THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA AND IN THE AMERICAS, 2018/19: TAKING THE PULSE OF DEMOCRACY

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Introduction to the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu

The pulse of democracy in the region remains weak. Citizen support for democracy is critical to sustaining free and fair systems and bolstering against democratic backsliding. Yet support for democracy declined in the last round of the AmericasBarometer (2016/17) and remains low in this round, fielded between late 2018 and early 2019. Public satisfaction with how democracy is performing has also declined, while support for executive coups (i.e., the executive shuttering congress) has continued to grow. Political legitimacy – the extent to which the public views their country's basic core institutions and processes as worthy of respect and confidence – remains below the midpoint in the average country in the Americas.

In the midst of this milieu of doubt regarding the value of democracy and the capacity of political institutions, social media are on the rise. Globally and in the Latin America and Caribbean region, analysts are asking whether social media on the whole help or hinder democratic processes and democracy itself. Findings from the AmericasBarometer's new social media module allow us to see how widespread social media are, and who uses them (the younger, the more urban, and the more educated). They also allow us to see distinctions among the political attitudes held by those who use social media frequently. In brief, frequent social media users tend to adhere more to core democratic values but also tend to be more disaffected in their satisfaction with democracy and their confidence in core political institutions.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP is a unique tool for assessing the public's experiences with democratic governance. The survey permits valid comparisons across individuals, subnational and supranational regions, countries, and time, via a common core questionnaire and standardized methods. Comparative research on democratic governance is critically important to understanding today's realities, anticipating key political challenges, and identifying actionable policy solutions.

The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer represents the 8th round of this project. The questionnaire contains a common core that allows us to assess the extent to which citizens support democratic values, perceive a sufficient supply of basic liberties, experience the rule of law, engage in political life, support their system of government, use social media, and more.

Fieldwork for the latest round of the AmericasBarometer began in late 2018 and continued into the summer of 2019.[1] At this time, 20 countries are included in the round. For the first time since their initial inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, we selected not to conduct surveys in Venezuela and Haiti due to instability and related concerns about interviewer safety. We will revisit this decision as circumstances change. For now, the full dataset for this round includes over 31,050

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[1] The Nicaragua survey was one of the latest to be completed for the AmericasBarometer round due to the socio-political crisis in the country that started on April 2018.

interviews, conducted across urban and rural settings and implemented with the assistance of partners and fieldwork organizations across the Americas.

Questionnaire content reflects input from a wide range of project sponsors and stakeholders. The surveys were pretested in each country via cognitive interviews and programmed into Survey to Go software for fieldwork. The samples are nationally representative and also programmed into the e-instrument. All fieldwork teams used e-devices for fieldwork and were trained in the project's protocols and in quality control. To monitor quality, we applied LAPOP's FALCON (Fieldwork Algorithm for LAPOP Control over survey Operations and Norms). All interviews were audited at least once to ensure the following: that interviewers were in the sampled location, enumerators were those who attended training, questions were read correctly, interview protocols were followed, and contact attempts were recorded efficiently and accurately. All datasets were audited and processed by our team. The data and project reports are publicly and freely available at the project website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Each round of the AmericasBarometer involves a multi-year process and the effort of thousands of individuals across the Americas. In each country, we partner with a local fieldwork organization and we further benefit from input from researchers, country experts, sponsors, and subject experts located in institutions across the Americas. This network is critical to the quality of the AmericasBarometer and its availability as a public good. On behalf of this entire team, we express our hope that the reports and data generated by this project reach and are useful to the broadest possible number of individuals interested in and working to improve democracy and development across the Americas.

Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister is Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University and Director of LAPOP. Dr. Noam Lupu is Associate Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University and Associate Director of LAPOP.

Chapter 1.
Support for Electoral Democracy in the Americas and in Nicaragua[1]

Oscar Castorena[2] and Sarah L. Graves[3] with Georgina Pizzolitto [4,5]

I. Introduction

Electoral democracy is the predominant framework for politics in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The principal threats to this system of government have changed over time. Immediately following the Third Wave of democratization of the 1970s and 1980s, observers worried about a new military seizure of power or a return to dictatorial rule. In contrast, contemporary concerns for democracy in the region focus on various forms of democratic backsliding, such as overreach by powerful executives[6] and the deinstutionalization of democratic politics and society.[7]

Within this context, some worry about the development and persistence of electoral authoritarian regimes that feature regular elections marred by manipulation of votes or harassment of the opposition.[8] Related, scholars have suggested that a democratic "recession" or wave of autocratization is underway,[9] including within the LAC region.[10]

The LAC region has seen backsliding caused by, and permitting, disregard for the rule of law, among other factors. In the region, instances of backsliding are often accompanied by revelations

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[1] The AmericasBarometer survey in Nicaragua is nationally representative of all adults of voting age. Data collection took place between April 4th and May 4th, 2019. During this period, 1,547 citizens or permanent residents in Nicaragua of 16 years of age and older were surveyed. The interviews were face to face, at the place of residence of the respondents, who were selected through a stratified multi-stage sample with sex and age quotas at the household level. For more information and technical data of the study, consult: www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.

[2] Oscar Castorena is a Ph.D. in Political Science at Vanderbilt University and an associate researcher at LAPOP.

[3] Sarah L. Graves is a student at Hanover College in Indiana and a Fellow of Leadership Alliance at LAPOP during the summer of 2019.

[4] Georgina Pizzolitto has a master's degree in Economics and International Development Economics. She is coordinator of special studies at LAPOP.

[5] Some text in this chapter is taken, with permission, from a previous report published by LAPOP (Cohen 2017). We thank Mollie Cohen for her effort in that earlier project and for her permission to build on that work.

[6] Bermeo 2016.

[7] Morgan 2018.

[8] Levitsky and Way 2010.

[9] Diamond and Plattner 2015, Lührmann and Lindberg 2019.

[10] Almagro 2019; Goldfrank 2017; but see Van Dyck 2017.

of corruption or "an escalation of authoritarian tendencies, populism, and violence". [11][12] Recent presidents in a number of countries, such as Peru, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, have sought to weaken the other branches of government and the capacity of international organizations to keep them in check.[13] Further complicating democratic consolidation and maintenance is the fact that countries in the region are grappling with problems such as economic hardship and crime. For example, transnational organized crime groups in Mexico and several Central American countries have exacerbated corruption, insecurity and violence.[14] These problems of insecurity as well as economic downturns, cast as failures of democratic regimes, can create the fertile conditions for the rise of authoritarian alternatives.

Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the state of democracy in the Latin America and Caribbean region as interpreted through indices (ratings) from the V-Dem project[15] and Freedom House, which rely on expert evaluations.[16] The data in these projects complement the public opinion surveys analyzed in the remainder of the report. Along with each country's latest score, the figure also plots the score from two years prior.[17][18] This provides a sense of the recent change in electoral democracy in each country. There is notable variation across countries in the advance and retreat of democracy in this relatively short two-year period. While the ratings are created using different methodologies, they point to similar conclusions.[19] According to both measures, the highest quality democracies in the region are Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Chile. At the other extreme, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala rank at the bottom.

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[11] Peru's president resigned in March just ahead of a vote on impeachment on corruption charges. In Nicaragua, widespread protests against the government of President Daniel Ortega were suppressed violently, with over 300 people killed. In Guatemala, efforts by President Jimmy Morales to undermine and expel the U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) prompted widespread protests and expressions of international concern.

[12] Almagro 2019, p.6.

[13] Sullivan et al. 2019 p.5.

[14] Sullivan et al., 2019 p.1.

[15] Coppedge et al. 2019

[16] For more information on the methodologies of the V-Dem and Freedom House scores, see
https://www.v-dem.net/en/reference/version-9-apr-2019/ and
https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018.

[17] Freedom House provides ratings for each country in its annual *Freedom in the World* report. These ratings are based on the previous calendar year such that the 2019 ratings reflect events in 2018 and so on. Therefore, the V-Dem and Freedom House scores summarized in Figure 1.1 cover the same period.

[18] The left panel of Figure 1.1 shows the values of the V-DEM Electoral Democracy Index for the years 2016 (squares) and 2018 (circles). The differences between the years, for each country, are represented by arrows. This arrow is red if there was a decline in the index between years, and green if the democratic indicator shows improvement. Similarly, the Freedom House data presented in the right panel show ratings for 2017 (squares) and 2019 (circles). Green and red arrows are also used to indicate improvement or decline, respectively, in the democratic indicator for each country. When there is no colored arrow, the values of the two measures are exactly the same (circles and squares are superimposed), indicating no trend.

[19] The ratings provided by Freedom House are originally coded such that a value of one represents the most free and a value of seven represents the least free. We reverse the coding here so as to facilitate comparison with other democracy measures.

Ecuador had the largest improvement in V-Dem's electoral democracy index of the 18 countries included here and was also one of the three countries to see an improvement in Freedom House's freedom rating. In early 2017, a referendum saw Ecuadorians vote to bring back presidential term limits, placing constraints on executive power. At the other end of the spectrum, Nicaragua experienced the largest decline in democracy, according to both the Freedom House and V-Dem measures.[20] Nicaragua's democratic backsliding is evident – among other ways - in its holding of hundreds of political prisoners, arrested by paramilitary forces controlled by the Ortega government, for protesting against the regime. This type of capture and detention of citizens as political prisoners undermines basic human rights that should be guaranteed to citizens in a democratic system[21].

Figure 1.1. State of Democracy in the LAC-18 Region

A central question for scholars and policymakers concerns the factors behind democratic consolidation and, likewise, behind democratic backsliding. Theoretical work in political science holds that the endurance and quality of democratic governments rests, in part, on the political attitudes of their citizens. Without popular support, democratic regimes in crisis are more prone to experience breakdowns or democratic backsliding[22].

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[20] Another country experiencing notable declines in democracy, but not included in the 18 countries studied in this report, was Venezuela. The decision not to include Venezuela in the 2018/19 round of of the AmericasBarometer survey was influenced by the levels of insecurity associated with the country's political and economic instability, which complicated fieldwork in the 2016/17 round.

[21] Almagro 2019.

[22] Lipset 1959, Easton 1965.

Recent empirical work has found evidence for a causal relationship between citizens' opinions and the endurance of democracy in a country[23]. That is, the mass public's support for democracy has a positive effect on the resilience and nature of democracy. We use this insight, that citizens' attitudes and beliefs about democracy are consequential for democracy's endurance and growth, as the starting point for this report's assessment of public support for democracy in general and public evaluations of democracy in practice in the LAC region.

II. Main Findings

A summary of this report's key findings is as follows:

- In Nicaragua support for democracy in 2019 remains low when compared to the pre-2016 time period. Men and older Nicaraguans express more support for democracy.

- Support for executive coups in Nicaragua remains at similar levels as in 2016. The level of tolerance for executive coups under high levels of crime and corruption increased in 2019 compared to 2016.

- Satisfaction with democracy in Nicaragua decreased in 2019 (showing a decrease of 15.2 percentage points compared to 2016). Wealthier citizens (at a marginal level), and more educated urban individuals are those less satisfied with democracy.

- Over half the LAC public believes their country is democratic. Across countries, the percent agreeing that their country is a democracy ranges from 52.3% to 67.3%. In Nicaragua, 56.3% believe that their country is a democracy.

III. Basic Tenets of Electoral Democracy

While there exist multiple conceptualizations and definitions of democracy[24], this report focuses on *electoral democracy*. In his classic work, Schumpeter provides a definition of electoral democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote"[25]. While other definitions provide more comprehensive conceptualizations with additional dimensions[26], this minimalist definition addresses the most basic tenet of democracy: rule by competitively elected leaders. This definition also directly relates to the principal threats that have challenged democratic government in the contemporary LAC region. The first is the risk that unelected actors, such as the military, seize political power from elected officials. The second is the risk that executives go beyond their mandate and seek to rule unilaterally, undermining congresses elected by the people to legislate.

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[23] Claassen 2019.
[24] Diamond 1999.
[25] Schumpeter 1942, p.260.
[26] See Dahl 1971.

The following sections assess the state of public support for electoral democracy in the LAC region as well as the extent to which the public tolerates or rejects military and executive coups.

Support for Democracy in the Abstract

To what extent do individuals in the Latin America and the Caribbean region believe that democracy is the best political system, and how does their support for democracy in 2018/19 compare to past years? Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer project has asked respondents across the Americas the following question to assess support for democracy:[27]

> **ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Respondents provide an answer ranging from 1-7, with 1 signifying "strongly disagree" and 7 denoting "strongly agree." We consider responses on the agree side of the scale, that is values of 5-7, to indicate support for democracy.

Figure 1.2 displays the percent of individuals in each country that expresses support for democracy in 2018/19.[28] Support for democracy ranges from a low of 45% in Honduras to a high of 76.2% in Uruguay. The percent of the public that supports democracy is highest in some of the region's most stable democracies (Uruguay, Costa Rica). Support for democracy is lowest in Guatemala and Honduras. In Nicaragua, 51.5% support democracy as the best form of government, which places the country in the middle-lower range, close to Panama and Paraguay.

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[27]This question is often referred to as a "Churchillian" question of democratic support, as it is derived from Winston Churchill's oft-quoted speech from the House of Commons, in which he noted that, "...democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time (Churchill 1947)."

[28] See Annex A, "Explanation of the Graphs in this Study" for a description of how to read this and other graphs in the report.

Country	Support for Democracy (%)
Uruguay	76.2%
Costa Rica	72.4%
Argentina	71.1%
Chile	63.9%
Mexico	62.7%
Brazil	60.0%
Colombia	59.8%
Dominican Republic	59.2%
El Salvador	58.6%
Ecuador	54.4%
Panama	53.8%
Nicaragua	51.5%
Paraguay	51.2%
Jamaica	51.2%
Peru	49.3%
Bolivia	49.1%
Guatemala	48.9%
Honduras	45.0%

95 % Confidence Interval
(with Design-Effects)

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2018/2019; v.GM_20190814

Figure 1.2. Support for Democracy, 2018/19

Figure 1.3 displays the relationship between the percentage of citizens in each country who strongly support democracy and that country's score in V-Dem's electoral democracy index. Generally, there is a positive relationship between the two measures (Pearson's correlation = .64). That is, although the analysis here is descriptive and not a test of a causal relationship, the pattern

is consistent with previous research that identifies public support as a critical ingredient for the vitality of democracy[29].

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2018/19; GM(20190814) and V-Dem, Version 9

Figure 1.3. Support for Democracy and the Level of Democracy, 2018/19

On average a majority (57.7%) of citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean region indicated support for democracy in the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer. This level of support is similar to that recorded in the 2016/17 round, when support for democracy registered a significant and worrying decline in the region, compared to previous years.

The evolution of the level of support for democracy in Nicaragua over time is shown in Figure 1.4. While most Nicaraguans have shown support for democracy since the beginning of the measure (2004), the percentage that recognizes democracy as the best form of government has declined to its lowest historical level in 2019 (51.5%).[30] From 2004 to 2019, the reduction in support of the idea that democracy is the best form of government is 17.7 percentage points; a substantial, systematic, and statistically significant reduction over time.

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[29] Claassen 2019.

[30] It is important to note that there was a significant decrease in support for democracy between 2004 and 2006, this period coincides with the signing of the Alemám-Ortega pact.

Figure 1.4. Support for Democracy, Nicaragua 2004-2019

Who is most likely to support democracy? Figure 1.5 shows statistically significant relationships between five demographic and socio-economic subgroups (education, wealth, urban/ rural residence, gender, and age) and support for democracy in Nicaragua. In all such figures of demographic and socio-economic correlates in this report, we only show relationships that are statistically significant with 95% confidence. If a socio-demographic variable is excluded from the figure, this means we did not find significant differences in a particular dependent variable across the values of that socio-demographic variable.

Figure 1.5 shows that, generally, women are less likely to express support for democracy than are men (showing 6 percentage points of difference between genders), and older individuals are more likely to report support for democracy than younger citizens do. Age is a particularly significant predictor of support for democracy: while 46.2% of those 16-25 years old support democracy, this percentage increase to 65.7% for those Nicaraguans 66 years old or older.[31]

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[31] Except for urban/rural residence, these relationships hold when controlling for other demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Regression results available upon request from the lead author.

Figure 1.5. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of Support for Democracy, Nicaragua 2019

Rules of the Game: Tolerance of Military Coups

In addition to support for democracy in the abstract, acceptance of the basic rules of electoral democracy as "the only game in town" is key to stability and persistence of democratic governance.[32] This means, in short, that citizens in democratic societies should not tolerate military coups that replace the incumbent democratically elected government with military leadership. The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer includes two items that tap willingness to tolerate a military takeover of the government. A randomly drawn half of respondents received the first of the following questions, while the other half was randomly assigned to receive the second:

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[32] Linz and Stepan (1996) use the phrase "the only game in town" to refer to the consolidation of democracy. With respect to the role of public opinion, they state, "Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from prodemocratic forces (16)."

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**	A military take-over of the state would be justified	A military take-over of the state would not be justified
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	1	2
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	1	2

Figure 1.6 shows the percentage of respondents that said that they would find a military coup justifiable under each of these circumstances. We consider those who express this view to be "tolerant" of military coups under particular circumstances. Tolerance for military coups under conditions of high crime ranges from a low of 23% in Uruguay to a high of 65% in Jamaica. Tolerance for coups under high corruption ranges from 23.8% in Uruguay to a high of 58.3% in Jamaica.

More generally, levels of tolerance for military coups are lowest in Uruguay, Colombia, Panama, Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador. Tolerance for coups is the highest in Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Honduras, and Guatemala. In Nicaragua, support for military coups under high crime is 34.7%, which places the country among the lowest in the region; while support for military coups under high levels of corruption is slightly lower (32.4%).

Figure 1.6. Tolerance for Military Coups during High Crime and High Corruption, 2018/19

Figure 1.7 shows cross-time change in tolerance for military coups in Nicaragua. Levels of tolerance for military coups under high crime have increased 8 percentage points in 2019 (34.7%) compared to 2016 (26.7%). Meanwhile, levels of support for military coups under high corruption have increased 6.7 percentage points (from 25.7% in 2016 to 32.4% in 2019). Despite of recent increases in both cases, tolerance for military coups is lower in recent years compared to a decade or more prior (2004-2014), after both reached their lower historical level in 2016.

Figure 1.7. Tolerance for Military Coups, Nicaragua 2006-2019

Figure 1.8 shows tolerance for military coups by demographic and socio-economic subgroups. For the sake of parsimony, we present results only for tolerance of coups in contexts of high crime, because the relationships between socio-demographic categories and tolerance of coups under high corruption are substantively similar to those reported here. In Nicaragua, older individuals are less likely to express tolerance for military coups than are their younger. Those in rural areas are more likely to tolerate a military coup than those in urban areas.

Figure 1.8. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Tolerance for Military Coups, Nicaragua 2019

Tolerance of Executive Coups

The AmericasBarometer in 2018/19 asked all respondents the following question, to gauge tolerance of executive coups – that is, the shutdown of legislative bodies by the executive branch:

	Yes, it is justified	No, it is not justified
JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress?	1	2

Figure 1.9 shows the distribution of tolerance for executive coups in very difficult times across countries in the LAC region in 2018/19. Tolerance for executive coups across the region is generally lower than tolerance for coups by the military under conditions of high crime or corruption. The variation in tolerance for executive coups across countries is notable, the lowest being in Uruguay (9.2%) and highest in Peru (58.9%). Nicaragua is among countries with the lowest support for executive coups with 21.7% saying they are justified.

Not only is the Peruvian case an outlier in terms of average tolerance for executive coups, it also registered the largest increase in the measure from the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer

(21.1 percentage points.). This dramatic shift in the public's tolerance for unilateral assertions of power by the executive reflects recent political developments in the country.[33]

Figure 1.9. Tolerance for Executive Coups, 2018/19

While tolerance for executive coups under high crime or corruption increased in 2019, Figure 1.10 shows that levels of tolerance for an executive shutdown of the legislature remains constant in

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[33] See Ramírez Bustamante and Zechmeister 2019.

the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua. Compared to 2016 the percentage of Nicaraguans expressing tolerance to executive coups increased from 19.9% to 21.7%. This round is also the highest point observed in the Nicaragua AmericasBarometer survey, however the difference respect to 2016 is not statistically significant.

Figure 1.10. Tolerance for Executive Coups, Nicaragua 2010-2019

Figure 1.11 shows the demographic and socio-economic predictors of tolerance for executive coups: Nicaraguans places in the 4th wealth quintile are less likely to tolerate executive coups than those placed in the rest of quintiles. Regarding age, there are significant differences just between those of 16-25 years old and Nicaraguans 26-35 years old. There are no significant differences in tolerance for executive coup among education cohorts nor differences between men and women, and place of residence.

Figure 1.11. Predictors of Tolerance for Executive Coups, Nicaragua 2019

On summary, these metrics of middling support for democracy and non-trivial levels of tolerance for coups that sideline democratically elected officials suggest a relatively deterioration in the perceptions on the electoral democracy in the region and in Nicaragua. The remainder of this report turns to the question of respondents feel about the way that democracy is functioning in their particular national context.

IV. Evaluation of Democracy

Electoral democracy rests on a stronger foundation to the degree that citizens are satisfied with how their democracy is performing in practice. It is also important to consider whether citizens believe their system is a democracy, or whether they feel the system has slid too far away from that ideal to warrant the label. In general, satisfaction with democracy and the condition of democracy in the political system are important for understanding citizen support for democracy, serve as a foundation of citizens' commitment to democracy (a fundamental component for democratic consolidation).

Satisfaction with democracy "is an indicator of support for the *performance* of the democratic regime" (Linde and Eckman 2003, p. 399). In other words, it is a measure of the evaluations made by the people of the political regime (Klingeman 1999). Satisfaction falls under the concept of "specific" support, based on its "relationship to members' satisfaction about the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities of the system they belong to" (Easton 1975, p. 437). Specific support is "possible only under conditions in which the culture permits the members to entertain the notion that the authorities can be held responsible for what happens in the society…"

and "... when these [perceived benefits or satisfactions] decline or cease, support will do likewise" (Easton 1975, pp. 438-9). In short, levels of satisfaction are mediated by interactions with political authorities and institutions.

Electoral democracy is more legitimate, in the eyes of the public, to the extent there is a high degree of satisfaction with democracy and to the extent that citizens perceive their system to be a democracy.

The following sections examine satisfaction with democracy and assessments of the democratic status of political systems in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the goal of better understanding specific support for electoral democracy in the region.

Satisfaction with Democracy

Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer has asked respondents across the Americas the following question about satisfaction with democracy:

> **PN4**. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Nicaragua?

Respondents provide an answer ranging from 1-4, with 1 signifying "very satisfied" and 4 signifying "very dissatisfied." In the analyses that follow, we grouped the data, so that responses of "very dissatisfied" are "dissatisfied" are coded together as dissatisfaction, and responses of "very satisfied" and "satisfied" are coded together as satisfaction.

Figure 1.12 displays the percentage of respondents in each country that reports satisfaction with democracy. The percentage of citizens who are satisfied with democracy ranges widely, from 26.1% in Panama to 59.5% in Uruguay (the only country that exceeds 50%). Nicaragua is the second country with the highest percentage of people satisfied with democracy (46.4%). The average percentage for the entire LAC-18 region in the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer is 39.5%.[34]

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[34] Also, in 2019, the following question was asked: "PN5. In your opinion, ¿Nicaragua is a very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not democratic at all?" 27% of Nicaraguans said that the country is very democratic, 24% somewhat democratic, 28% not very democratic, and 21% said not democratic at all.

Figure 1.12. Satisfaction with Democracy 2018/19

In Figure 1.13 shows the percentage of Nicaraguans satisfied with democracy over time. The percentage in the 2019 round (46.4%) is lower than the one reported in the 2016 round (61.6%) and it is lower than levels of satisfaction reported in the 2012 and 2014. The decline of the level of satisfaction with democracy in the period 2016-2019 is of 15.2 percentage points.

Figure 1.13. Satisfaction with Democracy, Nicaragua 2006-2019

In terms of who is most likely to be satisfied with democracy, the results in Figure 1.14 show that – on average in Nicaragua– those with more wealth (to a marginal degree) and more education are more critical of democracy. Similarly, those living in rural areas are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than urban residents. There are no differences between women and men nor by age with respect to the satisfaction with democracy.

Figure 1.14. Demographic and Socio-Demographic Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy, Nicaragua 2019

Democratic Status of Political System

While satisfaction with democracy is a key element democratic governance, citizens' evaluations of their country as being democratic or not provide additional insight into how they view their country's political system. If they do not believe it to be a democracy, then they are more likely to give poor evaluations and be less satisfied. In nine countries included in the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer, the survey asked respondents the following question as a follow-up to the question of whether or not they were satisfied with democracy:

	Yes	No
DEM30. In your opinion, is Nicaragua a democracy?	1	2

Figure 1.15 shows that evaluations of countries as democratic ranges from only 52.3% in Honduras to 67.3% in Paraguay. The majority of the nine cases cluster around percentages in the mid-60s, and 56.3% in Nicaragua. As we had conjectured earlier, those who report that their country is not a democracy also have a high tendency to say that that they are dissatisfied with how democracy works in the country. Among those who disagree with the statement that their country is a democracy, 79.4% report being dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in their country. Among those who do agree that their country is a democracy, opinion is divided about the quality of that democracy: 50.2% report being dissatisfied, and 49.8% report being satisfied with democracy as it functions in their country.

Figure 1.15. Evaluations of Countries as Democratic 2018/19

Who is more likely to report that their country is democratic? Figure 1.16 shows the demographic and socio-economic features associated with thinking that Nicaragua is democratic. Wealthier and more educated people are less likely to believe their country is a democracy, and those 66

years old or older.[35] Rural individuals are more likely to believe their country is a democracy than those living in urban areas. There are not significant differences between women and men.

Figure 1.16. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Evaluation of Country as Democratic, Nicaragua 2019

V. Conclusion

What is the state of support for electoral democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2019? The analyses presented in this chapter provide some reasons to be concerned about the depth of citizens' commitment to democracy as a system, both in general support and satisfaction. On average, across the region, support for democracy has remained relatively stable over the last two rounds of the AmericasBarometer. However, this near-term stability has occurred after a decline in previous years. In contrast, the belief that executive coups are justified in difficult times has increased substantially over the last four rounds of the AmericasBarometer.

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[35] Graph 1.5 indicated how support for democracy as a system of government was lower among the younger participants. Graph 1.16 shows, on the other hand, that younger Nicaraguans believe that, to a greater extent than their older fellow citizens, that the country is effectively a democracy. The paradox here seems to lie in the fact that the youth of Nicaragua for the most part consider Nicaragua to be a democracy, but they are not totally convinced that this is the best system of government. This probably has to do with the political experience that various generations of Nicaraguans have gone through. While the older generations lived through various political processes (personal dictatorship, revolution, electoral democracy), young people have been exposed only to a system that holds elections with some regularity (see: Cruz, Jose Miguel. 2020. Nicaraguan youth in the political crossroads. Americas Barometer Nicaragua 2019 Special Report).

Trends in Nicaragua have mirrored these regional trends. Support for democracy as a system in the 2019 survey is the lowest since the measurements began. Also, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy registers the lowest level in the latest 9 years. Finally, although support for military coups increases in 2019, around 30-35% of the population, tolerance of an eventual Congress shut down by the executive remains at similar levels of 2016, with almost a fifth of respondents expressing that they would tolerate such a situation.

The overall downward casting trend in support for the basic tenets of democracy and diminished levels of system support may leave the public increasingly open to undemocratic leaders who offer action in times of crisis. Given the link between public opinion and democratic stability,[36] the stagnation of public support for democracy in the region in general, and in Nicaragua in particular, is troubling.

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[36] Claassen 2019.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Trends in Democratic Indicators by Country (2016/17 to 2018/19)

Country	Support for Democracy (ING4)	Tolerance for Military Coup under High Crime (JC10)	Tolerance for Military Coup under High Corruption (JC13)	Tolerance for Executive Coup (JC15A)	Satisfied with Democracy (PN4)
Mexico	13.4*	-4.2	-7.7*	10.9*	19.9*
Guatemala	0.4	-0.8	-6.1*	-1.6	-0.5
El Salvador	3.9*	-3.5	-5.2	1.7	-4.2*
Honduras	-6.1*	3.0	9.9*	6.0*	-2.5
Nicaragua	-6.4*	8.1*	6.7*	1.8	-15.2*
Costa Rica	0.9	-3.3	-18.1*	-1.6	-4.8*
Panama	-5.4*	-3.1	1.5	2.6	-12.0*
Colombia	6.8*	-8.1*		0.8	-2.1
Ecuador	1.5	10.6*	11.3*	2.2	-13.3*
Bolivia	-6.5*	4.3	6.0*	2.5	-4.3
Peru	-3.5*	-2.7	6.4*	21.1*	-2.7
Paraguay	2.6	-4.8	-9.5*	-1.5	9.8*
Chile	2.8	0.3	-1.3	-1.7	8.7*
Uruguay	-6.3*	-1.5	-3.6	0.6	-8.1*
Brazil	7.9*	-0.5	0.7	3.1	19.9*
Argentina	-6.1*	2.0	2.3	2.0	-12.2*
Dominican Republic	-2.8	-0.2	-0.9	5.1*	5.4*
Jamaica	-4.6*	5.7*	5.1	5.5*	-4.7*

Variables recoded as dichotomous as described in the text of the chapter. The numerical values are the differences in the percentages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds for each country.
* Denotes significant differences at p<0.05.

Chapter 2.
Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas and in Nicaragua

Oscar Castorena[1] and Brielle Morton[2] with Georgina Pizzolitto[34]

I. Introduction

One ingredient in democracy's success is its ability to generate public support for core institutions and processes. The former – support for core institutions – is often referred to as "political legitimacy" or "system support." The latter – support for democratic processes – refers to citizens' commitment to the use of those institutions in ways consistent with a liberal democracy. For example, confidence in elections is one expression of political legitimacy, while the belief in extending the franchise to all adults regardless of their beliefs is one expression of support for core democratic processes.

Political legitimacy or "system support" has long been a focus of public opinion research in both new and developed democracies because a decline in mass support could result in political instability.[5] Political systems with low levels of legitimacy will be ill equipped to weather periods of crisis. Moreover, legitimacy matters at the level of political institutions as it can prevent interbranch crises,[6] a key threat to the stability of democracy in the region. Along with concerns about the stability of democratic regimes, previous research has found that system support is important for the ability of political leaders to carry out their work successfully.[7] Political environments with high trust in the regime provide leaders with more leeway to govern effectively as they can count on a "reservoir" of support.[8] Conversely, in low trust environments, poor performance and political scandals can mean that governments quickly lose the broad support of the people to rule.

The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region's recent experiences with crises of economic hardship, insecurity, and corruption highlight the significance of political legitimacy for regime stability and policy outcomes. The case of Brazil provides a useful example. A period of economic contraction and the *Lava Jato* corruption scandal mired the government of Dilma Rousseff,

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[2] Brielle Morton is student at University of Maryland and a Leadership Alliance intern at LAPOP for the summer of 2019.

[3] Georgina Pizzolitto has a master's degree in Economics and International Development Economics. She is coordinator of special studies at LAPOP.

[4] Some text in this chapter is taken, with permission, from a previous report published by LAPOP (Carlin 2017). We thank Ryan Carlin for his efforts on that earlier project and for his permission to build on that work.

[5] Dalton 2004.

[6] Helmke 2010.

[7] Hetherington 1998.

[8] Easton 1975, Lipset 1963.

resulting in her impeachment in 2016. The sacking of the president, however, was not enough to restore public trust in the Brazilian government. Rousseff's successor, Michel Temer, had previously served as her vice president; as Acting President, Temer sustained approval ratings in the single digits and the public grew distrustful of the Congress, as the corruption scandal engulfed nearly every sector of the country's political class.[9] Persistent low levels of political legitimacy fueled the rise of an anti-establishment populist leader, Jair Bolsonaro, whose election ironically may have restored public confidence in democratic processes at the same time that his leadership style presents a challenge to the country's democracy.

Along with basic regime survival and stability, political legitimacy is necessary for a regime to govern effectively and for society to flourish. This is especially relevant for two challenges facing the region: migration and insecurity. Previous research has connected the quality of democracy and citizens' confidence in their government institutions to intentions to emigrate.[10] In contexts where the government has, through economic mismanagement, corruption, or repression, failed to secure diffuse political support, citizens may decide to emigrate (exit) rather than attempt to exercise their voice as a strategy to change the government.[11] Political legitimacy is also relevant for the ability of governments to address problems of insecurity. Previous research has identified trust in law enforcement institutions as an important factor in citizens' support for vigilante justice.[12] Although such extra-judicial actions may reduce crime in the short term, vigilantism ultimately undermines the state's monopoly on violence as well as its ability to maintain a strong criminal justice system.

While political support is necessary for the survival and effectiveness of a regime, political tolerance is an essential component of democratic political culture. Because democracy entails pluralism, it also entails disagreement and dissent. The extent to which governments respect the rights of the opposition and regime critics to participate is commonly held as a measure of the quality of a democracy.[13] Nicaragua and Honduras are illustrative of the relevance of political tolerance to democracy. Both countries are rated low, and have experienced declines, in the V-Dem electoral democracy index as of 2018.[14]

These two countries have experienced recent episodes of government repression of political dissidents. In Honduras, a protest movement recently formed in response to irregularities in the 2017 presidential elections that saw the incumbent, Juan Orlando Hernández, reelected. The government has met these protests with repressive actions. As of January 2018, 31 people had been killed in post-election violence according to the National Commission of Human Rights in Honduras, with state actors implicated in a number of these deaths.[15] In Nicaragua, what began as anti-austerity protests in the spring of 2018 were also met with repression by government and

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[9]   https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/07/28/the-temer-government-in-brazil-lacks-the-legitimacy-required-to-reform-its-way-back-to-recovery/

[10] Hiskey et al. 2014, Meyer and Taft-Morales 2019.

[11] Hirschman 1970.

[12] Zizumbo-Colunga 2017.

[13] Dahl 1971.

[14] For information about the V-Dem Varieties of Democracy data consulted for this report and the methodology of that project, see https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-9/.

[15] See also Haugaard 2018.

paramilitary forces. State actions have included the taking of political prisoners. As of 2018, over 300 people had been killed in the political unrest.[16] These recent events highlight the importance of political tolerance on the part of governments and their publics. Citizen commitment to the rights of political dissidents can temper the ability of governments to engage in acts of repression with impunity.

This report provides a cross-time analysis of support for the political system and political tolerance among the citizens of the LAC region and in Nicaragua from 2004 to 2019. Two dimensions of political legitimacy are analyzed—diffuse and specific. Diffuse support for regime institutions is assessed by analyzing system support over time, cross-nationally, and demographically. Specific support is assessed by analyzing levels of trust in political institutions over time.

II. Main Findings

Some key findings include:

- Support for the political system decreased in Nicaragua in 2019 by 11 degrees compared to the 2016 round of the AmericasBarometer. The components of the system support index with the largest declines were a) the believe that citizens should support the political system (13.8 degrees), and b) pride to live under in the Nicaraguan political system (13 degrees).

- Nicaraguans with higher education and wealth, and residents of urban areas express lower levels of system support. The level of system support is higher among women compared to men. Regarding age, Nicaraguans 26 - 35 years old shows in average a lowers level of support for the system than the rest of Nicaraguans.

- The Nicaraguan institutions with the lowest level of trust, on average, are the political parties (33.3 degrees in a 0-100 scale).

- The Armed Forces had the highest level of trust in Nicaragua in 2019 (52.3 degrees), while the local government scored between the Armed Forced and the political parties (47.8 degrees).

- Trust in the Nicaraguan President in 2019 decreased in 19.5 degrees compared to 2016 (62.4 degrees).

- Trust in the Nicaraguan Congress decreased from 56.3 degrees in 2016 to 43.0 degrees in 2019.

- Political tolerance has remained fairly stable in the LAC region and in Nicaragua since 2016. Nicaraguans express more support for guaranteeing the right of those who criticize the

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[16] Human Rights Watch 2019.

government to protest peacefully, than they do for dissidents to retain the right to run for public office.

- Women and rural residents show lower levels of tolerance.

- System support is positively correlated with four of the other attitudes related to the functioning of a democratic system: external effectiveness, trust in the president, trust in the municipality, and trust in the community. Trust in the president and trust in the municipality stand out as the strongest correlates of the system support.

III. System Support

Citizen support for the concept of democracy is a vital to the endurance of democratic regimes. Yet, while this aspect of political support is important, it is just one of the ways in which regimes are legitimate in the minds of their citizens. In what follows, and setting aside support for democracy in the abstract, we provide an analysis of the multifaceted concept of political legitimacy as it operates in the LAC region.

LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of support for the political system. Political legitimacy, or "system support," has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.[17] While specific support concerns evaluations of incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects that the political system and its institutions represent.

LAPOP's measure of system support captures the diffuse support for regime institutions that is central to democratic survival.[18] We operationalize the concept of system support through an additive index.[19] This index uses broad questions about political institutions in diffuse terms, rather than personal feelings towards any specific institution or actor. The questions are as follows:

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[17] Easton 1975.

[18] Booth and Seligson 2009.

[19] The system support index is the mean of five questions from the questionnaire: B1, B2, B3, B4, and B6. A Cronbach's alpha score is used to determine the reliability of combining the questions into a singular index. The system support alpha score is 0.80, which is high and evidence of scale reliability for the index.

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Nicaragua guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Nicaragua?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the Nicaraguan political system?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the Nicaraguan political system?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the Nicaraguan political system?

For each question, we rescale the original 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("a lot") scale to run from 0 to 100, such that 0 is the least support for the political system and 100 is the most support for the political system. This follows LAPOP's standard coding and can be interpreted as measuring support in units, or degrees, on a continuous scale running from 0 to 100.

Figure 2.1 shows mean responses for the system support index across time in Nicaragua (the graph at the left of the first row) alongside mean scores for each of its five constituent components. Overall, support for the political system in Nicaragua has decreased 11 degrees in 2019 (51.8) compared to 2016 (62.8). The lower level of system support registered in Nicaragua was in 2016, with 45.3 point of the 100 possible, and the higher was in 2016. In terms of the individual components of the index, the questions about the courts and the support to the idea that the basic rights are well protected, were the ones with lower levels of support in 2019, with 46.3 and 45.5 degrees respectively. On the other hand, the "respect for institutions" and the idea that people should "support the political system" show higher support in that same year, with 62.6 and 53.5 degrees, respectively. In 2019, all components of the system support index decreased compared to 2016.

Figure 2.1. System Support and Its Components, Nicaragua 2004-2019

Not surprisingly, given cross-national heterogeneity in political systems, there are differences in support for the political system by country. Figure 2.2 shows levels of system support for the eighteen LAC countries surveyed in the 2018/19 round. Costa Rica has the highest average level of support at 59.2 degrees and Peru has the lowest average at 41.8 degrees. Nicaragua is above average among the countries, ranking 5th (51.8), behind Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and Ecuador.

Figure 2.2. System Support, 2018/19

For the interested reader, we provide the country-level trends from the previous round of the AmericasBarometer for system support in the appendix. For the sake of parsimony, we will only comment on some findings from this analysis here. In a few cases, there are considerable shifts between the 2016/17 and 2018/19 rounds of the AmericasBarometer. Interestingly, these shifts appear to have some relation to the timing of elections. The countries experiencing the largest positive shifts in the system support index from 2016/17 to 2018/19 are Mexico (+10.6 degrees), Brazil (+8.5 degrees), Paraguay (+4.4 degrees), and Colombia (+3.1 degrees). These four countries

also held presidential elections in the spring to fall of 2018 prior to the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer fieldwork. At the other end, the countries with the largest negative shifts in system support are Nicaragua (-11.0 degrees), Honduras (-4.4 degrees), Panama (-4.1 degrees), and Argentina (-4.0 degrees). At the time of fieldwork, these countries had last held presidential elections in 2016, 2017, 2014, and 2015 respectively. Together, these sets of results suggest that elections play an important role in replenishing citizens' "reservoir" of support for their political system. In Nicaragua the last presidential election was held in 2016.

To analyze the relationship between the recentness of elections and the dynamics of system support, Figure 2.3 plots the shift in average system support between the last two rounds of the AmericasBarometer (y-axis) and the months since the last presidential election at the time of survey fieldwork for the 2018/19 round (x-axis). The figure shows, on average, large positive shifts among the countries that have experienced elections within the last 20 months.

In general, there appears to be a significant correlation between time since the last presidential election and changes in system support (Pearson's correlation = -.47). Honduras stands out as one exception - a case with a relatively recent election but declines in system support. Costa Rica likewise exhibits a similar pattern, but unlike Honduras, is already at a relatively high level of system support to begin with, as demonstrated in Figure 2.2. Finally, Nicaragua's decrease in system support is significantly greater than one would expect if only election timing mattered. These cases remind us that, while the holding of elections is important to system support, *how* elections are conducted and political leadership matter as well.

Figure 2.3. Changes in System Support and Recent Elections

Along with contextual factors, individual characteristics are also statistically significant predictors of levels of support for the political system, as shown in Figure 2.4.[20] In Nicaragua in 2019, there is a significant relationship between support for the political system and wealth, age, and urban (vs. rural) and gender. Individuals in the 4 and 5 quintal of wealth express lower system support than those in the 1st quintal of wealth. Individuals from rural settings have an average system support equal to 56.8 units out of 100, compared to a mean of 48.8 units for individuals from urban settings. Women have a higher mean level of support (56.1) compared to their male counterparts (47.6). Age shows significant differences between groups of younger people: Nicaraguans 26 – 35 years old show in average a lower level of system support that those in the 16 -25 years old group.

Figure 2.4. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of System Support, Nicaragua 2019

IV. Specific Institutions and Actors

The system support index is a diffuse, or broad, indicator of political legitimacy. For a more comprehensive evaluation, we can also analyze specific indicators of support by looking at other political institutions and actors.

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[20] For all demographic figures in this report, we evaluate statistical significance using the 95% confidence intervals from the bivariate analysis between the socio-demographic category and the variable of interest.

As in prior AmericasBarometer studies, the following questions were included in the 2018/19 study asking about confidence in a set of specific institutions:[21]

B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

Figure 2.5 shows levels of trust among Nicaraguans for each institution from 2004 to 2019. Trust in political parties has continuously had the lowest average. The worst year for this institution was 2008, when people assigned to it a trust average of 24.9 degrees in a 0-100 scale. dropping to 28.2 in 2018/19 on the 0 to 100 scale. In 2019, the level of trust in political parties is 33.3 points. For his part, the president gets the second lowest level of trust, standing at 42.9 points in 2019. The fall in trust in the president in the 2016-2019 period is 19.5 points. Trust in the National Congress scores close to, but slightly higher, than confidence in the president. In 2019, trust in the National Congress stands at 43.0 points. The lowest level of trust in the National Congress was recorded in 2008 (36.5 points). Finally, trust in the elections has been decreasing since 2012. In 2012, confidence in the elections registered 54.7 points, while in 2019 it reached only 46.9 points.

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[21] Again, we recoded responses from their original 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("a lot") scale, so that the measures in this report run from 0 to 100.

Figure 2.5. Trust in Institutions in Nicaragua (I), 2004-2019

The AmericasBarometer has asked several questions about institutional trust to capture public sentiment about public and social institutions. The responses are scaled from 0 to 100 degress where higher averages indicate greater institutional confidence:

B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B32. To what extent do you trust your municipality?

In Nicaragua, the armed forces have the highest level of trust of all of the institutions in 2019 (52.3 degrees). The municipality is the second most trusted institution by Nicaraguans in 2019 (47.8). However, both institutions have experienced a slight decline in levels of confidence in comparison to those reported in 2016 (66.8 for the armed forces and 55.7 for the municipality). Trust in national police declined from 56.9 in 2016 to 44.8 in 2019.

Figure 2.6. Trust in Institutions in Nicaragua (II), 2004-2019

As shown in Figure 2.7, Nicaragua, compared to other countries in the region, shows an intermediate level of trust in its Armed Forces in 2019. Trust in the National Police and in the municipality are located rather in the middle of the regional scale.

Figure 2.7. Trust in Institutions, 2018/19

To what extent are citizens' evaluations of these specific institutions related to expert evaluations of institutional performance? We can provide one answer to this question by looking at confidence in elections. Figure 2.8 plots the country mean level of trust in elections from the AmericasBarometer 2018/19 round and the country's mean score on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index for the 2012-2018 period. The Electoral Integrity Project creates this index using expert surveys of electoral processes.[22] There is a positive correlation between the two measures (Pearson's correlation = .61), indicating that experts and the mass public correspond in their evaluations of how elections are conducted in their country. Honduras stands out as a case where the public and expert evaluations exhibit particularly low levels of trust in the integrity of elections.

Figure 2.8. Mass Public and Expert Evaluations of Elections, 2018/19

Since these indicators capture the specific support dimension of political legitimacy (tapping into citizen trust of specific political actors and institutions), one ought to expect variation across time within a given political system. For example, trust in the president should ebb and flow along with the executive's performance in office. In this way, trust in the executive displayed substantial variation across countries in direction and magnitude of changes from 2016/17 to 2018/19. These ranged from a large positive shift in Mexico (+40.3 degrees) to a decline of 19.5 degrees in Nicaragua. The top four countries with the largest increases in trust in the executive each experienced recent presidential elections: Mexico, Brazil (+32.9 degrees), Paraguay (+17.2 degrees), and Colombia (+17.0 degrees). These countries also experienced statistically significant increases in the other three trust indicators (with the exception of trust in elections in Paraguay and trust in the national legislature in Colombia and Paraguay). At the other end, two countries experienced statistically significant declines across all four indicators: Nicaragua and Honduras. The largest decline in trust in elections (-11.6 degrees) was registered in Honduras; as mentioned above,

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[22] Norris and Grömping 2019.

Honduras was the site of a protest movement in response to perceptions of malfeasance in the 2017 elections.

V. Political Tolerance

This section shifts focus to a different dimension of democratic legitimacy outlined by Norris: support for regime principles.[23] Regime principles in this context refer to democratic ideals such as political competition, alternate sources of information, and universal suffrage.[24] Following the work of Booth and Seligson, we use citizen commitment to political tolerance as a measure of support for regime principles.[25] In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as "respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."[26]

Political tolerance is measure here by asking about citizens' approval of the right of people with dissenting political opinions to participate in politics. Specifically, the questions ask about rights to vote, peacefully demonstrate, run for office, and make televised speeches. The following questions are used to generate a political tolerance index:[27]

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Nicaragua's form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Nicaragua's form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?

In Nicaragua, political tolerance has remained fairly constant in 2019 compared to 2016 with 52.9 degrees, the difference with the level showed in 2016 is not statistically significant. Figure 2.9 shows that in 2019 the levels of approval of the rest of the index components remain stable: the

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[23] Norris 1999.

[24] Dahl 2008, Schmitter and Karl 1991, Diamond 1999.

[25] Booth and Selisgon 2009.

[26] Seligson 2000, p. 5.

[27] The political tolerance index is created using the mean score of the D series: D1, D2, D3, and D4. The Cronbach's alpha was 0.82, a high score that indicates scale reliability for the political tolerance index. For the analyses in this report, we rescaled responses from their original 1 to 10 scale to run from 0 to 100, as per LAPOP's standard.

approval level for retaining the right to peacefully protest of those critics to the govern reached a 63.2 degrees average, the level of support to the right to vote was 57.0 degrees. The lowest values are registered for approval of critic's right to run for office (43.5 degrees) and the right to make political speeches (48.2 degrees).

Figure 2.9. Political Tolerance and Its Components, Nicaragua, 2004-2019

Figure 2.10 shows the cross-national distribution of mean levels of political tolerance on the 0-100 scale. Jamaica has the highest average level of tolerance at 60.6, while Colombia has the lowest average at 48.0 units. Nicaragua is in 8th place, among countries in the region with levels of political tolerance around the mid-point on the 0-100 scale.

Figure 2.10. Political Tolerance, 2018/19

An analysis of trends from the 2016/17 to 2018/19 round at the country level, (data are detailed in the appendix), reveals considerable stability in the political tolerance index. Shifts in the political tolerance index ranged only from -4.1 to +3.5 degrees (on the 0-100 scale). In fact, there are only four countries with statistically significant increases in their index averages: El Salvador (+3.5 degrees), Peru (+2.7 degrees), Colombia (+2.5 degrees), and Honduras (+2.2 degrees). There are also only five cases that experienced statistically significant declines since the 2016/17 wave: Mexico (-4.1 degrees), Brazil (-3.6 degrees), the Dominican Republic (-3.0 degrees), Uruguay (-2.8 degrees),

and Panama (-1.7 degrees). It is worth noting that the two cases with the greatest declines in their political tolerance index average (Mexico and Brazil) also exhibited the greatest increases in measures of system support and trust in political institutions discussed above.

Figure 2.11 shows variation in political tolerance by socio-economic and demographic groups.[28] In the case of Nicaragua, men and residents of urban areas are the ones with higher levels of political tolerance than women and residents of rural areas. The rest of the socio-demographic variables are not statistically significant.

Figure 2.11. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Political Tolerance, Nicaragua 2019

VI. Dimensions of Democratic Legitimacy

This section analyzes the relationship between system support and five other dimensions of political regime legitimacy.[29] As discussed in the previous sections, the system support index is a measure of diffuse support for regime institutions. The political tolerance index is a measure of diffuse support for regime principles. To capture evaluations of regime performance, we look at another diffuse indicator, external efficacy - how much someone believes their government representatives care about their concerns as an individual. In addition, we consider three

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[28] As in the earlier analyses, we evaluate statistical significance using the 95% confidence intervals from the bivariate analysis between the socio-demographic category and the variable of interest.
[29] Norris 1999.

indicators of support for specific institutions: trust in the executive (measured with trust in the president) trust in local government (muncipality), trust in the public community (i.e., interpersonal trust). The specific measures are as follows:

System Support Index: B1, B2, B3, B4, B6 - (see section on System Support)
Political Tolerance Index: D1, D2, D3, D4 - (see section on Political Tolerance)
EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
B32. To what extent do you trust your municipality?
IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy…?[30]

We ran a regression analysis to determine the relationship between system support and these other five dimensions of democratic legitimacy. We control for the same socio-economic and demographic indicators analyzed earlier, and country-fixed effects (coefficients for control variables are not shown in Figures 2.12 and 2.13). All five support indicators have a positive, significant relationship with system support, according to a 95% confidence interval, as shown in Figure 2.12. This indicates that as external efficacy, political tolerance, trust of the executive, community, and local government increase, so does the average level of support for the political system. The highest correlations with system support are between trust in the president (coefficient = 24.6[31]), in the local government (19.7), and external efficacy (12.0). Two of the specific indicators, trust in local government and executive, have particularly strong correlations with system support.

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[30] Trust in the community has been reverse coded from its original scale in the survey so that higher values in that variable indicate higher levels of trust and lower levels indicate lower trust.

[31] Given the way the variables are coded, the regression coefficients can be interpreted as the predicted change in the dependent variable, on the 0-100 scale, given a min-to-max change in the independent variable.

Figure 2.12. Correlates of System Support, 2018/19

In the case of Nicaragua, we replicate the analysis. As shown in Figure 2.13, all the variables are statistically significant, however, external efficacy, trust in the Executive, trust in the community and trust in the local government have a positive relationship with system support; on the other hand, political tolerance has an inverse relationship with system support.

Figure 2.13. Correlates of System Support, Nicaragua 2019

Figure 2.14 clearly shows these relationships: support for the system is greater among those who strongly agree with external effectiveness. Support for the system is higher among lower levels of political tolerance (57.9) than among those with high tolerance levels (45.8). Support for the system increases as confidence in the executive increases: ranging from 28.9 degrees of support among

those who do not trust the executive to 80.0 degrees among those who trust a lot. Likewise, support for the system is greater among those who believe that their community is very trustworthy (58.8 degrees) compared to those who believe that their community is not trustworthy (46.8 degrees). Finally, support for the system is also greater among those with strong trust in their municipality (76.6) compared to those who do not trust at all (28.4).

Figure 2.14. System Support and Democratic Legitimacy, Nicaragua 2019

The empirical evidence presented here affirms that there exist important connections between a general measure of political support (political legitimacy) and other diffuse and specific indicators of democratic legitimacy. These results affirm the validity of the system support index, as a means by which one can evaluate the level of political legitimacy within a mass public. The results also suggest that trust in specific institutions may spill over into more diffuse trust and, of course, vice versa. That is, the fate of political legitimacy is connected not only to general assessments of political institutions and processes, but also to the evaluations that individuals develop of specific political actors and agencies.

VII. Conclusion

Democracy is stronger to the degree that citizens express support for its institutions and support for democratic processes. When citizens broadly view the system as legitimate and tolerate even its most ardent detractors, democratic governments are empowered to function in ways that are both effective and inclusive. However, when this cultural foundation is fragile, democracy's fate is less certain. Given the importance of these beliefs and attitudes by the mass public, we tracked

the legitimacy of democratic regimes and levels of political tolerance in the Americas, compared them across countries, and provided an analysis of the socio economic and demographic factors that influence these attitudes. We also considered the relevance of context, including elections, to changes in public opinion over time.

One conclusion from the cross-time analyses is that system support and political tolerance do not necessarily trend together, nor even do all components of these indices. Recall that overall system support fell in the previous decade largely due to flagging faith that courts guarantee a fair trial, that the system protects citizens' basic rights, and pride in the political system. Yet respect for the country's political institutions and normative commitments to liberal democracy, as operationalized by political tolerance, were more stable.

Another noteworthy finding from this report is that political legitimacy and to a lesser extent political tolerance exhibit short-term volatility in the Americas. Analyses of specific cases here suggest this volatility reflects real-time political processes, namely elections and turnovers in executive power as well as violent government crackdowns of protest movements. It is worth noting that the two cases that experienced the largest positive shifts in system support from 2016/17 (Mexico and Brazil), were also the two cases with the largest declines in average political tolerance. This indicates that these two important components of democratic legitimacy can trend in opposite directions, at least in the short term. Recent work on democratic political culture in the region has highlighted the willingness of citizens to delegate greater authority to popular executives (whose popularity can bolster system support) and support greater control on political dissent.[32] This dynamic poses a challenge for the development of a political culture conducive to stable democratic government, as both support for the political system and political tolerance are necessary for the legitimacy of democratic regimes.

In Nicaragua, there is a moderate support in both specific and diffuse support. In the most recent round of the AmericasBarometer, there is a decline in support for the system, pride in the political system, the thinking that basic rights are protected, respect for institutions, belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, and belief that the political system should be supported. There are also declines in the levels of trust in the main political institutions: the National Assembly, the president, elections, the National Police, the Armed Forces and the municipality. Confidence that basic rights are protected fell 12.4 points, which coincides with recent reports of human rights violations in the country. Trust in the legislative body fell 13.3 points in Nicaragua, reaching its lowest level on the AmericasBarometer since 2012. Trust in the president also reached its lowest level since 2012, falling 19.5 points. Nicaragua shows the greatest deterioration among countries in the region in almost all measures related to system support and trust in institutions.

Presidents and local governments are some of the institutions that are most visible in citizens' day-to-day lives. Levels of trust in these institutions are the strongest predictors of overall system support. Incumbent governments at the local and national level have the opportunity to make positive impacts on citizens' commitment to the democratic regime, i.e. building the "reservoir" of support. This places a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of the actors who inhabit these

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[32] Carlin and Singer 2011, Singer 2018.

institutions. It is thus incumbent upon political leaders to show themselves to be capable, honest, and responsive.

Another factor that can serve to build the "reservoir" are regular elections. Our analyses provide evidence that elections are instruments for reinvigorating the legitimacy of political institutions, as long as they are perceived to operate in ways that are free of bias and irregularities. Otherwise, they can generate frustration and protests.

Appendix

**Appendix Table 1. Cross-National Trends in System Support Indicators
(2016/17 to 2018/19)**

Country	Courts Guarantee Fair Trial (B1)	Respect Institutions (B2)	Basic Rights Protected (B3)	Proud of Living Under Political System (B4)	Should Support Political System (B6)	System Support
Mexico	6.9*	9.5*	7.9*	13.2*	15.8*	10.6*
Guatemala	-1.0	-1.5	-3.7*	-4.2*	-5.0*	-3.0*
El Salvador	-0.8	-0.3	-2.7*	-2.1	1.4	-0.8
Honduras	-2.8*	-5.2*	-3.7*	-4.4*	-7.2*	-4.4*
Nicaragua	-5.7*	-10.4*	-12.4*	-13.0*	-13.8*	-11.0*
Costa Rica	-2.7*	0.2	-4.3*	-4.4*	-4.0*	-3.1*
Panama	-3.8*	-1.5	-5.1*	-4.8*	-5.5*	-4.1*
Colombia	2.9*	1.9	0.7	3.9*	6.4*	3.1*
Ecuador	-1.7	-2.6*	-6.5*	-4.0*	-2.6*	-3.4*
Bolivia	0.1	0.8	-0.7	-2.3	-1.3	-0.6
Peru	-1.3	-2.1	-3.1*	-2.8*	-1.5	-2.1*
Paraguay	3.7*	4.8*	3.1*	4.0*	6.6*	4.4*
Chile	2.8*	3.0*	1.8	2.2	4.0*	2.8*
Uruguay	-0.6	-1.0	-2.1	-4.5*	-3.8*	-2.6*
Brazil	5.5*	8.7*	7.1*	8.2*	13.0*	8.5*
Argentina	-5.1*	-2.1	-3.8*	-3.7*	-5.3*	-4.0*
Dominican Republic	0.5	-2.8	-0.8	-5.9*	-5.2*	-2.8*
Jamaica	0.8	2.6*	0.7	3.1*	-0.7	1.4

Variables coded from 0-100. Numerical entries are differences in country averages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds.

* Denotes differences significant at $p < 0.05$.

Appendix Table 2. Cross-National Trends of Trust in Specific Institutions (2016/17 to 2018/19)

Country	Trust in National Legislature (B13)	Trust in Political Parties (B21)	Trust in Executive (B21A)	Trust in Elections (B47A)
Mexico	9.0*	10.4*	40.3*	15.2*
Guatemala	-1.4	0.2	-12.4*	-3.3*
El Salvador	-2.5*	-2.3*	-2.5	-1.1
Honduras	-9.1*	-5.8*	-9.7*	-11.6*
Nicaragua	-13.3*	-8.7*	-19.5*	-6.9*
Costa Rica	-9.1*	-5.4*	1.2	-5.6*
Panama	-5.2*	-1.7	-9.7*	-3.0*
Colombia	1.1	4.4*	17.0*	5.5*
Ecuador	-5.3*	-1.3	-13.0*	-4.5*
Bolivia	-2.9	-1.1	-3.4	-7.8*
Peru	-9.5*	-2.0*	5.8*	-4.3*
Paraguay	2.3	4.3*	17.2*	1.5
Chile	1.5	3.4*	-1.7	3.2*
Uruguay	-2.9*	-2.2	-7.8*	-3.6*
Brazil	9.7*	4.9*	32.9*	10.3*
Argentina	-4.5*	-2.0	-12.0*	-2.4
Dominican Republic	-4.6*	-0.8	-15.8*	-3.5*
Jamaica	-2.3	-0.7	0.1	-1.7

Variables coded from 0-100. Numerical entries are differences in country averages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds.
* Denotes differences significant at $p<0.05$.

**Appendix Table 3. Cross-National Trends in Political Tolerance Indicators
(2016/17 to 2018/19)**

Country	Right to Vote (D1)	Peaceful Demonstration (D2)	Run for Public Office (D3)	Make Speeches (D4)	Political Tolerance
Mexico	-3.5*	-5.4*	-3.1*	-4.2*	-4.1*
Guatemala	0.4	-3.9*	2.0	-1.8	-0.8
El Salvador	3.0*	3.6*	4.1*	3.4*	3.5*
Honduras	1.3	3.3*	2.7*	1.6	2.2*
Nicaragua	1.2	-1.5	-0.2	0.2	-0.3
Costa Rica	0.1	1.0	-0.1	1.8	0.7
Panama	-3.7*	-3.1*	-0.6	0.6	-1.7*
Colombia	3.7*	2.4	1.4	2.7	2.5*
Ecuador	0.6	1.4	-0.2	1.6	0.9
Bolivia	-1.6	-1.9*	0.2	0.6	-0.8
Peru	3.6*	1.0	3.3*	3.6*	2.8*
Paraguay	0.7	-3.3*	1.2	-0.8	-0.5
Chile	1.0	-0.4	2.9*	1.9	1.4
Uruguay	-5.3*	-5.2*	-0.2	-0.5	-2.8*
Brazil	-4.3*	-6.0*	-0.2	-3.7*	-3.6*
Argentina	-0.9	-1.6	2.3	1.6	0.2
Dominican Republic	-5.9*	-7.7*	0.9	0.9	-3.0*
Jamaica	-0.3	-1.9	2.1	1.1	-0.4

Variables coded from 0-100. Numerical entries are differences in country averages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds.

* Denotes differences significant at $p < 0.05$.

Chapter 3.
Social Media and Political Attitudes in the Latin America and Caribbean Region

Noam Lupu[1], Elizabeth J. Zechmeister[2],
and Mariana V. Ramírez Bustamante[3] with Georgina Pizzolitto[4]

I. Introduction

In the last decade, social media use has expanded around the world, including in the Americas[5]. And increasingly, people access the news through social media. On the one hand, social media can play a positive role in expanding access to timely information. On the other, social media can help spread misinformation, intimidation, and hostile rhetoric.

Given these dueling currents, it is challenging to determine whether social media improves or undermines the quality of democracy overall. One way to study this is to compare the attitudes and evaluations expressed by social media users and non-users. If social media users are less supportive of democracy and its institutions, this could mean that information spread via social media erodes democratic attitudes. Conversely, if social media users largely support democratic politics, their use of the platform may spread goodwill toward the system and counterbalance the negative experiences and evaluations that circulate in the general public.

Research on this topic has so far yielded mixed results, as well as reasons to be concerned about the attitudes held by social media users. Some scholars find a positive relationship between social media use and political cynicism (e.g., lower trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy), while others find weaker or no evidence of this connection.[6] Still, most of the research on these topics has focused on the more developed democracies of North America and Western Europe.

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[5] Data on social media penetration in Latin America are available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/244930/social-network-penetration-in-latin-america/

[6] On a positive connection between social media and cynicism, see Ceron 2015, Ceron and Memoli 2016, Johnson and Kaye 2015, and Yamamoto and Kushin 2013; but also see Hanson et al. 2013 and Yamamoto, Kushin, and Dalisay 2017.

Within the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, little is known about who uses social media and what political attitudes they hold. Looking at eight countries in the region, one study finds that social media users tend to be more educated, more urban, wealthier, and more interested in politics.[7] Other studies suggest that social media users in the region are less satisfied with democracy, more politically tolerant and democratic, and more likely to protest.[8] But these studies analyze data from nearly a decade ago, use blunt yes/no social media access measures, and focus on a subsample of countries in the region.

By analyzing an original module of questions in the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer, this chapter provides foundational evidence about these phenomena in the LAC region and in Nicaragua.[9]

Globally, the most popular social media platforms are Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp.[10] We developed the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer social media module to focus on these three platforms. In analyzing this module, we first present descriptive data on usage across the region and in Nicaragua. We then profile social media users in Nicaragua, providing a description of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, their propensity to use social media frequently, and their engagement with political information on these platforms. Finally, we analyze the connections between social media use and political attitudes, including political tolerance, support for democracy, trust in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy.

II. Main Findings

The main findings in this chapter are as follows:

- Facebook is the most used social network in Nicaragua. 56.2% of the population of voting age (16 years old and more) use this social network. Second, 48.1% use WhatsApp. For the region, 64.4% of adults use WhatsApp and 56.2% use Facebook.

- Twitter is used infrequently in the LAC region: the highest percentage of adult Twitter users is in Argentina, at 13%. In Nicaragua, 5.8% of voting age respondents use Twitter.

- The typical social media user in Nicaragua is young, urban, educated, and wealthier.

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[7] Salzman 2015.

[8] Gainous, Wagner, and Gray 2016; Salzman 2018; Valenzuela et al. 2016.

[9] Questions on social media use were also asked in the 2019 AmericasBarometer surveys of the U.S. and Canada, but these countries are not analyzed here.

[10] Data on the popularity of social media platforms worldwide are available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/. Although WhatsApp is primarily a messaging platform, we include it as a social media platform because of the way it is commonly used in the LAC region. Studies show that WhatsApp is widely used there for sharing news and information, coordinating political activities and discussing political issues (Bradshaw and Howard 2018). In Argentina's 2019 election campaign, for instance, WhatsApp was considered an important campaign tool (Gian 2018; Miri 2019). WhatsApp also played a key role in the 2018 election campaigns in Brazil (Capetti 2019; Nemer 2018).

- Among social media users in Nicaragua, WhatsApp is used with the greatest frequency: 56.5% of WhatsApp users use the platform daily, compared to 42.1% for Facebook and 28.1% for Twitter.

- In Nicaragua, about 25% of Facebook users report viewing political information on the platform daily. On Twitter and WhatsApp, 20.2% and 9.9% report the same, respectively.

- Frequent users of social media in the region are more politically tolerant and somewhat more supportive of democracy in the abstract, but they also express more cynicism: they are less satisfied with democracy and less trusting of core political institutions.

III. How Widely Used Are Social Media?

In the LAC region, WhatsApp is the most commonly used social media platform, followed by Facebook and then Twitter. Figure 3.1 shows region-wide average usage rates for each platform.[11] On average across the LAC region, 64.4% of adults report using WhatsApp. At a close second, 56.2% of adults indicate that they use Facebook. Trailing significantly in usage is Twitter: fewer than 1 in 10 adults (7.9%) in the LAC region use Twitter.

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[11] For each platform, we identify users with a combination of two sets of survey questions. First, we identify users as those who respond positively to the questions, SMEDIA1/SMEDIA4/SMEDIA7. Do you have a Facebook/Twitter/WhatsApp account? Then, we recode as non-users those who respond "never" to the follow-up questions, SMEDIA2/SMEDIA5/SMEDIA8. How often do you see content on Facebook/Twitter/WhatsApp?

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2018/19; v.GM20190821_E

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Figure 3.1. Social Media Use, the LAC Region and Nicaragua, 2018/19

Internet access and social media engagement vary across countries. Table 3.1 reports the proportion of adults in each country who have cellphones in their homes, home internet access,

and use each social media platform.[12] Where available, we also report statistics on smartphone penetration.[13] The majority of adults have a cellphone (averaging around 90% across the LAC region). In contrast, home internet access is more limited and varies significantly across countries. At 73.7%, Brazil has the largest proportion with access to internet at home, while this rate is comparatively low in Nicaragua and Guatemala, at less than 25%.

There are substantial differences in WhatsApp user rates across countries in the LAC region. Costa Rica has the largest proportion of WhatsApp adult users at 81.6%. Uruguay and Argentina also have high rates, with 80% and 78.9%, respectively. In contrast, WhatsApp is far less widely used in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras, at less than 48% of adults. WhatsApp use is higher when home access to the internet is higher: for the region as a whole, the correlation between the proportion of adults in a country who use WhatsApp and the proportion with internet access at home is a strong 0.93.[14]

Table 3.1. Internet Access and Social Media Usage by Country, 2018/19

Countries	Smartphone ownership	Cellphone in home	Home internet service	WhatsApp users	Facebook users	Twitter users
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Argentina	65.0	92.5	70.9	78.9	67.3	12.9
Bolivia	--	93.7	42.1	63.5	57.9	5.6
Brazil	54.0	95.4	73.7	76.2	59.8	8.5
Chile	72.0	97.0	70.3	75.5	62.9	9.2
Colombia	56.0	92.8	48.2	62.7	59.6	10.5
Costa Rica	--	96.3	67.9	81.6	66.6	8.0
Dom. Rep.	--	88.9	42.7	68.2	61.9	9.5
Ecuador	--	90.5	51.4	60.2	66.9	11.2
El Sal.	--	86.9	35.5	56.0	56.2	6.7
Guatemala	--	81.6	23.9	47.6	43.2	6.5
Honduras	--	86.4	25.1	46.9	44.6	4.8
Jamaica	--	94.2	55.0	68.1	45.9	4.5
Mexico	42.0	82.2	45.7	55.1	47.9	7.6
Nicaragua	**--**	**84.5**	**22.2**	**47.7**	**48.1**	**5.8**
Panama	--	84.0	35.2	56.7	34.6	5.8
Paraguay	--	95.8	44.1	69.3	60.5	8.0
Peru	41.0	86.5	37.5	58.6	61.4	7.6
Uruguay	--	95.6	70.0	80.0	66.5	9.8

Note: Smartphone ownership data come from Pew Research Center (2018); all other data are from the AmericasBarometer 2018/19.

Social media platform usage tends to coincide. That is, Facebook usage is high where WhatsApp use is high. With respect to Facebook usage, we again find that Argentina, Ecuador, and Costa Rica

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[12] Household assets are measured using two AmericasBarometer survey items included in a battery that begins, "Could you tell me if you have the following in your house": R4A. Cellular telephone (accept smartphone), R18. Internet from your home (including phone or tablet).

[13] Pew Research Center 2018.

[14] Since 2016, WhatsApp can be used on a smartphone or computer, through a web interface or via an app.

have comparatively high user rates. And again we see comparatively low usage rates in Guatemala and Honduras. Panama and Jamaica stand out as unusual cases in which WhatsApp usage substantially outstrips Facebook penetration: 56.7% of Panamanians and 68.1% of Jamaicans use WhatsApp, whereas only 34.6% and 45.9%, respectively, use Facebook. Table 3.1 also shows that, although Twitter usage is not especially widespread in the LAC region, usage rates vary across countries, from 4.5% in Jamaica to 12.9% in Argentina.

At the individual-level, many social media users are engaged in more than one type of social media.[15] Indeed, Figure 3.2 shows the majority of Facebook and WhatsApp users are multi-platform users. 44% of adults in the LAC region are both Facebook and WhatsApp users and, of those a small proportion (7% of adults) also are Twitter users. At the same time, Figure 3.2 usefully highlights that a sizable proportion of citizens in the average LAC country, 30%, do not use any of these social media platforms.[16]

**Figure 3.2. Overlap in Use of Social Media Platforms
in the LAC region, 2018/19**

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[15] Due to space constraints in the El Salvador survey, the AmericasBarometer randomly assigned each respondent to be asked about only one of the three social media platforms. As a result, we do not have information about users of multiple platforms for that country, and it is omitted from the data in Figure 3.2.
[16] In analyses of the region, we follow LAPOP's standard practice and weight each country equally. Averages for the region, then, can be interpreted as values that one would expect to find in the average country in the region.

IV. Who Uses Social Media?

The average social media user in Nicaragua is a younger adult, lives in an urban setting, has a comparatively higher economic status, and has more years of education than average. There is no detectable gender divide in WhatsApp and Facebook social media use, however, this divide is bigger among the Twitter users. These conclusions are based on Table 3.2, which draws on the AmericasBarometer dataset to show the percentage of adults in Nicaragua. Alongside these basic statistics, the table presents the proportion of WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter users (vs. non-users) who live in urban areas and are male, as well as their mean age, wealth, and education.

Table 3.2. Characteristics of social media users, Nicaragua 2019

Characteristics	General population	WhatsApp		Facebook		Twitter	
		Users	**Non-users**	**Users**	**Non-users**	**Users**	**Non-users**
Urban (%)	62.5	70.7	54.9	74.0	51.8	84.3	61.1
Rural (%)	37.5	29.8	45.0	26.0	48.2	15.7	38.8
Male (%)	50.3	51.2	49.4	50.9	49.6	70.8	49.0
Woman (%)	49.7	48.8	50.6	49.1	50.4	29.2	51.0
Mean Age	34.8	30.2	39.1	28.9	40.3	28.1	35.3
Mean Wealth	2.9	3.5	2.5	3.4	2.6	4.0	2.9
Mean Years of Education	8.7	10.1	6.9	10.6	6.9	12.3	8.5

Notes: Bolded figures indicate statistically significant differences between users and non-users. Wealth is measured by quintiles, 1-5.

The percentage of WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter users who live in urban areas in Nicaragua is greater than the percentage of non-users of these respective platforms who live in urban areas. Likewise, there are more people who do not use social networks in rural areas than those who do. Men are more active on Twitter than women, but no differences were found regarding the use of the other 2 social networks. The average social media user also belongs to higher economic strata, with wealth levels above the regional average.Further, compared to non-users, social media users have a higher average number of years of education.

V. How Frequently Do They Use Social Media?

The availability of social media has changed how people communicate, interact, and consume different kinds of information, including political information.[17] According to scholars, social media are "soft news" sources, where political content is an ancillary interest. That is, most social media users "are not necessarily seeking information about public affairs" when they make use of these platforms. [18] However, given that political content does circulate through these channels, many social media users will tend to see some amount of news about politics and related information.

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[17] Graber and Holyk 2011; Tucker et al. 2017.
[18] Baumgartner and Morris 2010: 28-9.

Not all social media account holders use it at the same rate, in general or to access political information. To gauge how often social media account holders use these platforms, and how often they see political information on WhatsApp, Facebook, or Twitter, we included the following questions within the AmericasBarometer social media module:

SMEDIA2. How often do you see content on Facebook?
SMEDIA3. How often do you see political information on Facebook?
SMEDIA5. How often do you see content on Twitter?
SMEDIA6. How often do you see political information on Twitter?
SMEDIA8. How often do you use WhatsApp?
SMEDIA9. How often do you see political information on WhatsApp?

Among those with social media accounts, frequency of viewing content differs substantially depending on the social platform they use. Account holders could indicate that they engage in general content and/or political information on these social platforms daily, a few times a week, a few times a month, a few times a year, or never.

Considering information in general, Figure 3.3 shows the frequency with which respondents reported viewing content on different social mediat platforms. The upper panel of the graph presents results for the region as a whole, while the lower panel show data for only Nicaragua. Frequently viewing content on WhatsApp and Facebook is very common among users in both Nicaragua and the LAC region as a whole, while this behavior is comparatively less common on Twitter.[19]

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[19] Questions SMEDIA2, SMEDIA5, and SMEDIA8 were recoded so that those respondents who report never seeing content on Facebook and Twitter, and those who indicate never using WhatsApp, are considered as non-users of these social media platforms.

Frequency Viewing WhatsApp Content

Frequency Viewing Facebook Content

Frequency Viewing Twitter Content

Legend:
- Daily
- A few times a week
- A few times a month
- A few times a year

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2018/19; v.GM20190821_E

Frequency of Viewing WhatsApp Content

Frequency of Viewing Facebook Content

Frequency of Viewing Twitter Content

Nicaragua

Legend:
- Daily
- A few times a week
- A few times a month
- A few times a year

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Figure 3.3. Frequency of Social Media Use, the LAC Region and Nicaragua, 2018/19

What individual-level characteristics predict social media use, versus non-use? We consider five demographic and socioeconomic factors that may affect the propensity to use social media: place of residence, gender, age, education, and wealth.[20] The dependent variable, *Social Media User*, is based on responses to the three questions about holding accounts from Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. This dichotomous measure distinguishes between those individuals who use accounts from one or more of these platforms, compared to those who do not engage with any social media account.[21]

Figure 3.4 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis that regresses social media use on measures of place of residence (urban vs. rural), gender (female vs. male), age, education, and wealth. For all such analyses in this report, country fixed effects are included but not shown. The dots in Figure 3.4 are the predicted changes in the probability of the dependent variable taking on the value of "1" (social media user), given a change from the minimum to maximum value on the independent variable. The results demonstrate that, on average in Nicaragua in 2019, urban, more educated, and wealthier individuals are more likely to be social media users. Gender is not a significant predictor of social media use, there is no significant differences between men and women about social media use.

Figure 3.4. Factors Associated with Social Media Use, Nicaragua 2019

In Nicaragua in 2019, while in the poorest quintile 31.5% are users of social networks, the percentage of users reaches 80.7% in the richest quintile. Something similar happens with educational levels: 17.6% of Nicaraguans with no education use social networks, while 84.8% of

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[20] Age and education are measured in years, rescaled to 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the youngest or the lowest level of education, and 1 the oldest or the highest level of education. Wealth is an ordinal variable, rescaled to 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the lowest level of wealth, and 1 the highest level of wealth. Place of residence is coded 1 for urban and 0 for rural. Gender is coded 1 for female and 0 for male.

[21] Account-holders who say they never access content on any of these platforms are considered non-users.

Nicaraguans with a higher education level use them. The use of networks reaches 73% of the youngest Nicaraguans (between 16 and 25 years old), while it only reaches 7.4% of the oldest (66 years and older). Finally, the use of networks is more widespread in urban areas (65.1%) than in rural areas (41.6%).

Figure 3.5. Social Media Use by Socio-Demographic Variables, Nicaragua 2019

What individual-level characteristics predict high use of social media? In order to answer that question, we created a second measure, also based on the three questions about frequency of use. This measure, "High Social Media Use" is a dichotomous variable that distinguishes between those users who access content on any one or more of these platforms (WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter) a few times a week or daily, and those individuals who have one or more social media accounts but do not often access any of them (that is, they have accounts but access social media only a few times a month, or a few times a year).

Figure 3.6 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis that regresses high use of social media (vs. low use) on the same set of demographic and socioeconomic factors. The results indicate that, on average in Nicaragua 2019, those who are wealthier are more likely to be high frequency social media users. The predicted effect of these individual characteristics is small compared to the analysis predicting social media use (vs. none). Further, whereas gender, education and age were marginally relevant in explaining usage, those are not significant predictors of high (vs. low) social media use.

Figure 3.6. Factors Predicting High (vs. Low) Social Media Use, Nicaragua 2019

Figure 3.7 shows that, although widespread across all wealth levels, frequent use of social networks is greater and more universal among the richest (quintile 5) than among the least wealthy.

Figure 3.7. Frequency of Social Media Use by Wealth, Nicaragua 2019

VI. Political Engagement on Social Media

Those who view content on social media vary in the extent to which they encounter political information. Figure 3.8 displays, for the region as a whole (upper panel) and for Nicaragua (lower panel), the frequency of viewing political information on WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter, among those who are social media users. For Nicaragua, there is a higher tendency for Facebook and Twitter users to view political information on a regular basis. WhatsApp users report viewing political information less often. More specifically, 24.7% of Facebook users report viewing political information on the platform daily, while about 35.9% view this type of information a few times a week. A 27.1% of Twitter users, indicate that they view political information on this social media daily, and 37.1% do so a few times a week. Users view political information in WhatsApp less often. Although more than half (51.6%) of those who use WhatsApp mention that they never view political information on this social media platform, 9.9% do so daily and 26.1% view political information a few times a week. This is a reminder that the platform is used not only for connecting friends and family on apolitical mundane matters, but also for the dissemination of political opinions and content.

Figure 3.8. Frequency Viewing Political Information on WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter, LAC and Nicaragua, 2018/19

What individual-level factors explain frequently viewing political information on social media? To answer this question, we created a "high frequency of viewing political information measure" by compiling answers to the questions about the three social media platforms. This new variable, "high frequency of viewing political information" distinguishes among social media users who use one or more account to view political information a few times a week or daily, and those who engage in political content on social media a few times a month, a few times a year, or never. We then analyzed the predictors of this dependent variable with the same model (that is, the same socioeconomic and demographic factors) used in the analysis of predictors of high social media use.

Figure 3.9 shows the results of this logistic analysis that regresses high political information consumption on social media on these demographic and socioeconomic factors. The results show that, on average in Nicaragua 2019, well-educated social media users, wealthier, as well as those who reside in urban areas, are more likely to view political information more frequently in social media. Further, older people have a small association with the probability of high political information consumption via social media than younger people. There are no significant differences between women and men.

Figure 3.9. Factors Associated with Frequent Viewing of Political Information on Social Media, Nicaragua 2019

As Figure 3.10 shows, the use of social media for access to political information is more frequent among those with a higher education level (68.4%) than those with no education (15.4%). Likewise, 69.5% of Nicaraguans in wealth quintile 5 use social media frequently to access political information compared to 40.6% in the poorest quintile. Age is also influential: people 66 years and older report greater use of social media for the consumption of political information than younger people. This figure also shows how the use of media to access political information is more frequent among residents of urban areas (62.3%) than residents of rural areas (49.0%).

Figure 3.10. Frequent Viewing of Political Information on Social Media by Socio-Demographic Variables, Nicaragua 2019

VII. Social Media Use and Political Attitudes

Do frequent social media users express different political opinions than those who use social media less, or who do not have any social network account? To assess this, we consider in our analysis those who have one or more of the three social media accounts considered in this report: WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter.[22] We use the same coding as in the prior section, to distinguish among those who access social media often (those with accounts who access any one or more of them a few times a week or daily) and those who do not access social media very frequently (those with accounts who access them a few times a month or a few times a year). We also include non-users: those who do not hold any social media account (those who indicate that they do not have a Facebook, Twitter, or WhatsApp account) and those who have an account but never access it. We consider several different political attitudes: political tolerance, support for democracy in the abstract, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in various institutions.

The results, in Figure 3.11, show that high social media users are more tolerant, and more supportive of democracy as a system of government than are low social media users or non-users. This trend can be seen both for the region as a whole (upper panel of Figure 3.11) and for Nicaragua (lower panel of the figure). On average, in Nicaragua, 54.2% of high social media users display high

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[22] See the percentage of high and low social media users, and non-users by country in the appendix material found on our project website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

levels of tolerance, while that rate is 48.0% among low social media users.[23] The difference between high users and sporadic users is not statistically significant. However, the differences between frequent users and non-users are statistically significant. Moreover, 49.9% of high social media users support democracy, compared to 54.1% of non-users.[24] The difference between support for democracy among the different types of social media users, is statistically significant.

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[23] This variable was measured with LAPOP's political tolerance index, which is calculated based on the degree to which individuals disapprove or approve of the right of regime critics to exercise the right to vote, the right to participate in peaceful demonstrations, the right to run for office, and the right to make speeches (D1-4). This 0-100 index was rescaled so that values from 51 to 100 are considered "tolerant", and 0-50 are not.

[24] This variable was measured with the following question: ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? [scale from 1 Strongly disagree to 7 Strongly agree]. This variable was rescaled as follows: from 5 to 7 are coded as supporting democracy, and response 1-4 are not.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2018/2019; v.GM19_1.0

Nicaragua

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Figure 3.11. Tolerance Level, and Support for Democracy by Type of Social Media Use and Non-Users, LAC and Nicaragua 2018/19

Figure 3.12 shows that users of social networks are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. This trend is observed both in the region in general (upper panel of the graph) and in Nicaragua (lower panel). Among the most frequent users of social networks, 42.6% report that they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Nicaragua, compared with 46.9% of sporadic users and 50.9% of non-users. The difference between frequent users of social networks and those who do not use them is statistically significant.

Figure 3.12. Satisfaction with Democracy by Type of Social Media User and Non-account Holders, LAC and Nicaragua 2018/19

Frequent social media users also trust the country's institutions less, and again in this case the trend for Nicaragua (lower panel of Figure 3.10) and for the region as a whole (upper panel of figure) are similar. As shown in Graph 3.13, among frequent users of social networks in Nicaragua, only 35.4% trust the Supreme Court, while 36.7% of sporadic users and 42.3% of non-users trust this institution. For trust in the media, 51.3% of frequent users of social networks trust them, 61.0% of sporadic users and 58.7% of non-users. Regarding the local government, 40.1% of frequent network users indicate that they trust it, 44.6% of sporadic users and 45.0% of non-users.

We further see that 35.2% of high social media users in Nicaragua trust in the National Congress, while 43.8% of low social media users and 39.5% of non-users report trust in this political institution. In addition, 35.5% of high social media users in Nicaragua trust the President, while this proportion rises to 49.0% among low social media users, and to 42.7% among non-users. Finally, 39.7% of high social media users express their trust toward elections in Nicaragua, yet this proportion rises to 42.2% among low social media users, and 48.7% among non-users. In general, in Nicaragua, those who use social media frequently trust institutions less than those who use them sporadically or not at all.[25]

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[25] See online appendix for regressions that control for individual-level characteristics in predicting the relationship between social media and trust in political institutions in the LAC region, 2018/19.

Figure 3.13. Trust in Institutions by Type of Social Media User and Non-account Holders in the LAC Region and Nicaragua, 2018/19

VIII. Conclusion

WhatsApp and Facebook are the most popular platforms, although the rates of engagement vary across countries. Social media is widely used in Nicaragua. 48.1% of adults in Nicaragua use Facebook and 47.7% use WhatsApp. However, Twitter, a common platform in many parts of the world, is not as widely used in Nicaragua (5.8%).

In Nicaragua, the average social media user is younger, more likely to live in an urban area, relatively wealthier, and more educated, compared to the average non-user.

Among social media users, there are also notable differences in how frequently they use it and how often they engage with political information on social media. Most WhatsApp and Facebook users use these platforms frequently, but Twitter users tend to use it less frequently. In Nicaragua, frequent social media users tend to be wealthier compared with those that uses not frequently.

Social media users in Nicaragua tend to use WhatsApp very frequently, however they tend to see political content on that platform less frequently. Users of Facebook and Twitter are more likely to report seeing political content on the platform on a frequent basis. Again, it is primarily older, more educated, wealthier, and individuals who live in urban areas who see political content on social media more frequently.

How is the use of social media related to democratic attitudes and evaluations? While frequent social media users are more tolerant and somewhat more supportive of democracy in the abstract, they are also less satisfied with how democracy works in their country, and less trusting in the political institutions. In Nicaragua, frequent social media use does not seem to net an exclusively positive or negative effect on political attitudes. While it is positively associated with some democratic attitudes, it seems to also promote more distrust towards fundamental democratic institutions. The continuing spread of social media will clearly shape politics in Nicaragua, but its effects on democratic attitudes at this point seem mixed.

Appendix

Appendix Table A1. Social Media Use by Country

Country	High Social Media Usage	Low Social Media Usage	Non-Users
Mexico	58.51	2.74	38.75
Guatemala	48.84	5.98	45.19
El Salvador	36.7	3.72	59.57
Honduras	47.79	4.87	47.34
Nicaragua	50.19	6.6	43.21
Costa Rica	82.89	1.34	15.77
Panama	57.69	1.74	40.57
Colombia	65.83	3.75	30.42
Ecuador	69.59	3.34	27.08
Bolivia	65.49	2.39	32.12
Peru	64.6	4.09	31.31
Paraguay	70.44	1.72	27.83
Chile	77.74	1.35	20.91
Uruguay	82.16	1.33	16.51
Brazil	77.21	2.41	20.38
Argentina	82.11	1.11	16.78
Dominican Republic	70.91	2.25	26.84
Jamaica	66.33	4.49	29.18
Regional Average	**65.34**	**3.06**	**31.6**

Regression Figures (Figure 3.13)

Socioeconomic Predictors
of Trust in the Supreme Court

95% Confidence Interval
with Design-Effects

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Socioeconomic Predictors
of Trust in the Congress

95% Confidence Interval
with Design-Effects

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Socioeconomic Predictors
of Trust in the Media

Low Social Media Use vs Non-Users   -0.01
High Social Media Use vs Non-Users   0.06
Wealth Quintiles   -0.06
Years of Education   -0.19
Age   -0.28
Female   0.03
Urban Area   -0.00
Prob(F) = 0.00
N = 1499

95% Confidence Interval
with Design-Effects

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Socioeconomic Predictors
of Trust in the Executive

Low Social Media Use vs Non-Users   -0.11
High Social Media Use vs Non-Users   -0.02
Wealth Quintiles   -0.12
Years of Education   0.02
Age   0.31
Female   0.08
Urban Area   -0.11
Prob(F) = 0.00
N = 1479

95% Confidence Interval
with Design-Effects

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Low Social Media Use vs Non-Users   -0.01
High Social Media Use vs Non-Users   0.01
Wealth Quintiles   -0.04
Years of Education   -0.02
Age   0.08
Female   0.07
Urban Area   -0.06

Prob(F) = 0.04
N = 1509

-0.20   -0.10   0.00   0.10   0.20   0.30

**Socioeconomic Predictors
of Trust in the Local Government**

95% Confidence Interval
with Design-Effects

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Low Social Media Use vs Non-Users   0.05
High Social Media Use vs Non-Users   0.02
Wealth Quintiles   -0.12
Years of Education   -0.04
Age   0.09
Female   0.10
Urban Area   -0.08

Prob(F) = 0.00
N = 1505

-0.20   -0.10   0.00   0.10   0.20   0.30

**Socioeconomic Predictors
of Trust in the Elections**

95% Confidence Interval
with Design-Effects

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC2019ts_1.0

Chapter 4.
The Challenges of Political Participation in Nicaragua

José Miguel Cruz[1]

I. Introduction

For years, Nicaraguans were characterized by their high levels of participation in public spheres.[2] This was not only expressed in their involvement in social and political organizations but also in high levels of electoral participation, in comparison with their Central American neighbors. Nicaragua's recent political history is full of social transformations and political reforms that have had, as central protagonists, social movements with the participation of large Nicaraguan social groups.[3] This chapter deals with the participation of Nicaraguan citizens in political affairs at a time of political crisis and social instability produced by the authoritarian consolidation of the government of Daniel Ortega.

The chapter focuses on five aspects of citizen participation on the results of the AmericasBarometer. First, this chapter explores citizen participation in civil organizations. Second, the chapter analyzes the trajectory of interest in politics by Nicaraguans. Then, it focuses on understanding how that interest in politics is mediated — or truncated — by the fears generated by the government response to social protests. Fourth, the chapter includes a section dedicated to presenting data regarding Nicaraguans' electoral participation and their partisan affiliation. Finally, this chapter closes with an exploration of opinions on the current political crisis and its link to participation.

II. Key Findings

- Nicaraguans report less participation in social organizations compared to previous years. This reduction is particularly notable in participation in religious organizations, community associations, and in groups with a political profile.

- Likewise, participation in municipal meetings has also decreased with respect to the AmericasBarometer's last measurement, although the difference is not statistically significant.

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[1] José Miguel Cruz is Director of Research at the Green Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (LACC) at Florida International University (FIU) and is an associate researcher at the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University.

[2] Coleman and Zechmeister 2015; Ortega Hegg et al. 2007

[3] Castro et al. 2016.

- Interest in politics has also decreased in Nicaragua. Between 2016 and 2019, the national average of interest in politics, on a scale of 0 to 100, went from an average score of 38.5 to 34.1. This places Nicaragua in the group of countries with the lowest levels of interest in politics in the region.

- The low interest in political issues especially affects the most socioeconomically disadvantaged populations: people with fewer years of education and with lower levels of wealth.

- The results of the 2019 AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua also reveal that citizen fear of participating in political activities has increased significantly in the last fifteen years. For example, the Nicaraguans' fear of participating in political demonstrations went from 46.1% in 2004 to 71.5% in 2019. The above seems to be linked to the political crisis that erupted in the country in 2018.

- The expression of citizen fears of political participation is strongly related to their political positions. Those interviewed who identify with the government and the ruling party show less fear than the rest of the population.

- The percentage of people that say they have voted in the last presidential election has also decreased significantly in recent years. According to data from the AmericasBarometer, people with national identity cards who voted in the last presidential elections went from 80.1% in 2012 to 52.4% in 2019.

- The results of the 2019 AmericasBarometer placed Nicaragua as the country where people expressed the lowest level of participation in a presidential election in the region during the 2018-2019 cycle.

- According to the responses to the 2019 AmericasBarometer, there was even less involvement among young people under 25 and people who do not identify with the government in the last presidential elections.

- Similarly, electoral support for the ruling party has diminished in recent years. In fact, all political groups have suffered significant declines. In the case of opposition government parties, the reduction is much more noticeable.

- Only a third of the Nicaraguan population said that the current political crisis is the result of an attempted coup d'état by groups opposing the government.

- Likewise, three out of ten respondents said that the best way out of the Nicaraguan crisis is for the current government to remain in power. Four out of ten respondents advocated the advancement of the elections and almost 18% stated that the president and vice president should resign from their positions.

III. The State of Nicaraguan Participation in Civil Organizations

As noted elsewhere, Nicaraguans have a long history of active social and political participation.[4] To establish the extent to which people are involved in groups and organizations that have an impact on the country's social and political dynamics, the AmericasBarometer included a battery measuring participation in civil organizations. The questions, which have a long history in the Barometer, are formulated as presented below.

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]**								
	Once a week	**Once or twice a month**	**Once or twice a year**	**Never**	**Don't know [DON'T READ]**	**No answer [DON'T READ]**	**Inappli-cable [DON'T READ]**	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP20. [WOMEN ONLY] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers? Do you attend them…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999	

The measurement of civil participation revolves around religious, school, community, partisan, and gender groups. As has happened in previous years and in most countries of the hemisphere, the highest rates of participation are found in religious organizations. Table 4.1 shows the

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[4] Almendárez 2009; Cruz et al. 2017; Pérez 2008.

frequency with which Nicaraguans declared attending meetings of these types of organizations in the 2019 survey.

Table 4.1. Attendance at Civil Organization Meetings, Nicaragua 2019 (%) *

	Once a Week	Once or Twice a Month	Once or Twice a Year	Never
Religious Organizations	34.6	15.0	7.6	42.8
School or College	7.8	37.7	7.2	47.2
Community Improvement Committee or Association	3.1	12.8	10.4	73.8
Political Party or Movement	3.4	8.0	8.2	80.4
Women's Association or Group (**)	3.7	5.8	4.6	85.9

(*) Rows may not add to 100 due to rounding
(**) Only women

According to the results, a little more than a third of those surveyed report that they attend religious group meetings at least once a week, while 15% say that they attend about once or twice a month. That means that half of the Nicaraguan population participates in religious groups at least once a month. In the rest of the organizations included in the survey, the participation percentages are significantly lower. For example, in school-based parent associations, only 7.8% said they participate at least once a week, while 37.7% report they participate about once or twice a month. This can be explained by the fact that not all respondents, and not all people, have sons and daughters at school and, therefore, do not need to associate with a parent association. This explanation, however, does not apply to community associations. In this case, it is possible to expect that all citizens are equally capable of participating in groups or committees to improve their place of residence. The results in this case show that only 3% of those consulted attend weekly meetings in their community and less than 13% participate on a monthly basis. Participation in political or party groups is equally low, with less than 12% of respondents reporting that they participate in these types of organizations at least once or twice a month.

To facilitate the comparison of levels of participation over time, Figure 4.1 presents the results on an average from 0 to 100, after recoding the responses, where 100 represents the highest frequency of participation and 0 represents the absence of participation in said organization. The data confirm the distribution of citizen participation in civil groups, averaging significantly higher in religious organizations than in political movements.

Figure 4.1. Average Participation in Civil Organizations, Nicaragua 2019

*Only includes women

The figure also shows the average participation of women in women's or housewives' groups, which is also low.

A comparison of these results with previous data from the AmericasBarometer reveals interesting trends. First, in terms of religious participation, there has been a slight decrease in attendance of religious organization meetings. This decrease has occurred with respect to the levels found ten years ago and has actually remained relatively stable over the last five years. Second, despite being relatively low, parents have increased their frequency of participation in associations linked to schools. According to the data, the average participation in school-related parent groups has gone from an average of almost 28 in 2008 to 35.4 in 2019, the highest recorded by Barometer surveys.

Third, attendance of community and political organization meetings has experienced notable declines in the past three years, particularly with involvement in community committees. Despite the fact that very few people actually participate in both types of associations, the data indicate that even fewer people are now involved in socially oriented groups than in the past. Finally, in the case of women's groups, the Barometer figures for recent years indicate a relatively stable trend.

Figure 4.2. Average Participation in Civil Organizations, Nicaragua 2004-2019

*Only includes women

The above results reflect the participation of Nicaraguan citizens in civil associations. What about attendance at town hall meetings, reflecting a more direct relationship with the public sector? According to the AmericasBarometer, almost 14% of the people surveyed in 2019 said they had attended an open council or city council meeting in the past year. Figure 4.3 shows that, although there has been some decrease in the percentage of participation in municipal meetings between 2016 and 2019, the degree of participation in public municipal meetings continues to be higher

than those recorded at the beginning of the decade. In fact, it is possible to say that Nicaraguans participate a slightly more in municipal meetings now than in the past.

Figure 4.3. Participation in Municipal Meetings Over the Years, Nicaragua 2004-2019

In fact, citizen participation in municipal boards or councils is not as low as in other countries in the region. In El Salvador, Mexico, Colombia, and Jamaica, the percentages of attendance of open council or municipal meetings is less than 11%. Despite the fact that this question was not included in the survey for most of the countries in the region, judging by the existing data, Nicaragua's low levels of participation does not appear to be a special case. In fact, the data available from other countries indicate that less than 15% of people participate in municipal council meetings.

IV. Interest in Politics and Political Participation in Nicaragua

Only 28% of Nicaraguans say they follow Nicaraguan politics with some or a lot of interest. These data, the result of answers to question POL1, indicate low levels of interest in politics in general.

> **POL1.** How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
> (1) A lot   (2) Some   (3) Little   (4) None

In fact, a comparison with previous AmericasBarometer results for Nicaragua reveals that interest in politics among the population has fallen since the last measurement, a change that is statistically significant. For comparison purposes, Figure 4.4 presents the averages of citizen responses to the question regarding interest on a scale of 0 to 100. The original answers were recoded so that the value 0 equals "no" interest in politics, and 100 is "a lot" of interest. According to the figures, the levels of interest in following the country's political dynamics is found to be almost the same as that registered in 2006.

Figure 4.4. Average Interest in Politics, Nicaragua 2006-2019

These levels of interest in politics also turn out to be low when compared regionally. As can be seen in Figure 4.5, Nicaragua is in the group of countries among which politics draws very little attention from its citizens. With the exception of Chile, Peru, and several of its Central American neighbors, interest in politics turns out to be much higher in most other countries in the hemisphere.

Who are the Nicaraguans most interested in politics? A series of bivariate analyses reveal that there are no statistically significant differences in attitudes towards political activity based on gender, age, or place of residence (size of city or area of the country). However, there are

important differences depending on level of education and wealth quintile. Both conditions point to a relationship between interest in politics and the position of the person surveyed within Nicaraguan society. Nicaraguans with higher levels of education and wealth tend to be more clearly interested in politics than people with less education and less resources. For example, the group of respondents who have studied at the university level has an average score of interest in politics of 41.5, more than ten points higher than the average score of the group with a primary education. Likewise, interest in politics increases as people have more economic resources. People pay more attention to politics in Nicaragua if they find themselves in a situation of social advantage. The poorest and least educated Nicaraguans do not follow political affairs in the same way.

Figure 4.5. Interest in Politics, 2018/19

Figure 4.6. Interest in Politics According to Educational Level and Wealth Quintile, Nicaragua 2019

V. Political Participation and Citizen Mistrust

The April 2018 protests, and the violent response by the government and its allies, have plunged Nicaragua into a deep political crisis. It is characterized by high levels of political repression, social uncertainty, and economic instability. As a result, and beyond specific party alliances, many people are likely to be afraid to express their political views and to openly participate in public affairs. To better understand the impact of the current crisis, the AmericasBarometer included a battery of four questions that explored the level of fear respondents may feel about participating in activities related to their political rights. The questions touched on the fear of participating in four types of activities: participation in community affairs, voting attendance, participation in peaceful protests, and running for elected office. The specific questions used are shown in the box below.

If you decided to participate in one of the activities I'm going to mention, would you do it with **no fear, some fear or a lot of fear**? [READ THE LIST, AND REPEAT THE QUESTION IF NECESARY]	No fear	Some fear	A loto f fear
DER1. Participate to resolve problems in your community?	1	2	3
DER2. Voting in a national election?	1	2	3
DER3. Participate in a peaceful demonstration?	1	2	3
DER4. Run for a public office?	1	2	3

The results of the answers to each question, as shown in Table 4.2, are very revealing. More than half of the people surveyed say they are not afraid when it comes to participating to solve community problems (55.4%) or when it comes to voting in national elections (57.6%). Some people, about 30%, express some level of fear in both cases, and just under 15% say they are very fearful. But when it comes to participating in a peaceful demonstration, the responses change substantially. Almost 44% of the respondents report they are very afraid and about 28% say they feel a little afraid. This means that around seven out of every ten Nicaraguans feel afraid to take to the streets to express themselves peacefully. In the case of running for an elected office, the answers are more evenly distributed, but about 70% of the respondents report they would feel a certain level of fear in running for office in a popular election.

Table 4.2. Fear of Participating in Public Activities, Nicaragua 2019 (%) (*) (**)

Questions	No Fear	A Little Fear	A Lot of Fear
Participate in Resolving Community Problems	55.4	31.5	13.1
Vote in a National Election	57.6	27.5	14.9
Participate in a Peaceful Demonstration	28.5	27.9	43.6
Run for an Elected Office	31.5	30.2	38.3

(*) Rows may not add to 100 due to rounding
(**) These percentages are reported based on total valid responses and therefore exclude those who answered "do not know" or who did not answer the question. [5]

These results indicate the impact that the political crisis has on citizens' attitudes related to getting involved in public affairs. These questions were asked, for the first time in many years, in the 2019 AmericasBarometer. The questions had originally been included in the first edition of the Barometer in Nicaragua in 2004. This offers the possibility of comparing the population's current levels of fear with an era in which political conditions were very different. To carry out the

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[5] The proportion of respondents who said they did not know or preferred not to answer is 4.8% for the question regarding participation in solving community problems, 4.7% regarding voting in a national election, 12.1% regarding participating in a peaceful demonstration and 14.5% in running for publicly elected office.

comparison, Figure 4.7 shows the percentage of people who expressed a little or a lot of fear related to carrying out each activity in 2004 and 2019.

Three points can be made from the examination of the results presented in the figure in question. First, it is clear that there is a significant increase in the levels of fear of participating in activities of a public and political nature compared to 2004. In all the areas consulted, including the one with the fewest political implications (such as participation in solving community problems), Nicaraguans feel much more fear today than they did in the early 2000s. In the case of voting in elections, a behavior that should be a normal exercise in a democracy, the percentage of people who expressed some or a lot of fear of going to vote more than doubled: from 18.4% to 42.2%. Second, the area where the increase in fear has been most notable, in absolute terms, is in peaceful protests. In 2004, 46.1% were afraid of protesting peacefully. In 2019, after increasing more than 25 points, 71.5% of those consulted reported some level of fear in participating in a peaceful protest. Finally, it is important to note that, at least in the case of peaceful protests and running for elected office, many Nicaraguans already expressed a certain level of fear in 2004. In other words, the fear of taking to the streets or running for elected office already existed among certain sectors of the population. The events of the past two years have only exacerbated those fears.

Figure 4.7. Fear of Participating in Various Political Activities, Nicaragua 2004 and 2019

To better understand who, among the Nicaraguan population, feel most afraid to participate, a bivariate cross of the survey item results referring to peaceful demonstrations with various sociodemographic and political variables was carried out. The data did not reveal significant differences based on age, place of residence (urban or rural), the size of the city where one lives, or one's level of wealth. The fear of participation in demonstrations is the same across all citizens when compared to the previously mentioned groups. However, the data did show statistically significant differences when comparing demographic groups according to gender and level of education. Significant differences were also found when comparing the results according to party preference and political ideology. Figure 4.8 presents the relevant comparisons.

In the case of gender, women feel more afraid than men when it comes to taking to the streets to protest. In the case of educational level, the fundamental difference is between people who have not attended school and the rest of the population. Nicaraguans who do not have any school-based education report higher average fear than people who, at least, completed some primary school, and especially in comparison to those who reached secondary school or higher education.

In other words, not attending school is associated with the fact that people are more afraid of demonstrating peacefully.

Figure 4.8. Average Levels of Fear for Participating in Peaceful Protests by Gender, Educational Level, Partisan Sympathy, and Political Ideology, Nicaragua 2019

But the results that show the strong political character of citizen fears are those that refer to partisan identification and political ideology. Responses to party identification were recoded into two groups: those who voted for the Sandinistas in the last presidential election and those who did not vote for the Sandinistas. When comparing the levels of fear between those two groups, the figures indicate that people who did not vote for the ruling party feel much more fearful of taking to the streets to protest peacefully than those who did vote for the ruling party. This trend is also found when levels of fear are compared according to political ideology. In looking at Figure 4.8, the fundamental difference is between those who identify themselves on the left and the rest of the population. Fear is significantly lower if the one's ideology is shared by the government.

The partisan nature of current citizen fears is even more remarkable when the averages of citizen fear are examined by respondents' evaluation of the president's performance. According to Figure 4.9, people who view the president's performance very negatively express twice as much fear (measured on the index from 0 to 100) of protesting peacefully than people who enthusiastically approve of President Ortega's performance in office.

Figure 4.9. Average Levels of Fear for Participating in Peaceful Protests by Evaluation of the President's Performance, Nicaragua 2019

This means that Nicaraguan men and women who do not affiliate themselves with the government or ruling party feel much more fearful of demonstrating peacefully. A very similar trend is found when fears of participating in elections are analyzed, a behavior much less compromising than protests. However, in this case, the differences are even more noticeable. For example, Figure 4.10 shows that female Nicaraguans express much more fear of voting in elections (34.5) than their male compatriots (23). As Figure 4.7 shows, the average for all Nicaraguans is 28.7. In terms of schooling, the data reveal a linear relationship with level of education and fear of participating in elections: to the extent that people have fewer years of academic training, the more fear they demonstrate of voting. In other words, lack of education stimulates fears of electoral participation. Other sociodemographic variables did not appear to be related to fear of voting, with the exception of place of residence. The data, not shown here, indicate that Nicaraguans living in rural areas of the country express more fear of voting in elections than people living in cities.

Figure 4.10. Average Levels of Fear of Voting by Gender, Educational Level, Party Sympathy, and Political Ideology, Nicaragua 2019

But again, political-party variables are also associated with fears of going to the polls. As expected, based on the results shown above, supporters of the Sandinistas and the ruling party are much less afraid to vote than those who did not vote for the Sandinistas or who did not approve of Ortega's work. In summary, Nicaraguans who do not agree with the government and the FSLN feel more fearful of expressing their political opinions through voting — and through protests. The above highlights the conditions under which the Nicaraguan population must participate politically. At the same time, it calls into question the supposedly democratic character of today's Nicaraguan political system. With high levels of fear, it stands to reason that many citizens prefer to refrain from getting involved in politics, especially if it means actions against the ruling party.

VI. Electoral Participation and Its Determinants

The above findings introduce the issue of Nicaraguan electoral participation. Specifically, they help explain citizens' electoral behavior in recent years. The data indicate that by 2019, the overwhelming majority of the people consulted, almost 85%, were able to vote because they had a national identity card. People who said they were able to vote were asked if they had voted in the last presidential elections. The central question to measure electoral participation was the following:

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2016?
(1) Voted
(2) Did not vote

According to the responses in the 2019 AmericasBarometer, a little more than half of those who were able to vote (52.4%) said they did so in the last presidential election, while the rest said they did not vote. When these data are compared with the results of previous polls, the vote reported in 2019 is considered to be the lowest recorded by the Barometer since 2004. According to Figure 4.9, the report of electoral participation in presidential elections has significantly declined since 2012, when 80% of people with an identity card, and thus were able to vote, reported doing so.

Figure 4.11. Percentage of People with National Government IDs who Voted in the Last Presidential Election, Nicaragua 2004-2019

This low electoral participation places Nicaragua as the country with the lowest participation in presidential elections in the hemisphere, according to a comparison with the rest of the countries included in the 2018/19 round of LAPOP's AmericasBarometer (Figure 4.12). These results are surprising considering that, in previous years, Nicaragua had one of the highest rates electoral participation in the Americas.[6] In 2019, on the contrary, a large number of the citizens indicated that they did not vote in the last presidential elections. This is probably due to the low levels of trust that citizens have shown in the electoral system in recent years.[7]

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[6] Coleman and Zechmeister 2015; Ortega Hegg et al. 2007.

[7] Cruz et al. 2017. During the 2016 round of the AmericasBarometer, the November presidential elections had not yet taken place, so the 2016 survey refers to participation in the 2011 elections and the 2019 survey refers to the 2016 elections.

Figure 4.12. Percentage of People Able to Vote who Voted in the Last Presidential Election in a Comparative Perspective, 2018/19

Who Continues to Vote?

According to data from the 2019 AmericasBarometer, in Nicaragua, young people voted much less than older people. Also, people with low levels of education voted at lower rates compared to other levels of education. Other variables, such as the respondent's gender, place of residence, or wealth quintile did not show statistically significant differences. However, the variables that turned out to be crucial in anticipating the probability that people will vote are those which reflect party identification. Thus, as Figure 4.11 reveals, people who see the president in a positive light voted in greater proportions in the last presidential election. More than 85% of the people who believe that the president is doing a good job voted in the last elections. In contrast, only 36.7% of those who indicated that Ortega is doing a very bad job exercised their vote. Likewise, ideology turned out to be a significant predictor of attendance in presidential elections. As can be seen, Nicaraguans who define themselves as leftists voted more than the rest of the population.

Figure 4.13. Percentage of People who Voted in the Last Presidential Elections by Age, Level of Education, Approval of the President's Performance, and Political Ideology, Nicaragua 2019

All of the above reiterates the findings that indicate the enormous influence exerted by the ruling party on political participation in Nicaragua. The people who voted the most are precisely those who agree with the ruling party and its political ideology. This is confirmed by examining the results of the question regarding political sympathies.

The AmericasBarometer surveys inquire about party identification with the following questions:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?
(1) Yes   (2) No

VB11. Which political party do you identify with?

(501) Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC)
(502) Alianza Unida Nicaragua Triunfa - Partido Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional (incluye los siguientes partidos/organizaciones: FSLN, PLN, PUC, AC, PRN, CCN, PIM, MYATAMARAM, PAL, MLC, ARNIC, PSC, MLCI, Movimiento Arriba por la República, Mov de Evangélicos en la Convergencia, Movimiento Indígena de la Costa del Caribe, Liberales Constitucionales en Convergencia)
(503) Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN)
(504) Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente (Alianza PLI) (Incluye los siguientes partidos/movimientos: PAMUC, Movimiento Liberal José Santos Zelaya)
(505) Alianza Partido Alianza por la República (APRE) (incluye los siguientes partidos: MUNRN, PRP, CGT-1, ADN, UDN, MIRAAN-MIRAAS)
(506) Partido Conservador
(507) Yatama
(508) Ciudadanos por la Libertad
(577) Other

Of all the people surveyed, 73% report that they do not identify with any political party, while only 27% report that they do identify with a political party. Within this group, 83.5% report sympathizing with Alianza Unida Nicaragua Triunfa, the party coalition led by the Sandinista Front. The rest of citizens who identified with a political party were divided among the other parties. Among those parties, the Liberal Constitutionalist Party obtained the highest percentage of support with 6.7%. In short, very few people follow political parties in Nicaragua, and among those who do — or claim to do so — the Sandinista-dominated coalition is the dominant group.

To get a more precise idea of how the party identification in favor of Ortega and Sandinismo have evolved, the responses related to the presidential vote by political party were recoded, classifying them into two groups: those who voted in favor of the FSLN and those who did not. The percentage of each group over the total surveyed population was then calculated — not just those who said they were eligible to vote or those who said they had voted. Figure 4.14 shows the evolution of support for Sandinismo over time, which gives an idea of the trajectory of support for the Sandinista government over the general population.

Figure 4.14. Percentage of People who Report They Voted for the Sandinistas by Survey Year, Nicaragua 2004-2019

As can be seen, the electoral support for the Sandinistas manifested by respondents has undergone important changes in the period between 2008 and 2019.[8] Before 2012, electoral support for the ruling party was less than 30%. Levels of support then increase significantly in 2012, after which it gradually decreases until 2019, when it totals 38% of the entire population. According to the survey results, the ruling party came to summon the support of more than half of the population in 2012; however, in 2019, only a little more than a third say they voted for the FSLN in the last presidential election. In any case, this political party is the only one that receives substantive support from the respondents. The rest of the political parties do not obtain percentages higher than 5% of the population.

Who are the official party's most frequent voters today? According to data collected by the 2019 AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua, the people most likely to vote for the Sandinistas in the last presidential election were women and older citizens. Despite the fact that women only report voting for the Sandinistas (35.9%) slightly more than men (30.8%), the difference is statistically significant. However, age emerges as the most important sociodemographic determinant of the vote in favor of Ortega. Support for the ruling party increases almost linearly with age. While only 23% of those surveyed under the age of 26 voted for Sandinistas, 38% of people between ages 46 and 55 years and 50% of those over 65 years old did. Therefore, it is possible to say that electoral support   for the ruling party is high among the country's oldest age groups and that political affinities have a strong generational character. The newer generations do not agree with the ruling party but, in light of the rest of the results, they do not agree with the other party options either.

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[8] Information on voting by political party was not available in the 2004 and 2006 surveys.

Figure 4.15. Percentage of People who Report Voting for the Sandinistas in the Last Election, by Gender and Age, Nicaragua 2019

VII. Opinions on the Political Crisis and Its Link to Participation

To explore how Nicaraguans position themselves in the face of the political crisis that began in April 2018, the AmericasBarometer for Nicaragua included two questions that refer to two points: a) if the political crisis is the product of a coup d'état, as argued by the government, and b) what is the best way to resolve the crisis. The formulation of the questions is shown in the following box.

NICJC21. Some people say that the current country's situation is the result of an attempted coup by the opposition. Do you think that is so?
(1) Yes
(2) No

NICJC22. In your opinion, what of the following is the best way out to the Nicaragua's current political crisis? **[Read alternatives]**
(1) Move the elections earlier after a reform of the electoral law.
(2) That Ortega and Murillo resign and be replaced by a governing board that ends their presidential term
(3) Let the current government stay in power
(4) That the current government be removed by force
(7) **[DON'T READ]** Other response

Two out of three people surveyed in 2019 replied that the political crisis is not the product of an attempted coup d'état by the opposition. Conversely, one in three responded affirmatively. This distribution of opinions on the coup d'état remains more or less the same in all sociodemographic groups. In other words, men and women, young and old, people with low and high levels of education, and rural and urban residents display a similar distribution in their opinions on the attempted coup.

Figure 4.16. Opinion if the Crisis Is the Product of an Attempted Coup, Nicaragua 2019

However, the way in which Nicaraguans perceive the crisis changes depending on their ideological and partisan positioning. For example, and as Figure 4.17 shows, people who defined themselves politically as leftist are more likely to interpret the crisis as the result of an attempted coup d'état by groups opposing Ortega. By contrast, less than a third of those who defined themselves as center and on the right believe that the opposition attempted to remove the government by force. This means that the government's rhetoric about an alleged coup attempt has captured a significant portion of people who do not share the government's ideology. However, it is important to note that, although the narrative of a coup d'état is much more frequent among left-wing respondents, only half of them (49.4%) hold that belief. The other half of people on the left believe that the crisis is not the product of an attempted coup.

The discourse of the coup d'état, however, is more prevalent among followers of the ruling party. When these opinions are crossed with levels of approval for Ortega's government, the vast majority of people who evaluate the performance of the president very positively believe that the current political conflict is the result of an attempted coup. This relationship between government performance and opinions on the coup d'état is practically linear. This again shows not only the enormous influence that the government's discourse has on its followers but also, and more importantly, the levels of polarization experienced by Nicaraguans in 2019. This polarization

divides citizens into two clearly defined fields: those who are in favor of the ruling party and those who are against it.

Figure 4.17. Opinions That the Crisis Is the Product of an Attempted Coup d'État by Political Ideology and Approval of the President's Performance, Nicaragua 2019

However, when the respondents answered the question about solutions to the current political crisis, responses were more varied. As Table 4.3 shows, 41% of all the people consulted were in favor of advancing the presidential elections as a way to resolve the political instability. Almost 31% of people report that Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo should remain in power, around 18% advocated that they resign and be replaced by a provisional governing board, while 8.3% desire to remove Ortega by force, and less than 2% offered other ways to solve the crisis.

The results indicate that there are differences in these opinions depending on respondent age, level of education, and place of residence. Furthermore, and unsurprisingly, there are also differences in opinions regarding how to resolve the crisis based on the partisan identification measured by the respondent's vote choice in the last presidential election. In the case of age, young people favor the advancement of elections more than any other option. On the other hand, older people more frequently report the preference that Ortega and Murillo stay in power (see Table 4.3). Similarly, people with higher levels of education and those who live in urban areas are more in favor of replacing Ortega and Murillo through the advancement of elections.

Finally, the results indicate that more than half of Sandinista supporters desire that Ortega and Murillo remain in power; while almost half of those who did not vote for the Sandinistas in the most recent presidential elections are in favor of holding early elections, after reforming the law.

Table 4.3. Opinions on the Best Way Out of the Crisis by Variable (%)*

Variables	Response Options				
	Advance Presidential Elections	**Ortega and Murillo Resign**	**Let the Current Government Remain**	**Remove the Government by Force**	**Other Responses**
Total	**41.3**	**17.7**	**30.9**	**8.3**	**1.8**
Age Groups					
16 to 25 Years	43.1	21.9	25.6	8.7	0.6
26 to 35 Years	43.8	16.9	28.7	8.6	1.9
36 to 45 Years	39.5	14.8	36.9	7.4	1.5
46 to 55 Years	40.4	14.4	34.9	8.2	2.0
56 to 65 Years	36.1	13.9	33.3	9.3	7.4
66 Years and older	33.9	14.5	45.2	4.8	1.6
Level of Education					
None	25.4	14.9	35.8	16.4	7.5
Primary	37.7	18.0	34.1	7.6	2.5
Secondary	43.0	18.8	28.9	8.2	1.0
Higher Education	46.0	15.1	29.9	7.5	1.4
Area of Country					
Urban	43.7	17.3	28.4	9.1	1.5
Rural	37.4	18.5	35.1	6.8	2.3
Voted in the Presidential Election					
Did Not Vote for the Sandinistas	48.9	19.7	19.1	10.8	1.5
Voted for Sandinistas	27.2	14.0	53.0	3.5	2.2

(*) Rows may not add to 100 due to rounding

VIII. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the results of the AmericasBarometer on citizen participation in the country's public affairs. The main findings can be summarized in four points. First, there is a notable decline in levels of citizen participation in social organizations, in general. This appears to be linked to a decline in general interest and political participation. In 2019, the Nicaraguan population seems to be less interested in getting politically involved when compared to previous years. Second, and related to the previous point, low levels of participation are strongly influenced

by an increase in fear. Fear of participating cross all measured areas: they range from involvement in solving community problems to participation in peaceful protests and voting in elections. The increase in fear of participating occurs in all social sectors, but it is particularly strong among those who oppose the official party and the Ortega government. Third, the results show the enormous impact that political polarization has on opinions about the country. Nicaraguans are divided between a sector that unconditionally supports the ruling party and those who reject the government and their party. Identification with the ruling party bring together a third of the population, especially the elderly, and consolidate around the FSLN. Antipathies towards the ruling party, which concentrate the majority of the population, especially the young, are not consolidated in a single partisan option. Finally, the majority of the population is in favor of a change of government and is divided between those who prefer an orderly transition through electoral reforms and the advancement of elections, and those who prefer that the government leaders immediately leave power. Most Nicaraguans who want to see the Ortegas out of government advocate for the advancement of the elections.

Chapter 5.
Freedom of Expression and the Political Crisis in Nicaragua

José Miguel Cruz[1]

I. Introduction

In recent years, important advances have been made in the adoption of freedom of information laws in Latin America. According to UNESCO, almost twenty countries in the Americas have passed laws that advance and protect access to information.[2] This progress is part of multisectoral efforts to expand freedoms of expression in the region. However, these efforts contrast with recent populist political trends, which have significantly reduced freedom of the press in several Latin American countries.[3] More than a decade ago, the prominent Nicaraguan journalist, Carlos Fernando Chamorro, pointed out that in order to consolidate power, new governments identify freedom of expression and "the independent media as the enemy to defeat."[4]

This chapter presents the results of the AmericasBarometer that refer to the exercise of freedom of expression, of the press, and of access to information. It is divided into four sections. The first section presents the results of the questions on freedom of the press and of expression. The second focuses on the importance of the media in Nicaragua. The third brings the discussion about the freedoms of expression to citizens' daily lives and analyzes data referring to Nicaraguans' fears of openly discussing politics. The last two sections describe how citizens obtain and access news and political information; first describing how frequently respondents are informed through traditional media sources and then analyzing the role of social networks in accessing information.

II. Key Findings

- In 2019, about 70% of those consulted by the AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua report that there is very little freedom of the press and very little freedom to express political opinions. These opinions have increased significantly compared to the last measurement in 2016, when less than 56% expressed similar opinions.

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[2] See: Freedom of Information in Latin America and the Caribbean. In: http://www.unesco.org/new/es/communication-and-information/freedom-of-expression/freedom-of-information/foi-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

[3] Waisbord 2013.

[4] Chamorro 2009.

- These opinions about the lack of freedom of expression are even more frequent among Nicaraguans who did not vote for Ortega in the last presidential election.

- Most of the people consulted, about 70% of the population, think that independent media are very important to the country. However, a little more than half, 53.6%, believe that freedom of the press in the media has been reduced.

- Supporters of the ruling party and the president tend to more frequently believe that freedom of expression in the media has increased in the past year.

- Almost 78% of the citizens consulted said that, nowadays, one has to be careful in talking about politics. Only 21.5% feel that talking about politics among friends is normal.

- Apprehension about discussing politics has increased in recent years. The percentage of people in 2014 who reported they had to be careful with talking about politics was 54.8%. This percentage increased to 62.6% in 2016 and 78% in 2019.

- Opinions that one must be careful in discussing politics are frequent in all Nicaraguan social groups, but they are especially high among those who do not sympathize with the ruling party.

- Following the news, in general, has decreased somewhat compared to previous years.

- Almost half of the Nicaraguans surveyed said they have Facebook and WhatsApp accounts, the most popular social networks in the country. However, Facebook is the social network most used to receive political news.

III. Opinions on Freedom of the Press and Expression

One of the fundamental indicators of the health of a democratic regime is the extent to which citizens perceive that there is freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The 2018 political crisis has raised many questions about if and to what extent the political regime allows for sufficient press freedom. In previous years, some sectors had expressed concerns about the growing restrictions on freedom of expression in Nicaragua and its link with the authoritarian consolidation of the current government.[5] The government responses to the social protests that began in April 2018 have made those concerns more apparent. The closure of various media outlets, the criminalization of social protests, and the harassment of those who express being against the government by paramilitary groups have brought the need to explore how citizens perceive their freedom of expression to the table for discussion.

To find out the extent to which Nicaraguans are concerned about the state of freedom of expression and freedom of the press in the country, the AmericasBarometer included two

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[5] Ieepp 2018; Marti and Puig 2016.

questions to collect their opinions. The way the questions were asked is presented in the following box, while the general results are shown in Figure 5.1.

	Very little	Enough	Too much
LIB1. Do you believe that nowadays in the country we have very little, enough or too much freedom of press?	1	2	3
LIB2C. And freedom to express political views without fear. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3

The results of the 2019 Barometer indicate that the vast majority of Nicaraguans believe that there is very little freedom of the press and expression in 2019. In both cases, approximately seven out of ten people consulted said that there is very little freedom of the press and very little freedom to express political opinions without fear. Fewer than 15% of Nicaraguans report the belief that there are sufficient levels of freedom and the same percentage indicate that there is "too much" freedom.

These questions have not been asked in all editions of the AmericasBarometer, only in a few survey rounds, but a comparison with the existing data from those years gives an idea of the perceived deterioration of freedoms in the country. To facilitate the comparison, Figure 5.2 displays a comparison of the percentage of people who said that there is very little freedom of the press in 2004, 2016, and 2019, and very little freedom of expression in 2016 and 2019.

As can be seen in the case of freedom of the press, in previous years (2004 and 2016), almost half of the population believed there was very little freedom of the press. That response increased by more than 20 percentage points between 2016 and 2019. These data allow us to point out two things. First, that a significant part of the population (almost half) believed there was very little freedom of the press in the country long before the 2018 political crisis; and, secondly, that the political crisis seems to have contributed significantly to the perception of restricted press freedom. In other words, the country's political situation has exacerbated the problem in the area of the press already perceived by people in Nicaragua. In the case of freedom of expression, in general, the previous data available only includes the year 2016 and also reveals a notable jump in perceptions of limited freedom of expression in the country: these opinions went from 55% in 2016 to almost 71% in 2019.

Figure 5.1. Opinions About Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Expression, Nicaragua 2019

Figure 5.2. Opinion That There Is Very Little Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Opinion by Survey Year, Nicaragua 2004, 2016, 2019

These figures confirm the findings reported in the previous chapter; results which indicate an increase in citizen fears related to political participation. Most Nicaraguans perceive that there is

very little freedom of expression and freedom of press in the country. Those views have been exacerbated today, in comparison to the years before the crisis.

An examination of these opinions based on different demographic variables, such as gender, age, level of education, and area of country, does not reveal substantive differences in opinions among the different groups. In all cases, the vast majority of people share the perception that there are very few freedoms of expression and press today. The differences are concentrated on the intensity with which the opinions about the lack of freedoms are expressed. However, when these opinions are crossed with the variable of party sympathies, specifically the one that separates those who voted, and did not vote, in favor of the Sandinistas, the results are different. As Figure 5.3 shows, approximately eight out of ten people who did not vote for Ortega believe that there are very few freedoms in Nicaragua. In contrast, the percentage of people who did vote for the ruling party and who think that there are too few freedoms of expression and press is much lower, at 57%. Instead, more than 40% of Sandinista voters report the belief that there is enough or too much freedom of expression in Nicaragua.

Figure 5.3. Opinions on Freedom of the Press and of Expression by Voting Preference in the Last Presidential Election, Nicaragua 2019

These figures suggest two things. First, that even among FSLN voters, most people think that there are not enough protections for freedom of expression in Nicaragua. While this majority does not

reach the levels of the rest of the population, the data clearly indicate that there is awareness among them about restrictions on these freedoms. Second, and despite the above, the AmericasBarometer reveals that some supporters of the ruling party have positive opinions about the state of freedom of expression in Nicaragua, even in the midst of the crisis. These individuals probably constitute the hardest core of support for the government and for whom no restrictions on these fundamental freedoms exist.

IV. The Media

The 2019 AmericasBarometer for Nicaragua also explored how the population views the media. In the context of the political crisis, many media critical of the government have had to limit their operations or even close their doors due to harassment by groups allied with the government.[6] The AmericasBarometer includes two questions to collect opinions on the media and their functions in Nicaragua's current situation.

NICMEDIA2. What do you think of the independent media (not affiliated with the government)? That these means exist is **[Read alternatives]**
(1) Very important   (2) Important   (3) Regular   (4) Not important
(5) Not Important at all

NICMEDIA1. During the past 12 months, have you noticed that freedom of expression in the media has increased, remained the same, or decreased?
(1) Increased   (2) Remained the same   (3) Decreased

In line with the findings from the previous section, the data indicate that the majority of the population thinks that the existence of independent media is important (Figure 5.4). Almost 70% of all Nicaraguans surveyed said that the independent media is important or very important. The rest of the population placed less emphasis on the importance of the media. However, at the same time, more than half of those consulted, 53.6%, report that freedom of the press has decreased, 25.6% said that freedom has remained the same, and a little less than 21% report that freedom of the press has increased.

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[6] Cuadra Lira 2018.

Figure 5.4. Opinions About the Media and Freedom of the Press, Nicaragua 2019

In the case of opinions regarding the importance of the independent media, a comparison with the results of previous surveys (2014 and 2016)[7] reveals a gradual but significant increase in the

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[7] This question was not included in the AmericasBarometer prior to 2014.

opinion that the media are "very" important. Specifically, in 2014, 27% of respondents held that opinion. In 2016, the percentage in that category rose to 29.6%. In 2019, as we have seen, the proportion of respondents who believe that the media is very important is 31.5%. However, and strikingly, the percentage of people who believe the media are "not at all" important also increased in the same period. In 2014, an insignificant percentage, 1.3%, said that the independence of the media was not important; in 2016, that percentage had reached almost 5% and, by 2019, it has exceeded 9%. In other words, although few Nicaraguans consider media independence to be unimportant, that group has grown significantly in recent years. This trend suggests the consolidation of certain opinions favorable to the government's discourse.

Opinions that media independence is important is overwhelming in all social groups. However, there are important differences depending on the level of education, place of residence, and political affinities. To easily compare the results, the responses were recoded on a scale from 0 to 100, where the strongest opinion in favor of the importance of an independent media receives a score of 100, while the responses that minimized the importance of media independence received a score of 0 (intermediate responses received intermediate scores). As Figure 5.5 shows, people with more years of education value media independence more than people without schooling or with only a few years of education. In the same way, citizens who live in cities appreciate the autonomy of the media slightly more than Nicaraguans living in rural areas. The data did not reveal substantial differences when comparing social groups according to age or level of wealth.

Figure 5.5. Average Importance of Media Independence by Level of Education, Place of Residence, Approval of Presidential Performance, and Vote in the Last Presidential Election, Nicaragua 2019

However, when the results are grouped by political sympathy, opinions reveal important distinctions. As expected, in light of past results, supporters of the Sandinista government value media independence less. This can be seen in the reduction of the average scores among those who report a positive impression of Ortega's performance and among those who said they voted for the Sandinistas in the last presidential election. Despite the fact that, in both cases, the majority of official supporters continue to value the autonomy of the press, the intensity with which they do so is significantly less than the rest of the population.

Furthermore, opinions on the importance of freedom of expression in the media are strongly related to levels of political tolerance. As Figure 5.6 reveals, people who are most politically tolerant, according to the traditional LAPOP measurement (see Chapter 2), are the ones who score higher in opinions that it is important that media with independence from the government exist.

Figure 5.6. Average Opinion Regarding the Importance of Independent Media by Political Tolerance, Nicaragua 2019

All of the above is related and explains the opinions on the state of freedom of expression in the country's press. As shown in Figure 5.4, more than half of respondents stated that press freedom has decreased in the past year.

To facilitate the analysis presented below, answers to the question about the recent evolution of freedom of expression were recoded on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 captures the most negative opinions (that freedom expression has decreased) and 100 the most positive (which are that freedom of expression has increased). When these data are analyzed according to government sympathies, the results indicate a trend very similar to those shown above (see Figure 5.7). This trend indicates that people who view Ortega's performance more favorably think that freedom of expression in the press has increased significantly in the last year. Average scores on the scale from 0 to 100 range from 20.2 among those who think that the government is performing poorly to almost 56 among those who believe the president does his job very well.

Figure 5.7. Average Opinion That Freedom of Expression in the Media Has Increased in the Last Year by Approval of Presidential Performance, Nicaragua 2019

Again, perceptions of the state of freedom of expression in Nicaragua are highly influenced by political sympathies. However, most people have seen a deterioration in freedoms over the past year, as shown in Figure 5.8. In fact, the average score of opinions that maintain that freedom of expression has increased in the last year has decreased dramatically in the last AmericasBarometer, from 58.5 in 2016 to 33.6 in 2019. It is also worth noting that a statistically significant reduction had already occurred between 2014 and 2016. However, it is likely that political events since 2018 have precipitated the current negative assessment of the state of freedom of expression in the press.

Figure 5.8. Average Opinion That Freedom of Expression in the Media Has Increased in the Last Year by Survey Year, Nicaragua 2014-2019

V. Fear of Talking About Politics

These findings are consistent with the results regarding Nicaraguan attitudes about political discussions. Those surveyed by the AmericasBarometer were asked about their attitude when it comes to talking about politics. The formulation of the question is shown below.

NICFEAR. Which perspective best describes your attitude about political discussions?
[Read alternatives]
(1) Talking about politics is normal with my friends
(2) Beware of talking about politics, even with friends
(3) **[DON'T READ]** Depends on the circumstances

The vast majority of people, almost 78%, report that they must be careful when it comes to talking about politics nowadays, even among friends (see Figure 5.9). Only 21.5% feel it is normal to talk about politics. This means that eight out of ten Nicaraguans do not feel free to discuss the country's political affairs. As Figure 5.10 reveals, these attitudes have increased significantly in recent years, particularly between 2016 and 2019, when important sectors of the population came out to protest and the government closed public spaces to such activities. In any case, it is important to note that precautionary attitudes in discussing politics were already very evident among Nicaraguans before the political crisis and reached more than half the population in 2014. The increase in government repression after the outbreak of social protests in 2018 further increased citizen suspicion, resulting in few people today being willing to speak openly about politics in the country.

Figure 5.9. Opinions About Political Discussions, Nicaragua 2019

Figure 5.10. Percentage of Respondents who Report They Should Be Careful Not to Talk About Politics by Survey Year, Nicaragua 2014-2019

Fears regarding talking about politics affect the entire population, but the Barometer data indicate that they impact people with low levels of education and those who are in the lowest wealth quintile particularly hard. For example, 92% of Nicaraguans who have no schooling said that one has to be careful when talking about politics; likewise, 82% of respondents who make up the first quintile of wealth are also afraid to talk about politics.[8]

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[8] The graphs showing these cross-tabulations are not displayed for space reasons.

The fear of talking about politics is also nuanced by Nicaraguans' political sympathies. Figure 5.11 reveals that fears of talking about politics are almost universal (85% or more) among those who negatively evaluate the president's performance. On the other hand, those who positively rated the executive's performance have lower levels of fear in talking about politics. In any case, apprehension in discussing Nicaraguan politics reaches the entire population. This indicates that the climate of social tension generated by the Ortega administration's response to citizen demands also affects its own supporters.

Figure 5.11. Percentage of People who Report that one has to be Careful not to Talk About Politics by Approval of Presidential Performance, Nicaragua 2019

VI. Means of Political Information

According to the answers to questions on news consumption (see the box below), about half of the people consulted (45.1%) follow the news daily via various forms of press and media, including the internet. A little more than a third of respondents report that they follow the news a few times a week and the rest responded with lower frequencies (Figure 5.12).

> **GI0N.** About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]:**
> (1) Daily   (2) A few times a week   (3) A few times a month
> (4) A few times a year   (5) Never

Figure 5.12. Frequency with Which Respondents Follow Different News Sources, Nicaragua 2019

These responses suggest that a good part of the Nicaraguan population consistently follow the news in 2019. However, when comparing these results with those of previous years, there is a slight but statistically significant decrease in the intensity with which respondents follow the news in Nicaragua.[9] In other words, in 2019, many people are following the news less frequently compared to the past. From the available data, it is not possible to know with certainty the reasons for this decrease, especially since the data between 2010 and 2016 displayed significant consistency in respondents' behavior. In light of the findings in this chapter, one possible explanation is that the closure of media outlets and areas of free speech may have reduced interest in general news by the media.

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[9] As usual, to make the comparison easier, the responses were recoded on a scale from 0 to 100, where average scores close to 100 represent a very frequent monitoring of the news via different media.

Figure 5.13. Average of How Often Respondents Follow the News via Various Media Sources, Nicaragua 2010-2019

VII. The Reach of Social Media

Given the growing importance of social networks in communications and the transmission of news and political information, the 2019 AmericasBarometer included a battery of questions about some of the applications or social networks most used by the population.[10] The battery asked about the use of three of the most popular social networks in Latin America: Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. The battery includes three questions for each social network: a) if the respondent has a registered account, b) the frequency with which they use the social network in general, and c) the frequency with which the respondent sees political information on that social network. Given that the fundamental interest in this report has to do with access to political information, this report only includes people who report having social network accounts and the level at which they access political information through those networks. The following box displays the formulation of the questions, whose results are presented in the report.

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[10] This topic is covered in depth in Chapter 3.

SMEDIA1. Do you have a Facebook account?

(1) Yes **[Continue]**

(2) No **[Skip to SMEDIA4]**

SMEDIA3. How often do you **see political information** on Facebook? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Daily
(2) A few times a week
(3) A few times a month
(4) A few times a year
(5) Never

SMEDIA4. Do you have a Twitter account?

(1) Yes **[Contonue]**

(2) No **[Skip to SMEDIA7]**

SMEDIA6. How often do you **see political information** on Twitter? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Daily

(2) A few times a week

(3) A few times a month

(4) A few times a year

(5) Never

SMEDIA7. Do you have a WhatsApp account?

(1) Yes **[Continue]**

(2) No **[Skip to R3]**

SMEDIA9. How often do you **see political information** on WhatsApp? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Daily
(2) A few times a week
(3) A few times a month
(4) A few times a year
(5) Never

Of all people consulted, 49% report that they have a Facebook account. Compared to Twitter and WhatsApp, this is the most popular social network among Nicaraguans. The next most popular social network is WhatsApp, where almost 48% of Nicaraguans report they were registered on this social network. Twitter turned out to be the least used social network by Nicaraguans. According to the results, only 6% said they have a Twitter account.

To estimate the role of these networks in the dissemination and communication of news and political information, the responses regarding the frequency with which respondents review information on each of the networks were recoded. Responses were transformed on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 means that the person does not view political news on that network, while 100 indicates that the person views news of a political nature daily on that network. It is important to add that the estimation of the scores was made on the basis of the entire surveyed population, not only of those who claim to have an account on each social network. The fundamental purpose is

to measure how much reach each social media platform has with respect to the entire Nicaraguan population.

Figure 5.14. Average Use of Each Social Network to Receive Political Information, Nicaragua 2019

The data, which are expressed in average scores, indicate that the most used social network to receive news and political information is Facebook, with an average of 28.1, followed by WhatsApp with 16.7. Very few people receive information through Twitter, and this is probably because very few people in Nicaragua have a Twitter account. The results for Facebook indicate that close to a third of Nicaraguans are exposed to political information that is transmitted and displayed on that platform.

Who are the people most exposed to information and news on social networks? To analyze this, a variable was created that consolidates the data from each of the social media platforms on a single scale from 0 to 100, where 100 means the highest possible level of reception of information through the three social networks. The average for the entire population surveyed on the scale was 16.1, which suggests a very low level of overall network use. The results reveal several interesting points and some of them are presented in Figure 5.15. First, men (18.2) receive much more political information through social networks than women (13.9). Second, there is a clear - almost linear - relationship between age and the use and reception of news through social network applications: the older the citizen, the less they use social networks to obtain information about political issues. In any case, that does not mean that all young people receive news via social networks. In general, few people (of any age) use the networks to inform themselves. Third, level of education plays a fundamental role in the ability to receive information through social networks. People with a university education receive news via social networks about ten times more frequently than people who have not received any schooling. Fourth, people who live in cities and those who have more wealth use social networks more than those who live in rural areas or those who have low economic resources. However, the most interesting results are those that

simultaneously reveal that people who see the Ortega regime more negatively and more positively are the ones who receive the most political information through social networks. In other words, the Nicaraguans who evaluated Ortega's performance as "very bad" and as "very good" are the ones who use the networks the most, compared to those who evaluated the government less intensively (see Figure 5.15). However, when respondents were grouped based on their last presidential vote, the data indicates that Sandinista voters used social media a little more than those who did not vote for the Sandinistas.

Figure 5.15. Average Reception of Political Information via Social Networks by Age, Level of Education, Approval of the President's Performance, and Vote for the Sandinistas, Nicaragua 2019

Rather than indicating contradictions, these data suggest that the people who follow the news the most through social networks are those who are the most politically active. In the group of those who did not vote for the Sandinistas, there are many who did not actually vote and were not interested in the electoral process.

The role of social networks in Nicaraguan political processes is complex. As several studies have pointed out,[11] social networks can be used as an instrument of democratization, as well as a tool to control the population. Examining the way in which Nicaraguans receive political information through the networks also reveals that, on the one hand, people who are not afraid to talk about politics are more likely to receive political information from social networks, but, on the other hand, those who think that the political crisis is the product of an attempted coup d'état are usually more exposed to social networks. In this sense, the use of social networks seems to offer slight

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[11] Shirky 2011; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2014.

benefit the current Nicaraguan government. This implies that while networks can contribute to overcoming barriers related to fear in political communication, they can also promote undemocratic narratives. The AmericasBarometer displays these disagreements clearly in Figure 5.16.

Figure 5.16. Average Reception of Political Information via Social Networks by Fear of Discussing Politics and Opinion That the Crisis Is the Result of a Coup, Nicaragua 2019

VIII. Conclusion

The results presented in this chapter highlight the concerns and challenges facing the exercise of freedom of expression and of the press in Nicaragua today. Firstly, the vast majority of Nicaraguans believe that there is very little freedom of the press and expression in 2019. Those opinions have been in the public consciousness for some years, but they have increased significantly since 2016, in a large part as a product of the closure of media outlets and public spaces of protest following the crisis. Even the majority of people who sympathize with the Ortega government think that Nicaragua suffers from limited freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

This is related to the fact that, for the majority of citizens, it is very important that there is freedom of expression and of the press that is independent from the government. Even with this understanding, more than half of the people consulted are convinced that there has been a significant reduction in freedom of expression in the media.

Those limitations on freedoms of expression, in general and in the media, are also manifested by the fact that almost all Nicaraguans are afraid to talk about politics, even among their own friends and acquaintances. Those fears cross all social groups, including Ortega's followers, and have markedly increased since 2016.

Related to the above, the results of the AmericasBarometer have also registered a significant decrease in news consumption through traditional media sources. Nicaraguans say they follow the news in the national press less than they did a few years ago. This could be due, at least in part, not to a lack of citizen interest but to reduced access to media outlets, although being able to affirm this conclusion is not possible without doing additional studies of Nicaraguan public opinion. In this context, the consumption of news through social networks, especially through Facebook, is important, but it does not reach the majority of the population and faces difficulties of access among people with less education, fewer economic resources, and for those who are socially marginalized. Despite this, the data also reveal that the role of social networks is complex. On the one hand, networks offer the opportunity to overcome fears by informing and communicating on political issues, but, on the other hand, they also offer the potential to feed narratives contrary to institutional solutions of political problems.

Chapter 6.
Migration as a Personal Way Out of the Political Crisis

José Miguel Cruz[1]

I. Introduction

In the late 1970s, Albert O. Hirschman, a leading political economist, published an article arguing that citizens who are dissatisfied with the functioning of the state or a political system face the same dilemmas faced by people discontented with an organization. These dilemmas are: a) they make their dissatisfaction known in the hope of transforming the organization or b) they leave the organization in the case there is no opportunity to change it.[2] In some cases, there is a third option: founding a new organization. People in a country who are unhappy with how their political regime works face the same alternatives. If they are dissatisfied, they can vote and/or take actions to change the government. However, if they cannot vote or change the government or the political regime, with the knowledge that they cannot found a new country, there is no other alternative but to emigrate.

Apart from the economic and social repercussions, migration has an important impact on the political dynamics of a country. It allows dissidents to find spaces for social and political expression in other settings. However, it also allows governments and regimes to remain in power because they do not face the same levels of response resulting from the accumulation of dissidents.[3] In the case of Nicaragua, it is very likely that the closure of spaces for political participation (which was explored in Chapter 4) and freedom of expression (Chapter 5) is forcing many citizens from all social groups to consider migration as a personal response to the current political crisis. In the past, Nicaragua has been characterized by emigration strongly linked to the country's political processes.[4] These patterns differ fundamentally from the emigration trends experienced by its neighboring countries.[5] According to several studies on migration, Nicaragua experienced one of its largest waves of migration as a result of the political instability related to the Revolution. Many citizens emigrated to flee political change and, when they did, they concentrated in the neighboring country of Costa Rica. Subsequent waves of migration were stripped of their political character and were more marked by economic reasons, but they continued the geographical pattern of expatriation to Costa Rica. This chapter is precisely devoted to exploring these points. It presents the results of the questions on migration and the opinions of those surveyed by the AmericasBarometer on the conditions surrounding the phenomenon of migration. The chapter has two major parts. The first is devoted to presenting the general results

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[2] Hirschman 1978.

[3] Goodman and Hiskey 2008.

[4] Fussell 2010.

[5] Massey and Sana 2003; Fussell 2010.

of the questions on migration; while the second tries to analyze the various conditions, in addition to politics, that may be behind the decision of some Nicaraguans to emigrate in 2019.

II. Key Findings

- Three out of ten Nicaraguans consulted by the AmericasBarometer in 2019 said they intend to move or work in another country in the next three years. This percentage is similar to that obtained in 2016 but is higher compared to the results obtained in 2012 and 2014. In addition, it places Nicaragua within the group of countries in which the most people intend to migrate.

- Intentions to migrate are higher among younger people and among men. For example, almost 40% of people under the age of 26 express intentions to leave the country.

- The intentions to leave the country are linked to economic problems and concerns about the political situation. For example, almost 40% of people who report they had run out of food in their home in the past three months said they wanted to leave the country. Meanwhile, three out of ten respondents said they have considered emigrating for political reasons.

- The preferred destination for those who have thought of emigrating is Costa Rica. Almost 44% of those who have thought of leaving identified the Central American country as a possible destination. In contrast, only 15% of those who thought of emigrating identified the United States.

III. Intentions to Migrate

Three out of ten Nicaraguans said they harbor intentions to leave the country to live or work elsewhere. This is the result of the fundamental question asked by the Barometer in 2019 (see question Q14 in the following box and Figure 6.1).

Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?   (1) Yes **[Continue]**　　　　　　(2) No **[Skip to Q14B]**
Q14F. How likely is it that you will go to live or work in another country in the next three years? **[Read alternatives]**   (1) Very likely   (2) Somewhat likely   (3) A little likely   (4) Not likely

Figure 6.1. Percentage of People who Intend to Live or Work in Another Country, Nicaragua 2019

What do these results mean in a historical and regional context? A comparison with the results of previous years reveals that the percentage of Nicaraguans with intentions to leave the country has increased significantly in the last five years, but does not register as the highest percentage of intentions to emigrate since the start of the AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua.

Indeed, the proportion of respondents who said they wanted to emigrate went from 23% in 2014 to 30.6% in 2016 and remained practically unchanged in 2019. This means that the trigger for the increase in these intentions did not occur with the 2018 crisis, but rather happened sometime between 2014 and 2016. In this context, it is important to mention that the last presidential elections took place in November 2016. They were characterized by the concern of various sectors about the already perceptible closure of spaces and political alternatives for opponents of the government party.[6] These conditions may have already stimulated many people to think about emigration since then. However, Figure 6.2 also shows that in 2008, the most notable increase in intentions to emigrate is seen. These wishes came in the context of the holding of municipal elections that consolidated the Sandinistas' power and on the brink of the economic recession that shook the United States that same year.

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[6] Cruz et al. 2017; Cuadra Lira 2018; Jarquín 2016.

Figure 6.2. Percentage of People with Intentions to Migrate by Survey Year, Nicaragua 2004-2019

In any case, the group of Nicaraguans trying to migrate outside the country constitutes an important sector of the population. In relative terms, more Nicaraguans are thinking of leaving the country than citizens of countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, or Mexico, which have had high rates of migration in recent years. As Figure 6.3 reveals, Nicaragua is part of a set of countries from which citizens are considering emigrating. Only in four countries in the region (Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Bolivia) are there significantly higher percentages of people with intentions to go and live elsewhere.

Now, Nicaraguans who replied that they intended to migrate were asked how likely they were to do so (question Q14F in the box). Most of them, 77.7% said that it was very or somewhat likely that they would emigrate, 18% said they were somewhat unlikely to emigrate, and 4.3% said that it was unlikely that they would emigrate. In short, almost all the people who claimed to have the intention of emigrating believe they are very likely to do so. The same question was asked to the respondents in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. With the exception of Hondurans (79.6%), Nicaraguans have the highest percentages of people who say that they are very or somewhat likely to leave their country (see Table 1). In other words, Nicaraguans are the nationality with the second highest levels of desires to emigrate.

Figure 6.3. Percentage of Intentions to Emigrate in Comparative Perspective, 2018/19

Table 6.1. Probability That Respondent Will Go to Another Country, Nicaragua and Other Select Countries, 2019
(In percentages, only among those who answered that they intend to emigrate)

Country	Answer			
	Very Likely	**Somewhat Likely**	**Somewhat Unlikely**	**Not Likely**
Nicaragua	43.6	34.1	18.0	4.3
Mexico	35.6	35.9	24.1	4.4
Guatemala	39.2	27.9	28.4	4.5
El Salvador	35.7	32.6	23.3	8.5
Honduras	51.3	28.3	16.8	3.6

IV. Reasons for Migrating

Who are the Nicaraguans with the strongest desires to emigrate? To identify the variables that play an important role in the desire to leave the country, a multivariate logistic regression was carried out. In addition to the sociodemographic variables, the regression included factors that may be associated with migration: the respondent's economic situation, insecurity due to crime, and the political situation.

Of the sociodemographic variables included in the analysis, two showed a significant difference, in regards to the intention to emigrate, among the surveyed population: gender and age. As can be seen in Figure 6.4, female Nicaraguans exhibit lower intentions of leaving the country (25.3%) than their male compatriots (35.2%). But the largest significant differences are found by age group. Almost 40% of Nicaraguans aged 25 and under expressed intentions to leave the country. This percentage decreases substantially as the age of the respondents increases, until it almost disappears when around the age of 66. Thus, for example, among those between 36 and 45 years of age, the percentage who want to emigrate is 30%, while among those between 46 and 55 years of age, the proportion drops to just over 20%. In short, the intentions to settle in another country are notably concentrated among the youngest Nicaraguans.

Figure 6.4. Percentage with Intentions to Emigrate by Respondent Gender and Age, Nicaragua 2019

Other demographic characteristics, such as level of education, wealth quintile, and place of residence have little relevance when considering the gender, age, and other variables associated with the intention to migrate. Those variables are of an economic and political nature. In economic terms, the AmericasBarometer included several questions that refer to the economic circumstances that people must face on a daily basis. One of them is food security, which refers to whether the person surveyed has run out of food at home due to lack of resources in the last three months.[7] The results of this question constitute an important predictor of intentions to migrate.

As Figure 6.5 reveals, almost 40% of Nicaraguans who have run out of food at home at some point in the past three months have considered leaving the country to live or work elsewhere. On the other hand, among people who have not had such problems, the percentage is 26%. Other questions that reflect respondents' economic insecurity confirm this trend in a statistically significant way, that is, economic problems have a substantial impact on the desire to leave Nicaragua. However, running out of food at home is one of the most pressing conditions that result in thinking of leaving the country.

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[7] The question was asked in the following way: "FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?" Among respondents, 32.2% answered affirmatively, that is, they ran out of food at home in the last three months; while the rest, 67.8%, said no.

Figure 6.5. Percentage of Those with Intentions to Emigrate by Problems with Food at Home in the Last Three Months, Nicaragua 2019

The other conditions that fuel the desire to leave the country are clearly of a political nature. Citizens who are most disappointed with the political system, how it functions, and who negatively evaluate the performance of Ortega and the presidency are more likely to report intentions of leaving the country when compared to the rest of the population, especially those who support the political system and the government. As Figure 6.6 shows, among those who show very low levels of support for the political system and those who negatively evaluate Ortega's presidency, the percentage of people who have considered leaving the country exceeds 45%. In contrast, less than 20% of people who demonstrate high levels of support for the political system and who believe the president is performing well report a desire to emigrate. As Hirschman (1978) predicted, the people who are most disappointed with the country's leadership are the ones who want to leave the most. This finding is repeated with other variables of a political nature. For example, people who say they would not vote for the ruling party, either because they would vote for another party, would void their vote, or simply not go to vote, show more intentions to emigrate than supporters of the ruling party (Figure 6.7).

Nicaraguan migration abroad has clear social and political implications for the country. First, it ensures that people who are disappointed with the regime and who disagree with the government are more concerned with leaving than engaging in the political dynamic. And, secondly, migration favors the permanence of the system and regime by removing dissidents through their departure from the country.

Figure 6.6. Percentage of Those with Intentions to Emigrate by Support for the Political System and Approval of the President's Performance, Nicaragua 2019

Figure 6.7. Percentage of Those with Intentions to Emigrate by Voting Intentions in the Next Elections, Nicaragua 2019

These findings contrast with that found by other authors regarding intentions to migrate from other Central American countries.[8] In places like Honduras and El Salvador, insecurity and victimization play an important role in intentions to emigrate. In the case of Nicaragua, insecurity and crime do not play an important role in migration when political and economic factors are considered. In other words, in 2019, Nicaraguans think about migrating because they do not have enough to eat or because they do not have real alternatives to choose their political representatives, not because they feel unsafe due to crime.

In fact, the AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua directly asked if respondents have considered migrating outside the country for political reasons in the last year and the countries to which they have thought of going (see box below). The results reiterate the enormous weight that the current political situation has on the desire to leave the country. Three out of ten Nicaraguans said they have considered emigrating for political reasons (Figure 6.8).

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[8] Hiskey et al. 2018.

Q14B. En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha considerado emigrar de su país debido a la situación política?
(1) Sí **[Sigue]**　　　(2) No **[Pasa a Q10E]**

Q14BF. ¿A qué país ha considerado irse? **[No leer alternativas. Marcar solo UNA respuesta]**
(1) Costa Rica
(2) Honduras
(3) México
(4) Otros países de Centro América (que no sean Costa Rica u Honduras)
(5) Estados Unidos
(6) Canadá
(7) España
(8) Otro país

Considered Migrating because of the Political Situation

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC19_1.0

Figure 6.8. Percentage of People who have Considered Emigrating for Political Reasons, Nicaragua 2019

The distribution of intentions to migrate for political reasons follows a behavior very similar to the question about intentions to migrate in general when crossed with future intentions to vote. Thus, for example, people who would vote for an opposition party or candidate are those who most express their intentions to migrate for political reasons (almost 50% of those who are considering migrating); while only 15.8% of those who would vote for the ruling party are considering leaving the country.[9] Therefore, with these data, it is possible to reiterate that the migration of Nicaraguans abroad is an event determined by political reasons.

The interesting thing about this block of questions is that they offer a window to information about the countries to which the potential emigrants are thinking of moving. As can be seen in Figure

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[9] The cross-tabulations of these data are not shown because they follow a pattern similar to that shown in Figure 6.7.

6.9, the most frequent destination for those who think about emigrating for political reasons is Costa Rica, the neighboring country to the south. Almost 44% want to move to Costa Rica. The rest is distributed among other Central American countries (17.9%), the United States (14.8%), Spain (11.9%) and other countries outside of the Central American region (11.6%). At this point, it is worth noting that less than 1% of Nicaraguans mentioned Mexico, the other country in the hemisphere that receives large numbers of Central American migrants. Nicaraguans, by contrast, do not appear to be particularly attracted to Mexico.

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2019; v.NIC19_1.0

Figure 6.9. Countries to Which Respondents Have Considered Emigrating, Nicaragua 2019

Who are the people who want to migrate to Costa Rica? Are there any particular characteristics of those who prefer Costa Rica as a destination? To answer these questions, the results on the destination countries were recoded into two groups: those who want to migrate to Costa Rica and the rest of the population.[10] The data were crossed with all the sociodemographic variables, plus some of a political nature. Figure 6.10 shows the results of the conditions that best reflect some of the characteristics of people who intend to migrate to Costa Rica for political reasons, which is not necessarily the same profile as all who intend to migrate.

According to the results, the people with the strongest intentions of leaving for Costa Rica are those with lower levels of schooling, respondents with fewer economic resources, those who live in rural areas, and those who report a left-wing political ideology. As presented in Figure 6.10, the desire to go to Costa Rica decreases significantly as respondents complete more years of schooling. Similarly, more than 60% of those who occupy the first wealth quintile want to emigrate to Costa Rica for political reasons. This contrasts with only 31.9% of those who occupy the fifth wealth quintile and who have more access to resources. A condition that significantly determines

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[10] This exercise was only done with Costa Rica because the number of people who indicated other countries, such as the United States or the rest of Central America, was too low to have results that would be consistent and generalizable.

intentions to move to Costa Rica is place of residence. Among inhabitants of rural areas, 56.1% would prefer to go to Costa Rica, compared to 37.8% of urban inhabitants. Finally, one of the most interesting results is that people with a left-wing ideology are more willing to move to Costa Rica than those with a center or right-wing political ideology.

Figure 6.10. Intentions to Go to Costa Rica by Level of Education, Wealth Quintile, Place of Residence, and Political Ideology, Nicaragua 2019

A good number of Nicaraguans who want to emigrate to Costa Rica for political reasons are among the least advantaged groups in the country: they have less wealth, less education, and live in rural areas. This is probably due to already existing family networks in that country, which would make migration less complex. Regarding ideology, the results are surprising, especially since, when the data was crossed with political sympathies (intentions to vote or evaluation of government performance), preferences for leaving for Costa Rica do not seem to differ from preferences for moving to another country. Left-wing political ideology emerges as a condition, over other ideologies, that seems to favor intentions to move to Costa Rica. This finding undoubtedly merits further exploration of the characteristics of existing migrant networks in this neighboring country.

V. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the results on Nicaraguans' intentions to emigrate and the reasons for doing so. A little less than a third of those consulted are seriously considering leaving the country, and the political crisis, together with frustration towards the political regime, seem to play a fundamental role in it. The 2019 AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua registers one of the highest percentages of intentions to emigrate over the last ten years. Unlike what is found in other Central

American countries with high migration rates, Nicaraguans show a desire to leave as a result of economic precariousness and the inability of the political system to offer alternatives to the national crisis. As political science literature has indicated in other latitudes, personal emigration appears as one of the most favored responses, especially for those who are dissatisfied with the country's government. In this decision, Costa Rica appears as the preferred destination, especially for the least socially advantaged Nicaraguans. All of the above has implications for the probability of resolving the political crisis. Emigration weakens groups that could play a fundamental role in opposing the current government, while favoring sectors that ensure the status quo.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's average trust in political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., stratified and clustered). In bar charts, this confidence interval appears as a grey block, whereas in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts). The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically not statistically significant; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are statistically significant with 95% confidence. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will frequently indicate in the text whether a difference is statistically significant or not.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at zero. When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is statistically significant when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line at zero.

On occasion, analyses and graphs in this report present "region-average" findings. LAPOP's standard is to treat countries as units of analysis and, thus, we weight countries equally in the calculation of region averages.

The dataset used for the analyses in this report correspond to the cross-time, cross-national merged 2004-2018/19 and Nicaragua cross-time merged dataset of the AmericasBarometer surveys. Finalized versions of each survey represented in the dataset are available for free download on the project's website at www.LapopSurveys.org.

Appendix B. Study Information Sheet

March, 2019

Dear Sir/ Ma'am:

You have been selected at random to participate in a study of public opinion on behalf of Borge y Asociados. The project is supported by Vanderbilt University.

The interview will last approximately 40 minutes.

The objective of the study is to learn your opinions about different aspects of the way things are in Mexico. Even though we cannot offer you any specific benefit, we do plan to make general findings available to the media and researchers.

Although you have been selected to participate, Sir/Ma'am, your participation in the study is voluntary. You can decline to answer any question or end the interview at any time. The replies that you give will be kept confidential and anonymous. For quality control purposes of my work, sections of the interview may be recorded.

If you have any questions about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Borge y Asociados at 505 2268-7352 with Mara Miranda Delgado or at the mmiranda@borgeya.com.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Are you willing to participate?

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Barómetro de las Américas 2018/19 Cuestionario Nicaragua Versión # 12.0.6.1 ***Aprobación IRB #: 110627***

B&A Borge y Asociados

LAPOP

AmericasBarometer *Barómetro de las Américas*

VANDERBILT®

LAPOP: Nicaragua, 2019
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PAIS. País:

01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	**05. Nicaragua**
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá
27. Surinam	28. Bahamas	29. Barbados	30. Granada	31. Santa Lucía
32. Dominica	33. Antigua y Barbuda	34. San Vicente y las Granadinas	35. San Cristóbal y Nieves	

IDNUM. Número de cuestionario **[asignado en la oficina]**

ESTRATOPRI: (501) Metropolitana   (502) Centro
(503) Norte   (504) Pacífico Norte   (505) Pacífico Sur
(506) Caribe

ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad:
(1) Grande (más de 75,000)
(2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 y 75,000)   (3) Pequeña (menos de 25,000)

UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"]: _____

PROV. Departamento: _____

MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____

UR.   (1) Urbano (2) Rural **[Usar definición censal del país]**

TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:
(1) Capital Nacional (área metropolitana)   (2) Ciudad grande   (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña
(5) Área rural

IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español

Hora de inicio: _____:_____

FECHA. Fecha Día: ____ **Mes:** _____ Año: 2019

ATENCION: Es un requisito leer siempre la HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN DEL ESTUDIO y obtener el asentimiento del entrevistado antes de comenzar la entrevista.

Q1. Género **[Anotar, NO pregunte]**:   (1) Hombre   (2) Mujer

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años **[Anota la edad. No puede ser menor de 16 años]**

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO una respuesta]**				
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61	
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02	
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59	
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15	
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10	
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Migración	16	
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12	
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14	
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04	
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06	
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22	
Deuda externa	26	Secuestro	31	
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27	
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33	
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07	
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60	
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57	
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55	
Guerra contra el terrorismo	17	Otro	70	
No sabe **[NO LEER]**	888888	No responde **[NO LEER]**	988888	

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace **doce meses**? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace **doce meses**? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su alcaldía...
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí   (2) No (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
MUNI5. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio? (1) Sí ha participado   (0) No ha participado (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	No sabe **[NO LEER]**	No responde **[NO LEER]**	Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		

CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable?   (1) Muy confiable   (2) Algo confiable   (3) Poco confiable   (4) Nada confiable   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "A" AL ENTREVISTADO]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**No sabe [NO LEER]**	lo responde **[NO LEER]** 988888
										888888	
uierda									**Derecha**		

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los **últimos 12 meses** ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?   (1) Sí ha participado   (2) No ha participado   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Ahora, yo le voy a leer dos frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo   **POP5. [Leer alternativas]**   (1) Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan,   [o al contrario],   (2) Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses?   (1) Sí **[Sigue]**   (2) No **[Pasa a VIC45N]**   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a VIC45N]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a VIC45N]**
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses?   **[Marcar el número]_____   [VALOR MÁXIMO ACEPTADO: 20]**   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**   (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

	Sí	**No**	**No sabe [NO LEER]**	**No responde [NO LEER]**	**Inaplicable [NO LEER]**	
VIC45N. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo o de lugar de estudio por temor a la delincuencia? **[Si no trabaja o estudia marque 999999]**	(1) Sí	(0) No	888888	988888	999999 (no trabaja/ estudia)	
VIC45NB. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo o de lugar de estudio a causa de la **situación política del país**? **[Si no trabaja o estudia marque 999999]**	(1) Sí	(0) No	888888	988888	999999 (no trabaja/ estudia)	

FEAR11. Pensando en su vida diaria, ¿cuánto temor siente usted de ser víctima directa de homicidio? ¿Siente usted mucho temor, algo de temor, poco temor, o nada de temor? (1) Mucho temor (2) Algo de temor (3) Poco temor (4) Nada de temor (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo **in**seguro(a) o muy **in**seguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	
PESE1. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en **su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor** que el de otras colonias o barrios en este municipio? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	
PESE2. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en **su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor** que el de hace 12 meses? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría… (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]

B0. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]**.	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Nada						**Mucho**	**No sabe [NO LEER]**	**No responde [NO LEER]**
						[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]		

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. **B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Nicaragua garantizan un juicio justo? *[Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]*	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Nicaragua?	

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político nicaragüense?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político nicaragüense?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político nicaragüense?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Supremo Electoral?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas; es decir, en el Ejército de Nicaragua?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica/Protestante?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	
NICB52B. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los Consejos de Poder Ciudadano (CPC)?	
NICB53. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP)?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

CUESTIONARIO A

PR5. ¿Usted cree que el Estado nicaragüense tiene el derecho a tomar la propiedad privada de una persona en nombre del interés nacional incluso si esa persona no está de acuerdo, o cree que el Estado no tiene el derecho a hacerlo? (1) El Estado tiene el derecho de tomar la propiedad (2) El Estado no tiene el derecho (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**	

CUESTIONARIO B

NICREFCON4B. Una de las reformas constitucionales permite la re-elección indefinida del Presidente de la República – es decir, que un Presidente puede ser reelegido una y otra vez por tiempo indeterminado. ¿Qué opina usted de la reelección indefinida de un Presidente de la República? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) No se debe permitir la reelección indefinida de un presidente (2) Sí se debe permitir la reelección indefinida de un presidente (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**	

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Daniel Ortega es...?: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	

ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

ENV2B. Si no se hace nada para reducir el cambio climático en el futuro, ¿qué tan serio piensa usted que sería el problema para Nicaragua? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy serio (2) Algo serio (3) Poco serio (4) Nada serio (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

Ahora, para hablar de otros temas…

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a) o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Nicaragua? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) **In**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

CUESTIONARIO A

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares…
[Leer alternativas]

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	No sabe [NO LEER] (888888)	No responde [NO LEER] (988888)	Inaplicable [NO LEER] (999999)
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	No sabe [NO LEER] (888888)	No responde [NO LEER] (988888)	Inaplicable [NO LEER] (999999)

CUESTIONARIO B

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares… **[Leer alternativas]**

JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	No sabe **NO LEER]** (888888)	No responde **NO LEER]** (988888)	Inaplicable **[NO LEER]** (999999)

CUESTIONARIO A

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre la Asamblea Nacional y gobierne sin Asamblea Nacional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	No sabe **NO LEER]** (888888)	No responde **NO LEER]** (988888)	Inaplicable **[NO LEER]** (999999)

CUESTIONARIO B

JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	No sabe **[NO LEER]** (888888)	No responde **[NO LEER]** (988888)	Inaplicable **[NO LEER]** (999999)

CUESTIONARIO A

DEM30. ¿En su opinión, Nicaragua es una democracia?
(1) Sí   (2) No
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO B

PN5. En su opinión, ¿Nicaragua es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?
(1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER**]
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "D" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría…

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 No sabe [NO LEER]	988888 No responde [NO LEER]
Desaprueba firmemente								Aprueba firmemente			

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: *[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]*

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:
(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno **no** democrático, o
(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o
(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO A
[NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: Split sample con NICNEW1 y NICNEW2]

	Muy poca	Suficiente	Demasiada	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
LIB1. Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada…Libertad de prensa.	1	2	3	888888	988888	999999
LIB2C. Y Libertad para expresar las opiniones políticas sin miedo. ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada?	1	2	3	888888	988888	999999

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No Marcar 999999** **Si la respuesta es Sí Preguntar:** Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? **Si la respuesta es No Marcar 999999** **Sí la respuesta es Sí Preguntar:** En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? **Si la respuesta es No Marcar 999999** **Sí la respuesta es Sí Preguntar:** ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No Marcar 999999** **Sí la respuesta es Sí Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? **Si la respuesta es No Marcar 999999** **Sí la respuesta es Sí Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	888888	988888	

CUESTIONARIO A

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Muy generalizada   (2) Algo generalizada   (3) Poco generalizada
(4) Nada generalizada
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO B

EXC7NEW. Pensando en los políticos de Nicaragua, ¿cuántos de ellos cree usted que están involucrados en corrupción? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Ninguno
(2) Menos de la mitad
(3) La mitad de los políticos
(4) Más de la mitad
(5) Todos
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

VB1. ¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad?
(1) Sí   (2) No   (3) En trámite
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas **elecciones presidenciales** de 2016?
(1) Sí votó **[Sigue]**
(2) No votó **[Pasa a VB10]**
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a VB10]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a VB10]**

VB3N.   ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2016? **[NO leer alternativas]**

   (01) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco)
   (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto)

   (501) Daniel Ortega Saavedra (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional – FSLN)
   (502) Máximo Rodríguez (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista - PLC)
   (503) José Alvarado (Partido Liberal Independiente - PLI)
   (504) Saturnino Cerrato (Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense - ALN)
   (505) Erick cabezas (Partido Conservador - PC)
   (506) Carlos Canales (Alianza por la República - APRE)

   (577) Otro
   (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
   (999999) Inaplicable (No votó) **[NO LEER]**

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
(1) Sí **[Sigue]**   (2) No **[Pasa a POL1]**
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   **[Pasa a POL1]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a POL1]**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted?   **[NO leer alternativas]**

(501) Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC)
(502) Alianza Unida Nicaragua Triunfa - Partido Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (incluye los siguientes partidos/organizaciones: FSLN, PLN, PUC, AC, PRN, CCN, PIM, MYATAMARAM, PAL, MLC, ARNIC, PSC, MLCI, Movimiento Arriba por la República, Mov de Evangélicos en la Convergencia, Movimiento Indígena de la Costa del Caribe, Liberales Constitucionales en Convergencia)
(503) Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN)
(504) Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente (Alianza PLI) (Incluye los siguientes partidos/movimientos: PAMUC, Movimiento Liberal José Santos Zelaya)
(505) Alianza Partido Alianza por la República (APRE) (incluye los siguientes partidos: MUNRN, PRP, CGT-1, ADN, UDN, MIRAAN-MIRAAS)
(506) Partido Conservador
(507) Yatama
(508) Ciudadanos por la Libertad
(577) Otro
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**   (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?
(1) Mucho   (2) Algo   (3) Poco   (4) Nada
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

NICFEAR. ¿Cuál perspectiva describe mejor a su actitud acerca de discusiones políticas?
[Leer alternativas]
(1) Hablar de la política es algo normal entre mis amigos
(2) Hay que cuidarse de hablar de la política, aún entre amigos
(3) **[NO LEER]** Depende de las circunstancias
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) No votaría
(2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente
(3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno
(4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CLIEN4. A veces en Nicaragua, candidatos o personas de partidos políticos ofrecen favores, dinero, regalos u otros beneficios a individuos a cambio de que voten por ellos. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba usted este tipo de actividad? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Aprueba firmemente
(2) Aprueba
(3) No aprueba pero lo entiende
(4) Desaprueba
(5) Desaprueba firmemente
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No respond**e [NO LEER**

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar ¿lo haría usted **sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor**? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	No sabe	No responde
DER1. ¿Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad?	1	2	3	888888	988888
DER2. ¿Votar en una elección nacional?	1	2	3	888888	988888
DER3. ¿Participar en una manifestación pacífica?	1	2	3	888888	988888
DER4. ¿Postularse para un cargo de elección popular?	1	2	3	888888	988888

URUMIN. ¿Usted considera que sus preferencias políticas son las mismas que las de la mayoría de la gente de su barrio o localidad, o que los que piensan como usted están en minoría? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Sus preferencias son las de la mayoría
(2) Los que piensan como usted están en minoría
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

NICJC21. Alguna gente dice que la situación actual del país es el resultado de un intento de golpe de Estado por parte de la oposición. ¿A usted le parece que eso es así?
(1) Sí
(2) No
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(9888888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

NICJC22. En su opinión, ¿cuál de las siguientes sería la mejor salida a la crisis política que vive Nicaragua en la actualidad? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Que se adelanten las elecciones presidenciales luego de una reforma a la ley electoral (2) Que Ortega y Murillo renuncien y sean sustituidos por una junta de gobierno que termine su periodo presidencial (3) Que se quede el actual gobierno en el poder (4) Que se saque al gobierno actual por la fuerza (7) **[NO LEER]** Otra respuesta (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe (9888888) **[NO LEER]** No responde		

Cambiando de tema…

CUESTIONARIO A

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de algunos países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	No respon-de [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
MIL10B. El gobierno de Rusia. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10Z. El gobierno de Cuba. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

CUESTIONARIO B

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de algunos países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	No respon-de [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10E. El gobierno de Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

CUESTIONARIO B
[NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: Split sample con LIB1 y LIB2C]

NICNEW1. ¿En su opinión, en los últimos 12 meses, la capacidad de los ciudadanos de participar en las decisiones del **gobierno central de Nicaragua** ha…**[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Aumentado?
(2) Permanecido Igual?
(3) Disminuido?
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER**]
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

NICNEW2. ¿En su opinión, en los últimos 12 meses, la capacidad de los ciudadanos de participar en las decisiones **del gobierno municipal aquí en su alcaldía** ha…**[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Aumentado?
(2) Permanecido Igual?
(3) Disminuido?
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER**]
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda periódica en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones?
(1) Sí   (2) No
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

(0) 0 años	Ninguno
(1) 1 año	1er año de primaria
(2) 2 años	2o año de primaria
(3) 3 años	3er año de primaria
(4) 4 años	4o año de primaria
(5) 5 años	5o año de primaria
(6) 6 años	6o año de primaria
(7) 7 años	1er año de secundaria
(8) 8 años	2o año de secundaria
(9) 9 años	3er año de secundaria
(10) 10 años	4o año de secundaria
(11) 11 años	5o año de secundaria
(12) 12 años	1er año de universidad/1er año de educación superior no universitaria
(13) 13 años	2o año de universidad/2o año de educación superior no universitaria
(14) 14 años	3er año de universidad/3er año de educación superior no universitaria
(15) 15 años	4o año de universidad/4o año de educación superior no universitaria
(16) 16 años	5o año de universidad
(17) 17 años	6o año de universidad o más
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

Q3CN. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[NO Leer alternativas]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

[Si el entrevistado dice "Cristiano" o "Evangélico", sondee para verificar si es católico (opción 1), pentecostal (opción 5) o evangélico no-pentecostal (opción 2). Si no está seguro, seleccione (2).]

(01) Católico **[Sigue]**

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). **[Sigue]**

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo). **[Sigue]**

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día). **[Sigue]**

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Santería, Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Esoterica). **[Sigue]**

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) **[Sigue]**

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) **[Pasa a Q5B]**

(77) Otro **[Sigue]**

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Sigue]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Sigue]**

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Más de una vez por semana   (2) Una vez por semana   (3) Una vez al mes
(4) Una o dos veces al año   (5) Nunca o casi nunca
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Muy importante   (2) Algo importante
(3) Poco importante   o   (4) Nada importante
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Trabajando? **[Sigue]**
(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Sigue]**
(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pasa a Q10A]**
(4) Es estudiante? **[Pasa a Q10A]**
(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pasa a Q10A]**
(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pasa a Q10A]**
(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pasa a Q10A]**
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10A]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10A]**

[Usar tarjeta OCUPOIT como apoyo, NO mostrar al encuestado]
OCUPOIT. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? **[SONDEAR: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?] [NO leer alternativas]**
(1) Directores y gerentes
(2) Profesionales científicos e intelectuales
(3) Técnicos y profesionales de nivel medio
(4) Personal de apoyo administrativo
(5) Trabajadores de los servicios y vendedores de comercios y mercados
(6) Agricultores y trabajadores calificados agropecuarios, forestales y pesqueros
(7) Oficiales, operarios y artesanos de artes mecánicas y de otros oficios
(8) Operadores de instalaciones y máquinas y ensambladores
(9) Ocupaciones elementales
(10) Ocupaciones militares
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Asalariado(a) del gobierno o empresa estatal?
(2) Asalariado(a) en el sector privado?
(3) Patrono(a) o socio(a) de empresa?
(4) Trabajador(a) por cuenta propia?
(5) Trabajador(a) no remunerado(a) o sin pago?
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

FORMAL. Por este trabajo, ¿realiza usted o su empleador contribuciones o cotizaciones para su pensión o jubilación?
(1) Sí
(2) No
8) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?
(1) Sí   (2) No
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "F" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Q10NEW. ¿Y en cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?
[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 700 córdobas
(02) Entre 700 – 1,400 córdobas
(03) Entre 1,401 – 2,600 córdobas
(04) Entre 2,601 – 2,900 córdobas
(05) Entre 2,901 – 3,600 córdobas
(06) Entre 3,601 – 3,900 córdobas
(07) Entre 3,901 – 4,500 córdobas
(08) Entre 4,501 – 5,400 córdobas
(09) Entre 5,401 – 6,000 córdobas
(10) Entre 6,001 – 6,600 córdobas
(11) Entre 6,601 – 7,600 córdobas
(12) Entre 7,601 – 8,200 córdobas
(13) Entre 8,201 – 10,200 córdobas
(14) Entre 10,201 – 12,500 córdobas
(15) Entre 12,501 – 17,000 córdobas
(16) Más de 17,000 córdobas

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?
(1) Sí **[Sigue]**   (2) No   **[Pasa a Q14B]**
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a Q14B]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a Q14B]**

Q14F. ¿Qué tan probable es que usted se vaya a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy probable (2) Algo probable (3) Poco probable (4) Nada probable (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**	
Q14B. En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha considerado emigrar de su país debido a la situación política? (1) Sí **[Sigue]** (2) No **[Pasa a Q10E]** (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10E]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10E]**	
Q14BF. ¿A qué país ha considerado irse? **[No leer alternativas. Marcar solo UNA respuesta]** (1) Costa Rica (2) Honduras (3) México (4) Otros países de Centro América (que no sean Costa Rica u Honduras) (5) Estados Unidos (6) Canadá (7) España (8) Otro país (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**	

Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]** mentó? rmaneció igual? sminuyó? 3) No sabe **[NO LEER]** 3) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.				
	No	**Sí**	No sabe **[NO LEER]**	No responde **[NO LEER]**
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	888888	988888
FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	888888	988888

Q11N. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento?_____ (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	

Q12BN. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____
00 = Ninguno
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro - nicaragüense, codificar como (4) Negra]**

(1) Blanca   (2) Mestiza   (3) Indígena   (4) Negra   (5) Mulata   (7) Otra
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

GI0N. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Diariamente   (2) Algunas veces a la semana   (3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Algunas veces al año   (5) Nunca
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

NICMEDIA1. Durante los 12 meses pasados, ¿ha notado usted que la libertad de expresión en los medios de comunicación ha aumentado, ha permanecido igual o ha disminuido?
(1) Ha incrementado   (2) Ha permanecido igual   (3) Ha disminuido
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

NICMEDIA2. ¿Qué piensa de los medios de comunicación independientes (no afiliados al gobierno)? Que existan estos medios es **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Muy Importante   (2) Importante   (3) Regular
(4) No Importante   (5) Nada Importante
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**   (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

SMEDIA1. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Facebook?
(1) Sí **[Sigue]**
(2) No **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**

SMEDIA2. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve contenido** en Facebook? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Diariamente **[Sigue]**
(2) Algunas veces a la semana **[Sigue]**
(3) Algunas veces al mes **[Sigue]**
(4) Algunas veces al año **[Sigue]**
(5) Nunca **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Sigue]**
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Sigue]**
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA3. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve información política** en Facebook? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Diariamente
(2) Algunas veces a la semana
(3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Algunas veces al año
(5) Nunca
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA4. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Twitter?
(1) Sí **[Sigue]**
(2) No **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**

SMEDIA5. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve contenido** en Twitter? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente **[Sigue]**
(2) Algunas veces a la semana **[Sigue]**
(3) Algunas veces al mes **[Sigue]**
(4) Algunas veces al año **[Sigue]**
(5) Nunca **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Sigue]**

(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Sigue]**

(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA6. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve información política** en Twitter? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente
(2) Algunas veces a la semana
(3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Algunas veces al año
(5) Nunca

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe

(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA7. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de WhatsApp?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]**

(2) No **[Pasa a R3]**

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a R3]**

(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a R3]**

SMEDIA8. ¿Con qué frecuencia usa WhatsApp? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente **[Sigue]**
(2) Algunas veces a la semana **[Sigue]**
(3) Algunas veces al mes **[Sigue]**
(4) Algunas veces al año **[Sigue]**
(5) Nunca **[Pasa a R3]**

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Sigue]**

(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Sigue]**

(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA9. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve información política** en WhatsApp? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente
(2) Algunas veces a la semana
(3) Algunas veces al mes
(4) Algunas veces al año
(5) Nunca

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe

(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

Podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

			(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R3. Refrigerador	(0) No	(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R4A. Teléfono celular [acepta smartphone/ teléfono inteligente]	(0) No	(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

R5. Vehículo. **[Auto, no moto]** ¿Cuántos? **[Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]**	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R7. Horno microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R15. Computadora [acepta tableta/iPad]	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R18. Servicio de Internet desde su casa [incluyendo teléfono o tableta]	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

R1. Televisión	(0) No **[Pasa a PSC1]**		(1) Sí **[Sigue]**	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**	(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**	(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

PSC1. ¿Cuál es la **principal** fuente de agua que usan para **tomar o beber** los miembros de su hogar? **[NO leer alternativas. Marcar solo una respuesta] [Si menciona que usa distintas fuentes, pedir la que usa más] [Si dice solamente cañería/tubería o red pública SONDEAR si es dentro (1) o fuera del hogar (2)]** (01) Tubería o red pública/del grifo/ de la paja/ llave dentro de la casa (02) Tubería o red pública en el patio (03) Conexión irregular (pegado) a red pública (04) Tanque/ llave comunitaria de uso público/ Puesto de agua (05) Pozo entubado/pozo perforación (con bomba) (06) Pozo excavado cubierto/ aljibe (sin bomba) (07) Pozo excavado descubierto (sin bomba) (08) Manantial cubierto (09) Manantial descubierto (10) Recolección de agua de lluvia (11) Agua embotellada (botellón de agua/ bidón de agua/ agua de bolsa) (12) Carreta con tanque pequeño/tambor (13) Pipa de agua (14) Río, arroyo, canal, canales de riego (77) Otro (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde	

PSC2. ¿Cuál es la **principal** fuente de agua usada en su hogar para otros propósitos, tales como **cocinar y lavarse las manos**? **[NO leer alternativas. Marcar solo una respuesta] [Si menciona que usa distintas fuentes, pedir la que usa más] [Si dice solamente cañería/tubería o red pública SONDEAR si es dentro (1) o fuera del hogar (2)]**
(01) Tubería o red pública/ del grifo/ de la paja/llave dentro de la casa **[Sigue]**
(02) Tubería o red pública en el patio **[Sigue]**
(03) Conexión irregular(pegado) a red pública **[Sigue]**
(04) Tanque/llave comunitaria de uso público / Puesto de agua **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(05) Pozo entubado/pozo/ perforación (con bomba) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(06) Pozo excavado cubierto/ aljibe (sin bomba) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(07) Pozo excavado descubierto (sin bomba) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(08) Manantial cubierto **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(09) Manantial descubierto **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(10) Recolección de agua de lluvia **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(11) Agua embotellada (botellón de agua/ bidón de agua/ bolsa de agua) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(12) Carreta con tanque pequeño/tambor **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(13) Pipa de agua **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(14) Río, Arroyo, canal, canales de riego **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(77) Otro **[Pasa a PSC11]**

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a PSC11]**
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a PSC11]**

[Preguntar sólo si hay acueducto/cañería/tubería – Si la respuesta a pregunta PSC2 fue (01) (02) o (03)]
PSC7. ¿Cuántos días por semana recibe agua del grifo o de la red pública?
(0) Menos de una vez por semana
(1) Un día por semana
(2) Dos días por semana
(3) Tres días por semana
(4) Cuatro días por semana
(5) Cinco días por semana
(6) Seis días por semana
(7) Siete días por semana
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

[Preguntar sólo si hay acueducto/tubería - Si la respuesta a pregunta PSC2 fue (01) (02) o (03)]
PSC8. ¿Cuántas horas de agua al día tiene cuando tiene el servicio?
Anotar cantidad de horas_____ **[Atención, si dice en minutos o fracción, redondear a horas] [Máximo valor aceptado: 24]**
[Refiere al suministro a través del acueducto/cañería/tubería, con independencia del sistema de acopio hogareño que pueda tener]

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

[Preguntar sólo si hay acueducto/tubería - Si la respuesta a pregunta PSC2 fue (01) (02) o (03)]
PSC9. ¿Durante las últimas cuatro semanas, cuántas veces fue interrumpido el servicio regular de agua?
[Anotar número] _____ **[Máximo valor aceptado: 50]**

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

[Preguntar sólo si respondió (1) o (2) en pregunta PSC2]
PSC10. En ocasiones, la gente no paga los recibos de agua por distintas razones: no creen que sea importante, creen que el agua debería ser gratis o porque no pueden pagarla**.** ¿De los últimos 6 recibos de agua que recibió, dejó de pagar alguno?
[Si dice "Sí" preguntar cuántos y anotar número] _____
[Valores aceptados: 1 - 6]

(0) No

(7) **[NO LEER]** No pagó porque no recibió el recibo

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

PSC11. ¿El baño o servicio higiénico de esta vivienda está conectado a **[Leer alternativas] [Sondear si es necesario. Atención, opciones (1) a (5) y (7) implican conexión a red o descarga hacia exterior de la vivienda]**
(1) Sistema de alcantarillado **[Pasa a PSC12]**
(7) Conectado a planta/sistema de tratamiento **[Pasa a PSC12]**
(2) Sumidero o pozo negro **fuera** de la casa **[Pasa a PSC12]**
(3) Entubado hacia arroyo/ curso de agua **[Pasa a PSC12]**
(4) Otra respuesta [sale hacia otro lugar] **[Pasa a PSC12]**
(5) Sale a lugar desconocido/no está seguro/No sabe donde **[Pasa a PSC12]**
(6) Pozo/pozo negro/ no conectado a ningún sistema **[Sigue]**
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a PSC12]**
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a PSC12]**

[Preguntar sólo si no tiene desagüe fuera de la vivienda, respuesta (6) en PSC11]
PSC11A. ¿Qué utilizan en su hogar como baño o servicio higiénico? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Letrina mejorada con ventilación
(2) Letrina de pozo con inodoro
(3) Letrina de pozo sin inodoro / pozo abierto
(4) Baño de composta/ letrina seca/ecológica
(5) Balde/cubo
(6) Baño/ retrete / letrina colgante
(7) No usa infraestructura o usa arbusto o campo/superficie
(77) Otro
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

PSC12. ¿Usted comparte este baño o servicio higiénico con otros hogares?
(1) Si   (2) No
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

PSC13. Por favor, me podría decir, ¿cómo eliminan la basura en esta vivienda?
[NO leer alternativas. Marcar todas las que correspondan] [Sondear si se trata de recolección de basura domiciliaria formal (01) o informal (02) y para reciclaje formal (12) o informal (13)]
(01) Recolección domiciliaria de basura (pasa servicio municipal)
(02) Recolección domiciliaria de basura (recolectores ambulantes)
(03) La deposita en contenedores de la comunidad
(04) La lleva al basurero municipal
(05) La entierra
(06) La prepara para abono/hace compost
(07) La quema
(08) La tira en terreno baldío o en curso de agua
(09) La tira en otro/cualquier lugar
(10) Recicla en su hogar (no abono)
(11) Lleva a centro de recepción para reciclado
(12) Recolección domiciliaria para reciclaje (municipal)
(13) Recolección domiciliaria para reciclaje (recolectores ambulantes)
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

PSC3. Voy a mencionar algunos problemas con los que muchos nicaragüenses hemos tenido que lidiar en los últimos años. ¿Cuáles de estos ha experimentado usted personalmente, o alguien de su hogar, en los últimos tres años? **[Leer alternativas. Marcar todas las que correspondan]**
(0) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno
(1) Sequías que tengan como consecuencia cortes o falta de agua
(2) Cortes de energía eléctrica (luz)
(3) Inundaciones
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

PSC4. ¿Quién cree que es el principal responsable de las sequías que tienen como consecuencia cortes o falta de agua? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Gobierno nacional
(2) Gobierno regional **[NO LEER: incluye gobierno de provincias indígenas]**
(3) Gobierno local o municipal **[NO LEER: incluye gobierno de corregimientos indígenas]**
(4) Empresa proveedora del servicio de agua/Enacal
(5) Cambio climático o condiciones climáticas extremas
(6) La gente/nosotros mismos
(77) **[NO LEER]** Otras respuestas
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

PSC5. ¿Quién cree que es el principal responsable de los cortes de energía eléctrica? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Gobierno nacional
(2) Gobierno regional **[NO LEER: incluye gobierno de provincias indígenas]**
(3) Gobierno local o municipal **[NO LEER: incluye gobierno de corregimientos indígenas]**
(4) Empresa proveedora del servicio eléctrico/ Unión Fenosa
(5) Cambio climático o condiciones climáticas extremas
(6) La gente/nosotros mismos
(77) **[NO LEER]** Otras respuestas
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

PSC6. ¿Quién cree que es el principal responsable de las inundaciones? **[Leer alternativas]**
(1) Gobierno nacional
(2) Gobierno regional **[NO LEER: incluye gobierno de provincias indígenas]** l
(3) Gobierno local o municipal **[NO LEER: incluye gobierno de corregimientos indígenas]**
(5) Cambio climático o condiciones climáticas extremas
(6) La gente/nosotros mismos
(77) **[NO LEER]** Otras respuestas
(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

Para finalizar…

INTEVAL. En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es nada interesante, y 10 es muy interesante, ¿qué tan interesante le resultó a usted esta entrevista?											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	o responde [NO LEER] 988888
da interesante									Muy interesante		

SENT1. Sólo una pregunta más: ¿quién cree usted que nos envió a hacer esta encuesta?

[NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO una respuesta]

El Gobierno de Nicaragua (Estatal y Nacional sería lo mismo)	1	Una organización de investigación	14
El Gobierno Regional (Aplica para RACCS y RACCN)	2	Un periódico/medio de comunicación	15
La Alcaldía Municipal	3	Una universidad	16
La Presidencia de la República	4	Una empresa privada	17
La Asamblea Nacional	5	Un organismo internacional	18
El Instituto Nacional de Información y Desarrollo (INIDE)	6	Dios, o una organización religiosa	19
El Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público	7	Borge y Asociados	20
El Ministerio de Educación (MINED)	8	LAPOP/ Barómetro de las Américas	21
El Ministerio de Economía, Familiar, Comunitaria, Cooperativa y Asociativa (MEFCCA)	9	Universidad de Vanderbilt	22
El Ministerio de Fomento, Industria y Comercio (MIFIC)	10	El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos	23
Otra oficina de gobierno	11	Donald Trump	24
Una ONG	12	Nadie	66
Un partido político	13	Otro	77
No sabe **[NO LEER]**	888888	No responde **[NO LEER]**	988888

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

| |
|---|
| **FORMATQ.** Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico
(1) Papel
(2) ADGYS
(3) Windows PDA
(4) STG |
| **COLORR.** [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____
(97) No se pudo clasificar **[Marcar (97)** *únicamente,* **si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]** |
| Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____ |
| **[Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, complete las siguientes preguntas]** |
| **NOISE1.** ¿Había alguien más presente durante la entrevista, además del entrevistado?
(0) No **[Pasa a CONOCIM]**
(1) Sí, pero en otra habitación/ a la distancia **[Sigue]**
(2) Sí, cerca del entrevistado pero sin interferir **[Sigue]**
(3) Sí, interfiriendo /participando esporádicamente **[Sigue]**
(4) Sí, interfiriendo mucho / poniendo en riesgo la entrevista **[Sigue]** |

NOISE2. ¿Quién(es) estaba(n) presente(s)? **[Marcar todas las que correspondan]**
(1) Esposo/esposa/pareja
(2) Hijo/a (niño/a)
(3) Hijo/a (adulto/a)
(4) Padres/ suegros/ padres adoptivos
(5) Otro pariente (niño)
(6) Otro pariente (adulto)
(7) Otra persona no pariente (niño)
(8) Otra persona no pariente (adulto)
(9) Otro niño (no se sabe vínculo)
(10) Otro adulto (no se sabe vínculo)
(888888) No sabe
(999999) Inaplicable

CONOCIM. Usando la escala que se presenta abajo, por favor califique su percepción sobre el nivel de conocimiento político del entrevistado
(1) Muy alto   (2) Alto   (3) Ni alto ni bajo   (4) Bajo   (5) Muy bajo

NICIMIEDO. ¿El entrevistado respondió a la mayoría de las preguntas...?
(1) Con seguridad y sin miedo
(2) Con seguridad pero un poco ansioso
(3) Con desconfianza y ansioso
(4) Con mucha desconfianza y miedo

TI. Duración de la entrevista *[minutos, ver página # 1]* _____

INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____

SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre   (2) Mujer

COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
Firma del entrevistador_____ Fecha ____ /_____ /_____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios: _____
_____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
*[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____*

Tarjeta A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Izquierda   **Derecha**

Tarjeta B

Tarjeta C

Tarjeta D

Aprueba firmemente

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

Desaprueba firmemente 1

Tarjeta H

China

Japón

India

Estados Unidos

Singapur

Rusia

Corea del Sur

Brasil

Venezuela

México

Tarjeta F

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 700 córdobas
(02) Entre 700 – 1,400 córdobas
(03) Entre 1,401 – 2,600 córdobas
(04) Entre 2,601 – 2,900 córdobas
(05) Entre 2,901 – 3,600 córdobas
(06) Entre 3,601 – 3,900 córdobas
(07) Entre 3,901 – 4,500 córdobas
(08) Entre 4,501 – 5,400 córdobas
(09) Entre 5,401 – 6,000 córdobas
(10) Entre 6,001 – 6,600 córdobas
(11) Entre 6,601 – 7,600 córdobas
(12) Entre 7,601 – 8,200 córdobas
(13) Entre 8,201 – 10,200 córdobas
(14) Entre 10,201 – 12,500 córdobas
(15) Entre 12,501 – 17,000 córdobas
(16) Más de 17,000 córdobas

Tarjeta OCUPOIT
[NO MOSTRAR, solo para el encuestador]

1 Directores y gerentes

Directores ejecutivos, personal directivo de la administración pública y
miembros del poder ejecutivo y de los cuerpos legislativos

Directores administradores y comerciales

Directores y gerentes de producción y operaciones

Gerentes de hoteles, restaurantes, comercios y otros servicios

2 Profesionales científicos e intelectuales

Profesionales de las ciencias y de la ingeniería

Profesionales de la salud

Profesionales de la enseñanza

Especialistas en organización de la administración pública y de empresas

Profesionales de tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones

Profesionales en derecho, en ciencias sociales y culturales

3 Técnicos y profesionales de nivel medio

Profesionales de las ciencias y la ingeniería de nivel medio

Profesionales de nivel medio de la salud

Profesionales de nivel medio en operaciones financieras y administrativas

Profesionales de nivel medio de servicios jurídicos, sociales, culturales y afines

Técnicos de la tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones

4 Personal de apoyo administrativo

Oficinistas

Empleados en trato directo con el público

Empleados contables y encargados del registro de materiales

Otro personal de apoyo administrativo

5 Trabajadores de los servicios y vendedores de comercios y mercados

Trabajadores de los servicios personales

Vendedores

Trabajadores de los cuidados personales

Personal de los servicios de protección (bomberos, policías)

6 Agricultores y trabajadores calificados agropecuarios, forestales y pesqueros

Agricultores y trabajadores calificados de explotaciones agropecuarias con
destino al mercado

Trabajadores forestales calificados, pescadores y cazadores

Trabajadores agropecuarios, pescadores, cazadores y recolectores de
subsistencia

7 Oficiales, operarios y artesanos de artes mecánicas y de otros oficios

Oficiales y operarios de la construcción excluyendo electricistas

Oficiales y operarios de la metalurgia, la construcción mecánica y afines

Artesanos y operarios de las artes gráficas

Trabajadores especializados en electricidad y la electrotecnología

Operarios y oficiales de procesamiento de alimentos, de la confección, ebanistas,
otros artesanos y afines

8 Operadores de instalaciones y máquinas y ensambladores

Operadores de instalaciones fijas y máquinas

Ensambladores

Conductores de vehículos y operadores de equipos pesados móviles

9 Ocupaciones elementales

Limpiadores y asistentes

Peones agropecuarios, pesqueros y forestales

Peones de la minería, la construcción, la industria manufacturera y el transporte

Ayudantes de preparación de alimentos

Vendedores ambulantes de servicios y afines

Recolectores de desechos y otras ocupaciones elementales

10 Ocupaciones militares

Oficiales de las fuerzas armadas

Suboficiales de las fuerzas armadas

Otros miembros de las fuerzas armadas

Paleta de Colores

| 1 |
| 2 |
| 3 |
| 4 |
| 5 |
| 6 |
| 7 |
| 8 |
| 9 |
| 10 |
| 11 |

The AmericasBarometer 2018/19

The AmericasBarometer is a regional survey carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). LAPOP has deep roots in the Latin America and Caribbean region, via public opinion research that dates back over four decades. Its headquarters are at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. The AmericasBarometer is possible due to the activities and support of a consortium of institutions located across the Americas. To carry out each round of the survey, LAPOP partners with local individuals, firms, universities, development organizations, and others in 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have three core purposes: to produce objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion; to build capacity and strengthen international relations; and to disseminate important findings regarding citizens' experiences with, assessments of, and commitment to democratic forms of government.

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. Other institutions that have contributed to multiple rounds of the survey project include Ciudadania, Environics, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme. The project has also benefited from grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Open Society Foundation and academic institutions in the continent.

The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer was carried out via face-to-face interviews in 18 countries across the Latin America and Caribbean region, and via the internet in Canada and the U.S. All samples are designed to be nationally representative of voting-age adults and electronic devices were used for data entry in all countries. In all, more than 31,000 individuals were interviewed in this latest round of the survey. The complete 2004-2018/19 AmericasBarometer dataset contains responses from over 300,000 individuals across the region. Common core modules, standardized techniques, and rigorous quality control procedures permit valid comparisons across individuals, subgroups, certain subnational areas, countries, supra-regions, and time.

AmericasBarometer data and reports are available for free download from the project website: www.LapopSurveys.org Datasets from the project can also be accessed via 'data repositories' and subscribing institutions at universities across the Americas. Through such open access practices and these collaborations, LAPOP works to contribute to the pursuit of excellence in public opinion research and ongoing discussions over how programs and policies related to democratic governance can improve the quality of life for individuals in the Americas and beyond.