

**Latin American Public Opinion Project**

**LAPPOP**



**Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina**

**Democratic Values and  
Behaviors in Peru:  
A Reanalysis of a Study  
Conducted by Apoyo**

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# Introduction

This report presents a reanalysis of the 1996 data set collected and analyzed by APOYO, of Lima Peru. That report, *Estudio sobre participación de los ciudadanos en procesos democráticos*, presents an extensive review of most aspects of the survey. The present report is not intended to replicate the original one, nor should it be viewed as a critique of the Apoyo research. Rather, the focus of this report is primarily to fill in some of the missing links in the Apoyo study by taking a more multivariate and theory-based approach to the data set. In so doing, it was necessary to retrace some of the steps taken by Apoyo and, as a result, some differences in interpretation of the data emerged.

The study was conducted under time constraints made necessary by the commitments of the author to other projects. As a result, only approximately three weeks were available for (and contracted) to undertake this phase of the work order. No doubt, additional analysis of the questionnaire could and probably should be undertaken once USAID/Peru fully absorbs the findings contained herein. That analysis perhaps would be best undertaken once the upcoming 1997 survey data set becomes available.

I wish to thank Miriam Choy at USAID/Peru for doing so much to facilitate this project. I would also like to thank José René Argueta, my graduate assistant, for reading these chapters and commenting on them.

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## Executive Summary

This report presents a reanalysis of the 1996 survey conducted by Apoyo for USAID Peru. The study begins with a series of methodological points regarding the importance of multivariate analysis and appropriate scale construction in situations of non-response to survey data. The Apoyo report truncated many of the items and scales into a “high” and “low” range and created indexes in such a manner as to throw away as many as half of all of the interviews for a given scale. In the reanalysis presented here, the full range of the scales was utilized, and a method was employed to minimize the loss of cases in scale construction. Finally, graphical presentation of the results was made in order to facilitate interpretation of the data.

After the initial version of this report was written, USAID requested an explicit test of its SO1 hypothesis. That test was added as a supplemental report at the end of this document, but given the strong interest in it by USAID, the results are presented at the outset of this executive summary.

The Mission requested that the following hypothesis be tested:

To what extent does confidence in national political institutions, responsiveness of local governments, access to justice and knowledge of rights and responsibilities determine participation of citizens in local and national democratic processes? What is the correlation between them?

The findings of that analysis are summarized in the following table:

Dependent Variable	Significant correlates:	Significant predictors in multivariate analysis:
D1. Civil society participation	✓Knowledge of rights	Age Education Wealth
D2. Demand-making	✓Knowledge of rights	✓Knowledge of rights Gender Age Education Wealth
D3. Municipal participation	✓Responsiveness ✓Knowledge of rights	✓Knowledge of responsibilities Gender Age Wealth
D4. Voluntarism	✓Responsiveness ✓Knowledge of rights ✓Knowledge of responsibilities	Age Wealth
D5. Voting	✓Treatment by the Justice System	Age Education

✓= Conforms to USAID SO1 hypothesis.

The other major findings of the study are as follows:

☉The Latinbarometer data shows that even though support for the Peruvian legislature is not high, in comparative terms it ranks about the middle of the Latin American cases.

☉In terms of the press and the courts, however, Peru scores third from the bottom in Latin America on the Latinbarometer data. The University of Pittsburgh data base further shows that in the item measuring confidence in getting a fair trial, Peru scores lowest, only 26 on a scale of 0-100.

☉Those with higher education express lower system support in Peru as compared to those with lower education. Females and older Peruvians also express less support, as do those whose native language is Quechua and Aymara as compared to Spanish.

☉Political tolerance in Peru is similar to the levels found in other Latin American countries.

☉Women and those with little education and rural dwellers are less tolerant in Peru than men, those with higher levels of education and urban dwellers. The poor are also less tolerant than the better off.


⊗The report also presents an analysis of a model of political stability, and compares Peru to other countries in the University of Pittsburgh data base. Peru turns out to have the lowest percentage of its citizens in the “stable democracy cell,” and the highest percentage in the “democratic breakdown” cell.

Joint Distribution of System Support and Tolerance in Latin America, 1995-96				
Country	Stable Democracy	Unstable Democracy	Oligarchy	Democratic Breakdown
Costa Rica, 1995	52%	7%	38%	4%
El Salvador, 1995	36%	25%	23%	16%
Paraguay, 1996	29%	20%	30%	22%
Nicaragua, 1995	23%	34%	18%	24%
Peru, 1996	16%	39%	13%	33%

Percents do not always total 100 owing to rounding.

Source: University of Pittsburgh Latin America Public Opinion Project

The above table is complex, and the reader might be able to better grasp the comparisons by an examination of the “stable democracy” cell alone. The following figure shows these results.



☛ The Apoyo analysis greatly understates the level of civil society participation in Peru, claiming erroneously that three-quarters and more of the population are inactive. Nearly half of all Peruvians participate in school or church-related groups, while over one-quarter participate in sports clubs or community development organizations. Among such organizations as political parties and professional organizations, however, the Apoyo presentation and the one made here are not strikingly different.

☛ Differences by gender are striking, disposing of some myths about Peruvian women. In contrast to the myth that it is the men who are active, women are found to be more active than men in school-related groups, in church groups and, of course, in organizations designated especially for them (i.e., women's groups). Men, on the other hand, are more active in sports clubs, unions, community development organizations, professional associations and political parties.



☉ In community development organizations, older Peruvians participate more, but wealthier Peruvians participate **less**. Education is negatively related to this form of participation; the higher the education the lower the participation. Gender differences are largely irrelevant. Thus, myths of the inactive poor, hyperactive youth or inactive women are dashed by this survey.

☉ More than half of Peru's poor women are active in "comedores populares" and other similar organizations.

☉ In terms of community voluntarism (donating time, money and labor to a community project) Apoyo reports that over two-thirds score "low," the implication being that inactivism is the predominant mode in Peru. Rather than a picture of most Peruvians being inactive in community voluntarism, the opposite picture emerges from this reanalysis. In fact, the completely inactive represent less than one-third of the sample.

☉ Peruvian females exhibit their highest level of voluntarism when their level of education is the lowest. Their voluntarism declines markedly as they increase their levels of education, and only increases again for women with a university level of education. Males, however, tend not to vary their level of voluntarism with their level of education.


☉ Demand-making is central to the entire question of accountability. Citizens who have felt needs and try to resolve them with communal resources can often only go so far with those resources. They often need help from the public sector, and when they make demands they expect to have a responsible reply. How large a proportion of the Peruvian population has engaged in demand-making on public officials and agencies? Nearly two-fifths of Peruvians have made a demand on their district mayors, and nearly a quarter on their provincial mayors. These data, when compared to demand-making of public offices or legislators, show that the assistance of local officials is much more likely to be sought than assistance from national officials.

☉ About half of all Peruvians make demands on at least one public individual or institution. Once again, this suggests a very active population; one out of every two Peruvians has made a demand on a public official or institution.

☉ At every level of education, women make fewer demands than men. Indeed, at all levels of education, male demands exceed the national average, while female demands are lower except for university educated females. Peruvians with higher levels of education are more apt to make demands than those with lower levels of education. As Peruvians grow older, their demand-making increases. This is true for both men and women, although for the oldest cohort of women in the survey, demand-making declines.

☉ Peruvians who are more active in civil society organizations are also more active in municipal government participation.

☉ Are there payoffs of civil society participation in terms of satisfaction with local or national government in Peru? Civil society participation is not linked to any of our key measures of satisfaction with district or provincial government. Nor is it linked to system support or tolerance. These are not only disturbing findings that do not follow patterns uncovered elsewhere, they also suggest that the basic civil society thesis emphasizing the importance of civil society participation for democracy, does not seem to be working in Peru. But, that satisfaction with local government is significantly associated with system support at the national level. Consider the following figure, which shows the relationship between evaluation of district municipal services and our 5-item system support measure. The relationship is very clear; those who are very dissatisfied with municipal services score only around 20 on the 0-100 scale, whereas those who are very satisfied score twice as high (around 40). For a country with low levels of system support, it seems obvious that finding ways to satisfy citizens with their local government might help increase system support nation-wide. There is also a significant association between the respondents' perception of the treatment they have received in their district municipality and system support, although the pattern is not as clear-cut as it is with satisfaction with services.



⊗ Although we have found evidence of a significant association between satisfaction with government at the local level and system support at the national level, we still did not find linkages between civil society participation and satisfaction with local government. We probed this disturbing finding by moving beyond our 9-item civil society index to the voluntarism and demand-making indexes. Once again, significant associations do not emerge. Thus, civil society participation does not associate with satisfaction with district or provincial government. These findings suggest that in Peru, while there exists an active civil society, but it is activism that does not translate into attitudes conducive to stable democracy. Rather, we find connections between satisfaction with local government and system support. This finding might have an important impact on USAID's programmatic decisions. Why is there this disconnect? Is there something wrong with civil society participation or is it with the institutions themselves?

⊗ Compared to other Latin American countries for which we have data, support for a military coup because of economic difficulties, was not much different. For each of the countries, about one-quarter of the population supported a coup, except for Nicaragua, where support reached one-third. Peru is the lowest of the countries in the data base, but again, the variation between countries is small.

⊗ Females are far more supportive of a coup than males, even when education is controlled for. In addition, education reduces support for a coup, but only at the level of university education and among males. Females remain equally supportive of a coup irrespective of their level of education. This finding coincides with other characteristics of Peruvian females that we have seen in this report and suggest that more attention should be paid to the female population as it appears to be more susceptible to authoritarian appeals. Whereas fewer than ten per cent of university educated males in Peru would support a coup for economic reasons, nearly a third of females would support a coup under these circumstances, a difference of nearly three-to-one.

⊗ A majority surveyed in 1996 favored the April, 1992 executive coup, whereas one-third of Peruvians would justify a new assault on democracy.

⊗ The indigenous population, often seen as a major target of Senderista violence, was much more strongly in favor of the executive coup than the non-indigenous population. It should also be recalled that system support among the Quechua/Aymara speakers was especially low.

⊗ Fewer than one-third of Peruvians would not justify a coup under any circumstances, and more than two-thirds would justify it under any one or more of the five circumstances presented in this five-item series. At the other extreme are 100 respondents who would justify a coup under each of the five circumstances presented in the questions.

⊗ A comparison of approval of legal and illegal forms of protest in Peru suggests the following overall conclusions: a) In Peru, support for legal forms of political protest is lower

than it is in other countries of Latin America, whereas support for illegal forms of protest in Peru is higher than it is in other Latin American countries; 2) Overall, most Peruvians support legal forms of protest while most oppose illegal forms of protest.

☉ Males are significantly more supportive of legal demonstrations than females. This coincides with earlier findings that females were less tolerant than males. The tolerance scale, however, is also a significant predictor of approval of legal demonstrations, even when gender is held constant. This means that tolerant Peruvians, male and female alike, are more likely to approve legal demonstrations than intolerant Peruvians.

☉ Civil society participation emerges as a significant predictor of approval of legal demonstrations. This comes as a surprise given the disappointing findings about the role of civil society participation earlier in this report. But here we see that those who participate more in local organizations are more willing to support the democratic right to protest. It is also important to note that wealth, education, age, rural/urban residence, and coup support measures play no role in predicting support for legal demonstrations.

☉ Civil disobedience is not connected in any way to gender, education, civil society participation or trust. The only variable which accounts for both support for legal and illegal forms of protest is tolerance; tolerant Peruvians are willing to support both forms, whereas intolerant Peruvians are not. Civil disobedience is more strongly supported in urban Peru than in rural Peru, and is also connected to support for a coup and poverty. Among the poorest people in the survey, support does not go beyond a score of 3.2 on the 1-10 scale, meaning that even among the poor, support for civil disobedience is not high.

☉ There is a significant association between supporting a military coup and support for civil disobedience. Among those Peruvians with very high approval of civil disobedience there is also very high support for a coup to extinguish democracy. Thus, approval of violent means to achieve political objectives in Peru apparently coincides with the use of state force to overturn democracy.

Details of these and other findings are contained in the report that follows.

# Chapter I: System Support

## The Apoyo Report Compared to the Present Document

### *A Second Look at the Comparative Data*

The Apoyo data analysis includes an extensive discussion of the system support data in the survey. This is entirely appropriate since support for the political system is considered a critical variable in political stability. Those democratic systems that are not supported by their populations, that are not considered legitimate by them, cannot endure over the long run. Authoritarian systems, of course, can use unlimited amounts of coercion to repress dissent.

The Apoyo analysis, especially in its discussion of the comparative data from the Latinbarometer (see their Table 14), suggests that the Peruvian situation is not especially problematical when compared to its counterparts in Latin America. In some important ways, however, that analysis might offer undue comfort to the reader. Two problems emerge here. First, the list of institutions includes several that are largely irrelevant to support for democratic political institutions. These include: the Church, television, large businesses, business associations, and unions. Citizen attitudes towards these institutions might be important in a broader, sociological sense, but one can easily imagine a situation in which there could be very high support for the Church, for example, and very low support for key democratic institutions. Indeed, this is what we find in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America. Other institutions such as the armed forces, and the police have a very complex relationship to support for democracy. For example, citizens who are very supportive of the armed forces might in fact have nothing but disdain for democracy and wish for a military coup. The key democratic institutions on the list from the Latinbarometer that were discussed in the Apoyo report are: the Legislature, the Press, the Courts and Political parties. Two of these key institutions (the courts and the press), it turns out, are among the only two that Apoyo found to be lower than the Latin American average, whereas the other, largely irrelevant institutions, were found to be higher or about the same as the Latin American average. Political parties are not well supported in Latin America, but nor are they in most other countries around the world. Apoyo's analysis of the Latinbarometer data ranks political parties at the 19 per cent level, so low as to make inter-country variation of little interest, and for that reason this institution is not examined further here. Each of the others, however, will be examined immediately below.

The second observation to be made with regard to the Apoyo analysis is one that afflicts not only the discussion of system support, but of many other variables as well. For that reason this point is elaborated upon here so as to help guide the reader through the difference in methodology between the Apoyo report and the one used in this reanalysis of the 1996 data set. In an effort to provide the reader with a report that is easy to comprehend, Apoyo attempted to simplify the presentation of the multi-point scales. For example, if an item was coded on a 7-point scale or a 10-point scale, in order to measure the degree of intensity expressed by the respondent toward a given issue, Apoyo would divide these scales into a “high range” and a “low range.” While this procedure simplifies the presentation, it also has the effect of throwing away important information about intensity.<sup>1</sup> Consider the following example. Two individuals are asked how much they trust the court system of their country, and are asked to respond on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being low and 10 being high. One individual answers “6” and the other “5.” In the Apoyo scheme, which would divide the 10 points into 1-5 and 6-10, the first respondent would be scored “high” and the second “low.” These would be the identical scores as two other respondents, one who scored a “10” and the other a “1.” These scores are each very different, but by condensing them each into a “high” or a “low,” this information is lost. It is impossible to tell what impact this had on the overall results of the Apoyo study, but in the analysis presented here, the full range of the scores will be used, but converted into a conventional 0-100 format, since it is common to think of test scores as ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 100.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Apoyo report explicitly recognizes this difficulty on the top of p. 47. It appears that there was a misreading of the University of Pittsburgh El Salvador report. Apoyo may have believed that in the El Salvador study the individual scale items were each dichotomized and then summed into a scale. In fact, the items were retained in their original format, but only dichotomized in order to classify respondents into four large categories.

<sup>2</sup>On page 45 of the Apoyo report, the last line of the page, there is reference to the scale score of their “high” range for the system support items as ranging from a low of 36 to a high of 56. In fact, since the scale was constructed of eight items, each of which could range from a low of 5 in their dichotomization scheme (dividing 7-points into a 1-4 and 5-7), the lowest score would be 8 items x 5 = 40. Apoyo, however, reports a low of 36. Presumably this is an error.

A further difficulty with the scale construction in the Apoyo report is that when I examined the support scale included in the revised data base, I found that their label says it consists of only seven items (b1, b2, b3, b4, b12, b13, and b27), rather than eight items as stated in the text of the report. A seven-item scale would correspond to high-end of 49 (7 points x 7 items = 49), but a frequency distribution on the scale shows that the scale does in fact have a high end of 56, which would correspond to seven items.


Another observation to be made is with respect to the manner in which Apoyo presents the Latinbarometer data. In their presentation, the results for the other countries in Latin America included in the Latinbarometer are averaged, making it difficult to locate Peru in the context of the other 16 countries of the study. All we know from the Apoyo table is the average of the 16 other countries, not the rank of Peru in the context of its Latin American neighbors.<sup>3</sup> As we all know, averages can be misleading.

Once those methodological points are cleared up, it is possible to take a fresh look at the Latinbarometer comparisons calculated by Apoyo. Let us take a look first at the Legislature. This is certainly a very important democratic institution, and one that Apoyo correctly reports is scored higher than the average of other Latin American countries. Figure I.3 shows the Latinbarometer results for each of the 17 countries included in the study, scored from 0-100.<sup>4</sup> Peru scores right in the middle of the other Latin American countries, with trust in the legislature being neither particularly high nor particularly low. Of course, it is important to note that in no country is the average level of trust in the positive end of the continuum, i.e., 50 or over on the 0-100 scale. Peru scores 38, compared to the score of 37 given to it using the Apoyo methodology. This suggests that the two approaches reach similar conclusions, thus increasing our confidence in the results. The overall conclusion that one could reach from the two analyses is that even though support for the Peruvian legislature is not particularly high, in Latin American comparative terms, it does not stand out as an especially problematical institution. As we shall shortly see, however, this cannot be said about all political institutions in Peru.

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
<sup>3</sup>The Apoyo report spends several pages (pp. 47-56) analyzing the system support scale by comparing the relationship between the overall scale and its individual components. It is not clear why this was done since all that it tells us is that one component of the overall scale is associated with the overall scale. Since the very definition of a scale is that the items are related to each other (i.e., are correlated), this sort of analysis is not very informative.

<sup>4</sup>The scoring system of the Latinbarometer is 1-4, with 1 being “a lot” and 4 being not at all. In this report, these numbers are rescaled to a 0-100 metric, with 100 being high and 0 being low.

**Figure I.3**


Next, we examine trust in the Press, scored by Apoyo as 42, compared to a Latin American average of 50. Figure I.4 below shows the results. On this measure of support, Peru does not do nearly as well, scoring in the third lowest of Latin America, nearly in a tie with Colombia and Panama. A free press is, of course, an essential element to democratic governance. Unless the press is free, citizens cannot learn what their governments are doing and have little basis to judge their performance when elections are held. In 1997, subsequent to the 1996 APOYO survey, the Peruvian government struck several blows against freedom of the press.






**Figure I.4**

Finally, we come to the courts, the institution that the Apoyo analysis correctly identifies as one meriting concern based on the Latinbarometer data alone. Figure I.5 shows the comparative data. Here again, Peru does not score well, positioned third from the bottom of the list of 17 countries.



**Figure I.5**

The Latinbarometer data are useful to help highlight the democratic institutions in Peru that seem to be the ones that are least well supported. A more direct approach to the question of support for the judiciary is to ask Peruvians if they think that courts hold fair trials. We asked this question in Peru as well as in selected other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion data base. Figure I.6 shows the results. These results are consistent with those from the Latinbarometer, even though the range of countries is far smaller. The question, of course, is a different one, since here we are asking about the outcome of a judicial proceeding. Nonetheless, the low ranking of Peru compared to these other cases reinforces the notion that the judiciary in Peru is a problematical democratic institution in that country.

**Figure I.6**

### ***The Treatment of Non-Response***

A final important difference between the Apoyo report and this one involves the handling of missing data. In any survey, there will be respondents who do not give an answer to one or more of the questions they are asked. This can occur for many reasons, including failure to understand the question, lack of information on which to base an answer, the desire for privacy, etc. Whatever the reason, when respondents do not reply to a question, we code their responses with a “don’t know” (often indicated as DK, or in Spanish “no sabe,” NS). Non-response generally does not cause any difficulty when the analysis is based on a single item, but when scales are constructed, based on multiple items, the problem can become compounded. For example, if the scale consists of five items, and 10 percent of the respondents did not answer each item, and that 10 per cent happened to be a different subset for each question, the overall index could lose 50 per

cent of its cases. If two scales are being associated, and each one has significant amounts of non-response, then the sample size being analyzed could drop even further.

Fortunately, there are well-established ways around this problem. Generally, when non-response produces a significant loss of cases in scale construction, it is best to maintain a larger sample size by assigning to each missing case the average of the non-missing responses for that individual. For example, if a respondent answered 3 of the 5 items in a scale, then the scale score for that person would be the average of the three responses for that respondent. On the other hand, if there are more missing data than valid data for a given individual (e.g., the respondent only answered two out of the five questions), then we would normally treat that person as having a non-response for the entire scale. In this report, this method is used for scale construction. For each respondent, the person's average score across the five items is utilized when all items were answered. When only four items were answered for a given respondent, the algorithm takes the average of the four, and when three out of the five are answered, again, we assign the respondent the average of those three. When, however, the respondent answers fewer than three of the five, then the respondent's score is excluded entirely (i.e., coded as "missing" by SPSS).

The Apoyo approach was to exclude any respondent who gave a non-response to any item in their scales. The careful reader of that report will note that in many tables the sample size was unusually low. For example, Table 17 reports on only about 660 cases out of the sample of 1,508 responses. This loss of cases is so great that it is possible that the analysis reflects only a very special sub-set of the population, namely all of those who responded to all of the items in the scales being analyzed. This may mean, for example, that the analysis is being based on a subset of the population that is more educated, more articulate, and more urban than the population as a whole, and thus distort our view of the data. In order to minimize the possible distorting effects of non-response, a problem that dramatically lowered the sample size being analyzed in a number of the Apoyo tables, the analysis presented here assigns to each respondent with some missing data his or her average score when at least a majority of the items in the scale are answered by that individual. The result is a much higher sample size for each index analyzed, and a presentation that more closely reflects the views of the entire sample than does the Apoyo report. Of course, when the majority of the responses for a given individual are missing, then this report also eliminates that respondent from the tables reported here.

## **System Support in the 1996 Survey**

In prior studies of system support conducted by the author of this study, five core items have been utilized. These are items B3, B4, B6, B1 and B2 on page 3 of the Apoyo questionnaire. In order to obtain an overall picture of system support in Peru, these items will be used again here. To facilitate interpretation, the scale is recoded from its original 1-7 format to a 0-100 format, and, as discussed above, the mean score for each respondent is utilized when there is some missing data. For this scale, if at least three of the five questions were responded to, the mean of those three was utilized. If a larger proportion of missing data was detected, the case was dropped. The result is that for the five item scale, only 78 out of the 1508 cases are lost, a sharp contrast with the Apoyo methodology, which produced a loss of over 50% of the cases.

How does system support vary in Peru? In order to answer this important question, the first step in the analysis was to examine the basic demographic and socio-economic factors that might influence system support: sex, age, education, wealth, and ethnicity. The measurement of the first three variables is straight forward, but in the Apoyo questionnaire wealth was measured not by monthly or weekly income but by ownership of six capital goods: TV, refrigerator, telephone, car, washing machine, number of bathrooms in home. This was a wise way to proceed since many respondents do not have a cash income (students, housewives, retirees, subsistence farmers), and many individuals are unwilling to disclose their incomes to interviewers. An additional measure of socio-economic status was the Apoyo-assigned social stratification of A, B, C, and D, based on the observation of the household made by interviewer. Ethnicity is defined in three distinct ways. First, it is defined by maternal language (Spanish vs. Indian language), second, by ability to speak an indigenous language and third, by self-identification (variable TR1 on p. 6 of the survey).<sup>5</sup>

In order to determine which, if any of these demographic factors are associated with variations in support for the political system of Peru, multiple regression was utilized. This technique allows us examine simultaneously the impact of many variables on system support, while controlling for each of the others in the analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in Table I.3. Although the table might look rather confusing at first, it is relatively easy to interpret. The reader can examine the last column of numbers, under the heading "Sig." indicating statistical significance. Any number smaller than .05 is considered significant. The variables and significance levels that meet this standard have been highlighted in bold print. As the table shows, education, sex, age and ethnicity defined by maternal language are significant predictors of system support in Peru. Wealth, defined

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<sup>5</sup>For analysis purposes, a new variable, "ethnic" was created, that distinguishes between those Peruvians who identify as being indigenous, and those who say that they are "mestizas" or "blancas." The small number of other ethnic identifications were (e.g. 10 "Negra" respondents) were recoded as "missing" for this analysis.

by capital good or as defined by the Apoyo classification scheme has no significant relationship to system support.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of System Support in Perú <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	47.728	10.007		4.769	.000
	<b>EDU2 Ultimo año de educación aprobado</b>	-.571	.166	-.115	-3.433	<b>.001</b>
	<b>SEXO Sexo</b>	-2.959	1.171	-.072	-2.526	<b>.012</b>
	<b>EDAD Edad años cumplidos</b>	-.257	.045	-.171	-5.658	<b>.000</b>
	<b>RLENGA Lengua materna (rec.)</b>	5.135	2.417	.064	2.125	<b>.034</b>
	LENGB Habla otro idioma aparte del Castellano.	2.695	1.538	.051	1.752	.080
	R1 Tenencia de TV	2.325	2.054	.035	1.131	.258
	R3 Tenencia de refrigeradora.	1.644	1.401	.040	1.174	.241
	R4 Tenencia de teléfono.	-1.617	1.625	-.035	-.995	.320
	R5 Tenencia de automóvil.	.472	3.205	.004	.147	.883
	R6 Tenencia de lavadora	-2.681	2.059	-.044	-1.302	.193
	NB1 Número de baños	-.371	.880	-.015	-.421	.674
	OVI Observación de la Vivienda	-.087	.937	-.003	-.092	.926
	ETHNIC	.603	2.115	.009	.285	.776


a. Dependent Variable: PSA5 5 core items b3 b4 b6 b1 b2 valid if 3 or more; Adj Mult. R-sq. = .05

**Table 1.3**

The reader needs to pay close attention to the signs on the coefficients in the table (see the column labeled "B"). These signs show the direction of the relationship. Education is **negatively** associated with system support: the higher the education the lower the support. Gender is coded so that male = 1 and female = 2. Since the coefficient for gender is also negative, it means that females in Peru have lower system support than males. Age is also **negatively** related to system support: older Peruvians are less supportive than younger ones. Finally, those whose native language is Spanish have higher system support than those whose native language was Quechua, Aymara or another indigenous language. It is very important to understand that these significant relationships

are not spurious. That is, it is not the case that the lower system support among women is a function of their level of education, although education could affect their system support. What these relationships are telling is that independent of education, age and ethnicity, Peruvian women have a lower level of system support than do Peruvian males. They are also telling us that independent of gender, ethnicity and age, Peruvians with higher levels of education express less system support than those with lower levels of education.


In order to visualize these relationships more clearly, it is helpful to provide a series of graphs that depict the impact of demographic and socio-economic factors on system support in Peru. Figure I.7 shows the relationship of gender to system support. Although males are significantly more supportive of the system than females, in absolute terms, the difference between them is very small. The overall mean for the sample on the 0-100 scale is 35.7, with males and females not differing from this by more than one point. Gender, then, plays a minor role in system support in Peru. There would seem to be little reason to develop gender specific programs to boost system support among women since the benefits of such a program, if successful, would not be great.

**Figure I.7**

Age has a much stronger relationship to system support. Figure I.8 shows that younger Peruvians have the highest level of system support, and those in their 50s have the lowest. There is some recovery of system support among the oldest respondents in the study, but they represent less than 10 per cent of the entire sample. Two distinct interpretations can be given for this data. The first, a more positive one, is that younger Peruvians, those just coming into the political system, are more positive toward their political system, and if that confidence remains throughout their lives, the entire level of system support will increase. A second, more realistic interpretation is that Peruvian youth enter the system with a reasonable degree of trust in it, but as they go through life their experiences persuade them otherwise. It is not possible to untangle this issue and select among the alternatives with only a single sample based at one point in time. Future



surveys will help determine which explanation is the more accurate. Nonetheless, the results have clear policy implications. Young Peruvians are more supportive of their political system, and therefore it would make sense to target that group in order to help maintain (indeed, even to boost) that support.



**Figure I.8**

Education, as noted above, has a negative relationship to system support. Figure I.9 shows this clearly. The more education Peruvians have, the less they support the political system. This suggests that something is going on in the process of obtaining an education that makes Peruvians less trusting of their political system. Moreover, it is not a process confined to university education, where perhaps many individuals learn to become skeptical. It is a process that begins earlier, in high school. Finally, it is the process


of education itself that seems to make Peruvians less supportive of their political system, rather than any increase in political knowledge that comes from higher levels of education. The survey contained a number of questions (GI series on p. 8) that measured knowledge of political personalities and issues (e.g., ability to name the President of Argentina). Those variable had no significant relationship with system support.

What is it about education in Peru that seems to make its citizens less supportive of the political system? Two possibilities emerge. One is that civic education that goes on in the school system produces a negative image of the system for the students. Perhaps civic education is communicated via teachers who themselves are very negative on the political system. This possibility could easily be explored by gathering a sample of teachers. This was the procedure that USAID followed in Nicaragua.<sup>6</sup> The second possibility is that the education process itself, independent of its content, makes Peruvians skeptical of their political system. It is important to sort out which of these explanations is the correct one so that the appropriate policy implications can be arrived at.

The reader might suppose that the findings on education may be misleading since we already know that system support declines with age, perhaps the relationship between education and system support just discussed is really a function of age. Figure I.9 shows, however, that such is not the case. The figure shows that system support declines with increased education for each of the age groups displayed. Indeed, even among the youngest respondents in the study, those who have not yet had the time to complete a college education, system support declines with advancing education. These results demonstrate in a graphic way the same findings that were shown above in the multiple regression results; each of the variables that are found to be significant in the multiple regression are significant even when the other variables in the analysis are taken into consideration (i.e., held constant).


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<sup>6</sup>See Mitchell A. Seligson, *Democratic Values in Nicaragua: 1991-1997*, Report to USAID/Nicaragua (Pittsburgh, PA., 1997).



**Figure I.9**

Ethnicity is the final significant predictor of system support examined in this section. As already noted, the regression analysis found that only when ethnicity was defined by maternal language spoken did differences emerge. Figure I.10 shows that those who grew up speaking Spanish had significantly higher system support than those who grew up speaking an indigenous language.

**Figure I.10**

Region played an important role in the Apoyo report. Utilizing the methodology applied in the present report, systematic differences on system support seem far less notable. Figure I.11 shows the results. The Selva region exhibits the highest level of system support, while the Sierra Norte the lowest. But on the 0-100 scale, these vastly different regions of Peru are only separated by eight points. Closer inspection shows that education varies considerably by region, a factor that we have already seen has an impact on system support. For example, while the Selva is the highest in system support, it is also the lowest in education of any of the regions. When controlled by each of the factors

shown to have a significant relationship to system support, the regional differences diminish somewhat, but remain basically the same way they are as displayed in this figure.<sup>7</sup>




Figure I.11

### ***Conclusions***

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<sup>7</sup>The control variables were entered as covariates in an MCA analysis.

In this chapter a number of methodological differences with the Apoyo study have been highlighted. Some of those differences involve little more than changing the presentation of the scale to a 0-100 format and graphing the results, so that the reader can more easily absorb the findings. Other changes, however, are more substantive and significantly affect our interpretation of the results. Unlike the Apoyo study, which concludes that comparisons with other Latin American countries results in Peru scoring above average, this analysis, focused on the critical institutions of the legislature, the press and the courts, finds that Peru fares poorly on the latter two. In addition, on the 5-point system support scale, which ranges from 0-100, Peruvians on average score only at 35.7, well below the mid-point of 50. One can conclude from these findings that system support is low in Peru.

This chapter has also shown that a number of key demographic and socio-economic factors are related to system support. Increased age and education both relate to declining system support, as does being a woman or growing up speaking an indigenous language. Wealth and information, however, have no relationship to system support, and region shows small differences.

This is not the last we will see of system support in this report. In future chapters system support will be related to political participation at both the national and local level so that it will be possible to see the extent to which democratic participation relates to increasing or decreasing support for the political system.

## Chapter II. Political Tolerance

Political tolerance is a fundamental element of democratic stability. Tolerant citizens are willing to provide political space for their opponents and other groups whose views differ from their own. When majorities will not allow minorities to enjoy a full range of civil liberties, democratic rule is threatened.

The Apoyo study contained a core of four items designed to measure political tolerance. These items asked respondents if they would be willing to extend to those who only say bad things about the Peruvian system of government the right to vote, to demonstrate, to run for office and to free speech. These are the same items utilized in other studies of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. Tolerance items are absent in the Latinbarometer.

The Apoyo analysis of the tolerance items is limited in two ways. First, it divides the population into tolerant and intolerant, rather than using the full range of the 4-item scale in which each item ranges from 0-10.<sup>8</sup> Second, there is no analysis at all of differences in the population by basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics,<sup>9</sup> nor is there any attempt to relate tolerance to system support. These analyses will be undertaken here.

### ***Comparisons with Other Countries***

Political tolerance does not differ much from country-to-country in Latin America, according to the data we have at hand. Figure II.12 shows the results. It is not surprising that Costa Rica is the most tolerant of the countries for which we have data, but Peru's

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<sup>8</sup>Once again, the system of creating scales utilizes the method of assigning a mean score to the respondents with missing data. When two or more of the four items in the scale were answered the mean of the valid data for that case was utilized.

<sup>9</sup>Perhaps there is an error in the report since the basic scale items are discussed on page 94, but then the analysis shifts in Table 43 to knowledge of rights and responsibilities. It is not clear why this switch is made in the report.

level, while the second lowest only to Paraguay, is not very different from the other countries.




Figure II.1

### ***Tolerance and its Correlates***

As has already been shown in Chapter I, various demographic and socio-economic factors are related to system support. Replicating that analysis here reveals the correlates tolerance. Table II.4 shows the results. Once again, the variables in bold type are the ones that have a statistically significant relationship to tolerance when the other variables are taken into consideration.




Predictors of Tolerance <sup>a</sup>					
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta	
1	(Constant)	50.520	6.958		.000
	<b>SEXO Sexo</b>	-3.710	1.542	-.066	.016
	EDAD Edad años cumplidos	5.954E-02	.059	.029	.316
	<b>EDU2 Ultimo año de educación aprobado</b>	.474	.215	.071	.028
	RLENGA Lengua materna (rec.)	4.539	3.121	.042	.146
	<b>ZONA Zona</b>	-4.087	1.803	-.067	.024
	ETHNIC	-1.070	2.716	-.011	.694
	<b>WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + Car + Washing machine</b>	1.590	.747	.069	.033

a. Dependent Variable: TOL; Adj. Multiple R-sq. = .03


**Table 2.1**

The results of the multiple regression analysis show that once again education and gender are important. Similar to system support, Peruvian women are less tolerant than Peruvian men. But, unlike system support, those with **lower** levels of education are **less** tolerant than those with higher levels of education. Also, unlike system support, ethnicity plays no role in tolerance. Two new factors that play a role in tolerance, however, are rural/urban residence (see “Zona” in table II.1), with the urban residents being more tolerant than the rural. Finally, wealth, as measured by material goods, finds that those who are wealthier are more tolerant, independent of their level of education.


It is useful to depict these findings graphically. Figure II.2 shows the relationship between tolerance and gender. As can be seen, men are significantly more tolerant than women.

**Figure II.2**


Education normally is associated with higher levels of tolerance. Figure II.3 shows that this pattern is also clearly and strongly evident in Peru. For those with the lowest levels of education, tolerance is below the mid-point on the 0-100 scale, but rises to nearly the two-thirds level among those who have a university education. The policy implication of this finding is clear; more education brings more tolerance.

**Figure II.3**


Location of residence in Peru also has an impact on tolerance. Rural residents are more intolerant than urban residents, as shown in Figure II.4. Education levels are of course lower in rural Peru, with rural areas averaging 9.3 and urban 10.7, and as we have already seen, higher education means greater tolerance. But, the multiple regression analysis presented at the beginning of this chapter demonstrated that even when controlled for education, rural Peruvians are less tolerant than urban Peruvians. Thus, there are other factors in urban Peru that stimulate tolerance. In terms of policy, these findings suggest that education programs designed to increase tolerance might be better aimed at rural areas than urban areas if the goal is to increase tolerance where it is lowest.

**Figure II.4**

Geographic region also has an influence on tolerance, but most of that is a function of other factors such as education and the rural/urban split. Figure II.5 shows that Lima, which is highly urban and has the highest levels of education, has the highest levels of tolerance. In contrast, the Sierra Centro/Trapezio (i.e., Junín, Ayacucho, Pasco, Huánuco and Huancavelica) have the lowest levels of tolerance. Again, these findings have programmatic implications in terms of focusing resources that might be expended to increase tolerance.

**Figure II.5**

Finally, we come to the relationship between wealth and tolerance. As noted above, wealthier Peruvians are more tolerant than poorer Peruvians. But even as commonly owned artifacts as a TV (87 per cent of the respondents owned a TV) relates to higher tolerance. TV ownership, which is an indicator of wealth, also implies exposure to the mass media. In Peru, such exposure increases tolerance, once again a finding with policy implications. TV could be used as a medium to communicate a message promoting political tolerance.

**Figure II.6**

### **Predictors of Democratic Stability**

How do system support and tolerance relate, and what is the potential impact of this relationship on democratic stability? <sup>10</sup> It is easiest to answer these questions by creating a simple two-by-two table, dichotomizing the system support variable (discussed in Chapter I) and tolerance (as described in this chapter) into “high” and “low.” Table II.2 presents,

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<sup>10</sup> This framework was first presented in Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías, *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador* (San Salvador: IDELA, 1992).

for this dichotomous situation, all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance.

Theoretical Relationship Between  
Tolerance and System Support  
in Institutionally Democratic Polities

		Tolerance	
		High	Low
System support	High	Stable Democracy	Oligarchy
	Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

**Table 2.2**

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Systems that are populated by individuals who have high system support and high political tolerance are those the model would predict would be democratic and stable. This prediction is based on the simple logic that high system support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable, and that tolerance is needed for the system to be able to guarantee civil liberties (especially to minorities) and thus remain democratic. Emerging democracies with this combination of attitudes, are likely to experience a deepening of democracy and might eventually end up as one of Dahl's polyarchies.<sup>11</sup>

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule is in jeopardy. Such

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<sup>11</sup> Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

systems would tend to move toward what we might call “oligarchical rule” in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Countries in which system support is low (the bottom two cells in Table II.2) should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since such instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when values tend toward political tolerance. In countries in which system support is low and tolerance is high, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or in a protracted period of instability characterized by considerable violence. That is, such countries may be moving toward the upper-left cell, stable democracy, or they may be moving toward breakdown. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the most likely ultimate outcome.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which, at a minimum, competitive, free, fair and regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance in non-democratic systems might well produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, these variables explain only the micro-factors that might make democratic stability possible, and they are meant to supplement the macro-factors already described by Przeworski and his colleagues.<sup>12</sup> What is being assumed here is that over the long run, attitudes of the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may, of course, remain incongruent for many years.

How does Peru fare in the scheme developed here? Table II.3 shows the results.

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<sup>12</sup>Adam Przeworski, José Antonio Cheibub Michael Alvarez and Fernando Limongi, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (January 1996): 39-55.



Empirical Relationship Between  
Tolerance and System Support  
in Peru, 1996

		Tolerance	
		High	Low
System support	High	16.2% Stable Democracy	12.6% Oligarchy
	Low	38.5% Unstable Democracy	32.7% Democratic Breakdown

**Table 2.3**

The results show that only 16.2% of the Peruvian population in 1996 had values supportive of stable democracy, whereas nearly one-third (32.7%) had values conducive to democratic breakdown. Since it has already been shown that tolerance in Peru is not especially low, the major reason why such a large proportion of Peruvians are located in the unstable cells (unstable democracy and breakdown) is because of low system support. Since we do not have any prior data from Peru it is not possible in this report to compare the 1996 data with any other points in time and to know if the relatively low support for stable democracy has been declining or increasing. As additional USAID surveys become available in the future, these trends will become evident.

Fortunately, we do have data from the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project that allow us to place these findings in comparative perspective. Table II.4 shows the results, with the five countries in the sample ordered by the percentage of their

populations in the “stable democracy” cell.<sup>13</sup> As can be seen, Peru has the lowest percentage of its citizens in the stable “democracy cell,” and the highest percentage in the “democratic breakdown” cell.<sup>14</sup> This is a factor that will be important in the analysis of support for military in Chapter IV of this report.

Joint Distribution of System Support and Tolerance in Latin America, 1995-96				
Country	Stable Democracy	Unstable Democracy	Oligarchy	Democratic Breakdown
Costa Rica, 1995	52%	7%	38%	4%
El Salvador, 1995	36%	25%	23%	16%
Paraguay, 1996	29%	20%	30%	22%
Nicaragua, 1995	23%	34%	18%	24%
Peru, 1996	16%	39%	13%	33%

Percents do not always total 100 owing to rounding.

Source: University of Pittsburgh Latin America Public Opinion Project

**Table 2.4**

The above table is complex, and the reader might be able to better grasp the comparisons by an examination of the “stable democracy” cell alone. Figure II.7 shows these results.

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<sup>13</sup>These results differ slightly from other presentations made from these data because of the manner in which missing data has been treated.

<sup>14</sup>The 1997 survey for Nicaragua is under review by USAID/N. It is expected that those results will be released shortly. See Mitchell A. Seligson, *Democratic Values in Nicaragua: 1991-1997*, Report to USAID/Nicaragua (Pittsburgh, PA., 1997).




Figure II.7

## Conclusions

This chapter has examined political tolerance in Peru. Overall, tolerance was found to be similar to other Latin American countries in the University of Pittsburgh data base. Education and wealth were both found to have a positive impact on tolerance, but females are less tolerant than males. The chapter also sought to link system support and tolerance in order to develop a model of democratic stability. Only a small percentage of Peruvians are both tolerant and supportive of their political system. Compared to other countries in the data base, Peru is at the bottom end.

## Chapter III.

# Civil Society Participation

Social scientists have proposed numerous theories to explain why some nations develop stable democracies, while others do not.<sup>15</sup> In recent years, there has been an increase in attention to an idea popularized over a century ago by the French social philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, in his classic work, *Democracy in America*, published in 1835. Tocqueville's observation was that the strength of democracy in the United State emanated from the highly active involvement of its citizens in community life. Today, we refer to community life as "civil society," and by it, we mean the wide range of non-governmental associations, organizations, clubs, committees, etc., that exist throughout the world in societies in which they are not prohibited by repressive governments.

The current renewed attention being paid to civil society is largely linked to a prize-winning book published by Robert Putnam of Harvard University. In his study of democracy in Italy, Putnam found that, "the performance of government and social institutions is powerfully influenced by citizen engagement in community affairs, or what I termed *social capital*."<sup>16</sup> That is, Putnam has found that when citizens get involved in community affairs through their participation in civil society organizations they build social capital, and in so doing they are able to make effective demands on their governments, especially at the local level. Strong civil societies help to ensure accountability of governments, both local and

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<sup>15</sup>This introduction to the theory of civil society draws on the 1997 democratic values study I prepared for USAID, Guatemala. See Mitchell A. Seligson and Malcolm B. Young, *Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic Development: With Emphasis on Civil Society Participation, Local Government and the Justice System* (Arlington, VA.: Development Associates, Inc., 1997).

<sup>16</sup>Italics in original. The basic study is contained in Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). The quote is from a related study, this one looking at the U.S. See, Robert D. Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 28.4 (December 1995): 664. For a recent discussion on the thesis see: Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, *American Behavioral Scientist*, "Social Capital, Civil Society, and Contemporary Democracy," vol. 40 (March/April) (1997).

national. Using long-term data from as early as the turn of the century, Putnam shows how regions of Italy with high levels of citizen involvement in civil society organizations have been able to secure much higher levels of institutional performance from their regional governments. As Putnam argues:

Civic regions were characterized by a dense network of local associations, by active engagement in community affairs, by egalitarian patterns of politics, by trust and law-abidingness. In less civic regions, political and social participation was organized vertically, not horizontally. Mutual suspicion and corruption were regarded as normal. Involvement in civic associations was scanty. Lawlessness was expected. People in these communities felt powerless and exploited.<sup>17</sup>

The interest in increasing civil society participation is more than purely academic; some research in the U.S. has shown that when such participation increases among young people it tends to produce a life-time of increased democratic participation, including voting.<sup>18</sup> Therefore, programs designed to increase civil society participation in Peru might also have the same effect.

Latin Americans have long had a tradition of civil society participation, a factor often forgotten during the darkest years of political repression and military rule. Indeed, even in those years, as a multi-country study showed, civil society managed to survive, even if to only a limited degree.<sup>19</sup> But in Peru, the terrorist violence of recent years has inhibited citizens from participating. This chapter examines the 1996 status of civil society participation in Peru.

The Apoyo report provides extensive analysis of participation in Peru, and there is no reason to replicate that analysis here. Rather, the key is to examine important relationships in the data, especially as they relate to system support and tolerance as analyzed in Chapters I and II of this report.

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<sup>17</sup>Putnam, op. cit., 1993, p. 182.

<sup>18</sup>James Youniss, Jeffrey A. McLellan and Miranda Yates, "What we Know about Engendering Civic Identity," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 40, March/April, 1997, pp. 620-631.

<sup>19</sup>John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Images of Participation in Latin America," in John A. Booth, and Mitchell A. Seligson (ed.), *Citizen and State: Political Participation in Latin America, Vol. I*. (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1978), pp. 3-33.

## The Levels of Civil Society Participation

The main information on civil society participation in the Apoyo report is contained in their “Cuadro 3” on page 16 of their report. Examination of that table reveals that anywhere from 75% to 97% of the respondents were not active. In fact, while the data presented in the table is accurate, it presents a misleading picture of civil society participation in Peru by vastly understating the degree of participation. It does so because it considers active participation only those respondents who said that they “frequently” participate in the organization. Since the survey does not use an absolute standard for participation (i.e., actual number of meetings attended within the last month or year), we have left it up to the individual respondents to determine what is “frequently” “once in a while” and “almost never.” A given organization may only hold meetings three or four times a year, but the respondent might attend every one of those meetings, and thus might well answer “once in a while” even though his/her participation rate is 100%. In the United States, for example, Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) often hold one meeting per school semester, and some parents attend each of those meetings, whereas the same parents might only attend a sports club once a month that has weekly softball/football games. An examination of the frequency distributions on the nine organizations included in the study makes this point very clearly. Table III.1 contains the results. In six out of the nine variables the “de vez en cuando” response was more frequent than the “frecuentemente” response. By considering all of those in the “de vez en cuando” category to be inactive, Apoyo has cut by about half the number of active Peruvians and thus underestimated the level of civil society participation in Peru.

Civil Society Participation								
	1 Frecuentemente		2 De vez en cuando		3 Casi nunca		4 Nunca	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
CP7 Asistencia a Asociación de Padres de Familia	377	25.4%	296	19.9%	42	2.8%	771	51.9%
CP16 Asistencia a Club Deportivo	174	11.8%	257	17.4%	101	6.8%	944	64.0%
CP13 Asistencia a Asociación de Mujeres	165	11.1%	148	10.0%	63	4.3%	1105	74.6%
CP6 Asistencia a Comunidad Parroquial	305	20.6%	419	28.3%	96	6.5%	662	44.7%
CP9 Asistencia a Agrupaciones Profesionales	36	2.4%	52	3.5%	13	.9%	1399	93.3%
CP3 Asistencia a Organizaciones Vecinales	144	9.9%	243	16.7%	96	6.6%	976	66.9%
CP10 Asistencia a Sindicatos	29	2.0%	59	4.0%	34	2.3%	1336	91.6%
CP17 Asistencia a Agrupaciones o Partidos Políticos	22	1.5%	67	4.6%	40	2.8%	1325	91.1%
CP30 Asistencia a otra Organización	44	2.9%	78	5.2%	48	3.2%	1324	88.6%

Missing data vary from 1 to 3.9%.


**Table 3.1**

Comparisons with other countries in the University of Pittsburgh data bank reveals that civil society participation is very similar to that found elsewhere. Although not all of the items used in other countries were also used in Peru, for the ones that are comparable, Table III.2 shows the results.

Civil Society Participation in Comparative Perspective								
				Pais				
				2 El Salvador	4 Nicaragua	5 Costa Rica	7 Paraguay	10 Peru
CP6	1	Casi siempre	Col %	21.9%	22.0%	24.2%	24.8%	20.6%
Asiste reuniones de la iglesia	2	De vez en cuando	Col %	27.0%	24.4%	15.6%	35.1%	28.3%
	3	Casi nunca	Col %	11.2%	5.9%	10.5%	8.3%	6.5%
	4	Nunca	Col %	39.9%	47.7%	49.7%	31.7%	44.7%
Total		Col %		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
CP7	1	Casi siempre	Col %	15.4%	23.6%	28.1%	25.6%	25.4%
Asiste asociación de la escuela	2	De vez en cuando	Col %	24.4%	19.9%	9.7%	26.9%	19.9%
	3	Casi nunca	Col %	10.3%	3.3%	4.8%	5.4%	2.8%
	4	Nunca	Col %	50.0%	53.2%	57.4%	42.1%	51.9%
Total		Col %		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
CP9	1	Casi siempre	Col %	1.4%	3.8%	15.3%	5.5%	2.4%
Asiste asociación profesional	2	De vez en cuando	Col %	2.3%	6.1%	9.1%	10.0%	3.5%
	3	Casi nunca	Col %	3.0%	1.2%	4.6%	2.7%	.9%
	4	Nunca	Col %	93.3%	89.0%	71.0%	81.8%	93.3%
Total		Col %		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
CP10	1	Casi siempre	Col %	.2%	1.9%	6.3%	3.7%	2.0%
Asiste un sindicato	2	De vez en cuando	Col %	1.1%	3.0%	1.8%	3.8%	4.0%
	3	Casi nunca	Col %	1.4%	.7%	2.2%	1.4%	2.3%
	4	Nunca	Col %	97.3%	94.4%	89.7%	91.2%	91.6%
Total		Col %		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 3.2**


In order to remedy the underestimate reported by Apoyo, in this report active civil society participants will be those who participate frequently or once in a while, whereas the inactives will be those who respond “almost never” or “never.” Recoding the variables in this fashion, produces the following results shown in Figure III.1. Comparing these results with “Cuadro 3” results in a much higher proportion of active citizens, one this author believes is more reflective of reality than the Apoyo presentation. Nearly half of all Peruvians participate in school or church-related groups, while over one-quarter participate in sports clubs or community development organizations. Among such organizations as political parties and professional organizations, however, the Apoyo presentation and the one made here are not strikingly different.



**Figure III.1**

The Apoyo report also shows civil society participation by gender (see their "Gráfico 3", page 17). Using the coding scheme proposed in this report, the results are presented in Figure III.2. It is important to note that all of the difference between male and female participation in Peru are statistically significant except for church-related participation. The differences by gender are striking, disposing of some myths about Peruvian women. In contrast to the myth that it is the men who are active, as shown in the figure, women are more active than men in school-related groups, in church groups and, of course, in organizations designated especially for them (i.e., women's groups). Men, on the other hand, are more active in sports clubs, unions, community development organizations, professional associations and political parties.





**Figure III.2**

What about other key factors in participation? Who participates more, the rich or the poor, the educated or the uneducated, the urban or the rural resident, etc. One approach to this question would be to create an overall scale of civil society participation, as Apoyo has done (see their p. 22). While such a procedure is appropriate for certain kind of analyses, there are problems associated with it. In this case, the kinds of organizations are so different, and the audiences they attract so varied, that an overall approach to predicting participation might be misleading. An additional factor is that USAID is likely to be less interested (or able) in promoting increased participation in some organizations than in others. For example, USAID is not likely to be associated with an effort to increase

participation in church-related groups or in sports clubs, and it might not wish to be associated with increased union or party activity. Yet another factor is that school-related participation, the second highest of all types of participation studied here, is heavily dependent upon individuals having children who are in school.

Fortunately, recent research has shown that one type of community organization is especially effective in building democracy from the ground up, and that is the community development organization.<sup>20</sup> Members of community development organizations have been found to be especially active in making demands on public officials and involving themselves in a wide variety of self-help activities. For that reason, the focus here is on community development organizations (variable CP3).


Regression analysis finds that the only significant predictors of community development organization participation are gender (as already shown), wealth, education, and age. The differences in gender, however, are small, and when the original item is used with its 4-point scale (frequent, once in a while, almost never, never), the gender difference becomes insignificant.<sup>21</sup> Older Peruvians participate more, but wealthier Peruvians participate **less** in this kind of organization. Education is negatively related to this form of participation; the higher the education the lower the participation.

Let us look at these relationships in more detail. Figure III.3 shows the relationship between gender, age and community development participation. The results show that community development participation is relatively low among young Peruvians, but rises sharply, almost doubling, as they reach their middle years. Males and females have a similar pattern, except that females tend to withdraw by the time they reach their mid-50s, whereas men continue to increase their level of activity. The policy implications here are clear. If one wants to stimulate community development participation, one should aim the programs at the young, since that is where participation is the lowest.


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<sup>20</sup>See Amber L. Seligson, "Civic Association and Democratic Participation in Central America: A Cross National Test of the Putnam Thesis," *Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming).

<sup>21</sup>It is necessary to utilize the original item since OLS regression does not work well on dichotomous dependent variables. One would have to use Logit or Probit for that kind of data.

**Figure III.3**


An equally clear relationship emerges for the association of wealth with community development organization participation. Figure III.4 shows the results. As can be seen, such participation is relatively high among those who score at the lower end of the scale of wealth (as noted earlier, based upon ownership of TV, refrigerator, telephone, car, or washing machine), but drops off precipitously for both men and women who achieve higher levels of wealth. This finding also has important programming implications. Community development organizations seem to be a way that poorer Peruvians, men and women alike, organize to improve their lives.



**Figure III.4**


Combining the last two analyses shows that there are important differences in participation in Peru. For example, of Peruvians between the age of 18 and 24, only 6 percent of them in the highest category of wealth (category 5) participate in community development organizations, compared to twice as many (12%) among the poorest Peruvians (wealth category 0).

Finally, we see the same relationship found above with education. As Figure III.5 shows, those with lower levels of education participate more than twice as actively as those with higher levels of education.



**Figure III.5**


One form of civil society participation in Peru is important to look at from the standpoint of gender. Women's associations (variable CP13), especially the "vaso de leche" and "comedor popular" programs. For Peruvians as a whole, as noted above when we looked at all civil society organizations, this form of organization is less popular than most of the others. Yet, striking differences emerge between men and women. As shown in Figure III.6, these groups are extremely popular among very poor women, with nearly half of Peruvian poor women participating.

**Figure III.6**

### **Civil Society Participation, Community Voluntarism and Demand-Making**

The preceding analysis has provided sufficient detail regarding the levels of civil society participation in Peru and how those levels vary by demographic and socio-economic factors. Does civil society participation have any payoffs? That is, do the more participant in organizations also give more of themselves through voluntary work and contributions to community projects? And, beyond voluntary contributions, does civil society participation also relate to demands Peruvians place on the political system?

The Apoyo report deals with community voluntarism on pages 32-34. Their analysis divides the sample into high and low participation, formed by a scale of the four items in this series, CP5, CP5a, CP5b and CP5c. These items measure participation beyond attending meetings of groups, but of actual donation of labor, money and material goods. The scale is formed by summing up the four items, which are already in a yes-no format. Apoyo reports 32% high, and 68% low (see p. 32), the implication being that inactivism is the predominant mode in Peru. In fact, if we examine the full scale of the four activities (created by summing up the actives versus the inactives on all four variables, in the same fashion as APOYO created their scale), a different picture emerges. Figure III.7 shows the full scale of community voluntarism. Rather than a picture of most Peruvians being inactive in community voluntarism, the opposite picture emerges. In fact, the completely inactive represent less than one-third of the sample.



**Figure III.7**

Comparisons with other countries from the University of Pittsburgh data base, allows comparison on three of the items: donating money or material, donating labor, and attending a meeting to resolve a community problem. As shown in Table III.3, Peru is much lower than the other countries on the first of these items, and lower than all but Costa Rica on the second. In terms of attending community meetings, it ranks higher than both Paraguay and Nicaragua.

Voluntarism in Comparative Perspective								
				PAIS Pais				
				2 El Salvador	4 Nicaragua	5 Costa Rica	7 Paraguay	10 Peru
CP5A Ha donado dinero o materiales	1 Sí	Col %	54.5%	56.9%	47.5%	77.8%	33.9%	
	2 No	Col %	45.5%	43.1%	52.5%	22.2%	66.1%	
	Total	Col %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
CP5B Ha trabajado con vecinos	1 Sí	Col %	72.4%	85.2%	42.0%	77.5%	45.9%	
	2 No	Col %	27.6%	14.8%	58.0%	22.5%	54.1%	
	Total	Col %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
CP5C Ha asistido reuniones sobre problema comunal?	1 Sí	Col %	59.2%	64.5%	36.2%	68.7%	50.7%	
	2 No	Col %	40.8%	35.5%	63.8%	31.3%	49.3%	
	Total	Col %	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

**Table 3.3**

The Apoyo analysis correctly concludes that age is related to voluntarism (their page 33), but misses the fact that it is also significantly related to wealth, education, and ethnicity, as is shown on the multiple regression in Table III.4. Apoyo also notes, incorrectly, that this type of participation varies by gender. As the regression analysis shows, gender, controlled for socio-economic factors, is not a significant predictor of voluntarism. But, as we shall see in a moment, gender does have an important relationship to voluntarism.




Predictors of Voluntarism in Peñu						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	22.696	6.488		3.498	.000
	SEXO Sexo	-2.799	1.878	-.040	-1.491	.136
	EDAD Edad años cumplidos	.326	.072	.128	4.493	.000
	WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + car + was	-2.191	.878	-.076	-2.495	.013
	ETHNIC	7.530	3.128	.066	2.407	.016
	EDU2 Ultimo año de educación aprobado	.670	.259	.082	2.588	.010

a. Dependent Variable: VOLUNT; Adj. R Square = .02

**Table 3.4**

The relationships are more complex than this overall regression analysis reveals. Consider the way that voluntarism varies by education and gender, as shown in Figure III.8. Here, we see that Peruvian females exhibit their highest level of voluntarism when their level of education is the lowest. Their voluntarism declines markedly as they increase their levels of education, and only increases again for women with a university level of education. Males, however, tend not to vary their level of voluntarism with their level of education.

**Figure III.8**

Apoyo correctly notes (p. 33) a relationship between age and voluntarism, arguing that voluntarism increases with age. Figure III.9 shows this relationship in more detail. First, we can see that the overall pattern for males and females is similar, with males participating at the same level as females when they are young. Participation rises through middle age, but then falls off again, probably as a result of infirmities that limit activity beyond the home as well as the declining likelihood of having school-aged children, a factor that frequently motivates many forms of community activism.




Figure III.9

The regression analysis shown above found a difference in voluntarism according to the ethnicity of the respondent, a factor not notes by Apoyo. It might surprise some (because of their relatively lower incomes) to find that voluntarism is higher among the indigenous population than it is among the white and mestizo population of Peru. As Figure III.10 makes clear, this relationship is not affected by education; for each level of education, the “indigenous” population participates at a higher level. This finding could have important programmatic implications.





Figure III.10


We have so far explored two dimensions of civil society participation. The first was attendance at meetings of such organizations. The second, discussed immediately above, measured voluntary contributions in the form of labor or money to resolve community problems. The third is demand-making, i.e., asking public officials and/or institutions to respond to a community need. The survey has four questions in this area (CP2 through C4), although, as far as I can tell, they were left unanalyzed by Apoyo. This is unfortunate because demand-making is central to the entire question of accountability. Citizens who have felt needs and try to resolve them with communal resources can often only go so far with those resources. They often need help from the public sector, and when they make demands they expect to have a responsible reply.

How large a proportion of the Peruvian population has engaged in demand making on public officials and agencies? An overall view of demand-making is found in Figure III.11. Nearly two-fifths of Peruvians have made a demand on their district mayors, and nearly a quarter on their provincial mayors. These data, when compared to demand-making of public offices or legislators, show that the assistance of local officials is much more likely to be sought than assistance from national officials.



**Figure III.11**

An overall picture of the extent of demand-making emerges from an examination of an overall scale, in which the four variables shown above are combined. Figure III.12 shows that just about half of all Peruvians make demands on at least one public individual or institution. Once again, this suggests a very active population; one out of every two Peruvians has made a demand on a public official or institution.



**Figure III.12**


When we examine the predictors of demand-making, we see a similar pattern to that which was uncovered in voluntarism. Table III.5 shows the multiple regression results. Gender, age, education, wealth and ethnicity are all significant predictors of demand-making.

Predictors of Demand-Making						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	22.329	4.843		4.611	.000
	SEXO Gender	-4.271	1.500	-.076	-2.847	.004
	EDAD Edad años cumplidos	.210	.056	.103	3.725	.000
	EDU1 Education	2.613	.823	.097	3.176	.002
	WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + car + wash	-2.209	.703	-.096	-3.142	.002
	ETHNIC	-1.985	2.508	-.022	-.791	.429

a. Adj. R Square = .02

**Table 3.5**

The relationship between education, gender and the overall index of demand-making is shown in Figure III.13. Two findings stand out. First, at every level of education, women make fewer demands than men. Indeed, at all levels of education, male demands exceed the national average, while female demands are lower except for university educated females. Second, Peruvians with higher levels of education are more apt to make demands than those with lower levels of education.



**Figure III.13**

As Peruvians grow older, their demand-making increases. This is true for both men and women, although for the oldest cohort of women in the survey, demand-making declines. For each age cohort, men are more likely to make demands than women. These results are shown in Figure III.14.








Figure III.14

We now examine the linkages between civil society participation and local government. Not surprisingly, as shown in Figure III.15, Peruvians who are more active in civil society organizations are also more active in municipal government participation.

**Figure III.15**


But the more pregnant question is, are there payoffs of civil society participation in terms of satisfaction with local or national government in Peru? Civil society participation is not linked to any of our key measures of satisfaction with district or provincial government (SGL1d; SGL2d; SGL1p; SGL2p). Nor is it linked to system support or tolerance. These are not only disturbing findings that do not follow patterns uncovered elsewhere, they also suggest that the basic civil society thesis, as elaborated by Putnam, does not seem to be working in Peru. What we do find is that satisfaction with local government is significantly associated with system support at the national level. Consider Figure III.16, which shows the relationship between evaluation of district municipal services and our 5-item system support measure. The relationship is very clear; those who are very dissatisfied with municipal services score only around 20 on the 0-100 scale, whereas those who are very satisfied score twice as high (around 40). For a country with low levels of system support, it seems obvious that finding ways to satisfy citizens with their local government might help increase system support nation-wide. There is also a significant association between the respondents' perception of the treatment they have received in their district municipality and

system support, although the pattern is not as clear-cut as it is with satisfaction with services.



**Figure III.16**


A very similar pattern is observed between satisfaction with the services provided by the provincial municipality and system support. The results are shown in Figure III.17.

**Figure III.17**

Although we have found evidence of a significant association between satisfaction with government at the local level and system support at the national level, we still did not find linkages between civil society participation and satisfaction with local government. We probed this disturbing finding by moving beyond our 9-item civil society index to the voluntarism and demand-making indexes. Once again, significant associations do not emerge. Thus, civil society participation does not associate with satisfaction with district or provincial government.

These findings suggest that in Peru while there exists an active civil society, but it is activism that does not translate into attitudes conducive to stable democracy. Rather, we find connections between satisfaction with local government and system support. This


finding might have an important impact on USAID's programmatic decisions. Why is there this disconnect? Is there something wrong with civil society participation or is it with the institutions themselves? An analysis of local government in Peru compared to other countries in the University of Pittsburgh data base does not reveal major differences. For example, Figure III.18 shows that although satisfaction with municipal services (defined in Peru in terms of the district municipality) is lower than in the other countries, the difference is not very large at all.



**Figure III.18**

It is also possible to compare Peru to other countries on the variable of treatment received by municipal government. Figure III.19 shows that, once again, Peru is lower than the other countries in the data base. Indeed, the difference between Paraguay and Peru is substantial, yet the difference between Peru, on the one hand, and El Salvador and

Nicaragua on the other, is not great. Therefore, even though local government is not quite as favorably viewed in Peru as in the other countries for which we have comparable data, the difference does not seem to be so great as to explain the disconnect uncovered here.



**Figure III.19**

All we are able to conclude from the above analysis is that, unlike other countries in Latin America where civil society participation on the one hand, is linked to local government satisfaction, political tolerance and system support on the other, in Peru they are not. This presents a major challenge to those who seek to strengthen democracy by building on civil society.

## Conclusions

Peruvians are very active in civil society, especially in church and school related activities. Contrary to popular belief, Peruvian women are not less active than men, and in some spheres of civil society participation, are more active than men. Peruvians go beyond participating and actively make demands on their public officials. Moreover, those active in civil society are active in municipal government. But in Peru, that is where the linkages seem to stop. Unlike other countries in Latin America that have been studied, such activism does not translate into satisfaction, system support or other key measures of democracy. We will see, however, in the next chapter, that civil society is related to approval of legal demonstrations, an important expression of democratic beliefs. Thus, we see portions of the linkages, with civil society participation linked to local government participation, and local government satisfaction linked to system support. The challenge, it seems is to fill in the missing links uncovered here.

## Chapter IV.

# Support for Authoritarian Rule and Protest Behavior

One of the greatest concerns today in Latin America is the fear that dictatorships will once again replace democracies. For decades Latin America was caught in a cyclical, or pendular pattern, oscillating between dictatorship and democracy.<sup>22</sup> In the mid-1980s, however, the current world-wide wave of democracy took hold and many observers are hopeful that it will become a permanent pattern this time.<sup>23</sup>

The concern in Peru is especially great since this is one of four Latin American countries that has experienced an attempt to extinguish democracy in the 1990s (the others being Guatemala, Venezuela and Paraguay), but Peru was the only case in which the attempt was a success. The Fujimori executive coup of April, 1992 was carried out in the context of an extremely difficult terrorist threat. Although Peru has since restored the institutional structure of democracy, many of its functional aspects, including civil liberties and an independent judiciary and legislature have not fully emerged.

### Support for a Coup

In this context, what is the degree of popular support for an authoritarian solution in Peru? The survey contained only a small number of questions on this vitally important issue. Compared to other Latin American countries for which we have data, support for a military coup because of economic difficulties, was not much different. Figure IV.1 shows


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<sup>22</sup>For a discussion of this tradition, see James M. Malloy and Mitchell Seligson, *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

<sup>23</sup>For the evidence and the concerns see Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).



the results.<sup>24</sup> For each of the countries, about one-quarter of the population supported a coup, except for Nicaragua, where support reached one-third. Peru is the lowest of the countries in the data base, but again, the variation between countries is small.




**Figure IV.1**


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<sup>24</sup>Note that Apoyo did not include the same wording as in the other surveys. In those surveys, the question focused on a military take over in the context of such specific economic factors as high inflation, high unemployment, etc. In Peru, the question asked if a military coup would be justified based on “economic problems.” This rendering of the item is less forceful.

Examining the Peru data in more detail reveals that a number of factors significantly relate to support for a coup for economic reasons, even if overall support for such an event in Peru is low compared to other Latin American countries. Figure IV.2 shows that females are far more supportive of a coup than males, even when education is controlled for. In addition, education reduces support for a coup, but only at the level of university education and among males. Females remain equally supportive of a coup irrespective of their level of education. This finding coincides with other characteristics of Peruvian females that we have seen in this report and suggest that more attention should be paid to the female population as it appears to be more susceptible to authoritarian appeals. For example, whereas fewer than ten per cent of university educated males in Peru would support a coup for economic reasons, nearly a third of females would support a coup under these circumstances, a difference of nearly three-to-one.


**Figure IV.2**

System support is significantly lower among those who would support a coup, a finding that is to be expected. Figure IV.3 shows, however, that the difference in system support among those who would support a coup and those who would not is not large at all in absolute terms. This is probably because overall system support is so low; even among those who oppose a coup the level of support is not high.




**Figure IV.3**

The survey also asked about violence as a factor that would justify a coup. As can be seen in Figure IV. 4, a larger proportion of Peruvians would justify a coup because of a concern with violence than with a concern for economic factors. The difference, however, in absolute terms is quite small. It would appear that there is a hard core of nearly a quarter of Peruvians who would justify a coup irrespective of the two justifications. The same basic pattern of gender and education emerges for violence as a justification for a coup as it did for economic problems as a justification. The figures demonstrating this fact are not reproduced here.




**Figure IV.4**

The two specific questions regarding support for a military coup were followed up by a more general one: “Aside from the situations that I have just mentioned to you, do you think that there exist situations which would justify a military coup or that there is no reason for a military government?” As can be seen in Figure IV.5, nearly one-third of the population can envision some justification for a coup (economic, violence or for some other reason). Once again, females are more supportive of a coup than males.




**Figure IV.5**

An indication of the magnitude of support for an authoritarian solution to Peru's problems of governance is revealed in the two questionnaire items that refer specifically to the April, 1992 executive coup. Apoyo first asked about support for that coup and then asked if the President would be justified in again closing down the legislature if he deemed it necessary. Figure IV.6 shows the results of these questions. As can be seen, a majority favored the April, 1992 executive coup, whereas one-third of Peruvians would justify a new assault on democracy.



**Figure IV.6**


Support for the 1992 coup varied strongly by ethnicity, as is shown in Figure IV.7. The indigenous population, often seen as a major target of Senderista violence, was much more strongly in favor of the executive coup than the non-indigenous population. It should also be recalled that system support among the Quechua/Aymara speakers was especially low.




**Figure IV.7**

To present an overall picture of support for a coup in Peru, I created an index of the five items dealing with this issue (JC10 to JC14). The items form a reasonably reliable scale (Alpha = .62). Figure IV.8 shows the distribution of the sample. At the extreme left are the 442 respondents, out of the 1432 for whom we have scale data in the sample, who would not support a coup under any circumstances. These represent the largest group in the survey, but are only 30.1% of the entire sample. This means that fewer than one-third of Peruvians would not justify a coup under any circumstances, and more than two-thirds would justify it under any one or more of the five circumstances presented in this five-item series. At the other extreme are 100 respondents who would justify a coup under each of the five circumstances presented in the questions.



**Figure IV.8**

Examining those two extremes in more detail reveals strong differences by gender, once again highlighting the gender gap in Peru. Figure IV.9 shows only those Peruvians who would either not support a coup under any circumstances (the 442 respondents in the above figure) or who would support it under all circumstances (the 100 respondents above). As can be seen, females are much more likely to be supportive of a coup than males. Again, this figure deals only with the extremes of full support or full opposition, but it helps to highlight the difference between males and females in Peru on this important issue.

**Figure IV.9**

When we use multiple regression to examine all of the various socio-economic, demographic, ethnicity and other factors studied in this report related to support for a coup, we find that many of the factors reported on above tend to wash out. If we exclude interpersonal trust (for the moment) from the analysis, a factor that is difficult to change in the short run since it relates to deep personality characteristic, the only variable that remains a significant predictor of coup support is the nine-item civil society participation index. The association is negative (see the bolded sig. coefficient of .050 in Table IV.1). This means that the higher the civil society participation, the lower the support for a coup. This finding stands in marked contrast to the prior chapter in which civil society participation was not found to relate to other key measures of democracy. While the relationship is not

strong, at least here we do have some limited evidence that civil society participation can help insulate Peru from democratic breakdown.

Predictors of Support for a Coup <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	39.670	6.889		5.758	.000
	SEXO Gender	1.418	1.761	.024	.805	.421
	EDAD Edad años cumplidos	-.113	.071	-.051	-1.603	.109
	EDU2 Ultimo año de educación aprobado	-.227	.251	-.031	-.906	.365
	WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + car + washer	-.252	.816	-.010	-.309	.757
	ETHNIC	2.378	3.011	.024	.790	.430
	PSA5 5 core items b3 b4 b6 b1 b2 valid if 3 or more	-.068	.043	-.047	-1.598	.110
	VOLUNT Voluntarism in local projects	.022	.027	.026	.832	.406
	DEMAND Demand-making	.029	.033	.027	.879	.380
	CIVPPT9 Civil Society Participation--9 items	-.128	.066	-.061	-1.943	<b>.050</b>
	RIGHTS Knowledge of Rights	-.032	.031	-.032	-1.040	.299

a. Dependent Variable: SUPTCOUP Support for a Coup (jc10 thru jc14 mean system); Adj. R-square = .012

**Table 4.1**

As noted, another factor that plays a role in support for a coup is interpersonal trust (item IT1). We asked our respondents the following question: Speaking in general of the people of your neighborhood, would you say that the people in general are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy. Figure IV.10 shows that those Peruvians who have higher levels of interpersonal trust are significantly less likely to support a coup.




Figure IV.10

Interpersonal trust, then, seems to be an important factor in determining the proclivity of Peruvians to support or oppose a coup. What factors are associated with interpersonal trust? Table IV.1 shows the results. We see that wealth, system support and education are each significant predictors of interpersonal trust.

Predictors of Interpersonal Trust <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	31.146	2.375		13.116	.000
	WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + car + washer	3.109	.722	.127	4.306	.000
	PSA5 5 core items b3 b4 b6 b1 b2 valid if 3 or more	.083	.038	.057	2.156	.031
	EDU1 Education	1.778	.835	.063	2.129	.033

a. Dependent Variable: TRUST; Adjusted Multiple R-square = .027

**Table 4.1**

These results, taken together, suggest an interesting path to support/opposition to a coup in Peru. It appears that the socio-economic factors of wealth and education, as well as system support, are each predictors of interpersonal trust, which in turn is a predictor of opposition to a coup. There is no direct connection between socio-economic status and support for a coup, as is shown in the following regression (see Table IV.2). Only interpersonal trust is directly associated with support/opposition to a coup. Thus, we have a two step process at work here, where greater wealth and education, along with higher levels of system support help predict greater inter-personal trust, which in turn predicts to opposition to a coup.


Predictors of Support for a Coup <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	42.309	6.972		6.068	.000
	SEXO Gender	.986	1.771	.017	.557	.578
	EDAD Edad años cumplidos	-.118	.071	-.054	-1.670	.095
	EDU2 Ultimo año de educación aprobado	-.216	.252	-.030	-.855	.393
	WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + car + washer	.032	.827	.001	.039	.969
	ETHNIC	2.375	3.003	.024	.791	.429
	PSA5 5 core items b3 b4 b6 b1 b2 valid if 3 or more	-.067	.043	-.046	-1.541	.123
	VOLUNT Voluntarism in local projects	.017	.027	.020	.648	.517
	DEMAND Demand-making	.031	.033	.029	.951	.342
	CIVPPT9 Civil Society Participation--9 items	-.113	.066	-.054	-1.708	.088
	TRUST	-.074	.030	-.073	-2.472	.014
	RIGHTS Knowledge of Rights	-.024	.031	-.024	-.770	.442

a. Dependent Variable: SUPTCOUP Support for a Coup (jc10 thru jc14 mean system); Adj. R=quare = .017

Table 4.2


## Approval of Civil Disobedience

Perhaps the “flip-side” of support for a military coup is support for the right of citizens to take aggressive political actions when they wish to protest the policies of the state. The survey included two questions to measure approval of civil disobedience (approval of blocking public streets and approval of invading private property) for the purpose of achieving political objectives. It also included an item involving a legal form of political expression, public demonstrations. We begin the analysis with that item in order to provide a standard of comparison against which to measure approval of illegal forms of protest. Figure IV. 11 shows the results for Peru in comparative perspective. While Peruvians have statistically significantly lower support for the right of public demonstrations than do Nicaraguans, Costa Ricans and Paraguayans, in absolute terms (on the 1-10 scale), the differences are quite small. On the ten-point scale, Peruvians average 6.6, well into the positive end of the continuum.


**Figure IV.11**

We now turn to civil disobedience. Many protestors around the world block public streets in order to make a political point and hopefully achieve their political objectives. In Peru, this form of civil disobedience is significantly more widely supported than it is in Central America, but just about the same as it is in Paraguay. Figure IV.12 shows the comparisons. At the same time, it is important to contrast the relatively low level of support for this form of civil disobedience in Peru compared to the much higher level of support for legal protest marches, as shown immediately above.



**Figure IV.12**

The final form of civil disobedience measured in the Apoyo survey is approval of the invasion of private property (vacant houses or land) to achieve a political objective. In Peru and elsewhere in Latin America, this form of civil disobedience is frequently expressed in the form of squatter movements, such as the well-known case of the Hugo Blanco movement in Peru. Figure IV.13 shows the results. Once again, Peru (and Paraguay) stand out as having significantly higher support for this form of civil disobedience than do the Central American comparative cases.

**Figure IV.13**

This comparison of approval of legal and illegal forms of protest in Peru suggests the following overall conclusions: a) In Peru, support for legal forms of political protest is lower than it is in other countries of Latin America, whereas support for illegal forms of protest in Peru is higher than it is in other Latin American countries; 2) Overall, most Peruvians support legal forms of protest while most oppose illegal forms of protest. We can delve into this finding in more detail by examining the Peruvian data set in more detail to see which factors relate to support for legal and illegal forms of protest.


We first examine support for legal forms of protest, in this case, support for a legal demonstration (E5). The regression results are shown in Table IV.3. Three variables are significant predictors of approval of legal demonstrations: gender, civil participation and tolerance. Males are significantly more supportive of legal demonstrations than females. This coincides with earlier findings that females were less tolerant than males. The tolerance scale, however, is also a significant predictor of approval of legal demonstrations, even when gender is held constant. This means that tolerant Peruvians, male and female alike, are more likely to approve legal demonstrations than intolerant Peruvians. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, civil participation emerges as a significant predictor of approval of legal demonstrations. This comes as a surprise given the disappointing findings about the role of civil society participation earlier in this report. But here we see that those who participate more in local organizations are more willing to support the democratic right to protest. It is also important to note that wealth, education, age, rural/urban residence, and coup support measures play no role in predicting support for legal demonstrations.

Predictors of Support for Legal Demonstrations <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	5.597	.565		9.908	.000
	SEXO Gender	-.343	.158	-.061	-2.169	.030
	ZONA Zona	3.62E-02	.183	.011	.361	.718
	EDAD Edad años cumplidos	-7.1E-03	.006	-.034	-1.153	.249
	EDU1 Education	-.113	.086	-.042	-1.313	.189
	CIVPPT9	1.48E-02	.006	.076	2.670	.008
	SUPTCOUP Support for a Coup (jc10 thru jc14 mean system)	-4.0E-03	.003	-.043	-1.510	.131
	SUPTFUJ	3.78E-04	.002	.011	.361	.718
	TRUST	-3.1E-03	.003	-.033	-1.149	.251
	WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + car + washer	.105	.075	.046	1.395	.163
	PSA5 5 core items b3 b4 b6 b1 b2 valid if 3 or more	-5.9E-03	.004	-.043	-1.456	.146
	TOL	3.56E-02	.003	.351	12.326	.000


a. Dependent Variable: E5 Aprueba participación en manifestaciones permitidas por la Ley: Adj. R-square = .13

**Table 4.3**

Looking at these results in more detail, it is important not to overemphasize the role of gender. Figure IV.14 shows that males are only slightly more supportive of the right to protest than are females, even though the difference in statistical terms is significant.

**Figure IV.14**

A far stronger relationship emerges between tolerance and approval of legal demonstrations. Figure IV.15 shows the results. Those with low levels of tolerance are likely to disapprove of a legal demonstration, whereas those who are more tolerant show much higher levels of approval.

**Figure IV.15**

In order to study approval of civil disobedience, we combine the two measures (E15 and E 14) because they are very highly correlated with each other ( $r = .55$ ) and thus are tapping into the same overall dimension. The index is merely the sum of the two variables, divided by 2 so as to return the measure to the same 1-10 metric of the original question. The initial regression results are quite different from the results shown for approval of legal demonstrations, suggesting that the legal and illegal sides of protest are two very different phenomena in Peru. Civil disobedience is not connected in any way to gender, education, civil society participation or trust. The only variable which accounts for both support for legal and illegal forms of protest is tolerance; tolerant Peruvians are willing to support both forms, whereas intolerant Peruvians are not. But what we do find is that the civil


disobedience is more strongly supported in urban Peru than in rural Peru, and is also connected to support for a coup, poverty and system support. In order not to complicate the regression results with variables that are not significant predictors of civil disobedience, Table IV.4 shows only the significant predictors (this is the so-called “trimmed equation”). These results are complex, and we need to take them one at a time.

Predictors of Approval of Civil Disobedience <sup>a</sup>						
Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.847	.291		9.794	.000
	ZONA Zona	-.470	.137	-.098	-3.437	.001
	SUPTCOUP Support for a Coup (jc10 thru jc14 mean system)	.011	.002	.146	5.396	.000
	WEALTH TV + Refrig + Tel + car + washer	-.292	.051	-.164	-5.742	.000
	PSA5 5 core items b3 b4 b6 b1 b2 valid if 3 or more	.009	.003	.089	3.313	.001
	TOL	.011	.002	.134	4.944	.000


a. Dependent Variable: CIVDIS; Adj. R-square = .07

**Table 4.4**

First, as noted, support for civil disobedience is higher in urban Peru than in rural Peru. The difference, while significant, is not great in absolute terms. As noted in Figure IV.16, in both urban and rural Peru, approval of civil disobedience is far below the mid-point on the 1-10 scale.


**Figure IV.16**

Wealth also has a direct relationship to approval of civil disobedience, as is shown in Figure IV.17. Poorer Peruvians are significantly more willing to support civil disobedience than wealthier Peruvians. Even so, among the poorest in the survey, support does not go beyond a score of 3.2 on the 1-10 scale, meaning that even among the poor, support for civil disobedience is not high.


**Figure IV.17**

Tolerance is also significantly related to approval of civil disobedience. In order to see the pattern clearly, we divide tolerance into three levels: low, medium and high. Figure IV.18 shows the pattern; high tolerance is associated with high approval of civil disobedience. So, in both legal and illegal forms of protest behavior, political tolerance plays a role.



**Figure IV.18**

But the most surprising results from the analysis emerge in the relationship between approval of illegal protest behavior, support for a coup and system support. We tend to think of protest behavior as a protest against an incumbent administration demanding greater freedom (i.e., Tienanmen Square), higher wages (in the case of a labor strike), respect for human rights (Mothers of the Plaza 5 de Mayo in Argentina). But not all protests necessarily favor democratic ends. In Peru, there is a significant association between supporting a military coup and support for civil disobedience. Figure IV.19 shows that among those Peruvians with very high approval of civil disobedience there is also very high support for a coup to extinguish democracy. Thus, approval of violent means to achieve political objectives in Peru apparently coincides with the use of state force to overturn democracy.

**Figure IV.19**

The final relationship shown in the regression analysis is system support. This relationship at first appears puzzling, since high system support should not coincide with approval of civil disobedience. In fact, as Figure IV.20 shows, the relationship is actually very slight and curvilinear (rising in the middle, but declining again at the extremes). At all levels of approval of civil disobedience, system support does not vary more than the range of 35-38 on the 100-point scale.




Figure IV.20

## Conclusions

Support for authoritarian rule in Peru is a fact of life that those who wish to promote democracy must recognize and find ways to deal with. Peru has had an authoritarian tradition for centuries, and it is difficult to imagine that such a long tradition could be reversed in a brief period of time. Nonetheless, majorities oppose a coup in Peru, and majorities oppose illegal civil disobedience. It would seem that in this analysis we have uncovered a path to opposition to a coup, via interpersonal trust. If such trust can be

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increased by improved quality of public institutions as well as through education, coups may become a phenomenon of the past rather than a threat to the present.