textbf{307.} See S.C. Res. 1929, \textit{supra} note 83; S.C. Res. 1874, \textit{supra} note 145.
\end{itemize}
assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile programs. The legally permissible extent of those measures will depend on whether they constitute a use of force, which could not have been authorized under Article 41.

VI. INTERFERENCE MEASURES: INTERDICATION AND CYBER ATTACKS

The advent of low-level conflict in the context of unilateral counterproliferation efforts involves the use of measures that may be said to occupy an intermediate status between nonforcible and forcible actions, including industrial sabotage and cyber attacks. Such measures, usually designed to interfere with or interrupt a nuclear program, will in most cases involve some form of intervention in the sovereign domain of the target state. The legal treatment of such activities will hinge principally on whether or not they involve the use of force, as this distinction determines whether they run afoul of the international prohibition on the use of force.

One category of such measures is the interdiction and seizure of sanctioned goods. It is not always clear whether interdictions rise to the level of use of force. Questions may arise in this context as to the proper boundaries between military force and police action on the high seas. Similarly, it is not always clear whether measures designed to interfere with or interrupt illicit proliferation activities, such as cyber attacks, constitute forcible measures or armed attacks. If they are not considered uses of force, they may be legally available as countermeasures to address internationally wrongful acts such as proliferation. If these actions do constitute uses of force, however, they will not generally be available as a function of international law without Security Council authorization.

The legal consequences of intermediate status preventive measures will depend on whether those measures are uses of force, and if so, whether they are low-gravity uses of force or whether they rise to the level of armed attack. In the context of nuclear nonproliferation, the question of the legality of the activity being targeted will also play a significant role in assessing the legality of the counterproliferation measure in question. The concept of the use of force under the UN Charter is broader than that of armed attack.

309. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 240 (providing supporting references for assertion that forcible countermeasures are prohibited under international law).
as the latter triggers the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter. 311 Low-gravity uses of force are prohibited under Article
2(4) of the Charter, yet they do not trigger a right of self-defense,
leaving the targeted state without the option of using force to
respond. This discrepancy creates “a large area where both a forcible
response to force is forbidden, and yet the United Nations
employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap, is
absent.” 312

When interdiction and interference measures do qualify as uses
of force, they will likely occupy this low-gravity use of force “gap” that
prohibits the target state from responding with force. 313 The
threshold question in any analysis of intermediate status preventive
measures is therefore whether the action constitutes a use of force.
The next step in the analysis is to consider the legal consequences of
a resort to force. In this respect, the recognition of degrees of gravity
and correspondent consequences may provide helpful incentives to
states when forcible measures are concerned. 314 However, legal
consequences relating to degrees of gravity in the use of force are not
well developed under international law. The repercussions of low-
gravity uses of force may merit additional, distinct treatment.

In the context of interdiction, the law of the sea supplies a
specialized legal regime to guide behavior. The key question on
interdiction, however, is whether it falls within the ambit of Article
41 nonforcible measures when such measures have been authorized.
Other forms of interference or interruption, such as cyber measures,
do not have the benefit of a clearly defined legal regime. To the extent that Article 41 and 42 of the UN Charter guide interpretations of the legal status of these measures, these alternative measures may be said to occupy an undefined space in between the two. Under applicable legal doctrine, however, they must be categorized as either forcible or nonforcible.

A. Interdiction: State Action and International Law

Interdiction as a tool to prevent proliferation may arise in two distinct contexts. First, a right of interdiction in the form of a blockade may perfect enforcement of an embargo. In this context, interdiction clearly constitutes the use of force under the UN Charter, thus requiring Security Council authorization.\textsuperscript{315} Such measures have been authorized with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, and Leone.\textsuperscript{316} Second, a right of interdiction could apply specifically to proliferation-sensitive items. In this latter context, the right of visit, boarding, search, and seizure does not necessarily constitute a forcible act.\textsuperscript{317} The question then arises whether single acts of interdiction may be considered nonforcible under Article 41. It may be argued that the law enforcement characteristics of interdiction conducted under extraterritorial domestic authority represent an applicable legal paradigm to address this question.\textsuperscript{318} The potentially overlapping legal frameworks involved in an

\textsuperscript{315} Blockades are listed as measures involving the use of force under Article 42 of the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 41; see also BROWNLE, supra note 245, at 365–66 (“[A] naval blockade involves an unlawful use of force, although the tactical posture is passive, since its actual enforcement includes the use of force against vessels of the coastal state.” (footnotes omitted)).


\textsuperscript{317} Under law of the sea principles, the use of force may be said to occur at a certain stage in the process of visitation of vessels, but the full process is not categorically considered forceful. See, e.g., M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, Order of Jan. 20, 1998, 2 ITLOS Rep. 4, 7.

The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using internationally recognized signals. Where this does not succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship. It is only after the appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use force. Even then, appropriate warning must be issued to the ship and all efforts should be made to ensure that life is not endangered.

\textsuperscript{318} See generally DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPping INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 276 (2009) (“A ‘police action’ is not something other than a use of force.”).
assessments of the legal character of nonproliferation interdictions present a variety of possible approaches.

Under all relevant legal instruments, the bedrock principle of interdiction law is that the right of visit to a vessel in international waters requires the consent of the flag state under which a vessel is registered, with limited exceptions. This principle is reflected in the law of sea, under the Statement of Principles of the PSI, and in various bilateral shipboarding agreements.319 Flag-state jurisdiction does not imply, however, that all interdictions are forcible acts, as the boarding of vessels does not generally involve a use of force. But to the extent that interdictions are not uses of force, they would still be unlawful under the law of the sea in the absence of flag-state consent. A variety of legal regimes may affect the analysis of whether interdiction violates the prohibition on the use of force. These intersecting legal regimes include the law of armed conflict, the law of interdiction, nonproliferation law, intervention law, and international and domestic criminal law. Despite the storied political history of interdiction and nuclear weapons, the proper approach to assessing the legality of interdiction of nuclear weapons or materials under the use of force law remains unclear.

1. Cuban Missile Redux

In the pre-NPT world, there was no enforceable international legal norm against proliferation, and domestic criminal laws hardly addressed the subject.320 Vessels could roam the high seas carrying nuclear materials, or even nuclear weapons, with the full protection of international law. The UN Charter was in effect, but the Security Council was largely paralyzed due to Cold War tensions and a heated U.S.–Soviet arms race in which resort to UN procedures was not feasible. This was the world of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the best available legal argument to interdict, or “quarantine,” Soviet missiles in transit came through a thinly supported reliance on the

319. Id. (“[T]he correct starting point must be that the exclusive jurisdiction principle renders a vessel immune from foreign interference unless there is a permissive rule of international law allowing the interference or the flag state consents to the interdiction.”); Günther Handl, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Legitimacy as a Function of Process, 19 Tul. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 32 (“[T]he specific operational language of the PSI boarding provisions is consistent with the traditional allocation of jurisdictional powers between flag, port, and coastal states, except perhaps in respect of interdiction measures in the contiguous zone.”).

authority of regional organizations under Article 53 of the UN Charter.\(^{321}\) A modern version of this scenario more likely concerns a less symmetric environment, in which a state that does not participate in any of the relevant legal regimes carries nuclear weapons or related materials on the high seas. Nearly fifty years after the Cuban Missile Crisis and forty-five years after the enactment of the NPT, the question of whether it is a violation of international law to interdict an illicit nuclear weapon on the high seas remains a live one.

This issue was brought to a head in 2002 when a North Korean shipment of Scud missiles was tracked on an apparently stateless vessel (the So San) on the high seas.\(^{322}\) In this particular case, the law of the sea provided the necessary legal authority to board and search the vessel, due to its apparent statelessness.\(^{323}\) Were the vessel North Korean, and had North Korea refused to cooperate, no express international authority would have permitted interdiction on the high seas, even if the vessel were carrying a nuclear weapon. Considering the importance of flag-state consent to the law on interdiction, international cooperation to procure such consent is crucial to gaining the legal authority necessary to address proliferation in international waters. An increase in bilateral shipboarding agreements through the PSI framework and the SUA Protocol has filled some of the proliferation gaps in the law of interdiction.\(^{324}\) Yet these cooperative arrangements leave a yawning gap that theoretically shields noncooperative rogue states that might transfer illicit weapons on the high seas.

A legal analyst confronted with the scenario of a rogue state carrying a nuclear weapon on the high seas is not in much better position today than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Law of the Sea Convention specifies five exceptions permitting a right of visit on a foreign vessel, as well as a general exception when acts of

\(^{321}\) The analysis hinged on a memorandum of the State Department Legal Advisor's Office that the authorization of the quarantine by the Organization of American States was not an "enforcement action" under Article 53 of the UN Charter because it was no mandatory upon member states. See Memorandum from the Dep't of State, Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba (Oct. 23, 1962), reprinted in CHAYES, supra note 314, app. III, at 146–48.

\(^{322}\) MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34327, PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 1 (2011).

\(^{323}\) Id.

\(^{324}\) See, e.g., EMMA BELCHER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE LESSONS FOR USING NONBINDING AGREEMENTS 1–2 (2011), available at https://secure.www.cfr.org/proliferation/proliferation-security-initiative/p25394 (arguing that a non-legally binding framework pledging to interdict illicit weapons of mass destruction shipments between state and non-state actors is an effective alternative to formal treaties for problems requiring immediate attention).
interference derive from powers conferred by treaty. The SUA Protocol, while criminalizing acts of proliferation on the high seas, did not create a right of interdiction absent flag-state consent. A last—though hardly ideal—line of defense for the legal analyst confronted with this issue may be through resort to Security Council Resolution 1540 and the extraterritorial application of domestic law enforcement.

2. Roving Police Authority

Acts of interdiction in non-armed-conflict situations may be usefully considered under a criminal law paradigm of police action. Although use of force principles gauged to the effect of an action may limit possibilities in this regard, explicit or implicit Security Council authorization of national criminal measures would tend to support their legality. Resolution 1540, enacted in support of the PSI initiative, did not create a right of interdiction, but it does reaffirm the call in the 1992 Security Council Presidential Statement for states to take “appropriate measures” to counter proliferation. It also requires states to develop effective national laws to regulate proliferation and expressly recognizes the validity of extraterritorial controls on products originating within the legislating state. It further calls on states to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking “in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law.”

The legal analyst might argue that interdiction is justified in the 1540 framework either because the gravity of the violation of global nonproliferation norms justifies exceptional enforcement measures as “appropriate” under the relevant Security Council Resolutions, or because interdiction is permissible on an exceptional basis as a valid extraterritorial enforcement of national law. An approach that treats interdictions as unlawful interventions rather than uses of force would provide more flexibility for the application of a law enforcement model as a means to excuse interdiction in exceptional cases.

In the event that the 1540 framework could be said to tolerate roving national police enforcement authority over proliferation on the

326. See SUA Protocol, supra note 31.
328. Id.
329. Id.
high seas, such authority would require effective domestic laws providing the necessary penal and enforcement authority. To this end, Resolution 1540 is facilitating the domestic criminalization of WMD trafficking worldwide. Several states have reported the promulgation of domestic criminal laws to cover WMD offenses, pursuant to the committee created to oversee implementation of Resolution 1540.\textsuperscript{331} The United States' radiological weapons law applies a broad extraterritorial power on the basis of the offense's occurrence in "interstate or foreign commerce,"\textsuperscript{332} while its nuclear weapons law simply states, "there is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section."\textsuperscript{333}

Widespread criminalization of proliferation offenses facilitated through Resolution 1540 enhances the legitimacy of claiming a sovereign right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. Such a process has to some extent already occurred in the context of the global drug and sex trafficking trades,\textsuperscript{334} and in the more distant past with respect to the slave trade.\textsuperscript{335}

As a matter of domestic law, the United States has traditionally reserved a unilateral right to apply its criminal laws extraterritorially, with Congress expressly granting extraterritorial interdiction authority in specific instances.\textsuperscript{336} This authority has been


\textsuperscript{332} 18 U.S.C. § 2332h (2006). This language derives from broad congressional authority "to regulate Commerce with Foreign nations" under the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

\textsuperscript{333} 18 U.S.C. § 832(b) (2006).


\textsuperscript{336} For a comprehensive review of American case law, see generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94–166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (2012).
justified legislatively and in the courts under the “protective” principle of jurisdiction, in which the nexus for enforcement is said to be the security interests of the state, “to such an extent and to so great a distance as is reasonable and necessary to protect itself and its citizens from injury.” 337 Traditionally, restrictions on extraterritorial interdiction were few. In the 1804 case of Church v. Hubbart, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the principle of extraterritorial seizure authority of a nation in a case involving a seizure and arrest by Portuguese authorities off of the coast of Brazil.338 The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935 defined “customs waters” to include jurisdiction over foreign vessels outside of U.S. territorial jurisdiction that are subject to a treaty or “other arrangement” with a foreign government, which enabled U.S. authorities to interdict.339 The Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 1980 similarly authorized extraterritorial jurisdiction over marijuana trafficking. 340 The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act applies extraterritorially as well, and expressly asserts jurisdiction over stateless vessels.341

In United States v. Gonzales, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the application of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act to a Honduran vessel 125 miles off of the coast of Florida.342 Despite the fact that Honduras consented to the seizure, the court stated that “[e]ven absent consent,” the United States could prosecute foreign nationals on the basis of the protective principle. 343 In interpreting the legal principles animating the statute, the court noted legislative “ambivalence” between respect for flag-state jurisdiction and the United States’ “long history” of extraterritorial jurisdiction.344 Considering that the legal authority to interdict is distinct from the legal authority to prosecute, the ability to obtain domestic criminal law jurisdiction over acts taking place on the high seas leaves open the question of how domestic authorities may conduct a seizure under international law. A right to seize persons and property is nonetheless implied. The House Report on the Marijuana on the High Seas Act captures the exceptional character of extraterritorial jurisdiction when it recommends “the most

338. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 235 (1804) (“[O]n the coast of South America, seldom frequented by vessels but for the purpose of illicit trade, the vigilance of the government may be extended somewhat further.”).
341. Id.; see also United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding the extraterritorial provisions of the Act in the face of due process challenges). For more on court treatment of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, see Doyle, supra note 336, at 16–17 (discussing various court challenges).
343. Id. at 938.
344. Id. at 940.
circumspect and judicious consideration before exercising any sovereign right of unilateral action in accomplishment of national objectives.\footnote{345}

Notwithstanding the existence of extraterritorial laws criminalizing proliferation, the U.S. legal system remains imperfect in terms of providing authority for warships to conduct interdictions on the high seas pursuant to those laws. While the armed forces have broad arrest and seizure authority in the event of armed conflict, the legal situation is less clear as a function of law enforcement. The U.S. Coast Guard possesses the statutory authority to exercise police authority within the territorial waters of the United States\footnote{346} but the Army and Air Force do not possess general authority to enforce the domestic criminal law of the United States under the Posse Comitatus Act; they may only act under statutory provision or under the authority of the U.S. Constitution.\footnote{347} The U.S. Navy and Air Force are similarly subject to restrictions on cooperation with civilian law enforcement. Notwithstanding questions over whether the Posse Comitatus Act applies extraterritorially,\footnote{348} the Defense Department applies the underlying policy extraterritorially, with exceptions under relevant directives.\footnote{349} The Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense may authorize military cooperation outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States\footnote{350} but this must be done on a case-by-case basis and presumably in cooperation with federal law enforcement authorities.

Statutorily, there is no direct interdiction authority for extraterritorial criminal law violations under Title 50 of the United States Code, which addresses military powers.\footnote{351} The sole statutory nuclear counterproliferation carve-out to the Posse Comitatus Act is

\footnote{345. H.R. REP. NO. 96-323, at 6 (1979).}
\footnote{346. The Coast Guard is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act and possesses authorities both as a domestic law enforcement agency under 14 U.S.C. § 89 (2006) and as one of the “armed forces” under 10 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).}
\footnote{347. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”).}
\footnote{348. Memorandum from Office of the Assistant Attorney Gen., to General Brent Scowcroft, Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus (Nov. 1989).}
\footnote{350. Dept of Def., Directive No. 5525.5, supra note 349, ¶ 8.2.}
\footnote{351. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1–2822 (2006).}
found in the Criminal Code at 18 U.S.C § 831, which authorizes the Attorney General to request the assistance of the military to execute law enforcement powers for offenses relating to unauthorized transfers or threats associated with nuclear materials. However, this carve-out only extends to the territorial waters of the United States. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, a Title 50 statute, addresses interdiction yet oddly contains no express authority for the military to conduct interdiction on the basis of criminal law violations. Criminal law aspects of United States export and import control laws do not provide any extraterritorial seizure authority either. Domestic legal authority for a warship to conduct an extraterritorial interdiction would have to either flow from the Attorney General, through a request to the Secretary of Defense, or directly from the President as a function of his constitutional powers to enforce the laws of the United States.

Assuming a state has relevant domestic authorities in place, the extraterritorial application of those authorities to interdict nuclear weapons in exceptional circumstances would provide one avenue for overcoming the proliferation gap, albeit a somewhat controversial one were such a principle to be exercised without limitation. In the event that a state exercises roving jurisdiction on the basis of domestic penal laws, that state might then argue that under Resolution 1540, a flag state is required to cooperate if proliferation-sensitive activities are at issue. A lack of cooperation may be an additional basis for interdiction as a countermeasure to respond to a wrongful act.

3. Interdiction and Force

Even assuming a valid law enforcement framework and an acceptance that the extraterritorial exercise of police authority is admitted under international law, the question of whether the interdiction constitutes a use of force under Article 2(4) still follows. If interdiction is considered categorically as a use of force under these circumstances, the default rule would then be that interdiction is illegal under international law unless justified as self-defense,

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353. See id. § 831(c)(1).
357. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 330, at 218 ("[T]he absence of any other criterion of any other limiting criterion ratione loci or ratione materiae makes this principle one of enormous potential scope.").
authorized under Chapter VII, or otherwise justified based on emerging nonproliferation norms.

Overly broad construals of the use of force present unworkable models for practical application. A recent example of this tendency is the case of Guyana v. Suriname,\(^{358}\) in which an ad hoc arbitral tribunal found that a relatively minor incident involving the expulsion of an oil platform from a disputed area was an unlawful use of force under Article 2(4). In that case, gunboats from the Surinamese Navy warned the supervisors of the rig that they should leave the area within twelve hours or face “consequences.”\(^{359}\) Suriname argued that its actions were lawful countermeasures in response to a wrongful act—unauthorized drilling in a disputed area of the continental shelf.\(^{360}\) The arbitrators disagreed, holding that the measures were “more akin to a threat of military action rather than a mere law enforcement activity.”\(^{361}\) In reaching its finding, however, the tribunal recognized that “in international law force may be used in law enforcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable, reasonable and necessary.”\(^{362}\) Whether any coercive police activities can meaningfully coexist with such a broadly applied prohibition on force is unclear.

The tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname posed such a wide conception of the use of force that it is difficult to conceive of coercive measures at sea that would not constitute force. Such a wide conception risks subsuming all acts of sovereign law enforcement into Article 2(4), widening the use of force gap significantly. Such a restrictive concept of self-defense (which diverges widely from state practice) reflects a formalistic application of Article 2(4). This approach deprives decision makers of more nuanced options that reflect prudential considerations of necessity and proportionality. That said, the province of what defines the use of force has not been thoroughly staked out, leaving the concept open to some degree of interpretation. Coercive measures that straddle the line of low-gravity uses of force might in this regard be more adequately considered under legal regimes of intervention or countermeasures, providing space for those areas of law to develop practical applications.


\(^{359}\) Id. ¶ 433.

\(^{360}\) Id. ¶ 441.

\(^{361}\) Id. ¶ 445.

\(^{362}\) Id.
B. The Advent of Low-Level Conflict: Cyber Attacks and Sabotage

With political controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear energy program, reports have emerged of industrial sabotage and cyber attacks targeting Iran's nuclear industry. While attribution of responsibility for these operations may not be possible, the international legality or illegality of such operations is nonetheless relevant to the determination of appropriate responses, if any. Cyber attacks and industrial sabotage fall into a grey area as actions that may or may not constitute the use of force. If they do not constitute use of force, the legal character of the action being targeted—that is, whether it is wrongful or not—will be relevant to the legal character of the coercive measure in question.

Cyber attacks represent a new challenge for international law. As a threshold matter, cyber attacks must be distinguished from forms of cyber exploitation, which serve to gather intelligence but do not interfere with a system's operation or cause physical harm. The use of cyber attacks as a counterproliferation tool has come into view with reports of computer malware known as Stuxnet, which targeted industrial control systems associated with Iran's centrifuge operations, causing the centrifuges to spin out of control. The application of these tools to interfere with nuclear programs with suspected military dimensions raises novel issues of legality. Putting aside problems of attribution for such an attack, the question of the legality of preventive cyber attacks largely hinges on whether they are considered uses of force under international law. If such attacks are not uses of force, what legal consequences flow from this type of intentional destruction of property in another state?

Cyber intrusions, consisting of exploitation and attack initiated for criminal, military, or law enforcement purposes are gaining

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365. See Lin, supra note 363, at 77 (“No one has come close to solving the problem of technical attribution—the ability to identify the party responsible for an offensive cyber operation based only on technical indicators and information associated with that operation.”).
366. See id. at 74–79 (examining different scenarios to arrive at a better understanding of what constitutes “use of force”).
increased attention in international and domestic law circles. Analysts consider cyber intrusions under various legal models, including regimes of criminal law, use of force law, and the law of armed conflict. It is generally agreed that the legality of a cyber intrusion is determined by its effect. Thus, if a cyber attack has the same “effect” as an armed attack, then it will be treated as such for legal purposes. As a multiform instrument of intelligence, coercion, or force, the effect of cyber intrusions and their attendant legal regimes cannot be defined ex ante, although a default standard might prove useful. Furthermore, with respect to state action in the international context, international criminal law is largely nonexistent at this stage of the law’s development. While state-sponsored attacks may be a matter of concern for domestic law enforcement authorities, there are currently no international instruments addressing state-sponsored cyber intrusions. The principal legal regimes applicable to state preventive measures involving offensive cyber operations are therefore the law of force, state responsibility, and the law of intervention.

A critical threshold matter in considering the legality of cyber measures as preventive tools is whether the measures amount to a use of force. If they do not, they may be reviewed against the backdrop of state responsibility for countermeasures and principles of nonintervention. In this context, unilateral cyber measures could be legal in the absence of express Security Council authorization, as they would not fall within the ambit of the Article 2(4) prohibition on the


368. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 363, at 33–34 (“The committee believes that the conceptual framework that underpins the UN Charter and today’s law of armed conflict regarding the use of force and armed attack is generally consistent with the notion that the effects of an action rather than the modality of that action are the primary measure in judging its legality under the UN Charter or LOAC.”); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 886 (1999) (proposing a normative framework determined by the effects of the cyber operation); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 431–32 (2011) (discussing general acceptance of the effects-based approach).

369. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 363, at 33–34.

370. The only international treaty addressing the subject is not directed at states. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185 (encouraging member states to adopt measures to prevent cybercrime by individuals or groups within their nations).
use of force. This would be the case under the law of countermeasures if they are (1) necessary, (2) proportional to address a wrongful act, and (3) instituted by a member of an especially interested group.\footnote{371} There are no bright line rules in determining whether apparent or possible misuses of sensitive nuclear technology are internationally wrongful.

On the other hand, if cyber intrusions are considered uses of force, the succeeding question will be whether the cyber attack rises to the level of an armed attack, triggering a right of self-defense, or whether the attack represents a low-gravity use of force, thus falling into the use of force gap insofar as the target has no right to use force in return. Corollary questions will arise in the context of broad-range authorizations of Article 41 nonforcible measures. Judgments relating to the forcible or nonforcible character of cyber intrusions are therefore crucial to determining whether such measures could be authorized within the scope of Article 41, or whether they require further authorization under Article 42 as uses of force.

1. Cyber Measures and the Use of Force

In the absence of an agreed definition on the use of force, arriving at a clear standard to determine the effect of an intermediate coercion tool is difficult. While the effect of the attack in terms of physical harm caused would seem a useful measure, some commentators have noted that often it will be the nonviolent consequences of the attack that have a more severe effect than the violent consequences.\footnote{372} States will wish to secure a broad right of response. The legality of state action in this context will depend on how restrictive international law is both on the offensive and defensive uses of force. If force is defined broadly and armed attack defined restrictively,\footnote{373} a large space will result for prohibited low-gravity uses of force that only permit nonforcible countermeasures in response. There is no doubt that the dominant juristic view on the defensive use of force is restrictive under international law, defining armed attack and imminent armed attack at such a high threshold that forcible measures of prevention cannot generally qualify as acts

\footnote{371} See infra Part VI.B.2.\footnote{372} See Nat’l Research Council, supra note 363, at 253–54 (“Thus, cyberattacks on the controlling information technology for a nation’s infrastructure (whether or not it caused immediate large-scale death or destruction of property) would be an armed attack . . . .”); Waxman, supra note 368, at 436 (“[I]n a world of heavy economic, political, military, and social dependence on information systems, the ‘nonviolent’ harms of cyber-attacks could easily dwarf the ‘violent’ ones.”).\footnote{373} See Waxman, supra note 368, at 438–39 (discussing the permissive U.S. position on self-defensive as a means of deterring small-scale attacks that would not trigger self-defense under a restrictive approach to self-defense).
of self-defense.\textsuperscript{374} In the use of force context, however, the law is largely undefined, as tools of cyber coercion were clearly not contemplated as acts of military force at the time of the drafting of the UN Charter.

The context in which Article 2(4) was conceived does not support the inclusion of measures that disrupt communication, disrupt economic activity, or even cause physical destruction in a nonmilitary environment. The overarching animus of Article 2(4) is the prevention of aggressive war; the Article was a direct successor of a provision in the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed recourse to “war” generally.\textsuperscript{375} The expansion of the term to refer to force implies broader coverage, yet does not extend to every forcible intrusion on state sovereignty. As Albrecht Randelzhofer notes in his history of Article 2(4), “The term does not cover any possible kind of force, but is, according to the correct and prevailing view, limited to armed force.”\textsuperscript{376} According to this view, the prohibition does not apply to all measures involving physical force, but only to “one means of coercion, namely military force.”\textsuperscript{377} Ian Brownlie notes that Article 2(4) was not limited to armed force—but was also not as broad as argued by some of his contemporaries—in light of the “predominant view of aggression” that drove the process of the United Nations’ creation and the Article’s adoption.\textsuperscript{378} Under Brownlie’s view, physical acts, such as forcible population expulsion, the release of large quantities of water down a valley, and the spread of fire across a frontier were difficult to regard as uses of force.\textsuperscript{379}

Due to the lack of settled opinion on the breadth endowed to Article 2(4), the existence of new tools of coercion will no doubt reinvigorate this debate. Multiple commentators on the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States\textsuperscript{380} have pointed out that the prohibition on the use of force was treated in this declaration as distinct from other forms of coercion. This was accomplished by considering military force under the rubric of “force” and “economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State” under the rubric of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{374} Analysis of this question typically applies to anticipatory self-defense. See, e.g., \textsc{Gray}, \textit{supra} note 302, at 160 (“The majority of states reject anticipatory self-defense.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{375} Albrecht Randelzhofer, \textit{Article 2(4), in \textsc{The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary}}, \textit{supra} note 316, at 116.
  \item \textsuperscript{376} \textit{Id.} at 117.
  \item \textsuperscript{377} \textit{Id.} at 119.
  \item \textsuperscript{378} \textsc{Brownlie}, \textit{supra} note 245, at 362.
  \item \textsuperscript{379} \textit{Id.} at 362–63; \textit{see also} Randelzhofer, \textit{supra} note 375, at 118–19.
\end{itemize}
“intervention.” As Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz notes, the declaration itself does not distinguish differing legal consequences of these acts and does not necessarily constitute a statement of law in any event. Moreover, the confusion surrounding the term “intervention,” often used to refer to armed intervention, does not provide a clear basis to distinguish the legal regimes in play. The existence of a distinction between force and intervention does, however, tend to reinforce the view that force is limited to military force, or its equivalent, and that intervention is a broader concept.

The exclusion of economic and political coercion from the term “force” is clear from the drafting history of the UN Charter. These forms of coercion are generally incident to the lawful exercise of sovereign rights. Measures to interrupt or interfere with computer systems were not familiar to the drafters of the Charter or the various committees addressing the law of force, and the definition considered applied principally to military force. An appropriate default analysis would treat cyber measures as “other type of measures to coerce” under the rubric of intervention, unless they are clearly calculated to bring about the type of destruction associated with military force. Shoehorning cyber attacks—attacks that do not cause or are not associated with extensive physical harm—into a prohibition that was originally designed to prevent aggressive war would represent an undue expansion of Article 2(4). Cyber measures do not fit neatly into a classification of political, economic, or military coercion measures, and thus belong by default to the category of

381. Id. at 122–23. See generally Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, THE UN DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF SOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1979); Frowein & Krisch, supra note 316, at 137–38 (discussing the unique qualities of military force when discussing coercion); Randelzhozer, supra note 375, at 118 (explaining when “force” should be understood as military force). Frowein and Kirsch note that the historical confusion on this point, however, as this distinction was rolled back in the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987). See Frowein & Krisch, supra 316, at 136–38 (discussing understandings of assistance mandates in different situations).

382. ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 381, at 99–100 (noting that separate legal consequences for force and intervention are not delineated in the Charter or the declaration).

383. Id. at 93 (“There can hardly be any doubt, in conclusion, that the declaration embodied in resolution 2625 (XXV)—the ‘Friendly Relations’ declaration—is to be considered, from the legal point of view, as an instrument of purely hortatory value.”).

384. Id. at 106, 127. On the overlap of intervention and force, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27) (“The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force.”).
They are by default nonforcible, and in this context should be viewed primarily as a disruption to communications systems, as described below.

Computer malware such as Stuxnet implants itself into a computerized network, commandeering or disrupting communication between components in an industrial control system via a reprogramming of network communications systems. Such malware is, in this regard, a form of interference with a communications network. Analysis of the effects of the virus therefore begins from the fact that it acts as a form of communications interference that may or may not have effects equivalent to military force. The intrusion itself is not a physical intrusion in the traditional sense; rather, it is a form of communication disruption. From this default position, a determination of a forceful effect would depend upon whether the interference in the communication system triggered significant harm equivalent to an act of force in terms of physical destruction. Causing a system to malfunction is itself not an act of force, unless that malfunction resulted in excessive physical damage or loss of life. Damage caused by cyber attacks is more likely to be economic. Moreover, proceeding from the legal model of communications interference, Article 41 of the UN Charter specifically contemplates that measures involving the “interruption” of all means of communication are nonforcible measures. Just as the inclusion of blockades within the ambit of forcible Article 42 measures provides prima facie evidence that blockades are acts of force, the inclusion of communications interruption in Article 41 would imply that communications disruptions are by default nonforcible.

Whether cyber attacks trigger a right of self-defense justifying a forcible response has been the principal concern of commentators addressing the broader question of how to respond to cyber attacks. As prevention tools to interrupt proliferation activities, it is unlikely that cyber attacks would rise to the level of armed attack. However, if a cyber attack were to cause the demolition of a uranium enrichment site, use of force rules would come into play, and possibly questions of whether the intrusion constituted an armed attack, thus triggering a right of self-defense. No special legal status would attach to the fact that an attack was carried out through a computerized channel,

385. See ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 381, at 128 (“The ‘forms of interference’ referred to [in the Declaration of Friendly Relations are indeed very hard to define in positive terms. As our personal effort has not been successful we leave this matter for more ingenious lawyers to resolve.”).
387. U.N. Charter art. 41.
388. Id. art. 42.
however. Because cyber measures are ill-defined in terms of their effects and have not received thorough consideration in any international venue, caution should be exercised in concluding that cyber measures constitute the use of force when they do not cause significant physical destruction.

2. Cyber Measures, Intervention Law, and State Responsibility

Principles of nonintervention, while largely undeveloped as a matter of law, 389 may provide useful guidance through the assessment of cyber measures in terms of their intrusive effect on state sovereignty. Although the content of the rule of nonintervention has historically been ambiguous, 390 its basic parameters are fairly clear. Intervention is a broad term that covers both military force and nonmilitary forms of coercion. 391 For an action to constitute intervention as a matter of law, the interference must intrude on the sovereignty of the target in some way, affecting “matters which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely.” 392 As Michael Wood notes, “The principle of non-intervention is the mirror image of the sovereignty of States.” 393 Not all forms of interference will constitute intervention, however, as the action must be “forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in question.” 394

389. See Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 381, at 130 (“[T]oo many jurists, while rightly acknowledging the state of confusion that characterizes the concept of nonintervention, seem not to believe in the possibility of at least reducing that confusion.”); Brownlie, supra note 243, at 44 (“The term and the use made of it by governments and writers have been a very considerable source of confusion.”); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 1 (“[H]ow the norm [of nonintervention] applies to nonforcible conduct is inadequately understood.”).

390. See, e.g., Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 381, at 2 (“The attempt to prove the content of a presumed rule of nonintervention by testing tentative hypotheses against states’ known behavior turns out to be as difficult as trying to confirm theories about New York City’s jaywalking laws by observing pedestrian traffic patterns in midtown Manhattan.”).


394. Oppenheim’s International Law 432 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 1996); see also Thomas G. Weiss & Don Hubert, Non-Intervention, in
The principle finds unique relevance in the context of intrusions that do no rise to the level of the use of force.

An intrusion on industrial control systems operated by and within a state would clearly constitute interference in the sovereign domain of that state. While the regime of nonintervention has been largely irrelevant in regard to economic measures—which are generally legal exercises of sovereign rights—cyber intrusions provide a clear example of unlawful interventions that fail to rise to the level of the use of force. The law of intervention here finds a useful application outside of the context of Article 2(4).

Under the legal regime of nonintervention, cyber attacks would not be considered legal simply because they do not involve the use of force. As a prohibited act of intervention, a cyber attack might be illegal insofar as it targets a lawful activity and legal insofar as it targets an internationally wrongful activity. This is an important distinction. A cyber attack that shuts down a stock exchange will be unlawful because it is directed at a lawful activity, while a cyber attack that shuts down a banned centrifuge program could be lawful if it is directed at an internationally wrongful activity. It is perfectly conceivable that states could conduct “cyber wars” without ever triggering the Article 2(4) prohibition.

The law of state responsibility provides a well-developed legal framework of “secondary rules” to assess the legal consequences of nonforcible interventions such as cyber measures. Nonforcible acts that would otherwise be unlawful may be excused either on the basis of necessity or as countermeasures addressing unlawful behavior. Under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, necessity may provide a basis to preclude wrongfulness if the action is the only means for a state to safeguard “an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril,” and it does not impair an essential interest of the targeted state or the international community.15 This doctrine is fairly restrictive, however, and can be invoked if the measure in question is the “only way” to bring about a cessation of the targeted state’s unlawful act.16

Countermeasures apply when actions that would otherwise be unlawful are initiated to achieve a cessation of, or reparation for,
internationally wrongful behavior. A state may take such action unilaterally if it is (1) “injured” by the unlawful behavior,397 (2) “specially affected” by the injury,398 or (3) part of a collective to which an obligation to cease the unlawful behavior runs.399 As discussed in Part II, nonproliferation obligations may be considered *erga omnes* legal obligations, running to all states insofar as those norms have achieved high-order status through the NPT, state practice, and multiple Security Council resolutions. When the Security Council has expressly prohibited proliferation activities, the compliance obligations of the targeted state may be said to run to all members of the United Nations. Countermeasures must be proportional—that is, commensurate to addressing the unlawful behavior targeted—and may be calibrated to effectively address the gravity of that unlawful act.400 Cyber measures could therefore be legally used when the targeted behavior is internationally wrongful. The targeting of an illicit nuclear weapons program may fit this model of analysis, although actions targeting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy present a more problematic scenario.

VII. PREVENTIVE FORCE AND NONPROLIFERATION LAW

International law is highly restrictive on the use of force by states without Security Council authorization. The scope of self-defense to justify unilateral action on a preemptive basis has been thoroughly vetted through debates relating to the Iraq War, which have done little to produce consensus.401 In the meantime, jurists continue to facilitate an ever-widening gap by promoting impractically broad offensive restrictions and narrow defensive permissions for the use of force. In the defensive context, as Theresa Reinold notes, a divergence has already resulted between state practice and international law doctrine.402 Where preventive force is

398. *Id.*
399. *Id.* art. 48.
402. Reinold, *supra* note 312, at 246 (“[T]he question arises as to what balance can be struck between the traditional, restrictive interpretation of self-defense (which is widely viewed as inadequate for dealing with the security challenges of the twenty-first century) and what might amount to a re legitimation of war as the continuation of politics by other means.”).
concerned, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has gained little traction as a basis for justifying unilateral force. The concept of an “imminent” attack remains confined in nineteenth century conceptions, as articulated in the Caroline case. Notwithstanding Ian Brownlie’s early 1963 recognition that, due to the advent of long-range missiles in a state of readiness, “the difference between attack and imminent attack may now be negligible,” carving out a doctrine of anticipatory self-defense that does not eviscerate the prohibition on the use of force has historically been an unworkable proposition. Thus, unilateral preventive force does not occupy a sound position under the current scheme of international law.

In the context of low-level conflict, numerous quandaries on the law of force surface. It is unclear, for example, whether targeted killings of Iranian nuclear scientists should be a matter of Iranian domestic law or a question of international humanitarian law. In the absence of an attribution of responsibility for such acts, it is difficult to prove a nexus to international conflict, inviting the question—similarly posed in the context of terrorism—of whether such isolated acts should be considered primarily a criminal law matter. Moreover, under prevailing standards on the use of force, isolated killings would likely not be considered an armed attack meriting the invocation of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Forcible reprisals for such targeted killings would therefore be problematic under international law. The absence of clear-cut legal standards in the context of low-level conflict suggests that international law is ill-equipped to deal with such situations.

Assuming that a state suspected of developing nuclear weapons is the victim of an unlawful use of force targeting the cessation of that activity, the suspect state may face the grim reality of having no effective remedy. Although international law does not excuse the unlawful use of force in the context of a counterproliferation strategy, a state that has been isolated as a result of its alleged interests in developing a nuclear weapon may be in the awkward situation of

403. Id. at 247 (commenting that “[t]he Webster formula from the Caroline case of 1837 continues to be the authoritative statement on the right to anticipatory self-defense in customary international law” and then discussing ambiguities and legal criticisms surrounding this approach).

404. J.B. Moore, Destruction of the “Caroline,” in A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 409–12 (1906) (reproducing Secretary of State Webster’s comment that “[u]ndoubtedly it is just that, while it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation”).

405. Brownlie, supra note 245, at 368.

having little support in the collective security apparatus for addressing low-level uses of force. One prominent example is the attack on the Dair Alzour/Ali Kibar nuclear site in Syria in 2007 and the ensuing silence of the international community. At the time of the attack, both the attacker and the nature of the facility attacked remained unclear, though it later became clear that Israel launched the attack.407

The international response to the attack at Dair Alzour was relatively muted,408 with no Security Council condemnation (in contrast with Israel’s 1982 attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor, which was condemned by the Security Council in Resolution 487).409 On May 24, 2011, the IAEA concluded on the basis of environmental samples, satellite imagery, photographs, and other assessments that the facility was likely a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency.410 The IAEA Board of Governors referred the matter to the Security Council on June 9, 2011.411

Although it widely understood that the airstrikes on Dair Alzour were an unlawful use of force, it is also undisputed that the muted reaction signals an increasing lack of global political concern regarding the legality of such low-level uses of force when the target state is outside of international norms regarding nuclear policy.412 The closest corollary in legal doctrine that captures the international community’s muted response to the Dair Alzour strikes is found in the doctrine of “clean hands,”413 or the principle that “an unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action in law.”


412. Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Israel’s Airstrikes on Syria’s Al-Kibar Facility, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 263, 290 (2011) (“Israel’s failure to offer any legal justification for its airstrike, and the muted international reaction to the Al-Kibar episode, appear to be part of a recent trend in state practice indicating a broader lack of concern over the legality of relatively minor uses of force.”).

A prime historical example of the clean hands doctrine is the Pelletier case (1885), in which the United States took the position that an arbitral award against Haiti for the seizure of the vessel of an American claimant should not be enforced because the claimant was engaged in slave trading. Judge Anzilotti most succinctly summed up the doctrine in The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland when he stated, “[A]n unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action at law.” This is essentially an adaptation of the Latin maxim *ex injuria jus non oritur*, or “no legal right can spring from a wrong.” In the Nicaragua case, the doctrine was considered and rejected, as evidenced by Judge Schwebel’s elaborate dissent on the matter. The doctrine of clean hands currently has no force in law and does not excuse an unlawful act of force. But the doctrine may be operative in the political context, rendering international law somewhat ineffective as a method to secure a remedy against counterproliferation attacks.

VIII. CONCLUSION: ALL ROADS LEAD BACK TO EFFECTIVE MONITORING IN A COOPERATIVE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The nuclear nonproliferation regime comprises cooperative and coercive elements, each of which play a role in the development of prevention and enforcement norms. On the cooperative side, the principal prevention mechanism is found in the institutional and legal framework of the IAEA, operating under the NPT comprehensive safeguards system. The IAEA serves to monitor and verify the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as well as offer technical assistance in an environment in which nations can freely trade in nuclear technology for peaceful uses. On the coercive side, the IAEA defers to the collective security apparatus of the Security Council and individual states for the enforcement of nonproliferation obligations. Inherent in the global nonproliferation framework is a tension between the deterrence value of coercive action and the fact that the regime cannot exist without the cooperation of all states. The risk in imposing aggressive prevention and enforcement measures is that the cooperative framework will break down, and enforcement measures...
will devolve into a proxy for interstate rivalries. Prevention and enforcement norms are important in this context. A norm involving coercive action in the nonproliferation context should remain fixed on a singular overriding objective: creating conditions for a return to good faith participation in the international monitoring system.

The spread of nuclear weapons poses great risks for international peace and security. State and non-state groups may face great temptations to remedy asymmetries in international relations by acquiring and even deploying nuclear weapons. Yet injecting more nuclear weapons into unstable and hostile environments creates a greater likelihood that the weapons will be used in either state or non-state conflicts. The law on nonproliferation reflects these dangers in norms that are developed through the IAEA, the Security Council, and state action. Throughout this evolution, nonproliferation has come to occupy binding legal status as an obligation \textit{erga omnes}, that extends to all members of the international community. The absence of a clear-cut definition of proliferation makes enforcing the regime a challenge, underscoring the importance of developing clear and consistent standards that can be adapted across a range of circumstances to prevent the misuse of potentially dangerous nuclear technologies.

Because nonproliferation is ultimately a question of threats to peace and security, the task of devising appropriate measures necessarily relies on mixed questions of law and policy. Decisions on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security and what constitutes appropriate responsive action are largely political decisions, although nonproliferation law provides the basic framework for the exercise of such decisions. Arriving at legal standards that allow for consistency in the development of nonproliferation norms requires a full accounting of factors that signal heightened levels of risk and a reconciliation of those factors with legal obligations. The development of consistent standards to assess proliferation risk—and hence to provide the raw materials to judge what additional measures of prevention and enforcement may be necessary—starts and ends with the IAEA safeguards system. Cooperative action within the framework of that system should be the top priority of any prevention and enforcement efforts under the nuclear nonproliferation regime.