

Political Culture of Democracy in Venezuela: 2007

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Foreword

The AmericasBarometer, 2006-2007: Background to the Study

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I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006-2007 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006-2007, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica). The U.S and Canada were also included, with the support of the Center for the Americas. Brazil and Uruguay were added too late to be included in this volume. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006-2007 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators.

We embarked on the 2006-2007 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the

Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behavior. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviors. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was



prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CSPRO software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps, the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors was encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006-2007 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyre into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006-2007 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006-2007 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire were pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the AmericasBarometer to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November June 2004, teams of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project., read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always

seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

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Executive Summary

The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 is the first survey in this series to be conducted in Venezuela and represents an important reference point for scholars and policy makers, particularly as the series expands in coming years. The survey is based on a nationwide, probability sample of 1500 Venezuelans and was conducted in August-September 2007, some three months before the December 2 constitutional referendum. This particular version of the survey includes a standard battery of questions used in all 2006-07 AmericasBarometer surveys concerning popular understandings of democracy; support for democracy; corruption, crime, and the rule of law; participation in and satisfaction with local government; electoral behavior; and social capital. It also includes a number of customized questions designed to gauge attitudes and behavior specific to the contemporary political context in Venezuela. Some of these questions, particularly affect for Hugo Chávez, support for populist discourse, and participation in the new Communal Councils, are reported here. Because the Venezuela survey was the last to be conducted in the 2006-07 series, the report provides us with an especially good opportunity to engage in cross-country comparisons, which we do for many indicators.

Overall, the survey presents a mixed picture. Venezuelans have extreme responses on issues such as crime, the rule of law, and popular understandings of democracy, but on most measures the country is about average for the region. What really stands out in a large number of modules, however, is the political polarization of the country. As questions tap into increasingly subjective measures of government performance, the differences between supporters and opponents of Chávez become extreme; in some instances the distributions of responses between the two groups are mirror images of one another.

Chapter I provides a brief historical background that contextualizes the results of the survey and highlights its potential contributions. It briefly describes the breakdown of the traditional “Punto Fijo system,” the pact that initiated democracy in Venezuela in 1958 after many decades of dictatorship, as well as the rise of Chávez and his movement since roughly 1998. Venezuelans currently confront several important political issues, including the deepening of the government’s program of radical reform, the recent constitutional referendum, and rising crime and corruption. The economy has performed extremely well in recent years, generating high levels of approval for Chávez, but high growth rates mask growing problems with inflation and macroeconomic mismanagement. Social science survey research has a long history in Venezuela but has been somewhat irregular in its coverage and periodicity, a problem compounded in recent years by controversy that often surrounds polling data, particularly political market research surveys conducted during electoral campaigns.

Chapter II describes the methodology and particularly the sampling techniques used in this survey. Like other AmericasBarometer 2006-07 surveys, the Venezuela version is a face-to-face survey performed at the respondent’s home. Questions specific to the survey were designed by the authors and contributors during the four months preceding the administration of the survey. Field testing and training followed in July, and the final survey ran for approximately seven weeks in August and September. All survey respondents gave an oral informed consent,

following the regulations enforced by Vanderbilt University's Institutional Review Board (IRB). Fieldwork and sample design were carried out by the Costa Rican firm Borge y Asociados using Venezuelan workers and managed by Mitchell Seligson's team at Vanderbilt University. The sample itself was stratified geographically into six regions, with sampling units in each stratum selected with probability proportional to size according to data from the 2001 Population Census (updated with 2005 population estimates). The results of several sociodemographic indicators suggest that the resulting sample is very similar to the population.

Chapter III provides the first significant substantive results and focuses on Venezuelans' definitions of democracy. Venezuelans have what scholars consider strongly *normative* conceptions of democracy that focus specifically on freedom, especially freedom of expression. The clarity of these definitions varies most directly with education, in that highly educated Venezuelans are more likely to have a specific definition of democracy. Broad patterns of definitions among Venezuelans are fairly consistent across other measures, including partisanship. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that supporters of Chávez are not especially likely to define democracy in the participatory terms championed by the government.

An important module in this chapter examines two new sets of questions for measuring affinity to populism. The first considers popular acceptance of direct, plebiscitary democracy, a conception of populism known by social scientists as *political-institutional*. We find that Venezuelans show relatively greater levels of support for direct, plebiscitary democracy when compared to other Latin American countries, but that across the region these levels are low and not always intuitive when we consider specific countries. The second set of questions measures populism in more *cultural* terms, as a Manichaeian discourse that equates the side of good with the putative "will of the people," and the side of evil with a conspiring elite. Levels of populism according to this measure are much higher in Venezuela, but the results are somewhat inconsistent across indicators. Populist statements indicating that a government has a responsibility to protect and honor the will of the people or that opponents should not be tolerated receive strong support from Venezuelans, but statements specifying a Manichean worldview find relatively less echo. Together these results suggest the need for further refinement of our measures.

Chapter IV examines support for democracy in Venezuela. Partisanship proves to be a major factor here. The perceived legitimacy of the system is fairly high in comparison with other countries in the region, but supporters of Chávez are much more likely than opponents to see the current political system as legitimate, trustworthy, and efficacious. Other sociodemographic factors may also play a role in shaping political support, but their effects are smaller or less consistent. Measures of political tolerance yield surprising results. Not only are levels of tolerance much higher than previous surveys suggest, but they are higher in comparison with other countries from the region. Tolerance is also only weakly associated with partisanship, with Chávez supporters tending to be somewhat less tolerant of opposition. We suspect that these results are in part a function of the way tolerance is measured in the study, namely, a focus on the civil liberties of those who are critics of the political system.

Chapter V measures corruption, crime, and the rule of law. These represent some of Venezuelans' greatest concerns and are areas where the country stands out compared to others in



the region. Perceived corruption is the highest in the region, although experienced corruption tends to be somewhat lower in comparative context; both perceived and experienced crime are among the highest in the region; and the rule of law is the worst in Latin America, with confidence in the police consistently at rock-bottom. Many of these assessments are widely held across different social and partisan groups, which show a strong propensity to adhere to rational-legal norms of corruption and the rule of law. However, as we consider particular institutions and the current government's effort to combat these problems, opinions become highly polarized by support for Chávez. Confidence in the judiciary is particularly low among Chávez opponents.

Chapter VI considers participation in and assessments of local government. Over the past two decades Venezuela has experimented heavily with government decentralization, and more recently with a slate of radical participatory initiatives sponsored by the Chávez government. The assessment of traditional forms of local government is somewhat mixed in the survey. Levels of citizen participation and assessments of these programs are low and negative in absolute terms, but about average for the region. Supporters of Chávez tend to assess these programs more favorably, a finding that probably reflects the control that Chávez allies have over most municipal governments today. As for the Communal Councils—the most important of the Chávez government's current initiatives—levels of participation seem to be higher and overall assessments are at least as positive as they are with traditional local government; however, both of these aspects are strongly colored by partisanship, in that Chávez proponents are much more likely to participate in the CC and to judge these programs positively.

Chapter VII measures several aspects of electoral participation, including vote choice, partisan identity, turnout, and presidential approval. Partisan identity dwindled in the years leading up to the election of Chávez, and the results here confirm this trend. Venezuelans who express any kind of partisan identity tend to favor electoral vehicles of personalistic candidates, particularly Chávez, although the same pattern can be seen among members of the opposition. Cross-national data show that these levels of partisan identity are low but not extremely so. Levels of voter turnout offer a more mixed picture, in that presidential elections during the Chávez era have achieved impressive levels of turnout. However, the levels of turnout are highly variable across other elections, tend to be especially low for the opposition, and are probably driven by the high stakes of presidential elections in a polarized environment. Presidential approval levels suggest a more positive interpretation of the current political system. Despite the tumult of the past 9 years, voters seem to assess Chávez based at least in part on standard economic evaluations, and retrospective assessments of personal economic well-being are particularly good predictors of presidential approval.

Finally, Chapter VIII gauges social capital, conceived of here as any feature of social interactions that facilitates collective action in other spheres. Overall, we find low levels of social capital in Venezuela. Venezuelans lack strong levels of interpersonal trust, even among Chávez supporters. And participation in various types of associations, both formal and informal, seems relatively low or average, despite the government's push for a more participatory democracy. We do find some evidence that Chávez supporters participate more in the search for solutions to community problems, but the differences are not large and fail to extend to more formal kinds of organizations such as professional associations, labor unions, and even parties. A more definitive analysis would need to take into account the newer forms of associations linked to the

government, such as the *Comités de Tierra Urbana*, the *Comités de Salud*, the economic cooperatives, and the *Círculos Bolivarianos*.

I. Background

Since roughly 1998, Venezuela has experienced a dramatic transformation of its political system with the coming to power of Hugo Chávez and his movement, known in Venezuela (and referred to in this report) as *Chavismo*. This survey was administered at a relatively high point in the popularity and strength of the Chávez government, just a few months before its loss in the constitutional reform referendum of 2007, and after nearly three years of impressive economic growth. A 2008 AmericasBarometer survey has already been conducted, and we plan on reporting on those results, compared to the 2007 round, in the near future.

Background and political context

From the transition to democracy in 1958 up until 1998, Venezuela had a peculiar democratic regime known as the “Punto Fijo system,” named for a pact signed by key political actors during the transition. Although the system that emerged was characterized by the predominance of a small number of hierarchically organized, disciplined parties that largely monopolized access to the country’s oil rents, it enjoyed a high level of peaceful electoral competition and regular turnover that made Venezuela a model of democracy in Latin America, often ranked right behind Costa Rica as the second most democratic system in the region. The country was a striking contrast with other Latin American countries that for much of that same period experienced electoral fraud and violence, polarization between parties of the Right and Left, and periods of military rule (Blank 1973; Levine 1973; Levine 1989; Kornblith and Levine 1995; Martz and Myers 1977; Merkl 1981, 127-28; O’Donnell 1992, 37).

With the rise of Chavismo this exceptionalism ended (McCoy and Myers 2004). Venezuela was transformed into a polarized party system with two camps that saw each other as enemies in a cosmic struggle. The opposition made frequent recourse to non-electoral means to challenge Chávez, while the government chiseled away at the civil liberties of its opponents and used public resources to win elections. Many political institutions that previously had a semblance of autonomy (or at least offered proportional representation to the different parties) were turned into organizations allied with Chávez’s views that frequently excluded or ruled against the interests of the opposition. Yet throughout this conflict, both sides continued to frame their goals and tactics in terms of democratic principles, and they ultimately hewed to minimal procedural standards that gave elections a degree of democratic legitimacy.

Chavismo itself had its beginnings in the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200, or MBR 200 (*Movimiento Bolivarian Revolucionario 200*), a clandestine organization within the armed forces founded in 1983 by Chávez and fellow junior officers (Hawkins 2003; López-Maya 2005; Ellner 2008). The organization first acquired fame when it attempted a failed coup against the unpopular government of Carlos Andrés Pérez in February of 1992. While spending two years in prison, Chávez and his fellow conspirators won considerable popular support and made contacts with a variety of dissidents and critics of the Punto Fijo parties. After they were pardoned and released in 1994, Chávez and his comrades toured the country in an effort to create a more truly



civilian-popular movement, and eventually organized a party to contest the general elections of 1998. In a hard-fought campaign in which they promised to end the old political system and call for a constituent assembly, Chávez and his new party, Movimiento V República (or MVR) steadily increased in the polls and won the presidential election with a solid 54% of the vote.

During the first two years of his presidency, Chávez's "democratic revolution" enjoyed fairly widespread popular support, evidenced in large part by the approval of the new 1999 constitution and the party's tremendous success in the "mega elections" of 2000 that reconstituted national and local governments and brought a Chavista majority into nearly every branch and level of government in the country. However, a deepening economic recession, coupled with Chávez's personalistic rule and incendiary rhetoric, caused many Venezuelans and even some of his political allies to lose faith in the movement. By 2002, Chávez's approval ratings dipped below 40%, and the movement faced a period of crisis that culminated in massive popular protests and a short-lived coup in April 2002, followed by a two-month national strike in December 2002-January 2003.

Chávez reacted forcefully to this turn of events, announcing the refounding of the original MBR 200 movement and calling for the creation of local, neighborhood groups known as *Círculos Bolivarianos* to mobilize civil society and defend the revolution. These efforts at mobilization proved highly successful, as over two million Venezuelans organized *Círculos* and other pro-Chávez organizations in their communities. The *Círculos* in particular provided a basis for popular opposition to the attempted coup of 2002 and eventually for an electoral campaign organization that reinvigorated the Chavista electorate (Hawkins and Hansen 2006).

Thanks to a dramatic rise in oil prices, Chávez was also able to institute a series of new social programs that turned popular approval around and became the basis for a radical new direction in the government's program of socioeconomic reform. The programs, called *Misiones*, drew on several billion dollars in oil revenues to provide free health care, remedial education, basic foodstuffs, and occupational training and developmental loans for economic cooperatives (Penfold-Becerra 2008; Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson forthcoming). Chávez also pursued greater control over key branches of government, in particular the judiciary (where a 2004 reform allowed the government to stack the Supreme Court) and the National Electoral Council (which ended up with a Chavista majority on its governing board).

Thus, while feelings of frustration lingered and allowed the opposition to successfully call for a presidential election in August 2004, by the time of that election in August Chávez had regained his popular support and was able to create an extraordinary grass-roots campaign organization, the *Comando Maisanta*, that helped him win with 59% of the vote and exceptionally high voter turnout. In subsequent local elections of October 2004, Chavista candidates captured nearly every seat in the country. And in the 2005 national legislative elections, a decision by the opposition to abstain resulted in a complete victory by Chavista candidates. As a result, the legislature no longer had an opposition party in it.

Riding this extraordinary wave of popularity, Chávez and his movement pushed forward an increasingly radical agenda of leftist reforms denominated "Socialism of the Twenty-First Century" that sought the creation of a participatory, egalitarian democracy. Reforms included:

- maintenance of the Misiones
- expansion of community media outlets (radio and television)
- re-nationalization of key industries, such as telecommunications and energy firms
- extension of pre-Chavista initiatives in the shantytowns such as the *Mesas Técnicas de Agua* and the *Comités de Tierra Urbana*
- development of new communally based urban communities
- financing of new local quasi-governmental organizations, the Communal Councils
- creation of a new political party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (in Spanish, PSUV) to absorb MVR and other partisan allies

Chávez's most recent victory in the 2006 presidential elections seemed to vindicate this radical program of reform. However, the president apparently reached too far and pushed forward a package of constitutional reforms that would have removed term limits to the presidency and possibly done away with municipal and state governments in favor of the new Communal Councils. In the referendum, held in December 2007 (after the survey was completed), the government narrowly lost as Chavista voters either abstained or voted against the proposal. It was the first major loss for Chávez since coming to power in 1998 and a cause for reflection and reorganization within the movement.

It is within the context of the constitutional referendum campaign that this survey was administered. Aside from the government's frustrated attempts at constitutional reform, at least two other political issues are worth noting because they come up again in later chapters of this study. First is the emergence of new centers of opposition and protest against the government. The principal among these are university student organizations, which have taken an increasingly anti-Chávez stance in response to the government's attempts to restrict the autonomy of the country's traditional universities. Students were also galvanized by the government's decision to revoke the broadcasting license of RCTV, the country's most popular television station and a critical voice against the government, in May 2007. This decision led to a series of protests by university student organizations and marked their first significant entry onto the national political scene in many years.

The second broad political concern is with crime and corruption. Both of these have been problems in Venezuelan politics for at least a decade—indeed, Chávez and his movement came to power in 1998 partly on an anti-corruption discourse that spoke out against the excesses of the Punto Fijo parties—but have been exacerbated since police and judicial reforms were sidelined after 1998 (in the case of crime) and since the executive branch assumed direct control of the state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in 2002-03 (in the case of corruption). Levels of violent crime have skyrocketed in Caracas, and problems of kickbacks and other abuses of government funds have become endemic in PDVSA, which formerly had a reputation for autonomy and technical proficiency. Both of these problems became issues in the 2006 presidential campaign. While Chávez promised to make corruption a focus of his new term in office, reform efforts were set aside during 2007 in order to pursue constitutional reforms.



Economic Situation

While the history related above gives a rough sense of the political situation in Venezuela today and its most important antecedents, it is important to focus on some of the economic trends in the country that have played such an important role in Chavismo's rise to popularity since its nadir in 2002-03.

The key points to emphasize here are the exceptional turnaround in economic growth, but also the growing problems associated with the government's deficit spending and imposition of price controls. Over the last three years Venezuela has boasted an average annual GDP growth rate of at least 10% (Parra Luzardo, 7). In 2006, Venezuela reached an annual GDP of 181.6 billion in current US dollars, roughly twice the 1998 level (Venezuela Central Bank). GDP growth stems mainly from rising oil prices, which have increased more than sevenfold since 1999 (Energy Information Agency).

Table I-1 Economic Indicators

IndicatorYear	2004	2005	2006
GDP(millions of current US\$, PPP)	157,070	178,527	202,742
GDP growth (%)	18	10	10
Inflation, deflator of GDP(%)	34.0	29.0	16.9
Inflation, CPI (%)	21.8	16.0	13.7
Exchange rate average (BS\$:US\$1)	1891	2090	2147
Foreign Direct Investment (BoP, millions of current US\$)	864	1400	-2632
Trade export index (2000=100)	119	174	205

Source: World Development Indicators


Table I-2 shows the rise in per capita GDP is most dramatic since 2003, when it fell to a low of \$5,040. The nation-wide strike against the government near the end of 2002 significantly impacted levels of output (Figure I-1). Price controls instituted by Chávez and the enormous rise in oil prices have helped to calm the economic situation while regaining and finally surpassing levels of output achieved before Chávez took office.

Even with this extraordinary gain in recent years, Venezuela's level of economic output only falls near the middle of the pack when compared to other countries in the region (Table I-2 and Figure I-4). For example, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile all record higher per capita GDP. However, Venezuela is not far behind some of them.

Table I-2 Annual PPP Per Capita Income in Current US Dollars in Seven Countries of the Americas 2002-2006

Country Name	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Venezuela	5,451	5,040	6,012	6,717	7,503
Argentina	10,522	11,573	12,826	14,286	15,795
Brazil	7,535	7,669	8,206	8,587	9,054
Chile	9,820	10,298	11,080	11,940	12,655
Latin America & Caribbean	7,223	7,433	7,973	8,470	9,075
Canada	29,492	30,433	31,785	33,370	35,030
United States	36,126	37,545	39,772	41,890	44,155

Fuente: World Development Indicators

**Figure I-1 Annual PPP Per Capita GDP in Current US Dollars in Venezuela 1998-2006**




Figure I-2 PPP Per Capita GDP in US Dollars in Latin American Countries, 2006

The unemployment rate fell radically starting in 2004 and has continued to fall (Figure I-3). The 2006 unemployment rate (8.8%) is a little more than half of the 2003 high of 16.8%. Although the unemployment rate has been reduced to more acceptable levels, this rate is still higher than historic lows.




Figure I-3 Total Unemployment Rate

The big question for the Venezuelan economy is whether these levels of growth will be sustainable. When Chávez came to power in 1999, he began his leadership with modest public spending habits. However, as he became more ambitious with programs such as the *Misiones*, government spending more than tripled from 1999 to 2004 (IMF 2007). This increase in public spending, in addition to the strain of the nation-wide strike at the end of 2002, led to a rapid increase in inflation and unemployment rates which topped out at 31% and 18% respectively in 2003 (IMF 2007). In an effort to stem this growing inflation, Chávez initiated price controls in 2003, successfully lowering inflation to a modest 11% in April 2007 (IMF 2007).




Figure I-4 Annual Variation in the Consumer Price Index

While price controls have given inflation the appearance of containment, and unemployment rests at a currently moderate level (10.9% in February 2007), larger problems have developed below the surface. During 2007, price controls led to an artificially low supply of food in Caracas, causing large lines to form outside food stores as many Venezuelans, mostly from poorer areas, waited to purchase their groceries (*The Economist* 2007). Food retailers complained that Chávez's price controls forced them to sell food at a loss or risk being shut down. And by the end of 2007, inflation was on the rise again, reaching over 20 percent. These and other macroeconomic problems could be exacerbated if oil revenues dropped in the future. Even with the current oil price boom and windfall revenues, the government ran a modest annual deficit in 2006 and 2007 of around 2% of GDP (World Bank).



Popular assessments of performance

In light of the overall growth of the economy in recent years and increases in public spending, we are not surprised to find that popular assessments of economic performance are among the best in the region. The survey includes several assessments of economic performance, two of which are found in Table I-3. The first question asks respondents to compare the country's current economic situation to the circumstances twelve months ago; the second question solicits a similar comparison but in regard to their own personal economic situation.

Table I-3 Questions Regarding Economic Situation of Government and Individual

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su situación** económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR

Figure I-5 shows how Venezuelans feel about changes in the national economy. It shows that Venezuelans are almost equally divided into three groups. Only a fraction more than one third (36.4%) felt the overall economic condition was the *same* as twelve months ago. The rest of respondents were almost evenly divided between those who felt that the economic situation had *improved* and those who felt it had gotten *worse*.




Figure I-5 Popular Assessments of the Country's Economic Situation Over the Past 12 Months

The results regarding the personal economic situation of respondents were just as symmetric but somewhat less positive (Figure I-6). Most respondents believed that their personal economic situation was the *same* as twelve months ago (44.6%), while 26.5% felt that the situation was *worse*, and 28.9% perceived an improvement. Again the *better* and *worse* groups shared similar proportions.




Figure I-6 Popular Assessments of Personal Economic Situation Over the Past 12 Months

While these assessments of economic performance might seem lukewarm, they are actually among the highest across the region. Figure I-7 shows the percent of respondents who felt the country's economic situation was better, for all countries in the AmericasBarometer where this question was asked (essentially, all countries but the United States and Canada). Almost a third of Venezuelans answered that they thought the current economic situation was better during the time of the survey than it was twelve months earlier. Only Uruguay and the Dominican Republic ranked higher, with 44.1% and 41.6% respectively. Overall, Venezuelans appear to be pleased with their current economic situation despite its potential problems.




Figure I-7 Percent of Respondents Who Think that the Country's Economic Situation is Better than Twelve Months Ago, by Country.

Studies of political culture in Venezuela

Unlike some Latin American countries, Venezuela enjoys an ample history of public opinion research extending back to the 1970s. The classic 1973 study of public opinion by Enrique Baloyra and John Martz (1979) made use of standard social science questions and methods and still serves as a crucial reference point for studies of public opinion in the country. Private survey research firms, beginning particularly with the work of Andrew Templeton at DATOS, have long had a presence in the country, engaging not only in marketing research but also providing important advice to politicians and engaging in significant conversations with academics (see for example Templeton 1995). Indeed, the relationship between academic research centers and polling firms remains close today (see for example Gil Yepes 2004). Marketing surveys continue to provide highly popular series of presidential approval ratings and “feeling thermometers” of national moods that are often cited by academics, as well as more timely measures of attitudes towards key issues of the day.

That said, regular national surveys by political scientists have been somewhat intermittent. Key surveys that stand out are the 1983 Baloyra-Torres survey (a follow-up to the 1973 survey), the 1993 CIEPA/DOXA survey, the 1995 Canache survey (not a fully national survey; see Canache 1995), the 1998 pre-election survey by the Red Universitaria de Estudios Políticos (or RedPol), and the 2000 World Values Survey. Datasets for these surveys are publicly available.

While numerous other academic surveys based on smaller samples have also been conducted, with the partial exception of the Latinobarometer there is still no regular series of public opinion polls conducted at regular intervals using highly consistent sets of questions across the years. This is not for a lack of trained academics in Venezuela. All of the major national universities, including especially the Universidad Simón Bolívar, house centers of public opinion research and databanks and regularly publish work in-house. However, there have not been any consistent efforts by Venezuelan university consortia to institutionalize this kind of survey research.

Thus, the AmericasBarometer serves a dual purpose. Not only does it help provide a broadly comparative set of data on public opinion in Venezuela, but it stands to become one of the first *series* of social science surveys on political attitudes in the country that is broadly available to academics and the public. We remain hopeful that Venezuelan academics will consolidate their efforts and produce a more nationally focused series of surveys, say in the mold of the National Election Studies performed in the United States. Surveys such as RedPol 1998 hint at this possibility. Until that occurs, the AmericasBarometer may help fill some of the gap.

On a final note, the use of surveys in election campaigns has become a hot-button topic in Venezuelan politics beginning with the highly contested 2004 recall election. Electoral marketing surveys often give contradictory results and are frequently tainted by charges of partisan bias. We cannot speak to the sample procedures or field methodology of those other surveys; however, in the next chapter we provide a careful discussion of our own sampling techniques, and throughout this report we take care in interpreting our findings. Specific survey questions are frequently reprinted in the text, and most of the graphics and tables use straightforward descriptive statistics. This transparency and, we feel, the careful way in which the survey was designed and conducted should give added confidence in the validity and reliability of these results. We note that there is much here for both sides of the current partisan contest to celebrate: whether the high levels of popular support for Chávez (which back up claims that the presidential election of 2006 was largely free) or the strong association between partisanship and subjective perceptions of government performance in Venezuela (which confirm the existence of strong partisan biases in the country today). We believe there is still space for scientific research and conversation on both sides of the current political conflict.



II. Data and Methodology

This survey is part of a multinational, collaborative effort to gauge public opinion and especially support for democracy across the Western hemisphere, and is coordinated by Mitchell Seligson and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. For each country in the series, the AmericasBarometer survey studies a nationally representative sample using a standardized questionnaire and survey procedure, with a smaller set of country-specific questions designed by the particular authors of each study in coordination with the LAPOP team.

While the AmericasBarometer was conducted for the first time in 2004, the 2006-07 series is the first time the survey has been carried out in Venezuela. Hence, the Venezuelan survey represents a unique opportunity to gauge key aspects of public opinion in this country in a regionally comparative context. Unfortunately, it also means that there is no opportunity for cross-time comparison as in other survey reports.

Survey procedure

The AmericasBarometer is a nationally representative survey measuring the attitudes and experiences of adult Venezuelans. The survey relies on face-to-face rather than telephone interviews because of the greater length and depth this allows for and because many Venezuelans do not have telephones with regular landlines. The average interview lasted 42 minutes. The procedures detailed here are essentially the same ones used in all of the AmericasBarometer surveys, thus enhancing comparability.

The questionnaire includes a standard template of questions used in all AmericasBarometer surveys in this 2006-07 series, as well as a custom set of questions designed specifically for the Venezuela survey. The complete set of questions, frequently referred to here as “variables,” can be found in the questionnaire reproduced in Annex B. The basic template was designed by LAPOP in consultation with collaborators from a variety of academic and research institutions, and it comprises approximately 80% of the 276 questions in this survey. The Venezuela-specific questions, often designated by “VEN” in the questionnaire, were designed between April and July 2007 by the authors at Brigham Young University, Professor Damarys Canache of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the team led by Professor Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University.

Actual field testing of the survey was conducted in several stages, the most important of which was a pilot study in Venezuela by a member of the LAPOP team during 5-9 July.¹ This study consisted of 16 formal interviews and a number of shorter interviews in the Venezuelan cities of Valencia and Caracas.

¹ Ms. Fernanda Boidi of LAPOP carried out the pretests using a Venezuelan interviewer provided by Borge y Asociados.

The final version of the survey was administered in Venezuela by the Costa Rican public opinion research firm Borge y Asociados under the supervision of Mitchell Seligson and the authors, who also designed the nationwide sample described in detail below. Immediately before the initiation of the fieldwork, a LAPOP staffer trained the interview team. Members of LAPOP trained the field workers in the use of the questionnaire and the sampling procedures. Since the survey was carried out using handheld computers (PDAs) using software written by our research partners at the University of Costa Rica, the training focused on the management of this software. In total 36 interviewers and six supervisors conducted the interviews and labored from 20 August until 30 September to complete the survey.

As is appropriate (and required) in human-subjects research, all respondents were asked to give their informed consent to be interviewed. At the beginning of each potential interview, participants were told that they had been randomly selected, that their participation was voluntary, that there was no monetary compensation for participation, and that they would be ensured confidentiality; they were then asked if they wished to proceed. The full text of this consent form is provided in the Annex A. To better preserve confidentiality and grapple with occasional problems of illiteracy, the consent form was read aloud and no signature was required, although a copy of the form was left with each respondent for their reference.

As noted, in Venezuela and some of the other countries incorporated into the AmericasBarometer, the survey teams made use of palmtop computers, or PDAs, rather than paper copies of the questionnaire. Survey questions are read as they appear on the screen and interviewers then enter responses directly using a stylus. The PDAs not only automate the sequencing of questions and provide the appropriate skip sequence, but they also provide workers with crucial, daily directions about sampling and quotas, and they help eliminate the step of hand-coding and entering the data from questionnaires to a computer. At the end of each work day, data can be uploaded and transferred to a central location. All of these features help reduce random measurement error and greatly speed the process of preparing data for analysis, eliminating weeks of effort once the fieldwork is complete. The dataset was eventually cleaned and merged with the other AmericasBarometer countries by members of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt University, using the SPSS 15 statistical software package, as well as STATA 10.

Sampling

The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 in Venezuela uses a multi-stage, probabilistic, nationally representative sample of a minimum of 1500 respondents. The target population is all Venezuelans over the age of 18, male and female, who are naturalized or native-born citizens residing in private residences in the country (that is, not living in hospitals, barracks, hotels, etc.). It excludes Venezuelans who cannot respond because of physical or mental handicaps.

In order to ensure that the survey covered most areas of the country, and thus increase its precision, the sample was broken down into strata constituted by the six basic geographic regions of the country: (1) the *área Metropolitana*, consisting of the Distrito Capital and the states of Miranda y Vargas; (2) the *área Zuliana*, composed of the states of Zulia y Falcón; (3) the *área Occidental*, formed by Andean states of Mérida, Táchira and Trujillo; (4) the *área Centro-*



Occidental, formed by the states of Aragua, Carabobo, Cojedes, Yaracuy and Lara; (5) the *área Oriental*, consisting of the states of Anzoátegui, Sucre, Monagas, Nueva Esparta, Delta Amacuro, Bolívar and Amazonas; and (6), the *área de los Llanos* formed by the states of Apure, Barinas, Portuguesa and Guárico.

Within each stratum, the sample was further subdivided into states, and the state population subdivided into municipalities, which became our primary sampling unit (PSU). Each municipality was further divided into its urban and rural components. A set of municipalities was randomly selected with probability proportional to size of the population of those areas (PPS). A total of approximately 185 sample clusters (corresponding to the census bureau's "segmentos") of 8-12 houses each were randomly selected within each PSU, with the number of households proportionate to population estimates made from the 2001 Census (as projected by the 2005 estimates). This reliance on clustering marginally increased the error of our results (by increasing the "intra-class correlation"), as shown in the appendix. The trade off, however, is a good one, allowing us to have a large and nationally disbursed sample, and still have reasonable costs per interview. Within each household, interviewers selected respondents using age and gender quotas designed to ensure that the overall sample was in line with the population. Callbacks to achieve this end are not possible in large national samples of the AmericasBarometer since this would have meant retaining interview teams in neighborhoodss for days, perhaps weeks, in order to track down a given respondent selected randomly in the household.

The final sample consisted of 1510 respondents. Table II-1 compares several attributes of the sample with the actual population according to the 2001 Census (or 2005 population estimates). Generally the comparison confirms the representativeness of our sample. Key attributes such as the number of men in the sample, the average age of respondents, and the share of the sample in the six strata are nearly identical to analogous census figures for the whole population. Ownership of certain household goods differs somewhat more, depending on the type of good. However, given the economic boom that has taken place since 2003, the fact that the census data are from 2001, and the targeted effect of government policies on poverty, these increases in material welfare seem within reason. The difference in education levels is harder to explain with precision. The government has made some attempts since 2001 to expand access to education at all levels, particularly through the Misiones, but the actual impact of these programs is still unclear (Rodríguez and Ortega 2007).

Table II-1 Comparison of the 2001 Census and the AmericasBarometer Survey

Characteristic	2001 Census	2007 survey
% Men	48.8	49.9
Average age (years)	35.6	36.3
% technical education or higher	22.8	33.7
Selected household goods		
Television	88.9	98.2
Refrigerator	83.2	86.2
Washer	54.3	78.8
Strata	2005 Population Estimates from Census	2007 survey
Metropolitana	19	20%
Zuliana	16	17
Occidental	10	10
Centro-Occidental	24	25
Oriental	20	18
Llanos	10	11
Total (numbers rounded to total 100%)	100%	100%

Multivariate analysis

This report primarily offers a series of descriptive statistics conveying some of the most interesting results of the AmericasBarometer survey. Because of the sampling technique used, we have not had to weight any of these figures (i.e., the sample was self-weighted). Additionally, however, we present a variety of multivariate analyses exploring the relationship between survey questions and related sociodemographic and partisan indicators. Where the dependent variable is roughly interval-level, we use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate the association of these variables. In a few instances the dependent variable is dichotomous, and we instead use logistic regression. Regression analyses necessarily give the impression that we are demonstrating causal relationships, and in the report we sometimes use causal language out of habit. But we must emphasize that these are rather crude regressions. It is almost certain that we have omitted important causal variables from the analysis, and in many instances (particularly when we use partisan indicators), we cannot preclude reverse causality (i.e., endogeneity). Thus, the results should be taken as causal only in the social scientific sense of the term.

The standard set of sociodemographic indicators we use are as follows. Basic descriptive statistics for these variables are found in Table II-2.

- *Age.* The age of respondents in years. For ease of presentation, we usually group responses into four categories: 18-30 years, 31-45, 46-60, and >60.
- *Sex.* In the survey, men take a value of 1 and women a value of 2.
- *Income.* We use the results of an ordinal question asking respondents whether their household income is more than sufficient and allows them to save (=1), is sufficient (=2),

is insufficient and makes living hard (=3), or is insufficient and makes living very difficult (=4).

- *Education.* The years of education the respondent has completed. For ease of presentation, we often group responses into four categories that correspond to typical thresholds in Venezuela's educational system: up to 6 years, 7-9 years, 10-11 years, and 12 or more years.
- *Size of locality.* Because the dichotomous rural/urban indicator found in the survey generates a very small number of rural responses (only 72 respondents or 4.8% of the sample live in rural areas—Venezuela is a highly urbanized country), we prefer a four-part indicator gauging whether the respondent is from the capital city, a large city, a medium-sized city, or a small city/rural locale.

Our key partisan indicator is *Affect for Chávez*, a 4-point, ordinal measure of whether respondents agree with the statement that “Chávez expresses a convincing vision of the future.” Possible answers are 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=somewhat disagree, and 4=strongly disagree.

Readers may wonder why we use this measure of confidence or faith in Chávez rather than a more standard partisan indicator such as partisan identification or prior vote choice, both of which are also measured in the survey. The first reason is that the numbers of useful responses to both party ID and vote choice questions are rather low in the survey, and even among respondents these results are extremely lopsided. For example, only 33% of respondents expressed identification with any party, and of those over 70% mentioned either MVR or the newer PSUV. Likewise, while 77% indicate having voted in the past presidential election, nearly 76% of these respondents claim to have voted for Chávez. In the case of vote choice, these results partly reflect distortions found in all survey data, especially a survey taken almost a year after the most recent president election, but they leave us with rather low variance on both indicators. *Affect for Chávez*, in contrast, has a nearly perfect response rate and a slightly more normal distribution that still correlates highly with vote choice ($r = .66, p < .000$). Roughly two-thirds of Venezuelans either strongly or somewhat agree with the statement that Chávez expresses a convincing vision of the future.

A second reason for preferring *Affect for Chávez* is that this measure is drawn from a widely used index of charismatic attachment from the organizational behavior literature, one that has been shown to have a nice capacity to capture powerful emotional attachment to political leaders (Merolla, Ramos and Zechmeister 2007). In the Venezuelan context where so much of partisan identity is driven by support for or opposition to Chávez, this seems a useful substitute. A third and final reason is that *Affect for Chávez* provides us with a more fine-grained ordinal scale that will prove helpful in some of our analyses, whereas vote choice and partisanship are effectively dichotomous. In any case, using a more standard partisan indicator such as vote choice yields very similar results.

Table II-2 Descriptive Statistics for Key Sociodemographic and Partisan Indicators

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Age	1514	36.27	14.04	18	89
Sex	1514	1.50	0.50	1	2
Income	1470	2.54	0.89	1	4
Education	1513	10.49	4.44	0	20
Size of locality	1510	2.17	0.77	1	5
Affect for Chávez	1391	2.27	1.20	1	4

While we consider this same set of sociodemographic and partisan indicators for all of our cross-tabulations, within the report we often present figures for statistically significant associations only in order to save space. Regression tables, of course, report all variables in the model.

In several instances we also provide comparisons of Venezuelan results with those from other countries in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 series. Because the Venezuela survey was the last one to be conducted in the 2006-07 series, these country-comparisons are the most comprehensive to be found in any of the AmericasBarometer country reports. We take advantage of this opportunity and make use of comparative figures somewhat more liberally. All of these figures use unweighted statistics (except for Ecuador and Bolivia, whose larger samples of ca. 3,000 each, were designed to be weighted).

All figures, descriptive statistics, and multivariate analyses in this report were generated using the statistical software package Stata 10.

Funding

Before concluding this chapter, a quick word about the funding is in order. Generally the AmericasBarometer benefits from a generous grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). However, because of political sensitivities that could have suggested a lack of independence of the research had it been funded by the U.S. government, we opted to fund this version of the survey through private donors. A significant portion of the funding comes from a grant by the College of Family Home and Social Sciences at Brigham Young University (particularly the Fulton Fund), as well as the David M. Kennedy Center for International and Area Studies at BYU. Another portion comes from Mitchell Seligson's Centennial Professorship endowed funds at Vanderbilt University. Finally, an additional portion was provided by Professor Elizabeth Zechmeister and the Department of Political Science at the University of California-Davis, as well as Jennifer Merolla and the School of Politics & Economics (including a Fletcher Jones Grant) at Claremont Graduate University. We thank all of these generous contributors for making this version of the survey possible. Needless to say, the particular conclusions described in this report are the responsibility of the authors.



III. Conceptions of Democracy

Recent research argues that the meanings citizens attach to democracy can affect its stability (Sarsfield 2006). Thus, the aim of this section is to discover how Venezuelans define democracy and what types of meaning they attach to the term. Our point of reference is the classic academic understanding of democracy as a procedural arrangement based on electoral competition, citizen participation, and the rule of law (Schumpeter 1962; Dahl 1971; O'Donnell 1998).

With the rise of Chávez and the creation of a new constitution in 1999, it is clear that Venezuelan democracy has been sharply altered. However, it is less evident whether these changes have impacted the way Venezuelans understand democracy. In the 2005 Latinobarometer Survey, over 60% of Venezuelans defined democracy as “freedoms and civil rights” (Canache 2007, 33). Chávez and members of the Bolivarian Revolution, however, continue to call for and increase the presence of participatory democracy in Venezuela. According to Canache, this call has resonated only slightly with Venezuelan citizens. Venezuelans are more likely by a small margin to define democracy in terms of participation than other Latin Americans (Canache 2007, 23). Yet while the majority of Venezuelans still attach the values of liberty and freedom to democracy, a growing minority may connect the idea of participation with democracy.

In order to measure how Venezuelans understand democracy, the survey uses a series of questions reproduced in Table III-1. We separate each of the 36 possible responses into four categories devised by scholars associated with LAPOP: utilitarian, normative or axiomatic, negative or pejorative, and empty. Responses are classified as utilitarian when respondents attach ideas of economic or political well being to democracy. The normative or axiomatic classification encompasses definitions that center on procedures or ideals associated with democracy. A pejorative classification is used when citizens hold negative ideas of democracy or feel that it is bad for society. Finally, empty definitions include those where citizens were unable to attach any qualities, ideas, or values to democracy.

Table III-1 Questions Used to Study the Meanings Given to Democracy

<p>DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, qué significa para usted la democracia? [OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, “¿significa algo más?”]. Aceptar hasta tres alternativas.</p> <p>DEM13D. ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.]</p> <p>88. NS/NR 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]</p>
--

Figure III-1 shows how Venezuelans fall into each of these four categories. The vast majority of respondents, 78.7%, gave normative answers; that is, most Venezuelans define democracy through the procedures or ideals they associate with it. Another 5.0% have a utilitarian understanding of democracy. The negative category was the least popular among those surveyed with only 2.3%; the fact that only a slim minority of Venezuelans responded with negative definitions suggests that support for democracy is strong. However, 14.0% fall into the empty category, meaning that they either could not define democracy or chose not to. The respondents that fall into the empty category do not necessarily disfavor democracy, and as we will see below

when we compare Venezuela with other countries, they constitute a relatively modest portion of the overall sample.




Figure III-1 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy in the Venezuela

Turning from these four categories to the specific answers Venezuelans gave, we see that 2007 definitions of democracy do not differ significantly from definitions given in the 2005 Latinobarometer and cited by Canache (2007). Figure III-2 shows the most common responses, while dropping responses that were given less than 1% of the time. The majority of Venezuelans continue to attach ideas of freedom to democracy, where the two most common responses are “Freedom, unspecified” (34.1%) and “Freedom of expression, voting, choosing, human rights” (32.5%). Likewise, the most popular negative response is “Freedom, lack of,” although this only accounts for 2.4% of respondents. Together, these three responses account for more than two thirds of all Venezuelans. The fact that so many Venezuelans hold what the literature regards as a “normative” definition of democracy is encouraging, but at the same time we note that most Venezuelans chose not to emphasize “free elections,” the key component of academic understandings of democracy, but rather the civil liberties that constitute the preconditions and hopeful outcomes of elections.




Figure III-2 Most Common Responses to the Question: “What does democracy mean to you? Which meaning is the most important?”

Factors that explain conceptions of democracy

What factors help explain these conceptions of democracy? It is remarkable that in our analysis of various sociodemographic and partisan indicators, few have statistically significant associations with conceptions of democracy, and the substantive differences we find are minor. Only sex and especially education prove to be significant correlates of different definitions. This suggests that the dominant definitions of democracy noted above are widely held by all groups of Venezuelans, and refutes the claim that Chavistas are more likely to adopt participatory definitions of democracy.

First, sex does appear to make a statistical difference in Venezuelans’ definition of democracy. In the normative and negative categories men and women responded about the same (Figure III-3), but of those who fell into the utilitarian category, 61.8% were men, compared to 38.2% women. An opposite relationship exists between men and women under the empty category, where a higher percentage of women offer this (non) definition.

In contrast, age and income reveal very little about how Venezuelans form their definitions of democracy. Normative responses increase with age until age 60 (Figure III-4), and then fall

significantly. The empty category demonstrates an opposite pattern, falling until age 60 whereupon it rises sharply. Income (Figure III-5) varies little across categories of definitions. Negative responses increase somewhat across lower levels of income, but then decrease again in the lowest income category.

Perhaps more importantly, partisanship lacks any statistically significant association with definitions of democracy. In Figure III-6, the Chávez supporters are somewhat more likely to have a normative definition of democracy and somewhat less likely to have an empty definition than Chávez opponents, but this difference is not large. Table III-2 looks more closely at two particular definitions of democracy that are strongly associated with Chavismo's participatory ideology, those of "participation" and "power of the people." Chávez supporters are twice as likely to use these definitions as Chávez opponents, but the total numbers of respondents in either category are so small that the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure III-3 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Sex




Figure III-4 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Age




Figure III-5 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Income




Figure III-6 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Partisanship



Table III-2 Percentage of Respondents with Participatory Definitions of Democracy, by Affect for Chávez

			Affect for Chávez		Total
			Anti-Chavista	Chavista	
Definition of democracy	"Participation"		11	20	31
	"Power of the people"		3	7	10
Total			14	27	41
chi2 = 0.1011, p<0.750					

Figure III-7 shows that only the level of education has a strong association with definitions of democracy. The utilitarian and negative categories display only small deviations among the education groups, but the percent of respondents in the empty category falls significantly and steadily among groups with more than eight years of education. Likewise, normative definitions consistently increase across levels of education; there is a difference of more than 20% from the lowest education group to the highest. The steady decline in empty responses and the rising share of normative respondents make sense, given that it is the business of education to socialize citizens. In Venezuela under the Punto Fijo system, the educational system celebrated the virtues of democracy and the country's struggle to achieve it.




Figure III-7 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Education

Venezuelan conceptions in comparative perspective

This section uses data from other LAPOP surveys in this 2006 series to compare Venezuela to the rest of the region, using our familiar four categories of definitions. As Figure III-8 demonstrates, Venezuelans give a high percentage of normative answers in comparison with other countries in the region. Venezuela places fourth out of twenty countries for the highest proportion of normative responses. Uruguay is the only Latin American country with a higher percentage of normative responses, reporting 83.4% compared to Venezuela's 78.7%. In contrast, empty responses are relatively low in Venezuela, ranking it sixth among the twenty countries listed in Figure III-8. Only three Latin American countries had a lower percentage of negative responses. Compared to her peers Venezuela demonstrates a proclivity toward a principle-based definition of democracy.




Figure III-8 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy by Country

Populism

This final section of the chapter considers populist attitudes in Venezuela, an important aspect of conceptions of democracy. Definitions of populism vary widely within the social sciences, and particularly in the study of Latin American politics (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001). The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 tapped into two different approaches to populism. Across all

countries in the series, we first considered a set of four questions designed to gauge popular acceptance of direct, plebiscitary democracy, a conception of populism known as *political-institutional*. The questions are found in Table III-3. Answers to these questions turn out to be highly correlated across respondents, so we created an index of populist attitudes (political-institutional) that weights the responses to each of the four questions equally, then rescales the results on a scale of 0-100, where a score of 100 indicates that the average respondent gave a populist answer to all four questions and a score of 0 indicates the average respondent gave only non-populist answers.²

Table III-3 Questions Used to Create Political-Institutional Populism Index

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo
POP1.
(1) Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición,
(2) Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.
POP2.
(1) La Asamblea Nacional impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorada,
(2) Aun cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima de la Asamblea Nacional.
POP3.
(1) Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados,
(2) Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas.
POP4.
(1) Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional,
(2) Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.

Figure III-9 shows the average score of the index across all of our countries including Venezuela. Venezuela ranks fifth among its neighbors, indicating fairly high levels of support for populism in the institutional sense. Given significant popular support for Chávez, these results are not entirely surprising and seem to support the validity of this set of indicators. However, the absolute levels of populism that we find here are rather low and the differences across countries are not that great; the figure suggests that populist attitudes are actually fairly uncommon throughout Latin America. Haiti, the highest scoring country on the index, reported an average score of only 42.3, suggesting either that less than half the country has strongly populist attitudes, or that most citizens are only mildly populist in outlook. Moreover, the placement of other countries is counterintuitive. Chile and Costa Rica both lack strong histories of populist leadership (Drake 1999), yet they appear here as having average levels of support for populism among Latin American countries.

² Surveys in several of the countries included additional questions in this political-institutional populism module, but they were not used in all countries. The index here is based on only the four questions common to all countries.




Figure III-9 Country Averages of Populism Index

Consequently, we considered a second set of questions designed to gauge a different conception of populism, a *discursive* one that defines populism in more culturalist terms as a Manichaeian discourse that equates the side of good with the putative “will of the people” and evil with a conspiring elite. This approach to populism is found across the the social sciences and is somewhat more prevalent in studies of populism in Western Europe and the United States (Hofstadter 1967; Kazin 1998; Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Laclau 2005), although it is used by some scholars who study populism in Latin America (de la Torre 2000; Laclau 2005; Panizza 2005). However, it has never been measured quantitatively at the mass level, especially through surveys.

The questions we devised are found in Table III-4. POP8 and POP9 tap into the dualism of the Manichaeian discourse; POP5 and POP6 focus on the idea of a unified “will of the people”; POP 7 explores an important corollary of populist discourse that echoes the political-institutional definition of populism, the idea that the will of the people can be best served by some kind of direct democracy; and POP10 and POP11 get at another corollary of populist discourse, namely an “anything goes” attitude towards democratic formalities and minority rights (McGuire 1995).

Responses across these questions tend not to correlate very highly once we move beyond the pairings just mentioned, so we present separate results for each one. Specifically, each figure shows the percent of respondents in each country that gave the populist response. Unfortunately, this latter set of populism measures was applied in only three countries in the AmericasBarometer series for 2006-07, Colombia, Venezuela and Uruguay,³ so our comparison is somewhat more limited than it was with the first module of populism indicators.

³ A larger series of items is included for all countries in the 2008 round.

**Table III-4 Questions Used to Measure Populist Discourse**

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo

POP5.

- (1) Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan,
- (2) Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.

POP6.

- (1) Los gobernantes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto,
- (2) Los gobernantes a veces tienen que tomar decisiones que al pueblo pueden no gustarle

POP7.

- (1) La forma más efectiva de que los ciudadanos expresen sus puntos de vista al Presidente es a través de sus representantes electos.
- (2) La forma más efectiva para que los ciudadanos expresen sus puntos de vista al Presidente es directamente a él, y no a través de sus representantes electos.

POP8.

- (1) Hay solamente dos clases de personas: las que trabajan para el bienestar del pueblo y las que trabajan en su contra
- (2) No se puede dividir a la gente en dos clases de personas.

POP9.

- (1) En el mundo de hoy hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos
- (2) Tal lucha realmente no existe; el mundo es muy complejo, no únicamente el bien y el mal.

POP10.

- (1) Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, no podemos dejar que los que están en contra se opongan
- (2) A pesar de que el pueblo ha decidido qué es lo correcto, los que **no** están de acuerdo siempre deben tener toda la libertad de oponerse.

POP11.

- (1) Una persona puede estar en desacuerdo con la mayoría, y aún así tratar de defender los intereses del país.
- (2) Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza a los intereses del país.

The statements “Our president should do what the people want even if it’s against the law” (POP5) and “The government must protect the will of the people, because what the people want is always right” (POP6) deal specifically with how people feel a government should react to the will of the people. Venezuela leads the rankings in both Figures III-10 and III-11, demonstrating that many Venezuelans feel that the government should obey the will of the people. In both graphs Uruguayans have a significantly lower percentage that agreed with the populist statement. In Figure III-10, Venezuelans are only slightly more likely than Colombians to agree that the president should do what the people want even if it is against the law; however, Venezuelans have a strong lead over both Colombians and Uruguayans in Figure III-11. These trends indicate that Venezuelans are more prone than those in other countries to agree with populist statements when those statements indicate that the will of the people is for the good of the country.




Figure III-10 Our President Should do What the People Want Even if it's Against the Law




Figure III-11 The Government Must Protect the Will of the People, Because What the People Want is Always Right

If high levels of populism exist then we expect many respondents to agree that the most effective way for them to express their point of view would be directly to the president and not through elected representatives. Figure III-12 displays the results of support for an attitude of direct representation. Venezuelans show high levels of support for this idea (45.6%), but Colombia, with an exceptionally popular president, now comes first with 57.1% agreeing. Uruguay again trails the leader by a significant margin (34.8%). Strong responses among Colombians may reflect the reality of Alvaro Uribe's strong presidentialism and his leadership within the inchoate Colombian party system today.




Figure III-12 The Most Effective Way for Citizens to Express Their Point of View is Directly to the President

A Manichean world view is an essential part of populist rhetoric and thinking. True populists believe that the world is locked in a struggle between good and evil. However, Figures III-13 and III-14 indicate to us that Venezuelans are less liable to view the world in such black and white dynamics. The AmericasBarometer survey found that 42.5% of Colombians agree that there are only two types of people: those who work for the good of the people and those against it; yet



surprisingly, Venezuela ranks last with only 24.2% in agreement (Figure III-13). Again, Colombia tops the rankings (43.7%) in Figure III-14 but in this instance Venezuela is close behind, with 39.3% agreeing that a fight between good and evil exists in the world today and that the people must choose between the two.




Figure III-13 There Are Only Two Types of People: Those Who Work for the Good of the People and Those Against It




Figure III-14 In the World Today there is a Fight Between Good and Evil, and the People Must Choose Between the Two

An “anything goes” attitude is another important corollary of a populist worldview. Figures III-15 and III-16 show that these ideas are mostly strong held by Venezuelans, with nearly one third agreeing that dissent by a minority is unacceptable. Colombia too demonstrates a high level of agreement that opposition from a minority group is not tolerable. Not surprisingly, agreement with such a populist statement was again quite low among Uruguayans.




Figure III-15 Once the People Have Decided What is Correct, We Cannot Allow Opposition by Those Who Disagree




Figure III-16 Those Who Disagree with the Majority Represent a Threat to National Interests

Overall, this second set of indicators suggests fairly high levels of popular sympathy with populist discourse in Venezuela. Compared especially to Uruguay, but even in absolute terms, Venezuelans (and Colombians) demonstrate high overall support for key elements of populism,

including the belief that the will of the people is paramount and that opposing minorities must not be tolerated. However, support is not as high for Manichaeian notions of a cosmic struggle between good and evil.

Conclusions

Generally, Venezuelans have a strongly normative understanding of democracy. Ideals form the bedrock for their definitions. Very few Venezuelans define democracy through utilitarian measures; even fewer view democracy negatively. A larger, yet still relatively small minority cannot or choose not to define democracy. If high levels of normative responses show an inclination to support democratic rule, then democracy in Venezuela is more consolidated than the currently polarized situation suggests.

Education provides the most insight into understanding how Venezuelans form their opinion about the meaning of democracy. More educated Venezuelans define democracy more normatively and are more likely to provide a definition. The majority of Venezuelans, however, demonstrate normative views and a rather consistent understanding of democracy as civil liberties, particularly freedom of speech.

Looking at support for populism, the picture is less clear but our indicators are also relatively new and quite experimental at this stage. Venezuelans show relatively greater levels of support for direct, plebiscitary democracy when compared to other Latin American countries, but across the region these levels are low and not always intuitive when we consider other countries. When we instead examine support for populist discourse, in the sense of a Manichaeian worldview that posits a conflict between the will of the people and a conspiring elite, levels are much higher in Venezuela but the results are somewhat inconsistent across indicators. Populist statements indicating that a government has a responsibility to protect and honor the will of the people or that opponents should not be tolerated should receive great support from Venezuelans, but statements specifying a Manichean worldview find relatively less popular echo.



Chapter Appendix: Categorization of definitions of democracy

Category Classification

Normativo

Libertad (sin decir que tipo)
 Libertad económica
 Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos
 Ser independientes
 Capitalismo
 Libre comercio, libre negocio
 Elecciones, voto
 Elecciones libres
 Igualdad (sin especificar)
 Igualdad económica, de clases
 Igualdad de género
 Igualdad de razas o étnica
 Participación (sin decir que tipo)
 Participación de las minorías
 Poder del pueblo
 Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos, respeto (a secas)
 Justicia
 Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción
 Gobierno no militar
 Vivir en paz, sin guerra

Negativo

Libertad, falta de
 Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico
 Trabajo, falta de
 Elecciones fraudulentas
 Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad
 Limitaciones de participación
 Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción
 Guerra, invasiones

Utilitario

Libertad de movimiento
 Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento
 Trabajo, más oportunidad de
 Derecho de escoger líderes
 Igualdad frente a la leyes

Vacio

No tiene ningún significado
 Otra respuesta
 NS/NR

IV. Support for Democracy

Perhaps more than any other regime type, the stability of democracy depends on the good will of the people. Of course, a sharp decrease in mass public support will not automatically result in drastic regime change, because elite attitudes and international actors also play a crucial role in democratic consolidation. But a decline in mass support may make instability more likely and embolden wavering anti-democratic elites to seize the opportunity to extinguish democracy. It is this liability that makes public support an important topic of study for political culture. In this chapter we consider several measures of political support in Venezuela. We then turn to a related set of attitudes that have a bearing on mass support for democracy, namely, tolerance.

Political support

Easton (1975) sought to elucidate our understanding of political support by breaking the concept into two tiers: specific and diffuse. The former covers attitudes and behaviors toward incumbent leaders and their policies, and the latter focuses on broader attitudes and behaviors toward the political system. Easton further divided diffuse support into legitimacy and trust, both of which we will discuss in the following sections. The division of support into two tiers of specific and diffuse adds great value to our understanding of democratic stability, as diffuse support tends to be more correlated with democratic stability than specific support. However, it has often proven difficult to measure these two parts distinctly. This is partly because citizens tend to allow their feelings toward incumbents to influence their attitudes toward the system in general.

While Easton's separation of political support into two tiers has proved controversial, his division of support into three objects—authorities, political regime, and political community--has been more valuable. In recent years, scholars have sought to expand on this idea by creating a hierarchy for political support in order to better measure its effect on democratic stability. Most recently, Canache (2002) arranged political support in ascending order from support for the incumbent authorities, the political system, and finally for the form of government.

In this report, we have decided to organize our findings on political support in Venezuela by two aspects of support, legitimacy and trust/efficacy, and by the hierarchy that Canache suggests: incumbent authorities, the political system, and democracy. In section one of this module we discuss the current status of legitimacy in the Venezuelan political system and democracy. Then, in section two, we explore the trust/efficacy of Venezuela's incumbent authorities, political system, and democracy. This breakdown will enable us to clearly evaluate the various aspects and levels of support in Venezuela.

Legitimacy

Political legitimacy is defined as the extent to which the political system conforms to citizens' perceptions of what is morally right or acceptable. Easton categorized legitimacy as a part of diffuse support, meaning that he believed it to be less susceptible to the ebb and flow of incumbent approval (1975). Lipset added that political legitimacy is "evaluative" as it is the citizens that decide whether or not the political system aligns with their own values (1981, 64).



Thus, legitimacy is the aspect of support that looks at how citizens feel about the moral correctness of their system and form of government.

In general, political scientists use measures of support and/or confidence in political institutions as a measure of political legitimacy. While confidence in institutions is a valid measure of legitimacy, this measurement loses some precision as the same confidence is also used to measure political support in general. Hence, in this section of the report, we will use questions that more distinctively measure legitimacy. Specifically, we measure the degree to which Venezuelans perceive that their political system and democracy align with what they believe to be the appropriate actions of these objects. In order to make comparisons easier we created an index of support for the system based on the responses to five questions listed below. The index ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates high levels of support.

- B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Venezuela garantizan un juicio justo? *(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7, o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*
- B2.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Venezuela?
- B3.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político venezolano?
- B4.** ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político venezolano?
- B6.** ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político de Venezuela?

Originally, much of Venezuela's political legitimacy was rooted in the pact between elites that created the Punto Fijo democracy and the willingness of the two main political parties, AD and COPEI, to share power. This legitimacy began to unravel in the early 1980s, however, leading to two attempted coups in 1992 and the creation and implementation of a new constitution in the late 1990s. Most attribute this crisis of legitimacy to Venezuela's centralized "partyarchy" (Coppedge 2005, 308) and the pervasive economic problems that plagued the country. In addition to these two important causes, we point out the influential role that corruption played in the demise of Venezuelan political legitimacy. Coppedge acknowledges that polls taken during the 1990s showed that many Venezuelans attributed the economic downturn to politicians stealing money rather than to stagnating oil prices (2005, 311), and more recent research indicates that corruption had just as much if not more impact on the loss legitimacy in Venezuela as strong parties and economic problems (Hawkins forthcoming). Thus, the volatile combination of a rigid party structure, economic turmoil, and rampant corruption led to the destabilizing loss of Venezuelan political legitimacy over the 1980s and 1990s.

It is important to recognize that while Venezuelans questioned the legitimacy of their political institutions and leaders during this period, they still saw democracy as the preferable form of government. In 1983 and 1988 surveys, Venezuelans overwhelmingly supported a democracy over a dictatorship, even though they believed it to breed more corruption than a dictatorship (Canache 2002, 64).

Figure IV-1 presents the index of support for the system for all countries in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. It shows moderate to high levels of support among Venezuelans

when compared to other Latin American countries. On the support for the system index Venezuelans scored a 57.0 out of 100 possible points.




Figure IV-1 Index of Support for the System by Country

To further understand the sources of this support for the system in Venezuela we analyze two questions that make up the index used above, “To what degree do you feel proud to live under the Venezuelan political system?” and “To what degree do you think you should support the political system of Venezuela?” We compare levels of support given for each of these questions by income, gender, education, age, and affect for Chávez.

First, we evaluate levels of pride in the Venezuelan political system. Overall levels of pride appear very high, 54.4% reporting higher than average support (Figure IV-2). Next we consider its association with our key sociodemographic and partisan indicators. Looking at gender, we fail to find a statistically significant association with pride in the political system. Men are only slightly more likely to have pride in the political system, but the difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero.




Figure IV-2 Pride in the Venezuelan Political System

Income shows a slightly positive relationship with pride in the Venezuelan political system. Figure IV-3 shows that as respondents' incomes rise, pride in their political system does as well. Of those surveyed who answered that their income was sufficient to meet their needs and save, 30.8% reported to have a great deal of pride in the Venezuelan political system.

Age shows a weaker link with pride but still a positive one (Figure IV-4). Venezuelans who feel a stronger sense of pride tend to be older. Respondents between the ages of forty-six and sixty show the highest levels of pride. A lack of pride in the political system among younger generations may be troublesome for future governments.




Figure IV-3 Pride in the Venezuelan Political System by Income




Figure IV-4 Pride in the Venezuelan Political System by Age




Figure IV-5 Pride in the Venezuelan Political System by Education




Figure IV-6 Pride in the Venezuelan Political System by Sex

Years of education also demonstrate a statistically significant association with pride in the political system among Venezuelans. Generally speaking, better educated Venezuelans have noticeably lower levels of pride. Still, the difference is not substantively large; some 49.1% of Venezuelans with twelve years of education or more reported higher than average levels of pride.

In contrast, partisanship has an exceptionally strong association with the amount of pride that Venezuelans feel in their political system. Figure IV-7 presents a dramatic contrast. While 73.7% of the people who support Chávez feel a lot of pride in the political system, only 24.6% of respondents who do not support Chávez feel a lot of pride in the political system. The distribution of responses across these two partisan groups are virtually mirror images of one another.




Figure IV-7 Pride in the Venezuelan Political System by Affect for Chávez



We next analyze the level of support that citizens feel they should give the political system. Most Venezuelans feel that they owe high levels of support; 55.2% answered above the median level (Figure IV-8). Like pride, support in the political system is quite high, and the distribution of responses we see here closely matches that found in Figure IV-2.




Figure IV-8 Support for Political System of Venezuela

The pattern of associations with our key sociodemographic and partisan indicators is also quite similar. As was true in the analysis of pride in the political system, gender lacks a statistically significant association with the support that Venezuelans feel they should give their political system. Likewise, as income rises so does support for the political system. Respondents who report having enough for their needs reported significantly higher levels of support, about two thirds among the highest income category but only 49.6% among the lowest (Figure IV-9).

Age also has a positive relationship with support. Older Venezuelans reported substantially higher levels of support. Nearly one third (32.5%) of respondents between forty-six and sixty answered that they felt that they owed a lot of support to the Venezuelan political system (Figure IV-10). Among those thirty-one to forty-five, slightly more than a quarter (25.5%) responded the same way. Venezuelans' support for their political system decreases with age but remains relatively high among those over thirty.

Figure IV-11 shows that there is again a negative relationship between number of years of education and support of the political system. Overall support tends to be higher among the less educated, although as before the difference is not extreme. At least 50.2% of Venezuelans with high levels of education still have positive levels of support for the political system.




Figure IV-9 Support for Political System of Venezuela by Income




Figure IV-10 Support for Political System of Venezuela by Age




Figure IV-11 Support for Political System of Venezuela by Years of Education




Figure IV-12 Support for Political System of Venezuela by Sex

Again, however, we found the strongest predictor of political system legitimacy to be partisanship. Figure IV-13 reveals that 74% of the Pro-Chávez group ranked their support for the political system above the median score, while only 27% of the Anti-Chávez group would give the same ranking. Again, the distributions of support rankings appear to be mirror images of each other.




Figure IV-13 Support in the Venezuelan Political System by Affect for Chávez

Political trust and efficacy

Beyond a sense of legitimacy, a democracy also relies on its citizens' belief that it will function consistently and produce policies that benefit its citizens. These concepts are respectively identified as political trust and efficacy. While Easton originally classified trust as an aspect of diffuse support, more recent writings understand trust and efficacy to apply to both levels of support, specific and diffuse (Hetherington 1998; Lipset and Schneider 1983). Patterns in incumbent trust and efficacy affect the levels of trust and efficacy for the political system and form of government (Abramson and Finifter 1981).

Measures of trust and efficacy are straightforward. For the most part, trust is evaluated through levels of confidence in various political and social entities. We consider each of these questions separately as well as an index of Venezuelans' confidence in their institutions and social organizations. In contrast, efficacy can be measured through survey questions that look at the level of satisfaction citizens have with their democracy, or the degree to which they believe their incumbents, political system, and form of government promote their well being. To do this we look at Venezuelans' responses to two questions: "Would you say that the work of Chávez is: very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad" and "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, unsatisfied, or very unsatisfied with the way democracy functions in Venezuela?" The former assesses the level of efficacy that Venezuelans ascribe to their incumbent leadership while the latter evaluates the efficacy that they perceive in the political system.

Looking first at trust, we note that while Venezuela suffered a general lack of trust in government throughout the 1990s, this trend has partly reversed. According to the World Values Survey, Venezuelan's trust in their government increased dramatically from 1996 to 2000, more than doubling the percentage that have "a great deal" or "quite a lot" of trust in the Venezuelan

government. In addition, trust in specific entities like the police, armed forces, political parties, and church all increased from 1996 to 2000. We therefore expect to see somewhat improved levels of trust in most public institutions in this survey.

Below we reproduce the questions used to measure how much respondents trust a selection of public institutions. Respondents' answers are on a scale from one to seven, 1 indicating "not at all" and 7 signifying "a lot." To increase the ease of comparison we recode the responses using a 0-100 point scale, with higher numbers indicating higher levels of trust. Table IV-1 reports the results of the index for each of these institutions, then breaks down these scores by affect for Chávez.

- B10A.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?
- B11.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Consejo Nacional Electoral?
- B12.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerza Armadas?
- B13.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Asamblea Nacional?
- B14.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno?
- B15.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la República?
- B18.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?
- B20.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?
- B21e.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los políticos?
- B21.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?
- B31.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Tribunal Supremo de Justicia?
- B32.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en concejo municipal?
- B37.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?
- B42.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el SENIAT
- B47.** ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?

According to the data collected, Venezuelans appear to have the most trust in the Catholic Church, the media, the armed forces, and the national tax agency. The first three are not entirely surprising, as they have generally been the institutions that Venezuelans trust the most; the addition of the SENIAT to this list may reflect reforms to this agency in recent years and the remarkable decrease in tax evasion that has resulted. Trust in other institutions, all of them political ones, fails to surpass the midpoint on the scale and probably reflects a decrease from levels found in the 2000 World Values Survey. If we create a similar index of 0-100 for the World Values Survey questions (a somewhat problematic calculation, since the wording of the questions differs slightly and uses a 4-point ordinal scale rather than the 7-point sliding scale here), we get the following values: Church = 73.3, Armed Forces = 58.8, national government = 52.5, police = 40.8, National Assembly = 36.1, and political parties = 23.4. While the National Assembly and political parties have continued to increase since 2000, the other institutions have declined, sometimes considerably. We suspect much of the decline is a result of the political polarization since 2000 and the control the Chávez government has increasingly exercised over most of these institutions. Scores for political institution are extremely low among opponents of Chávez, while the reverse partly holds true for the communications media and Church, both of which are the main societal institutions to come out on the side of the opposition. The average difference between Chávez supporters and opponents is nearly 22 points; five of the fifteen

institutions evaluated show a difference of more than thirty points. Only the police, politicians, and political parties seem to be universally mistrusted by both sides.

Table IV-1 Trust/Confidence Index Scores and Partisan Differences

Institution	Index	Pro-Chávez	Anti-Chávez	Difference (Pro - Anti)
La Iglesia Católica	61.2	59.2	64.5	-5.3
Los medios de comunicación	53.2	52.7	54.9	-2.2
El SENIAT	53.0	60.9	41.9	19.0
Las Fuerza Armadas	52.4	63.8	34.4	29.4
El Gobierno	46.7	62.3	22.0	40.3
Las elecciones	44.6	58.6	22.2	36.4
El Asamblea Nacional	43.3	55.5	24.6	30.9
La Fiscalía General de la República	42.2	54.4	23.3	31.1
La Consejo Nacional Electoral	42.0	55.4	21.0	34.4
El sistema de justicia	40.0	47.7	27.6	20.1
La Tribunal Supremo de Justicia	38.5	48.4	23.2	25.2
El concejo municipal	37.0	44.7	24.4	20.3
Los políticos	27.0	33.9	16.6	17.3
Los partidos políticos	27.0	33.9	16.6	17.3
La Policía	25.0	29.8	17.2	12.6

A similar pattern is seen in the level of efficacy that Venezuelans ascribe to their government. We first provide a bit of historical perspective. According to the World Values Survey, satisfaction with those in office went from 13.7% in 1996 to 61.1% in 2000. Also, in 2000 Venezuela had the highest level of satisfaction with “the way democracy is developing in our country” of any Latin American country questioned that year. This means that Venezuelans were much more satisfied under the first year of Chávez’s rule than they were during the third year of President Rafael Caldera’s leadership. We hesitate to attribute this early rise in trust and perceived government efficacy entirely to Chávez, however; many political factors were at work in Venezuela during this time, including economic problems, corruption, and the breakdown of party politics in general.

Below are listed the questions that we examine in this section. The first deals directly with whether or not Venezuelans feel that the incumbent government is functioning properly. The second indicates how satisfied respondents feel with their democracy in general.

- M1.** Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Hugo Chávez es: [Leer alternativas]
 (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR
- PN4.** En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Venezuela?
 (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

The data in Figure IV-14 indicate that many Venezuelans (44.4%) feel that the incumbent government is doing either a good or very good job. A small minority (19.3%) feel that the government is not performing satisfactorily, leaving more than a third of all Venezuelans feeling indifferent or undecided about the incumbent government’s performance.




Figure IV-14 Incumbent Government Performance

We further examine Venezuelans' opinions of the Chávez government's performance by breaking them down by age, years of education, locality (urban/rural), gender, income, and partisanship (Pro-Chávez or Anti-Chávez). For ease of comparison we rescale the responses to the original question from 0 to 100, where 100 is equivalent to "very good" and 0 to "very bad."

We find that all predictors but sex have statistically significant associations with assessments of government performance. Figure IV-15 breaks down opinions of the Chávez government's performance by income. It shows a positive relationship between income and opinions of government performance. This is a surprising finding given the negative association between income and support for Chávez we find elsewhere; we are not certain why it fails to hold true here. A more typical association prevails in Figure IV-17, which shows that satisfaction with the incumbent government's performance generally decreases with more years of education. And satisfaction with the government's performance has a slightly positive relationship with age, with older respondents somewhat more likely to assess the government positively (Figure IV-18).




Figure IV-15 Index of Incumbent Government's Performance by Income




Figure IV-16 Index of Incumbent Government's Performance by Gender




Figure IV-17 Index of Incumbent Government's Performance by Years of Education




Figure IV-18 Index of Incumbent Government's Performance by Age

Still, all of these effects are rather small when we compare them with partisanship. Using this 0-100 index, we find a striking and statistically significant difference between respondents who support and those who oppose Chávez. Of course, this association is probably highly endogenous, in that affect towards Chávez is itself likely to be a function of satisfaction with government performance.




Figure IV-19 Index of Incumbent Government's Performance by Affect for Chávez

A similar yet more surprising picture emerges when we turn finally to Venezuelans' level of satisfaction with the functioning of their democracy. The academic literature predicts that Venezuelans will have greater satisfaction with the function of their democracy as whole than with their current incumbents, yet Figure IV-20 shows somewhat the opposite. Most of those surveyed ranked their satisfaction with their democracy toward the middle of the scale, resulting in a lower average score than we saw in the case of attitudes towards the Chávez government. Less than a quarter of those surveyed answered that they were either very satisfied or very unsatisfied. Thus, Venezuelans are on average more satisfied with the incumbent than they are with the system as a whole.

We again break these results down by sociodemographic and partisan indicators. In this instance, gender does not have any statistical association with the level of satisfaction with the form of democracy in Venezuela, and to save space we omit this graphic. However, satisfaction again increases with income (Figure IV-21). With respect to education, respondents' answers follow the same negative pattern as before, in that higher levels of education are associated with lower satisfaction with the form of democracy (Figure IV-22). And older Venezuelans also appear to be more satisfied with the form of democracy that exists in Venezuela (Figure IV-23).




Figure IV-20 Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Functions




Figure IV-21 Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Functions, by Income




Figure IV-22 Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Functions, by Years of Education




Figure IV-23 Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Functions, by Age

Once again, the starkest differences emerge when we consider partisanship. Chávez's supporters and opponents report nearly opposite levels of satisfaction. 82.2% of all Chávez supporters responded that they were either very satisfied or satisfied, while only 20.1% of Chávez's opponents answered the same way (Figure IV-24). The difference is statistically significant. Again, though, these results are likely to reflect some reverse causality.




Figure IV-24 Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Functions, by Affect for Chávez

Political tolerance

Political tolerance is the degree to which citizens allow disliked groups within their society the same level of freedoms enjoyed by other society members. Political tolerance is included in the evaluation of support for a stable democracy because it measures the necessary democratic attitudes of citizens for a healthy democracy (Seligson 2000). However, scholars explain that while high levels of political intolerance threaten the health of the support for democracy in a country, they do not necessarily translate into an intolerant political system (Sullivan, Piereson, Marcus 1979; Barnum and Sullivan 1989). Thus, we cannot interpret high levels of political intolerance held by the public to mean high levels of state-led discrimination.

Although other measures of political tolerance have been suggested, the method introduced by Stouffer in his seminal work is still widely used in political science today. This asks respondents to what degree they approve or disapprove of those that speak out against the government or the form of government having the right to vote, hold peaceful demonstrations, run for public office, or speaks on television; questions are listed below. While this method has suffered some criticism (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979), recent research shows Stouffer's method to be quite compatible with and produce statistically similar results to alternate measures (Gibson 1992). Thus, in this survey we use Stouffer's measure for political tolerance and assume that these results would roughly match an alternate measure.



Little research exists on the history of political tolerance within Venezuela. However, in 1996, the World Values Survey tested Venezuela's level of political tolerance. It found that 90.3% of Venezuelans would not allow their "most disliked" group to hold office, 91.2% would not allow them to teach in their schools, and 91.1% would not allow them to demonstrate. In comparative perspective, Venezuela scored higher on intolerance than the other Latin American countries questioned that year, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. Thus, at least in the mid-1990s, Venezuela had an intolerant mass public.

We measure the level of tolerance Venezuelans have for dissent by creating a political tolerance index from four measures in the survey: the right to vote, protest, run for office, and give speeches. While the values for each underlying component range from 0 to 10, the resulting index weights each question equally and ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating higher levels of tolerance.

- D1.** Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Venezuela, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: *[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]*
- D2.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.
- D3.** Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Venezuela, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?
- D4.** ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

By way of information, Figure IV-25 graphs the average value given by Venezuelans to each of the four questions that constitute the index of political tolerance. These data indicate that political tolerance is quite high in absolute terms, and they seem to contradict the results of the earlier World Values Surveys.




Figure IV-25 Average Values of Tolerance Indicators in Venezuela

Because previous measures of tolerance in Venezuela use a slightly different set of questions, it is important to compare values here with those in other countries. Figure IV-26 shows the average level of political tolerance using the combined index discussed earlier and juxtaposes Venezuela's score with that of all other countries from the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. Venezuela ranks high compared to other countries in the region, scoring a 66.5 when the maximum (the United States) is 75.9. These results reaffirm the high absolute levels of tolerance in Venezuela shown in the previous figure and indicate a significant change from the World Values Survey.

As in previous sections, we analyze the impact of a small basket of indicators on tolerance in Venezuela. Most of these sociodemographic indicators lack any appreciable association with tolerance. For both age and gender (Figures IV-29 and IV-30), the relationship is small or there is no clear pattern of association at all. Only education displays a statistically significant relationship in the direction we might expect—as years of education increase so does political tolerance—and the effect is moderately large (Figure IV-27).

In contrast, affect for Chávez has a very strong association with tolerance. Chávez supporters are less tolerant than Chávez opponents by a full 11.1 points (Figure IV-28); the difference is statistically significant. The average score among Chávez's opponents was 77.3, nearly as high as the United State's national average (78.3). Still, even among Chávez supporters the average score is 66.2 on a scale of 100, only 0.6 points behind Uruguay's high national average (66.8). Thus, even the most intolerant political groups in Venezuela are still reasonably tolerant.




Figure IV-26 Political Tolerance Index by Country




Figure IV-27 Average Political Tolerance Index Score in Venezuela by Years of Education




Figure IV-28 Average Political Tolerance Index Score in Venezuela by Partisanship




Figure IV-29 Average Political Tolerance Index Score in Venezuela by Age




Figure IV-30 Average Political Tolerance Index Score in Venezuela by Gender

Conclusions

Time and again partisanship proves a major factor determining Venezuelans' support for democracy. The sense of legitimacy of the system and levels of tolerance are fairly high in comparison with other countries in the region, but these political attitudes, as well as trust in government institutions and the sense of the system and the current government's efficacy, are strongly associated with affect for Chávez. Supporters of Chávez are much more likely than opponents to see the current political system as legitimate, trustworthy, and efficacious. They are also somewhat less likely to be tolerant, although here the differences with Chávez opponents are not as stark.

Other factors may also play a role in shaping political support, but their effects are smaller or more inconsistent. Rising incomes among Venezuelans do seem to bring increased support for the political system and a greater sense of its legitimacy and efficacy. Likewise, as Venezuelans grow older they tend to have more support for their democracy. Strangely, education appears to have an opposite effect, with higher levels of education correlating with a decreased sense of the system's legitimacy or efficacy. And gender has no noticeable associations with any of these indicators.

Finally, measures of political tolerance yield surprising findings in the survey. Not only are levels of tolerance much higher than previous surveys suggest (a finding that may simply result from differences in question wording), but they are higher in comparison with other countries from the region. As of 2007, Venezuelans are a relatively tolerant group, although again this tolerance is associated somewhat with partisanship. We can only speculate here on this finding, but we wonder if the harsh experiences of the past nine years have instilled a greater appreciation for pluralist norms of tolerance among some groups of Venezuelans. This may especially be true of members of the opposition who have seen themselves shut out of government offices and sectors of government employment.



V. Corruption, Crime, and the Rule of Law

One of the areas given special emphasis in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 is corruption, crime, and the rule of law. These are significant concerns in Venezuela, which like many Latin American countries has traditionally suffered the effects of a weak state. The survey confirms that both corruption and crime remain significant problems in Venezuela, with the latter worsening in recent years, and that these problems are experienced by Venezuelans from all sociodemographic and political categories. Important differences emerge along partisan lines when we consider the rule of law, particularly attitudes towards the courts and specific judicial institutions, but perceptions of the rule of law in Venezuela and especially assessments of the police are probably the worst in the region.

Corruption

While corruption is commonly defined as the “abuse of public office for private gain,” (Seligson 2002, 408) its measurement remains difficult. Most corruption indicators are criticized because of their reliance on individual perceptions of corruption or self-reported involvement in corrupt activities. However, while previous LAPOP surveys find that respondents report higher level of corruption *perception* than actual corruption *experience*, both often (but not always) correlate, providing a fairly consistent picture of actual corruption within a country (Seligson 2005).

Within the Latin American context, corruption poses a serious threat to regime legitimacy as fragile democracies battle the long-term political and economic costs of corrupt exchanges (Seligson 2002). On a local level, corrupt political practices jeopardize legitimacy by fostering clientelism, effectively redistributing social trust from the political system to the political patron (Johnston 1979, Mainwaring 1991). On a more national scale, corruption’s inherently unequal treatment of its citizens can undermine democracy insofar as wealth, rather than agency, determines the extent of political power (O’Donnell 2001). While these political implications are particularly obvious in Latin American democracies, there are also serious economic repercussions of corruption, including increased transaction costs, decreased incentives for international investment, and ultimately, economic decline (Seligson 2002; Mauro 1998).

While corruption has always been a problem in Venezuela, the 1973 oil boom exacerbated the problem and eventually transformed it into a major public concern (Pérez Perdomo 1995; Rey 1998). Skyrocketing oil revenues overwhelmed Venezuelan markets that were unprepared to effectively absorb and distribute the sudden influx of petrodollars. Since then, Venezuelan citizens have battled corrupt administrations with their votes in the ballot box, eventually using corruption as a justification for the attempted coup of 1992. Since Chávez’s rise to power in 1998, a series of referenda and attempted coups illuminate the remaining deep divisions on the country’s support for President Chávez. This module aims to understand if government support for President Chávez continues to relate to individual perceptions of corruption.

Venezuela in comparative perspective

Compared with other countries, Venezuela has a relatively high rate of corruption. While corruption is difficult to measure, international organizations like Transparency International

have done their best to estimate a country's level of transparency by using a variety of methodologies. Figure V-1 presents Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for all countries in 2007. This index is created by combining the results of multiple independent surveys of ordinary citizens, businesspeople (within-country and without-country) and country experts (within- and without-country) by country-risk consulting firms, NGOs, and international organizations. The resulting scale ranges from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates the highest possible levels of perceived corruption. Venezuela has an extremely high corruption score of 2.0-2.9, the second highest score possible, demonstrating that Venezuelans continue to perceive corruption as a major problem in their country. Venezuela's corruption score is not unique, however; many other Latin American countries (all but Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica) have relatively high levels of corruption in comparison with the industrial democracies.




Figure V-1 Corruption Perceptions Index Map for 2007

The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 includes two similar measures designed to gauge mass-level perceptions of corruption, which are found below. As we examine these figures within the context of Latin America, we should bear in mind that most countries in the region struggle with corruption. If Venezuela seems only marginally different from other countries reported in this module or in some of the subsequent questions we consider, it is only because we are unable to incorporate much variance into the sample.

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR

N9. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.

Figure V-2 reports the responses to a question asking Venezuelans how common they perceive corruption of public officials to be, and compares these results with those for other countries in the sample. The numbers indicate that Venezuela ranks comparatively high in perceived corruption, falling behind only Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, and Jamaica. A total of 57% of Venezuelans say that, according to what they have experienced or heard, corruption is “very common” in Venezuela. These results differ only slightly from those of Transparency International, in that here they show Peru and Jamaica with slightly higher levels of transparency than Venezuela. Together, these numbers indicate that corruption remains a significant, perceived problem even nine years after Chávez came to power.




Figure V-2 How Common is Corruption? By Country

The picture changes somewhat when we ask Venezuelans whether the government is combating corruption, our second question in this section. Figure V-3 shows results for Venezuela, broken down into the seven possible response categories, and Figure V-4 compares the percentage of highly negative responses (“nothing”) in Venezuela to those of other countries. The cross-country comparison shows Venezuela with an improved ranking: The country now falls in the middle of the pack, with 25.3% of respondents indicating that the government does nothing to combat corruption, versus 51.9% in Ecuador and a mere 3.2% in Bolivia. As we look more closely at the results within Venezuela, we find a slightly bimodal distribution of responses. While over 1/4 of all Venezuelans responded that the government does nothing to combat corruption, the rest of the distribution is relatively normal, suggesting that many Venezuelans

have a much more measured view of the government's effectiveness. What explains this more nuanced pattern of responses?




Figure V-3 How Much Does the Government Combat Corruption?




Figure V-4 Percent of Respondents Who Indicate the Government Does “Nothing” to Combat Corruption, by Country

When these responses are broken down by sociodemographic and partisan indicators, we find several significant associations. While age lacks any really significant relationship, we find that males, the better educated, the wealthy, and those living in larger communities all tend to assess the government’s efforts more negatively. The effect of income is particularly large and linear; 36% of the wealthiest respondents feel the government is doing nothing to combat corruption. However, the strongest association is clearly with partisanship. Affect for Chávez explains most of the bimodality we see in the overall distribution. Approximately 50.7% of Chávez opponents report that the government does nothing to combat corruption, while only 11.5% of Chávez supporters answer that way. Similarly, while only 1% of Chávez opponents answer that the government does a lot to combat corruption, 12.8% of Chávez supporters answer that way. These results suggest that while most Venezuelans are frustrated with corruption within the country, there is a serious divide over how people perceive the government’s response.




Figure V-5 Percent of Respondents Who Indicate the Government Does “Nothing” to Combat Corruption, by Sex




Figure V-6 Percent of Respondents Who Indicate the Government Does “Nothing” to Combat Corruption, by Education




Figure V-7 Percent of Respondents Who Indicate the Government Does “Nothing” to Combat Corruption, by Age




Figure V-8 Percent of Respondents Who Indicate the Government Does “Nothing” to Combat Corruption, by Size of Locality




Figure V-9 Percent of Respondents Who Indicate the Government Does “Nothing” to Combat Corruption, by Income




Figure V-10 Percent of Respondents Who Indicate the Government Does “Nothing” to Combat Corruption, by Affect for Chávez

Definitions of corruption

In addressing corruption, the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 asks a series of questions concerning how corrupt or how justifiable certain scenarios seem to respondents. The questions are listed below. The object of these questions is to identify what corruption actually means to the citizens of a country. This proves to be extremely important in Latin America, where corrupt activities have been the norm for so long that their definition of corruption may naturally differ from those adopted by scholars or the international organizations and NGOs that study and struggle against corruption.

Vamos a hablar un poco de la corrupción. Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas, 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias, o 3) no corruptas.

DC1. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta una coima de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es [Leer alternativas]:

- 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado
- 2) Corrupto pero justificado
- 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8

DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga Bs.10000 de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es [Leer alternativas]:

- 1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada
- 2) Corrupto pero se justifica
- 3) No corrupto
- 8) NS/NR

DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñada de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es [Leer alternativas]:

- 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado
- 2) Corrupto pero justificado
- 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8



The first question asks how corrupt it is for a deputy of the National Assembly to accept a bribe equivalent to US\$10,000. Because this question specifically mentions a public official accepting a *bribe*, we expect most respondents to recognize such an act as corrupt and punishable by law. Thus, this question is probably the least discerning of the three. Figure V-11 shows that there is indeed very little difference across countries. Venezuela is about in the middle of the cross-country distribution, with 94% of respondents reporting that this action is definitely corrupt and worthy of punishment by the state.




Figure V-11 Whether it is Corrupt and Should be Punished, Corrupt but Justified, or Not Corrupt for a Congressman to Accept a Bribe of Ten Thousand Dollars

The next question, however, provides more information as to how countries feel about corrupt activities between average citizens and public officials. This question asks how corrupt or justifiable it is for a mother to pay extra to obtain a birth certificate more quickly—a more difficult ethical scenario. It is difficult not only because of the mitigating circumstances, but because this question deals with the actions of a citizen and technically might not be considered an example of corruption (the abuse of *public office* for private gain). And indeed, we find greater variation in responses within and across countries. Overall, Venezuelans and respondents in other countries are nearly evenly split between those who feel this action is corrupt and should be punished, and those who feel that this action is corrupt but justified. Although Venezuela appears to be on the lower end of the spectrum, it is really quite average with 43.4% of respondents who feel that it is corrupt and should be punished and a slightly higher 45% of respondents reporting that this action is corrupt but justified.




Figure V-12 Whether it is Corrupt and Should be Punished, Corrupt but Justified, or Not Corrupt for a Mother to Pay Extra to Get a Birth Certificate More Quickly for One of Her Children

The third question regarding the definition of corruption provides the most discerning measure. This question asks respondents how corrupt it is when a politician uses his influence to get his unemployed brother-in-law a job—a scenario that gets directly at the behavior of public officials but also appeals to conflicting rational-legal and traditional norms of conduct. It is evident in Figure V-13 that this question generates much greater variance in cross-national responses than the previous two questions. Some countries, such as Peru, seem to have applied the definition of corruption fairly liberally, with nearly 80% of respondents agreeing that this conduct is corrupt and punishable by law. At the other end of the distribution is Jamaica, where only 28.1% of respondents make this same judgment. Venezuela finds itself roughly in the middle of the distribution. While most Venezuelans (54.0%) feel that this type of behavior is corrupt and should be punished, there is also a sizeable portion (35.2%) that feels this is corrupt but justified, and a slightly higher proportion of respondents than we have seen until now (10.8%) who feel that this action is not corrupt.

Thus, with some important variations across questions, Venezuelans apply a moderately rational-legal standard in defining corruption, one that is roughly average for the region.




Figure V-13 Whether it is Corrupt and Should be Punished, Corrupt but Justified, or Not Corrupt for a Politician to Use His Influence to Get His Brother-in-Law a Job

The final two questions in this section reflect the different views that Venezuelans may have regarding what justifies paying a bribe, and more importantly, if corruption is justifiable at all.

EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?

EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar sobornos es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?

The first question asks if paying a bribe is justified "because of the way things are." This question is purposefully vague, probing to see if Venezuelans distinguish between their moral positions on corrupt activities in general and how they apply those moral views to their own circumstance. Figure V-14 gives the percent answering "yes" across all countries in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. Once again we find that Venezuela is roughly average for the region, falling closely behind Costa Rica and Mexico. Only 25% of Venezuelans feel that sometimes paying a bribe is justified because of the way things are. These results are somewhat encouraging given the high levels of corruption that Venezuelans have traditionally had to confront in their government, and they reaffirm that most Venezuelans hold their leaders to high standards of conduct, even if the reality repeatedly falls short.




Figure V-14 Percent Who Agree that the Way Things Are, Sometimes Paying a Bribe is Justified, by Country

By way of comparison with some of our previous results, we break down the answers to this question by partisanship. The results suggest that the effects of partisanship are felt in only targeted ways. Figure V-15 shows that while there is a statistically significant difference between how Chávez opponents and Chávez supporters respond to this question (Chávez opponents are somewhat more likely to justify paying a bribe in the current political context), the difference is not really very large. The vast majorities in both groups see paying a bribe as an inappropriate action even with the political system working the way it does.




Figure V-15 Percent Who Agree that the Way Things Are, Sometimes Paying a Bribe is Justified, by Affect for Chávez

The final question concerns the justifiability of corrupt exchanges to avoid the hassle of working within inefficient systems. Specifically, it asks respondents if they think that in their society, paying bribes is justified because of poor quality public services. This is a more morally challenging question, and Venezuelans show that they are somewhat more willing to justify corruption under these circumstances—but only marginally. As Figure V-16 indicates, Venezuela ranks slightly higher on this question (5th), but not by much. A marginally greater proportion of respondents than in the previous question (27.4%) think that a bribe is justified under these circumstances.




Figure V-16 Percent Who Agree that Paying Bribes is Justified Because of Poor Quality Public Services, by Country

For added comparison we again break down these results along partisan lines. The difference is somewhat greater than before. We find that 35.0% of Chávez opponents versus 23.8% of Chávez supporters justify paying a bribe because of poor quality public services (Figure V-17). This again hints at the polarization of Venezuelans under the Chávez government. However, while this difference is statistically significant, it still does not seem as large as we have seen (and will again see) in questions that probe more directly into assessments of government performance.




Figure V-17 Percent Who Agree that Paying Bribes is Justified Because of Poor Quality Public Services, by Affect for Chávez

Overall, Venezuelans adopt a moderately rational-legal stance towards the behavior of their public officials and the appropriate ways for citizens to interact with those officials. Despite fairly high perceived levels of corruption in how the government actually operates, there is relatively little disconnect between how Venezuelans define corruption in the abstract and how willing they are to justify it. The country is about average for the region, with most respondents (about 3/4) seeing bribery in any form as a corrupt activity and a bare majority unwilling to justify it even under extenuating circumstances. These responses vary somewhat by partisanship, with Chávez opponents somewhat more willing to justify bribery under current political conditions, but the partisan differences we see here are smaller than what we found in assessments of government efforts to combat corruption.

Corruption victimization in Venezuela

Because corruption is so common in Venezuela, it is important to understand what kinds of corruption average citizens actually encounter on a daily basis. The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 asks a series of questions, listed below, that gauge the types of corruption that respondents personally experienced over the past year. These questions also allow us to gauge the degree to which general perceptions of corruption correlate with experienced corruption.

Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...

EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un

soborno en el último año?

EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno en el último año?

EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el concejo municipal en el último año?

No → Marcar 9

Sí → Preguntar:

Para tramitar algo en como un permiso, por ejemplo durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?

EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja?

No → Marcar 9

Sí → Preguntar:

En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algun soborno en el último año?

EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados?

No → Marcar 9

Sí → Preguntar:

¿Ha tenido que pagar una en los juzgados en el último año?

EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año?

No → Marcar 9

Sí → Preguntar:

Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar algun soborno?

EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año?

No → Marcar 9

Sí → Preguntar:

En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno?

EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió un soborno para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?

Figure V-18 describes the percent of Venezuelans that have experienced each of these types of corruption. The graph shows relatively low corruption victimization percentages in every category, with the highest reported corruption incidence taking place at local municipalities. The survey found that 14.2% of respondents report having to pay more than was necessary to process a legal document at a local municipality. Similarly, 12.4% and 9.4% report that they have been asked for a bribe by a police officer or public official respectively. These three highest categories deal with official government institutions; the lowest categories, except for the courts, concern institutions that often have private-sector components. This suggests that while corruption does happen in every sphere of civil life, the majority of corrupt activities take place within institutions closely tied to the government.




Figure V-18 Victims of Corruption in Different Sectors of Society

In order to understand the breakdown reported in Figure V-9 in cross-national comparison, we produce a series of charts for each specific question. The first question deals directly with an extension of law enforcement group, the National Police. This question asks respondents whether or not they have had to pay a bribe within the last year to the police department. While only 12.4% of Venezuelans report that they had to pay a bribe to the police department within the last year, Figure V-19 shows that compared with other nations, this percentage is actually relatively high. Venezuela ranks the fourth highest among other countries surveyed, falling closely behind Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. This indicates that Venezuelan police are relatively corrupt when compared to other Latin American nations.




Figure V-19 Has a Police Official Asked You for a Bribe During the Past Year?

The next question deals with corruption among public officials in general, asking whether the respondent was asked for a bribe within the last year (Figure V-20). Only 9.4% of Venezuelans recorded that they had been asked for a bribe by a public official. However, in comparative context this figure is again somewhat high, although not as much as with the results for police officials. This is indicative of a weak rule of law that damages both law enforcement institutions and ultimately political institutions.




Figure V-20 Has a Public Official Asked You for a Bribe During the Past Year? By Country

The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 inquires about corruption in local government, specifically the municipal government (*consejo municipal*). A surprising 14.2% of respondents have been asked to pay more than was legally required to process documentation such as a license. While this percentage is the most common type of corrupt activity that has been reported so far, it ends up being a surprisingly average statistic when compared with other countries. Figure V-21 shows that Venezuela actually falls almost directly in the middle of the distribution, far away from the more extreme cases like Haiti, where 62.0% of respondents who tried to process documentation through a municipal government were required to pay more than was legally necessary. This international perspective suggests that while this is the most common type of corruption that those surveyed report encountering, Venezuelan municipal governments function relatively well when seen in comparison with other Latin American countries. This is confirmed in Chapter VI, which shows that levels of confidence in local government are not very high but are still average for the region.




Figure V-21 Within the Last Year, Did You Have to Pay More Than Is Legally Required to Process a Document at a Municipality? (Note: Only for respondents who have had official dealings with the municipality.)

The remaining five questions ask respondents about corrupt exchanges at work, in the courts, at hospitals, within the school system, and in preventing the electricity from being cut off. Each of these spheres of activity seemed relatively free of corruption in Venezuela, with 5% of Venezuelans reportedly being a victim of corruption. It turns out that these results tend to hold cross-nationally as well, in that Venezuela generally shows up as average or better on each of these measures. To save space, we do not reproduce any of these comparative figures here.

In brief, despite high levels of perceived corruption in Venezuela, levels of corruption incidence are about average in regional comparison. These results partially contradict both the earlier data we reported (see Figure V-2) as well as Transparency International's (TI) report showing Venezuela with high levels of perceived corruption. Of course, we should bear in mind that being average in Latin America still suggests high levels of corruption. Yet the gap between perceived and experienced corruption in Venezuela suggests that either respondents underreported corruption victimization or that measures of corruption perception are colored by Pro/Anti-Chávez sentiments. We suspect that the latter is the case, as it is evident throughout the report that more highly subjective questions tend to pick up stronger partisan biases and show stronger effects of political polarization.



Predictors of victimization

We next examine our series of sociodemographic and partisan predictors to see if we can better identify the causes of corruption in Venezuela. We would also like to know if our measures of experienced corruption are truly more objective than measures of corruption perceptions. To perform this analysis, we created a corruption victimization index that combines all of those who reported that they had been a victim of some incidence of corruption; this index is common to many of the LAPOP studies. We then show a series of graphs that depict the breakdown of this index by age, sex, size of locality, education, income, and affect for Chávez. Finally, we run a logistic regression using the individual-level values of the victimization index (0 or 1 for each respondent) as our dependent variable and these other indicators as independent variables.




Figure V-22 Corruption Victimization, by Age




Figure V-23 Corruption Victimization, by Sex




Figure V-24 Corruption Victimization, by Size of Locality




Figure V-25 Corruption Victimization, by Education




Figure V-26 Corruption Victimization, by Income




Figure V-27 Predictors of Corruption Victimization, by Affect for Chávez

Several of these bivariate associations are statistically significant. Corruption victims are more likely to be younger, male, live in larger cities, and highly educated. However, corruption victimization does not have a strong association with income, nor, interestingly, affect for Chávez. Most of these are intuitive findings that confirm the reliability of the corruption data. The findings for partisanship in particular (Figure V-27) suggest that our measures of experienced corruption are relatively objective and somewhat more immune to partisan biases than perceptions of government performance. The exceptions to this overall intuitive pattern are income and education; we expected levels of education and income to be negatively correlated with experienced corruption, in that wealthier localities with better educated voters would tend to provide better government services. Studies find that wealth and corruption are negatively correlated at the national level (Mauro 1998). However, it may be that this relationship changes at the individual level, and that Venezuelans with less education and lower income are less likely to define some of their experiences as corruption or as “bribes.” More likely, poor respondents are simply not attractive targets of corrupt officials in part because they have so little money that can be extorted from them, and in part because the poor often have few dealings with official state agencies. For example, the poor are less likely to own a vehicle than the rich, and therefore more likely to be stopped by a police officer. But these hypotheses require additional analysis that we cannot undertake here.

Table V-1 reports the results of a logit regression using all of these same variables, although wherever possible we use the original, continuous measures from the survey rather than the simplified scales shown in the above figures. The regression essentially repeats the results of the bivariate analyses shown above. Size of locality and sex of the respondent are the best predictors of corruption victimization. More specifically, a male citizen living in the capital has the highest probability of becoming a victim of corruption. Education has only a marginal association with corruption victimization, with a slight propensity for the highly educated to report greater levels of experience with corruption. Once we control for these effects, age, income, and partisanship no longer have a statistically significant association with experienced corruption.

**Table V-1 Logistic Regression of Corruption Victimization**

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	95% Interval	Confidence
age	-0.097	0.077	-1.26	0.207	-0.248	0.054
sex	-0.649	0.135	-4.80	0.000	-0.914	-0.384
size of locality	-0.305	0.106	-2.86	0.004	-0.513	-0.096
education	0.032	0.016	2.00	0.045	0.001	0.064
income	0.019	0.075	0.26	0.797	-0.128	0.167
affect for Chávez	-0.071	0.055	1.29	0.198	-0.037	0.179
y-intercept	-0.018	0.450	-0.04	0.968	-0.899	0.863
Number of observations	1356					
LR chi2(6)	44.48					
Prob > chi2	0.000					
Pseudo R2	0.0305					

Note: Age is measured in whole years; Sex is a dichotomous variable where 0=Male 1=Female; Size of Locality is a 4-point scale where 1=capital, 2=large city, 3=medium city, 4=rural area; Education is measured in years of education; Income is a 4-point scale where 1=Has enough and can save, and 4=is not enough, cannot cover basic needs; and Affect for Chávez is a 4-point variable (c5ch, but with the scale reversed) where 1=strongly disagree and 4=strongly agree with the statement that “Chávez has a convincing vision of the future.”

In summary, we see that corruption is still a major problem in Venezuela, especially when compared with other Latin American countries. Perceptions of corruption are among the highest in the region, while experienced corruption is somewhat lower and concentrated in explicitly political institutions. The tendency to experience or perceive corruption is only partially explained by sociodemographic or partisan indicators. In contrast, assessments of government efforts to combat corruption are strongly linked to partisanship, with supporters of Chávez much more likely to favorably assess the government’s efforts. Venezuelans’ definitions of corruption are about average for the region. Most Venezuelans readily label formally corrupt acts as such, although they are more willing to equivocate and accept bribery as a necessity under extenuating circumstances or in response to the endemic corruption of the state.

Crime

Simply defined, crime is any act in violation the law. Measuring crime, however, remains inconsistent and controversial. Because surveys rely on self-reported information, their results are subject to personal bias and individual perceptions; ‘actual’ crime rates, as reported by police agencies, are equally suspect, due to inconsistencies in reporting, scrutinizing, and even classifying criminal behavior.

While crime rates between countries vary considerably, there has been a general increase in criminal activity across the globe in many, but not all, countries in recent years (Fajnzylber et. al. 2000). In Latin America, high crime rates have been aggravated by political instability following the transition to democracy in some countries, as well as the economic downturns during the first part of the decade. The region’s failure to resolve its socioeconomic gap or create effective government fosters an ideal atmosphere for petty crime, as low opportunity costs are complemented by relatively high returns, thus increasing the cost-benefit value of crime among the urban poor (Fajnzylber et. al. 2000).

In Venezuela particularly, government corruption and a fragile rule of law contribute to dangerously high crime rates. Since Chávez assumed power in 1998, homicide rates have more than doubled, giving Venezuelans claim to the fourth highest murder rate of sixty surveyed nations (United Nations 2001). Additionally, the U.N. has reported that Venezuela has the highest gun-related violence rate in the world (Reel 2006). In the early months of 2007, U.S. surveillance discovered that forty of the forty-six suspected drug flights detected in the Caribbean originated in Venezuela (James 2007). It is currently estimated that over one third of the cocaine produced in Colombia is sent through Venezuela, with many drug lords now claiming that Venezuela offers the "path of least resistance" for the drug trade (Kraul 2007; James 2007). These developments continue despite several large public demonstrations in May of 2006, when Venezuelan citizens voiced their frustration with government inaction in the face inexcusably high crime incidence.

Crime victimization in comparative perspective

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país?			
Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo/ malos sueldos	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Sicariato	87
División política, polarización	89	NS/NR	88

According to the AmericasBarometer 2006-07, Venezuelans exhibit an extremely high concern with crime, the highest in the region. One of the first questions in the survey (seen above) asks respondents, "What is the most important problem facing the country?" 54.4% of Venezuelans answer "crime." While corruption is the next most common response, it accounts for only 7.6% of those surveyed. The cross-country comparison in Figure V-28 shows that Venezuela has the



highest percentage of those who feel that crime is the most important problem facing their country.




Figure V-28 Percent of Respondents Mentioning Crime as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, by Country

Because so many citizens are concerned with crime we expect to find a high percentage of respondents who have been victims of crimes. The survey includes a fairly straightforward question, reprinted below, that asks respondents whether they have been a victim of some crime during the past year. The results from this question, displayed in Figure V-29, show that nearly 25.1% of Venezuelans consider themselves the victim of some type of crime within the last year.

VIC1. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?
 (1) Sí [sigu] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS/NR [pasar a AOJ8]




Figure V-29 Have You Been the Victim of a Crime within the Last Year?

The meaning of these numbers is not entirely clear because a definition of crime is not provided in the question. We can put these results into better perspective by considering Figure V-30, which shows the percent of respondents in each country of the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 who say they have been a victim of some type of crime over the past year. Venezuela reports the second highest percentage of crime victimization. Falling just behind Peru's 26.2%, Venezuela's 25.1% more than triples the proportion of the population of countries like Panama, which show that only 7.1% of the respondents claim to have been victims of crimes within the last year. Thus, both the country and international reports show that crime is a major problem in Venezuela affecting a significant proportion of the population.




Figure V-30 Cross-Country Comparison: Have You Been the Victim of a Crime Within the Last Year?

When analyzed across party lines, Chávez opponents report being a victim of crime more often than Chávez supporters. Figure V-31 shows that 32.5% of Chávez opponents, compared with only 21.4% of Chávez supporters, report that they were a victim of a crime within the last year. This association is statistically significant at the $p < 0.000$ level (chi-squared test). This distribution suggests that either opposition members are targeted by criminals more often than Chávez-supporters or that Anti-Chavistas perceive themselves as victims more often than Chavistas.




Figure V-31 Crime Victimization by Support for Chávez

To get at this trend better, Table V-2 presents the results of a logistic regression using our standard set of sociodemographic and partisan indicators. The results show that age, size of locality, and the respondent's support for Chávez are statistically significant predictors of whether or not a respondent is a victim of crime. Older Venezuelans, those who live in rural areas, and those who support Chávez are less likely to report being the victim of a crime. The effect of the size of locality is especially large. Education also has a marginal effect, with the better educated being more likely to report being the victim of a crime. And the sex of the respondent and their income are not statistically significant predictors. While the results for the sociodemographic indicators seem sensible, we do not know why Chávez supporters would be less likely to experience (or at least report experiencing) crime, particularly when we saw previously that experience with corruption (a more political phenomenon than crime) is largely unassociated with partisanship.

**Table V-2 Logistic Regression of Crime Victimization**

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	95% Interval	Confidence
age	-0.227	0.077	-2.94	0.003	-0.378	-0.075
sex	-0.087	0.129	-0.68	0.499	-0.340	0.166
size of locality	-0.499	0.116	-4.31	0.000	-0.725	-0.272
education	0.036	0.016	2.25	0.025	0.005	0.067
income	0.098	0.073	1.34	0.180	-0.045	0.242
affect for Chávez	-0.184	0.054	3.43	0.001	0.079	0.289
y-intercept	-0.567	0.452	-1.26	0.209	-1.453	0.318
Number of observations	1354					
LR chi2(6)	63.3					
Prob > chi2	0.000					
Pseudo R2	0.04					
Log likelihood	-735.736					

Note: Age is measured in whole years; Sex is a dichotomous variable where 0=Male 1=Female; Size of Locality is a 4-point scale where 1=capital, 2=large city, 3=medium city, 4=rural area; Education is measured in years of education; Income is a 4-point scale where 1=Has enough and can save, and 4=is not enough, cannot cover basic needs; and Affect for Chávez is a 4-point variable (c5ch, but with the scale reversed) where 1=strongly disagree and 4=strongly agree with the statement that “Chávez has a convincing vision of the future.”

These partisan effects are also evident in more subjective assessments of crime. Figure V-32 shows the distribution of responses to a question asking respondents “speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being?” with answers broken down by affect for Chávez. The question uses a 4-point scale: 1=a lot, 2=some, 3=a little, and 4=none. Overall responses are highly skewed, with more than three out of four Venezuelans reporting that crime is “very much” a threat to our future well-being. However, the distribution is somewhat less skewed for Chávez supporters. While 80.9% of Chávez opponents report that crime is “very much” a threat to Venezuela’s future well-being, only 75.0% of Chávez supporters say the same. This difference is not as large as some in the survey, but it is statistically significant ($p < .000$, chi-squared test).




Figure V-32 How Much is Crime a Threat to Our Future Well-Being? By Affect for Chávez

Figure V-33 provides a cross-country comparison of this breakdown, reporting the percentages of respondents who agree that crime is “very much” a threat to the future well-being of their country. All countries show great concern that current levels of crime represent a threat to future well-being. However, in this case Venezuela falls just above the middle of the distribution, between the Dominican Republic (90.2%) and Guayana (53%). This suggests that despite Venezuela’s extremely high levels of crime and the sense among citizens that crime is the country’s most serious problem, Venezuelans are relatively more optimistic that it will be addressed.




Figure V-33 How Much is Crime a Threat to Our Future Well-being? By Country

Types of crime victimization in Venezuela

While previous graphs have shown that crime in general is perceived as a significant problem among Venezuelans, it is important to look at what kinds of crimes are the most common among those who report that they have been victims of some crime within the last year. The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 includes a follow-up question, listed below, asking what kind of crime the respondent experienced.

VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió?

- (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física
- (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física
- (3) Agresión física sin robo
- (4) Violación o asalto sexual
- (5) Secuestro
- (6) Daño a la propiedad
- (7) Robo de la casa
- (8) Otra
- (88) NS
- (99) Inap (no víctima)

Figure V-34 shows that robberies (unarmed and armed, in that order) are by far the most common type of crime reported, accounting for 85.5% of the total. While "damage to property" is the next most frequently reported category, it makes up a mere 5.8% of the distribution.




Figure V-34 What Kind of Crime Were You the Victim of?

Although robberies clearly outweigh other types of crime, it is also important to see how crime is distributed in other countries with similar crime rates. We take as reference points Peru and Chile, which according to Figure V-30 has similar levels of crime victimization (26.2% and 23.1% respectively, as compared with 25.1% in Venezuela). Figure V-35 depicts the kinds of crimes reported in each of these countries. While Venezuela does report the highest incidence of robbery, with 85.5% compared to Peru's 74.7% and Chile's 57.7%, robbery remains the most common type of crime in all three countries. However, Peru and especially Chile have more respondents that claim to be victims of home burglaries (16.4% and 27.7%, versus 4.0% in Venezuela). This suggests the inability of the police in Venezuela to prevent even ordinary street crime; in countries such as Chile that tend to have higher levels of the rule of law, perpetrators are forced to attempt more difficult types of crime that require more planning and risk.




Figure V-35 Venezuela, Peru, and Chile: What Kind of Crime Were You a Victim of?

Bearing in mind that robberies are the most common type of crime in Venezuela, it is now important to see how these kinds of crimes affect respondent's sense of safety. Here we probe a survey question, reported below, asking whether the respondent feels "very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe" in the neighborhood when they think about the possibility of being a victim of an assault or robbery.

AOJ11. Hablando de la urbanización o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro?
 (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR

While previous graphs report that crime is extremely common among respondents, and that even those unaffected directly by crime are very concerned about its implications in Venezuela, Figure V-36 shows that approximately 55.1% of Venezuelans still feel either "very safe" or "somewhat safe." This distribution appears to be normally distributed, with most respondents reporting that they feel "somewhat safe" or "somewhat unsafe." While Venezuelans widely regard crime as a problem and remain somewhat concerned about its threat to their future well-being, they tend to discount its dangers at home. Given the actual incidence of crime in Venezuela (remember that only 25.1% have been the victim of a crime over the past year), this assessment may not be all that irrational.




Figure V-36 Considering Where You Live and the Possibility of Being Assaulted or Robbed, How Safe Do You Feel?

Before concluding this section, we again consider several sociodemographic and partisan indicators to see which ones predict this rather wide distribution in perceived safety. Age and sex have only marginal associations with perceived safety, and level of education has none at all. However, income does have a statistically significant association with perceived safety: wealthier respondents are much less likely to report feeling safe in their neighborhoods. This is an ironic outcome, given that income is not a very good predictor of actual crime victimization. We suspect that the rich have more to steal (and to lose) and thus their fears are greater. Size of locality has an even stronger association, with residents of smaller localities being more likely to feel safe from crime; residents of rural areas have exceptionally high levels of perceived safety. These differences are not as surprising given that we found rural areas reported significantly less crime victimization than urban areas (see Table V-2). Finally, supporters of Chávez report feeling safer than opponents of Chávez, a difference that is modest and statistically significant.




Figure V-37 Perceived Safety from Crime, by Age




Figure V-38 Perceived Safety from Crime, by Sex




Figure V-39 Perceived Safety from Crime, by Size of Locality




Figure V-40 Perceived Safety from Crime, by Education




Figure V-41 Perceived Safety from Crime, by Income




Figure V-42 Perceived Safety from Crime, by Affection for Chávez

Overall, we see that crime is an extremely important problem in Venezuela that not only directly affects those who have become victims of crime (over 1/4 of Venezuelans over the past year), but also indirectly affects most citizens, who generally agree that crime is a threat to their future well-being. In cross-country comparisons, Venezuela exhibits one of the highest reported crime victimization levels in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07, and has the highest percentage of respondents who feel that crime is the most important problem facing their country. Interestingly, we find that the partisan effect that is evident in other portions of our survey is also evident here, although its effects are less marked. Crime victimization, the perception of crime as a threat to the future well-being of the country, and perceptions of personal safety are all associated with affect for Chávez, with Chávez supporters being less likely to experience crime or see it as a problem for the country or their personal safety. That said, other indicators probably factor more heavily into these experiences and perceptions, particularly the size of locality and the respondent's income. Rural areas are especially likely to experience less crime and to create a sense of personal safety.

Rule of law

The rule of law is the supremacy of the law over every member of society, regardless of wealth, rank, or status. The equality of citizens before the law is such a fundamental principle of democracy that many argue democracy cannot exist without it (Ungar 2001, 1). In a democracy, citizens maintain equal power; they are each endowed with “the legal attribution ... of the capacity to make choices” and find political equality through fair representation (O'Donnell 2001, 17). Democracies reinforce this equality by establishing agencies that hold all citizens accountable to the law.

Measuring the existence of the rule of law is difficult, especially within a survey. The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 uses a series of questions dealing with trust in government agencies, institutions, and procedures, as well as descriptive questions that help assess the effectiveness of the rule of law on local levels. Because these questions follow the attitudinal approach to measuring the rule of law, it likely correlates with support of the current administration. While these self-reported biases weaken the measurement of the rule of law globally, they do offer useful insight into the practical aspect of the rule of law on an individual level.

The rule of law has continually threatened democratic legitimacy in Latin America, and Venezuela is no exception. Since the establishment of Punto Fijo democracy in 1958, partisanship has undermined the impartiality of Venezuelan courts and the bureaucracy. Court appointments were meted out based on party loyalties and court decisions consequently followed suit (Perdomo 1995, 318). Similarly, Venezuela's police system has been widely viewed as unprofessional and unjust, favoring wealthy citizens who can bribe officials.

As is already evident in the high crime rates and the public concern with corruption, the rule of law in Venezuela is precarious. The current government of Chávez claims to have purged party corruption with its Bolivarian revolution, but Chávez's strong personalistic control seems to have exacerbated the problem. In 2004, the Human Rights Watch released a report that explained the serious implications of Chávez's court packing scheme in 2003. Despite reassuring testimonies



of some of the Supreme Court judges, “a rule of law that relies on the self-restraint of those with power is not in fact the rule of law” (Human Rights Watch 2004, 2). Throughout this section, we will test survey responses against partisan sympathies, particularly affect for Chávez.

Attitudes towards the rule of law in Venezuela

One of the first major evidences of a trusted system of law enforcement is reflected in whether or not those who considered themselves victims of a crime report the crime to the correct offices. As a follow-up to the question used to measure crime victimization, respondents who said they were victims were asked if they had reported the incident to any institution. The results in Figure V-43 shows a nearly 3:2 ratio of non-reporters to reporters. Over 60% of Venezuelans do not trust law enforcement to efficiently and effectively do their job.




Figure V-43 Did You Report the Crime to Any Institution?

Figure V-44 reexamines this finding along partisan lines, showing slightly more Chávez opponents who report than Chávez supporters. However, the difference is not statistically significant ($p < 0.455$). Because failure to report crime may be seen as evidence of a lack of faith in the efficacy of the rule of law, this result is encouraging, suggesting that partisanship does not strongly influence whether or not Venezuelans report crime to the proper authorities.




Figure V-44 Did You Report the Crime to Any Institution? By Affect for Chávez

Venezuelans do report crime less frequently than respondents in other countries. Figure V-45 shows that Venezuela is on the low end of the distribution, with only 39.4% of respondents reporting crimes to government institutions. By way of comparison, while Venezuela and Uruguay share similar rates of crime victimization (see Figure V-30), Venezuela shows a 39.4% reporting rate versus 61.8% in Uruguay. This suggests that the rule of law is much weaker in Venezuela.




Figure V-45 Did You Report the Crime to Any Institution? By Country

To get a better picture of why Venezuelans have such low reporting rates, the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 includes a question asking respondents to choose from a list of reasons as to why they failed to report their crime. The question and responses are provided below.

AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas]

- (1) No sirve de nada
- (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias
- (3) No tenía pruebas
- (4) No fue grave
- (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar
- (7) Otra

Figure V-46 shows that an overwhelming 62.4% of Venezuelans claim they did not report their crime to the proper authorities because “it does not serve any purpose.” The next most popular response was fear of reprisal, accounting for 15.5% of respondents. These results suggest that Venezuela’s high rate of unreported crime incidence is largely attributable to a widely shared distrust in the effectiveness of legal institutions.




Figure V-46 Why Didn't You Report the Incident?

Figure V-47 examines these results across other countries in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. Specifically, it compares Venezuela's 62.4% of respondents who said that they did not report a crime because "it does not serve any purpose" with the percentage who gave the same response elsewhere. The chart shows that while this response is likely the most common one in every country, Venezuela has the second highest proportion of respondents who share this belief. Falling just below Uruguay's 67.3%, Venezuela not only has a relatively low rate of crime reporting, but is much more likely to underreport out of low confidence in political institutions. These results coupled with the extremely high rate of crime bode poorly for the rule of law in Venezuela.




Figure V-47 Reporting Crimes Doesn't Serve Any Purpose, by Country

Moving away from examining why Venezuelans fail to report crime, we continue to explore respondents' feelings about the rule of law by analyzing a question that probes into their definition of the rule of law. The question asks respondents whether or not authorities "should always obey the law or that on occasion, they can skate close to the limits of the law?" Figure V-48 shows that 68.6% of Venezuelan respondents reported that authorities should always obey the law. This seems to reflect a well-balanced understanding of the rule of law in that two out of three Venezuelans feel that it should be strictly observed, even if it is not always observed in practice. Thus, the weak rule of law in Venezuela is not the product of a weak political culture.




Figure V-48 Can Authorities Occasionally Skate Close to the Limits of the Law in Order to Catch Criminals?

In order to see whether these results reflect partisan differences, we break them down by affect for Chávez. Figure V-49 shows that there is virtually no difference between supporters and opponents of Chávez, suggesting that Venezuelans' understanding of the rule of law is the same for all citizens and not influenced by partisan ties.




Figure V-49 Can Authorities Occasionally Skate Close to the Limits of the Law in Order to Catch Criminals? By Affect for Chávez

Now that we have established that Venezuelans, independent of partisan leaning, feel that the government should always respect the law, we examine how these responses compare with other countries in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. Figure V-50 shows that Venezuela has the second highest proportion of respondents who follow this strict interpretation of the rule of law. Venezuela's 68.6% falls just below Jamaica's 69.8%, which is surprising considering that Jamaica is a country with extremely low rates of crime (10.1% compared with Venezuela's 25.1%) and a relatively functional rule of law (evident in their 52.7% of respondents who reported their crimes to authorities, compared with Venezuela's 38.4%). This reinforces our finding that the ineffective rule of law in Venezuela is almost solely a product of the political structure and not individual-level misconceptions among the citizens.




Figure V-50 Authorities Should Always Respect the Law, by Country

Overall, Venezuelans show a common distrust in the efficacy of the rule of law while simultaneously maintaining a relatively strictly constructed interpretation of the rule of law. On both a local and a global level, Venezuelan rule of law appears to be dysfunctional and ineffective, reflecting poorly on the legitimacy of the government as perceived by all citizens, independent of their support for Chávez.

Attitudes towards the justice system

The above results vary slightly as we begin to explore the perceived rule of law by examining to what degree Venezuelans trust specific government institutions. The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 first asks a series of questions about the courts, arguably the most important defenders of the rule of law because of their role in judging the actions of public servants and citizens alike.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Venezuela garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7, o escoja un puntaje intermedio)

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Tribunal Supremo de Justicia?

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR



The first question asks Venezuelans to what extent they feel that the courts in Venezuela guarantee a fair trial. Figure V- 51 shows a bimodal distribution, with 16.1% of Venezuelans who respond “Not at all” and about one out of four rating their feelings a “4,” the value that falls directly in the center of the distribution. If the first response is excluded from Figure V-51, the distribution would be roughly normal.




Figure V-51 To What Extent Do the Courts in Venezuela Guarantee a Fair Trial?

In order to examine this relationship more closely, Figure V-52 shows how Venezuelans feel that the courts guarantee a fair trial grouped by their support for Chávez. The results explain only part of the bimodality visible in Figure V-51, as 25.2% of Anti-Chavistas compared with only 11.1% of Chavistas feel that the courts do not guarantee a trial at all. This relationship is statistically significant ($p < 0.000$). However, while non-supporters of Chávez show much higher level of trust in the courts' ability to guarantee a fair trial, both distributions show a bi-modal curve. This distribution will continue throughout the trust indicators and may be largely attributable to the seven point scale used, which may favor the more easily recognizable positions on the tails or directly in the middle of a distribution. Regardless of scaling biases, however, we find that Venezuelans feel either extremely poorly toward the courts or tend to be fairly satisfied with their ability to guarantee a fair trial.




Figure V-52 To What Extent Do the Courts in Venezuela Guarantee a Fair Trial? By Affect for Chávez

In a global context, respondents' mildly negative attitudes toward the courts are fairly average for most Latin American countries. Figure V-53 shows the average trust score for each country surveyed. Venezuela is almost directly in the middle, with a mean trust score of 4.0. Because lower scores indicate less trust that the courts guarantee a fair trial, Venezuela has a relatively high level of support for the courts in comparison with extremely low-scoring countries such as Paraguay, which reports an average trust score of 2.8.




Figure V-53 Average Response: To What Extent Do You Think the Courts Guarantee a Fair Trial? By Country

The next question of trust in the justice system asks Venezuelans how much they trust the *sistema de justicia*, or justice system. In Venezuela, the *sistema de justicia* refers to a dual body of both judges and judicial police; under Venezuela's system of code law, the judge typically reviews evidence in a case and orders the court police to arrest a suspect. When Venezuelans are asked how much they trust the justice system, it is likely that they answer the question with both the court officials and judicial police in mind. Figure V-54 again shows a bimodal distribution for trust that has a slightly more moderate distribution than the preceding evaluation of how well courts guarantee a fair trial. Again, we see that most respondents report trust figures that are in the low or middle range, indicating that Venezuelans hesitate to trust government institutions.




Figure V-54 To What Extent Do You Trust the Justice System?

When this bi-modal distribution is divided by partisan sympathy, the influence of support for Chávez becomes more apparent. Figure V-55 shows a skewed right distribution of support for Anti-Chavistas and a fairly normal distribution of trust for Chavistas. Trust in the justice system is clearly highly affected by a respondent's feelings toward Chávez, which again suggests that Chávez's involvement in the justice system has introduced a partisan bias to Venezuelan's perceptions of the rule of law at the level of specific institutions.




Figure V-55 To What Extent Do You Trust the Justice System? By Affect for Chávez

In a more comparative context, we again find that Venezuela is almost directly in the middle of the distribution. Figure V-56 shows that Venezuela's average trust score of 3.8 is not significantly lower than most countries surveyed.




Figure V-56 Average Response: How Much do You Trust the Justice System? By Country

The next trust indicator for the court system asks respondents to what extent they trust the Supreme Court. It is clear from the high levels of distrust that these responses are colored by recent historical events in Venezuela. After the Supreme Court failed to convict the organizers of the 2002 coup, Chávez proposed an initiative to increase the number of Supreme Court judges from 20 to 32. This motion passed through the National Assembly in 2004, causing five long-standing judges to resign early and enabling Chávez to choose 17 new appointees for the Supreme Court. While Figure V-57 is similar to the other bimodal distributions shown in this section, it also reports the highest percentage of respondents with the lowest levels of trust in this section. These results suggest that the legitimacy of the Supreme Court was undermined by Chávez's actions in 2004.




Figure V-57 To What Extent Do You Trust the Supreme Court?

Consequently, we are not surprised to find that the division between supporters and opponents of Chávez is even more apparent in this question than in those previously reported. Figure V-58 shows that opponents of Chávez are nearly four times as likely to not trust the Supreme Court at all as are Chávez supporters. Again, we see a skewed right trend for opposition members and a roughly normal trend for Chavistas. While the Supreme Court should act as the key defender of the rule of law, in Venezuela it appears to be one of the most divisive aspects of the justice system.




Figure V-58 What Extent Do You Trust the Supreme Court? By Support for Chávez

These trends are supported by a cross-country comparison of Venezuela's trust in the Supreme Court. Figure V-59 shows that Venezuela's average score of 3.7 is rather low compared with most other countries surveyed. While other average trust indicators show Venezuela as about average in its popular support of the justice system, this distribution is less favorable. This may reflect the impact of Chávez's decisions to alter the membership and functioning of Supreme Court.




Figure V-59 Average Response: How Much Do You Trust the Supreme Court? By Country

Moving away from explicit trust indicators, the last question in this section asks respondents, “If you were the victim of some crime, how much faith do you have that the justice system will punish the guilty party?” Because this question seeks to measure the actual functionality of the justice system in the country somewhat more than a respondent’s diffuse sense of trust in a specific institution, the distribution of responses shifts dramatically. Across both Chávez supporters and opponents, there seems to be a consensus that the actual state of the rule of law in Venezuela is poor (Figure V-60). Although the differences in the distributions reinforce the finding that Chavistas and Anti-Chavistas have different perceptions of the justice system, the similar skew in graphs indicates that there is also a commonly-held sense of distrust.




Figure V-60 If You Were the Victim of Some Crime, How Much Faith Do You Have that the Justice System Would Punish the Guilty Party? By Affect for Chávez

Taking this investigation a step further, Figure V-61 compares answers to this question across countries in the region. To make the results more intuitive, the graph shows the percent of respondents that had “some” or “a lot” of faith in the justice system in each country (i.e., the more optimistic side of the scale). Venezuela appears to be in the lower-middle portion of the distribution, with only 33.0% of respondents reporting that they have at least some faith that, in the event of a crime, the justice system would punish the guilty party. This again deviates from the previous pattern of average international standings on trust in judicial institutions. As we move from questions about specific institutions back to more diffuse matters of the judicial system as a whole, partisan attitudes seem to converge around a sense of mistrust.




Figure V-61 Percentage of Respondents Who Have “Some” or “A Lot” of Faith that if They Were the Victim of Some Crime, the Justice System Would Punish the Guilty Party.

Overall, as we move to questions of trust in specific judicial institutions, attitudes improve somewhat but begin to show a strong partisan bias that reaches its extreme in the case of the Supreme Court. Only as we retreat to more general questions about the functioning of the judiciary do these partisan differences attenuate, but always in the direction of more negative average assessments. While there are some hints here of its potential to arouse citizen trust, the judiciary in Venezuela today is not a branch of government uniting the country or dramatically enhancing the rule of law.

Attitudes towards the police

While the justice system is the foundation for the rule of law, the most commonly seen law enforcement agency for most citizens is the police. This section explores two different questions on national and international scales to see how Venezuelans' perceptions of the police compare with other countries in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. The questions are listed below.

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de esta urbanización o barrio protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? (1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS/NR

The first question asks respondents to report how much they trust the police. While this question uses the same seven-point scale that was used in the battery of trust questions about the justice system, Figure V-62 shows a skewed-right distribution instead of the bimodal construction that we saw in the case of the judiciary. That is, Venezuelans have even less confidence in this component of the government than they do in the courts. It seems less likely that we will find the same sharp partisan differences here that we did in the case of particular judicial institutions.




Figure V-62 How Much Do You Trust the Police?

We see this in Figure V-63, which breaks the question down by affect for Chávez. While opponents of Chávez have statistically significantly higher levels of distrust, both distributions remain similarly skewed. There seems to be a widely shared notion of the ineffectiveness of the rule of law when it comes to the police.




Figure V-63 How Much Do You Trust the Police? By Affect for Chávez

While Venezuela has extremely low levels of trust in the police, it is important to see how this compares with other Latin American countries. Figure V-64 shows that Venezuela has the highest proportion of respondents who reported that they trust the police “not at all.” On both a national and global perspective, these graphs show that Venezuelan rule of law, as seen on a daily basis, is perceived as ineffective.




Figure V-64 Percentage of Respondents Who Trust the National Police “Not at All,” by Country

The second question regarding the police asks whether the police in the respondent's neighborhood protect people from criminals, or whether they are themselves involved in crime. This is a real concern in many Latin American countries, where low levels of professionalism in the police force (and especially low salaries) make it easier for officers to become involved in protecting or even fomenting organized crime. Figure V-65 presents the results of this question, already broken down by affect for Chávez. Venezuelan skepticism of the legitimacy of the police department remains strong, with nearly 4 out of 5 Venezuelans saying that local police are involved in crimes, rather than protecting residents from criminal activity. There is again a statistically significant difference between Chávez supporters and opponents, with Chavistas more likely to believe that the police are doing their job, but the shape of these two distributions is essentially the same. When it comes to the police, most Venezuelans have widely-shared concerns about the rule of law in Venezuela that is not dramatically affected by partisan sympathy.




Figure V-65 Do the Police in this Neighborhood Protect People from Criminals, or Are they Involved in Crime? By Affect for Chávez

In order to see how Venezuelans compare with other countries in Latin America, we conducted a cross-country comparison of the proportion of respondents who reported that they feel like the police are involved in the crime. Venezuela again reports the highest percentage of respondents who are skeptical of the police, with the Dominican Republic (at 70.0%) in second place (Figure V-66). The dismal pattern seems clear.




Figure V-66 Percentage of Respondents Who Feel the Police are Involved in Crime, by Country

In summary, the rule of law in Venezuela appears to be the weakest in the region. While Venezuelans believe in a strict construction of the rule of law, they show little belief in its actual power. Although respondents report high rates of crime victimization, few actually report the crimes due to a widely-held belief that reporting a crime does not serve any purpose. Venezuelans hold somewhat better levels of trust in specific institutions of the justice system, but respondents demonstrate a common skepticism for the efficacy of the judiciary on a more abstract level. Confidence in the police is consistently the lowest in the region no matter how it is measured.

Support for Chávez influences to a large extent whether Venezuelans trust the justice system and particular institutions, especially the Supreme Court, these differences begin to dissolve as we ask more general questions about the judiciary and its effectiveness. Partisan differences are still present but nearly disappear when we ask about trust in the national police or the effectiveness of local police at fighting crime.

Conclusions

Problems with corruption, crime, and the rule of law in Venezuela are among the worst in Latin America. This survey suggests that these problems are closely interrelated. High levels of perceived and experienced crime go with extremely low confidence in the police; marginally lower levels of corruption correlate with a judiciary that is seen as corrupt and ineffective, but somewhat more trustworthy in regional context. In order to reduce corruption and crime,



Venezuela must ultimately create institutions that can effectively enforce the rule of law. Unfortunately, the potential for these institutions to play this role is limited by today's polarized environment and the control the government has exercised over these institutions, particularly the judiciary. Attitudes toward judicial institutions especially, but also somewhat the police, show strong partisan biases that are not unjustified. Unless these institutions can be made truly neutral arbiters, they cannot credibly claim to enforce the rule of law. Supporters of the Chávez government may contend that these fears are exaggerated (witness for example the tendency of higher income respondents to express greater fears of crime even though the actual risk of victimization is unrelated to income). But public attitudes play a crucial role in sustaining the rule of law; public fears that political institutions will only respond to bribery or partisan criteria can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Without the confident endorsement of all Venezuelans, the judiciary and police force will face a more difficult task of implementing a truly democratic revolution in Venezuela.

VI. Local Government

As in most Latin American countries, Venezuela experienced a burst of decentralizing reforms during the 1980s and 1990s designed to improve the efficiency of government, its responsiveness to local concerns, and its participatory qualities. Two sets of laws constituted the core of these reforms. The first, the Law Regarding Election and Removal of State Governors, was enacted at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989 and instituted the direct election of governors. The second, the Organic Law of Municipal Rule, or LORM, was originally passed in 1978 but reformed in August 1988 and June 1989, and created the new office of a directly-elected mayor. Additional details were added by the Law Regarding Terms of Branches of State Governments, which set the terms of governors and mayors at three years; and the Organic Law of Decentralization, Delimitation, and Transference of Powers of the Branches of Government (LODDT).

The second set of laws, enacted in 1993, included a decree-law regarding the sharing of revenues from the national Value Added Tax and another law regarding share of revenues from petroleum (Mascareño 2000, 33). These also established the Intergovernmental Fund for Decentralization, better known as FIDES, a popular program that funded infrastructure projects by state and municipal governments. Important changes were also made to the electoral laws, the most significant being the inclusion of a large number of single-member district seats in national congressional elections, a reform originally intended to decrease the power of national party leaders in favor of greater popular participation.

These initial attempts at reform have been modified and in some cases rolled back by the Chávez government, which has emphasized greater centralization of power around the office of the president. Initially, the Constitution of 1999 reaffirmed key provisions of the decentralization reforms, particularly the direct election of mayors and governors, and it extended the process of decentralization to political parties by mandating the selection of party leadership and electoral candidates through internal elections.⁴ However, the Chávez government made increasing use of discretionary spending programs such as the *Misiones* that circumvented budget transfer requirements and allowed the central government to control funding (Hawkins, Rosas, and Johnson forthcoming). The central government also asserted control over local police forces, and since 2005 has sponsored a series of local government initiatives designed to partially replace traditional, representative local government entities such as the municipalities.

The Communal Councils are the most recent and ambitious of these initiatives, creating thousands of local quasi-governmental entities of up to 400 families each that adopt a formal charter and select a council which administers and coordinates other local government programs. The Communal Councils receive sizeable grants for community projects designed to complement or even replace the functions of municipalities and states. Since the rejection of the

⁴ Article 67 of the 1999 Constitution states, “All citizens have the right to associate for political ends, through democratic methods of organization, operation, and leadership. Their leadership bodies and their candidates to positions of popular election shall be chosen in internal elections with the participation of the members. The financing of political associations with funds from the State shall not be permitted.”

government's constitutional reform referendum in December 2007, which would have given the Communal Councils greater powers and legal clarity, the future of these newer programs has become uncertain (López Maya 2008; García-Guadilla 2007).

The AmericasBarometer includes a standard module of questions designed to gauge citizen participation in local government and popular attitudes towards local government performance. The questions are listed below. In addition, the survey includes a separate module of questions unique to the Venezuela version that gauge participation in and attitudes towards the Communal Councils, the newest local government initiative by the Chávez government; these are presented in the last section of the chapter.

- NP1.** ¿Ha asistido a una reunión del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?
(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR
- NP1B.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios municipales hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR
- NP2.** ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina o funcionario del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?
(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR
- SGL1.** ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el concejo municipal está dando a la gente son ...? [**Leer alternativas**]
(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR
- SGL2.** ¿Cómo considera que lo han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al concejo municipal para hacer trámites? ¿Lo han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?
(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR
- LGL2.** En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a los concejos municipales, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales?
(1) Más a los concejos municipales
(2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios
(3) No cambiar nada [**NO LEER**]
(4) Más al concejo municipal si da mejores servicios [**NO LEER**]
(8) NS/NR
- LGL3.** ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al concejo municipal para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la concejos municipales?
(1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos
(8) NS/NR

Levels of participation

Figure VI-1 presents the results of the first question in this module, asking whether respondents have attended city council meetings over the past year, and compares the results in Venezuela to those in other countries from the AmericasBarometer series. Venezuelans' attendance at city council meetings is about average for the region. Just over 13.3% of Venezuelans have attended a city council meeting, well below the 23-24% reported in countries such as the United States or the Dominican Republic (an outlier among Latin American countries), but well ahead of other countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama, where fewer than 7% have attended.




Figure VI-1 Percent Who Attended a City Council Meeting During the Past Year

Figure VI-2 presents a similar set of comparative results for the third question in this module, which asks whether respondents have solicited help from a member of the city council over the past year. Again, we find that Venezuelans are about average for the region, with just over 13.4% having solicited help.




Figure VI-2 Percent Who Solicited Help From a Member of the City Council During the Yast Year

Figures VI-3 through VI-8 present cross-tabulations of these measures of participation in local government with a set of sociodemographic and partisan indicators. Although we examined additional sociodemographic indicators, specifically sex and education, we report only those with statistically significant differences here. The effect of age (Figures VI-3 and VI-4) is fairly consistent across both categories of participation, with the elderly and young adults being the least likely to participate in city council meetings or solicit help; however, the result is still rather moderate in absolute terms. The size of the locality where the respondent lives (Figures VI-5 and VI-6) has a mixed effect, in that both the largest localities and the most rural ones seem to show the highest levels of participation and the most frequent solicitations; this effect again holds across both indicators, although it is more pronounced for attendance at city council meetings. Finally, partisanship has the strongest and most statistically significant effect, with supporters of Chávez being twice as likely to participate in city council meetings and about 50% more likely to solicit help from their city council members. Given that Chávez allies controlled nearly all municipal governments in Venezuela at the time of this survey, these last results are predictable but do not portend well for perceptions of local government performance, which we address next.




Figure VI-3 Attendance at City Council Meetings by Age




Figure VI-4 Petitioning of City Officials by Age




Figure VI-5 Attendance at City Council Meetings by Size of Locality




Figure VI-6 Petitioning of City Officials by Size of Locality




Figure VI-7 Attendance at City Council Meetings by Affect for Chávez




Figure VI-8 Petitioning of City Officials by Affect for Chávez



Evaluations of local government

We next consider attitudes towards local government performance using three questions from the survey. Generally, these indicate somewhat negative attitudes towards current local government among Venezuelans. Figure VI-9 reports how responsive Venezuelans feel that public officials are to the citizens who attend city council meetings. Results are broken down by whether or not the respondent has personally participated in these meetings. Venezuelans are fairly negative overall; however, attitudes are much more positive among those who attend city council meetings. The data do not allow us to determine whether this positive response is the result of experience at city council meetings, or if those who already have positive attitudes are more likely to attend.




Figure VI-9 Perceptions of City Officials' Responsiveness at City Council Meetings, by Whether Respondents Attend

Our second question asks respondents how satisfied they were with the services provided by the municipal government. As in other AmericasBarometer reports, we have converted the original 5-point scale from the survey into a more intuitive 100-point scale, where higher values indicate a more favorable assessment. Figure VI-10 reports the mean values for all countries in the series. Venezuela falls somewhat at the lower end of these countries. While a few countries such as Jamaica and Haiti report much lower values, Venezuela ranks 15th out of the 20 countries where this question was asked.




Figure VI-10 Satisfaction with the Services of the Municipal Government

Finally, we considered a question that asked respondents to evaluate how they and their friends and relatives are treated when they go to city hall to conduct official transactions. For the sake of comparison, we again convert the original 5-point scale into a 100-point one in which higher values represent more positive assessments, and we compare Venezuela with other countries. Venezuela again stands roughly in the middle of other Latin American countries in the dataset.




Figure VI-11 Satisfaction with Treatment by City Hall

We considered potential causes of these assessments by focusing on just one variable, satisfaction with the services of municipal government. A review of sociodemographic and partisan indicators from the survey suggests that a few factors may play a role. While age, education, and the size of the municipality lack any statistically significant association with satisfaction (and are thus not shown here), income and partisanship have at least a moderate association, with lower-income households (Figure VI-12) and Chávez supporters (Figure VI-13) being more likely to evaluate their local government positively.




Figure VI-12 Satisfaction with Services of the Municipal Government, by Income




Figure VI-13 Satisfaction with Services of the Municipal Government, by Affect for Chávez

These results seem sensible, in that pro-government mayors are found in nearly every municipality of the country and thus very likely to color the assessments of Chávez supporters across the board, many of whom are very poor. To test this argument and to round out this section, we ran an OLS regression using the 5-point scale of satisfaction with local government services as the dependent variable (we reverse the scale so that higher responses indicate greater satisfaction) and our usual array of sociodemographic and partisan measures as our key explanatory variables.⁵ The results in Table VI-1 largely repeat the findings in our charts above. The most statistically significant coefficients are for income and affect for Chávez, although sex and education also have noticeable effects once we control for other indicators. Higher affect for Chávez and lower levels of income are strongly associated with greater satisfaction. Women and lower educated respondents also tend to have greater satisfaction.

Table VI-1 Regression of Satisfaction with Services of the Municipal Government

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval	Interval]
age	-0.002	0.002	1.06	0.287	-0.002	0.007
sex	0.195	0.057	-3.40	0.001	-0.307	-0.082
size of locality	-0.076	0.039	1.96	0.051	0.000	0.153
education	-0.019	0.007	2.85	0.004	0.006	0.033
income	-0.203	0.033	6.11	0.000	0.138	0.268
affect for Chávez	0.165	0.024	6.74	0.000	0.117	0.213
y-intercept	-2.050	0.202	10.17	0.000	1.655	2.446
Number of observations	980					
F(6, 973)	19.14					
Prob > F	0					
R-squared	0.11					
Adj R-squared	0.10					
Root MSE	0.89068					

Note: Age is measured in whole years; Sex is a dichotomous variable where 0=Male 1=Female; Size of Locality is a 4-point scale where 1=capital, 2=large city, 3=medium city, 4=rural area; Education is measured in years of education; Income is a 4-point scale where 1=Has enough and can save, and 4=is not enough, cannot cover basic needs; and Affect for Chávez is a 4-point variable (c5ch, but with the scale reversed) where 1=strongly disagree and 4=strongly agree with the statement that “Chávez has a convincing vision of the future.”

Support for increased local government

The survey includes two final questions designed to measure support for increased local government. Together, these present a picture of low support for increasing local government that reaffirms the lukewarm satisfaction with local government performance. As Figure VI-14 demonstrates, Venezuelans tend to favor shifting powers and resources back to national government. And as Figure VI-15 also shows, a sizeable majority feels it would be worthless to pay higher taxes to municipal governments. None of our standard basket of sociodemographic or

⁵ We ran the regression using ordered probit as well, but the results were similar enough that we used OLS for simplicity.



even partisan indicators seems to explain these attitudes. They hold constant across sex, age, education, income, and—surprisingly in light of previous findings—level of affect for Chávez.




Figure VI-14 Should City Government or the National Government be Given Greater Responsibilities?




Figure VI-15 Are You Willing to Pay More Taxes to City Government if it Provides Better Services?

The Consejos Comunes

As already mentioned, one of the key local government innovations sponsored by the Chávez government is the Communal Councils (hereafter, CC in the plural). The CC were begun by Chávez in 2005 and achieved legal status in the Communal Councils Law of April 2006. The Council itself is an executive body constituted by an initial Citizen Assembly. While having some attributes of civil society in that participation in the CC is voluntary, the CC are supposed to register with a government agency controlled by the presidency, and they receive significant funding for community projects from the national government, thus making them a quasi-state entity (García-Guadilla 2007; López Maya 2008).

Because of the CC's significance, we included a series of questions in the survey designed to gauge the quantity and quality of citizen participation in these organizations. Generally, we find very high levels of access to and participation in the CC, with fairly positive assessments of the CC's performance, and highly democratic methods used to select the members of the CC. However, satisfaction with the performance of the CC is strongly colored by partisanship.

We first measure participation in the CC by asking (a) whether there is a CC in the respondent's community, and if there is, (b) whether the respondent participated in the initial Citizen Assembly that selected the CC and (c) how often they continue to participate in the CC. As Figures VI-16 and VI-17 show, 65.6% said there was a CC in their community, and of these 37.9% said that they participated in the initial Citizen Assembly. Out of this same group that has a CC in their community, 53.5% participate at least yearly in meetings of either the Citizen Assembly or the CC itself (results not shown here).⁶

⁶ In Chapter VIII: Social Capital, we report the responses to a question asked earlier in the survey showing that about 36 percent of all Venezuelans participated at least once during the past year in a CC. If we examine the new results shown here—that nearly two-thirds of Venezuelans have a CC in their community, and out of this group over




Figure VI-16 Is There a Communal Council in Your Community?




Figure VI-17 Participation in the Initial Citizen Assembly

These levels of participation are much higher than we see for traditional local government—nearly three times higher than attendance at city council meetings. However, participation seems to be driven much more by partisanship. As Figure VI-18 shows, levels of participation are much higher for supporters of Chávez than for opponents. 59.6% of Chávez supporters participate at least annually in the meetings of either the CC or the Citizen Assembly, while 43.3% of Chávez opponents do the same. This difference is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. It should be noted that even though Chávez opponents exhibit lower participation, 2/5ths of them do participate, which is a very high level given the data we generally find for citizen participation in other local-level associations.

53.5% continue to participate at least annual in meetings—then this indicates that roughly 35% of all Venezuelans participate at least annually. The fact that these two results are very close to each other suggests that the self-reported estimates of participation in both modules are reliable. The small difference may be accounted for by the fact that here we ask about participation in CC only within the respondent's community.




Figure VI-18 Frequency of Participation in Communal Councils, by Affect for Chávez

Partisanship also enters into Venezuelans' evaluations of the Communal Councils' performance. Overall, 49.7% of Venezuelans report that they are "very" or "somewhat satisfied" with the responsiveness of the CC (not shown here), results that are at least as positive as we find for city councils. However, when we break down these results by affect for Chávez (Figure VI-19), we learn that only 29.4% of Chávez opponents feel this way, in contrast to 58.9% of Chávez supporters. Likewise, when we ask respondents whether the CC represents only one political view (Figure VI-20), 57.7% of Chávez opponents but only 37.0% of Chávez supporters agree with this potentially negative assessment. Both of these results are statistically significant at the $p < .000$ level.




Figure VI-19 How Well does the Communal Council Respond to the Community's Needs? By Affect for Chávez




Figure VI-20 Does the Communal Council Represent only one Political View? By Affect for Chávez

Partisanship also factors into what Venezuelans think is the appropriate role of the CC and their relationship to the traditional institutions of local government. The survey was conducted during the campaign for the constitutional reforms, reforms that would have potentially eliminated municipal and state government in favor of a participatory model based on the CC. Overall, only 29.9% of Venezuelans favored replacing municipal government with the CC, while 56.0% opposed the idea and 14.1% said it depends (not shown here). Figure VI-21 breaks down these results by affect for Chávez. Only 15.2% of Chávez opponents but 38.7% of Chávez supporters agreed with the proposal. While still not enough to have carried the vote, the difference is statistically significant and large.




Figure VI-21 Should Communal Councils Replace Municipal Governments? By Affect for Chávez

Lastly, and somewhat on a separate note, we consider how the members of the CC (known as speakers, or *voceros*) were selected. When we consider the method of selection actually used (Figure VI-22), the CC are highly democratic. 74.7% of Venezuelans who have a CC in their community report that the speakers were chosen by secret ballot; an additional 19.1% say that a voice vote was used; and only 6.1% say that speakers were chosen by consensus (i.e., without a formal vote), government designation, or some other method. Likewise, when we instead ask what method *should* be used to select speakers (Figure VI-23), the vast majority of Venezuelans with a CC in their community still prefer using either a secret ballot (61.1%), a secret ballot as part of the general elections (24.5%), or a voice vote (9.8%); only 4.7% suggest that speakers should be chosen by government designation or some other method.




Figure VI-22 Method of Selecting CC Members




Figure VI-23 How Should CC Speakers be Chosen?

Conclusions

Over the past two decades Venezuela has experienced some of the same decentralization initiatives as other Latin American countries, as well as a new slate of more radical participatory initiatives under the Chávez government. The record of the more traditional forms of local government is somewhat mixed at present. Levels of citizen participation and assessments of these programs are low and negative in absolute terms, but about average for the region. Supporters of Chávez tend to assess them more favorably, a finding that probably reflects the control that Chávez allies have over most municipalities. As for the Communal Councils (the most important of the Chávez government's current initiatives), levels of participation seem to be higher and overall assessments are at least as positive; however, both of these aspects are strongly colored by partisanship, with Chávez opponents being much more likely to abstain from the CC and to judge these programs negatively.

VII. Electoral Behavior

Vote Choice

The first important aspect of voting behavior investigates the motivations behind a voter's selection of a candidate, or vote choice. Compared with industrialized democracies, Latin American voting patterns suggest a relatively weak attachment to parties, favoring instead charismatic personalities and traditional-patrimonial ties of clientelism. Elections are thus characteristically volatile; re-election of incumbents is rare and if successful, incumbents nearly always experience a drop in support from the previous year (Dix 1984, 435).

Traditionally, Venezuela has been an exception to this trend. Strong party attachment predominated in Venezuela, which saw nearly thirty years of steady turnover between its two major parties, AD and COPEI. While initially this turnover seemed indicative of a thriving, competitive, electoral system, some scholars attributed shifting party power to Venezuelans' "endemic discontent" with ineffective government administrations (Molina 1998). In any case, in the early 1990s longstanding frustration with the party system led to its complete breakdown. The 1993 election of Rafael Caldera as an independent followed by the surprising success of Hugo Chávez in 1998 marked an important transition in the political system, as Venezuelans moved from *party*-politics to *personality* politics by rejecting the unresponsive party system that proved unable to adapt to the needs of its constituents (Morgan 2007). In 2007, Chávez demonstrated the power of the new personality-based system when he single-handedly organized the consolidation of the 24 parties that currently support the government into the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, or PSUV.

This evolution of the electoral system in Venezuela is evident in the results for the 2006 elections. The official results for this election show that Chávez won 62.8% of the votes, with Manuel Rosales, the principal opponent, garnering about 36.9% (Consejo Nacional Electoral 2008). These results differ slightly from the responses in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 asks respondents to report whom they voted for in the last presidential election. As Figure VII-1 shows, over 75% of respondents who say they voted claim to have voted for Chávez, while only 19.7% report voting for Rosales. This is a fairly typical level of over-reporting for the winner in a post-electoral survey, especially in a survey conducted nearly a year after the election. Even adjusting for this discrepancy, the data tend to confirm Chávez's claim to victory.




Figure VII-1 Vote Choice 2006 Presidential Election

Some misrepresentation of past elections is also evident in Venezuelans' responses to vote choice in the 2005 parliamentary elections. This election followed the 2004 presidential recall referendum, in which opposition groups attempted to remove Chávez from office but were soundly defeated, with 58% in favor of keeping Chávez and only 42% in favor of recalling him. Suspicions about the results, coupled with fears concerning the transparency of new electronic voting devices, led opposition parties to boycott the 2005 parliamentary elections and give Chavista parties a complete victory.

The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 includes a question asking respondents how they voted in this election. Again, these results (found in Table VII-1) do not entirely match with national reports. For example, while the CNE reports that MVR received about 60% of the vote and PPT 6.8%, the results in Table VII-1 show that 72.9 % of Venezuelans claim to have voted for MVR, with only 2.87% voting for PPT. Even more surprising is that while Un Nuevo Tiempo did not formally exist during these elections, 8.4% of survey respondents claim to have voted for the party. Needless to say, while the general results reported here are roughly similar to the actual vote, these data must be interpreted with caution. It is common in surveys to find that memories become clouded with time, and the further back in time one goes, the less accurate the recall. For most people, politics is not very salient, and recall of scores in soccer games from the past may be better than the self-report of voting behavior.

Table VII-1 Vote Choice in 2005 Parliamentary Elections

Partido	No.	Porcentaje
Movimiento Quinta Republic (MVR)	279	72.85
UNT (Un Nuevo Tiempo)	32	8.36
Primero Justicia (PJ)	14	3.66
PODEMOS	12	3.13
Patria Para Todos (PPT)	11	2.87
PCV (Partido Comunista Venezolano)	4	1.04
Unidad Popular Venezolana (UPV)	3	0.78
Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)	3	0.78
Acción Democrática (AD)	3	0.78
MIGATO (Movimiento Independiente Ganamos Todos)	2	0.52
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro	2	0.52
CMR (Clase Media Revolucionaria)	1	0.26
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)	1	0.26
Un Sólo Pueblo	1	0.26
Otro	10	2.61
ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)	5	1.31
Total	383	100.00

Partisan identity

A foundational motivation for vote choice is seen in the second component of voting behavior, partisan identity, which generally refers to a citizen's identification with a specific political party. In Venezuela, partisan identity is still undergoing a major transition, having changed dramatically during the collapse of the two-party Punto Fijo system. The turnover between these two parties, COPEI and AD, gave structure and balance to the Venezuelan party system, and their demise left many Venezuelans without any firm partisan identity.

This shift of identity from parties to candidates was again made evident in Chávez's inaugural address in January 2007, in which he informed Venezuelans of the creation of a new government party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), which would combine into one political entity over twenty-four parties that supported Chávez. Although a few parties resisted this decision, most others (including the original Chavista party, MVR) quickly disbanded and began participating in the effort to create the new party. This suggests that partisan identity within the government coalition is largely a matter of identification with the figure of Chávez.

Within the survey, the waning importance of parties in the electoral system is evident in the breakdown of citizens who report that they do or do not sympathize with a party. The survey gauged this with the following sequence of questions.

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?

(1) Sí [Siga]

(2) No [Pase a POL1]

VENVB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA]



Figure VII-2 shows the inequality of distribution between those who sympathize with a party—a mere 32.5% of respondents—and those who claim that they do not sympathize with a party—accounting for approximately 67.5% of Venezuelans.




Figure VII-2 Do You Currently Sympathize with a Political Party?

Even those respondents who claim to identify with a party must be taken with a grain of salt. When we break these numbers down by presidential vote choice in 2006 (Figure VII-3), we see that many of those who report some kind of partisan attachment voted for Chávez, who has largely distanced himself from political parties, including his own, since coming to power in 1998. ‘Party sympathy’ is an ambiguous phrase in Venezuela and is probably confused with attachment to figureheads like Chávez rather than the actual party.




Figure VII-3 Partisan Identity, by Vote Choice in 2006 Presidential Election

We see this more clearly when we consider the specific parties with which Venezuelans currently identify. Figure VII-4 present this distribution. The two exploded sections represent the MVR (44.7%) and PSUV (27.6%). The survey included both because the transition to the PSUV was ongoing at the time of our survey. Two important facts stand out in this chart. The first is that parties endorsing Chávez are by far the most popular, and they are the least institutionalized parties within his coalition that garner the most sympathy. Older parties such as the PPT (2.4%) and PCV (1.9%) are nearly irrelevant in this emerging party system. The same can be said of the opposition. The traditional parties of AD and COPEI are of course insignificant nowadays, but even the somewhat more institutionalized Primero Justicia (3.9%) clearly loses out to Manuel Rosales' UNT (10.0%). The second fact captured by this chart is the relative ease with which supporters of Chávez have made the transition from the MVR to the PSUV. The PSUV was only in the process of organization at the time of the survey (plans called for a party congress to be held later in November), yet already it captured a significant portion of those who identified with parties from Chávez's coalition. It seems evident that the most popular parties in Venezuela today are merely vehicles for the candidates that lead them. Whether the PSUV or any of the opposition parties will ultimately be able transcend this remains uncertain.




Figure VII-4 Parties Venezuelans Identify With

All that said, we may gain some hope for a more institutionalized form of party politics when we look at other questions from the survey. The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 asks Venezuelans who voted in the 2006 presidential election what the principal reason was for voting; the possible answers are listed below.

VB8. [Para los que votaron] Cuando votó, ¿cuál fue la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos]
[Solo aceptar una respuesta]

- (1) Las cualidades del candidato, o
- (2) El partido político del candidato, o
- (3) El plan de gobierno del candidato

As Figure VII-5 indicates, only 4.2% responded that party-affiliation was an important factor behind their decision about who to vote for. An additional 24.2% of respondents report that the qualities of the candidate are the most important determinant of voter choice. However, a clear majority of 71.4% report that the candidate's program (*plan de gobierno*) was their most compelling reason. These results suggest an important additional component of Chávez's consistent popularity outside of charisma and shifting party-alliances.




Figure VII-5 Reasons for Vote Choice in the 2006 Presidential Election

We should also avoid thinking that Venezuela represents an extreme case of weak partisan identity in Latin America today. As the cross-country comparison of total levels of partisan identity in Figure VII-6 shows, their results are in fact somewhat normal for the region. A number of countries clearly have higher overall levels of partisan identity, especially the United States and the Dominican Republic at over 60%, but Venezuela falls in the bottom middle of the distribution. Admittedly, this may be less of a cause for optimism in Venezuela than it is a cause for pessimism generally.




Figure VII-6 Total Partisan Identity, by Country

Electoral participation in Venezuela

Electoral participation is generally measured through voter turnout, or the percentage of the registered voter population (or alternatively, the voting age population) who actually vote in an election. Voter turnout is difficult to explain and predict because it represents a kind of collective action problem with both low costs and low potential benefits (Aldrich 1993, 265). As a result, voter turnout is extremely sensitive to institutional and contextual changes from election to election.

This is especially true in Venezuela, where electoral participation is often symptomatic of other, more substantive public issues. Historically, Venezuela has enjoyed extremely high voter turnout, due in large part to compulsory voting laws that were in force through the 1988 presidential election. Under the mandatory voting system, more than 81% of registered Venezuelan voters participated in the elections, a sharp contrast to the 58.3% that voted in the year when the mandate was lifted. During the next few elections, turnout fluctuated between 46% and 60%, climbing to nearly 70% for the 2004 recall election. Chávez's victory was protested and in the 2005 parliamentary elections, five opposition parties organized a boycott, resulting in a mere 25% turnout.

The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 gauges turnout in both the 2005 parliamentary election and the 2006 presidential one. As we might expect, respondents report a slightly higher rate of participation in the parliamentary election than official national reports show, with nearly 30%

claiming to have voted rather than the 25% that actually did. Since voting is socially desirable, and in Venezuela for many years obligatory, overreporting in surveys is common..




Figure VII-7 Voter Turnout in the 2005 Parliamentary Elections

While participation in Venezuela appeared bleak at this point, the 2006 presidential elections generated an impressive turnaround with 74% turnout. Although reasons for this leap in participation are still unclear, one possible explanation is the apparent shift in the cost-benefit paradigm of Venezuelan elections: as Chávez's administration becomes increasingly radical, both the 'costs' and 'benefits' of his presidency rise significantly, encouraging either public support or censure at the polls. This shift may also be a reflection of aggressive get-out-the vote campaigns conducted by Chávez and the improved coordination among opposition parties in their campaign. Thus, while political participation is usually evidence of a thriving democratic system (Lijphart 1996, 1; Jackman 1987, 419), Venezuelan voter turnout may instead be symptomatic of a politically polarized electorate. As we expect, the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 reports slightly higher rates of participation than the official results in the 2006 election, around 76.8% instead of 74% (Figure VII-8).




Figure VII-8 Voter Turnout in the 2006 Presidential Elections

The differences in these elections are also clear when they are broken down by affect for Chávez. Figure VII-9 shows that both supporters and opponents of Chávez failed to turn out for this election, but that abstention was indeed much higher among opponents—79.8%, in fact, versus 56.9% for Chávez supporters. While the boycott contributed considerably to the inequality of representation between Anti-Chavistas and Chavistas in this election, Figure VII-10 suggests that some of this differential is due to more fundamental problems within the opposition. Despite mobilization efforts among both Chávez supporters and opposition parties, Chavistas still had higher rates of voter turnout in the 2006 presidential election. The difference here is obviously smaller than in the 2005 parliamentary election, but it remains statistically significant. This differential may be due to a more effective campaign organization by Chávez, the heavy use of government resources in the campaign, or simply the inability of the opposition to present a candidate that can capture the public's attention and overcome the feeling of pessimism and disaffection with the political process. Even if turnout had been at 100 percent for the opposition, the data here suggest that Rosales would still not have won, and rational voters may have acted on this calculus.




Figure VII-9 Voter Turnout in the 2005 Parliamentary Elections, by Affect for Chávez




Figure VII-10 Voter Turnout in the 2006 Presidential Elections, by Affect for Chávez

Venezuela has a comparatively high rate of voter turnout among the countries in the AmericasBarometer 2006-07. Figure VII-11 compares the proportion of eligible voters who voted in the last presidential elections across twenty-two countries. While these cross-national results are encouraging for Venezuela, we must bear in mind that the results are not consistent with official national reports. In the United States, for example, 85% of Americans report in the AmericasBarometer that they voted in the last presidential election even though the actual 2004 voter turnout was only 55.3% —admittedly, the highest since the presidential elections of 1968.⁷ Thus, while this cross-national comparison is good for a general glance at the different trends in voter turnout, we cannot read too much into this data.

⁷ The U.S. data come from a phone survey conducted two years after the election itself. Faulty recall and limitations of phone survey data probably affect these results. All other surveys, except Canada, were conducted in person, face-to-face.




Figure VII-11 Voter Turnout in the Last Presidential Election: A Cross-Country Comparison

Presidential Approval

Since Chávez's debut on the national political stage during the failed coup of 1992, he has continued to act as a powerful leader and spokesman for the people of Venezuela. His election in 1998 was the beginning of a new Venezuela that has continued to change and evolve over the past nine years in office. Chávez's ambition and consistent popularity have allowed his influence to penetrate nearly every level of Venezuelan society, causing him to become an extremely controversial leader both for domestic and international audiences. Despite the resulting polarization of Venezuelan citizens, Chávez continues to pursue his vision of a truly participatory democracy and egalitarian society.

In order to measure approval of Chávez, the survey asks respondents "Speaking in general, how well is President Hugo Chávez performing his job." The wording of the question is found below.

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Hugo Chávez es: [Leer alternativas]
 (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR

Figure VII-12 shows that there is a large base of support for Chávez as president. Nearly 45% of Venezuelans feel that Chávez is performing "well" or "very well," while only 19.3% think he is doing "poorly" or "very poorly." Considering the large number of citizens who openly and vociferously oppose Chávez, these results must be encouraging for the government.




Figure VII-12 Presidential Approval September-October 2007

In order to understand the bases of Chávez's job approval more fully, we conducted a series of cross-tabulations using survey questions that gauge the country's economic performance, one of the most common predictors of presidential approval ratings in other countries. The first variable that we examine is whether or not respondents say they were employed, as this was an issue of concern in Venezuela as recently as 2002, when almost 15.5% of Venezuelans were unemployed. While we expected to find a significant difference in support for Chávez between employed and unemployed respondents, Figure VII-13 shows that there is virtually no difference. This may be partially explained by Chávez's success in significantly reducing the unemployment rate in Venezuela. Because unemployment was down to 8% at the time of the survey, it is possible that respondents considered this a success of the government and were less willing to blame their personal situations on Chávez.




Figure VII-13 Presidential Approval by Employment Status

In contrast, when we consider a few subjective indicators of personal well-being (“pocketbook” evaluations), economic situation proves to be a strong predictor of presidential approval. In Figure VII-14, respondents describe their overall economic situation (very good/good/neither good nor bad/bad/very bad), and in Figure VII-15 respondents are asked how their economic situation has changed in the last year (better, the same, or worse). Both indicators have a statistically significant correlation with the level of presidential approval. Those who report less favorable economic situations show steadily declining rates of approval, while those who report more negative changes over the past year are increasingly less likely to approve of Chávez’s performance. Thus, a variety of pocketbook assessments correlate strongly with presidential approval.




Figure VII-14 Presidential Approval by Individual Economic Situation




Figure VII-15 Presidential Approval by Change in Economic Situation over the Last Year

Of course, we may still wonder if this is a case of reverse causality—if, for example, existing affect for Chávez colors Venezuelans' assessment of their economic well-being. To test this possibility, we consider one final indicator of economic well-being, household income, which we have used elsewhere in this report. As Figure VII-16 shows, higher levels of income are in fact associated with better job approval. This relationship is statistically significant, although it is admittedly not as pronounced as what we find with more subjective indicators. This suggests that the country's impressive economic performance over the past few years does help sustain Chávez's popularity, but that there is probably some bias in how Chavista respondents see the situation of themselves and the country.




Figure VII-16 Presidential Approval by Income

Conclusions

Chavismo is both a beneficiary of the breakdown of Venezuela's party system and an important protagonist in that process. It is clear that partisan identity has become much rarer and less meaningful in Venezuela since the collapse of the Punto Fijo system and its dominant parties. When Venezuelans express some kind of partisan identity nowadays, they tend to favor electoral vehicles of personalistic candidates, particularly Chávez, although the same trend can be seen in support for the opposition. Interestingly, cross-national data show that these low levels of partisan identity are not extreme; other countries currently fare worse. And Venezuelans report a variety of reasons behind their choice of presidential candidates, the most important of which is his platform. We are somewhat skeptical of the significance of these latter results, but they do leave some room for hope that Venezuela's political system can ultimately reconsolidate itself. The dimensions of this new system are obviously unknown at present.



Levels of electoral participation also offer a mixed picture. Presidential elections during the Chávez era have achieved impressive levels of turnout, but the quantity of turnout is highly variable across other elections (those without Chávez as a candidate are usually quite low), tends to be especially low for the opposition (even when there is no boycott), and is probably driven partly by the high stakes of the contest for the presidency in a polarized environment. It remains to be seen if this increase in voter turnout is sustainable.

Presidential approval levels suggest a more positive interpretation of the current political system. Despite the tumult of the past nine years, voters seem to assess Chávez at least partly based on ordinary economic evaluations. We consider only a limited set of indicators here, but personal (“pocketbook”) assessments of well-being are correlated with job approval for Chávez. The effect is weaker but noticeable even for objective indicators such as income. This suggests a very ordinary kind of rationality at work among Venezuelans, although we have only engaged in a superficial analysis.

VIII. Social Capital

Social capital can be understood as the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993). It is premised on the notion that relationships and social networks, no matter how casual or informal, have extrinsic material value. According to Putnam (2000), social capital’s value is evident in a society’s increased ability to collectively solve problems, advance economically through mutual trust, and raise the quality of political life through increased awareness and tolerance. Research suggests that increased trust acts as a lubricant to the economy, facilitating trade and maximizing economic efficiency (Knack and Keefer 1988).

Because social capital is a relatively new concept, it continues to provoke debate over its appropriate measurement. The most common method consists of survey questions that gauge both interpersonal trust and societal participation, attempting to capture both the cognitive and practical dimensions of social capital. The AmericasBarometer 2006-07 applies this traditional measure by asking a series of questions relating to trust and another series of questions on levels of participation in civil society.

In Latin America, high crime rates, economic instability, and democratic fragility have contributed to markedly low levels of interpersonal trust. However, while trust remains tenuous, Latin America as a whole demonstrates relatively regular levels of nonpolitical participation (Klesner 2007).

This finding has important implications for Chávez’s push for a participatory democracy. The government has made great efforts to mobilize previously disenfranchised sectors of society through organizations such as the *Círculos Bolivarianos*, traditional shantytown organizations such as the *Comités de Tierra Urbana*, a dramatic expansion of community media outlets, and new forms of direct democracy at the local level, most notably the Communal Councils discussed in Chapter VI. However, many of these efforts are highly transitory, subject to the changing will of Chávez and ultimately lacking the capacity to develop a unique organizational identity or permanent, self-sustaining organization. In addition, they tend to reinforce problems of extreme political polarization that wear on an already thin level of interpersonal trust, threatening the survival of a pluralist civil society. Whether or not high levels of plebiscitary participation without high levels of interpersonal trust can procure the benefits associated with social capital remains to be seen.

Cognitive dimension of social capital: Interpersonal trust

The central aspect of the cognitive dimension of social capital is interpersonal trust. This kind of trust is perhaps more relevant to the idea of social capital, as interpersonal trust is both a foundation for and byproduct of an efficient society. To measure interpersonal trust, respondents were asked the following question.



IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..?

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable

Figure VIII-1 shows a roughly normal distribution of the four responses, with a solid majority of respondents (56.6%) indicating that they feel that people are either somewhat or very trustworthy.




Figure VIII-1 How Trustworthy Are People in This Community?

The distribution of interpersonal trust is not significantly affected by affect for Chávez. Figure VIII-2 shows that while slightly more Chávez supporters find other people somewhat trustworthy or very trustworthy, the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure VIII-2 How Trustworthy Are People in This Community? By Affect for Chávez

While interpersonal trust is distributed normally, Venezuela has a relatively low level of interpersonal trust once we compare across countries. Figure VIII-3 shows that while approximately 56.6% of Venezuelans find others in their neighborhoods somewhat or very trustworthy, this statistic is unimpressive in comparison with the other countries like Canada and the United States, which report numbers as high as 95.9% and 93.9%. Even excluding these two observations, Venezuela is still in the bottom third of the distribution, falling just behind Nicaragua and just ahead of Ecuador.




Figure VIII-3 Interpersonal Trust, by Country

Structural dimension of social capital

Informal participation in the community

The first component of the structural dimension we will explore deals with informal participation within the community. The graphs in this section are based on Venezuelan's responses to the following battery of questions. These first ask respondents whether they have contributed to the solution of some problem in their community over the past year. If they have, the survey asks a series of questions about what kinds of participation they engaged in. All of these are general kinds of activities such as voluntary service and community problem-solving rather than particular organizations.

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...

CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o urbanización?

(1) Sí [siga]

(2) No [Pase a CP6]

(8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]

CP5A. ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio o urbanización?

CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?

CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?

CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?

Figure VIII-4 starts with an international comparison of answers to the first question. It indicates that 35.3% of Venezuelans report having participated in the solution of some problem in their community over the past year. These levels of participation are average for the region.




Figure VIII-4 Percent Who Participated in the Solution of Some Problem in the Community, by Country

Figure VIII-5 shows the breakdown of the different ways that Venezuelans actually participate in solving community problems. All categories show modest levels of participation, but the graph indicates that respondents are more likely to donate services and time (such as by attending a meeting) than they are money or goods.




Figure VIII-5 Types of Informal Participation in Venezuela

While aggregate levels of participation are encouraging, examining the percentage of Anti-Chavistas who participate in each different category in comparison with the percentage of Chavistas shows a less optimistic depiction of participation in Venezuela. While both Chávez supporters and opponents report having nearly identical levels of interpersonal trust, Figure VIII-6 shows that Chavistas are more likely to contribute to the solution of problems in their community in every category. These results should temper our enthusiasm for the government's goal to create a more participatory democracy, because they suggest a strong partisan bias in community involvement. We cannot tell whether these differences reflect the mobilization of Chávez supporters, such as through government-sponsored initiatives; or the demobilization of Chávez opponents through self-selection or outright exclusion.




Figure VIII-6 Types of Informal Participation in Venezuela by Affect for Chávez

Participation in formal organizations

To measure participation in more formally organized groups, respondents were asked how often they participated in the following list of associations. Possible answers were “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year,” or “never.”

- CP6.** ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...
- CP7.** ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....
- CP8.** ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...
- CP9.** ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...
- CP10.** ¿De un sindicato?
- CP13.** ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...

In this section, it is important to note that we do not include graphs disaggregating participation by affect for Chávez. We tested for partisan effects across all of these organizations, but we found that only attendance at parent-teacher associations, associations for community improvement, and meetings of a political party were statistically significant, and none of these appeared substantively significant.

The first question reports attendance at meetings of religious associations. Figure VIII-7 shows that 54.2% of Venezuelans attend a religious association at least once or twice a year, if not more

often. Looking across countries, we can see that Venezuela's level of attendance is actually below the regional average. Figure VIII-8 shows that Venezuela has slightly lower attendance than Brazil's 55.6% and slightly higher than that of Costa Rica, which reports 54%. This is far below the 86.8% and 81.4% in Jamaica and Guayana, the highest reported levels of attendance in the survey.




Figure VIII-7 Attendance at Meetings of Religious Associations




Figure VIII-8 Attendance at Meetings of Religious Associations, by Country

Figure VIII-9 shows Venezuelans' attendance at meetings of a parents' association at school. 38.9% go at least once or twice a year, making parent-teacher associations the most attended organization outside of religious associations. However, while parent-teacher associations enjoy relatively high levels of attendance in Venezuela, an international comparison reveals that Venezuelan participation is slightly below the regional average. According to Figure VIII-10, Venezuela is in the lowest portion of the center of the distribution, having slightly higher attendance than Chile and slightly lower attendance than Nicaragua. Because this is Venezuela's best-attended association outside of religious ones, an international ranking such as this does not bode well for social capital in Venezuela.




Figure VIII-9 Attendance at Meetings of a Parents' Association at School




Figure VIII-10 Attendance at Meetings of a Parents' Association at School, by Country

Figure VIII-11 shows that Venezuelans have only slightly fewer participants in meetings that address community improvement. More than 34.7% of respondents report that they attend these meetings at least once or twice a year. That said, more Venezuelans participate in committee meetings for community improvement than do respondents in many other countries. Figure VIII-12 shows that Venezuela ranks in the upper middle of the distribution, coming just above Dominican Republic and just below Ecuador.




Figure VIII-11 Committee Meetings for Community Improvement Attendance




Figure VIII-12 Committee Meeting for Community Improvement, by Country

While Venezuelans have a relatively high rate of participation in community improvement associations, they show a much lower level of attendance at associations of professionals, merchants, or farmers. Figure VIII-13 shows that only 8.5% of Venezuelans attend these meetings at least once or twice a year. While we may expect participation to drop when moving from a broadly community-organized institution to a more specialized one, this skewed distribution seems quite low. An international comparison (Figure VIII-14) confirms that this low participation places Venezuela very close to the bottom of the region.




Figure VIII-13 Attendance at Associations of Professionals, Merchants, or Farmers




Figure VIII-14 Attendance at Associations of Professionals, Merchants, or Farmers, by Country

Similarly, meetings of labor unions are also poorly attended. According to Figure VIII-15, a mere 7% of respondents reported that they attend at least once or twice a year. However, an international comparison (Figures VII-16) reveals that this rate of attendance is actually average for Latin America. Venezuela ranks in the upper middle of the ranked countries, just above Nicaragua's 6.9% and below Haiti's 7.3%.




Figure VIII-15 Attendance at Labor Union Meetings




Figure VIII-16 Attendance at Labor Union Meetings, by Country

The last form of participation that the AmericasBarometer 2006-07 includes is meetings of a political party or movement. In Venezuela, we might expect this to be high due to the political polarization that exists between Chavistas and Anti-Chavistas, as well as the fact that the question mentions movements and not just the much-maligned parties. Throughout the survey, we have seen how influential this division is in nearly every sector of society. However, Figure VIII-17 shows that this kind of political participation is not really noteworthy, hovering around 15% of Venezuelans who attend a meeting at least once or twice a year. In global comparison (Figure VIII-18), Venezuela's 15% is almost directly in the middle of the distribution, falling just behind Colombia (15.7%) and ahead of Mexico (13.4%).




Figure VIII-17 Participation in Political Parties




Figure VIII-18 Participation in Political Parties, by Country

Conclusions

Overall, we find low levels of social capital in Venezuela. In terms of the cognitive dimensions of social capital, Venezuelans lack strong levels of interpersonal trust, even among Chávez supporters. And participation in various types of associations, both formal and informal, seems relatively low or average, despite Chávez's push for a more participatory democracy. We do find some evidence that Chávez supporters participate more in the search for solutions to community problems, but the differences are not large and fail to extend to more formal kinds of organizations such as professional associations, labor unions, and even parties.

While some may argue that participation in democracy refers only to voting or explicitly political institutions, social capital implicitly values participation in other, more social organizations. We might expect participatory initiatives to give some kind of boost to more traditional forms of civil society. However, we find that this is probably not the case, at least for the more traditional forms of civil society that are included in this part of the survey. A more complete analysis would need to take into account the newer forms of associations linked to the government, such as the *Comités de Tierra Urbana*, the *Comités de Salud*, the economic cooperatives, and the *Círculos Bolivarianos* to see if these significantly complement or merely overlap traditional associations.



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Annex A Informed Consent Form

Julio, 2007

Estimado señor o señora:

Le estamos pidiendo que participe en un estudio de opinión pública. Este estudio es una encuesta de opinión pública realizada por la Universidad de Vanderbilt y CISOR (Centro de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales). El objetivo del estudio es conocer las opiniones de la gente sobre los diferentes aspectos de la situación local y nacional de Venezuela.

Usted ha sido seleccionado para participar en esta encuesta a través de un sorteo. La encuesta se completa a su voluntad, y llevará de 30 a 45 minutos aproximadamente.

No se le pagará por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le causará costo alguno. Aunque no podemos ofrecerle ningún beneficio específico, planeamos hacer una serie de conferencias y charlas basadas en lo que la gente dice en la encuesta.

Se mantendrá la confidencialidad de sus respuestas. Su dirección no será registrada; no le pediremos su nombre, y nadie podrá jamás saber cuáles fueron sus respuestas. Nunca revelaremos su opinión individual, ni siquiera la opinión de las personas de su barrio. Lo que haremos será mencionar tendencias y patrones a nivel nacional.

Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder, y puede interrumpir la entrevista en cualquier momento.

Si tiene alguna pregunta, por favor no dude en contactar a Víctor Borge y Asociados, al teléfono 0416-211- 0761.

Como referencia, dejamos copia de esta nota.

¿Desea participar?

Annex B Survey Questionnaire

Versión # 12 27 de Julio de 2007 IRB Approval: 060187

	 <p>AmericasBarometer Barómetro de las Américas by LAPOP</p> <p>www.AmericasBarometer.org</p>
<p>Latin American Public Opinion Project</p>  <p>Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina</p>	 <p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p>

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: VENEZUELA, 2007

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	PAIS	16
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
Estratopri: 1. Región capital 2. Región zuliana 3. Región occidental 4. Región centro-occidental 5. Región oriental 6. Región los llanos	ESTRATOPRI	16 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Estado : _____	VENPROV	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Municipio: _____	VENMUNICIPIO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Parroquia: _____	VENDISTRITO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SEGMENTO CENSAL	SEGMENTO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Sector	SEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>



CLUSTER. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural	UR	
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande	TAMANO	
3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural		
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	VENIDIOMA [IDIOMAS]	1
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		----- --
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2007	FECHA	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
OJO: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA		
Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	Q1	

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]	A4	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
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Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo/ malos sueldos	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Sicariato	87
División política, polarización	89	NS/NR	88

DEM13. ¿En pocas palabras, qué significa para usted la democracia? **[OJO: No leer alternativas. Después de la primera y segunda respuesta preguntar, “¿significa algo más?”]. Aceptar hasta tres alternativas.**

	1 ^o Respuesta DEM13A	Sondee: ¿significa algo más? 2 ^o Respuesta DEM13B	Sondee: ¿significa algo más? 3 ^o Respuesta DEM13C
No tiene ningún significado	0		
Libertad:			
Libertad (sin decir que tipo)	1	1	1
Libertad económica	2	2	2
Libertad de expresión, de voto, de elegir, de derechos humanos	3	3	3
Libertad de movimiento	4	4	4
Libertad, falta de	5	5	5
Ser independientes	6	6	6
Economía:			
Bienestar, progreso económico, crecimiento	7	7	7
Bienestar, falta de, no hay progreso económico	8	8	8
Capitalismo	9	9	9
Libre comercio, libre negocio	10	10	10
Trabajo, más oportunidad de	11	11	11
Trabajo, falta de	12	12	12
Sufragio:			
Derecho de escoger líderes	13	13	13
Elecciones, voto	14	14	14
Elecciones libres	15	15	15
Elecciones fraudulentas	16	16	16
Igualdad:			
Igualdad (sin especificar)	17	17	17
Igualdad económica, de clases	18	18	18
Igualdad de género	19	19	19
Igualdad frente a la leyes	20	20	20
Igualdad de razas o étnica	21	21	21
Igualdad, falta de, desigualdad	22	22	22
Justicia social	34	34	34
Participación:			
Limitaciones de participación	23	23	23
Participación (sin decir que tipo)	24	24	24
Participación de las minorías	25	25	25
Poder del pueblo	26	26	26
Estado de derecho:			
Derechos humanos, respeto a los derechos, respeto (a secas)	27	27	27
Desorden, falta de justicia, corrupción	28	28	28
Justicia	29	29	29
Obedecer la ley, menos corrupción	30	30	30
Gobierno no militar	31	31	31
Vivir en paz, sin guerra	32	32	32
Guerra, invasiones	33	33	33
Otra respuesta	80	80	80

NS/NR	88	88	88
Código (si da únicamente una respuesta, se codifica 13B y 13C con 0. Si da dos respuestas, se codifica 13C con 0.) [Si da una sola respuesta, marcar y pasar a A1]	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
DEM13D. ¿De estos significados de democracia que usted ha dicho, en su opinión cuál es el más importante? [Preguntar sólo si dio dos o tres respuestas a la pregunta anterior. Anote el código.] 88. NS/NR 99. INAP [Una o ninguna respuesta]			DEM13D <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Ahora, cambiando el tema..... [Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS/NR		
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1	
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.	1	2	3	4	8	A2	
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos (en papel)	1	2	3	4	8	A3	
A4i. Lee noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i	

A5. ATENCION: esta pregunta no se hace si la persona contestó NUNCA en A2 Y cuando Ud. Mira noticias en la televisión, ¿qué canal ve más a menudo? [NO LEER, Marcar sólo una opción] 1) Globovisión (privado) 2) Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV)(privado) 13) Miraba Radio Caracas Televisión cuando existía (ya no mira más porque el canal cerró) 3) Televen (privado) 4) Venevisión (privado) 5) Venezolana de Televisión (del estado) 6) ViVe TV (del estado) 7) Vale TV (del estado) 10) Telesur (del estado) 11) Tves (del estado) 12) otro (incluyendo canales regionales o comunitarios) 88) NS/NR	A5	
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SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	SOCT1	
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	SOCT2	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	IDIO1	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	IDIO2	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. A algún diputado del la Asamblea Nacional?	1	2	8	CP2	
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, concejal)?	1	2	8	CP4A	
CP4. A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	CP4	

PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó “nunca” o “NS/NR”, marcar 9 en PROT2 y en PROT3 y pasar a CP5]	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) Nunca PASE A CP5	(8) NS/NR PASE A CP5		PROT1
PROT2. ¿En el último año, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) Nunca PASE A CP5	(8) NS/NR PASE A CP5	9 Inap PASE A CP5	PROT2
PROT3. Y en el último año cuando ha participado en estas actividades ha sido para apoyar al presidente y a su gobierno, o para rechazarlo? (1) Apoyar (2) Rechazar (8) NS/NR (9) INAP						PROT3



Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre su comunidad y los problemas que afronta...	Sí	No	NS/NR	INAP		
CP5. ¿En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o urbanización? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [Pase a CP6] (8) NS/NR [Pase a CP6]	1	2	8		CP5	
CP5A. ¿Ha donado usted dinero o materiales para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de la comunidad o de su barrio o urbanización?	1	2	8	9	CP5A	
CP5B. ¿Ha contribuido usted con su propio trabajo o mano de obra?	1	2	8	9	CP5B	
CP5C. ¿Ha estado asistiendo usted a reuniones comunitarias sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5C	
CP5D. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar usted a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema del barrio, o para buscar alguna mejora?	1	2	8	9	CP5D	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a reuniones de ellos por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año”, o “nunca” para ayudar el entrevistado]						
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿De un sindicato?	1	2	3	4	8	CP10

CP13. ¿De un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13	
CP14 ¿Y a reuniones de un Consejo Comunal? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP14	
CP15 ¿Y de un Comité de Salud?	1	2	3	4	8	CP15	
CP16 ¿De una Cooperativa?	1	2	3	4	8	CP16	
CP17 ¿Y a reuniones de un Comité de Tierra Urbana? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP17	

VENCP30. ¿Usted pertenece actualmente o perteneció a algún Círculo Bolivariano? <i>[Si la respuesta es afirmativa, sondee si es actualmente o en el pasado]</i> 1. Pertenece actualmente [PASE A LS3] 2. Perteneció en el pasado pero ya no pertenece [SIGA] 3. Nunca ha pertenecido [PASE A LS3] 8. NS/NR [PASE A LS3]	VENCP30	
VENCP31. ¿Y cuándo dejó Ud. de participar en ese Círculo Bolivariano, fue durante este año o antes? 1. Dejó de participar durante este año [desde inicios del 2007] 2. Dejó de participar antes 8. NS/NR 9. Inap	VENCP31	

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra ... (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS3	
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IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es ..? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	IT1	
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**ENTREGAR TARJETA # 1**

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) Ahora para cambiar de tema.... En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		L1	
Izquierda										Derecha	(NS/NR=88)	

Recoger Tarjeta # 1

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipalidad...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a una reunión del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP1	
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios municipales hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	NP1 B	
NP2 . ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina o funcionario del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	NP2	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el concejo municipal está dando a la gente son ...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR	SGL 1	
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que lo han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido al concejo municipal para hacer trámites? ¿Lo han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR	SGL 2	
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a los concejos municipales, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más a los concejos municipales (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al concejo municipal si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR	LGL2	
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos al concejo municipal para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales, o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la concejos municipales? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR	LGL3	

CC1. Que Usted sepa, ¿en su comunidad existe un Consejo Comunal registrado en la Comisión Presidencial del Poder Popular? (1) Sí [SIGA] (2) En proceso de formación [PASE A CC9] (3) No [PASE A CC9] (8) NS/NR [PASE A CC9]	CC1	
CC2 ¿Participó Ud. En la Asamblea de Ciudadanos que constituyó el Consejo Comunal? (1) Sí [PASE A CC3] (2) No [SIGA] (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	CC2	
[Sólo para los que NO participaron en la Asamblea constitutiva] CC2i. ¿Por qué no participó? [No leer, marcar solo primera mención] (1) Falta de interés (2) Falta de tiempo o recursos (3) Falta de comunicación/información (4) No comparte la política del gobierno (5) Fue excluido por razones políticas (6) Otra razón (8) NS-NR (9) INAP [Después de esta pregunta pase a CC4]	CC2i	
CC3. ¿Cómo fueron seleccionados los representantes o voceros y voceras del Consejo? [LEER RESPUESTAS] (1) Por aclamación (2) Por voto secreto (3) Designados por el gobierno (4) Por consenso (los voceros del consejo eran los únicos que asistieron) (5) Otro método [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	CC3	
CC4 ¿Está ese Consejo Comunal activo actualmente? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	CC4	
CC5 ¿Y con qué frecuencia participa Ud. en reuniones de la Asamblea de Ciudadanos o el Consejo Comunal? [LEER RESPUESTAS] (1) Casi todos los días [PASE a CC6] (2) Una o dos veces por semana [PASE a CC6] (3) Una o dos veces por mes [PASE a CC6] (4) Una a dos veces al año [PASE a CC6] (5) Nunca [SIGA] (8) NS/NR [NO LEER, PASE a CC6]	CC5	(9) INAP

<p>[Sólo para los que nunca participaron]</p> <p>CC5i. ¿Porqué no participa? [No leer, marcar solo primera mención]</p> <p>(1) Falta de interés</p> <p>(2) Falta de tiempo o recursos</p> <p>(3) Falta de comunicación/información</p> <p>(4) No comparte la política del gobierno</p> <p>(5) Fue excluido por razones políticas</p> <p>(6) Otra razón</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>CC5i</p>
<p>CC6. En su opinión ¿en su comunidad participa la mayoría, una buena parte, o muy poca gente en las reuniones de la Asamblea de Ciudadanos o el Consejo Comunal?</p> <p>(1) La mayoría</p> <p>(2) Una buena parte</p> <p>(3) Muy poca gente, unos pocos</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>CC6</p>
<p>CC7. ¿Cree Ud. que el Consejo Comunal de su comunidad representa sólo un lado político de la comunidad o que representa todos los puntos de vista políticos?</p> <p>(1) Sólo un lado [SIGA]</p> <p>(2) Todos los puntos de vista políticos [PASE A CC8]</p> <p>(3) Otra respuesta [NO LEER, PASE a CC8]</p> <p>(8) NS/NR [PASE A CC8]</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>CC7</p>
<p>[Sólo para los que dijeron “un solo lado” en CC6]</p> <p>CC7i ¿Qué grupos cree que representa más—los del gobierno, los de la oposición, o alguna otra agrupación?</p> <p>(1) Gobierno (Oficialismo)</p> <p>(2) Oposición</p> <p>(3) Otra agrupación</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>CC7i</p>
<p>CC8. ¿Qué piensa Ud. de la manera en que el Consejo responde a las necesidades de su comunidad—está muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, poco satisfecho, o nada satisfecho?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho</p> <p>(2) Algo satisfecho</p> <p>(3) Poco satisfecho</p> <p>(4) Nada satisfecho</p> <p>(8) NS/NC</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	<p>CC8</p>

CC9. [PARA TODOS] ¿Cómo cree Ud. que se debería seleccionar a las autoridades o voceros de los Consejos Comunales? [LEER RESPUESTAS] (1) Por aclamación (2) Por voto secreto dentro de una Asamblea (3) Por voto secreto, como parte de las elecciones locales regulares de municipios y estados (4) Por designación del gobierno (5) Algún otro método [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR [NO LEER]	CC9	
CC10. ¿Cree Ud. que los Consejos Comunales deberían sustituir a los gobiernos municipales? [NO LEER] (1) Si, deben sustituirlos (2) No deben sustituirlos (3) Depende (8) NS/NR	CC10	

Ahora hablemos de las Misiones del gobierno.

MIS1. ¿Qué tan a menudo usa los servicios de la Misión Barrio Adentro: <i>[Leer las alternativas]</i> 1) Casi todos los días, [SIGA] 2) Una o dos veces a la semana [SIGA] 3) Una o dos veces al mes [SIGA] 4) Una o dos veces al año [SIGA] 5) Nunca [PASE a MIS3] 8) NS/NR [NO LEER] [PASE a MIS4]	MIS1
(SI HA PARTICIPADO) MIS2. ¿Y su experiencia con Barrio Adentro ha sido buena, regular, o mala? 1) Buena 2) Regular 3) Mala 8) NS/NR 9) INAP	MIS2
(SI NO HA PARTICIPADO NUNCA) MIS3. ¿Por qué no los ha usado? <i>[Anotar primera respuesta. OJO: No leer las alternativas]</i> (1) No tiene necesidad/ recibe servicios de salud privada (2) No hay un local cerca (3) Siempre hay cola/no hay cupo (4) Desconfianza en calidad de servicios (5) Por desacuerdo con la política del gobierno (6) Le negaron servicios por razones políticas (7) Tiene un ambiente muy partidista (8) No le gusta, no le interesa (10) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) INAP (Ha participado)	MIS3
MIS4. ¿Y que tan a menudo usa los servicios de Mercal? <i>[Leer las alternativas]</i> 1) Casi todos los días, [SIGA] 2) Una o dos veces a la semana [SIGA] 3) Una o dos veces al mes [SIGA] 4) Una o dos veces al año [SIGA]	MIS4



5) Nunca [PASE A MIS 6] 8) NS/NR [NO LEER] [PASE A MIS7] (SI HA PARTICIPADO)	
MIS5. ¿Y su experiencia con Mercal ha sido buena, regular, o mala? 1) Buena 2) Regular 3) Mala 8) NS/NR 9) INAP	MIS5
(SI NO HA PARTICIPADO NUNCA) MIS6. ¿Por qué no los ha usado? <i>[Anotar primera respuesta. OJO: No leer las alternativas]</i> (1) No tiene necesidad/ hace sus compras en locales particulares (2) No hay un local cerca (3) Siempre hay cola/no hay cupo (4) Desconfianza en calidad de servicios/no tiene lo que necesita (5) Por desacuerdo con la política del gobierno (6) Le negaron servicios por razones políticas (7) Tiene un ambiente muy partidista (8) No le gusta, no le interesa (10) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) INAP (Ha participado)	MIS6
MIS7. ¿Ha participado alguna vez en un curso de la Misión Robinson II? [Atención: Robinson II es Educación Primaria. Esta pregunta NO refiere a Robinson I, que es alfabetización] 1) Si [SIGA] 2) No [PASE A MIS9] 8) NS/NR [PASE A MIS 10]	MIS7
(SI HA PARTICIPADO) MIS8. ¿Y su experiencia con Misión Robinson ha sido buena, regular, o mala? 1) Buena 2) Regular 3) Mala 8) NS/NR 9) INAP	MIS8
(SI NO HA PARTICIPADO NUNCA) MIS9. ¿Por qué no ha participado? <i>[Anotar primera respuesta. OJO: No leer las alternativas]</i> (1) No tiene necesidad/recibe educación en escuela publica o privada/ ya completó ese nivel educativo (2) No hay un local cerca / horarios no servían (3) Falta de tiempo/recursos (4) Siempre hay cola/no hay cupo (5) Desconfianza en la calidad de los servicios (6) Por desacuerdo con la política del gobierno (7) Le negaron servicios por razones políticas (8) Tiene un ambiente muy partidista (9) No le gusta, no le interesa (10) Se anotó pero no lo llamaron, no salió sorteado (11) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) INAP (Ha participado)	MIS9
MIS10. ¿Ha participado alguna vez en un curso de la Misión Ribas? 1) Si [SIGA] 2) No [PASE A MIS12] 8) NS/NR [PASE A MIS13]	MIS10

<p>(SI HA PARTICIPADO) MIS11. ¿Y su experiencia con la Mision Ribas ha sido buena, regular, o mala? 1) Buena 2) Regular 3) Mala 8) NS/NR 9) INAP</p>	MIS11
<p>(SI NO HA PARTICIPADO NUNCA) MIS12. ¿Por qué no ha participado? <i>[Anotar primera respuesta. OJO: No leer las alternativas]</i> (1) No tiene necesidad/recibe educación en escuela publica o privada/ya completó ese nivel educativo (2) No hay un local cerca/ horarios no servían (3) Falta de tiempo/recursos (4) Siempre hay cola/no hay cupo (5) Desconfianza en calidad de servicios (6) Por desacuerdo con la política del gobierno (7) Le negaron servicios por razones políticas (8) Tiene un ambiente muy partidista (9) No le gusta, no le interesa (10) Se anotó pero no lo llamaron, no salió sorteado (11) Tiene que completar el anterior nivel educativo antes (12) Otro (88) NS/NR (99) INAP (Ha participado)</p>	MIS12
<p>MIS13. ¿Y ha participado alguna vez en un curso de la Misión Sucre? 1) Si [SIGA] 2) No [PASE A MIS15] 8) NS/NR [PASE A JC15]</p>	MIS13
<p>(SI HA PARTICIPADO) MIS14. ¿Y su experiencia con la Mision Sucre ha sido buena, regular, o mala? 1) Buena 2) Regular 3) Mala 8) NS/NR 9) INAP</p>	MIS14
<p>(SI NO HA PARTICIPADO NUNCA) MIS15. ¿Por qué no ha participado? <i>[OJO: No leer las alternativas]</i> (1) No tiene necesidad/recibe educación en escuela publica o privada/ ya completó ese nivel educativo (2) No hay un local cerca/horarios no servían (3) Falta de tiempo/recursos (4) Siempre hay cola/no hay cupo (5) Desconfianza en calidad de servicios (6) Por desacuerdo con la política del gobierno (7) Le negaron servicios por razones políticas (8) Tiene un ambiente muy partidista (9) No le gusta, no le interesa (10) Se anotó pero no lo llamaron, no salió sorteado (11) Tiene que completar el anterior nivel educativo antes (12) Otro</p>	MIS15



(88) NS/NR

(99) INAP (Ha participado)

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre la Asamblea Nacional, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	JC15	
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva el Tribunal Supremo de Justicia o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	(1) Si	(2) No	(8)NS/NR	JC16	

Ahora, yo le voy a leer varias frases. Quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo

POP1. [Leer alternativas]

(1) Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición, [o al contrario],

(2) Aunque atrase el progreso del país, nuestros presidentes no deben limitar la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición.

(8). NS/NR

**POP
1****POP2. [Leer alternativas]**

(1) La Asamblea Nacional impide mucho la labor de nuestros presidentes, y debería ser ignorada, [o al contrario],

(2) Aun cuando estorbe la labor del presidente, nuestros presidentes no debieran pasar por encima de la Asamblea Nacional.

(8) NS/NR

**POP
2****POP3. [Leer alternativas]**

(1) Los jueces con frecuencia estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, y deberían ser ignorados, [o al contrario],

(2) Aun cuando a veces los jueces estorban la labor de nuestros presidentes, las decisiones de los jueces siempre tienen que ser obedecidas.

(8) NS/NR

**POP
3****POP4. [Leer alternativas]**

(1) Nuestros presidentes deben tener el poder necesario para que puedan actuar a favor del interés nacional, [o al contrario],

(2) Se debe limitar el poder de nuestros presidentes para que nuestras libertades no corran peligro.

(8) NS/NR

**POP
4**

POP5. [Leer alternativas] (1) Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario], (2) Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste. (8) NS/NR	POP5	
POP6. [Leer alternativas] (1) Los gobernantes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto, [o al contrario] (2) Los gobernantes a veces tienen que tomar decisiones que al pueblo pueden no gustarle (8) NS/NR	POP6	
POP7. [Leer alternativas] (1) La forma más efectiva de que los ciudadanos expresen sus puntos de vista al Presidente es a través de sus representantes electos. [o, al contrario] (2) La forma más efectiva para que los ciudadanos expresen sus puntos de vista al Presidente es directamente a él, y no a través de sus representantes electos. (8) NS/NR	POP7	
POP8. [Leer alternativas] (1) Hay solamente dos clases de personas: las que trabajan para el bienestar del pueblo y las que trabajan en su contra [o, al contrario] (2) No se puede dividir a la gente en dos clases de personas. (8) NS/NR	POP8	
POP9. [Leer alternativas] (1) En el mundo de hoy hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos [o, al contrario] (2) Tal lucha realmente no existe; el mundo es muy complejo, no únicamente el bien y el mal. (8) NS/NR	POP9	
POP10. [Leer alternativas] (1) Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, no podemos dejar que los que están en contra se opongan [o, al contrario] (2) A pesar de que el pueblo ha decidido qué es lo correcto, los que no están de acuerdo siempre deben tener toda la libertad de oponerse. (8) NS/NR	POP10	
POP11. [Leer alternativas] (1) Una persona puede estar en desacuerdo con la mayoría, y aún así tratar de defender los intereses del país. [o, al contrario] (2) Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza a los intereses del país. (8) NS/NR	POP11	

Ahora vamos a hablar de otro tema.

VIC1. ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [siga] (2) No [pasar a AOJ8] (8) NS/NR [pasar a AOJ8]	VIC1	
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VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [Leer las alternativas] (1) Robo sin agresión o amenaza física (2) Robo con agresión o amenaza física (3) Agresión física sin robo (4) Violación o asalto sexual (5) Secuestro (6) Daño a la propiedad (7) Robo de la casa (8) Otra [NO LEER] (88) NS (99) Inap (no víctima)	VIC2	
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a AOJ8] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar a AOJ8] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a AOJ8]	AOJ1	
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (7) Otra (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	AOJ1B	
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que: las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS/NR	AOJ8	
AOJ11. Hablando de la urbanización o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR	AOJ11	
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ11A	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12	

AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de esta urbanización o barrio protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted?

AOJ18

(1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (8) NS/NR

[Déle la tarjeta "A" al entrevistado]

Ahora vamos a usar una tarjeta... Esta tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	NS/NR

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Venezuela garantizan un juicio justo? (<i>Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7, o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i>)	B1	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Venezuela?	B2	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político venezolano?	B3	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político venezolano?	B4	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar el sistema político de Venezuela?	B6	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?	B11	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	B12	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Nacional?	B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno?	B14	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la República?	B15	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	B18	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	B20	
B21e ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los políticos?	B21e	



Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR			
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?		B21	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Tribunal Supremo de Justicia?		B31	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el concejo municipal?		B32	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser venezolano?		B43	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37	
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el SENIAT (Servicio Integrado de Administración Aduanera y Tributaria)?		B42	
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47	

Seguimos usando **la tarjeta "A"**, por favor conteste estas preguntas

Ahora, en esta misma escala, (seguir con tarjeta A: escala de 1 a 7 puntos)	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
N1. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza.		N1	
N3. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos.		N3	
N9. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno.		N9	
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.		N10	
N11. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana.		N11	
N12. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo.		N12	

[Recoja tarjeta A]

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Hugo Chávez es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1	
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[Entregue tarjeta B]: Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo Muy de acuerdo							NS/NR

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR			
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los venezolanos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		PN2	
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		DEM23	

RECOGER TARJETA B

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Venezuela? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Venezuela es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5	

[Entréguele al entrevistado tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala de 10 puntos, con el 1 indicando que usted desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que usted aprueba firmemente. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Aprueba o desaprueba?	E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades.	E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato	E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras.	E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados.	E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios.	E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido.	E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales	E16	

[No recoja tarjeta "C"]

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez en la que 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente y 10 que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	D32	
D33. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político de Venezuela?	D33	
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	D34	

D36. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?

D36

D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?

D37

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Venezuela. Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos [tarjeta C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno del Venezuela, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	D1	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	D2	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Venezuela, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D3	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	D4	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	D5	

RECOGER TARJETA "C"

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR	DEM2	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) NS/NR	DEM11 1	
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR	AUT1	



PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otra para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR	PP1	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR	PP2	

Vamos a hablar un poco de la corrupción. Me gustaría que me indique si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas, 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias, o 3) no corruptas.

DC1. Por ejemplo: Un diputado acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagada por una empresa. Considera usted que lo que hizo el diputado es [Leer alternativas] : 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) Corrupto pero justificado 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8	DC1	
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga Bs.10000 de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es [Leer alternativas] : 1) Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 2) Corrupto pero se justifica 3) No corrupto 8)NS/NR	DC10	
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñada de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Usted cree que el político es [Leer alternativas] : 1) Corrupto y debe ser castigado 2) Corrupto pero justificado 3) No corrupto NS/NR=8	DC13	

	No	Sí	NS/NR	INAP		
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC2	
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno en el último año?	0	1	8		EXC6	

	No	Sí	NS/NR	INAP		
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el concejo municipal en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo como un permiso, por ejemplo durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	0	1	8	9	EXC11	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC13	
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en el último año?	0	1	8	9	EXC14	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno?	0	1	8	9	EXC15	
EXC16. ¿Tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno?	0	1	8	9	EXC16	
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió un soborno para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	0	1	8		EXC17	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?	0	1	8		EXC18	
EXC19. ¿Cree que en nuestra sociedad el pagar sobornos es justificable debido a los malos servicios públicos, o no es justificable?	0	1	8		EXC19	
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					EXC7	

Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...			
GI1. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush]	GI1		
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde			
GI2. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional de Venezuela? [NO LEER: CILIA FLORES]	GI2		
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde			
GI3. ¿Sin contar el distrito capital y las dependencias federales, cuántos estados tiene Venezuela? [NO LEER: 23 estados]	GI3		
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde			
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Venezuela? [NO LEER: 6 años]	GI4		
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde			
GI5. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"]	GI5		
(1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde			

Ahora vamos a hablar un poco de los líderes políticos de Venezuela. Voy a pedirle que me indique qué tan de acuerdo está Usted con las siguientes afirmaciones. [LEER OPCIONES y repetir luego de cada una: está usted muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo?]

	Muy de acuerd o	Algo de acuerd o	Algo en desacuerd o	Muy en desacuerd o	NS	NC		
C1CH. Usted se siente orgulloso de estar asociado con Hugo Chávez	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C1CH	
C2CH. Hugo Chávez actúa más por el interés de todos que por el suyo propio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C2CH	
C3CH. Las acciones de Hugo Chávez hacen que usted le respete más	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C3CH	
C4CH. Hugo Chávez mide las consecuencias éticas y morales de lo que hace	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C4CH	
C5CH. Hugo Chávez expresa una visión convincente del futuro	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C5CH	

¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con las siguientes afirmaciones... **[LEER OPCIONES]** y repetir luego de cada una: está usted muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo?]

	Muy de acuerdo	Algo de acuerdo	Algo en desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NC		
C1R Usted se siente orgulloso de estar asociado con Manuel Rosales	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C1R	
C2R Manuel Rosales actúa más por el interés de todos que por el suyo propio	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C2R	
C3R Las acciones de Manuel Rosales hacen que usted le respete más	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C3R	
C4R Manuel Rosales mide las consecuencias éticas y morales de lo que hace	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C4R	
C5R Manuel Rosales expresa una visión convincente del futuro	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(9)	C5R	

VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa...¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad? 1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB6]	VB2	

VENVB3 [VB3]. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER LISTA] 0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 1. Hugo Chávez (MVR, PPT, PODEMOS, PCV, hay muchos partidos menores) 2. Manuel Rosales (Nuevo Tiempo, PJ, COPEI, MAS, y otros partidos menores) 77. Otro 88. NS/NR [Pasar a VB8] 99. Inap (No votó) (Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB8)	VENVB3	
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<p>VB4. [Sólo para los que no votaron] [No leer alternativas] ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [anotar una sola respuesta] 1 Falta de transporte 2 Enfermedad 3 Falta de interés/No quiso votar 4 No le gustó ningún candidato 5 No cree en el sistema 6 Falta de cedula de identidad/ No estaba inscripto 7 No se encontró en el registro electoral 10 No tener edad necesaria 11 Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado 12 Tener que trabajar/Falta de tiempo 13. Incapacidad física o discapacidad 15. Estaba fuera del país 14. Otra razón (88) NS/NR (99) Inap (Votó) (Después de esta pregunta, Pasar a VB6)</p>	<p>VB4</p>
<p>VB8. [Para los que votaron] Cuando votó, ¿cuál fue la razón más importante de su voto? [Leer todos] [Solo aceptar una respuesta] (4) Las cualidades del candidato, o (5) El partido político del candidato, o (6) El plan de gobierno del candidato (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (no votó)</p>	<p>VB8</p>
<p>VB6. ¿Votó usted para diputado en las últimas elecciones de 2005? 1. Sí [Siga] 2. No. [pasa a VB10] 8. NS/NR [pasa a VB10]</p>	<p>VB6</p>

<p>VENVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputado en las últimas elecciones de 2005?</p> <p>0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto)</p> <p>1. Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR)</p> <p>2. Partido Patria Para Todos (PPT)</p> <p>3. PODEMOS</p> <p>4. Unidad Popular Venezolana (UPV)</p> <p>5. MIGATO (Movimiento Independiente Ganamos Todos)</p> <p>6. MEP (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo)</p> <p>7. CMR (Clase Media Revolucionaria)</p> <p>8. PCV (Partido Comunista Venezolano)</p> <p>9. Liga Socialista</p> <p>10. Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro</p> <p>12. UNT (Un Nuevo Tiempo)</p> <p>13. Primero Justicia (PJ)</p> <p>14. Comité de Organización Política Independiente (COPEI)</p> <p>15. Acción Democrática (AD)</p> <p>16. Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)</p> <p>17. Proyecto Venezuela</p> <p>18. Izquierda Democrática</p> <p>19. Convergencia</p> <p>20. Un solo Pueblo</p> <p>21. Fuerza Liberal</p> <p>22. Vision Emergente</p> <p>23. Bandera Roja</p> <p>77. Otro</p> <p>88. NS/NR</p> <p>99. INAP (no votó)</p>	<p>VENVB7</p>	
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga]</p> <p>(2) No [Pase a POL1]</p> <p>(8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]</p>	<p>VB10</p>	
<p>VENVB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>1. Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR)</p> <p>2. Partido Patria Para Todos (PPT)</p> <p>3. PODEMOS</p> <p>4. Unidad Popular Venezolana (UPV)</p> <p>5. MIGATO (Movimiento Independiente Ganamos Todos)</p> <p>6. MEP (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo)</p> <p>7. CMR (Clase Media Revolucionaria)</p> <p>8. PCV (Partido Comunista Venezolano)</p> <p>9. Liga Socialista</p> <p>10. Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaro</p> <p>11. Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)</p> <p>12. UNT (Un Nuevo Tiempo)/ Atrévete Venezuela (Manuel Rosales)</p> <p>13. Primero Justicia (PJ)</p> <p>14. Comité de Organización Política Independiente (COPEI)</p>	<p>VENVB11</p>	



15. Acción Democrática (AD)		
16. Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)		
17. Proyecto Venezuela		
18. Izquierda Democrática		
19. Convergencia		
20. Un solo Pueblo		
21. Fuerza Liberal		
22. Vision Emergente		
23. Bandera Roja		
24. Directorio popular alternativo		
77. Otro		
88. NS/NC		
99. INAP		

VENVB12 Y Usted diría que esa simpatía por el partido [partido que mencionó en VENVB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? 1) Muy débil 2) Débil 3) Ni débil ni fuerte 4) Fuerte 5) Muy fuerte 8) NS/NR 9) INAP	VENVB12	
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? 1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) NS/NR	POL1	
POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas] 1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca 8) NS/NR	POL2	

ENTREGAR TARJETA B

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas actitudes que tienen las personas. Vamos a utilizar nuevamente la escala del 1 al 7, donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo , ¿hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?	Escala							NS/ NR	
	Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		
AA1. Una manera muy eficaz de corregir los errores de los empleados es regañarlos frente a otros empleados ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con esa práctica?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	AA1
AA2. La persona que aporta más dinero a la casa es la que debería tener la última palabra en las decisiones del hogar. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	AA2
AA3. En la escuela, los niños deben hacer preguntas solamente cuando el maestro lo indique. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	AA3
AA4. Cuando los niños se portan mal, se justifica a veces que sus padres les den nalgadas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	AA4

RECOGER TARJETA “B”

Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:		
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (tribunales, ministerios, alcaldías) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS2	
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap (No buscó trabajo)	DIS3	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS4	
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado) (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	DIS5	
Ahora le voy a leer una serie de pares de palabras opuestas, y voy a pedirle que me indique, para cada par, de qué extremo está más cerca Usted. En una escala que va de 0 a 10, dígame que palabra lo describe mejor a Usted. Por ejemplo, si el 0 significa “relajado” y el 10 significa “tenso”, el número 5, que está exactamente en el medio significa ni relajado ni tenso. Ud. puede usar cualquier número del 0 al 10.		88 NS 99 NR
PER1 Entonces, Si 0 es relajado y 10 es tenso, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER1	
PER2 Si 0 es locuaz, y 10 es tímido, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER2	
PER3. Si 0 es trabajador, y 10 es vago, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER3	
PER4 Si 0 es pensativo y 10 es impulsivo, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER4	
PER5 Si 0 es introvertido, y 10 es extrovertido, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER5	
PER6 Si 0 es nervioso y 10 es tranquilo, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER6	
PER7 Si 0 es simpático y 10 es antipático, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER7	
PER8 . Si 0 es pragmático y 10 es intelectual, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER8	
PER9 Si 0 es descortés y 10 es amable, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER9	
PER10 Si 0 es desordenado, y 10 es ordenado, ¿qué número lo describe mejor a Usted?	PER10	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

	1 ^a	2 ^a	3 ^a	4 ^a	5 ^a	6 ^a		
Ninguno	0						ED	
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Secundaria (Básico)	7	8	9					
Secundaria (Diversificado)	10	11						
Superior no universitaria (Técnica)	12	13	14	15				
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17+		
NS/NR	88							

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR)

Q2

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? **[No leer alternativas]**

- (1) Católica
- (2) Cristiana no católica (incluye Testigos de Jehová)
- (3) Otra no cristiana
- (5) Evangélica
- (6) Judía
- (7) Umbanda (otras religiones afro-brasileñas)
- (4) Ninguna (ateo, agnóstico)
- (8) NS/NR

Q3

[Mostrar lista de rangos Tarjeta E]

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

- (00) Sin ingreso monetario
- (01) Menos de Bs. 170,000
- (02) Entre Bs. 170,001 – 305,000
- (03) Entre Bs. 305,001 – 410,000
- (04) Entre Bs. 410,001 – 510,000
- (05) Entre Bs. 510,001 – 545,000
- (06) Entre Bs. 545,001 – 680,000
- (07) Entre Bs. 680,001 – 765,000
- (08) Entre Bs. 765,001 – 1,020,000
- (09) Entre Bs. 1,020,001 – 1,360,000
- (10) Más de Bs. 1,360,000
- (88) NS/NR

Q10

RECOPAR TARJETA E

Q10A. ¿Recibe su familia remesas (dinero) del exterior?

No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C

99. Inap

Q10A

Sí → preguntar: ¿Cuánto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, <u>escribir cantidad y especificar moneda</u>]		
Q10B. [SOLO SI RECIBEN REMESAS] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	Q10B	
Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde] (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No (8) NS/NR	Q10C	
Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? 1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR	Q14	
Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] 1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar 2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades 3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades 8. NS/NR [No leer]	Q10D	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (concubinato) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos? ¿Cuántos hijos(as) tiene? _____ (00= ninguno) NS/NR 88.	Q12	<input type="text"/>

VENETID. ¿Usted considera que es una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra (afrovenezolana), mulata, morena u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (afrovenezolana) (5) Mulata (6) Morena (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	VENETID	
VENETIDA. ¿Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata o morena? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (afrovenezolana) (5) Mulata (6) Morena (7) Otra (8) NS/NR	VENETIDA	
VENLENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa solamente] (1) Castellano (2) Dialecto indígena (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR	VENLENG1	



Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No			(1) Sí	R1	
R3. Nevera	(0) No			(1) Sí	R3	
R4. Teléfono de línea (fijo)	(0) No			(1) Sí	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	R4A	
R5. Vehículo (¿Cuántos?)	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R6	
R7. Microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	R7	
R8. Moto	(0) No			(1) Sí	R8	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R12	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	R14	
R15. Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	R15	

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es su ocupación principal? [No leer alternativas; si contesta que está sin trabajo o desempleado preguntar cuál era su ocupación anterior (anotar código) y luego marcar "No" en la pregunta siguiente (OCUP4)]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Profesional, directivo 2. Técnico 3. Oficinista, administrativo 4. Comerciante (dueño del comercio) 5. Campesino o agricultor (dueño de la tierra) 6. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 7. Artesano, artista 8. Servicio doméstico (o limpieza) 9. Otros servicios (ej: vendedor, chofer, taxista) 10. Obrero especializados (operador de maquinaria) 11. Obrero no especializados 12. Estudiante [Pase a MIG1] 13. Ama de casa [Pase a MIG1] 14. Pensionado, jubilado, rentista [Pase a MIG1] 88. NS/NR 	OCUP1	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>OCUP4. ¿Está usted trabajando actualmente?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sí [Siga] 2. No [Pasar a DESOC2] 8. NS/NR [Pasar a MIG1] 9. INAP 	OCUP4	
<p>OCUP1A En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Empleado público? 2. Empleado privado? 3. Patrón o socio de empresa? 4. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? 8. NS/NR 9. INAP 	OCUP1A	
<p>OCUP1B1. ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? [Leer alternativas] OJO: Hacer incluso si dijo que es trabajador por cuenta propia. Tomar en cuenta el total de la empresa, no sólo la división en la que trabaja la persona.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Menos de 5 empleados (2) De 5 a 9 empleados (3) De 10 a 19 empleados (4) De 20 a 100 empleados (5) Más de 100 empleados (8) NS/NR (9) INAP 	OCUP1B1	
<p>OCUP1C. ¿Tiene Usted seguro social?</p> <p>Sí 2. No 8. NS/NR 9. INAP</p>	OCUP1C	



DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIO NO A OCUP4] => ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas (88) NS/NR (99) Inap	DESOC2 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente: en el campo, en un pueblo, o en una ciudad?: 1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR	MIG1
MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 1. En este mismo municipio (barrio) [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio (barrio) en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]	MIG2
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] (1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	MIG3


Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	TI <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.


Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____ Firma del supervisor de campo _____ Comentarios: _____ _____ Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____ Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____




Tarjeta # 1



Tarjeta “A”




Tarjeta “B”





Tarjeta “C”



Tarjeta E

- (00) Sin ingreso monetario
- (01) Menos de Bs. 170,000
- (02) Entre Bs. 170,001 – 305,000
- (03) Entre Bs. 305,001 – 410,000
- (04) Entre Bs. 410,001 – 510,000
- (05) Entre Bs. 510,001 – 545,000
- (06) Entre Bs. 545,001 – 680,000
- (07) Entre Bs. 680,001– 765,000
- (08) Entre Bs. 765,001 – 1,020,000
- (09) Entre Bs. 1,020,001 – 1,360,000
- (10) Más de Bs. 1,360,000



Annex C: Design Effects

Accuracy of the Findings

Two types of errors affect all surveys: non-sampling errors and sampling ones. Non-sampling errors are those that are committed during the data collection and processing. These can be controlled using a good measuring instrument, adequately training the surveyors, supervising the fieldwork, and with appropriate data collection programs. These errors can be controlled but not quantified. However, comparing the sample results with those of the population gives us an idea of whether these errors have generated biases that reduce the representativeness of the sample. The use of handheld computers (palm pilots) probably reduced these errors by carrying out consistency checks of the responses and flow of the interview at the same time and place that it was done. Additionally, by eliminating the process of data entry, we eliminated the errors that this activity generates. With the traditional procedures of paper-based questionnaires, processes of coding and critiquing the data must be carried out in the office (eliminated by using palm pilots), which can also generate errors. With paper questionnaires, computer-based consistency checks can only be run several weeks after the data was collected. Correcting errors detected in the office during the critique or by programs that detect inconsistencies is difficult or impossible given the separation in time and space between the moment of the interview on paper and the detection of these errors.

Sampling errors are a product of chance and from surveying a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is selected, this sample is one of many possible samples that could be selected from the population. The variability that exists between all these possible samples is the sampling error, which we could measure if all these samples were available, obviously an impossible situation. In practice, what is done is to estimate this over the variance obtained from the sample itself.

To estimate the sampling error of a statistic (average, percentage, or ratio), we calculate the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This allows us to measure how close the statistic is to the result that would have been obtained if the entire population were interviewed under the same conditions. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design with which the sample was selected. The design effect (DEF – above is DEF) indicates the efficiency of the design used in relation to a unrestricted random sampling design (URS). A value of 1 indicates that the standard error (SE) obtained for both designs (the complex and the URS) is equal; that is, the complex sampling is as efficient as the URS with the same-sized sample. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sampling produces a SE greater than that obtained with a URS.

$$DEF = SE_{complex} / SE_{URS}$$

The table shows the 95% confidence intervals (1.96 times the SE) and the design effects (DEF). The table also shows the value of the statistic in question (average or percentage). The SE were estimated with the Stata 9 computational package. Extreme values come from a high degree of homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, in these cases there is an important spatial segregation of people according to their socioeconomic condition, which reduces the efficiency of cluster sampling to measure these characteristics.

It is worth stating that sampling error is usually 10% to 40% greater than that which would have been obtained with unrestricted random sampling. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, the important index of support for democracy (PSA5) has a sampling error of 0.66. This means that the 95% confidence interval (1.96 times the SE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEF of the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained with a URS.



Country	Average	Std. Error	DEF	Average	Std. Error.	DEF	Average	Std. Error	DEF
	Wealth			it1r			Corvic		
Mexico	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panama	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Peru	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
Uruguay	5.00	0.10	2.10	62.58	1.39	1.68	7.0	0.87	1.18
Brazil	4.52	0.08	1.87	---	---	---	15.57	1.61	1.54
Venezuela	4.89	0.08	1.97	53.88	1.47	1.76	19.40	1.85	1.81
Dominican R.	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haiti	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84
Guyana	3.87	0.11	1.98	59.88	1.03	1.57	25.21	1.68	1.53

Country	Average	Std. Error	Deft	Average	Std. Error	Deft	Average	Std. Error	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
Mexico	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panama	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49	----	-----	----
Peru	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
Uruguay	64.25	0.95	1.51	62.43	1.70	1.86	60.17	0.84	1.16
Brazil	44.60	1.40	1.96	55.14	1.50	1.89	42.56	1.46	1.96
Venezuela	57.04	1.00	1.53	66.45	1.46	2.10	46.71	1.17	1.60
Dominican R.	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haiti	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53
Guyana	52.70	1.19	1.94	64.32	1.33	1.84	39.58	1.32	1.95