2012

Political Culture of Democracy in Peru and in the Americas

USAID
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Towards Equality of Opportunity

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AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
Barómetro de las Américas

Latin American Public Opinion Project
LAPOP
Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Political Culture of Democracy in Perú and in the Americas, 2012:

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This study was performed with support from the Program in Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
Centennial Professor of Political Science, Professor of Sociology
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project,
and
Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science
and Associate Director of LAPOP,
Vanderbilt University

We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the *AmericasBarometer*, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The *AmericasBarometer* is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the *AmericasBarometer* constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the *AmericasBarometer* began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the *AmericasBarometer*. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 *AmericasBarometer* Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The "Marginalization in the Americas Conference" was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the *AmericasBarometer* Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the

www.*AmericasBarometer*.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process

of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior *AmericasBarometer* surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample.[1]Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.[2]

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the *AmericasBarometer* project.

[1] The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

[2] All *AmericasBarometer* samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Caribbean	
Belize	B&A Borge y Asociados
Dominican Republic	Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. / UNIVERSIDAD intec Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo
Guyana	DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS DP
Haiti	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL
Jamaica	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname	ANTON DE KOM UNIVERSITEIT VAN SURINAME
Trinidad & Tobago	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	CIPPEC
Bolivia	Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	Universidade de Brasília	CNPq, Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Chile	Instituto de Ciencia Política	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	FLACSO ECUADOR	UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO; PRIME CONSULTING
Paraguay	IRD, Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	***IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos***	
Uruguay	CIFRA	UM, UNIVERSIDAD DE MONTEVIDEO
Venezuela	CISOR	ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Canada and United States	
Canada	UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL; YORK UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.; THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY; MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES; PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of many institutions, foremost among them the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. We are very grateful to the Tinker Foundation, and especially to Ms. Rente Rene for ongoing support for the entire LAPOP endeavor. At the UNDP, we thank Heraldo Muñoz, Rafael Fernández de Castro, and Freddy Justiano for their strong support of the 2012 round of the *AmericasBarometer*. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Fabiana Machado for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. At the World Bank, thanks go to Norbert Feiss for enthusiastic and insightful contributions. We are deeply grateful to Nat Stone at Algonquin College for securing the financing for the Canadian survey, for providing research assistants to help with the production of the Canadian country report, and for helping us with the French translation for Canada. Thanks also to François Gélineau for important help with the translation of the French questionnaire. Great thanks also go to Keith Neuman and the Environics Institute for generous support of and partnership in the 2012 round in Canada. We want to take special note of the support that the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia provided to our Bolivia team, and to thank Daniel Moreno for writing the grant proposal and obtaining the funding.

Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K. Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research

Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA - LAPOP Central	●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Professor of Spanish Linguistics, Department of Spanish and Portuguese ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Program Coordinator for Field Operations, LAPOP, Uruguay ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor, Iowa State University
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ●Dr. Vidal Romero, Professor of Political Science, Instituto Tecnológico de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	●Dr. Miguel Cruz, Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida International University ,USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	●Dr. John Booth, Emeritus Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica ● Ronald Álfaro Redondo, Doctoral Student, University of Pittsburgh, and Researcher, Universidad de Costa Rica, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Belize	●Georgina Pizzolitto, Coordinator of Special Studies, LAPOP Central
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	●Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Formerly, Research Coordinator of LAPOP and Currently, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA ●Dr. François Gélineau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval
Jamaica	●Balford Alexander Lewis, University of Technology, Jamaica and Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, Faculty of Social Sciences, UWI, Mona
Suriname	●Dr. Jack Menke, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago	●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	●Dr. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia ●Dr. Miguel García, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
Ecuador	●Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco de Quito ●Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco de Quito
Peru	●Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor at the University of Delaware, USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima ● Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima
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Paraguay	● Manuel Orrego, CIRD ● Álvaro Caballero, CIRD
Chile	●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

The present round of the *AmericasBarometer* offers us a new opportunity to examine Peruvian citizens' attitudes towards the political system, democracy, local governments, and other important themes. This survey was conducted in a markedly different context than the one carried out in 2010[3], the year of the prior survey of the *AmericasBarometer* survey. First, it was conducted after the presidential election of 2011, a process that generated a highly political polarization in the country. Second, it was implemented in a context of relative economic recovery, at least in macroeconomic terms. While our 2010 survey looked to determine potential attitudinal changes as a result of the global crisis—which fortunately was only a temporary slowdown in Peru—the present survey seeks to explore themes associated with inequality and lack of equal opportunities. The findings of this survey offer some positive news, which we discuss below, but they do not suggest a change in the general context of political discontent that we find in Peru.

Our study begins by recognizing that economic inequality in Peru (measured through the Gini coefficient) is slightly below the Latin American average, and has improved in recent years. In 2010, the Gini coefficient for the Latin American region was 50.3 and it was 48.1 for Peru. Although inequality continues to be high, it decreased from 53.2 in 2007 to 48.1 in 2010. Likewise, there are important segments of Peruvian society that exhibit a clear social and economic disadvantage: women in general, the elderly, and those who reside in rural areas, register lower education and their income levels are below the national mean, even when controlled by education. The persistence of the lack equal opportunities in Peru can be clearly appreciated by the fact that one of the factors that emerges as an important predictor of educational attainment among respondents is their mother's level of formal educational.

One of the worrisome features that the survey reveals is that in some instances Peruvian public opinion shows discriminatory attitudes. For instance, in terms of marginalization and poverty, a relatively high percentage of respondents (28.3 percent) say that the condition of poverty of the majority of dark-skinned people is due to their culture, instead of unfair treatment. Furthermore, and probably because Peru is a country with a very low proportion of people who participate in social programs, there exists a moderate-to-high belief that people receiving public assistance are lazy. Although support for policies of affirmative action is not the lowest in the region, it is among the lowest in Latin America.

This study uncovers some important associations between socio-economic condition, gender, and involvement in associative life. For instance, participation in activities devoted to improve the community or neighborhood is more pronounced among people of lower socio-economic status. In a similar vein, we find that people in the lowest quintile of wealth have a greater propensity to this kind of participation than those who are in the richest quintile. Likewise, and consistent with the previous finding, people whose mothers have a lower educational attainment are more active than those whose mothers have college education. Finally, we find that women have a greater rate of participation in community problem-solving than men.

[3] The previous survey was conducted in January 2010, when the economy was still in a moment of stagnation (GDP grew only 0.9 percent in 2009) within the period of economic growth experienced in the last decade. The last survey, conducted in January 2012, happened right after the year when the economy grew by 6.9 percent.

Overall, community-based participation tends to be particularly high in countries whose national income is relatively low, such as Haiti, Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Honduras. Per capita income in Peru hovers around the middle of the regional distribution and because of that it is not surprising to find that the country is also placed in a middling position in the regional ranking of community-based participation. In relation to turnout, however, there is a very high level of participation in Peru, the highest in the region. Due to the magnitude of this participation, we do not find that socio-economic variables affect this type of activism.

One of the important findings of our previous reports was that the levels of support for democracy, political tolerance, system support, and trust in political institutions in Peru were among the lowest in the Latin American region. This year's survey gives us a new opportunity to revisit these attitudes and see if they are unchanged. We discuss these issues in greater detail below, but we can say at this point that system support in Peru improved between 2010 and 2012. We can also state that "external efficacy" (the extent to which citizens believe that the government is interested in what people think) in Peru is in the intermediate-low position in the region. Likewise, we find that the majority of respondents disagree with the statement that political parties are interested in representing people. Overall, our data indicate that political discontent and negative experiences with corruption and delinquency influence citizen participation in public protests. Indeed, those with greater interest in politics, higher education, and a low level of system support are more likely to engage in protests.

Another of our previous findings, and confirmed in the present study, is that even though problems associated with the economy, unemployment and poverty continue to have relevance in the Americas, issues of violence and insecurity are of great importance, especially in Peru. For instance, the percentage of people who mention crime and insecurity as the country's most important issue has increased from 10.7 percent in 2006 to 30.7 in 2012. In similar vein, we find that the percentage that mentions corruption as a serious issue in Peru went from 6.5 percent in 2006 to 12.6 percent in 2012. Economic problems continue to be important but not to the extent that they were in 2006, which is consistent with the economic growth of recent years. In this sense, it is important to stress that the greater salience of violence, insecurity and corruption may be due to the decrease in the salience of economic problems rather than an increase in the levels of violence and corruption themselves.

A good segment of the Latin American public tends to perceive high levels of corruption. The countries that exhibit the highest levels of the perception of corruption in the Americas are Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina, with average levels of 81.7, 80.9, and 79.5, respectively. The lowest levels are found in Uruguay (61.8), Canada (58.3), and specially Surinam, which registers a score of 38.8, lower than the mid-point of the scale (that goes from 0 to 100). Peru ranks seventh with an average score of 76.9, which is an improvement if we consider that in the 2010 survey Peru occupied third place, although the confidence intervals suggest that the country continues to rank high in comparative terms. The slight reduction is explained by the decrease between 2006 and 2012 in the percent of people who believe that corruption among public officials is common. In percentage terms, around 80 percent of the population believe that is either somewhat or very common in the country.

Next to corruption, the perception of citizen insecurity continues to be a serious problem in Peru. Once again, the country ranks first in the perception of insecurity, with a national average score of 48.6. This year, next to Peru, we find Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. When we restrict the analysis to only the city capitals, we find that Lima occupies the second place in the region in the ranking of perception of citizen insecurity (with a score of 53.9). In the other end of the distribution, Canada and the United States stand out because their scores are practically half the average of the

perception of insecurity found in Peru. On the other hand, and from a more upbeat perspective, despite the fact that Peru continues to rank first in the region in the perception of citizen insecurity, the mean values of this perception are lower in 2012 than those found in 2010, and significantly lower than those registered in 2006.

The perception of citizen insecurity is high in Peru but so is the level of victimization. In the 2012 survey we find again that Peru is among the top countries in the rankings of both personal and household crime victimization. If we take into account personal crime victimization, the one that is self-reported, we see that Peru, with around 28 percent, occupies second place in the region, below Ecuador (the country with the highest level of victimization) and above Bolivia. In the other extreme, the countries that register the lowest level of crime victimization include Panama, Guyana and Jamaica. Our data reveal that the majority of those who were victims of crime experienced it close to their places of residency. Indeed, more than 60 percent of the respondents were victims of a crime in their own district. When the analysis is restricted to the city capitals, we find that Lima is in sixth place in the regional ranking of personal crime victimization, and in fifth place when the question asks whether a member of the family has been victim of a crime. Who are more likely to be victimized? The data indicate they are those who reside in large cities, the youth (18-24), and students.

One of the negative consequences of high crime is that citizens may develop unfavorable attitudes towards the rule of law and the need of both police and authorities to respect it. In Peru, the percentage of public support for the rule of law, measured as the no acceptance of authorities acting outside the law to capture delinquents, has improved in relation to 2010, although it is still hovering at the bottom of the regional distribution.

As we have noted previously, one of the problems encountered in Peru is the low level of citizen support for the political system. In particular, there is a high degree of distrust with the judiciary. However, the most recent survey indicates a relatively positive trend: the levels of system support, which were extremely low in previous years, have begun to climb up. Although system support in Peru, in comparative terms, is still in an intermediate-low position in 2012, it is better than what it was in previous years.

Where we do not find a significant improvement is in relation to political tolerance. The average levels of political tolerance have declined steadily in the last six years, reaching the lowest point in the present round of surveys. What factors affect the levels of political tolerance in Peru? Out of all the determinants examined in the report, only two emerge as statistically significant predictors: the degree of support for democracy (greater support, greater tolerance), and the acceptance that religion is very important in the respondent's life (greater importance of religion, less tolerance). Likewise, and consistent with our previous finding of an improvement in the levels of system support, when we ask respondents about their trust in specific institution, we find that the level of trust in the president, political parties, congress, the National Electoral Board, and the Supreme Court improved in 2012 in relation to 2010. Support for democracy in Peru, when compared with that of the other countries, continues to be very low. But, again, we find encouraging news in this regard in 2012 because the level of support for democracy is 3.5 percentage points higher than the one found in 2010 (63.6 percent and 60.1 percent, respectively), although it does not match the level found in 2008 (when this support reached 65.5 percent).

Switching our attention to themes associated with local government, we find that citizen participation in activities related to municipalities has remained stable in the span of our studies (2006-

2012), with exception of demand making on local government: in 2006 about 21.2 percent of Peruvians declared to have filed a petition to the municipality, and that figure declined to 15.7 percent in 2012. In the case of participation in municipal meetings, the proportion of respondents performing this activity ranges between 12 and 14.7 percent. In relation to participation in meetings related to the municipal budget, the participation is far lower, reaching 3.2 percent in 2012.

As we can see, the levels of participation in municipal meetings are not high in Peru, however Peru is still in a middling point as far as the regional distribution is considered. Where participation is high in Peru, when compared with other countries, is in relation to demand making on local government. The respective regression analysis shows that men and older citizens are the ones more inclined to participation in the affairs of local governments. Consistent with the existing low level of support for the political system, we find that satisfaction with municipal services is relatively low in comparison with that of other Latin American countries. While it is true that few respondents participate and are involved in issues associated with local governments –for instance, only 3 percent declare to have participated in the deliberation of the municipal budget– what we find is that citizens' satisfaction with local governments is influenced by their perception of the way they are treated by them, their trust in the management of the municipalities' resources, and their perception of the influence they have in municipal affairs. This is important to stress because, unlike previous years, there is an improvement in the perception of the level of influence citizens have on local governments. Likewise, trust in municipal governments in Peru is among the lowest in the region, and this situation has not changed significantly in relation to 2010. In both 2012 and 2010, low trust is associated with low confidence in state and political institutions in general, and low system support. It is worth noting that if we compare the levels of trust between municipal government and other state institutions, we would find that trust in local governments is higher than in other political institutions. Once again, satisfaction with the services provided by local governments has an important effect in system support in general.

One of the themes that generate considerate interest is citizens' attitudes toward the role of the state in the economy and society. How do Peruvians' attitudes toward the state compare with those found in other countries of the region? Are Peruvians more or less inclined to accept state's intervention in society and economy than other Latin Americans? What we find is that despite the fact that Peruvians tend to favor a more active involvement of the state, we also see that, in comparative terms, these favorable attitudes are not among the highest in the region. For instance, the mean score of the index of support for the role of the state is 76.8 in Peru, while in 14 countries of the region this value is 80 or higher. Our data suggest that an increase in the level of interest in politics is correlated with a more favorable view of state participation in the economy and society; in addition, people who have a lesser degree of support for democracy see the state in a more favorable light; this is also the case for those who have been victims of crime.

The analysis of the attitudes toward the state suggests that the socio-economic condition of the respondent's place of residence has an important effect. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a multilevel regression analysis, including as one of the predictor variables the value of the Human Development Index (HDI) of the respondent's district. The results confirm our hypothesis. Lower values in the HDI are associated with a greater propensity to favor more state participation in the economy and society.

Street protests and other non-conventional forms of political participation as means of demand-making against the state emerged as a major issue in Peru in the context of regime change in 2000.

Although protests have been routinely been a form of collective action (as in the rest of the West), it is only since the year 2000 that they began to be used as mechanisms of direct political action, taking the place of the existing institutional mechanisms (such as congressional action or some other participatory mechanism). This is somewhat puzzling, considering that the democratic transition of 2000 favored the involvement of citizens in more conventional forms of political participation (which sought to involve citizens in the decision making process). The data, collected by state institutions as well as the *AmericasBarometer*, show that the level of participation in protest is very high in Peru when compared with other countries in the region. However, we also find that approval for this type of activism is not particularly high: Peru ranks in a medium-to-low place in the regional raking of approval for direct action.

Our study ends by engaging in the issue of the "Peruvian paradox:" the fact that despite almost a decade of economic growth and improvement in some indicators such as poverty and unemployment, the Peruvians exhibit a high degree of discontent towards political institutions and their representatives. But a more careful look at the Peruvian situation shows that there are many reasons why political discontent is still high. Despite the growth of recent years, the legacy of inequality and lack of political representation still inform the attitudes of the majority of Peru's citizens. Moreover, some indicators such as employment have not improved with the same speed and, therefore, many needs are still unmet, which is clearly registered in our survey. For instance, although the percentage of people who admit that their personal economy has improved has practically quadrupled between 2006 and 2012, the great majority of respondents (about 64 percent in 2012) still describe their economic situation as fair. The perceptions are even slightly more negative when we probe about the country's economic situation, with 25 percent of the respondents describing it in 2012 as "bad" or "really bad".

We have pointed out that there exists strong citizen dissatisfaction with their political institutions and representatives, but we do find some evidence of an improvement in these attitudes. The history of distrust towards political institutions, as opposed to that of inclusion and conflict, transcends the transitional period opened in 2000. Indeed, as early as the 1980s, the Peruvian state was widely seen as inefficient and corrupt, in a context of economic crisis and public insecurity. Only few institutions have escaped from this harsh assessment (such the Ombudsman Office created by the 1993 Constitution, and the electoral institutions after the year 2000). But almost all the other institutions (among which Congress, the judicial branch, and municipal government stand out) exhibit widespread levels of citizen distrust. The presidency, on the other hand, tends to have a more variable level of trust, generally associated with the president's popularity. A somewhat higher level of trust can be found in certain institutions associated with the "de facto powers": the Catholic Church and the Armed Forces.

The reasons for the persistent political discontent are diverse, although we can point out some key factors. Despite the improvement of some economic indicators, clearly the gains in average incomes are not great as one would like. Only one out of nine respondents says that their income is enough and that he/she can save. Almost fifty percent of the sample (48.2 percent) say that their income is not enough, and 9.7 percent acknowledge having "great difficulties." But not only has income not increased dramatically but also the moderate progress registered in the statistics has not been uniformly distributed. When one examines how the answers to this question vary by the natural region where the respondent resides, we find a clear pattern of inequalities. Only 3.7 percent of Metropolitan Lima's respondents declare that their family income is not enough and they can't save. The percentages of respondents who acknowledge similar condition are much higher in the other areas of the Costa (14.1 percent), the Selva (16 percent), and the Sierra (10.1 percent). In a similar vein,

while a third of respondents in Metropolitan Lima declare that their income is not enough and have difficulties, the percentages are much are much higher (44.1 percent).

In conclusion, our study finds that some indicators of citizen attitudes toward the political system and its institutions are showing a positive movement, although they still remain very low in comparative terms. For instance, system support, support for democracy, trust in the president, congress, and National Electoral Board, and the Supreme Court were higher in 2012 than they were in 2010. Likewise, we also find positive movement in citizen evaluations of corruption among government officials, citizen security, and support for rule of law. But, again, this positive movement happens in a context of extremely low levels when compared with those of other countries in the region. In some cases, such as political tolerance, the findings of the survey in 2012 show a worsening trend. Although political discontent continues to be substantial in Peru, it is encouraging to find that some of the indicators are moving in the right direction.

We hope that this new round of the *AmericasBarometer* helps us all understand the important processes of change that Peruvian society is undergoing, and contributes to the understanding of citizens' attitudes towards those changes.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

Part I:
Equality of Opportunities and Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Social and Economic Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality[4]. More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced[5].

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction[6]. Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002)[7].

Inequality is a not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

[4] Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

[5] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

[6] De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. nequality in Latin America: Breaking with History? Washington DC: The World Bank.

[7] Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." Journal of Law and Economics 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,[8] fosters political instability and violence,[9] and decreases trust in democracy.[10] LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic "glue" that holds together democratic societies.[11] Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of "perfect" equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime. However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers' educational attainment alone.[12] Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the *AmericasBarometer*, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Peru and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 *AmericasBarometer*, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After assessing objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who perceives that

[8] De Ferranti et al., 2004, Ibid.

[9] Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement." *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

[10] Córdova, Abby B. 2008. "Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies." Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

[11] Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

[12] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: The Equality of Social and Economic Opportunity in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Peru and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1.1 takes a look at inequality both within countries and between countries within a region.[13] The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.



Figure 1.1. Gini Indices by World Regions

[13] See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yithaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" *World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper* 2562.

Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.[14]14 As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.



Figure 1.2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 1.3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).[15] The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution. Inequality in Peru, in 2010, was lower than the mean reported for South America, given that the Gini Coefficient was 48.1.[16]

[14] The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

[15] Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 3865.

[16] http://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI



Figure 1.3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.[17] In Figure 1.4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).



Figure 1.4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

[17] López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

In Peru we also observe a moderate reduction of inequality in recent years: while the Gini Coefficient was 53.2 in 2007, in 2010—as we mentioned before—declined to 48.1.[18]

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.[19]

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).[20] Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which "discounts" each dimension of the HDI based on a country's level of inequality. Figure 1.5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the average IHDI is the largest in the world. Peru's HDI (0.725) is very similar to the mean values found for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 (0.73). Given the inequality is relatively high in Peru, the initial value of 0.725, when the HDI is adjusted by inequality, it declines to 0.557, but in this case the resulting value is higher than the regional average (0.54).



Figure 1.5. Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

[18] http://datos.bancomundial.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI

[19] Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

[20] The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country's average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).

Figure 1.6 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality. For Peru, the lost because of inequality is equal to 23 percent.



Figure 1.6. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

However, these figures of the HDI and the IHDI hide the important differences in the levels of human development found in the country. In Peru, for instance, the differences among regions in relation to this index are significant. As we can see in Table 1.1, the HDI in Metropolitan Lima is the highest in the country, while the mean values for the districts located in the Sierra Norte and Sur are the lowest.

Table 1.1. Peru. Human Development Index by Regions, 2011

Región	IDH
Costa norte	0.633
Costa sur	0.655
Lima metropolitana	0.686
Selva	0.594
Sierra central	0.597
Sierra norte	0.553
Sierra sur	0.575

Fuente: PNUD[21]

[21] PNUD – http://www.pnud.org.pe/data/publicacion/IDH_Anexo_Estadistico_FINAL.xls

Figure 1.7 allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with advantaged (light green bar) and disadvantaged (dark green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.[22] For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has odds of completing sixth grade on time that register at just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the odds are close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of achievement. At the same time, most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal.



Figure 1.7. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas[23]

[22] Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean.* Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

[23] Source: Barros, et al., 2009, Ibid.

III. Equality of Social and Economic Opportunities in Peru: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the *AmericasBarometer* allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent citizens perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies citizens might endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently or have different employment opportunities.[24] Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of "statistical discrimination," meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.[25] Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.[26]

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labor force participation among men and women has become more equal.[27] Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.[28] Furthermore, a gender gap in

[24] For an overview of this literature, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank

[25] Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. "Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil." *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. "Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. "The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach." *Económica* L (1-2).

[26] Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. "Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzúa. 2009b. "An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan and Máximo Torero. 2009. "Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru." *In Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective.*

[27] Abramo, Laís, and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. "Women's Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America." *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, Ibid.

[28] Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure." *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

educational levels has also shrunk significantly.[29] So, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social situations, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.[30] Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development. Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas. [31] Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.[32]

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.[33]

We begin our analysis using the *AmericasBarometer* 2012 by examining what Peruvian citizens of different racial, gender, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The *AmericasBarometer*'s 2010 and 2012 questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. We assessed respondents' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.[34] Question **ETID** simply asks respondents whether they identify as white, mulatto, mestizo, indigenous or black. In addition, beginning with the *AmericasBarometer* 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a color palette.[35] At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin color of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see Figure 10). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the

[29] Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. "The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean." SSRN eLibrary (April).
Available in http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

[30] De Ferranti et al., 2004, Ibid; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

[31] Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

[32] Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[33] See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, Ibid; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" AmericasBarometer Insights 73, Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[34] The full text of all questions is provided in the questionnaire in Appendix C

[35] Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. Ibid.

region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the color palette in 2012.[36]

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. The latter group of questions, found in the R series, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.[37]

In the 2012 survey we also included a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we also asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question GEN10.

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**
(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
(2) You earn less than your spouse;
(3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
(4) You earn more than your spouse;
(5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
(6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
(88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP

The 2012 *AmericasBarometer* also included a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is measured in question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.[38]

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries**: FS2** and **FS8**.[39] Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

[36] In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.

[37] This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[38] Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. 2013. Inequality Matters: The Role of Education in Defining Social Class in Colombia vs. Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[39] These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.				
	No	Yes	DK	DA
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98



Figure 1.8. Determinants of Educational Achievement in Peru

We first assess how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect educational status in Peru, using linear regression analysis[40]; we also examine how family background affects affect education

[40] In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and

attainment in Peru. For this purpose, we include in the regression analysis the variable **ED2**, which measures the respondent's mother's level of education. Figure 1.8 indicates that darker-skinned, older, female, and rural Peruvians[41], and especially those whose mothers have a lower educational level, tend to have a lower level of formal education.

In Figure 1.9 we observe with clearer clarity how men, people who reside in urban areas, and those who are between 18 and 45 years of age, are more likely to have a higher level of formal education. This figure also shows that the respondents with a mother who possesses high school or college education tend to have a greater number of years of formal education. For instance, a person whose mother has college education exhibits on average 15 years of education, in clear contrast with the 8 years of education exhibited by a person whose mother lacks formal education.



Figure 1.9. Peru. Respondent's Education by Urban-Rural Area, Gender, Age, and Mother's Education

Are the same factors associated with education also associated with income? How do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, urban-rural residence, and family background in Peru? In Figure 1.10 we assess, using linear regression analysis, the determinants of personal income among

the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page xxxiv.

[41] The variable geographic area has two values, 0 is rural, and 1 is urban.

respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.[42] The results indicate that, among the included variables in the model, the level of education of the respondent's mother, gender, and place of residence emerge as the most important determinants of personal income.



Figure 1.10. Determinants of Personal Income in Peru, Among Respondents Who Work

The previous figure (1.10) suggests that women have lower personal incomes than men in Peru. As discussed above, in question **GEN10** we asked respondents who were married or who had an unmarried partner about their income versus their spouse's incomes. In Figure 1.11 we examine differences between the men and women who have such partners in responses to **GEN10**, only among those who also said that they were employed.

[42] Income (both **Q10NEW**, family income, and **Q10G**, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.



Figure 1.11. Respondent's Versus Spouse's Income, Among Peruvians Who Work

In the Peruvian case, we can see that men in general tend to have greater income than women (Figure 1.12).[43]



Figure 1.12. Skin Color and Personal Income, Among Peruvians Who Work

[43] See the footnote on page 2 for more information about how to interpret the scale of income

Finally, we assess to what extent family background influence personal income in Peru. Figure 1.13 clearly suggests that people with higher income are those whose mothers exhibit a greater level of formal education.



Figure 1.13. Mother's Educational Achievement as Determinant of Personal Income in Peru, Among Peruvians Who Work

Arguably the most critical basic resource to which citizens need access is food. In Figure 1.14 we use linear regression analysis to establish the determinants of food insecurity. Questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food insecurity that runs from 0 to 2, where respondents who report higher values have higher levels of food insecurity.[44] Limiting the analysis to half of the respondents reduces our ability to make inferences about the effects in the other variables. The results for Peru show that dark-skinned people tend to have greater food insecurity.

[44] Bear in mind that many of the new questions in the 2012 survey were asked of a split sample, to maximize space in the questionnaire.



Figure 1.14. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Peru

Public Opinion on Gender and Racial Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among Peruvians in different groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. They have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. Tilly holds that "social exclusion lies at the heart of the processes that generate inequality, that exclusion itself promotes poverty and that the escape of poverty, therefore, depends on eliminate or exceed the usual effects of social exclusion."[45] The *AmericasBarometer* 2012 included several questions that provide a look at how social and economic inequalities are related to general attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labor force.[46] In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following question, on a 7-point scale:

[45] Tilly, Charles. 2008. "La pobreza y la política de exclusion" in Deepa Narayan and Patti Petesh (editors). *Salir de la pobreza. Perspectivas interdisciplinarias sobre la movilidad social.* Washington, D.C. World Bank.

[46] Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure 1.15 presents average levels of agreement with this statement across the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison with other variables. On one side of the distribution we see countries such as the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Paraguay, and Bolivia, which show a high degree of agreement with this statement. On the other extreme, we find countries such as Brazil, Uruguay, Canada and the United States, where the level of agreement is very low. Between these two extremes we find Peru, closer to the level of disagreement than agreement with the statement.



Figure 1.15. Agreement that Men Have Labor Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas

The average levels of agreement with this statement obscure substantial variation among Peruvians in their responses. In Figure 1.16 we examine their responses in further detail, returning to

the original 1-7 scale of the question. The data show that 22 percent of Peruvians manifest strong disagreement with the idea that men should have preference in the labor market, while only six percent is in strong agreement with the statement.



Figure 1.16. Agreement/Disagreement that Men Should Have Labor Market Priority in Peru

The *AmericasBarometer* 2012 also asked citizens across the Americas about their perceptions of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. This round, we included the following question in every country of the Americas.[47]

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this? [Read alternatives, just one answer]
(1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
(3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 1.19 we can see the percentage of respondents who agreed that inequality was due to the "culture" of "people with dark skin." In the Americas we find that citizens of Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic and Peru are more likely to select culture as the most important explanatory factor. By contrast, residents of Chile, Panama, Venezuela, and Uruguay have the greatest reluctance to select culture as the determinant factor. It is worth mentioning that in Peru there is a majority (66 percent) of respondents who believe that the poverty of indigenous people and those of darker skin is due to the unjust treatment they have received.

[47] This question was asked of a split sample



Figure 1.17. Percentage Agreeing that Poverty is Due to "Culture" or "Injustice" in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the major social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report and answering this question with precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions on important normative and ideological debates that are the purview of citizens and politicians, rather than the authors of this study. Nonetheless, we outline here some common policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the *AmericasBarometer* asked citizens across the region what they thought the role of the state is in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

> **ROS4.** The Peruvian state should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which citizens agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. In Figure 1.18 we present the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. As always, we have recoded responses to run from 0 ("Strongly disagree") to 100 ("Strongly agree"). As we would expect, the distribution of preferences is wide: on one hand, we have countries such Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Paraguay that exhibit a strong preference for state intervention to reduce income inequality; on the other, we have a country such as the United States that shows a high resistance to the idea. In Peru, citizens manifest a clear "interventionist" orientation, but in comparison with other countries of the region, it is not too strong.



Figure 1.18. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality

Conditional Cash Transfers and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many of the region's governments have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their children in school.[48] The most well-known and largest of these programs include "Oportunidades" in

[48] Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the

Mexico, "Bolsa Família" in Brazil, "Familias en Acción" in Colombia, and the "Asignación Universal por Hijo" in Argentina. Peru created in 2005 the Programa Nacional de Apoyo Directo a los más pobres "Juntos", which assists rural population in extreme poverty. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, "CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest."[49] However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depend, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.[50] These social assistance and CCT programs are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region's most historically unequal contexts.[51]

In 2012, we measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programs across the region, using question **CCT1NEW**.

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Levels of receipt of social assistance and CCTs vary greatly across the region. In Figure 1.19 we present the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance.

The results show that, apart from Bolivia (where more than 50 percent of respondents declare to receive some form of assistance), the majority of Latin American countries exhibit percentages that range from 10 to 20 percent of reception of public assistance. In comparison with the rest of the region, Peru emerges in the next to last place among countries providing public assistance to their citizens. It is important to note that the beneficiaries of the PTMC Juntos are mothers with schoolchildren and, as mentioned before, the program targets people in extreme poverty living in rural areas.[52]

Presidential Vote in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights 66*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[49] Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

[50] Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. "Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean." *Social Protection Working Paper #0605*. The World Bank.

[51] Fort he "Juntos" program see: Perova, Elizaveba and Renos Vakis, 2011. Más tiempo en el Programa, Mejores resultados: Duración e impactos del Programa JUNTOS en el Perú. Lima: Juntos y Banco Mundial. http://www.juntos.gob.pe/images/noticias/2011/07/juntosIE-2011.pdf; Jaramillo Baanante, Miguel Alan Sánchez. 2011. "Impacto del program Juntos sobre nutrición temprana". Lima: GRADE. http://grade.org.pe/upload/publicaciones/archivo/download/pubs/ddt61.pdf

[52] By December 2011, Juntos included 492,871 households in situation of poverty and extreme poverty.



Figure 1.19. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas

The 2012 *AmericasBarometer* provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about **CCT** and other public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about support for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.[53]

> **CCT3**. Changing the topic…Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

Responses were coded on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and 7 represents "Strongly agree." Figure 1.20 presents levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas; responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items.

[53] This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.



Figure 1.20. Belief that Public Assistance Recipients are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

Unfortunately, important segments of the Latin American public agree with the statement that those who receive public assistance do so because they are lazy. In six countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Canada, and Honduras), the national mean scores exceed the midpoint of the scale, which is 50. In ten more additional countries, the score of agreement with this statement ranges from 45 to 49.9. Clearly, there is a strong stigma against those who benefit from these programs. In the case of Peru, this information is consistent with the findings from some qualitative studies about perceptions of the Juntos program, as there remains a lack of understanding about the central objective of the CCT programs that seek to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty.[54]

[54] Huber, Ludwig et al. 2009. Programa JUNTOS. *Certezas y malentendidos en torno a las transferencias condicionadas – Estudio de caso en seis distritos rurales del Perú*. Lima: IEP, UNICEF. UNFPA; Zárate et.al. 2012. *Insumos para una estrategia de egreso del Programa Juntos*. Lima: CARE, IEP

Affirmative Action

Another possible policy solution that has very recently attracted attention in some places within Latin America is affirmative action. While in the United States affirmative action has a history of several decades, in Latin America it is a very recent phenomenon, and has only been seriously considered in a handful of countries with the largest populations of Afro-descendants.[55] In Peru, the gender quota was approved by Congress in October 1997, right before elections for local governments on 1998. The quota for native peoples and youth was used for the first time in the elections for local and regional governments in 2002.

In the 2012 round of the *AmericasBarometer*, we asked about support for affirmative action in every country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was administered to a split sample of respondents, who were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a scale from 1 to 7.

RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 1.21 we examine support for affirmative action across the Americas. Here, responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items.

Overall, the results suggest a positive predisposition of significant numbers of Latin American citizens towards affirmative action. In the upper range of support we find Paraguay, Honduras, and Argentina. Behind them, we see 10 countries with scores that vary between 50 and 60. In the other end of the distribution we encounter countries such as El Salvador, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Canada, and the United States, which exhibit a high degree of opposition to the idea of setting aside opening in colleges for dark-skinned students. In comparative terms, Peruvians display a relatively stronger opposition than support for affirmative action.

[55] For further information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Erica Amy. 2010. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *AmericasBarometer Insights Series, 49*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP).



Figure 1.21. Support for Affirmative Action in the Countries of the Americas

V. Conclusion

The great differences in life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. While inequality has recently been improving in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country's social milieu.

In Peru we find that economic inequality (measured through the Gini Coefficient) is moderately lower than the Latin American average and has declined in the last years (from 53.2 in 2007 to 48.1 in 2010). There are segments of the population that particularly affected by social

inequality, such as women, the elderly, and residents of rural areas, and who exhibit significantly lower levels of formal educational. Moreover, men tend to have significantly greater incomes than women, even when controlled for education. One of the factors that emerge as an important predictor of the respondent's educational attainment is his or her mother's level of education.

The analysis shows that public opinion towards issues related to marginalization and poverty shows that although a majority of the population believes that the condition of poverty is due to injustice (66 percent), a significant 28 percent believes that it is due to their culture. On the other hand, and consistent with the findings of qualitative studies conducted on perceptions about public assistance programs, we find that that there is a moderately extended belief in Peru that the beneficiaries of these programs are lazy.

VI. Appendix to Chapter 1. Results of the Regression Analysis

Table 1.2. Determinants of Educational Achievement in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Nivel de educación de la madre	0.411*	(20.00)
Ámbito geográfico	-0.098*	(-2.73)
Mujer	-0.091*	(-3.54)
Color de piel	-0.092*	(-3.66)
26-35 años	0.053*	(2.47)
36-45 años	0.053*	(2.36)
46-55 años	0.013	(0.47)
56-65 años	-0.060	(-1.74)
66 años o más	-0.073*	(-2.14)
Constante	0.027	(1.00)
R-cuadrado: 0.265 N. de casos: 1429 * p<0.05		

Table 1.3. Determinants of Personal Income in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Nivel de educación de la madre	0.324*	-8.65
Ámbito geográfico	-0.197*	(-4.23)
Mujer	-0.220*	(-5.64)
Color de piel	-0.079*	(-2.25)
26-35 años	0.124*	-3.35
36-45 años	0.186*	-4.49
46-55 años	0.216*	-4.9
56-65 años	0.099*	-2.47
66 años o más	0.05	-1.25
Constante	0.019	-0.46
R-cuadrado: 0.239 N. de casos: 719 * p<0.05		

Table 1.4. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Ámbito geográfico	0.061	-1.13
Color de piel	0.104*	-2.75
Mujer	0.068	-1.78
26-35 años	-0.007	(-0.18)
36-45 años	0.002	-0.05
46-55 años	0.104*	-2.03
56-65 años	-0.008	(-0.24)
66 años o más	0.07	-1.75
Constante	0	(-0.01)
R-cuadrado: 0.034		
N. de casos: 739		
* p<0.05		

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.[1] This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.



[1] The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**

Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer*Insights *Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.[1] While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.



As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

[1]The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage

*This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer*Insights *Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometerrespondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.[1] The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.

The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[1] The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B.**

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 *AmericasBarometer* survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine who participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.[59] An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.[60] Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.[61]

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[59] Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

[60] Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

[61] Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." The *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually more biased against certain groups.[62] For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.[63] Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.[64] Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.[65] Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.[66]

Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.[67] Specifically in Peru, despite the increase in female political participation and the fact that the gender quota establishes that 30 percent of the

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Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

[62] In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

[63] Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[64] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation.* Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218.

[65] Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly.* Vol. 34, No. 1.pp. 156-173.

[66] Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

[67] Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

candidates should be female, only 28 of the 130 congresspeople are women, which represents 21.5 percent. The number of women who are province-level mayors is no greater than five percent, and women who are district-level mayors is barely above three percent.

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.[68] In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.[69] Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous women, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.[70]

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.[71] In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.[72]

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.[73] Moreover, having

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[68] Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, Ibid. Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

[69] Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[70] Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

[71] Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129–2155

[72] See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

[73] Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'"

minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.[74] Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

II. Participation in the Americas

In this section, we attempt to gauge how unequal political participation actually is in the Americas, using data from the 2012 *AmericasBarometer* surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exists in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind vis-à-vis participatory inequality in the Americas. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the possibility remains that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Turnout

First, we examine inequalities in turnout in Peru and across the Americas. In the *AmericasBarometer* surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of 2011? [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.] (1) Voted [Continue] (2) Did not vote [Go to VB10]

In Figure 2.1 we present turnout by gender across the Americas. It is important to stress that voting is compulsory in countries in the region, whereas it is voluntary in others.[75] This figure clearly shows that there are great inequalities across Latin American countries where voting is compulsory. For instance, self-reported turnout in Peru it is 90.7% whereas in Honduras is 50.7%. The data from all twenty-six countries included in the *AmericasBarometer* surveys suggest that men and women participate in elections at similar rates, in countries with compulsory voting as well as in those where it is voluntary. This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men.[76]

American Political Science Review 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

[74] Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

[75] Countries where voting is compulsory include, in addition to Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. For an analysis of these countries see Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. "Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote." *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[76] Note that the one anomalous case in Figure 32 is the United States, where men self-report higher turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies here. First, more women voted in the last U.S. election than men 66% to 62%), and second, there is substantial over-reporting of voting in the survey by about 18%. This over-report percentage is not unusual for recent U.S. presidential elections. See United States Census Bureau, "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," July, 20, 2009, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html, accessed July 21, 2012, and Allyson L.

Figure 2.1. Gender and Turnout in the Countries of the Americas

We now examine in greater detail the inequalities on turnout in Peru (Figure 2.2). Overall, and given the high turnout reported in the country, we do not find significant differences in turnout when we use socio-economic variables.

Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," February 2009, http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed July 21, 2012.



Figure 2.2. Sociodemographics and Turnout in Peru

Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not tell the whole story. Certainly there are myriad ways that citizens can engage their democratic system besides just voting, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. Fortunately, the *AmericasBarometer* surveys include an extensive battery of questions on other political participation besides voting. Among numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often citizens contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

The *AmericasBarometer* by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently citizens participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the **CP** battery is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them… (1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L, CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]**

To what extent to citizens of the Americas participate in community groups? In Figure 2.3 we examine this question. The left side of the figure presents levels of community participation in each country of the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average response to **CP6**, **CP7**, and **CP8**, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups.[77] In effect this is a measure of overall intensity of civil society engagement. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents in each country who said they had a leadership role in any community group.

Communal participation tends to be particularly high in countries whose national income is relatively low, with Haiti, Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Honduras registering the highest levels of communal participation. By contrast, countries with greater per capita income such as Chile, Argentina, Canada, and Uruguay show levels of communal participation that are substantially lower. Peru is located in a relatively middling position between these two extremes, which is consistent with the suggestion that poorer countries tend to have greater levels of communal participation, since Peru's per capita income tends to be in a middling position in the region.

In terms of the percentage of people who declare to have leadership roles in community organizations we find that very few acknowledge having this type of participation. The highest proportion of participation in leadership roles is found again in Haiti, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In Peru, the percentage of participation barely reached eight percent (Figure 2.3).

[77] This index is given as a reference, since the analysis of reliability of the scale shows that the Cronbach's Alpha does not exceed 0.4.



Figure 2.3. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 2.4 we examine the results for Peru in greater detail, showing the average of communal participation according to different demographic groups. What we find is that people of lower socio-economic status tend to have a slightly greater predisposition to communal activism than those with more wealth. For instance, we observe that people in the lowest quintile of wealth participate more than those who are in the highest quintile of wealth. Similarly, those whose mothers have less formal education are more active in community-based activism than those whose mothers have a college education. In addition, we find that women declare a greater level of activism than men, and this is due to the fact that in the LAPOP-created index of communal participation women have greater participation in religious organization and parent-teacher associations. The analysis of these demographic factors in the disposition to take leadership roles in communal organizations shows that they do not have a significant effect on this type of activism (the figures are not shown to save space).



Figure 2.4. Sociodemographics and Community Participation in Peru

Many citizens also participate in campaign related activities beyond simply voting. To gauge involvement in elections, we asked respondents questions **PP1** and **PP2**.

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]** (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 2.5 we examine participation in campaign activities across the Americas. The left side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens who report having "tried to persuade others" either "frequently" or "occasionally." The right side presents the percentage who said they had worked for a campaign. In most countries of the region the percentage of respondents who report having tried to persuade others to work for a candidate or party is less than 20 percent. Only in Brazil, Surinam, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic we find that that figure approaches or exceeds 25 percent. Peru, with only 16 percent of respondents, is in a middling position.

In relation to the percentage who worked for a candidate or party, the numbers are even lower. The countries that exhibit the highest proportion of this type of activism –around 17 percent– are Surinam, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In most of the other countries, less than 10 percent of those probed declare to have engaged in this modality of political participation. In Peru that proportion barely reached five percent.



Figure 2.5. Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas

In what follows we examine the results for Peru more closely. In Figure 2.6 we recode all those who report having tried to persuade others either frequently or occasionally as having attempted to persuade others. As it can be appreciated in the figure, the socio-demographic variables we have been analyzing do not have a significant impact in the respondent's decision to persuade others.



Figure 2.6. Sociodemographics and Attempts to Persuade Others in Peru

In Figure 2.7 we present the percentage of respondents in different groups who said they worked for a candidate or party in the most recent elections. The results show that again, though there are some differences based on socio-demographic factors, these are not statistically significant.



Figure 2.7. Sociodemographics and Campaign Work in Peru

In the preceding analysis, we have found evidence for some participatory inequalities by gender. However, it is quite likely that rates of participation vary by women's positions in the labor market and family.[78] Figure 2.8 presents rates or levels of participation by gender and, for woman, by family and labor market status. What we find is that in the case of these two types of participation (communal and campaign-related), married women without income have a greater level of activism than other women and men in general. In the other forms of participation, the differences are not significant.

[78] See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.



Figure 2.8. Gender Roles and Participation in Peru

III. Public on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of the majority or society as a whole support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that women's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

Note that responses to these questions are likely subject to what public opinion scholars call "social desirability bias," meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes

because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.[79] This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give the "socially desirable," non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions will likely be lower than their actual levels in the population.

Public Opinion towards Women's Leadership

The 2012 *AmericasBarometer* included three questions tapping attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.[80] The text of these questions is as follows:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Discriminatory attitudes against women are not openly held by the great majority of citizens. With the exception of Guyana, the Dominican Republic and Haiti –where the values of the index approach 50– in the rest of the countries the mean value ranges from 40 to 25. The attitudes in Peru are relatively nondiscriminatory, with values similar to what we find in Canada (Figure 2.9)

[79] Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

[80] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 2.9. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Leadership of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 *AmericasBarometer* also included one question on attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**.[81]

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.
VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
(1) Strongly agree (2)Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

[81] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

Discriminatory attitudes are less accentuated in this case, where the highest score of discrimination barely exceeds and average of 30 in four countries (Chile, Bolivia, Honduras, and Guatemala). As we can see in Figure 2.10, Peru is closer to this group of countries than to the less discriminatory ones (such as Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay).



Figure 2.10. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 *AmericasBarometer* included question **D5** on attitudes towards gays running for public office.

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

Tolerance towards the political participation of gays is very high in various countries, notably Canada, Uruguay, the United States, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, with mean values of 60 or more. On the other side of the distribution, we find strong discriminatory attitudes in countries such as Honduras, Guyana, Jamaica, and Haiti. In Peru we observe that, again, attitudes tend to be closer to the discriminatory side than the nondiscriminatory (Figure 2.11).



Figure 2.11. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 *AmericasBarometer* included a new question on attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.[82]

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?

The data show that there is a marked predisposition or tolerance towards the participation of the disabled in the Americas. In all the countries with exception of two (Guyana and Haiti), the mean of agreement with the statement that the disabled should be permitted to run for public office exceeds 50, that is the mid-point of the scale. In eleven countries that value exceeds 70 points. In Peru, the mean approval is 65.8, which means that although the approval is relatively high, it is below of what is found in many countries (Figure 2.12).



Figure 2.12. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

[82] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

For at least some indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist important differences in the rates of participation between men and women, and different social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as American democracies have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 *AmericasBarometer* surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.[83] The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are thus more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 *AmericasBarometer* included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.[84]

> **GEN6**. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure 2.13 shows existing support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. We find that in almost all countries this support is above the mid-point of the scale. In fact, in all countries but three the value of the mean support is above 58, and in seven of them this value is over 70. In Peru we find that this support, while above the mid-point (60.8) is not very strong.

[83] Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf.

[84] This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.



Figure 2.13. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.[85] While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.[86] One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is

[85] Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid*.; Jackman 1987, *Ibid*.

[86] Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.[87]

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.[88] While the relationship between socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,[89] material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

Despite reductions in inequality over the past decades, this chapter has revealed that important aspects of political participation remain unequal in the Americas. In Peru we find that discriminatory attitudes, though not extremely strong, are however higher than we find in many neighboring countries.

We also observe in Peru that there is a high degree of turnout, the highest in the region, and that due to this widespread participation we do not find that socio-economic variables affect this type of activism. In addition, we also find that communal participation is also high in Peru, although in this case it is not among the highest in the region. In relation to this form of activism, we find that people with the lowest level of socio-economic status tend to have a greater involvement in communal activism. As far as public opinion is concerned, we see that there is a moderate support for the idea that women can be effective leaders, as well as for the view that dark-skinned people can be capable leaders. However, public opinion support for the gender quotas is much less prevalent.

[87] Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid*.; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

[88] Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.

[89] Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.[1] In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?

The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

[1] To measure levels of community participation, questions **CP5** and **CP8** were used.

Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?



Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.[1]

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation.[2]The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

[1] The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women's group meetings, CP20.

[2] In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.

Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout





Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.[93] Indeed, a recent Insights report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.[94] On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.[95] If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own experiences, leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy. In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the

[93] Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

[94] Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[95] Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

group– may well base their judgments of political leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.[96]

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.[97] Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders' ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.[98] When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the *AmericasBarometer* 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.[99]

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 *AmericasBarometer* data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.[100] However, in an analysis of 2010 *AmericasBarometer* data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.[101]

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we

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[96] Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality." *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

[97] Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

[98] Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

[99] Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

[100] Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?" *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

[101] Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005."The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination," *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.[102] However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.[103]

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the *AmericasBarometer* that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.[104] And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as "important rallying cries" during democratization,[105] and raise "the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action."[106] It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.[107]

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

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[102] Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid*.

[103] Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[104] Cleary, Matthew. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid*.

[105] Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women's Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

[106] Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

[107] Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethinicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the *AmericasBarometer*, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the *AmericasBarometer*'s long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). In addition, the 2012 *AmericasBarometer* asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.[108]

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, class, household wealth, and intra-household inequalities by gender and self-reported victimization by discrimination in government offices, public places, and employment situations.

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy (one's perception of one's own political capabilities), **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas. Internal efficacy is distributed in a very unequal manner across the Americas. In some countries citizens exhibit high levels of internal efficacy (the United States, Canada, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua), while in others these levels are relatively low (Honduras, Brazil, Paraguay). In Peru, the mean value of citizens' internal efficacy does not reach the mid-point of the scale, which suggests that a slight majority declare that they do not understand well the country's most important political issues (Figure 3.1).

[108] This question was administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the question.



Figure 3.1. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? Figure 3.2 shows the linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences. The data suggest that males, those who feel safer in their neighborhoods, those who most strongly support the political system, those with higher interest in politics, and those with more years of formal education tend to have the highest degree of internal efficacy.



Figure 3.2. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Peru

In Figure 3.3 we explore in greater depth how personal characteristics and discrimination are related to citizens' belief in their ability to understand the political system in Peru. As we can see, the levels of internal efficacy increase with greater years of formal education, his or her wealth, and his or her overall support for the political system. However, internal efficacy decreases when the respondent's sense of citizen insecurity increases.



Figure 3.3. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Peru

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described at the beginning of this section. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of these variables in the Americas. The findings suggest some worrisome trends. Even in the countries where we find the highest values in agreement with the efficacy question, the average does not exceed 50, the mid-point of the scale. In fact, there is a greater number of countries with mean scores that begin with 30 (including Peru) than with 40 points. It is difficult not to conclude that there is a relatively high degree of skepticism towards parties and governments in the Americas.



Figure 3.4. External Efficacy and Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas

Who within Peru believe that those who govern the country are interested in what people like them think? And who are in agreement with the statement that political parties represent them? In Figures 3.5 and 3.6 we use linear regression to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report high external efficacy and positive perceptions of political parties.

In the case of external efficacy, we observe that the most important factor is the respondent's attitude towards the political system as a whole: higher system support generates a higher sense of external efficacy. In relation to the question whether political parties represent the people, the results indicate that the most important determinants of this perception are, in addition to system support, age and level of education: younger and less educated people tend to have a more skeptical view of parties.



Figure 3.5. Determinants of External Efficacy in Peru



Figure 3.6. Determinants of Belief in Party Representation in Peru

For a better understanding of the factors associated with these two attitudes, Figures 3.7 and 3.8 provide information about how some of the variables that emerge as statistically significant from the regression analysis related to external efficacy and perception of the political parties' representativeness.



Figure 3.7. External Efficacy and System Support



Figure 3.8. Factors Associated with Belief in Party Representation in Peru

III. System Support and Commitment to Democracy

The 2012 *AmericasBarometer* analyses citizen general attitudes and two of the most important are support for the political system and support for democracy. In Chapter Five we describe in detail how these attitudes were measured and how they have changed over time in Peru. In this section we examine how individual traits affect these important attitudes for the stability of democracy.

In Figure 3.9 we report the results of a regression analysis that examines respondents' individual traits and how they impact on the levels of system support in Peru. What we find is the degree of attitudinal commitment to democracy, the assessments of the national economic situation, the perception of insecurity and the level of education are the factors that determine the levels of system support.



Figure 3.9. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Peru

To offer a more detailed examination of the factors that affect support for the political system in Peru we show in Figure 3.10 the relationship between age, degree of support for democracy, perception of citizen insecurity, assessment of the national economy and system support in Peru.

Another regression analysis was performed to determine if the personal characteristics previously identified are associated with the belief that "democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government." (Figure 3.11).



Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with System Support in Peru



Figure 3.11. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Peru

Figure 3.12 examines in greater detail the variables that have been identified as significant in the previous regression analysis. We clearly observe that people with greater material wealth, levels of education and system support tend to proffer a greater attitudinal commitment with democracy.



Figure 3.12. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy

IV. Protest Participation

Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting may be becoming a more "normalized' method of political participation: "individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest."[109] In the 2012 *AmericasBarometer*, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including most importantly **PROT3**.

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 3.13 we examine the levels of political protest throughout the Americas. In nine countries, five percent or less of those polled report to have participated in one demonstration or rally. In five countries (Bolivia, Haiti, Peru, Paraguay, and Chile) the number of people who admit to such participation exceeds 10 percent.

[109] Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. "The Normalization of Protest in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights 42*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).



Figure 3.13. Participation in Protests in the Countries of the Americas

Who are the ones who protest in Peru? Figure 3.14 reports the results of a logistic regression analysis that explores the determinants of protest participation in Peru. What we find is that experiences of crime and corruption victimization tend to increase the participation in protests. Socio-economic condition is also significant because people who have lower levels of material wealth exhibit a greater degree of protest activism. Likewise, people who have higher levels of education and interest in politics are more predispose to participate in protests.



Figure 3.14. Determinants of Protest Participation in Peru

Figure 3.15 illustrates how participation in protests relates with some of the variables examined in Figure 3.14



Figure 3.15. Factors Associated with Protest Participation in Peru

V. Conclusion

The reported information suggests that feelings of internal and external efficacy are not very high in Peru, turning out to be in the medium-to-low levels in the regional context. Likewise, we find that the majority of respondents do not agree with the statement that political parties are interested in representing them. Overall, our data suggest that interest in politics, the level of education, and attitudes towards the political system are positively related to the sense of external and internal efficacy. By contrast, participation in demonstrations and public protests is very high in Peru. Those who have been victims of crime and corruption, are in the lower rungs of wealth, and have a greater level of education tend to be more likely to engage in this type of activism.

VI. Appendix to Chapter 3: Results of the Regression Analyses

Table 3.1. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.038	-1.14
Mujer	-0.068*	(-2.92)
Edad	0	(-0.02)
Años de educación aprobados	0.127*	-4.11
Quintiles de riqueza	0.045	-1.55
Interés en la política	0.166*	-5.49
Apoyo al sistema	0.235*	-7.35
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	0.037	-1.53
Victimización por crimen	0.048	-1.88
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.064*	(-2.48)
Constante	0.001	-0.02
R-cuadrado: 0.151 N. de casos: 1435 * p<0.05		

Table 3.2. Determinants of External Efficacy in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.037	(-1.00)
Mujer	-0.031	(-1.23)
Edad	0.008	-0.31
Años de educación aprobados	-0.01	(-0.33)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.011	(-0.34)
Indígena	-0.019	(-0.35)
Afroperuana	0.024	-0.64
Blanca	0.024	-0.42
Mestiza	0.026	-0.36
Interés en la política	0.007	-0.26
Apoyo al sistema	0.318*	-12.61
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	0.001	-0.02
Victimización por crimen	0	(-0.01)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.026	(-0.89)
Constante	0.003	-0.1
R-cuadrado: 0.110 N. de casos: 1438 * p<0.05		

Table 3.3. Determinants of Belief in Party Representation in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.037	(-0.99)
Mujer	-0.002	(-0.10)
Edad	-0.082*	(-3.86)
Años de educación aprobados	-0.068*	(-2.33)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.012	-0.37
Indígena	-0.049	(-0.87)
Afroperuana	-0.007	(-0.15)
Blanca	0.005	-0.09
Mestiza	-0.006	(-0.07)
Interés en la política	0.035	-1.33
Apoyo al sistema	0.353*	-12.1
Victimización por corrupción	-0.036	(-1.35)
Victimización por crimen	-0.036	(-1.33)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.009	(-0.28)
Constante	0.01	-0.27
R-cuadrado: 0.153 N. de casos: 1428 * p<0.05		

Table 3.4. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	-0.075*	(-2.81)
Mujer	-0.009	(-0.36)
Años de educación aprobados	-0.095*	(-2.62)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.01	-0.33
Indígena	0.026	-0.51
Afroperuana	0.044	-0.98
Blanca	0.082	-1.52
Mestiza	0.135	-1.96
Situación económica nacional	0.074*	-2.64
Situación económica personal	0.025	-0.82
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.061*	(-2.34)
Victimización por crimen	-0.047	(-1.60)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	-0.033	(-1.18)
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	0.038	-1.12
Importancia de la religión	0.041	-1.07
Apoyo a la democracia	0.227*	-6.49
Constante	-0.005	(-0.13)
R-cuadrado: 0.093 N. de casos: 1393 * p<0.05		

Table 3.5. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	0.067*	-2.58
Mujer	0.072*	-3.53
Años de educación aprobados	0.097*	-2.95
Quintiles de riqueza	0.088*	-2.48
Indígena	0.03	-0.66
Afroperuana	0.051	-1.29
Blanca	0.042	-0.79
Mestiza	0.047	-0.67
Situación económica nacional	0.083*	-2.66
Situación económica personal	0.061*	-2.1
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.02	(-0.78)
Victimización por crimen	-0.014	(-0.58)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	-0.027	(-1.11)
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	0.015	-0.41
Importancia de la religión	-0.027	(-0.77)
Apoyo al sistema	0.226*	-7.68
Constante	-0.001	(-0.04)
R-cuadrado: 0.112 N. de casos: 1393 * p<0.05		

Table 3.6. Determinants of Protest Participation in Peru

Predictor	**Coeficiente**	**Valor t**
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.323*	(-2.52)
Mujer	-0.085	(-0.98)
Años de educación aprobados	0.287*	-2.77
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.283*	(-2.63)
Indígena	0.121	-0.73
Afroperuana	-0.197	(-1.26)
Blanca	0.02	-0.12
Mestiza	-0.076	(-0.39)
Interés en la política	0.522*	-6.54
Apoyo al sistema	-0.134	(-1.40)
Victimización por corrupción	0.240*	-2.73
Victimización por crimen	0.150*	-2.01
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.035	(-0.42)
Constante	-2.131*	(-18.21)
F: 7.77 N. de casos: 1393 * p<0.05		

Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights *Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.*

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?[1]

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.



[1] For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support

This box reviews findings from the paper "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America," by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.[1] The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.[2] Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries





Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2010

[1] The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

[2] The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information

This box reviews findings from the 2012 report "Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the DemocraciaActiva-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results," by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The DemocraciaActiva-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.

The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.[1] As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

Average support for democracy, by year and survey



Percentage who have received information about candidates, by gender and year



Source: Baseline and Follow-Up Surveys by LAPOP, 2010-2012

[1] This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement, and Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Delinquency, and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990's, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.[114] Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.[115]

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.[116] However, others show that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally. Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even help specific

[114] See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[115] Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

[116] Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations.* New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

governments maintain public support.[117] Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using *AmericasBarometer* data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.[118] However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).[119] While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.[120] Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to emigrate to other countries.[121] Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be

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[117] Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

[118] Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64

[119] Global Study on Homicide. 2011. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html

[120] Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*

[121] Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region. Even tough economic concerns, unemployment, and poverty continue to be relevant in Latin America, the problem of violence and insecurity has significant importance. This is clearly seen in the Peruvian case, if we look at what has happened in this country between 2006 and 2012 (Figure 4.1), we will observe an important change in the last survey. Economic concerns have diminished in salience and instead the percentage of respondents who mention that crime and insecurity is the main problem of the country has increased dramatically, from 10.7 percent in 2006 to 30.7 percent in 2012. In similar vein, we find that in the case of corruption the percentage of people who mentioned as the country's most important problem went from 6.5 percent in 2006 to 12.6 percent in 2012. Economic concerns continue to be important, but not in the same magnitude as they were in 2006, which is consistent with the period of economic growth that the country has been experiencing in recent years. In this sense, it could be that the greater salience of issues of crime and corruption may be due to the diminishing concern with the economy rather than the product of an increase in violence and corruption per se.



Figure 4.1. The Country's Most Important Problem in Peru 2006-2012[122]

[122] In this figure we have recodified mentions about basic services and political problems in the "Others" category. In 2012 these issues were mentioned by 5 percent and 1.8 percent of the respondents, respectively. These proportions have remained more or less stable throughout the years of the study.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the *AmericasBarometer* surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996, these items have been refined and improved, as we will see in the three sections that follow.[123]

Perception of Corruption

The perception of corruption is measured by one single question, which is recodified in a 0-100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is not very common among public officials and 100 that it is very common.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 4.2 shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas; the regional mean is a high 70.4. The highest countries are Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago with average levels of corruption of 81.7 and 80.9, respectively; the lowest countries are Surinam (38.8) followed by Canada (58.3) and Uruguay (61.8). Peru ranks seventh with a mean score of 76.9, which is an improvement considering that in the previous round of the *AmericasBarometer* (2010) ranked in third place. The confidence intervals suggest, however, that the perception of corruption in Peru continues to be among the top scorers in the region.

As with the other indicators throughout this report, we present the changes in perceptions of corruption over time. Figure 4.3 show the trend in the perception of corruption in Peru for the years for which we have information. Between 2006 and 2012 we find a slight decline in the average perception that corruption is very common among public officials. However, the decline from 2010 to 2012 is not significant enough as to be statistically representative, which is consistent with the previous finding that, while Peru's position in the regional context has improved, the confidence intervals show that Peru is still among the group of countries with the highest levels of perception of corruption. In percentage terms, about 80 percent of the adult population believes that corruption is somewhat or very common in Peru.

[123] Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates, y Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates



Figure 4.2. Perceptions of Corruption in the Countries of the Americas



Figure 4.3. Perception of Corruption in Peru 2006-2012

Corruption Victimization

Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).[124] This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[**DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]** **EXC20**. In the last twelve months, did any **soldier or military officer** ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

[124] Question EXC20, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

This section addresses the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. In Figure 4.4 we present the percentage of respondents who report that they have been asked to pay a bribe in at least one location in the last year. We can easily observe the great variation in the rates of corruption among Latin American countries. Peru ranks fifth in terms of corruption victimization (28.5%), a percentage that is relatively similar to the one found in Mexico. This figure is significantly different from the ones found in the countries with highest levels of reported corruption, such as Haiti, where more than two thirds of respondents state to have been asked a bribe, and Bolivia and Ecuador, whose percentages are 40 and 45 percent, respectively. On the other end of the distribution, and with a wide margin of difference, we find that Canada, the United States, and Chile exhibit less corruption victimization, less than a fifth of what is found in Peru.

The majority of citizens who were victims of corruption were forced to pay bribes in one place only: seventy percent of those forced to pay did it in only one place, whereas the rest had to do it in more than one place. This proportion has remained relatively stable in recent years in Peru. In Figure 4.5 we can also see that the majority of instances of corruption were found in dealings with the police, and the less frequent was with the courts.



Figure 4.4. Percentage Victimized by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas



Figure 4.5. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in Peru

What have been the variations in the levels of victimization by corruption over time in Peru? Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of citizens who reported any type of experiences with corruption in the different years that the *AmericasBarometer* surveys have been carried out in Peru. Even though corruption victimization in 2012 is less than what it was found in 2010, we cannot say that this reduction is statistically significant because the confidence intervals overlap. It is worth stressing that, in comparative terms, victimization by corruption declined in Peru, as we saw in Figure 4.4.



Figure 4.6. Percentage Victimized by Corruption over Time in Peru

Who Are More Likely To Be Victims of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model to identify those socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that were positively and negatively associated with corruption victimization. Figure 4.7 displays the results of this regression.

To better appreciate the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that a person has been a victim of corruption we also offer bivariate results in Figure 4.8. As we can see, men have a greater probability of being victims of corruption than women, a finding we have seen in our previous studies. Although the bivariate analysis is not conclusive, the regression results indicate that, once other factors are held constant, respondents who speak an indigenous language are more likely to be asked a bribe than those who have Spanish as a mother tongue. Similarly, the level of education emerges again as a determinant, with those with higher educational attainment being more likely to be victims of corruption. Finally, those residing in Lima and large cities are more likely to encounter corruption than those living in rural areas.



Figure 4.7. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Peru[125]



Figure 4.8. Demographics and Corruption Victimization in Peru

[125] In this regression analysis we have use the variable "mother tongue" that has two values: 0 for those whose mother tongue is a native language (Quechua or other native language) and 1 for those who have Spanish as first language.

One aspect that can help us better understand the phenomenon of corruption is citizens' tolerance for it. To identify this attitude, LAPOP included in its questionnaire a question to probe whether respondents were willing to justify paying a bribe. We see that in Peru this attitude has varied changed in recent years. The percentage of citizens willing to justify paying a bribe went from 21.8 percent in 2006 to 13.7 percent in 2012. This decline suggests an improvement in the capacity of the citizens to deal with the state without falling prey to corrupt practices. However, it is worth noting that those who justify paying a bribe are precisely those who have had to pay it, as well as the youth.

III. Perception of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The *Americas Barometer* measures citizens' perception of their safety by asking the following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

Following the LAPOP standard, responses were recalibrated on a 0-100 scale, where higher values mean greater perceived insecurity. Figure 4.9 shows the results for all the counties included in the 2012 round. Once again, Peru tops the ranking of perception of insecurity, with a mean value of 48.6. In this year, along with Peru we find Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In the other extreme, Canada and the United States stand out because they have virtually half the average of insecurity than the one registered in Peru.

Even though we are still occupying the first place in the perception of insecurity, Figure 4.10 shows the changes across time in the levels of this perception in Peru. Using data from previous rounds of the *AmericasBarometer* that asked the same question, we find an improvement in this perception, with less insecurity reported in 2012 than in 2010 and significantly lower than the one found in 2006.



Figure 4.9. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Countries of the Americas



Figure 4.10. Perception of Insecurity Over Time in Peru

Residents of Metropolitan Lima and large and medium cities (those with more than 100,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, respectively) report a higher perception of citizen insecurity than those living in rural areas. This is consistent with the relationship that exists between violence and urbanization. Muggah (2012) speaks of the "urban dilemma" as the double-faced urbanization in the 21st century. On the one hand, urbanization is a force that helps in the progressive development of the poor. On the other hand, it increases the risk of permanent insecurity among the poor. This negative aspect of urbanization threatens to erase its potential as stimulus to growth, productivity, and economic gains.[126]

In this round, we have decided to report the data of perception of insecurity for each of the 24 city capitals in the sample (we do not include the United States and Canada due to sampling issues). Figure 4.11 displays the results for all countries in the 2012 round. In this indicator, Lima is placed second in the level of perception of insecurity with a mean value of 53.9 behind only Mexico City. On the other extreme of the distribution, the cities of Georgetown, Port of Spain, and Kingston (Jamaica) stand out because they register almost half of the mean value recorded for Lima.

[126] Muggah, Robert. 2012. *Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty, and Violence*. Ottawa: IDRC, UKAID.



Figure 4.11. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Capitals of the Americas

Not always high levels of perception of insecurity correspond to elevated rates of crime. In the Peruvian case, however, this correspondence does exist, as we shall see below.

IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare to individuals' experiences with crime? Since 2010, the Americas Barometer has used an updated series of items to measure crime victimization, which reads as follows:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip toVIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]
(98) DA [Skip toVIC1HOGAR]

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?**[Read options]**
(1) In your home
(2) In this neighborhood
(3) In this municipality/canton
(4) In another municipality/canton
(5) In another country
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Given that most crime occurs in urban areas, especially in city capitals, we decided to report the data on crime victimization for the 24 city capitals in the countries included in the sample (excluding the U.S. and Canada).

Figure 4.12 combines the answers to questions **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR** and shows that 33.5 percent of those interviewed in metropolitan Lima report to have been victim of a crime in the year previous to the survey.[127] About 38.9 percent declared that another member of the family was victim of a crime. It is important to note, however, that the survey is administered only to adults of voting age, and therefore it is possible that the victimization of minors is not reported given that family members might not be aware of the situation. It is also important to keep in mind that this is self-reported victimization. In some contexts certain delinquent acts (especially those against marginal groups) may be "normalized" and therefore not reported accordingly.



Figure 4.12. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Capitals of the Americas

[127] Even though the percentages are the same, in absolute terms the number of other victims in the household is lower. However, the number of no responses is higher in VIC1HOGAR

If we compare Lima with other capitals in Latin America and focus on the variable of personal victimization, the one self-reported, we see that Lima ranks sixth in the ranking, flanked by Mexico City and Montevideo, with 30.9 percent of respondents acknowledging to been a victim of a crime. At the other end of the distribution, the city capitals that report the lowest level of crime victimization are Belmopan, Kingston, and Georgetown.

If we compare Peru with the other Latin American countries (Figure 4.13), we find that, again, Peru is among the top countries in terms of crime victimization, both personal and among members of the household. In terms of individual victimization by crime, Peru ranks second in the region (with 28.1 percent), next to Ecuador (which registers the higher proportion of self-reported crime victimization) and Bolivia, both with percentages hovering 28 percent. At the other end, countries with the lowest level of crime victimization include Panama, Guyana, and Jamaica.



Figure 4.13. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 4.14 shows the places where most of the crime takes place in Peru, according to the respondents. More than 60 percent say that they were victim of a crime in their own district.



Figure 4.14. Place of the Most Recent Crime Victimization in Peru, 2012

Finally, it might be of interest to know how experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure 75 illustrates trends in self-reported crime victimization in Peru between 2006 and 2012. Note, however, that the text of the questions measuring crime victimization changed in 2010. Between 2004 and 2008, LAPOP used **VIC1**, which read: "*Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?*" In 2010 and 2012, this was replaced with **VIC1EXT**, which provided more detail on the types of crimes that may have occurred. This modification was intended to increase the validity of responses. The change in wording of the crime victimization questions might account for the jump in victimization reported between 2008 and 2010.



Figure 4.15. Crime Victimization Over Time in Peru, 2006-2012

Overall, we find a very high perception of insecurity and self-reported crime victimization. However, the rate of homicide, and in general the violence associated with crime, is not as high in Peru when compared with other countries of the Americas. If we analyze the type of crime that the respondent reports to have been victim of, we see that theft is the most frequent form of victimization. This differentiates Peru from other countries such as Honduras and Venezuela, where half of the self-reported victims report to have encountered aggravated theft (that is, using weapons, see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Type of Delinquent Act in the Countries of the Americas

	País												
	Ecuador	Perú	Bolivia	México	Uruguay	Argentina	Colombia	Guatemala	Haití	Venezuela	Rep. Dom.	Honduras	
Hurto	28.0	34.9	36.7	20.3	48.2	26.2	24.1	22.7	12.6	17.9	32.5	14.2	
Robo con amenaza / violencia	17.1	19.6	17.8	11.3	9.8	14.2	11.1	15.0	17.3	14.8	9.1	16.3	
Robo con arma	33.3	17.0	16.9	24.9	10.1	28.7	41.3	40.3	31.6	50.0	31.8	50.4	
Robo de casa	11.2	12.0	9.8	9.9	16.0	14.8	7.3	4.8	7.1	5.9	13.6	4.3	
Daño a la propiedad	3.1	1.7	2.7	6.4	8.9	6.6	1.9	1.9	1.4	1.7	2.8	4.3	
Agresión física	1.9	4.1	6.6	4.3	2.1	3.5	3.5	4.5	8.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	
Extorsión	1.4	7.2	4.4	17.4	0.3	0.3	2.9	7.3	3.4	2.1	3.5	2.1	
Otro	4.0	3.6	5.1	5.5	4.7	5.7	7.9	3.5	18.0	3.1	2.1	4.3	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Base	(421)	(418)	(409)	(345)	(338)	(317)	(315)	(313)	(294)	(290)	(286)	(282)	

	País												
	Costa Rica	El Salvador	Trin. y Tobago	Brasil	Paraguay	Surinam	Chile	Nicaragua	Belice	Jamaica	Guyana	Panamá	Total
Hurto	41.6	22.0	24.7	16.7	26.2	33.5	50.5	25.1	31.7	34.6	24.8	24.0	28.2
Robo con amenaza / violencia	8.2	14.7	12.3	5.7	10.2	9.2	5.7	13.8	14.6	9.4	20.7	9.6	13.3
Robo con arma	30.7	29.3	24.3	39.8	27.1	13.8	8.1	31.8	11.0	13.4	20.7	34.6	28.1
Robo de casa	7.4	5.4	10.2	11.8	20.9	32.1	12.9	8.7	23.8	12.6	12.4	11.5	11.4
Daño a la propiedad	6.2	1.9	3.4	1.6	7.6	1.4	5.7	2.6	1.2	3.9	3.3	9.6	3.7
Agresión física	3.1	3.9	8.9	5.7	4.0	1.8	7.1	6.2	8.5	7.9	7.4	2.9	4.7
Extorsión	0.0	15.4	3.0	5.3	0.9	1.8	1.4	2.1	0.0	1.6	1.7	1.0	4.0
Otro	2.7	7.3	13.2	13.4	3.1	6.4	8.6	9.7	9.1	16.5	9.1	6.7	6.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Base	(257)	(259)	(235)	(246)	(225)	(218)	(210)	(195)	(164)	(127)	(121)	(104)	(6481)

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

Figure 4.16 depicts the results of a logistic regression model assessing who is likely to be a victim of crime in Peru. In this and all other regression charts, we standardize all variables. As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.



Figure 4.16. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Peru

The results show that those who live in large cities, the youth, and students are more likely to be victims of a crime.

Figure 4.17 shows the relationship between age and crime victimization: younger respondents exhibit a higher propensity to be victims of crime. In this figure we have recodified the original age variable into groups to better observe the trend. It is important to remember that the 18-24 age group is the largest segment in the sample and the largest among the Peruvian population 18-years-old and older.[128] Figure 4.18 shows the bivariate relationship between the other independent variables that emerge as statistically significant in the logistic regression and crime victimization in Peru. The most

[128] Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática. Censo de población y vivienda 2007.

affected population are those who reside in Lima and medium and large cities and, in occupational terms, students.



Figure 4.17. Predicted Probabilities of Crime Victimization by Age



Figure 4.18. Crime Victimization by Size of Town and Occupation

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high rates of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perceptions of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in Peru? We now turn to a multivariate linear regression which estimates the impacts victimization and insecurity have on support for the political system. Figure 4.19 depicts the impacts of perceptions of and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.[129] As in previous years, the perceptions of insecurity and corruption, rather than actual victimization, are associated with a lower level of system support. However, when other variables are added to the model, this initial relationship disappears.



Figure 4.19. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Peru

Although in an expanded model the relationship between the perceptions of corruption and insecurity and system support stop being significant, we show in Figure 4.20 their bivariate relationship. As we can see, those with higher levels of perception of insecurity and those who believe that corruption is somewhat or very common among public officials tend to have a lower level of system support.

[129] System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.



Figure 4.20. Crime, Corruption, and System Support in Peru

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section addresses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is often conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.[130] Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, those that perceive higher levels of crime and those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.[131] To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
(1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

In addition, we consider the following question that probes the strength with which respondents agree or disagree with the use of vigilante justice in case the state does not punish criminals.

E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove? 0=strongly disapproves, 100= strongly approves

Figure 4.21 shows the percent of citizens who, in each country of the Americas in 2012, proffered support for the rule of law, as opposed to those who believe that in some occasions the police and authorities can act above the law. The highest levels of support for the rule of law are found in Jamaica and Venezuela with 74.9 and 74.2 percent, respectively. Conversely, the lowest levels of support are found in Bolivia and Ecuador with 53.3 and 54.8 percent, respectively. Peru ranks closer to the bottom because the confidence intervals indicate that there is no significant difference between

[130] See O'Donnell, Guillermo. 2004. "Why the Rule of Law Matters". *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

[131] Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBarometer Insight Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

Peru, on one hand, and Bolivia and Ecuador, on the other. Likewise, we include in Figure 4.21 the distribution of the disapproval of vigilante justice, and we observe that Peru also is placed towards the bottom. The average regional disapproval for vigilante justice is 70 and Peru's average is 64.5. It is interesting to note there is not always a correspondence in the country's positions in each of these two distributions, but we do find that three Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) and El Salvador do consistently rank among the bottom countries in terms of support for rule of law and disapproval of vigilante justice.



Figure 4.21. Percentage Supporting Rule of Law in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 4.22 depicts the levels of support for rule of law across time in Peru. What we find is an increase in this support in relation to 2010.



Figure 4.22. Support for the Rule of Law over Time in Peru

Finally, this section ends with the analysis of the determinants of support for the rule of law in Peru. Figure 4.23 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis used to identify these factors in explaining both support for rule of law and disapproval for vigilante justice. In the first case is a logistic regression, in the second case a linear regression.

Two variables emerge as statistically significant in the first analysis: age and support for military coups to deal with crime.[132] None of the variables of perception of or corruption and crime victimization emerge as statistically significant, even before we include political variables.

On the other hand, in the case of disapproval of vigilante justice, we find that, in addition to age and the justification of a military coup, the size of the town and the perception of corruption emerge as significant predictors of this attitude.

[132] An initial analysis was performed using the overall support for coups variable but the bivariate relationship turned out to be rather weak, so we decided to use the variable support for coups to deal with crime and corruption.



Figure 4.23. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Peru

Figure 4.24 shows in greater detail some of the independent variables that are associated with support for the rule of law. It is worth mentioning that the older the respondent the less willing he or she is to undermine the rule of law. Similarly, those who refuse to justify a military coup to deal to confront crime are more likely to endorse rule of law.



Figure 4.24. Factors Associated with Support for the Rule of Law in Peru

VII. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the magnitude and impact of victimization by crime and corruption, as well as the perceptions of insecurity and corruption among public authorities, on support for the political system and rule of law in Peru. As economic growth continues in Peru, the economy recedes in people's minds as an urgent problem and others take its place as the country's most pressing issue, such crime and insecurity and, to a lesser degree, corruption.

In terms of corruption, we find again a widespread perception that corruption among public officials is common. Victimization by corruption in Peru, however, is not among the highest in the region. We do find the tolerance for corruption has decreased, and those with the highest tolerance for it are precisely those who have been affected by it. Those likely to be victims of corruption tend to be men, have higher levels of education, have Quechua or some other indigenous language as their mother tongue, and nonwhites.

We also find that, again, Peru ranks among the top places in perception of insecurity and crime victimization. What distinguishes Peru from other countries that exhibit similar high levels of insecurity and crime is that delinquency in Peru is less violent than in the other countries with high crime and insecurity. Those more likely to be affected by crime are the youth, the residents of metropolitan Lima, student, and residents of large and medium-size cities.

The perception of corruption and the perception of insecurity have an impact on support for the political system in Peru, as long as do not include additional economic and political variables in the regression model.

The percent of respondents who support rule of law, measured as the rejection of the idea that authorities can act above the law to capture criminals, has improved in relation to 2010, although this support is still among the lowest among the countries of the Americas. Two variables influence this support: age and the refusal to justify a military coup to deal with extensive crime. We also study support for rule of law by measuring the degree of disapproval for vigilante justice; in this case, Peru is also below the regional average in terms of commitment to rule of law.

VIII. Appendixes to Chapter 4: Results of the Regression Analysis

Table 4.2. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	-0.084	(-1.61)
Mujer	-0.251*	(-4.12)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.232*	-3.16
Lengua materna	-0.227*	(-3.47)
Años de educación aprobados	0.201*	-2.71
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.006	(-0.08)
Indígena	0.167	-1.59
Afroperuana	0.151	-1.86
Blanca	-0.06	(-0.46)
Mestiza	0.101	-0.63
Constante	-0.970*	(-13.97)
F: 5.23 N. de casos: 1497 * p<0.05		

Table 4.3. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.039	-0.56
Edad	-0.235*	(-3.57)
Años de educación aprobados	0.134	-1.69
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.369*	-4.78
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.038	(-0.54)
Tiene trabajo	0.322	-1.57
Estudiante	0.249*	-2.04
Ama de casa	0.141	-0.74
Jubilado/no trabaja	0.093	-0.71
Busca trabajo	0	(.)
Constante	-1.003*	(-13.20)
F: 6.28 N. de casos: 1491 * p<0.05		

Table 4.4. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Peru (a)

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	-0.026	(-1.04)
Mujer	0	(-0.01)
Años de educación aprobados	-0.052	(-1.41)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.012	(-0.25)
Lengua materna	0.034	-0.97
Quintiles de riqueza	0.056	-1.69
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.061*	(-2.21)
Victimización por crimen	-0.047	(-1.53)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.099*	(-3.03)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	-0.046	(-1.67)
Constante	0	-0.01
R-cuadrado: 0.029 N. de casos: 1425 * p<0.05		

Table 4.5. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Peru (b)

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	-0.017	(-0.64)
Mujer	0.051*	-2.38
Años de educación aprobados	-0.045	(-1.36)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.017	(-0.46)
Lengua materna	-0.004	(-0.12)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.011	-0.33
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.041	-1.53
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.038	(-1.44)
Victimización por crimen	-0.025	(-0.93)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.037	(-1.24)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	-0.034	(-1.37)
Situación económica nacional	0.057*	-2.15
Interés en la política	0.076*	-2.46
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.093*	-2.99
Partidos políticos representan bien a sus votantes	0.342*	-10.45
Justificación de un golpe militar	-0.054	(-1.96)
Constante	-0.007	(-0.20)
R-cuadrado: 0.182 N. de casos: 1309 * p<0.05		

Table 4.6. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law (Authorities Should Always Abide by the Law)

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	0.165*	-2.96
Mujer	0.051	-0.96
Lengua materna	-0.093	(-1.09)
Años de educación aprobados	-0.023	(-0.32)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.014	(-0.16)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.056	(-0.77)
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.074	(-1.18)
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	-0.004	(-0.06)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.06	(-0.88)
Victimización por crimen	-0.103	(-1.64)
Confianza en que el Sistema de Justicia castigue al culpable	0.079	-1.41
Interés en la política	0.1	-1.77
Golpe de estado justificado cuando hay mucha delincuencia	-0.258*	(-3.16)
Golpe de estado justificado cuando hay mucha corrupción	0.104	-1.44
Apoyo al sistema	0.12	-1.87
Constante	0.315*	-4.01
F: 3.69 N. de casos: 1341 * p<0.05		

Table 4.7. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law (Vigilante Justice)

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	0.084*	-3.3
Mujer	0.001	-0.02
Lengua materna	0.008	-0.21
Años de educación aprobados	0.064	-1.74
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.168*	-3.46
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.039	(-1.01)
Percepción de la corrupción	0.086*	-2.77
Porcentaje que ha sido víctima de corrupción	-0.035	(-1.26)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.033	(-1.00)
Victimización por crimen	-0.034	(-1.20)
Confianza en que el Sistema de Justicia castigue al culpable	-0.004	(-0.13)
Interés en la política	-0.070*	(-2.37)
Golpe de estado justificado cuando hay mucha delincuencia	-0.108*	(-3.07)
Golpe de estado justificado cuando hay mucha corrupción	-0.110*	(-3.50)
Apoyo al sistema	0.057	-1.88
Constante	-0.018	(-0.40)
R-cuadrado: 0.098		
N. de casos: 1354		
* p<0.05		

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,[133] others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.[134] Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.[135]

In LAPOP studies using *AmericasBarometer* data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.[136] While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the *AmericasBarometer* survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.[137] This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians' proximity to citizens' policy preferences have an important effect on citizens' attitudes about the political system.[138] Institutional variables have also

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[133] Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial; Przeworski Adam. 1999. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense," en Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, y Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P.1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

[134] Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A.2000. "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America". *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. y Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[135] See also Almond, Gabriel Abraham y Sidney Verba. 1963 *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

[136] Easton, David. 1975."A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29.

[137] Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

[138] Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World*, 1950-1990, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008. "Income and Democracy," *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian, 2011. "Public

been shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.[139]

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.[140] In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.[141]

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."[142] Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.[143] Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,[144] authoritarian personality,[145] and religion.[146] At the

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support for liberal democracy," *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and S tephen Whitefield, 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

[139] Anderson, Christopher. 2007. *Losers' consent : elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. y Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

[140] Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[141] Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[142] Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," 5. *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, 2.

[143] Gibson, James L. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L.2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," American Journal of Political Science 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L. 1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L.1995. "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

[144] Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, y Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. y Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How*

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.[147] Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.[148] LAPOP-affiliated researchers using *AmericasBarometer* data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.[149]

Research by Golebiouwska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.[150] It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in Table 1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Terrorist Threats Affect the Public, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al..2005 "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 : 593-608; Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino, y Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978.

[145] Altemeyer Bob. 2007., *The Authoritarians*.

[146] Postic, Robert K.2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest, 2007); Stouffer, Samuel A.1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc.).

[147] Sidanius, Jim y Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[148] Peffley, Mark y Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi- level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257.

[149] Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[150] Golebiouwska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 *AmericasBarometer* data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.[151]

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's "system support" index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the *AmericasBarometer* survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read***:* If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Peru?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Peru?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Peru?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Peru?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas?

In Figure 5.1 we present the levels of political support in our study in 2012. In none of these countries the mean value of support reaches 65, which suggests a situation of political discontent. In Peru, the mean value is almost at the midpoint of the scale. This value is, in fact, an improvement over what it was registered in previous years, when support for the political system in Peru was among the lowest in the region.

[151] Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations.* New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).



Figure 5.1. Support for the Political System in the Countries of the Americas

Support for the political system is usually higher in some of the individual items that are part of the index. Figure 5.2 depicts the levels of support for each of the five components of system support. As one would expect, the lowest support is found in relation to the question whether the courts guarantee a fair trial. Conversely, the highest levels of support are to be found in the questions regarding generalized respect for the political institutions and whether one should support the system.



Figure 5.2. Components of Support for the Political System in Peru

In relation to the evolution of the overall support across time, Figure 5.3 shows a positive trend: the levels of system support, which were very low in previous years, have begun to inch up progressively. Although the degree of support is still mid-to-low in 2012, this is a much better position than the one reported in previous years.



Figure 5.3. Support for the Political System over Time in Peru

III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the Americas Barometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Peruvian form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Peruvian form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?



Figure 5.4. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas

As with all LAPOP indexes, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance. Political tolerance is very unequally distributed in the Americas (Figure 5.4). In some countries the mean values of tolerance exceed 60 whereas in others, such as Peru, they are lower than 45, which indicate very low levels of tolerance.

In Figure 5.5 we report the scores of each of the four components of the index of political tolerance in Peru. The only instance in which respondents in Peru show a slightly higher level of tolerance is in the case of allowing peaceful demonstrations by those who always criticize the system of government.



Figure 5.5. Components of Political Tolerance in Peru

How has political tolerance evolved over time in Peru? Figure 5.6 shows the mean values of political tolerance in Peru for each of the *AmericasBarometer* rounds since 2006. What we find is worrisome: basically, political tolerance in has steady declined in the last six years in Peru, reaching its lowest point in the 2012 round.



Figure 5.6. Political Tolerance over Time in Peru

What factors influence the levels of political tolerance in Peru? In Figure 5.7 we offer the results of a linear regression analysis that attempts to answer this question. Of the included variables, only two emerge as statistically significant: the degree of support for democracy (greater support, greater tolerance), and the statement that religion is very important in the respondent's life (greater importance of religion, less tolerance).



Figure 5.7. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Peru

Figure 5.8 expands on the results of Figure 5.7, showing the variables of greater theoretical interest and importance in the analysis. We find that greater attitudinal commitment to the idea of democracy is related to increased political tolerance. Likewise, people who assign great importance to religion in their lives tend to have a lower level of political tolerance.



Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Peru

Although political tolerance has decreased in Peru, it is important to note that interpersonal trust, albeit low in comparative terms, has steady increased since 2006, as we can see in Figure 5.9.



Figure 5.9. Interpersonal Trust over Time in Peru

IV. Democratic Stability

As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are critical for democratic stability. In Figure 5.10 we examine the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes.

With the exception of four countries, the percent of respondents who have the combination of high system support and high tolerance is lower than 40 percent in the Americas. In countries such as Ecuador, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Bolivia, Haiti, and Honduras, this support is actually lower than 20 percent. As we can see in the figure, Peru's position is very low in comparative terms. This is due, as we said previously, to the decline of political tolerance in Peru.

How have the attitudes favorable to democratic stability evolved over time in Peru? Figure 5.11 reports the percentage of citizens to proffer high levels of system support and political tolerance since our first 2006 survey. Although the percentage found in 2012 is the lowest of the four rounds of surveys, it is not too different from what we found in 2010.



Figure 5.10. Stable Democratic Attitudes in the Countries of the Americas



Figure 5.11. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in Peru

What are the factors that influence Peruvian citizens' attitudes that are conducive to stable democracy? Figure 5.12 depicts the results of the logistic regression analysis. The only factor that emerges as statistically significant is the degree of support for democracy. This relationship can be seen clearly in Figure 5.13.



Figure 5.12. Determinants of State Democratic Attitudes in Peru



Figure 5.13. Stable Democratic Attitudes and Support for Democracy in Peru

V. The Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in Peru support major political and social institutions? In the *AmericasBarometer*'s 2012 round, we asked about attitudes towards many specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," we asked citizens to respond to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Council?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Assembly?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical**]**?

In Figure 5.14 we examine support for each of these items. As usual in the *AmericasBarometer* report, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100.



Figure 5.14. Trust in Institutions in Peru

How do these results compare with those of previous years in Peru? Figure 5.15 reports the results since 2006. They show that, with one notable exception, the levels of trust are relatively stable over time. The noted important change is the increase in trust in the president, which rose significantly in relation to 2008 and 2010.



Figure 5.15. Trust in Institutions by Year in Peru

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the *AmericasBarometer*, we measure support for democracy by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,[152] and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Miller.[153] The "Churchillian" question again uses a 7 point response scale, this time running from 1 ("Strongly disagree") to 7 ("Strongly agree"):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In Figure 5.16 we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas.

[152] Churchill actually referred to democracy as "the worst form of government except for all the others."

[153] Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.



Figure 5.16. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas

Unlike the case of some of the attitudes previously discussed, we find here that even in the country with the lowest level of support for democracy (Honduras), this support is slightly above the midpoint of the scale. Encouragingly, in the majority of the region's countries the attitudinal commitment to democracy exceeds 70, and in three countries (Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina) that value is above 80. Support for democracy in Peru, when compared with that of the other countries, is very low.

How has support for democracy in Peru changed over time? Figure 5.17 offers a view of these changes since 2006. As it can be seen, the levels of support for democracy remain relatively unchanged in the last six years, hovering about a mean value of 60. Although in 2012 there is an uptick in relation to 2010, the level of support for democracy does not exceed the value found in 2008, which continues to be the highest for the rounds of surveys conducted so far.



Figure 5.17. Support for Democracy over Time in Peru

VII. Conclusion

The findings of this chapter are not encouraging for Peruvian democracy. We find, first, and consistently with what we discovered in previous years, that citizen support for the political system is low, one among the lowest in the region. Second, the data show that the levels of political tolerance are not only low but have actually decreased in recent years. We also find that trust in Peru's political institutions is low, although we do notice in 2012 a strong uptick in citizens' trust in the presidency.

Finally, support for democracy is also low, and we do not find significant changes in this attitude since 2006. The importance of these findings is discussed in a more detailed fashion in Part III of this report.

VIII. Appendixes to Chapter 5: Results of the Regression Analyses

Table 5.2. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Situación económica nacional	-0.024	(-0.72)
Situación económica personal	0.016	-0.55
Percepción de inseguridad	0.006	-0.21
Victimización por crimen	0.034	-1.54
Victimización por corrupción	0.043	-1.4
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	-0.022	(-0.69)
Importancia de la religión	-0.070*	(-2.21)
Apoyo a la democracia	0.148*	-3.77
Años de educación aprobados	0.036	-1
Quintiles de riqueza	0.006	-0.16
Indígena	0.005	-0.09
Afroperuana	0.013	-0.27
Blanca	-0.002	(-0.03)
Mestiza	-0.098	(-1.18)
Mujer	0.009	-0.31
Constante	0	-0.01
R-cuadrado: 0.045 N. de casos: 1376 * p<0.05		

Table 5.3. Determinants of Stable Democratic Attitudes in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Situación económica nacional	0.094	-1.12
Situación económica personal	0.029	-0.32
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.047	(-0.56)
Victimización por crimen	-0.027	(-0.38)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.055	(-0.69)
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	0.065	-0.67
Importancia de la religión	-0.031	(-0.32)
Apoyo a la democracia	0.365*	-3.73
Nivel de educación	0.097	-1.14
Quintiles de riqueza	0.015	-0.16
Mujer	0.055	-0.71
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.101	-1
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.001	-0.01
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.143	-1.59
Interés en la política	0.099	-1.2
Constante	-1.741*	(-19.18)
F: 3.62 N. de casos: 1308 * p<0.05		

Chapter Six: Local Governments

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.[154] This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.[155] Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.[156] Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.[157] Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.[158] However, others argue that local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared.

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[154] Rondinelli, Dennis, John Nellis and Shabbir Cheema.1983. Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, *Management and Development Series* (8): 1-99; p. 9.

[155] Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

[156] Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. *Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia* [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

[157] Akai, Nobuo and Masayo Sakata. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

[158] Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.[159] Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.[160] Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.[161]

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.[162] Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.[163] Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 *AmericasBarometer* data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.[164] Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.[165] Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.[166] So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.[167]

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[159] Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

[160] Willis, Eliza, Christopher Garman, and Stephen Haggard. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7-56.

[161] Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", Working Paper. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés.

[162] Hiskey, Jonathan and Mitchell Seligson. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64-88.

[163] Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

[164] Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[165] Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519-530.

[166] West, Karleen. 2011. The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. *Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University, p. 4

[167] West, ibid; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62; Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.[168] Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.[169] West uses the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.[170] In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: attending town meetings and presenting requests to local offices. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010).We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the *AmericasBarometer* surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.[171] Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.[172] In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.[173] Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.

Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". Latin American Perspectives 36 (4): 101-125.

[168] Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

[169] West, ibid.

[170] Montalvo, Daniel. 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[171] Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4

[172] Montalvo, Daniel. 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

[173] Montalvo, Daniel. 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 *AmericasBarometer* included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
MUNI5. ¿Have you participated in the elaboration of the municipal budget? (1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR

Participation in Municipal Affairs

Figure 6.1 reports the percentage of Peruvian citizens who participated in different ways in the affairs of the local government, writing a petition, attending a meeting, or participating in the budgetary process. What we see is that, overall, participation in local affairs has remained stable over time (from 2006 to 2012). The exception is demand making on local government (Question **NP2**), which declined from 2006 to 2012 (21.2 and 15.7 percent, respectively). In the case of participation in town meetings (Question **NP1**), the percentage of participation varies from 12 to 14.7 percent, and participation in the budgetary process is much lower, reaching only 3.2 percent in 2012.



Figure 6.1. Forms of Municipal Participation in Peru

The *AmericasBarometer* allows us to compare Peru to other countries of the region in two of the types of participation mentioned above: participation in town meetings and submitting requests to the municipality. In Figure 6.2 we show this comparison and observe that Peru occupies a middling position in terms of participation in local affairs. Whereas Haiti, the United States and the Dominican Republic have participation levels bordering 20 percent in 2012, Peru reports about 12 percent, significantly above the 5 percent found in countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Costa Rica.

Attendance to town meetings implies a certain level of commitment of the citizen with his or her local government, and requires allowing time and interest in solving the issues of the community. To determine who are more likely to participate in town meeting we performed a regression analysis. Figure 6.3 depicts the results that show that age, gender, mother tongue, and the size of the town where the respondent lives are statistically significant predictor of this participation.



Figure 6.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas



Figure 6.3. Determinants of Municipal Meeting Participation in Peru

Figure 6.4 shows in greater detail the bivariate relationships between participation in town meetings and the variables that emerge as significant from the logistic regression. Those more likely to participate in town meetings are those over forty years old, those who speak Quechua as mother tongue, and those who participation in communal problem solving.



Figure 6.4. Factors Associated with Municipal Meeting Participation in Peru

Another dimension of the relationship between citizens and their local governments is requesting or demanding help (Question **NP2**). Figure 6.5 shows the percent of people who acknowledge having requested or petitioned their local governments in the year previous to the survey. Peru ranks among the top countries in this type of participation, next to Haiti, which is the countries with the highest level of participation in this activity with 21.3 percent,[174] Uruguay, and El Salvador. At the bottom of the distribution we find Panama, Ecuador, and Venezuela. In 2008 Peru ranked third and in 2010 it occupied a middling position.



Figure 6.5. Demand Making on Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

[174] The case of Haiti is interesting because in 2008 it ranked among the bottom with 9.7 percent, and moved to middling places in 2010, next to Peru, and now, in 2012, ranks at the top.

We have performed a logistic regression analysis to identify the determinants of participation in requesting or petitioning local governments, including the same variables we used to analyze participation in town meetings. We find that age, education and participation in communal problem solving are predictors of this participation (Figure 6.6).



Figure 6.6. Determinants of Demand Making on Local Government in Peru

The bivariate relationships between these variables and petitioning local governments can be found in Figure 6.7. We see that men tend to petition more local governments than women. Also, younger respondents are less active than older citizens. People with either primary or college education are more active than those with just high school. Finally, those who are active in communal problem solving are again more likely to have greater involvement with requesting help from local governments.



Figure 6.7. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government in Peru

Perception of Local Governments

The *AmericasBarometer* in Peru probes some questions that have been asked repeatedly from 2006 to 2012. With them we try to ascertain the perception that citizens have of their participation in local governments and the attitudes of local officials towards them. We ask if they think that the mayor is interested in citizen involvement in municipal affairs (**MUNI15**), if municipal officials pay attention to what people demand in town meetings (**NP1B**), and if they perceive that have any influence in the municipal government does (**MUNI11**). Some of these questions were also asked in Bolivia and El Salvador, but we will analyze only the Peruvian data.

MUNI15. ¿How interested do you think the mayor is in the participation of people in municipal affairs? [Read options]
(3) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (1) Somewhat uninterested (0) Not interested at all
(88) DK (98) NA

NP1B. ¿To what extent do you think the officials of the municipal government pay attention to what people demand in town meetings? They paid attention… [Read options]
(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None at all (88) DK (98) NA

MUNI11. ¿How much influence do you think you have in that the municipal government does? ¿Would you say that you have a lot, somewhat, little, or no influence at all? [Leer options]
(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None at all (88) DK (98) NA

What we see in Figure 6.8 is very interesting because in the four rounds of surveys the mean values have changed very little, with exception of one question. In 2006 the average of the perception of the mayor's interest in people's participation was 40.3 and it fell to 37.1 in 2012, however the difference is not statistically significant. A similar pattern can be found with the perception that municipal officials pay attention to what people demand in town meetings, with the average falling from 32.4 to 29, which is not a significant difference. However, we do find that the perception of the respondent's influence in what the municipality does has increased from 17.5 in 2006 to an average of 22.4 in 2012.



Figure 6.8. Perceptions of Participation in Municipal Affairs, Peru 2006-2012

III. Satisfaction With Services and Treatment of Local Governments

The *AmericasBarometer* also probes respondents about their satisfaction with the services and treatment they receive from their local government. The first question has been asked in previous rounds and second is applied only to Peru and El Salvador.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are [Read options]
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) NA

SGL2. How would you say you or your neighbors have been treated by the municipality when you have gone there to obtain a service? Have you been treated very well, well, neither well nor bad, bad or very bad?
(1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor bad (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) NA

Figure 6.9 reports the mean values of satisfaction with the services and treatment they receive from their local governments. Following the *AmericasBarometer* standard, we recoded the answers to a 0-100 scale, where 0 represents the lowest and 100 the highest level of dissatisfaction. As we can see in the figure, the mean value for the assessment of how citizens have been treated is higher than the average value for the evaluation of the services. However, these variables have not significantly changed over time, which suggest a relatively stable relationship between citizens and local governments.



Figure 6.9. Satisfaction with Local Government Services and Treatment over Time in Peru

Figure 6.10 depicts satisfaction with the services provided by local governments in the countries of the Americas. In the regional context, Canada and Argentina show the highest average of satisfaction with the services of local governments, with scores of 59.5 and 59.1, respectively. On the other end of the distribution, Haiti and Jamaica report the lowest level of satisfaction with municipal services, with scores of 37.6 and 42.3 respectively. Peru ranks in the lower third of the distribution, with a mean value of 46.9.



Figure 6.10. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas

In the Peruvian case, the provision of some local services such as roads, schools and health clinics is more the responsibility of the central and regional governments than local ones, but it is conceivable that citizens' assessments of their local municipalities are influenced by their degree of satisfaction with these services. Figure 6.11 shows the levels of satisfaction with the condition of the roads and schools as well as health services in the Americas. The average score of satisfaction with the condition of the roads in Peru is 49.5, very similar to regional average. In the case of schools, Peru reports a mean value of 47.3, which is significantly below the regional mean (53.7). Finally, in terms of satisfaction with the provision of public health, the Peruvian mean is 43.7 where the regional average is 47.7.



Figure 6.11. Satisfaction with Roads, Public Education, and Public Health in the Countries of the Americas

Lastly, we are interested in knowing the factors that determine the evaluation of municipal services. To do so, we perform a regression analysis. Initially we include only demographic factors in the model. A second model includes political variables and others related to the municipal governments that could be relevant. In the first analysis the only statistically significant variables are age and socio-economic status. However, both of them ceased to be significant when other variables are introduced in the model. In the second model we include variables that measure satisfaction with

the conditions of roads, schools, and health services to see if they affect the respondent's overall satisfaction with local government services. In a similar vein, given than some studies have shown the impact of corruption and insecurity in the respondent's assessments of local governments, we include these variables in the model. Finally, we also add variables related to the evaluation of the treatment received by, and trust and participation in local governments. As Figure 6.12 shows, the inclusion of new variables changes the initial results and the only factors that emerge as statistically significant are: trust in the proper handling of municipal funds by the authorities, the perception of citizen influence in the municipality, the perception that the municipality pays attention to its citizens, and perception of the treatment received by local governments.



Figure 6.12. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Peru

Figure 6.13 shows the bivariate relationships that emerge from the regression analysis: those who have greater trust in the handling of municipal funds by its authorities tend to have more satisfaction with its services; those who believe that the municipal government pays attention to what people want and those who state to have been treated well by the local government exhibit greater satisfaction with its services. This means that people do not necessarily have to visit the municipality or have dealings with it to have a good opinion of them; trust and good treatment are key factors for a good evaluation of local services.



Figure 6.13. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Selected Municipal Variables

Trust in Local Governments

In the 2012 *AmericasBarometer*, we asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted that government. This question may tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government.

B32. To what extent do you have trust in (municipality)?
MUNI6. To what extent do you trust that the municipal funds are properly handled by the municipal government? [Read options]
(3) A lot of trust (2) Some trust (1) Little trust (0) No trust (88) DK (98) NA

The first question we analyze here has been repeatedly asked in previous rounds, and assesses trust in local government. The second question has been used for Peru, and deals with trust in the use of municipal funds. Both questions were recoded on a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparison. Figure 6.14 show that trust in municipal governments is higher than trust that its funds will be properly handled.

The levels of trust on municipal government have remained mostly unchanged in recent years, and so have trust in the handling of funds, although we did see an uptick of this trust in 2010.



Figure 6.14. Trust in Local Government in Peru

Figure 6.15 shows that average levels of trust in local governments in the countries of the Americas. El Salvador, Venezuela, and Chile report the highest levels of trust: 60.9, 59.4, and 58.4, respectively. On the other end of the distribution, we find Haiti, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago with mean values of 35.3, 41.2, and 41.9. What calls our attention is that Haiti and Peru are two countries with the highest proportion of people declaring to have requested help or petitioned local governments.



Figure 6.15. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

Even though the levels of trust in local government are very low in comparison with other countries in the Americas, the municipality is not the institution with less trust in Peru. Among the key state institutions, the ones with the highest levels are the presidency and armed forces (52.9 and 52, respectively). Trust in local governments is similar to the trust found for regional governments,[175] the system of justice, and the police. The lowest level of citizen trust is for Congress.

[175] The average of trust in regional governments, in the rest of the country without including metropolitan Lima, is 39.8.



Figure 6.16. Trust in Local Government in Comparison with Other Institutions

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As we argued in the introduction of this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government except for local government. As a result, perceptions of local government may have an important impact on attitudes towards the political system more generally. In Figure 6.17 we develop a linear regression model to examine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in Peru, while controlling for many other factors that may affect system support, such as the justification of military coups, the view that parties don't represent people, the evaluation of the government's efficacy, and approval of the president. Along with some of these variables, satisfaction with local services has a positive impact on system support.



Figure 6.17. Satisfaction with Local Services as Determinant of System Support in Peru

In Figure 6.18 we depict the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and system support. As it can be seen, those who are satisfied with these services tend to have a greater support for the political system.



Figure 6.18. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Peru

V. Conclusion

Overall, we find a relative stable situation in people's attitudes and participation in local governments, which values that have remained mostly unchanged since 2006.

The levels of participation in town meetings are not very high in Peru; however, the country ranks in a middling position in the region in this respect. Where Peru does rank very high, along with Haiti, is in terms of requesting or petitioning local governments. We find that men and older citizens are more likely to participate in local government, which is similar to the profile of those who engage more in communal problem solving.

Satisfaction with local services is relatively low in Peru when compared with other countries. Even though a small group of respondents does participate and is engaged in municipal affairs –for instance, three percent of respondents participate in the elaboration of the municipal budget– what we find is that satisfaction with local services is influenced by the perception of how funds are handled by municipal authorities, the treatment they receive in their dealings with local government, and by how much influence they think they have in municipal affairs. Unlike previous years, we find an increase in the perception of influence citizens have in the affairs of their local government.

Trust in the municipality is among the lowest in the region, and this has remained unchanged in relation to 2010. In this year, as in the previous round, this low trust is associated with low trust in state and political institutions in general and with low system support. Again, satisfaction with local services has an important impact on the overall levels of system support.

VI. Appendix to Chapter Six: Regression Analysis Results

Table 6.1. Determinants of Municipal Meeting Participation in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	0.454*	-6.45
Mujer	-0.135	(-1.64)
Lengua materna	-0.156	(-1.97)
Años de educación aprobados	0.093	-0.95
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.459*	(-4.30)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.09	(-0.77)
Participa en la comunidad	0.388*	-4.52
Solicitó ayuda a una autoridad local	0.281*	-3.8
Firmó una petición	0.203*	-2.92
Constante	-2.368*	(-22.09)
F: 11.92 N. de casos: 1419 * p<0.05		

Table 6.2. Determinants of Demand Making on Local Governments in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	0.246*	-3.48
Mujer	-0.129*	(-1.99)
Lengua materna	-0.036	(-0.48)
Años de educación aprobados	0.186*	-2.22
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.158	(-1.60)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.019	(-0.22)
Participación en la comunidad	0.475*	-6.39
Constante	-1.802*	(-18.35)
F: 9.97 N. de casos: 1441 * p<0.05		

Table 6.3. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Peru (Only Sociodemographic Variables)

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	-0.080*	(-2.82)
Mujer	-0.006	(-0.24)
Lengua materna	0	0
Años de educación aprobados	-0.036	(-1.19)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.035	-0.86
Quintiles de riqueza	0.111*	-3.18
Constante	0.001	-0.02
R-cuadrado: 0.018		
N. de casos: 1429		
* p<0.05		

Table 6.4. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Peru (With Municipal Variables)

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Edad	-0.02	(-0.78)
Mujer	-0.011	(-0.48)
Lengua materna	0.005	-0.19
Años de educación aprobados	-0.001	(-0.03)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.041	-1.39
Quintiles de riqueza	0.023	-0.81
Participa en la comunidad	0.038	-1.67
Satisfacción con las carreteras	-0.005	(-0.17)
Satisfacción con las escuelas públicas	0.048	-1.42
Satisfacción con servicios de salud públicos	0.037	-1.13
Percepción de la corrupción	-0.032	(-1.27)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.037	(-1.31)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	-0.019	(-0.73)
Confianza en manejo de fondos del municipio	0.181*	-5.89
Percepción de influencia ciudadana en la municipalidad	0.088*	-3.03
Municipalidad atiende pedidos ciudadanos	0.129*	-4.24
Evaluación del trato recibido en la municipalidad	0.370*	-10.44
Constante	-0.009	(-0.31)
R-cuadrado: 0.367		
N. de casos: 1064		
* p<0.05		

Part III:
Beyond Equality of Opportunities

Chapter Seven: The Role of the State and Public Opinion

I. Introduction

The debate about the role of the state in Peru reignited in the early 2000s in the wake of the fall of the Fujimori regime. The Fujimori government (1990-2000) confronted the possible collapse of the state both in economic (the fiscal deficit and hyperinflation were a constant feature in the late 1980s) and political (given the growing strength of Shining Path) terms, in a context where the state was widely characterized as inefficient and corrupt. After the 1992 self-coup, Fujimori deepened the free market model as a possible solution to these crises. With the reform the state recovered strength in specific sectors. Thus the first "islands of efficiency" in the country were generated: sectors and institutions within the state—generally linked to the financial sector or the regulation of public services—that were modernized with support of international organizations.[176] Simultaneously, a whole machinery of assistance to the poor was generated through focalized state programs.

The economic reforms implemented by President Fujimori placed Peru as one of the countries that were aggressive in adopting the "Washington Consensus".[177] The restructuring of the economy and the state participation in it were significant. The economic model fostered by the military government of Juan Velasco Alvarado was completely dismantled. Not only was the state participation in the economy was reduced through the privatization of diverse public enterprises but also the commercial policy of the country was reformed, opening it to the world economy. In this context, similar to the one found in many Latin American countries, some academics proclaimed the end of the "state-centric matrix".[178]

The generalized corruption of the Fujimori regime, the economic crisis, and the low-grade performance of the state (particularly in the provision of public services) brought about a paradigmatic change in the role of the state, after his government ended in a dramatic fashion in 2000. The state begins to adopt a public discourse assigning itself a central role in wealth redistribution –contrary to the anti-state rhetoric of the 1990s– and that leads to a growing interest in its dynamics and possibilities of improvement.[179] However, the lack of fiscal resources means that many projects of state reform –vetoed during the Fujimori years– cannot be pursued, especially during the first years of the democratic transition. In similar vein, civil society actors, and the citizenry more generally, begin to be increasingly included in the discussion about the goals of public policies and are involved in their follow up through participatory and decentralization mechanisms (approaches that would further empower the discourse of wealth redistribution). Nevertheless, the Alejandro Toledo administration

[176] Cortázar, Juan Carlos. 2008. La Reforma de la Administración Pública Peruana (1990–97) Conflicto y estrategias divergentes en la elaboración de políticas. XIII Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 4 - 7 nov. 2008

[177] Corrales, Javier. 2003 "Market Reforms". In Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter (eds.), *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. Second Edition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 74-99.

[178] Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 2002. "La transformación de la acción colectiva en América Latina". *Revista de la CEPAL*. No. 76, pp. 7-24.

[179] Vich, Víctor (ed.) 2005. *El Estado está de vuelta: desigualdad, diversidad y democracia*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos

(2001-2006) focused its attention on reactivating the economy as the main state goal, which did not allow to design of long-term redistributive policies.

In the mid-2000s, and more specifically in the midst of the 2006 electoral contest, the issue of social inclusion –understood as wealth redistribution led by the state in favor of the poor– emerged as a priority in a country that no longer endured economic stagnation and where extractive industries obtained large profits. Clearly, the emergence of this issue was related to the increase in state resources and the macroeconomic stability.[180]

The electoral success of the left in Latin America seemed to signal a return to attitudes more favorable to state intervention. According to Corrales, "Both the former populist and the traditional leftist parties have begun to shift back to more statist electoral platforms, and new political movements expressing market discontent have emerged."[181] It seems, then, that the pendulum has moved to positions more favorable to the state. For some, as Yusuke Murakami,[182] the worsening of the social and economic conditions in the region have "led Latin American countries to revise the neoliberal line", which would imply that we are now in a "postliberal period". Adrianzén characterizes the current moment as "the return of the state."[183]

According to some scholars,[184] Peruvians seem to have a "mixed" position on the role of the state. On one hand, macroeconomic stability and respect for private investment is valued, but on the other hand they demand state intervention in areas considered critical, such as education and health (areas where the profit motive associated with private activity is stigmatized). This scenario is clearly divided if we look at the subnational level, especially if we contrast metropolitan Lima with the Andean regions. This has led some to speak of a "neodualist" Peru,[185] with an important "modern" sector (post-state in Vergara's words) linked to the globalization process and whose agenda transcends state interventionism, and "traditional" sector that demands state attention in the provision of public services.

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[180] Tanaka, Martín. 2001. *Participación popular en políticas sociales. Cuándo puede ser democrática y eficiente y cuándo todo lo contrario*. Lima, Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social (CIES) - Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

[181] Corrales, Javier. 2008 "The Backlash against Market Reforms in Latin America in the 2000s". In Jorge Domínguez and Michael Shifter (eds.), *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. Third Edition.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, pp. 39-71.

[182] Murakami, Yusuke. 2012. *Perú en la era del chino. La Política no institucionalizada y el pueblo en busca de un salvador. 2ª edición*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

[183] Adrianzén, Alberto. 2010. "El regreso del estado". In Alberto Adrianzén and others. *El Estado en debate*. Lima: PNUD, 2010.

[184] Vergara, Alberto 2007. *Ni amnésicos ni irracionales. Las elecciones peruanas de 2006 en perspectiva histórica*. Lima: Solar.

[185] Tanaka, Martín and Sofía Vera. 2010. "Perú: la dinámica 'neodualista' de una democracia sin sistema de partidos". In: Maxwell Cameron and Juan Pablo Luna, eds., *Democracia en la región andina: diversidad y desafíos*. Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2010 (p. 197-242).

II. Public Opinion on the Role of the State

To understand in greater detail citizen attitudes towards the role of the state in the economy and society, the *AmericasBarometer* asked the following questions:

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7.
ROS1. The Peruvian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS2. The Peruvian government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS3. The Peruvian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS4. The Peruvian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS6. The Peruvian government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The distribution of the answers to these questions is reported in Figure 7.1. We find that there is in the Peruvian public a marked preference for an active state. In four of the five questions the mean value of the index exceeds 70, and in one question it is over 80, which indicates a tendency to accept a greater participation of the state in key areas of society. The question that generates less support for state intervention is the one that asks whether the state should be the owner of the most important industries of the country.



Figure 7.1. Attitudes towards the Role of the State in Peru

How do these attitudes compare with the ones found in other countries of the region? Are Peruvians more or less inclined to state intervention in the economy and society than other Latin Americans? To answer these questions we built an index of attitudes towards the state that ranges from

0 to 100, where the maximum value represents the most pro-state attitude. The distribution of the mean values for each country of the Americas is shown in Figure 7.2. Even though the prevalent attitudes in Peru are favorable to a more active state intervention, we can clearly see that, in comparative terms, these attitudes are not that strong. For instance, the mean value of the index for Peru is 76.8, where in 14 countries of the region that value is 80 or more.



Figure 7.2. Attitudes towards the Role of the State in the Countries of the Americas

Despite the impression that the election of Ollanta Humala in 2011 reflects a statist turn in Peruvian's attitudes the truth is that people's opinions towards the role of the state have been relatively stable in recent years. Figure 7.3 shows the evolution of this index between 2008 and 2012. Clearly, the attitudes do not change much.



Figure 7.3. Attitudes towards the Role of the State over Time in Peru

What factors distinguish those who have a more pro-state attitude from those who favor the market more? The regression analysis shows that the degree on interest in politics, the level of support for democracy and crime victimization influence this attitude. Surprisingly, ideology (being left- or right-wing) does not affect the respondent's attitude towards the role of the state (Figure 7.4).



Figure 7.4. Determinants of the Attitudes towards the Role of the State in Peru

In Figure 7.5 we illustrate how these variables are related to the attitudes towards the role of the state: an increase in interest in politics is correlated with a more favorable attitude towards the state; likewise, people who are more supportive of democracy also support a more active state; the same occurs among those who have been victim of a crime.



Figure 7.5. Factors Associated with Attitudes towards the Role of the State in Peru

III. Multilevel Analysis of the Role of the State

As one can expect, attitudes towards the role of the state are not the same across the Peruvian territory. We can suggest, as a hypothesis, that regions with greater social and economic deficits are more incline to accept a greater role of the state in the economy and society. The new sampling design utilized in this round of the *AmericasBarometer* allows us to perform a multilevel analysis of these attitudes in Peru. In this particular case, we want to examine to what extent contextual factors (such as the district's socioeconomic condition, measured through the district's Human Development Index)[186] influence citizen attitudes towards this issue.

A previous analysis of attitudes towards the role of the state by municipalities in Peru indicates that 30.3 percent of the variance in the index that measures attitudes towards the state can be attributed

[186] This indicator is a composite of a series of data that measure the quality of life and educational attainment. A full explanation for how is this index calculated can be found in http://www.pnud.org.pe/data/publicacion/idh2009vol2-09anexos.pdf

to the differences in the municipalities' HDI that were included in the sample.[187] Given this strong influence, we can recalculate the regression analysis reported in Figure 7.4, including this type the district or municipality HDI as an additional determinant. The results are reported in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Multilevel Analysis of Attitudes towards the Role of the State

Rol del Estado	*Coeficiente*	*Error Estándar*	*z*	*P>z*
IDH municipal	-52.7192	26.19038	-2.01	0.044
Percepción de la economía nacional	-.0143281	.0286284	-0.50	0.617
Percepción de la economía personal	-.0278444	.0324689	-0.86	0.391
Percepción de inseguridad	-.0257903	.0184794	-1.40	0.163
Víctima de delincuencia	.0350536	.0105668	3.32	0.001
Víctima de corrupción	. 213135	.0106641	2.00	0.046
Importancia de la religión	-.0031532	.0177425	-0.18	0.859
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	.0330718	.020977	1.58	0.115
Apoyo a la democracia	.1151236	.0205517	5.60	0.000
Nivel de educación	.2313452	.7621218	0.30	0.761
Quintiles de riqueza	-.4176774	.4037883	-1.03	0.301
Indígena	-4.378713	3.152735	-1.39	0.165
Afroperuano	-1.877312	4.301487	-0.44	0.663
Blanco	-1.313873	2.992004	-0.44	0.661
Mestizo	-1.492312	2.6112	-0.57	0.568
Mujer	.6852146	.9816925	0.70	0.485
Tamaño de la localidad	-1.80486	1.327565	-1.36	0.174
Interés en la política	.028182	.0175843	1.60	0.109
Apoyo al sistema	.0579454	.0270702	2.14	0.032
Ideología	-.0718065	.2390194	-0.30	0.764
Constante	103.9544	19.0066	5.47	0.000
Parámetros de efectos aleatorios	*Estimado*	*Error Estándar*		
municipio: Identity				
var(_cons)	111.0227	22.938		
var(Residual)	248.4205	10.47308		

The results confirm our hypothesis. The lower the value of a municipality's HDI, the greater the support for a more active state in the economy and society.

In conclusion, we see that there is a relatively favorable attitude towards the state in Peru, with the only exception of the state possession of the most important industries of the country. On the other hand, we find that support for the state in Peru is not as high as the one registered in other countries in the region.

[187] The variance in the index of role of the state among municipalities is 116.322, whereas the variance among individuals is 267.9595. The correlation coefficient among groups (CCG) is therefore 0.3026 (116.322/16.322+267.9595), which implies that 30.3 percent of the variance in the attitudes towards the state is due to the existing differences among municipalities.

IV. Appendix to Chapter Seven: Results of the Regression Analysis

Table 7.2. Determinants of Attitudes towards the Role of the State in Peru

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Situación económica nacional	-0.018	(-0.57)
Situación económica personal	-0.041	(-1.15)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.041	(-1.10)
Victimización por crimen	0.113*	(3.83)
Victimización por corrupción	0.046	(1.50)
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	-0.006	(-0.18)
Importancia de la religión	0.065	(1.84)
Apoyo a la democracia	0.180*	(4.16)
Años de educación aprobados	-0.005	(-0.14)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.022	(-0.59)
Indígena	-0.067	(-1.37)
Afroperuana	0.005	(0.13)
Blanca	-0.028	(-0.55)
Mestiza	-0.036	(-0.62)
Mujer	0.010	(0.36)
Tamaño del lugar	-0.087	(-1.54)
Interés en la política	0.069*	(2.11)
Apoyo al sistema	0.049	(1.38)
Ideología	-0.020	(-0.78)
Constante	-0.009	(-0.18)
R-cuadrado: 0.083 N. de casos: 1208 * p<0.05		

Chapter Eight: Social Conflicts

I. Introduction

The issue of social conflicts is associated, as Arce[188] holds, to the debates of "contentious politics". In the definition of its most notable students, "Contentious politics consists of public, collective making of consequential claims by connected clusters of persons on other clusters of persons or on major political actors when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to the claims".[189] According to them, contentious politics share certain characteristics that make it possible: a) political opportunity structures, b) collective actors, and, c) performance and repertoires of action. In the theory of contentious politics they propose, five distinct mechanisms explain their origin, development, and success or failure. These mechanisms are: brokerage, change of identities and creation of borders, cooptation, diffusion, and repression.

The theme of social conflicts (the use of street protests and nonconventional forms of political participation to press demands against the state) emerges as a problematic in Peru with greater force in the context of regime change in 2000. Even though protests have been routine forms of collective action since the beginning of the 20th century (as in the rest of the western world)[190], it is only since 2000[191] that they are utilized as mechanisms of direct action in Peru, taking the place of the existing institutional mechanisms (such as parliamentary action or the use of participatory mechanisms).[192] This development is to certain extent surprising, given the favorable context to political participation opened as a result of the democratic transition (which sought to include citizens in the decision making process). Clearly, these mechanisms were overcome by a more sweeping phenomenon, as we explain later.

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[188] Arce, Moisés. 2010. "Algunos apuntes sobre los movimientos y protestas sociales en el Perú," In *La iniciación de la política: El Perú en perspectiva comparada*, Carlos Meléndez y Alberto Paniagua, (eds.) Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2010.

[189] McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. 2009. "Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics". In Mark Lichbach y Alan Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure. Second edition*. Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 261.

[190] From many different perspectives many authors have discussed the social and psychological mechanisms that lead people to protest. See Smelser (1963), Simmel (1964), and Rudé (1971).

[191] There were other grand protest movements before this era, but their goal was more political, basically to contest the legitimacy of the regime. That happened on 1975 and 1977 during the dictatorial government of Francisco Morales Bermúdez and in 2000 after Fujimori's second reelection.

[192] A suggestive but not yet well studied associates the emergence of social conflicts with the decline of the legitimacy of congress and the practical obstacles to participatory mechanisms. As LAPOP has shown in previous years, support for Congress in Peru is among the lowest in Latin America (Degregori, Carlos Iván and Carlos Meléndex. 2009. *El nacimiento de los otorongos: El Congreso de la República durante los gobiernos de Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000)*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Similarly, the participatory mechanisms have been limited to issues of "small politics" (such as participatory budgets and local recall elections) and have not been able to have an impact in more substantive issues that motive people to protest (such as the expansion of extractive mining). See Tanaka, Martín. 2001. *Participación popular en políticas sociales. Cuándo puede ser democrática y eficiente y cuándo todo lo contrario*. Lima: CIES, IEP.

After many years of the political opposition focusing on its efforts to block Fujimori's second reelection, the regime change opened new discussions, associated with the existing developmental model and the needs of the population. Without a doubt, one issue that has occupied a great number of Peruvian social scientists has been the emergence of social movements in the post authoritarian transition period.[193] The most emblematic cases of this new type of mobilization occurred in 2001 with the protests against the privatization of two energy companies in Arequipa and later the protests against the exploitation of Quilish Mountain in 2004 in Cajamarca. In both cases we find violent actions carried out by urban populations and peasant communities, without internal organization or recognized leadership. Likewise, these conflicts were not seeking to establish mechanisms of negotiation with the state; on the contrary, they just expected the national government to concede the totality of their demands. This does not mean to imply that these "movements" did not draw the attention of political leaders; in fact, many local leaders (from incumbent to potential candidates) sought to lead and use the protests for their own political gain. However, their participation in the conflict not always went beyond their efforts to steer them (with leaders vanishing from local politics afterwards). This can also be explained by the nature of the conflict: in conflicts where the "agenda for discussion" means that one actor cedes completely to the other, there is literally no room for negotiation (and therefore, no room for leaders to assume that role).

The studies of social conflict have achieved a certain degree of specialization in Peru. The first approaches came from Grompone and Tanaka[194] and De Echave and others[195] who focused their concerns on case studies. There are also approaches that are mostly political, that call the attention on the supposed politicization of the protests caused by radical left-wing activists.

A variety of factors have been mentioned as causes for the emergence of social conflicts. For instance, some authors have stressed the role that chronic poverty and limited life opportunities play in these conflicts.[196] Others pay greater attention to medium- and long-term political processes that have generated a situation where there is no effective intermediation between state and society.[197] Precisely this lack of intermediation mechanisms perhaps explains one of the central characteristics of early social conflicts in Peru: their local and sporadic character, without significant coordination at the national level.[198] In the words of Arce, "taking into account the fragmentation of traditional social organizations such as parties and unions, the great majority of recent mobilizations in the country are spontaneous, answer to specific demands, and lack the mobilization resources in the form of organization or coordinating networks, among other things".[199] In more recent years, however, these

[193] We do not try to imply that there were not protests before. However, the term social conflict has a clear contextual connotation closely associated to the 2000s in Peru.

[194] Grompone, Romeo and Martín Tanaka. 2009. *Las protestas sociales en el Perú actual. Entre el crecimiento económico y la insatisfacción social.* Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

[195] De Echave et.al. 2009. *Minería y conflicto social*. Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos – CIPCA – CBC – CIES.

[196] Bebbington, Anthony, Martín Scurrah and Claudia Bielich. 2011. *Los Movimientos Sociales y la Política de la Pobreza en el Perú*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

[197] Aldo Panfichi and Omar Coronel, 2012. "Cambios en los vínculos entre la sociedad y el estado en el Perú: 1968-2008". In Orlando Plaza (ed). *Cambios sociales en el Perú: Homenaje a Denis Sulmont. Segunda edición*. Lima: Fondo Editorial-Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

[198] Remy, María Isabel. 2010. "El asedio desde los márgenes: entre la multiplicidad de conflictos locales y la lenta formación de nuevos movimientos sociales en Perú". In Martín Tanaka and Francis Jácome (eds.), *Desafíos de la gobernabilidad democrática*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.

[199] Arce, 2010, *Ibid*., p. 278.

conflicts have gain in territorial impact and coordination to the extent that they have acquired a regional character and have focused on social and environmental demands.

From a more political perspective, the weakness of the Toledo administration, which lost support during its first months, is explained by some as the result of his unwillingness to reformulate some of the most controversial aspects of the economic model.[200] As a consequence, some argue, the social conflicts escalated dramatically. According to data provided by Arce, 2002 was the year with the highest number of conflicts for the whole 2000-2006 period.[201]

From an institutional perspective, the emergence of a pro-decentralization and participatory discourse at the beginning of the new millennium, created a new institutional context. New political actors emerged in the regions and they led mobilizations against mineral projects or to demand resources.

From the economic view, as mentioned before, the lack of public resources in the early 2000s, the result of the world crisis of the 1990s, led the state to focus on the recovery of economic growth indicators in detriment of its redistributive role.

Finally, and perhaps the most important factor, the consolidation of the neoliberal economic regime, particularly in relation to extractive industries, led to the creation of conflicts in many parts of the country in issues related to the redistribution of profits and the impact on the environment. These conflicts were not organized by opposition parties but by populations mobilized around specific local leadership. The most representative examples of this were the mobilizations in Arequipa n 2002 against the privatization of the energy companies EGASA and EGESUR.

Confronting this scenario, the office of the Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman) started in 2004 a series of reports on "social conflicts". Since then, this term began to be used frequently as an indicator of the conflictive relationship among state, population, and private companies, especially in regions with low levels of human development. Attempts to sharpen the concept and operationalize it in a way that is more amenable to the implementation of effective policies against exclusion and inequalities have been offered since then. However, the state institutions that have grappled with the issue of social conflicts have tended to adopt a compartmentalized approach, both the Defensoría del Pueblo[202] and the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.[203]

Studies that go beyond this compartmentalized approach include the work of Tanaka and others.[204] They stress three aspects of the conflicts in the last years: first, the perception that certain

[200] Adrianzén, Alberto. 2010. "El regreso del estado". In Alberto Adrianzén and others. *El Estado en debate*. Lima: PNUD, 2010.
[201] Arce, 2010, *Ibid*., p. 281.
[202] The Defensoría del Pueblo classifies regional conflicts into seven categories: socio-environmental, territorial borders, local government issues, regional government issues, national government issues, electoral, labor, and communal conflicts, and illegal coca cultivation.
[203] The PCM (Presidency of the Council of Ministers) classifies conflicts in a very similar way to that of the Defensoría: socio-environmental, territorial borders, Infrastructure, Water Resources, Governability, Social Affairs, Productive, Labor, Normative and Coca Affairs.
[204] Tanaka, Martín, Patricia Zárate and Ludwig Huber. 2011. *Mapa de la conflictividad social en el Perú. Análisis de sus principales causas.* Lima, PREVCON-PCM

economic activities and life forms are incompatible, particularly of indigenous populations in relation to large extractive projects such as large-scale mining or large energy and forestry projects.

Second, access to private economic benefits and public resources that mobilize population against companies and authorities, respectively. These are conflicts that generally stem from disputes related to the amount and disbursement of companies' resources in the context of social responsibility budgets or with public authorities over the use of the "canon" (tax). There are also conflicts between populations that fight over their geographical borders (which are associated with their access to payments from royalties paid by private companies). Likewise, it includes demands from populations for infrastructure projects. Finally, mobilizations against the way public authorities manage public resources, especially when related to sensible issues such as privatization.

II. Public Opinion and Social Protest

In the *AmericasBarometer* we ask questions about the predisposition and participation of respondents in protest. Our objective is to investigate not only participation in acts of protest but also the attitudes towards these actions (whether they approve it or not). This provides a clearer picture of the attraction that these nonconventional forms of political participation have among Peruvian voters. For this analysis we use the following questions:

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to PROT6] (88) DK[Go to PROT6] (98)DA [Go to PROT6]
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?
E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?

We have shown in Chapter 3 how Peruvians exhibit a high degree of participation in protests (answers to Question PROT3): 13.1 percent declares to have participated in one in the year previous to the survey. This percentage is the third highest in the region, barely four percentage points below the countries with the highest participation in protests, Bolivia (17.7 percent) and Haiti (16.8 percent).

We have also pointed out in that chapter how corruption and crime victimization, education, interest in politics, and residency in small cities tend to increase the likelihood of protest participation. Peru also ranks third in 2008, below Bolivia and Argentina. In 2006 Peru was also among the top countries in terms of protests.



Figure 8.1. Protest Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2010-2012

As important as it is to determine the percentage of people who participates in protests, it is to examine the potential support that exists for this type of participation. To do so we use Questions E14 and E15.

Figure 8.2 suggests that only in the case of approval for the invasion of private property or land we find a significant change in relation to 2006, the first year when we asked this question. In 2012 there is greater support for this activity than the found in 2006.



Figure 8.2. Approval of Direct Action Tactics in Peru, 2006-2012

How does approval for these types of protests compare with the ones found in other countries? The mean values for each country in the Americas are reported in Figure 8.3.



Figure 8.3. Approval of Direct Actions Tactics in the Countries of the Americas

What this figure shows is that approval for these forms of protest is not very high in Peru, when we examine it in comparative terms. For instance, approval for the blocking of streets or roads is very low; although approval for the invasion of private property is higher, this approval is mid-to-high in comparative terms.

The best way to appreciate this relatively low approval of direct action in Peru is by averaging the responses to these two questions and comparing this average with that of other countries (Figure 8.4). We can see there that the attitudinal support for protest in Peru is relatively low.



Figure 8.4. Approval of Protest Participation in the Countries of the Americas

We find an interesting paradox in the data. On one hand, Peru occupies a relatively high position in the percentage of people who admit to have participated in an act of protest. On the other hand, when we examine the degree of citizen support to this form of activism, we find that it is relatively low. This suggests a degree of polarization in which a relatively small segment of the

population (about 13 percent) –but significant in comparative terms– operates in a context in which a much larger segment of the population does not approve of these tactics.

Let's now examine the factors that influence a person to have a more favorable attitude towards protests. Three possible sets of factors can explain this attitude. In first place, we can think of political discontent as a central factor: those who are dissatisfied with the functioning of the political system and its institutions (including the president), are more inclined to approve of protests. In second place, those who have been victims of corruption and crime can be more inclined to support protests. Finally, those whose socioeconomic condition is less fortunate can have greater reasons to endorse direct actions of protest. Figure 8.5 shows the regression analysis results that try to determine the factors that influence in the decision to have a more favorable view of protests. The dependent variable is the index of support for direct action.



Figure 8.5. Determinants of Approval of Protest Participation in Peru

The figure shows that people who grew up speaking a language other than Spanish, who have a level of educational attainment lower than the average, and those who reside in relatively small localities have a greater predisposition to support protest acts. These relationships can be appreciated more clearly in Figure 8.6.

It is important to stress the relationship between education and support for direct action protest: every additional year of education decreases support for direct action as a form of political participation (Figure 8.7).



Figure 8.6. Factors Associated with Approval of Protest Participation



Figure 8.7. Predicted Probabilities of Approval of Protest Participation by Years of Education

In conclusion, we find that the issue of social conflicts has become a salient one in Peruvian social sciences. The data, both collected by state organisms and the *AmericasBarometer* surveys, show that the level of protest in Peru is high in relative terms. However, we also find that, somewhat paradoxically, that the approval of this type of activism is mid-to-low in Peru when we compare it with other countries in the region.

III. Appendix to Chapter Eight: Regression Analysis Results

Table 8.1. Determinants of Approval of Protest Participation

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Ámbito geográfico	0.016	(0.19)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	-0.012	(-0.38)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.033	(1.14)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.183*	(-2.73)
Mujer	-0.007	(-0.32)
Años de educación aprobados	-0.102*	(-2.99)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.006	(-0.14)
Interés en la política	0.013	(0.41)
Apoyo al sistema	-0.096*	(-2.21)
Legitimidad política de las instituciones	0.214*	(4.50)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.063	(-1.80)
Victimización por corrupción	0.000	(0.01)
Victimización por crimen	0.011	(0.37)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.008	(0.21)
Castellano	-0.095*	(-2.41)
Constante	0.000	(0.00)
R-cuadrado: 0.093 N. de casos: 1404 * p<0.05		

Chapter Nine: Roots and Consequences of Political Discontent in Peru

I. Introduction

Some speak of the "Peruvian paradox:" the fact that despite almost one decade of economic growth and improvement in some indicators such as poverty and unemployment, the citizenry vocalizes a high degree of political discontent with political institutions and their representatives. But a closer look to the Peruvian situation would show that there are many reasons why political discontent is high. Despite the economic growth of recent years, the legacy of inequality and the lack of political representation inform the attitudes of the majority of Peruvians. Before we examine the roots and consequences of political discontent is important to discuss briefly the changes in the economic and social conditions in the country.

First of all, and as Figure 9.1 shows, the economic growth in Peru in the last decade is beyond dispute. From 2002 on, with the exception of 2009 –the year of the global meltdown– the economy grew no less than 4 percent a year, and in many of those years, the rate of annual growth exceed seven percent. In clear contrast with the see-saw pattern of the 1990s, the rate of GDP growth had positive values throughout the new millennium.



Figure 9.1. Growth of Gross National Product, Peru 1992-2012

This growth has begun to have to positive impact in some social indicators. For instance, and as we can see in Figure 9.2, poverty has gradually declined in recent years. This reduction has lost steam in 2010 in comparison with previous years.



Figure 9.2. Total Poverty over Time in Peru, 2004-2012

The improvement is found in other indicators too. For instance, unemployment in metropolitan Lima has declined slightly: in 2009 it was 8.4 percent, but in the second quarter of 2012, according to the ongoing survey of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI), unemployment was only 6.3 percent. In similar vein, the employment index in the rest of the country, at least in its urban areas, has risen, although slightly (Figure 9.3.). There are reports that show that average incomes also have improved: according to the INEI, the average salary in metropolitan Lima grew by 8.2 percent between June and August of 2012 in comparison with similar period the previous year.



Figure 9.3. Index of Urban Employment, Peru 1997-2012

Given this information, it is not surprising that –although the percentage of Peruvians who admit that their personal economic situation has improved practically quadrupled between 2006 and 2012– the majority (approximately 64 percent in 2012) describes their economic situation as fair (Figure 9.4). The perceptions are even more negative when respondents are probed about the country's economic situation, with 25 percent of the respondents in 2012 describing it as "bad" or "very bad" (Figure 9.5).



Figure 9.4. Perceptions of Personal Economic Condition, Peru 2006-2012



Figure 9.5. Perceptions of National Economic Condition, Peru 2006-2012

This report has shown in previous pages that there is deep citizen dissatisfaction with Peru's political institutions and their representatives. The history of mistrust towards these institutions, unlike the issues of inclusion and social conflict, predates the transition period opened in 2000. Indeed, as early as the 1980s, the Peruvian state has been largely seen as inefficient and corrupt, in a context of economic crisis and citizen insecurity. Some state institutions (such as the Defensoría del Pueblo, created by the 1993 constitution, and the electoral bodies after 2000) have avoided this negative assessment. However, almost all other state institutions (Congress, the Judicial branch, the National Police, the municipalities), exhibit a significant deficit of citizen trust. The presidency of the Republic, on the other hand, tends to have a more volatile trust, generally associated with the popularity of the incumbent. Slightly better levels of approval are enjoyed by certain "de facto" powers, such as the Catholic Church and the Armed Forces.



Figure 9.6. Trust over Time in National Institutions

II. The Causes of Political Discontent

The reasons for this persistent political discontent are manifold, although we can identify some key factors. Although the economic indicators have improved, clearly the improvement in average incomes is not as significant as one would like. Figure 9.6 shows answers to the question about people's perceptions of their family income, whether it is enough to cover their family's basic needs. Only 1 out of 9 respondents acknowledge that his/her income covers their needs and can save. Almost 50 percent (48.2 percent) states that their income is not enough and 9.7 percent says that they have "great difficulties".



Figure 9.7. Subjective Assessment of Family Income

It is not only that incomes that have not improved significantly but also that the modest improvement registered in the statistics is not distributed equality. When we examine how the answers to the previous question are distributed in by natural regions, we see a clear pattern of inequality (Figure 9.8). Only 3.7 percent of respondents in metropolitan Lima state that their income is not enough and have great difficulties. The percentages that admit similar situation are much higher in the rest of the Coast (14.1 percent), the Amazon region (16 percent), and the Sierra (10.1 percent). Similarly, whereas one third of metropolitan Lima residents say that their income is not enough and have difficulties, that percentage is much higher in the Sierra (44.1 percent).



Figure 9.8. Subjective Assessment of Family Income by Natural Regions

Another factor that explains the deep citizen mistrust is related to the country's recent history. As one of the authors of this report wrote in another place, "In key moments of their history, Peruvians have rallied behind governments that promised change, but those early hopes have always turned into bitter disappointment. The memories of these unfulfilled hopes clearly linger".[205]

Likewise, an additional factor that explains the discontent is the low accountability that some institutions have, which lead them to have low levels of approval among the public, when these institutions do not conform to the standards that the public expect. One of the most frequently watched institutions, especially by the media, is the Congress. This level of scrutiny leads to frequent reports of corruption scandals that foster low levels of approval to this public institution.

In a similar vein, the actual performance of some institutions, particularly those related to the provision of public services, leave much to be desired. The poor performance of institutions such as the police and the judicial branch (with multiple cases of corruption) and some municipalities (with perceived deficits in "getting things done") leads to a strong stigmatization among the public. To this we need to add the deep feeling of insecurity that affects the majority of the population.

These lead us to the following question: What are the consequences of this political discontent? We have seen in previous chapters that in some cases that both low support for the political system and lack of trust in political institutions are factors that influence support for democracy, participation and approval of protests, and rule of law. Here we want to examine the impact of political discontent on support for antidemocratic actions, such as military coups (Figure 9.9).



Figure 9.9. Support for Military Coups

[205] Carrión, Julio F. 2009. "Peru's Confidence Gap". *Americas Quarterly*. July, p. 38.

III. Discontent and Authoritarian Attitudes

The results show that political discontent, in and of itself, does not lead citizens to favor a military coup. What we do find is that socio-demographic variables such as age and education – along with some variables of economic nature (perception of the condition of the national economy) – and crime victimization do influence in the attitude towards military coups. These associations can be clearly seen in the following figures.

Figure 9.10 shows the expected probabilities of support for military coups according to age and years of education. As it can be seen, an increase in age and education leads to a decrease in support for coups.



Figure 9.10. Predicted Probabilities of Support for Coups by Age and Education

Figure 9.11 depicts the other two variables that emerge as determinants of support for military coups: those who tend to have a more negative assessment of the national economy and those who have been victims of a crime.



Figure 9.11. Factors Associated with Support for Coups

The previous discussion suggests that, fortunately, political discontent (measured in terms of system support and trust in political institutions) does not affect support for military coups. Let's ask now if political discontent has a negative impact on support for democracy. The information reported on Figure 9.12 suggests that the answer is affirmative. People who have a low level of system support tend to reject the idea of democracy. Trust in institutions, however, does not affect attitudes towards democracy.



Figure 9.12. Determinants of Support for Democracy

In conclusion, we find that political discontent in Peru is widespread and although it does not have a significant role in determining attitudes towards military coups, it is important as far as support for democracy is concerned.

IV. Appendixes for Chapter Nine: Regression Analysis Results

Table 9.1. Determinants of Support for Military Coups

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.007	(0.29)
Edad	-0.085*	(-3.11)
Lengua materna	-0.035	(-0.91)
Años de educación aprobados	-0.101*	(-3.23)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.068	(-1.95)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.028	(0.61)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	0.006	(0.17)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	-0.106*	(-3.82)
Interés en la política	0.035	(1.13)
Apoyo al sistema	-0.034	(-0.96)
Legitimidad política de las instituciones	-0.071	(-1.54)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	-0.029	(-0.93)
Victimización por corrupción	0.017	(0.54)
Victimización por crimen	0.070*	(2.51)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.036	(1.21)
Constante	-0.002	(-0.05)
R-cuadrado: 0.067 N. de casos: 1378 * p<0.05		

Table 9.2. Determinants of Support for Democracy

Predictor	Coeficiente	Valor t
Mujer	0.086*	(3.93)
edad en años	0.059*	(2.19)
Años de educación aprobados	0.068*	(2.06)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.086*	(2.42)
Percepción negativa de la economía personal	0.028	(0.98)
Percepción negativa de la economía nacional	0.060*	(2.07)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.052	(1.39)
Interés en la política	0.075*	(2.06)
Apoyo al sistema	0.208*	(6.18)
Legitimidad política de las instituciones	0.001	(0.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.054	(1.81)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.025	(-1.02)
Victimización por crimen	-0.019	(-0.75)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.036	(-1.48)
Lengua materna	0.059	(1.81)
Constante	-0.008	(-0.23)
R-cuadrado: 0.122		
N. de casos: 1379		
* p<0.05		

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Appendices

Appendix A: Consent Letter

January 2012

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been randomly selected to participate in a public opinion study, which is being conducted by Vanderbilt University and the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. The main objective of the study is to know people's opinions about different aspects of the country's situation.

On behalf of Ipsos APOYO Opinion and Market, I am soliciting you for an interview that will last from 30 to 40 minutes.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may choose to not respond to questions or to end the interview at any moment. The responses that you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous.

If you have questions about this study, you can contact Ipsos APOYO Opinion and market by telephone at (01) 610-0100 and ask for Karina Miranda or Ghislaine Liendo. The IRB number for the study is 110627

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix B: Questionnaire

Questionnaire number

LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2012 Master Core Version # 10.0 IRB ***Approval: 110627***

AmericasBarometer: Peru, 2012

PAIS. Country:

01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada
27. Suriname				

|__|__|

IDNUM. Questionnaire number **[assigned at the office]** |__|__|__|__|__|

ESTRATOPRI: Insert the names of the strata here |__|__|

ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality: (1) Large (more than 100,000) (2) Medium (25,000-100,000) (3) Small (< 25,000) |__|

UPM (Primary Sampling Unit)_____ |__|__|__|__|

PROV. Province (or department) :_____ |__|__|

MUNICIPIO. County (or municipality): _____ |__|__|

XXXDISTRITO. District (or parish, etc.): _____ |__|__|

XXXSEGMENTO. **Census Segment** _____ |__|__|__|

XXXSEC. Sector_____ |__|__|__|

CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: _____
[A cluster must have 6 interviews]

UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural **[Use country's definition]**

TAMANO. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area

IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (11) English INSERT OTHER LANGUAGES

Start time: _____:_____ |__|__|__|__|__|

FECHA. Date Day: ____ **Month:**_____ Year: 2012 |__|__|__|__|__|

Do you live in this home?
Yes → continue
No →Thank the respondent and end the interview
Are you a [country] citizen or permanent resident of [country]?
Yes → continue
No → Thank the respondent and end the interview
Are you at least 18 years old [in Ecuador and Nicaragua: 16 years]?
Yes → continue
No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.

Q1. **[Note down; do not ask]** Sex: (1) Male (2) Female

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... **[Read options]**?
(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES |___|___|

[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONSHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]

A4. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country? **[DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]**

Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98
N/A	99		

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad
(5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	
IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	
IDIO2. Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? **[Read the options and mark the response]**	**Yes**	**No**	**DK**	**DA**	
CP2. A member of Congress/Parliament	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. A local public official or local government for example, a mayor, municipal council, councilman, provincial official, civil governor or governor)	1	2	88	98	
CP4. Any ministry or minister (federal), state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	88	98	

Now let's talk about your local municipality...	
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**	
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]**(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	

	Once a week	**Once or twice a month**	**Once or twice a year**	**Never**	**DK**	**DA**	
CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in the last 12 months.	1	2	3	4	88	98	

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]**

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Attend/member	Leader/Board member	DK	DA	INAP
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4 **[Go to CP7]**			88	98	
CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]**					1	2	88	98	99
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4 **[Go to CP8]**			88	98	
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]**					1	2	88	98	99
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4 **[Go to CP9]**			88	98	
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? **[If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]**					1	2	88	98	99
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
CP21. Meetings of sports or recreation groups?	1	2	3	4			88	98	

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA

[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]
MIL6. Now, changing the subject, how proud are you of the Armed Forces of [country]? **[Read options]**
(1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud
(4) Not at all proud or (5) Do you not care? (88) DK (98) DA

MIL5. How proud do you feel to be [nationality] when you hear the national anthem? **[Read options]**
(1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud
(4)Not at all proud or (5) Do you not care? (88) DK (98) DA

[GIVE CARD A]

L1. [Use L1B in United States, Canada, and Guyana] Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**DK 88**	**DA 98**
Left									**Right**		

[TAKE BACK CARD A]

[Give Card A]

L1B. [For the United States, Canada, and Guyana] (Liberal-Conservative Scale) Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from liberal to conservative. One means liberal and 10 means conservative. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of liberals and conservatives. In other words, some people sympathize more with the liberals and others with the conservatives. According to the meaning that the terms "liberals" and "conservatives" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**DK 88**	**DA 98**
Liberal									**Conservative**		

[Take back Card A]

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]**
(88) DK**[Go to PROT6]** (98)DA **[Go to PROT6]**

PROT4. How many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in **the last 12 months**? _____ (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A

PROT7. And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space as a form of protest?
(1) Yes, participated (2) No, did not participate
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PROT6. In the **last 12 months** have you signed any petition?
(1) Yes, signed (2) No, has not signed
(88) DK (98) DA

PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut? (1) Yes, has done (2) No, has not done (88) DK (98) DA	

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]**: **[Customize** for Costa Rica (Fuerza Pública), Panama (Fuerza Pública de Panamá), and Haiti (Police Nationale d'Haïti)]					
JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC16A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal and govern without the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]** (88) DK **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]** (98) DA **[Skip toVIC1HOGAR]**	
VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? ____ [fill in number] (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

VIC2. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? **[Read the options]** (01) Unarmed robbery, **no** assault or physical threats (02) Unarmed robbery **with** assault or physical threats (03) Armed robbery (04) Assault but not robbery (05) Rape or sexual assault (06) Kidnapping (07) Vandalism (08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there) (10) Extortion (11) Other (88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)	
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?**[Read options]** (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality/canton (4) In another municipality/canton (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)	

ARM2. If you could, would you have your own firearm for protection? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	

Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the **last 12 months** ….

	Yes	**No**	**DK**	**DA**	**INAP**	
VIC40. Have you limited the places where you go to shop?	(1)Yes	(0) No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC41. Have you limited the places where you go for recreation?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC43. Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC44. Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC45. In the last twelve months, have you changed your job out of fear of crime? **[If does not work mark 99]**	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	(99) INAP	

I am going to read you some things you hear on the street or in the media when people talk about ways to combat crime. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree somewhat, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each one of them. The best way to fight crime…

	Strongly Agree	**Somewhat Agree**	**Somewhat Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**	**DK**	**DA**	
VIC101. is to create prevention programs. Do you: **[Read Alternatives]**	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK	DA	
VIC102. The best way to fight crime is to be tougher on criminals	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC103. The best way to fight crime is to contract private security	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

Following, I am going to read you a series of situations that you could see at any time. I would like for you to indicate for each one if you would approve, would not approve but would understand, or would neither approve nor understand.

	Would approve	Would not approve, but would understand	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA	
VOL207. Suppose that in order to teach a child, a parent hits the child each time he or she disobeys. Would you approve of the parent hitting the child, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL206. Suppose that a man hits his wife because she has been unfaithful with another man. Would you approve of the man hitting his wife, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL202. Suppose that a person kills someone who has raped a son or daughter. Would you approve of killing him, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL203. If a person frightens his community and someone kills him, would you approve of killing the person, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL204. If a group of people begin to carry out social cleansing, that is, kill people that some people consider undesirable, would you approve of them killing people considered undesirable, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

	Would approve	Would not approve, but would understand	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA	
VOL205. If the police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized crime group, would you approve of the police torturing the criminal, **or** would you not approve but understand, **or** would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
(1) Should always abide by the law
(2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **un**safe?
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe
(4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? **[Read the options]**
(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?
(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? **[Read options]**
(1) Police protect people from crime or
(2) Police are involved in crime
(3) **[Don't Read]** Neither, or both
(88) DK
(98) DA

AOJ20. And thinking about your and your family's security, do you feel safer, equally safe, or less safe than five years ago?
(1) Safer (2) Equally safe (3) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA

AOJ21. I am going to mention some groups to you, and I would like you to tell me which of them represents the biggest threat to your safety: **[READ ALTERNATIVES. MARK JUST ONE RESPONSE]**
(1) People from your neighborhood or community
(2) Gangs
(3) The police or military
(4) Organized crime and drug traffickers
(5) People in your family
(6) Common criminals
(7) **[DO NOT READ]** Other
(8) **[DO NOT READ]** None
(88) DK (98) DA

AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: **[read options]**
(1) Implement preventive measures
(2) Increase punishment of criminals
(3) **[Don't read]** Both
(88) DK
(98) DA

[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]**.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Not at all						**A lot**	**Doesn't know**	**Doesn't Answer**

Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. **B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read*:*** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)	
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?	
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?	
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?	
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?	
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?	
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?	
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? **[Not in Costa Rica or Haiti; ; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]**	
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?	
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?	
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?	
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church **[use the most common name in your country]**?	
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?	
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?	
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?	
B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?	
B43. To what extent are you proud of being (nationality corresponding to country)?	
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?	
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?	

Now, using the same ladder, ***[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]*** **NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT**	**Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA**
N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?	
N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?	
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?	
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?	
N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** And continuing to use the same card, **NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT**	**Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA, 99 = N/A**
EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do [nationality] political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A	
EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A	

Now, using the same ladder, ***[continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]*** **NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT**	**Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA**
MIL1. **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]** To what extent do you believe that the (nationality) Armed Forces are well trained and organized?	
MIL2. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] To what extent do you think that the Armed Forces in (country) have done a good job when they have helped to deal with natural disasters?	
B3MILX. **[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]** To what extent do you believe that the [nationality] Armed Forces respect [nationality's] human rights nowadays?	
MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?	
MIL4. [DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA OR HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces of [country] to improve national security?	

[Take Back Card B]

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? **[Read the options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
M2. Now speaking of Congress/Parliament, and thinking of members/senators and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members/senators and representatives of Congress/Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA	

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dis**satisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]** (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]** (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD C]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

Write a number 1-7, or 88 = Doesn't Know, 98 = Doesn't Answer

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Strongly disagree						**Strongly agree**	**Doesn't know**	**Doesn't answer**

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements **POP101.** It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents/prime ministers limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?	
POP107. The people should govern directly **rather than** through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?	
POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?	

We are going to continue using the same ladder. Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

	Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA
ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98)DA**	
ROS1. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS2. The (Country) government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS3. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS4. The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS6. The (Country) government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA, HAITI, OR PANAMA] **MIL7**. The Armed Forces ought to participate in combatting crime and violence in [country]. How much do you agree or disagree?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[QUESTIONS CCT3-RAC2A SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]**	
CCT3. Changing the topic…Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A	
GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A	
Now I would like to know how much you are in agreement with some policies I am going to mention. I would like you to respond thinking about what should be done, regardless of whether the policies are being implemented currently. **[Write Down Number 1-7, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A.]**	
GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A	
RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A **[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, "non-whites" in general]**	

[Take Back Card C]

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[QUESTIONS W14-PN5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]**	
W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger? (1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
PN4. And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
PN5*.* In your opinion, is country very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic? (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic (4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

[Give the respondent Card D]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 **Doesn't know**	98 **Doesn't Answer**
Strongly disapprove									**Strongly approve**		

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	
E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in country. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?	
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[QUESTIONS D6-D8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** **D6.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry? (99) N/A	
ODD QUESTIONNAIRES **[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]** **D7.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A	
D8. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the state/government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be **politically damaging** to it? (99) N/A	

[Take back Card D]

[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY]
I'm going to read you a list of several groups of people. Can you tell me if there are some groups that **you wouldn't like** to have as neighbors?

	Mentions [Does **not** want as neighbors**]**	**Does not mention [Does not mind** with having as neighbors**]**	**DK**	**DA**	
DIS35A. Gays. Would you mind having them as neighbors?	1	0	88	98	
DIS35B. Poor people	1	0	88	98	
DIS35C. People from other countries	1	0	88	98	
DIS35D. Afro-country/blacks	1	0	88	98	
DIS35E. Indigenous/Native (country)/First Peoples	1	0	88	98	

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most: **(1)** For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or **(2)** Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or **(3)** Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one. (88) DK (98) DA	
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA	
AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? **[Read the options]** (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (88) DK (98)DA	

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	**No**	**Yes**	**DK**	**DA**	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...						
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98	
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] **EXC20**. In the last twelve months, did any **soldier or military officer** ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. Do you work? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98	

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA	
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA	
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] **EXC7MIL**. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption in the **Armed Forces** is **[Read options]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA	

[QUESTIONS DIS2-DIS5 ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY.]
Now, changing the subject, and thinking **about your experiences in the past year,** have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?

	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP	
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98		

VB1. Are you registered to vote? [El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru: Do you have an Identity Card?] (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA	
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA, PANAMÁ, PERÚ, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, AND EL SALVADOR] **INF1**. Do you have a national identification card? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of (year of last presidential elections)? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]** (1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]** (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**	
VB3. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2008? **[DON'T READ THE LIST] [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]** (00) none (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot) (X01) INSERT NAMES AND PARTIES (X02) (X03) **Replace X with Country Code** (77) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Did not vote)	
VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to POL1]** (88) DK **[Skip to POL1]** (98) DA **[Skip to POL1]**	

VB11. Which political party do you identify with? **[DON'T READ THE LIST]** **(X01) WRITE DOWN THE NAMES OF CURRENT POLITICAL PARTIES** **(X02)** **(X03) Replace X with Country Code** (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA	

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read options]** (1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote (88) DK (98) DA	

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]** (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA	
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA	
VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES
[QUESTIONS VB51-AB5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]

VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?
(1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?
(1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.
VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?
[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous/native-(country)/First Peoples, "non-whites" in general]
(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
[Read alternatives, just one answer]
(1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
(3) **[Do not read]** Another response (88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

Changing the subject, and talking about the qualities that children ought to have, I am going to mention various characteristics and I would like you to tell me which one is the most important for a child:
AB1. (1) Independence, or (2) Respect for adults (3) **[Don't read]** Both
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

AB2. (1) Obedience, or (2) Autonomy (self-sufficiency, taking care of oneself)
(3) **[Don't read]** Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

AB5. (1) Creativity, or (2) Discipline (3) **[Don't read]** Both
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

ONLY IN BRAZIL:
SOC1-SOC12B SHOULD BE ASKED OF THE ENTIRE BRAZILIAN SAMPLE

SOC1. For every 100 [local currency of country] that a rich person earns and 100 [currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should each pay in taxes? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) The rich person should pay 50 [currency], and the poor person 20 [currency].
(2) The rich person should pay 40 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency].
(3) The rich person should pay 30 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency].
(4) **[DO NOT READ]** Another combination
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC2A. Tell me, please, in which of the following areas the government should invest more money? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(3) Housing (4) Retirement
(5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment
(7) Health (8) Security
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC2B. And in second place? **[READ OPTIONS ONLY IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REMEMBER THE OPTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS QUESTION]** (1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage) (3) Housing (4) Retirement (5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment (7) Health (8) Security (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC3. Now we are going to talk about some of the ways that the government spends money from taxes. We are going to start with education. What do you think about the quality of primary public education in [country]? Is it: **[READ OPTIONS]** (1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC4. In your opinion, to improve the quality of primary and secondary education in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]** (1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on education, or (2) Spend more money on education, even if it has to raise taxes, or (3) Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC5. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on primary and secondary education? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC6. In your opinion, to improve the quality of schools, who should decide how to spend the money that goes to schools? **[READ OPTIONS]** (1) Schools (2) Local governments (3) [Regional/state/provincial] governments (4) The central government (5) **[DO NOT READ]** Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC7. Now we are going to talk about health services. What do you think about the quality of public health services in [country]? Is it: **[READ OPTIONS]** (1) Good (2) Fair (3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC8. In your opinion, to improve the quality of public health services in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]** (1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on health, or (2) Spend more money on health, even if it has to raise taxes, or (3) Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC9. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on public health services? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC10. In your opinion, what should the government do to reduce poverty and inequality in [country]? **[DO NOT READ]** (1) Create jobs/improve the economy (2) Promote agrarian reform (3) Improve public education services (4) Offer public assistance to the poor (5) Increase taxes on the rich (6) Improve infrastructure (highways, water, sewage) (9) **[DO NOT READ]** Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SOC11. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on [income transfer program specific to the country]? [If there is no specific program, ask about the creation of a program of income transfer] (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
[GIVE THE INTERVIEWEE CARD "E"] **SOC12A**. On this scale from 1 to10, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where are [country] politicians located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**	

SOC12B. And using the same scale, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where **would you like** [country] politicians to be located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**
[TAKE BACK CARD "E"]

ONLY IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, GUATEMALA, MEXICO, PERU, VENEZUELA, URUGUAY, AND THE UNITED STATES:

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[THE FOLLOWING MODULE (SOC1-SOC12B) IS ASKED ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" "9")]

SOC1. For every 100 [local currency of country] that a rich person earns and 100 [currency] that a poor person earns, in your opinion, how much should each pay in taxes? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) The rich person should pay 50 [currency], and the poor person 20 [currency]
(2) The rich person should pay 40 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency]
(3) The rich person should pay 30 [currency], and the poor person 30 [currency]
(4) **[DO NOT READ]** Another combination
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC2A. Tell me, please, in which of the following areas the government should invest more money? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(3) Housing (4) Retirement
(5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment
(7) Health (8) Security
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC2B. And in second place? **[READ OPTIONS ONLY IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOES NOT REMEMBER THE OPTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS QUESTION]**
(1) Education (2) Infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(3) Housing (4) Retirement
(5) Assistance to the poor (6) Environment
(7) Health (8) Security
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[ASK ONLY TO RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" "9")]

SOC3. Now we are going to talk about some of the ways that the government spends money from taxes. We are going to start with education. What do you think about the quality of primary public education in [country]? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Good (2) Fair
(3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC4. In your opinion, to improve the quality of primary and secondary education in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on education, or
(2) Spend more money on education, even if it has to raise taxes, or
(3) Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC5. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on primary and secondary education?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC6. In your opinion, to improve the quality of schools, who should decide how to spend the money that goes to schools? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Schools (2) Local governments
(3) [Regional/state/provincial] governments (4) The central government
(5) **[DO NOT READ]** Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC7. Now we are going to talk about health services. What do you think about the quality of public health services in [country]? Is it: **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Good (2) Fair
(3) Poor (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC8. In your opinion, to improve the quality of public health services in [country], what should the government do? **[READ OPTIONS]**
(1) Use better the money that it's currently spending on health, or
(2) Spend more money on health, even if it has to raise taxes, or
(3) Both
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC9. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on public health services?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC10. In your opinion, what should the government do to reduce poverty and inequality in [country]? **[DO NOT READ]**
(1) Create jobs/improve the economy (2) Promote agrarian reform
(3) Improve public education services (4) Offer public assistance to the poor
(5) Increase taxes on the rich
(6) Improve infrastructure (highways, water, sewage)
(9) **[DO NOT READ]** Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

SOC11. Would you be willing to pay more taxes than you do currently so that the government can spend more on [income transfer program specific to the country]?
[If there is no specific program, ask about the creation of a program of income transfer]
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

[GIVE THE INTERVIEWEE CARD "E"]
SOC12A. On this scale from 1 to10 where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where are [country] politicians located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**

SOC12B. And using the same scale, where 1 means defending the rich and 10 means defending the poor, where **would you like** [country] politicians to be located? **[Note a number from 1-10, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A]**
[TAKE BACK CARD "E"]

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES
[QUESTIONS VB22-MIL11E SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]
[VB22 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY IN ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, ECUADOR, PARAGUAY, AND PERU] VB22. How likely is it that you will be penalized by the government if you do not vote in the next national election?
(1) Very likely (2) Somewhat likely (3) Not very likely (4) Unlikely
(88) NS (98) NR (99) N/A

SNW1A. Do you personally know an elected official or some person who was a candidate in the most recent national, state/departmental or local elections?
(1) Yes (2) No **[Go to FOR1]**
(88) DK **[Go to FOR1]** (98) DA **[Go to FOR1]** (99) N/A

SNW1B. And is this position at the local, state/departmental or national level?
(1) Local (2) State/departmental (3) National
(4) Candidates at more than one level (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

FOR1. Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. When we talk about "China" in this interview, we are talking about mainland China, the People's Republic of China, and not the island of Taiwan. Which of the following countries has the **most influence** in **Latin America/the Caribbean**? **[READ CHOICES]**

(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States
(5) Brazil (6) Venezuela
(7) Mexico (10) Spain
(11) **[Don't read]** Another country, or (12) **[Don't read]** None **[Go to FOR4]**
(88) **[Don't read]** DK **[Go to FOR4]** (98) **[Do not read]** DA **[Go to FOR4]**
(99) N/A

FOR2. And thinking of **[country mentioned in FOR1]** do you think that its influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?

(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) **[Do not read]** DK (98) **[Do not read]** DA
(99) N/A

FOR3. [Ask ONLY if the country mentioned in FOR1 was NOT China]
And thinking of China and the influence it has in **Latin America/the Caribbean**, do you think that this influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?

(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

FOR4. And **within 10 years**, in your opinion, which of the following countries will have most influence in **Latin America/the Caribbean**?
[Read options]

(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States
(5) Brazil (6) Venezuela
(7) Mexico (10) Spain
(11) **[Don't read]** Another country, or (12) **[Don't read]** None
(88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES
[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]
FOR5. In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be a model for the future development of **our country**? **[Read options]**

(1) China (2) Japan
(3) India (4) United States
(5) Singapore (6) Russia
(7) South Korea (10) **[Exclude in Brazil]** Brazil
(11) **[Exclude in Venezuela]** Venezuela, or (12) **[Exclude in Mexico]** Mexico
(13) **[Do not read]** None/We ought to follow our own model
(14) **[Do not read]** Other (88) DK
(98) DA (99) N/A

FOR6. And thinking now **only of our country,** how much influence do you think that China has in **our country? [Read options]**

(1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) None **[Go to FOR8]**
(88) DK **[Go to FOR8]** (98) DA **[Go to FOR8]** (99) N/A

FOR7. In general, the influence that China has on our country is **[Read alternatives]**
(1) Very positive (2) Positive
(3) **[Do not read]** Neither positive nor negative (4) Negative
(5) Very negative (6) **[Do not read]** Has no influence
(88) DK (98) DA
(99) N/A

FOR8. How much do you agree with the following statement: "Chinese business contributes to the economic development of [country]? Do you **[Read alternatives]**…
(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree
(4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (88) DK
(98) DA (99) N/A

According to what you have heard, do Chinese businesses operating in [country] suffer from any of the following problems? **[Read alternatives.]**

	It is a problem	**It is not a problem**	**No opinion/ DK**	**DA**	**N/A**	
FOR9A. Labor relations, such as disputes with workers or unions. Do you think that it is a problem, or that it is not, or do you not have an opinion on the matter?	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9B. Problems that arise from failure to understand the culture and customs of [country].	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9C. Lack of knowledge of the political, legal, and social values and rules in [country].	1	2	88	98	99	
FOR9D. Lack of communication with the media and residents.	1	2	88	98	99	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES
[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust the governments of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trust-worthy	**Somewhat trust-worthy**	**Not very trust-worthy**	**Not at all trust-worthy**	**DK/No opinion**	**DA**	**N/A**	
MIL10A. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10B. That of Russia. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	

MIL10C. Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10D. Israel. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	

Now I would like to ask you about the relations in general of our country with other nations around the world. When you think of our country's relationship with **China**, would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

	Closer	**About the same**	**More distant**	**No opinion**	**DA**	**N/A**	
MIL11A. China.	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11B. And our country's relationship with Russia. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES **[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]**							
MIL11C. And with Iran. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11D. And with Israel. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11E. Finally, with the United States. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99	

On a different subject…

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8"), AND ONLY IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, MEXICO, AND PERU]

CCT1B. Now, talking specifically about the Plan de Equidad/el programa Juntos, are you or someone in your house a beneficiary of this program?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1^0	**2^0**	**3^0**	**4^0**	**5^0**	**6^0**
None	0					
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11	12
University	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Post-secondary, not university	13	14	15			
Doesn't know	88					
Doesn't respond	98					

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[ED2 AND MOV1 SHOULD ONLY BE ASKED FOR INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? **[DO NOT READ OPTIONS]**

(00) None
(01) Primary incomplete
(02) Primary complete
(03) Secondary incomplete
(04) Secondary complete
(05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
(06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
(07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
(08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
(88) DK
(98) DA
(99) N/A

MOV1. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the …? **[READ OPTIONS]**

(1) Upper class (2) Upper middle class (3) Middle class
(4) Lower middle class, or (5) Lower class?
(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Q2D-Y. On what day, month and year were you born? **[If respondent refuses to say the day and month, ask for only the year, or ask for the age and then calculate the year.]** _____ Day ____ Month (01 = January) _____Year (For Q2D and Q2M: 88 =DK and 98 = DR) (For Q2Y: 8888 = DK and 9888 = DR)	|_|_|Q2D Day |_|_|Q2M Month |_|_|_|_|Q2Y Year

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? **[Do not read options]** **[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]** (1) Catholic (2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian). (3) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i). (4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion) (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra). (6) LDS (Mormon). (7) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform). (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God). (12) Jehovah's Witness. (88) DK (98) DA	
Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? **[Read options]** (1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once a month (4) Once or twice a year (5) Never or almost never (88) DK (98) DA	
Q5B. Please, could you tell me how important is religion in your life? **[Read options]** (1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important (88) DK (98) DA	

[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] **MIL8**. Do you or your spouse or partner or one of your children currently serve in the Armed Forces, or have one of you ever served in the Armed Forces? (1) Yes, currently serving (2) Previously served (3) Never served (88) DK (98) DA	

OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently **[Read options]** (1) Working? **[Continue]** (2) Not working, but have a job? **[Continue]** (3) Actively looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (4) A student? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (5) Taking care of the home? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work **[Go to Q10NEW]** (7) Not working and not looking for a job? **[Go to Q10NEW]** (88) DK **[Go to Q10NEW]** (98) DA **[Go to Q10NEW]**	
OCUP1A. In this job are you: **[Read the options]** (1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise? (2) A salaried employee in the private sector? (3) Owner or partner in a business (4) Self-employed (5) Unpaid worker (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

[GIVE CARD "F"]

Q10NEW. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? **[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?]** [17 categories based on the currency and distribution of the country] (00) No income (01) Less than $25 (02) $26- $50 (03) $51-$100 (04) $101-$150 (05) $151-$200 (06) $201-$300 (07) $301-$400 (08) $401-500 (09) $501-$750 (10) More than $751 (11) xxxx (12) xxxx (13) xxxx (14) xxxx (15) xxxx (16) xxxx (88) DK (98) DA	

[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]
Q10G. How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension**? [If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]**
(00) No income
(01) Less than $25
(02) $26- $50
(03) $51-$100
(04) $101-$150
(05) $151-$200
(06) $201-$300
(07) $301-$400
(08) $401-500
(09) $501-$750
(10) More than $750
(11) xxxx
(12) xxxx
(13) xxxx
(14) xxxx
(15) xxxx
(16) xxxx
(88) DK
(98) DA
(99) N/A (Not working and not retired)

[TAKE BACK CARD "F"]

Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**
(1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
(2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
(3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
(4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
(88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA

Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**
(1) Increased?
(2) Remained the same?
(3) Decreased?
(88) DK (98) DA

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES
[FS2 AND FS8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]
Now I am going to read you some questions about food.

	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A	
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99	

FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99	

Q11. What is your marital status? **[Read options]**
(1) Single **[Go to Q12C]** (2) Married **[CONTINUE]**
(3) Common law marriage **[CONTINUE]** (4) Divorced **[Go to Q12C]**
(5) Separated **[Go to Q12C]** (6) Widowed **[Go to Q12C]**
(88) DK **[Go to Q12C]** (98) DA **[Go to Q12C]**

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

(1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
(2) You earn less than your spouse;
(3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
(4) You earn more than your spouse;
(5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
(6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
(88) DK
(98) DA
(99) INAP

Q12C. How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____
(88) DK (98) DA

Q12. Do you have children? How many? _____
(00 = none → Skip to ETID) (88) DK (98) DA

Q12B. How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household? _____
00 = none, (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (no children)

ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? **[If respondent says Afro-country, mark (4) Black]**
(1) White (2) Mestizo (3) Indigenous (4) Black
(5) Mulatto (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA

LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? **[Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options]**
[Coding: the 'X' is replaced by the country code as found in variable "PAIS"]
(X01) Spanish (X02) Indigenous language **[NB; list the name of the most common indigenous languages]** (X04) Other (indigenous) (X05) Other foreign
(88) DK (98) DA

[Use only in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru]
LENG4. Speaking about the language that your parents knew, your parents speak or spoke: *[Interviewer: if one of the parents spoke only one language and the other two, mark 2.]* **[Read the options]**
(1) Spanish only (2) Spanish and indigenous language (3) Indigenous language only
(4) Spanish and foreign language (88) DK (98) DA

WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? **[Read options]**
(1) Daily
(2) A few times a week
(3) A few times a month
(4) Rarely
(5) Never
(88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA

For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country...

GI0. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]:**

(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never
(88) DK (98) DA

	Correct	Incorrect	Don't know	Don't answer	
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? **[Don't read**: Barack Obama, accept Obama**]**	1	2	88	98	
GI4. How long is the presidential/prime ministerial term of office in country? **[Don't read**: insert number of years**]**	1	2	88	98	
GI7. How many representatives does the **[lower or only chamber of Congress]** have? **[NOTE EXACT NUMBER. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]**	Number: _____		88	98	

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R1. Television	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? **[If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]**	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	
R6. Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R15. Computer	(0) No **[GO TO R16]**			(1) Yes	
R18. Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes		(99) N/A	
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No			(1) Yes	
R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?	(0) No			(1) Yes	

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____ (97) Could not be classified **[Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]**	**|___|___|**
Time interview ended _____ : _____ **TI**. Duration of interview ***[minutes, see page # 1]*** _____	|__|__|__|
INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____	|__|__|__|
SEXI. Note your own sex: (**1**) **Male** (**2**) **Female**	
COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.	**|___|___|**

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.
Interviewer's signature_____ Date ____ /_____ /_____

Field supervisor's signature _____
Comments:
_____
_____
[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____
[Not for PDA use]Signature of the person who verified the data _____

Card A (L1)



Card A (L1B)



Card B



Card C



Card D



Card E



Card F

(00) No income
(01) Less than $25
(02) $26- $50
(03) $51-$100
(04) $101-$150
(05) $151-$200
(06) $201-$300
(07) $301-$400
(08) $401-500
(09) $501-$750
(10) More than $751
(11) Xxxx
(12) Xxxx
(13) Xxxx
(14) Xxxx
(15) Xxxx
(16) Xxxx

Color Palette

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United Stated and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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