

Supplemental Online Appendices

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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

A.1: First Level Covariate Averages by Country (Explanatory Variables)

Note: change over time in parentheses

Country	Years Included (even only)	Coup Support	Net Change, Coup Support	Trust in the Military	System Support	Democracy as the Best Form of Government	Corruption as Widespread
Mexico	2004-2014	63.1	.31	70.0 (.08)	57.1 (-6)	68.1 (-3.3)	74.9 (-.02)
Guatemala	2004-2014	53.2	-9.1	56.6 (21)	50.1 (.009)	63.2 (10)	74.6 (-.01)
El Salvador	2004-2014	60.8	-17.7	64.8 (.07)	56.2 (-4)	65.6 (-3.4)	67.5 (.02)
Honduras	2004-2014	54.1	-20.0	57.4 (4)	51.2 (.67)	62.7 (2.6)	73.7 (-.02)
Nicaragua	2006-2014	54.5	2.9	63.0 (13)	53.0 (12)	69.0 (.49)	71.3 (-.06)
Costa Rica	2004; 2010-2014	42.5	-23.9	NA	62.7 (-5)	77.1 (-3.5)	75.4 (-.01)
Panama	2004; 2010-2014	35.1	-10.4	NA	50.9 (.3)	67.8 (-14.2)	73.9 (-.04)
Colombia	2004-2006; 2010-2014	52.6	-10.2	64.2 (-7)	56.8 (-8)	71.6 (1.2)	76.7 (.06)
Ecuador	2004-2014	54.8	-30.1	59.7 (19)	46.6 (17)	65.8 (7.3)	69.0 (-.15)
Bolivia	2004-2014	49.4	-15.9	52.3 (5)	50.3 (7)	66.7 (4.2)	.62 (-.01)
Peru	2006-2014	63.8	-11.8	52.6 (-.2)	45.9 (1.3)	62.3 (2.6)	78.4 (-.02)
Paraguay	2006; 2010-2014	52.7	18.9	51.8 (10)	41.6 (4.1)	65.6 (4.0)	77.0 (-.01)
Chile	2006; 2010-2014	35.2	-6.6	66.0 (-5)	54.5 (-3)	74.2 (2.2)	66.4 (.01)
Uruguay	2008-2014	37.8	-8.1	56.1 (-.4)	61.7 (-2)	85.8 (2.7)	62.7 (-.01)
Brazil	2008-2014	49.5	2.1	68.0 (-6)	44.9 (-6)	70.0 (4.3)	67.2 (-.04)
Venezuela	2008-2014	38.3	-6.1	52.5 (-12)	49.3 (-7.4)	79.8 (-7.7)	78.2 (.01)
Argentina	2010-2014	33.7	6	45.3 (18)	51.0 (8)	82.9 (-5.2)	80.6 (-.05)

Dominican Republic	2006-2014	45.9	-13.6	53.2 (16)	50.6 (5.4)	72.9 (-6.1)	78.4 (-.04)
Jamaica	2006-2014	52.0	9.6	64.9 (-6)	49.2 (-6.4)	71.7 (-13)	81.1 (-.05)
Guyana	2006-2014	60.6	-10.5	62.0 (-11)	53.2 (-5.7)	72.2 (-1.8)	78.9 (.01)
Trinidad and Tobago	2010-2012	44.4	-7.9	53.3 (0.002)	47.2 (8.2)	70.9 (5.3)	82.2 (-.02)
Belize	2008-2014	57.6	-13.3	63.8 (-12)	55.7 (-9)	72.3 (-4.4)	72.0 (.06)
Suriname	2010-2012	34.4	1.9	64.4 (.2)	60.3 (3.6)	71.7 (-11.3)	45.5 (-.12)
AVERAGE [standard deviation]		49.7 [11.5]	-9.3 [11.4]	59.1 [31.4]	51.7 [22.7]	69.7 [28.6]	73.5 [-.02]

(continued)

Country	Years Included (even only)	Neighborhood Insecurity	Presidential Approval
Mexico	2004-2014	44.1 (10.7)	53.8 (-9.1)
Guatemala	2004-2014	42.1 (-.79)	53.0 (-3.6)
El Salvador	2004-2014	45.9 (3.6)	60.1 (6.4)
Honduras	2004-2014	37.3 (-.48)	53.7 (19.8)
Nicaragua	2006-2014	38.8 (-3.8)	52.5 (16.6)
Costa Rica	2004; 2010-2014	40.5 (6.8)	50.4 (-17.1)
Panama	2004; 2010-2014	39.2 (-5.4)	51.6 (21.3)
Colombia	2004-2006; 2010-2014	40.5 (5.1)	64.0 (-19.4)
Ecuador	2004-2014	42.9 (-2.3)	55.0 (29.8)
Bolivia	2004-2014	48.4 (5.8)	57.1 (9.3)
Peru	2006-2014	54.5 (-3.4)	47.5 (3.4)
Paraguay	2006; 2010-2014	39.2 (.68)	51.0 (13.6)
Chile	2006; 2010-2014	43.6 (-5)	55.6 (4.9)
Uruguay	2008-2014	42.5 (1.3)	64.5 (-.88)
Brazil	2008-2014	41.5 (8.3)	63.6 (-9.9)
Venezuela	2008-2014	52.0 (16.4)	49.1 (-18.8)
Argentina	2010-2014	48.8 (-11.2)	51.4 (-7.8)
Dominican Republic	2006-2014	47.6 (5.2)	61.7 (11.1)
Haiti	2012-2014	44.5 (-9.0)	46.2 (21.8)
Jamaica	2006-2014	31.8 (-11.3)	46.1 (4.5)

Guyana	2006-2014	36.8 (-3.9)	53.8 (-2.6)
Trinidad and Tobago	2010-2012	32.5 (-5.4)	40.8 (4.7)
Belize	2008-2014	40.9 (9.8)	49.1 (15.9)
Suriname	2010-2012	40.0 (1.1)	59.0 (20.3)
AVERAGE (standard deviation)		42.1 (30.8)	54.4 (24.8)

Source: LAPOP AmericasBarometer, 2004-2014


All variables represented here as 0-100 for ease of interpretation. In the models presented, independent variables are scaled 0-1.

Averages and standard deviations include the 21 countries in our analysis (excluding Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, and the U.S.)


A.2: Demographic control variables (sample wide)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Age	39.3	15.8
Gender	.51	.5
Wealth Quintile	2.9	1.4
Education	9.2	4.5
Size of City	3.1	1.6

A.3: Stylized cases of military contestations



AmericasBarometer Fieldwork: 12/10/2007-1/26/2008 and 3/24-4/25/2014



AmericasBarometer Fieldwork: Feb.-Mar. 2008

A.4: Verification of coup justification as a measurement of consolidation

Support for Radical Preferences:

ACR1. Now I'm going to read you three phrases. Please tell me which of the three best describes your opinion:

- 1) The way in which our society is organized should be completely and radically changed by revolutionary means.
- 2) Our society should be gradually perfected or improved through reform.
- 3) Our society should be courageously defended from revolutionary movements.
- 8) DN

Note: options 1 and 3 are coded as “radical preferences” while option 2 is coded as “support for democratic reform.” Our coding scheme is congruent with Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich (2016) who suggest that “Actors were coded as “radical” when they expressed uncompromising policy goals; showed willingness to subvert the law to achieve their policy preferences; or undertook violent protests against the government to force (or prevent) policy change.” (8)

Support for Groups Overthrowing the Government (E3):

E3: Now I’m going to read you a list of some actions individuals can do to achieve their political goals and objectives. I’d like you to tell me how firmly you approve or disapprove of the following scenarios: That people participate in a group wanting to remove an elected government by violent means (1-10 scale).

Years	Countries	Coup justification specification	Correlation with E3 and coup support	Correlation with ACR1 and coup support
2004; 2006 for Colombia only	Colombia, Panama, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico	Coup justification per paper	0.1	-0.074
1998	Bolivia	BC15: Podrían ocurrir motivos por los cuales justificaría Ud. Un golpe de Estado que interrumpa el proceso democrático Boliviano?	.06	-0.0629
1991	Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama	Considera Ud. que hay alguna razón por la cual se justifique un golpe de estado que interrumpa el proceso de democratización que ha estado viviendo el país?	.12	-0.07
1999	<i>El Salvador</i>	<i>Conditions of high crime only</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>-.11</i>
1995	<i>El Salvador</i>	Considera Ud. que hay alguna razón por la cual se justifique un golpe de estado que interrumpa el proceso de democratización que ha estado viviendo el país?	0.11	-0.04

<i>1991</i>	<i>Nicaragua</i>	Considera Ud. que hay alguna razón por la cual se justifique un golpe de estado que interrumpa el proceso de democratización que ha estado viviendo el país?	.2	-0.15
<i>2001</i>	<i>Ecuador</i>	Coup justification per paper	0.04	-0.05

Replacing Coup Justification with E3:

Quick-Changing, Proximate Attitudes	Original Model (Coup Justification)	Support for Groups Overthrowing the Government
Belief that Corruption is Widespread	.11 (1.34)	-3.73*** (0.62)
Neighborhood Insecurity	8.32*** (0.99)	1.56*** (0.42)
Presidential Approval	-7.14** (1.96)	-9.73*** (0.91)
Slow-Changing Attitudes and Demographics		
Gender (female = 1)	1.60** (0.43)	-1.06*** (0.26)
Age	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.01)
Education	-0.70*** (0.11)	-0.33*** (0.04)
Size of City	0.07 (0.33)	0.13 (0.13)
Wealth Quintile	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.38*** (0.10)
System Support	-11.08*** (2.71)	3.68*** (1.05)
Normative Preference for Democracy	-13.83*** (1.63)	-9.28*** (0.71)
Trust in the Armed Forces	20.05*** (2.04)	-1.66*** (0.54)
Constant	82.66*** (2.89)	42.65*** (1.08)
Observations	122,348	134,273
R-Squared	0.08	0.06
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<.10		

A.5: Correlations among independent variables (demographics excluded)

Variable	Corruption	Neighborhood Insecurity	System Support	Normative Preference for Democracy	Presidential Approval	Trust in the Military
Corruption	1.000					
Neighborhood Insecurity	0.023	1.000				
System Support	-0.175	-0.136	1.000			
Normative Preference for Democracy	0.023	-0.066	0.184	1.000		
Presidential Approval	-.0120	-0.075	0.340	0.090	1.000	
Trust in the Military	-0.088	-0.114	0.399	0.121	0.189	1.000

A.6: Verification of normative preferences with WVS survey data

Key independent variable used to measure normative preferences for democracy:

(V140 in Wave 6, V162 in Wave 5): How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?

Key dependent variable used to measure coup justification:

(V129 in Wave 6, V150 in Wave 5): Would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having the army rule

Notes:

- Wave 6: 2010-2014
- Wave 5: 2005-2009
- Results are presented with variables scaled the same as our results: the dependent variable is coded dichotomously 0-100, and the independent variable ranges from 0-1 so that the estimate below represents a minimum to maximum shift using a Linear Probability Model
- Results are presented with standard errors clustered at the country level.

Empirical findings:

	Correlations	Bivariate Regressions
Wave 5	-.12	-25.18*** (4.51)
Wave 6	-.15	-28.53*** (4.68)

Ultimately a full comparative model goes beyond the scope of the paper: we proposed to test the Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2013) argument about Latin America at the individual level. Due to space constraints, equivalency issues, and a regional expertise in Latin America, we test only our key relationship of interest: whether democratic preferences at the individual level shape attitudes towards military rule. We find that even with different questions and a much wider sample, this relationship holds. A full test of a comparative model is an extension of future research rather than critical to our argument.

A.7: Second level covariate averages by country (change from last to first survey wave in parentheses)

Country	GDP per capita, PPP	Year of Democratization
Mexico	14455.67 (2025.646)	2000
Guatemala	6417.025 (733.57)	1996
El Salvador	7215.979 (866.168)	1994
Honduras	4200.834 (560.3623)	1998; 2010*
Nicaragua	4013.058 (504.7715)	1990
Costa Rica	12133.85 (2049.713)	1953
Panama	14619.3 (3538.164)	1994
Colombia	10493.36 (1781.38)	1958
Ecuador	8862.424 (1221.531)	1996
Bolivia	5200.422 (805.5635)	1983
Peru	9784.446 (574.9844)	2001
Paraguay	7278.451(325.0552)	1993
Chile	18758.48 (-466.2803)	1989
Uruguay	17775.77 (-1356.373)	1985
Brazil	14526.29 (-1153.456)	1990
Venezuela	17305.06 (-2888.456)	1958; ceases in 2007**
Argentina	20160.19 (4632)	1983
Dominican Republic	9553.298 (2228.058)	1970
Haiti	1555.171 (31.42297)	1996; ceases in 2000**
Jamaica	8483.758 (-301.29)	1962
Guyana	5559.359 (403.9448)	1992
Trinidad and Tobago	31111.29 (-3579.512)	2002
Belize	7950.359 (-454.0225)	1981
Suriname	15911.24 (-2079.42)	2010

*Accounts for the 2009 military coup where democracy was suspended in 2009, and reinstated in 2010

**Previous democratic regime fails (subsequent survey waves following this date are represented by a 0 for age of democracy)

Appendix B: Additional individual level predictors: ethnic minority status, political interest, and self-declared political position

B.1: Ethnic minority status

Ethnic minority status (etid):

Do you consider yourself white, mixed, indigenous or black?

- (1) White
- (2) Mixed
- (3) Indigenous
- (4) Black
- (5) Mulatto
- (7) Other

Notes:

- Ethnic identification cannot be interpreted on the same 0-1 scale as other independent variables (otherwise the categorization would not be possible).
- The baseline category is white.

Findings:

We conclude from the below model that coup justification does not seem to be an issue of descriptive representation or any specific pattern over time. Country-by-country and year-by-year analyses (not presented) shows very few significant findings. While we can conclude that racial identity does have an effect on coup justification, we think that the comparatively small magnitude and lack of systematic patterns across time or countries suggests that race is not driving people's attitudes towards coups; our model findings are consistent regardless of the inclusion of race. Furthermore, we lose 6,000 cases, and our model fit remains the same, so we proceed without ethnic identification in our model. Further research is needed to further investigate these mechanisms.

Direct Test of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán and/or Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich		
Normative Preference for Democracy	-13.83*** (1.63)	-13.77*** (0.61)
Presidential Approval	-7.14** (1.96)	-6.64*** (0.76)
New Contributions		
System Support	-11.08*** (2.71)	-12.50*** (0.90)
Gender (female = 1)	1.60** (0.43)	1.80*** (0.28)
Age	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.01)
Education	-0.70*** (0.11)	-0.74*** (0.05)
Size of City	0.07 (0.33)	0.24 (0.15)
Wealth Quintile	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.61*** (0.13)
Ethnic Identification		
Mestizo		-0.69 (0.46)
Indigenous		-1.44* (0.85)
Black		1.68* (0.85)
Mulatto		0.61 (0.99)
Other		2.03** (0.87)
Controls		
Trust in the Armed Forces	20.05*** (2.04)	19.79*** (0.58)
Belief that Corruption is Widespread	.11 (1.34)	0.50 (0.60)
Neighborhood Insecurity	8.32*** (0.99)	9.10*** (0.54)
Constant	82.66*** (2.89)	84.75*** (3.03)
Observations	122,348	118,354
R-Squared	0.08	0.08
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<.10		

Linear Probability Model. Standard errors clustered by country.
Year, country, and country-year fixed effects included but not presented.

B.2: Left-Right political placement

Left-Right political placement (11):

Now, for a subject change. In this card there's a one to ten scale that goes from left to right. Today, when people talk about politics they mention left wingers and right wingers, referring to people that sympathize with the left or the right. According to your sense of "left" and "right" in politics, where would you place yourself in this scale?
Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Right

Notes:

- Ethnic identification cannot be interpreted on the same 0-1 scale as other independent variables (otherwise the categorization would not be possible).
- The baseline category is white.

Findings:

Ultimately, this was a tough decision to exclude, because it serves as one of the two main predictors of elite preferences in Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán's analysis. However, we ultimately exclude it because theoretically speaking, we do not think the L/R scale translates particularly well from elite measurement to self-reported individual measurement. Many studies have shown that people have a hard time understanding the meaning of this scale in the Americas. This feeds directly into our empirical concern: we lose 25,000 cases, which we think is problematic and may indicate a selection issue related to not understanding the scale.

Generally, we see in the data that the more leftist an individual, the less likely they are to support coups. This is true regardless of which coding scheme is used: 3-category (left, center, right) or 5-category (far left, left, center, right, far right), but the findings are not always statistically significant particularly with respect to the differences between far leftists and left of center identifiers. This overall finding is not surprising given the "Pink Tide" that strongly overlaps with the period of our data. The magnitude (when rescaled 0-1) is not inconsequential, but it still falls far behind our main predictors, lending at least anecdotal support to our contention that L/R attitudes among the elites and the masses are not directly comparable using the L/R scale.

Direct Test of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán and/or Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich		
Normative Preference for Democracy	-13.83*** (1.63)	-13.21*** (0.66)
Presidential Approval	-7.14** (1.96)	-7.57*** (0.83)
New Contributions		
System Support	-11.08*** (2.71)	-13.31*** (0.97)
Gender (female = 1)	1.60** (0.43)	1.77*** (0.31)
Age	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.39*** (0.01)
Education	-0.70*** (0.11)	-0.78*** (0.05)
Size of City	0.07 (0.33)	0.09 (0.15)
Wealth Quintile	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.71*** (0.14)
Left-Right Placement		
Left		-0.69 (0.46)
Center		-1.44* (0.85)
Right		1.68* (0.85)
Far Right		0.61 (0.99)
Controls		
Trust in the Armed Forces	20.05*** (2.04)	19.97*** (0.62)
Belief that Corruption is Widespread	.11 (1.34)	1.64** (0.65)
Neighborhood Insecurity	8.32*** (0.99)	8.06*** (0.58)
Constant	82.66*** (2.89)	84.75*** (3.03)
Observations	122,348	97,659
R-Squared	0.08	0.09
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<.10		

Linear Probability Model. Standard errors clustered by country.
Year, country, and country-year fixed effects included but not presented.

B.3: Political interest

Political interest (pol1):

How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

- 1) A lot
- 2) Some
- 3) Little
- 4) None

Notes:

- Political interest was not asked until 2006, so our sample is restricted to 2004-2014
- Political interest cannot be interpreted on the same 0-1 scale as other independent variables (otherwise the categorization would not be possible).
- The baseline category is high political interest.

Findings:

We conclude that those with higher political interest are less supportive of coups. When we look at a categorical break down, we see that, compared to those with "a lot" of political interest, all categories are statistically significant and increasingly positive. Our primary reason for excluding this measure is because it restricts our sample size because the question is not asked in 2006. However, if we include the measure on a 0-1 scale (without looking at each individual category), the magnitude of political interest is only -2, which falls far behind the top predictor (trust in the military, with a magnitude of 20).

Direct Test of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán and/or Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich		
Normative Preference for Democracy	-13.83*** (1.63)	-13.38*** (0.63)
Presidential Approval	-7.14** (1.96)	-7.13*** (0.78)
New Contributions		
System Support	-11.08*** (2.71)	-12.75*** (0.93)
Gender (female = 1)	1.60** (0.43)	1.86*** (0.29)
Age	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.01)
Education	-0.70*** (0.11)	-0.73*** (0.05)
Size of City	0.07 (0.33)	0.28* (0.15)
Wealth Quintile	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.62*** (0.13)
Political Interest		
Some		1.41** (0.56)
A Little		2.44*** (0.53)
None		2.59*** (0.56)
Controls		
Trust in the Armed Forces	20.05*** (2.04)	20.01*** (0.59)
Belief that Corruption is Widespread	.11 (1.34)	0.27 (0.62)
Neighborhood Insecurity	8.32*** (0.99)	8.98*** (0.56)
Constant	82.66*** (2.89)	84.75*** (3.03)
Observations	122,348	118,354
R-Squared	0.08	0.08
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<.10		

Linear Probability Model. Standard errors clustered by country.
Year, country, and country-year fixed effects included but not presented.

Appendix C: Table 2 results when GDP per capita PPP (national wealth) is lagged 1 year

β_{0j} Main Effect	
Logged, LAGGED National Wealth	-5.81*** (1.78)
Age of Democracy	-0.06 (0.06)
Constant	106.03*** (16.02)
Observations	86
R-squared	.13
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<.10	

Appendix D: Question wording and original variable scales

Demographics

- Age (q2): “How old are you?”
 - Scale: 16-101

- Gender (q1): Sex (recorded but not asked)
 - (1) Male (2) Female

- Education (ed): “How many years of schooling have you completed?”
 - Scale: None – 18+

- Size of place (tamano): (recorded by enumerator)
 - (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area)
 - (2) Large City
 - (3) Medium City
 - (4) Small City
 - (5) Rural Area

- Wealth Quintile: Calculated by totaling the household items a respondent owns
 - Scale: 1 (lowest quintile) to 5 (highest quintile)

Perceptions of Crime and Corruption

- Perception of corruption (exc7): Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is:
 - (1) Very common
 - (2) Common
 - (3) Uncommon; or
 - (4) Very uncommon?
 - (88) DK (98) DA

- Perception of neighborhood insecurity (aoj11): “Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?”
 - (1) Very safe
 - (2) Somewhat safe
 - (3) Somewhat unsafe
 - (4) Very unsafe
 - (88) DK (98) DA

Normative Preference for Democracy

- System support (psar): Additive index of respondents’ evaluations of the following questions. All scales are 1-7, where 1 = “not at all” and 7 = “a lot”
 - B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial?
 - B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
 - B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

- B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
- B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?
- Normative Preference for Democracy as the best form of government (ing4): “Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”
 - Scale: (1) Strongly disagree; to (7) strongly agree

Evaluation of Institutions

- Trust in the military (b12): “To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?”
 - Scale: (1) Not at all; to (7) a lot
- Presidential Approval (m1): Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT?
 - (1) Very good
 - (2) Good
 - (3) Neither good nor bad (fair)
 - (4) Bad
 - (5) Very bad
 - (88) DK (98) DA

Appendix E: Relationships between dependent and independent variables

E.1: Correlations among dependent variable and relevant independent variables

Variable	Correlation with DV, Coup Justification	Average (100 unit scale)
COUP JUSTIFICATION		43.7
Trust in the Military	.08	59
System Support	-.04	51.5
Presidential Approval	-.05	54.7
Normative Preference for Democracy	-.12	69.8


E.2: Cross tabular analysis of coup justification and trust in the military

	Justify Coup			
Trust in the Military	0	50	100	Total
Not at all – 1	7,535	1,807	4,382	13,724
2	5,108	1,470	3,112	9,690
3	8,429	2,585	5,196	16,210
4	12,516	3,868	8,244	24,628
5	14,692	4,822	10,194	29,708
6	11,875	4,306	9,674	25,855
A lot – 7	11,904	4,652	9,674	25,855
Total	72,059	23,510	53,040	148,609

E.3: Cross tabular analysis of coup justification and Normative Preference for Democracy

	Justify Coup			
Democracy is Better than Any Other Form of Government	0	50	100	Total
Strongly Disagree – 1	3,049	1,027	3,119	7,195
2	2,428	918	2,595	5,941
3	5,560	2,200	5,505	13,265
4	10,625	4,012	9,301	23,936
5	13,730	4,941	10,415	29,086
6	14,889	4,679	9,149	28,717
Strongly Agree – 7	28,050	7,062	14,550	50,662
Total	79,329	24,839	54,634	158,802

E.4: Cross tabular graphical analysis of trust in the military and Normative Preference for Democracy



95 % Confidence Interval
(with Design-Effects)

Source: AmericasBarometer, LAPOP

Appendix F: Individual level subgroup analyses (gender and urban/rural divide)

All other subgroup analyses (education level, economic quintile, and political interest) are available from the authors upon request.

Quick-Changing, Proximate Attitudes	Full Model	Urban/Rural Subgroups		Gender Subgroups	
		Rural	Urban	Female	Male
Belief that Corruption is Widespread	.11 (1.34)	-2.15 (2.21)	0.97 (1.25)	1.10 (1.48)	-0.98 (1.30)
Neighborhood Insecurity	8.32*** (0.99)	8.83*** (1.27)	8.33*** (0.75)	10.82*** (0.96)	6.90*** (0.81)
Presidential Approval	-7.14** (1.96)	-5.28** (1.91)	-8.06*** (2.24)	-7.12*** (2.09)	-7.29*** (2.13)
Slow-Changing Attitudes and Demographics					
Gender (female = 1)	1.60** (0.43)	-0.30 (0.57)	2.44*** (0.53)		
Age	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.04)	-0.40*** (0.04)	-0.33*** (0.04)	-0.41*** (0.04)
Education	-0.70*** (0.11)	-0.29*** (0.09)	-0.93*** (0.12)	-0.43** (0.16)	-0.94*** (0.10)
Size of City	0.07 (0.33)	-0.88 (1.34)	0.42 (0.40)	-0.16 (0.33)	0.30 (0.38)
Wealth Quintile	-0.41 (0.27)	0.64** (0.29)	-0.74** (0.30)	-0.55* (0.28)	0.30 (0.38)
System Support	- 11.08*** (2.71)	-4.15 (2.56)	-14.26*** (2.80)	-9.34*** (2.97)	-12.75*** (2.63)
Normative Preference for Democracy	- 13.83*** (1.63)	-10.66*** (2.11)	-15.02*** (1.58)	-12.77*** (1.79)	-14.74*** (1.78)
Trust in the Armed Forces	20.05*** (2.04)	16.00*** (2.06)	21.79*** (2.31)	18.95*** (2.06)	21.06*** (2.15)
Constant	82.66*** (2.89)	76.90*** (7.91)	82.66*** (2.89)	75.33*** (3.38)	75.33*** (3.38)
Observations	122,348	39,363	122,348	59,734	62,614
R-Squared	0.08	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.08
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<.10					

Linear Probability Model. Standard errors clustered by country.

Year, country, and country-year fixed effects included but not presented.

Appendix G: Serial autocorrelation tests on second level model

G.1: Testing for serial autocorrelation using the Woolridge test for correlation in panel-data models

The following test is performed in Stata 13 using the xtserial command using the model in Table 2 (with the exception that national wealth is not log-transformed in the below analysis):¹

$$F(1, 15) = .526$$

$$\text{Prob} > F = .4795$$

Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is serial autocorrelation present in the model. However, because there is theoretical reason to suspect autocorrelation, we cluster at the country level to try to account for non-independence of errors.

G.2: Testing for serial autocorrelation using panel corrected standard errors

Additionally, we ran the model using panel corrected standard errors, specifying both casewise and pairwise selection.²

	Original OLS Model	Casewise panel corrected SEs	Pairwise panel corrected SEs
National Wealth	-0.0007*** (0.0002)	-.0007*** (0.0001)	-.0007*** (0.0001)
The Age of Democracy	-.0862 (0.0620)	-.0862** (0.0371)	-.0862* (0.0371)
Constant	60.8053*** (2.2986)	60.8053*** (.9359)	60.8053*** (2.1156)
Observations	88	88	88
R-squared	.22	.22	.22
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<.10			

Standard errors are clustered by country in the original OLS model

Our results remain robust regardless of the standard error specification. Additionally, the model presented in Table 2 is the most conservative of the models tested.

¹ See <http://www.stata-journal.com/sjpdf.html?articlenum=st0039> for more information.

² See http://fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/x/xtscc_paper for more information.

G.3: 3-level hierarchical linear model

As a final check, we ran a 3-level hierarchical linear model with individuals nested in countries nested in years. A null model yields the following for a total of 149,332 individual observations:

Group Variable	No. of Groups	Observations per Group		
		Minimum	Average	Maximum
Year	6	12,758	24,888.7	33,726
Country	95	1,127	1,571.9	2,969

The intraclass correlations of the null model are:

Level 1 (individual)	95%
Level 2 (year)	.005%
Level 3 (country)	.045%

A fully specified model with level 1 and level 2 covariates (consistent with Table 1 and Table 2) yields the following:

Direct Test of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán and/or Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich	Original LPM Model	HLM
Normative Preference for Democracy	-13.83*** (1.63)	-14.00*** (0.51)
Presidential Approval	-7.14** (1.96)	-7.37*** (0.65)
New Contributions		
System Support	-11.08*** (2.71)	-11.30*** (0.75)
Gender (female = 1)	1.60** (0.43)	1.55*** (0.28)
Age	-0.37*** (0.04)	-.037*** (0.01)
Education	-0.70*** (0.11)	-0.70*** (0.04)
Size of City	0.07 (0.33)	0.04 (0.10)
Wealth Quintile	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.40*** (0.11)
Controls		
Trust in the Armed Forces	20.05*** (2.04)	20.19*** (0.50)
Belief that Corruption is Widespread	.11 (1.34)	.28 (0.51)
Neighborhood Insecurity	8.32*** (0.99)	8.81*** (0.47)
Constant	82.66*** (2.89)	85.31*** (2.40)
Observations	122,348	121,145
R-Squared	0.08	
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<.10		

Second level variables in Model 1 are presented from Table 2.

Again, the substantive findings remain the same between the LPM two-step model and the three-level hierarchical linear model. We choose to present the former because of the problematic nature of small sample sizes in traditional HLM models. There are only two to four survey waves per country for the second level of analysis (year), and 88 observations at the tertiary level (country), which can be problematic for estimation of HLM. Additionally, the utility of a three-level model is called into question upon examination of the variance. In the null model, 95% of the variance occurs at the individual level.³ However, we rely on the two-step model not only

³ The individual level percent of variance explained by the model increases to 97.5% upon the inclusion of the level 1 and level 2 variables.

due to the shortcomings of our data with respect to the HLM structure, but for the flexibility of two-step modeling. By modeling a country-year intercept, fixed effects are included for each year, each country, and their interaction. In addition, we account for country-level clustered standard errors. Based upon these tests, we are confident that clustering at the country level with a country-year intercept is adequate to account for 1) the nested nature of the data, and 2) potential serial autocorrelation, as evidenced by robust findings across models.

Appendix H: Does civilian control of the military affect coup justification?

To date, Michael Kenwick’s dataset is the most comprehensive for our purposes, covering all of our Latin American cases from 2004-2010. This leaves us with a total of 16 cases out of 21, and all cases dropped after 2010. Other similar databases (See (Booth and Richard 2015), Table 1, 9 for a summary) typically end prior to 2010, and/or omit more cases. We test both Kenwick’s dynamic and static measures⁴ of civilian control of the military control separately in the second step of the two-step model, originally presented in Table 2.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Original Model (Table 2)	Dynamic Civilian Control of the Military	Static Civilian Control of the Military
National Wealth	-0.0007*** (0.0002)	-0.0007* (0.0003)	-0.0006^ (0.0003)
The Age of Democracy	-.0862 (0.0620)	-0.1562 (0.1353)	-0.2244 (0.1336)
Civilian Control of Military (Dynamic)		-2.5881 (2.8910)	
Civilian Control of Military (Static)			3.7789 (4.0088)
Constant	60.8053*** (2.2986)	65.1567*** (3.8397)	63.3483*** (4.2454)
Observations	88	46	46
R-squared	.22	.22	.22
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<.10			

We cannot make any definitive conclusions about whether or not civilian control of the military affects individual coup justification based on only half of our country-year observations. However, with the data we have, neither the dynamic or static measures yield a significant finding. Intuitively, we would expect a negative relationship: as civilian control approaches 1, individual coup support should presumably decrease. However, this only appears to be the case for the dynamic measure. Kenwick does find that the dynamic measure outperforms the static measure, which our results theoretically (and inconclusively) support.

⁴ Interested readers are encouraged to review Kenwick (2016) for details on these measures.

Appendix I: Two-step model presented as a logit model

I.1: Table 1 (first step of the two-step model) presented with logit standard errors

Direct Test of Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán and/or Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich	Original LPM Model	Logit Model
Normative Preference for Democracy	-13.83*** (1.63)	-0.60*** (0.07)
Presidential Approval	-7.14** (1.96)	-0.31*** (0.09)
New Contributions		
System Support	-11.08*** (2.71)	-0.49*** (0.12)
Gender (female = 1)	1.60** (0.43)	0.07*** (0.02)
Age	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Education	-0.70*** (0.11)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Size of City	0.07 (0.33)	0.00 (0.01)
Wealth Quintile	-0.41 (0.27)	-0.02 (0.01)
Controls		
Trust in the Armed Forces	20.05*** (2.04)	0.87*** (0.10)
Belief that Corruption is Widespread	.11 (1.34)	0.00 (0.06)
Neighborhood Insecurity	8.32*** (0.99)	0.38*** (0.03)
Constant	82.66*** (2.89)	1.40*** (0.13)
Observations	122,348	122,348
R-Squared	0.08	
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<.10		

Year, country, and country-year fixed effects included but not presented.
Standard errors clustered by country.

I.2: Table 2 (second step of the two-step model) presented with logit standard errors (in the first step)

	LPM Model (Table 1)	Logit Model
National Wealth	-0.0007*** (0.0002)	-.0000*** (0.0000)
The Age of Democracy	-.0862 (0.0620)	-0.0009 (0.0006)
Constant	60.8053*** (2.2986)	0.6087*** (0.0232)
Observations	88	88
R-squared	.22	.22
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<.10		

Works cited

- Booth, John A., and Patricia Bayer Richard. 2015. *Latin American Political Culture : Public Opinion and Democracy*. Los Angeles: CQ Press/SAGE.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal S. Pérez-Liñán. 2013. *Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America : Emergence, Survival, and Fall*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
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