

“Political Support, Political Skepticism and Political Stability in New Democracies: An Empirical Examination of Mass Support for coups d’Etat in Peru,” co-authored with Julio Carrión *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (February, 2002), pp. 58-82.

Conventional wisdom holds that high levels of system support serve as an attitudinal barrier to democratic breakdown. In unconsolidated democracies, however, where democratic norms are regularly violated, the authors hypothesize that a healthy dose of political skepticism toward the political system, neither extreme rejection nor uncritical support of the system, would be associated with greater attitudinal resistance to breakdown in the form of a military coup. Using survey data from Peru, the authors confirm this expectation, showing that the relationship between system support and approval of military coups follows a V-curve pattern. This research fails to find support for the contention that a greater involvement in associational life or a greater degree of interpersonal trust predispose people to reject coups. The authors found other factors, such as rejection of the use of direct tactics for political purposes, support for the incumbent, and age, that are better predictors of coup support and rejection.

POLITICAL SUPPORT, POLITICAL
SKEPTICISM, AND POLITICAL
STABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES
An Empirical Examination of
Mass Support for Coups d’Etat in Peru

MITCHELL A. SELIGSON
University of Pittsburgh

JULIO F. CARRIÓN
University of Delaware

Survival of democracies over the long term has long been linked to their legitimacy. The prevailing scholarly view is that satisfaction with the performance of the political system and its institutions creates, over time, a reservoir of good will—a high level of diffuse support—that enables democratic regimes to survive when times are bad (Easton, 1965, 1975; Inglehart, 1988; Lipset, 1959; Norris, 1999). Studies have shown that in long-standing democratic systems, system support can be deep enough to allow these systems to weather even severe crises (Finkel, Muller, & Seligson, 1989; M. A. Seligson & Muller, 1987).

COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 35 No. 1, February 2002 58-82
© 2002 Sage Publications

In emerging or consolidating democracies, however, recent work has called our attention to the need to take into account the character of the political system when analyzing the relationship between system support and political stability. For instance, Norris (1999) argued,

In newer democracies dissatisfaction with the performance of regimes characterised by widespread corruption, abuse of power and intolerance of dissent, can be regarded as a healthy reaction. Too much blind trust by citizens and misplaced confidence in leaders, for good or ill, can be as problematic for democracy as too little. *The consequences of declining support for government institutions therefore remains open to debate* [italics added]. (p. 27)

In a similar vein, in post-Communist societies, Mishler and Rose (1997) suggested that excessive trust in political institutions might not enhance democracy. As they put it,

Trust [in political institutions], however, is double edged. Democracy requires trust but also presupposes an active and vigilant citizenry with a healthy skepticism of government and a willingness, should the need arise, to suspend trust and assert control over government—at a minimum by replacing the government of the day. Whereas insufficient trust presages the disintegration of civil society, excessive trust cultivates political apathy and encourages a loss of citizen vigilance and control of government, both of which undermine democracy. (p. 419)

In light of this distinction between consolidated and nascent democracies, we propose in this article to modify the standard theory of system support, taking into account the context in which it is being proffered or withheld by citizens. We suggest that in unconsolidated democracies, system support and political stability are not linearly related as they are thought to be in consolidated democracies. The conventional wisdom holds that an increase in the levels of system support among the mass public is an effective prophylaxis against political instability. We argue that in unconsolidated democracies, the relationship between system support and political stability is not monotonic but follows instead a V-curve pattern.

Consider the case of an unconsolidated democracy in which elections are regularly held but are widely suspect of being highly fraudulent and in which the executive brazenly manipulates the rules of the game to circumvent or silence the legislature, the courts, and the press. In such a system, conventional legitimacy theory would predict that those with low support for the system might well express their alienation by favoring a regime change by whatever means, including a military coup. On the other hand, what are we to make of citizens in such a country who express high system support? These

are individuals who are highly supportive of a regime that has minimally democratic credentials, suggesting that their support may be high precisely because of the many nondemocratic features of the regime rather than its democratic elements. Such individuals, then, could both support the regime and support military coups to suppress threats to order. Thus we theorize that in unconsolidated democracies in which the incumbent government broadly violates democratic practices, both those who are low and those who are high on system support could favor a military coup. We further hypothesize that those most likely to oppose coups in these unconsolidated democracies of the type we are describing are those who are neither very high nor very low on system support, the "political skeptics," to use Mishler and Rose's (1997) terminology. In regimes of the type we are describing, individuals in the middle range of support for the system, Mishler and Rose's political skeptics, are not alienated from it, nor do they blindly support it, and we theorize that they are the ones (in the system) who would least want to see it overthrown by a military coup.

It should be stated unequivocally that we do not attempt to propose here a general theory of military coups. Our intention is more circumscribed: We seek to understand the factors that lead people to support coups in unconsolidated democracies in which the incumbent regime broadly violates democratic norms. We also view mass support for military intervention as only one of the several factors that ultimately explain coups, which include such important variables as the role of foreign powers. We do believe, however, that the great wave of democracy that has swept the world forces those who contemplate a military coup to seriously take into consideration the power of public preferences as signaling tolerance for or opposition to a possible coup.

Despite the widespread belief that low system support is one of the factors that leads to military coups in Latin America (Finer, 1988; Fitch, 1977; Huntington, 1968; Nordlinger, 1977), very few studies have actually tried to empirically test this proposition. In an early pioneering work, Putnam (1967) tested a number of hypotheses using aggregate data to explain military intervention in Latin American politics. He did not, however, address the impact of system support, an understandable omission given the almost complete lack of survey data in Latin America at the time. Baloyra (1988), in his study of support for coups in Venezuela in the early 1980s, did not directly address the issue of system support either, but he did find that those more likely to support a coup "included those more critical of the democratic regime" (p. 212). A recent empirical analysis of the Venezuelan case (Myers & O'Connor, 1998, pp. 193-211) did examine this connection and found inconclusive evidence as to the impact of system legitimacy on mass support for coups: An index of negative evaluations of governmental performance is found to have a




Figure 1. Theoretical relationship between system support and mass support for coups in unconsolidated democracies.

significant albeit small impact on the decision to support coups in 1973; this same index fails to predict support for coups in 1993. We revisit this connection and dispute the existence of an inverse, linear relationship between system support and rejection of military coups. We argue that in the context of unconsolidated democracies, skepticism or neutrality toward the political system enhances regime stability. Our interest is in carrying out a direct test of the impact of system support, now reconceptualized to emphasize political skepticism, on political stability.

In our revised model, therefore, support for the political system is not linearly associated with rejection of military coups but rather follows a V-curve pattern (see Figure 1). This model does not minimize the traditionally expected relationship between high levels of political discontent and the disposition to support radical system change, including a predisposition to support coups, but it does highlight the antidemocratic implications of those who express high support for systems in which many democratic rights are not respected.

OTHER FACTORS IN COUP SUPPORT

There are, of course, other factors influencing support for or opposition to a coup, and we incorporate those into our model. Some of those are exogenous to public opinion research (e.g., pressure from foreign ambassadors on

coup plotters), and we do not attempt to deal with them here. We expect at least three other factors to be at work. First, evaluations of governmental performance are a crucial variable in determining support for regime overthrow in unconsolidated democracies. We know that in advanced democracies, dissatisfaction with the government of the day does not lead people to challenge the legitimacy of the political system at large. As Dalton (1996) put it, “dissatisfaction with authorities, within a democratic system, is not usually a signal for basic political change” (p. 263). In contrast, Fitch (1977, p. 116) has shown that in Latin America, civilian discontent with the government usually provides the legitimizing argument for coup plotters. We argue that in less democratic systems, the connection between dissatisfaction with the incumbent and regime stability is significant. People who are unhappy with the government will be more tolerant of military coups to remove it, whereas those who support the government will be less inclined to do so.

Second, coups often involve the use of direct action tactics or the threat of violence. We assume, therefore, that citizens who are constitutionally opposed to the use of direct action tactics or violence would not support a coup, regardless of their degree of support for, opposition to, or skepticism about the incumbent regime. On the other hand, individuals who can conceive of political violence as a legitimate mechanism for expressing discontent would be more likely to support a coup with its implicit threat of violence. We hypothesize that people more inclined to accept the use of direct action tactics for political purposes would be more likely to support a military coup.

A third additional factor that we believe influences coup support or opposition is personal experience with authoritarian rule. In the political science literature, extensive evidence seems to show that among advanced industrial democracies, the young are those who most strongly enunciate postmaterialist values. Inglehart (1977, 1997) has argued that the formative experiences of the postwar youth in Europe and of the Japanese youth in the 1960s—years of economic expansion in Japan—have led to the emergence of a new set of postmaterialist values among them. Accordingly, the Western European and Japanese youth are depicted as the driving force behind the rise of new political issues and movements, which tend to emphasize quality-of-life concerns rather than old socioeconomic issues (Inglehart, 1997). Latin American youth, however, had quite a different formative experience in the 1980s. These were the years of economic recession and high inflation, combined with high levels of political violence in many countries of the region. Peruvian youth have been particularly affected by unemployment and underemployment (Carrión, 1991). At the same time, the 1980s were years of democratic transition all over Latin America. Today’s youth were socialized in a

quite different political environment than those of older generations. They have not experienced military rule directly. Older Latin Americans, on the other hand, lived through the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s and saw just how repressive those systems had become and how state terror had created a national climate of fear. In addition, noncollege youth tend to express higher levels of political apathy. In short, we hypothesize that the young are more likely than the old to be supportive of a coup in the Latin American context.

Prior research has suggested a number of other factors that ought to be linked to coup support. We consider each of these in turn, but we believe that in the case of unconsolidated democracies, they will not be linked to opposition to coups. Among the most important of these is political tolerance. This thesis stands in contrast to our own, articulated above. It suggests that even though a political system may fail to address popular needs, this discontent should not allow those committed to political tolerance to support authoritarian solutions. In other terms, strong allegiance to democratic values, it has been argued, can save democracy when conditions are dire (Inglehart, 1990; Linz & Stepan, 1996).

However, in new democracies, where order and stability are still very much in question, one wonders if political tolerance translates into opposition to coups that are claimed to be staged in order to quell disorder. Therefore we remain skeptical of the linkage between coup opposition and political tolerance in unconsolidated democracies, yet we include this variable in our model as well.

Another variant on the putative connection between democratic values and support/opposition to a coup is the role of political participation. Citizen involvement in the issues that affect them has always been considered a central aspect of any definition of a democratic society (Pateman, 1970). Similarly, and citing Tocqueville's description of America as a pluralistic and highly organized civil society, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1995) concluded that "a vigorous civil society can help to inculcate norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, and accommodation that facilitate the peaceful, democratic regulation of cleavage and conflict" (p. 28). Putnam (1993) has made a strong case, based on data from Italy, that organizational life links to effective democracy via its ability to cultivate interpersonal trust among citizens. In his view, "networks of civic engagements" (neighborhood associations, cooperatives, sports clubs, political parties) foster the emergence of social trust and capital, thus helping communities solve traditional collective action problems. Political action in the form of civil society participation is linked to the formation of a key political attitude, interpersonal trust, which in turn should help support democracy. The linkage of coup opposition to these theories is

straightforward. It is well documented that one of the central objectives of most military coups is the demobilization of civil society. This demobilization serves in part to put an end to politics itself, a major justification of many coups in the 20th century, but it also caters to the survival instincts of the coup plotters themselves by helping to prevent the emergence of organized, autonomous opposition to the coup and the policies of the new military regime (Casper, 1995). Presumably, citizens engaged in associational activities should report greater resistance to military coups than those who do not belong to any organization or who are less involved. Those same citizens should show higher levels of interpersonal trust.

Our skepticism of this argument rests on the many theoretical and empirical criticisms leveled against the thesis (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Tarrow, 1996). Civil society activism and its links to democracy have been studied since Tocqueville first proposed the thesis, yet there is little compelling evidence to demonstrate that the theory works outside of the consolidated democracies, and there are even many doubters among those who study advanced industrial democracies. Two journals have devoted entire special issues to the subject (Foley & Edwards, 1998; Mondak, 1998). Our concern rests on the nature of civil society participation in the emerging democracies. We do not presume, as did Putnam (1993), that all civil society activism favors democracy. As A. L. Seligson (1999) has noted, some forms may be more favorable than others. We also believe that in some cases, certain forms of civil society organizations may promote downright antidemocratic values, as apparently was the case in pre-Hitler Germany and as recent research has demonstrated for the case of Argentina (Armony, 1998). In short, we do not expect that in unconsolidated democracies, civil society participation, at least as normally measured, and interpersonal trust will serve as significant barriers to popular support for coups.

THE PERUVIAN CASE

Peru provides a good case of an unconsolidated democracy. Peru has had an entrenched tradition of military governments over the past six decades. Yet in 1980, after 12 years of military rule, Peru returned to civilian politics. For a decade, this nation was able to sustain regular, competitive elections, even in the midst of an acute economic crisis and high levels of political violence caused by two powerful guerrilla groups, Sendero Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru. In April 1992, however, President Fujimori, who had been elected in the 1990 general elections, staged an executive coup, suspended the legislature and the judiciary, and began ruling

by decree. In contrast to the widespread international condemnation for this measure, domestic public opinion was highly supportive, suggesting the finite limits to international pressure in the post-cold war epoch. The *Fujigolpe*—as it was rapidly labeled—was carried out with full support of the armed forces. Army troops seized the congressional building and TV stations as well as many newspapers and political magazine offices. Although technically not a military coup d'état, Fujimori's *autogolpe* in 1992 received open and complete support from the military. The 1992 executive coup also received widespread mass public support: Nearly 8 out of 10 people surveyed in the capital, Lima (which contains 40% of the national electorate), declared support for the coup in polls conducted immediately after it took place (Conaghan, 1995).

Although domestic opposition to the Fujicoup was negligible, Fujimori faced serious opposition from the international community, including the suspension of all but humanitarian aid provided by the United States. The Organization of American States adopted a harsh resolution condemning the coup and demanded an immediate return to democracy. As international opposition mounted and multilateral aid to Peru was suspended, Fujimori agreed to a transition calendar that included elections for a new constituent assembly in 1992 and general elections in 1995. The newly drafted constitution allowed Fujimori to run for a second term despite the fact that he was originally elected under the 1979 constitution, which barred such reelection. The new constitution was approved in a national referendum in 1993, and Fujimori was reelected with 64% of the vote in 1995. In May 2000, after a controversial campaign, Fujimori was reelected for an unprecedented third term.¹ When a videotape surfaced showing Fujimori's main security advisor buying for U.S.\$15,000 the allegiance of a recently elected opposition congressman, a major political crisis ensued, forcing Fujimori to announce his resignation and call for new general elections in April 2001.

It is very likely that attitudes toward military coups in Peru are shaped by one's position toward the Fujimori administration. Some of those who support the idea of a coup may do so in the belief that such action could remove

1. The 2000 elections were held amid widespread denunciations of the illegal use of state resources and control of the media to support Fujimori's candidacy. Despite this series of manipulations, Fujimori failed to obtain a majority in the April 9, 2000, elections and was forced into a runoff against the leading opposition candidate, Alejandro Toledo. As the allegations mounted, Toledo withdrew from the race calling for a boycott. The international observation mission fielded by the Organization of American States declined to participate in the observation efforts for the runoff, characterizing the entire electoral process as "irregular" and "far from being free and fair." Despite Toledo's withdrawal from the race, the runoff proceeded, and the National Electoral Board declared Fujimori as the winner. The U.S. State Department characterized the electoral process as "flawed."

an authoritarian leader from the scene. For this reason, we include the respondent's evaluation of his government as a control variable. We do not suggest that all those who tolerate the idea of a coup do so out of antidemocratic views, just as we do not assume that all those who express strong system support do so because of impeccable democratic convictions.

Data for this study come from a national multistage probability sample surveys (1,508 respondents) conducted in 1996 by APOYO, S. A., Peru's best known survey research organization. All interviews were face to face and lasted an average of a half hour each. Both authors participated in the design of the questionnaire for the 1996 survey, but the ultimate execution of the fieldwork was entirely under the control of APOYO, S. A.

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY COUPS IN PERU

In our surveys, we asked the respondents three questions regarding their views of coups. First, we asked, "Do you think that a military coup would be justified to better resolve the economic problems of the country?" Second, we asked, "Do you think that a military coup would be justified to better resolve the problems of violence in the country?" Finally, we asked, "Aside from the above-mentioned circumstances (i.e., the economy and violence), do you think that there are any other circumstances that would justify a military coup, or do you think that there are no circumstances that could justify a military government?" As many as 31% of voting-age Peruvians were willing to support a military coup for unidentified reasons, 23% would justify a coup to solve economic problems, and 26% would do so to solve problems of violence.² An average of 10% did not answer. These three questions were entered into a principal components factor analysis, and the results showed the presence of a single factor. Because we were confident that they measure the same underlying attitude, and to facilitate interpretation, we combined these questions into a single index. Each question had a dichotomous response pattern ("a coup justified," "a coup not justified"), so we coded these as 0-1 dummy variables and added them up into a summated index ranging from 0 to 3. At the other extreme of the scale, a score of 3 (15%) means that a respondent would support a coup under any of the circumstances mentioned. The middle of the distribution, scores of 1 (15%) and 2 (9%), mean that the respondent justified a coup under some circumstances but not others. The resulting Index of Support for Military Coups groups respondents into three categories: those who never support a coup (coded 0), those

2. These percentages do not include missing values.

who support it under some circumstance (coded 1), and those who always support it (coded 2). This is our dependent variable.

SYSTEM SUPPORT AND APPROVAL OF COUPS: A REASSESSMENT

To measure system support, we employed a set of five questions developed and cross-nationally validated by Muller and Seligson (Finkel, Muller, & Seligson, 1989; Muller, Jukan, & Seligson, 1982; Seligson, 1983).³ The questions probe respondents' pride in the political community and their evaluations of regime performance. They measure, however, a single underlying attitude as confirmed by a factor analysis of the five items, which produced one single factor. Respondents were given a card showing a scale with seven different rungs. They were told that a score of 1 meant *not at all* and 7 meant *a lot* and that if their views were somehow in the middle of these two extremes, they could choose any one of the rungs located in the middle of the scale. The Peruvian population scored very low on our measure of system support in both absolute and relative terms. On the 1-to-7 scale, the average for all five items was 3.1. To put these findings in a comparative perspective, we transformed the original 1-to-7 scale into a 0-to-100 scale and compared it with the scores of five other Latin American nations.⁴ Peru ranked at the very bottom with a score of 36, whereas Costa Rica ranked first with a score of 72 in a survey conducted in 1995. Other scores were 53 for Paraguay (1996), 53 for Nicaragua (1997), 52 for El Salvador (1995), and 44 for Bolivia (1998). It is clear that the levels of system support were extremely low in Peru, even for the Latin American region, and bolster our argument that Peru is a good case of an unconsolidated democracy.

Despite the heavy concentration of respondents in the lower levels of support, respondents who chose the lower two rungs on the scale items had higher levels of support for coups than those who placed themselves in the midpoint of the scale. In a similar vein, those who scored in the higher two rungs of the distributions—manifesting a high degree of satisfaction with the

3. These questions were as follows: (a) To what extent do you think that Peruvian courts guarantee a fair trial? (b) To what extent do you trust Peruvian political institutions? (c) To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Peruvian political system? (d) To what extent are you proud of living under the Peruvian political system? (e) To what extent do you think the Peruvian political system should be supported? These items were entered into a factor analysis, and a single, unique factor was identified.

4. Data came from the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

political system—were also more likely to support coups than those who chose the midpoint of the scales. Clearly the association between system support and support coups is not linear. Yet those in the middle expressed far lower support for coups than those at either extreme.

Based on our theory and the empirical evidence, in modeling citizen attitudes toward military coups it would be erroneous to assume that the impact of system support on those attitudes is linear, given the previous finding. We can transform these data, however, to reflect the pattern predicted in Figure 1 by focusing on the distance each respondent has from the midpoint of the system support items, the point that represents a neutral evaluation of the political system, what we label here *political skepticism*, following Mishler and Rose's (1997) terminology.⁵

A MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL FOR COUP SUPPORT IN UNCONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACIES: ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION

To test for the presence of the V curve in our regression model, we include both system support measured in the traditional manner (linear low-to-high support) and its alternative measure, redefined as political skepticism. In this way, we can test both the traditional (i.e., linear) specification and our revised (i.e., V-curve) specification. We hypothesize that the political skepticism rather than the traditional measure of system support will be a significant predictor of support for coups.⁶

In the introduction to this article, we argued that we expected to find that three other factors would be linked to support or opposition to a coup. We said that people with negative evaluation of the presidential performance (presi-

5. To measure the respondent's distance from political skepticism (the midpoint in each of the items of system support), we employed the following procedure. First, we subtracted 4 (the midpoint in each question) from the actual respondent's score in each of the items of the scale and took the resulting absolute value as the indicator of this distance. An absolute value of 0 means that the respondent scored 4 in the original item, whereas an absolute value of 3 means that the respondent scored either 1 (*extreme dissatisfaction*) or 7 (*extreme satisfaction*) (actual score - 4). Then we added the absolute values for each of the items and divided by 5. The resulting variable ranges from 0 (*political skepticism*) to 3 (either *extreme support* for or *extreme rejection* of the political system).

6. The scale of system support was created by adding the items shown in Note 3 and dividing by 5. The resulting scale ranges from 1 (*low support*) to 7 (*high support*). The Pearson's *r* between this scale and the index of support for coups is -.01, and it is not significant at the .05 level. When we transform the system support scale to reflect the pattern predicted by Figure 1, the correlation becomes statistically significant.

dential approval variable) would be more likely to support a coup.⁷ We argued that those who approve of direct action tactics for political purposes (approval of direct action variable) and those who were too young to have direct experience with prior military rule (age variable) would be the most likely to support coups. We also include here the conventional control variables (socioeconomic status, education, political knowledge, and gender) to test the presence of these effects on support for coups. We also argued that other factors long thought to predict support for democracy and opposition to dictatorship would not function well in unconsolidated democracies. These variables included political tolerance, political participation (we employ two indicators of participation: communal participation, which is measured by participation in communal-based activities, and membership in civil society organizations, which is measured by participation in civil society associations), and interpersonal trust (see the appendix for an explanation of how these variables were operationalized). The descriptive statistics of the independent variables are shown in the table in the appendix.

In this article, we will use multinomial logistic regression to estimate our model of support for coups. The respondents who supported military coups in all circumstances comprise the baseline category of the dependent variable. Our task is to determine what set of predictors make it more likely that a respondent would fall into the “never” or “sometimes” categories rather than in the “always” category. Our predictor variables are of two types: ordinal/interval and nominal. In the case of ordinal- or interval-level variables, the interpretation is straightforward. The logistic coefficient indicates the change in the odds of a person being in a category of the dependent variable relative to the baseline category for each unit increment of the independent variable. In the case of nominal variables, the multinomial logistic coefficient indicates the change in the odds of a case falling in a given category relative to a reference category of the independent variable (e.g., females in relation to males).

Table 1 presents the multinomial logistic regression estimates for three different models. The results support our contention for the need to reconceptualize the way system support interacts with support for military coups. The results clearly show the V-curve pattern and reject the linear specification. The traditional understanding for this relationship is not supported by the Peruvian data in any of the three models. The coefficient for the conventional scale of system support is not significant among those who always support coups or among those who expressed mixed support for coups. This

7. Respondents were asked, “Speaking in general of the current administration, would you say that the job President Fujimori is doing is: very good, good, fair, bad, very bad?”

Table 1
Parameter Estimates for Multinomial Logistic Regression of Support for Military Coups in Peru, 1996. (Reference category: Always support coups).

Predictor Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>		<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	
Never									
Intercept	3.656	.703	(27.03)**	3.595	.761	(22.30)**	3.903	.817	(22.83)**
System support	-.180	.100	(3.21)	-.159	.102	(2.43)	-.177	.104	(2.92)
Political skepticism	-.353	.139	(6.49)*	-.341	.143	(5.72)*	-.340	.145	(5.53)*
Presidential approval	-.332	.134	(6.16)*	-.334	.136	(6.06)*	-.327	.136	(5.73)*
Approval of direct action	-.189	.046	(17.10)**	-.165	.047	(12.42)**	-.179	.048	(14.04)**
Political tolerance	.029	.041	(.506)	.018	.042	(.187)	.029	.042	(.457)
Communal participation	-.099	.104	(.893)	-.137	.107	(1.65)	-.160	.109	(2.13)
Membership in civil society organization	.161	.077	(4.39)*	.121	.079	(2.32)	.117	.082	(1.56)
Interpersonal trust	.098	.083	(1.41)	.089	.084	(1.14)	.095	.085	(2.05)
Political knowledge				.180	.103	(3.06)	.198	.121	(2.65)
Age (years)									
18-24				-.713	.289	(6.10)*	-.691	.308	(5.03)*
25-34				.097	.313	(.095)	.137	.329	(.174)
35-44				-.255	.302	(.711)	-.242	.310	(.610)
45 and older ^a				0	0		0	0	
Education							-.002	.032	(.004)
Socioeconomic status							-.114	.095	(1.46)
Gender									
Female							-.235	.216	(1.18)
Male ^a							0	0	

Sometimes									
Intercept	1.369	.777	(3.11)	1.027	.843	(1.45)	1.490	.903	(2.72)
System support	-.016	.109	(.021)	-.015	.110	(.018)	-.037	.112	(.110)
Political skepticism	-.234	.152	(2.36)	-.200	.156	(1.65)	-.194	.158	(1.51)
Presidential approval	-.173	.149	(1.43)	-.178	.152	(1.37)	-.162	.152	(1.13)
Approval of direct action	-.121	.051	(5.65)*	-.115	.052	(4.88)*	-.129	.053	(6.01)*
Political tolerance	.046	.046	(.99)	.045	.047	(.931)	.048	.047	(1.03)
Communal participation	-.195	.117	(2.76)	-.184	.120	(2.34)	-.214	.123	(3.05)
Membership in civil society organization	.206	.083	(6.12)*	.199	.086	(5.33)*	.202	.089	(5.13)*
Interpersonal trust	.092	.092	(.995)	.090	.093	(.934)	.100	.094	(1.11)
Political knowledge				.041	.115	(.129)	.069	.135	(2.62)
Age (years)									
18-24				.201	.332	(3.67)	.264	.354	(.558)
25-34				.663	.356	(3.48)	.764	.374	(4.17)*
35-44				.068	.354	(.037)	.110	.363	(.092)
45 and older ^a				0	0		0	0	
Education							-.029	.035	(.663)
Socioeconomic status							-.052	.105	(.242)
Gender									
Female							-.238	.240	(.976)
Male ^a							0	0	
-2 Log likelihood			1616.10**			1589.36**			1556.72**
Overall percentage predicted			60.6			61.0			60.9

a. This parameter is set to 0 because it is redundant.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. The Wald statistic is presented between parentheses.

lack of significance is because both extreme political discontent and extreme acquiescence with the political system increase the likelihood of always supporting military coups, whereas the conventional literature suggests that only those at the extremes of discontent would support a coup.

Further support for our contention is that political skepticism emerges as having a significant effect on coup support in all three models. The negative sign of the logistic coefficient for political skepticism indicates that respondents who are skeptics or hold neutral evaluations of the political system are less likely to fall into the never support coups category than in the always support coups category. This effect is statistically significant across our three different models. It is important to note that this effect is present even when controlling for presidential approval. Independently of the views they hold about Fujimori's performance as president, respondents who assume a skeptical stance toward the political system are less likely to support a military coup.

We also find that presidential approval is associated with coup rejection. Respondents who hold positive views of President Fujimori are more likely to fall in the never support coups category than those who hold negative evaluations of him. This is not at all a surprising finding but one that says little about the far more theoretically significant impact of system support's relationship to coup support. The finding does, however, help emphasize the Eastonian distinction between specific support (measured here as presidential approval) and diffuse support (measured by our five-item System Support Scale).

We also find strong support for our contention that approval of direct action tactics significantly predicts coup support. Those who reject direct action are more likely to always reject coups than to always support them. Again, the effects are statistically significant across the three different models.

As predicted by our theory and in direct contradiction to postmaterialist findings from the advanced industrial democracies, we found in Peru that the youth (defined as those between ages 18 and 24) were far less likely to reject military coups than were members of the older generation (45 years and older; see Model 2). At the same time, the young turn out to be the age cohort with the highest levels of support for the political system.⁸

This finding strongly reinforces our view that high system support alone in unconsolidated democracies is not the path to stability. Absent our theory,

8. The 18-to-24 age group presents a mean of 3.42 in the scale of system support. The 25-to-34 age group has a mean of 3.17. The 35-to-44 age group has a mean of 2.96, and the 45 and older group has a mean of 2.94. A Bonferri test for multiple comparisons shows that the mean for the 18-to-24 age group is significantly different from each of other age groups' means at the .05 level of significance.

it would be paradoxical to find that the very people who are extremely supportive of the system (certainly a minority among Peruvians) are also the ones most likely to support the change of the political regime. It is the younger members of the Peruvian mass public who hold these apparently contradictory views.

Our controls for additional variables beyond our core predictors do not have much of an impact on our model. We do not find a significant association between formal education or political knowledge and coups. It is important to note, however, that as we suggested at the outset, skeptics tend to have a greater degree of political sophistication or knowledge than rejectors/supporters.⁹ In addition, and as the results of Model 3 show, neither gender nor socioeconomic status helps us in predicting whether a respondent will always reject coups or will always support them.

It is also important to stress that the other theories that have been used to explain the resilience of democracy do not do well in our Peruvian case. As shown in the multinomial logistic regression analysis, we failed to uncover a significant association between either political tolerance or interpersonal trust and resistance to military rule. Of the two measures of political participation, only one emerged as a significant effect. In our first model, membership in civil society associations emerges with the expected positive sign (greater activism increases the likelihood that the respondent will fall in the never support coups category) and achieves statistical significance. However when other predictors are included in the model, as the results for Models 2 and 3 show, this effect is reduced to insignificance among those who never support coups, and it survives only among those who reject coups some of the time. The other indicator for political participation (communal participation) does not achieve statistical significance under any conditions. These findings challenge the neo-Tocquevilleian notion of democracy that has become so popular; participation in communal activism and interpersonal trust do not offer a barrier against the development of authoritarian predispositions among the mass public in Peru.

The results also show that the model does better in predicting strong rejection of military rule (“never”) than it does for less decisive attitudes (“sometimes”). Only two factors seem to be consistent predictors for those who reject coups only some of the time in relation to those who always support them: their rejection of the use of direct action tactics for political purposes and their membership in civil society associations. This suggests that those

9. “Skeptics” (those who deviated little or none at all from the midpoint of the items in the scale of system support) showed a mean of 1.5 in the scale of political knowledge (range = 0-3). Strong supporters/strong rejectors had a mean score of 1.1. The difference in means was statistically significant at the .01 level.

who support coups only under some circumstances are attitudinally closer to those who always support coups than to those who always reject them.

In summary, we find persuasive evidence for our contention that in unconsolidated democracies, skepticism toward the political system rather than unqualified support for it reduces the chances of public support for coups. A much more complex, nonlinear picture has been identified here. Extreme discontent with the system increases the chances of support for coups, but so does extreme support for it. Those less likely to support regime change are those who tend to have neutral evaluations of the political system, neither extremely critical nor extremely positive. Certainly further research is needed to see whether this finding can be replicated elsewhere. We also find that negative evaluations of presidential performance and approval of violent, direct tactics for political purposes increase the likelihood of support for coups. Finally, we find that the younger generation is much more likely to support coups than are members of older generations.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article provides evidence from only one case of an unconsolidated democracy, and therefore our conclusions must be tentative and subject to additional testing in other national contexts. However, Peru is representative of that subset of unconsolidated democracies where semicompetitive elections are used as the legitimating mechanism for what is essentially authoritarian rule. Thus although recognizing the inherent limitations of our single-case study, we believe that our article speaks to larger issues that are not exclusive or limited to the Peruvian experience.

A number of studies published in recent years have concerned themselves with the levels of public trust in political institutions and politicians in the United States (Dionne, 1991; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; Lipset & Schneider, 1987), Western Europe (Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995; Norris, 1999), and Eastern Europe (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Mishler, Rose, & Haerpfer, 1998). This line of inquiry strongly suggests that the venerable notion of system support (and its derivatives "diffuse" and "specific" support) enjoys a healthy life. Moreover, there is a renewed effort to do further analytical work on this subject, bridging the gap between macrolevel concerns with legitimacy and individual-level public opinion findings (Weatherford, 1992) as well as expanding the objects of support (Norris, 1999). Most of the previously cited literature, however, treats system support as a dependent variable. Thus the potential effects of system support on other political attitudes tend to be overlooked (Hetherington, 1998). It has been

shown that political trust is a good predictor of citizens' feelings toward presidents (Hetherington, 1998) and votes for nonincumbent parties and third-party candidates (Hetherington, 1999). Our study is an effort to look at the attitudinal consequences of system support (redefined as political skepticism) on support for military coups in an unconsolidated democracy.

Whereas in the United States and Western Europe system support may not have a significant impact on regime change (Citrin, 1974; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995; Norris, 1999), our study shows that this is certainly not the case in Peru. We find evidence that system support does matter in predicting people's support for military solutions. But we also find evidence for our claim that we need to reassess the way system support interacts with coups approval and disapproval in unconsolidated democracies. Instead of an inverse linear relationship, we identify a V curve in Peru. In substantive terms, this suggests that high system support in unconsolidated democracies appears not to be an unequivocal precursor of regime stability; those with high support can also support coups. We discover that political skepticism—neither extreme rejection nor extreme approval of the system—is associated with greater attitudinal resistance to military coups.

In addition to political skepticism, we have found that rejection of the way the president is conducting his job is associated with greater tolerance for coups. We also found that the disposition to the use of confrontational tactics significantly affects whether a person will be predisposed to approve a military coup. As we expected, we did not find that political tolerance has a significant impact on this approval. We found that neither the formal levels of education nor the levels of political awareness are predictors of coup support or rejection. In a similar vein, and despite the current emphasis on the importance of trust, we fail to uncover a significant, independent impact of interpersonal trust in the determination of support for coups. The evidence for political participation as a barrier for coup support is mixed: Participation in communal activities does not have a significant impact on this attitude, but participation in civil society organizations does, but only among those who reject coups under some circumstances.

Finally, we have shown that age constitutes an important predictor of a respondent's position toward military coups. Older citizens, those who at one point or another in the past have experienced firsthand the perils of military governments, are much less inclined to support military coups than are younger people. Today's Peruvian youth are the sons and daughters of the 1980s, the years of economic crisis, hyperinflation, political violence, and transition to civilian rule in Peru; they have not had direct exposure to the terrors of military rule.

We must not overlook an important finding of this article that does conform to prior theorizing: Dissatisfaction with the political system (widespread in Peru and in many other Latin American nations) and the incumbent president leads to greater approval for military coups. This is a confirmation of theoretical expectations of the role of system support in regime change with empirical evidence rarely found in the literature.

Our study suggests important lines for future research. One is to determine to what extent what we have found in the Peruvian case can be replicated elsewhere. Anecdotal evidence shows that coup attempts have encountered a degree of mass support in places such as Venezuela, Paraguay, and Ecuador. Were those who opposed these coup attempts more likely to have a neutral or skeptical evaluation of the political system than those who supported them, as we suggest here? Another line of research is to identify the role of democratic values in the predisposition to support coups. This article has focused only on political tolerance and approval of violent action for political purposes. Certainly additional and finer indicators need to be used, such as personality traits (e.g., authoritarianism).

In closing, we are not encouraged by the finding that support for military coups is a function of political skepticism, evaluations of the incumbent, and age rather than the extensively researched and presumably deeper democratic values such as support for civil liberties, communal participation, or interpersonal trust. Dismal economic performance has been no stranger to Latin America, and it would be absurd to assume that major economic crises all lie in the past. Such crises could certainly reduce the degree of citizen neutrality toward the political system, fostering greater political discontent and new military coups.

APPENDIX

Political tolerance. Political tolerance was measured with a 10-point format scale on four questions probing attitudes toward the civil rights of those who oppose the political system. The questions were introduced with the following statement: "There are people who always say bad things about Peru's system of government. Now I'm going to read you a series of questions about certain things that these people can do and I would like you to tell me to what extent would you approve or disapprove that these people had the right to perform these actions": (a) To what extent do you approve or disapprove that people who only say bad things about the Peruvian form of government should have the right to vote? (b) Thinking always about these people, to what extent do you approve or disapprove that they should have the right to organize peaceful protests or rallies to express their views? (c) To what extent do you approve

or disapprove that they should have the right to run for public office? (d) To what extent do you approve or disapprove that these people be given the right to appear on television to express their views?

The items were added into a single scale. To minimize missing cases, when one of the questions had a missing answer, the mean of the other three answers was assigned. When missing data were present in two or more items, the case was assigned a missing value. Higher scores in the coding correspond to higher levels of political tolerance.

Approval of direct action tactics. This variable was measured by two 10-point format questions, combined into a simple additive scale. The questions had the following introductory statement: "I would like you to tell me to what extent would you approve or disapprove of people having the right to perform the following actions." The actions probed were as follows: (a) that people participate in the closing or blocking of streets to pursue a political goal or (b) that people invade private property (houses or land) to pursue a political goal. Higher values indicate higher approval of direct actions.

Political participation. To measure political participation, respondents were asked the following questions about whether they had performed actions in the 12 months immediately prior to the interview: (a) Have you worked on or tried to resolve a problem in your community or neighborhood? (b) Have you donated money, in cash or in kind, to help resolve a problem or improve the condition of your community or neighborhood? (c) Have you volunteered your own work? (d) Have you attended any meetings to resolve a problem or to improve your community or neighborhood? Respondents were also asked whether they frequently, occasionally, rarely, or never attended meetings of the following organizations in the 12 months immediately prior to the interview: (a) neighborhood associations, (b) parent-teacher associations, (c) sports associations, (d) women's groups, (e) church associations, (f) professional associations, (g) labor unions, and (h) political parties. All these items were factor analyzed. Three factors were identified: one factor underlying communal problem-solving participation and two indicating different forms of membership in civil society organizations. We use the factor scores of the first factor to indicate a respondent's degree of involvement in community problem-solving activities. We added (and divided by 2) the factor scores for Components 2 and 3 to create a single scale of membership in civil society associations.

Interpersonal trust. The scale of interpersonal trust was created using the following questions: (a) Speaking in general of the people of your neighborhood, would you say that the people are generally very trustful, somewhat trustful, little trustful, or not trustful at all? (b) Do you believe that most people care only for themselves, or do you believe that most of the time they try to help others? (c) Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they had the opportunity, or do you think that they would not take advantage of you? The questions were added, and then we subtracted 3 from the resulting scale to keep a 0-to-5 range, from low to high interpersonal trust.

Sociodemographic variables. The variable of gender was coded 1 for males and 0 for females. To measure socioeconomic status, respondents were asked if they owned the following goods: a television set, a refrigerator, a telephone, a washing machine, and an automobile. For each positive answer, a score of 1 was assigned, and 0 was assigned if the respondent did not possess the good. The resulting scale ranges from 0 to 4. Education was measured by years of education.

Political knowledge. In this article, we use a scale of political awareness based on the number of correct answers to three questions. These items were introduced with the statement, "I would like you to tell me if you can recall" the following: (a) Who is the president of the United States? (b) Who is the president of Argentina? (c) What is the number of congressmen in Peru? Those who gave the correct answer for the item were assigned a score of 1. Those who provided incorrect answers or stated that they did not know the answer were given a score of 0.

Appendix Table
Descriptive Statistics of the Independent Variables

Variable	Range	Full Sample		Never Support Coups (<i>n</i> = 762)		Sometimes Support Coups (<i>n</i> = 301)		Always Support Coups (<i>n</i> = 193)					
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>				
System support	1-7	3.15	(.04)	1.22	3.13	(.11)	1.38	3.28	(.07)	1.20	3.00	(.04)	1.19
Skepticism	0-3	1.22	(.02)	.85	1.18	(.03)	.83	1.18	(.05)	.82	1.43	(.07)	.92
Presidential approval	1-5	2.96	(.02)	.79	2.90	(.03)	.76	3.00	(.05)	.78	3.16	(.06)	.89
Approval of direct action	1-10	2.87	(.06)	2.12	2.62	(.07)	1.94	3.01	(.12)	2.10	3.65	(.20)	2.63
Political tolerance	1-10	5.79	(.07)	2.48	5.69	(.09)	2.50	5.97	(.14)	2.42	5.92	(.18)	2.48
Communal participation	-1.8-2.2	.01	(.03)	1.00	.06	(.04)	1.01	-.06	(.06)	.98	-.04	(.08)	1.04
Membership in civil society	-2.0-7.2	.01	(.04)	1.50	.02	(.06)	1.49	.12	(.10)	1.60	-.22	(.10)	1.38
Interpersonal trust	0-5	1.90	(.04)	1.26	1.92	(.05)	1.29	1.88	(.07)	1.19	1.84	(.10)	1.26
Political knowledge	0-3	1.34	(.03)	1.04	1.42	(.04)	1.04	1.30	(.06)	1.04	1.07	(.07)	1.00
Age	18-87	34.83	(.38)	13.6	36.05	(.50)	13.7	32.77	(.75)	13.0	33.23	(.97)	13.4
Education	0-20	10.66	(.12)	4.19	10.80	(.15)	4.27	10.80	(.22)	3.79	9.87	(.32)	4.42
Socioeconomic status	0-5	1.92	(.03)	1.23	1.95	(.04)	1.21	1.90	(.07)	1.24	1.79	(.09)	1.25
Gender	0-1	.51	(.01)	.50	.54	(.02)	.50	.48	(.03)	.50	.44	(.04)	.50

Note: Standard errors of the means are in parentheses.

REFERENCES

- Armony, A. (1998). *Democracy and the double-edged sword of civil society: Argentina in comparative perspective*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, PA.
- Baloyra, E. (1988). Public opinion about military coups and democratic consolidation in Venezuela. In D. Herman (Ed.), *Democracy in Latin America: Colombia and Venezuela* (pp. 125-218). New York: Praeger.
- Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41(2), 999-1023.
- Carrión, J. F. (1991). *La juventud popular en el Perú* [Working-class youth in Peru]. Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Casper, G. (1995). *Fragile democracies: The legacies of authoritarian rule*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Citrin, J. (1974). Comment: The political relevance of trust in government. *American Political Science Review*, 68(3), 973-988.
- Conaghan, C. M. (1995). Polls, political discourse, and the public sphere: The spin on Peru's Fuji-golpe. In P. Smith (Ed.), *Latin America in comparative perspective* (pp. 227-255). Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Dalton, R. J. (1996). *Citizen politics* (2nd ed.). Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Diamond, L., Linz, J., & Lipset, S. M. (1995). Introduction: What makes for democracy. In L. Diamond, J. Linz, & S. M. Lipset, (Eds.), *Politics in developing countries: Comparing experiences with democracy* (2nd ed., pp. 1-66). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Dionne, E. J., Jr. (1991). *Why Americans hate politics*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Easton, D. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: John Wiley.
- Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4), 435-457.
- Finer, S. (1988). *The man on horseback: The role of the military in politics* (2nd enlarged ed., rev.). Boulder, CO: Westview.
- Finkel, S., Muller, E., & Seligson, M. A. (1989). Economic crisis, incumbent performance and regime support: A comparison of longitudinal data From West Germany and Costa Rica. *British Journal of Political Science*, 19(3), 329-351.
- Fitch, J. S. (1977). *The military coup d'etat as a political process: Ecuador, 1948-1966*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Foley, M., & Edwards, B. (Eds.). (1998). Beyond Tocqueville: civil society and social capital in comparative perspective—editor's introduction. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 42(1), 5-20.
- Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. *American Political Science Review*, 92(4), 791-808.
- Hetherington, M. J. (1999). The effect of political trust on the presidential vote. *American Political Science Review*, 93(2), 311-326.
- Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (1995). *Congress as public enemy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, S. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1988). The renaissance of political culture. *American Political Science Review*, 82(4), 1203-1230.

- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Klingemann, H. -D., & Fuchs, D. (Eds.). (1995). *Citizens and the state*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Linz, J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53(1), 69-105.
- Lipset, S. M., & Schneider, W. (1987). *The confidence gap: Business, labor, and government in the public mind*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1997). Trust, distrust and skepticism: popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-Communist societies. *Journal of Politics*, 59(2), 418-451.
- Mishler, W., Rose, R., & Haerpfer, C. (1998). *Democracy and its alternatives: Understanding post-Communist societies*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Mondak, J., (Ed.). (1998). Psychological approaches to social capital, special issue. *Political Psychology*, 19(3), 433-439.
- Muller, E. N., Jukan, T. O., & Seligson, M. A. (1982). Diffuse support and antisystem political behavior: A comparative analysis. *American Journal of Political Science*, 26(2), 240-264.
- Myers, D. J., & O'Connor, R. E. (1998). Support for coups in democratic political culture: A Venezuelan exploration. *Comparative Politics*, 30(2), 193-211.
- Nordlinger, E. (1977). *Soldiers in politics: Military coups and governments*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Norris, P. (1999). Introduction: The growth of critical citizens. In P. Norris (Ed.), *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic governance* (pp. 1-27). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Pateman, C. (1970). *Participation and democratic theory*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, R. (1967). Toward explaining military intervention in Latin American politics. *World Politics*, 20(1), 83-110.
- Putnam, R. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Seligson, A. L. (1999). Civic association and democratic participation in Central America: A cross national test of the Putnam thesis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 31(3), 342-362.
- Seligson, M. A. (1983). On the measurement of diffuse support: Some evidence from Mexico. *Social Indicators Research*, 12(1), 1-24.
- Seligson, M. A., & Muller, E. N. (1987). Democratic stability and economic crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983. *International Studies Quarterly*, 31(3), 301-326.
- Tarrow, S. (1996). Making social science work across space and time: A critical reflection on Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*. *American Political Science Review*, 90(2), 389-397.
- Weatherford, S. M. (1992). Measuring political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 86(1), 149-66.

Mitchell A. Seligson is the Daniel H. Wallace professor of political science and a research professor of international studies at the University of Pittsburgh, where he is also a professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. He has published extensively on attitudes toward democracy in Latin America.

Julio F. Carrión is an assistant professor of political science and international relations at the University of Delaware. He has published a number of articles dealing with public opinion in Peru. He is engaged in research dealing with mass attitudes toward civilian and military authoritarianism in Latin America and is editing a book dealing with the lessons of the Fujimori administration.