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# Political Culture of Democracy in Panama, 2010

## *Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times*

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## Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

*AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

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## **Prologue: Background of the Study**

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This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: [www.LapopSurveys.org](http://www.LapopSurveys.org). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), York University and Université Laval in Canada, and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic down might influence democracy in Latin America and

the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009 and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior AmericasBarometer surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.<sup>1</sup> Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are cantered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a

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<sup>1</sup> With the exception in 2010 of larger samples in Bolivia (N=3,000), Brazil (N=2,500), Chile (N = 1,965), and Ecuador (N=3,000).

preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.<sup>2</sup> In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

<sup>2</sup> The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

<sup>3</sup> All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.














Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers using the system. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that in future we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.








In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org) web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Andean/Southern Cone	
Argentina	
Bolivia	
Brazil	
Chile	 
Colombia	 
Ecuador	 
Paraguay	
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>
Uruguay	 
Venezuela	

Caribbean		
Dominican Republic		
Guyana		
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Suriname		
Trinidad & Tobago		

Canada and United States	
Canada	
United States	

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At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efren Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bemby, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the databases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

<b>Country/ Institution</b>	<b>Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)</b>
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science</li> <li>●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science</li> <li>●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Department</li> <li>●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP</li> <li>●Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP</li> </ul>
<b>Mexico and Central America Group</b>	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados</li> <li>●Dr. Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)</li> </ul>
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA</li> <li>●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES</li> </ul>
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Visiting Professor, Florida International University, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO</li> </ul>
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. José Rene Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA</li> </ul>
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA</li> </ul>
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations</li> </ul>
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA</li> </ul>
<b>Caribbean Group</b>	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA</li> </ul>
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants</li> <li>●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants</li> </ul>
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA</li> </ul>
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Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Assistant Professor, Universidad de San Francisco, Quito</li> <li>●Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Vanderbilt University, USA</li> <li>●Dr. Diana Orcés, LAPOP Research Analyst, Vanderbilt University, USA</li> </ul>
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware in the USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima</li> <li>●Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima</li> </ul>
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Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>●Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Associate Professor of Political Science, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica</li> </ul>

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Argentina	●Dr. Germán Lodola, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Venezuela	●Dr. Damaris Canache, CISOR Venezuela and University of Illinois, USA
<b>North America Group</b>	
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Canada	●Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee  
July, 2010



## Executive Summary

In 2009, Panama's economy slowed sharply and grew only 2.5%, compared to the 9% average annual rate registered over the previous five years. This performance reflected the fact that, though some domestic market sectors performed well, they were unable to offset the contraction in activities related to the external sector. The AmericasBarometer survey found that a majority, 56.7%, of Panamanians believed the country suffered an economic crisis, but that it was not very serious. Another, 30.8%, indicated the country was suffering a very serious economic crisis, and 12.5% said the country did not suffer an economic crisis. This appraisal is generally more positive than the entire region. Our survey found that 38.8 percent of Panamanians blame the previous administration, led by Martin Torrijos, for the economic crisis. Only 5.5% blame the administration of Ricardo Martinelli. Beyond the previous administration, Panamanians blame themselves for the crisis, with 15.3% choosing this answer, with an additional 14.4% blaming the rich. Panamanians exhibit the fifth lowest rate of job loss among the 25 countries included in the survey, with 18.6% of respondents saying that at least one member of the family lost their job in the last year. This compares favorably with the worst job losses found in Mexico, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, where nearly 40% of individuals say that at least one member of their family lost their job in the last year.

In terms of democratic governance, Freedom House has ranked Panama's political system as an "electoral democracy" since 1994, and the rankings for the indexes used by the organization, political liberties and civil rights, have remained 1 and 2, respectively, since 1999, for an average rating of 1.5. Despite the "free" classification, however, the 2009 Freedom House report for Panama raises a number of troubling issues for the country's democratic institutions. Principally among them is corruption. Freedom House notes that Panama was ranked 85 out of 180 countries surveyed on Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Freedom House emphasized that the judicial system is inefficient and prone to politicization, and the prisoner-to-public ratio is high, with 354 inmates for every 100,000 residents. Indigenous communities enjoy a degree of autonomy and self-government, but some 90 percent of the indigenous population lives in extreme poverty.

In 2009, Panama held its fourth presidential elections since the restoration of democracy in 1989. The elections held on May 3, 2009, pitted Balbina Herrera, a former Minister of Housing and legislator, against wealthy businessman Ricardo Martinelli. Herrera was the standard-bearer of the governing Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), and Martinelli led a coalition of opposition parties headed by the Democratic Change Party. The campaign was devoid of much substance and centered on personal attacks between the candidates. In the end, the desire for change, despite robust economic performance during the last 3 years, and Herrera's poor campaign led to a landslide victory for Martinelli who captured 60% of the votes. His coalition also won a majority of seats in the legislature.

The evidence suggests that the impact of the economic crisis varies across the region. Some countries such as Mexico and Jamaica were more affected than others. Our analysis found that support for democracy did not decline substantially as a result of the economic crisis, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. The results show that perception of government economic performance is a significant indicator of support for democracy and the political system. Panama's results parallel those for the rest of the hemisphere with perception of the government economic performance as the most significant factor in determining support for the political system. In the case of satisfaction with democracy individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the

incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the president's performance during hard economic times are also highly important. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups among Latin Americans. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups, suggesting that Latin Americans, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk.

In Panama, trust in the ability of the political system to protect basic rights is the weakest of the components of system support in 2010, and trust in political institutions the highest. An analysis of the components of system support over time finds that after a significant dip in 2006 and 2008, trust in the basic components of the political system have improved considerably in 2010. Panama's level of system support compares favorably with the rest of the region. We have noted that support for the current administration is a key factor in determining support for the system, and Panamanians expressed substantially greater support for the current president than the last; thus partially explaining the rise in system support. Another factor is the perception of government economic performance which has improved and is significantly linked to system support. Regression analysis indicates that presidential job approval and government economic performance are key factors in determining support for the political system in Panama.

Political tolerance levels in Panama are highest for allowing opponents of the political system to protests peaceably. Support for opponents running for office and making a speech on TV is below the mid-point of the scale. Panamanians are in the bottom half of countries on political tolerance, with an average barely above the mid-point of the scale. At most, we find a population in 2010 with relatively low levels of political tolerance but increasing system support. Unfortunately, a majority of Panamanians exhibit attitudes that place them in the relatively less democratic cells when we combine political tolerance and system support.

According to the results presented in the report, the Catholic Church is the most trusted institution with a score of 80 on the 0-100 scale. The Church's rating is well above any of the public institutions. The most trusted agency is the Canal Authority with an average score of 69.9, followed by the president with 65.3. The least trusted institutions are the political parties with a score of 41.1, well below the mid-point of the scale, and the National Assembly with a score of 46.6. It is worth noting that with the exception of the Supreme Court, Assembly and political parties, all other institutions achieved levels of trust on the positive side of the scale. Finally, our analysis shows that support for and satisfaction with democracy have rebounded from their low levels in 2006. In 2010, Panamanians exhibit the second highest level of satisfaction with democracy among all the countries surveyed.

Crime, insecurity and corruption are among the most critical issues confronting Latin America. All three have the potential to undermine support for democracy by eroding trust in key State institutions and in the ability of the government to confront effectively the challenges facing citizens on a day-to-day basis. The results presented here show that insecurity has a particularly strong relationship to democratic values and system support. In Panama, while perception of insecurity has declined since 2004, crime has increased significantly as the number one issue facing the country. The key variable determining perception of insecurity is the extent of reported gang activity in respondent's neighborhood. The analysis reveals that younger Panamanians living in medium sized cities and the metropolitan Panama City area are more likely to be victims of crime.

After a decline in 2008, Panamanians' perception of corruption among public officials increased sharply in 2010. However, Panamanians reflect a relatively low level of corruption victimization. Only 9.4% of citizens in Panama say they were victims of corruption in the previous 12 months. Municipal agencies, followed closely by the courts, are the places in which Panamanians say they experience the greatest levels of demands for bribes. Education has the strongest impact on corruption victimization.

The results indicate that perception of insecurity and corruption victimization are significant factors in explaining variation in support for democracy. Support for democracy declines as perception of insecurity and corruption victimization increases.

Perception of insecurity also is a major factor in determining levels of interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust declines nearly 40 points between respondents that feel "very safe" in their neighborhood and those who are "very unsafe." The fact that insecurity has such a dramatic effect on interpersonal trust should alert the relevant authorities to the pernicious effects that increased crime and violence may have on the ability of citizens to participate actively in their communities, thus undermining a fundamental requirement for stable democratic governance.

Panamanians level of municipal government participation is the lowest of any country in the 2010 AmericasBarometer. Panama's municipal government structures are weak and little concrete efforts have been made to strengthen them despite policy pronouncements and legal requirements to do so.

Chapter VIII focused on political parties and democracy. The analysis finds that political parties are the least trusted institution, and while a majority of voters are registered in a party, few express identification with a political party. Panamanians are ranked second among all 25 countries in their belief that democracy can exist without political parties; the United States is number one. Our analysis finds little ideological differences among supporters of the various legal parties. Finally, more than 82% of Panamanians said they had never been offered or received any tangible benefits (e.g. food, money, job, etc.) in exchange for voting for a party or candidate.

In Chapter IX of the report we focused on attitudes toward the judicial system and the National Police. We find that Panamanians believe the biggest problem facing the court system is corruption. More than 20% of respondents who had dealings with the courts say they were asked for a bribe. Despite the level of corruption, most Panamanians believe the system would be able to punish someone who committed a crime, with respondents living in rural or small cities expressing greater confidence in the judicial system. The report finds substantial general support for the work done by the National Police, although very few citizens have actually witnessed police activity in working with the community to prevent crime. Large numbers of Panamanians, however, are worried of being victims of crime, with the Panama City metropolitan region exhibiting the highest levels.

Finally, in Chapter X, we focused on public attitudes toward environmental policies. Panama has an extensive legal and regulatory framework for protecting the environment but enforcement is often lacking. Panamanians generally believe that the institutions in charge of protecting the environment are doing a good job. They think that the main problem with the enforcement of environmental laws is corruption, and say the central government should be the main organization in charge of promoting and enforcing environmental laws. Finally, most Panamanians do not believe that public officials are truly concerned with protecting the environment in their communities.



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## **Part I: Hard Times and Their Effects on Democracy**

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## **Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview**

### **Introduction**

Since the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, one of the most severe world-wide economic recessions since the Great Depression took place. This crisis affected most nations in the world; the Americas have not been immune. Yet, many of the nations in the Americas seem to have managed the crisis unusually well, no doubt mitigating its potential impact on democracy. In this study, we first briefly examine the data on the economic downturn, but then we turn to the core of our analysis, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the largest survey of democratic public opinion ever conducted in the Americas. We look at the 2008 round, which was conducted before the full weight of the crisis had been experienced, and the 2010 round, when most countries were recovering.

Sparked by a massive set of financial problems in the United States, the problem reached crisis proportions in September, 2008; several months after the 2008 AmericasBarometer fieldwork had been completed. The upshot was a near-universal decline in economic growth, increased unemployment, and increased poverty levels that are still being felt, albeit unequally around the globe.

In the prior study in this series of analyses of public opinion in the Americas, we examined the impact of various governance indicators on support for stable democracy. In this round of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we report on the characteristics of those affected by the crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and those who state that their personal economies have deteriorated. Is the crisis linked to citizens' support for democracy and democratic principles? And ultimately, does the economic crisis threaten support for democracy?

In this chapter, we begin with a global overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment, and poverty levels, followed by a regional and specific country assessment. We then document a global, as well as a regional, "democracy recession", and then discuss democracy at the country level. We conclude by identifying the important relationships scholars have theorized and found between economic and democratic decline.

### **Economic Overview**

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey took place in the context of the greatest global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, world real GDP growth showed a systematic decline from 3.9 to 3 percent by the end of 2008, and in 2009 fell to a negative 1.4% (see Figure I-1). Yet, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections estimating a recovery was underway.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, while some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were not and were even able to sustain growth in the context of a world-wide slowdown. Indeed, it appears that unlike the severe crises of the past that sharply weakened Latin American and Caribbean economies, careful management of counter-cyclical policies averted many of the worst effects.

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<sup>1</sup> IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2009: Crisis and Recovery* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).



While by the time the 2010 round of surveys began, the world economy was exhibiting signs of economic recovery in a variety of countries, the effects of the crisis were still being suffered across the globe. Forty three poor countries in 2009 suffered serious consequences of the economic crisis, with many facing underperformance in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with recovery, it is believed that as many as 64 million more people will be living in extreme poverty than in 2009, that is, on less than \$1.25 per day. Moreover, more than 1 billion people were expected to go chronically hungry reversing many benefits that had been obtained from successful anti-poverty programs implemented in the previous decade.<sup>2</sup>




Figure I-1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections 2007 - 2011  
(Source IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010)<sup>3</sup>)

Crisis-related unemployment increases were substantial and widely felt. According to the International Labour Organization, the global unemployment rate for 2009 was estimated at 6.6 percent, corresponding to about 212 million persons. This means an increase of almost 34 million people over the number of unemployed in 2007, with most of this increment taking place in 2009. In addition, many workers fell into more vulnerable forms of employment and this, in turn, has reduced work benefits, swollen precarious employment conditions and elevated the number of the working poor. It is estimated that vulnerable employment increased by more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, even though “the extreme working poor,” that is, individuals living on less than \$1.25 per day, was reduced by 16.3 percentage points between 1998 to 2008, by the end of 2008, the extreme working poor remained at a total of 21.2% of all employment, implying that around 633 million workers were living with their families on less than \$1.25 a day worldwide.<sup>5</sup>

All these figures point to the severity of the impact of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to

<sup>2</sup>See [www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm](http://www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm) and <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22152813~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

<sup>3</sup> IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2010: Rebalancing Growth* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010).

<sup>4</sup> ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010* (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2010), 42.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 22.

name a few, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was not as severe.<sup>6</sup> Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%).<sup>7</sup> Economic recovery seems to be underway based on the latest projections available as of this writing, and show that real GDP growth may increase from 3.1 and 3.6 percent by 2010 and 2011, respectively.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank also suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate, as the prices of primary commodities have fallen.<sup>9</sup>

The financial turmoil also clearly had a negative impact on the Latin American labor market. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5% in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8% during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010). Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal took place in 2009.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9 percent in 2009.<sup>11</sup> These are just some examples of the serious “side-effects” that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations also affected the level of remittances on which so many families in Latin America depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30% of recipient families, helping to keep these families out of poverty.<sup>12</sup> Remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the region’s nations receive 12% or more of GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). As early as 2008 the growth rates of remittances declined considerably across Latin America, even becoming negative in some countries (see Figure I-2).

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<sup>6</sup> Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%).

See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel, "Crisis Response in Latin America: Is the "Rainy Day" at Hand?," (Inter-American Development Bank, 2009).

<sup>10</sup> World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

<sup>11</sup> ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010*, 30.

<sup>12</sup> See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986> and

<http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>




Figure I-2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009 as reported by the World Bank


Figure I-2 shows that throughout the year 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4% in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent remittance growth rate of over 25% in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.<sup>13</sup>

The most recent data available as of the writing of this report shows that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010 recovery was underway.<sup>14</sup> As shown in Figure I-3, drawn from a recent IDB study, which is based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region's GDP), the growth decline in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010).

<sup>15</sup> These data are based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region's GDP).



**Figure I-3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010**

(Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4% in 2007 to -6.5% in 2009. The general economic problems world-wide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the relatively least affected countries in the region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.2 percent between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9 percent in 2010-2011. An estimation of the change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I-4. As can be seen, all but eleven of the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer suffered declines in GDP.

Changes in the growth rates from 2008 to 2009 varied from country to country. For instance, in Ecuador, the growth rate in 2008 was 6.5% whereas in 2009 it was 0.4%. The change in Mexico was from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.




Figure I-4. Change in Real GDP, 2008 - 2009

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced owing to a number of factors. As the IDB's latest analysis states:

"...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank runs so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable..."<sup>17</sup>

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems make the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

<sup>17</sup> Izquierdo and Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1.

## Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Panama

In 2009, Panama's economy slowed sharply and grew only 2.5%, compared to the 9% average annual rate registered over the previous five years. This performance reflected the fact that, though some domestic market sectors performed well, they were unable to offset the contraction in activities related to the external sector. In 2010, the economy is expected to grow at a 4.5% rate, propelled by the recovery in world commercial demand and the continuation of infrastructure projects. Among the most significant projects is the expansion of the Panama Canal, and the widening of the coastal road.




Figure I-5. Panama: GDP and Inflation, 2007-2009

In the second half of 2008 it became evident that Panama's economy was slowing down. Nevertheless, between January and June 2009, real GDP growth was 2.4% up on the year-earlier period, driven primarily by growth in construction, transport, storage and communications. Growth in mining and construction reflected mainly works already under way, since new construction fell off significantly, particularly the Panama Canal expansion project which is estimated will pump roughly \$5.5 billion in direct investment and several more billions in related investments.

Table I-1. Panama: Main Economic Indicators

PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS			
	2007	2008	2009 <sup>a</sup>
<b>Annual growth rates</b>			
Gross domestic product	12.1	10.7	2.5
Per capita gross domestic product	10.2	8.9	0.9
Consumer prices	6.4	6.8	0.7 <sup>b</sup>
Average real wage	1.3	-0.6	...
Real effective exchange rate <sup>c</sup>	1.4	-1.8	-5.8 <sup>d</sup>
Terms of trade	-1.0	-4.5	4.2
<b>Annual average percentages</b>			
Urban unemployment rate <sup>e</sup>	7.8	6.5	7.9
Central government			
overall balance/GDP	1.2	0.3	-1.8
Nominal deposit rate <sup>f</sup>	4.8	3.5	3.5 <sup>g</sup>
Nominal lending rate <sup>h</sup>	8.3	8.2	8.3 <sup>g</sup>
<b>Millions of dollars</b>			
Exports of goods and services	14 263	16 153	16 209
Imports of goods and services	14 627	17 604	16 715
Current account balance	-1 422	-2 792	-1 974
Capital and financial account balance <sup>i</sup>	2 044	3 377	2 124
Overall balance	622	584	150

**Source:** Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.

<sup>a</sup> Preliminary estimates.

<sup>b</sup> Twelve-month variation to October 2009.

<sup>c</sup> A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.

<sup>d</sup> Year-on-year average variation, January to October 2009.

<sup>e</sup> Includes hidden unemployment.

<sup>f</sup> Six-month deposits.

<sup>g</sup> Average from January to September, annualized.

<sup>h</sup> On one-year loans for commercial activities.

<sup>i</sup> Includes errors and omissions.

## Trends in Democratic Development

While the economic recession was a major event in many countries, politically it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world.<sup>18</sup> According to the Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom*, for the fourth consecutive year, freedom declines offset gains in 2009 (Figure I-6). This is the longest uninterrupted period of democracy's decline in the 40 year history of the Freedom House series.<sup>19</sup> Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations, at the same time as non-democratic nations (e.g., Iran, Russia) became even more repressive. Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years have now undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).

<sup>18</sup> Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2009: The Erosion Accelerates," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).

<sup>19</sup> Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free."






Figure I-6. Freedom in the World: Global Gains Minus Global Declines from 2003-2010, by Reporting Year

Examining Freedom House's specific classification of countries (Table I-2), we find that in 89 countries continue to belong to the "free" category, representing 46% of the world's 194 countries as well as 46% of the global population. The number of countries that are considered "partly free" decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of "not free" nations rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24 percent of the world's population, respectively. More specifically, in the "not free" category, more than 2.3 billion individuals reside in countries, that is, ones where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China makes up 50% of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and among those nations considered not free, nine of the 47 countries in this category scored the lowest possible ratings in both indicators.<sup>20</sup>

Table I-2. Global Trends in Freedom 1979-2009

Year	TOTAL COUNTRIES	FREE		PARTLY FREE		NOT FREE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24

Source: Freedom House 2010

In accordance with *Freedom House*, within Latin America and the Caribbean region, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development, according to Freedom House, in the 2008-2010 period, highlighted by the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the "electoral democracy" category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in

<sup>20</sup> See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela.<sup>21</sup> Figure I-7 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered “free” by Freedom House, that is, 26% of Latin American nations are rated “partly free” because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures point to a current “democracy recession” in the Americas, much as there is a “democracy recession” in the world as whole.




Figure I-7. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas

While *Freedom House* registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. Rather, the Freedom House measure focuses on institutions, not political culture, which is the focus of the present study. It is central to the theory of political culture that over the long term culture and institutions should be congruous with each other, but over the short term significant incongruities can emerge.<sup>22</sup> For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, political culture there exhibited strong support for democracy.<sup>23</sup> So, too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be “corrected” over the long term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes might only serve to strengthen anti-democratic political cultures.

## Dimensions of Democracy in Panama

Freedom House has ranked Panama’s political system as an “electoral democracy” since 1994, and the rankings for the indexes used by the organization, political liberties and civil rights, have remained 1 and 2, respectively, since 1999, for an average rating of 1.5. Despite the “free” classification,

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>22</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

<sup>23</sup> John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993).

however, the 2009 Freedom House report for Panama raises a number of troubling issues for the country's democratic institutions. Principally among them is corruption. Freedom House notes that Panama was ranked 85 out of 180 countries surveyed on Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Freedom House emphasized that the judicial system is inefficient and prone to politicization, and the prisoner-to-public ratio is high, with 354 inmates for every 100,000 residents. Indigenous communities enjoy a degree of autonomy and self-government, but some 90% of the indigenous population lives in extreme poverty. In March 2008, nongovernmental organizations condemned the government before the Inter American Commission on Human Rights for using force and intimidation to displace thousands of indigenous people in connection with a hydroelectric project on the Rio Changuinola. Nearly 38% of Panamanians live in poverty, and the wealthiest 20% make 32 times the average income of the poorest 20%.

In July 2008, President Torrijos issued a series of controversial executive decrees to reform the police and security institutions. After the 1989 United States military intervention Panama abolished the military and created a series of civilian-led police and security agencies. The United States and the Panamanian government argue the extant security architecture is deficient to meet the security challenges facing the country in the Twenty-first Century. The most important changes included: (1) The creation of a National Frontier Service to strengthen border security, particularly along the Panama-Colombia border; (2) A decree merging the National Air Service and National Maritime Service into the National Aeronaval Service; and (3) A decree creating the National Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS), reorganizing the National Public Safety and Defense Council and making other changes to the intelligence agencies. As part of the move to strengthen the nation's defenses, Panama rejoined the Inter-American Defense Council. The new measures sparked significant protest from opposition political parties and civil-society organizations who had fought the military dictatorship of the 1980s, claiming the decrees would remilitarize Panama's security apparatus.

In 2009, Panama held its fourth presidential elections. The elections held on May 3, 2009, pitted Balbina Herrera, a former Minister of Housing and legislator, against wealthy businessman Ricardo Martinelli. Herrera was the standard-bearer of the governing Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), and Martinelli led a coalition of opposition parties headed by the Democratic Change Party. The campaign was devoid of much substance and centered on personal attacks between the candidates. Herrera was accused of being a radical leftist who had received support from Hugo Chávez, the controversial president of Venezuela. Martinelli exploited Herrera's past links to General Manuel Noriega's regime and strong anti-American statements. Martinelli's campaign also emphasized the need for change after 5 years of PRD-led government. For her part, she accused Martinelli of being mentally unstable; rumors have abounded for years that Martinelli is bipolar. She also tried to use Martinelli's wealth and business practices against him. Martinelli turned the charges in his favor by adopting the campaign slogan "the crazies are more" (*los locos somos más*). Herrera countered with the slogan "the poor are more" (*los pobres somos más*). In the end, the desire for change, despite robust economic performance during the last 3 years, and Herrera's poor campaign led to a landslide victory for Martinelli who captured 60% of the votes. His coalition also won a majority of seats in the legislature. Martinelli's victory was considered a setback for the recent leftist trend in Latin America (see Tables I-2 and I-3). Importantly, Martinelli's victory may indicate realignment in the political party dynamics because he represents the first presidential winner, since the reestablishment of democracy, not to come from either the Arnulfista Party or the PRD.

**Table I-3. Results of Presidential Election of May 3, 2009**

<b>Candidate (party)</b>	<b>% of the vote</b>
Ricardo Martinelli (CD/Arnulfista)	60.0
Balbina Herrera (PRD)	37.6
Guillermo Endara (Vanguardia Moral)	2.3
Source: Electoral Tribunal	

**Table I-4. Results of Elections for the National Assembly, May 3, 2009  
(Number of seats)**

<b>Parties</b>	<b>2009-2014 (Total=71)</b>
Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)	26
Partido Arnulfista (PA)	22
Cambio Democrático (CD)	14
Unión Patriótica (UP)	4
Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista (MOLIRENA)	2
Independents	2
Partido Popular (PP)	1

## **The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy**

Should we be concerned that the economic crisis could have spilled over and affected democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the AmericasBarometer of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability, approaching the problem from two schools of thought. The first has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-democratic alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of “democracy’s fickle friends”<sup>24</sup>, as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic crises. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al.<sup>25</sup> found that no democracy had collapsed where the country’s per capita income exceeded \$6,055. In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current

<sup>24</sup> Nancy Gina Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

<sup>25</sup> Adam Przeworski et al., “What Makes Democracies Endure?” *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996).

economic crisis without the “inoculation” protection of historically adequate levels of economic development.<sup>26</sup>

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al.<sup>27</sup> also found that “democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow.” As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most of the countries placing most nations in Przeworski et al.’s danger zone. Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies.<sup>28</sup> Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and the continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability?<sup>29</sup> In this round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-six countries, we have the data to explore that very question.

Following a discussion of the economic crisis’ impact on the region and Panama, the present chapter looked at how democracy has fared during the economic crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and more specifically in Panama. It also analyzed the trends in democratic development in the last few years and concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy. In the following chapter, we will focus on citizen perceptions of the economic downturn as measured by the AmericasBarometer 2010. In Chapter III of this study we will examine how well the political culture of democracy has fared under economically difficult times. In that chapter we will examine three main variables (as well as others), namely, support for democracy, system support, and life satisfaction as three key variables that will help us understand how the region as a whole, as well as Panama have fared since 2008.

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<sup>26</sup> Abby Córdova and Mitchell Seligson, “Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010).

<sup>27</sup> Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.

<sup>28</sup> Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Insurgency and Inequality,” *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987).

<sup>29</sup> Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2009), Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean,” *Latin American Politics and Society*, forthcoming (2010).



## Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences During Hard Times in the Americas

### Introduction


In the previous chapter we presented a general overview of the economic crisis on the world, on the Americas, and Panama economy, followed by a summary of the trends in democracy since the 2008 AmericasBarometer study was conducted. In this chapter we concentrate on citizens' perceptions and experiences during hard times by attempting to answer the questions: 1) how did citizens perceive the crisis, 2) who did they blame for it and 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? We first present first a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of the crisis as well as where Panama is located in relation to the other countries in the Americas. We then assess citizens' experiences with economic instability in the countries included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey.

### Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to look specifically at the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed two new survey items. This is the first time that these items have been used in the AmericasBarometer, and they were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. The two items represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceive an economic crisis. Second, among those who thought that there was, we ask who is to blame for it. The following is the text of the items themselves:

- CRISIS1.** Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis; others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, while others say that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**
- (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
  - (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
  - (3) No economic crisis
- CRISIS2.** Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**
- (01) The previous administration
  - (02) The current administration
  - (03) Ourselves, the Belizeans
  - (04) The rich people of our country
  - (05) The problems of democracy
  - (06) The rich countries **[Accept also Unites States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
  - (07) The economic system of the country, or
  - (08) Never have thought about it
  - (77) **[Don't read]** Other

Looking at the Americas as a whole, including all 25 countries in the AmericasBarometer, we can see in Figure II-1 that the majority of citizens in the Americas perceive an economic crisis, be it serious or not very serious.



**Figure II-1. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in the Americas 2010 (Percentage of Total Population)**

Among all these countries, we see in Figure II-2 that Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua and the United States, have the highest percentages with respect to citizens' perceptions of a crisis, although in all of the countries a very high percentage perceive a crisis.






Figure II-2. Percentage of the Population that Perceived There is an Economic Crisis





Figure II-3. Perceptions of the Economic Crisis in Panama, 2010

Figure II-3 shows that a majority of Panamanians express the opinion that the country is suffering an economic crisis, but that it is not very serious. Another, 30.8% indicate the country is suffering a very serious economic crisis. Therefore, a significant majority of Panamanians believe the country suffered under the global economic crisis despite the fact that the country experienced growth of 2.5% in 2009. This growth, however, represented a significant decline from the 9% the country experienced in 2008.

### Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?

In this section we examine to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the economic crisis. The results for the Americas as a whole are provided first.



**Figure II-4 . Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? (Percentage of Total Population)**

The majority of citizens who perceive a crisis in the Americas blame either the current or previous administration for the economic crisis (Figure II-4). Fewer than 10% of Latin Americans who perceive a crisis blame the rich countries or the advanced industrial countries, contrary to what one might have expected, especially in the Latin American context. Many individuals in these countries, instead, blame themselves for the economic crisis. We examine these results by the major regions in the Americas, with the results shown in Figure II-5. As shown in Figure II-4 respondents blame the current and previous governments for the economic crisis. Nonetheless, we should mention that in the Caribbean, 17.4% of respondents blame themselves for the crisis.




Figure II-5. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? Regional Overview, 2010

## Evidence for Panama




Figure II-6. Who is to blame for the crisis? (Panama, 2010)

Figure II-6 illustrates that 38.8% of Panamanians blame the previous administration, led by Martin Torrijos, for the economic crisis. Only 5.5% blame the administration of Ricardo Martinelli. After the previous administration, Panamanians blame themselves for the crisis, with 15.3% choosing this answer, with an additional 14.4% blaming the rich of Panama.

## **Personal Experiences with Economic Instability**

In the previous section, we analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is to blame for it. Here, we explore how citizens experience the crisis.

### **Jobs Loss**

The questions used in this section are the following:

**OCUP1B1.** Have you lost your job in the past two years? **[Read options]**

- (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one.
- (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one
- (3) No, you did not lose your job
- (4) No, you did not work because you decided not to work or because of disabilities

**OCUP1B2.** Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II-7 below. While three-quarters of the population did not report having lost a job, about 7% did, but found a new one, and whereas about 8.5% of the respondents lost jobs but did not find a new one. Looking at the households as a whole, over 16% of respondents report lost jobs.





Figure II-7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010

To get an overall picture of job loss, a composite indicator variable was computed based on these two items (Figure II-8), which shows if at least one household member lost his or her job in the past two years. In comparison, Panama is among the least affected countries with only 18.6% of citizens reporting that at least one member of their families lost their job.



**Figure II-8. Percentage of Households with Least One Family Member Who Lost a Job in the Past Two Years**

Panamanians exhibit the fifth lowest rate of job loss among the 25 countries included in the survey, with 18.6% of respondents saying that at least one member of the family lost their job in the last year. Aggregate unemployment has declined in Panama from 16% in 2003 to 7.1% in 2009, with the low experienced in 2008 when the average unemployment rate was 5.6%.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See <http://panamaeconomyinsight.blogspot.com/>.




Figure II-9. Percentage of Panamanians Who Lost Jobs

Over 72% of respondents said they are employed. Slightly over 8% said they were unemployed and another 4.3% said they were temporarily unemployed. These figures are close to the national aggregate statistics discussed earlier.






Figure II-10. Percentage of Panamanians Who Lost Jobs by Sex, Age, Education, Area

As reported in Figure II-10, 71.4% of respondents that chose not to work are female. Also females make up 35.8% of the unemployed. More young people chose not to work than older individuals; this result probably reflects the fact that a significant proportion of respondents in the 18-25 age cohort are students. A majority of unemployed Panamanians are between the ages of 26 and 45. The urban area exhibits the greatest proportion of unemployed individuals.

## Reported Decrease in Household Income

We now examine reports by our respondents about changes in their household incomes. We asked the following question:

**Q10E.** Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**  
 (1) Increased? **[Go to Q11]**  
 (2) Remained the same? **[Go to Q11]**  
 (3) Decreased? **[Go to Q10F]**

The results for the Americas as a whole (see Figure II-11) show that about half of the respondents say that their incomes have remained the same, with nearly 30% saying that their incomes have declined, and one-fifth saying that it has increased.




Figure II-11. Reported Household Income Changes in the Americas, 2008-2010

Figure II-12 shows these results by country, ranked by the percentage who say that their incomes have declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with up to half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, whereas in other countries the situation is the reverse, with up to half of respondents reporting an increase income. These findings reinforce our argument that the economic slide has affected countries in very different ways in the Americas.




Figure II-12. Has your household income decrease, remain the same, or increase over the past two years?  
(Percentage of Total Population)

In the case of Panama 60% of respondents expressed the view that their household income remained the same during the past two years. Those whose incomes decline amount to 16.1%, the third lowest among the countries in the survey.

### Who Was Most Affected by Economic Hardship?

As shown in Figure II-13, a greater percentage of individuals living in rural areas reported that their household income decreased over the past two years in the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole.

Moreover, Figure II-13 shows that as family wealth declines, the degree percentage of individuals reporting a decline in income increases; the poorest individuals in the region are most likely to have reported suffering a decline in their household income. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on a different methodology for measuring

relative wealth, one based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The methodology allows ranking individuals from poor to rich taking into account local economic conditions.<sup>2</sup>





Figure II-13. Percentage of Individuals in the Americas Reporting a Decrease in their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth

<sup>2</sup> For more information on how this indicator was computed and its reliability, see Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).



**Figure II-14. Percentage of Individuals in Panama Reporting a Decrease in their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth**

The evidence presented in Figure II-14 indicates that while a greater percentage of urban residents saw their income decline, the difference between rural and urban is not statistically significant. However, in the case of wealth we do find a statistical significant difference between the lowest two fifths of respondents in terms of wealth and the remaining three fifths. Only 6% of respondents at the highest level of wealth saw a decrease in income whereas 26% and 27.5%, respectively, saw declines at the lowest two levels of wealth.

### Perceptions of Both the Personal and National Economy

The AmericasBarometer traditionally reports on respondents' perceptions of their personal and national economic situation. We ask respondents to consider their personal and national economic situations currently and as compared to a year prior to the interviews. Below are the items used in the survey:

<p><b>SOCT1.</b> How would you describe <b>the country's</b> economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</p> <p>(1) Very good    (2) Good    (3) Neither good nor bad (fair)    (4) Bad    (5) Very bad</p>
<p><b>SOCT2.</b> Do you think that <b>the country's</b> current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Better    (2) Same    (3) Worse</p>
<p><b>IDIO1.</b> How would you describe <b>your</b> overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</p> <p>(1) Very good    (2) Good    (3) Neither good nor bad (fair)    (4) Bad    (5) Very bad</p>
<p><b>IDIO2.</b> Do you think that <b>your</b> economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Better    (2) Same    (3) Worse</p>

We now couple these items with the one analyzed above asking about reports of decreases in household income. As can be seen in Figure II-15, those who perceive their personal or economic situation to be very bad are far more likely to have experienced a loss of household income when compared to those who are reporting that their personal economic situation is very good. The same findings hold, a bit less sharply, for the perception of the national economy and also for perceptions of personal and national economic situations when compared to a year earlier.




Figure II-15. Relationship Between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy during Hard Times in the Americas, 2010

Figure II-16 shows similar results for Panama. Respondents who evaluate the national and their personal economic situations more negatively also are far more likely to have experienced loss of income.




Figure II-16. Relationship Between Reported Decrease in Household Income and Perceptions of the Economy in Panama

## Conclusion

Just as in the rest of the continent, a majority of Panamanians perceive that their country suffered an economic crisis, despite the favorable macroeconomic environment. Nevertheless, unlike other countries in the region, the perception of how severe the crisis was is more varied. While 80% of respondents believe there was an economic crisis, the majority say it was not serious. Another difference between Panama and the rest of the region is the low level of responsibility Panamanians assign to the current government. In the rest of the region, the current and immediate past governments are blamed almost equally for the crisis. In Panama, only the previous government is blamed by a significant number of citizens. Only 6% blame the current government of President Ricardo Martinelli for the economic crisis.





## Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

### Introduction

Thus far, we have seen how Latin American citizens have fared during the great economic recession that began in 2008 in relation to their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of national and personal economic well-being. In this chapter, our objective is to go a step further and see how key attitudes toward democracy have fared during these hard times.

Bad economic times have often been linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor individuals, whom we have seen above were hard hit by income declines in the current crisis afflicting wide swaths of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during hard economic times.<sup>1</sup> Others suggest that national economic underdevelopment and low growth rates also affect democracy, while others show how poor national economic indicators may affect individuals support for key components of democracy.<sup>2</sup>

Given the severity of the impact of the most recent economic recession on many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined when times got tough, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in the previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects on different regions in the Americas. Through the analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010, we will take a more detailed look into these conundrums by examining the results by region and focus on Panama.

Under hard economic conditions worldwide, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by looking at the most general of all measures, that of subjective well-being, commonly referred to "life satisfaction" or "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to citizens' feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who experience economic hard times presumably expressing low levels of subjective well-being, while those individuals who enjoy better economic conditions expressing greater happiness.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, the same research takes note of contradictions between economic conditions and life satisfaction or happiness.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>But see the work of Bermeo, who reviews this thesis and ultimately rejects it: Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*.

<sup>2</sup> Córdova and Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean", Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990*.

<sup>3</sup> Frey S. Bruno and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness," in *Culture and Subjective Well-Being*, ed. Ed Diener and Eunkook M. Suh (Cambridge, Mass MIT Press, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> Carol Graham, *Happiness Around the World : The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Carol Graham, Eduardo Lora, and Inter-American Development Bank., *Paradox and*

When we look at the specific case of the Americas, how satisfied with their lives are the citizens of the Americas now in the aftermath of the economic recession compared to two years ago? To respond to this question we examine two survey items, one which asks people about their current happiness and the other asks them how happy they were in 2008, the period before the crisis had become full-blown. We subtract from their reports of their current happiness their reported level of happiness in 2008 and compute national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are shown below:

**[GIVE CARD "A"]**

**LS6.** On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.

On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment**? Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.

**[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible". Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].**

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Worst life possible						Best life possible					Doesn't know	Don't Answer

**LS6A.** On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III-1 shows that, on average, there is an even split in the Americas, with about half the countries having citizens who report, on average, that they are happier today than they were in 2008, while about half of the countries have citizens who report, on average that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III-1, we see Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilians, and Paraguayans on average say that they are more satisfied with their lives in 2010 than they report that they were in 2008. In stark contrast, Jamaicans report that their happiness in 2010 is sharply lower than they report it was in 2008. Other countries in which average reported happiness in 2010 is lower than respondents said they had in 2008 are Belize, El Salvador, the United States, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras.<sup>5</sup> Thus, we have our first hint that even though the economic crisis affected the Americas in many ways, it was not associated with a hemisphere-wide decline in life satisfaction/happiness. But this finding is very general, and in the following section we examine a set of items specifically designed to measure citizens' perceptions of the economic recession.

*Perception : Measuring Quality of Life in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank : Brookings Institution Press, 2009), Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> To be clear, we are not comparing here the 2008 and 2010 survey, but two items from the 2010 survey that report on current (2010) and prior (2008) happiness. We do not have a panel design in this survey (we have repeated cross-sections) and do not know the actual level of happiness reported in 2008 for those interviewed in 2010.




Figure III-1. National Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008

A different view of these data looks a bit more carefully at each segment of the survey population to show the percentages that expressed declines or increases in life satisfaction, and those that showed no difference between 2008 and 2010. The results are shown in Figure III-2. Some countries, Jamaica for example, had over half of its population expressing a decline in life satisfaction, whereas in Uruguay, in contrast, less than one-fifth expressed a decline, and just less than one-half expressed an increase.




Figure III-2. Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction in 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of Total Population)

We now examine how life satisfaction changes relate to the respondents' evaluation of his/her personal retrospective economic situation. That is, in the prior chapter we examined how respondents viewed their own (and also national) economic situation at the moment of the interview and then looking back a year.




Figure III-3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Perceptions of the Personal Retrospective Economic Situation

Looking now only at those who expressed a decline in life satisfaction as shown in this chapter, we can see from Figure III-3, that there is a systematic link to the perception of respondent retrospective personal economic situation. Figure III-3 shows that this happens in the countries included in the study. The overall conclusion is that nearly everywhere in the Americas, life satisfaction declines when individuals report that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated.

Putting this finding into a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart Figure III-4. We need to emphasize that we are not explaining levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when we compare the level of such satisfaction that they reported possessing at the time of the interview to the one that they reported having possessed two years earlier.<sup>6</sup> To this regression equation, we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, sex, education, residence (urban vs. rural) area, and wealth quintiles. While in prior LAPOP studies we have used an indicator of wealth based on an additive index of ownership of household goods, in this study we implement a new indicator using the same variables, but based on relative wealth.<sup>7</sup> Also included in the regression are variables measuring economic evaluations, and government economic performance.

The results shown in the regression plot (Figure III-4) are controlled for variation by country (the “country fixed effects”), the variation that was shown in Figures III-1 and III-2 in this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of those variables on attitudes of support for democracy is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive contribution, and if to the left of the “0” line a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot; only when the confidence intervals do not overlap the vertical “0” line is the factor significant (at .05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. “beta weights”).

The results show that basic socio-economic characteristics such as education and wealth have no significant effect on satisfaction. We do see that the demographic characteristics of age and sex matter to some degree; females report a positive change over the 2008-2010 period, while older respondents report just the opposite, namely that they are *less* satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. This result, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people on average suffer from more health afflictions and limitations and as such have more reason to report a decline in their life satisfaction.

A block of economic variables, however, has a consistent and in most cases far stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far has already been shown in Figure III-3; respondents, who have a negative retrospective perception of their own personal economic situation, have a strongly diminished sense of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent’s evaluation that his country is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does perception of one’s economic situation matter, but the objective information (drawn from the survey reporting) of a decline in household income over that same period of time (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household in which at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

Yet, of all of the variables in the regression that point to changes in perceived life satisfaction 2008-2010, the one that has the greatest significance is the *very strong positive impact of the perception of government economic performance*.<sup>8</sup> Since satisfaction with the general performance of the incumbent chief executive is also included in the regression equation (and it also has a positive effect), this means

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<sup>6</sup> We stress that this is not a panel design and therefore we do not have data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We are relying on self reports of current and previous levels of satisfaction.

<sup>7</sup> For more information on this indicator, see: Córdova, Abby B. 2009 “Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators.” In AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).

<sup>8</sup> This was measured by two survey items, N1 and N12, which measure respondent evaluation of the government’s effectiveness in fighting poverty and unemployment.

that even though individuals may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may also have lived in a household that has suffered unemployment, when the government is perceived as managing the economy well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of stress.




Figure III-4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010




Figure III-5. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in Panama, 2010

In the case of Panama, we find that perception of personal economic situation is significantly associated with perceived change in life satisfaction. Individuals who perceive their personal economic situation as good and improving exhibit greater satisfaction with their lives. As expected, decrease in income and loss of employment are negatively associated with life satisfaction. Additionally, we find that age is negatively associated with change in life satisfaction. Younger respondents express greater satisfaction than their older compatriots.




Figure III-6. Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Perception of Personal Economic Situation in Panama

Figure III-6 illustrates the relation between perceptions of personal economic situation and perceived change in life satisfaction. Both in the case of retrospective and present economic situations, individuals who perceive their own economies as bad or worse than 12 months ago express significantly lower life satisfaction.






Figure III-7. Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Loss of Job and Decrease of Income

As observed in Figure III-7 respondents who lived in households where at least one member lost their job and who reported a decrease in household income perceive a decline in life satisfaction. It is worth noting that the confidence intervals are quite large indicating significant variance around the mean for both independent variables. We might speculate that the level of decline in life satisfaction is based on the extent of income loss and the number and length of time without employment; both of those indicators are beyond the purview of our questionnaire to measure.

Finally, Figure III-8 shows that older individuals exhibit greater decrease in perceived life satisfaction than younger cohorts. As speculated earlier, this result may reflect the impact of disease and other problems associated with older individuals.




Figure III-8. Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction by Age

### Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 with those in 2010 are shown in Figure III-5.<sup>9</sup> The dark blue bars in this chart show the *average* levels of support for democracy found in 2010 whereas the light blue bar shows the average levels found in 2008.<sup>10</sup> The reader should note that whenever the two grey areas overlap, there is no statistically significant difference between the two years. For example, support for democracy declined in Mexico from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decline is not statistically significant. Indeed, what we find is that in many countries the change is not significant in either direction. The only countries that experienced a significant decline in support for democracy in 2010 compared to 2008 are Canada, Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. On the other hand, support for democracy increased significantly between 2008 and 2010 just in Chile, at least as measured by this general “Churchill” item that has been so widely used in the comparative study of democracy.

<sup>9</sup> Support for democracy was measured by the following question: **ING4**. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with these statements (1-7 scale)? This item, like most other LAPOP items, was recoded into a 0-100 scale to facilitate comparisons.

<sup>10</sup> Note that in some countries (Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname), we do not have 2008 survey data, so only one bar is shown.




Figure III-9. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a minority of countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself did not take its toll. Support for democracy, like all attitudes, is affected by a wide variety of factors, with the economic crisis being only one of them. A given country may have been seriously buffeted by the economic decline, but if the crisis was managed well by the government, citizens are not likely to have lost faith in their systems. In order to have a better idea of the magnitude of the impact of hard times on *individual attitudes toward democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis (see Figure III-10).




Figure III-10. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010

Figure III-10 shows that education and age are important predictors of support for democracy. This result is consistent with our previous studies of democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the notion that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we take note of the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. Age also is an important predictor with older Latin Americans exhibiting significantly higher support for democracy than younger citizens. We also find that those who live in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding we have also reported before. Females are often found to be less supportive of democracy, and we find this again here, even when controlling for education and other variables. While there is much dispute in terms of the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer, looking at the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the “country fixed effects”) we find that higher levels of wealth levels are positively associated with greater support for democracy.<sup>11</sup>

What is striking about the results presented in Figure III-10 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact on reducing support for democracy. Respondents who live in households in which a member has lost his/her job, there is a small reduction in support for democracy, but economic perceptions play no significant role one way or the other. On the other hand, there is a weak *positive* impact of a reduction in income with increased support for democracy. But far more important is the very strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of government management of the economy. We find that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is handling the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.

<sup>11</sup> John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth on Political Participation," in *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, ed. Anirudh Krishna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted and feared. It also suggests that the democracy recession observed by *Freedom House* does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the region. We now turn to the case of Panama.




Figure III-11. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Panama, 2010

Figure III-11 shows the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of support for democracy in Panama. We find that most economic variables are not statistically significant except for individuals who believe the country suffered no economic crisis; the latter are more likely to support democracy. Age also is statistically significant with older individuals exhibiting greater support for democracy. Perception of insecurity seems to have a weak negative effect on support for democracy; increased levels of insecurity reduce support for democracy. Finally, it seems the most robust coefficient is that for satisfaction with the performance of the president. Respondents who are more satisfied with the president's performance exhibit greater support for democracy. The latter result lends support for the connection between evaluations of the extant administration and support for democracy.




Figure III-12. Statistically Significant Factors of Support for Democracy

Older Panamanians that believe the country did not suffer an economic crisis, feel safer in their neighborhoods and approve of the job the President Martinelli is doing are those who express greater support for democracy. It is important to note, however, that support for democracy is relatively high among most groups of Panamanians, and that differences, although statistically significant, are rather small.

### Support for the Political System

Belief in the legitimacy of one's government (i.e., system support) is a key requisite for political stability. In an extensive investigation based on LAPOP survey data John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson found that legitimacy emerges from multiple sources, but that the performance of government in satisfying citizen needs and demands is central.<sup>12</sup> Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies over the past 30 years.<sup>13</sup> Does this decline mean that low levels of system support place democracy at risk? Thus far, there is no indication of that for the advanced industrial democracies. But what of the consolidating democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean? This subject was treated in depth for the 2006 round of

<sup>12</sup> System Support is an index created from five questions. For a more detailed explanation of how this index was created, see Chapter V in Part II of this study. See John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

the AmericasBarometer data, but we look at it in this year's report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

For many years LAPOP has utilized a System support index based on five variables, each scored on a 1-7 based, but converted to the traditional 0-100 LAPOP system for better understanding of the results:

- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
- B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
- B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
- B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

To understand the dynamics of “system support,” we compare the levels from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III-13 some countries experience important changes in system support. For example, Honduras, in the aftermath of the coup and the elections that restored democracy to the country, support soared from its pre-coup low of 46.4 up to 60.4. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was taken only one month after the inauguration of a new administration, and thus the level of support may be elevated by the well-known “honeymoon effect” that new government usually get. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, Paraguay y Uruguay also saw statistically significant increases in support for the political system, despite the economic crisis. On the other hand, Belize, Canada, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic saw statistically significant (albeit quantitatively small) decreases in system support between 2008 and 2010. The other countries remained statistically unchanged.




Figure III-13. Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Turning now to the determinants of system support, we see that, indeed, perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with Latin Americans' system support, illustrated in Figure III-14. Further, as we saw with support for democracy, low system support is present among those who hold a pessimistic view of their household and national incomes. Older people and women have significantly higher system support, but the effect is quite small. Unemployment has a negative significant impact on system support.






Figure III-14. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010

*The major impact on system support, as in the case with support for democracy, is perception of government economic performance.* Once again, then, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. Clearly we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters, but what matters most is their views of government performance. This finding once again suggests that the impact of the economic crisis was mitigated by governments that are perceived to have responded effectively to the challenge.

Evidence that in many countries citizens did in fact perceive improved government economic performance appears in Figure III-15. Note that in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, United States, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and in Ecuador significant increases were found in terms of government economic performance. On the other hand, only in Belize, Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala and Jamaica were significant declines recorded by the two surveys.




Figure III-15. Perception of Government Economic Performance, 2008 vs. 2010

Direct evidence at the national level that improvements in the perception of government economic performance are in part driving levels of system support is shown in Figure III-16. In this chart, country averages are presented for both the variation in average perception of government performance and the 2008-2010 variations in system support. The results are very clear: the greater the change in satisfaction with government management of the economy, the greater the change in system support.




Figure III-16. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis.

Not only is this result found at the national level, we find it regionally as well. In Figure III-17 we examine these same items of change in perception of government performance and change in system support, but use the sub national strata of each sample. For example, in Bolivia, each department is a separate sample stratum and in other countries regions are used for the strata. Details of the sample designs are contained in the appendix of each country report. What we see is that even at the sub national level, when the average perception of government economic performance is perceived as shifting in a more positive direction, average system support increases.




Figure III-17. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Regional Level Analysis

The results for Panama parallel those for the rest of the hemisphere with perception of the government economic performance as the most significant factor in determining support for the system.




Figure III-18. Determinants of System Support in Panama, 2010

As shown below, Figure III-19, respondents who perceive the performance of the government more positively are more likely to express support for the political system.




Figure III-19. System Support by Perception of Government Economic Performance

Figure III-19 shows that system support climbs from less than 50 on the 0-100 scale to just above 70, an increase of more than 20 points. Such results emphasize the close connection between government performance and support for the political system. We turn now to consider the determinants of satisfaction with the way democracy works.

### Satisfaction with Democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government continues to be high in the Americas despite the economic crisis, what about satisfaction with democracy, another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world? Research in the advanced industrial democracies has found that the satisfaction with democracy has been in long-term decline, a process that began some decades ago and continues, indicating that this is a process not directly linked to economic downturns.<sup>14</sup> During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? Certainly that is what the classical hypotheses, based on considerable social science literature suggest, as we noted in Chapter I. Put differently, citizens may continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government, but in practice, they may feel that democracy has not delivered. The question thus becomes: Are citizens of the countries of the Americas less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy when they are living in hard economic conditions?

<sup>14</sup> Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*; Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*.

Evidence from the AmericasBarometer suggests that this may be in fact the case, at least in some countries.

An examination of Figure III-20 shows that in a number of countries average satisfaction with democracy declined between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for example, a country especially hard hit by the economic crisis, satisfaction dropped from 50.4 on our 0-100 scale to 44.6, a decline that is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered by far the sharpest decline, dropping from 58.8 to 46.3. Other statistically significant decline occurred in Argentina, Canada, Guatemala, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic. Likewise, in the United States, where the effects of the crisis were heavily felt by most citizens, there is a statistically significant decrease in the levels of satisfaction with democracy from 57.3 to 50.6 during this period.

On the other hand, there were some countries in which satisfaction with democracy increased sharply. Consider Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009.<sup>15</sup> In that country, satisfaction increased from 44.8 to 57.8. The largest shift occurred in Paraguay, a country at the very bottom of satisfaction in 2008, with a score of 30.2, leaping to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey was conducted just prior to the April, 2008 election that brought the decades long dominant party rule to an end in that country; no doubt this was a factor in the robust increase in democratic satisfaction measured in the 2010 survey.

Other significant increases occurred in El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (in this case the FMLN) won power for the first time in 15 years. We also observe a significant increase between 2008-2010 in Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Panama, and Uruguay. In many countries, however, there was no statistically significant shift in satisfaction with democracy in spite of the severe economic crisis that has left its imprint world-wide.

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<sup>15</sup> Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Trouble in Central America: Crime, Hard Times and Discontent," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).




Figure III-20. Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Moving on to the determinants of democratic satisfaction, we see that, indeed, perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with this satisfaction among Latin Americans, shown in Figure III-21. We also see that negative perceptions of personal and national economic situations as well as negative perceptions of retrospective personal and national economic situations are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works. In addition, older people have significantly higher democratic satisfaction, while wealthier and more educated individuals, and those who live in urban areas show lower levels of this satisfaction. Yet these effects are quite small.




Figure III-21. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010

More interestingly, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the major impact on satisfaction with democracy is perception of government economic performance *in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president*. Once again, we see that individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the presidents' performance during hard economic times are also highly important.

In the case of Panama, as shown in Figure III-22, satisfaction with the performance of the president is the most significant determinant. Age and opinions about the extent of economic crisis also are significant factors, but their relation is weaker than for presidential approval rates.






Figure III-22. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Panama, 2010




Figure III-23. Statistically Significant Factors Determining Satisfaction with Democracy

Older Panamanians who express greater approval of the president's job and who do not believe the country underwent a severe economic crisis are more likely to express satisfaction with democracy. The gap in satisfaction with democracy is over 22 points between those individuals who believe the president's job is very good and those who believe it is very bad. The latter result clearly demonstrates the connection between democracy and the performance of the extant administration.

### **Support for Military Coups**

An extreme reaction to hard times is for the military to take over in a coup. Historically in Latin America a number of such coups have been attributed to economic crises, but militaries have also been forced from power when economic crises broke out during their period of authoritarian rule. The Honduran coup of 2009 heightened interest in military coups that many had thought were a thing of the dark past of Latin America's history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate citizens' support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three distinct conditions: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion, would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified, and (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified. These were later recoded into 100 = a military coup is justified, 0 = a military coup is not justified.




Figure III-24. Justification of a Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

The comparisons 2008-2010 are shown in Figure III-24. We do not have comparative data for all countries since three countries that do not have an army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti) were not asked these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, for those three countries we did ask about a take-over of the country by their police forces, in order to create some sort of hypothetical alternative. Moreover, the question on a military coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries and especially low in Panama and Costa Rica. On our 0-100 scale, only one country scores even as high as 50. On the other hand, such support was very high in Honduras in 2008, the only country to score above 50, and, perhaps not surprisingly, a coup occurred there in 2009. Post-coup, support for such illegal take-overs of a democratic system dropped sharply in Honduras. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that

Hondurans were having with the regime and now they saw no reason for it; or, it could be that the experience with the coup itself lessened support for this type of action. We leave the discussion of the coup issue to the detailed country report on Honduras. Coup support also declined significantly in 2010 from 2008 levels in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Guyana. We also note that coup support increased significantly only in one country for which we have data, Guatemala, between 2008 and 2010.

Returning to the relationship between hard economic times and authoritarian tendencies is support for military coups higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed? We see in Figure III-25 that unfortunately this is the case. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups, suggesting that citizens in the Americas, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk.





Figure III-25. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010

Interestingly, older, wealthier, and more educated individuals show lower pro-coup tendencies. An interesting finding and consistent with previous results is the positive effect of the satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Those who evaluate the president positively show lower levels of support for coups, indicating the significant role that the president plays in reducing the support for authoritarian alternatives. Perception of government efficacy did not yield any significant results when related to support for military coups.



**Figure III-26. Determinants of Support for Military Coup in Panama, 2010**

The results for Panama indicate that negative perceptions of the national economy, coupled with opinions of a very serious economic crisis, and positive retrospective attitudes toward the national economy are significant predictors of support for military coups.<sup>17</sup> Age also is a strong predictor of support for military coups, with younger respondents showing greater support. Sex is weakly connected, with men slightly more supportive of coups than women.

<sup>17</sup> It is important to note that Panama does not possess a traditional military. Security forces in Panama are organized around a Public Force (*Fuerza Pública*), divided into three institutions, National Police, Air-naval service, and National Border Service, all under the newly formed Ministry of Public Security.




Figure III-27. Support for Military Coup by Economic Performance in Panama, 2010

Support for coups increases to the extent that respondents evaluate the national economic situation as bad and believe that Panama has undergone a very serious economic crisis. Interestingly, the results indicate that those individuals who believe the economy is better than 12 months ago express greater support for coups. While the differences in support for coups between individuals who believe the economy has remained the same or gotten worse seems to be statistically significant, the confidence interval of those who express a positive retrospective evaluation is relatively wide and thus the variance in those responses is less reliable. Nonetheless, these results merit further analysis beyond the purview of this study at this time.

## Conclusion

This chapter has examined the impact of the global economic crisis on democratic values. The evidence suggests that the impact varies across the region. Some countries such as Mexico and Jamaica were more affected than others. The chapter found that support for democracy did not decline substantially as a result of the economic crisis, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. Perception of government economic performance is a significant indicator of support for democracy and system support. The results for Panama parallel those for the rest of the hemisphere with perception of the government economic performance as the most significant factor in determining support for the system. In the case of satisfaction with democracy individuals in the Americas are strongly affected by their views as to how their governments perform. But we also see that satisfaction with the incumbent president matters *more* when related to satisfaction with democracy (as opposed to its lower impact on support for democracy); this suggests that while perceptions of governments as responding effectively to the crisis were important, perceptions of the president's performance during hard economic times are also highly

important. Unemployment and the perception of a very serious economic crisis are associated with significantly greater support for military coups among Latin Americans. Furthermore, individuals who exhibit a negative perception of the national economic situation also show a higher support for military coups, suggesting that Latin Americans, under crisis conditions, do take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if these may put democracy at risk.





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## **Part II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society**

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## Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime, and Corruption

### Introduction

In Part I of this study, we presented a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development. We also focused on citizens' perceptions of the economic crisis by answering the question: *who are those most likely affected by the crisis?* We presented a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal economic welfare. We concluded Part I with a general assessment of the extent to which those who report being affected by the crisis may express lower democratic support. In Part II of this study, we attempt to test key hypotheses that relate to rule of law, crime, and corruption. The objective of this section is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption influence support for democracy. The variables used in Part I that measure the economic crisis are used as additional control or predictor variables in this part, but are not the central focus here.

### Theoretical Background

Violence has become a major social problem around the world. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 1.6 million people are killed each year by violence.<sup>1</sup> Outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America is the most violent region in the world. The difference, however, lies in that while in Africa violence is mostly the product of civil wars and ethnic conflict, in Latin America is the result of social violence and crime.

Despite the high levels of deaths caused by non-political violence in Latin America, few academic studies have analyzed the impact of such violence. This is primarily due to the fact that historically the survival of democracy in the region has been associated with economic and social development rather than with public security.<sup>2</sup>

However, the rise of crime has focused attention on the effects violence can have on the political processes in general and democracy in particular.<sup>3</sup> Although most studies focus on the impact democracy has had on the judicial system or criminal violence itself, recently some studies have focused on the effects crime has on the quality of democracy.<sup>4</sup> Such studies become ever more relevant as the violence generated by crime becomes an increasingly serious problem for many democratic governments.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Krug, Etienne H.; Dahlberg, Linda L.; Mercy, James A.; Zwi, Anthony B., and Lozano Rafael. (eds). *World Report on Violence and Health*. Geneva: World Health Organization Publications, 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Bates, Robert. *Prosperity and Violence. The political economy of development*. New York: Norton, 2001.

Tilly, Charles. *The Politics of Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Bodemer, Klaus. *El nuevo escenario de (in)seguridad en América Latina ¿Amenaza para la democracia?* Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 2003.

<sup>4</sup>Cruz, José Miguel. *Violencia y democratización en Centroamérica: el impacto del crimen en la legitimidad de los regímenes de posguerra*. *América Latina Hoy* 35 (2003): 19-59. Pérez, Orlando. *Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala*. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118 (4) (2003). Winter 2003-2004. Seligson, Mitchell y Azpuru, Dinorah. "Las dimensiones y el impacto político de la delincuencia en la población guatemalteca". In Luis Rosero Bixby (ed). *Población del istmo 2000: Familia, migración, violencia y medio ambiente*. San José: Centro Centroamericano de Población, 2000; Beirne, Piers. 1997. *Issues in Comparative Criminology*. Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company; Howard, Gregory J., Graeme Newman, and William Alex Pridemore. 2000. "Theory, Method, and Data in

Coinciding with the recent wave of crime in Latin America, the last two decades have seen the rise of a new form of repressive policing called *mano dura*, or “strong hand,” as well as relative high levels of support for authoritarian measures. As Orlando J. Pérez explains:

*Crime undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime rates increase, pressure mounts for “strong” government action which in many instances results in highly repressive and undemocratic measures.*<sup>6</sup>

At its core, *mano dura* necessitates curtailing individual rights and re-empowering the military and police. These sets of policies normally include deploying the military for internal policing, in addition to lengthening prison sentences, suspending due process guarantees and other protections for alleged criminals, and aggressively arresting youths suspected of gang membership.

Table IV-1 presents data from the World Health Organization’s Report on Violence and Health that shows that Latin America has the dubious distinction of having the highest rates of crime and violence in the world. Violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pagés, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the differences with the rest of the world are growing larger.<sup>8</sup>

**Table IV-1. Comparison of Homicide Rates around the World**

<b>Region</b>	<b>No. of Homicides per 100,000 persons (2000)</b>
<b>Latin America and Caribbean</b>	<b>27.5</b>
United States	6.9
Africa	22.2
Europe*	1.0
Southeast Asia	5.8
Western Pacific	3.4
<b>World</b>	<b>8.8</b>
*Includes only Western European countries Source: World Report on Violence and Health (statistical annex), World Health Organization (WHO), 2002.	

Central America is the sub-region with the highest level of homicides pr 100,000 inhabitants in Latin America. The recently published Human Development Report for Central America provides aggregate data for homicide rates between 2000-2008 that indicates a significant increase. Table IV-2 illustrates the evolution of homicide rates. In the case of Panama, the data show an increase from 10 per 100,000 persons in 2000 to 19 in 2008.

Comparative Criminology." In *Criminal Justice 2000*, Volume 4 (July), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice; Prillaman, William C. 2003. "Crime, Democracy, and Development in Latin America," *Policy Papers on the Americas* Volume XIV, Study 6, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C.

<sup>5</sup> LaFree, Gary y Tseloni, Andromachi. "Democracy and crime: a multilevel analysis of homicide trends in forty-four countries, 1950-2000". *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605 (6) (2006): 26-49.

<sup>6</sup> Pérez, "Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala" 638.

<sup>7</sup>See Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales CIEN, "Carta Económica," (CIEN, 1998); P. Fajinzyliber, D. Lederman, and N. Loayza, *Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World; Diagnóstico de la Violencia en Guatemala* (Guatemala: CIEN, 1999).

<sup>8</sup>Alejandro Gaviria and Carmen Pagés, "Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America," Inter-American Bank Conference on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America," (Washington D.C.: 1999).

**Table IV-2. Central America Homicide Rates, 2000-2008**

País	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Belice	19	25	30	24	27	28	31	30	32
Costa Rica	6	6	6	7	7	8	8	8	11
El Salvador	45	40	39	40	49	62	65	57	52
Guatemala	28	30	32	37	38	44	47	45	48
Honduras	-	-	69	65	35	37	46	50	58
Nicaragua	9	10	10	12	12	13	13	13	13
Panamá	10	10	12	11	10	11	11	13	19

Fuentes:  
- Belice: Joint Intelligence Coordinating Center, Belize Police Department 2000-2007; director general de Statistical Institute of Belize para 2008.  
- Costa Rica: Anuario de Estadísticas Judiciales, Poder Judicial, Departamento de Planificación, Sección de Estadística.  
- El Salvador: Instituto de Medicina Legal (datos de 2000 a 2004) y Mesa de homicidios (datos de 2005 a 2008), ajustado según censo de población de 2007.  
- Guatemala: Policía Nacional Civil (PNC).  
- Honduras: Dirección General de Investigación Criminal (2002-2004) y Observatorio Nacional de la Violencia (2005-2008), con base en datos de la Policía Nacional.  
- Nicaragua: Anuario Estadístico de la Policía Nacional.  
- Panamá: Sistema Integrado de estadísticas criminales (SIEC), con base en información suministrada por la Unidad de Análisis de Estadística Criminal de la Dirección de Investigación Judicial (DIJ).

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital, if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that is the more important factor. Even in countries with a high murder rate, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime, is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a portion of the population far wider than the victims themselves; citizens hear about crime from their neighbors, read about it in the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on the TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on support for stable democracy.

### A. Perception of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The AmericasBarometer examines insecurity and crime in two ways. The first measures citizens' perception of their own security in their neighborhood. The question is as follows:

**AOJ11.** Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat **unsafe** or very **unsafe**?

#### a) Comparative Perspective

Figure IV-1 shows the perception of insecurity in a comparative perspective. The question was recoded into a scale between 0-100, where 0 means "very secure" and 100 "very insecure." The Figure indicates that Canada and the United States are the two countries with the lowest levels of insecurity,

while Peru, Argentina and El Salvador are the nations with the highest levels. Panama finds itself in a low intermediate place, below the mid-point of the scale, with an average perception of insecurity of 36.1.




Figure IV-1. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective, 2010

## b) Perception of Insecurity Overtime

Figure IV-2 shows that perception of insecurity has diminished since 2004 from an average on the 0-100 scale of 46.9 to 36.1 in 2010. Additionally, the data shows little difference between 2008 and 2010. These results belie the increase in crime, as seen in Table IV-2, and the increased government and media attention to the issue of crime. Below we find that crime has increased as the major issue of concern to Panamanians.




Figure IV-2. Perception of Insecurity in Panama: 2004-2010




Figure IV-3. Main Problem Facing the Country by Year

Security, related primarily to violence and crime, is chosen as the main problem facing the country by 56.3% of respondents in 2010. That percentage represents a five-fold increase since 2004, when only 10.8% of Panamanians chose security as the major problem. In order to investigate the determinants of perception of insecurity, we turn to OLS regression. Below we observe the results of the regression analysis with insecurity as dependent variable and the key socio-demographic variables as independent variables.




Figure IV-4. Determinants of Perception of Insecurity in Panama, 2010

The results of the regression analysis indicate that reported presence of gang related activity in the neighborhood is the most significant factor explaining perceptions of insecurity. Respondents living in neighborhoods with significant gang activity express greater levels of insecurity. Gang activity has become a major problem in Central America, with countries such as El Salvador and Honduras experiencing significant levels of gang related violence. While Panama is not among the most affected in the region, gang activity has been on the rise particularly related to drug trafficking. Moreover, the regression analysis shows that, as expected, crime victims also are more likely to perceive greater insecurity.






Figure IV-5. Perception of Insecurity and Gang Activity

Perception of insecurity more than doubles between communities that have no reported gang activity to those where gangs constitute a major problem.




Figure IV-6. Perception of Neighborhood Affected by Gangs in Panama, 2010

Figure IV-6 shows that nearly 22% of respondents say that there is a lot of gang activity in their neighborhood, with an additional 27.2% saying there is some activity.




Figure IV-7. Perception of Insecurity by Crime Victimization in Panama, 2010

Figure IV-7 illustrates the relationship between crime n victimization and perception of insecurity. As expected from the regression analysis, those respondents who indicated they were victims of crime express significantly higher levels of insecurity than those who were not victims.

## Crime Victimization

### a) The Measurement of Crime Victimization

The second way the AmericasBarometer examines crime and insecurity is by measuring direct personal experiences with such phenomena. For this round, the Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a new item to measure crime victimization more accurately to obtain more precise responses. While in previous surveys crime victimization was asked by: *have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?* In this round, this question was slightly modified and is now accompanied by some examples of criminal acts. The following items are:

**VIC1EXT.** Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type of crime** in the past 12 months?

**VIC2AA.** ¿Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this Parish
- (4) In another Parish
- (5) In another country

(88) DK (98)DA (99) N/A

**VIC1HOGAR.** Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA




Figure IV-8. Individual and Household Crime Victimization, 2010

In 2010, 11.3% of Panamanians surveyed reported being victims of crime. Of those, 2.5% reported that members of their family along with themselves were victims, 8.8% said only the respondent was a victim, and an additional 7.5% indicated that a member of their household, but not the person interviewed, was a victim.




Figure IV-9. Place of Respondent's Crime Victimization, 2010

A majority of crimes occurred in the home or neighborhood of the respondent. A third of victims reported that the crime occurred in their neighborhood, with another third saying it happened in their homes.




Figure IV-10. Type of Crimes Reported by Panamanians, 2010

Figure IV-10 shows the type of crimes identified by respondents. Unarmed robbery without threat or physical assault is the most prevalent crime, 34.1% of those who were victims of crime chose this type. Next, were armed robberies with 26.4% of victims choosing this type of crime.

#### **b) Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective**

Figure IV-11 shows the percentage of people victimized by crime in comparative perspective. It should be noted that while the comparison between different years shown above may be due to the change in the question wording, in this case all the countries have been exposed to the same change, so that the differences between countries are real and are due to different levels of criminality in Latin America. The results displayed on the graph indicate that Peru is the country with the highest victimization by crime, with 31.1% of those interviewed reporting having suffered an act of crime in the 12 months preceding the survey. In second place is Ecuador with 29.1%, followed by Bolivia and Venezuela with a 26.2%; in other words, the countries of the Andean area are the most dangerous in the region, according to data collected by the AmericasBarometer. At the other end, we see countries like Guyana, Jamaica and Panama where the victimization by crime affected an average of 10% of the population in the 12 months prior to the completion of the survey.




Figure IV-11. Percentage of People Victimized by Crime in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### c) Crime Victimization Overtime

Figure IV-12 indicates a sharp decline in crime victimization between 2004 and 2006, but a steady increase since then.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> As previously mentioned, given the addition of specific examples of categories of crime to our standard crime victimization question in 2010 (i.e., VIC1EXT), it is likely that crime victimization reports went up in 2010 vs. 2008 as shown in Figure IV-11. However, it is unclear whether reports of crime went up as a result of “real” crime increases or if this increase reflects the change in the wording of the question. In the case of Panama, aggregate crime data, such as that presented on Table IV-2, shows an increase in crime, so we suspect that crime victimization has indeed increased since 2008.




Figure IV-12. Crime Victimization in Panama, 2004-2010

The next section examines who are more likely to be victims of crime.

#### d) Who is Most Likely to Be a Victim of Crime?

Logistic regression is used to determine the demographic characteristics that distinguish crime victims from the rest of the population.




Figure IV-13. Who is Likely to Be a Victim of Crime in Panama? (2010)

Figure IV-13 shows that younger Panamanians living in medium sized cities and the metropolitan Panama City area are more likely to be victims of crime. The analysis reveals that gender, education and wealth are not statistically significant factors in explaining who victims of crime are.




Figure IV-14. Crime Victimization by Area of Residence and Age in Panama, 2010



Panamanians living in medium sized cities are significantly more vulnerable to crimes than those living in cities of other sizes. Nearly 24% of residents of medium sized cities say they were victims of a crime in the last year, compared to 7.5% in rural areas, 5.7% in small cities, 12.4% in large cities, and 14.4% in the Capital. The rates of victimization in the Capital and in medium and large cities exceed the national average (11.3%). The differences among age cohorts are small, but younger Panamanians are more likely to have experienced crime.

## B. Corruption

### Theoretical Background

Corruption is indicated by Latin Americans as a major threat to the democracies of the region. According to Rose-Ackerman,<sup>10</sup> the institutionalization of corruption is a clear signal that the State does not work correctly, statement that is corroborated by the AmericasBarometer, which found, in the 2006 edition, that along with high levels of crime, the spread of corruption is one of the two reasons which would lead to large proportions of the population to support coups d'état by the military.<sup>11</sup> Corruption is present in all strata of society, from the lower class to the economic and political elites. In the last decade, government officials, including Presidents in Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru and Ecuador have faced criminal charges for committing acts of corruption.

Arvind Jain<sup>12</sup> defines corruption as the misuse of public office for private profit. The misuse of public office suggests that there are flaws in the political institutions. However, corruption can also be the product of beneficial rules or inefficient public policies; for example, paying a bribe to avoid a large fine or offering an illegal payment to avoid the delay of unnecessary formalities within bureaucratic processes.<sup>13</sup>

The majority of countries with high levels of corruption share similar characteristics. Many are developing countries or face a political transition. They also tend to be countries with low income levels and high levels of centralization in their governments.<sup>14</sup> Corruption, however, is not exclusive of countries with these features. In 2000, Daniel Treisman conducted a study in which he demonstrated that, controlling for low levels of income and for democratic instability, the countries of Latin America were not significantly more corrupt than the consolidated industrial democracies of Western Europe or North America.<sup>15</sup>

Panama was ranked number 17 in the region by Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, with a core of 3.4 on the 0-10 point scale. Panama's standing on the index has deteriorated since 2002 when the country's score stood at 3.0. Scores below 5 indicate serious problems with corruption. Panama is ranked 84 among the 180 countries globally that were included in the 2009 survey.

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<sup>10</sup> Rose-Ackerman, Susan. *Corruption and Development*. Washington D.C: The World Bank, 1997.

<sup>11</sup> Cruz, Jose Miguel. "The Impact of Crime on the Political Culture of Latin America." In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence Form the Americasbarometer 2006-2007*, edited by Mitchell Seligson, 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Jain, Arvind, ed. *The Political Economy of Corruption*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

<sup>13</sup> Svensson, Jakob. "Eight Questions About Corruption." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 3 (2005): 19-42.

<sup>14</sup> Weyland, Kurt. "The Politics of Corruption in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998): 108-21.

<sup>15</sup> Treisman, Daniel. "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study." *Journal of Public Economics* 76 (2000): 399-457.

**Table IV-3. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2009**

Rank	Regional Rank	Country / Territory	CPI 2009 Score	Confidence Interval		Surveys Used
				Lower bound	Upper bound	
8	1	Canada	8.7	8.5	9.0	6
19	2	United States	7.5	6.9	8.0	8
20	3	Barbados	7.4	6.6	8.2	4
22	4	Saint Lucia	7.0	6.7	7.5	3
25	5	Chile	6.7	6.5	6.9	7
25	5	Uruguay	6.7	6.4	7.1	5
31	7	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.4	4.9	7.5	3
34	8	Dominica	5.9	4.9	6.7	3
35	9	Puerto Rico	5.8	5.2	6.3	4
43	10	Costa Rica	5.3	4.7	5.9	5
61	11	Cuba	4.4	3.5	5.1	3
75	12	Brazil	3.7	3.3	4.3	7
75	12	Colombia	3.7	3.1	4.3	7
75	12	Peru	3.7	3.4	4.1	7
75	12	Suriname	3.7	3.0	4.7	3
79	16	Trinidad and Tobago	3.6	3.0	4.3	4
84	17	El Salvador	3.4	3.0	3.8	5
84	17	Guatemala	3.4	3.0	3.9	5
84	17	Panama	3.4	3.1	3.7	5
89	20	Mexico	3.3	3.2	3.5	7
99	21	Dominican Republic	3.0	2.9	3.2	5
99	21	Jamaica	3.0	2.8	3.3	5
106	23	Argentina	2.9	2.6	3.1	7
120	24	Bolivia	2.7	2.4	3.1	6
126	25	Guyana	2.6	2.5	2.7	4
130	26	Honduras	2.5	2.2	2.8	6
130	26	Nicaragua	2.5	2.3	2.7	6
146	28	Ecuador	2.2	2.0	2.5	5
154	29	Paraguay	2.1	1.7	2.5	5
162	30	Venezuela	1.9	1.8	2.0	7
168	31	Haiti	1.8	1.4	2.3	3

The general perception is that anti-corruption laws are not applied rigorously and that government enforcement bodies have lacked determination in prosecuting those who are accused of corruption, particularly in high-profile cases involving former presidents Mireya Moscoso, Ernesto Perez Balladares, and Martin Torrijos. The judicial system also has been repeatedly under a cloud of corruption. In 2002, two legislators allegedly accepted large sums of money in exchange for confirming the nomination of two prospective Supreme Court justices. In response to mounting evidence of bribery and blackmail, the country's Public Ministry opened an investigation into the case; however, the Court ultimately declared the claim null, and the case was never fully heard.

In 2005, another case was resolved in a discouragingly similar manner. In this instance, a Supreme Court Justice accused three of his colleagues of blatantly ruling in favor of drug-traffickers, citing six different cases in which he had observed preferential treatment being handed out by the Court. Despite a preponderant amount of evidence suggesting the validity of this claim and the U.S. Embassy's rescission of two of the justices' U.S. Visas, the case was never pursued. Reports by the Due Process of Law Foundation and the Alianza Ciudadana Pro Justicia suggest that Panama's judicial system is plagued by executive interference. They also have noted the judiciary's failure both to meet the standards of due process as stipulated by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and to establish a transparent, robustly participatory selection process for Supreme Court justices. According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators—which defines rule of law as “the extent to which agents have

confidence and abide by the rules of society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, police and courts, as well as the likelihood of crime or violence”—Panama places in the 50th percentile.

Corruption in Panama can only be understood within an international context, as Panama's history and traditions are strongly linked to its history as a service economy and the corresponding influence and relations with international economic, political and social forces, particularly those of the United States. Not only is corruption associated with Panama's formal service-based economy, but with illegal arms trading, drug trade and money laundering, all vital facets of Panama's informal economy.

One of the biggest problems researchers and academics encounter when dealing with corruption is how to measure it. In a sense, corruption is like democracy, recognizable when we see it, but very difficult to measure, due mainly because corruption is secret by nature. It is known that corruption exists, but there are usually few witnesses and those who know directly what happened often prefer to keep quiet for their own interest.<sup>16</sup> The difficulties in measuring the concept of corruption usually result in confusing the operationalization used to measure it with the concept itself.<sup>17</sup> However, in order to effectively combat corruption first we must quantify it, and so have emerged several efforts by scholars who have tried to quantify corruption and thus have contributed to its understanding and above all to the development of several tactics to combat it.<sup>18</sup>

### The Measurement of Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in (Seligson, 1999, Seligson, 1997) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: "Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of victims of crime, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption items is as follows:

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<sup>16</sup> Kaufmann, Daniel; Art Kraay; and Massimo Mastuzzi. "Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities." In *Global Corruption Report*, edited by Transparencia Internacional: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>17</sup> Babbie, E. *The Practice of Social Research*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995

<sup>18</sup> Graf, Johan. "Corruption Perception Index 2006." In *Global Corruption Report*, edited by Transparencia Internacional: Cambridge University Press 2007; Lavers, Tom. "The Global Corruption Barometer 2006." In *Global Corruption Report*, edited by Transparencia Internacional: Cambridge University Press 2007.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
<b>EXC2.</b> Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC6.</b> In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
<b>EXC11.</b> In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the city/town /Village council office? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC13.</b> Do you work? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC14.</b> In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC15.</b> Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
<b>EXC16.</b> Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? <b>If the answer is No → mark 99</b> <b>If it is Yes→ ask the following:</b> Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

An item that is related to the topic but that taps on the perception of corruption (rather than victimization), is also included in the questionnaire:

<b>EXC7.</b> Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is <b>[Read]</b> (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA
--

## Perception of Corruption

### a) Comparative Perspective of Perception of Corruption

The differences between the countries in the perception of widespread corruption in the public sector are illustrated in Figure IV-15. The graph shows a recoding of the question in the box above; where 100 means that the citizens perceive that corruption among public officials is "widespread" and zero

means that people think that it is "not widespread." The greatest level of perceived corruption among public officials is found in Trinidad & Tobago, Jamaica and Peru. The lowest levels are found in Suriname, Canada and Uruguay, despite being above the half point of the scale. This means that while there are important differences between countries, in general the citizens of the Americas have a relatively high perception of corruption in the public sector. Panamanians perceive relatively high levels of corruption among public officials, 76.2 on the 0-100 scale, placing the country in 11<sup>th</sup> place among the 25 countries surveyed.




Figure IV-15. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective, 2010

## b) Perception of Corruption Overtime




Figure IV-16. Perception of Corruption in Panama, 2004-2010

After a decline in 2008, Panamanians' perception of corruption among public officials increased sharply in 2010. Perhaps the continued media attention to scandals in the judiciary and executive branches, along with the focused giving to the corruption issue during the 2009 elections led to the increase in the perception of corruption. Whatever the reason, what is certain is that more Panamanians than ever, according to the AmericasBarometer indicators, perceive that corruption is a generalized problem among public officials.

The next section measures the extent to which Panamanians are victims of corruption. While perception is important, actual victimization by corrupt officials might have a greater impact on citizens' attitudes toward the political system and democracy.

## Corruption Victimization

Once we have seen how the corruption of public officials in Panama and the rest of the region is perceived, it is important to know the experiences of the citizens of the countries of the Americas with corruption. The battery of questions developed by LAPOP to measure victimization by corruption was detailed above. These aim to describe the experiences of people with corruption in their countries in both public (courts, municipalities) and private (the work of the interviewee) area.

### a) Comparative Perspective of Corruption Victimization

Figure IV-17 demonstrates the percentages for each country of citizens that report being victims of corruption at last once in the last 12 months. Corruption victimization varies widely across the region. Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru are the countries with the highest level of corruption victimization. In each of

these countries over a third of the population says they suffered from corruption. This means that in these three countries, one of every three citizens was the victim of corruption in the twelve months preceding the survey. At the other extreme, with the lowest levels of corruption victimization, are Canada, Chile and the United States where the rate of victimization for corruption does not reach 10%.




Figure IV-17. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Panamanians reflect a relatively low level of corruption victimization. Only 9.4% of citizens in Panama say they were victims of corruption. It is worth noting, however, the large dispersion across the mean which reflects the wide range of experiences with corruption among Panamanians surveyed. Therefore, victimization could be much lower but for a few cases where individuals experienced high levels of corruption resulting in a somewhat skewed national average.




Figure IV-18. Total Index of Corruption Victimization in Panama, 2010

In 2010, over 90% of Panamanians interviewed said they had not been a victim of corruption. Only 1.1% was victim three or more times.

#### b) Corruption Victimization Overtime

Figure IV-19 shows that corruption victimization has remained steady since 2008, after declining since 2004. Ironically, at the same time that perception of corruption among public officials has increased individual experiences with corruption have declined.






Figure IV-19. Percent of Population Victimized by Year in Panama

The next section explores who is more likely to be a victim of corruption.

**c) Who is more Likely to Be a Victim of Corruption?**

The results of the regression analysis indicate that age, education and number of children are the most important factors in determining who is a victim of crime. Gender is weakly related to corruption victimization as well. Younger, more educated, with larger families exhibiting greater levels of corruption victimization.




Figure IV-20. Who is more likely to be a victim of corruption in Panama? (2010)




Figure IV-21. Corruption Victimization by Age, Education and Number of Children in Panama, 2010

Education has the strongest impact on corruption victimization. Respondents with a university education are nine times more likely to be victims of corruption than those who only attended primary school, and twice as more likely to be victims than those with a secondary education.

### C. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy

We now look at the impact of crime victimization, perception of insecurity, perception of corruption and corruption victimization on system support, support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy. Crime, insecurity and corruption erode citizens' trust in democracy by undermining the belief that state institutions function in an efficient and effective manner to solve national problems. That is, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well they lose faith in democracy. To the extent that individuals view the job performed by democratic governments as effective, they will be less inclined to support extra-constitutional measures. However, when legitimacy declines, citizens may be receptive to new political alternatives, even those that would undermine democracy.




Figure IV-22. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on System Support in Panama (2010)

The results of the regression analysis indicate that of the variables studied in this chapter only perception of corruption is statistically significant factor in determining support for the system.




Figure IV-23. Impact of Perception of Corruption on System Support in Panama (2010)

Figure IV-23 shows the decline in system support as respondents' perceive that corruption among public officials is very common. Corruption thus undermines support for the political system not by the extent of victimization but by the generalized perception of corruption. So even when relatively small numbers of Panamanians are victims of corruption, the perception that it is rampant among public officials serves to undermine confidence in state institutions.




Figure IV-24 Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for Democracy in Panama (2010)

Perception of insecurity and corruption victimization are significant factors in explaining variation in support for democracy. Support for democracy declines as perception of insecurity and corruption victimization increases.




Figure IV-25. Impact of Insecurity and Corruption Victimization on Support for Democracy in Panama, 2010

The relationship is illustrated clearly in Figure IV-25. The impact of corruption victimization is shown to be clearer with a drop in support for democracy of 6 points. Support for democracy drops with insecurity but the relationship is weaker and the pattern is not as clear.

Finally, we explore the impact of crime and corruption on satisfaction with democracy. Figure IV-26 presents the results of the regression analysis. None of the corruption or crime variables are statistically significant. The most robust coefficient is for evaluation of the performance of the current president. In Chapter III we discussed the significant impact that evaluations of the extant administration have on a number of key democratic values, including satisfaction with democracy and support for military coups.




Figure IV-26. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Satisfaction with Democracy in Panama (2010)

## D. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

The term "Rule of law" is not easy to define, its importance, however, goes without saying. The ability of a nation to create and maintain the rule of law is decisive when assessing a democracy and its prospects for consolidation.<sup>19</sup> The rule of law embodies constitutional safeguards and; without this, many of the authoritarian tendencies that have historically existed in our region would come back to the surface to threaten the democratic institutions and destabilize them. The rule of law exists when the authorities are governed strictly by and in good faith to the Constitution and laws,<sup>20</sup> which gives citizens the security of being protected by their legal and political systems. The question developed by LAPOP and described below seeks to examine the perceptions of citizens towards the rule of law in Panama.

**AOJ8.** In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?

- (1) Should always abide by the law      (2) Occasionally can cross the

<sup>19</sup> Ungar, Mark. *Elusive Reform: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Dorsen, Norman and Prosser Gifford, eds. *Democracy and the Rule of Law*. New York: CQ Press, 2001.




Figure IV-27. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Panama (2010)

Nearly two-thirds of Panamanians believe that authorities should always abide by the law. However, a substantial minority of 37.1% agree with the notion that on occasion the government may act beyond the law in order to fight criminals.

### a) Support for the Rule of Law Comparative Chart




Figure IV-28. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective, 2010

We observe that in all countries, with only three exceptions, more than 50% of the interviewees supported the unrestricted respect for the rule of law. The only three cases where support for the rule of law is a minority are Peru, El Salvador and Ecuador, countries where the rate of victimization by crime is among the highest in the region. Panamanians are ranked 11<sup>th</sup> of 25 countries with an average score of 62.9 on the 0-100 scale.

### b) Impact of Crime Victimization and Perception of Insecurity on Respect for the Rule of Law

To find the factors that explain support for the rule of law, we have developed a logistic regression model; the results are shown in Figure IV-29.






Figure IV-29. Determinants of Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law in Panama

The regression analysis demonstrates that age is the only factor that is statistically significant. Older Panamanians are more likely to support the rule of law.




Figure IV-30. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law by Age in Panama, 2010

Figure IV-30 illustrates the relationship between age and support for the rule of law. Support for the rule of law increases steadily as respondents get older. Two-thirds of the youngest cohort supports the rule of law, while three quarters of the oldest Panamanians do so. This finding, unfortunately, is consistent with other results that show younger Panamanians expressing less support for democratic values, including support for and satisfaction with democracy.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has explored the connection between crime and corruption and democratic values. Crime, insecurity and corruption are among the most critical issues confronting Latin America. All three have the potential to undermine support for democracy by eroding trust in key State institutions and in the ability of the government to confront effectively the challenges facing citizens on a day-to-day basis. The results presented here show that insecurity has a particularly strong relationship to democratic values and system support.

In Panama, while perception of insecurity has declined since 2004, security has increased significantly as the number one issue facing the country. The key variable determining perception of insecurity is the extent of gang activity in respondent's neighborhood. The analysis reveals that younger Panamanians living in medium sized cities and the metropolitan Panama City area are more likely to be victims of crime.

The evidence suggests a perception that corruption among public officials is widespread in the region. After a decline in 2008, Panamanians' perception of corruption among public officials increased sharply in 2010. Panamanians reflect a relatively low level of corruption victimization. Only 9.4% of citizens in Panama say they were victims of corruption. Education has the strongest impact on corruption victimization.

Finally, perceptions of insecurity and corruption victimization are significant factors in explaining variation in support for democracy. Support for democracy declines as perception of insecurity and corruption victimization increases.

## Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

### Introduction

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.<sup>1</sup> New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, et al., 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson, 2009, Gilley, 2009). In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by LAPOP, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. In this sense, greater legitimacy and political tolerance are conceived as scenarios more favorable to the development of a stable democracy.

### Theoretical Background

#### The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation

In AmericasBarometer studies for prior years, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance to political opposition have been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful for pointing to democracies in the region that might be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes (support for the system and political tolerance) are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson, 2000). Ideally, a political system should have high levels of support for the system and also with high levels of political tolerance, however, different combinations may take place, as a function of the degree to which a society confers legitimacy on its institutions and guarantees the right of opposition to the minority. The framework shown in Table V-1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

Before focusing on the results, it is necessary to explain the way that the indicators of support for the system and tolerance are built. Support for the system is a summary measure which indicates the degree to which individuals trust the country's political institutions, respect them and feel protected by them. It is the result of the average of the responses given to the following questions:

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<sup>1</sup> Dictatorships, of course, like to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

**B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

**B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

**B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

**B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

**B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the usual procedure, the original scale of one to seven was transformed into a new scale of zero to 100, in which zero indicates the least possible support to the system, and 100 the maximum possible support.

The index of political tolerance is constructed by asking citizens to what extent they are willing to extend a series of political rights to those who are against the system of government in the country. The questions used were as follows:

**D1.** There are people who always speak badly of Panama's form of government, not only the current administration, but the kind of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these peoples' **right to vote**? Please read me the number on the scale: [*Probe: Up to what point?*]

**D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their points of view? Please read me the number.

**D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about Panama's form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can **run for public office**?

**D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people appear on television to **give speeches**?

The original answers were provided on a scale of 1 to 10, in which one indicated strong disapproval, and 10 indicated strong approval. Thus, low values indicate low tolerance to the political rights of those who do not agree with the form of government or low political tolerance. The original values for each question were recoded in the usual scale of 0 to 100, and to create the index we took a simple average of responses to the four questions.

**Table V-1. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance**

	Tolerance	
System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

From a theoretical point of view, we intend to analyze the interrelationship between system support or legitimacy and tolerance, to which it is necessary to dichotomize both scales into "high" and "low."<sup>2</sup> Table V-1 presents the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance.

Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable (*stable democracy*). This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl, 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, in other words in an *authoritarian stability* context, the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence; for this it is described as *unstable democracy*.

On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown, so this situations are described as *democracy at risk*.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, which incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But

<sup>2</sup> Each of these scales goes from zero to 100, so the mid-point is 50. Thus, a value of less than 50 in system support have been listed as "low," and values of more than 50 are considered "high." Similarly, for political tolerance, values below 50 are considered "low" and values higher than 50 are "high."

the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson, 1991, Booth and Seligson, 1994, Seligson and Booth, 1993). And we remember the most recent case in Honduras, which carried out a military coup in June 2009. This was not surprising since Hondurans had low levels of support for the system and at the same time low levels of political tolerance. For a more detailed study of this case, see the national report for Honduras.

## **A. System Support**

### **Theoretical Background**

As seen above, support for the political system is important to the prevalence of democracy as a form of government, but in combination with political tolerance, given that the two are the key elements for a stable democracy. In this section, we focused on the analysis of support for the political system. First, we looked at each of its components; we continued with a comparison across countries and finished with an analysis over time.

Previous studies suggest that support for the system is composed of several dimensions, such as the feeling of belonging to the political community, basic principles of regime, and the performance of the system, institutions and political actors (Dalton 2004; Dalton 2006; Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Easton 1976; Norris 1999).<sup>3</sup> Specifically, support for the political system is more commonly known as a specific support that responds primarily to the economic situation and depends on the popularity of the current government, and a diffuse support dealing with more abstract support at the level of legitimacy of the political system. However, it is thought that diffuse support is influenced by the specific support, especially when it comes to the perception of the performance of the President (i.e., if the President popular or not). Each component is discussed below.

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<sup>3</sup> David Easton (1965, 1975) focuses on the analysis of support to the political system taking into account three dimensions: support to the political community, the regime and the authorities.

### a) Components of System Support




Figure V-1. Components of System Support in Panama (2010)

Trust in the ability of the political system to protect basic rights is the weakest of the components of system support in 2010, and trust in political institutions the highest. An analysis of the components over time (Figure V-2) finds that after a significant dip in 2006 and 2008, trust in these basic components of the political system have improved considerably in 2010. As seen earlier, system support in Panama is influenced positively by increased support for a new administration and improvement in the assessment of the government's economic performance.




Figure V-2. Components of System Support in Panama by Year

## b) System Support in Comparative Perspective

How does Panama compare with the rest of the Americas? Figure V-3 shows results for all the countries in the survey.






Figure V-3. System Support in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Panama's level of system support compares favorably with the rest of the region. The country's ranks fifth among the 25 countries surveyed. Uruguay and Costa Rica exhibit the highest rates of system support and Argentina and Trinidad & Tobago the lowest.

### c) System Support Overtime





Figure V-4. System Support in Panama by Year

Figure V-4 shows a dramatic increase in system support in 2010. Earlier (Figure V-1) we observed that the greatest boost is found in trust in the political institutions. We have noted that support for the current administration is a key factor in determining support for the system, and Panamanians expressed substantially greater support for the current president than the last; thus partially explaining the rise in system support. Another factor is the perception of government economic performance which has improved and is significantly linked to system support.



**Figure V-5. Effects of Presidential Job Approval and Government Economic Performance on System Support in Panama, 2010**

Figure V-5 shows the results of a regression analysis which indicates that presidential job approval and government economic performance are key factors in determining support for the political system. Additionally, we find that satisfaction with local government services also is an important factor. Women living in the Western Region (Provinces of Chiriqui, Bocas del Toro, and the Comarca Ngobe-Bugle) are more likely to support the system.




Figure V-6. System Support and Presidential Job Approval and Government Economic Performance

Figure V-6 shows the relationship between support for the political system and the perception of the economic performance of the government, and the satisfaction with the work done by the current President. In both cases we see a significant increase between the positive and negative perceptions. In the case of the government's economic performance the increase is dramatic and represents more than 20 points in the scale of 0-100, among those who receive a poor performance and those who believe that the government's economic work is very positive.

## B. Political Tolerance

### Theoretical Background

In this section, we turn to investigate the levels of political tolerance in Panama and compare them with those of the other countries in the study. Political tolerance is one of the most important democratic values.<sup>4</sup> In the previous section, we analyzed political system support. Support for the system is important

<sup>4</sup>There is an extensive literature on political tolerance, see Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955); Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict," *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Toward and Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica," *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; Mitchell A. Seligson and Dan Caspi, "Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (in Hebrew)," *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53; John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982); James L. Gibson, 1993, "Perceived Political Freedom in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Politics* 55:4 November 936-974; James L. Gibson, 1992a, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least Liked'?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36:2 May 560-577; James L. Gibson, 1992b, "The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political

for political stability, but it does not guarantee the survival of democracy. Therefore, political tolerance, defined as an individual's acceptance of the rights of others to express varied opinions, is key to establish a stable democratic regime. Specifically, the consolidation of democratic systems not only requires high support for the political system, but the protection of the rights of minorities is also imperative for democracy to remain stable over time.

Some researchers argue that intolerant attitudes could increase and could put at risk those who are the target of political intolerance.<sup>5</sup> The intolerant attitudes have important implications because they can create "second class citizens who are denied equal rights and protection."<sup>6</sup> Citizens must therefore respect minorities to live in harmony under the same political system. In short, if democracies are to be truly legitimate, their citizens must respect the rights of minorities to be able to enjoy democratic stability.

#### a) Components of Political Tolerance in Panama




Figure V-7. Components of Political Tolerance in Panama (2010)

Freedom" *American Political Science Review* 86:2, 338-356; James L. Gibson, 1988, "Political Tolerance and Political Repression during the McCarthy Red Scare." *American Political Science Review* 82, June, 511-529; James L. Gibson, 1989, "The Policy Consequences of Political Intolerance: Political Repression during the Vietnam War Era." *Journal of Politics* 51:13-35; James L. Gibson y R. Bingham, 1985, "The Behavioral Consequences of Political Tolerance." En Gibson y Bingham, *Civil Liberties and Nazis: The Skokie Free-Speech Controversy*. New York: Praeger.

<sup>5</sup> Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch. 1993. Political Intolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion. *Comparative Political Studies* 26:286-329. Prothro, J.W. and C.W. Grigg. 1960. Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement. *The Journal of Politics* 22:276-94. Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

<sup>6</sup> Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p.12.

Tolerance levels in Panama are highest for allowing opponents of the political system to protests peaceably. Support for opponents running for office and making a speech on TV are below the mid-point of the 0 – 100 scale, indicating that a minority of Panamanians support those rights for the people who constantly criticize the form of government of Panama.

## b) Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective




Figure V-8. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Political tolerance is highest in the United States, Argentina and Costa Rica, and lowest in El Salvador, Bolivia, Peru, and Honduras. Panamanians are in the bottom half of countries, with an average barely above the mid-point of the scale.

### c) Political Tolerance Overtime




Figure V-9. Political Tolerance in Panama by Year

Political tolerance declined between 2004 and 2006 and has not recovered yet in 2008 or 2010. Figure V-9 shows a small majority of Panamanians express support for political tolerance.




Figure V-10. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Panama, 2010

Regression analysis reveals that size of city/town is a significant factor in determining levels of political tolerance. Citizens living in larger cities tend to express greater tolerance. Additionally, men and those on the right of the ideological spectrum also exhibit higher levels of political tolerance. Education and wealth are not significant factors.




Figure V-11. Political Tolerance by Ideology and City/Town Size in Panama, 2010



Figure V-11 shows the connection between tolerance, ideology and size of city. Tolerance is over 15 point higher among respondents who self-identify themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum. It is worth noting that Panama's ideological scale is skewed toward the right with only 14% of respondents classifying themselves on the left or center-left. People living in big cities, over 100,000 inhabitants, and the national capital express greater political tolerance than those residing in small towns and rural areas.

### C. Support for Stable Democracy

**Table V-2. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance:  
Panama, 2010**

	<b>Tolerance</b>	
<b>System Support (i.e., legitimacy)</b>	<b>High</b>	<b>Low</b>
<b>High</b>	Stable Democracy 30.9%	Authoritarian Stability 39.4%
<b>Low</b>	Unstable Democracy 11.6%	Democracy at Risk 18.2%

As explained earlier in this chapter, the categories presented in the Table V-2 are not predictive of regime outcomes. Instead, they represent attitudinal syndromes that reflect support for political tolerance and levels of system legitimacy. At most, we find a population in 2010 with relatively low levels of political tolerance but increasing system support. Unfortunately, a majority of Panamanians exhibit attitudes that place them in the relatively less democratic cells.

#### a. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective

Below we compare all countries on the stable democracy cell. We find that Uruguay, Costa Rica, Suriname and Canada exhibit the highest combination of tolerance and system support. Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay are the lowest. Panama is in the 10<sup>th</sup> place among the 25 countries.




Figure V-12. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

## b. Support for Stable Democracy by Year




Figure V-13. Support for Stable Democracy by Year, Panama 2004-2010

Figure V-13 demonstrates a decline in support for stable democracy attitudes between 2004 and 2006, and a steady increase since then. The increases, however, while in the right direction, do not seem to be statistically significant. We can be fairly certain that most, if not all the increase in 2010, is due to a rise in system support. In turn, the rise in system support is linked to evaluations of the president's performance and the perception of government economic performance. If either of these indicators falters we can expect a decline in attitudes supportive of stable democracy.

c. Who is more likely to Support Stable Democracy?




Figure V-14. Who is more likely to Support Stable Democracy in Panama?

Figure V-14 shows that the only factor that is statistically significant is satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Therefore, the expression of attitudes that support stable democracy depends substantially on short-term evaluations of the public on the performance of the current President. This finding reflects the vulnerability of the support for stable democracy, above all the component of support for the political system.




Figure V-15. Stable Democracy and Presidential Job Approval in Panama, 2010

The results of Figure V-15 indicate that people who think that the performance of the President is good tend to express high levels of political tolerance and support for the system.

#### D. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

In this section, we examine the level of trust for other institutions. According to the results presented in Figure V-16, the Catholic Church is the most trusted institution with a score of 80 on the 0-100 scale. The Church's rating is well above any of the State institutions.




Figure V-16. Trust in Institutions in Panama, 2010

The most trusted State institution is the Canal Authority with an average score of 69.9, followed by the media and the president with 65.6 and 65.3, respectively. The least trusted institutions are the political parties with a score of 41.1, well below the mid-point of the scale, and the National Assembly with a score of 46.6. It is worth noting that with the exception of the Supreme Court, Assembly and political parties, all other institutions receive levels of trust on the positive side of the scale.




Figure V-17. Trust in Institutions by Year in Panama

As shown in Figure V-17, all institutions benefitted from an increase in levels of trust between 2008 and 2010. Some, like the president, witnessed a dramatic increase. For some institutions, such as the Electoral Tribunal, confidence in elections, media, and the national police, the increase in trust represents a return to the 2004 levels. For others, such as the national government the increases correspond to a dramatic positive shift in levels of confidence. Finally, the Canal Authority has seen steady and statistically significant shifts in confidence levels since 2006. There seems to be a “rising tide lift all boats” syndrome going on here. Increases in the job approval of the president, coupled with increased confidence in the economic performance of the government, have combined to boost every State institution. A caveat to this rosy scenario, however, is in order. Presidential approval is subject to wide swings based on political conditions, and so just as it can promote support for the system, it can decline rapidly precipitating a parallel decline in trust in other institutions.

### E. Attitudes toward Democracy

So far, we have seen the importance of supporting system support and political tolerance for stable democracy. Also, we analyzed the confidence in several key political institutions. In this section, we focus on two basic democratic values: support and satisfaction with democracy. First, we examine the support for democracy in comparative perspective and through time, and ends with the same analysis for satisfaction with democracy.

**(ING4):** Democracy may have problems, but is better than any other type of government.

### a) Support for Democracy

The comparative analysis indicates that Uruguay, Costa Rica and Argentina exhibit the highest levels of support for democracy, even higher than Canada and the United States. The least supportive of democracy are Peru, Honduras, and Guatemala. Panama ranks among the top 10 countries in support of democracy, with average support of 75.5 on the 0-100 scale. These results suggest that significant majorities of Panamanians do indeed believe that democracy is the best political system. However, one should keep in mind that Panamanians express relatively low levels of political tolerance, a key component of democratic values, thus reducing significantly the percentage of citizens who are classified as having attitudes conducive to “stable democracy.”




Figure V-18. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010






Figure V-19. Support for Democracy in Panama by Year

Support for democracy has rebounded from its low levels in 2006. Figure V-19 shows a precipitous decline between 2004 and 2006, a rebound in 2008 which has been sustained in 2010. The drop in 2006 may be due to the end of the honeymoon for President Torrijos, and the implementation of controversial social security reforms that caused massive protests. However, we are uncertain why the magnitude of the drop and the significant rebound in 2008 and 2010, but for those interested in democratic governance it is a positive sign.

#### b) Satisfaction with Democracy

The survey asked the following question:

**PN4.** In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Panama?




Figure V-20. Satisfaction with Democracy in Panama (2010)

Over 68% of Panamanians express satisfaction with democracy in 2010. Only a tiny percentage, 1.1%, expresses great dissatisfaction. An additional 19.6% express dissatisfaction. If we add those who are “very satisfied” to the “satisfied” we get an overwhelming majority of 79.2% that are satisfied to some degree with the country’s democracy.




Figure V-21. Satisfaction with Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2010

The comparative analysis shows that Panama ranks second among the 25 countries in satisfaction with democracy. Only Uruguayans are more satisfied. Panama in 2010 exceeds levels of satisfaction with democracy found in Canada and the United States.




Figure V-22. Satisfaction with Democracy in Panama by Year

Over time we see an increase in levels of satisfaction with how Panama's democracy functions. Figure V-22 shows that the low point was again in 2006, with satisfaction levels increasing in 2008 and then jumping significantly in 2010. We suspect that again, as with support for democracy and system support, a combination of perceived good economic performance by the government and presidential approval ratings, are the factors that help explain the rise in levels of satisfaction with democracy.

## Conclusion

This chapter has examined levels of political legitimacy, and the connection between support for the political system and political tolerance. Trust in the ability of the political system to protect basic rights is the weakest of the components of system support in 2010, and trust in political institutions the highest. An analysis of the components of system support over time finds that after a significant dip in 2006 and 2008, trust in the basic components of the political system have improved considerably in 2010. Panama's level of system support compares favorably with the rest of the region. We have noted that support for the current administration is a key factor in determining support for the system, and Panamanians expressed substantially greater support for the current president than the last; thus partially explaining the rise in system support. Another factor is the perception of government economic performance which has improved and is significantly linked to system support.

Political tolerance levels in Panama are highest for allowing opponents of the political system to protests peaceably. Support for opponents running for office and making a speech on TV is below the mid-point of the scale. Panamanians are in the bottom half of countries, with an average barely above the mid-point of the scale. At most, we find a population in 2010 with relatively low levels of political tolerance but increasing system support.

According to the results presented in the chapter, the Catholic Church is the most trusted institution with a score of 80 on the 0-100 scale. The Church's rating is well above any of the public institutions. The most trusted agency is the Canal Authority with an average score of 69.9, followed by the president with 65.3. The least trusted institutions are the political parties with a score of 41.1, well below the mid-point of the scale, and the National Assembly with a score of 46.6. Finally, the chapter has shown that support for and satisfaction with democracy has rebounded from their low levels in 2006. In 2010, Panamanians exhibit the second highest level of satisfaction with democracy among all the countries surveyed.



## Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

### Introduction

In this chapter we concentrate on the analysis of interpersonal trust and participation in civil society, more commonly known as social capital. Scholars have focused attention on this issue since the work of Robert Putman: *Making Democracy Work* (1993).<sup>1</sup> Putman and other scholars argue that both interpersonal trust and participation in civil society are fundamental to the strengthening of democracies. Countries or communities with high levels of these democratic values have citizens who trust each other and at the same time trust in their governments, which leads to the consolidation of democratic political culture.

### Theoretical Background

The theory of social capital suggests that people involved in civil society learn to work together, and eventually learn to trust each other. This means that interpersonal trust originates from active participation in organizations of civil society. Social capital is also important because it increases tolerance towards others since it allows for the interaction of people who do not necessarily think alike, but who are willing to work together.<sup>2</sup>

Many studies have shown that citizens active in multiple associations express higher levels of interpersonal trust.<sup>3</sup> However, in the specific case of Latin America they have found low levels of interpersonal trust with high levels of participation, which is against what the theory of social capital suggests; that is the two not always go hand in hand. Among the factors that lead to these low levels of interpersonal trust in the region, one of them is social inequality.<sup>4</sup>

New studies even suggest that there is a negative social capital, meaning that many contentious social movements as gangs, militias, authoritarian movements or even populists have been strengthened thanks to social capital.<sup>5</sup> A recent study published in *Perspectives from the AmericasBarometer* of LAPOP, showed that interpersonal trust could lead to increased support for taking justice in their own hands by citizens when it appears alongside with a lack of confidence in the institutions of law enforcement. However, and despite all these possible negative effects, many agree that there are important benefits of social capital for democracy.

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<sup>1</sup> Putman, Robert D (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>2</sup> Cordova, Abby (2008). Social Trust, Economic Inequality, and Democracy in the Americas. In M. Seligson (Ed.), *Challenges to democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007* (pp. 147-176). Nashville, Tennessee: Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt. Latin American Public Project (LAPOP): United States. Fukuyama, Francis (1995). *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: The Free Press, 1995. Inglehart, Ronald (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Uslaner, Eric M. (2002). *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Putman, Robert D (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Paxton, Pamela (2007). "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multilevel Model Across 31 Countries." *Social Forces* 86, no. 1 47-76.

<sup>4</sup> Córdoba, Abby (2008). Social Trust, Economic Inequality, and Democracy in the Americas.

<sup>5</sup> Armony, A.C. (2004). *The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Bourgois, P. (1996). *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio*. Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

This chapter begins by examining interpersonal trust and the levels and forms of citizen participation in solving community problems. Then, we analyze different forms of participation in organizations of civil society. The last section deals with political participation.

## A. Interpersonal Trust

As we saw previously, interpersonal trust is one of the components of social capital and is important for democracy because it allows people who are not necessarily known or like-minded to work together, allowing consolidation of democratic political culture. In this section, we first discuss the levels of interpersonal trust of Panamanians, followed by confidence in comparative perspective. We continue with an analysis of the level of interpersonal trust over time and conclude with an assessment of the factors behind that explain interpersonal trust in Panama.

The following question measures interpersonal trust:

**IT1.** Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**  
 (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy  
 (4) Untrustworthy (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer




Figure VI-1. Interpersonal Trust in Panama, 2010

A significant majority of Panamanians (69.3%) believe their fellow citizens are “trustworthy” to some degree. Only 7.8% indicate that people are untrustworthy, and another 22.9% say they are “not very trustworthy.”



### a) Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

Figure VI-2 shows that Panama ranks in the middle of the countries surveyed on interpersonal trust. Panama occupies the 12<sup>th</sup> position among the 25 countries with an average score of 59.8 on the 0-100 scale. Costa Rica, Canada and the United States exhibit the highest levels of interpersonal trust, with Bolivia, Belize and Peru the lowest levels. All but two countries, Belize and Peru, exhibit scores on the positive side of the scale.




Figure VI-2. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective, 2010

### b) Interpersonal Trust Overtime

Here we analyze the extent to which interpersonal trust changed overtime in Panama.




Figure VI-3. Interpersonal Trust in Panama by Year

In Figure VI-3 we observe that interpersonal trust has improved since 2006, when the average score was slightly below the mid-point of the scale. While the change in 2010 is not statistically significant compared to 2008, the averages exhibited in the 2008 and 2010 surveys are significantly higher than in 2006. Of particular note is the rebound in 2010 which corresponds with increased support for the political system and much higher satisfaction with democracy.

### c) Determinants of Interpersonal Trust

Regression analysis is used to measure the determinants of interpersonal trust.




Figure VI-4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Panama (2010)

Figure VI-4 reveals that perception of insecurity is the most significant factor. As insecurity increases interpersonal trust drops precipitously. Age also is weakly related to interpersonal trust. Older Panamanians are more likely to express trust in their fellow citizens than younger cohorts.




Figure VI-5. Interpersonal Trust and Perception of Insecurity in Panama, 2010

Figure VI-5 illustrates the negative linear relationship between insecurity and interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust levels decline nearly 40 points between respondents that feel “very safe” in their neighborhood and those who are “very unsafe.” The fact that insecurity has such a dramatic effect on interpersonal trust should alert the relevant authorities to the pernicious effects that increased crime and violence may have on the ability of citizens to participate actively in their communities, thus undermining a fundamental requirement for stable democratic governance. A lack of interpersonal trust, leading to unwillingness to cooperate to solve problems, can lead to anomie, a condition whereby citizens feel alienated from their communities resulting in less effort to solve problems collectively; and perhaps increased violence as individuals take the law into their own hands.

## B. Civic Participation

To have a deeper understanding of social capital in Panama, we continue with an analysis of who have contributed to solve community problems. If we recall the theory at the beginning of this chapter, social capital suggests that the people involved in civil society learn to work together, and eventually learn to trust each other, leading to strengthening of democracy. But to do this, active participation in civil society organizations is necessary. The questionnaire asked the following questions:

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer	
<b>CP6.</b> Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP7.</b> Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP8.</b> Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP9.</b> Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP13.</b> Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<b>CP20. [Women only]</b> Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	DA 98	N/A 99

### a) Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations




Figure VI-6. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Panama (2010)

Panamanians participate more widely by far in religious groups than any other civic organization. Second are the associations of parents and third committees or boards of improvements to the community.

### b) Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations Overtime

Participation overtime has fluctuated across all groups. With the exception of community improvement organizations, there has been increased participation between 2008 and 2010. The biggest increase is for religious groups' participation in which decreased between 2006 and 2008, but which rebounded in 2010.




Figure VI-7. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Panama by Year

## C. Protest Participation

Some studies have shown that there is a decrease in satisfaction with democracy among citizens and a growing lack of confidence in political institutions (for example, the legislatures, political parties, military, etc.) and political leaders in industrialized countries. This growing dissatisfaction is seen as a result of the changing demands of citizens for better quality democracies.<sup>6</sup> Those most unhappy with the way democracy works seem to be more prone to carrying out extrajudicial forms of political

<sup>6</sup> Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, Russell J. 2006. *Citizens Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Fourth edition. Washington, D.C: CQ Press. Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

participation, while formal means of participation are most common among those who trust in the government and the regime.<sup>7</sup>

Here we review the level of participation in protests or public demonstrations by Panamanians in comparison to the rest of the region. Then we analyze the most common ways of participation such as electoral participation. The next question measures participation in protests or demonstrations:

**PROT3.** In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?  
 (1) Yes [Continue]      (2) No [Go to JC1]      (88) Doesn't know [Go to JC1]  
 (98) Doesn't answer [Go to JC1]

Protests are a relatively common occurrence in contemporary Panama. University students frequently take to the streets blocking traffic to protest government policies or measures taken by University authorities. Labor unions consistently protest government austerity or structural adjustment measures. While vocal, rarely do protests become violent.<sup>8</sup> Recently, however, protests by banana workers in Bocas del Toro, over changes to the Labor Code, did become violent when local security forces open fired killing and wounding several workers. Often the pattern of protests revolves around pressure on the government to alter or end their policies resulting in the authorities agreeing to negotiate through broad social dialogue mechanism, which more often than not result in a modified law or policy.

<sup>7</sup> Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Putman, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

<sup>8</sup> The exception to this rule in modern Panama were the protests associated with the civic crusade movement that swept Panama in the late 1980s aimed at toppling the regime led by General Noriega. While generally peaceful from the protestors' point-of-view, the government's violent reaction precipitated a number of killings and injuries. The traumatic effects of the clashes, resulting in the end in the U.S. military invasion, help explain the orientation toward social dialogue and compromise that has characterized Panama since 1990. For a more comprehensive look at the effects of the invasion on elite and mass attitudes and behavior, see Orlando J. Pérez, *Political Culture in Panama: Democracy after Invasion*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2011.

### a) Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective




Figure VI-8. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Figure VI-8 shows that Argentineans are by far the most protest oriented of all citizens in the region. It is worth noting that Argentina in 2001 witnessed violent protests against government policies that helped bring down President de la Rúa, and constituted the beginning of a period of massive mobilization by labor, students and others against structural adjustment policies. The country with the least protests is Jamaica with only 3.1% of respondents admitting to having participated in a demonstration or protest. Despite the regularity of protests in Panama, only 4.8% of citizens surveyed say they have participated in a protest or demonstration in the last 12 months. Admittedly, the small number may reflect the qualifier we place on the question limiting protests to the last year. This is done so as to not inflate the amount of protest activity, but conversely it could underestimate the number of citizens who have participated in demonstrations. Regardless, if we accept the figure as accurate, 4.8% of the population represents roughly 140,000 individuals.



What factors make citizens more likely to protest? To answer this question we employ regression analysis.




Figure VI-9. Determinants of Participation in Protests, Panama (2010)

Figure VI-9 shows that education and gender are the most significant factors to explain protest activity. Men with higher education levels are more likely to participate in demonstrations than the rest of the population. This finding could reflect the fact that many protest in Panama are organized and led by labor unions, and that men traditionally have dominated the organized formal sector of the economy. Additionally, protests also are organized and led by University students thus the link between education and demonstrations.




Figure VI-10. Participation in Protests by Education and Sex in Panama, 2010

## D. Electoral Participation

With the return of democratically elected regimes, the legitimacy of the electoral process has become a concern. At the same time, the need to understand citizen voting behavior has become paramount.

According to the Electoral Tribunal voter turnout for the most recent election, May 2009, was 74% of registered voters.<sup>9</sup> Table VI-1 presents the aggregate turnout rates for the last three presidential elections.

Table VI-1 Voter Turnout in the 1999, 2004 and 2009 Presidential Elections

	1999		2004		2009	
	Absolute Number	% of the population able to vote	Absolute Number	% of the population able to vote	Absolute Numbers	% of the Population able to Vote
<b>Voters</b>	1,746,989	99.1	1,999,553	99.0	2,211,261	99.0
<b>Annulled or blank votes</b>	56,225	3.2	38,295	1.9	50,081	3.1
<b>Valid votes</b>	1,274,505	72.4	1,499,097	74.9	1,586,427	71.7
<b>Total votes</b>	1,330,730	<b>75.5</b>	1,537,392	<b>76.9</b>	1,636,508	<b>74</b>

Source: Electoral Tribunal

<sup>9</sup> Panama operates a system of automatic voter registration once a person obtains their *Cédula de Identidad*. Voters do need to verify which voting center and voting booth (mesa electoral) they belong to prior to voting. The center and mesa are based on your *cédula* number and permanent residence.

The AmericasBarometer question is as follows:

**VB2.** Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2009?  
 (1) Voted [Continue]      (2) Did not vote [Go to VB10]      (88) Doesn't know[Go to VB10] (98)  
 Doesn't answer [Go to VB10]

### a) Electoral Turnout in Comparative Perspective

The comparative analysis shows that Chile has the highest rate of electoral participation with 94.2% of citizens voting in the last general election. Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay all enforce compulsory voting regulations. It is important to note that reported turnout often differs from aggregate data because voting has become a socially expected behavior so individuals are loathed to admit that they did not vote. Additionally, of course, surveys are subject to random errors. Panama's reported participation of 81.8% exceeds the percentage reported by the Electoral Tribunal by close to 8%.




Figure VI-11. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in Last Elections in Comparative Perspective, 2010

## b) Electoral Turnout Overtime

Voting in Panama has remained relatively high since 2004, ranging from a low of 71.3% in 2008, for the 2004 elections, to a high of 81% in 2010, for the 2009 elections. The drop in 2008 may reflect the time elapsed since the previous election in 2004 resulting in demographic changes and memory lapses.




Figure VI-12. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in Last Elections by Year in Panamá

## c) Predictors of turnout in Panama

Regression analysis is used to ascertain who is more likely to vote. Figure VI-13 shows that age and education are the two factors that best explain variation in voting turnout.




Figure VI-13. Predictors of Turnout in Panama




Figure VI-14. Voter Turnout by Education and Age, Panama (2010)

As shown in Figure VI-14, voting increases with age, stabilizing at a high rate when the person is in their 30s. In terms of education, we find a “V” shaped relationship where voting is high for low and high educational levels, but decreases for those with secondary education.




Figure VI-15. Ideological Self-Placement of the Voters and Voting Preferences

There is little ideological difference among supporters of the three presidential candidates in the 2010 elections. This finding is not surprising given the paucity of ideological cleavages within Panamanian politics.<sup>10</sup>

## E. Interest in Politics and Activism

We continue by analyzing the level of political interest among Panamanian citizens:

**POL1.** How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

(1) A lot    (2) Some    (3) Little    (4) None    (88) Doesn't know    (98) Doesn't answer

<sup>10</sup> See Pérez, *Political Culture in Panama*, Op. Cit.; and Orlando J. Pérez, *Cultura política de la democracia en Panamá, 2008: El impacto de la gobernabilidad*. Un estudio del Proyecto de Opinión Pública en América Latina (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University, USAID, IADB, UNDP, 2008; Orlando J. Pérez, *La cultura política de la democracia en Panamá: 2006, Barómetro de las Américas*, Un estudio del Proyecto de Opinión Pública en América Latina (LAPOP), Vanderbilt University, USAID, 2007.




Figure VI-16. Interest in Politics in Panama, 2010

A majority of Panamanians, 68.1%, express “interest” in politics to some degree. Only 7.9%, however, are interested a lot in political affairs. Slightly over a third of respondents express having no interest in politics.




Figure VI-17. Interest in Politics by Year in Panama

As shown in Figure VI-17, interest in politics has steadily increased since 2006.

## F. Political Activism

But one thing is to express interest in politics and another is actual experience with it. So we now examine what how active Panamanians are in the elections and electoral campaigns. The following questions measure political activism.

**PP1.** During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**

(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

**PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections?

(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer




Figure VI-18. Political Activism in Panama, 2010

Over 64% of Panamanians never tried to convince others to vote and over 87% did not work for a party or candidate during the last elections. Only 12.5% said they had worked for a party or candidate.

## Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed the participation of Panamanians in civil society and the determinants of interpersonal trust. We have also studied participation in civic organizations and elections, as well as the level of political activism and participation in protests or demonstrations. We note that interpersonal trust decreases almost 40 points between respondents who feel “very secure” in their neighborhood and those who are “very insecure.” The Panamanians are more involved in religious groups than any other civic organization. Second are the associations of parents and third committees or boards of improvements to the community. Despite the regularity of protests in Panama, only 4.8% of surveyed citizens say that they have participated in a protest or demonstration in the past 12 months. Men with higher education levels are more likely to participate in demonstrations than the rest of the



population. There is little ideological difference between the supporters of the three presidential candidates in the 2010 elections. A majority of Panamanians, 68.1%, expressed "interest" in politics.



## Chapter VII. Local Government

### Theoretical Background

What are the factors that could affect the levels of citizen participation in local government? To answer this question, we analyze two of the most representative forms of local political participation: citizen participation in meetings of the local government and the submission of petitions to the municipality.

Citizens who participate in and evaluate positively local government (variables that themselves are not necessarily positively correlated) may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of “outsiders.” There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson, 2009). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital.

### A. Participation in Local Government Meeting

In order to identify individuals who have a higher probability of participating in municipal meetings, the AmericasBarometer has asked the following question:

**NP1.** Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or village meeting in the past 12 months?  
(1) Yes                      (2) No                      (88) Doesn't know                      (98) Doesn't answer




Figure VII-1. Participation in Local Meetings in Comparative Perspective, 2010

The evidence presented in Figure VII-1 indicates that very few Panamanians participate in local government meetings. Panama ranks last among the 25 countries included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey. Although, repeated administrations have endorsed the principle of decentralization few concrete efforts, particularly in terms of financing, have been made to implement the program. Panamanian municipalities, with few exceptions, remain weak in terms of institutional authority and financial resources.




Figure VII-2. Participation in Local Meetings in Panama by Year

Figure VII-2 demonstrates a significant drop in local level participation since 2006. Participation in local government meetings halved between 2006 and 2008, and remained at a low level in 2010.

## B. Demand-Making on Municipal Government

What are the characteristics of Panamanians who petition the municipality more often? To answer this question, the AmericasBarometer has been making for some years the following questions:

**NP2.** Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the city/town/village within the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [Continue]      (2) No [Go to SGL1]      (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1]

(98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]

**MUNI10.** Did they resolve your issue or request?

(1) Yes      (0) No      (88) Doesn't know      (98) Doesn't answer      (99) N/A




Figure VII-3. Demand-Making on Municipal Government in Panama (2010)

The answer to the earlier question is categorically, no! Close to 95% of Panamanians have not made any demands on local governments and of those that did an overwhelming majority, 70.5%, say their issue or request was not resolved.




Figure VII-4. Demand-Making on Municipal Government in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Again, we find Panamanians at the bottom of the scale when it comes to demand-making on municipal governments.




Figure VII-5. Demand-Making on Municipal Government in Panama by Year

Following the trend with participation in municipal meetings, the number of Panamanians who make demands of local government has declined steadily since 2004. In 2010, the percent of respondents who made demands of the municipal authorities was less than half of those who did so in 2004. Not only has the process of decentralization not advanced, but interest among the population has waned; perhaps the two are closely linked. Without progress on decentralizing power, Panamanians lose interest in local government and gravitate toward the level of government that has most of the power, namely the central authorities.



a) Who is More Likely to Seek Assistance or Present a Request to the Local Government?




Figure VII-6. Who is More Likely to Seek Assistance or Present a Request to the Local Government in 2010

Figure VII-6 shows that participation in municipal government meetings is the most important factor in explaining demand-making on local governments. It seems that involvement with local authorities feeds the propensity to make demands; the two feed on each other. In the case of Panama, however, since participation is low, demand-making also is low, and since the latter results in no resolution of the problems, citizens naturally become disenchanted with local government.




Figure VII-7. Demand-Making on Municipal Government by Attended a Municipal Meeting

### C. Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The next section provides statistical analysis of the factors that affect the satisfaction by Panamanians with services provided by the municipality. To measure the level of satisfaction with the institutional performance of the local government, AmericasBarometer asked the following question:

**SGL1.** Would you say that the services the city/town/village is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]**  
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad  
 (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

We established in Chapter V that satisfaction with local services is a significant factor in determining support for the political system (see Figure V-5).




Figure VII-8. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Panama (2010)

Despite the fact that few Panamanians make demands of local governments or participate in local government meetings, their level of satisfaction with local services is generally “fair.” Over 56% of respondents say that services provided by local governments are neither good nor bad. Slightly over 22% rate those services as good, and only 1% as very good.




Figure VII-9. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective, 2010

Compared with other countries Panama ranks in the bottom third for satisfaction; an improvement over its ranking with respect to participation and demand-making. Colombians, Canadians and Uruguayans are the most satisfied with the services provided by local governments. Citizens of Jamaica and Suriname are the least satisfied.




Figure VII-10. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Panama by Year

Satisfaction with local services in Panama has remained rather steady since 2004, although we do see a slight increase for 2010; but this could possibly reflect the generalized upsurge of trust in public institutions witnessed in the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer in Panama.




Figure VII-11. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Panama, 2010

What factors explain satisfaction with local services? The regression analysis presented in Figure VII-11 indicates that the single most important variable is trust in municipal governments. Citizens who express greater confidence in their local authorities tend to be more satisfied with local services.




Figure VII-12. Satisfaction with Local Services by Trust in Municipal Government

Satisfaction with local services nearly doubles for those individuals who express the highest level of confidence in local governments.

## Conclusion

In general, this chapter has found that few Panamanians participate in local government. Among the countries surveyed Panamanians are those who least attend meetings of the municipality or made demands to local governments. Panama's municipal government structures are weak and little concrete efforts have been made to strengthen them despite policy pronouncements and legal requirements to do so.

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## **Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis**

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## Chapter VIII. Political Parties and Democracy in Panama

### Introduction

While parties were not necessarily seen as inevitable, let alone desirable, political institutions when they first emerged, they have now become firmly rooted in contemporary democracies. Parties serve as a key link between the State and civil society; they structure political participation and competition; are key to recruitment of political leaders; develop programs that serve as the basis for government policy; serve to check and balance extant governments; and are key vehicles for political socialization. Ironically, given their importance to democracy political parties are consistently among the least trusted of institutions. Parties are regularly considered corrupt, unrepresentative, and polarizing. Their leaders are considered self-serving and motivated by individual rather than national interests.

With few exceptions, Panamanian political parties have weak links to society and are mostly vehicles for the promotion of individual political careers. The two exception, historically, are the *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (PRD) and the *Panameñista* Party. The former was created during the military regime to serve as the political vehicle for the perpetuation of military power, but has adapted to the democratic “game” participating in all post-invasion elections and winning the presidency in 1999 and 2004. The party claims to represent a social democratic ideology, but presidents serving under its banner have implemented structural adjustment policies favored by neoliberalism. The *Panameñista* party was the vehicle for the advancement of the political ideology and ambition of Arnulfo Arias, one of Panama’s great political leaders of the twentieth century. Populist in inclination the party is generally conservative but spouses certain ideas closer to the center-left. The newest party, in power under a coalition with the Panameñistas since 2009, is Cambio Democrático (Democratic Change). This party is non-ideological and was formed in 2004 to serve as the political vehicle for the presidential ambitions of the current Panamanian president, Ricardo Martinelli.

Table VIII-1 shows the number of persons registered in each legally recognized party and those in the process of legalization.

Table VIII-1. Number of Persons Registered in Political Parties

Partidos Políticos	Enero 2008	Abril 2010	Mayo 2010
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,124,444</b>	<b>1,172,016</b>	<b>1,173,218</b>
<b>***Constituidos***</b>	<b>1,124,118</b>	<b>1,168,127</b>	<b>1,169,073</b>
PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRÁTICO	587,906	548,435	542,507
PARTIDO POPULAR	38,888	32,227	32,002
MOVIMIENTO LIBERAL REPUBLICANO NACIONALISTA	68,970	53,993	53,514
PARTIDO PANAMEÑISTA	205,122	244,012	246,437
CAMBIO DEMOCRÁTICO	113,233	205,880	211,558
UNIÓN PATRIÓTICA	109,999	83,580	83,055
<b>***en Formación***</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>3,889</b>	<b>4,145</b>
ALTERNATIVA POPULAR	326	3,846	4,104
MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL		43	41

Earlier, on Table VI-1, we indicated that the registered number of voters for the 2009 elections was 2,211,261. Taking that number and the data presented in Table VIII-1 we find that 53% of the registered voters also belong to a political party. However, when asked, significant majorities express little support for any given political party. The survey asked the following questions:

**VB10.** ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?

(1) Sí [Sig] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1]

(98) NR [Pase a POL1]

**VB11.** ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]

(701) Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD)

(702) Cambio Democrático

(703) Partido Panameñista (Arnulfista)

(704) Partido MOLINERA

(705) Partido Popular

(706) Partido Liberal

(707) Partido Unión Patriótica

(708) Partido Vanguardia Moral de la Patria


(88) NS [Pase a POL1]

(98) NR [Pase a POL1]

(99) INAP [Pase a POL1]

**VB12** Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?

(1) Muy débil      (2) Débil      (3) Ni débil ni fuerte      (4) Fuerte      (5) Muy fuerte (88)NS  
(98) NR      (99) INAP



**Figure VIII-1. Identification with a Political Party**

Close to 70% of Panamanians do not identify with a political party. This number contrasts sharply with the majority of registered voters who “officially” belong to a political party.




Figure VIII-2. Political Party Identification in Panama, 2010

Among persons who self-identify or are sympathetic to a political party, 40.6 per cent do so with the PRD and 39.4% with Democratic Change.




Figure VIII-3. Strength of Party Identification in Panama

When asked about the strength of party ID, 44% said it was “strong” and 41% were lukewarm. Only 7.1% indicated having very strong partisan identifications.




Figure VIII-4. Strength of Partisanship by Political Party in Panama

As we would expect the two historically dominant parties, the PRD and the *Panameñistas*, receive the highest degree of partisan intensity. These two parties have alternated in power since the U.S. invasion, except for the most recent elections where a coalition led by Democratic Change won the presidency and a majority in the legislature. There are evidence of a realignment of political forces, with the possibility of some of the minor parties merging with Democratic Change, and internal discord within the PRD, but it is too early to determine the impact of those potential changes.

Ironically, however, the ideological distance between supporters of each political party is rather narrow. As seen in Figure VIII-5, most parties range on narrow spectrum around the national mean for ideology which is slightly to the center-right at 6.1.




Figure VIII-5. Ideological Orientation of Supporters of Each Political Party


The Panameñistas are the most conservative party, but primarily in the center. The PRD, although claiming it is a social democratic party, attracts supporters who are slightly to the right of the national average. Democratic Change's supporters are slightly to the left of the national average. In the end, the differences are very small and most parties range in a narrow spectrum near the national average, mainly in the center-right.

### Can Democracy Exist without Political Parties?

The AmericasBarometer asks a question measuring the extent to which respondents believe political parties are essential for democracy.

**DEM23.** Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This question is initially asked using a 1-7 metric, which is then transformed into a 0-100 scale to facilitate statistical analyses.



**Figure VIII-6. Democracy Can Exist Without Political Parties in Comparative Perspective**

Panamanians are the second most hostile population toward political parties, ranking just below the United States in supporting the proposition that democracy can exist without parties. The countries in which most citizens believe parties are essential to democracy are Belize and Uruguay. Note that only the United States average is above the 50 point mark on the scale, so only in the U.S. does a majority of citizens believe that political parties are not necessary for democracy.

Figure VIII-7 shows the results of a regression analysis to ascertain the factors that best explain support for the idea that political parties are not necessary to democracy.




Figure VIII-7. Determinants of Support for the Idea that Democracy can Exist without Political Parties in Panama, 2010

Education is the most significant factor. The higher the educational level the *less* supportive of political parties as essential to democracy.




Figure VIII-8. Democracy without Political Parties and Education in Panama, 2010



Figure VIII-8 demonstrates the relationship between attitudes against parties and education. Individuals with secondary education are above the mid-point of the scale, thus are less supportive of political parties.

### Clientelism among Political Parties

The 2010 AmericasBarometer asked a series of questions regarding levels of clientelism with respect to elections, political parties and campaigns.

**CLIEN1.** In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or thing in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never?

(1) Often [Continue with CLIEN2]

(2) Sometimes [Continue with CLIEN2]

(3) Never [Skip to CLIEN3]

(88) DK [Skip to CLIEN3] (98) DA [Skip to CLIEN3]

**CLIEN2.** And thinking of the last time this happened; did what they offered make you more likely or less likely to vote for the candidate or party that offered you those goods?

(1) More likely

(2) Less likely

(3) Equally likely

(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A





Figure VIII-9. Tangible Benefits for Voting

More than 82% of Panamanians said they had never been offered or received any tangible benefits (e.g. food, money, job, etc.) in exchange for voting for a party or candidate. Those who sometimes have received those offers account for 13.7%, and 4.1% said they often receive such offers. Considering that

our survey is representative of the national population, and even with the margin of error, 4.1% still represents thousands of Panamanians.



**Figure VIII-10. Likelihood of Voting for Party or Candidate because of the Offered Benefit**

Of the 17% of respondents who admitted to having been offered tangible benefits to vote for a party or candidate, 20.4% said the “gift” made them more likely to vote for that candidate or party, another 46.8% said it made little to no difference, and 32.8% said it made them less likely to vote for that candidate or party.

## **Conclusion**

This Chapter has examined attitudes toward political parties in Panama. Political parties are the least trusted institution (see Chapter V), and while a majority of voters are registered in a party, few express identification with a political party. Panamanians are ranked second among all 25 countries in their belief that democracy can exist without political parties; the United States is number one. Finally, more than 82% of Panamanians said they had never been offered or received any tangible benefits (e.g. food, money, job, etc.) in exchange for voting for a party or candidate.

## Chapter IX. Administration of Justice, Crime, and the National Police

### Introduction

The country's judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, four superior courts, eighteen circuit courts, and at least one municipal court per district. Nine Supreme Court magistrates, as well as their nine alternates, are appointed by the president for ten-year terms, pending approval by the legislative assembly. Unlike many other systems in the western hemisphere, in Panama, Supreme Court magistrates are responsible for appointing superior court judges who, in turn, appoint the circuit court judges. Panama operates within an inquisitorial system that diverges significantly from the adversarial system in place in the United States. In the adversarial system, judges are expected to be merely impartial arbiters of the case, whereas in Panama's courts, judges are offered extensive latitude in determining how cases are to be investigated. As stated in the United States Department of State's 2009, in Panama "the court system is slow and prone to massive case backlogs and corruption."

### Confidence in the Justice System

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey in Panama asked a series of questions related to the administration of justice, crime and the National Police.

**PANAOJ3.** ¿Podría decirme cuál considera usted que es **el principal** problema que enfrenta actualmente la Administración de Justicia en Panamá? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Corrupción
- (2) Lentitud de la Justicia
- (3) Falta de capacitación del personal
- (4) Falta de presupuesto
- (5) Falta de independencia judicial
- (6) Otro
- (88) NS                      (98) NR




Figure IX-1. Main Problem Facing the Administration of Justice

A majority of Panamanians believe that corruption is the major problem facing the administration of justice in their country.

The AmericasBarometer asked about the prevalence of bribes in a series of government institutions. One way of explaining the large percentage of respondents who choose corruption as the major problem is by looking at the number of Panamanians who report having been asked to pay bribes when dealing with the courts.




Figure IX-2. Percentage of Panamanians asked to Pay Bribes by Various Institutions, 2010

Figure IX-2 shows that courts rank second, only to municipalities, as the institution where Panamanians are asked for bribes the most. Nearly 24% of Panamanians who had dealings with a court indicate they have been asked to pay a bribe.




Figure IX-3. Percentage Bribe in the Courts in Panama by Year

Figure IX-3 shows the increase in bribes in the courts since 2008. Between 2008 and 2010 the percentage of Panamanians who report having been asked for bribes in the courts tripled.<sup>1</sup>

Another problem that may undermine confidence in the judicial system is the perception that it cannot deal effectively with rising crime. We asked the following question the results of which are found in Figure IX-4:

**AOJ12.** Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable?  
**[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría...  
 (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR

<sup>1</sup> An important caveat interpreting this data is that the number of respondents who say they had anything to do with the courts is rather small. Therefore, what we are reporting here is based on a very small sub-sample of the survey and the confidence interval is rather large.




Figure IX-4. Confidence Judicial System Punishes Criminals

A majority of Panamanians express some level of confidence that indeed the system would punish criminals. Figure IX-4 shows that 58.6% indicate that they have “some” or “a lot” of confidence the judicial system would punish a criminal who had perpetrated a crime against the respondent. However, a considerable minority of 41.5% has little or no confidence the judicial system would punish someone who has committed a crime.

What factors affect confidence in the judicial system? To answer this question we use as the dependent variable a question in the B-series (b10a) that asks about confidence in the judicial system, and regression analysis with the traditional demographic variables.




Figure IX-5. Determinants of Trust in the Judicial System

Size of the area of residence and perception of insecurity are the statistically significant factors to determine trust in the judicial system. Respondents living in rural or small cities express greater confidence in the judicial system. One would suspect that this might be a function of little to no direct day-to-day contact with the courts. Additionally, respondents who express greater insecurity in their neighborhood exhibit less trust in the judicial system.




Figure IX-6. Trust in the Justice System, Insecurity and Size of City in Panama, 2010

## Confidence in the National Police

Panama's National Police is one part of the country's security forces created after the U.S. invasion from the remnants of the old Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). Currently, the National Police is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security that was created in 2009 from parts of the old Ministry of Government & Justice to house the nation's security forces, including the Air-Naval Service and the Border Security Force. The latter is a specialized unit within the National Police trained and deployed to protect border areas, particularly the one with Colombia. The security structure is entirely led by civilians, although the current head of the police is a former PDF officer.

In Chapter V (Figure V-16) we saw that the National Police receives a mean level of trust of 57.9 on the 0-100 scale, well into the positive side of the scale, indicating that most Panamanians do trust the police. However, in terms of ranking the same figure shows that the police is well below other institutions such as the Catholic Church, President, media, and Electoral Tribunal.

In this chapter we explore other measures of confidence in the police that are more specific. First, the survey asked the following series of questions:

<b>POLE1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría el trabajo que la policía nacional está haciendo con la gente de este barrio para solucionar los problemas del barrio? ¿Usted diría que el trabajo que está haciendo la policía es...?: <b>[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b>			
(1) Muy bueno	(2) Bueno	(3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)	
(4) Malo	(5) Muy malo (pésimo)	(7) <b>[espontánea no leer]</b> La policía no está haciendo nada	(88) NS (98) NR
<b>POLE2.</b> En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la calidad de los servicios policiales por parte de la policía nacional en este barrio? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>			
(1) Muy satisfecho	(2) Satisfecho	(3) Insatisfecho	(4) Muy insatisfecho
(7) <b>[espontánea no leer]</b> La policía no está haciendo nada	(88) NS	(98) NR	
<b>POLE3.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría el trabajo que está haciendo la policía nacional para prevenir la delincuencia en <b>este barrio o comunidad</b> ? Usted diría que el trabajo que está haciendo la policía para prevenir la delincuencia es...?: <b>[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b>			
(1) Muy bueno	(2) Bueno	(3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)	(4) Malo
(5) Muy malo (pésimo)	(7) <b>[espontánea no leer]</b> La policía no está haciendo nada	(88) NS	(98) NR






Figure IX-7. Rating Police Work in the Neighborhood

A majority of Panamanians, 59.2%, rate the work done by the National Police to solve the problems of respondents' neighborhood as "regular." The percentage who rates the work as good or very good is 28.9%. Only 10% rate the work as bad or very bad, and another 1.5% volunteered that the police was doing nothing to solve local problem.




Figure IX-8. Satisfaction with Quality of Work Performed by Police in Neighborhood

A significant majority of Panamanians express satisfaction with the work done by the National Police in their neighborhood. However, 35.8% say they are not satisfied with the work of the police.




Figure IX-9. Satisfaction with Police Work to Prevent Crime

Finally, we asked about the work of the police to prevent crime in the respondents' neighborhood. A majority of Panamanians believe the preventive work of the police is neither good nor bad, regular. An additional 30% believe the work is good.

The results presented above indicate a fairly positive evaluation of the work done by the National Police in the neighborhoods. However, the Americas Barometer asked more specific questions about the work of the police that measure actual activities performed by the police in the neighborhoods.

**ICO2. ¿Con qué frecuencia la policía nacional patrulla su barrio? Usted diría: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

- (1) Muchas veces al día
- (2) Al menos una vez al día
- (3) Algunas veces por semana
- (4) Algunas veces por mes
- (5) Rara vez
- (6) Nunca
- (88) NS                    (98) NR

En los últimos 12 meses, cuál de las siguientes actividades ha visto a la policía nacional hacer en su barrio	Sí	No	NS	NR
<b>CPOL1.</b> Hablar con los residentes del barrio	1	2	88	98
<b>CPOL2.</b> Asistir a reuniones de vecinos del barrio	1	2	88	98
<b>CPOL3.</b> Ayudar a realizar actividades de prevención de la delincuencia en el barrio	1	2	88	98
<b>CPOL4.</b> Involucrarse con los niños y jóvenes de su barrio a través de actividades recreacionales y escolares	1	2	88	98




Figure IX-10. Frequency of Police Patrol

A third of Panamanians say the police patrol their neighborhood once a day, another 19.4% say that it does so many times a day. Therefore, a significant majority believes that the police patrol their neighborhood at least once per day.




Figure IX-11. Frequency of Police Patrol by Region

As expected, patrols are more common in the metropolitan area of Panama City than in less populated areas. The Eastern Region which includes the city of Colon also reports significant police activity. The area with the least amount of police patrols is the Central Region, which is mostly rural or small towns. The Central Region also has the lowest crime rate in the country.

When asked about four specific actions the police may do to improve community relations or prevent criminal activity, few citizens responded affirmatively.




Figure IX-12. Police Speak and Attend Meetings with Community Members

Only 21.2% of respondents say they have seen police speak to residents of their neighborhood, and only 7% have seen police attend meetings with community members.




Figure IX-13. Police Work with Community and with Children/Young Adults to Prevent Crime

Few police are involved in preventive work, at least as perceived by respondents, and fewer still are involved with children and young persons in order to prevent or reduce criminal activity. The evidence shows that again it is in the Metropolitan Panama City area where the police are most active.

Given a choice, an overwhelming majority of Panamanians would prefer the police be more involved in the solution to community problems.

**DEMP1. Que prefiera usted, [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

- (1) Qué la policía nacional se involucre más en la resolución de los problemas de su barrio, o
  - (2) Que la policía nacional se involucre menos en la resolución de los problemas de su barrio o
  - (3) que todo siga igual
- (88) NS      (98) NR




Figure IX-14. Police Participation in Solving Community Problems

Figure IX-14 indicates that 91.3% of Panamanians think the police should be more involved in helping to solve community problems. Only 7.1% say the police should be less involved.

To what extent do Panamanians feel safe when they interact with members of the National Police? The Americas Barometer asked the following questions:

<b>PANAOJ6.</b> ¿Cuándo ha estado cerca de un miembro de la Policía Nacional que tan seguro se siente? (1) muy seguro [PASE A PANA0J8]                      (2) algo seguro [PASE A PANOJ8] (3) algo inseguro [SIGA A PANA0J7]                      (4) muy inseguro [SIGA A PANA0J7] (88) NS [PASE A PANA0J8]                      (98) NR [PASE A PANA0J8]	
<b>PANAOJ7.</b> ¿Por qué se siente inseguro? [Leer alternativas] (1) La policía abusa los derechos humanos (2) La policía es corrupta (3) La policía abusa su poder (4) Mi experiencia con policías en el pasado no es buena (5) Los policías me dan miedo (6) [No Leer] Otro                      (88) NS                      (98)NR (99) Inap	
<b>PANAOJ8.</b> ¿Conoce Usted un policía por su rostro ó su nombre en su barrio o comunidad? (1) Sí, por rostro [Siga a PANA0J9]                      (2) Sí, por nombre [Siga a PANA0J9] (3) Sí, ambos [Siga a PANA0J9]                      (4) No [PASE A FEAR0] (88) NS [PASE A FEAR0]                      (98) NR [PASE A FEAR0]	
<b>PANAOJ9.</b> ¿Qué tan confiable piensa que es el policía que usted conoce? (1) Muy confiable    (2) Algo confiable    (3) Poco confiable    (4) Nada confiable                      (88) NS    (98) NR (99) Inap	




Figure IX-15. How Safe do Panamanians Feel Interacting with the National Police?

As seen in Figure IX-15, Panamanians generally feel safe when near a member of the National Police. Over 80% of citizens say they feel either very or somewhat safe when near a policeman. For the 18.5% who say they don't feel safe, the most important reason is that they believe the police is corrupt. A majority of 55.1% of citizens say they know a policeman either by sight, name or both. When asked if the police they know is trustworthy, 82% say they are very or somewhat trustworthy. These results reflect a fairly positive evaluation of the police.

What factors distinguish between those who feel safe and those who do not when near a police? For this analysis, as before, we use regression analysis.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The dependent variable is question PANAJO6 recoded into a 0-100 metric.






Figure IX-16. Determinants of Safety When Near a Member of the National Police

Perception of insecurity is the most robust determinant of how safe citizens feel when near a police. Those respondents who feel more secure in their neighborhood also feel more secure when near a member of the National Police. Age and gender also are significant factors. Older Panamanians and females are more likely to feel safe when near a police. This result may reflect a natural fear among younger males who are generally more likely to be perpetrators of crime. Finally, crime victimization is weakly related to feelings of safety toward the police. Individuals who have not suffered crime are more likely to feel safe among the police.




Figure IX-17. Perception of Safety with the Police by Age, Sex, Insecurity and Crime Victimization

Figure IX-17 demonstrates the relation between perception of safety when near a police and the factors that the regression analysis showed to be statistically significant. Older females who feel safe in their neighborhood and have not been victims of crime express significantly greater perception of being safe when near members of the National Police.

Finally, the AmericasBarometer 2010 survey asked a series of questions to measure the extent of worry among Panamanians regarding criminal activity. In particular, we asked how worries respondents were to being victims of a robbery when no one was at home; a violent assault in their neighborhood; and how worry they are that a member of their family could be a victim of a violent assault. The specific questions were as follows:<sup>3</sup>

**FEAR6.** ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que alguien entre a su casa a robar cuando no hay nadie? Está usted ...  
(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (88) NS (98) NR

**FEAR7.** ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que alguien lo detenga en la calle, lo amenace, golpee, o le haga daño en su **barrio**? Está usted...

(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (88) NS (98) NR

**FEAR8.** ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que a algún miembro de su familia lo detengan en la calle, lo amenacen, golpeen, o le hagan daño en su barrio? Está usted...

(1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (88) NS (98) NR

<sup>3</sup> For purposes of our analysis each question was re-coded into a 0-100 metric, where 0 represents no worry at all and 100 very worried.




Figure IX-18. Perception of Fear of Being a Victim of a Robbery at Home, Assault and Family Member Assaulted

Fear levels among Panamanians of being a victim of a robbery or assault are very high. For all three questions we find averages well above the mid-point of the scale, indicating that substantial numbers of Panamanians are very worried of falling victims of crime.




Figure IX-19. Fear of Being Victim of Crime by Region

Figure IX-19 demonstrates that, not surprisingly, the metropolitan Panama City region is the area of the country where citizens express the greatest amount of fear of being victims of crime.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has focused on the courts and the National Police as key components of the security and judicial systems. Rising crime in Panama has engendered immense media attention, government efforts and citizen concerns. We find that Panamanians believe the biggest problem facing the court system is corruption. More than 20% of respondents who had dealings with the courts say they were asked for a bribe. Despite the level of corruption, most Panamanians believe the system would be able to punish someone who committed a crime, with respondents living in rural or small cities expressing greater confidence in the judicial system. The chapter found substantial general support for the work done by the National Police, although very few citizens have actually witnessed police activity to work with the community to prevent crime. Large numbers of Panamanians, however, are worried of being victims of crime, with the Panama City metropolitan region exhibiting the highest levels.

## **Chapter X. Environmental Policies and Public Opinion**

### **Introduction**

The Americas Barometer 2010 survey in Panama asked a series of question measuring popular attitudes toward environmental issues, including government policies and confidence in environmental institutions.

Environmental law in Panama is governed by Law 41 (July 1, 1998) which creates the National Environmental Authority of Panama (known as ANAM). The main objective of this law was to assure that the environment be protected against both public and private actions that failed to take account of costs or harms inflicted on the eco-system.

The role of ANAM, according to Law 41, is to formulate national environmental policy and to regulate the use of natural resources, as well as to direct, supervise and implement the execution of the environmental policies, strategies and programs of the government. The basic purpose of the legislation is to force project promoters and governmental agencies to consider the effects on the environment of their decisions.

ANAM has also been charged with enforcing Law 41, including its regulations, the environmental quality rules and the technical and administrative provisions which the law has assigned to it. ANAM reviews environmental impact studies which have been presented and then issues the respective resolution approving or denying the study. ANAM also has authority over matters such as flora & fauna, protection of wildlife species, forestry and reforestation investments.<sup>1</sup>

Law 1 of February 3, 1994, “Establishing Forest Legislation in the Republic of Panama and laying down other provisions” sets out the forest “heritage” of the country. Article 10 specifies that the forest heritage of the State consists of all the natural forest, the land on which such forests are growing and the State lands with mainly forest potential. Forest plantations established by the State on State-owned land are also part of this heritage.

Law 10 of April 12, 1995, adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done in New York of May 9, 1992. Subsequently, by Law 88 of November 30, 1998, Panama adopted all parts of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, of December 11, 1997. Executive Decree 35 of February 26, 2007, adopted the National Climate Change Policy. The functions of the National Program on Climate Change include: to promote, on a national scale, the development of vulnerability studies, policy measures, and projects for adaptation to climate change in the different natural ecosystems and socio-economic sectors; to manage the necessary resources with the corresponding agencies; and to use mechanisms linked to the UN Convention for the creation and/or strengthening of national capacity in the area of climate change and to heighten public consciousness and awareness.

Finally, Executive Decree 1 of January 9, 2009 created the Panama National Climate Change Committee [*Comité Nacional de Cambio Climático en Panamá* CONACCP] to support ANAM in the

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<sup>1</sup> See ANAM’s web page: <http://www.anam.gob.pa/>.

implementation and monitoring of the National Climate Change Committee. According to the aforementioned Decree, the National Climate Change Committee (CONACCP), must ensure the implementation of the inter-institutional coordination system necessary for compliance with the provisions of the international agreements on the topic of climate change of which Panama is a signatory.

## Public Opinion and Environmental Protection

Having laid out the legal framework for Panama's environmental policies and programs, we proceed to look at how Panamanian citizens view the efforts of their government in this important policy arena.

The survey asked the following specific questions which we will analyze here.

Y ahora cambiando de tema, ¿dígame si usted cree que el trabajo que desempeñan las siguientes instituciones <b>sobre el tema ambiental (protección del medio ambiente)</b> es muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo (regular), malo, o muy malo (pésimo)?
<b>PANENV1.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña La Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM) sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88)NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV2.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña La Autoridad de los Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá (ARAP) es.... (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV3.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña La Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP) sobre el tema ambiental es?. (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV4.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña La Corte Suprema de Justicia . sobre el tema ambiental es?. (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV5.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña la Asamblea Nacional . sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV7.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña El Poder ejecutivo sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV9.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña El Gobierno Municipal sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV10.</b> Y ahora me puede decir, ¿hasta qué punto cree usted que las leyes de protección al medio ambiente son aplicadas de manera justa? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV11.</b> ¿Quién cree Usted que deba tener mayor responsabilidad para proteger el medio ambiente? (1) El Gobierno Central (2) El Gobierno Municipal (3) La empresa privada (4) Las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (ONG) o (5) Los ciudadanos [NO LEER] (6) Todos por igual (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto considera usted que actualmente existe una política de Estado que fortalezca la institucionalidad ambiental? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR
<b>PANENV13.</b> ¿Diría usted que la situación ambiental actual es mejor, igual o peor que hace 12 meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR

<p><b>PANENV14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree Usted que puede incidir personalmente en las decisiones sobre actividades que impactan el ambiente y los recursos naturales?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p><b>PANENV15.</b> ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o violación ambiental, donde lo denunciaría? [No leer alternativas] [Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?]</p> <p>(0) No denunciaría (1) ANAM (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente) (2) Fiscalía o Procuraduría (3) Policía (4) Medios de comunicación (5) Corregiduría (corregidor) (6) Otros (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p><b>PANENV16.</b> ¿Qué tanto cree usted que los funcionarios públicos se preocupan por mejorar la calidad ambiental de su comunidad?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98)NR</p>
<p><b>PANENV17.</b> ¿Podría decirme cuál considera usted que es el principal problema que enfrenta actualmente la institucionalidad ambiental en Panamá?</p> <p>(1) Corrupción (2) Falta de políticas de Estado (3) Falta de capacitación del personal (4) Falta de presupuesto (5) Falta de independencia institucional [No Leer] (6) Otro (88) NS (98) NR</p>
<p><b>PANENV18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto está Usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que el Estado panameño debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la degradación de los recursos naturales?</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Algo en desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p>

The first 9 questions asked about specific institutions and the public evaluations of their work.<sup>2</sup>




Figure X-1. Evaluation of the Work Performed Protecting the Environment by Various Institutions

<sup>2</sup> In order to better illustrate the results we have transformed the questions into a 0-100 metric.

The Canal Authority is the institution that receives the highest level of support. This result parallels the one reported in Chapter V, where we saw that the Canal Authority is the most trusted government institution. The National Assembly and the Supreme Court are evaluated the least well, although their scores are above the 50 point mark, and thus the evaluations tend to be minimally positive. In this case, it is important to note that small but significant numbers of Panamanians did not know or could not express an opinion. The don't knows were as follows: ANAM, 7.9%; ARAP, 14.7%; Canal Authority, 10.2%; Supreme Court, 18.3%; National Assembly 18.4%; the executive branch, 20.2%; and municipal government, 16%. It is interesting to note that refusal to evaluate increases as the institution's direct relation to environmental law enforcement diminishes.




Figure X-2. Environmental Laws are Applied Justly

Most Panamanians believe environmental laws are applied in a just manner, at least to some degree. Only 11.1% of respondents said the laws were not being applied justly.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> We have no way of knowing what exactly respondents understood by “in a just manner” since we did not probe that question.






Figure X-3. Who should be more responsible for protecting the environment?

We asked Panamanians who should have greater responsibility in protecting the environment. Respondents chose the central government, followed by “everyone equally”. The non-governmental sectors, either NGOs or private business, are the organizations Panamanians least want to be responsible for environmental protection.

Below we present answers to three questions which ask (1) to what extent the State policies strengthen environmental protection? (2) What is the state of environmental protection now compared to 12 months ago? And (3) To what extent to respondents believe they can personally influence environmental laws?





Figure X-4. State Should Implement Strong Policies to Protect the Environment

A significant majority of 90.8% agree that the government should implement strong laws to protect the environment. Only 1.8% disagree.



**Figure X-5. State Police Strengthens Environment, Current Environment Situation and Personal Ability to Influence Environmental Laws**

A majority of Panamanians believe that the there are State policies that strengthen environmental institutions. Only 15.3% believe that it absolutely does not. Over 69% believe that the environmental situation is the same as 12 months ago, 20.1% say it is worse and 10.3% that it is better. Finally, about 60.6% of Panamanians believe they can influence the formulation of environmental laws either a lot or some. Only 11.8% say they absolutely cannot influence the formulation of environmental laws.




Figure X-6. Main Problem Facing Enforcement of Environmental Regulations

Finally, when asked about the major problem facing the implementation of strong legal regulations to protect the environment, a plurality of Panamanians point to corruption. Lack of trained personnel is the second most identified problem, followed by lack of resources.




Figure X-7. Public Officials are Concerned about Improving the Environment?

Few Panamanians believe that public officials are concerned about improving the environmental conditions of their community. A majority of 61.2% of respondents say that public officials care little or none at all for improving environmental conditions. Only 3.3% believe they care “a lot” and another 35.6% say they care to “some” degree.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has analyzed a series of questions related to the enforcement of environmental laws. Panama has an extensive legal and regulatory framework for protecting the environment but enforcement is often lacking. Panamanians generally believe that the institutions in charge of protecting the environment are doing a good job. They think that the main problem with the enforcement of environmental laws is corruption, and say the central government should be the main organization in charge of promoting and enforcing environmental laws. Finally, most Panamanians do not believe that public officials are truly concerned with protecting the environment of their community.



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## Appendixes

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## Appendix I: Technical Description of Sample Design

### PANAMA LAPOP 2006-2008-2010 Methodology and sample distribution

For this project, the method used corresponds to a probability sampling at all stages, except for household level, where quotas by sex and age were used, stratified, multistage, by clusters. The parameters were the following: 1. No less than 1500 cases; 2. Clusters of 6-8 interviews in urban areas and in rural areas for each sampling point (census sector); 3. Select at least 125 sampling points in a probabilistic selection.

For this study, the national territory was divided into 4 strata made up for the geographic areas of the country. The Metropolitan area formed by Panama districts (capital of the Republic) and San Miguelito. The Eastern area includes the Panama provinces (excluding the districts of Panama and San Miguelito), Colon and Darien. The Central area includes the Cocle, Herrera, Los Santos and Veraguas provinces. Finally, the Western area formed by Bocas del Toro, Chiriqui and the Comarca Ngobe-Bugle provinces. These areas called regions on the official literature – have been commonly used by institutions in charge of policy design and development programs, by the Panamanian government as well as by the private sector. The insular areas were excluded – the Pacific and the Caribbean coastal-, because of its high cost and difficult access. The study object unit is made up by the population 18 and older, who reside in private households. Population living in collective households was excluded: such as hospitals, orphanages, schools, barracks, hotels, etc. To avoid the sample bias in favor of more populated areas, each stratum was divided in rural and urban, and in each region the clusters were selected using a probabilistic method. The sample distribution among different strata was made proportional to the population of each stratum.

#### Sample distribution:

Geographic area	
Metropolitan	36%
Eastern	23%
Central	21%
Western	20%

*Source: Population and Housing Census, 2000*

**PANAMA MASTER TABLE - MAY 30**  
**LAPOP -2006**  
**CENSUS 2000**

The 2000 census data were used for the sample design. As in 2004, the regions Embera and Kuna Yala were excluded. The regions and criteria are the same as for 2004.

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	% urban	% rural	URBAN SAMPLE	RURAL SAMPLE	TOTAL SAMPLE	URBAN SEGMENT	RURAL SEGMENT	TOTAL SEGMENTS
METROPOLITAN AREA	PANAMÁ	PANAMÁ	679794	28644	708438									
	PANAMÁ	SAN MIGUELITO	293745		293745									
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>973539</b>	<b>28644</b>	<b>1002183</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>3%</b>	522	15	537	66	2	68
EASTERN AREA	PANAMÁ	ARRAIJÁN	134492	15426	149918									
	PANAMÁ	BALCOA		2336	2336									
	PANAMÁ	CAPIRA	9527	23583	33110									
	PANAMÁ	CHAME	5295	14330	19625									
	PANAMÁ	CHEPO	11334	24166	35500									
	PANAMÁ	CHIMÁN		4086	4086									
	PANAMÁ	LA CHORRERA	104404	20252	124656									
	PANAMÁ	SAN CARLOS		15541	15541									
	PANAMÁ	TABOGA		1402	1402									
	COLÓN	CHAGRES		9191	9191									
	COLÓN	COLÓN	137496	36563	174059									
	COLÓN	DONOSO		9671	9671									
	COLÓN	PORTOBELO		7964	7964									
	COLÓN	SANTA ISABEL		3323	3323									
	DARIÉN	CHEPIGANA	1741	25232	26973									
	DARIÉN	PINOGENA		13311	13311									



REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	% urban	% rural	URBAN SAMPLE	RURAL SAMPLE	TOTAL SAMPLE	URBAN SEGMENT	RURAL SEGMENT	TOTAL SEGMENTS
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>404289</b>	<b>226377</b>	<b>630666</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>22%</b>	217	121	338	27	10	37
CENTRAL AREA	COCLÉ	AGUADULCE	26519	12771	39290									
	COCLÉ	ANTON	15882	28157	44039									
	COCLÉ	LA PINTADA		23202	23202									
	COCLÉ	NATA	5546	12265	17811									
	COCLÉ	OLA		5652	5652									
	COCLÉ	PENONOMÉ	13965	58483	72448									
	HERRERA	CHITRÉ	39925	2542	42467									
	HERRERA	LAS MINAS		7945	7945									
	HERRERA	LOS POZOS		7827	7827									
	HERRERA	OCÚ	2942	12994	15936									
	HERRERA	PARITA	2744	6083	8827									
	HERRERA	PESÉ	2529	9942	12471									
	HERRERA	SANTA MARIA		6992	6992									
	LOS SANTOS	GUARARÉ	2037	7448	9485									
	LOS SANTOS	LAS TABLAS	8105	16193	24298									
	LOS SANTOS	LOS SANTOS	5951	17877	23828									
	LOS SANTOS	MARACAS	2052	7085	9137									
	LOS SANTOS	PEDASÍ		3614	3614									
	LOS SANTOS	POCRÍ		3397	3397									
	LOS SANTOS	TONOSÍ		9736	9736									
	VERAGUAS	ATALAYA	2645	6271	8916									
	VERAGUAS	CALOBRE		12184	12184									
	VERAGUAS	CAÑAZAS	2678	13321	15999									
	VERAGUAS	LA MESA	2058	9688	11746									
	VERAGUAS	LAS PALMAS		17924	17924									
	VERAGUAS	MONTIJO	1730	10481	12211									
	VERAGUAS	RÍO DE JESUS		5256	5256									
	VERAGUAS	SAN FRANCISCO		9899	9899									
	VERAGUAS	SANTA FE		12890	12890									

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	% urban	% rural	URBAN SAMPLE	RURAL SAMPLE	TOTAL SAMPLE	URBAN SEGMENT	RURAL SEGMENT	TOTAL SEGMENTS
	VERAGUAS	SANTIAGO	42979	31700	74679									
	VERAGUAS	SONÁ	7394	19997	27391									
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>187681</b>	<b>409816</b>	<b>597497</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>40%</b>	101	220	320	13	19	32
WESTERN AREA	BOCAS DEL TORO	BOCAS DEL TORO	3139	6777	9916									
	BOCAS DEL TORO	CHANGUINOLA	32095	39827	71922									
	BOCAS DEL TORO	CHIRIQUI GRANDE		7431	7431									
	CHIRIQUI	ALANJE		15497	15497									
	CHIRIQUI	BARU	21897	38654	60551									
	CHIRIQUI	BOQUERON		12275	12275									
	CHIRIQUI	BOQUETE	5655	11288	16943									
	CHIRIQUI	BUGABA	27482	41088	68570									
	CHIRIQUI	DAVID	104861	19419	124280									
	CHIRIQUI	DOLEGA	1527	15716	17243									
	CHIRIQUI	GUALACA	2606	5742	8348									
	CHIRIQUI	REMEDIOS		3489	3489									
	CHIRIQUI	RENACIMIENTO		18257	18257									
	CHIRIQUI	SAN FÉLIX		5276	5276									
	CHIRIQUI	SAN LORENZO		6498	6498									
	CHIRIQUI	TOLÉ		11563	11563									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	BESIKO		16843	16843									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	KANKINTÚ		19670	19670									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	KUSAPÍN		14691	14691									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	MIRONÓ		10419	10419									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	MÜNA		28330	28330									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	NOLE DUIMA		9294	9294									
	COMARCA NGÖBE BUGLÉ	ÑÜRÜM		10833	10833									

REGION	PROVINCE	DISTRICT	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	% urban	% rural	URBAN SAMPLE	RURAL SAMPLE	TOTAL SAMPLE	URBAN SEGMENT	RURAL SEGMENT	TOTAL SEGMENTS
	<b>SUBTOTAL</b>		<b>199262</b>	<b>368877</b>	<b>568139</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>305</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>1764771</b>	<b>1033714</b>	<b>2798485</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>946</b>	<b>554</b>	<b>1500</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>168</b>
<b>%</b>			<b>63,1%</b>	<b>36,9%</b>	<b>100,0%</b>									
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>946</b>	<b>554</b>	<b>1500</b>							<b>960</b>	<b>576</b>	<b>1536</b>



## **Appendix II: The IRB “informed consent” document**



Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been chosen by lottery to participate in a study of public opinion, which is funded by Vanderbilt University. I come on behalf of Borge y Asociados S.A. to request an interview lasting 30 to 40 minutes.

The main objective of this study is to find out people's opinions about various aspects of your country's current situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You can leave questions unanswered or end the interview at any time. The answers you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous.

If you have questions about the study, you may contact Borge y Asociados at phone number 67091409 and ask for Claudia Canton, the person responsible for this project.

Would you like to participate?



## Appendix III: The Questionnaire

Panamá, Versión # 10.1a IRB Approval: # 090103



El Barómetro de las Américas: Panamá, 2010

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<b>PAIS.</b>					<b>7</b>
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	<b>07. Panamá</b>	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
<b>IDNUM.</b> Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>ESTRATOPRI:</b> (701) Área Metropolitana (702) Área Oriental (703) Área Central (704) Área Occidental (705) Darién (706) Río Jaqué (707) Río Mogue (708) Río Tuquesa					<b>7</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>UPM.</b> (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>PROV. Provincia:</b> _____					<b>7</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>MUNICIPIO.</b> Distrito: _____					<b>7</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>PANDISTRITO.</b> Corregimiento: _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>PANSEC.</b> Sector: _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>CLUSTER.</b> (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>UR.</b> (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>TAMANO.</b> Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural					<input type="text"/>
<b>IDIOMAQ.</b> Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español					<input type="text"/>
<b>Hora de inicio:</b> ____: ____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>FECHA.</b> Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes: ____ año: 2010					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA</b>					

<b>Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar]</b> Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
<b>LS3.</b> Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

<b>A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]</b>				<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61	
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02	
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59	
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15	
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10	
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16	
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12	
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14	
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04	
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06	
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22	
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31	
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27	
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33	
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07	
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60	
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57	
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55	
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70	
NS	88	NR	98	

<b>SOCT1.</b> Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR					
<b>SOCT2.</b> ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR					
<b>SOCT3.</b> ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR					
<b>IDIO1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR					
<b>IDIO2.</b> ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR					
<b>IDIO3.</b> ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR					

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	<b>Sí</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>NR</b>
<b>CP2.</b> ¿A algún diputado de la Asamblea Nacional?	1	2	88	98
<b>CP4A.</b> ¿A alguna autoridad local, como el alcalde de este distrito?	1	2	88	98
<b>CP4.</b> ¿A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98



<b>PANCP4B.</b> ¿Al representante de corregimiento?	1	2	88	98
<b>PANCP4C.</b> ¿Al corregidor?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...				
<b>NP1.</b> ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde				
<b>NP2.</b> ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina o funcionario de la alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a SGL1]</b> (88) NS <b>[Pase a SGL1]</b> (98) No responde <b>[Pase a SGL1]</b>				
<b>MUNI10.</b> ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.				
<b>SGL1.</b> ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR				

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
<b>CP5.</b> Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. <b>[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]</b>								
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS		NR	
<b>CP6.</b> ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88		98	
<b>CP7.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88		98	
<b>CP8.</b> ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88		98	
<b>CP9.</b> ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88		98	
<b>CP13.</b> ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88		98	
<b>CP20. [Solo mujeres]</b> ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98	INAP 99	

**[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]**

**LS6.** En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del cero al diez. El cero es el escalón más bajo y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es el escalón más alto y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja el escalón que mejor represente su opinión.**

**[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la "peor vida posible" y el que representa "la mejor vida posible". Indíquelo a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].**

posible. Marque a la persona entrevistada que pueda seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala.														
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98		
La peor vida posible						La mejor vida posible						NS	NR	

**LS6A.** ¿En qué [grada] escalón diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

**[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]**

**IT1.** Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR

**[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]**

**L1.** Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88) (NR=98)	
Izquierda					Derecha						

**[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]**

**PROT3.** En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?

(1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC1]**

(88) NS **[Pase a JC1]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC1]**

**PROT4.** ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses? \_\_\_\_\_ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

**Y4.** ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? **[NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]**

- (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)
- (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)
- (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)
- (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)
- (5) Derechos humanos
- (6) Temas ambientales
- (7) Falta de servicios públicos
- (8) Otros
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. En su opinión se justificaría que la Fuerza Pública se tomen el poder por un golpe de estado frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]**

<b>JC1.</b> Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que La Fuerza Pública tome el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que La Fuerza Pública tome el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
<b>JC10.</b> Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que La Fuerza Pública tome el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que La Fuerza Pública tome el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
<b>JC13.</b> Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que La Fuerza Pública tome el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que La Fuerza Pública tome el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

<b>JC15A.</b> ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre la Asamblea Nacional y gobierne sin la Asamblea Nacional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
<b>JC16A.</b> ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

<b>VIC1EXT.</b> Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o <b>algún otro tipo</b> de acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]</b> (88) NS <b>[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]</b> (98) NR <b>[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]</b>	
<b>VIC1EXTA.</b> ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

<b>VIC2.</b> Pensando en el último acto delictual del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (01) Robo sin arma <b>sin</b> agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma <b>con</b> agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	
--	--

<b>VIC2AA.</b> ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
<b>VIC1HOGAR.</b> ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o <b>algún otro tipo</b> de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

<b>AOJ8.</b> Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>AOJ11.</b> Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	

<i>Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...</i>	SÍ	No	NS	NR	
<b>VIC40.</b> ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1)	(0)	88	98	
<b>VIC41.</b> ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1)	(0)	88	98	
<b>VIC42.</b> ¿Tiene usted un negocio? <b>No → Marcar 99</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha cerrado su negocio a causa de la delincuencia?	(1)	(0)	88	98	99
<b>VIC43.</b> ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o vecindario por temor a la delincuencia?	(1)	(0)	88	98	
<b>VIC44.</b> Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1)	(0)	88	98	
<b>VIC45.</b> ¿Usted trabaja? <b>No → Marcar 99</b> <b>Sí → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia?	(1)	(0)	88	98	99

<b>AOJ11A.</b> Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>AOJ12.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>AOJ17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

<p><b>VIC11.</b> ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? <b>[No leer]</b>  <b>[Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?]</b>  (0) No denunciaría  (1) Alcaldía  (2) Policía  (3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría, etc.)  (4) Iglesia  (5) Medio de comunicación  (6) Corregiduría  (7) Policía Técnica Judicial (PTJ) o Dirección de Investigación Judicial (DIJ)  (8) Otros  (88) NS  (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>AOJ12a.</b> Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> Confiaría...(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco  (4) Nada (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>AOJ16A.</b> En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses?  (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>AOJ18.</b> Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>  (1) La policía protege, o  (2) La policía está involucrada con delincuencia  (3) <b>[No leer]</b> No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia  (4) <b>[No leer]</b> Protege e involucrada con la delincuencia  (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>VIC50.</b> Hablando de la ciudad o el pueblo en donde usted vive, ¿cree que los niveles de violencia son en general alto, medios o bajos?  (1) Altos (2) Medios (3) Bajos (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>VIC56.</b> ¿Y qué tanto cree usted que los políticos se preocupan por mejorar la seguridad de su ciudad o comunidad: mucho, algo, poco o nada?  (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ3.</b> ¿Podría decirme cuál considera usted que es el principal problema que enfrenta actualmente la Administración de Justicia en Panamá? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>  (1) Corrupción  (2) Lentitud de la Justicia  (3) Falta de capacitación del personal  (4) Falta de presupuesto  (5) Falta de independencia judicial  (6) Otro  (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ6.</b> ¿Cuando ha estado cerca de un miembro de la Policía Nacional que tan seguro se siente?  (1) muy seguro <b>[PASE A PANA0J8]</b> (2) algo seguro <b>[PASE A PANOJ8]</b>  (3) algo inseguro <b>[SIGA A PANAOJ7]</b> (4) muy inseguro <b>[SIGA A PANAOJ7]</b>  (88) NS <b>[PASE A PANA0J8]</b> (98) NR <b>[PASE A PANA0J8]</b></p>	
<p><b>PANAOJ7.</b> ¿Por qué se siente inseguro? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>  (1) La policía abusa los derechos humanos  (2) La policía es corrupta  (3) La policía abusa su poder  (4) Mi experiencia con policías en el pasado no es buena  (5) Los policías me dan miedo  (6) <b>[No Leer]</b> Otro (88) NS (98)NR  (99) Inap</p>	

<b>PANAOJ8.</b> ¿Conoce Usted un policía por su rostro ó su nombre en su barrio o comunidad? (1) Sí, por rostro <b>[Siga a PANAOJ9]</b> (2) Sí, por nombre <b>[Siga a PANAOJ9]</b> (3) Sí, ambos <b>[Siga a PANAOJ9]</b> (4) No <b>[PASE A FEAR0]</b> (88) NS <b>[PASE A FEAR0]</b> (98) NR <b>[PASE A FEAR0]</b>	
<b>PANAOJ9.</b> ¿Qué tan confiable piensa que es el policía que usted conoce? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap	

Ahora cambiando de tema, me podría decir, ¿qué tan seguro o inseguro se sentiría usted en las siguientes situaciones?						
	Muy seguro	Algo seguro	Algo inseguro	muy inseguro	NS	NR
<b>FEAR0.</b> Estar en su casa con su familia cuando es de día ¿se sentiría usted...	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>FEAR1.</b> Estar solo en su casa cuando es de día ¿se sentiría usted...	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>FEAR2.</b> Estar solo en su casa cuando es de noche ¿se sentiría usted...	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>FEAR3.</b> Caminar solo por este barrio cuando es día ¿se sentiría usted...	1	2	3	4	88	98
<b>FEAR4.</b> Caminar solo por este barrio cuando es de a noche ¿se sentiría usted...	1	2	3	4	88	98

<b>FEAR6.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que alguien entre a su casa a robar cuando no hay nadie? Está usted (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (88) NS (98) NR
<b>FEAR7.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que alguien lo detenga en la calle, lo amenace, golpee, o le haga daño en su <b>barrio</b> ? Está usted... (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (88) NS (98) NR
<b>FEAR8.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted de que a algún miembro de su familia lo detengan en la calle, lo amenacen, golpeen, o le hagan daño en su barrio? Está usted... (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (88) NS (98) NR

	Mayor	Igual	Menor	NS	NR
<b>PESE1.</b> ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en <b>su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor</b> que el de otros barrios, colonias, o comunidades en este municipio?	1	2	3	88	98
<b>PESE2.</b> ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en <b>este barrio es mayor, igual, o menor</b> que el de hace 12 meses?	1	2	3	88	98
<b>PESE3.</b> Y en los próximos 12 meses, cree usted que el nivel de violencia en <b>este barrio</b> será <b>mayor, igual, o menor</b> que ahora?	1	2	3	88	98

Ahora voy a leerle una lista de situaciones que pueden o no ser problema en algunos barrios. Por favor dígame si las siguientes situaciones son un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no son un problema en <b>este barrio</b> . <b>[Repita después cada pregunta “es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema” para ayudar al entrevistado]</b>							
	Muy serio	Algo serio	Poco serio	Nada serio	No es un problema	NS	NR
<b>DISO7.</b> Jóvenes en las calles sin hacer nada, vagando, <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98



<b>DISO8.</b> Jóvenes que viven en este barrio en pandillas o maras <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO9.</b> Vandalismo o ataques intencionales a la propiedad privada, <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO10.</b> Venta o tráfico de drogas ilegales en su barrio <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO11.</b> Gente peleando y discutiendo en la calle, <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98

<b>DISO13.</b> Gente borracha en las calles <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO14.</b> Gente endrogada en las calles <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO15.</b> Robo a viviendas, <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO16.</b> Asaltos a las personas cuando caminan por la calle <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO17.</b> Balaceras <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
<b>DISO18.</b> Riñas o peleas de pandillas o maras <b>es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema en este barrio</b>	1	2	3	4	5	88	98

**[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]**

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
<b>Nada</b>						<b>Mucho</b>	<b>NS</b>	<b>NR</b>

**Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

**B1.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Panamá garantizan un juicio justo? *(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*

<b>B2.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Panamá?	
<b>B3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político panameño?	
<b>B4.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político panameño?	
<b>B6.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político panameño?	
<b>B10A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
<b>B11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Tribunal Electoral?	
<b>B13.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Nacional?	
<b>B14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	
<b>B18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	
<b>B20.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
<b>B20A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?	
<b>B21.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
<b>B21A.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
<b>B31.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
<b>B32.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	
<b>B43.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser panameño(a)?	
<b>B16.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General del Estado?	
<b>B17.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	
<b>B37.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
<b>B47.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	
<b>B48.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?	
<b>PANB49.</b> ¿Hasta que punto tiene confianza usted en la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera <b>[continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7]</b> <b>NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO</b>	<b>Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR</b>
<b>N1.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
<b>N3.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
<b>N9.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
<b>N11.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
<b>N12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	
<b>N15.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

<b>PANWT3.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted que haya un ataque terrorista contra el Canal de Panamá en los próximos 12 meses?	
<b>PANWT4.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted que la guerrilla colombiana (FARC) lleve acabo un ataque terrorista en Panamá en los próximos 12 meses?	
<b>PANWT5.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted que grupos fundamentalistas islámicos lleven acabo un ataque terrorista en Panamá en los próximos 12 meses?	

**[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]**

<b>WT1.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado(a) está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en Panamá en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado(a), o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>WT2.</b> ¿Qué tan preocupado(a) está de que usted o alguien de su familia sea víctima de un ataque violento por terroristas? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado(a), o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	



**[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]**

Vamos a seguir usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho.

<b>SOCO9.</b> Y ahora hablando de <b>su barrio</b> , ¿Hasta qué punto diría que los vecinos de este barrio están organizados para prevenir la delincuencia y la violencia?	
<b>SOCO10.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto diría que los vecinos de este barrio se llevan bien con la policía?	

**[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]**

<b>POLE1.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría el trabajo que la policía nacional está haciendo con la gente de este barrio para solucionar los problemas del barrio? ¿Usted diría que el trabajo que está haciendo la policía es...?: <b>[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b> (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (7) <b>[espontánea no leer]</b> La policía no está haciendo nada (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>POLE2.</b> En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la calidad de los servicios policiales por parte de la policía nacional en este barrio? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (7) <b>[espontánea no leer]</b> La policía no está haciendo nada (88) NS (98) NR	

<b>POLE3.</b> ¿Cómo calificaría el trabajo que está haciendo la policía nacional para prevenir la delincuencia en <b>este barrio o comunidad</b> ? Usted diría que el trabajo que está haciendo la policía para prevenir la delincuencia es...?: <b>[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b> (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (7) <b>[espontánea no leer]</b> La policía no está haciendo nada (88) NS (98) NR	
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<b>ICO1.</b> En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido usted alguna conversación casual con un policía en su barrio? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>ICO2.</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia la policía nacional patrulla su barrio? Usted diría: <b>[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b> (1) Muchas veces al día (2) Al menos una vez al día (3) Algunas veces por semana (4) Algunas veces por mes (5) Rara vez (6) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	

En los últimos 12 meses, cuál de las siguientes actividades ha visto a la policía nacional hacer en su barrio	Sí	No	NS	NR
<b>CPOL1.</b> Hablar con los residentes del barrio	1	2	88	98
<b>CPOL2.</b> Asistir a reuniones de vecinos del barrio	1	2	88	98
<b>CPOL3.</b> Ayudar a realizar actividades de prevención de la delincuencia en el barrio	1	2	88	98
<b>CPOL4.</b> Involucrarse con los niños y jóvenes de su barrio a través de actividades recreacionales y escolares	1	2	88	98

<b>DEMP1.</b> Que prefiere usted, <b>[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b> (1) Que la policía nacional se involucre más en la resolución de los problemas de su barrio, o (2) Que la policía nacional se involucre menos en la resolución de los problemas de su barrio o (3) Que todo siga igual (88) NS (98) NR	
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<b>M1.</b> Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Ricardo Martinelli es...?: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Muy bueno      (2) Bueno      (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular)      (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo)      (88) NS      (98) NR	
<b>M2.</b> Hablando de la Asamblea Nacional y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados de la Asamblea Nacional panameña están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien      (2) Bien      (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular)      (4) Mal      (5) Muy Mal (88) NS      (98)NR	

**[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]**

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NS
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	88	98
							Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones

**POP101.** Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

**POP102.** Cuando la Asamblea estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin la Asamblea. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

**POP103.** Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema de Justicia debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

**POP107.** El pueblo debe gobernar **directamente** y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

**POP113.** Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

(88) NS (98) NR

**Continuamos usando la misma escalera.** Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

**EFF1.** A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**EFF2.** Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

**ING4.** Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**DEM23.** La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

**NS = 88, NR = 98**

**ROS1.** El Estado panameño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**ROS2.** El Estado panameño, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**ROS3.** El Estado panameño, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**ROS4.** El Estado panameño debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**ROS5.** El Estado panameño, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**ROS6.** El Estado panameño, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

**[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]**

**PN4.** En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Panamá?

(1) Muy satisfecho (a) (2) Satisfecho (a) (3) Insatisfecho (a) (4) Muy insatisfecho (a)  
(88) NS (98) NR

**PN5.** En su opinión, ¿Panamá es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático  
(88) NS (98) NR

**[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "E"]**

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
<b>Desaprueba firmemente</b>									<b>Aprueba firmemente</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>98</b>
										<b>1-10, 88, 98</b>	
<b>E5.</b> Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
<b>E8.</b> Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
<b>E11.</b> Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
<b>E15.</b> Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escalera, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
<b>E14.</b> Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
<b>E3.</b> Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
<b>E16.</b> Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											

**[No recoja tarjeta “E”]**

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Panamá. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente								Aprueba firmemente		88	98

	1-10, 88, 98
<b>D1.</b> Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Panamá, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el <b>derecho de votar</b> de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escalera: <b>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</b>	
<b>D2.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo <b>manifestaciones pacíficas</b> con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
<b>D3.</b> Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Panamá. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan <b>postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?	
<b>D4.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión <b>para dar un discurso</b> ?	
<b>D5.</b> Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas <b>puedan postularse para cargos públicos</b> ?	
<b>D6.</b> ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

**[Recoger tarjeta “E”]**

Ahora cambiando de tema...

<b>DEM2.</b> Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno <b>no</b> democrático, <b>O</b> (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, <b>O</b> (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>DEM11.</b> ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>AUT1.</b> Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PP1.</b> Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PP2.</b> Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
<b>EXC2.</b> ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC6.</b> ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC11.</b> ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en los últimos 12 meses? <b>Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99</b> <b>Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:</b> Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC13.</b> ¿Usted trabaja? <b>Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99</b> <b>Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:</b> En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC14.</b> ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? <b>Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99</b> <b>Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:</b> ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC15.</b> ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? <b>Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99</b> <b>Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:</b> En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC16.</b> En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? <b>Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99</b> <b>Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar:</b> En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC18.</b> ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
<b>EXC7.</b> Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: <b>[LEER]</b> (1) Muy generalizada      (2) Algo generalizada      (3) Poco generalizada      (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS      (98) NR						

**[Entregar otra vez la Tarjeta “D”]** Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
<b>Muy en desacuerdo</b>						<b>Muy de acuerdo</b>		NS NR
<b>Usted se considera una persona que es:</b>								
PER1. Sociable y activa								
PER2. Una persona critica y peleona								
PER3. Una persona confiable y disciplinada								
PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestarse								
PER5. Una persona abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual								
PER6. Una persona callada y tímida								
PER7. Una persona generosa y cariñosa								
PER8. Una persona desorganizada y descuidada								
PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable								
PER10. Una persona poco creativa y con poca imaginación								

**[Recoger Tarjeta “D”]**

<p><b>CRISIS1.</b> Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave  (2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o  (3) No hay crisis económica <b>[Pase a VB1]</b>  (88) NS <b>[Pase a VB1]</b> (98) NR <b>[Pase a VB1]</b></p>	
<p><b>CRISIS2.</b> ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: <b>[LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]</b></p> <p>(01) El gobierno anterior  (02) El gobierno actual  (03) Nosotros, los panameños  (04) Los ricos de nuestro país  (05) Los problemas de la democracia  (06) Los países ricos <b>[Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón]</b>  (07) El sistema económico del país, o  (08) Nunca ha pensado en esto  (77) <b>[NO LEER]</b> Otro  (88) <b>[NO LEER]</b> NS (98) <b>[NO LEER]</b> NR (99) INAP</p>	

<p><b>VB1.</b> ¿Tiene cédula de identidad?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>VB2.</b> ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009?</p> <p>(1) Sí votó <b>[Siga]</b>  (2) No votó <b>[Pasar a VB10]</b>  (88) NS <b>[Pasar a VB10]</b> (98) NR <b>[Pasar a VB10]</b></p>	



<b>VB3.</b> ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b> (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (701) Balbina Herrera (702) Ricardo Martinelli (703) Guillermo Endara (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)	
<b>VB10.</b> ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a POL1]</b> (88) NS <b>[Pase a POL1]</b> (98) NR <b>[Pase a POL1]</b>	
<b>VB11.</b> ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? <b>[NO LEER LISTA]</b> (701) Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) (702) Cambio Democrático (703) Partido Panameñista (Arnulfista) (704) Partido MOLINERA (705) Partido Popular (706) Partido Liberal (707) Partido Unión Patriótica (708) Partido Vanguardia Moral de la Patria (88) NS <b>[Pase a POL1]</b> (98) NR <b>[Pase a POL1]</b> (99) INAP <b>[Pase a POL1]</b>	
<b>VB12</b> Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido <b>[partido que mencionó en VB11]</b> es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte? (1) Muy débil      (2) Débil      (3) Ni débil ni fuerte      (4) Fuerte      (5) Muy fuerte      (88)NS (98) NR      (99) INAP	
<b>POL1.</b> ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho      (2) Algo      (3) Poco      (4) Nada      (88) NS      (98) NR	
<b>VB20.</b> ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? <b>[Leer opciones]</b> (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS      (98) NR	
<b>CLIEN1.</b> En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente <b>[SIGA con CLIEN2]</b> (2) Rara vez <b>[SIGA con CLIEN2]</b> (3) Nunca <b>[Pase a PANENV1]</b> (88) NS <b>[Pase a PANENV1]</b> (98) NR <b>[Pase a PANENV1]</b>	
<b>CLIEN2</b> Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien? (1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS      (98) NR      (99) INAP	

Y ahora cambiando de tema, ¿dígame si usted cree que el trabajo que desempeñan las siguientes instituciones <b>sobre el tema ambiental (protección del medio ambiente)</b> es muy bueno, bueno, ni bueno ni malo (regular), malo, o muy malo (pésimo)?	
<b>PANENV1.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM) sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV2.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña la Autoridad de los Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá (ARAP) es.... (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV3.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP) sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV4.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña la Corte Suprema de Justicia sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV5.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña La Asamblea Nacional sobre el tema ambiental es?. (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV7.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña el Poder ejecutivo sobre el tema ambiental es?. (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV9.</b> ¿El trabajo que desempeña el Gobierno Municipal sobre el tema ambiental es? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV10.</b> Y ahora me puede decir, ¿hasta qué punto cree usted que las leyes de protección al medio ambiente son aplicadas de manera justa? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b> (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV11.</b> ¿Quién cree Usted que deba tener <b>mayor</b> responsabilidad para proteger el medio ambiente? (1) El Gobierno Central (2) El Gobierno Municipal (3) La empresa privada (4) Las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (ONG) o (5) Los ciudadanos <b>[NO LEER]</b> (6) Todos por igual (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV12.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto considera usted que actualmente existe una política de Estado que fortalezca la institucionalidad ambiental? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV13.</b> ¿Diría usted que la situación ambiental actual es mejor, igual o peor que hace 12 meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV14.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto cree Usted que puede incidir personalmente en las decisiones sobre actividades que impactan el ambiente y los recursos naturales? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
<b>PANENV15.</b> ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o violación ambiental, donde lo denunciaría? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b> <b>[Si dice “a la autoridad competente” sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?]</b> (0) No denunciaría (1) ANAM (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente) (2) Fiscalía o Procuraduría (3) Policía (4) Medios de comunicación (5) Corregiduría (corregidor) (6) Otros (88) NS (98) NR	



<p><b>PANENV16.</b> ¿Qué tanto cree usted que los funcionarios públicos se preocupan por mejorar la calidad ambiental de su comunidad?</p> <p>(1) Mucho      (2) Algo      (3) Poco      (4) Nada      (88) NS      (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>PANENV17.</b> ¿Podría decirme cuál considera usted que es <b>el principal</b> problema que enfrenta actualmente la institucionalidad ambiental en Panamá?</p> <p>(1) Corrupción  (2) Falta de políticas de Estado  (3) Falta de capacitación del personal  (4) Falta de presupuesto  (5) Falta de independencia institucional  <b>[No Leer]</b> (6) Otro  (88) NS  (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>PANENV18.</b> ¿Hasta qué punto está Usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que el Estado panameño debe implementar políticas <b>firmes</b> para reducir la degradación de los recursos naturales?</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo      (2) Algo de acuerdo      (3) Algo en <b>desacuerdo</b>  (4) Muy en <b>desacuerdo</b>      (88) NS      (98) NR</p>	

Y Ahora, vamos a preguntar algunas preguntas para efecto estadístico

<p><b>ED.</b> ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?</p> <p>_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total <b>[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]</b></p>						
	<b>1<sup>o</sup></b>	<b>2<sup>o</sup></b>	<b>3<sup>o</sup></b>	<b>4<sup>o</sup></b>	<b>5<sup>o</sup></b>	<b>6<sup>o</sup></b>
Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+
NS	88					
NR	98					

<p><b>Q2.</b> ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888 = NS    988 = NR)</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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<p><b>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C]</b></p> <p><b>Y1.</b> Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo... <b>[Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]</b></p> <p>(1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político  (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones  (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario  (4) Ninguna de estas  (5) <b>[NO LEER]</b> Otra  (88) NS  (98) NR  (99) INAP</p>	
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<p><b>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]</b>  <b>Y2.</b> ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia?  <b>[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice “el futuro” preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]</b>          (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral          (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos          (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras)          (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación          (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas          (6) Relacionamento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros)          (7) Salud          (8) Medio ambiente          (9) Situación del país          (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada          (11) Otra respuesta          (88) NS          (98) NR          (99) INAP</p>	
<p><b>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]</b>  <b>Y3.</b> En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada?          (1) Correcta          (2) Equivocada          (88) NS          (98) NR          (99) INAP</p>	
<p><b>[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]</b>  <b>HAICR1.</b> Podría decirme ¿cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país?  <b>[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]</b>          (01) TV          (02) Diario          (03) Radio          (04) Iglesia          (05) Centro comunitario          (06) Escuela          (07) Familiares          (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio          (09) Amigos          (10) Vecinos          (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios)          (88) NS          (98) NR          (99) INAP</p>	

<p><b>Q3C.</b> Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? <b>[No leer opciones]</b>  <b>[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]</b>(01) Católico  (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).  (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).  (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)  (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).  (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).  (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza (Lucumi); Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica, Alianza Francesa, Yompi Yompi, Santería Cubana, Vudu, Yoruba Endo).  (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)  (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)  (12) Testigos de Jehová.  (13) Oración Fuerte al Espíritu Santo  (88) NS  (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>Q5A.</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>  (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes  (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>Q5B.</b> Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>  (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS  (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]</b>  <b>Q10.</b> ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?  <b>[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]</b>  (00) Ningún ingreso  (01) Menos de \$100  (02) Entre \$100- \$199  (03) \$200-\$399  (04) \$400-\$599  (05) \$600-\$799  (06) \$800-\$999  (07) \$1000-\$1499  (08) \$1500-\$2499  (09) \$2500-\$4999  (10) \$5000-y más  (88) NS  (98) NR  <b>[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10A.</b> ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?  (1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b> (2) No <b>[Pase a Q10C]</b> (88) NS <b>[Pase a Q10C]</b>  (98) NR <b>[Pase a Q10C]</b></p>	
<p><b>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas]</b> ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b>  (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

<p><b>Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas]</b> En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido (4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p><b>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿en dónde?]</p> <p><b>[No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga] (2) Sí, en los estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga] (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) [Siga] (4) No [Pase a Q14] (88) NS [Pase a Q14] (98) NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	
<p><b>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C]</b> ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos?</p> <p><b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p><b>Q14. [Preguntar a todos]</b> ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>Q10D.</b> El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p><b>Q10E.</b> En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: <b>[Leer opciones]</b></p> <p>(1) ¿Aumentó? [Pase a Q11] (2) ¿Permaneció igual? [Pase a Q11] (3) ¿Disminuyó? [Pase a Q10F] (88) NS [Pase a Q11] (98) NR [Pase a Q11]</p>	
<p><b>Q10F.</b> ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? <b>[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</b></p> <p>(1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien (4) El negocio familiar se quebró (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar (7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo (8) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos (8) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP ( “Aumentó”, “Permaneció igual” o NS/NR en Q10E)</p>	
<p><b>Q11.</b> ¿Cuál es su estado civil? <b>[No leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>Q12.</b> ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

**Q12A. [Si tiene hijos]** ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? \_\_\_\_\_  
**00 = ninguno,** (88) NS (98) NR **(99) INAP (no tiene hijos)**

**ETID.** ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-panameña, codificar como (4) Negra]**  
 (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR

**LENG1.** ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa?  
**[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]**  
 (701) Castellano (Español) (702) Kuna (703) Emberá (704) Otro (nativo) (incluye Patuá)  
 (705) Otro extranjero (por ejemplo, ingles, francés, italiano, portugués, chino, japonés, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR

**WWW1.** Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**  
 (1) Diariamente  
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana  
 (3) Algunas veces al mes  
 (4) Rara vez  
 (5) Nunca  
 (88) NS **[No leer]** (98) NR **[No leer]**

Para propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...

**G10.** ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]:** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana  
 (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR

**G11.** ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde

**G13.** ¿Cuántas provincias tiene Panamá? **[NO LEER: 10 provincias y 4 comarcas indígenas. Aceptar 10 ó 14]**  
 (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

**G14.** ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Panamá? **[NO LEER: 5 años]**  
 (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

<b>R1.</b> Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R3.</b> Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R4.</b> Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R4A.</b> Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R5.</b> Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más	
<b>R6.</b> Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R7.</b> Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R8.</b> Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R12.</b> Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R14.</b> Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R15.</b> Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R16.</b> Televisor de pantalla plana (plasma, LCD o LED)	(0) No	(1) Sí
<b>R18.</b> Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí

<p><b>OCUP4A.</b> ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Trabajando? <b>[Siga]</b></p> <p>(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? <b>[Siga]</b></p> <p>(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? <b>[Pase a OCUP1B1]</b></p> <p>(4) Es estudiante? <b>[Pase a OCUP1B1]</b></p> <p>(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? <b>[Pase a OCUP1B1]</b></p> <p>(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? <b>[Pase a OCUP1B1]</b></p> <p>(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? <b>[Pase a OCUP1B1]</b></p> <p>(88) NS <b>[Pase a OCUP1B1]</b></p> <p>(98) NR <b>[Pase a OCUP1B1]</b></p>	
<p><b>OCUP1A.</b> En su ocupación principal usted es: <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono o socio de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p><b>OCUP1B1.</b> ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo.</p> <p>(2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo.</p> <p>(3) No, no perdió su trabajo</p> <p>(4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo</p> <p>(88) NS                      (98) NR</p>	
<p><b>OCUP1B2.</b> ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años?</p> <p>(1) Sí    (2) No                      (88) NS                      (98)NR</p>	
<p><b>PEN1.</b> ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones [o jubilación] ?</p> <p>(1) Sí <b>[Siga]</b>                      (2) No <b>[Pase a SAL1]</b>                      (88) NS <b>[Pase a SAL1]</b>                      (98) NR <b>[Pase a SAL1]</b></p>	
<p><b>PEN3.</b> ¿A qué sistema de pensiones está usted afiliado? <b>[Leer alternativas]</b></p> <p>(1) Fondo de pensiones privado</p> <p>(2) Sistema público o de seguro social [Subsistema exclusivamente de beneficio definido]</p> <p>(3) Subsistema Mixto [componente de beneficio definido y componente de ahorro individual]</p> <p>(4) Sistema de Ahorro y Capitalización de pensiones de los Servidores Públicos (SIACAP)</p> <p>(7) Otro</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p><b>PEN4.</b> ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted cotizó a su fondo de jubilación [o pensión]? <b>[Leer alternativas]:</b></p> <p>(1) Todos los meses</p> <p>(2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o</p> <p>(3) No cotizó</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	



**[Preguntar a todos]****SAL1.** Tiene usted seguro médico?(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No (88) NS (98) NR**[Si el entrevistado respondió “No”, “NS” o “NR” y la entrevista es en el “Darién” pase a PANDES, para el resto de entrevistados que respondieron “No, NS o NR” finalizar la entrevista]****SAL2.** Es su seguro médico... **[Leer opciones]**

(1) Del gobierno, parte de la Caja de seguro social

(2) De otro plan del Estado

(3) Es un plan privado

**[No leer]:** (4) Tiene ambos, del gobierno y un plan privado (88) NS (98) NR

(99) INAP (no tiene seguro médico)

**SAL4.** ¿En su plan de seguro médico, es usted titular o beneficiario?

(1) Titular (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap

**[SOLO para las personas en el Darién continuar con las siguientes preguntas. PARA EL RESTO TERMINAR ENTREVISTA]****PANDES.** ¿Me puede decir si Usted es una persona desplazada o refugiada?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

**A4C.** En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que enfrenta esta comunidad? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**☐☐

Agua, falta de	19	Medio ambiente/Basura en las calles	10
Áreas de recreación, falta de	71	Migración	16
Áreas de recreación, mal estado	72	Narcotráfico	12
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Pandillas/Maras	14
Corrupción	13	Pobreza	04
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desigualdad	58	Secuestro	31
Desnutrición	23	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Discriminación	25	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Consumo de drogas	11	Violencia	57
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Vivienda, malas condiciones	55
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Otro	70
Electricidad, falta de	24	NS	88
Explosión demográfica/sobre población/hacinamiento	20	NR	98
Terrorismo	33		

**FARC1.** ¿Por lo que usted sabe o ha escuchado las FARC [guerrillas colombianas] promueven actividades en su comunidad?(1) Sí **[siga]** (2) No **[Pase a PARAM1]** (88)NS **[Pase a PARAM1]** (98) NR **[Pase a PARAM1]****FARC2.** ¿Con qué frecuencia cree Usted que las FARC promueven actividades en su comunidad? Usted diría:**[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

(1) Muchas veces al día

(2) Al menos una vez al día

(3) Algunas veces por semana

(4) Algunas veces por mes

(5) Rara vez

(6) Nunca

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

**FARC3.** ¿Por lo que usted sabe o ha escuchado las actividades de las FARC en su comunidad benefician esta comunidad?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

**PARAM1.** ¿Por lo que usted sabe o ha escuchado los paramilitares colombianos promueven actividades en su comunidad?

(1) Sí **[siga]** (2) No **[Fin entrevista]** (88) NS **[Fin entrevista]** (98) NR **[Fin entrevista]**

**PARAM2.** ¿Con qué frecuencia cree Usted que los paramilitares colombianos promueven actividades en su comunidad? Usted diría: **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]**

(1) Muchas veces al día  
(2) Al menos una vez al día  
(3) Algunas veces por semana  
(4) Algunas veces por mes  
(5) Rara vez  
(6) Nunca  
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

**PARAM3.** ¿Por lo que usted sabe o ha escuchado las actividades de los paramilitares colombianos en su comunidad benefician esta comunidad?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

**Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.**

**COLORR.** [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] \_\_\_\_\_

□□

(97) No se pudo clasificar **[Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]**

Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista \_\_\_\_\_ : \_\_\_\_\_

□□□□

**TI.** Duración de la entrevista **[minutos, ver página # 1]** \_\_\_\_\_

**INTID.** Número de identificación del entrevistador: \_\_\_\_\_

□□□□□

**SEXI.** Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

**COLORI.** Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo \_\_\_\_\_

□□

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador \_\_\_\_\_ Fecha \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_

Firma del supervisor de campo \_\_\_\_\_

Comentarios:


[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos \_\_\_\_\_

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos \_\_\_\_\_




## **Tarjeta “A”**


¿En qué escalón [grada] de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




**Tarjeta “B”**




## Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta “D”



## Tarjeta "E"



## ***Tarjeta “F”***

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$100
- (02) Entre \$100- \$199
- (03) \$200-\$399
- (04) \$400-\$599
- (05) \$600-\$799
- (06) \$800-\$999
- (07) \$1000-\$1499
- (08) \$1500-\$2499
- (09) \$2500-\$4999
- (10) \$5000-y más