



Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

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
The Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua and in the Americas, 2012:

Towards Equality of Opportunity

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
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Prologue: Background to the Study

We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned

citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use handheld electronic devices. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the web site and can be consulted there www.americasbarometer.org. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents’ homes; only in the

US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common “informed consent” form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent’s household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior *AmericasBarometer* surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample.¹ Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.²

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.


The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

¹ The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

² All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, Bolivia, Chile, Haití, Trinidad & Tobago, United States and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		 
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Caribbean	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname	
Trinidad & Tobago	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		
Paraguay		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		

Canada and United States			
Canada	 UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	 YORK UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.	 THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	 VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY	 MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES	 PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

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Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K.

Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

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Haiti	●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Formerly, Research Coordinator of LAPOP and Currently, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA ●Dr. François Gélinau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval
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Peru	●Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor at the University of Delaware, USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima ●Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

Great differences in the lives and opportunities of citizens of the Americas constitute a major problem for the region. Chapter One illustrates several challenges Nicaragua faces as a poor country with high inequality in wealth and income. Nicaragua's level of human development (measured with the Human Development Index - HDI) remains well below the regional mean. Despite improving HDI scores, Nicaragua lags behind its regional neighbors in the reduction of inequality. We estimate 27% of Nicaragua's human development potential is lost because of inequality. We find that within-country inequality profoundly affects Nicaraguans' life chances. Residents of poor communities tend to have insufficient income and less education than the rest of the population.

While gender does not affect the distribution of education among the population, other factors and circumstances such as being older, having darker skin, rural residence, and having a mother with little formal education tend to lower the level of education an individual obtains. Today Nicaraguans enjoy an average of 4 more years of schooling than their mothers, showing that the expansion of access to education has reduced the educational deficits of the previous generations. Skin color has no discernible effect on family income, but being a rural resident, female, older, and having low maternal education all tend to reduce family income. Similarly, women, older Nicaraguans, and those with less-educated mothers experience greater food insecurity.

Very few Nicaraguans report employment discrimination. This finding holds across diverse groups and social classes. In attitudes toward equality of opportunity, over half of Nicaraguans disapprove of giving men employment preference over women in hard times. Similarly, only 20% of Nicaraguans state opinions indicative of racial prejudice. Nicaraguans firmly support government efforts to reduce inequality and poverty, and they are in favor of affirmative action for dark-skinned university students. They also do not view recipients of social assistance as lazy.

Despite reductions in inequality over the past decades, Chapter Two shows political participation remains unequal in the Americas. Among Nicaraguans, we find women are more active than men in community participation, but much less active in working for political parties or campaigns. At the same time, the data shows that skin color neither privileges nor disadvantages Nicaraguans in political participation. Nevertheless, having more education increases political participation in all forms.

Nicaraguans tend to hold non-discriminatory attitudes towards certain potentially disadvantaged groups. They approve of women and dark-skinned people as political leaders, and they support gender quotas for women in the lists of candidates for public office. In the broad regional context, Nicaraguans express somewhat less bias against women, people of color, and the disabled than citizens of the Americas as a whole, but they are less tolerant of homosexuals.

Chapter Three considers whether inequality affects the perceptions of Nicaraguans regarding various factors, such as their capacities as citizens, their sense that the government responds to their interests, their support for the political system and democracy, and towards protest. With few exceptions, we find that inequalities and perceived discrimination have little effect on Nicaraguans' sense of political efficacy, support for the political system, democratic attitudes, or protest. On the

other hand, discrimination by the government elevates Nicaraguans' internal efficacy (belief that they understand national problems). Government discrimination, in contrast, lowers Nicaraguans' sense that officials care what people think. Most of the inequalities explored (whether of gender, skin color, economic well-being, being a housewife, size of the community of residence, and discrimination by non-government actors) exert no significant effect on political efficacy. More than inequality, partisan political engagement, community organization activism, and interest in politics increase Nicaraguans' sense of their political capabilities and the system's responsiveness.

Nicaraguans' political system support (relatively high for the hemisphere) and protest levels (moderate for the region) emerge more from personal political inclinations and party and community engagement than from inequality. In absolute terms, Nicaraguans firmly support democracy as the best system of government. Nicaraguans' high support for democracy is evenly distributed among those politically engaged and unengaged, and among both victims and beneficiaries of inequality and discrimination.

Chapter Four studies the effects of crime victimization and corruption, and citizens' resulting perceptions on support of the political system and the rule of law. In comparison to the rest of Latin American, especially the countries to the north, Nicaraguans' perceptions of corruption, corruption victimization, perceived insecurity, and actual crime victimization are relatively low. Moreover, all of these have recently been declining. Each of these problems is more prevalent among residents of metropolitan Managua than in smaller communities or other regions. Corruption and crime victimization are more common among wealthier Nicaraguans and among men.

Corruption and crime victimization are more common among Nicaraguans that possess more wealth, as well as among men than among women. In contrast, perceived corruption and a sense of insecurity are fairly evenly distributed across all demographic groups. Skin color and age exert little influence on system support and support for the rule of law. However, perceived and experienced corruption and crime victimization lower Nicaraguans' support for the political system. Crime victimization also lowers support for the rule of law. On balance, Nicaragua's relatively low corruption and crime rates minimize these factors' impact on support for the rule of law and the political system. Even crime and corruption victims remain supportive of the political system and the rule of law.

One concerning finding is that more educated Nicaraguans express less support for the rule of law. Normally, it is expected that more formal education leads to more tolerance and other democratic attitudes, but this expectation was incorrect. Intriguingly, this pattern also manifests itself across the entire 26 country sample for 2012. Influential elites in general, national political leaders and public officials, in Nicaragua and around the hemisphere, come disproportionately from the ranks of the better educated. We are troubled to find that the best-trained and best-informed citizens of Nicaragua and the hemisphere do not strongly embrace the rule of law.

Chapter Five traces two attitudes argued to be important for democratic stability – support for national institutions and political tolerance. Institutional legitimacy has trended upward since 2006. Overall Nicaraguans rank relatively high on institutional support, but tenth overall in the hemisphere on political tolerance. Nicaraguans favor rights for critics to protest and to vote but they express less support for critics' rights to seek office or have access to the mass media. Political tolerance among Nicaraguans has fluctuated since 2004, ending with a small decline in 2012. Among Nicaraguans,

sympathy with any Liberal faction and viewing religion as important in one's life elevate tolerance, while FSLN sympathy and female gender lower it.

The “stable democracy” attitude combination of high tolerance and high system support is held by nearly one third of Nicaraguans, placing them in the middle of the hemispheric distribution. This share declined from 2004 to 2008, but has since risen. An interest in politics, approval of presidential performance, and a perception of low levels of corruption all elevate Nicaraguans' chances of being simultaneously system-supportive and tolerant. As our theory predicted, among Nicaraguans, the “stable democracy” attitude combination is associated with higher support for democracy as the best system of government.

Almost across the board Nicaraguans' trust in government in 2012 shows increases over previous levels. Nicaraguans express high trust for the Army, police, communications media, and religious institutions, and lower but positive trust for other institutions.

Chapter Six reveals Nicaraguans rank averagely in attending municipal government meetings and petitioning local government. Both declined from 2004 to 2006, but have remained stable since. Of those making requests to local government, only about a third report the resolution of their demands. Those who demand things from local government perceive their economic situations as positive. In addition, the demanders attend more municipal government meetings than other people.

Nicaraguans are modestly satisfied with local government services, but nevertheless rank fifth highest in the Americas. Most Nicaraguans report indifferent evaluations of local government services, but over three times more people evaluate them positively than negatively. While none of the following is a service provided by local governments (each is a national-government responsibility), Nicaraguans judge the highways and the public health service positively, but by very little (one point below fifty on a scale that ascends to 100). They rate public education at 62, placing their evaluation at third place in the hemisphere. This high position likely derives from recent improvements in the accessibility to education, instead of the comparatively low individual gains of Nicaraguans in the field of education.

This chapter began with the hypothesis that satisfaction with local government services would contribute to higher levels of general political system support. Nicaraguans overall report a middling level of satisfaction with local government services (56 of 100) and trust in local government (52). Their satisfaction with local government services and their general system support do correlate positively. However, when a control for trust in local government is added to the analysis, this positive association disappears.

Chapter Seven examines Nicaraguan youth. A quarter of the Nicaraguan population is aged between 16 and 25. This fraction appears to be decreasing due to a reduction in fertility in recent decades. The cohorts aged 16 to 25 have the highest average level of formal education completed. Youth are slightly better off than older Nicaraguans, and are more optimistic about the economy. However, young Nicaraguans' life chances and educational opportunity vary according to local socioeconomic context, with the worst outcomes in the least developed areas.

A major pattern in our findings is that younger Nicaraguans differ little from older ones on most political and social views. Nicaraguans view the biggest threats to youth as drugs (49%), alcohol

(21%) and gangs (15%). As responses to these threats they propose sports programs, job creation, education, and volunteer programs. What Nicaraguans would change about schools is to improve the infrastructure (33%), improve academics (22%), improve the teachers (11%), and increase recreation and sports activities (10%). Almost no one (1.4%) mentions problems of politicization in schools. The effects of crime are very similar among the young and old.

The political attitudes of Nicaraguan youth resemble those of older Nicaraguans, with a few exceptions. The exceptions include that young Nicaraguans are more willing to justify hypothetical military coups, and are more ideologically extreme and more right-wing than older cohorts. Finally, there is variation in political participation. Compared to their elders, fewer young people are registered to vote, fewer turn out to vote, and fewer contact public officials. Young Nicaraguans use the Internet more than older ones. In civil society, the young are more active only in sports groups, but not in any other type of association. The clear tendency of youth is to be less active and take lower leadership initiative than their elders.

The regional context, measured in terms of the municipal human development index and presidential vote in the 2011 elections, has little effect on system support or political tolerance among the young. One modest effect, detected by a multilevel analysis, is that youth who live in more developed areas express less political tolerance of regime critics. This appears to stem from the presence of many public employees and FSLN sympathizers in urban Nicaragua.

As in 2010, our findings provide little hint that Nicaraguan youth might destabilize the political system. Although more inclined towards the right ideologically and more likely to support hypothetical military coups, the youth are also less politically active. Some of their reduced electoral participation may come from a reported failure to receive national identity documents necessary to vote in a timely way before the 2011 presidential election (see Chapter Nine).

Chapter Eight shows Nicaraguan women differing from men in only a few important ways, especially their economic vulnerability, some attitudes and experiences that support political engagement, and their political and civil society activism. Overall, we find that Nicaraguan women generally share the same political culture and opinions as men.

Women average only 6.3 years of education, which certainly hurts their economic opportunities. Two thirds of women with domestic partners depend on their male counterpart for all of their income. This explains why women are 50% more likely to experience food insecurity than men, and why they are more pessimistic about their economic situations than men. Female poverty is worse in the less socioeconomically developed municipalities, and better in more developed and urbanized areas. Women mention economic issues as Nicaragua's most serious problem much more frequently than men, probably due to their relative economic dependency.

Some 13.5% of Nicaraguan women report being crime victims in the last year; they are less likely to be robbed violently or physically assaulted than are men, but more likely to be robbed at home. Nicaraguan women have, we believe, under-reported sexual assaults to our interviewers because the reported incidence is so minute. Women who experienced violence were three times more likely to have it happen at home than men, and a third less likely than men to experience violence in the street. About a third of Nicaraguan women perceive gangs as a problem and feel unsafe in their

neighborhoods. Only 7.3% of Nicaraguan women report experiencing corruption in the last year (half the level men report).

Nicaraguan women share with men nearly identical levels in most of their attitudes and opinions. Observed attitude gaps between the genders are small, even on gender-related attitudes such as support for gender quotas in parties' nomination lists. Women, however, significantly oppose job preference for men in hard times more than men, and express more doubt that men make better leaders. In contrast, women believe men would make better national economic managers. Overall Nicaraguans favor gender equity. Only 9% of Nicaraguans (female and male) favor therapeutic abortion, thus aligning with public policy.

Nicaraguan women strongly support democracy and the re-election of an effective president. They oppose coups both military and executive. They strongly view the state as having a major welfare responsibility, but split evenly on whether the government should own major industries. They trust the government, but not very highly. Nicaraguan women evaluate the government and its performance moderately positively. Women are more system-supporting than men, but in that attitude like many others, their criterion does not vary much from that of men. Nicaraguan women, just as men, express inclusiveness and tolerance of the handicapped, dark-skinned people, and even homosexuals (though support for gay marriage is very low).

Attitudes and behaviors that facilitate political participation vary more between Nicaraguan women and men than most other views. Compared to men, Nicaraguan women follow the news less, have much less political information, trust others less, believe themselves less knowledgeable on issues, and identify less with any of the Liberal party splinters. Women are more active in church- and school-related civil society than men, who engage more in economic and sports/recreational groups. The genders tie on community group activity (including CPCs), overall civil society engagement, and community group leadership.

Women's projection of their interests into the political system depends on political participation. Participation differences with men are modest in several arenas, but women engage less in community problem-solving activity, convincing others how to vote, and in overall participation. Thus they project their concerns into the public arena less than men, probably to their disadvantage in policy outcomes. Women's political participation is driven by education, a sense of personal efficacy, sympathy with the FLSN, interest in politics, and by contextual poverty. Most of all, however, civil society engagement in all its forms mobilizes Nicaraguan women into politics.

Chapter Nine explores the vote, the most common type of participation amongst Nicaraguans. We find several barriers to becoming a voter in Nicaragua. In early 2012 between 4.4% and 6% of voting age Nicaraguans lacked the first essential requirement, a *cédula de identidad*. This problem affects citizens aged 16 to 20 most; roughly one third had no *cédula*. The second requirement to vote is to have one's name on the *padrón electoral* of one's voting district. Again, the young were the most affected. About 5% of older voters report being absent from the electoral roll, compared to 29% of 16-20 year olds and 13% of 21-25 year olds. Third, about 4% of those who were successfully enrolled were then not allowed to vote at their *junta receptora de votos* in the 2011 national election. Summing these cumulative effects we estimate that between 16% and 23% of Nicaraguans of voting age could not vote in the 2011 national election. Not all Nicaraguans experience barriers to voting equally. Sympathizers of the FSLN report significantly lower rates of these problems than other Nicaraguans.

Despite the problems reported, voter turnout is widespread and evenly distributed across demographic lines.

Some 48% of Nicaraguans report no party identification, followed by 44% for the FSLN and 7% for all Liberal factions combined. FSLN identification has roughly doubled since 2008 and Liberal identification fallen by half. Voting in presidential elections follows a similar trend. The extent of party identification change suggests a possible historic shift from Nicaragua having a competitive two-party dominant to a single-party dominant political system with weak opposition. A hypothetical presidential election poll in early 2012 shows that the FSLN benefits from a perception of successful economic management by the government and approval of the president's performance.

Intention to vote in the 2012 municipal elections (82%) resembled Nicaraguans' prior reported turnout. This was likely inflated for various reasons: First, there is a tendency that has been amply demonstrated by surveys of inflation of the intention to vote. Also, when local elections do not occur at the same time as national elections, like the municipal election in November 2012, less people come out to vote. Consequently, we doubt that 82% will vote in November. (In fact, the provisional results of the November 4, 2012 elections indicate abstention at 45%.) Those most likely to vote in November 2012 included FSLN sympathizers and CPC activists. Those least likely to vote reported having observed election irregularities in 2011 and those with low trust in the Consejo Supremo Electoral.

Nicaraguans are polarized along left-right ideological lines. Over half of them place themselves on either the far left (29%) or far right (20%) compared to only 33% in the ideological center. The average ideological position of Nicaraguans – now slightly left of center -- has shifted leftward as the right has eroded while the left has grown over time.

About 25% of Nicaraguans reports observing or experiencing irregularities in the 2011 national election (double voting, expulsion of *fiscales* from *juntas*, and “intimidation” at the voting place). In another example of partisan inequality, almost three times more non-FSLN voters report such irregularities in 2011 than do FSLN voters.

Despite these perceived irregularities and many critical comments by the media of the 2008 and 2011 elections, Nicaraguans declared increased confidence in elections and the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) from 2010 to 2012. We attribute this to (1) a halo effect from generally rising evaluation of public institutions, and (2) shifting partisanship patterns. FSLN sympathizers, who view the CSE positively, have become much more numerous in recent years, in both absolute and relative terms.

Support for the political system in Nicaragua comes mostly from approval of the current president's performance and trust in the CSE. Nicaraguans' appraisals of the president's performance and of the CSE also increase satisfaction with/evaluation of their democracy's performance. On the negative side, evaluation of Nicaraguan democracy suffers among the more politically tolerant, witnesses of election irregularities, and those who would vote against the FSLN in a straw presidential vote. The partisan coloration to evaluating institutions and Nicaraguan democratic performance stands out sharply. In this polarized nation, Nicaraguans' appraisal of their democracy and their support for national institutions - for good or bad - both derive importantly from their views of the Ortega administration and the CSE. In essence, Nicaraguans of different parties diverge on the criteria for evaluating their institutions and democracy. Sandinista sympathizers admire the system and its



elections. They are growing in numbers and are more politically active than other Nicaraguans. The contemporary political system provides easier access to suffrage for Sandinista voters and supporters than it does to others. Those sympathetic to other parties or no party at all find greater fault in the election system than Sandinistas, and may well be discouraged from taking part by the biases they perceive.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

Part I:
Equality of Opportunity and
Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira, and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.³ More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.⁴

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.⁵ Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).⁶

Inequality is not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

³ Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

⁴ López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

⁵ De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

⁶ Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,⁷ fosters political instability and violence,⁸ and decreases trust in democracy.⁹ LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic “glue” that holds together democratic societies.¹⁰ Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of “perfect” equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.¹¹ However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.¹² Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Nicaragua and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region. After assessing

⁷ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid.*

⁸ Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

⁹ Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

¹⁰ Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

¹¹ Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹² Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in Nicaragua and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. **Error! Reference source not found.** takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.¹³ The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.




Figure 1. Gini Indices by World Regions

¹³ See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.¹⁴ As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.




Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).¹⁵ The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural

¹⁴ The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

¹⁵ Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper* 3865.

Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution. The World Bank reports a Gini Index of 52.3 for Nicaragua for 2005, a value above the mean for Central America in Figure 2.¹⁶




Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.¹⁷ In Figure 4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

Information about inequality of income in Nicaragua is scant. The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) reports an average income inequality value for Nicaragua for 1993 as 54.7, 1998 as 54.2, for 2001 as 54.4, and for 2005 as 52.3.¹⁸ This series of values suggests

¹⁶ World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER), 2008. *World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008*, United Nations University, Helsinki, Finland, http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database, accessed July 10, 2012.

¹⁷ López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

¹⁸ The value reported here is the mean of income inequality Gini indexes for each of these years listed in the WIDER World Income Inequality Database V2.0c May 2008. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reports a similar trend, but with somewhat higher inequality scores (approximately 4 points for each of the same years. *Estadísticas*

that Nicaragua's income inequality tends to be stable and somewhat higher than average for Central America. The approximately two point decline for the most recent data point available (2005), when compared to the earlier values, suggests that income inequality may have abated slightly, but still remains above the regional mean (Figure 2).




Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.¹⁹ Since 2006 Nicaragua has sought to reduce of inequality by distributing certain benefits to poorer citizens.²⁰ Such programs have some potential to reduce income inequality and improve living standards among the poor. These programs may continue over the middle run because of the 2011 re-election of the administration of President Daniel Ortega through 2016.

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).²¹ Since 2010, however, the United

de América Latina y El Caribe, 2012, accessed July 10, 2012, <http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegradaFlashProc.asp#>.

¹⁹ Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forging Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

²⁰ John A. Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker, 2010, *Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion and Change*, Boulder, CO: Chapter 5.

²¹ The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country's average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income

Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI based on a country’s level of inequality. Figure 5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the average IHDI is the largest in the world. Nicaragua’s reported HDI for 2011 is 0.59 (world rank of 129th), and its IHDI is 0.43. In both cases Nicaragua falls well below the regional average for human development.²² Despite raising its HDI from 0.46 in 1980 to 0.59 in 2011, Nicaragua has over the same period fallen slightly behind the medium human development countries which have improved HDI at a faster rate.




Figure 5. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

(standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).

²² United Nations Development Programme, 2012, *International Human Development Indicators*, Nicaragua Country Report, <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/NIC.html>, accessed July 10, 2012.

Figure 6 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality. For Nicaragua in 2011 the corresponding value is 27% of development lost because of inequality, a percentage point more than for Latin America and the Caribbean overall (Figure 6).




Figure 6. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

These measures of the HDI and the IHDI obscure major differences in levels of human development across the country, however. No Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) was available for Nicaragua, so we calculated our own for the municipalities in the study based on data from the 2005 census.²³ Figure 7 presents mean MHDI by the size of the community of residence. It vividly illustrates a key pattern about the distribution of unequal life chances and human development in Nicaragua. The larger the community in which one resides, the greater the average municipal human development index. Residents of rural areas on average live in municipalities with an MHDI of 0.4, while residents of the national capital enjoy a much more resource-rich environment, with a mean MHDI of 0.9. For each successively smaller type of Nicaraguan community, residents' municipal contexts have significantly weaker local HDI scores than larger communities.

²³ The index number calculated ranges from zero for the municipality in our sample with the lowest MHDI to 1.0 for that with the highest MHDI. These indicate relative inequality within the study municipalities, not absolute inequalities. Thus the MHDI of 1.0 merely indicates the highest equality observed, not perfect equality.




Figure 7. Municipal-Level HDI (self calculated)
by Size of Community of Residence, Nicaragua.

Now we inquire what difference this context makes. **Error! Reference source not found.** allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with advantaged (light green bar) and disadvantaged (dark green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.²⁴ For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has odds of completing sixth grade on time that register at just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the odds are close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of achievement. At the same time, most countries of Central and South America stand out as highly unequal. In Nicaragua Figure 8 shows that a student from a disadvantaged background has only 8% odds of completing sixth grade on time, while her peer with an advantaged background vastly more likely (approaching 90%) to complete sixth grade on time.

²⁴ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.




Figure 8. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

In Nicaragua other effects of an unequal social context stand out in Figure 9. The top half of the figure presents the educational attainment of Nicaraguans in 2012 by the level of MHDI. The differences are striking. In the top MHDI municipalities (those scored from 0.75 to 1.0) the mean education attained is 8.5 years, contrasted to only 4.4 years of schooling in the lowest scoring MHDI municipalities (scored from 0 to 0.25). The bottom half of Figure 9 compares the average reply of Nicaraguans to the question “Do your salary or wage and those of your household (1) provide well and permit you to save, (2) provide just enough without great difficulties, (3) does not provide enough and there are difficulties, or (4) does not provide enough and there are great difficulties.?” In the top MHDI municipalities the average score is 2.6, which falls near the midpoint of possible answers – between 2 (just enough) and 3 (not quite enough). In contrast, the average for all citizens of the lower MHDI groups is significantly lower, averaging at or near the “not enough” response of 3. Thus in Nicaragua as for the region at large, the social-economic context directly affects the wellbeing and achievement of individuals.




Figure 9. Municipal Human Development Impact on Income and Education, Nicaragua

III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in Nicaragua: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent citizens perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies citizens might endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently

or have different employment opportunities.²⁵ Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of “statistical discrimination,” meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.²⁶ Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.²⁷

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labor force participation among men and women has become more equal.²⁸ Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.²⁹ Furthermore, a gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.³⁰ So, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social situations, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.³¹ Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development.³² Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas.³³

²⁵ For an overview of this literature, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

²⁶ Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. “Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil.” *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. “Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. “The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach.” *Económica L* (1-2).

²⁷ Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. “Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzúa. 2009b. “An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. “Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan and Máximo Torero. 2009. “Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

²⁸ Abramo, Laís, and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. “Women’s Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America.” *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

²⁹ Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 “Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure.” *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

³⁰ Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. “The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean.” SSRN eLibrary (April). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

³¹ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

³² Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

³³ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.³⁴

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.³⁵

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 by examining what Nicaraguans of different racial, gender, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The AmericasBarometer's 2010 and 2012 questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. We assessed respondents' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.³⁶ Question **ETID** simply asks respondents whether they identify as white, mulatto, mestizo, indigenous or black. In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a color palette.³⁷ At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin color of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the color palette in 2012.³⁸

³⁴ Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

³⁵ See, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 73, Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁶ The full text of all questions is provided in the questionnaire in Appendix C.

³⁷ Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid*.

³⁸ In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.



**Figure 10. Skin Color Palette
Used in the AmericasBarometer**

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. The latter group of questions, found in the **R series**, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.³⁹

We also included a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we also asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question **GEN10**.

³⁹ This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
- (88) DK (98) DA

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is measured in question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.⁴⁰

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.⁴¹ Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.				
	No	Yes	DK	DA
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98

⁴⁰ Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. 2013. Inequality Matters: The Role of Education in Defining Social Class in Colombia vs. Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁴¹ These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

We first assess how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status affect educational status in Nicaragua, using linear regression analysis.⁴² **Error! Reference source not found.** indicates that as age increases, educational attainment decreases. This reflects the substantial change in educational opportunity in Nicaragua since the 1980s, when the country made a major investment in literacy and providing schools. Older cohorts of Nicaraguans would have had much less opportunity to obtain a formal education than younger generations. Compared to the reference group of the youngest cohort (16 to 25) each older age cohort has less education. Skin color has a modest effect on educational attainment, with darker-skinned Nicaraguans having less schooling. Women have slightly less education than men, but the difference is not significant. Rural dwellers have much less education than Nicaragua's urbanites. This comes from the distribution of schools, especially secondary schools, which are less common in rural communities.




Figure 11. Determinants of Educational Level in Nicaragua

⁴² In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page xxxiv.

Figure 12 illustrates these effects on education. The effect of gender is very small and not significant, demonstrating that Nicaragua has reduced the traditional educational disadvantage of women. In contrast, the difference in education between the urban and rural population is dramatic, with urban citizens having a 3.3 year average advantage in schooling. The age differential is also dramatic, each younger cohort having a distinct advantage. Nicaraguans 65 and older average only 3 years of formal education, while 16 to 25 year olds average 8.7 years. Skin color also matters. Lighter skinned Nicaraguans tend to enjoy a distinct educational advantage over those who are darker skinned, although this pattern breaks down among the darkest-skinned groups. (This last phenomenon -- a statistical artifact -- arises because of the very small number of individuals in the skin color category 11).




Figure 12. Factors Influencing Educational Attainment in Nicaragua

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects educational level in Nicaragua. We did not include our measure of family background, **ED2**, in the multivariate regression model because the question was only asked of half the sample.⁴³ Limiting analysis to half the sample would reduce inferential power regarding the effects of the other variables. Nonetheless, **Error! Reference source not found.12**, which shows the respondent's years of schooling (y-axis) according to the level of education his/her mother obtained (x-axis), indicates that the effects are very strong. Nicaraguans whose mothers had no education have a mean of only 4 years of schooling, but those whose mothers attended college have an average of 12.8 years of schooling. Relatively speaking, the fact that children of mothers with no education at all average four years of schooling reveals intergenerational progress in Nicaragua as educational opportunity has expanded since the 1980s. Similarly, children of mothers with only primary education average a secondary level of schooling (7.8 years). The relative advantage tapers off for children of high-school and college-educated mothers (Figure 13).




Figure 13. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Respondent Educational Level in Nicaragua

⁴³ In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.

Are the same factors associated with education also associated with income? How do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, urban-rural residence, and family background in Nicaragua? In Figure 14 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of personal income among respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.⁴⁴




Figure 14. Determinants of Personal Income in Nicaragua, Among Respondents who Work

⁴⁴ Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.

The previous figure suggests that women have lower personal incomes than men in Nicaragua. The effect of gender is less than that of urban versus rural residence, but is greater than age. As discussed above, in question **GEN10** we asked respondents who were married or who had an unmarried partner about their income versus their spouse's incomes. In Figure 15 we examine differences between the men and women who have such partners in responses to **GEN10**, only among those who also said that they were employed. Among working males who are in such couples, 40.8% earns all the income for the pair compared to only 2.0% of females who earn all the pair's income. Among males, another 25.0% earns more than their wives, while among females only 3.8% earns more than their husbands. The imbalance is also great at the other end of the income scale. Among working men only 12.1% earns no income, while among women with a partner the figure is 71.0% earning no income.




Figure 15. Respondent's Versus Spouse's Income, among Nicaraguans Who Work

Figure 16 illustrates the effects on income of the three main significant factors identified in Figure 14. Residents of urban areas have an income level of 1.5 out of 16 “income units” more income than rural residents. Men have a mean income of 6.1, which is 1.1 income units more than women. The impact of age is more complex. As age rises from 16-25 to 36-45 income also rises. Thereafter, however, income declines for the older age groups – even falling below levels similar to those of 16 to 25 year olds.⁴⁵ This pattern identifies an area of income vulnerability among Nicaraguans 56 and older.




Figure 16. Factors Influencing Income, Nicaragua.

⁴⁵ See Footnote 44 on page 13 for more information on interpretation of the income scale.




Figure 17. Skin Color and Personal Income, Among Nicaraguans Who Work

Finally, we assess the extent to which family background affects personal income in Nicaragua. In Figure 17 we find evidence that for the most part skin color has relatively modest effects on income, but with a striking exception for both men and women. For men of the two lightest skin color shades income is from one to two points (out of 16 “income units”) higher than among men with darker skin. But the rest of the skin color array among men varies little. For women, those in the second lightest skin color category enjoy three times more income than women in any other part of the skin color array.

Figure 18 reveals the clear, positive influence of a mother's educational attainment on the subsequent income levels of her children as voting age respondents to our survey. Children of mothers with no education earn an average income of 5.4 of 16 possible income units. Having a mother with primary or secondary education raises one's income significantly; for example, those with college-educated mothers have an income average of 8. Were it possible for Nicaraguans to travel back in time to select their own parents, this finding strongly suggests that they should choose a college-educated mother because the advantageous circumstances of her life would elevate their incomes well above the children of less-educated mothers.




Figure 18. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Own Income, among Nicaraguans Who Work

Arguably the most critical basic resource to which citizens need access is food. We have seen that personal income is not distributed in a perfectly egalitarian fashion across Nicaragua. Does access to food follow similar patterns? In **Error! Reference source not found.** we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of food insecurity, based on the two questions described above. Questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food insecurity that runs from 0 to 2, where respondents who report higher values have higher levels of food insecurity.⁴⁶ Figure 19 reveals that, compared to Nicaraguans younger than 36, older Nicaraguans are more likely to experience food insecurity. So, too, are women. Skin color and urban/rural residence have no impact on food insecurity.




Figure 19. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Nicaragua

Figure 20 provides an example of the impact of the two significant conditions that influence food insecurity in Nicaragua. Older Nicaraguans tend to be less food secure than younger ones. The problem is especially present for Nicaraguans who are 66 and older. While Nicaraguans of all age groups rank in the “low food insecurity” category, the problem definitely affects seniors more than any other group. Women are significantly but modestly less food secure than men. Figure 21 presents the impact of education on food insecurity. College educated Nicaraguans, for example, enjoy a great advantage over the completely uneducated, with high food insecurity ten times worse among the latter than the former.

⁴⁶ Recall that these questions were asked of a split sample (that is, of only half of respondents).




Figure 20. Influences on Food Insecurity in Nicaragua




Figure 21. Educational Attainment and Food Insecurity in Nicaragua

Who Reports Discrimination?

Another way of viewing social and economic discrimination is from the point of view of the purported victim. In 17 countries of the Americas, we included questions tapping whether respondents perceived themselves to have been victims of discrimination. The questions were a slightly modified battery that had first been used in 2008, and were optional in each country:

Now, changing the subject, and thinking about your experiences in the past year , have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

In Figure 22 we report the percentage of citizens in each country where question **DIS3** was asked who said they had been the victim of employment discrimination. We find that perceived employment discrimination ranges from a low of 3.6% in Venezuela to a maximum of 23.4% in Trinidad and Tobago. There are three tiers of perceived discrimination, a low group of 7 countries below 10%, a middle tier between 10% and 14% with six countries, and a higher tier of four nations above 16%. Nicaraguans (at 8.0%) report the second lowest level of perceived employment discrimination in the region.




Figure 22. Self-Reported Employment Discrimination in the Countries of the Americas

Who reports that they have been the victim of discrimination at work? In Figure 23 we use logistic regression analysis to examine determinants of self-reported victimization by discrimination in Nicaragua. Particularly remarkable in Figure 22 is how few types of Nicaraguans report employment discrimination. Gender, race, and rural residence do not affect perceived workplace discrimination. Age reveals some effects, but they are partial and negative. Nicaraguans 66 and more years of age report not having experienced workplace discrimination, and the two immediately younger cohorts also affirm significantly that they have not experienced discrimination. In sum, in Nicaragua the only discernible factor influencing a low level of perceived employment discrimination is age, and the least

likely to have experienced it are older citizens. Perhaps perceptions of discrimination are not necessarily strongly related to objectively measured discrimination,⁴⁷ but the evidence here suggests few Nicaraguans hold such views of their own experience.




Figure 23. Determinants of Victimization by Self-Reported Employment Discrimination in Nicaragua

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among Nicaraguans in different groups defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. They have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The AmericasBarometer 2012 included several questions that provide a look at how social and economic inequalities are related to general attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labor force.⁴⁸ In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following question, on a 7-point scale:

⁴⁷ Ñopo, et al. 2009. *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the *Marginalization in the Americas* Conference, Miami, FL; Inglehart,

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Figure 24 presents average levels of agreement with this statement across the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison with other variables. We see that the range of opinion on employment preferences for men is wide, from a low of 21.7 in Uruguay (similar to the U.S. and Canada) to a high of 54.9 in the Dominican Republic. With an average agreement level of 42.0 out of 100 on this statement, Nicaraguans rank in the top third in the hemisphere on giving job preference to men when there is not enough work. This average is statistically the same as four other Central American nations (Guatemala, El Salvador, Belize and Honduras) but just a bit higher than for Costa Ricans and Panamanians.




Figure 24. Agreement that Men Have Labor Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas

The average levels of agreement with this statement obscure substantial variation among Nicaraguans in their responses. In Figure 25 we examine their responses in further detail, returning to the original 1-7 scale of the question. Despite their comparative position, it is important to note that Nicaraguans on balance oppose favoring men with the right to scarce jobs, with 44.6% disagreeing strongly with the notion and 53% overall in disagreement (Figure 25). Meanwhile only 22.7% agreed strongly that men should receive preference for jobs when they are short, and a total of 39.3% overall agreed.




Figure 25. Agreement/Disagreement that Men Should Have Labor Market Priority in Nicaragua

The AmericasBarometer 2012 also asked citizens across the Americas about their perceptions of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. This round, we included the following question in every country of the Americas.⁴⁹

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?

[Read alternatives, just one answer]

(1) Because of their culture, or

(2) Because they have been treated unjustly

(3) **[Do not read]** Another response

(88) DK

(98) DA

⁴⁹ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.

In Figure 26 we present the percentage of respondents who agreed that inequality was due to the “culture” of “people with dark skin.” One may argue that expressing this view is a coded form of racial bias. In the Americas opinion varies widely from a low of 12.4% of Uruguayans blaming the culture of dark-skinned people for their poverty up to a high of 33.3% in Guatemala. Nicaragua falls squarely in the middle of the hemisphere’s nations.




Figure 26. Percentage Agreeing that Poverty is Due to “Culture” in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 27. Determinants of Attitudes toward Poverty among People of Color

Figure 27 presents an analysis of the sources of the belief among Nicaraguans that inequality is due to the “culture” of “people with dark skin,” but it in fact clarifies little. The only factor significantly related to this bias, and the link is negative, is being between 56 and 65 years of age. In sum, then, this view, held by only about one in five Nicaraguans, is largely randomly distributed among the population rather than linked to race, gender, urban or rural residence, educational attainment, or relative wealth.

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the major social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report and answering this question with precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions on important normative and ideological debates that are the purview of citizens and politicians, rather than the authors of this study. Nonetheless, we outline here some common policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens across the region what they thought the role of the state is in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

ROS4. The Nicaraguan government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which citizens agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. In Figure 28 we present the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. As always, we have recoded responses to run from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 100 (“Strongly agree.”). Across the Americas (except for the United States) there is strong agreement ranging from a low of 65.4 in Haiti up to a high of 86.3 in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. Nicaraguans average 86.3 on the zero to 100 scale, indicating a strong cultural bias in favor of the government working to reduce income inequality. Comparatively Nicaraguans are at the top of the scale in agreeing that the state should work strongly to reduce inequality, but they are also in a statistical tie with several other countries. U.S. respondents diverge strongly from Latin Americans, Caribbeans, and Canadians in this regard, reporting only 47.2 agreement on government working to reduce inequality.




Figure 28. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many of the region's governments have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their

children in school.⁵⁰ The most well-known and largest of these programs include Oportunidades in Mexico, Bolsa Família in Brazil, Familias en Acción in Colombia, and the Asignación Universal por Hijo in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, “CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest.”⁵¹ However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depend, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.⁵² These social assistance and CCT programs are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region’s most historically unequal contexts.

In 2012, we measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programs across the region, using question CCT1NEW.

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Levels of receipt of social assistance and CCTs vary greatly across the region. In Figure 29 we present the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance. Bolivia stands out for its very high rate of reported assistance at 54.9%. The rest of the countries range from 22.6% in the Dominican Republic down to only 4.9% in Honduras. Central American nations (except Costa Rica) tend to fall in a lower tier group with fewer than 11% reporting such income. Only 7.7% of Nicaraguans report receiving governmental social assistance on a monthly basis, placing them near the very bottom of the array for the Americas. Nicaragua has a small program known as Zero Usury (*Usura Cero*), a program of small donations to women and small producers that operated through a foundation connected to the FSLN and headed by the president’s wife, with funding from Venezuela. Other programs of assistance to the poor included Zero Hunger. In July 2012 the National Assembly created a new Ministry of the Family, Community, and Cooperative Economy which will absorb Zero Usury, Zero Hunger, and certain other development

⁵⁰ Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. “New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. “Social Spending and Political Support: The ‘Lessons’ of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico.” *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. “Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁵¹ Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

⁵² Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. “Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *Social Protection Working Paper #0605*. The World Bank.

agencies. Financing will come from loans and donations from the Swiss government, the U. N. Development Program, and the Inter-American Development Bank.⁵³




Figure 29. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas

⁵³ Gutiérrez, Alejandro. "The Disconcerting 'Success' of Nicaragua's Anti-Poverty Programs," The Tricontinental Centre (CETRI), accessed September 9, 2012, <http://www.cetri.be/spip.php?article1552&lang=en>; Mendez, Margaret, "National Assembly approves new Family Economy Ministry," *The Nicaraguan Bugle*, July 14, 2012, accessed September 9, 2012, <http://www.nicaraguanbugle.com/2012/07/14/national-assembly-approves-family-economy-ministry/>.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about CCT and other public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.⁵⁴

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

Responses were coded on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 represents “Strongly disagree” and 7 represents “Strongly agree.” Figure 30 presents levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas; responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items.

This attitude varies from a low average of 28.3 in Guyana (an outlier mean over 10 scale points below the next-lowest country Haiti at 39.0), up to a high mean of 63.7 in Argentina. The mean for the whole 26 nations sample is 46.6. There is a very slight negative correlation between receiving CCT benefits and viewing CCT recipients as lazy. Nicaraguans rank fourth least prone to attribute laziness to citizens who receive conditional cash transfers, with their average score of 40. It is important to recall that only one Nicaraguan in thirteen reports receiving such payments.

⁵⁴ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.




Figure 30. Belief that Public Assistance Recipients are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

Affirmative Action

Another possible policy solution that has very recently attracted attention in some places within Latin America is affirmative action. While in the United States affirmative action has a history of several decades, in Latin America it is a very recent phenomenon, and has only been seriously considered in a handful of countries with the largest populations of Afro-descendants.⁵⁵

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked about support for affirmative action in every country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was administered to a split sample of respondents, who were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a scale from 1 to 7.

RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 31 we examine support for affirmative action across the Americas. Here, responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, the national means of support for affirmative action in university admissions for students with darker skins ranges widely from a high of 69.8 in Paraguay to a low of 30.5 in Trinidad and Tobago. We observe still lower support for such affirmative action in Canada (28.8) and the United States (25.7). Nicaraguans average 58.4 on the scale for affirmative action. This places Nicaragua in the top third of countries on support for affirmative action in university admissions.

⁵⁵ For further information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Erica Amy. 2010. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 49. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion (LAPOP).




Figure 31. Support for Affirmative Action in the Countries of the Americas

V. Conclusion

The great differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. While inequality has recently been improving in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country's social milieu.

Nicaragua faces significant challenges with regard to some inequalities, but less for others. Income inequality is high, and above average in a region of high income inequality. Some evidence suggests a recent modest decline in income inequality but data are insufficient to discern a lasting trend. In terms of human development, Nicaragua is well below the regional mean and despite improving HDI scores over time has lagged somewhat behind its hemispheric neighbors where improvement has been greater. We estimate that 27% of Nicaragua's human development potential is lost because of inequality. Delving into inequality within the country, we developed a measure of municipal-level HDI (MHDI) for the municipalities of our 2012 Nicaragua sample. Within-country MHDI inequality profoundly shapes Nicaraguans' life chances: Residents of small communities have far worse educational attainment and more report insufficient family income.

Gender has no effect on the distribution of educational attainment. This likely reflects government efforts to distribute access to education. In contrast, being older, having darker skin color, and living in Nicaragua's rural areas all correspond with obtaining less education. Maternal education also sharply affects educational attainment among Nicaraguans. That said, we found that those whose mothers had no education report an average of 4 years of schooling. This reveals that expanding educational opportunity is reducing inequalities in education across generations. Skin color had no effect on family income in Nicaragua, which appears to provide equal opportunity across the races. However, being a rural resident, female, and older and having low maternal education all reduced income among respondents. Women, older Nicaraguans and individuals with less-educated mothers all experience greater food insecurity.

An encouraging finding is that very few Nicaraguans report employment discrimination, a fact true across diverse social groups and strata. In attitudes toward equality of opportunity, over half of Nicaraguans disapprove of giving men employment preference over women in hard times. Only one in five Nicaraguans attributes poverty among dark-skinned citizens to "their culture," a viewpoint that one may interpret to indicate low levels of racial bias. Nicaraguans strongly support government efforts to reduce inequality and poverty, generally support affirmative action for dark-skinned university students, and are among the least likely in the Americas to view recipients of social assistance as lazy.

In sum, in terms of structural inequalities, Nicaragua faces great challenges of poverty and inequality of critical human needs. Brighter spots in the inequality picture include women and men enjoying equal educational attainment, very low levels of perceived employment discrimination, and only modest effects of skin color on education and income. In their attitudes, Nicaraguans are among the least likely citizens in the Americas to express racial or class bias.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color

This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.


To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.⁵⁶ This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly

marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

Diferencias en el logro educativo por color de piel en las Américas



⁵⁶ The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.

Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.⁵⁷ While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.


As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt

Percepciones de una crisis muy grave, color de piel y riqueza en el hogar, Barómetro de las Américas 2010



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP



the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

⁵⁷ The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage



This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.⁵⁸ The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.

The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to

Apoyo al matrimonio con indígenas en cuatro países de las Américas, y sus determinantes



experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

⁵⁸ The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.⁵⁹ An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.⁶⁰ Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

⁶⁰ Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

⁶¹ Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.⁶² For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.⁶³ Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.⁶⁴ Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.⁶⁵ Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.⁶⁶ Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.⁶⁷

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and

⁶² In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

⁶³ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁶⁴ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218..

⁶⁵ Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 156-173.

⁶⁶ Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

⁶⁷ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.⁶⁸ In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.⁷⁰

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.⁷¹ In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.⁷²

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.⁷³ Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.⁷⁴ Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism.

⁶⁸ Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid.* Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

⁶⁹ Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123-1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁷⁰ Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

⁷¹ Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155

⁷² See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

⁷³ Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

⁷⁴ Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge how unequal political participation actually is in the Americas, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exist in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind vis-à-vis participatory inequality in the Americas. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the possibility remains that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Turnout


First, we examine inequalities in turnout in Nicaragua and across the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2011? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]**
 (1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**
 (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

In Figure 32 we present turnout by gender across the Americas. Two points are clear from this figure. First, there are great inequalities *across* the countries of the Americas in turnout, such that self-reported turnout in Honduras is 50.7%, while in Peru it is 90.7%. It is important to note that voting is compulsory in a number of countries in the region, while it is voluntary in others; these institutional differences certainly contribute to part of the cross-national variation in turnout. Voting is voluntary in Nicaragua. Second, compiling data from all twenty-six countries included in the AmericasBarometer surveys, it appears that men and women participate in elections at similar rates—in fact women across the region actually boast *higher* turnout rates than men. This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men.⁷⁵ Based on our survey, Nicaragua's overall turnout rate is 80.1%, about 4% higher than the ⁷⁶mean for the Americas. Allowing for some overreporting, likely present in all the data reported here, Nicaragua's turnout rate remains relatively high. There is no difference between turnout for men and women, so Nicaragua fits the regional paradigm of women having closed the voter turnout gap with men.

⁷⁵ Note that the one anomalous case in Figure 32 is the United States, where men self-report higher turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies here. First, more women voted in the last U.S. election than men (66% to 62%), and second, there is substantial over-reporting of voting in the survey by about 18%. This over-report percentage is not unusual for recent U.S. presidential elections. See United States Census Bureau, "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," July, 20, 2009, <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>, accessed July 21, 2012, and Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," February 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>, accessed July 21, 2012.

⁷⁶



Fuente: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Figure 32. Gender and Turnout in the Countries of the Americas

We now turn to explore inequalities in turnout in Nicaragua in greater detail (see Figure 33). We see that personal wealth as measured quintiles has a modest positive effect on presidential election turnout in Nicaragua, with the range rising from 76.8% among the poorest quintile to 83.8% among those in the richest. Gender has no impact on election turnout in Nicaragua. Educational attainment increases turnout substantially between the 75.8% reported among those with no education to 86.7% among those with a college education. In effect, the lowest three rungs of educational attainment are statistically tied for their influence on voting. The big impact comes from those with higher education. Nicaraguans' mothers' educational attainment effect on voting is not linear, nor is its effect statistically significant. In sum, only wealth and education (especially university education) affect presidential election voting in Nicaragua for 2012.




Figure 33. Sociodemographics and Turnout in Nicaragua

Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not tell the whole story. Certainly there are myriad ways that citizens can engage their democratic system besides just voting, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer surveys include an extensive battery of questions on other political participation besides voting. Among numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often citizens contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently citizens participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the **CP** battery is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) NR

After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both" mark "leader"]

To what extent do citizens of the Americas participate in community groups? In Figure 34 we examine this question. The left side of the figure presents levels of community participation in each country of the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average response to CP6, CP7, and CP8, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups. In effect this is a measure of overall intensity of civil society engagement. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents in each country who said they had a leadership role in any community group.

For the Americas as a whole, the range of community participation is broad, from a low of 12.4 on the 100 point scale in Uruguay to a high of 41.6 in Haiti. Guatemala is also quite high at 40.5. The mean for all countries is 26.3. We believe that Haiti's high rate of community participation comes in significant measure from the aftermath of the earthquake there in January 2010, which spawned by a wave of self-help and organizational activism to assist victims and rebuild. Nicaragua ranks fourth

overall in the hemisphere with a mean score of 33.7 on community participation. Two successive recent Nicaraguan presidential administrations have mobilized community engagement, but the 1973 earthquake and the 1979-1990 revolution previously built a vibrant base of community organizations. By way of a comparative note, we find the mean intensity of community participation in both the United States (21 on the 100 point scale) and Canada (at 12.7) in the bottom half of the distribution. Compared to these two countries, most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have a more civil society activism.

Turning to taking a leadership role in community organizations, the right side of Figure 34 presents the percentage of those reporting any leadership. The range is from a low of 2.8% in Argentina up to a high of 29.8% in Haiti. In most countries, fewer than one in nine adults are self-reported community leaders and the mean is 8.8%. Within this array, Nicaraguans ranked seventh in the percentage reporting community organization leadership roles at 12.7%.




Figure 34. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 35 and Figure 36, we explore the results further within Nicaragua, presenting the average levels of participation among Nicaraguans, by demographic group. We see that the factor with the greatest impact on intensity of community participation is gender, with women (37.1) considerably more active than men (30.3). This is one of few arenas in which women are more engaged than men. There is a slight tendency, but not statistically significant, for the poor, the less educated, and those

with less-educated mothers to be more active community participants. Other researchers have observed that community participation tends to be more intense among poorer Latin American citizens who are typically not well served by government and who have many needs that can be addressed with self-help activism.⁷⁷




Figure 35. Sociodemographics and Community Participation in Nicaragua

Examining demographic effects on who reports taking a leadership role in community organizations in Nicaragua, we see in Figure 36 that none of the major factors reveal any statistically significant difference for wealth, education, maternal education or gender. This indicates that leadership roles in Nicaraguan community groups are widely distributed demographically.

⁷⁷ See, for example, John A. Booth and Patricia Bayer Richard, "Repression, Participation, and Democratic Norms in Urban Central America," *American Journal of Political Science* 40:4 (November 1996): 1205-1232; and "Revolution's Legacy: Residual Effects on Nicaraguan Participation and Attitudes in Comparative Context," *Latin American Politics and Society* 48:2 (Summer 2006): 117-140; John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth and Poverty on Political Participation," in Anirudh Krishna, ed., *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008; and Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America, Vol. II: Politics and the Poor*, New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979.




Figure 36. Sociodemographics and Percent Taking a Leadership Role in a Community Group in Nicaragua

Many citizens also participate in campaign related activities beyond simply voting. To gauge involvement in elections, we asked respondents questions **PP1** and **PP2**.

- PP1.** During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA
- PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 37 we examine participation in campaign activities across the Americas. The left side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens who say they have “tried to persuade others” either “frequently” or “occasionally.” The right side presents the percentage who said they had worked for a campaign. The range of this type of electoral activism goes from the top level of 45.2% for the United States, followed by the Dominican Republic at 31.6%, down to lows in Paraguay and Mexico of just above 8 % and in Bolivia of 7.3%. The mean for the whole sample is 16.7% of citizens who try to convince others how to vote. Nicaraguans rank in the bottom half of the array and well below the regional mean at 12.4%.




Figure 37. Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas

The right side of Figure 37 focuses on actually working for a party or a candidate during and election. Again the range is quite wide, from a low of 1.9% in Chile (Canada is next at 3.9%) to a high of 17.9% in Surinam and Haiti. The regional mean is 8.8%, roughly half the rate at which people tried to persuade others how to vote. Among Nicaraguans 11.1% report party and campaign activity, a level above the regional mean. Thus while Nicaraguans are less likely than average to try to persuade others how to vote, more of them engage in election campaign-related participation.

Next, we explore results for Nicaragua in further depth. In Figure 38 we recode all those who report that they tried to persuade others either frequently or occasionally as having attempted to persuade others. Nicaraguan women are much less likely than men to try to convince others how to vote (9.8% versus 14.5%). Educational attainment has a modest positive effect on trying to convince others how to vote. In contrast, the impact of wealth, while slightly positive, is insignificant. Mother's educational background has an erratic and insignificant effect.




Figure 38. Sociodemographics and Attempts to Persuade Others in Nicaragua

In Figure 39 we present the percentage of respondents in different groups who said they worked for a candidate or party in the most recent elections. In this case, the activity is fairly evenly distributed among Nicaraguans in terms of their wealth, gender and maternal education – none has a statistically significant effect. The only demographic that matters, and strongly so, is educational attainment. Only 2.2% of Nicaraguans with no schooling report working on an election campaign for a party or candidate, while the figure rises to 19.9% for those with university education.




Figure 39. Sociodemographics and Campaign Work in Nicaragua

In the preceding analysis, we have found evidence for some participatory inequalities by gender. However, it is quite likely that rates of participation vary by women's positions in the labor market and family.⁷⁸ Figure 40 presents rates or levels of participation by gender and, for woman, by family and labor market status. We see a mixed picture among Nicaraguans on these five activities, one that leaves an impression of relative equality of participation overall. On three of five (voting in the last presidential election, leadership in community organizations, and trying to persuade others how to vote) there are no significant differences between either group of women or men. Notable differences exist for the remaining two participation types, but to some extent they counterbalance each other. Women are much more active on average than men in community participation (but there is no difference between married women without income and other women). In contrast to community participation, women are significantly less active than men in working for a party or candidate in an election campaign. Married women without income are less active than other women in this arena, but the difference between them is not statistically significant.

⁷⁸ See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

How does Nicaragua compare to the average patterns for the whole region on simple gender differences? Nicaragua is like the Americas in general on voting and community group leadership (no gender difference). Nicaragua is also like the Americas on community activism (women are more active), and campaign participation (men are more active). Finally, Nicaragua is unlike the Americas at large in that women are as likely to try to convince others how to vote as are men, where on balance men take a lead in this activity.




Figure 40. Gender Roles and Participation in Nicaragua

These results have not told us much about the association between race and participation in Nicaragua. In Figure 41 we present the rates or levels of each form of participation across the spectrum of skin color. Using the recoded variable for skin color,⁷⁹ we see a general pattern in which skin color does not matter excessively in participation rates. The lines tend to be flat – even across all skin color categories. That said, there are a few nuances among Nicaraguans. The lowest voting rate occurs among those in skin color category 3; both the lighter (1-2 group) and the darker categories above 4 are higher. The highest voting rate comes among those with darker skin colors (8-11). Convincing others how to vote is generally even across skin color categories with a small increment among the darker-skinned. Party and campaign work tends to be more frequent among those in the middle-toned skin colors, and slightly lower among both the lightest- and darkest-skinned. Community participation appears to be largely the same across all skin color groups. Community leadership activity is somewhat higher among darker-skinned Nicaraguans. But such small variations notwithstanding, Figure 41 suggests that skin color does not affect political participation very much in Nicaragua. With respect to the whole sample of the Americas, in which participation rates are also virtually flat across all skin colors, Nicaragua fits the larger regional pattern of little impact of skin color on political engagement.




Figure 41. Skin Color and Participation in Nicaragua

⁷⁹ The recoding scheme collapses the two lightest-skinned and the 4 darkest-skinned categories because of tiny numbers of respondent assigned to these (none for the second-darkest value of 10). This allows more meaningful comparisons of categories.

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of the majority or society as a whole support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that women's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

Note that responses to these questions are likely subject to what public opinion scholars call "social desirability bias," meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.⁸⁰ This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give the "socially desirable," non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions will likely be lower than their actual levels in the population.

Public Opinion towards Women's Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions tapping attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.⁸¹ The text of these questions is as follows:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?						
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree	(88) DK	(98) DA	
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?						
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) Both the same	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?						
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) It does not matter	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	

⁸⁰ Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, de Jonge, Chad K., Meléndez, Carlos, Osorio, Javier and Nickerson, David W. 2012 Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

⁸¹ VB51 and VB52 were administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

Figure 42 presents the mean score on our usual 0 to 100 conversion scale for agreement that men make better leaders than women. The averages range from a high in Guyana of 53.3 down to a low of 26.6 in Uruguay. A comparative perspective comes from the U.S. citizens' average of 30.1. The regional mean for the Americas is 35.7, indicating that on average citizens of the Americas disagree that men make better leaders, with the Guyanese being the only exception.




Figure 42. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

We considered whether having or ever having had a woman president would tend to lower agreement that women are not as good leaders, we examined the six countries that have had female presidents (Chile, Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Brazil – the last three have female presidents at the present time). All of the six countries register below the regional mean on this sexist view. This suggests that there may be some merit to our argument that having female presidents associates with less political sexism, whether the association reflect cause or effect. (Because presidential nominations are the product of elite-insider politics rather than mass attitudes, we suspect the causal arrow runs from the context to the attitudes). Another possible explanation is that of the respondents' gender. We expected women to be less skeptical of female leaders. This proved to be true for the region as a whole, with men scoring 41.2 out of 100 in agreement that men are better leaders, while women averaged eleven points less--only 30.4. Nicaraguans average 33.6 on the scale. The spread between genders in Nicaragua is smaller than for the Americas as a whole, with Nicaraguan men at 35.9 and women at 31 on the scale.

Public Opinion towards the Leadership of Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included one question on attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**.⁸²

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.

VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	

Figure 43 presents the distribution on this question, one that we believe elicits racial prejudice in the political arena. We have reversed the polarity and recoded to give the usual 0 to 100 scale; a score of 100 indicates the greatest bias against dark-skinned political leaders. Interestingly, this type of racial prejudice concerning political leaders is weaker than that against female leaders.⁸³ The index scores range for the hemisphere from a low of 15.4 in Uruguay to a high of 34.3 in Chile (the whole sample mean is 26.2). How does this prejudice distribute itself among people of different skin color? An inspection of this distribution for the whole region (not shown to conserve space) reveals a curvilinear relationship, with the lowest bias against dark-skinned leaders among the darkest- and the lightest-skinned respondents, while greater racist bias against dark-skinned leaders is present among persons in the middle of the skin-color range

Nicaraguans average 28.1 on the scale -- on balance within the scale range not very racially biased but slightly above the regional mean. In striking contrast to the larger regional pattern, darker skinned Nicaraguans are more likely to view dark-skinned leaders negatively than their lighter-skinned fellow citizens, and the bias increases fairly evenly across the skin-color spectrum. That said, the differences are not statistically significant in the split sample population of 750.

⁸² This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

⁸³ This resembles what polling revealed in the United States during the historic 2008 election primary season when Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama were vying for the Democratic Party nomination.




Figure 43. Belief that Dark Skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included question D5 on attitudes towards gays running for public office.

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

Figure 44 presents the distribution of bias against homosexuals running for public office, recoded into the usual zero to 100 scale with 100 indicating support for gays' right to seek public office. The mean for all the Americas is 41.6, in the disapproving end of the scale. But Figure 44 also reveals the broadest range of national means of almost any item we have examined in this survey. At the low end, Haitians average only 8.5, while at the high end Uruguayans and Canadians are tied at almost 80. The countries where approval of homosexuals seeking public office is strongest include several South American nations – Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. Support for gays' right to seek office tends to be low in the Caribbean Basin. Nicaraguans average 39.1 on the approval scale, placing them slightly below but statistically tied with the regional mean of 41.6.




Figure 44. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on attitudes towards those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.⁸⁴

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?

Figure 45 presents the comparative distribution of dis/agreement that the disabled should be permitted to run for public office. The usual 100 point scale is employed, having been recoded from the original answers so that a score of 100 is the most tolerant position, zero the least. We find that the mean position of all respondents in the 2012 Americas surveys is robust approval (67.9). The range descends from a high of 88.8 in the United States and Uruguay to a low of 37 for Haiti. All but two countries' citizens register in the approving end of the scale, with only Haitians and Guyanese on average in disagreement with allowing the handicapped to seek public office. Thus on balance the position on this issue is on the tolerant side nearly everywhere in the hemisphere. In Nicaragua the mean approval score is 70.6, strongly in favor of this aspect of political rights for the disabled.

⁸⁴ This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




Figure 45. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, for at least some indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist nontrivial discrepancies in rates of participation between men and women, different racial groups, and social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as American democracies have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we

can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.⁸⁵ The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are thus more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.⁸⁶

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 46 we find support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. The scale used to measure these attitudes is recoded into a zero to 100 scale, with the highest value representing the greatest approval. The range for the Americas is from a low of 46.4 in Trinidad and Tobago to a high of 81.3 in El Salvador. The mean for the hemisphere is 65.1, registering on average firm approval. Nicaraguans' average 73.6, placing them firmly in the approving end of the scale.

⁸⁵ Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

⁸⁶ This question was administered to a split (half) sample of respondents.




Figure 46. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.⁸⁷ While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly

⁸⁷ Lijphart, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.⁸⁸ One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.⁸⁹

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.⁹⁰ While the relationship between socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,⁹¹ material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

Despite reductions in inequality over the past decades, this chapter has revealed that important aspects of political participation remain unequal in the Americas. We see a mixed picture among Nicaraguans on five important political activities, one that leaves an impression of relative equality of participation overall. On three of five (voting in the last presidential election, leadership in community organizations, and trying to persuade others how to vote) there are no significant differences between either women or men. Notable gender differences exist for the remaining two participation types, but to some extent they counterbalance each other. Nicaraguan women are much more active on average than men in community participation (but there is no difference between married women without income and other women). In contrast to community participation, women are significantly less active than men in working for a party or candidate in an election campaign. Married Nicaraguan women without income are less active than other women in this arena, but the difference between them is not statistically significant. We also found that skin color makes very little difference in the political participation rates of Nicaraguans – participation rates vary little across the skin-color palette. The variable that most affects all the participation types is education.

⁸⁸ Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

⁸⁹ Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid*.; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

⁹⁰ Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.

⁹¹ Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Overall, Nicaragua is like the Americas in general on voting and community group leadership (no gender difference). Nicaragua is also like the Americas on community activism (women are more active), and campaign participation (men are more active). Finally, Nicaragua is unlike the Americas at large in that women are as likely to try to convince others how to vote as are men, where on balance men take a lead in this activity. Nicaragua is also like the Americas as a whole in the absence of a skin color influence on political participation. While there may be racial or ethnic differences in participation we have not yet explored, skin color does not privilege or disadvantage Nicaraguans.

In their attitudes towards participation in politics by certain potentially disadvantaged groups, we have found Nicaraguans tend to hold non-discriminatory attitudes. Nicaraguans take an open-minded view of women as political leaders, of dark-skinned political leaders, of and legislative gender quotas for women. In the broad regional context, Nicaraguans express somewhat less bias against all of these groups than citizens of the Americas as a whole. They deviate from this pattern in holding a bias against homosexuals seeking public office. Nicaraguans are biased against potential homosexual office seekers and slightly more than the regional average. Finally, it is worth noting that, while still firmly in the low-bias end of the spectrum, Nicaraguans are more prejudiced against women leaders' abilities than they are against dark-skinned people as leaders, the disabled seeking public office, and gender quotas for female legislators.

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.⁹² In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?


The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

Efectos del género y variables de control sobre la participación y participación según los roles de género



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

⁹² To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.

Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php>.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.⁹³

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010

Probabilidades predichas de la participación de hombres y mujeres en América Latina



rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas to elect party authorities in that country in 2009⁹⁴. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation. The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

⁹³ The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; asking help from a government official, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women's group meetings, CP20.

⁹⁴ In 2014 there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.


Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.

Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from

El impacto de las variables socioeconómicas y políticas sobre el voto



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010

voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.⁹⁵ Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.⁹⁶ On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.⁹⁷ If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own

⁹⁵ Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

⁹⁶ Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁹⁷ Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

experiences, leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy.⁹⁸ In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group – may well base their judgments of political leaders’ receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.⁹⁹

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.¹⁰⁰ Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders’ ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents’ performance and what is often called “specific political support”: support for the particular people in office.¹⁰¹ When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing “diffuse support,” or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.¹⁰²

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.¹⁰³ However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. “Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America.” *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

⁹⁹ Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. “An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality.” *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

¹⁰⁰ Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. “Politics as a Vocation.” In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁰¹ Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support.” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

¹⁰² Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

¹⁰³ Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. “Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?” *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

¹⁰⁴ Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America.” Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. “The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination,” *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.¹⁰⁵ However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.¹⁰⁶

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary (2000), on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.¹⁰⁷ And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as “important rallying cries” during democratization,¹⁰⁸ and raise “the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action.”¹⁰⁹ It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.¹¹⁰

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

¹⁰⁵ Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹⁰⁷ Cleary, Matthew. 2000. “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women’s Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

¹⁰⁹ Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

¹¹⁰ Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.¹¹¹

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been described in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, class, household wealth, and intra-household inequalities by gender and self-reported victimization by discrimination in government offices, public places, and employment situations.

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy (one's perception of one's own political capabilities), **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas. Figure 47 presents the range of responses to the internal efficacy question across the Americas, utilizing our usual zero to 100, with 100 indicating a high self-perception of personal ability to understand major issues facing one's country. The two countries with the highest levels of internal efficacy in the Americas are the United States (67.6) and Canada (60.0). Among Latin American and Caribbean nations Venezuelans registered the highest level at 57.6. On the low end are Paraguayans with a scale score of 38.8. Nicaraguans ranked fifth overall in the Americas with a mean score of 54.6. Thus a majority of Nicaraguans expresses confidence in understanding major issues confronting their country.

¹¹¹ This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.




Figure 47. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? In Figure 48 we use linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences. We include three additional variables we believe may affect internal efficacy –identification with a political party, community group activism, and community group leadership. The rationale for these is that they, too, represent inequality of engagement that might contribute to knowledge of political issues and problems.

We see in Figure 48 that many factors under consideration do not affect one's sense of internal efficacy among Nicaraguans – skin color, wealth, age, size of one's community, discrimination by

nongovernmental actors and party identification. The factors that are influential are several. Women report considerably less perceived knowledge of important national issues. On the positive side, those with high levels of interest in politics are much more likely to report feeling personally efficacious. Being more engaged in community organizations, having more education, and perceiving themselves to be the victim of discrimination by the government all elevate Nicaraguans' internal efficacy.




Figure 48. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Nicaragua

In Figure 49 we explore in greater depth how personal characteristics and discrimination are related to citizens' belief in their ability to understand the political system in Nicaragua. The difference between men and women is striking – an almost 11 point advantage for men in their sense of understanding of political issues and problems. Having less education clearly curtails Nicaraguans' sense of internal efficacy – there is a 10 point difference between those with no schooling and those with only primary education. The internal efficacy advantage increases to 61.8 for those with higher education. The less educated have much poorer tools for informing themselves about problems and correspondingly lower confidence they understand them.

Discrimination by the government does not reduce but actually elevates Nicaraguans' sense of internal efficacy. Perhaps perceiving that the government discriminates against them identifies some of the national problems to be understood. Lower and middle levels of community involvement make little difference in internal efficacy, but those who are highly active report a 12 to 14 point of less engaged groups. Finally, those who are uninterested in politics are least internally efficacious. The effect is quite large -- a 30 point difference between the least and most interested.




Figure 49. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Nicaragua

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described at the beginning of this section. In Figure 50 we present the distribution of these two variables across the countries of the Americas. The left hand side of Figure 50 comparatively ranks citizens of all the AmericasBarometer survey countries in terms of how much they believe those in government care what the people think. The results are somewhat surprising. Every country averages below the scale midpoint, so in general there is skepticism that those in power care what the people think. The lowest mean is among Costa Ricans, at 25.7, while the highest is among Venezuelans at 48.7. Thus in Latin America's oldest democracy, Costa Rica, its citizens express the least external efficacy, while in polarized and revolutionary-led Venezuela there is a the highest level of belief that government cares about public opinion. By way of comparison, U.S. citizens rank fourth from the bottom on external efficacy at 31.8. Nicaraguans are fourth overall in this type of external efficacy, averaging 47.1 on the 100 point scale.




Figure 50. External Efficacy and Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas

On the right hand side of Figure 50 are displayed the comparative levels of agreement that political parties “listen to the people.” The range is even broader than for “the government is interested in what the people think,” but all within the negative half of the scale. Interestingly Costa Rica again is the country with the lowest sense of external efficacy -- perceptions of leaders’ receptiveness to citizen input -- (at 21.6), revealing citizens’ alienation from their parties. Venezuelans also again rank first (at 49) on this aspect of external efficacy. Nicaraguans averaged fourth overall once again with a score of 42.7. While the rankings of the countries from least to greatest external efficacy of both kinds (Figure 50) is not identical, several countries in addition to Costa Rica figure among the bottom third of agreement that parties care what the people think – Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Who within Nicaragua thinks that “those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think”? And who agrees with the notion that “political parties represent people like you”? In Figure 51 and Figure 52, we use linear regression analysis to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report high internal efficacy and strong perceptions of representation. Among Nicaraguans only four factors appear to shape the view that those in power care about what people think. Those reporting discrimination by the government agree less with this proposition. On the positive side, being interested in politics, engaged in community groups, and sympathizing with a political party all increase this form of external political efficacy (Figure 51). With respect to belief that parties listen to the people (Figure 52), party sympathizers and those interested in politics are take positive views. Again we observe that victims of government discrimination hold negative views. One

striking finding is that more educated Nicaraguans take a strongly negative view of parties' attentiveness to the people. (While not statistically significant, a similar tendency is also observed in Figure 51.)




Figure 51. Determinants of External Efficacy in Nicaragua




Figure 52. Determinants of Belief in Party Representation in Nicaragua

To further understand what factors are associated with these two attitudes, in Figure 53 and Figure 54 we examine how several of the most important variables from the regression analysis are related to internal efficacy and perceptions of party representation. In Figures 53 and 54 we see that being interested in politics is much stronger than any other factor influencing both forms of external efficacy. Those who are interested in politics have greater faith in the responsiveness of both those in office and political parties. Perceiving oneself as being victimized by government lowers both types of external efficacy by 9 to 14 scale points. Sympathy for (identification with) a political party increases both forms of external efficacy substantially. Community engagement gives those most involved a 20 point boost over the least involved in agreement that leaders care what the people think (Figure 53). It is possible that through civic activity in Nicaragua citizens gain experience with public officials, finding them more responsive than those not engaged. Finally, Figure 54 reveals that the effect of education on assessments of party responsiveness is somewhat complex, being highest among those with primary education and lower for all others. However, the overall effect is driven by the low external efficacy expressed by those with higher education. They rank from 9 to 15 points lower on the “parties pay attention” question than any other education cohort.




Figure 53. Factors Associated with External Efficacy in Nicaragua




Figure 54. Factors Associated with Belief in Party Representation in Nicaragua

III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination may also affect more abstract political attitudes. As discussed above, discrimination could be seen as a failure of the political system, and could lower support for the general political system. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we tap a number of more general political attitudes; the most important of these are support for the political system and support for democracy in the abstract. In Chapter Five we describe in detail how these are measured, as well as the levels of these attitudes across the region and over time within Nicaragua. In the present section, we consider how personal characteristics and experiences of discrimination shape these attitudes that are so critical for democratic stability.

In Figure 55 we use linear regression analysis to assess what individual traits and reported experiences predict levels of political support in Nicaragua. To begin we note that support for the political system is relatively high in Nicaragua (graph not shown to conserve space). It ranges from 20 points on our 0 to 100 scale from a low of 41.4 in Honduras to a maximum of around 61 in both Belize and Surinam. Nicaraguans average 60.7, ranking them third overall and slightly above Canadians in support for their political system. (A point of comparison is offered by the United States, whose citizens' replies on the system support items averages 53.8 and rank fourteenth of 26 countries.)




Figure 55. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Nicaragua

The factors that lower Nicaraguans' system support (Figure 55) are believing oneself to be a victim of government discrimination, being older, and having more education and wealth. Factors elevating system support are interest in politics, identification with a political party, participation in community organizations, and being a woman. Many of the factors of inequality expected to advantage or disadvantage citizens and affect system support have no significant effect: racial and ethnic group, discrimination by other than the government, being a housewife, and size of one's community of residence. Thus we see that system support in Nicaragua is not only quite high comparatively, social inequalities have little effect upon it. That is, this relatively high degree of system support is broadly distributed across the Nicaraguan population.

To assess in greater depth the most important factors determining support for the political system, in Figure 56 we examine the separate relationships between a number of personal traits and experiences and system support. For communal group participation, system support rises steadily from among the least active (57.8) to the most active (70). Party sympathizers are 11 scale points more system supportive than those who do not identify with a party. Those experiencing discrimination by the government are over 9 points less system supportive than others. Nicaraguans who are the least interested in politics average 54.4 on system support, a value that rises steadily to 69.8 for those most interested in politics. Women are slightly but significantly more system supportive than men. Finally, the system support average declines evenly across the education cohorts. Nicaraguans with no formal education average 63.2, a value that falls to 54.5 among those with higher education. System support appears to be much more determined by political engagement among Nicaraguans than by inequality.




Figure 56. Factors Associated with System Support in Nicaragua

For comparative reference the level of agreement that democracy is the best form of government is in the prodemocracy end of the scale for all countries in the Americas, ranging from a low of 52.6 in Honduras to a high above 85 in both Uruguay and Venezuela. (For an interesting contrast, agreement that democracy is the best form of government among citizens of the United States and Canada, while still positive, is somewhat weaker at 76.4 and 76.3, respectively.) Nicaraguans are in the middle of the distribution on support for democracy overall, still strongly positive at 73.8.

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination might also have spillover effects on support for democracy in the abstract. In Figure 57 we use linear regression analysis to assess how the set of personal traits we reported above are associated with the belief that “democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.” The regression analysis reveals that only one inequality variable, perception of being discriminated against by some actor other than the government, lowers system support.




Figure 57. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Nicaragua

In Figure 58 we continue to examine the variable identified as important in the regression analysis above, discrimination not by the government, as well as a few other factors that came close to statistical significance in the regression analysis. We see that Nicaraguans discriminated against by some entity or actor other than the government average six points lower on the system support scale than those who were not. So, discrimination – even outside government channels -- appears to have a modestly corrosive effect on system support. But as the remaining parts of Figure demonstrate, the effects of education, party identification and government discrimination are smaller and fail to attain significance. We conclude that the inequality factors among Nicaraguans, and some are strong, have relatively little effect on support for the political system. Inequalities and disadvantages matter very little in shaping Nicaraguans’ comparatively robust system support. Age elevates system support, as does interest in politics. Finally, the smaller the community of residence, the greater the system support.




Figure 58. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in Nicaragua

IV. Protest Participation

Last, as we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups – at least those that are highly politicized – to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting may be becoming a more “normalized” method of political participation: “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest.”¹¹² In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including most importantly **PROT3**.

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?

(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to PROT6] (88) DK [Go to PROT6] (98) DA [Go to PROT6]

In Figure 59 we examine the levels of political protest throughout the Americas. The first thing to observe is that participation is in most countries a relative uncommon political behavior. Only 7.8% of respondents across the Americas reported engaging in a protest within the previous twelve months. The range of protesting across the Americas is broad. Jamaicans do it the least (2.3%) while Bolivians

¹¹² Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

and Haitians protest the most (17.7% and 16.8% respectively). U.S. and Canadian citizens protest behavior falls in the middle of the distribution at 6.9% and 5.3%, respectively.

Nicaraguans report an average of 8.2% participating in a protest or demonstration. This places them among the top third of protesters in the Americas, but their average is nevertheless below half that of Bolivians and Haitians.




Figure 59. Participation in Protests in the Countries of the Americas

Who protests in Nicaragua? In **Error! Reference source not found. 60** we now use logistic regression analysis to consider whether and how experiences of marginalization and discrimination affect whether Nicaraguans participate in protest politics. Only four factors contribute to protesting among Nicaraguans, and of these only one is one of the inequality factors at the heart of this chapter's analysis. Discrimination by the government slightly elevates Nicaraguans' protest participation. Interest in politics has a larger effect, and party sympathy the biggest effect. This strongly suggests that in Nicaragua protest stems not from inequality problems, but from political and partisan interests and from a sense of being discriminated against by the government. This last factor probably also has partisan roots, given the sharp party polarization in Nicaragua and complaints about problems with the last two national elections in 2008 (municipal) and 2011 (presidential). Finally, residents of larger communities are slightly more prone to protest.




Figure 60. Determinants of Protest Participation in Nicaragua

In **Error! Reference source not found.** we explore further how protest participation is related to several important variables discovered in the analysis presented in **Error! Reference source not found.** 60. We see that the most educated are three times more prone to protest than the least educated. Nicaraguan housewives are only about 40% as likely to as other women to protest. Those with very high interest in politics are six times more likely to protest than the lowest-interest Nicaraguans. Party sympathizers are four times more prone to protest than those with no party identification. Finally, Nicaraguans who view themselves as victims of discrimination, whether by the government or some other source, are twice as likely to protest as those who do not see themselves this way.




Figure 61. Factors Associated with Protest Participation in Nicaragua

V. Conclusion

The questions of this chapter were whether inequalities affect Nicaraguans' perceptions of their own capabilities as citizens, of whether government pays attention to their concerns, their support for their political system, for democracy, and their protest behavior. In Chapter 2 we found little evidence that race and gender inequality have little effect on Nicaraguans' political participation, and that Nicaraguans hold relatively nondiscriminatory attitudes toward women, minorities, the disabled, and darker-skinned people in politics. In this chapter a somewhat similar pattern has emerged. With a few exceptions, inequalities and perceived discrimination have little or no effect on Nicaraguans' sense of political efficacy, their support for their political system, democratic attitudes, or protest.

Discrimination by the government elevates Nicaraguans sense of internal efficacy (belief they understand national problems), as does having more education, while females believe themselves less internally efficacious. Government discrimination, in contrast, lowers both types of external efficacy among Nicaraguans (belief that officials care what people think and that parties pay attention to the people). Most of the inequalities we explored – gender, skin color, wealth, age, being a housewife, community size and perceived discrimination by non-government actors – have no significant effect on political efficacy in any of the three forms considered. The factors most important in shaping political efficacy among Nicaraguans are interest in politics, party identification, and community participation. Thus far more than inequality, partisan political engagement, community organization activism, concern about politics in general increase Nicaraguans sense of their own political capabilities and of the responsiveness of their political system.

Nicaraguans' system support is increased slightly by being a female, and reduced by experiencing government discrimination and having more education. Support for democracy as a system of government is very evenly distributed through the Nicaraguan population, affected (negatively) only by a sense of non-governmental discrimination. Discrimination by government tends to elevate protest among Nicaraguans. Otherwise almost none of the inequalities we have examined shape system support, preference for democracy, or protest. Again, the political engagement factors exert far more influence (consistently positive) on Nicaraguans' system support, and protest participation than do inequality and discrimination. Nicaraguans' political system support (which is relatively high compared to the region as a whole) and protest (moderate for the region) emerge much more from personal political inclinations and party and community engagement than they do from the inequalities we have measured. Nicaraguans support for democracy as a system of government, very positive in absolute terms, is evenly distributed among those politically engaged and not, and among both victims and beneficiaries of inequality and discrimination.

Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?¹¹³

The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.


Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.

La división urbano-rural y las explicaciones de oportunidad versus motivación



95% I.C. (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010



¹¹³ For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support


This box reviews findings from the paper “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America,” by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.¹¹⁴ The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.


Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.¹¹⁵ Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiencias con la discriminación en ocho países



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010



¹¹⁴ The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

¹¹⁵ The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information


This box reviews findings from the 2012 report “Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results,” by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.


The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.¹¹⁶ As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this

Apoyo promedio a la democracia, por año y encuesta



Porcentaje que recibió información sobre candidatos, por género y año



Fuente: Encuesta de Línea de Base y de Seguimiento por LAPOP, 2010-2012

study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

¹¹⁶ This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.”

Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement,
and Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990's, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.¹¹⁷ Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.¹¹⁸

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.¹¹⁹ However, others show that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally.¹²⁰ Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even *help* specific

¹¹⁷ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

¹¹⁸ Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

¹¹⁹ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

¹²⁰ Canache, Damarys, and Michael E. Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

governments maintain public support.¹²¹ Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.¹²² However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).¹²³ While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.¹²⁴ Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to emigrate to other countries.¹²⁵ Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.¹²⁶

¹²¹ Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

¹²² Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

¹²³ Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>

¹²⁴ Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C.; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

¹²⁵ Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹²⁶ Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3).

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996¹²⁷, these items have been refined and improved. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).¹²⁸ This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

While the series measures "experiential" corruption very effectively, it does not measure "grand" or larger-scale corruption" at all. That is to say, what Nicaraguans may know or believe about large-scale corruption is likely only what they glean from scandals that have become public and covered in the press, or from gossip. One additional item presented below may capture the perception of large-scale corruption.

¹²⁷ Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates, y Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates

¹²⁸ Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99				
		0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99				
		0	1	88	98

Another item that taps perceptions of rather than experiences with corruption is also included in the questionnaire. This item, we believe, may capture perception of corruption on the large scale. The question reads as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon?
(88) DK (98) DA

We rescale this variable from 0-100, where 0 represents a perception that corruption is very uncommon, and 100 a perception that corruption is very common. The reader should exercise great caution when comparing experiential corruption (petty in scale and based on personal observation) and perceived corruption (likely an amalgam of public scandals citizens have learned about in the media, gossip about leaders and how they live, and innate cynicism about the way government works).

Perception of Corruption

Error! Reference source not found.⁶² shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption in the Americas; the regional mean is a high 70.4. The highest countries are Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago with average reported levels of corruption of 81.7 and 80.9, respectively; the lowest countries are Surinam (38.8) followed by Canada (58.3) and Uruguay (61.8). Nicaraguans' average level of perceived corruption is fourth lowest in the hemisphere at 62.2, which is statistically identical to Uruguay. For a comparative benchmark, U.S. citizens perceive more corruption than do Nicaraguans (66.3). Thus while comparatively low for the hemisphere, Nicaraguans nevertheless perceive a high level of corruption. As we noted above, this likely refers to what Nicaraguans believe to be the grand or large-scale corruption taking place. An example of this type of corruption would be the acts of money laundering and embezzlement for which former president Arnoldo Alemán was convicted and incarcerated in 2003.¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Former president Alemán's conviction was overturned in 2009 by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court of Justice.




Figure 62. Perceptions of Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

As with the other indicators throughout this report, we present the changes in perceptions of corruption over time. Figure 63 reports trends in perception of corruption in Nicaragua for the years in which these data were collected. We see that levels of perceived corruption in Nicaragua have fallen significantly across each survey since reaching a peak of 83.5 in 2006. The net change in perceived corruption from 2006 to 2012 on our 100 point scale has been a decline of 21.1 points.




Figure 63. Perceptions of Corruption over Time in Nicaragua

It is important to note that high levels of perceived corruption might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of corruption. Thus, although perceptions of corruption – likely referring to larger-scale acts -- might be high, actual victimization of individuals might be low. We turn to actual experiences with corruption victimization in the next section.

Corruption Victimization

This section addresses the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. To this end, we present the percentage of respondents who report that they have been asked for a bribe in at least one location in the last year.




Figure 64. Percentage Victimized by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 64 shows wide variation in rates of experiential corruption in different countries across the region. The regional mean percentage of respondents having experienced any corruption is 11.7 %, but the range goes from very low among Canadians (3.4%), U.S. citizens (5.3%) and Chileans (5.8%) all the way up to a trio of countries with very high rates – Ecuador (40.9%), Bolivia (44.8%) and Haiti (67.0%). Some 11.4 percent of Nicaraguans report experiencing corruption. This places Nicaragua in the bottom third of countries on reported corruption experience.

Some citizens received requests for a bribe in many instances, while others received requests in one or none. Next, we assess the number of instances in which citizens reported being victimized by corruption Nicaragua in 2012. This information is presented graphically in Figure 65. We find that 88.6% reports no experience with corruption in the past 12 months, 8.9 being victimized in one instance, while 1.8% reports two instances, and only 0.7% three or more instances. Thus Nicaraguans experience fewer bribe solicitations than most of the hemisphere's citizens – only about one Nicaraguan in nine experiences bribe requests.




Figure 65. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in Nicaragua

How have levels of corruption victimization varied in Nicaragua over time? In Figure 66 we show the percentage of citizens who report any corruption victimization, by year. One reason for the relatively low number of requests for bribes among Nicaraguans in 2012 is that there has been a significant decline in this unhappy experience since 2006. Nicaraguans report a net decline of 6.6 percentage points for bribe solicitations over this period. While no change from one year to the next was statistically significant, the 2006 to 2010 and 2012 differences are significant. Reported bribe seeking has declined in Nicaragua.




Figure 66. Percentage Victimized by Corruption over Time in Nicaragua

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model to identify those socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that were positively and negatively associated with corruption victimization. Figure 67 displays the results of this regression. The figure reveals that Nicaraguans who are more prosperous, younger, and who reside in larger cities are asked for bribes more; women are solicited less. Skin color, education and perceived family economic situation have no apparent effect.




Figure 67. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Nicaragua

To better grasp the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that an individual has been victimized by corruption, we present bivariate results in **Error! Reference source not found.** There we see that the difference in bribe solicitation is uneven across wealth levels. Nicaraguans among the wealthiest quintile experience several percent more bribe solicitation than people in any other less prosperous quintile. Twice as many men experience bribe requests as women. Nicaraguans aged 26 to 45 years experience the most bribe solicitations, while those 66 or older get the fewest.

Finally, residents of the capital city Managua report experiencing approximately double the rate of bribe requests (18.3%) as residents of rural areas or small and medium-sized cities (fewer than 10%). Pursuing this further we also broke down the experience of corruption by region (not shown to conserve space). Residents of metropolitan Managua are significantly more likely to experience corruption than residents of any other area of the country. Some 17.4% percent of the residents of metropolitan Managua report bribe solicitations, and 10.6% report that the solicitation came from a police officer. Thus over half the bribery solicitations in the capital area result from encounters with the police. The proportional incidence of reported police bribery solicitations was somewhat lower in other areas and in smaller population centers.

In sum, while Nicaraguans experience comparatively low levels of petty corruption and evaluate the National Police at high levels (Chapter Five), around half of the petty corruption reported occurs from bribe solicitations by police officers, especially in the capital area.




Figure 68. Demographics and Corruption Victimization in Nicaragua

III. Perceptions of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The Americas Barometer measures citizens' perception of their safety by asking question AOJ11:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

(1) Very safe	(2) Somewhat safe	(3) Somewhat unsafe
(4) Very unsafe	(88) DK	(98) DA

Following the LAPOP standard, responses were recalibrated on a 0-100 scale, where higher values mean greater perceived insecurity. Given that the majority of criminal acts occur in urban areas, and especially in national capitals, we opted to present crime victimization data for the 24 national capitals included in the sample (for sampling reasons, the United States and Canada are excluded). Figure 69 shows the results for all the capitals in the survey. Residents in Ciudad de Mexico and Lima report the greatest sense of insecurity (54.7 and 53.9, respectively), while the low end of the scale is occupied by citizens in Puerto España and Kingston (around 30 on the scale). Respondents in Managua at 41.1 rank among the bottom third on perceived insecurity. Within the Central American isthmus, Managua is statistically tied on the low end with Tegucigalpa and Panama, while San José, San Salvador, and especially Ciudad de Guatemala (at 53.9) have higher mean insecurity levels.




Figure 69. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Capitals of the Americas

Figure 70 shows how perceived levels of insecurity have changed over time in Nicaragua, using data from past waves of LAPOP surveys in which respondents were asked the same question. Nicaraguans in 2012 express considerably lower perception of insecurity than in several previous years. The level has declined from an average of 45 in 2004 to 32.9 in 2012. There are several possible reasons for this. First, Nicaragua's police have maintained their institutional strength and reputation of effectiveness in recent years. Nicaraguan authorities have also enjoyed success in diverting narcotics trafficking away from Nicaragua in recent years. Finally, Nicaragua has experienced considerably less gang-related activity than some of its neighbors to the north. Nicaraguans may thus view themselves both as absolutely and relatively safer over time than their neighbors in the more violent nations to their north.




Figure 70. Perceptions of Insecurity over Time in Nicaragua

In what regions of the country are perceptions of insecurity most severe? In Figure 71 we examine this issue. Perceived insecurity is statistically equal in five of six regions of Nicaragua. The only areas where Nicaraguans hold a meaningfully higher than average sense of insecurity is metropolitan Managua.




Figure 71. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Regions of Nicaragua

Once again, in the same way as we previously discussed for the issue of corruption, it is important to note that high levels of perceived insecurity might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of crime. Thus, although perceptions of insecurity might be high, actual victimization might be low. We turn to a discussion of crime victimization in the next section.

IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare to individuals' experiences with crime? Since 2010, the Americas Barometer has used an updated series of items to measure crime victimization, which reads as follows:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]
 (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options]

(1) In your home
 (2) In this neighborhood
 (3) In this municipality/canton
 (4) In another municipality/canton
 (5) In another country
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Figure 72 presents responses from **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR**. It shows that a wide range of individuals have been crime victims, ranging from a low of 7.9% in Georgetown to a high of 39.6% in Quito. Turning to the right side of Figure 72, the range for crime victimization for any member of the household was highest in Quito (45.3%) and lowest in Panama (6.4%). The risk of crime victimization clearly ranges widely across the hemisphere. It is important to remember, however, that our survey is only administered to adults of voting age or older, making it possible for youth crime victimization that family members do not know about to go underreported. It is also important to remember that responses are individuals' self-reported crime victimizations. In some contexts, certain crimes (particularly those that are perpetrated almost exclusively against particular marginalized groups) might be normalized and thus reported with less frequency than that with which they occur.¹³⁰




Figure 72. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas

Compared to other capitals in the Americas, Managua's victimization as individuals at 26.2% ranks tenth from the top. With respect to victimization levels of anyone in the respondent's household, Managua at 29.0% ranked twelfth from the bottom.

¹³⁰ Further, some crimes may be underreported for various reasons, including social stigma or shame. For example, almost no Nicaraguans reported having been sexually assaulted in the 2012 survey, a figure that stretches credulity. We suspect underreporting by our respondents.

Figure 73 illustrates where most crime in Nicaragua occurred, according to respondents. The largest share (30.8%) of the crime victimization occurred in the respondents' own homes. Outside the homes, 28.5% took place in the victim's neighborhood, another 26.6% within the municipality, and 13.6% in a different municipality.




Figure 73. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization in Nicaragua

In which regions of Nicaragua does most crime take place? Figure 74 illustrates regional patterns in crime. The Managua metropolitan area has the highest crime victimization rate of 23.7%. In contrast, only 12.5% of the Northern Pacific region's citizens have been crime victims, a level similar to the 14.3% reported in the Southern Pacific's. The least crime of all, ranging from a low of 7.5% to 8.3%, occurs in the Central, Caribbean, and Northern zones.




Figure 74. Crime Victimization by Region in Nicaragua

Finally, it might be of interest to know how experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure 75 illustrates trends in self-reported crime victimization in Nicaragua between 2004 and 2012. Note, however, that the text of the questions measuring crime victimization changed in 2010. Between 2004 and 2008, LAPOP used VIC1, which read: *“Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?”* In 2010 and 2012, this was replaced with VIC1EXT, which provided more detail on the types of crimes that may have occurred. This modification was intended to increase the validity of responses. The change in wording of the crime victimization questions might account for the jump in victimization reported between 2008 and 2010.

Figure 75 reveals crime victimization rates stable at around 16% from 2004 to 2008. The apparent increase in 2010 must be discounted for the reason explained above. A statistically significant decline, however, occurred from 2010 at 19.2% to 13.5% in 2012. On balance, then, Nicaragua has relatively low crime rates and our evidence suggests that the crime rate in the country is on a downward trajectory.




Figure 75. Crime Victimization over Time in Nicaragua

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

Figure 76 depicts the results of a logistic regression model assessing who is likely to be a victim of crime in Nicaragua. In this and all other regression charts, we standardize all variables. As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.




Figure 76. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Nicaragua

Those most likely to be crime victims in Nicaragua include residents of the Managua metropolitan area, who we have already seen report crime victimization at twice that of residents of most of the rest of the country. Men are also more often crime victims. Crime victimization is higher among those who perceive their economic situations as positive and among those of greater wealth.

To better understand the effect each independent variable has on crime victimization in Nicaragua, Figure 77 shows the bivariate relationships between each of the significant independent variables from the original logistic regression and crime victimization in Nicaragua. There is an almost 8% higher crime victimization rate among the wealthiest quintile of Nicaraguans compared to the poorest quintile. The difference between the worst to best categories of perceived family economic situation is only 2.2%, but in the multivariate model (Figure 76) controlling for other effects this difference proves significant. Nicaraguan men experience 4.3% more crime than women. The young report more crime victimization than older Nicaraguans (Figure 77), but in the multivariate model

(Figure 76) this difference is not significant. Finally, crime victimization is clearly greater in large communities of residence. Managua and metropolitan area residents report three times more crime experience than residents of rural areas, 2.5 times more than small-city dwellers, more than double the amount reported by medium-sized city residents, and almost double that for large cities not part of the capital area itself.




Figure 77. Demographics and Household Crime Victimization in Nicaragua

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high rates of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perceptions of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in Nicaragua? We now turn to a multivariate linear regression which estimates the impacts victimization and insecurity have on support for the political system. Figure 78 depicts the impacts of perceptions of and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.¹³¹ Turning first to the control variables included in the model, interest in politics, political party identification, community group participation increase system support. In Nicaragua women are more system supportive but the more educated are less system

¹³¹ System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.

supportive. In terms of the key variables being analyzed here, three of four significantly reduce system support. Nicaraguans who perceive corruption, who experience corruption, and who experience crime all report lower system support. A perception of insecurity does not have a significant effect in Nicaragua.




Figure 78. Determinants of System Support in Nicaragua

Figure 79 delves further into the effects of the independent variables on system support, presenting the bivariate relationships between system support and corruption and crime perceptions and experiences. Crime victims in Nicaragua report 9 points out of 100 lower system support than non-victims, and corruption victims 10 points lower support. The corrosive effect on system support among those who perceive high levels of corruption is even greater than among those who are actual victims – 15 scale points. The relationship revealed for perceived insecurity is much narrower and erratic, both factors accounting for its lack of significance. It is worth emphasizing here that Nicaraguans' mean levels of system support are relatively high in the hemispheric context, and that crime and corruption victimization are relatively low, so that the net effect on system support across the whole population is modest. Even among crime and corruption victims and among higher corruption perceivers the average system support remains above the scale midpoint.




Figure 79. Crime, Corruption, and System Support in Nicaragua

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section addresses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is often conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.¹³² Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, those that perceive higher levels of crime and those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.¹³³ To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?

(1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 80 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in each country of the Americas who express support for the rule of law, versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other authorities may act with impunity. The highest support for the rule of law is found in country Jamaica

¹³² See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

¹³³ Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

(74.9%), while the lowest support is found in Bolivia (53.3%). Nicaragua falls slightly above the middle of this distribution with a mean of 66.1% support for the idea that officials should adhere to the law, a figure well in the supportive end of the continuum. For comparison's sake, this places Nicaraguans' support for the rule of law roughly six points below citizens of the United States and six points above Canadians.




Figure 80. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law in the Countries of the Americas

In **Error! Reference source not found.81** we show levels of support for the rule of law over time in Nicaragua. The trends are dramatic. In 2004 71.1% of Nicaraguans expressed support for officials following the law but this figure declined more than 26 percentage points over the next two surveys to a level of 46.7% in 2008. The trend then sharply reversed itself to rise almost 8 points in 2010 and another 12 points by 2012 to a level of 66.1%. Whatever factors eroded support for the rule of law between 2004 and 2008, a striking recuperation of agreement that officials should follow the law has taken place in recent years.




Figure 81. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law over Time in Nicaragua

Finally, we conclude this section by attempting to clarify the determinants of support for the rule of law in Nicaragua. **Error! Reference source not found.**² represents the results of a logistic regression used to identify those factors. Nicaraguan women are slightly more favorable toward the rule of law than men. The less educated favor the rule of law more than those with more education. Nicaragua's self-reported crime victims are slight less favorable toward officials following the law to apprehend criminals than non-victims. Other factors in the model have no significant effect: left-right ideology, trust, skin color, size of one's community of residence, personal wealth, and corruption victimization. Thus the support for the rule of law is broadly distributed across demographic traits except for gender and education.




Figure 82. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Nicaragua

Error! Reference source not found.³ delves more deeply into some of the more important independent variables in this analysis. Nicaraguan women are 4% more likely than men to support the rule of law, a difference that is significant in the multivariate analysis. Crime victims are 11% less supportive of the rule of law than non-victims. Finally, those with higher education are 16% less supportive of the rule of law than those with no education. This is a somewhat disturbing finding because it suggests that Nicaragua's elite (as defined by education) has not internalized a value that many believe provides support for political system stability and democracy.




Figure 83. Factors Related to Support for the Rule of Law in Nicaragua

VII. Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the magnitude and the relationships between crime victimization, corruption victimization, perceptions of insecurity, crime, and corruption and support for the political system and the rule of law in Nicaragua. Nicaraguans' perceptions of corruption, corruption victimization, perceived insecurity, and actual crime victimization are relatively low compared to the rest of Latin America. Moreover, perceived and experienced corruption, crime victimization and perceived insecurity have been declining among Nicaraguans in recent years. Each of these problems is more prevalent among residents of the capital city Managua and its surrounding metropolitan areas than in smaller communities or other areas of the nation.

Corruption victimization, and crime victimization are more common among wealthier Nicaraguans and among men. Perceived corruption and a sense of insecurity are fairly evenly distributed across all demographic groups. Skin color and age exercise virtually no influence on the models tested in this chapter, including the key dependent variables. With respect to the influence of the four main variables of interest on system support and support for the rule of law, we have seen that perceived insecurity has little effect on either. Perceived corruption and experienced corruption, however, do tend to lower Nicaraguans' system support. Crime victimization lowers both system support as well as support for the rule of law. On balance, these factors have some of the expected effects on system support and the rule of law, but the fact that both corruption and crime are comparatively low in Nicaragua minimizes their impact. On average, those most affected by crime

and corruption or perceptions of these still remain supportive of both the Nicaraguan political system and the rule of law.

One final finding of concern is the negative relationship observed in Nicaragua between educational attainment and support for the rule of law. Educational attainment is widely observed to associate positively with democratic attitudes and tolerance. The rule of law is a principle for which one would reasonably expect to find support among the educated, yet in Nicaragua this is not so. Intriguingly, a cursory analysis reveals that the negative relationship between education and support for public officials following the law is also observed across the entire 26 country sample for 2012. Influential elites in general, national political leaders and public officials, in Nicaragua and around the hemisphere, come disproportionately from the ranks of the better educated. One must wonder what are the implications for human rights and for the quality of official behavior when the best-trained and best-informed citizens do not strongly embrace the rule of law.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,¹³⁴ others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.¹³⁵ Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.¹³⁶

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.¹³⁷ While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP’s measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.¹³⁸ This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians’ proximity to citizens’ policy preferences have an important effect on citizens’ attitudes about the political system.¹³⁹ Institutional variables have also

¹³⁴ Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial, ; Przeworski Adam. 1999. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” en Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, y Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P. 1991., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press..

¹³⁵ Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America”. *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. y Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹³⁶ See also Almond, Gabriel Abraham y Sidney Verba. 1963 *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

¹³⁷ Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America.” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29

¹³⁸ Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

¹³⁹ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008. “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian, 2011. “Public support for liberal democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and

been shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.¹⁴⁰

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.¹⁴¹ In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.¹⁴²

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."¹⁴³ Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.¹⁴⁴ Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,¹⁴⁵ authoritarian personality,¹⁴⁶ and religion.¹⁴⁷ At the

Stephen Whitefield, 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

¹⁴⁰¹⁴⁰ Anderson, Christopher. 2007., *Losers' consent : elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. y Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

¹⁴¹ Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) .

¹⁴² Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

¹⁴³ Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," 5. *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, 2.

¹⁴⁴ Gibson, James L.. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L.2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L.1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L.1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

¹⁴⁵ Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, y Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. y Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al..2005 "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 : 593-608; Brader, Ted,

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.¹⁴⁸ Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.¹⁴⁹ LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.¹⁵⁰

Research by Golebiouwska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.¹⁵¹ It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in Table 1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Nicholas A. Valentino, y Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978.

¹⁴⁶ Altemeyer Bob. 2007., *The Authoritarians*.

¹⁴⁷ Postic, Robert K.2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest, 2007); Stouffer, Samuel A.1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc,).

¹⁴⁸ Sidanius, Jim y Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴⁹ Peffley, Mark y Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257.

¹⁵⁰ Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

¹⁵¹ Golebiouwska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiouwska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 AmericasBarometer data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.¹⁵²

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's "system support" index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Nicaragua?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Nicaragua?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Nicaragua?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas? In **Error! Reference source not found.**4 we present the levels of political support in our study in 2012. The political system support averages range from a low of 41.4 out of 100 in Honduras, where a coup occurred in 2009, to a high in Belize of 61.7. Two interesting points of comparison are that Canadians at 60.7 rank second in the Americas on system support, while the citizens of the United States average 53.5, which places them in the middle of the array. Nicaraguans average 60.7, placing them fourth overall in system support and statistically tied with several other countries at the top of the array. Overall system support among supporters of the ruling Sandinista Party is 15 scale points higher than among those supporting other parties or no party at all.

¹⁵² Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)




Figure 84. Support for the Political System in the Countries of the Americas

Support for the political system is typically higher on some of the individual dimensions of the index than on others. In **Error! Reference source not found.**5 we present the levels of agreement in Nicaragua with each of the five components of system support. Nicaraguans express their lowest evaluations for the fairness of the courts (at 51.3, a score just above the scale midpoint). Evaluation of Nicaragua's basic rights protection is also relatively low at 56.3. Moving beyond these specific lower evaluations of the courts and rights, Nicaraguans express more pride in their political system (61.1), a sense they should support the system (65.2), and generalized respect for Nicaragua's institutions (68.8). Thus Nicaraguans express higher diffuse (non-specific) support than they do for specific evaluations of courts and rights.




Figure 85. Components of Support for the Political System in Nicaragua

Figure 86 presents the evolution of system support in Nicaraguan since 2004. After an initial decline from 49.9 (effectively the scale midpoint) in 2004 to 45.3 in 2006, Nicaraguans' system evaluations have recuperated at an increasing pace. Evaluation of the political system rose more than 15 scale points between 2006 and the current year 2012, when the score of 60.6 placed Nicaraguans solidly in the positive end of the system support scale. Breaking down system support by party identification over time (not shown to conserve space), supporters of the ruling Sandinista party increased their system support 25 scale points between 2006 and 2012, while support among other parties' sympathizers and those supporting no party rose only 8 scale points. Thus increasing support for the system has principally occurred among Sandinistas.




Figure 86. Support for the Political System over Time in Nicaragua

III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the Americas Barometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Nicaraguan form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: **[Probe: To what degree?]**

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Nicaraguan form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all LAPOP indexes, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance. Figure 86 reveals tolerance ranges from a low in Honduras of 36.6 (well below the scale midpoint) up to a high in the United States of 72.6. Canadians, for the sake of comparison, average 67.6, which places them fourth in the hemisphere on political tolerance. Nicaraguans rank tenth in the hemisphere with a mean of 56.1, quite similar to the tolerance levels found in Chile and Brazil and 3 scale points higher than in Costa Rica, Latin America's oldest democracy. Tolerance tends to be lower in Central America and higher in the Caribbean and Uruguay.




Figure 87. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas

In **Error! Reference source not found.8** we present the levels of agreement with each of the four components of tolerance in Nicaragua. Nicaraguans are less tolerant concerning system critics running for office (50.3) and expressing their views on television (52.6). In contrast, the right to vote for system critics receives a 57.5 average score among Nicaraguans, who express their highest for critics' right to protest and demonstrate (64.3). The range of support for these tolerance items is similar to that observed above in Figure 85 for the components of system support.




Figure 88. Components of Political Tolerance in Nicaragua

How was political tolerance evolved over time in Nicaragua? In **Error! Reference source not found.9** we display the average levels of political tolerance in Nicaragua in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Political tolerance has varied somewhat erratically over the history of the AmericasBarometer surveys. It declined from 55.3 in 2004 to 50.4 in 2008. Tolerance then increased almost 10 scale points in 2010, but in 2012 again declined significantly to 56.1. Political tolerance for system critics, therefore, remains in flux among Nicaraguans. Perhaps this is in response to the highly polarized and contentious partisan national political context, which has remained very fraught because of constitutional maneuvers by the government, electoral system problems, alleged irregularities in the 2008 and 2011 elections, and discussions of all of these in the national press.

It is particularly interesting to track tolerance over time by party sympathy (not shown to conserve space). In 2006 Sandinista sympathizers and all other Nicaraguans reported statistically identical levels of political tolerance. By 2010 and 2012, however, tolerance among Sandinista sympathizers had declined slightly, while the tolerance of all other Nicaraguans had risen significantly above Sandinista sympathizers' tolerance levels (52 to 60 scale points in 2012, for example). The

FSLN was out of power at the time of the 2006 survey, but returned to governing power in 2007 and remains there until the present. There is an evident logic to this pattern. Those who do not control the reins of government usually desire the freedom to criticize those in power, while those who support the party holding the reins are less likely to accept the criticism of outsiders. The patterns in Nicaragua reveal a shift that follows this logic.




Figure 89. Political Tolerance over Time in Nicaragua

What affects levels of tolerance in Nicaragua? In **Error! Reference source not found.90** we develop a linear regression model to answer this question. Three types of Nicaraguans reveal significantly higher levels of political tolerance – supporters of democracy, those who view religion as important in their lives, and sympathizers of any of the Liberal parties. Two types of Nicaraguans manifest less political tolerance – women and sympathizers of the ruling party the Frente Sandinista. The findings for party sympathy and tolerance make sense on their face. The Sandinistas, in power, are less willing to see critics of the political system engage in politics. Meanwhile the out-of-power Liberals, who are often critics of the system with the FSLN in power, express more sympathy for system critics’ rights to express themselves in the political arena.




Figure 90. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Nicaragua

In Figure 91 we continue to explore the results from **Error! Reference source not found.0**, showing the variables of greatest theoretical interest and the ones that were most important in the analysis. Women in Nicaragua are about 5 scale points less tolerant than men. Nicaraguans who report that religion is “very important” in their daily lives report 5 or 6 points more political tolerance than those who attribute low importance to religion. Liberals are approximately 15 points more tolerant than other Nicaraguans, while Sandinista sympathizers report roughly 20 points less political tolerance. The strongest effect of all on tolerance occurs for the attitude “support for democracy as the best form of government,” which over its range from low to high adds 20 scale points to tolerance.




Figure 91. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Nicaragua

IV. Democratic Stability

As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are critical for democratic stability. In **Error! Reference source not found.2** we examine the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes. The data are remarkable for the range displayed and for the very low score for one country. The percentage of citizens with a combination of high tolerance and high system support ranges from a high of 51.5% in Canada to a low of 7.2% in Honduras. U.S. and Uruguayan citizens reported this “stable democracy” attitude combination over 45% of the time, thus ranking second and third in the hemisphere, respectively. Hondurans, in stark contrast, are 41% below Canadians in simultaneously being tolerant and system-supportive. To the extent that this combination of views constrains elites or the mass public from attacking democratic institutions, one must regard these very low scores with concern. In Costa Rica,

Latin America's oldest democracy, 31.5% hold this combination of views – over four times more than in Honduras. Other countries with very low “stable democracy” attitudes are Haiti (10.7%), Peru (15.8%) and Bolivia (15.6%).

In Nicaragua 32.7% of citizens have high tolerance and high system support, eleventh highest in the region and near the mean for the hemisphere. Nicaragua is statistically tied with their southern neighbor Costa Rica, and with Chile, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. For a country as politically polarized as Nicaragua often appears, this score is high.




Figure 92. Stable Democratic Attitudes in the Countries of the Americas

How has the percentage of Nicaraguans with the combination of attitudes that is most compatible with stable democracy evolved over time? In **Error! Reference source not found.**³ we present the percent of citizens with high levels of both system support and tolerance since 2004. The percentage of Nicaraguans with the stable democracy combination declined significantly from 28.3% in 2004 to 20.6% in 2008, but has since recuperated and indeed risen above the highest previous level observed to reach 32.7%. The largest increase (almost 9 percentage points) occurred between 2008 and 2010, but the trend continued into 2012. An inspection of the “stable democracy” combination of attitudes over time by party sympathy (not shown to conserve space) is very interesting. It reveals that the increase over time revealed in Figure 78 comes mainly from the growth in system support among Sandinista sympathizers. This pattern is reinforced by the growing number of FSLN sympathizers over time. In 2008 only 19% of Nicaraguans reported sympathy with the FSLN, while in 2012 that share had grown to 44%.




Figure 93. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in Nicaragua

What affects the extent to which citizens in Nicaragua hold attitudes that produce stable democracy? In **Error! Reference source not found.**⁴ we examine this question using logistic regression analysis. The results indicate that only two factors have a significant positive impact, interest in politics and approval of the job the president is doing. Two negative factors appear as well, size of the community of residence and perceived corruption. That other political and demographic variables have no significant influence reveals that a combination of tolerance and system support are evenly distributed among Nicaraguans across the demographic spectrum. Moreover, and most interesting, with other factors held constant there is almost no difference in the tolerance/system support attitude combination between sympathizers of the Frente Sandinista and those of any of the opposition Liberal parties.




Figure 94. Determinants of Stable Democratic Attitudes in Nicaragua

To further explore the determinants of support for the political system, in **Error! Reference source not found.**⁵ we examine the bivariate relationships between system support and the most important variables from the regression analysis. There we see that those perceiving the highest levels of corruption are up to 15% less likely to hold the stable democracy tolerance/support combination of attitudes than those seeing much less corruption. Residents of the capital city Managua are 10% less likely than rural area Nicaraguans to be both system supporting and politically tolerant of critics of the system. Those with high political interest are about 12% more likely to be both tolerant and system supportive than those with no interest in politics.

Finally, and for the largest effect observed, those giving President Ortega high approval on the job he is doing are 25% more likely to have the tolerance/system support combination. The large positive effect observed in Figure 94 for approval of the president's job performance eliminates the significant effects of the two party identification variables in the model. However, approving of President Ortega's performance and being a Sandinista sympathizer overlap significantly. FSLN sympathy alone accounts for almost one quarter of approval of the president's performance, and another 6% (negative) comes from Liberal sympathy. Thus much of what we measure here as stable democratic attitudes among Nicaraguans in 2012 comes from Nicaraguans' views (positive or negative) of presidential performance after controlling for demographics, political interest, and perceived corruption.




Figure 95. Factors Associated with Stable Democratic Attitudes in Nicaragua

V. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in Nicaragua support major political and social institutions? In the AmericasBarometer's 2012 round, we asked about attitudes towards many specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," we asked citizens to respond to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Council?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Assembly?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical?]
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?
B43. To what extent are you proud of being Nicaraguan?
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

In
Figure 96. Trust in Institutions in Nicaragua

6 we examine support for each of these items. As usual in the AmericasBarometer report, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. The most trusted institutions in Nicaragua in 2012 at 69.5 scale points were “the communications media,” many of which are partisan, polarized and testy. Nicaraguans seem satisfied with what they are getting from the media. In a statistical tie with the media is the Army (69.3). The next most trusted institutions are, like much of the media, private -- the “Iglesia Evangélica” (that is, the many Protestant denominations and congregations) at 64.4 on the scale, followed by the Catholic Church (62.7). The president comes next with a score of 60.9, followed in descending order by the police (60.5), the “justice system” and elections (54.5) (tied at 55.0), the Supreme Court of Justice (52.8), National Assembly (51.2), Supreme Electoral Council (49.4), and the political parties (39.8). Thus two or three institutions have very low evaluations. The National Assembly’s score of 51.2 is above the scale midpoint, but is not significantly different from the midpoint. The Electoral Council’s score of 49.4 is below the midpoint, but not significantly so. The weakest popular evaluation is the political parties, which fall ten points into the negative end of the scale at 39.8.

We further considered whether being asked for a bribe might affect evaluations of certain institutions. These results are inconclusive because experiential corruption rates are low. Bribe solicitation reports range from a low of 1.4% for “public officials” to a high of 7.5% for municipal officials. The percentages for other institutions were: military (6.2%), police (5.4%), hospital/health clinics (4.1%), and schools (3.4%).¹⁵³ The police and military enjoy high evaluations despite their relatively higher (but nonetheless absolutely low) bribe solicitation reports. Analysis not shown here to conserve space reveals that Nicaraguans solicited for bribes by representatives of an institution evaluate that institution much worse than those not having such an experience. For example, the police receive a significant 20 scale points lower approval rating among bribe solicitation victims (42 out of 100) than among other Nicaraguans (62). When party sympathy is considered in this relationship, non-Sandinistas report much lower support for the police than FSLN sympathizers. Non-Sandinistas experiencing a police bribe solicitation report evaluating the police at 31 out of 100 scale points compared to 57 among pro-FSLN bribe solicitation victims. Overall, petty corruption experience affects institutional evaluations in Nicaragua, and partisan orientation magnifies the negative effects of corruption on institutional legitimacy. Compared to other countries, however, the legitimacy of specific Nicaraguan institutions almost certainly benefits from the country’s low petty corruption rates.

¹⁵³ The number of respondents for the courts was so low that the error range was much greater than the percent reporting this problem (6.5%).




Figure 96. Trust in Institutions in Nicaragua


How do these results compare with those from prior years in Nicaragua? In Figure 97 we present results since 2004. One notable pattern is that several institutions retained positive evaluations over time – the communications media, religious institutions, the Army, and the police – while others like the Asamblea Nacional, political parties, Supreme Court, Consejo Supremo de Elecciones, and justice system earned public disapproval in much of the period examined. A third pattern is divergence among the types of institutions. Nicaragua’s mass communications media are partly government-owned and partly formally independent but even then often significantly operated by supporters of the ruling Sandinista party. Freedom House classified Nicaraguan news media as only “partly free” in 2011.¹⁵⁴ Among AmericasBarometer respondents, the mass media lost about ten scale points in approval from 2004 to 2006, but recovered to virtually the 2004 level (69.5) by 2012. Evaluations of the media rose significantly more among FSLN sympathizers than among other Nicaraguans between

¹⁵⁴ Freedom House, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/nicaragua> and Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press: Nicaragua,” <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/nicaragua> 3, 2012, both accessed November 13, 2012.

2006 and 2012. Two nongovernmental institutions, the Catholic Church and Evangelical churches remained statistically stable with scores in the mid and low 60s respectively.

A fourth pattern is that government institutions gained in the Nicaraguan public's estimation in recent years: The Army gained rose several points from 2004 to 2012 to finish at 69.3, effectively tied with the media for the best-evaluated institution. The police gained 9 scale points between 2006 and 2012. The justice system increased 14 points between 2006 and 2012. The National Assembly experienced a trust rise of 11 points in 2012 to end in approving territory. Most notably, President Daniel Ortega's trust increased 28 scale points from 2008 to 2012. It is further true (analysis not shown to conserve space) that the increase in approval for these governmental institutions over time occurred significantly more among Sandinista sympathizers than among other Nicaraguans. FSLN supporters have become both more approving of these institutions and more numerous in overall identification among Nicaraguans between 2008 and 2012.

Although Figure 97 reveals that several other institutions had more complex changes over time, their public trust also rose by 2012: The election system lost ground 2004 to 2006, recovered somewhat in 2008, declined again by 2010, but then showed a 13 point trust increase in 2012. The Consejo Supremo de Elecciones lost public trust from 2004 to 2010, but recovered 9 points in 2012. Thus the CSE and "elections" finished at or above the public trust scale midpoint in 2012 despite denunciations of election irregularities in 2008 and 2011. The Supreme Court lost support from 2004 to 2008, but recovered 16 points in the public's trust by 2012 to finish slightly above the scale midpoint. Even political parties, typically a public whipping boy (see the trust scores in the low 30s from 2004 to 2010) ended with a 9 point rise in 2012. Most of the parties' increase in approval came among Sandinista sympathizers (both more numerous and more approving) compared to other Nicaraguans, including sympathizers of any of the Liberal factions. Nicaraguans, therefore, clearly manifested increased trust in government in 2012 compared to their previous views, but much of this growth in trust occurred among supporters of the FSLN.



Source: © Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Figure 97. Trust in Institutions by Year in Nicaragua

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, we measure support for democracy by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,¹⁵⁵ and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Miller.¹⁵⁶ The “Churchillian” question again uses a 7 point response scale, this time running from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In **Error! Reference source not found.8** we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. With one exception, citizens of the nations of the Americas tend to strongly agree that democracy is the best form of government. Hondurans, on the low end of the distribution, average only 52.6 on the 100 point scale. There is a 9 to 12 point gap between Hondurans and citizens of the next lowest group of countries (Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and El Salvador) whose means are statistically tied at scores of 61.7 to 65.6. At the top of the distribution are Uruguayans at 86.5 and Venezuelans at 85.3. As points of comparative reference, the score on supporting democracy as the best form of government among U.S. citizens is 76.4, among Canadians 76.3, and among Costa Ricans 75.1. Nicaraguans rank near the middle of the distribution for the hemisphere with a mean of 73.8. Nicaragua’s average support for democracy is statistically tied with roughly a dozen other nations of the hemisphere.

¹⁵⁵ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

¹⁵⁶ Rose, Richard and William Mishler. 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.




Figure 98. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas

How has support for democracy evolved in recent years in Nicaragua? In **Error! Reference source not found.** we examine changes in support for democracy since 2004. Nicaraguans averaged 67.9 that year, a value that then declined significantly to 60.4 in 2006. In 2008, however, the score of agreement with the Churchillian view that democracy is the best form of government rose over 12 scale points to the low 70s among Nicaraguans. It has remained statistically stable at that level through 2012.




Figure 99. Support for Democracy over Time in Nicaragua

Figure 100 presents the results of a regression analysis of the determinants of support for democracy among Nicaraguans in 2012. No demographic variables except age influence support for democracy as the best form of government. This reveals democracy support to be evenly distributed among Nicaraguans with respect to gender, class, location, race, and education. Neither sympathy with the FSLN nor with any of the Liberal parties associates with increased support for democracy. The two variables that do matter are those predicted by our theory – system support and political tolerance. Tolerance has roughly twice the impact on preference for democracy as the best system of government as system support.




Figure 100. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Nicaragua

VII. Conclusion

This chapter has traced two attitudes widely believed to be important for democratic stability – support for national institutions and political tolerance. It has shown that Nicaraguans’ diffuse support for the political system is higher than their support for specific institutions. The general trend of institutional legitimacy has been upward since 2006. Nicaraguans rank relatively high overall on institutional support, but tenth overall in the hemisphere on political tolerance. They favor rights for critics to protest and to vote more than they favor their right to seek office or have access to the mass media. Institutional support has risen more rapidly among FSLN supporters, who are also becoming more numerous, than among supporters of other parties or those who profess no party sympathy. Political tolerance among Nicaraguans has fluctuated since 2004 -- declining from 2004 to 2008, rising nearly 10 points in 2010, then again declining in 2012. Tolerance is higher among opposition party identifiers than among Sandinista sympathizers. Among Nicaraguans, positive sources of tolerance include an attitude of support for democracy, being a Liberal sympathizer, and viewing religion as important in one’s life. In contrast, being female or identifying with the FSLN associate with lower tolerance.

The “stable democracy” value configuration is held by nearly one third of Nicaraguans, which places them in the middle of the array for the hemisphere. The percentage holding the stable democracy combination declined from 2004 to 2008, but has since increased. The rise in stable democracy attitudes comes mainly from increasing system support among FSLN supporters rather than tolerance, which has fluctuated over five surveys but declined among sympathizers of the ruling party between 2010 and 2012. Characteristics associated with Nicaraguans who have both high support for institutions and political tolerance are an interest in politics, approval of presidential performance, and

a perception of low levels of corruption. Among Nicaraguans, as predicted by our theory the stable democracy attitudes associate with higher levels of support for democracy as a system of government.

Nicaraguans' trust in government in 2012 increased compared to their views at earlier dates. Nicaraguans in 2012 express high trust for the Army, police, communications media, and religious institutions, but lower trust levels for other institutions. Nevertheless, the prevalent mistrust in several other government entities between 2004 and 2010 (the president, elections, the justice system, the Supreme Court, and the National Assembly) recuperated into positive territory in 2012. Thus our survey reveals a widespread growth of public approval of national institutions. However, we have also identified an inequality in system support rooted in party identification. System support and support for specific national institutions and the news media have risen mainly among the rapidly growing number of sympathizers of the ruling Sandinista party, while other Nicaraguans' approval of the system and of specific institutions has grown much slower or remained stagnant.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹⁵⁷ This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.¹⁵⁸ Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.¹⁵⁹ Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.¹⁶¹

However, others argue that local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan

¹⁵⁷ Rondinelli, Dennis, John Nellis and Shabbir Cheema. 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

¹⁵⁸ Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

¹⁵⁹ Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

¹⁶⁰ Akai, Nobuo and Masayo Sakata. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

¹⁶¹ Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.¹⁶² Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.¹⁶³ Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.¹⁶⁴

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.¹⁶⁵ Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.¹⁶⁶ Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.¹⁶⁷ Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.¹⁶⁹ So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶² Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

¹⁶³ Willis, Eliza, Christopher Garman, and Stephen Haggard. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7–56.

¹⁶⁴ Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés.

¹⁶⁵ Hiskey, Jonathan and Mitchell Seligson. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64–88.

¹⁶⁶ Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285–308.

¹⁶⁷ West, Karleen. 2011. *The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.

¹⁶⁸ Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹⁶⁹ Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519–530.

¹⁷⁰ West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.¹⁷¹ Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.¹⁷² West uses the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.¹⁷³ In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010). We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.¹⁷⁴ Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.¹⁷⁵ In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.¹⁷⁶ Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷¹ West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62; Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

¹⁷² Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

¹⁷³ West, *ibid*.

¹⁷⁴ Montalvo, Daniel. 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁷⁵ Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

¹⁷⁶ Montalvo, Daniel. 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁷⁷ Montalvo, Daniel. 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...				
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer				
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?				
(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1]				
(98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]				
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request?				
(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A				

Local Meeting Attendance

In **Error! Reference source not found.**¹ we examine the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who say they have attended a local meeting in the past year. The range of attending municipal government meetings in the hemisphere is relatively narrow (18 percentage points overall) on a fairly low base compared to other forms of participation. That is, on the low end only 4.1% of Chileans and 4.3% of Argentines report attending local government meetings, while at the high end 21.2% of Haiti citizens and 19.8% of U.S. citizens report doing so. Nicaraguans fall in the middle of the array; 10.5% saying they have attended local government meetings within the previous year.




Figure 101. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? In **Error! Reference source not found.2** we examine levels of local participation 2004. Despite a higher-than-usual attendance rate in 2004 (16.4%), compared to the performance of subsequent years oscillating around 11%, there is no statistically significant difference over time among Nicaraguans. On the other hand, seasoned observers of municipal government in Nicaragua informed the lead author in recent conversations that the 2012 attendance decline may be an early sign of the erosion of formal local government institutions. Their argument is that the ruling Sandinista party has established Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (CPCs) to promote participation in local government. The CPCs also distribute benefits to citizens that originate with a foundation controlled by the ruling party. These observers argue that the CPCs undermine formal local government authority by enticing public attention to them and away from municipal authorities who have traditionally attended to some of such demands.




Figure 102. Municipal Meeting Participation over Time in Nicaragua

Demand-Making on Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who makes requests or demands of their local government. In **Error! Reference source not found.3** we analyze question NP2 to present the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have made a request or demand of some person or agency in local government in the past year. Similarly to attendance at municipal meetings, making demands on local government has a narrow range (of only 15 percentage points) on a low base. Those who made the fewest demands to their local governments were Panamanians (6.3%) and Ecuadorians (7.2%). Those making the most demands were citizens of Haiti (21.3%) and Uruguay (16.2%). (Note that Haitian citizens were also the most active local government meeting attenders.)

Nicaraguans are somewhat more demanding of local government than they are to attend its council sessions. Some 13.6% of Nicaraguans report seeking assistance or making some sort of request of municipal government within the previous twelve months, ranking them eleventh in the hemisphere.




Figure 103. Demand Making on Local Government
in the Countries of the Americas

How has local demand making evolved over time? In **Error! Reference source not found.4** we examine the percentage of citizens making demands since 2004. We note that demand-making on municipal government was highest in Nicaragua in 2004 (18.3%), then declined several points and remained fairly stable from 2006 to 2012. From 2006 onward demand-making directed at local government ranged from 11% to almost 15%, variation that is not statistically significant and shows no clear trend. Again, observers of municipal government suspect that the small decline of demand-making to local government may have occurred because of what constitutes effectively competition from CPCs based upon their ability to distribute certain goods to citizens.




Figure 104. Demand Making on Local Government over Time in Nicaragua

Finally, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens' demands and requests were satisfied. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said that they had made a demand or request. These responses can provide an important view on the quality of services municipalities provide, at least from citizens' perspectives. In **Error! Reference source not found.5** we examine responses to question MUNI10 in Nicaragua. In 2012, of the 13.6% of Nicaraguans who sought assistance from or petitioned municipal government over the previous year, only 36.0% of them report that their requests were resolved. While one might reasonably conclude that this might foretell frustration with local government, much of the rest of this chapter will tell a different story. On balance Nicaraguans report being satisfied with local government and the services it provides.




Figure 105. Resolution of Demands Made on Local Government in Nicaragua

Who chooses to make demands of local government? In **Error! Reference source not found.6** we develop a logistic regression model to examine a number of factors that may affect local demand-making in Nicaragua. Nicaraguans across various demographic differences report little difference in their demand-making on municipal government. Only two types of people are likely to make demands. The first group is those who attend municipal council sessions. This makes considerable sense on its face because attendance at municipal meetings places the citizen in immediate proximity to local officials and provides both formal and informal opportunities to make requests. The other factor is perceiving one's economic situation positively associates with lower municipal demand making, irrespective of the citizen's actual age, education, gender or income.




Figure 106. Determinants of Demand Making on Local Government in Nicaragua

In **Error! Reference source not found.7** we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand-making on local government and a number of important factors assessed in the logistic regression analysis. We see that Nicaraguans who report that their family income provides well (“alcanza bien”) for their needs report almost three times less petitioning of local government than those who see themselves as facing great economic difficulties. People who report attending municipal government meetings are about 3.5 times more likely to report having petitioned local government than those who did not attend meetings.




Figure 107. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government in Nicaragua

III. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2012 round featured three new questions that tapped satisfaction with particular services typically delivered by local governments. It is very important to emphasize that, with only very rare exceptions, these particular services *are not provided by local governments in Nicaragua, but by the national government*. Municipal governments provide only local streets and roads, while highways are the national government's responsibility. Schools and health services are completely supplied and managed by the national government. It is of course likely that municipal governments mistakenly receive some of the credit or blame from citizens for the quality of these services in their areas.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA

Finally, the last question, which measures trust, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In **Error! Reference source not found.**⁸ we examine citizens’ average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been recoded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. The range of satisfaction with local government services stretches 21 scale points across the middle of the distribution, suggesting middling levels of satisfaction. The highest satisfaction is expressed by Canadians (59.5), followed by Argentines at 59.1. The lowest satisfaction level is found among Haitians at 37.6.

Nicaraguans stand out for a comparatively high level of satisfaction with local services. Their mean satisfaction of 56.2 ranks third overall among the 26 countries of the hemisphere included in the 2012 AmericasBarometer. The absolute level of satisfaction falls well in the positive end of the scale. Thus, despite only a small bit more than a third of Nicaraguans reporting that their petitions to local government as resolved, on average Nicaraguans approve of government services. Examining the relationship between resolution of issues and satisfaction more closely reveals that those who reported their issues being resolved expressed an approval score about 5 scale points higher than those not reporting resolution. Thus, as expected, Nicaraguans reporting unresolved petitions or demands reported a bit less satisfaction with municipal services, but the difference in satisfaction is not statistically significant.




Figure 108. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas

In **Error! Reference source not found.9** we further explore the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with local government in Nicaragua. Most citizens report indifference (“neither good nor bad”) as their satisfaction level with municipal services. Those who reported good or very good evaluations of local government services, however, made up 41.8% of the respondents, while only 16.8% report “bad” or “very bad” evaluations.




Figure 109. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Nicaragua

How has satisfaction with local government services evolved in recent years? In **Error! Reference source not found.10** we examine trends in satisfaction since 2004. In that year the mean score among Nicaraguans for evaluation of municipal services was 50.2. It has risen steadily and significantly since then to reach a score of 56.2 in 2012.




Figure 110. Evaluation of Local Services over Time in Nicaragua

Citizens may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction with the state of the roads and schools, and the provision of health care across the Americas.¹⁷⁸ To begin, in Figure 111 we examine satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2. As always, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Again, we insist that for the most part that highways and important roads are the responsibility not of municipalities but of the national government.

The range for satisfaction with roads in the Americas is 25 scale points, with the mean satisfaction score at 49.1, one point below the scale midpoint. Thus across the hemisphere roads elicit at best a middling evaluation. Jamaicans express the lowest satisfaction with their roads (34.9) and Ecuadorans the most (60.8). Nicaraguans rank fifth in the hemisphere on satisfaction with roads at a mean of 54.3. Nicaragua has experienced severe weather damage to its roads and bridges, including from Hurricane Mitch in 1998, tropical storm Agatha in 2010, and other storms. Maintaining public satisfaction with the basic transportation infrastructure represents a challenge in a country subject to such natural disasters.

¹⁷⁸ We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.




Figure 111. Satisfaction with Roads in Nicaragua

In **Error! Reference source not found.**2 we turn to satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2. (We again remind the reader that public schools are the responsibility not of municipalities but of the national government.)

Satisfaction with public schools in the hemisphere ranges about 20 scale points from a low in Chile of 42.8 to a high in Costa Rica of 64.1. The regional mean is 53.8. Nicaraguans' satisfaction level in 2012 ranks third in the hemisphere at 61.6. Both absolutely and relatively this is remarkable because the Nicaraguans in our survey average 6.8 years of schooling, which is approximately 2.4 years less educational attainment than reported by other hemispheric survey respondents in the 2012 AmericasBarometer round (excluding the United States and Canada). Moreover, Nicaraguans rank

very near the bottom in educational attainment in the hemisphere. Why would they be so relatively satisfied? The answer likely comes from the change in the educational effort made by Nicaraguan governments since the 1979 revolution. Nicaragua has invested heavily in education and made strides in distributing at least primary education more broadly in recent decades. Between 2004 and 2008 our surveys found a significant 1.6 year increase in average educational attainment among Nicaraguans. Nicaraguans likely are responding to progress in education rather than relative accomplishment.




Figure 112. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas

Finally, in **Error! Reference source not found.**³ we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2. (Again we remind the reader that public health services are the responsibility not of municipalities but of the national government.) Satisfaction with public health in the hemisphere is lower than satisfaction with either roads or public schools, with a regional mean of 47.9. The range of 23 scale points goes from a low of 33.3 in Trinidad and Tobago to a high of 56.8 in Costa Rica, which has had a public health system covering much of the population for several decades. Nicaraguans express considerable relative satisfaction with their public health system, ranking fourth in the hemisphere (excluding the United States and Canada). The absolute level of approval among Nicaraguans, however, is only five points above the scale mean at 55.7.




Figure 113. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas

Trust in Local Government

In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted that government. This question may tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In **Error! Reference source not found.**⁴ we present average levels of trust in local government across the Americas. The range of trust in local government across the hemisphere is about 25 of 100 scale points and its mean is roughly the scale midpoint. That is, attitudes in the Americas about trust in municipal government are fairly evenly divided between positive and negative assessments. The countries with the highest levels of trust are El Salvador (60.9) and Venezuela (59.4), and the country with the lowest trust in local government is Haiti (35.3). Nicaragua's mean score is slightly above the scale midpoint at 52.2, placing Nicaraguans in a statistical tie with U. S. citizens.

In Nicaragua trust in municipal government has oscillated around the scale midpoint, falling to its lowest level in 2008 (45.5) but rising significantly to 52.0 by 2012. In this pattern of rising trust in recent years, Nicaraguans' attitudes toward local government resemble those toward other government institutions in which trust has also risen significantly in recent years (Chapter Five). As in evaluation of other institutions, sympathy with the ruling Sandinista party generally increases trust in local government. In 2012, for example, FSLN sympathizers reported over 15 scale points higher trust in municipal governments than did other Nicaraguans. This party-line gap in trusting municipal government according to party preference widened markedly after 2006, with Sandinistas expressing greater support than others from 2008 on.




Figure 114. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As we argued in the introduction of this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government except for local government. As a result, perceptions of local government may have an important impact on attitudes towards the political system more generally. In **Error! Reference source not found.5** we develop a linear regression model to examine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in Nicaragua, while controlling for many other factors that may affect system support. Three factors depress system support, size of

residence, personal wealth and education, as already reported in Chapter Five. Being a female, interest in politics, and approval of the president's performance also increase system support. Turning to the main hypothesis of this chapter, we see that a positive evaluation of local government services associates with higher generalized trust in the national political system, as expected.¹⁷⁹




Figure 115. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of System Support in Nicaragua

¹⁷⁹ On the assumption that trust in local government might also influence national system support, and that party sympathy might also influence system support (which we have reported earlier), we re-estimated this regression equation three ways, adding first trust in municipal government (b32r) without trust in local government, then also sympathy for both the Sandinista party and any Liberal party and local government trust. Party identification has no impact on the satisfaction with local government-general system legitimacy relationship, although both are significant. However, when trust in municipal government is introduced into the regression equation, the correlation between satisfaction with local government services and general political system trust vanishes. Thus this issue must remain unresolved in the Nicaraguan case. General system trust seems more linked to Nicaraguans trust in their local governments than it is to their satisfaction with municipal services.

In **Error! Reference source not found.**6 we present the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and support for the political system. This reveals a substantial 20 scale point rise in system support as satisfaction with local government support rises. This finding appears to substantiate this chapter's hypothesis, but as noted in the preceding footnote, this relationship may be spurious. We are left with a doubt whether in Nicaragua's case generalized system support is a function of citizen satisfaction with municipal services or merely with a feeling of trust in local government.




Figure 116. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Nicaragua

V. Conclusion

In comparative terms across the hemisphere, Nicaraguans average in the middle in attendance at municipal government meetings (roughly one person in nine attends) and petitioning local government (one person in seven). Meeting attendance and demand-making on local government declined from 2004 to 2006, but each has remained stable since 2006. It is possible that Sandinista-dominated CPCs may be undermining formal local government by creating competing sources of assistance to local citizenries. Of those making requests to local government, a few more than a third report the resolution of their demands. Those who make demands on local government perceive their family economic situations as negative. Not surprisingly demand-makers are also attenders at municipal government meetings.

In satisfaction with local government services, Nicaraguans reported a modestly positive evaluation that ranked fifth highest in the Americas. Nicaraguans' evaluations of local government services have improved somewhat since 2008, but much of the increase is attributable to sympathizers of the FSLN. Most people report indifferent evaluations of local government services, but over three

times more Nicaraguans evaluate them positively than negatively. As to specific services, Nicaraguans score roads and public health services slightly positively (low 50s out of 100), but rank relatively high within the Americas on these evaluations. They are more positive about education (62), and rank third highest in the hemisphere in evaluating public schools. We believe the high comparative ranking for public schools may stem more from recent improvements in education access than from the overall educational attainment of Nicaraguans, which remains very low in comparative terms. The reader should recall that most inter-city roads and all schools and public health services are provided not by municipalities but by the national government.

This chapter hypothesized that satisfaction with local government services would contribute to higher levels of general political system support. Nicaraguans overall report a middling level of satisfaction with local government services (56) and of trust in local government (52). There is indeed a correlation between Nicaraguans' satisfaction with local government services and general system support. However, when level of trust in local government is included in the analysis, the local service evaluation/system support association disappears. So, for Nicaragua the relationship remains unproven.

Part III: Beyond Equality of Opportunity

Chapter Seven: Nicaraguan Youth

I. Introduction

In the AmericasBarometer 2010 report on Nicaragua, an extended profile of the economic and political characteristics of young people compared to older Nicaraguans found more similarities than differences across age lines. Nicaraguan young people, defined as occupying two groups ages 16 to 20 and 21 to 25, had roughly the same levels of political information and news media consumption, crime victimization, democratic values, interest in politics, and attitudes toward the welfare roles of the state. Some differences between younger and older Nicaraguans were detected: Compared to older Nicaraguans, youth were slightly better off economically, better educated, held more optimistic economic views, had less experience of corruption, evaluated the government more positively, were more tolerant of homosexuals, had more positive views of the possibility of a hypothetical coup d'état, and were less politically active and less engaged with civic organizations. These differences were judged “unlikely to alter nation’s style of politics, party identification or ideological patterns, or behavior.”¹⁸⁰

Nicaragua continues to have a very young population because of its high (although gradually declining) fertility rate of 2.6 births per female in 2010.¹⁸¹ As a result the country has special issues facing a large share of its citizenry. Because young Nicaraguans can begin to vote at age 16 and because nearly one quarter of the citizen population surveyed was 25 or younger, we have divided the Nicaraguans by breaking the youngest into age cohorts of 16 to 20 and 21 to 25. The distribution of population by age in 2012 is illustrated in Figure 116. The group aged 16 to 20, includes the newest voters, workers, and in some cases even family heads, and constitutes 14.9 % of respondents. Those aged 21 to 25 make up another 10.1%. Thus approximately one quarter of Nicaragua’s voting population is under age 26.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ John A Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, 2011. *Political Culture of Democracy in Nicaragua, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times*. Nashville, Tennessee: Latin American Public Opinion Project-AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University, chapter VIII.

¹⁸¹ The World Bank, 2012. *World Development Indicators and Finance*, accessed August 21, 2012, http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bnccpjof8f9_&met_y=sp_dyn_tfrt_in&idim=country:NIC&dl=en&hl=en&q=nicaragua+fertility+rate.

¹⁸² In the 2010 report on Nicaragua by the AmericasBarometer, almost 40% of the population from the pooled surveys of 2004 to 2010 fell into the 16 to 25 year-old groups (Booth and Seligson 2011, Chapter 7). The 25% figure for 2012 suggests two possibilities: sampling errors resulting in under- or over-counts of the youth population in successive years, or that the youth cohorts have in fact shrunk in 2012. Both may be occurring simultaneously. In fact, more detailed analysis reveals a bulge in the combined youth cohort in 2008 and 2010, followed by a contraction in 2012. Indeed, the World Bank study cited above reveals a decline in Nicaragua’s fertility rate from 5.4 to 4.1 between 1985 and 1995, the decade during which our 2012 survey’s youngest voters would have been born, and a further marked decline continuing through 1997. Thus a contraction of the size of this cohort should be expected.




Figure 117. Distribution of Nicaraguans by Age Cohort, 2012

The purpose of this chapter is to survey differences between young and older Nicaraguans with regard to the demographic characteristics, economic situations, political engagement, their experiences and needs of the young. It concludes with an analysis of the socioeconomic context on youth and their important political attitudes of system support and tolerance.

II. Characteristics of Nicaraguan Youth

We begin with an analysis of the personal and economic resources of Nicaraguan youth in Figure 118. The 16-20 year old group reports 8.7 years of education, with the 21-25 year group 8.8. The 21 to 25 year old cohort averages five years older than the youngest (16 to 20) cohort, and is the age group for which continued secondary or university education would be likely to occur. This group enjoys no significantly higher level of education than their younger peers, however. This indicates that education beyond some secondary schooling remains rare among young Nicaraguans, and may well constitute a potential bottleneck to development.

Continuing, the 26 to 35 year old cohort would have been the first Nicaraguans to receive at least some access to expanded educational opportunity begun by the revolutionary government in the 1980s. Accordingly, 26 to 35 year olds reflect this advantage with a mean of 8.6 years of schooling. The average amount of formal schooling falls rapidly and significantly for age groups older than 35. We see an average of only 3.7 years of education for the 56 and older cohort. These Nicaraguans would have been at least 23 during the Somoza era, when schools were scarce and of poor quality. In sum, young Nicaraguans enjoy today a substantial educational advantage over older citizens who had much less opportunity for schooling.




Figure 118. Education by Age Cohorts

Figure 119 presents the average position in quintiles of wealth among Nicaraguans across the age cohorts. This index tends to compress the apparent range of the scale because of its construction, but nevertheless indicates that younger Nicaraguans are on average somewhat better off than their older fellow citizens. No difference is significant between adjacent age cohorts, but Nicaraguans 16 to 20 years old are significantly better off than those 46 and older.




Figure 119. Wealth Cohorts by Age

Seeking a more personal perspective, we turn to Figure 120, which graphs average perceptions of the state of both one's personal economy and the national economy by age. The indexes used in each case are those described in Chapter One and are converted into scales ranging from zero to 100 points, with 100 representing the most optimistic or favorable reading of the economic situation by the respondent. They are based on these items:

SOCT1. How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?				
(1) Very good	(2) Good	(3) Neither good nor bad (fair)	(4) Bad	(5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't Answer			
IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?				
(1) Very good	(2) Good	(3) Neither good nor bad (fair)	(4) Bad	(5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't Answer			

Figure 120 reveals several telling patterns. First, younger Nicaraguans do successively older cohorts. Second, despite the relative optimism of youth about the national economy, Nicaraguans are generally more pessimistic than optimistic, with the 16-25 age groups having the highest mean perception of 50, the scale midpoint, and each successive age group giving a worse evaluation. Third, respondents are on average several points more positive about their own situations than about the national economy for every age cohort. Here, too, though, the mean perceived personal economic situation declines for successive age groups. This decline in personal economy evaluations is steeper across age cohorts than it is for the national economy. Nicaraguans aged 16-20 years average almost 58 points out of 100, which declines to 53 for 21-25 year olds, and continues falling to an average of roughly 46 among Nicaraguans 56 years and older. The two scales almost converge among the oldest cohort of Nicaraguans. Older Nicaraguans may have such negative views because they have much less education than the young and therefore worse economic prospects, because they are poorer than younger Nicaraguans, because they lived through many of the economically straitened years of the revolution and economic embargo. We presume that such experiences would temper the evaluations by older respondents of the Nicaraguan economy and its prospects.




Figure 120. Perceptions of National and Personal Economies by Age

One factor that affects the wellbeing of younger Nicaraguans is that having children and having to take care of them constitutes a significant economic burden. Because the responsibility for rearing children falls most heavily on females, Figure 121 presents data, separated by gender, on the differences our respondents of different ages report in the number of children they have under age 13 who live in the home with them. Women in the youngest cohort have roughly 1.2 children each at home with them, while their male counterparts report .8 children at home. The female/male difference narrows thereafter. The number of young children at home averages increase, respectively to 1.7 for women aged 21 to 25, and to 1.5 for men of the same age. Women continue to carry the greater burden of young children at home than men into the 36-45 age cohort. We suspect that the additional child-rearing responsibilities of young women in Nicaragua disadvantages their potential and ability to engage as citizens compared to their male age peers. This may constitute a source of inequality and lost political representation for younger women based on disparate opportunities. The disparity may also disadvantage older women based on their political socialization marked by years of constricted opportunity for citizenship.




Figure 121. Number of Children under 13 by Age and Gender

A final look at the characteristics of Nicaraguan youth considers the impact of age and regional inequality on educational attainment. We argued in Chapter One that the social context can impose inequities on citizens that condition their life chances. Figure 122 graphs the impact of domestic inequality (different within-country levels of human development conditions) upon the educational attainment of Nicaraguans. No Municipal Human Development Index (MHDI) was available for Nicaragua, so we calculated our own for the municipalities in the study based on data from the 2005 census. The index takes into account the distribution of access to health services, literacy, educational opportunity, and income.¹⁸³ We see that living in a low-MHDI community imposes a 2.5 year disadvantage on the education attainment of the two younger cohorts of Nicaraguans. The disadvantage is even greater for some of the older cohorts, but the data paint a vivid picture of the cost of inequalities in social and service infrastructure on Nicaraguans. The lifetime impact of this disadvantage in personal income and living standards is likely to be powerful.

¹⁸³ The index number calculated ranges from zero for the municipality in our sample with the lowest MHDI to 1.0 for that with the highest MHDI. These indicate relative inequality among the study's Nicaraguan municipalities, not absolute inequalities. Thus the MHDI of 1.0 merely indicates the highest resource level observed within the municipalities in this study, while a zero corresponds to the lowest level observed.




Figure 122. Education by age Cohort by Municipal Human Development Index Levels

III. Perceived Needs of Younger Nicaraguans

One way to learn of the needs and concerns of young Nicaraguans is to ask citizens what they think about various issues affecting the nation. This section explores such views and opinions. We begin with what Nicaraguans view as the principal problem the country faces, dividing the responses by age. The AmericasBarometer survey included this question:

A4. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?

Figure 123 presents the breakdown of the main categories of responses to this question by two cohorts Nicaraguans, respondents 16 to 25 years of age and those 26 and older. Economic problems are the main concern of both younger and older Nicaraguans, and to almost the same degree. Over three fourths mention an economic problem (unemployment, debt, “the economy,” inflation, poverty, etc); only 1.4% more youth mention economic concerns than older Nicaraguans, a negligible difference. Security-related concerns (crime, personal safety, etc.) are next most common, mentioned by 8.9% of the young and 7.3% of older Nicaraguans. Younger Nicaraguans are less concerned (3.9%) than older ones (6.4%) about basic services. Older Nicaraguans mention political problems more frequently (5.7%) than younger ones (4.4%). All in all, however, the problems cited by young and older Nicaraguans are quite similar, with the overwhelming majority focused on economic problems.




Figure 123. Major National Problem Cited by Age Cohorts

The 2012 AmericasBarometer survey asked three questions to solicit Nicaraguans' views on the major risks or challenges facing young people:

NICY10. What is the main risk that young people face in their neighborhood / community / city?

NICY11. Which of the following is the program that would best meet the needs of young people in their neighborhood / community / city?

NICY12. Thinking about education, if you could improve something in the schools in your community or city, what would you improve?

Figure 124 breaks down the opinion of all Nicaraguans for NICY10, which asks what is the main challenge (risk) that young people face in their communities. We include the responses of all Nicaraguans because the differences between younger and older populations were negligible. Nicaraguans young and old believe that drugs (49.1%) and alcohol (21.2%) are the two main problems facing Nicaraguan youth. Some 16% mentioned gangs (*maras*), followed by violence (3.4%) and a lack of schools (2.7%).




Figure 124. Main Risks Facing Young Nicaraguans

Of programs to combat or respond to these perceived problems (question NICY11), respondents of all ages (there are no real differences between younger and older Nicaraguans) suggested programs as summarized in Figure 125. They recommended programs designed to provide recreation and improve economic prospects. Specifically, Nicaraguans recommended sports programs (40.5%), presumably to provide alternatives to boredom and the use of intoxicants. Job creation programs followed at 25.1%, then came education programs (13.3%), voluntary community service and work programs (9.0%), and religious programs or training (3.2%). The array of proposals recommend by Nicaraguans seem eminently practical. They focus on wholesome physical activities and voluntary service, followed by human capital and resource-building recommendations for job creation and educational opportunities. Such remedies as health, cultural, and television or radio programming lagged far behind.




Figure 125. Programs Recommended to Address the Problems Facing Youth

Turning to schools in particular, question NICY12 asked what citizens would most like to change about their community's public schools if they could improve one thing in particular. Figure 126 presents the recommendations, which range widely. Most mentioned is a desire for better school infrastructure (buildings, furnishings, etc.) at 32.5%. Nicaraguan schools, many built since 1980, have experienced heavy use because many run multiple sessions per day and are overcrowded. The next largest priority change in schools (21.6%) is "academics," which includes curriculum content and quality. Among other issues, 10.9% would improve teachers, 9.5% recreational and sports activities, 3.7% desire more computers and computer instruction, and 3.0% would change school locations (we presume the last suggestion refers to the distance to public schools). Only 1.9% cited administrators as their preferred thing to change. "Nothing" was cited by 3.5% and the very unspecific "everything" by 4.7%. Complaints about politicization of the curriculum were very infrequent (1.4%).




Figure 126. Proposals for Improving Local Public Schools

Another area of concern is crime and how it affects the young. The AmericasBarometer asked several questions on victimization by criminal delinquency and perceptions of insecurity and the police. We asked whether individuals had been victims of crime within the previous year, whether they feel themselves secure or insecure in their neighborhoods (0 to 100), whether they perceive gangs to be a problem (zero=no...100= very much), and whether they believe the police protect them (100), or are involved in crime (0), or neither (50).

Figure 127 breaks down the answers to these questions among the cohorts 16 to 25 years and 26 years and older. We begin with the actual percentage of respondents reporting having been crime victims in the previous 12 months (not shown graphically), which reveals that 15% of young Nicaraguans were crime victims compared to 12% of their older peers. This difference is not statistically significant, but suggests a slightly greater vulnerability to crime among the young.¹⁸⁴ On the perceptions of security and the police, we observe no significant differences between younger and older Nicaraguans. The mean perception of insecurity (interpolating slightly between the scores in Figure 126) is a modest 33 out of 100. The perception that the respondent's neighborhood is affected by gangs is very slightly less at around 30. Finally the perception of the police as protectors rather than

¹⁸⁴ When asked if a recent act of violence against them, if any, had occurred, 13.4% of Nicaraguans responded affirmatively. Upon close inspection of the types of "most recent" crimes experienced reported by age, the rates were essentially the same for all crime categories except for "damage to property" and extortion, of which there were only older victims. Locations of the crimes (for all Nicaraguans) were at home (31%), in one's own neighborhood (29%), within one's own municipality (27%), and within Nicaragua but outside one's own municipality (14%). Almost no meaningful differences were found between youth and older Nicaraguans as to where such violence took place.

criminals or victimizers themselves averages in the mid 60s out of 100, well above the scale midpoint. Youth are somewhat more positive (but not significantly so) about the police.




Figure 127. Crime Victimization and Related Concerns.

We also examined whether the experience of corruption or its perception varied by age. We are not showing the analysis to conserve space, but Nicaraguans young and old experienced no significant differences in being asked for bribes by the police, public employees, military officials, municipal officials, by the courts, by health services, by public schools, or at work. As already noted in Chapter 4, Nicaragua is a country with relatively low rates of official corruption. And as to perceived corruption, Nicaraguans like most citizens in the hemisphere, perceive more corruption than they report experiencing. There is no significant difference between youth and older Nicaraguans on perceived corruption.

IV. Political Attitudes

What role do young Nicaraguans expect their government to play in their society? Several questions in the AmericasBarometer 2012 survey address this issue. In classical conceptions, the state role might range from full socialism, in which government might own the means of production (ROS1), to lesser economic government roles assuring collective welfare, creating jobs, reducing income inequality, and providing health services (ROS2, ROS3, ROS4, and ROS6). We have converted responses to these items into the usual zero to 100 scale, with 100 representing the highest level of agreement with a proposition.

ROS1. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS2. The (Country) government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS3. The (Country) government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS4. The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
ROS1. The (Country) government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 128 contrasts the views of younger and older Nicaraguans on these five “role of the state” items. The first pattern we note is that there are no significant differences between younger and older Nicaraguans on any of the five items. Second, support for state ownership of major enterprises (state socialism) is only in the high 40s overall, with young Nicaraguans very slightly but not significantly higher than their older fellow citizens. Third, there is a near consensus on the other four items. Nicaraguans average round 91 on a government role in providing health services, 90 on job creation, 86 on the state working to reduce income inequality, and 83 on “insuring the welfare” of the population. Nicaraguans thus have a nearly consensual social welfare-state orientation. Nicaraguans, however, on average slightly disagree that the government should own large firms.




Figure 128. Attitudes about the Roles and Responsibilities of the Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer includes several questions that probe democratic and authoritarian attitudes. The first three below are coded into zero to 100 scales so that a pro-democratic response is a higher score, with 100 being the highest level of democracy preference.

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?			
AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? [Read the options]			
(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected			
(2) Electoral democracy is the best	(88) DK	(98) DA	
DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?			
(1) Iron fist	(2) Everyone's participation	(88) DK	(98) DA

Figure 129 presents the levels of agreement with the democratic responses to these three items among Nicaraguans in 2012. The first strong pattern that emerges is that Nicaraguans strongly share these democratic attitudes. Beginning at the bottom of the graph (and interpolating between the younger and older groups to provide a rough estimate of the overall mean), we see that Nicaraguans average about 73 on support for the idea that democracy is the best form of government. They average about 82 out of 100 on the preference for a “government of all” as opposed to an “iron-fisted” (*mano dura*) government. Nicaraguans average about 88 in agreeing with preferring an elected over unelected leader. These findings place Nicaraguans firmly in the prodemocracy end of the attitude continuum. Finally, Figure 129 reveals that on all three attitudes youths average from one to four scale points lower democratic norms than their older fellow citizens. However, these differences are not statistically significant differences given the sample size.




Figure 129. Democratic Attitudes by Age

Several items probe authoritarian and antidemocratic attitudes in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. We examine six. The first, PRES1, asks whether it is acceptable for a president to seek office multiple times if he/she is doing a good job. We view this as an anti-democratic attitude because such a principle goes against the concept of term limits. Term limits are typically imposed as a constitutional protection against excessive concentration of power in the hands of an executive who holds power overly long. (We recognize, however, that one might reasonably argue that the repeated reelection of an effective leader who is desired by a majority of citizens constitutes democracy.) This matter is highly salient in Nicaragua because of a much criticized Supreme Constitutional Court ruling that allowed President Ortega and other incumbents to be reelected despite explicit constitutional prohibitions against successive terms in office. President Ortega is now in his second successive term and his third term as president overall.

The next three attitudes (JC1, JC10, JC13) ask whether Nicaraguans believe a military coup d'etat might be justified under three sets of circumstances: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption. This explores the question of whether in a dire moment Nicaraguans might support unconstitutional military intrusion into governing. The final two items (JC15A, JC16A) explore attitudes toward an executive coup d'etat in which the president violates the constitution to act alone. All six of these items are recoded on a zero to 100 scale so that the strongest authoritarian or antidemocratic opinion has a value of 100.

PRES1. When a president is doing a good job, they should be allowed to go to re-election as many times as they would like. To what extent do you agree or disagree?
Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances?
(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified
(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified
JC1. When there is high unemployment.
JC10. When there is a lot of crime
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption
JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament? (1) Yes, it is justified (2) No, it is not justified
JC16A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal and govern without the Supreme Court/Constitutional Tribunal? (1) Yes, it is justified (2) No, it is not justified

Figure 130 presents an analysis of these arguably authoritarian or antidemocratic views. Beginning at the top of the figure, we see that at an average of roughly 57, Nicaraguans agree that a successful president should be allowed to be reelected. This comports with the outcome of the 2011 presidential election, in which President Ortega won reelection by a reported 62% of the vote. So, Nicaraguans who are highly favorable toward elected, democratic government, express approval for the principle of repeated reelection of their president. (We will further address the issues of the vote for and the evaluation of the performance of President Ortega later in this chapter, and in Chapter 9.) On average, then, Nicaraguans have reconciled the potentially conflicting principles of supporting democracy and allowing repeated reelection in favor of the latter. That is to say, in statistical terms the average Nicaraguan does not view these as conflicting values. Finally, the difference between youth and older Nicaraguans is statistically negligible.

Staying with the theme of presidential powers, Figure 130 examines attitudes toward a hypothetical national crisis and whether a president should be able to suspend the constitution and govern without the Supreme Court of Justice or the National Assembly. While Nicaraguans are willing to reelect a powerful incumbent, they reject presidential coup-making as proposed by items JC15A and JC16A. They register an average approval scale of only 12 of 100 for a president closing the National Assembly and only 11 for closing the courts and governing without them. Youth and older Nicaraguans weigh in with strong and statistically identical rejection of such executive seizures of the power of other governmental branches.

The picture is less clear with respect to military coups d'etat. In each hypothetical scenario for a possible coup Nicaraguans on average express disfavor toward the idea. The average of the three coup items is 33 out of 100. However, for a potential coup justified by high levels of corruption the combined average is 44 out of 100, for a coup justified by high crime it is 39, while for high unemployment it is only 17. Thus potential coup support involving the military rather than the executive, while below a favorable rating in all cases, comes closer to the scale midpoint. When we examine Figure 130 for the differences between youth and older Nicaraguans pattern of disagreement emerges. Younger Nicaraguans favor hypothetical coups more than their older fellows by 9 scale points for the high unemployment scenario, 8 points for high crime, and 14 points for high corruption (all significant differences). On this last item younger Nicaraguans register actual approval (56.2) for a corruption-justified hypothetical coup. Here, then, we encounter an attitude difference between young and older Nicaraguans. Younger Nicaraguans, perhaps less mindful than their older peers of the noxious role of Nicaragua's National Guard when it served as the instrument of the Somoza dynasty, tend to view the military more favorably with regard to ending a corrupt regime or crime wave.




Figure 130. Authoritarian and Antidemocratic Attitudes by Age

Another area of political attitudes included in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey concerns citizens' views of the rule of law. Should citizens and officials follow the law? And how much would one approve of actions of vigilante justice if the government does not punish criminals?

- E16.** Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove? 0=strongly disapproves, 100= strongly approves
- AOJ8.** Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think?
(1) Police protect people from crime or (2) Police are involved in crime

Figure 131 presents the mean scores on indexes for these variables by age. Recall that in the items in Figure 130 we observed that young Nicaraguans are more supportive of coups than older ones. Will there be similar differences here? Will younger Nicaraguans register weaker commitment to

democratic procedures the rule of law or greater support for communities taking the law into their own hands? Turning first to the support for the rule of law (the police following the law), we see that there is no significant difference between young and old, with overall approval in the mid 60s on the 100 point scale. In contrast, approval for taking the law into one's own hands in the absence of the state's action receives 38 out of 100 from youth but only 31.3 among older Nicaraguans, a significant difference. Thus youth are somewhat more less restrained on this attitude than their elders.




Figure 131. Attitudes Related to the Rule of Law, by Age

Trust, life satisfaction, and political efficacy are other important political attitudes for which the AmericasBarometer 2012 included items. Interpersonal trust facilitates cooperation in the economic and political realms and thus contributes to the formation of political organizations, social movements, and utilization of public institutions. Satisfaction with one's life can be a politically demobilizing attitude; the most satisfied tend to be less politically active. A sense of internal political efficacy (belief in one's own capacity) encourages the citizen to be more active. A sense of external efficacy represents a citizen's judgment about how likely he is to be effective based on government's receptiveness to her initiative or pressure, and may also shape activism.

Figure 132 presents a detailed breakdown of these factors by age. First, there is no significant difference between youth and older Nicaraguans on these items. Extrapolating between the youth and older cohorts means to get a rough average on each of these variables, we see some shared patterns among Nicaraguans of all ages. At roughly 80 out of 100 scale points, Nicaraguans are satisfied with their lives. At 60 scale points, Nicaraguans view their fellow citizens as relatively trustworthy. Their sense of internal political efficacy at 54 is slightly above the scale midpoint on believing they

understand important national issues. Nicaraguans are at roughly 47 out of 100, slightly dubious that public officials care about their views.

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... **[Read options]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**

(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy
(88) DK (98) DA

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?




Figure 132. Life Satisfaction, Trust, and Political Efficacy by Age

In increasing order of specificity, citizens evaluate their political systems in general, their government's political actors, and the specific policies of their governments. The AmericasBarometer 2102 included several such items. PSA5 is an index composed of five measures: belief that the courts give fair judgments, respect for political institutions, perceived protection of basic rights, pride in the system, and a sense of obligation to support the political system (see Chapter Two for a description). Eight other items are described below:

Y3. In your opinion, in general terms, the country is heading in the right direction or the wrong direction?
M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? [Read the options]
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA
M2. Now speaking of Congress/Parliament, and thinking of members/senators and representatives as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members/senators and representatives of Congress/Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?
(1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA
N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?
N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?
N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?

Figure 133 breaks down several of these attitudes by age. A first large pattern is that Nicaraguans approve of these four parts of their political system. Approval for all registers in the positive end of the scale. Nicaraguans' system support averages above 61, their agreement that the country is on the right track averages 63, their approval of the president's labor's is just above 66, and their evaluation of the National Assembly, though lower than the others, averages around 54. The second big pattern and most important finding here concerning youth is that there are no significant age differences in system support, the "right track" opinion, approval of the president's labors, and approval of the National Assembly's labors. Irrespective of age, therefore, Nicaraguans approve moderately of their government in general, and of the president and legislature in particular.




Figure 133. Support for Institutions and "Country is on the Right Track," by Age

Turning to the N series of items concerning Nicaraguans evaluations of the government's performance in specific policy areas, Figure 134 breaks dis/approval down by age. We see that overall Nicaraguans are modestly positive on these specific policy initiatives. They evaluate the government's fighting poverty at a mean of above 65 out of 100, promoting democratic principles at around 61, fighting corruption at about 56, improving security at above 63, and managing the economy well at 59. Once again we see that no statistically significant difference exist between the evaluations of younger Nicaraguans and those of their older peers.




Figure 134. Evaluation of Current Government Specific Policies, by Age

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked a number of questions concerning opinions about social issues. The answers were converted into our usual scale arrangement of zero to 100 points and the findings are presented in Figure 135. Details of the wording of these items were presented in Chapters One and Two and may be found in the questionnaire in the Appendices. Once again we encounter no significant differences between younger and older Nicaraguans on any of these items. On specific, Nicaraguans average around 42 out of 100 (modest disapproval) of giving men preference for jobs in difficult economic times, but they also strongly support gender quotas for the legislature (73). Support for affirmative action for “dark skinned” students at universities averages 57 overall. Nicaraguans favor allowing the physically disabled to run for public office (70 out of 100), but do not favor allowing homosexuals the same right (39). Nicaraguans express intolerance about gay marriage (an average score of approximately 13). On this last item younger Nicaraguans register a few points more approval than older Nicaraguans, but as noted the difference is not significant.

On the question of dis/approving of abortion if the life of the mother is in danger, the national mean score is 9 out of 100, a level of intense disapproval.

The final four items are expressed in terms of disapproval of certain hypothetical circumstances related to one's neighbors. A score of zero indicates that having someone of the hypothetical type would not matter at all, while a score of 100 indicates that it would matter greatly. We note that Nicaraguans do not voice any such prejudice concerning most hypothetical neighbors. The scores are under 1 on a scale of zero to 100 for homosexuals, Afro-Nicaraguans, and indigenous people. The only prejudice registered, and this one still low at slightly less than 17 out of 100, is distaste for having foreigners as neighbors. Again, for all of these opinions no differences appear based on age.




Figure 135. Attitudes on Social Issues

How different are young Nicaraguans from older Nicaraguans in their political attitudes and engagement? Figure 136 presents the data on seven questions, broken down by age group. On only one item is there a significant difference – use of the Internet. The frequency of use score among the younger Nicaraguans, while low in comparative international terms, at 31.8 is much higher than among the older cohorts at only 9.9. Young Nicaraguans are slightly more prosperous than older ones, as we have seen, and many are still in or have recently been in school. Both education and prosperity would increase their access to computers and Internet connections. Young Nicaraguans reveal no statistical difference from older Nicaraguans in their interest in politics, frequency of following the news, political information level, sympathy with either the FSLN or any Liberal party. Finally, there is no statistical difference in receiving public assistance.




Figure 136. Social and Political Interests and Links by Age

Turning to ideology, we asked Nicaraguans about political tendencies to support the left or the right. The item was based on a ten point scale from left (1) to right (10) as follows:

L.1. On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

We have recoded this item by combining each pair of steps on the ten point scale with one next to it to make it easier to represent graphically. Thus the two most left-wing steps (originally 1 and 2) are combined, the two next (3 and 4) combined, and so on through the two most right-wing steps (9 and 10), which are similarly combined. The result is a 5-step scale ranging from very left to moderately left to centrist (originally steps 5 and 6), to moderately right, and to very right-wing. Figure 137 presents the percentage of each age cohort among Nicaraguans in each ideological position. We see is that the percentage of leftists increases from 29.1% among 16 to 20 year olds to 31.3% among 21 to 25 year olds, up through a maximum of 33.0% among 26 to 35 year olds. The percentage then declines gradually to 29.2% among those 56 and older. The youngest voting-age Nicaraguans are, therefore, slightly less leftist than the two next older groups, but they are really not greatly different from any other group.

On the ideological right the pattern varies (Figure 137). Among 16 to 20 year old Nicaraguans 31.4% describe themselves as very rightist, a share that falls sharply to 23.8% among those 21 to 25 years old, and continues to decline across the age cohorts to only 17.2% among the 56 and older group. In a second distinctive pattern, the moderate ideology group (a combination of the center left center right steps from the original scale) grows larger across the ascending age cohorts. Only 24.1% of those aged 16 to 20 are in this effective center of the scale, but that share rises among older Nicaraguans – 34% among the 21-25 year olds, 34.6 % among 36 to 45 year olds, and further still to 40% of Nicaraguans 56 and older. Thus we observe Nicaraguans as they age tending increasingly to describe themselves as political moderates. The proportion of Nicaraguans who view themselves as rightists declines with age. We suspect that some of this decline of extreme conservatism with age might derive from distaste for the Somoza regime, which many of these older Nicaraguans would have experienced as adolescents or even adults. Finally, young Nicaraguans are somewhat more ideologically polarized (that is, place themselves more on the extremes) than older ones.




Figure 137. Left-Right Ideology by Age

V. Political Participation

How much do younger Nicaraguans participate in politics? Do they do so differently from older Nicaraguans? Figure 138 presents data on political participation broken down by age. Here in the realm of political behavior (as opposed to opinions) we see more differences according to age than we found with political attitudes. First, we see that 95% of older Nicaraguans have a *cédula de identidad* (national identity card/voter registration document), compared to only 78.9% of those 26 or younger. A portion of this younger group would not have been old enough to qualify for a *cédula* at the time of the survey, so this cohort will naturally have lower rate than older Nicaraguans. However, there were complaints that the issuance of identity cards and compilation of the voter lists (*padrón electoral*) was slow and kept some from voting. The AmericasBarometer survey for 2012 reveals that this was more severe among younger Nicaraguans. Indeed, 29% of 16-20 year old Nicaraguans report not being on the electoral list for the 2011 election; 13% of 21 to 25 year olds reported the same – less than half of the rate of failure to appear on the *padrón electoral* than reported by their younger peers. In contrast, older Nicaraguans reported being left off the *padrón* at 6.9% for 26 to 35 year olds and 5.2% for those over 35. Younger Nicaraguans in 2011 were, therefore, clearly disadvantaged by voter list problems in being able to vote.

Turning to the act of voting in the 2011 presidential election, Figure 138 reveals that 67.5% of Nicaraguans aged 16 to 25 reported voting, compared to 84.3% of older Nicaraguans, a 16.8% difference. Youth almost always turn out at lower rates than older voters, which may account for some of this difference. However, some of it also appears to be related to the *cedulación* and *empadronación*

problems mentioned above. Some 5.7% of Nicaraguans aged 16 to 20 reported not being allowed to vote, 5.8% among those 21 to 25, 4.2% among those 25-36, 5.5% among those aged 36 to 45, and about 1.5% among those 46 years of age or older. This evidence suggests that a portion of younger voters were excluded from casting a ballot in 2011 by these difficulties.

Turning to other types of political participation, we see in Figure 138 that contacting public officials is significantly lower (7.5%) among younger Nicaraguan voters than among older ones (11.2%). No significant differences between younger and older Nicaraguans appear for partisan and campaign activity (about 13%), petition signing (about 6.7%), or for protesting (about 8.2%). Young Nicaraguans (19.9 scale points out of 100) are less active in organizations than are than their older fellow citizens (23.5 scale points).




Figure 138. Political Participation by Age

Figure 139 allows us to delve more deeply into the civil society (group) activism of younger Nicaraguans. We observe that only in sporting groups are younger Nicaraguans more intensely active (25.5 out of 100 scale points) than older ones (9.0). For two types of groups young Nicaraguans are essentially tied with older ones in their intensity of involvement – community improvement groups and Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (CPCs). For other types of groups older Nicaraguans are more active. Older Nicaraguans have higher school-related group participation (36.6) than younger ones (18.7). This makes sense on its face because older Nicaraguans are more likely to have children and more children involved in schools than youth. Older Nicaraguans engage more in producer, professional and business organizations (7.2) than youth (3.9). This, too, makes sense because older individuals are more likely than the young to be engaged in professional, business and productive activity than their younger fellows. Finally, as to their level of leadership activity in groups, older Nicaraguans score 4.5 out of 100 compared to 2.7 for youth.




Figure 139. Civil Society Activism and Leadership by Age

VI. The Regional Context and Youth Democratic Stability Attitudes

Finally, we are concerned whether the social-political context within which Nicaraguan youth live affects a pair of key attitudes, their political tolerance (an important democratic norm), and their system support (a component of stability). (See Chapter Five for the rationale for this approach.) The important question here is whether the level of political support for the government, measured as the vote for the FSLN in the 2011 election, and socioeconomic opportunity, measured as the municipal-level human development index (MHDI), affect attitudes among young people. Does living in a strongly pro-FSLN area increase system support or reduce political tolerance for system critics among young Nicaraguans? Does living in an area of extreme poverty and low services lower system support or lower tolerance among youth?

Evidence that the local context matters for both system support and tolerance is strong. Figure 140 presents average levels of system support (left-hand graph) and tolerance (right-hand graph) by municipality in Nicaragua. System support ranges 17 scale points from 78.3 out of 100 down to 50.9 across the municipalities in the study. Political tolerance ranges twice as much across as much (35 scale points), from a high of 71.3 to a low of 36.1. These two attitudes are little correlated with each other. For example, residents of the municipality of Waslala have the highest political tolerance but the lowest system support. Within-country socioeconomic development (MHDI) also varies widely across Nicaraguan municipalities. So, too, does the presidential vote for the FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega in 2011, ranging from a high of 75.8% (in El Tuma/La Dalia and La Paz Centro) to a low of 17.4% (in Bocana de Paiwas).

These differences by municipality argue strongly that we should employ multilevel analysis to ascertain whether the context influences these key attitudes among young people. When traditional regression analysis employs both contextual variables and individual-level measures, the repetition of values for the context variables tends to inflate their weight in the analysis. The appropriate solution for this problem is to employ a hierarchical model that correctly weights the system-level effects. We have analyzed youth system support and tolerance, modeling them on two contextual variables, HDIM and 2011 presidential vote percent. The results (presented in the Appendix as Hierarchical Linear Models A and B) are not shown here to conserve space. To summarize, neither presidential vote in 2011 nor human development level affects system support among Nicaraguan youth.¹⁸⁵ This strongly suggests that support for the political system among younger Nicaraguans is not conditioned either by the political context (recent presidential vote) or by the locally measured human development index.

Context has a somewhat different effect on political tolerance among the young. The hierarchical regression analysis indicates that, as for system support, the municipal-level 2011 presidential vote does not affect political tolerance for system critics among youth.¹⁸⁶ In contrast, the municipal-level human development index does have a significant effect on this attitude among youth, albeit a very slight effect. The z-score (Appendix XY) is -1.97 ($p=.049$), which reveals a weak negative correlation. Thus young Nicaraguans tend to be less politically tolerant in more prosperous or developed community contexts, even controlling for their gender, income, and education levels. We

¹⁸⁵ The z-scores for presidential vote and for HDIM are, respectively, 0.28 ($p=.299$) and -1.04 ($p=.778$), in each case indicating no significant effect.

¹⁸⁶ $Z = .084$ ($p=.399$) (see Appendix XY).

would have expected the opposite as greater educational achievement – more present in developed areas -- correlates positively with tolerance.

This presents an interesting puzzle: Why might more developed and advantaged areas have less tolerant youth? Turning to Figure 140 Part A and Part B, we note that political tolerance in general (Part B) tends to be lower in the relatively developed urban areas of Managua (Districts III, IV, V, and VI), which may have higher concentrations of public employees and Sandinista supporters than other districts. (The FSLN typically performs strongly in elections in the metropolitan center of the country.) As a way to indirectly explore this idea we can examine party identification rates by municipality. Not surprisingly we find that residents of Managua's Districts III, IV and VI all average among the top political subdivisions in Nicaragua for identification/sympathy with the FSLN. The correlation between tolerance and sympathy for the FSLN is -0.12 among all Nicaraguans. Such an atmosphere of partisanship toward the incumbent party, therefore, contributes to slightly lowered tolerance of regime critics. We surmise that young Nicaraguans in such pro-FSLN areas (such as parts of the districts of the metropolitan zone) are apparently being socialized into a pattern of intolerance.




Figure 140. Part A. Impact of Municipal Context on System Support




Figure 140. Part B. Impact of Municipal Context on Political Tolerance

VII. Conclusions

One quarter of the Nicaraguan population is aged between 16 and 25, a proportion that appears to be declining because of lower fertility. The cohorts aged 16 to 20 and 21 to 25 are Nicaragua's most educated citizens, are slightly better off than older Nicaraguans, and are more optimistic about the economy. The life chances and educational opportunity of young Nicaraguans varies sharply according to the local socioeconomic context, with the worst outcomes observed in the least developed areas of the country.

One strong pattern in the data is that younger Nicaraguans differ very little from older ones on most political and social views. Younger and older Nicaraguans, for example, perceive nearly identical

levels of main national problems (economy 78%, security 9%). Nicaraguans see the biggest threats to youth as drugs (49%), alcohol (21%), and gangs (15%). As the best responses to these threats they mention sports programs (41%), job creation (25%), education (13%), and volunteer programs (9%). What Nicaraguans would change about schools is to improve the infrastructure (33%), improve academics (22%), improve the teachers (11%) and increase recreation and sports activities (10%). What they emphasize very little is politicization in the schools (only 1.4%). The effects of crime and fear of crime on behavior are quite similar between young and old.

The political attitudes of Nicaraguan youth are largely similar to their older fellow citizens, but there are a few interesting exceptions. All Nicaraguans view the roles of the state similarly, all strongly embrace basic democratic values, moderately support various aspects of the rule of law, and have similar levels of trust, life satisfaction, and political efficacy. Younger and older Nicaraguans express similar and positive levels of institutional support, approval of the job of the president and National Assembly, and give the current administration similarly good marks on several areas of its policy. There is practically no age difference in political knowledge, following the news, or identification with political parties. One notable difference is that young Nicaraguans use the Internet more than older ones. Young and old engage in party and campaign activism, protest, and petitioning at similar rates.

The few differences that we have detected are that young Nicaraguans are more willing to justify hypothetical military coups than their older fellow citizens. Ideologically, young Nicaraguans are more extreme (more concentrated near the ends of the ideological spectrum), have fewer moderates than older cohorts, and tend to be more right-wing. Moderation grows and rightist identification declines among older cohorts. Finally, participation differences appeared. The young are more active in sports groups, but not in any other type of organization where the clear tendency is to be less active and take lower leadership initiative. Compared to their elders, fewer young people are registered to vote, fewer turn out to vote, and fewer contact public officials.

In sum, age drives few political differences among Nicaraguans. Youth tend to be slightly more ideologically conservative, more receptive to the idea of a hypothetical military coup (albeit opposed to coups on balance), but are also less active in groups and in political participation. The regional context measured as development levels (MHDI) and presidential vote for the FSLN) have little effect on system support among the young or their political tolerance. The single, modest effect that holds up under multilevel analysis is that youth who live in more developed areas are less politically tolerant of regime critics. This appears to stem from the presence of many public employees and FSLN sympathizers in urban Nicaragua.

In conclusion, and as we concluded in 2010, one gets the distinct sense Nicaraguan youth offer little prospect for destabilizing the political system. While being somewhat more conservative and coup-supporting, younger Nicaraguans are less politically active. Some of their reduced electoral participation may come from a reported failure to receive national identity documents necessary to vote in a timely way before the 2011 presidential election.

Chapter Eight: Nicaraguan Women

I. Introduction

Nicaragua's persistent economic underdevelopment and the poverty of its people have many unhappy effects. Underdevelopment and poverty may place special burdens on women. Political engagement and participation in organizations and politics offer paths for the disadvantaged to struggle to improve their lives and communities.

Nicaragua's Sandinista revolution permitted women to assume roles previously unknown – organizer, fighter, leader, public official – but many women became disappointed with the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional because it consigned certain women's issues to the back burner or abandoned them. Ironically it was a Conservative woman, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro who achieved the ultimate political post of the presidency and helped defuse the terrible tensions of the 1980s. She may well have changed how Nicaraguans, female and male, viewed the political potential and roles of women. Nicaragua has incorporated by law quotas for women on parties' candidate slates, ensuring the continued presence of women in national political life. The FSLN has reconciled with the Catholic Church, eventually prohibiting abortions in all instances.

The goal of this chapter is to survey the situation of the women of Nicaragua as it is revealed in the information collected in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. Two main questions will dominate the following discussion: Are Nicaraguan women substantially different from men in their resources, attitudes, experiences, and political and civil society behaviors? Do Nicaraguan women participate in politics in amounts and ways that will allow them to press their interests and concerns upon the government and their communities? In answering the last question we will examine the factors that shape and mobilize the political participation of Nicaraguan women. We will ultimately find that taking part in civil society – organizations – has enormous influence on how Nicaraguan women engage in politics.

II. Characteristics of Nicaraguan Women

We begin the discussion of Nicaraguan women by comparing their social-demographic characteristics to those of men. Table 2 summarizes a number of traits for women and men and indicates whether the differences between genders are statistically significant. Our main question is to what extent Nicaraguan women have advantages or disadvantages with respect to men that make their lives respectively easier or harder.

We see that Nicaraguan women in 2012 have slightly lower average education (6.3 years) than men (7.0 years), but that the difference is not statistically significant. In terms of maternal education, women also lag men on the index, but again the difference – though larger -- is not significant. In essence the average education of women's mothers amounts to two or three fewer years of primary schooling than men's mothers received. There are a few differences in marital (civil) status: For women, 29% live alone (*solteras*), while 35% of men do. Only 30.9% of women report being married, while 35% of men say they are married. At 7.1%, women are nearly three times more likely to be

widowed than men (2.4%). The number of children under 13 living at home (1.2) is the same for both genders. At 10.5%, almost 3% more women report receiving cash transfers than men. While this difference in Usura Cero or other transfers is not statistically significant, we assume that more men than women travel abroad to work. Thus more men likely send home remittances to their domestic partners than receive them. This surmise is strengthened by the significant difference in the percentage of men considering emigrating to seek work (24.3%) compared to women (15.7%).

Table 2 presents data on the economic status of women. We constructed a measure of standard of living based on the possession of household artifacts and amenities.¹⁸⁷ Based on the index's range of 0 to 15, women average 3.9 of these amenities, while men average 4.2 but the difference lacks statistical significance. It is worth emphasizing that Nicaraguans overall on average report just over four of these basic household amenities, which include very basic services such as sewer and potable water hookups, an interior bathroom, washing machine, and telephone, as well as other luxury and communication items. This national average indicates the generally poor economic standing of Nicaraguan households. But are there other measurable differences that might affect the relative status of women? One is an index of food insecurity, which ranges from zero (very low food insecurity) to 100 (very high food insecurity -- see Chapter One for the items) based on two questions asking about missing meals or going hungry. Women report significantly higher average food insecurity (31.2) than men (20.2), which indicates an important area of vulnerability for women.

Why might women be less secure in their access to food for themselves and their families than men? We suspect that part of the problem may stem from the dependency of domestically partnered females on males for the family's income. Men may withhold their earnings from their domestic partners to use for their own purposes, leaving the women who depend on them disadvantaged. Figure 140 indicates that this explanation has validity. We see that among men only 11.2% report earning no income while the spouse/partner earns all the income, while for women the figure is 67.2% -- six times more. Further, only 6.1% of men report gaining less than their spouses, while 12.8% of women do so. In sum, the large discrepancy between domestic partners' incomes between females and males (to the males' advantage) suggests women have fewer economic resources to devote to food than their male partners do.

¹⁸⁷ These are a television set, refrigerator, land-line telephone, cellular telephone, vehicles (up to 3), washing machine, microwave oven, motorcycle, potable water connection inside the home, interior bathroom, computer, flat screen television set, internet service and sewer connection. This measure is superior to reported income in assessing the household's and respondent's status because it has virtually no missing values while income has many refusals. It also indicates when a dependent, for example, lives in poverty or prosperity based on the overall living standard of the family, as opposed to the dependent's negligible income if unemployed.

Table 2. Characteristics of Nicaraguan Women (Compared to Men)

Variable	Females	Males	Significant at .05 (*)
Education (years)	6.3	7.0	NS
Maternal Education (0=none, 1=some primary, 2 = completed primary...8 (completed university)	1.1	1.4	NS
Civil Status (%)			
Living alone	29.0	35.0	
Married	30.9	35.0	
Free union	26.8	24.6	
Divorced	1.3	0.5	
Separated	4.9	2.6	
Widowed	7.1	2.4	
Number of Children under 13 Living at Home	1.2	1.2	NS
Receives Cash Transfers (%)	10.5	7.6	NS
Considering emigrating abroad to seek work within the next three years (%)	15.7	24.3	*
Living Standard (by household artifacts, range 0-15)	3.9	4.2	NS
Perceived personal economic situation (0= very bad...100=very good)	47.6	46.2	NS
Food Insecurity (0 = very secure... 100=very insecure)	31.2	20.2	*
Perceives current economic situation better than a year ago (%)	23.5	26.5	NS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2012			




Figure 141. One's Own Income Versus Domestic Partner's Income

Within Nicaragua where is this problem of food insecurity among women most severe? We suspect that economic development levels may affect the male/female food insecurity discrepancy. Figure 142 confirms this by charting food insecurity across municipal human development levels (MHDI), which sorts municipalities into four human development strata based on levels of income, education, health and services. One very interesting patterns appears: Women report almost 20 scale points more food insecurity than men in the least developed municipalities, and between 12 and 15 points more food insecurity in the top two levels of municipal development. The relationship is not consistent for all development levels, with women reporting slightly less food insecurity than men in the second least-developed group of municipalities. However, food insecurity among women is worse in three of four local development categories. Food insecurity among women in the least-developed municipalities reveals the greatest disadvantage compared to men.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ To our surprise, the overall average food insecurity for men and women combined is higher in the three groups of more developed municipalities than in the least developed municipality group. We suspect that people in the less developed municipalities (largely rural) may have more capacity to produce their own food compared to residents of more developed and thus more urban areas. Urban residents would necessarily rely more on food purchased through markets and stores supplied by remote producers and supply chains. Rural residents, in contrast, have access to more self-cultivated or locally produced and bartered food. This difference could contribute to the apparently higher food insecurity among residents of more developed areas.




Figure 142. Food Insecurity by Gender by Municipal Human Development Index

Pursuing why women have greater food insecurity than men, and where the problem may be most severe, Figure 143 presents a measure of economic dependency on domestic partners. It was constructed by recoding the responses to the following item into a 0 to 100 point scale with zero representing the least dependency on a partner's income to 100 to represent the least dependency on a partner's income. Only respondents with domestic partners are included in the measure:

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income
- (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP

Figure 143 reveals a high level of dependency among female domestic partners on the income of their male counterparts at all development levels ranging from 77.4 to 89.3 on the 100 point scale. Female earning dependency is greatest in the two middle level municipal development level municipalities. Women are least dependent on their male domestic partners in the most developed (urban) municipalities (77.4) – still a high level of income dependency. The large discrepancy between female income dependency in the least developed municipalities (84.5 on the scale) versus men (15.7) may account for the large gap in females reporting food for these less developed parts of the country. Men are much more likely to earn cash income than women, and from what we are seeing are less prone to share it with their partners, some of whom experience food insecurity at much higher rates than men.




Figure 143. Dependency of Respondent on Income of Domestic Partner, by Gender and Municipal Development Level

Another indication of the likely sources of female food insecurity comes from Figure 144, which graphs the standard of living by gender by municipal development level. The evidence here is powerful. Women and men in the very low development municipalities have a living standard index (range from 0 to 15) of about 1.9 of the measured artifacts and amenities that indicate household wealth. Average household wealth rises significantly for each successive municipal development level to attain an average of about 6.0 for the most-developed municipalities –three times higher than for residents of Nicaragua’s least-developed municipalities. There are no significant differences between

women's and men's standards of living at any development level. The main point to be taken from Figure 144 is that Nicaraguans (male and female) in the least developed areas have the least household wealth.




Figure 144. Living Standard by Gender by Municipal Development Level

A few other indicators shed light on the relative economic situations facing women versus men in Nicaragua. Table 2 reveals that there is no significant difference between women and men in terms of how they perceive their own economic situation, although 26.5% of men say it is better compared to 23.5% of women. Figure 145 shows that women perceive that their household income in considerably poorer terms than male respondents. Nearly ten percent more women (at 23.6%) than men (13.9%) say their household income is insufficient and they experience “great difficulties.” Forty percent of men report their income as sufficient or allowing saving, compared to only 28.3% of women. There may be perceptual differences built into this differential response that arises from Nicaraguan women typically

carrying the burden of managing a household economy. This may make them more sensitive than men to the difficulties of managing on the household income. However, it may simultaneously true that, given males' disproportionate role as the main family income earner, they are not sharing all they earn with their domestic partners. Men may also perceive themselves to be more effective providers than their domestic partners do.




Figure 145. Family Income Sufficiency by Gender

A final look at their economic situation as perceived by Nicaraguan women appears in Figure 146. It graphs responses to the question “In the last two years, did your household income go up or not?” We see that effectively the same percentage of women and men (almost 59%) reported no change. Only 15.4% of women believed their income had risen, compared to 21.1% of men. And 25.9% of women reported declining family income compared to 20.5% for men. Thus, roughly a fourth more women than men reported shrinking family incomes over the last two years, while roughly a third fewer women than men reported increasing family incomes.




Figure 146. Family Income Up or Down by Gender

III. Perceived Needs and Experiences of Nicaraguan Women

We turn to how Nicaraguan women perceive issues and problems that face them, and to certain experiences they have. As before, we will contrast these to those reported by men in order to assess the inequality of perceptions and experience. The previous section emphasized that many Nicaraguan women have different and more negative economic perceptions than men. We attributed these differences to women's relative poverty, their responsibilities for managing the household, their dependency on domestic partners for income, and the context of underdevelopment affecting many Nicaraguan municipalities.

Perceived problems

First we turn to Figure 147, which presents the distribution of responses to “what is Nicaragua’s most important problem?” Because women so frequently hold worse economic perceptions than men as reported in the previous section (despite near parity on living standard and education), we expected women to be more concerned with economic issues than men. Indeed this is true. Some 79.3% of women mention economic issues as Nicaragua’s most important problem, compared to men at 66.5%. Women are also more concerned about personal security issues (8.3%) than men (5.5%). Men cite politics as a major national problem (13.4%) almost four times as frequently as women (3.5%). This last finding suggests that we may find Nicaraguan women to be less politically engaged, an issue we will address in a later section.




Figure 147. “The Most Important Problem of Nicaragua,” by Gender

The AmericasBarometer 2012 survey also asked Nicaraguans what are the main problems or risks for young people in their communities. Table 3 breaks down the main responses to this query by gender. We see that, while differences are statistically insignificant, women and men concurred that drugs/drug use is the largest problem (chosen by 47.1% of women), followed by alcohol (mentioned by 23.4% of women), gangs (15.8% of women) and violence (4% of women). The 2012 survey also asked Nicaraguans what program might best respond to these needs. Table 3 lays out the principal answers, again with insignificant male/female differences for most. The only program mentioned significantly differently were sports programs, which 44.6% of men mentioned compared to only 36.3% of women. Other programs suggested most frequently were job creation (25.4% of women mentioned this), education (cited by 14.3% by women) and voluntary work programs (mentioned by 10.5% of women).

In 2012 the AmericasBarometer survey asked Nicaraguans what change they would like to see that would better the “educational centers” in their communities. Table 3 lists the most frequently cited, broken down by gender. No significant differences appeared between women and men. The things Nicaraguans would change about their community’s educational facilities were the infrastructure (school plants) (31.6% of women). Women mentioned academic concerns including curriculum and computing-related training (26.1%), improving teachers (11.5%), and additional sports and recreation programs (7.3% of women, 11.7% of men).

In summary, Table 3 paints a picture of consensus across gender lines concerning the major problems of the country, challenges facing youth, programs to address these challenges, and schools. The biggest difference noted it that women mention sports and recreation programs in both the

community and schools less than do men. Sports activities tend to be dominated by men, so this difference of emphasis is not surprising.

Table 3. Perceived Problems Among Nicaraguan Women (Compared to Men)

Variable	Females	Males	Significant at .05 (*)_
Main threat/risk facing youth in your neighborhood (%)*			
Gangs	15.8	16.2	NS
Drugs	47.1	51.1	NS
Alcohol	23.4	19.0	NS
Violence	4.0	2.8	NS
Proposed programs to respond to youth's problems (%)*			
Sports programs	36.3	44.6	*
Education	14.3	12.4	NS
Job creation	25.4	24.7	NS
Voluntary work programs	10.5	7.6	NS
Suggested changes to schools (of all levels)(%)*			
Academics (including more computers/Internet)	26.1	24.4	NS
Infrastructure	31.6	33.3	NS
Teachers/professors	11.5	10.4	NS
More sports and recreation programs	7.3	11.7	NS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2012			
*Note: Categories will not sum to 100% because a group of "other" responses is excluded.			

Experiences with Crime and Corruption

Crime

About a quarter of the 2012 Nicaraguan survey's respondents overall report being crime victims or having a victim in their household. This is a relatively low level of crime victimization within the Americas. Where crime occurs and how it is perceived varies within the country. In general for all Nicaraguans, the social strata where individual and household crime victimization is worst are the most developed (in terms of the municipal human development index). Crime is also highest in the most urban areas. Some 42% of residents of the metropolitan Managua area report at least one household member being a crime victim in the previous year, followed by 28% in each in the northern and southern Pacific areas. The Caribbean, center region, and the north averaged about 14% overall household crime victimization. The areas in which people report gang activity in their neighborhood follows a very similar pattern. In partial contrast, perceived insecurity because of crime is more generalized than actual victimization. Perceived insecurity is highest in metropolitan Managua, as one would expect given higher crime rates there (42 out of 100). All other regions, however, report significantly lower (from 27 to 33) insecurity perceptions that do not track the much lower levels of crime victimization in the Caribbean, north and central regions.

We turn now to Nicaraguan women's experiences with crime and corruption, comparing their responses to men. Table 4 presents data on the AmericasBarometer 2012 survey related to these issues.

We note first that 13.5% of Nicaraguan women report being a crime victim within the last 12 months, slightly but not significantly less than men (14.7%). The level of crime against any other member of the respondent's household is higher (although at 18.3% identical for both women and men).

Table 4. Crime and Victimization and Related Experiences and Opinions among Nicaraguan Women (Compared to Men)*

Variable	Females	Males	Significant at .05 (*)_
Respondent was crime victim within last 12 months (%)	13.5	14.7	NS
Some other person in household was crime victim within last 12 months (%)	18.3	18.3	NS
Any crime victim in household within last 12 months (%)	24.3	25.8	NS
How badly do you think this neighborhood is affected by gangs? Not at all =0...Much=100) (scale range 0-100)	32.2	27.9	NS
How unsafe do you feel in your neighborhood with respect to being a crime victim? Very safe=0, very unsafe =100.	31.2	34.7	NS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2012			
*Note: Categories will not sum to 100% because a group of "other" responses is excluded.			

What types of crimes do Nicaraguan women report, and how do they compare to those reported by men? Figure 148 presents a breakdown: Women (at 28%) are five percentage points more likely than men to report robbery without a weapon, aggression or threat. Women (at 25.8%) report 11 percent fewer armed robberies than men (36.8%). Women (at 4.3%) are roughly half as likely as men to report a physical assault. Women (at 12.9%) are roughly twice as likely as men to report the robbery of their residences. Finally, only 2.2% of Nicaraguan women report sexual assault (no men did so). We believe this figure to be unrealistically low, and suspect that some sexual assault victims do not give such information to survey interviewers due to a sense of shame. We therefore do not believe that this level of sexual assault reporting by Nicaraguan women provides a definitive answer on this issue. Sexual assault has been widely reported to be drastically under-reported to the authorities.¹⁸⁹

In sum, Nicaraguan women are more likely to be robbed without the use of a weapon or threat than men, but much less likely to be armed robbery victims. Women, less active in the street and more present in the home than men for various reasons, report twice the level of robbery of their homes than men.

¹⁸⁹ The Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network (RAINN), based on U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics, reports (2006-2010 survey) that in the United States 54% of rapes are not reported to the police; see <http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates>; accessed September 13, 2012. We are not offering this statistic as an analog for Nicaragua or for reporting rape to survey researchers. We are merely citing it as evidence that there are powerful emotional barriers to reporting sexual assault, which undergirds our assumption that the 2.2% figure here is artificially low.

Where do crimes against Nicaraguan women occur? Do the locations of crime victimization vary between women and men? Because data reveal that Nicaraguan women on average have greater responsibility for the home while men have more employment outside the home, we expect differences in the locales of crime victimization between women and men. Among women, 42.9% report that the crime occurred in their homes compared to 22% for men, 24.2% in their neighborhood (31.7% for men), 24.2% in their municipality of residence (28.5% for men), and 8.8% outside their municipality (17.9% for men). As expected, then, far more Nicaraguan women crime victims had the experience in their homes than Nicaraguan men.

We asked an additional question about being a victim of an “act of violence,” which is distinct from being a victim of a crime. (Violence is often criminal, but some violent acts may not even be considered crimes.) In Figure 149 we see that 69.3% of the Nicaraguan women reporting experiencing acts of violence (8.9% of all women in the study) say the violent act occurred the home, compared to only 26.1% for men. Nicaraguan women report 13.3% of the violence experienced as taking place in their “barrio,” while men reported 23.9% in their neighborhoods. Only 8% of women report experiencing violence “on the street,” contrasted with 28.3% for men. In sum, crimes against Nicaraguan women tend to take place in the home and to involve less violence, while crimes against Nicaraguan men tend to occur outside the home and often involve physical violence or the use of arms. It is important to consider that more than 69% of Nicaraguan female victims of violence report that these acts took place in their homes, compared to only 42.9% of crimes against women taking place in their homes. Thus 27% more Nicaraguan women experiencing violence say it happened in their homes than say they experienced crimes in their homes. That there is apparently more violence in women’s homes than there are crimes of all sorts committed in women’s homes strongly suggests that many Nicaraguan women do not even consider domestic violence to involve a criminal act. This finding suggests that there may be a large unreported incidence of domestic violence and that male and female Nicaraguans fail to consider this behavior to involve criminal acts. Progress in reducing domestic violence against women will, we suspect, depend upon reducing this gap by increasing awareness that domestic violence constitutes criminal behavior.




Figure 148. Type of Crime Victimization Experienced by Gender




Figure 149. Location of Victimization by Violence by Gender

Corruption

Only 11.4% of Nicaraguans report any experience of corruption in the previous 12 months, a low level of corruption victimization within the Americas. Where corruption occurs and how it is perceived varies within the country, however. In general, for all Nicaraguans, the social strata where corruption victimization is worst are the most developed (in terms of HDIM), followed by the least developed municipalities. Corruption is most intense in metropolitan Managua, where 17.4% report at least one incidence. The rest of the country averages around 9%. Perceived corruption is a different matter. When asked how generalized corruption is in Nicaragua in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, 65.7% respond that it is “generalized” or “very generalized.” This opinion varies much less by region of the country than does the actual experience of corruption. In sum, Nicaraguans experience relatively little direct corruption by public officials, but believe that corruption is widespread, a pattern that resembles that in most countries of the Americas.

Figure 150 presents the differences in perceived corruption and experienced corruption in Nicaragua broken down by gender. We see first that an index of perceived of corruption is very high, and that women (60.0) and men (64.3) are not statistically different. The levels of actual corruption indicated by the lower two graphs. We see that whether measured as the percent of any experience of corruption or as an index taking into account multiple incidents, women report significantly less corruption experience than men. We surmise that this stems from the differential economic and familial roles of women and men that would place females in contact with officialdom less because their activities take place less in the public square.




Figure 150. Experience and perception of corruption by gender

Are there specific arenas in which this summary pattern of Nicaraguan women experiencing fewer acts of bribe solicitation than men? Figure 151 examines specific institutional context for levels of corruption experience, by gender. We see that, because of the very small numbers affected (usually less than ten percent by institution) only one relationship attains a statistically significant difference (bribe solicitation by the police). In that case women report less than a third of the corruption reported by men. A second notable pattern is that, by and large, Nicaraguan women experience less bribe solicitation than men. The levels reported by women range from about one to six percent across the institutional contexts, compared to 4 to 10 percent for men. The only arena in which women (4.6%) report more bribe solicitation than men (2.9%) is at work (but the difference is not significant).




Figure 151. Experienced solicitation for bribe (%) by institution

IV. Political Attitudes and Opinions

Women and men share the political culture of the society in which they live, and thus often have similar political attitudes on many issues. We expect this to be true of Nicaragua. However, on certain issues the interests of women may diverge from those of their male counterparts. This could lead women to hold different attitudes from men. We begin this section by examining several issues related directly to the political roles and expectations about women in Nicaraguan society, and then turn to broader political issues.

Gender-related issues

Our goal in this section is to determine whether, on issues in which women's interests may arguably differ from men's in Nicaragua, there are observable differences in opinions by gender. Do women hold similar views to men on these salient issues, or do they diverge from men? Figure 152 breaks down several opinions concerning issues we believe affect women's interests directly. By a wide margin women and men support gender quotas for women on party nomination slates for public office. Nicaraguan women are significantly more positive about it (81.6 scale points out of 100) than men (71.6). In contrast, on the hypothetical question of whether a woman leader would manage the national economy better than a man we see that women support this idea very narrowly (51.4 out of 100), while men take a more positive view than do women (59.4). Women, it appears, lack confidence in the potential economic management skills of a female leader. As has been widely observed in other countries, women and men are more supportive of women in legislative roles than executive roles.

Nicaraguan women and men disagree that a female politician would be less corrupt as a leader than a man (Figure 152); both genders express similar average opinions (32.3 out of 100 agreement for women, 35.3 for men). When asked whether men would make better political leaders than women, Nicaraguans on average disagree with the idea. Women disagree more strongly (scale score of 31.1 compared to men at 36.1). In Latin American countries that have had female presidents, such as Nicaragua, this positive view of female political leaders is more widespread than in those lacking the experience of a female national executive. Continuing in Figure 151 we see that Nicaraguans of both genders on average disagree that men should be given priority in jobs during hard economic times. However, women hold this opinion significantly more intensely (32.8 scale points out of 100) than do men (44.4).

The final issue of potentially great salience to women is the question of support for terminating a pregnancy if the health of the mother is in danger. This matter (therapeutic abortion – legal prior to October 2006) was extensively debated in Nicaragua in the run-up to the 2006 presidential election. The Nicaraguan Catholic Church took strong positions against abortion under any circumstances, and the National Assembly passed a therapeutic abortion ban in October 2006.¹⁹⁰ While opinion was more divided previously than now, we see in Figure 152 that Nicaraguan men and women today hold almost identical and strongly negative views of therapeutic abortion. Only about one person in eleven now supports abortion in the interest of the mother's health.

To sum up, some of these findings surprise us. First, Nicaraguan women and men disagree very little on most issues of salience for women. In four of six opinions are the differences statistically significant, but the observed gaps between women and men are modest. Nicaraguans of both genders strongly support gender quotas on nomination slates for public office, and they agree that a woman might manage the national economy better than a man (indeed, males hold this view more strongly than women). Nicaraguan women and men oppose job priority for males in hard times and disagree that female politicians would be less corrupt than men, but disagree that men make better political leaders than women. Finally, both genders very strongly and similarly oppose therapeutic abortion, which is the law of the land. We have found little evidence of real female-male divergence.

¹⁹⁰ BBC News, Americas "Nicaragua Brings in Abortion Ban," November 18, 2006, accessed September 15, 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6161396.stm>.




Figure 152. Gender-Related Issues by Gender

Other Political Attitudes

We extensively reviewed Nicaraguans political attitudes in Chapter Seven as part of the discussion of Nicaraguan youth, so benchmarks have been established for many political attitudes and the variables in question described there. In the following discussion we will move more rapidly through the findings, taking note of the very extensive similarities between the political and social attitudes and opinions of Nicaraguan women and men. We will also employ tables that summarize the findings rather than figures, using figures only on occasion to highlight particularly interesting findings.

Table 5 presents mean scores of Nicaraguan women (compared to men) on several attitudes related to democracy and authoritarian or undemocratic attitudes. First, we see that only on one of ten of the variables presented is there a significant difference between women and men. This indicates that

in this issue area, Nicaraguan women and men share virtually identical attitudes on democracy. Second, on the items labeled democratic attitudes we see apparently solid support for democracy (mean scale scores range between 72 and 90 out of 100). Nicaraguan women (and men) strongly hold democratic norms. The item on which the support for democracy score is lower, tolerance of participation rights for system critics, is also the statistically significant difference. Women (53.7) are about five scale points less tolerant than men (58.6).

Table 5. Democratic and Authoritarian Attitudes of Nicaraguan Women (Compared to Men)*

Variable	Females	Males	Significant at .05 (*)_
Democratic Attitudes			
Agreement that democracy is the best form of government	71.7	73.9	NS
Agreement that problems require the participation of all rather than an iron-fisted government (<i>gobierno de mano dura</i>) (%)	82.2	83.4	NS
Prefers electoral democracy over strong unelected leader (%)	88.3	90.2	NS
Tolerance of political participation rights for system critics	53.7	58.6	*
Authoritarian or Undemocratic Attitudes			
Agreement that an effective president should be allowed to be re-elected repeatedly (opposition to presidential term limits)	60.0	56.3	NS
Agreement that high unemployment may justify military coup	17.1	16.2	NS
Agreement that high crime rates may justify a military coup	39.8	37.8	NS
Agreement that high corruption may justify a military coup	44.6	43.8	NS
Agreement that “difficult moments” for the country justify the president closing and governing without the Nat. Assembly	12.2	12.3	NS
Agreement that “difficult moments” for the country justify the president closing and governing without the Supreme Court	12.0	10.9	NS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2012			
*Note: Unless indicated by a percentage sign (%), all values reported are on a 0 to 100 scale.			

In the next section of Table 5 we again see that Nicaraguans support the idea of repeatedly re-electing an effective president (women at 60, men at 56.3). We have interpreted this as an antidemocratic value because it goes against institutional restraints on executive power, but recognized that one may also reasonably view this position as democratic because it would allow the popular will to express itself even if through *continuismo*. As noted in Chapter Seven, Nicaraguans generally oppose military coups, though the opposition is weak for a corruption-justified hypothetical coup. Nicaraguans strongly oppose an executive coup d’etat in the form of a president closing the National Assembly or the Supreme Court of Justice and governing without them. There are no significant differences in these views by gender.

The first section of Table 6 examines Nicaraguan women’s expectations about what role the government (state) should play in the society. Once again we observe no statistically significant differences between women and men. Nicaraguan women split evenly over whether the government should own major business and industries, but strongly favor (all scores well above 80 out of 100) a

government role in promoting popular welfare, job creation, inequality reduction, and providing health services.

In the second section of Table 6 we find evaluations of government performance. First, we find that women (at 63) report significantly more diffuse or general support for Nicaraguan institutions than men (59.3), although the absolute difference is modest. Some 64.1% of women agree that the country is “headed in the right direction”. Women give the president a positive average approval (68.4 points out of 100), and give the National Assembly a narrowly positive approval of 54.9. None of these last three items’ means are significantly different from those for men.

The third section of Table 6 includes specific evaluations of the current government’s performance in several policy areas for women. All of these are positive to moderate positive, and on none are women significantly divergent from men. Women seem best pleased with the government’s efforts to “fight poverty,” improve citizen security, and promote/protect democratic principles (low to mid 60s out of 100), but evaluations of the government’s economic management and control of corruption are also positive (high 50s). Once again, the emergent picture is that Nicaraguan women and men share the same political culture and hold effectively similar of the government and the roles it should play.

Table 7 breaks down Nicaraguan women’s evaluations (trust) in specific national institutions. The first section of the table provides evaluations of three non-governmental institutions. The communication media rank at the top of institutional trust with a mean of 71 out of 100 among Nicaraguan women. Opinions of the Catholic Church (62.7) and Evangelical churches (64.1) are also firmly positive. Men’s views do not vary significantly. Comparing the values of the entries in this first section of Table 7 with those below for governmental and political institutions, we note immediately that the non-governmental entities generally enjoy greater trust than governmental and political entities.

Table 6. Expectations of and Evaluations of the Government among Nicaraguan Women (Compared to Men)*

Variable	Females	Males	Significant at .05 (*)_
Perceptions of Proper Roles of the State			
Agreement that the government, not the private sector, should own the most important businesses.	49.6	46.9	NS
Agreement that the government, not individuals, should assure the well-being of the people.	83.9	84.3	NS
Agreement that the government, not private enterprise, should be responsible for job creation.	88.7	90.4	NS
Agreement that the government should implement strong policies to reduce inequality between rich and poor.	86.1	86.4	NS
Agreement that the government, more than the private sector, should be the main provider of health services.	91.7	90.6	NS
Evaluations of Government Performance			
Institutional support in general	63.0	59.3	*
Agrees that “the country is headed in the right direction.” (%)	64.1	62.9	NS
Evaluation of the president’s performance	68.4	66.6	NS
Evaluation of the National Assembly’s performance	54.9	51.9	NS
Evaluation of Performance of Current Government			
How well does the current government fight poverty? 0=not at all ... 100=very well.	64.8	64.6	NS
How well does the current government promote and protect democratic principles? 0=not at all ... 100=very well.	62.1	59.3	NS
How well does the current government fight corruption in the government? 0=not at all ... 100=very well.	58.3	56.4	NS
How well does the current government improve citizen security? 0=not at all ... 100=very well.	63.2	63.5	NS
How well is the current government managing the economy? 0=not at all ... 100=very well.	59.7	59.2	NS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2012			
*Note: Unless indicated by a percentage sign (%), all values reported are on a 0 to 100 scale.			

Turning to the governmental institutions in the bottom part of Table 7, we see that the least trusted one (at 53 scale points for women and 47 out of 100 for men – a statistically significant difference) is the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). Women also evaluate “elections” more favorably (56.6) than do men (53.7). Thus Nicaraguan elections in general garner more female (and male) support than the Supreme Electoral Council that oversees all elections. Despite what one might expect given the controversy swirling around Nicaraguan elections since 2008, evaluations of elections and the CSE have risen modestly but significantly since 2010.

Nicaraguan women express the most trust in the armed forces (66.7 out of 100), the president (62.2), and the police (60.7). The same three items appear as men's most trusted, but in a different order. Men trust the armed forces significantly more than women (72.1 – over a 5 point difference). Men evaluate the police identically to women, and trust the president less than women at 59.6).

Table 7. Trust in Specific Institutions among Nicaraguan Women (Compared to Men)*

Variable	Females	Males	Significant at .05 (*)_
Trust (<i>confianza</i>) in Non-Governmental Institutions			
Communications media	71.0	69.0	NS
Catholic Church	62.7	63.1	NS
Evangelical churches	64.1	64.5	NS
Trust in Governmental and Political Institutions			
The justice system	57.0	54.0	NS
Elections	56.6	53.7	NS
Supreme Electoral Council	53.0	47.0	*
Armed Forces	66.7	72.1	*
National Police	60.7	60.8	NS
National Assembly	53.4	50.6	NS
President	62.2	59.6	NS
Supreme Court of Justice	55.1	51.8	NS
Political parties	41.5	39.4	NS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2012			
*Note: Unless indicated by a percentage sign (%), all values reported are on a 0 to 100 scale.			

To what extent do Nicaraguan women support the rule of law and related attitudes? Table 8 presents data on women's attitudes on several questions of this nature, allowing us to compare women to men. The first pattern observable in these results is that both genders share mostly similar opinions on rule of law issues, and even where they differ (in one out of nine variables where the difference is significant), the difference is more technical than substantive. With respect to specific items, Nicaraguan women tend to support letting authorities handle crimes and to support the rule of law. Nicaraguan women are least supportive of using violence to disrupt legal demonstrations. Only about a third of Nicaraguans approve of vigilantism (taking the law into one's own hands if the state fails to punish the guilty).

Table 8. Attitudes Related to the Rule of Law among Nicaraguan Women (Compared to Men)*

Variable	Females	Males	Significant at .05 (*)_
“Do you believe that the police should respect the law to catch criminals, or may they act outside the law?” Outside the law = 0...follow the law = 100	68.6	64.6	NS
Approval of taking justice into one’s own hands if the government does not punish criminals (0=disapprove... 100 approve)A	33.7	32.7	NS
Approval of people using physical violence to prevent legal demonstrations? (0= disapprove... 100 approve)	16.6	18.7	NS
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP 2012			
*Note: Unless indicated by a percentage sign (%), all values reported are on a 0 to 100 scale.			

Social Attitudes of Discrimination and Inclusion

How different are Nicaraguan women and men with respect to inclusion of or discrimination against people of different skin color, who are poor, or who are foreigners? Do they equally embrace attitudes such as affirmative action to remedy differences between social groups? We have reported in previous chapters and just above that Nicaraguans tend to be non-discriminatory and support inclusiveness, including such remedies as gender quotas for women on party nomination slates. We assume that, because poverty and race transcend gender, women would not have different views on such issues than men.

Figure 152 presents breaks down Nicaraguans attitudes on several such questions by gender. We see, first, that women do not hold significantly different views from men on any of these items, as we expected. As to individual attitudes, only 13.2% of Nicaraguan approve of gay marriage. Nicaraguans are more tolerant on all other issues mentioned in the AmericasBarometer survey. For instance, 65.3% of women favor physically handicapped being able to seek public office. Only 50.4% of women support affirmative action in the form of reserving university admissions places for “dark-skinned people.” This is 10 percentage points fewer than men. Only one third of Nicaraguan women would prefer not to have homosexuals as neighbors, only 30.1% believe that dark-skinned people do not make good political leaders, and only a quarter believe that dark-skinned people’s culture is the cause of their poverty. Fewer than 19% of Nicaraguan hold discriminatory or exclusionary attitudes toward foreigners, blacks, or indigenous as neighbors.




Figure 153. Attitudes toward Social Discrimination and Inclusion

Attitudes and Experiences Facilitating Engagement with the Political System

Despite the attitudinal similarities observed in most of the attitudes mentioned above, we found women to be less engaged in the public arena outside the home than are men, and less food-secure. Moreover, attitudinal similarities aside, traditional social roles for men and women obviously retain a strong grip on Nicaraguans' behaviors. This combination of attitudes, social roles, and economic differences lead us to surmise women are also less attuned to politics than men. Several attitudes and experiences have been identified in prior research that tend to promote greater political participation (the subject of the next section), so we explore here gender differences in these phenomena. Figure 154 breaks down nine such attitudes and experiences by gender. Five of them reveal significant differences between women and men, and these tend to support the idea that the distinctive social arenas and responsibilities occupied by women and men condition their levels of concern with political affairs.

Figure 154 demonstrates that women follow the news slightly less than men (78.7 to 83.4 scale points). Trust, as noted in previous chapters, functions as a lubricant for economic, civic, and political cooperation. Nicaraguan women report less interpersonal trust than men (57.6 compared to 65.3 out of 100). Information or knowledge about the political system can empower citizens or motivate them to engage in pursuit of their interests. Nicaraguan women have a much lower level of political information than men based on our measure (34.0 to 50.4 out of 100). A sense of political efficacy can increase a citizen's engagement and participation in the political system. Efficacy can be conceptualized as internal (here a belief that one understands the main issues in national politics) or external (faith that public officials care about one's views). Nicaraguan women report a lower level of internal efficacy than men (49.3 to 59.7, respectively). There is no difference in external efficacy. Women likely feel less competent in evaluating national issues because of traditional gender roles and because of their lower information and involvement in some arenas. Certain kinds of politics are not "women's business."

A final significant difference in Figure 154 has to do with identifying with a political party or movement. If a citizen considers herself a partisan or identifies with a particular party, she is more likely to vote for that party in elections and positively to evaluate its performance when in power. Compared to men at 43.8%, women in Nicaragua report a statistically equal percentage of identifying with the FSLN (45.4%). In contrast, women report significantly less identification with any of the Liberal parties (here considered all together) at 5.1% for females compared to 9.7% for males. Interest in politics also motivates participation. Finally, receiving some benefit from government may encourage attentiveness to politics. We asked Nicaraguans if they received monthly benefits from a public agency. We find that 8.3% of women and 7.2% of men report such assistance (the difference is not significant, and the percentage receiving these cash transfers is small).




Figure 154. Political Engagement of Women Compared to Men

V. Political Participation

Having attitudes and opinions is one thing, but political participation – behavior – affects the political system in a way that beliefs do not. The most common way of participating is through voting, but there are many others. Elections offer a fairly blunt instrument in Nicaragua, allowing only a very narrow range of viable choices among candidates or parties or visions in contrast to one another, or of choosing to retain or replace an incumbent. More direct communications, in contrast, can be much more specific. Direct contact with a public official can lodge a complaint or make a precise demand. Protesting a policy or situation lets government know what the citizen wants or opposes. Working with one's neighbors to solve a shared problem can build confidence for future participation, informs a citizen of issues, and builds organizational capacity that policy makers and vote-seeking politicians

will note and may respond to. In sum, participation sends messages and put pressure on those in government.

How Nicaraguan women take part in the political system in different ways likely affects the government's responsiveness to their needs and concerns. Government will respond less to women if women themselves do not actually contact public officials to express their demands, do not engage political parties, bureaucrats, and their fellow citizens. Previous studies have found that women equal men in most of Central America in their participation in elections, but lag men in other types of participation. Voting has become an accepted gender role for women, while their acceptance in other forms of political participation lags behind voting. What is the status of Nicaraguan women's participation in 2012?

Figure 155 presents data on political participation from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, broken down by gender. We see that in Nicaragua, a country in which women played important roles in the revolutionary movement of the late 1970s, there are today few arenas in which women are less active than men. Compared to men, women vote (80%), attend party meetings (21.5%), contact public officials (10.2%), work for parties and candidates (9.3%), sign petitions (6.8%), protest (6.8%), and share political information via social networks (3.7%), at statistically the same rates as men. However, in several of these activities, women engage a bit less than men – attending party meetings, working for parties or candidates, protesting, and social network communications. We mention these small differences because they have a cumulative effect on participation overall and reflect continuing gender role differences.

There are two types of participation in which Nicaraguan women lag well behind men. Women take less part (25.2%) in efforts to solve community problems than do men (33.6%). Women try to persuade others how to vote (10.1%) less often than men (14.7%). We have averaged all nine of these types of participation to create an overall index of political participation (total participation). Figure 155 reveals that the cumulative effect of these two significantly larger gaps and the insignificant smaller female-male gaps for other activities produces a net effect in which women on average participate in 19.3% participation rate compared to 22.2% for men. So, overall, women are modestly less politically active than men, despite effective parity on many participation types.




Figure 155. Political Participation by Gender

VI. Civil Society Activism

Taking part in formal or informal organizations, or civil society, has important political and social effects. Most importantly, as discussed in previous chapters, by articulating common interests and socializing its members, a group can shape its members' political attitudes, and more importantly, their behavior within their political system. Scholars have repeatedly found civil society activism mobilizes citizens in voting, parties, campaigns, making demands on officials, and protesting. In this section we examine the levels of Nicaraguan women's activism in civil society. How engaged are Nicaraguan women organizations? Do women exceed men in activity certain types of groups?

Figure 156 presents data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer on civil society activism, broken down by gender. Most items in this figure present information in the form of an index of the frequency of attendance at meetings of certain types of organizations, so that the scales range from zero (does not engage at all) to 100 (attends meetings once or twice a week). Thus the measures are not percentages of individuals active, but the average intensity of engagement in particular groups across the Nicaraguan citizenry.¹⁹¹ We can take as a benchmark the third item from the top of Figure 156 – mean civil society activism. This index averages the intensity of participation scales for religious, school-related, community improvement, and professional-business-producer, and sports groups. (Because of their importance for this analysis, we treat activity in women’s organizations and Citizens’ Power Councils – CPCs -- as separate items.) The mean activism level for the five types of groups in this index is the same for men and women 22.6 out of 100, with no significant difference between the genders.¹⁹²

Figure 156 demonstrates that religious groups have the highest intensity of activism, followed in descending order by school-related groups, improvement groups, CPCs, with women’s business, and sports-recreation associations having the least intense activity. Women are disproportionately active in religious groups (55 out of 100) compared to men (45.5). Women lead men by almost 13 scale points in school-related parent associations (38.6 to 25.7, respectively). Again likely influenced by traditional gender roles, women significantly lag men in business-professional, and sports-recreational groups, and are effectively tied with men in community improvement groups and CPCs. The community environment offers more space for Nicaraguan women. A final item in Figure 156 presents the percent of individuals who exercised leadership roles in community based (school, church, community improvement) organizations. Women tie men in community group leadership roles (women 4.0% and men 4.2%).

On balance we find a divided picture concerning civil society engagement among Nicaraguans. More women participate (and take part more intensively) in church- and school-related groups – arenas closely tied to familial responsibility and child-rearing. Nicaraguan men, very disproportionately most families’ wage earners, dominate in economic and recreational organizations. Women share with men equal intensity of activism in communal improvement groups and CPCs.

¹⁹¹ By type of group, the percentage of Nicaraguans involved in each of these types of groups is: church-related 38.7%, school-related 48.3%, community improvement 28.9%, professional-business-producer 11.1%, sports or recreation 16.1%, Citizens Power Council 24.1%, women’s (among women only) 7.7%.

¹⁹² In percentage terms the average proportion of Nicaraguans involved in these five types of groups is 28.6%. As seen in the previous note, school-related groups for parents involve the most, business groups the fewest people.




Figure 156. Civil Society Activism by Gender

In the next section we turn to how these attitudes and behaviors of Nicaraguan women shape their political participation.

VII. Influences on Women's Political Participation

Our final question in this chapter concerns the factors that influence women's political participation. Participation in politics is the main way in which women convey direct and specify demands to the polity, so the factors facilitating or retarding them take on special importance. To the extent our survey allows, we are attempting here to identify demographic, attitudinal, experiential, and contextual factors that help or hinder women's political activism. We define participation broadly as the overall set of instruments by which women engage the national political system (represented in Figure 155 as the overall participation variable).

We employed conventional multivariate regression analysis on the overall participation variable. In a first estimation of the model we included a wide array of individual-level demographic traits, behaviors, experiences and attitudes that seemed likely to influence political participation. We focused on resources (e.g., income, education, media contact, political information), experiences such as crime and corruption victimization, civil society activism, and types of engagement with the political system as explained in earlier sections of this chapter. Many of these factors, especially attitudinal variables and both crime and corruption victimization, revealed no influence on Nicaraguan women's political activism. We therefore re-estimated the very cumbersome original model by trimming out many of these insignificant variables. Figure 157 is the graphic result of the trimmed multiple regression analysis. The model is powerful, capturing 42% of the variation in the summary political participation variable (R-squared).

Figure 157 reveals that the most powerful influences on female political participation are, in descending order, intensity of activism in Citizens Power Councils, a woman's expressed interest in politics, identification with the Sandinista political party (FSLN), overall civil society activism (excluding women's groups and CPCs), educational attainment, a sense of internal efficacy, women's group activism, and community organization leadership. Age, family wealth, skin color, receiving cash transfers, political information, external efficacy, and following the news exercise no statistically significant influence.

The most remarkable finding here is how profoundly many aspects of civil society affect women's involvement in politics – overall associational activity, CPC and women's group membership, and community organization leadership all play an independent role. Identification with the FLSN is another important factor. The party encourages political engagement and seeks to mobilize participation through CPCs and other mechanisms. Identifying with the FSLN likely encourages women to take part in politics. Interest in politics, a sense of understanding issues, and a woman's education round out the package. That other resources such as wealth, age, information, and media contact demonstrates that female political participation is widely distributed across Nicaragua's social strata rather than confined to an elite (though women specialize more in some arenas than others). Mobilization by civil society engagement – much of it experienced locally through community organizations -- and by sympathy for the governing party draw Nicaraguan women into the political arena and may help break down traditional social barriers to their political participation.

We also consider whether contextual factors might impinge upon the degree to which women take part in politics. In order to model this we have employed random effects hierarchical linear modeling. In addition to individual variables, this technique considers the possible influence of social units above the individual on individual behavior, in our case two factors measured at the municipal level.

We theorize that, given that sympathy for the FSLN affects female participation, there might also be an aggregated effect of the party's local influence on participation that could be detected by using the percent of the vote for FSLN candidates in the 2011 election. The assumption is that having a large share of Sandinista voters around in a community might pull more women into the political arena above and beyond their individual sympathies for the party (i.e., there might be social pressure to become more engaged). We also propose that the level of socioeconomic inequality at the municipal level could influence women to participate. We know that homogeneously resource-deprived areas have large percentages of poor people, but also that even more resource rich areas have many poor and

therefore a broader range of inequality. Scholars have reported from different areas of the world that poor citizens are very politically active, sometimes more engaged than those who are better off.¹⁹³ The poor in poor communities, for example, often seek to better their situations with collaborative self-help activity, lobby officials for resources, and ally with and vote for parties likely to assist them. Thus we hypothesize that Nicaraguans (in this case women) from low-inequality (the poorest and most resource-deprived) municipalities will engage more in politics than those in high-inequality municipalities.

Our analysis using hierarchical linear modeling incorporated our municipal inequality and presidential vote measures, along with all the other variables discussed just above in the ordinary individual-level regression. (The results are presented in the Appendix as Hierarchical Linear Model C.) This analysis fully confirms the findings of Figure 157 for individual-level variables. But it also supports one of our contextual hypotheses but fails to support the other. The 2011 vote for the FLSN does not affect Nicaraguan women's political participation. In contrast, the z-scores for the inequality index in Appendix ZZ demonstrate that lower inequality contributes modestly but significantly to female participation in politics. Thus, independent of individual resources and experiences, low inequality (which in Nicaragua correlates closely with intense poverty and low average resources in health, income and education) is a context that encourages women to participate in politics.

¹⁹³ Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth. 1979. "Development and Political Participation by the Poor in Latin America", in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, eds., *Political Participation in Latin America, Vol. II: Politics and the Poor* New York: Holmes and Meier; John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2008. "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth and Poverty on Political Participation," in Anirudh Krishna, ed., *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also other contributions to both volumes for numerous examples from Latin America, India, and Africa.




Figure 157. Individual-Level Factors Influencing Nicaraguan Women's Political Participation

VIII. Conclusions

Nicaraguan women differ from Nicaraguan men in a few important ways, especially their economic vulnerability, some attitudes and experiences that support political engagement, and their political and civil society activism. Nevertheless, we have found on balance that on most attitudes Nicaraguan women share the same culture and opinions as men.

Nicaraguan women average only 6.3 years of education, undoubtedly a drag on their economic prospects. They are 50% more likely to experience food insecurity than men and see their economic situations as worse, almost certainly because two thirds of women who have domestic partners depend on their male counterpart for all of their income. Female poverty is worse in the less socioeconomically developed municipalities, and better in more developed and urbanized areas. Women mention economic issues as Nicaragua's most serious problem much more frequently than do men, probably because of their economic dependency. Women perceive the main threats to young people in their communities as drugs and alcohol; they pragmatically cite recreation-sports, job training, and community volunteer programs as remedies for these threats, and call for academic and infrastructure improvements in their communities' schools.

Some 13.5% of Nicaraguan women report being crime victims in the last year; they are less likely to be robbed violently or physically assaulted than are men, and more likely to be robbed at

home. We believe Nicaraguan women under-reported sexual assaults to our interviewers because the reported incidence is tiny. Women who experienced violence were three times more likely to have it happen at home than men, and a third less likely than men to experience violence in the street. About a third of Nicaraguan women perceive gangs as a problem in their neighborhoods and feel unsafe there. Only 7.3% of Nicaraguan women report experiencing corruption in the last year (half the level men report). Nicaraguan women and men perceive corruption to be widespread, despite the modest numbers who experience it (this is a common phenomenon in our surveys around the Americas).

Nicaraguan women share similar levels of most political attitudes with men, and observed gaps between the genders are small, even on gender-related attitudes such as supporting female quotas on party nomination slates. Women do significantly oppose job preference for men more than men (who also oppose them) and doubt men make better leaders, but also believe men would make better national economic managers. Overall Nicaraguans attitudes favor gender equity. Only 9% of Nicaraguans (female and male) favor therapeutic abortion, aligning with public policy.

Nicaraguan women strongly support democracy (as well as supporting multiple re-election of an effective president). They oppose coups both military and executive. They strongly view the state as having a major welfare responsibility, but split evenly on whether the government should own major industries. Nicaraguan women evaluate the government and its performance moderately positively, including most institutions and presidential performance. Women are significantly more system-supporting than men, but on this as nearly all other such attitudes their views are rarely far from those espoused by men. Women support police following the law and generally oppose vigilantism or taking the law into one's own hands. Nicaraguan women, like Nicaraguan men, tend toward inclusiveness and tolerance of the handicapped, dark-skinned people, and even homosexuals (though support for gay marriage is very low).

Attitudes and behaviors that facilitate political participation vary more between Nicaraguan women and men. Compared to men, Nicaraguan women follow the news less, have much less political information, trust others less, believe themselves less knowledgeable on issues, and identify less with any of the Liberal party splinters. (Identification with the FSLN is several times higher for both genders.) Women are more active in church- and school- related civil society than men, who are more active in economic and sports/recreational groups; the genders tie on community group activity (including CPCs), overall civil society engagement, and community group leadership.

Women's ability to protect their interests, needs, and demands into the political system depends on their political participation. Participation differences with men are modest in several arenas, but women engage less in community problem solving activity, convincing others how to vote, and in overall participation. Thus they project their concerns into the public and policy arenas less than do men, probably to their disadvantage in policy outcomes. Women's political participation is driven by education, a sense of personal efficacy, sympathy with the FLSN, interest in politics, and by contextual poverty. But most of all, civil society engagement in all its forms gets Nicaraguan women into politics – overall organizational activity, CDC and women's group participation, and leadership roles in community organizations.

Chapter Nine: Elections: Attitudes, Participation, Evaluations

I. Introduction

This chapter focuses on citizen participation in elections, but we have seen in previous chapters that voting is merely one way to take part in politics, and for some purposes not even the best way. Voting provides the citizen with a “blunt instrument” that allows only a narrow array of means of communicating with public officials. Potential voters face limited choices: Whether to vote and thus exercise a vanishingly small influence on a choice of candidates, or to abstain? If one is going to the polls, whether to submit a blank or damaged ballot as a protest, or actually to vote? If voting, whether to retain or reject the incumbent or her party or not? If voting against the incumbent (or if there is none), to vote for which of the alternatives? In contrast to such simple choices, issues in elections are often complex, individuals’ interests are diverse, and parties’ issue positions may not align neatly with individuals’ preferences. From the standpoint of a government official or politician, the intention of the voter in taking each of these steps often remains opaque. Compared to voting, other participation tools may allow citizens to convey demands to government directly and clearly – to make specific demands directly to relevant officials, to work for parties or candidates whose views they support, to organize with others to increase their clout, to protest unsatisfactory policies or situations, or even to rebel against power holders. Each of these approaches may also suffer limitations, but they most can convey specific messages to public officials than an election.

In essence, voting is rather like trying to repair a clock with a hammer: casting a ballot in an election addresses all the complexity of issues and citizens’ preferences rather crudely. That said, in democratic nations, the rules of the game focus heavily on elections and political parties. Elections constitute the main device for allowing the citizenry to choose who governs by voting. Elections thus hold enormous symbolic importance, and sometimes have the potential to sharply alter course by shifting policy directions or by “throwing the rascals out.” In its short history of democracy, Nicaragua has had two elections – 1990 and 2006 – that clearly changed the course of the nation’s politics. Indeed, despite its imperfections, voting is by far the political act more citizens engage in than any other. Thus, the quality of electoral processes, the nature of the parties competing for votes, and the proportion of citizens voting matter greatly in assessing the quality of democracy.

The AmericasBarometer survey of 2012 asked several questions about being inscribed to vote by means of a *cédula de identidad*, access to the polls in 2011, voters’ observations of the 2011 election process, actual voting behavior, party preferences and ideology, and the like. These do not allow a comprehensive overview of elections in Nicaragua, but they do offer rich insights into how citizens vote, what they think about elections and national institutions.

II. Political Participation

We begin with an overview of political participation in Nicaragua in 2012. Figure 158 shows the level of engagement in several types of activity. We see that 89.3% of voters report having a *cédula*, the basic citizenship document. An additional 4.2% of respondents report that their *cédulas* had been applied for but not yet delivered (“*en trámite*”). Continuing, 80.1% report voting in the 2011 national election for president and National Assembly deputies. The next most frequent type of

participation among Nicaraguans is trying to resolve communal problems through collective action of some sort (29.4%). The next several items in Figure 158 relate to party and campaign activity – attending party meetings (23%), trying to convince someone else how to vote (12.4%), and working for a party or candidate during an election campaign (11.1%). Some 10.3% of Nicaraguans report contacting government officials, and 7.0% signing a petition which is another form of contacting officials. Protesting is reported by 8.2% of Nicaraguans, and another 5.2% reports either seeking or receiving political information via an electronic social network.

Not shown in Figure 158 is civil society (organizational) engagement, which involves well more than half the population. For example, one Nicaraguan of every two report having participated in a church-related group, and a third in school-related organizations, not to mention several other types of groups. Overall, seven of eight adult Nicaraguans report at least some organizational activity (attending at least one meeting of one group) per year. What is more, taking part in groups is a powerful motivator of other forms of political activism such as voting and contacting officials, as we saw in the discussion of factors shaping female participation in Chapter Eight. Civil society activity, therefore, almost constitutes political participation in and of itself, even if organizational activists are not ostensibly seeking to sustain, change, or get something from government.




Figure 158. Political Participation

III. Being Able to Vote

Now we focus on the process of obtaining eligibility to vote and of actually voting. The precursor to voting in Nicaragua is a two-step process: First one must obtain the national identity document (*cédula de identidad*). Second, citizens with the *cédula* become eligible to vote in a process by which their names are placed on the *padrón electoral* or voter's list for the voting area served by their *junta receptora de votos*. Once appearing on the voter list, the citizen may then attempt to vote by presenting the *cédula* at that polling place on election day, where the effort may be challenged. Once the final hurdle has been passed, a ballot may be obtained and cast.

A Nicaraguan applies for a *cédula* upon attaining the constitutionally prescribed voting age of 16. At the time of our survey not all in our sample will have obtained their *cédulas* or voted in the 2011 election. Figure 158 breaks down the percentage of citizens with *cédulas* by age cohort. We see that for older cohorts of Nicaraguans, from 3.1% to 3.8% reporting having their *cédulas* in process, and another 1.1% to 2.8% say they do not have the identity document. This suggests that between 4.4% and 6.0% of Nicaraguans in 2012 lacked a *cédula* and would have been unable to vote at the time of the survey (of course there were no elections at that time, but one was approaching in November of 2012). More interesting is the proportions without *cédulas* among younger Nicaraguans. Figure 159 demonstrates that almost 18% of those aged 21 to 25 and 34% of the youngest cohort report lacking a *cédula* for whatever reason.




Figure 159. Possession of *Cédula de Identidad* by Age

Further analysis (not shown here) reveals that among those 16 to 18 years old nearly one in five report their applications to be in process, a proportion that declines for 19 to 25 year olds. The *en trámite* group was very large for 16 and 17 year olds (33.3% and 25%, respectively) when our survey was taken, and remained as high as 7% and 16% even among youth aged 18 to 20 years. These data indicate that the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) had a substantial backlog of *cédulas* to process for youth as recently as the early months of 2012. We can make no statement about whether that situation has been resolved in time for the November 2012 election.

Figure 159 addresses the second issue related to voting. We asked respondents “Did your name appear on the voter list for the junta where you usually vote?” in the 2011 national election. About one in 20 Nicaraguans aged 36 or older report not being on the local voter list for that election. A different picture emerges for progressively younger cohorts. Some 6.9% of 26 to 35 year olds and 13% of 21 to 25 year olds say they were not on their local list despite all having been old enough to be eligible to vote in 2011 and despite having a *cédula*. The number excluded balloons to 13% among the 21 to 25 year olds and to 29% for 16 to 20 year olds. Of course, some who are now 16 and 17 were not old enough to vote in 2011, but everyone 18 or older was eligible to vote, at least by age, and yet failed to appear on the *padrón electoral*.




Figure 160. Were You on the Electoral List Where You Usually Vote in 2011?

What was the specific experience of the very young potential voters in 2011? A separate detailed analysis by each year of respondents' age (not shown) revealed that 37% of 18 year olds in 2011 said they were not on the electoral roll. For Nicaraguans presently aged 19 to 24 – all of them of voting age in 2011 -- between 10.3% and 19.4% reported exclusion from their local electoral list for

the 2011 vote. These findings isolate a substantial share of young voters who say they could not exercise the franchise in 2011. Again, our findings suggest strongly that the CSE either failed to get many registered youth on the local voting rolls in time for the 2011 election, or that many of these young people simply failed to obtain a national identity document.

The next question is, among those who did appear on the voter rolls for their local *junta*, were they allowed to vote? We see in Figure 161 that nearly 6% of young voters whose names were on the local electoral roll reported being not allowed to vote (we do not know the reason). Between 4.2% and 4.7% of registered (on the rolls) citizens between 26 and 56 years of age report not being allowed to vote in 2011, and about 1.5% of those older than 56. So, if our respondents gave accurate answers, the loss of potential voters just from among properly registered voters (people with a *cédula* and on the local voter roll) by their being not allowed to vote in 2011 appears to have been roughly 4%.¹⁹⁴




Figure 161. If You Were on the Electoral Roll in Your Junta Receptora de Votos in 2011, Did They Let You Vote?

¹⁹⁴ Memory, however is imperfect. Six Nicaraguans who claimed they were not permitted to vote in 2011 at their normal voting place also stated that they voted in that election. This is either inaccurate recall or they invoked a way to vote that we have not measured. Ten times as many people said they were allowed to vote by their local boards in 2011, but did not do so. These are probably abstainers.

While we cannot determine with precision how many Nicaraguans of voting age could not vote in 2011 when they should have been eligible by age, we can say some things. Between 9% and 10% percent report they did not have *cédulas* despite being old enough to have the essential document (half of those were “in process”), a problem most pronounced among the young. In addition, another 7% to 8% did not appear on the local voting rolls, excluding them from voting. Finally, about 4% of those who were of age, had identification, and on the rolls say they were not permitted to vote. Applying some simple arithmetic to these estimates after allowing for sampling error suggests that between 16% and 23% of our sample of voting age Nicaraguans might not have been able to vote in the 2011 election *if* the conditions of non-delivery of *cédulas* we detect for early 2012 was also present before the 2011 vote. (That may not be a reasonable assumption, of course, given that the conditions may very well have been better in late 2011 than in early 2012. The CSE would probably have worked to reduce its backlog of identity document processing prior to the 2011 election.) What our data do suggest, however, is that younger Nicaraguans from 16 to 25 – especially the very young – bear the heaviest potential burden of exclusion from the voting booth because of processing delays and errors in compiling the voter rolls.

Let us consider a further point concerning who is able to vote and who is not. Some observers have suggested that a partisan bias exists within the CSE. They argue that there may occur a partisan shading or selection to the process of voter documentation and election administration. We have calculated the percentages of Sandinista party sympathizers (self-declared) and all other respondents who do not have *cédulas*, were not on the voter rolls, and were not allowed to vote, and present them in Figure 162. This shows that Sandinista sympathizers report almost a 7.5% advantage over non-FSLN sympathizers in having the basic identity documentation, an 8.3% advantage in appearing on their local voter roll, and a 3.3% advantage in being allowed to vote.




Figure 162. Voter Eligibility and Participation by Sympathy for the FSLN

While the absolute differences on each item are small, each is statistically significant. When we consider their combined effect, however, the impact could be considerable when translated into the actual electoral arena (16% to 23% of some young voters prevented from voting). We hasten to emphasize that we are *not* claiming that these data suggest – far less prove -- that the system is rigged, despite the apparent advantage it gives to the FSLN. Much of the difference observed could arise from the Sandinista party having enthusiastic and persistent sympathizers who pursue their potential new allies' documentation more effectively than other Nicaraguans. The party may also deploy more effective advocates for their electoral “ground game” who encourage their local supporters to register and follow up to assure their names appear the local rolls, and perhaps advise and support such efforts. Finally, other parties have recently fielded fewer election-day *fiscales* (poll watchers) than the FSLN. Their absence from the urns may have allowed more rejection of the documentation of their supporters or the party unaffiliated than of FSLN sympathizers.

Finally, we return to the original point of political participation. How many Nicaraguans actually vote? Figure 158 above provides the answer from the results of our 2012 survey for the 2011 presidential election – 80.1% of our entire Nicaraguan sample report voting. To refine this slightly, when we eliminate from the calculation the very young (16 and 17 year olds) who may not have been eligible, we find that 81.9% report having voted in 2011. The reader should recall that survey respondents reveal a prevalent tendency to over-report having voted, so even this revised value for reported voting is likely some percentage points higher than the actual turnout.

Figure 163 presents a multiple regression analysis of the factors from our survey that associate with reported voter turnout in Nicaragua's 2011 presidential election.¹⁹⁵ We have included a large number of attitudes, behaviors, experiences, and demographic items, as well as evaluations of government performance. Figure 162 reveals that older and better educated Nicaraguans report having voted at a higher rate; both of these findings are common around the world. Of some interest is that family living standard and gender do not associate with voter turnout. This indicates the thoroughness to which voting now permeates the Nicaraguan social and political system. Rich and poor report turning out roughly equally, as do women and men.

The size of one's community has a modest but significant negative effect on turnout. Near the top of Figure 163 we see that activism in school-related groups is linked to higher voter turnout. This suggests that schools parent associations may encourage voting in order to exert pressure on or to support politicians who might assist them with their local schools. Activity in no other type of civil society affects voting, something we did not expect. Those claiming higher levels of political information vote more, as do those interested in politics. Finally, the second most powerful association we see with voter turnout is sympathizing with the Sandinista party.

¹⁹⁵ We must be cautious here in ascribing causality for the very simple reason that all of the “independent” or predictor variables here were measured in early 2012, while the reported behavior (voting) took place months earlier in November 2011. For the sake of conjecture we will simply assume that the respondent remembers correctly, and that the “explanatory” or associated factors had not changed greatly between the election and the survey.




Figure 163. Factors Influencing Voter Turnout in 2011

To sum up, the voter turnout model is less complex than expected, and many factors anticipated to associate with higher turnout, such as evaluations of the economy and presidential performance, simply do not matter. Only six factors are statistically linked to 2011 turnout in Nicaragua – age, education, town size (negative), FSLN sympathy, interest in politics, and school-group activism.

IV. Party Choice and Elections

Party Identification

Where do Nicaraguans partisan political sympathies lie? There are several ways to approach this question. One is the question “*At this time [recall that it is early 2011], do you sympathize with any political party? [If so], with which one?*” Another is to ask for whom the respondent voted in a recent election or for whom she or he plans to vote in a future election “if it were held today?”

Figure 164 reveals Nicaraguans self-declared party identification or sympathy as of early 2012. The largest category of party sympathy is “none” at 48.3%. Some 44.2% specify the FSLN as their party; this places the Sandinistas first in number of supporters. The Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente (APLI) stands at 6.2%, followed by the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista at 1.2%, and a negligible 0.1% for “other.” No survey respondent declared for the Alianza por la República (APRE) or the Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense. All the Liberal tendencies combined in 2012 add up to only 7.4% of the citizenry that expresses Liberal sympathy of any type. This is a very significant loss of

citizen loyalty from an overarching Liberal movement that won two consecutive presidencies in the 1990s and early 2000s.




Figure 164. Party Identification over Time

To evaluate the relative trajectories in public identification with the parties we turn to the bottom half of Figure 164, which reveals AmericasBarometer respondents' self-declared sympathies

over time since 2004. The FSLN dipped in 2008 to about a 19% identification rate, but has risen since to the current 44.2%. In stark contrast, the combination of identification with any of the Liberal party factions shows the (artificial) Liberal combination peaked in 2008 at about 17%, a rate not significantly different from the FSLN at that time. Since 2008, however, the combined Liberal parties' identification has eroded to the present level of 7.5%. Thus the "Liberal" brand appears deeply troubled, whether by its factionalism and personal rivalries or by scandals.

Turning to the most recent election to gauge support for Nicaragua's different parties, Figure 164 lays out the reported vote in the 2011 presidential and National Assembly elections. The results track each other closely. The FSLN, by respondents' self-reports, won about three fourths of both presidential and legislative votes. Because of another widely observed tendency in surveys, over-reporting support for the winner in the last election, this is probably higher than the true FSLN vote cast by those in our sample. The actual (i.e., headcount) presidential result reported by the CSE was 62.9% for the FSLN, roughly 10% fewer than our respondents' self-reports.




Figure 165. Party Choices in 2011 Elections

The trends in the presidential election by party over time demonstrate two kinds of dynamism. On the Liberal side, as Arnoldo Alemán's fortunes faded, the PLC dropped from around 25% of the self-reported vote in 2008/2010 to 2.4% in 2012. The Independent Liberals in coalition (APLI) surged from the low single digits in 2008/2010 to 19.5% as they became the favored vehicle for Liberals in 2011. From near 20% of the reported vote as of 2008/2010 the Liberal Alliance (ALN) plunged to a reported 0.2% in 2012. The combined Liberal vote went from well above 40% in 2008/2010 (recall that these are reported rather than actual votes and clearly somewhat inflated) down to only 23.9% in 2012. The Sandinista party's star was rising from a reported percentage in the low to middle twenties in 2008/2010 to 76.3% in the 2011 election. Again, we emphasize that the reported votes are clearly inflated because they sum to more than 100%, but the crucial point here is not the accuracy of remembered votes but the movement these recollections of the respondents reveal.

What factors may have contributed to the rising identification of Nicaraguans with the Frente Sandinista? One obvious factor is the very decline of the Liberal movement in general, which has been

riven by factionalism and personalism. In the eyes of some observers the various Liberal parties have nominated weak or flawed presidential candidates in 2006 and 2011. A second factor in the FSLN's ascent is probably Nicaragua's rapid recent economic growth since 2006. GDP increased by nearly 40% in nominal U.S. dollars between 2006 and 2011,¹⁹⁶ a period corresponding with President Ortega and the FSLN's government. Substantial foreign assistance from Venezuela to Nicaragua during President Ortega's presidency has almost certainly fueled the rapid economic growth. President Ortega and the FSLN have likely received considerable credit for this strong economic performance which may have attracted more supporters to the party.

A third factor that may have contributed to the strengthening of the FSLN's base of sympathizers involves cash transfers from the government to citizens. The Ortega administration has deployed some of Venezuela's direct foreign assistance through an administration-controlled private foundation to finance cash transfer programs to citizens in the form of micro-enterprise loans, direct economic aid, and so forth. Figure 165 indicates patterns of distribution of these cash transfers by family standard of living, size of community of residence, sympathy for the FSLN, and level of activity within a Consejo de Poder Ciudadano (CPC). According to AmericasBarometer respondents in early 2012, the cash transfers go disproportionately to members of better-off families, to residents of Managua, to FSLN sympathizers, and to low-level CPC activists (Figure 165). For example, an average of 11% of FSLN sympathizers report receiving cash transfers, while only 5% of other Nicaraguans say they receive them. And some 11% of Nicaraguans with medium-high and high levels of household wealth receive cash transfers compared to just over 6% from the poorest families. These patterns suggest that the administration deploys cash transfers toward its base of sympathizers among capitol city government employees and modestly engaged CPC participants.

¹⁹⁶ Inter-American Development Bank, 2012, Latin American and Caribbean Macro Watch Data Tool, <http://www.iadb.org/Research/LatinMacroWatch/lmw.cfm>, accessed November 14, 2012.




Figure 166. Distribution of Cash Transfers among Nicaraguans by Demographic and Party-Related Factors , 2012

Overall, the fluctuations in declared party sympathy tell a big story. As the Liberals divided and remained so, their combined support (a way to estimate their sympathy base should they unify) eroded from almost 20% to less than 10%. Meanwhile the FSLN's support rose sharply. The base of the Sandinista party (its sympathizers), likely encouraged or reinforced by access cash transfers, grew from less than a third of the electorate in the AmericasBarometer's surveys of the early 2000s to nearly 44%. These changes are so pronounced that one could reasonably argue that Nicaragua is no longer a two-party dominant political system as it has been for almost two centuries, but is now a one-party dominant polity. Nicaragua increasingly resembles Mexico under the rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) prior to 2000, when the PRI's effective monopoly on power was broken. One must ask whether another party might arise to replace Liberalism and its divided adherents in the Nicaraguan system as the FSLN displaced the Conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s.

Hypothetical Next Presidential Vote

A final question to assess party support involves survey respondents projecting their vote for the next presidential election (a straw vote). A stated intention to vote for a different party from the FSLN might indicate potential softness in its base of sympathizers.

VB20. If the next presidential election were this week, what would you do? (1) I would not vote; (2) I would vote for the candidate or the party of the current president; (3) I would vote for a candidate or party different from the current government; (4) I would go to the polls but would leave my ballot blank or annul it.

Figure 167 reveals the results of this exercise. We see an electorate that projects a three-way split on this hypothetical next presidential vote if held "this week" (i.e., early in 2012). Some 27% overall say they would either vote but nullify their ballots (2.8%) or would not vote at all. Thus nearly

two out of seven adult Nicaraguans expresses disinterest in voting for any candidate or party for president. Of those who would vote, the Sandinistas at 55.4% enjoy a very large 37.8% advantage over some unspecified hypothetical opponent (17.6%). For now this augurs very well for the party in power, but much could change in the four years that remain until the next presidential election.




Figure 167. Projected Vote if the Next Presidential Election Were Held This Week




Figure 168. Influences on Stated Intention to Vote for FSLN in Hypothetical Next Presidential Election if Held “This Week”

Municipal Elections of November 2012

The final issue in this section has considerable salience at the present -- the upcoming municipal elections of November 2012. Some 82% of Nicaraguans in early 2012 stated their intention to vote in the municipal elections. Who was likely to vote in this election (based on intentions stated in early 2012)?

Figure 168 indicates some of the factors that influenced Nicaraguans' stated intention to vote in these elections several months before they actually occurred. Notable immediately is a partisan divide; 95.2% of FSLN sympathizers state their intention to vote in the municipal election compared to only 70.3% of all other Nicaraguans (a significant difference), but being a Liberal sympathizer makes no significant difference. CPC activists report significantly greater intention to vote than those with no CPC activity. Residents of the Norte region affirm less intention to vote than residents of Metropolitan Managua and Pacífico Norte. Two more interesting patterns may be seen at the bottom of Figure 169. Nicaraguans who report seeing or experiencing no election irregularities in the 2011 presidential election report a 13% greater intention to vote than those who did witness such irregularities. Apparently experiencing or seeing election fraud may demobilize subsequent voting. Those who have high levels of confidence in the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) report a highly significant 17% greater intention to vote than those with the lowest level of confidence in the CSE. Thus it appears that mistrust in electoral institutions has a very significant potential demobilizing effect on Nicaraguans.

If all these partisan and trust patterns were to have held true the FSLN would have been likely to do very well in the November 4, 2012 municipal election because its sympathizers expressed more intention to vote than other Nicaraguans, and they were less likely to be discouraged by lack of trust in the CSE and by having experienced election fraud in 2011. In effect the actual results reported in the Nicaraguan press were that the FSLN won control of 134 of 153 municipalities (88%), the Independent Liberals won 12 (8%), the Liberal Constitutionalist won two, and the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance won only one. Nationwide the FSLN won 68% of the 2,020,025 popular votes cast out of 3.7 million registered voters. Thus the abstention rate was about 45%, a historically low turnout rate since elections were re-established during the revolution in 1984.¹⁹⁷ These results appear to indicate that the election system as arranged by the FSLN since the mid-2000s, the individual-level effects of which are described earlier in this chapter, do, indeed, discourage non FSLN voters and witnesses to past irregularities, and also amplify the FSLN vote in the November 4, 2012 municipal elections.




Figure 169. Factors Influencing Intention to Vote in 2012 Municipal Election

¹⁹⁷ "Resultados oficiales de las elecciones municipales en Nicaragua 2012," Star Media, <http://noticias.starmedia.com/sociedad/resultados-oficiales-elecciones--municipales-Nicaragua-2012>; and "CSE: FSLN gana 124 alcaldías," *El Nuevo Diario.com.ni*, <http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/elecciones-municipales-2012/268558-cse-fsln-gana-134-alcaldias>; both accessed on November 15, 2012. The Consejo Supremo de Elecciones had no results from the 2012 election published on its web page as of November 15, 2012.

Ideology and Political Party

The last point we will address on party choice is left-right orientation. As we have seen in earlier chapters, a large majority of Nicaraguans can place themselves on a left-right ideological scale. In 2010 Nicaraguans ranked among the most ideologically polarized citizens in the Americas.¹⁹⁸ Large percentages of Nicaraguans placed themselves at or near the left extreme or the right extreme of the continuum. Ideological polarization when extreme tends to pull competing party supporters toward extreme issue positions. A large share of centrists in a polity tends, in contrary, to draw the parties issue positions toward the center, especially in elections. How ideologically polarized were Nicaraguans in 2012? How did the average orientations of party sympathizers and of 2011 presidential voters map onto the ideological distribution?

Figure 170 shows that, rather than clustering in the center (the 5 and 6 positions), many Nicaraguans in 2012 tend toward the ideological extremes: Almost 29% claim the extreme left position (1), and almost 20% the far right position (10). Another large group of almost 26% place themselves in the just-left-of-center position (5), with almost 7% more in the just-right-of-center position. There are more Nicaraguans who place themselves in the center than on either of the ideological extremes, therefore, but almost half position themselves on one extreme or the other.

The average ideological position of each party's sympathizers and the "nones" are plotted on the graph. FSLN sympathizers average 3.8, and the party non-sympathizers 5.8 (just above the distribution midpoint of 5.5). The two Liberal factions supporters average 7.5 (APLI) and 8.0 (PLI).

¹⁹⁸ John A. Booth and Patricia Bayer Richard, *Political Culture and Democracy in Latin America*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, forthcoming.




Figure 170. Distribution of Ideology with Mean Party Sympathizer Positions

Figure 171 repeats the same exercise (the basic graph is the same ideological distribution as Figure 170) but instead plots on it the mean ideology by our respondents' self-reported 2011 presidential vote. Attracting some of the many more moderate party non-sympathizers into the presidential vote has moved the parties' mean positions in Figure 171 toward the center from where the sympathizers are (Figure 170). Thus the FSLN's voters in 2011 in Figure 171 reveal an average ideological position of 4.1 (.3 closer to the center than FSLN sympathizers). The PLC's 2011 voters included enough more moderate voters to move its average ideological position to 6.9, 1.1 scale points closer to the center. The APLI's voters at 6.9 have attracted enough more moderates to move their mean .6 scale points closer to the center.




Figure 171. Distribution of Ideology with Mean 2011 Presidential Vote Positions

Figure 172 presents a final illustration of the relationship between ideology and party in the minds of Nicaraguans in 2012. How is ideology distributed within each set of party sympathizers? For this figure we have combined the ten item L1 ideological gradations from left to right into adjacent pairs to provide a 5-tier arrangement (to simplify the graphed results). Extreme-left positions 1 and 2 are combined, moderate left positions 3 and 4 combined, the 2 “center” positions 5 and 6 combined, and so on. Figure 171 is revelatory. Non-partisan Nicaraguans declare themselves to fall in the “centro” group (5-6 on the original scale) and there are many fewer extremists among them. Compare this to the FSLN identifiers, only 19.4% of them places themselves in the ideological center while 52.1% elect the extreme left. Among PLC identifiers 63.2% classify themselves as extreme rightists and only 10.5% centrists. APLI identifiers are 52.1% extreme rightists and 21.9% centrists.




Figure 172. Left-Right Ideological Orientation by Party Identification

How has the ideological orientation of Nicaraguans changed in recent years? The answer may be found in Figure 173. From 2004 to 2012 the mean self-assigned ideological position moved from 6.2 (0.7 scale points right of the scale midpoint of 5.5), to a current mean of 5.0. The current position is a half scale point leftward of the midpoint. The process of shifting leftward has followed a volatile path. A significant 0.9 point shift leftward transpired between 2004 and 2006. This change then partially reversed itself to 5.7, another significant change. Another larger and significant leftward shift of 0.7 between 2010 and 2012 took the average ideological self-placement of Nicaraguans once again slightly into the left end of the ideological scale. In sum, Nicaraguans have shifted significantly toward the ideological left recently, leaving their average position slightly left of center. The polarization toward the extremes, however, remains present.

Among whom did this leftward shift occur? We examined more closely the distribution of ideology over time (not shown) and have discovered that the shifting of the mean from right to left between 2004 and 2012 came primarily from more Nicaraguans professing themselves to be on the most extreme left. That extreme leftist group has almost tripled from about 10% to 28% since 2004. A contraction of extreme rightists has occurred, but at a slower pace on that end of the spectrum. We conclude that 6 years of FSLN government has encouraged more Nicaraguans to identify themselves as belonging to the left end of the ideological spectrum after a previous period (two presidential terms) of Liberal ascendance. This should surprise no one because the party in power has a great advantage in getting its message before the public. The Ortega administration has earned positive evaluations from the public, as we have reported in earlier chapters. Moreover, other factors encouraging this shift may include the FSLN's programs that likely resonate with the many poor Nicaraguans who after several years of hardship now experienced some improved economic conditions. Finally, the Ortega

administration has administered, first through a foundation and eventually a new government ministry, cash transfer programs that have benefitted a number of Nicaraguans. Given the oscillating nature of the average ideological position and its apparent response to the return of a leftist government to power in 2006, we conclude that ideological orientation is malleable, likely moved by political events, economic conditions, and institutional constraints. As such, in highly a contested and polarized political environment such as Nicaragua, left-right ideological orientation may fluctuate more than it might in an environment with greater inter-party cooperation and less conflict. It may also be true that the factionalism among conservative political tendencies, especially of the greater Liberal movement, contributes to ideological volatility.




Figure 173. Ideological Orientation over Time in Nicaragua

V. Perceived Election Quality

We turn now to election quality. The main vehicle for measuring Nicaraguans' perceptions of the quality of elections is this item from the AmericasBarometer 2012 survey:

NICELEC1. Did you observe or did you experience an irregularity during the voting this past November 6? (0) No (1) Yes, Double (or multiple) vote (2) Applied ink after voting (3) Expulsion of Prosecutors (4) Bullying in the polling station (5)

Figure 174 reveals that 7% of Nicaraguans report having observed “double or multiple” voting, and 4.8% the expulsion of poll watchers from *juntas receptoras de votos*. Another 4.1% report “intimidation” at voting places or within a junta itself. We cannot specify what form such intimidation

took, or what constituted intimidation to the person reporting it. A tiny 0.2% report observing a failure to apply ink to the finger of voters after depositing their ballots. A further 10.5% reported “other” irregularities, which could have included many things – failure to open or close juntas on time, missing election materials, manipulation of ballot counting, failure to strictly follow the documentation protocols, incorrect handling of ballots after the polls closed, and so on. Some technical problems may have been minor and did not influence outcomes, but other irregularities may have intentionally distorted the will of voters.




Figure 174. Irregularities Observed in the 2011 National Election

These observations by Nicaraguans about what they experienced or witnessed at their polling places during the 2011 presidential election are troubling. An ideal level of irregularities in an election would be zero or nearly so. The CSE has a structure dominated by political parties rather than party-neutral or nonpartisan representatives. Party representatives run all lower-level election commissions and supervise elections. The national CSE has suffered from its troubled constitutional status in recent years (incumbents whose terms have expired remaining on the CSE because of a constitutional dispute between the president and National Assembly). Various media and observers have denounced the conduct of the 2008 municipal election and the 2011 national election under this CSE regime. None of this should, we believe, build confidence in the quality of elections or in the CSE. Such lack of trust may discourage potential voters, especially those not associated with the ruling party, and may also undermine evaluations of Nicaraguan democracy and institutions. We examine this possibility in the next section.

One critical question about election irregularities concerns who observed or experienced them. Did all Nicaraguans, regardless of party sympathy or voting behavior, equally experience these irregularities? This is not a simple question, and its possible answers have complex implications. Let us stipulate that the ideal democratic election system should not distort the will of the voters by intention or by incompetence. If partisans of all stripes and nonpartisans as well see irregularities at similar rates, then either the election system functions poorly, or multiple actors are attempting to distort the will of the voters, or both. If perceiving election irregularities is skewed heavily toward one party's voters or sympathizers, then one of two things seems likely. That party may be misbehaving and its supporters unwilling to admit it, or its sympathizers may have suffered less from improper acts, or both. Second, in this skewed reporting scenario the opposing party's greater reporting of irregularities could either be accurate, or could reflect a bias against the election system causing an intentional effort to discredit it with accusations of unfounded irregularities. This last possibility seems less likely to occur among a whole population of non-ruling party supporters than it would among party elites. Our respondents are a national sample, so we discount this last option. A final possibility for a very skewed outcome is that media coverage may have created narratives that have shaped or shaded respondents' present views of what they experienced last year. Nicaragua's press is divided between pro- and anti-government viewpoints, so these narratives likely differed and may have reinforced perceptions of good or bad performance during the 2011 election. So, the report of recalled events may be better/worse than the reality at the time according to the individual's party orientation.

In sum, if we find evidence of perceived irregularities skewed unevenly among the parties and non-partisans, what we will know is that – at a minimum – the election system is not functioning well enough technically to produce a perception of fairness and probity. Our findings cannot address at all whether actual irregularities have occurred or how many there were, only whether Nicaraguans perceive them.

Figure 175 addresses the issue of who witnessed or experienced election irregularities in the 2011 national vote. The left-hand graph demonstrates that 13.8% those who report voting for the FSLN perceived irregularities compared to 30.4% of those who voted for no party (or another party (labeled “ninguno”), 41.4% of PLC voters, and 67.2% of APLI voters. The right-hand graph repeats this exercise for self-declared party sympathizers as of early 2012. Only 11.9% of FSLN sympathizers report having seen or experienced election irregularities, but 34.3% of those without party affiliation reported them, 60.7% of PLC voters, and 69.8% of APLI voters. The results are highly skewed. Comparatively very few Sandinista voters and sympathizers report irregularities, but all other groups report vastly more problems. Non-Sandinista voters/sympathizers report 2011 election irregularities between two and six times more frequently than Sandinistas.




Figure 175. Observed Election Irregularities in 2011 by Party Identification and Presidential Vote

For all the reasons stated above this proves little except that Nicaragua's leaders have failed to keep the CSE and the national election system functioning so as to meet the democratic ideal of not distorting results and perceptions of results. Many Nicaraguans outside the ruling FSLN, and at least a ninth of Sandinista voters and sympathizers too, saw irregularities in the 2011 election where ideally they should have seen none.

We turn next to the implications of these findings and ask what impact they have had on confidence in elections and electoral institutions in Nicaragua.

VI. Confidence in Elections

One quarter of the Nicaraguan adult population claims to have witnessed or experienced irregularities in the 2011 national election. These perceptions skew heavily toward those not sympathetic to or voting for the ruling party. This seems an indictment of the Consejo Supremo Electoral and its election administration system which, even if no actual irregularity occurred, nevertheless has presided over a process which much of the population perceives as flawed. What

implications does this have for Nicaraguans' trust in their election system? Has trust in elections and the CSE eroded or risen, and among whom might it have changed?

Figure 175 shows that trust in the CSE eroded steadily from 2004 until 2010, falling significantly from a score of 47.3 out of 100 on our zero to 100 scale to 40.3. This conforms to what one would expect given the problems reported with the 2008 municipal and 2011 national elections. What seems anomalous; however, is that support for the CSE then jumped from the low 40s to 49.6 from 2010 to 2012, a statistically significant change in only two years. The reader should bear in mind, of course, that a score of 49.6 out of 100 is, effectively, an even split between not trusting and trusting the CSE, which seems a poor outcome. Other Nicaraguan government institutions enjoy higher confidence levels in 2012, so the CSE is doing relatively poorly within the context of the government as a whole. However, we must scrutinize the nine point improvement in order to verify that it is not an anomaly. Thus we also calculated Nicaraguans trust in “elections” in general. We assume that the CSE and elections would track together over time. Our analysis (not shown here to conserve space) shows that confidence in elections was at 48.2 out of 100 in 2004, fell several points for 2006 to 2010, then rose 13 scale points to 54.5 in 2012. This it roughly tracks trust in the CSE and confirms that the 2010-2012 increase in trust in the CSE is not an aberration.




Figure 176. Trust in the Supreme Electoral Council over Time

Why did this unexpected increase in trust in the CSE (and elections) occur and to whom they may be attributed. First, recall from earlier chapters that most Nicaraguan government institutions have enjoyed higher confidence scores in 2012 than in 2010. Thus some of the change for the CSE is likely a rising tide of support floating the CSE's boat as well. However, given the widespread perceptions of election irregularities and discovery that there is a partisan slant to perceiving irregularities, we wondered whether any these factors might affect the CSE's evaluation. Figure 177 presents a

breakdown of the CSE's trust scores from 2006 to 2012 by whether one sympathizes with the FSLN or not. A notable pattern appears. Sandinista sympathizers' confidence in the CSE rises steadily and significantly from 47.8 to 64.4 out of 100 between 2006 and 2012, while all others' confidence significantly declines by several points from 43.4 to 37.7. A similar analysis of trust in elections in general revealed the same pattern (not shown). Over this period the number of FSLN sympathizers also rises, thus increasing the weight of their opinion in the general population's score, driving it up even more.

To sum up, partisan skewness of perceived election irregularities in the 2011 vote does not drive down Nicaraguans' mean evaluation of the CSE. The apparent anomaly is in fact not an anomaly. It occurs because a growing number of FSLN sympathizers were becoming more confident in the CSE's performance. These additional positive evaluations by FSLN supporters lifted up the CSE's evaluation despite the erosion of the trust among other Nicaraguans.




Figure 177. Confidence in the Supreme Electoral Council by FSLN Identification over Time

VII. Satisfaction with Nicaraguan Democracy

We now ask what implications the election quality problem, as perceived by citizens, has for system support and for satisfaction with democracy in Nicaragua. A flawed election system should constitute a significant blemish for a democratic polity because it indicates real or perceived distortions in the conversion of the popular will into leadership and public policy. Do perceived election irregularities weaken Nicaraguans' support for the political system or their evaluation of their own democracy? Is the view of democracy shaded by partisan leanings?

At first glance, system support and holding a positive view of Nicaraguan democracy may appear to be the same thing, but they are distinct. As explained in previous chapters, general political system support or institutional support is a broad measure that includes a mix of pride items (how much respect one has “Nicaragua’s political institutions,” pride in “living under the Nicaraguan political system” and how much one should support the system) with evaluations of how fair the courts are and how well basic rights are protected. A Nicaraguan may be proud of national institutions in general, but not pleased with how the democratic system works at a particular moment. We asked two questions related to how positively citizens evaluate democracy in Nicaragua. One item concerned satisfaction with “how democracy functions in Nicaragua” and the other with whether Nicaragua is “very democratic” or not. These items correlate closely enough with each other that we have combined them into an index of evaluation of Nicaraguan democracy. It ranges from zero to 100, with high values indicating a very positive view of the system.

We turn first to Figure 178, which presents a multiple regression analysis of system support. It examines which specific perceptions of elections and political party orientations shape institutional support. Each result presented in the graph represents the independent contribution of the particular variable to system support after controlling for the effect of each of the others. (Recall at the outset that Nicaraguans average 60.7 out of 100 on the institutional support scale, fourth highest in the Americas in 2010). Figure 178 reveals that this generalized political system support has very few independent correlates.¹⁹⁹ First, perception of 2011 election irregularities reduces system support. Tolerance also associates weakly negatively. Interestingly, once the numerous overly partisan factors and demographics are accounted for, only three variables reveal positive influence. Viewing democracy as the best system of government exerts a modest positive impact on system support, approval of presidential performance a stronger one, and trust in the CSE a very large positive effect. The overarching message of this graph is that system support in Nicaragua stems from approval of the president’s approval and trust in elections.

¹⁹⁹ In order to assure that inequality and partisanship at the local context level were not affecting this relationship, we conducted a multiple-level regression analysis based on the municipal level distribution of votes in the 2011 election and our inequality index. Neither factor had a significant influence on the relationship or the model shown here. See the Appendix, Hierarchical Linear Model D.




Figure 178. Election- and Party-Related Influences on Institutional Support

Figure 179 breaks down system support on four key variables to illustrate the relationships just detected more clearly. System support rises a whopping 46 scale points, from 28.3 to 74.8, as one moves from those least satisfied with the president's performance to the most satisfied. Those with low confidence in the CSE report a disapproving 43.5 scale points, which rises to a very positive 78.1 among those most confident in the CSE. This indicates a strong partisan and pro-president divide in sources of system support. Those who trust the CSE and admire President Ortega express high support for the Nicaraguan political system. Nicaraguans with lower commitment to democracy are 12 scale points less system-supporting than those who strongly favor democracy. Political tolerance is negatively related to system support, indicating that those who embrace the present system as it is are less willing to allow system critics to speak out against it.




Figure 179. Election- and Party-Related Factors and System Support

We turn now to the final question of this chapter, whether election quality- and party-related factors influence citizens' belief in the quality of Nicaraguan democracy. We employ two items from the AmericasBarometer 2012 survey to measure Nicaraguans' sense of the quality of democracy in the country.

PN4. And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PN5. In your opinion, is country very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?

(1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic
(4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

These variables correlate strongly with each other, which indicates they are capturing different aspects of the same phenomenon, which we interpret as an evaluation of the quality of Nicaraguan democracy. PN5 captures Nicaraguans evaluation of their system in a frame of reference that asks them to state how much democracy Nicaragua has attained. PN4 seeks their personal evaluation or satisfaction with the amount of democracy they believe the country has. (Comparatively, Nicaraguans average 54.6 on this measure, tenth highest in the Americas and well above the score of 47.5 for U.S. citizens). We have recoded and combined these two measures into an index of their evaluation of Nicaraguan democracy that ranges from zero to 100, with high scores indicating a very positive view, low scores a very negative view. The mean score of Nicaraguans on this index is 54.8, moderately positive but not strongly approving. We suspect that the polarization of the political system informs this average view.

Figure 180 presents a multiple regression analysis of the impact of several election quality and party orientation variables on this evaluation. We see eight factors that have significant effects, four in a negative direction and four positive. The positive factors are political participation, belief that democracy is the best form of government, and confidence in the CSE. The largest positive effect comes from approval of the job the president is doing. On the negative side, political tolerance of critics of the government contributes to a negative view of Nicaraguan democracy. Moreover, three partisanship-linked variables exert significant negative effects – witnessing/experiencing election irregularities (more common among non-FSLN sympathizers), stating the intention to either not vote or cast an invalid ballot in a hypothetical presidential straw poll if it were “held this week,” and intending to vote for an opposition candidate (i.e., not of the current party in power) in the same hypothetical election. Women report marginally less approval of Nicaraguan democracy than men.²⁰⁰




Figure 180. Determinants of a Positive View of Nicaraguan Democracy

We may examine these factors more closely in Figure 180, which breaks Nicaraguans' average evaluations of their democracy down by each independent variable. Four of the six significant effects derive directly from election quality and party orientation. The party-orientation shading of evaluations of democracy are striking. For example, those who state their intention to vote in the hypothetical straw presidential poll betray how their party preference affects their satisfaction with democracy. Those who would vote for an anti-FSLN candidate have a low mean satisfaction 40.1 scale points out of 100 compared to 58.4 for those who would not vote against an FSLN candidate.²⁰¹ Self-declared

²⁰⁰ In order to assure that inequality and partisanship at the local context level were not affecting this relationship, we again conducted a multiple-level regression analysis based on the municipal level distribution of votes in the 2011 election and our inequality index. Neither factor had a significant influence on citizens' evaluations of Nicaraguan democracy or on the model shown here. See the Appendix, Hierarchical Linear Model E.

²⁰¹ This group includes all the hypothetical nonvoters, ballot nullifiers, and FSLN voters.

ballot nullifiers or nonvoters average a low 46.6 on approval of Nicaraguan democracy, while all others report a mean and positive approval of 58.3. Approval of presidential performance divides Nicaraguans powerfully in terms of their approval of democracy. When crossed with a low level of this evaluation of Daniel Ortega's leadership, disapproval of Nicaraguan democracy is intense (an extremely low 26.1). Meanwhile, for those most approving of presidential performance satisfaction with Nicaraguan democracy ascends to a strong 70.1.

Continuing with Figure 181, the impact on evaluating Nicaraguan democracy of having experienced or witnessed election irregularities in the 2011 national vote stands out. Those who reported seeing irregularities register moderate disapproval of Nicaraguan democracy (41.9), while those who did not report this give a solidly positive evaluation that is almost 18 scale points higher (59.6). Recall that FSLN voters and sympathizers perceived substantially fewer voting irregularities than other Nicaraguans, so this factor also contains a party-sympathy bias as well.

Figure 181 reveals the inverse relationship between tolerance of system critics and Nicaraguans' appraisal of the quality of their democracy. Those who are less tolerant of system critics evaluate Nicaraguan democracy significantly better than those who are more tolerant. For the least tolerant the mean score is 58.4, significantly higher than that for the most tolerant at 51.5. Stated a different way, Nicaraguans who like the way democracy functions in the country are less tolerant of the system's critics than are their fellow citizens who disapprove of it.

One final association with positive evaluations of Nicaraguan democracy merits our attention. Those who are least politically active report only a middling evaluation of Nicaraguan democracy (49.) The most politically active are far more approving at 62.9 out of 100. This suggests two explanations (both of which may be true). First, political participation by voting, contacting officials, working on campaigns and party activities, and protesting may actually enhance citizens' views of Nicaraguan democracy. Even though it is now tilted heavily in the direction of the Sandinistas, the political system provides opportunity to express needs and opinions to those who want to do so, which may boost their approval. Second, the ruling party appears more effective at mobilizing its supporters into the political arena. Thus Sandinista sympathizers who approve of Nicaraguan government because their party is in power may receive more encouragement to take part in the system by the ruling party in order to augment and retain its political advantage. Indeed, evidence from the survey confirms the ruling party's general lead in political participation. Those who declare for the FSLN average 28 points on the participation index (range = 0 to 100) compared to 20 for Liberals and 14 for those who declare for no party. Those more active in politics tend to receive more from the system or find it more responsive than those who seek nothing. This quite likely contributes to the higher positive evaluation of Nicaraguan democracy among the ruling party's relatively politically active supporters.




Figure 181. Factors Influencing a Positive View of Nicaraguan Democracy

VII. Conclusion

Voting constitutes only one of many forms of political participation, but it is the most widely practiced by roughly 4 of 5 adult Nicaraguans. Almost a third report working to solve community problems, over one fifth attend political party meetings. At least one in ten engage in convincing others how to vote, work on political campaigns, and petition the government, and one in twelve protest. Civil society activity, while not necessarily directly political but an important mobilizer of political participation, involves seven of eight citizens each year at least minimally.

Our findings indicate several barriers to becoming a voter in Nicaragua, one of the more striking inequalities in Nicaragua especially for a system which purports to practice universal suffrage. Ostensible participation is high, but in early 2012 between 4.4% and 6% of Nicaraguans of the age to legally vote lacked the first essential requirement, a *cédula de identidad*. This burden falls most heavily on younger citizens aged 16 to 20 of whom roughly one third had no *cédula* (about half of these report them to be in process). The second requirement to vote is to have one's name appear on the *padrón electoral* of the voting place for one's voting district. Again the young suffer most. About 5% of older voters report being absent from the electoral roll, compared to 29% of 16-20 year olds and 13% of 21-15 year olds. Third, about 4% of those who were successfully enrolled were then not allowed to vote at their *junta receptora de votos* in the 2011 national election. Summing these cumulative effects we estimate that between 16% and 23% of Nicaraguans of voting age were not able to vote in the 2011 national election because of these barriers to suffrage. Not all Nicaraguans experience barriers to voting equally across political party lines. Sympathizers of the FSLN report significantly lower rates of these problems than other Nicaraguans. Despite the problems reported, voter turnout is widespread and evenly distributed across demographic lines. Only six factors influenced reported voter turnout in 2011 – age, education, FSLN sympathy, interest in politics, and school-group activism (positive) and community size (negative).

More Nicaraguans report no party sympathy (48%), followed by 44% for the FSLN and 7% for all Liberal factions combined. FSLN identification has roughly doubled since 2008 and Liberal identification fallen by half. Voting in presidential elections follows a similar trend, with Liberal faction voting declining and FSLN voting increasing. The extent of change suggests a possible historic shift from Nicaraguan having a competitive two-party dominant to a single-party dominant system. A straw presidential poll in early 2012 suggests that the FSLN benefits from a perception of successful economic management and approval of the president's performance.

Intention to vote in the 2012 municipal elections at 82% tracked Nicaraguans prior reported turnout. Those most likely to vote included FSLN sympathizers and CPC activists. Those least likely to vote report having observed election irregularities in 2011 and those with low levels of trust in the Consejo Supremo Electoral. The actual results of the 2012 municipal election was that the FSLN captured 88% of the mayoralties, and won over 67% of the recorded popular vote, confirming our "prediction about the election's likely participants. However, that abstention was roughly 4 of 9 registered voters, a historical high for the previous quarter century.

Nicaraguans are very polarized along left-right ideological lines both absolutely and comparatively – half place themselves on either the far left (29%) or far right (20%) compared to only 33% in the ideological center. The average ideological position of Nicaraguans – now slightly left of center -- has shifted leftward as the right has eroded while the left has grown over time.

Just over one fourth of Nicaraguans reports having observed or experienced irregularities in the 2011 national election. These include most notably voting, expulsion of *fiscales* from *juntas*, and "intimidation" at the voting place. In another striking political inequality, almost three times more non-FSLN voters report such irregularities in 2011 than do FSLN voters.

Despite these perceived irregularities and many critical comments by the media for the 2008 and 2011 elections, Nicaraguans overall declared increased confidence in elections and the Consejo Supremo Electoral from 2010 to 2012. Our findings suggest that this apparent anomaly occurred partly

because of a halo effect from generally rising evaluation of public institutions driven by the increasing number of FSLN sympathizers and their positive evaluations.

Support for the political system in Nicaragua stems slightly from support for democracy, but most of all from factors shaded by partisanship -- approval of the current president's performance and trust in the CSE. Finally, Nicaraguans' appraisals of the president's performance and that of the CSE also increase satisfaction with/evaluation of their democracy's performance. So do political activism and a preference for democracy as the best form of government. On the negative side, evaluation of Nicaraguan democracy suffers among the more politically tolerant, those who experienced election irregularities, and those who would vote against the FSLN in a straw presidential vote. The divergent partisan coloration to evaluating institutions and Nicaraguan democracy's performance could hardly be more clear. In this polarized nation, how pleased Nicaraguans are with democracy and their pride in national institutions both derive importantly from their views of the Ortega administration and the CSE.

In essence, Nicaraguans of different parties diverge on the criteria for evaluating their institutions and the quality of democracy. Sandinistas sympathizers admire the system and its elections, they are growing in numbers, and they are much more politically active than other Nicaraguans. Our evidence indicates that the system FSLN supporters admire provides easier access to Sandinista voters and supporters than it does to others. Those sympathetic to other parties or who profess no party sympathy see more flaws in the election system than Sandinistas and may well be discouraged from taking part by the biases they observe. The municipal elections of 2012 appear to confirm this suspicion.

Appendixes

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Enero, 2012

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública. Vengo por encargo de la Universidad de Vanderbilt. El proyecto está financiado por la AID de los Estados Unidos. La entrevista durará unos 45 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Nicaragua.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse **Borge y Asociados**, al teléfono 265 6860 ó 378 3932 con la Sra. Mara Miranda. El número IRB del estudio es 110627.

¿Desea Participar?

Appendix B. Sample Design

Sample design for the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey in Nicaragua

Universe, population, unit of observation

Universe: the survey provides a national coverage of voting-age adults living in the four principal regions of the country: Metropolitan region, Pacific, North-Central, and Caribbean. In the past, these were the strata (ESTRATOPRI) for Nicaragua and they will continue being so for 2012. The universe is composed of those older than 15 years who live in the urban and rural areas of the 153 municipalities registered in the 2005 Nicaraguan census²⁰².

Population: the survey is designed to gather information on a national sample representative of the whole adult population of voting age. Only non-institutionalized adults were eligible to participate in the survey. Therefore, the sample excludes individuals living in jails, schools, hospitals, and military bases.

Sampling frame

The sampling frame covers 100% of the eligible population in Nicaragua. This means that each eligible person in the country has an equal and known opportunity of being included in the survey sample. This implies that no particular ethnic group or geographic area is excluded from the sample frame.

The list of municipalities, localities, census segments, and maps of Nicaragua from the 2005 census implemented by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC) were used as the sample frame in this design.

Nicaragua is divided into 17 departments and subdivided into approximately 153 municipalities. Within each municipality, the National Institute of Statistics and Census established the census segments and, within those, the constituent households.

According to the 2005 data, Nicaragua has a total of 3,213,899 adults over the age of 15. 59% of that population lives in urban areas and the remaining 41% live in areas categorized as rural. Table 1 shows the distribution of the population age 15 and older by department and by urban and rural area.

²⁰² Source: INEC Nicaragua 2005.

Table 1. Distribution of the population age 15 and older by department, urban and rural areas				
Region	Department	Urban	Rural	Total
Metropolitan (and Pacific South)	Managua	780,381	77,527	857,908
Center	Matagalpa	111,758	154,330	266,088
Center	Boaco	30,857	61,182	92,039
Center	Chontales	58,475	39,275	97,750
North	Nueva Segovia	53,929	69,434	123,363
North	Jinotega	44,051	137,231	181,282
North	Madriz	26,338	54,371	80,709
North	Estelí	79,203	54,058	133,261
Pacific North	Chinandega	147,273	88,655	235,928
Pacific North	León	144,737	103,670	248,407
Pacific South	Masaya	107,750	80,711	188,461
Pacific South	Granada	72,285	36,986	109,271
Pacific South	Carazo	69,636	39,874	109,510
Pacific South	Rivas	50,964	52,315	103,279
Caribbean	Río San Juan	14,034	39,077	53,111
Caribbean	RAAN	51,937	112,532	164,469
Caribbean	RAAS	68,101	100,962	169,063
	Total	1,911,709	1,302,190	3,213,899

Sampling method

The chosen sampling method takes into account a series of elements pre-established by LAPOP. The following requirements for the sample design were determined by LAPOP Central beforehand:

(a) Obtain representative samples for the following strata of the study:

Size of the municipalities

Municipalities with more than 75,000 inhabitants.

Municipalities of between 25,000 and 75,000 inhabitants.

Municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants.

First stage strata:

Metropolitan region

Center

North

Pacific North

Pacific South

Caribbean

Second stage strata:

Urban area

Rural area

- (b) Calculate the sampling errors that correspond to these strata.
- (c) Minimize the travel time spent in fieldwork.
- (d) Optimal distribution that permits a reasonable balance between budget, sample size, and level of precision in the results.
- (e) Use the best and most recent sampling frame available.
- (f) Expectation of 24 to 32 interviews per Primary Sampling Unit (UPM) or municipality that permits multilevel analysis²⁰³.
- (g) Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas.

Based on these requirements, the method utilized in Nicaragua corresponds with a stratified sample, multistage by conglomerates. The sample is stratified based on three factors:

Size of the municipalities

Region: Metropolitan region, Center, North, Pacific North, Pacific South, and Caribbean

Level of urbanization: urban and rural areas.

The stratified sampling ensures greater reliability in our sample to reduce the variance of the estimations. The stratification improves the quality of the estimations; with the only conditions that the complete sampling unit belongs to one stratum and the unity of the strata conform to the total population. The stratification also ensures the inclusion in the sample of the most important geographic regions of the country as well as the dispersion of the sample.

The design of the Nicaragua survey follows a multistage process, as shown in Table 2 below.

The first stage, which corresponds with the selection of Primary Sampling Units (UPMs), consists in selecting municipalities within each of the strata defined beforehand with probability proportional to the adult population of voting age in the country (PPT). Each UPM consists of 24 interviews.

Table 2: Stratified sampling, multistage by conglomerates	
Strata	Size of the municipalities, regions, and level of urbanization
Primary Sampling Unit (UPM)	Municipalities
Secondary Sampling Unit (USM)	Census segments or listed areas
Tertiary Sampling Unit (UTM)	Blocks
Quaternary Unit (UC)	Household
Final Unit	Interviewee

The second stage of the sample design consists in selecting from census segments or listed areas within each UPM using the Probability Proportional to Size (PPT).

²⁰³ The initial collection of data did not originally meet the requirement of at least 24 cases per UPM. For this reason, to the 1536 cases originally planned, 150 were added to complete the 24 cases per UPM requirement. As a result, the final simple of the AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua has 1,686 cases. After deliberation, however, equal weight is given to each UPM for all analyses.

In the third stage, blocks were selected from within the census segments.

In the fourth stage, conglomerates of households are selected within each UPM. A total of 6 interviews must be completed at each sampling point whether in urban or rural areas. The sampling points represent conglomerates of interviews, and these conglomerates were kept relatively small so as not to increase the “design effect” of the survey, as well as to reduce the costs of transportation to permit any degree of concentration in any given geographic point.

Finally, in the fifth stage of the sample design, a quota is employed for sex and age to select a *single interviewee in each household*. The objective of the sample quota is to ensure that the distribution of individuals by sex and age in the survey correspond with the official population statistics of the country or those reported by the offices of statistics and censuses. A completely random sample at the household level would require multiple attempts, drastically raising the costs but without any guarantee that there would be a correct balance in sex and age.

Stratification

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided in subgroups. Therefore, the survey is carried out in each subgroup separately. Stratification allows for the inclusion of the subgroups of interest in the survey; otherwise, in a non-stratified sample, some of these groups may be excluded due to the random nature of the selection process. In extreme cases, a non-stratified sample can by chance exclude a country’s capital or the largest city. Stratification increases the precision of the sample and reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on the variance of the population *within* the strata and not *between* the strata.

Now that the sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that it comes with a sufficient number of persons in each subgroup to permit significant analyses.

The survey of Nicaragua is stratified by the size of the population of the municipalities, regions (Metropolitan region, Center, North, Pacific North, Pacific South, and Caribbean), and level of urbanization (urban, rural). Table 3 shows the distribution of the interviews within each region according to the level of urbanization and Table 4 shows the distribution of the sample according to the size of the municipalities.

Table 3. Sample distribution by region and level of urbanization			
Region (Stratum)	Urban	Rural	Total
Metropolitan area	366	24	390
Center	114	138	252
North	114	162	276
Pacific North	162	102	264
Pacific South	174	126	300
Caribbean	72	132	204
Total	1,002	684	1,686

Table 4. Sample distribution by size of the municipality				
Region (Stratum)	Large (more than 75,000 inhabitants)	Medium (between 25,000 and 75,000)	Small (Less than 25,000)	Total
Metropolitan area	336	54	0	390
Center	0	102	150	252
North	0	120	156	276
Pacific North	48	108	108	264
Pacific South	0	144	156	300
Caribbean	0	102	102	204
Total	384	630	672	1,686

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Nicaragua 2012, Versión # 10.0.1.3 IRB Approval:110627



El Barómetro de las Américas: Nicaragua, 2012

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PAIS. País:					05
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					1 1 1 1
ESTRATOPRI.					
(501) Metropolitana		(502) Centro	(503) Norte		1 1 1 1
(504) Pacífico Norte		(505) Pacífico Sur	(506) Caribe		
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad: (1) Grande (más de 75,000)					1 1
(2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 y 75,000) (3) Pequeña (menos de 25,000)					
UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					1 1 1 1
PROV. Departamento: _____					5 1 1 1
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____					5 1 1 1
NICDISTRITO. DISTRITO : _____					1 1 1
NICSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL: _____					1 1 1 1
NICSEC. Sector: _____					1 1 1 1
CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral): _____					1 1 1
[El cluster debe de tener 6 entrevistas]					
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					1 1 1
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:					
(1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana)		(2) Ciudad grande	(3) Ciudad mediana	(4) Ciudad pequeña	1 1
(5) Área rural					
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español					1 1
Hora de inicio: _____ : _____					1 1 1 1 1 1
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ Mes: _____ año: 2012					1 1 1 1 1 1
¿Vive usted en esta casa?					
Si → continúe					

No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista
 ¿Es usted ciudadano nicaragüense o residente permanente de Nicaragua?
 Si → continúe
 No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista
 ¿Tiene por lo menos 16 años?
 Si → continúe
 No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista

ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a)
 (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR

Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada?

(1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (88) NS (98) NR

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98
INAP	99		

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica **del país**? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?

(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala
 (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses ?	(1) Mejor	(2) Igual	(3) Peor	(88) NS	(98) NR
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	(1) Muy buena	(2) Buena	(3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)	(4) Mala	
	(5) Muy mala (pésima)	(88) NS	(98) NR		
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?	(1) Mejor	(2) Igual	(3) Peor	(88) NS	(98) NR

Ahora, cambiando el tema, hablemos de la alcaldía / municipio de esta comunidad.					
MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio?	(1) Sí ha participado	(0) No ha participado	(88) NS	(98) NR	
MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte de la alcaldía? [Leer alternativas]	(3) Mucha confianza	(2) Algo de confianza	(1) Poca confianza	(0) Nada de confianza	
	(88) NS	(98) NR			
NICMUNI8. ¿Ha realizado usted algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en la alcaldía durante los últimos doce meses?	(1) Sí [siga]	(2) No [pase a CP2]	(88) NS [pase a CP2]	(98) NR [Pase a CP2]	
NICMUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido en este trámite o solicitud? [Leer alternativas]	(1) Muy bien	(2) Bien	(3) Ni bien, ni mal	(Regular)	(4) Mal
	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	(5) Muy mal	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.					
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR	
CP2. ¿A algún diputado de la Asamblea Nacional?	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, la municipalidad o concejales o gobernador?	1	2	88	98	
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del Estado?	1	2	88	98	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su alcaldía...						
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) No Sabe	(98) No Responde		
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses?	(1) Sí [Siga]	(2) No [Pase a SGL1]	(88) NS [Pase a SGL1]	(98) No responde		
[Pase a SGL1]						
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas]	(1) Muy buenos	(2) Buenos	(3) Regulares	(4) Malos	(5) Muy malos	(88) NS
	(98) NR					
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	Asistente/ Miembro	Líder/ Directivo	NS	NR	INAP
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP7]			88	98	
CP6L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP8]			88	98	
CP7L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP9]			88	98	
CP8L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
NICCP14. ¿Reuniones de un CPC, Consejo del Poder Ciudadano? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
CP21. ¿Reuniones de grupos deportivos o recreativos?	1	2	3	4			88	98	

Para cambiar el tema, hay personas que experimentan actos de violencia.

NICY13. En su caso personal, si usted ha sido víctima de algún acto de violencia durante los últimos 12 meses, ¿dónde ocurrió específicamente? **[Leer alternativas]**

[Si dice varios lugares, escoger el último ocurrido]

- (1) En su casa
- (2) En su barrio
- (3) En un centro educativo
- (4) En la calle
- (5) En la casa de amigos o conocidos
- (6) En el lugar de trabajo
- (7) En otro lugar
- (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP **(No ha sido víctima de acto violento)**

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS
- (98) NR

MIL6. Ahora, cambiando de tema otra vez, ¿qué tan orgulloso(a) está de las Fuerzas Armadas de Nicaragua? [Leer alternativas]	
(1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a)	(2) Muy orgulloso(a)
(4) Nada orgulloso(a)	(5) O no le importa?
(3) Algo orgulloso(a)	(88) NS
	(98) NR
MIL5. ¿Qué tan orgulloso(a) se siente de ser nicaragüense cuando escucha el himno nacional? [Leer alternativas]	
(1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a)	(2) Muy orgulloso(a)
(4) Nada orgulloso(a)	(5) O no le importa?
(3) Algo orgulloso(a)	(88) NS
	(98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98	
Izquierda										Derecha		

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado [Siga] (2) No ha participado [Pase a PROT6]	
(88) NS [Pase a PROT6]	(98) NR [Pase a PROT6]
NICPROT9. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? [No leer. Marcar solo una. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante.]	
(01) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades)	
(02) No le entregaron su cédula	
(03) Irregularidades en el proceso electoral	
(04) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa)	
(05) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra o a favor de leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción)	
(06) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas)	
(07) Derechos humanos	
(08) Derechos de la mujer	
(09) Temas ambientales	
(10) Falta de servicios públicos	
(11) Otros	
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No ha participado en protesta pública)	
PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses?	
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PROT7. Y ¿en los últimos doce meses, ha participado en el bloqueo de alguna calle o espacio público como forma de protesta?	
(1) Sí, ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
PROT6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha firmado alguna petición?	
(1) Sí ha firmado (2) No ha firmado (88) NS (98) NR	
PROT8. En los últimos doce meses, usted leyó o compartió información política por alguna red social de la web como Twitter, Facebook u Orkut?	
(1) Sí, ha hecho (2) No ha hecho (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? [Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:					
JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre la Asamblea Nacional y gobierne sin Asamblea Nacional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]					
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP					
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma, sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma, con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión [o alguien lo sobornó] (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)					

VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)	

ARM2. Si usted pudiera, ¿tendría un arma de fuego para su protección? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
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Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los **últimos doce meses** usted...

	SÍ	No	NS	NR	INAP	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC45. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si no trabaja marque 99]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	

Voy a leerle una serie de frases que se oyen en la calle o en los medios de comunicación cuando se habla de formas para combatir la delincuencia. Me gustaría que usted me dijera si está muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con cada una de ellas. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia...

	Muy de acuerdo	Algo de acuerdo	Algo en desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NR	
VIC101. es crear programas de prevención. Está usted: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC102. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es hacer leyes más duras	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC103. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es contratar seguridad privada	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.						
	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	NS	NR	
VOL207. Suponga que para corregirlo y educarlo un padre le pega a su hijo cada vez que este le desobedece. ¿Usted aprobaría que el padre le pegue a su hijo, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL206. Suponga que un hombre le pega a su esposa porque ésta le ha sido infiel con otro hombre. ¿Usted aprobaría que el hombre le pegue a su esposa, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a una hija o hijo. ¿Usted aprobaría que mate al violador, ó no aprobaría que lo mate pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata, usted. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a esa persona que mantiene asustada a la comunidad, ó no aprobaría que lo maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente que algunos consideran indeseable. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a gente considerada indeseable, ó no aprobaría que la maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL205. Si la policía tortura a un delincuente para conseguir información sobre un grupo de crimen organizado muy peligroso. ¿Usted aprobaría que la policía torture a un delincuente, ó no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigara al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	

AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía en este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) La policía protege a la gente frente a la delincuencia, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] Ninguna, o ambas (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ20. Y pensando en su seguridad y la de su familia, ¿usted se siente más seguro(a), igual de seguro(a), o menos seguro(a) que hace cinco años? (1) Más seguro(a) (2) Igual de seguro(a) (3) Menos seguro(a) (88) NS (98)NR	
AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad? [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) [NO LEER] Otros (8) [NO LEER] Ninguno (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes (3) [No leer] Ambas (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Nada						Mucho	No sabe	No responde	

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Nicaragua garantizan un juicio justo? <i>(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)</i>	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Nicaragua?	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político nicaragüense?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político nicaragüense?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político nicaragüense?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Supremo Electoral?	

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas nicaragüenses?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Asamblea Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser nicaragüense?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	
NICB49. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los CPC, Consejos del Poder Ciudadano?	
NICB50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los concejales de su municipio?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES	
[LAS PREGUNTAS EPP1 Y EPP3 SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")] Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta, NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR 99 = INAP
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos nicaragüenses representan bien a sus votantes? (99) INAP	
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted? (99) INAP	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7] 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
MIL1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas nicaragüenses están bien entrenadas y organizadas?		
MIL2. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de Nicaragua han hecho un buen trabajo cuando han ayudado a enfrentar desastres naturales?		
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas nicaragüenses respetan los derechos humanos de los nicaragüenses hoy en día?		
MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América?		
MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América deberían trabajar junto con las Fuerzas Armadas de Nicaragua para mejorar la seguridad nacional?		

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Daniel Ortega es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
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M2. Hablando de la Asamblea Nacional y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados de la Asamblea Nacional están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?		
(1) Muy bien	(2) Bien	(3) Ni bien ni mal (regular)
(4) Mal	(5) Muy Mal	(88) NS (98) NR

SD2NEW2. Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las pistas, caminos y carreteras?		
(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Satisfecho(a)	(3) Insatisfecho(a)
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)	(99) INAP (No utiliza)	(88) NS (98) NR
SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? [Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?]		
(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Satisfecho(a)	(3) Insatisfecho(a)
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)	(99) INAP (No utiliza)	(88) NS (98) NR
SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? [Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?]		
(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Satisfecho(a)	(3) Insatisfecho(a)
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)	(99) INAP (No utiliza)	(88) NS (98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre 1 y 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. **Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		
						NS NR		

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones		
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
(88) NS (98) NR		
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
(88) NS (98) NR		
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		
(88) NS (98) NR		

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		
PRES1. Cuando un presidente está haciendo un muy buen trabajo, debe permitirse la reelección todas las veces que quiera. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7. NS = 88, NR = 98	
ROS1. El Estado nicaragüense, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado nicaragüense, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado nicaragüense, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado nicaragüense debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado nicaragüense, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
MIL7. Las Fuerzas Armadas deben participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en Nicaragua. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS CCT3 – RAC2A SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

CCT3. Cambiando de tema... Algunas personas dicen que la gente que recibe ayuda de los programas sociales del gobierno es vaga. ¿Hasta qué punto usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

GEN1. Cambiando de tema de nuevo, se dice que cuando no hay suficientes trabajos, los hombres deben tener más derecho a los trabajos que las mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

Ahora quisiera saber hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con algunas medidas que le voy a mencionar. Quisiera que usted responda pensando en lo que cree que se debería hacer sin importar si se están aplicando o no actualmente. **[Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR]**

GEN6. El Estado debe exigir que los partidos políticos reserven algunos espacios para mujeres en sus listas de candidatos, aunque tengan que excluir (dejar afuera) a algunos hombres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

RAC2A. Las universidades deberían reservar cupos para los alumnos de piel más oscura, aunque tengan que excluir a otros alumnos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

[Encuestador: piel más oscura refiere a negros, indígenas, no blancos en general]

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA (W14A) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre?

(1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR
(99) INAP

PN4. Cambiando de tema, en general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **insatisfecho(a)** o muy **insatisfecho(a)** con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Nicaragua?

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) **Insatisfecho(a)** (4) Muy **insatisfecho(a)** (88) NS
(98) NR

PN5. En su opinión, ¿Nicaragua es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS
(98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 NS	98 NR
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente				

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
NICE17. Que las personas usen la violencia física para impedir manifestaciones pacíficas y permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Nicaragua. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5 Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (D6-D8) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse? (99) INAP

D7. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que se permita que las personas con discapacidad física se postulen para cargos públicos? (99) INAP

D8. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que el Estado tenga el derecho de prohibir que los periódicos publiquen noticias que le puedan producir **daño político**? (99) INAP

[Recoger tarjeta "D"]

Voy a leerle una lista de varios grupos de personas. ¿Podría decirme si hay algunos de ellos que **no le gustaría** tener como vecinos?

	Menciona [No los quiere de vecinos]	No menciona [No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos]	NS	NR	
DIS35A. Homosexuales. ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98	
DIS35C. Gente de otros países	1	0	88	98	
DIS35D. Afro- nicaragüenses/negros	1	0	88	98	
DIS35E. Indígenas	1	0	88	98	

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:

- (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático
 - (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno
 - (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático
- (88) NS (98) NR

DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?

- (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o
 - (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor
- (88) NS (98) NR

NICY10. Ahora cambiando de tema, en su opinión, ¿cuál es el principal riesgo que enfrentan los jóvenes en su barrio/comunidad/ciudad? [NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. Anote solo una respuesta. Si menciona más que una, pregunte "¿Cuál es el riesgo más importante para los jóvenes?" Si la respuesta es general, sondee para recibir una respuesta más específica.]

- (01) Pandillas
- (02) Drogas
- (03) Alcohol
- (04) Violencia
- (05) Falta de escuelas
- (06) Enfermedades
- (07) Falta de acceso a la salud
- (08) Trata de personas
- (09) Prostitución
- (10) Machismo
- (11) Narcotráfico
- (12) Otro
- (88) No Sabe [Pase a NICY12] (98) No Responde [Pase a NICY12]

NICY11. En su opinión, ¿cuál sería el programa que respondería mejor a las necesidades de los jóvenes en su barrio/comunidad/ciudad? [NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. Anote solo una respuesta. Si menciona más que una, pregunte “¿Cuál sería el programa más importante para los jóvenes?”] (01) Deportes (02) Salud (03) Educación (04) Programas de radio (05) Programas de TV (06) Programas religiosos (07) Creación de empleo (08) Programas de trabajo voluntario/comunitarios (09) Programas políticos (10) Programas culturales (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
NICY12. Si pudiera mejorar algo en los centros educativos de su comunidad o ciudad, ¿qué mejoraría? [NO LEER LA LISTA. Anote solo la primera respuesta o la que el encuestado considera más importante.] (01) Parte académica (currículo, textos) (02) Infraestructura (03) Directores (04) Profesores (05) Ubicación (06) Deportes, actividades recreativas (07) Computadoras (falta de equipo o instrucción) (08) La politización (09) Todo (10) Otro (11) No cambiaría nada. (88) No sabe (98) No responde	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
EXC20. En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1	88	98

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR	
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EXC7MIL. Teniendo en cuenta su propia experiencia o lo que ha escuchado, la corrupción en las Fuerzas Armadas está... [Leer opciones] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada o (4) Nada generalizada? (88) NS (98) NR	
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Y ahora, cambiando de tema y pensando en sus experiencias en el último año , ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado/a, o sea, tratado peor que a otras personas, en los siguientes lugares?					
	SÍ	No	NS	NR	INAP
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno [juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. En el trabajo o la escuela o cuando ha buscado trabajo	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. En lugares públicos, como en la calle, la plaza, tiendas o el mercado?	1	2	88	98	

VB1. ¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR	
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NICELEC1. ¿Observó o experimentó usted una irregularidad durante la votación del 6 de noviembre pasado? ¿Qué tipo de irregularidad? [Si menciona más que una, marque solo la primera] (0) No, ninguno (1) Doble (o múltiple) voto (2) Tinta no aplicada después de votar (3) Expulsión de Fiscales (4) Intimidación en el centro de votación o en la junta receptora de votos (5) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	
NICELEC2. ¿Apareció su nombre en el padrón electoral de la junta receptora de votos donde usualmente vota? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a VB2] (88) NS [Pase a VB2] (98) NR [Pase a VB2]	
NICELEC3. ¿Le permitieron votar en esa junta receptora de votos? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]	
VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (501) Arnoldo Alemán (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista - PLC) (502) Daniel Ortega Saavedra (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional – FSLN) (503) Enrique Quiñonez (Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense - ALN) (504) Fabio Gadeo Mantilla (Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI) (505) Roger Guevara Mena (Alianza por la República - APRE) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)	
NICVB7. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputados en las últimas elecciones de 2011? (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) (1) Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) (2) Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) (3) Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN) (4) Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI) (5) Alianza por la República (APRE) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no votó)	
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]	
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA] (501) Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) (502) Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) (503) Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN) (504) Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI) (505) Alianza por la República (APRE) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR	
NICPOLMUN. ¿Piensa votar en las próximas elecciones municipales del 2012? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otros para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	

PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	
VB50. Algunos dicen que en general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS VB51-RAC1CA SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

VB51. ¿Quién cree usted que sería más corrupto como político: un hombre, una mujer, o ambos por igual?

- (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer
(3) Ambos por igual (ninguno) (88) NS (98) NR
(99) INAP

VB52. Y si le toca a un político o a una política manejar la economía nacional, ¿quién va a hacer el mejor trabajo; un hombre, una mujer o no importa?

- (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer
(3) No importa (88) NS (98) NR
(99) INAP

Ahora vamos a hablar sobre la raza o color de piel de los políticos.

VB53. Algunos dicen que, en general, las personas de piel oscura **no son buenos líderes** políticos. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?

[Encuestador: “piel oscura” refiere a negros, indígenas, “no blancos” en general]

- (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo
(3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR
(99) INAP

RAC1CA. Según varios estudios, las personas de piel oscura son más pobres que el resto de la población.

¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS, SÓLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

- (1) Por su cultura, o (2) Porque han sido tratadas de manera injusta
(3) **[No leer]** Otra respuesta
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (AB1-AB5) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

Cambiando de tema y hablando de las cualidades que los niños deben tener, le voy a mencionar varias características y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para un niño o niña:

AB1. (1) Independencia; o (2) Respeto a los mayores
(3) **[No leer]** Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

AB2. (1) Obediencia, o (2) Autosuficiencia (valerse por sí mismo)
(3) **[No leer]** Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

AB5. (1) Creatividad; o (2) Disciplina
(3) **[No leer]** Ambos (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS SNW1A – SNW1B SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ó “8”)]

SNW1A. ¿Usted conoce personalmente a algún funcionario electo o a alguna persona que fue candidato en las últimas elecciones nacionales, departamentales o locales?

- (1) Sí (2) No **[Pasar a FOR1]** (88) NS **[Pasar a FOR1]**
(98) NR **[Pasar a FOR1]** (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

SNW1B. ¿Y ese cargo es a nivel local, a nivel departamental, o a nivel nacional?

- (1) Local (2) Departamental (3) Nacional
(4) Candidatos en más de un nivel (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR1 - FOR8) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

FOR1. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre sus opiniones respecto de algunos países. Cuando hablamos de "China" en esta entrevista, estamos hablando de China continental, la República Popular de China, y no de la isla Taiwán.

¿Cuál de los siguientes países es el que tiene **más influencia en América Latina?** [Leer opciones]

- (1) China (2) Japón
(3) India (4) Estados Unidos
(5) Brasil (6) Venezuela
(7) México (10) España
(11) [No leer] Otro país (12) [No leer] Ninguno [Pasa a FOR4]
(88) NS [Pasa a FOR4] (98) NR [Pasa a FOR4]
(99) INAP

FOR2. Y pensando en [país mencionado en FOR1], ¿Cree usted que su influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa?

- (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva
(3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

FOR3. [Preguntar SOLO si país mencionado en FOR1 NO fue China] Y pensando en China y la influencia que tiene en **América Latina**. ¿Cree usted que esa influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa?

- (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva
(3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

FOR4. Y dentro de 10 años, en su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países tendrá más influencia en **América Latina?** [Leer opciones]

- (1) China (2) Japón
(3) India (4) Estados Unidos
(5) Brasil (6) Venezuela
(7) México (10) España
(11) [No leer] Otro país (12) [No leer] Ninguno
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

FOR5. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro de **nuestro país?** [Leer opciones]

- (1) China (2) Japón
(3) India (4) Estados Unidos
(5) Singapur (6) Rusia
(7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil
(11) Venezuela, o (12) México
(13) [No leer] Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo
(14) [No leer] Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

FOR6. Y pensando ahora sólo en nuestro país, ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en nuestro país? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Mucha (2) Algo
(3) Poca (4) Nada [Pasar a FOR8]
(88) NS [Pasar a FOR8] (98) NR [Pasar a FOR8] (99) INAP

FOR7. En general, la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es [leer alternativas]

- (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva
(3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa
(5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia
(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

FOR8. Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con la siguiente afirmación: "Los negocios chinos contribuyen al desarrollo económico de Nicaragua"? ¿Está usted [leer alternativas]...

- (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo
(3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) En desacuerdo
(5) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR9A – FOR9D) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

¿Según lo que usted sabe o ha oído, los negocios chinos que están instalados en Nicaragua sufren algunos de los siguientes problemas? [Leer alternativas]

	Es problema	No es problema	No sabe/no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
FOR9A. Problemas laborales, tales como disputas con los empleados o con los sindicatos ¿Cree usted que es un problema o que no lo es, o no tiene opinión al respecto?	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9B. Problemas que surgen de la falta de entendimiento de la cultura o de las costumbres de Nicaragua.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9C. Falta de conocimiento de las normas políticas, legales o reglas y valores sociales de Nicaragua.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9D. Falta de comunicación con los medios de comunicación locales y con los residentes.	1	2	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL10A – MIL10E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")]

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en los gobiernos de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

MIL10B. El de Rusia. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?

1 2 3 4 88 98 99

MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?

1 2 3 4 88 98 99

MIL10D. Israel. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?

1 2 3 4 88 98 99

MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?

1 2 3 4 88 98 99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL11A – MIL11E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

Ahora me gustaría preguntarle sobre las relaciones en general de nuestro país con otras naciones del mundo. Cuando usted piensa en las relaciones de nuestro país con **China**, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?

	Más cercana	Más o menos igual	Más lejana	No sabe/no tiene opinión	NR	INAP	
MIL11A. China	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11B. Y la relación de nuestro país con Rusia, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11C. Y con Irán, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11D. Con Israel, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

MIL11E. Finalmente, con Estados Unidos, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?

1 2 3 88 98 99

Pasando a otro tema...

CCT1NEW. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total

[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11		
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17+	
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
NS	88						
NR	98						

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS ED2 Y MOV1 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su mamá? [NO LEER OPCIONES]

- (00) Ninguno
- (01) Primaria incompleta
- (02) Primaria completa
- (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto
- (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo
- (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta
- (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa
- (07) Universitaria incompleta
- (08) Universitaria completa
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

MOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? [LEER OPCIONES]

- (1) Alta (2) Media alta (3) Media (4) Media baja (5) Baja
- (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Q2D-Y. ¿En qué día, mes y año nació usted? [Si se niega a decir el día y mes, pedir solo el año o preguntar edad y calcular luego el año.]

Día: _____ Mes (01 = Enero): _____ Año: _____

(Para Q2D y Q2M: 88 = NS y 98 = NR)

(Para Q2Y: 8888 = NS y 9888 = NR)

___|Q2D
Día
___|Q2M
Mes
___|Q2Y
año

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones] [Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11] (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR	
Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR	
MIL8. ¿Usted o su pareja o algún hijo suyo actualmente está en servicio en las Fuerzas Armadas o ha servido alguna vez en las Fuerzas Armadas? (1) Sí, actualmente sirviendo (2) Servía en el pasado (3) Nunca ha servido (88) NS (98) NR	
OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas] (1) Trabajando? [Siga] (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a Q10NEW] (4) Es estudiante? [Pase a Q10NEW] (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a Q10NEW] (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a Q10NEW] (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a Q10NEW] (88) NS [Pase a Q10NEW] (98) NR [Pase a Q10NEW]	
OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]

Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?
[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 670
- (02) Entre 670 – 1,000 córdobas
- (03) Entre 1,001 – 1,340 córdobas
- (04) Entre 1,341 – 2,000 córdobas
- (05) Entre 2,001 – 2,670 córdobas
- (06) Entre 2,671 – 3,010 córdobas
- (07) Entre 3,011 – 3,350 córdobas
- (08) Entre 3,351 – 4,010 córdobas
- (09) Entre 4,011 – 5,010 córdobas
- (10) Entre 5,011 – 6,010 córdobas
- (11) Entre 6,011 – 8,020 córdobas
- (12) Entre 8,021 – 12,030 córdobas
- (13) Entre 12,031 – 16,040 córdobas
- (14) Entre 16,041 – 20,050 córdobas
- (15) Entre 20,050 – 24,060 córdobas
- (16) Más de 24,060 córdobas
- (88) NS (98) NR

[PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]

Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? [Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 670
- (02) Entre 670 – 1,000 córdobas
- (03) Entre 1,001 – 1,340 córdobas
- (04) Entre 1,341 – 2,000 córdobas
- (05) Entre 2,001 – 2,670 córdobas
- (06) Entre 2,671 – 3,010 córdobas
- (07) Entre 3,011 – 3,350 córdobas
- (08) Entre 3,351 – 4,010 córdobas
- (09) Entre 4,011 – 5,010 córdobas
- (10) Entre 5,011 – 6,010 córdobas
- (11) Entre 6,011 – 8,020 córdobas
- (12) Entre 8,021 – 12,030 córdobas
- (13) Entre 12,031 – 16,040 córdobas
- (14) Entre 16,041 – 20,050 córdobas
- (15) Entre 20,050 – 24,060 córdobas
- (16) Más de 24,060 córdobas
- (88) NS (98) NR
- (99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)

[RECOGER TARJETA “F”]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?

- (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?

- (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR	
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES					
[FS2 Y FS8 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR ("0" "2" "4" "6" ú "8")] Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.					
	No	Sí	NS	NR	INAP
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	88	98	99

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas] (1) Soltero [Pasar a Q12C] (2) Casado [Siga] (3) Unión libre (acompañado) [Siga] (4) Divorciado [Pasar a Q12C] (5) Separado [Pasar a Q12C] (6) Viudo [Pasar a Q12C] (88) NS [Pasar a Q12C] (98) NR [Pasar a Q12C]	
GEN10. Pensando solo en usted y su pareja y en los salarios que ganan, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor sus salarios? [Leer opciones] (1) Usted no gana nada y su pareja gana todo; (2) Usted gana menos que su pareja; (3) Usted gana más o menos lo mismo que su pareja; (4) Usted gana más que su pareja; (5) Usted gana todos los ingresos y su pareja no gana nada. (6) [NO LEER] Ningún ingreso salarial (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00 = ninguno → Pasar a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12B. ¿Cuántos hijos menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)	
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-nicaragüense, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (501) Español/ castellano (502) Inglés (503) Mískito (506) Sumo o Mayangna (Twahka, Panamahka o Ulwa) (507) Rama (508) Garífuna (504) Otro (nativo) (505) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR	
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WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR	
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Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente... G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? [Leer opciones] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR					
	Correcto	Incorrecto	No Sabe	No Responde	
G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]	1	2	88	98	
G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Nicaragua? [NO LEER: 5 años]	1	2	88	98	
G17. ¿Cuántos diputados tiene la Asamblea Nacional? [ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]	Número: _____		8888	9888	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R3. Refrigeradora	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más		
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R15. Computadora	(0) No [Ir a R16]	(1) Sí	
R18. Servicio fijo de internet (pagado mensualmente)	(0) No (1) Sí	(99) INAP	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí	
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de aguas negras/ desagüe/ drenaje?	(0) No	(1) Sí	



Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado]	_ _
(97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	_ _
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1 _____]	
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	_ _
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____	_ _

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
 Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios: _____

 [No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____


 [No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta A


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				



Tarjeta B




Tarjeta C





Tarjeta D



Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 670
- (02) Entre 670 – 1,000 córdobas
- (03) Entre 1,001 – 1,340 córdobas
- (04) Entre 1,341 – 2,000 córdobas
- (05) Entre 2,001 – 2,670 córdobas
- (06) Entre 2,671 – 3,010 córdobas
- (07) Entre 3,011 – 3,350 córdobas
- (08) Entre 3,351 – 4,010 córdobas
- (09) Entre 4,011 – 5,010 córdobas
- (10) Entre 5,011 – 6,010 córdobas
- (11) Entre 6,011 – 8,020 córdobas
- (12) Entre 8,021 – 12,030 córdobas
- (13) Entre 12,031 – 16,040 córdobas
- (14) Entre 16,041 – 20,050 córdobas
- (15) Entre 20,050 – 24,060 córdobas
- (16) Más de 24,060 córdobas



Paleta de Colores



Appendix D. Regression Tables

Capítulo 1

Figure 11. Determinants of Educational Level in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Urbano	0.353	0.027	13.080	0.000
Mujer	-0.018	0.018	-1.020	0.309
Color de piel	-0.060	0.022	-2.710	0.007
26-35 años	-0.056	0.025	-2.270	0.024
36-45 años	-0.161	0.023	-6.870	0.000
46-55 años	-0.219	0.024	-9.020	0.000
56-65 años	-0.291	0.024	-12.360	0.000
66 años o más	-0.333	0.023	-14.810	0.000
Constante	0.000	0.026	0.010	0.996
R-cuadrado	0.277			
N. de casos	1682			

Figure 14. Determinants of Personal Income in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Urbano	0.290	0.031	9.340	0.000
Mujer	-0.160	0.020	-7.970	0.000
Color de piel	-0.020	0.029	-0.710	0.479
26-35 años	-0.027	0.029	-0.940	0.346
36-45 años	-0.035	0.028	-1.220	0.222
46-55 años	-0.050	0.027	-1.870	0.063
56-65 años	-0.100	0.028	-3.570	0.000
66 años o más	-0.080	0.024	-3.300	0.001
Constante	0.003	0.029	0.110	0.916
R-cuadrado	0.121			
N. de casos	1587			

Figure 19. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Urbano	-0.021	0.035	-0.620	0.539
Color de piel	-0.011	0.034	-0.320	0.752
Mujer	0.138	0.039	3.540	0.000
26-35 años	0.010	0.039	0.260	0.796
36-45 años	0.108	0.041	2.610	0.010
46-55 años	0.098	0.040	2.470	0.014
56-65 años	0.092	0.037	2.490	0.013
66 años o más	0.125	0.043	2.910	0.004
Constante	-0.079	0.039	-2.030	0.043
R-cuadrado	0.035			
N. de casos	837			

Figure 23. Determinants of Victimization by Self-Reported Employment Discrimination in Nicaragua

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Urbano	0.161	0.093	1.730	0.085
Mujer	-0.084	0.092	-0.920	0.359
Color de piel	-0.085	0.082	-1.040	0.299
26-35 años	-0.007	0.102	-0.070	0.943
36-45 años	0.028	0.105	0.270	0.787
46-55 años	-0.334	0.133	-2.510	0.013
56-65 años	-0.614	0.210	-2.920	0.004
66 años o más	-0.677	0.275	-2.470	0.014
Constante	-2.715	0.134	-20.320	0.000
N. de casos	1557			

Figure 27. Determinants of Attitudes toward Poverty among People of Color

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.052	0.093	-0.560	0.575
Educación	-0.009	0.118	-0.080	0.937
Urbano	-0.042	0.101	-0.420	0.676
Mujer	0.048	0.108	0.450	0.655
Color de piel	-0.046	0.080	-0.570	0.569
26-35 años	-0.168	0.098	-1.720	0.087
36-45 años	-0.088	0.095	-0.930	0.352
46-55 años	-0.066	0.101	-0.660	0.512
56-65 años	-0.404	0.139	-2.910	0.004
66 años o más	-0.155	0.102	-1.510	0.131
Constante	-1.254	0.112	-11.240	0.000
N. de casos	791			

Chapter 3

Figure 48. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Simpatiza con partido	0.036	0.027	1.350	0.178
Participación comunitaria	0.077	0.024	3.230	0.001
Líder comunitario	0.014	0.023	0.600	0.552
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.033	0.027	-1.200	0.230
Mujer	-0.138	0.028	-4.940	0.000
Mujer que es ama de casa	0.003	0.032	0.110	0.914
Edad	0.050	0.028	1.770	0.078
Años de educación	0.119	0.032	3.690	0.000
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.001	0.027	-0.020	0.980
Interés político	0.221	0.025	8.710	0.000
Color de piel	0.010	0.027	0.390	0.699
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.070	0.027	2.600	0.010
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.015	0.025	-0.590	0.554
Constante	0.009	0.025	0.350	0.726
R-cuadrado	0.112			
N. de casos	1568			

Figure 51. Determinants of External Efficacy in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Simpatiza con partido	0.179	0.028	6.300	0.000
Participación comunitaria	0.087	0.025	3.470	0.001
Líder comunitario	0.004	0.024	0.160	0.874
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.036	0.028	-1.290	0.198
Mujer	0.017	0.027	0.610	0.543
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.017	0.029	-0.570	0.571
Edad	-0.083	0.027	-3.050	0.002
Años de educación	-0.058	0.031	-1.860	0.064
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.003	0.028	-0.110	0.911
Interés político	0.104	0.028	3.680	0.000
Color de piel	0.043	0.025	1.710	0.089
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.083	0.026	-3.190	0.002
Discriminado en otro lugar	0.017	0.024	0.680	0.498
Constante	0.014	0.026	0.560	0.579
R-cuadrado	0.088			
N. de casos	1547			

Figure 52. Determinants of Belief in Party Representation in Nicaragua

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Simpatiza con partido	0.111	0.035	3.190	0.002
Participación comunitaria	0.043	0.036	1.200	0.233
Líder comunitario	0.028	0.034	0.840	0.402
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.080	0.036	-2.220	0.027
Mujer	0.053	0.061	0.870	0.386
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.026	0.074	-0.350	0.730
Edad	-0.106	0.033	-3.170	0.002
Años de educación	-0.151	0.041	-3.710	0.000
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.007	0.032	-0.200	0.838
Interés político	0.225	0.037	6.080	0.000
Color de piel	-0.001	0.030	-0.020	0.981
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.137	0.034	-4.040	0.000
Discriminado en otro lugar	0.026	0.036	0.730	0.464
Constante	0.025	0.042	0.600	0.550
R-cuadrado	0.137			
N. de casos	792			

Figure 55. Determinants of Support for the Political System in Nicaragua

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.034	0.028	-1.220	0.223
Mujer	0.078	0.031	2.510	0.013
Mujer que es ama de casa	0.004	0.031	0.130	0.897
Edad	-0.058	0.027	-2.110	0.036
Años de educación	-0.089	0.032	-2.790	0.006
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.065	0.027	-2.450	0.015
Interés político	0.178	0.027	6.540	0.000
Indígena	0.020	0.023	0.840	0.400
Negro	0.009	0.023	0.380	0.707
Mestizo	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.998
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.102	0.028	-3.690	0.000
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.030	0.026	-1.140	0.256
Simpatiza con partido	0.166	0.026	6.370	0.000
Participación comunitaria	0.068	0.026	2.640	0.009
Líder comunitario	-0.013	0.023	-0.560	0.577
Constante	0.016	0.026	0.600	0.547
R-cuadrado	0.129			
N. de casos	1578			

Figure 57. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Nicaragua

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.075	0.029	-2.580	0.010
Mujer	-0.014	0.030	-0.460	0.645
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.014	0.036	-0.380	0.704
Edad	0.085	0.031	2.760	0.006
Años de educación	0.021	0.036	0.600	0.552
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.023	0.030	-0.750	0.455
Interés político	0.074	0.029	2.510	0.013
Indígena	0.003	0.031	0.090	0.927
Negro	-0.008	0.026	-0.310	0.758
Mestizo	-0.025	0.027	-0.910	0.363
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.042	0.028	1.540	0.126
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.068	0.028	-2.460	0.014
Simpatiza con partido	0.036	0.028	1.270	0.205
Participación comunitaria	-0.037	0.028	-1.340	0.180
Líder comunitario	-0.006	0.029	-0.210	0.836
Constante	0.001	0.029	0.050	0.964
R-cuadrado	0.026			
N. de casos	1550			

Figure 60. Determinants of Protest Participation in Nicaragua

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.205	0.096	2.130	0.034
Mujer	-0.017	0.104	-0.160	0.871
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.309	0.146	-2.120	0.035
Edad	0.092	0.106	0.870	0.386
Años de educación	-0.080	0.103	-0.780	0.436
Quintiles de riqueza	0.450	0.099	4.560	0.000
Color de piel	0.161	0.098	1.640	0.102
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.260	0.086	3.020	0.003
Discriminado en otro lugar	0.122	0.095	1.280	0.200
Participación comunitaria	0.123	0.100	1.240	0.217
Líder comunitario	0.059	0.081	0.720	0.471
Simpatiza con partido	0.493	0.133	3.720	0.000
Constante	-2.824	0.130	-21.800	0.000
N. de casos	1582			

Chapter 4

Figure 67. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Nivel de educación	-0.012	0.098	-0.120	0.904
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.258	0.080	3.230	0.001
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.111	0.086	-1.290	0.199
Mujer	-0.432	0.079	-5.500	0.000
Edad	-0.215	0.077	-2.790	0.006
Quintiles de riqueza	0.216	0.093	2.320	0.021
Color de piel	-0.072	0.078	-0.920	0.358
Constante	-2.174	0.087	-25.110	0.000
N. de casos	1677			

Figure 76. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Nivel de educación	0.161	0.100	1.600	0.110
Edad	-0.133	0.080	-1.670	0.097
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.447	0.076	5.850	0.000
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.229	0.074	-3.080	0.002
Mujer	-0.211	0.071	-2.950	0.003
Quintiles de riqueza	0.198	0.089	2.210	0.028
Color de piel	-0.010	0.072	-0.140	0.891
Constante	-2.001	0.080	-25.060	0.000
N. de casos	1676			

Figure 78. Determinants of System Support in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Nivel de educación	-0.081	0.025	-3.220	0.001
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.012	0.026	-0.450	0.650
Color de piel	0.027	0.022	1.220	0.223
Mujer	0.067	0.023	2.850	0.005
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.034	0.026	-1.330	0.184
Víctima delincuencia	-0.097	0.026	-3.730	0.000
Percepción de corrupción	-0.172	0.025	-6.860	0.000
Victimización por corrupción	-0.098	0.028	-3.500	0.001
Participación comunitaria	0.061	0.024	2.590	0.010
Simpatiza con partido	0.159	0.026	6.160	0.000
Interés político	0.171	0.027	6.450	0.000
Constante	0.006	0.026	0.230	0.817
R-cuadrado	0.169			
N. de casos	1545			

Figure 82. Factors Related to Support for the Rule of Law in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Victimización por corrupción	0.024	0.057	0.410	0.680
Víctima delincuencia	-0.110	0.053	-2.070	0.040
Nivel de educación	-0.226	0.070	-3.210	0.001
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.005	0.066	-0.080	0.939
Color de piel	-0.043	0.055	-0.780	0.438
Mujer	0.113	0.051	2.240	0.026
Quintiles de riqueza	0.074	0.067	1.100	0.270
Confianza interpersonal	0.073	0.054	1.350	0.177
Ideología	0.047	0.055	0.860	0.392
Constante	0.619	0.066	9.430	0.000
N. de casos	1445			

Chapter 5

Figure 90. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	-0.016	0.025	-0.640	0.521
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.003	0.027	-0.120	0.903
Simpatiza con FSLN	-0.117	0.026	-4.480	0.000
Simpatiza con cualquier partido liberal	0.067	0.023	2.940	0.004
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.012	0.025	-0.490	0.628
Víctima delincuencia	0.002	0.025	0.070	0.942
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	0.007	0.028	0.250	0.803
Importancia de la religión	0.068	0.025	2.670	0.008
Apoyo a la democracia	0.201	0.026	7.880	0.000
Nivel de educación	0.016	0.030	0.550	0.582
Quintiles de riqueza	0.029	0.026	1.110	0.267
Color de piel	0.051	0.024	2.120	0.035
Mujer	-0.071	0.022	-3.210	0.001
Constante	0.004	0.024	0.160	0.871
R-cuadrado	0.076			
N. de casos	1586			

Figure 94. Factors Associated with Stable Democratic Attitudes in Nicaragua

	Coficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Víctima delincuencia	-0.046	0.058	-0.800	0.426
Percepción de inseguridad	0.076	0.058	1.320	0.188
Percepción de corrupción	-0.030	0.055	-0.540	0.588
Victimización por corrupción	-0.151	0.059	-2.550	0.011
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.103	0.061	1.680	0.094
Mujer	-0.020	0.053	-0.380	0.702
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.028	0.065	-0.430	0.670
Edad	0.026	0.065	0.400	0.690
Nivel de educación	-0.055	0.073	-0.760	0.450
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.162	0.056	2.890	0.004
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.259	0.067	3.860	0.000
Interés político	0.145	0.062	2.330	0.020
Simpatiza con FSLN	-0.012	0.067	-0.180	0.857
Simpatiza con cualquier partido liberal	-0.055	0.065	-0.850	0.398
Constante	-0.721	0.054	-13.250	0.000
N. de casos	1555			

Figure 100. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas

	Coficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Tolerancia política	0.206	0.025	8.160	0.000
Apoyo al sistema	0.099	0.028	3.520	0.001
Interés político	0.034	0.029	1.180	0.237
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.071	0.033	2.160	0.032
Mujer	-0.028	0.022	-1.250	0.214
Edad	0.075	0.028	2.620	0.009
Años de educación	0.018	0.033	0.560	0.579
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.018	0.027	-0.670	0.505
Color de piel	-0.021	0.022	-0.990	0.323
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.053	0.027	-1.980	0.049
Simpatiza con FSLN	0.017	0.028	0.610	0.539
Simpatiza con cualquier partido liberal	0.031	0.027	1.140	0.254
Constante	-0.005	0.027	-0.200	0.844
R-cuadrado	0.072			
N. de casos	1604			

Chapter 6

Figure 106. Factors Associated with Demand Making on Local Government in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Confianza en el gobierno local	0.055	0.078	0.700	0.483
Asistió a una reunión local	0.502	0.061	8.290	0.000
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.334	0.090	-3.690	0.000
Nivel de educación	0.054	0.096	0.560	0.574
Mujer	-0.063	0.077	-0.820	0.415
Edad	-0.031	0.077	-0.410	0.683
Quintiles de riqueza	0.021	0.089	0.230	0.817
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.184	0.091	-2.010	0.045
Constante	-1.992	0.089	-22.450	0.000
N. de casos	1670			

Figure 115. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Nicaragua

	Coeficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Evaluación de los servicios de los gobiernos locales	0.158	0.024	6.600	0.000
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.376	0.023	16.260	0.000
Interés político	0.138	0.023	6.100	0.000
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.017	0.024	0.730	0.465
Nivel de educación	-0.079	0.027	-2.920	0.004
Mujer	0.060	0.022	2.780	0.006
Edad	-0.007	0.025	-0.280	0.782
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.087	0.025	-3.510	0.001
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.061	0.026	-2.310	0.021
Constante	0.002	0.024	0.100	0.921
R-cuadrado	0.273			
N. de casos	1580			

Chapter 8

Figure 157. Political Participation

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Edad	0.003	0.030	0.100	0.923
Último año de educación aprobado	0.111	0.042	2.670	0.008
Estándar de vida (por artefactos del hogar)	0.040	0.037	1.080	0.280
Color de piel	0.051	0.028	1.830	0.068
Nivel promedio de activismo en la sociedad civil	0.150	0.029	5.150	0.000
Nivel de reuniones de un CPC	0.251	0.034	7.320	0.000
Nivel de activismo en asociación o grupo de mujeres	0.103	0.030	3.410	0.001
Ejerce liderazgo en organizaciones comunales	0.093	0.031	2.990	0.003
Simpatiza con FSLN	0.151	0.028	5.300	0.000
Recibe asistencia pública	-0.016	0.027	-0.580	0.566
Nivel de información política	0.047	0.035	1.370	0.171
Frecuencia de seguir las noticias	0.005	0.023	0.200	0.842
Interés político	0.175	0.032	5.430	0.000
Los gobernantes están interesados en lo que piensa la gente	-0.036	0.027	-1.320	0.187
Siente que entiende los asuntos más importantes del país	0.108	0.028	3.910	0.000
Constante	-0.064	0.027	-2.360	0.019
R-cuadrado	0.426			
N. de casos	769			

Chapter 9

Figure 163. Party Identification over Time

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Mujer	0.063	0.086	0.740	0.461
Edad	0.628	0.101	6.210	0.000
Último año de educación aprobado	0.479	0.116	4.120	0.000
Estándar de vida (por artefactos del hogar)	0.019	0.118	0.170	0.869
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.216	0.102	-2.120	0.035
Simpatiza con FSLN	0.560	0.093	6.020	0.000
Simpatiza con cualquier partido liberal	0.013	0.071	0.190	0.852
Interés político	0.405	0.100	4.040	0.000
Nivel de información política	0.255	0.093	2.730	0.007
Frecuencia de seguir las noticias	0.027	0.074	0.360	0.716
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.060	0.087	-0.700	0.486
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.142	0.088	1.620	0.107
Cree país está encaminado en la dirección correcta	0.004	0.085	0.050	0.962
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.002	0.092	0.020	0.980
El gobierno actual maneja bien la economía	-0.026	0.093	-0.280	0.779
Apoya a la democracia como mejor sistema de gobierno	-0.016	0.076	-0.210	0.833
Participación para resolver problema comunal	-0.023	0.091	-0.260	0.796
Nivel de activismo en organización religiosa	-0.035	0.078	-0.440	0.657
Nivel de activismo en asoc. de padres de familia	0.195	0.083	2.360	0.019
Nivel de activismo en comité de mejoras	0.192	0.099	1.940	0.054
Activismo asoc. de prof., negocios, productores	0.069	0.090	0.770	0.444
Nivel de activismo en un grupo deportivo	-0.050	0.085	-0.590	0.556
Nivel de actividad en reuniones de un CPC	0.199	0.119	1.670	0.097
Liderazgo en organizaciones comunales	0.012	0.095	0.130	0.901
Constante	1.795	0.104	17.310	0.000
N. de casos	1388			

Figure 167. Influences on Stated Intention to Vote for FSLN in Hypothetical Next Presidential Election if Held “This Week”

	Coefficiente	Error estándar	t	P>t
Porcentaje que votó en las últimas elecciones	0.471	0.098	4.810	0.000
Mujer	-0.002	0.093	-0.020	0.987
Edad	-0.079	0.115	-0.690	0.491
Último año de educación aprobado	-0.115	0.115	-1.010	0.315
Estándar de vida (por artefactos del hogar)	-0.029	0.125	-0.230	0.816
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.039	0.115	0.340	0.733
Simpatiza con FSLN	1.284	0.093	13.860	0.000
Simpatiza con cualquier partido liberal	-0.225	0.125	-1.790	0.074
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.152	0.110	-1.380	0.167
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.079	0.102	0.770	0.442
Cree país está encaminado en la dirección correcta	-0.006	0.102	-0.060	0.952
Aprobación del trabajo del presidente	0.555	0.115	4.850	0.000
El gobierno actual maneja bien la economía	0.680	0.112	6.070	0.000
Apoya a la democracia como mejor sistema de gobierno	-0.321	0.089	-3.610	0.000
Participación para resolver problema comunal	0.035	0.095	0.360	0.717
Nivel de activismo en organización religiosa	0.063	0.088	0.720	0.470
Nivel de activismo en asoc. de padres de familia	0.192	0.088	2.170	0.031
Nivel de activismo en comité de mejoras	0.116	0.112	1.030	0.302
Activismo asoc. de prof., negocios, productores	-0.113	0.100	-1.130	0.259
Nivel de activismo en un grupo deportivo	0.027	0.102	0.260	0.792
Nivel de actividad en reuniones de un CPC	0.031	0.107	0.290	0.769
Liderazgo en organizaciones comunales	-0.065	0.095	-0.690	0.493
Constante	0.264	0.094	2.810	0.005
N. de casos	1254			

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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