



THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA AND IN THE AMERICAS, 2016/17

A Comparative Study of
Democracy and Governance

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March 2018

This study is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of this study are the sole responsibility of the authors and LAPOP and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.



Table of Contents

List of Figures.....	vii
List of Tables.....	x
Preface.....	xi
Prologue: Background to the Study.....	xiii
Acknowledgements.....	xvii
Introduction.....	xxiii
Chapter 1. Support for Electoral Democracy in the Americas.....	1
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Main Findings.....	2
III. The Basic Tenets of Electoral Democracy.....	2
Support for Democracy in the Abstract.....	4
Rules of the Game: Support for Coups under High Crime and Corruption.....	8
Support for Executive Coups.....	11
IV. Support for Democratic Institutions: Elections and Parties.....	14
Trust in Elections.....	15
Participation in Elections.....	18
Trust in Political Parties.....	21
Partisanship.....	24
V. Conclusion.....	28
Chapter 2. The Supply of Basic Liberties.....	29
I. Introduction.....	29
II. Main Findings.....	30
III. The Media.....	31
Supply of Freedom of the Press.....	31
Trust in the Media.....	34
IV. Freedom to Express Opinions.....	37
Perceptions of Freedom to Express Opinions in General.....	38
Perceptions of Freedom to Express Political Opinions.....	39
V. Human Rights.....	42
VI. Deficit of Basic Liberties Index.....	45
VII. Conclusion.....	49

Chapter 3. Corruption and Political Culture in Nicaragua	51
I. Introduction	51
II. Main Findings	52
III. The Perception of Corruption in Politics in Nicaragua.....	52
Evaluation of the Government's Efforts to Combat Corruption	59
IV. Corruption Victimization in Nicaragua	61
Justification of Paying Bribes.....	70
V. The Relationship between Corruption Victimization and Support for Institutions and Democracy	74
VI. Conclusion	76
Chapter 4. The Media, Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Expression in Nicaragua	77
I. Introduction	77
II. Main Findings	78
III. Media Consumption	79
IV. Opinions About Mass Media	83
V. Perceptions of Freedom of Expression in Nicaragua.....	91
VI. The Impact of Perceptions of the Media and Freedom of Expression on Support for Democracy and the Political System.....	95
VII. Conclusion.....	98
Chapter 5. Citizen Participation in Nicaragua.....	101
I. Introduction	101
II. Main Findings	102
III. The State of Citizen Participation in Municipalities	103
IV. Citizen Participation in Social Organizations.....	109
V. Participation of a Political Nature: Government corporatist organizations and participation in protests.....	115
VI. Citizen Participation and Support for the Political System and Democracy	123
VII. Conclusion.....	126
Chapter 6. Democratic Orientations in the Americas	127
I. Introduction	127
II. Main Findings	128
III. Democratic Orientations across the Region and over Time	129
Support for the Political System.....	130
Political Tolerance.....	132
Orientations Conducive to Democratic Stability.....	137
IV. Citizens, State Institutions, and Democratic Orientations.....	140
V. Conclusion	142



References	145
Appendices.....	157
Appendix A. Understanding Figures in this Study.....	159
Appendix B. Study Information Sheet.....	161
Appendix C. Questionnaire.....	163

List of Figures

Figure 1.1. Cross-National Support for Democracy.....	5
Figure 1.2. Support for Democracy over Time in Nicaragua.....	6
Figure 1.3. Support for Democracy by Age in Nicaragua.....	7
Figure 1.4. Satisfaction with Democracy over Time in Nicaragua.....	8
Figure 1.5. Support for Military Coups under High Crime and High Corruption.....	9
Figure 1.6. Support for Military Coups over Time in Nicaragua.....	10
Figure 1.7. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Support for Military Coups in Nicaragua.....	11
Figure 1.8. Support for Executive Coups.....	12
Figure 1.9. Support for Executive Coups over Time in Nicaragua.....	13
Figure 1.10. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Support for Executive Coups in Nicaragua.....	14
Figure 1.11. Percentage of Respondents Who Trust Elections.....	16
Figure 1.12. Trust in Elections over Time in Nicaragua.....	17
Figure 1.13. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Trust in Elections in Nicaragua.....	18
Figure 1.14. Electoral Turnout by Country.....	19
Figure 1.15. Electoral Participation in Nicaragua, 2004–2016.....	20
Figure 1.16. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Turnout in Nicaragua.....	20
Figure 1.17. Opinions about Reelection without Term Limits in Nicaragua, 2016.....	21
Figure 1.18. Percentage that Trust Political Parties across Countries.....	23
Figure 1.19. Trust in Political Parties over Time in Nicaragua.....	24
Figure 1.20. Partisanship across Countries.....	25
Figure 1.21. Partisanship over time in Nicaragua.....	26
Figure 1.22. Party Identification over Time in Nicaragua.....	27
Figure 1.23. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Partisanship in Nicaragua.....	28
Figure 2.1. Assessments of Freedom of the Press, 2016/17.....	33
Figure 2.2. Correspondence between Expert Ratings and Proportion of Individuals Reporting Very Little Freedom of the Press in the Americas.....	34
Figure 2.3. Trust in the Media by Country, 2016/17.....	36
Figure 2.4. Trust in the Media over Time in Nicaragua.....	37
Figure 2.5. Assessments of Freedom of Expression, 2016/17.....	39
Figure 2.6. The Supply of Freedoms of Expression in Nicaragua, 2016/17.....	40
Figure 2.7. Assessments of Freedom of Political Expression, 2016/17.....	41
Figure 2.8. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Reporting Very Little Freedom of Expression in Nicaragua.....	42
Figure 2.9. Assessments of Protection of Human Rights, 2016/17.....	44
Figure 2.10. Perception that there are few Human Rights Protections by Age in Nicaragua.....	45

Figure 2.11. Basic Liberties Deficit Score, 2016/17.....	46
Figure 2.12. Basic Liberties Deficit and Executive Approval in Nicaragua	47
Figure 2.13. Basic Liberties Deficit and Vote Intention in Nicaragua	48
Figure 3.1. Opinion of the Percentage of Politicians Involved in Corruption, Nicaragua 2016	53
Figure 3.2. Perception of Politicians' Level of Involvement in Corruption by Country, 2016/17....	55
Figure 3.3. Opinion of the Number of Politicians Involved in Corruption by Age, Level of Education and Place of Residence, Nicaragua 2016	57
Figure 3.4. Factors Associated with the Perception of Corruption Among Politicians in Nicaragua, 2016.....	59
Figure 3.5. Evaluation of the Performance of the Government's Efforts to Combat Corruption, Nicaragua, 2004-2016	60
Figure 3.6. Corruption Victimization by the Police, Public Employees and the Military in Nicaragua, 2016.....	63
Figure 3.7. Corruption Victimization in the Local Government, at Work, in Court, in Public Health Centers and Schools, Nicaragua, 2016	64
Figure 3.8. Victimization by Police Corruption, Nicaragua, 2004-2016	65
Figure 3.9. Reported Collection of Bribes by Government Employees, Nicaragua, 2004-2016	65
Figure 3.10. Overall Experience with Corruption, Nicaragua, 2004-2016.....	66
Figure 3.11. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2016/17	68
Figure 3.12. Factors Associated with Being a Victim of Corruption in Nicaragua, 2016	69
Figure 3.13. Corruption Victimization by Wealth Quintile, Respondent's Number of Children, if a Politician has Offered Favors for Votes, and Community Participation, Nicaragua, 2016.....	70
Figure 3.14. Justification of Paying a Bribe, Nicaragua, 2016	71
Figure 3.15. Justification of Paying a Bribe by Age Group and Corruption Victimization, Nicaragua, 2016.....	71
Figure 3.16. Justification of Paying Bribes by Country, 2016/2017.....	73
Figure 3.17. Political System Support and Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in Nicaragua by Corruption Victimization, 2016	75
Figure 4.1. Frequency of Following the News, Nicaragua 2016	79
Figure 4.2. Frequency of Following the News (2010-2016).....	80
Figure 4.3. Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors Associated with the Consumption of Daily News, Nicaragua 2016	81
Figure 4.4. Principal Source of National News, Nicaragua 2016	82
Figure 4.5. Television Channel Most Watched for National News.....	83
Figure 4.6. Perceptions of Freedom of Expression in the Media, Nicaragua 2014-2016	84
Figure 4.7. The Importance of Independent Media, Nicaragua 2016.....	85
Figure 4.8. Media Represents the Different Opinions in the Country, Nicaragua 2016	86
Figure 4.9. Factors Associated with the Perception that the Media Represent Diverse Opinions in the Country, Nicaragua 2016	87
Figure 4.10. Mass Media is Controlled by a Few Economic or Political Groups, Nicaragua 2016 ...	88



Figure 4.11. Factors Associated with the Perception that the Media are Controlled by a Few Economic and Political Groups, Nicaragua 2016	89
Figure 4.12. Opinions about the Media Associated with Trust in the Media, Nicaragua 2016	90
Figure 4.13. Presidential Approval and Confidence in the Media, Nicaragua 2016	91
Figure 4.14. Attitude about Political Discussions, Nicaragua 2014-2016.....	92
Figure 4.15. Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors Associated with Fear of Speaking About Politics, Nicaragua 2016	93
Figure 4.16. Evaluation of Freedom of Expression and Fear of Talking about Politics, Nicaragua 2016	94
Figure 4.17. Evaluation of President's Performance and Fear to Speak about Politics, Nicaragua 2016	94
Figure 4.18. Attitudes about the Media Associated with Support for Democracy, Nicaragua 2016	96
Figure 4.19. Attitudes about the Media Associated with Support for the Political System, Nicaragua 2016	97
Figure 4.20. Attitudes about Freedom of Expression Associated with Support for the Political System, Nicaragua 2016.....	98
Figure 5.1. Trust in Nicaragua's Political Institutions, 2016.....	104
Figure 5.2. Trust in Municipal Governments in Nicaragua, 2004-2017	105
Figure 5.3. Attendance of Municipal Meetings in Nicaragua, 2004-2016	106
Figure 5.4. Municipal Meeting Attendance by Country, 2016/2017	107
Figure 5.5. Trust in the Municipal Government by Attendance at Municipal Council Meetings in Nicaragua, 2016	108
Figure 5.6. Evaluation of Services Provided by Respondents' Corresponding Municipal Governments in Nicaragua, 2016	109
Figure 5.7. Participation in Religious Organizations, Parent Associations and Community Improvement Groups in Nicaragua, 2004-2016.....	112
Figure 5.8. Community Participation by Country, 2016/2017.....	113
Figure 5.9. Community Participation by Sex, Age, Crime Victimization and Support for the FSLN in Nicaragua, 2016	114
Figure 5.10. Community Participation by Region in Nicaragua, 2016.....	115
Figure 5.11. Participation in Government Organizations by Support for the FSLN in Nicaragua, 2016.....	117
Figure 5.12. Participation in Government Organizations by Community Participation in Nicaragua, 2016.....	118
Figure 5.13. Community and Government Participation by Condition of Receiving Assistance from the Government in Nicaragua, 2016.....	119
Figure 5.14. Participation in Social Protests by Condition of Supporting the FSLN and Level of Participation in Government Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016	120
Figure 5.15. Participation in Protests in Nicaragua, 2010-2016.....	121
Figure 5.16. Participation in Protests by Country, 2016/17.....	122

Figure 5.17. Support for the Political System by Level of Participation in Community and Government Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016	124
Figure 5.18. Satisfaction with Government Performance by Participation in Government Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016	125
Figure 5.19. Support for Democracy by Participation in Community Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016.....	126
Figure 6.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance	130
Figure 6.2. System Support and Its Components in Nicaragua, 2004-2016.....	131
Figure 6.3. System Support in the Americas, 2016/17.....	132
Figure 6.4. Political Tolerance and Its Components in Nicaragua, 2004-2016.....	134
Figure 6.5. Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2016/17.....	135
Figure 6.6. Approval of the Right to Vote for those who Criticize the Government, Nicaragua 2004-2016.....	136
Figure 6.7. Need to Limit the Voice of Opposition Parties for Progress, Nicaragua 2016.....	136
Figure 6.8. Democratic Orientations over Time in Nicaragua, 2004-2016.....	137
Figure 6.9. Democratic Orientations in the Americas, 2016/17.....	139
Figure 6.10. Maximal Effects of Predictors of Democratic Attitude Profiles in Nicaragua 2016/17.....	141

List of Tables

Table 5.1. Attendance at Organization Meetings in Nicaragua, 2016 (In percentages).....	111
Table 5.2. Attendance to Meetings of the CPC or Family Cabinets in Nicaragua, 2016 (In percentages).....	116



Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the AmericasBarometer. While its primary goal is to represent the voice of the people on a broad range of important issues, the AmericasBarometer also helps guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region. In numerous ways, the AmericasBarometer informs discussions over the quality and strength of democracy in the region.

USAID officers rely on the AmericasBarometer to identify priorities and guide program design. The surveys are often used in evaluations, by comparing results in selected areas with national trends and/or by comparing data across time. The AmericasBarometer alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their country as compared to other countries.

At every stage in the development of the AmericasBarometer, the team realizes another objective of the project: building capacity. In the course of the project, experienced and expert individuals in the field of survey research work alongside and transfer knowledge and skills to students, local researchers, and others. These opportunities come through discussions over the development of the core questionnaire, cross-national collaborations on sample design, training sessions for fieldwork teams and office personnel involved in the surveys, and workshops and presentations on the analysis and reporting of the public opinion data.

The AmericasBarometer is coordinated by a team at Vanderbilt University, which hosts the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the researchers who devote significant portions of their time to this project. At the same time, the AmericasBarometer is a collaborative international project. In the first stage of each round, LAPOP consults with researchers across the Americas, USAID, and other project supporters to develop a core questionnaire. For each individual country survey, subject experts, local teams, and USAID officers provide suggestions for country-specific modules that are added to the core questionnaire. In each country, LAPOP works with local teams to pre-test the questionnaire in order to refine the survey instrument while making sure that it is written in language(s) familiar to the average person in that country. Once the questionnaire is completed, it is programmed into software for fieldwork and each local survey team is trained according to the same exacting standards. The sample is designed and reviewed by LAPOP and local partners and programmed at this stage. At that point, local teams conduct interviews in the homes of selected respondents across the Latin America and Caribbean region. Throughout the process, LAPOP and these teams stay in constant contact to monitor quality, security, and progress. Once the data are collected, LAPOP audits and processes the files while engaging in conversations with a consortium of individuals and institutions, including USAID, over plans for the dissemination of those data, findings, and reports. A broad network of individuals across the region contributes to the reports that are developed after each round of the AmericasBarometer.

The collaborative nature of the AmericasBarometer improves the project and makes it possible. While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, each round of the project is supported by numerous other individuals and institutions. Thanks to this broad and generous network of supporters, the AmericasBarometer provides a public good for all those interested in understanding and improving democratic governance in the region.

USAID is grateful to the LAPOP team, who assiduously and scrupulously works to generate each round of the AmericasBarometer under the leadership of Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister (Director), Dr. Noam Lupu (Associate Director), and Dr. Mitchell Seligson (Founder and Senior Advisor). We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current students located at Vanderbilt and throughout the hemisphere, to the local fieldwork teams, to all those who took the time to respond to the survey, and to the many expert individuals and institutions across the region that contribute to and engage with the project.

Christopher Strom
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
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U.S. Agency for International Development



Prologue: Background to the Study

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and

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The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing the public's experiences with democratic governance. The survey permits valid comparisons across individuals, subnational and supranational regions, countries, and time, via a common core questionnaire and standardized methods. Comparative research on democratic governance is critically important to understanding today's realities, anticipating key political challenges, and identifying actionable policy solutions. Around the globe, and in the Americas, democracy is on the defensive against public disillusionment with what it has delivered. Geographically, this round marks a significant expansion of the project into the Caribbean, a region often overlooked and understudied in survey research. Methodologically, this round marks our transition to using electronic devices for fieldwork, and with this the ability to take quality control to new levels, in every country in the project. Substantively, this round of the AmericasBarometer marks the first time in the history of the project in which we detect noteworthy and troubling declines in the average citizen's support for democracy on a number of key indicators.

The 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer is the seventh regional survey produced by LAPOP and the largest to date, covering 29 countries across the Americas. The round began in early 2016 in seven Caribbean countries and data collection in the 29th country concluded in the spring of 2017. The full dataset for this round includes over 43,000 interviews, conducted based on national sample designs and implemented with the assistance of partners across the region.

With roots in survey research dating back to the 1970s, LAPOP has been housed at Vanderbilt University since 2004. LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer were founded by Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, who currently serves as Senior Advisor to LAPOP. The LAPOP research organization includes eight professional staffers, two research fellows, 15 affiliated Ph.D. students, a number of undergraduate students in various roles, and a roster of collaborators and sponsors from within Vanderbilt and across universities, NGOs, and other institutions throughout the Americas.

The AmericasBarometer consists of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in 11 countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the

hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer was implemented in 28 countries. The 2016/17 round marks the largest in scope to date, covering 29 countries across the Americas.

LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets available for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org, free of charge to all. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the project's supporters, who are acknowledged on pages that follow.

In undertaking the AmericasBarometer, our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens, NGOs, public officials and their governments, the international donor and development communities, journalists, and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics and professional associations, while also ensuring that these reports are accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction, sample design, data collection, and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspectives. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and across countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some prior core items in the 2016/17 survey. To do so, we solicited input from partners across the region and we carefully considered the trade-off between losing a time series for one round versus making space for new content. This process resulted in a first draft of a reduced questionnaire; we then proceeded to gather input into new common content, country-specific questions, and other revisions.

To develop new common content, we solicited input from subject, country, and AmericasBarometer project experts across the Americas. A number of these individuals generously agreed to participate in a set of planning caucus advisory committees organized by topic, and these groups developed proposals for questionnaire revision. A list of these advisory committee members appears below. Based on ideas developed during this period of activity, we conducted a series of question wording and ordering experiments, with support from the Research in Individuals, Politics, & Society lab at Vanderbilt. We presented some of these results to collaborators convened in New York City for a meeting in the spring of 2016. Following discussions at that meeting and additional sponsor requests and input, we then further revised the questionnaire. All new items were piloted in qualitative pre-tests across the Americas. Questionnaires from the project are available online at www.LapopSurveys.org and at the end of each report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology and also with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common “study information sheet” and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project took and



passed certified human subjects protection tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the anonymity guaranteed to each respondent.

With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common strategy to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a typical minimum of 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In 2016, we introduced an exception to this rule with the inclusion of six countries that are part of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS); in these cases, the sample sizes are approximately 1,000. To ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective, we stratify countries by major sub-regions and urban/rural divides, and we use a frequency matching approach to the selection of individuals by gender and age. Detailed descriptions of all samples are available on our website.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and expand the use of technology in the field. For the first time, the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer deployed electronic devices (tablets and phones) for data collection in 100% of the countries surveyed. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field decreases errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track the progress of the survey in real time, down to the timing and location of interviews (which are monitored but not recorded in public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy). For the 2016/17 round, we developed and transferred to partner firms a set of quality control procedures that we call the Fieldwork Algorithm for LAPOP Control over survey Operations and Norms (FALCON ©). Via FALCON, teams working on LAPOP projects are able to verify the location of interviews within programmed geo-fences around work areas; verify interviewer identities via photos and signatures; and verify the quality of the interview via audio and timing files. FALCON allows fieldwork to be reviewed in real time, rather than after fieldwork has been completed, and this means that errors can be more effectively and efficiently remedied, resulting in higher quality data. We believe FALCON represents a revolutionary advance in technologically sophisticated and scientifically rigorous survey research, and we are committed to continuing to transfer knowledge of our advances to others.

Another innovation introduced into the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer is the LAPOP Automated Response Tracker (ART), which facilitates accurate recording of participation rates. While participation rates are useful metadata in public opinion studies, the onerous burden placed on field teams to systematically record this information can lead to errors, and incomplete or poor quality information. ART overcomes these challenges by routinizing the tracking of survey participation. By requiring enumerators to record this information electronically at the time of each contact attempt, we are able to facilitate and assure high quality data on participation rates.

Standardization is critical to the value of a comparative project, and one way we ensure that we meet this objective is by training all fieldwork teams in AmericasBarometer project protocol. Each local fieldwork team is trained by a LAPOP staffer or an experienced affiliate. Our interviewer manuals are available on our website.

Security issues in the field are a constant concern for all those who work in the field of public opinion research. Shifting patterns of crime, insecurity, and instability in certain parts of the region have brought about additional challenges to the safety of personnel working on the project. We take these issues very seriously and, as in past rounds, we worked with local teams during the course of fieldwork for the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 to develop security protocols and, in a

small number of cases, to make substitutions to the original sample for locations that teams on the ground identified as especially dangerous.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we continued our practice of making book-length reports, infographics, and presentations based on survey data accessible and readable to the lay reader. This means that our reports make use of simple charts to the extent possible. Where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of regression analysis, we present results in easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2016/17 round were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled senior data analyst, Dr. Carole Wilson, which allow them to create these graphs using Stata. The analyses in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design and report on the uncertainty around estimates and statistical significance. We include in Appendix A in this report a note on how to interpret the output from our data analyses.

The AmericasBarometer regional and country reports represent the product of collaborations among LAPOP researchers and a set of LAPOP-affiliated experts. The regional (comparative) report focuses on general trends and findings with respect to issues in democratic governance. As in recent years, we were fortunate to work with Dr. Ryan Carlin, Dr. Gregory Love, and Dr. Matthew Singer on the regional report. Selected content from the regional report appears in our country reports. In the country reports, the focus turns toward country-specific trends and findings, yet we often refer to the comparative public opinion landscape. We do so because comparisons across countries frequently provide important insight into country-specific findings. We are grateful to the roster of experts who contributed to the 2016/17 series of country reports. In cases in which USAID commissioned the report, we solicited – and benefited from – USAID input into the selection of topics and feedback on a draft of the report. All AmericasBarometer regional and country reports can be downloaded free of charge from our website.

Each round of the AmericasBarometer involves a multi-year process and the effort of thousands of individuals across the Americas. In each country, we partner with a local firm and we further benefit from input from researchers, country experts, sponsors, and subject experts located in institutions across the Americas. This network is critical to the quality of the AmericasBarometer and its availability as a public good. On behalf of this entire team, we express our hope that the reports and data generated by this project reach and are useful to the broadest possible number of individuals interested in and working on democracy and development.



Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and a significant number of countries in the Caribbean requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by the individual members of the public in the Americas, who, as survey respondents, either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

The AmericasBarometer is made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both institutions. Over the course of this most recent round of the AmericasBarometer, our main contact at USAID, Vanessa Reilly, transitioned to a new position. Chris Strom stepped in as our new point of contact on the project. Both Vanessa and Chris have had a positive impact on the project, especially by amplifying its value and use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt, the Dean of the College of Arts & Science, Dr. Lauren Benton, and the Chair of the Political Science Department, Dr. David Lewis, have championed and supported the project in important ways. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, the Center for Latin American Studies, the office of Sponsored Programs Administration, and the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected efforts associated with the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer came from collaborations with organizations and institutions that include Ciudadanía (Bolivia), the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), Dartmouth University, Environics (Canada), Florida International University, the Inter-American Development Bank, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Foundation (in partnership for this project with Igarapé), the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the United Nations Development Programme, the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (Venezuela), the University of Illinois, and at Vanderbilt University: the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Office for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion, the Research on Individuals, Politics, & Society Lab, and the Trans-Institutional Programs (TIPs) initiative (and the TIPS-Brazil project). We thank the individuals behind all of these collaborations for their work to support, shape, and sustain the AmericasBarometer. On the page that follows, we present the logos of some of the partner institutions that were core to the success of this most recent round of the AmericasBarometer.

Mexico and Central America



Andean/Southern Cone



Caribbean, U.S., and Canada





We thank the LAPOP staff who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order: Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Sebastián Larrea, Seung Yong Lee, Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Georgina Pizzolitto, Dr. Mariana Rodríguez, and Dr. Carole Wilson. This group was skillfully aided this round by two Research Fellows, Dr. Mollie Cohen and Zach Warner. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science, as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and grants. We thank Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marengo, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in numerous project activities and we thank Roody Reserve for his very effective work with us on the Haiti study.

We take seriously the opportunity to develop new research capacities and train top-notch new scholars in the field of public opinion research. In turn, we benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes the following undergraduate research assistants and Fellows: Jaymee Cole, Miguel Cuj, Pawel Durakiewicz, Julia Gabriel, Caleb Harper, Shelby House, Claire Larson, Alexandra Lynn, Morgan Marquez, Noemi Monnerville, Lizzie Naylor, Lachanda Reid, Hannah Stack, Lawrence Waller, and Michael Zoorob. We want to especially recognize Christine Huang, who has assisted LAPOP in numerous ways over the past several years and who proofread significant portions of this report. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations recently: Dr. Fred Batista, Dr. Mollie Cohen, Dr. Matt Layton, Dr. Trevor Lyons, Dr. Arturo Maldonado, and Dr. Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the project: Gabriel Camargo, Kaitlen Cassell, Oscar Castorena, Claire Evans, Whitney Lopez-Hardin, Sebastián Meyer, Georgia Nilsson, Daniela Osorio, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Facundo Salles, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Adam Wolsky.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries we studied. For the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked many of these individuals to work on a set of advisory committees that formed a planning caucus for questionnaire design. We list the advisory committee members on a following page and thank them for their work on the committees and, in a number of cases, on other aspects of questionnaire design and testing. We also want to acknowledge some other individuals whose input was very helpful, either with respect to that design phase or the implementation of a particular country study, and/or dissemination of its results. With sincere apologies for anyone we might have inadvertently omitted from this listing, these individuals include Dr. Benigno Alarcón (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Venezuela), Leticia Alcaraz (CIRD), Mark Bynoe (Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana), Dr. John Carey (Dartmouth), Dr. Ricardo Córdova (FUNDAUNGO, El Salvador), Dr. Rosario Espinal (Temple University), Dr. Mario Fuks (UFMG, Brazil), Dr. François Gélinau (Laval University, Canada), Marciano Glasgow (Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana), Dr. Anthony Harriott (UWI, Jamaica), Balford Lewis (Centre for Leadership and Governance, UWI, Jamaica), Dr. Mary Malone (University of New Hampshire), Dr. Keith Neuman (Environics Institute, Canada), Dr. Brendon Nyhan (Dartmouth), Dr. Richard Olson (FIU), Manuel Orrego (CIRD), Nathalia Porto (formerly affiliated with UFMG, Brazil), Nat Stone (POR and Algonquin College, Canada), Dr. Juan Manual Trak (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Venezuela), Patricia Zárate (Institutos de Estudios Peruanos, Peru), and Dr. Thomas Zeitzoff (American University). LAPOP's rigorous procedures for monitoring the quality of fieldwork in real time requires significant effort; we are grateful to Dr. Juan Carlos

Donoso, Dr. Arturo Maldonado, and their teams at 50+1 in Quito and in Lima for their assistance in quality control on a number of the surveys included in this round.

To all the many individuals who contributed to the project, we offer our sincere gratitude. We could not achieve the scope, quality, and impact of the AmericasBarometer without your support.

Liz Zechmeister
Noam Lupu

Nashville, Tennessee
August 2017

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Introduction

Democracy is on the defensive in the Americas and around the world. In a number of places across the Americas, countries have been facing security and economic crises, and scandals produced by governments and parties. Among the public, there is mounting skepticism regarding the success democracy can have in delivering on citizens' expectations and improving the quality of their daily lives. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer investigates this growing frustration, and permits its study in comparative perspective across population subgroups, countries, and time. It also documents some notable signs of resilience and, at times, reveals important nuances in challenges to democratic governance across a heterogeneous region. In this way, the AmericasBarometer provides a sophisticated tool for diagnoses and distinctions that are fundamental to the design and implementation of effective policy.

A core focus of the AmericasBarometer are citizens' evaluations of "democratic governance." Democratic governance refers to a system of politics and public policy in which basic freedoms privilege and enable citizens' direct, indirect, and representative participation, with the goal of ensuring that states are held accountable for their actions. As the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2013) has defined it, "Democratic governance is governance that takes place in the context of a democratic political system, which is representative of the will and interests of the people and is infused with the principles of participation, inclusion, and accountability" (p. 37). The appeal of democratic governance is derived from its potential to improve the quality of citizens' lives by facilitating efforts to decrease corruption, increase economic development, reduce poverty, and build strong communities. The legitimacy of democratic governance hinges, at least in part, on how well it delivers on these expectations (Booth and Seligson 2009). For this reason, taking stock of its successes and short-comings requires evaluating the varied experiences and assessments of citizens under democratic governance.

In this latest series of regional reports on the AmericasBarometer, we examine public support for the institutions at the core of democracy, the extent to which citizens feel their countries are succeeding in supplying the basic liberties required of democratic governance, citizens' experiences and assessments regarding corruption and crime, their involvement with and assessments of local politics, and their general democratic orientations. To do so, we make use of data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer, often in combination with data from prior rounds of the study¹. Within the report, main findings are presented at the outset of each chapter, and in this introduction, we present a preview of these core results. While Chapters 1, 2 and 6 provide details on important differences across countries, highlighting specific findings for Nicaragua, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 cover exclusive issues for the case of Nicaragua.

To begin, Chapter 1 considers support for the abstract concept of democracy and its two most fundamental components: elections and parties. One of the most striking findings in this chapter is a significant decline in the region, and in Nicaragua, of the support for democracy. In Nicaragua, support for democracy fell from 69.2% in 2006 to 58% in 2016. On the other hand, support for

¹ The collection of data of the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 in Nicaragua took place between September 13 and October 19, 2016. The dates for the other countries can be found here: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2016/Fieldwork_dates_tables_2004-2016_17_092517.pdf

executive coups (that is to say, the closing of Congress by the Executive) in Nicaragua decreased by almost 20 percentage points from 45.3% in 2014 to 26.2% in 2016. Nicaragua is among the countries with the highest levels of trust in elections, with a little more than a half of those interviewed reporting trust in elections. Nevertheless, Nicaragua is among the lowest ranked countries in the region with 59.8% reporting having participated in the most recent general elections. Trust in political parties increased to its highest level in 2016. A little more than a third of Nicaraguans (35.1%) trust in the political parties. In addition, 40.6% identify with a political party in 2016, which represents a high rate in comparison with other countries in the region.

Basic liberties, such as freedom of the media, expression, and fundamental human rights, are critical to the public's engagement and inclusion in the democratic political system. Chapter 2 focuses on the degree to which the public perceives these basic freedoms to be restricted. As argued in this chapter and in Chapter 6, restrictions to basic liberties may undermine the motivation to participate, and erode individuals' support for the incumbent administration and the democratic system more generally. In Nicaragua, 47% of people believe that there is very little freedom of the press and a higher percentage feels that there is little freedom to express political opinions without fear. Nearly half of the public across the Americas perceives that there is very little freedom of expression in their country; and Nicaragua is no exception: 49% report that there is little freedom of expression (general) and 55% believe that there is very little freedom of political expression. The reports of the lack of basic liberties are even greater when we focus on the protection of human rights: in Nicaragua, 57% of the public believe that there is very little protection for human rights. On average across the region, nearly two-thirds of the public state that human rights are insufficiently protected in their country. Thus, while democracy promises a set of basic freedoms, a large proportion of the public in the Americas perceives that it is falling short in this regard. Insofar as Nicaraguans perceive shortcomings in the provision of basic freedoms, they express less approval for the president and a lower probability of voting for the incumbent government.

Chapter 3 presents Nicaraguans' opinions about corruption. Seven of every ten Nicaraguans believe that half or more of the politicians in the country are corrupt. Nevertheless, Nicaragua is one of the countries in the region in which comparatively fewer citizens perceive corruption. In other Latin American countries and the Caribbean, a higher percentage of citizens perceive that all of the politicians are involved in corruption. In addition, the experience of being the victim of corruption as well as the having been offered perks by a politician in exchange for votes increase the probability of perceiving corruption in the public sphere. Yet, more than half of those surveyed feel positively towards the government's efforts to fight corruption in Nicaragua. Citizens have a positive evaluation of the government's work in the fight against corruption in comparison with the majority of countries included in the 2016/17 round. Twelve percent of Nicaraguans were victims of police corruption, and a little more than 20% of the public were asked to pay any type of bribe in the year before the survey. The results indicate a significant increase in the reports of being a victim of corruption in comparison with previous years. This increase has caused Nicaragua to be one of the countries that registers the highest rates of corruption victimization in the hemisphere. Approximately one of every four Nicaraguans surveyed thinks that it is justified to pay a bribe. This percentage of people who think it is justified to pay a bribe is one of the highest in the region. These results indicate that being a victim of corruption not only affects in a significant way an individual's support for the political system, but also a person's evaluation of the functioning of democracy in Nicaragua.



Chapter 4 explores patterns in the consumption of news by Nicaraguans; the perceptions of the citizenry about the media and freedom of expression; and the possible impact of these perceptions in the levels of support for democracy and the political system. The majority of Nicaraguans (56.7%) report following the news daily. Close to 2 of every 5 citizens get their information through television. Half of Nicaraguans in 2014 and 2016 think that the freedom of expression in the media remains the same. On the other side, there is a decrease in the percentage that say that freedom of expression has increased – from 38% in 2014 to 33% in 2016. The vast majority of Nicaraguans express that it is important or very important that there be independent media in Nicaragua. And although two thirds think that the media represent different opinions that exist in the country well, more than half of the public also think that the media are controlled by a few economic groups or politicians. More than two thirds of Nicaraguans think that they have to be careful when talking about politics. This represents an important increase in comparison with the 55% who reported this attitude in 2014. Trust in the media and perceiving that the media represents a plurality of opinions increase support for democracy; being fearful about talking about politics decreases it. Trust in the media, believing that freedom of the press has increased, perceiving that the media represents a plurality of opinions, believing that there is sufficient freedom of expression, and not fearing talking about politics increase support for Nicaragua's political system.

Chapter 5 explores the issue of citizen participation in Nicaragua. A little more than half of Nicaraguan citizens (51.3%) trust municipal governments. Trust in municipal governments has been increasing since 2008 and in 2016 reached its highest level of trust registered by the AmericasBarometer. Likewise, Nicaraguans' participation in local government been increasing since 2012. For 2016, almost 16% of people said that they had attended a session organized by the municipality.

The rate of participation of Nicaraguans in municipal meetings is among the highest in the region. Trust in the municipality plays a fundamental role in the willingness of the public to participate in town meetings or city council meetings. A little more than half of the Nicaraguans surveyed (51.4%) have positive assessments of the quality of municipal services. Those surveyed tend to participate more in religious organizations than in any other type of associations or groups in Nicaragua. Yet, the percentage of people who participate actively in churches has decreased significantly since 2006. The average rate of participation in community organizations in general is comparatively higher in Nicaragua than in a good part of the countries of the region. Nicaraguans' participation in corporatist organizations promoted by the government, like the Citizen Power Councils and the Family Cabinets, is in general low, but it is strongly linked to identification with the FSLN and with their aid programs.

In the year before the survey, 6.1% of Nicaraguans had participated in a protest. This percentage has decreased since 2010 and constitutes one of the lowest in comparison with other countries in the region. The probability of participating in public protests is strongly linked to identification with the FSLN and with participation in corporatist organizations of the government. Participation in the Citizen Power Councils and in the Family Cabinets has a positive effect on support for the political system and satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Nicaragua. Participation in these types of organizations, however, has no effect on the support for democracy as a political order. In this case, only participation in civil society organizations favors the support for democracy as the preferred system.

Chapter 6 concludes the volume with an analysis of region-wide trends regarding two pillars of democracy: support for the political system and political tolerance. Over the years, LAPOP has

hypothesized and found that democracy rests on firmer ground the more the following joint conditions are met: the public perceives the political system to be legitimate and it supports the right to participate of those who may hold diverging political views. On average in the Latin America and Caribbean region, the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer detects a decrease in system support. Support for the political system reached its highest level in Nicaragua in 2016 (62.8). This is due to increases in trust that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that basic human rights are protected. Political tolerance in Nicaragua increased significantly to 53.1 points after reaching its lowest level in 2014. The increase in political tolerance among Nicaraguans is due to significant increases in all of the components of this index, which include measures of approval for the right to protest, vote, give speeches, and be a political candidate for those who disagree with the political system. In 2016, for the first time in Nicaragua, orientations conducive to a *stable democracy* dominated, followed by orientations conducive to *authoritarian stability*. The orientations conducive to democratic stability increased on average in Nicaragua in 2016 compared to 2014.

Democracy in the Latin America and Caribbean region is facing a critical set of challenges, from low public trust in elections, parties, and political leadership to deficiencies in the availability of basic liberties, the rule of law, citizen security, and robust service provision. As the chapters within note, and as is evident in the AmericasBarometer datasets and the country-specific reports based on this project, experiences vary significantly between individual countries. Each component of democratic values and governance described in this report, and more, can be analyzed in greater detail using these resources. Yet, overall, we can conclude that the public's continued support for democratic governance depends crucially on whether the region's political systems can deliver on its promises.



Chapter 1.

Support for Electoral Democracy in the Americas

Mollie J. Cohen with LAPOP

I. Introduction

Since the third wave of democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s, electoral democracy has been the default system of government in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). More than 100 (mostly) free, competitive, and fair elections for executive positions have been held across the region since the 1980s, with many of them observed by the Organization of American States, international NGOs, and in-country governance organizations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, elections have become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996) when it comes to rising to political leadership.

Yet, scholars have recently pointed to a democratic “recession” in the developing world, and in the LAC region specifically (Diamond 2015; Puddington 2012; but see Levitsky and Way 2015). Leaders in several countries have curtailed citizens’ rights and the freedom of the press (see Chapter 2 of this report). A string of corruption scandals¹ across the LAC region has fueled citizens’ already-high skepticism of politicians (see Chapter 3 of this report). Presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have repeatedly sought to extend their time in office beyond established term limits (BBC 2015; *Guardian* 2016a; Sonneland 2016).

The challenge of high quality governance has, in some contexts, been exacerbated by economic slowdown and persistent criminal violence (see also Chapter 4 of this report).² For example, the scarcity of basic goods in Venezuela provoked violent street protests in 2014 (Rodríguez 2016). In 2017, the incumbent administration took arguably illegal steps to tighten the *Chavista* regime’s hold on power (BBC 2017; Rodríguez and Zechmeister 2017). Viewed by citizens as a “self-coup,” this action sparked renewed street protests. The military responded by cracking down on protestors, resulting in numerous deaths (Cawthorne and Ulmer 2017). As another example, high levels of criminal violence in Mexico, Bolivia, and much of Central America, combined with low confidence in law enforcement, have led some citizens to take the law into their own hands (Bateson 2012; Zizumbo 2017). This summary execution of suspected criminals without trial undermines the state and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Zizumbo 2017).

In short, the gradual decay of basic liberties, episodes in which political corruption is exposed and made visible, and the economic and security crises that create barriers to high quality governance

¹ Several high-impact scandals have their roots in *The Panama Papers*, leaked in April 2016, which implicated politicians across the region in the largest global corruption scandal in history (see *Guardian* 2017). The *lavajato* scandal in Brazil led to the ouster of the president, the investigation of more than a hundred politicians (including her replacement), and arguably aggravated already high perceptions of corruption in Brazil. Even prior to these political bombshells, Layton (2014) made the case that mass protest participation among Brazilians in the wake of the World Cup was driven in large part by perceptions of corruption.

² In 2016/17, 59% of AmericasBarometer respondents in the “LAC-21” countries (see Footnote 14) said that the national economy has gotten worse – the poorest national economic perceptions observed since the study’s inception in 2004 and a notable increase (ten percentage points) since 2014.

suggest that citizens in the Americas may have good reason to be disillusioned with democracy. This chapter assesses public support for the *minimal* requirements of democracy – that is, the presence and persistence of elections as the means to select governing representatives – in Nicaragua and, more generally, in Latin America and the Caribbean.

II. Main Findings

This chapter assesses public support for the minimal requirements of democracy in Nicaragua and in the LAC region. Some key findings are:

- Across the region, support for democracy is significantly lower in 2016/17 than in previous years. In Nicaragua, support for democracy decreased from 69.4% in 2004 to 58% in 2016. Older Nicaraguans report a greater support for democracy.
- Support for executive coups in Nicaragua decreased by almost 20 percentage points from 45.3% in 2014 to 26.2% in 2016.
- Trust in political parties increased to its highest level in 2016. A little more than a third of Nicaraguans (35.1%) have trust in political parties.
- Partisan affiliation in Nicaragua decreased by 6 percentage points in 2016.

III. The Basic Tenets of Electoral Democracy

This chapter examines support for tenants of minimal or electoral democracy in the LAC region.³ “Minimalist” definitions of democracy argue that the presence of competitive elections (i.e., with a true possibility of alternations in power) is sufficient to identify a democracy.⁴ For example, in his classic work, Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy as, “...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions... by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (p. 260). Huntington (1991) similarly defines democracies as systems in which “powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes” (p. 7). Diamond (1999) calls systems with “regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage” *electoral* democracies (a minimal level of democracy, which he contrasts with “liberal” democracies, p. 10).⁵

³ This chapter uses the terms “democracy” and “electoral democracy” interchangeably.

⁴ In contrast to this minimalist definition of democracy, “maximalist” definitions argue that the protection of civil liberties is necessary for democracy to flourish. Dahl (1971) theorized that inclusiveness, or public participation, and liberalization, or public contestation, are key features of a democracy, or “polyarchy” (p.7). Public contestation and participation include voting *as a minimum*, but also implicate a free press and citizen participation through non-electoral channels (e.g., protest). Later chapters in this report turn to the supply of civil liberties and quality governance – two key pieces of maximal definitions of democracy. This chapter focuses more narrowly on support for and attitudes around competitive elections, which all scholars agree are necessary, if not sufficient, for democracy.

⁵ Introducing participation requirements complicates the task of classifying electoral democracies. Around the world, many systems recognized as democratic have, or have had, limited access to the franchise. For example, in the United States, felons are barred from voting in many instances and in Switzerland, women were not able to vote until 1971. Yet, most scholars still classify the contemporary U.S. and pre-1971 Switzerland as electoral democracies. A second complication comes from the ‘universal suffrage’



In seeking to measure “minimal” democracy, scholars often focus on the competitiveness of elections. Following Third Wave democratic transitions, several authoritarian states implemented elections to assuage public demand for democracy, and to appease the international community’s demands to liberalize political institutions. However, elections in such contexts often take place on an uneven playing field. Entrenched incumbent rulers and dominant parties have been known to manipulate the rules of competition (e.g., by inconsistently applying electoral law for challengers versus incumbent candidates) and, in extreme cases, election outcomes (e.g., by outright fraud).^{6,7}

In short, minimal or electoral democracies are countries in which competitive elections are held, and have led (or are likely to lead) to alternation in power at the national level. In the years following Third Wave democratic transitions, the vast majority of executive elections in the LAC region have met this minimum standard of democratic competition. However, over the years and including in recent times, some presidents across the region have taken steps to consolidate power behind powerful parties and individuals. For example, presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have sought to extend or eliminate term limits (BBC 2015; *Guardian* 2016a; Sonneland 2016). Viewed in the context of minimal definitions of democracy, these steps have the potential to harm democratic governance by limiting the competitiveness of elections.

The legitimacy and integrity of elections has been repeatedly called into question in the region. In 2016, the Peruvian electoral court was accused of favoritism when it removed high-polling presidential candidates from contention for minor errors in campaign paperwork (Cohen 2016; RPP 2016). Nicaragua’s 2016 election was accompanied by accusations of fraud and an uneven playing field that favored the incumbent party; the circumstances resulted in an election boycott by the opposition (and a landslide victory for the incumbent; see Baltodano 2016). Donald Trump has called into question the integrity of U.S. elections by repeatedly stating that he lost the popular vote due to fraudulent voting during the 2016 presidential contest (BBC 2016). In Ecuador’s 2017 runoff election, the losing opposition candidate argued that the election results had been manipulated and refused to concede, leading to mass street protests (BBC 2017). Finally, in Venezuela, incumbents associated with the *Chavista* regime have been accused of limiting opposition parties’ access to campaign resources and in 2016, the government cancelled gubernatorial elections in what some viewed as an attempt to stop the opposition from gaining power (Cawthorne 2016).

None of these incidents signifies the imminent downfall of democracy; yet, each serves as a reminder that electoral democracy does not always persist. Democracy has been the status quo political system in the Latin America and Caribbean region since the 1970s and 1980s, and since that time, scholars have debated whether and to what extent democracy has “consolidated” in

requirement: Is it sufficient that all citizens have access to the franchise, or must all citizens *participate* via the franchise (i.e., through the implementation of mandatory voting; see Lijphart 1999)?

⁶ Scholars have termed these systems, where elections are *held* but where the possibility of alternations in power is limited, “competitive authoritarian” regimes (see, e.g., Levitsky and Way 2010).

⁷ In particular, once they have identified the presence of elections, scholars typically ask whether two or more viable partisan options are present and whether a system has produced an alternation in power in the executive branch to identify electoral competitiveness and distinguish democracies from non-democracies (see Przeworski 1991, Przeworski et al. 2000). Przeworski et al. (2000) indicate that post-transitional regimes must include the alternation of power, and treat systems where elections are held but incumbents never lose power as authoritarian (p.27).

these countries – that is, whether electoral democracy exists as “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996).⁸ At the core of democratic consolidation is the relative stability of the political system. Simply put, regimes that are “consolidated” are likely to persist in the future (Diamond 1994; Schedler 1998).⁹

The persistence of democratic institutions relies in large part on citizen attitudes. Indeed, by defining regime consolidation in terms of its status as “the only game in town,” scholars directly implicate citizens and allude to two distinct sets of attitudes. First, citizens in consolidated democracies must support democratic norms and institutions (e.g., democracy as an ideal; the peaceful transfer of power across party lines; free and fair elections). Second and equally important, citizens in consolidated democracies must *reject* replacing political leaders with means other than elections (e.g., via military coup).

The following sections assess the state of democratic consolidation in Nicaragua by examining citizens’ support for democracy in the abstract and their rejection of coups.

Support for Democracy in the Abstract

To what extent do individuals in the Americas believe that democracy is the best political system, and how does their support for democracy in 2016/17 compare to past years? Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer project has asked respondents across the Americas the following question assessing support for democracy¹⁰:

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Respondents provided an answer ranging from 1-7, with 1 signifying “strong disagreement” and 7 denoting “strong agreement.” Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of respondents in each country that reports support for democracy (values of five to seven on the seven-point scale). Responses range from a low of 48.4% in Guatemala to a high of 82.4% in Uruguay. The percentage of the public that supports democracy is highest in some of the region’s oldest and most stable democracies (Uruguay, Canada, Argentina, the United States, and Costa Rica), while support for democracy is notably lower in countries that have recently experienced democratic, political or security crises (e.g., Guatemala, Paraguay, Mexico, Haiti, and Honduras).

⁸ Discussions of “democratic consolidation” can be problematic, as they often assume that all countries transitioning from dictatorship, and indeed all countries that hold competitive elections, are moving toward “deepening” democratic quality, when this is not always the case (see, for example, Levitsky and Way 2012).

⁹ The term “democratic consolidation” has been used to describe the prevention of democratic breakdown and the degradation of democratic norms, as well as to denote the “deepening” of democracy (e.g., through the increased protection of civil and other liberties) (see Schedler 1998). As in defining electoral democracy, we define consolidation “minimally” (and, arguably, “negatively”), as the avoidance of regime breakdown.

¹⁰ This question is often referred to as a “Churchillian” question of democratic support, as it is derived from Winston Churchill’s oft-quoted speech from the House of Commons, in which he noted that, “...democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In Nicaragua, a little more than half of the citizens (58%) support democracy as the best form of government, which places the country in an intermediate range of support for democracy in comparison with the rest of the countries in the region.




Figure 1.1. Cross-National Support for Democracy

Figure 1.2 documents the level of support for democracy in the Latin America and Caribbean region, as it has changed across time. This and all other cross-time and sub-group analyses in this chapter use data from Nicaragua only. Although the majority of citizens in Nicaragua have

supported democracy since 2004, the percentage that supports democracy has decreased significantly in 2016 (58%).




Figure 1.2. Support for Democracy over Time in Nicaragua

Who is most likely to support democracy? Figure 1.3 shows statistically significant relationships between five demographic and socio-economic subgroups (education, wealth, urban/ rural residence, gender, and age) and support for democracy in Nicaragua. In all such figures in this chapter, we only show relationships that are statistically significant with 95% confidence. If a category is excluded, this means that it does not significantly predict a particular dependent variable.¹¹

Figure 1.3 shows that older Nicaraguans are more likely to report support for democracy: while 54.2% of those between 16 and 25 years of age support democracy, between 61% and 65% of those who are 66 years old or older support democracy¹².

¹¹ For the results of the regressions in this chapter, see the online appendix on the LAPOP website.

¹² There are no statistically significant relationships among support for democracy and level of wealth, gender, education, and place of residence (urban and rural).




Figure 1.3. Support for Democracy by Age in Nicaragua

Satisfaction with democracy has increased significantly since 2010 in Nicaragua, when less than half of Nicaraguans expressed their satisfaction. In 2012, six out of every 10 Nicaraguans were satisfied with the way in which democracy functioned in their country. This rate is a bit lower in 2016, although the difference is not statistically significant, with two out of every three Nicaraguans expressing their satisfaction with democracy¹³. Nicaraguans with less education and those who reside in rural zones express more satisfaction with democracy than those with higher levels of education and those who live in urban areas.

¹³ According to the national survey carried out by LAPOP in 2016, the percentage of Nicaraguans who were satisfied with democracy increased significantly to 65.5%. These data are not included here given that this report refers to the results of the AmericasBarometer of 2016/17.




Figure 1.4. Satisfaction with Democracy over Time in Nicaragua

Rules of the Game: Support for Coups under High Crime and Corruption

In addition to support for democracy in theory, acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town” is key to the stability and persistence of democratic governance. This means, in short, that citizens in democratic societies should not support military coups that replace the incumbent, democratically elected government with military leadership. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer includes two items that tap participants’ hypothetical willingness to support a military takeover of the government. Half of respondents received the first of the following questions, while the other half was randomly assigned to receive the second:

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.

- (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified
- (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified

JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.

- (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified
- (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified

Figure 1.5 shows the percentage of respondents in each country that responded that they would support a military coup under each of these circumstances. Support for military coups under high levels of crime ranges from a low of 23.3 percent in the United States to a high of 59.3% of respondents in Jamaica. Support for coups under high corruption ranges from 23% in Argentina to 53.2% in both Costa Rica and Jamaica. Support for military coups under high levels of crime is

26.7% in Nicaragua, which places the country near the bottom of the ranking of countries in the region. Support for military coups under high corruption is similar (25.7%), and the second lowest rate for the region.

More generally, levels of support for military coups are lowest in Argentina, Uruguay, the United States, and Nicaragua. Support for coups is consistently high compared to the rest of the region in Jamaica, Peru, and Mexico.




Figure 1.5. Support for Military Coups under High Crime and High Corruption

For cross-time, socio-economic, and demographic analyses, we assess support for military coups, generally, by creating an index of these two variables.¹⁴ According to Figure 1.6, in Nicaragua,

¹⁴ In survey rounds when both questions were asked to all respondents, we generated an additive index, adding responses to both items and dividing through by two for each individual. In 2016/17, we proxy support for military coups, generally, with support for coups under either high crime or high corruption – whichever question the respondent received.

support for military coups has decreased to a large extent compared to the first round in 2004, when 42.8% of Nicaraguans supported coups. Support of military coups reached its lowest level in 2016, when only about a fourth of Nicaraguans supported this type of action.




Figure 1.6. Support for Military Coups over Time in Nicaragua

Figure 1.7 shows support for military coups by demographic and socio-economic subgroups. In Nicaragua, urban residents (28.4%) have a greater probability than rural residents (22.2%) of expressing their support for a military coup. At the same time, support of military coups is much more common among young Nicaraguans¹⁵.

¹⁵ There are no statistically significant relations among support for military coups and levels of wealth, education, and place of residence (urban and rural).




Figure 1.7. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Support for Military Coups in Nicaragua

Support for Executive Coups

In addition to the questions discussed above, the AmericasBarometer in 2016/17 asked all respondents the following question, gauging support for executive coups – that is, the shutdown of legislative bodies by the executive branch:

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament?

(1) Yes, it is justified (2) No, it is not justified

Because takeovers by the executive versus the military imply action by different government actors, we analyze these questions separately. Figure 1.8 shows the distribution of support for executive coups in very difficult times across countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2016/17. Support for executive coups across the region is substantially lower than support for hypothetical coups under high crime or high corruption, averaging 20.5% across the region. Support for executive coups is the lowest in Uruguay (8.7%) and support for executive coups is by far the highest in Peru (37.8%) – a country that experienced an executive coup in 1993. Nicaragua is in the middle of the ranking of countries of support for executive coups in the region (19.9%).




Figure 1.8. Support for Executive Coups

While support for executive coups is lower than support for military coups under high crime or high corruption, Figure 1.9 shows that levels of support for an executive shutdown of the legislature increased to its highest level in the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua from 11.7 in 2010 to 19.9% in 2016.




Figure 1.9. Support for Executive Coups over Time in Nicaragua

Figure 1.10 shows the demographic and socio-economic predictors of support for executive coups in Nicaragua. Around a fourth of Nicaraguans with lower levels of education (none or primary) or wealth support executive coups in comparison with 8.7% of those with higher education and 14.3% of those in the highest quintile of wealth.




Figure 1.10. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Support for Executive Coups in Nicaragua

On balance, these metrics of minimal support for democracy, support for democracy in theory, and the rejection of coups suggest declining public support for democracy in the region. Support for democracy in theory, for example, declined substantially in the region and in Nicaragua in comparison with 2014. At the same time the level of support for a hypothetical military coup in Nicaragua is relatively lower than in countries of the region and has decreased in recent years. On the other hand, support for executive coups grew by 7.4 percentage points in 2016 in Nicaragua. Although these figures are noteworthy, they are also hypothetical, abstract, and general. While respondents express lower support for democracy on average, or more support for hypothetical coups, it is unclear from these analyses whether this overarching displeasure is reflected in opinions about institutions as they function in respondents' national political contexts. The remainder of this chapter turns to this question.

IV. Support for Democratic Institutions: Elections and Parties

Electoral democracy relies on citizen participation through elections: voters select their representatives and straightforwardly voice their preferences at the ballot box. Public trust and participation in these institutions are therefore important for understanding citizen support for democracy as it functions in the real world and, in addition, serve as a signal of citizens' commitment to democracy (a foundational piece of democratic consolidation).

Voters select who governs through their participation in competitive elections. This process allows citizens an indirect role in policy-making under electoral democracy, which occurs



“...through the competition and cooperation of elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76). Citizens’ preferences are thus mediated through their interactions with political institutions (e.g., elections) and actors (e.g., politicians and parties) in a democracy. Citizen trust in the electoral process as clean, competitive, and fair is therefore foundational to democracy’s legitimacy.¹⁶

For voters, democratic elections are an opportunity to punish or reward outcomes from the previous term, and to signal their prospective preferences (see, e.g., Ferejohn 1986; Lewis Beck 1986; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Powell 2000). For elections to produce winners and electoral mandates, some portion of the public must participate in them by voting.¹⁷ Around the world, scholars have observed inequities in who participates: abstainers are often less interested in and more alienated from politics than other citizens (see Karp and Banducci 2008; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014), and those who vote are wealthier and more educated than those who abstain (Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister 2015; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Nadeau et al. 2017).¹⁸

In short, citizens legitimize electoral democracy by trusting in elections as a mechanism to select leaders and by participating in elections. The following sections examine citizen trust and participation in elections in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the goal of better understanding support for electoral democracy in the region.

Trust in Elections

In 2004 and every round since 2012, the AmericasBarometer has asked individuals the following question:

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

Responses range from 1-7, with 1 indicating “no trust” and 7 denoting “strong trust.” Figure 1.10 shows the percentage of individuals who trust elections (values of five to seven on the seven-point scale) in each country where the question was asked in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer study. The percentage of respondents who report trust in elections ranges widely, from 18.5% in Haiti to 73% in Uruguay. There are no clear trends in the ranking of countries. For example, Nicaragua’s 2016 election was accompanied by accusations of fraud culminating in a boycott of the election by

¹⁶ Scholars argue that trust in elections *among the losers* is potentially more important than democratic support among winners (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 2007).

¹⁷ There is some debate as to what the ideal rate of participation is. While some argue that full participation is a normative good (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997), others (e.g., Rosema 2007; see also Schumpeter 1942) argue that low electoral participation can signal citizen satisfaction with the status quo and may yield better representative outcomes (see also Singh 2016).

¹⁸ Several Latin American countries have sought to minimize these inequities and enforce a view of voting as both a right and a duty by implementing mandatory vote laws (Fornos et al. 2004). Mandatory vote laws arguably reduce unequal participation by income, and scholars have also suggested that compulsory voting can increase citizens’ *cognitive* engagement (that is, their knowledge of and interest in politics; see Carlin and Love 2015; Singh 2015; Söderlund et al. 2011). However, increased turnout across demographic subgroups does not necessarily mean increased positive participation in elections. Voters in the LAC region regularly turn out and spoil their ballots to signal their discontent with status quo politics, and levels of spoiled voting are especially high where voting is mandated (Cohen 2017; Power and Garand 2007).

opposition parties; yet, trust in elections is fourth from the highest in the region in that country. In contrast, in Colombia, only 24% of respondents report trust in elections, although elections have been regularly certified as clean from fraud by international observers in recent years. Nicaragua is among the countries with the highest rates of trust in elections, with a little more than a half of those interviewed reporting trust in the elections.




Figure 1.11. Percentage of Respondents Who Trust Elections



In Nicaragua, an average of 51.1% of citizens trust elections, according to the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer (see Figure 1.11). This constitutes an increase from the 2014 round.




Figure 1.12. Trust in Elections over Time in Nicaragua

In terms of who is most likely to trust elections, the results in Figure 1.13 show that those Nicaraguans with lower levels of education express more trust in elections than those with a post-secondary education. Similarly, women trust elections to a greater degree than men¹⁹.

¹⁹ There are no statistically significant relationships among confidence in elections and gender, wealth, or age.




Figure 1.13. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Trust in Elections in Nicaragua

Participation in Elections

In addition to supporting and trusting elections in theory, democracy requires citizen participation in elections to select winners. To measure electoral participation, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents in each country the following question:

VB2. Did you vote in the (first round of the) last **presidential elections** of (year of last presidential elections)?

- (1) Voted
- (2) Did not vote

Figure 1.14 shows the distribution of reported voter turnout in each of the countries in the study. Reported turnout ranges from 52.5% in the 2016 general election in Jamaica to 89.3% in Peru's 2016 general election.²⁰ Unsurprisingly, reported turnout is the highest in countries where mandatory vote laws exist and are strictly enforced (Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador; see Fornos et al. 2004) and is substantially lower in countries where voting is voluntary (e.g., Chile, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Colombia). Nicaragua is among the lowest ranked countries in the region, with 59.8%

²⁰ As in most studies of electoral behavior, turnout is over-reported by several percentage points in the AmericasBarometer study. For example, official turnout in the first round Peruvian election in 2016 was 81.8% of eligible voters, and official turnout in the 2016 US elections was 60.2% of eligible voters. Turnout over-reporting can be caused by social desirability (voting is seen as normatively desirable, and interviewees lie to appear to be good citizens) and faulty memory (individuals do not remember what they did during the last election, so incorrectly guess that they turned out to vote).

reporting having participated in the most recent general elections. Since 2012, electoral participation, like identification with political parties, has decreased significantly from 80.1% to 59.8%.




Figure 1.14. Electoral Turnout by Country




Figure 1.15. Electoral Participation in Nicaragua, 2004-2016

Who participates in elections? There are some interesting patterns in Figure 1.16. All of the age cohorts with the exception of the youngest (16-25) report participation in the general elections of more than 68%. The youngest Nicaraguans report a participation rate of only 38.8%²¹.




Figure 1.16. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Turnout in Nicaragua

²¹ Due to age, not all study participants were eligible to vote in the country's most recent presidential election, which accounts for much of the differences in electoral participation among the youngest and the rest of the age cohorts.

In Nicaragua, 51.5% of those interviewed reported trusting elections, which has been the status quo system for selecting leaders for well over 30 years on average across the region. This figure is one of the highest of the region. Nevertheless, Nicaragua is among the three countries with the lowest rates of electoral participation. Participation has remained relatively stable over time, and about 60% of voting-age individuals in Nicaragua still report participating in the most recent presidential elections in 2011.

At the start of 2015, a constitutional reform permitted unlimited presidential re-election in Nicaragua. In 2016, Nicaraguans were asked if they supported unlimited re-election. Figure 1.17 shows that, in 2016, a little less than half of those surveyed reported supporting unlimited re-election²². Support for unlimited re-election is highest among women and those Nicaraguans with lower levels of education and wealth.




Figure 1.17. Opinions about Reelection without Term Limits in Nicaragua, 2016

Trust in Political Parties

Citizens' preferences about policy are filtered not only through elections, but also through elected representatives and the political parties into which they are organized. The founders of the United States viewed the presence of "factions" as undesirable but inevitable in a republic (see Federalist No. 10). While parties are not mentioned explicitly in most countries' constitutions (Stokes 2002), scholars agree that party organizations are important for both politicians and voters. By organizing legislators into groups with similar policy preferences, parties are able to overcome coordination problems and enact legislation efficiently rather than building new coalitions for each piece of proposed legislation (Aldrich 1995). This has led some (see, e.g., Schattschneider 1967) to argue that

²² This rate is similar to those of the national survey of 2017.

representative democracy needs political parties, especially institutionalized parties (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995), to work.

Parties also serve an important role for citizens. By organizing politics on policy lines, parties enable voters to identify a “team” that aligns with their preferences. At their best, then, parties facilitate citizen participation in the democratic process and ensure high quality representation.

However, political parties are not always associated with positive outcomes. At their worst, strong parties divide politicians and citizens into fiercely oppositional groups, resulting in legislative gridlock. On the other hand, parties are not able to effectively organize the political space when they lack leadership and staying power. High turnover (or ‘volatility’) in the partisan options competing over time is especially relevant in some of Latin America’s weak party systems, where levels of partisan replacement over time are notably high (see, e.g., Cohen, Salles, and Zechmeister 2017; Roberts 2014). Further, the perception that politics is a dirty business and that parties protect members who engage in corruption might lead to relatively low trust in parties in an age of high salience corruption scandals (Canache and Allison 2005).

This section examines citizen interactions with political parties – specifically trust and participation in political parties in the Americas. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer study has asked participants the following question:

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

Response categories ranged from 1 to 7, with one signifying no trust and seven indicating high trust in political parties. Figure 1.18 shows the percentage of respondents that reported trusting parties (values of five and higher). The percentage of participants reporting trust in political parties ranges from 7.5% in Peru to 35.1% in Nicaragua. Nicaragua exhibits the highest level of trust in political parties (35.1%) in comparison with other countries in the region.




Figure 1.18. Percentage that Trust Political Parties across Countries

Figure 1.19 shows that trust in political parties has increased in Nicaragua since 2004: while 22.9% trusted in the parties in 2004, 35.1% reported trust in the parties in the 2016/17 round. Effectively, the levels of trust in political parties in the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 are the highest that have been registered since the study in Nicaragua. Between 2014 and 2016, trust in political parties in

Nicaragua increased significantly by more than seven percentage points²³. The tendency observed in Figure 1.19 could be a reflection of the degree of consolidation of the governing party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), among Nicaraguans who identify with a political party. Among these people (45.8% in 2016), 86.2% identify with the FSLN.




Figure 1.19. Trust in Political Parties over Time in Nicaragua

Partisanship

Trust in parties is a relatively low cost expression of an individual's commitment to the party system. It is substantially easier to express support for parties in general than it is to express an identification with a partisan organization. The following section examines this higher-cost variable, attachment to a partisan organization. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer surveys have asked respondents the following question:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes (2) No

Figure 1.20 shows that levels of partisanship in the Americas vary widely, from 5.9% of Guatemalans reporting partisanship to 44.4% of Uruguayans. As one might expect, levels of partisanship are highest in some of the countries where party systems are quite stable, with the same parties and coalitions competing over time (e.g., Uruguay, the Dominican Republic) and are lowest in some countries where parties change substantially across elections (e.g., Guatemala, Peru). However, there are some notable exceptions to this rule: for example, both Chile and

²³ There are no differences in trust in political parties by demographic or socioeconomic subgroups.

Mexico, two of the region's most stable party systems, have some of the lowest rates of partisanship in the region. This may be due to citizens' feelings of alienation from the party options and specifically the belief that the parties are too stable and do not represent the relevant spectrum of voter preferences (see, e.g., Siavelis 2009). In Nicaragua, 40.6% identify with a political party in 2016, which represents a high ranking in comparison with other countries of the region.




Figure 1.20. Partisanship across Countries

Figure 1.21 shows rates of partisan identification in Nicaragua over time. The percentage of those who identify with a political party decreased by about six percentage points in comparison with 2014. This represents one of the lowest levels of partisan identification in 10 years in Nicaragua.




Figure 1.21. Partisanship over time in Nicaragua

Figure 1.22 shows the rate of identification with each party in Nicaragua over time. With the exception of 2012, the percentage that say that they do not identify with any political party has increased from 48% to 64%. Among those who say that they do identify with a party, between 2006 and 2016, the majority identify with the FSLN. Nevertheless, since 2012, the percentage who say they identify with this party has also decreased. These tendencies give context to the constant decrease in partisan identification reported in Figure 1.19.




Figure 1.22. Party Identification over Time in Nicaragua

Given low average levels of partisanship, who reports belonging to political parties? Figure 1.23 shows that older Nicaraguans have a higher probability of identifying with a political party than younger citizens. Around 36% of the youngest report identifying with one political party²⁴.

²⁴ There are no statistically significant differences among partisan identification and gender, education, wealth, or place of residence.




Figure 1.23. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Partisanship in Nicaragua

V. Conclusion

How robust is support for electoral democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2017? The analyses in this chapter provide some reasons to be concerned about the depth of citizens' commitment to democracy as a system for the selection of political leaders. On average, across the region, support for democracy in the abstract declined precipitously in the last two years, while support for executive coups increased substantially. These downward trends in support for basic democratic values suggest that the public has become more cynical in their views of electoral democracy as an ideal.

When it comes to attitudes toward institutions that are central to representative democracy, public confidence and engagement stayed constant for some while it declined for others. In Nicaragua, an average of 51.5% of citizens had confidence in elections, according to the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer, which represents an increase from the 2014 round. More than a third reported trust in political parties in 2016, although there is a decrease in the percentage of Nicaraguans who say they identify with a political party: while close to 47% identified with a political party in 2014, in 2016, that figure is 40.6%. Since 2012, electoral participation, like identification with political parties, has decreased significantly from 80.1% to 59.8%.



Chapter 2.

The Supply of Basic Liberties

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with LAPOP

I. Introduction

Access to a diversity of information, freedom of expression, and the right to participate are critical to democracy. These basic liberties are fundamental to citizens' ability to form, express, and insert their preferences into government (Dahl 1971, pp. 2-3; see also Beetham 2005, Bollen 1991, Bollen and Paxton 2000, Diamond and Morlino 2004, among others).¹ In other words, the supply and protection of civil liberties are foundational to the functioning of responsive representative democracy.

Public space for the open exchange of socio-political information has been eroding in a number of countries in the Latin American region, among other places around the world (Cooley 2015). The reasons are varied and, further, reports suggest significant differences across countries and over time. One source of information on the state of basic liberties is the Freedom House organization. Freedom House asks experts to assess the extent to which countries provide a range of civil liberties, including freedoms to voice opinions, to participate in social and political life, and to access fair treatment by public institutions.

Freedom House aggregates these basic liberties assessments into a Civil Liberties rating. Since 2004, the year LAPOP's AmericasBarometer was launched, Freedom House has downgraded the Civil Liberties ratings of seven out of 32 Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries.² In other words, just over one-fifth of the LAC region has witnessed a decrease in the supply of basic liberties over the last 14 years. And yet other countries in the region have not experienced this same negative trajectory with respect to their Civil Liberties score. Importantly, expert ratings are not based on the experiences of the average citizen. In fact, we know little about how the average citizen experiences and perceives the supply of basic liberties in the Americas.

The question at the core of this chapter is the following: To what extent do citizens of the region feel that their political systems fail to supply a sufficient degree of freedom of the media, of expression, of political expression, and of human rights? While this question focuses our attention on deficiencies in basic liberties, it is also possible for individuals to perceive there to be too much of a freedom, and the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer anticipated this by allowing individuals to respond in this way. These data are presented in some figures in the chapter, but the principal focus here is on the extent to which the public finds there to be a deficit in the supply of basic freedoms. As an additional analysis at the end of the chapter, we examine the extent to which

¹ There are many other positive externalities of a free media and freedom of expression; see discussion in Färdigh (2013).

² Source: Freedom House. Analysis is based on subtracting the average Civil Liberties rating for each country across 2004-2005 from the average rating across 2016-2017. The countries whose Civil Liberties ratings were downgraded in 2016-17 related to 2004-05 are the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Eight countries' ratings improved across this time span: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines.

perceiving deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties (negatively) predicts presidential approval, electoral support for the incumbent, and individuals' inclination to participate in elections.

II. Main Findings

Analyses in this chapter reveal that many in the mass public in the Americas perceive significant deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties, from freedom of the press to the right to express opinions without fear to the protection of human rights. The chapter also documents significant variation across countries, individuals, and time. In a penultimate section, the chapter documents a robust negative relationship between perceptions of deficits in the supply of basic liberties and support for the incumbent administration. Not only are democracies stronger to the extent that governments oversee more open political spaces and more extensive liberties, but so too are the governments themselves. The main findings from the analyses in this chapter can be summarized as follows:

- In Nicaragua, 47% of individuals report that there is very little freedom of the press.
- The extent to which citizens perceive there to be a deficit with respect to freedom of the press varies significantly across countries; these country results correlate strongly with expert ratings regarding lack of freedom of the press.
- Trust in the media has remained stable in Nicaragua over time, but it increased from 62.7% in 2014 to 69.0% in 2016.
- Nearly half the public in the Americas believes there is very little freedom of expression in their country; just over half believes there is very little freedom of political expression. In Nicaragua, 49% reports very little freedom of (general) expression and 55% reports very little freedom of political expression.
- In Nicaragua, 57% of individuals report that there is very little protection of human rights. On average across the region, nearly two-thirds of the public feels there is very little protection of human rights.
- To the degree that Nicaraguans perceive deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties, they express lower approval of the president, lower likelihood of voting for the incumbent.

Considering Nicaragua, who is more likely to perceive there to be serious limitations in the degree to which basic liberties are supplied? Among other findings, the analyses in this report document that:

- The youngest Nicaraguans and those with the highest levels of education have a higher probability of reporting very little freedom of expression.
- Older Nicaraguans report with greater frequency that there is very little protection of human rights.

III. The Media

Freedom of the press has declined around the world over the last ten years. By 2016, only 31% of the world's countries were characterized by the Freedom House organization as having a “free” press (Freedom House 2017).³ The Americas are faring better than the global average: of 35 countries ranked by the Freedom House, 16 (46%) have “free” media environments.

However, freedom of the press is restricted (rated by the Freedom House as only “partly free”) in 14 LAC countries (Antigua & Barbuda, Guyana, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia, Guatemala, and Paraguay), while in five countries – Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, Venezuela, and Cuba – the press is categorized as “not free” (Freedom House 2017). Moreover, across the Americas, concerns about the concentration of media ownership have become salient (see, e.g., Mendel, Castillejo, and Gómez 2017). In addition, in March 2017, the Inter American Press Association denounced a spectrum of hostilities, ranging from harassment to murder, toward those working to generate and distribute media in the region.⁴ Journalists have experienced alarming levels of violence, including homicide, especially in Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.⁵ Populist leaders have threatened and targeted critical members of the press in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.⁶

Supply of Freedom of the Press

The 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer included several questions about citizens' perceptions of the media. One question asked about the extent to which there is very little, enough (sufficient), or too much freedom of the press.⁷ The wording was as follows:

	Very little	Enough	Too much
LIB1. Do you believe that nowadays in the country we have very little, enough or too much freedom of press?	1	2	3

On average across the Americas, 44% of the public reports that there is very little freedom of the press, 24% believes there is too much, and 32% of the public is content with the amount of freedom

³ The Freedom House categorizes countries' freedom of the press levels as “free”, “partly free”, or “not free” based on input provided by analysts who score countries on 23 questions that fall into three categories that capture the legal, political, and economic environment (see freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2017-methodology).

⁴ www.clarin.com/mundo/sip-denuncio-amenazas-hostigamiento-prensa-americ-latina_0_BlakCElpg.html

⁵ cpj.org/killed/

⁶ www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/in-tiny-ecuador-populist-president-restrains-press/2012/01/23/gIQAHBmQNQ_story.html?utm_term=.70b0c54a5d8e; cpj.org/2017/04/journalists-covering-venezuela-protests-harassed-a.php; freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/nicaragua; see also Freedom House (2017).

⁷ The question was not asked in the six OECS countries included in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer or in Guyana.

accorded to the press.⁸ These proportions vary significantly across countries, as shown in Figure 2.1. In Canada, only 11% report that there is very little freedom of the press; nearly three out of every four individuals (74%) feel there is a sufficient amount of freedom of the press. At the other end of the figure are nine countries in which one out of every two individuals, or more, reports very little freedom of the press: El Salvador, Bolivia, Panama, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, and Venezuela. In the latter case, Venezuela, 67% of the mass public perceives there to be very little freedom of the press.

Nicaragua falls near the middle of the ranking of countries in the region with respect to the percentage of citizens who perceive restrictions on the freedom of the press. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, 47% of Nicaraguans report that there is very little freedom of the press, 21% report that there is too much, and 32% report that there is a sufficient level of freedom.

⁸ Excluding the U.S. and Canada, across only those Latin American and Caribbean countries in which the question was asked, the mean proportion reporting very little, sufficient, or too much freedom of the press is 47%, 29%, and 25% (numbers do not add to 100 due to rounding).



Figure 2.1. Assessments of Freedom of the Press, 2016/17

To what extent do the mass public's perceptions correspond to expert ratings of the objective media environment in each country? This question is important to ask, because it is not a given that assessments made by scholars or other practitioners will match citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy (Pinto, Magalhaes, and Sousa, 2012). To test for expert-citizen correspondence, we examine the relationship between the percentage of citizens who indicate there is a deficit with respect to freedom of the press (reported in Figure 2.1) and the Freedom House freedom of the press rating for each country (data from Freedom House 2017; higher values indicate lower levels of freedom of the press). As Figure 2.2 shows, public perceptions concerning limits on the supply of freedom of the press tend to correspond fairly well to expert assessments of the extent to which freedom of the press is limited. The correlation between the two measures is moderately high: 0.76.




Figure 2.2. Correspondence between Expert Ratings and Proportion of Individuals Reporting Very Little Freedom of the Press in the Americas

In Nicaragua, who is more likely to perceive there to be an insufficient degree of freedom of the press? To answer this question, we analyze the extent to which there are differences in the proportion of Nicaraguans who report “very little” supply of freedom of the media, by core demographic and socio-economic subgroups: gender (female versus male), urban (vs. rural) residency, age, education, and wealth. The results indicate that there are no differences in the percentage that report very little freedom of the press by socioeconomic or demographic subgroups⁹. Nevertheless, when other individual-level characteristics are analyzed, Nicaraguans who identify with the FSLN party or approve of the performance of President Ortega are much less likely to think that there is very little freedom of the press in comparison with those who identify with another party or no party, or those who disapprove of the president’s performance. At the same time, those who fear talking about politics have a greater probability of thinking that there are restrictions on the freedom of the press in Nicaragua in comparison with those who feel comfortable talking about political topics.

Trust in the Media

From 2004 to present day, AmericasBarometer surveys have asked about trust in the media using the question reproduced below. Respondents answered on a 1-7 scale where 1 indicates “not at all” and 7 indicates “a lot”. For the sake of the analyses here, those who responded with a 5, 6, or 7 are coded as trusting, and those who give a response at the mid-point of 4 or lower are coded as not trusting the mass media.

B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?

⁹ For the results of the regressions in this chapter, see the online appendix on the LAPOP website.



Figure 2.3 shows the percentage of individuals in each country who trust in the media, according to data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer. Trust in the media is highest in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Costa Rica, and lowest in Haiti, Jamaica, Colombia, and the United States. Nicaragua is the country with the highest percentage of citizens expressing confidence in the media. At the individual level across the Americas as a whole, there is only a weak connection between trust in the media and belief that there is very little freedom of the press (Pearson's correlation=-0.04). This suggests that low levels of supply of freedom of the press do not necessarily erode or otherwise correspond to public confidence in the media. It could be that, in many cases, citizens do not see the press as complicit in closing media space.




Figure 2.3. Trust in the Media by Country, 2016/17

According to the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer regional report by LAPOP, trust in the media on average in Latin America and the Caribbean has declined over time since 2004. What has happened to trust in the media over time in Nicaragua? To answer this question, Figure 2.4 displays the average proportion of Nicaraguans who trust in the media across all rounds of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Because the question was not asked as part of the core questionnaire in 2014/2015, that round is not included. Trust in the media in the region as a whole

has declined over time¹⁰. In Nicaragua, the percentage that trust the media increased significantly in 2016, almost reaching 2004 levels. While in 2004 over 71% expressed trust the media, 60% of people expressed trust in the media in Nicaragua in 2016.




Figure 2.4. Trust in the Media over Time in Nicaragua

IV. Freedom to Express Opinions

Another fundamental freedom is that of individual expression. In the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer, respondents were asked to evaluate whether there is very little, enough, or too much freedom of expression in the country.¹¹ The question was asked about both freedom of expression in general and about freedom of political expression, as follows:

	Very little	Enough	Too much
LIB2B. And freedom of expression. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3
LIB2C. And freedom to express political views without fear. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3

The next two sub-sections present results on these two measures. Once again, the discussion is focused around understanding to what degree and among whom are there perceptions of a deficit of liberty.

¹⁰ The pattern of results over time in the region is similar if the sample is restricted to only the countries included in the 2004 round of the AmericasBarometer, although the drop in 2016/17 is not as pronounced.

¹¹ As with all questions in the LIB series, the question was not asked in the six OECS countries or in Guyana.

Perceptions of Freedom to Express Opinions in General

Nearly half the public in the Americas (49%) believes there is very little freedom of expression in their country. On the other hand, 34% report that there is a sufficient degree of freedom of expression, and 17% say there is too much.¹² Of course, these averages mask significant cross-national variation.

Figure 2.5 shows the proportion of individuals who give each assessment – very little, sufficient, or too much – for each country in which the question was asked in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer. As with freedom of the media, the least amount of concern regarding “very little” freedom is found in Canada, where just 14% report that there is a deficit with respect to freedom of expression in the country. Once again, perceptions of deficits in liberty are also comparatively low in the United States and Uruguay: 19% and 23%, respectively, feel that there is very little freedom of expression. In contrast, in 12 countries, more than 50% of people report that there is very little freedom of expression: Panama, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Ecuador, Mexico, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Honduras.

In Nicaragua close to half of the people say that there is a deficit with regards to freedom of expression in the country. Around a third of Nicaraguans report that there was sufficient freedom of expression in 2016.

¹² These values are calculated including the U.S. and Canada; for the LAC region (the LAC-21, minus Guyana), 52% of individuals report very little, 31% report sufficient, and 17% report too much freedom of expression.




Figure 2.5. Assessments of Freedom of Expression, 2016/17

Perceptions of Freedom to Express Political Opinions

Freedom to express political opinions is particularly important in a democracy. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer therefore asked a second question about whether citizens feel free to express political opinions without fear.¹³ On average across all of the Americas, 54% believe that there is

¹³ The question was not asked in the six OECS countries or in Guyana.

very little freedom of political expression in the Americas, while 32% believe there is sufficient and 14% believe there is too much of this type of liberty.¹⁴

Figure 2.6 presents a side-by-side comparison of the Nicaraguan public's assessment of the amount of freedom of general expression and freedom of political expression. As the figure shows, Nicaraguans report, on average, less freedom to express political opinions without fear (55.1%), in comparison to general opinion expression (48.6%).




Figure 2.6. The Supply of Freedoms of Expression in Nicaragua, 2016/17

Figure 2.7 shows the proportion of individuals in each country who report that there is very little, sufficient, or too much freedom to express political opinions. Not surprisingly, there is some similarity to what we found in analyzing the general expression measure. For example, once again, reports of very little freedom are lowest in Canada, the United States, and Uruguay. In 13 countries, more than 1 out of 2 (that is, more than 50%) of individuals report that there is a deficit of freedom to express political opinions without fear: Panama, Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Jamaica, Honduras, Ecuador, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Colombia. It is noteworthy that Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala are three of the countries that have experienced extraordinarily high levels of threats and violence (including homicide) targeted at individuals associated with the media.¹⁵

¹⁴ If the U.S. and Canada are excluded, the values for the LAC-21 region (minus Guyana) for very little, sufficient, and too much freedom of political expression are 57%, 28%, and 15%, respectively.

¹⁵ See, e.g., freedomhouse.org/article/persecution-and-prosecution-journalists-under-threat-latin-america

More than half of Nicaraguans (55%) feel that there is very little freedom to express political opinions without fear in 2016. Only a third of the population believes that there is sufficient freedom to express political opinions.




Figure 2.7. Assessments of Freedom of Political Expression, 2016/17

Considering public opinion in Nicaragua, are some individuals more likely than others to express that there is an insufficient degree of freedom to express political views without fear? Analysis of the data reveals significant differences by gender, age, and wealth.¹⁶ Figure 2.8 displays these results. In Nicaragua, on average, young people and those with higher education have a greater probability than older people or with lower levels of education to report that there is a deficit of freedom to express political opinions without fear. There are no differences by gender. If other individual-level characteristics are analyzed, Nicaraguans who identify with the FSLN party or

¹⁶ No significant results were found as a function of urban residence (compared to rural), wealth or age as predictors of this variable.

approve of President Ortega's performance are much less likely to think that there is little freedom of political expression as compared to those who identify with another party or no party, or those who disapprove of the president's performance. Those who have high levels of interest in politics are also less likely to report that there is very little freedom of political expression.

Of the subgroup variables examined here, education exerts the substantively strongest effect on the likelihood of reporting very little freedom of political expression. In Nicaragua, 63% of those who have post-secondary education report that there is very little freedom of political expression, in comparison with 52.2% or less who only completed a primary education or do not have any formal education.

Education reduces the probability of thinking that there is *too much* freedom of political expression. There are no differences among other sociodemographic subgroups. Nicaraguans who identify with the FSLN have a greater probability of thinking that there is *too much* freedom of political expression in comparison with people who do not sympathize with any political party.




Figure 2.8. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Reporting Very Little Freedom of Expression in Nicaragua

V. Human Rights

While concerns about deficiencies in levels of freedom of the press and of expression are elevated in the Americas, data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer reveal that concerns about human rights are even more pronounced. To gauge the public's assessment of the supply of human rights protection, individuals were asked the following question:

	Very little	Enough	Too much
LIB4. Human rights protection. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3

Across the Americas, on average, 64% of the mass public reports that there is very little protection of human rights in their country. Put differently, nearly two out of every three individuals in the Americas believes that general human rights are insufficiently protected in their country. Only 27% report that there is a sufficient level of protection of human rights, and just 9% report that there is too much protection of human rights.¹⁷

Figure 2.9 shows the results for each country on this measure. In Canada, only 19% of individuals report that there is very little protection of human rights in the country. The United States and Uruguay are next, with 37% and 45% respectively reporting very little in terms of protection of human rights. While these three countries have clustered in the lower end in similar graphs presented earlier in this chapter, these values nonetheless underscore the fact that far fewer individuals – in general – report that there is a sufficient amount of protection of human rights. In the vast majority of cases (all but four countries), more than 50% of the population reports that there is a deficit in human rights protection in their country. Nicaragua is among the countries with the highest percentages of citizens who believe that there is sufficient protection for human rights in the country. Among Nicaraguans, 57% believe that there is very little protection for this category of rights in 2016.

¹⁷ If the U.S. and Canada are excluded, the values in the LAC-21 region (minus Guyana) for the percent believing there is very little, sufficient, or too much protection of human rights are 67%, 23%, and 9% (values do not add to 100 due to rounding).



Figure 2.9. Assessments of Protection of Human Rights, 2016/17

Figure 2.10 presents statistically significant differences by age in Nicaragua. While 52.2% of young people between 16 and 25 years of age think that there is very little protection of human rights, a greater percentage of Nicaraguans over 26 years of age report this same opinion. There are no differences among gender, level of education, or ethnic group. Once again, those Nicaraguans who identify with the FSLN party or approve of President Ortega's performance are much less likely to think that there is very little protection for human rights in comparison with those who identify with other parties or no party, or those who disapprove of the president's performance.




Figure 2.10. Perception that there are few Human Rights Protections by Age in Nicaragua

VI. Deficit of Basic Liberties Index

Large numbers of individuals across the Americas express concern that there is very little in the supply of basic liberties, from freedom of the press to freedoms of expression to the protection of human rights. At the same time, there is significant variation across countries. In some countries, a minority expresses concern that there is a deficit of a given freedom, while in others it is an overwhelming majority. In this section, the public's assessments regarding the supply of liberties are condensed into a summary "basic liberties deficit" index. Continuing the focus on those who report that there is an undersupply of liberty, this index is generated by adding together – at the individual level – reports that there is "very little" (versus any other response) for each of the four basic liberties measures.¹⁸ Those additive scores are then scaled on the index to run from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates that an individual responded that there is "very little" in the supply of all 4 basic liberties examined in this chapter – media, general expression, political expression, and human rights protection. At the other end of the index, a score of zero indicates that an individual did not report that there is very little of any of these basic liberties. Figure 2.11 shows the mean scores for each country on this summary index.

¹⁸ The construction of this index is justified by the fact that the measures "hang" together well; the alpha statistic is 0.69 for the four dichotomous measures for the pooled data including the U.S. and Canada.




Figure 2.11. Basic Liberties Deficit Score, 2016/17

The “Basic Liberties Deficit” Index captures the degree to which a country’s populace is discontent (perceives very low levels) with respect to the supply of basic liberties. The scores in Figure 2.12 range from a low of 14.9 degrees in Canada to a high of 69.1 degrees in Venezuela. In the majority of countries – Nicaragua, Panama, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Jamaica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, and Venezuela – the mean degree of perceived inadequacy in the supply of basic liberties is above the mid-point (>50) on the 0 to 100 scale.



Does a deficiency in the supply of basic liberties have consequences for individuals' assessments of the government and their engagement in politics? Mishler and Rose (2001) argue and find evidence that the supply of liberties is related to regime support, so there is reason to expect such a connection here. The creation of the Basic Liberties Deficit index permits individual-level analysis of the extent to which deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties are, in this case, related to presidential approval and voting intentions. In this section, we conduct analyses focused on the data from the Nicaragua 2016 AmericasBarometer survey. In LAPOP's regional report for the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer, the analyses are conducted for the region as a whole; the results there show that, across the region on average, deficits in basic liberties predict lower support for the executive.

In Nicaragua, deficits in basic liberties are strongly (and negatively) related to executive approval. Figure 2.12 shows, for Nicaragua, a line graph of the relationship between the Basic Liberties Deficit Index and Executive Approval. It can be observed that as the Basic Liberties Deficit increases, presidential approval decreases. Moving from perceiving there to be no deficiencies (a minimum score on the summary index) to deficiencies across all four types of liberties predicts a decrease of 23 points of executive approval.¹⁹




Figure 2.12. Basic Liberties Deficit and Executive Approval in Nicaragua

If perceiving widespread deficits in basic liberties affects executive approval, we might also expect this to predict vote intentions (see Power and Garand 2007). The AmericasBarometer asks respondents for their vote intention, if an election were held that week. The principal options, which are analyzed here, are to not vote (i.e., abstain), to vote for a candidate associated with the incumbent, to vote for an opposition candidate, or to nullify/invalidate the vote. Because this variable has four outcome categories, it is appropriate to analyze it using a multinomial logistic regression. Figure 2.13 assesses the data from the Nicaragua 2016 AmericasBarometer study and

¹⁹ These results, and those for vote intention, hold in regression analysis that controls for individual characteristics (gender, place of residence, education, age, and wealth).

presents the change in predicted probabilities for the independent variables included in this analysis – the five demographic and socio-economic variables assessed throughout this chapter and the basic liberties deficit measure – from the regression analysis. For each variable on the y-axis, the figure shows the predicted change in the probability of observing each outcome – abstain, vote incumbent, vote opposition, nullify vote.²⁰




Figure 2.13. Basic Liberties Deficit and Vote Intention in Nicaragua

Figure 2.13 documents that, compared to those who perceive no deficit, those Nicaraguans who perceive a maximum degree of deficit with respect to the provision of basic liberties are 49 percentage points less likely to vote for a candidate associated with the incumbent. The perception of a significant and wide deficit in the supply of basic freedoms tends to motivate people in feeling opposed to support the incumbent government. At the same time, those who perceive there to be very little freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of political experience, and human rights protection are 5 percent more likely to vote for the opposition, 9 percent more likely to nullify their vote, and 34 percent more likely to abstain. It is important to consider these findings given the electoral context that, at the time of the survey, 44% said that they would vote for President Ortega. Among Nicaraguans, 35% said that they would not vote in the next elections and 15% would nullify their vote.

²⁰ All other variables are held constant at their means as each probability is predicted.



VII. Conclusion

The public perceives significant deficits in the supply of basic liberties across the Americas in general and in Nicaragua specifically. The citizens' perspective mirrors expert ratings: reality on the ground is much as it is described by those who are tracking the extent to which basic liberties – freedom of the media, of expression, and general human rights – are respected in the Americas. This was noted within the chapter, when comparing the public's assessments of deficiencies in the supply of freedom of the press and the Freedom House's scores on the same topic (see Figure 2.2). This conclusion also holds when considering the broader Basic Liberties Deficit Index (a 0-100 measure of the mass public's assessment of the extent to which basic liberties are under-supplied). The Basic Liberties Deficit Index and the Freedom House's Civil Liberty Rating (where higher scores reflect lower amounts of liberty) for the countries analyzed in this chapter are robustly connected; the Pearson's correlation between the two is 0.73.

As this chapter has documented, there is significant variation in citizens' experiences with the supply of basic liberties across countries and across sub-groups. With respect to countries, there are some countries in which the mean on the Basic Liberties Deficit Index is quite low; among these countries are Canada, the United States, Uruguay, and Costa Rica (see Figure 2.11). On the other hand, the public reports widespread deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties in a number of countries, including Nicaragua. When considering subgroups, the youngest cohort and those with higher levels of education are substantially more likely to feel there is an insufficient supply of freedom of the press and of expression.

Deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties matter. An adequate supply of basic liberties is necessary for citizens to deliberate and engage in politics. As citizen engagement in politics is fundamental to modern representative democracy (see the discussion in Chapter 1 of this report), so too are civil liberties critical to democracy. Deficits in the supply of basic liberties matter because they affect individuals' evaluations of the political system and their willingness to engage in it (see, e.g., Mishler and Rose 2001). As this chapter has demonstrated, those who perceive higher deficits in the supply of basic liberties report more negative evaluations of the executive and are more likely to report an intention to vote against the incumbent, or to withdraw from casting a valid ballot altogether. The more a government succeeds in maintaining open political spaces, the more positive are citizens' orientations toward it.

It may also be that perceptions of *too much* liberty matter. As noted at the start of this chapter, a detailed analysis of those who report that an over-supply of any particular type of freedom is not within the scope of this chapter's core objectives. However, it is important to keep in mind that, in a number of cases, there are non-trivial minorities in the public who express concern that there is too much of a particular liberty. In Nicaragua, for example, 21% of individuals report too much freedom of the press, 18% report too much freedom of political expression, and 10% report too much human rights protection. One might wonder whether these perspectives represent a threat to the full exercise of democratic rights by others in the country. To address this question, we examined – for the Latin America and Caribbean region – the extent to which the tendency to report that there is “too much” of a particular freedom is associated with lower degrees of tolerance for the rights of regime critics to participate in politics.²¹ In brief, in three of the four

²¹ The political tolerance measure is an additive index based on the degree to which individuals disapprove or approve of the right of regime critics to exercise the right to vote, the right to participate in peaceful

cases (freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of political expression), the analyses reveal that those who perceive too much freedom are distinctly less tolerant than those who perceive there to be a sufficient amount of that freedom.²² In short, there is reason to be concerned not only about the degree to which the public perceives deficits in the supply of basic liberties, but also with respect to the proportion of the public that believes there is too much freedom.

demonstrations, the right to run for office, and the right to make speeches. This index served as the dependent variable in four regression analyses. In each, we predicted political tolerance with the gender, urban (vs. rural) place of residence, education, age, wealth, country dummy variables, and dummies variables for those who said there was “too little” and those who said there was “too much” of a given freedom (the comparison category is those who responded “sufficient”). The analyses are available in the online appendix to LAPOP’s 2016/17 AmericasBarometer regional report.

²² Interestingly, those who perceive there to be too little freedom of expression (general or political) are also less tolerant as well, but only at the slimmest of margins, compared to those who report that there is a sufficient supply of that liberty. In short, while statistically significant, there is not a substantial difference between those who report very little and those who report sufficient freedom of expression in these analyses.



Chapter 3.

Corruption and Political Culture in Nicaragua

José Miguel Cruz

I. Introduction

According to a group of Latin American leaders consulted by the World Economic Forum in 2014, corruption constitutes the greatest challenge for Latin American countries (World Economic Forum, 2014). Most of the consulted leaders believed that the problem of corruption is more urgent than the challenges posed by the structural inequality and criminal violence that plague various Latin American countries. In fact, with the exception of Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica, most countries on the continent receive very low scores on the transparency scale developed by Transparency International (Transparency International, 2017). According to Transparency International, Venezuela, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Guatemala are the countries with the highest perceptions of corruption in the public sector in 2016.

Corruption is not a new phenomenon in Latin America, and its long prevalence has impacted the societies of the region. The lack of transparency in governments, public institutions, and the private sector has been identified as one of the most important structural obstacles to economic development (Lambsdorff, 2004). Moreover, according to several studies, corruption has also affected human development and the distribution of wealth (Chene, 2014). The lack of transparency in public service also has a profound political impact. After the processes of democratization, in which many of the hemisphere's countries embarked, many academics and political decision-makers warned about the role of corruption in the weakening of democratic institutions (Weyland, 1998; O'Donnell, 1994). In an influential article, Seligson (2002) showed that personal victimization by everyday acts of bribery erodes levels of citizen support for the political system. More recently, however, Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) found that the impact of corruption on political attitudes depends on the economic context under which the acts – or perceptions – of corruption occur.

In light of the above, it is not risky to affirm that Nicaragua faces a particularly urgent challenge regarding corruption. The above mentioned data from Transparency International, which place Nicaragua as one of the countries most affected by the lack of transparency, suggest that the magnitude of corruption, and the perception of corruption, in the country constitute a risk not only for human development and the fight against poverty, but also for the establishment of a sustainable democracy and long-term political stability. This chapter addresses precisely this dilemma based on the data gathered by the 2016 AmericasBarometer survey in Nicaragua. The content of the chapter is divided into two sections. The first presents the results of perceptions about corruption in Nicaragua and the conditions that influence those perceptions, including demographics, socioeconomic conditions, and political culture. This section also includes opinions on the government's performance in combatting corruption. The second part focuses on data about victimization by bribery, the variables associated with such victimization, and the impact that it has on support for the political system and democracy. Following the argument of Seligson (2002), it is to be expected that Nicaraguans who are victims of corruption in different

environments will view political institutions less sympathetically, will show less support for the political system, and will be more disillusioned with democracy and its functioning.

II. Main Findings

The results for the 2016 AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua indicate that:

- Seven out of ten Nicaraguans think that half or more of the country's politicians are corrupt.
- However, Nicaragua is one of the countries where, from a comparative perspective, fewer citizens perceive corruption in the region. In other Latin American and Caribbean countries, a greater percentage of citizens perceive that all politicians are involved in corruption.
- Younger people tend to perceive less corruption than older adults.
- In addition, the experiences of victimization through bribery, as well as the experience of having received an offer of financial incentive or benefit by a politician in exchange for votes, increase the probability of perceiving corruption in the public sector.
- More than half of respondents positively view the government's performance in fighting corruption in Nicaragua. Citizens better evaluate the government's work in the fight against corruption compared to most countries included in the 2016/17 round.
- The percentage of Nicaraguans who were victims of any type of bribe is a little higher than 20%, while a substantial 12% of them were victims of bribery by the police.
- The results indicate a significant increase in reports of experiences with corruption compared to previous years. This increase has caused Nicaragua to be one of the countries with the highest rates of corruption victimization in the hemisphere.
- The probability of being a victim of corruption in Nicaragua increases under the following conditions: having more children, possessing a high level of wealth, actively participating in community affairs, and being offered incentives by politicians.
- Approximately one in four Nicaraguans surveyed thinks that paying a bribe is justified. The percentage of people who justify paying bribes in Nicaragua is one of the highest in the region.
- The results indicate that corruption victimization not only significantly affects support for the political system, but also citizen evaluation of the functioning of Nicaragua's democracy.

III. The Perception of Corruption in Politics in Nicaragua

A recent study conducted by the Florida International University, with the support of the Civic Ethics and Transparency Group, revealed that behind the perceptions of corruption prevailing in Nicaragua, there is a belief held by many citizens that all or the vast majority of politicians are corrupt (Cruz et al., 2017). The study in question is of a qualitative nature and does not quantify the dimension of this type of opinion among the population. The AmericasBarometer, on the other

hand, does permit one to know how many Nicaraguans think politicians are corrupt. To do this, the LAPOP team included the following question in the survey to explore the opinions citizens have about the involvement of politicians in corruption:

EXC7NEW. Thinking of the politicians of [country]... how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) None (2) Less than half of them (3) Half of them (4) More than half of them (5) All

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

The results indicate that only 7.7% of Nicaraguans consulted think that no politicians are involved in corruption, and close to 19% think that less than half of politicians are involved in acts of corruption (see Figure 3.1). On the contrary, almost 21% of respondents believe that all politicians are corrupt, 24.4% think that more than half of politicians are corrupt, and almost 28% believe that half of Nicaraguan politicians are corrupt. In general, at least seven out of ten citizens perceive that half or more of politicians are involved in acts of corruption.




Figure 3.1. Opinion of the Percentage of Politicians Involved in Corruption, Nicaragua 2016

How do these results compare with the results regarding the corruption of politicians obtained in previous years? In the 2016 AmericasBarometer, LAPOP changed the formulation of the question with respect to previous years to more accurately measure the way citizens view politicians. In the past, the question referred to "public officials" in general, as well as asking how widespread corruption was.¹ Therefore, it is not possible to make a direct comparison with previous surveys. However, previous surveys showed a slight but progressive decrease in the percentage of people who said that corruption among public officials was widespread (Coleman and Zechmeister, 2015).

¹ In previous years, the question about the corruption of officials read as follows: EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard mentioned, is the corruption of public officials in the country: very widespread, somewhat widespread, a little widespread, or not at all widespread?

In 2014, for example, despite the fact that a good part of the population (39.4%) thought that corruption was widespread, the percentage of people who said that corruption was only a little or not at all widespread was 20.3%. In the present measurement, the proportion of Nicaraguans who think that less than half or none of the politicians are involved in incidents of corruption is 26.6%, which would suggest that the tendency to view public officials positively – in this case, the politicians – would have increased a bit more.²

In any case, it is not difficult to explain the fact that the majority of Nicaraguans think that all or more than half of politicians are corrupt. After all, and as already mentioned, Nicaragua tends to occupy some of the lowest positions in regional transparency indexes (Transparency International, 2017).³ However, it is more complicated to try to explain the apparent slight increase in positive opinions towards political officials. A possible explanation can be made following the argument of Cruz et al. (2017), in that the consolidation of the government of Daniel Ortega's clientelistic system in recent years could be contributing to the modification of some positions on corruption.⁴

Nonetheless, one way to put perceptions of corruption in perspective is by comparing the results of Nicaragua to other countries in the region. Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of people who said that all or more than half of the politicians are corrupt for each of the countries included in the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer. As can be seen, surprisingly, Nicaragua is among the countries where the perception of corruption by politicians is comparatively lower, with a percentage of opinions similar to the percentage exhibited by US citizens. Moreover, according to the results, the inhabitants of all Latin American countries, with the exception of Uruguay, perceive their politicians as more corrupt in comparison with Nicaraguans. In societies such as Chile and Costa Rica, generally marked with low levels of corruption in the hemisphere, citizens perceive much more corruption among their politicians than Nicaraguan citizens.

² As already mentioned, these results on perception are not exactly comparable with those of past years. However, this reflection is offered as a hypothesis on the possible trends in perception about corruption.

³ See also: World Bank. 2016. CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1 = low to 6 = high). It can be found at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.TRAN.XQ>.

⁴ See results later in the chapter.




Figure 3.2. Perception of Politicians' Level of Involvement in Corruption by Country, 2016/17

Again, despite the fact that almost half of Nicaraguans see most of their political officials as corrupt, these results seem to suggest that a significant proportion of the inhabitants of this Central American country have more lenient opinions with respect to their government officials than in other countries in the region. It is possible, then, that public opinion about corruption in Nicaragua has become a little less critical over the past two years.

To better understand how citizens perceive politicians' level of transparency, a series of statistical analyses were carried out. These analyses were conducted in two parts. In the first, perceptions of corruption of politicians were crossed using bivariate analysis with a series of demographic variables: gender, age, educational level, wealth quintile and region of the country. In this report, only the relationships found to be statistically significant are shown. Second, a logistic regression analysis was conducted to identify other factors associated with views on the corruption of politicians. For a better understanding of the results, the standard LAPOP procedure of recoding the data on a scale of 0 to 100 was followed, where 0 means that no politician is perceived as corrupt, while 100 represents the opinion that all politicians are involved in corruption.

What are the characteristics of people who perceive that politicians are involved in corruption? The results of the AmericasBarometer for Nicaragua found no differences between men and women when it comes to classifying the corruption of politicians. An interesting finding, however, is that women who identify as housewives tend to perceive politicians as less corrupt than the rest of the population.⁵ The academic literature has indicated that, in general, women tend to have political opinions closer to men insofar as they are employed outside of the home (De Vaus and McAllister, 1989). In this case, women who identify as housewives have a less critical perception of what happens in public life. This can also be related to other demographic variables associated with gender. In fact, the data shown in Figure 3.3 indicate that people with more schooling tend to view politicians as more corrupt than people with intermediate levels of education. To the extent that people have more years of education, their opinions that all politicians are corrupt are significantly more frequent. Additionally, people without schooling are also critical of politicians, but in this case, their opinions are a little more variable.⁶

Regarding age, the results are less linear. In general, it can be said that older people perceive politicians as more corrupt than young people, but it can also be said that young people are different from the rest of the population in terms of perceptions of corruption. Stated more clearly, Nicaraguans under 25 years of age differ from the rest of the population because they tend to perceive politicians as less corrupt. Above age 25, citizen opinions about political representatives become more negative. On the other hand, the data indicate differences in perceptions regarding the corruption of politicians based on place of residence. Residents in urban areas show an average number higher on the scale of perception of politician corruption than inhabitants of rural areas. In other words, in cities, more people think that all politicians – or most of them – are corrupt.

The data do not show important differences in terms of the country's geographical zones: residents of the Caribbean regions, for example, do not register statistically significant discrepancies in the way corruption is seen among politicians than that of inhabitants of the metropolitan area of Managua or of the Pacific coast. In the same way, the opinions of people who occupy the highest wealth quintiles are not significantly different from the opinions of the poorest Nicaraguans. In any case, it can be said that the Nicaraguans who have more education, are older, and live in the country's urban areas tend to be more critical with respect to their perceptions of corruption.

⁵ This result is not shown in Figure 3.3.

⁶ The wide range of confidence in the group of persons without formal education is due to a smaller number of cases in that group.




Figure 3.3. Opinion of the Number of Politicians Involved in Corruption by Age, Level of Education and Place of Residence, Nicaragua 2016

The above data help identify the demographic and socioeconomic groups that have the most negative opinions about the corruption of politicians in Nicaragua. However, the factors that are associated with perceptions of corruption do not only have to do with the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the population. In reality, it is very possible that they have to do with personal experiences with incidents of corruption and with respondents' ideological positions on the Nicaraguan political spectrum. In addition, it is also possible that perceptions of corruption are determined by the level of relationship that respondents have with political officials and their perceptions of how much they benefit from it.

To better understand the factors behind the perceptions of corruption of Nicaraguan politicians, a multivariate logistic regression analysis was carried out with a series of factors that may be associated with people's opinions about the amount of corruption that exists among politicians.⁷ Apart from the respondents' demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, the model included the following factors: whether the respondent sympathizes with a political party or not, if the person has been a direct victim of various types of bribery⁸, the political ideology of the person surveyed, and if the interviewee has received an offer of favors from a politician in exchange for the person's vote. In the case of sympathy with a political party, it is expected that people who do

⁷ To carry out the regression, the perception of corruption variable was recoded in such a way that people who believe that half of politicians or fewer are involved in corruption were coded as 0, while people who think that more than half of the politicians or all are involved in corruption are grouped under the code of 100.

⁸ The following section presents and explains the results on corruption victimization.

not support any party will be more critical of levels of corruption. Similarly, and considering the literature on corruption (Moreno, 2016; Ungar, 2013; Arnold, 2012), it is expected that people who have experienced incidents of corruption are more critical of the level of corruption among politicians. The model also included political ideology as a control variable because it is possible that people with a political ideology opposed to that of the government are more prone to perceive corruption by politicians. Finally, considering the reports of high levels of clientelism in Nicaragua, it is expected that people who have received offers of some benefit in exchange for their votes are more likely to perceive politicians as corrupt.

Figure 3.4 shows the changes in the probability of perceiving that half or all politicians in Nicaragua are involved in corruption, according to the maximum change in each of the independent variables (that is, from its lowest value to the highest).⁹ According to the results of the regression, the only demographic variable that maintains a significant effect on perceptions of corruption is age: the probability of perceiving the majority of politicians as corrupt increases by 24 percentage points when Nicaraguans are over 66 years of age compared to the youngest group (16–25). On the other hand, people who do not sympathize with a political party have a probability that is lower by 23 percentage points (compared to those who sympathize with a party) to perceive the majority of politicians as corrupt. As expected, being a victim of acts of corruption also increases the perception of corruption. Being a victim of corruption increases the probability of perceiving the majority of politicians as corrupt by 18 percentage points. On the other hand, Nicaraguans' political ideology did not turn out to be associated with perceptions of corruption.¹⁰ Finally, the data indicate that people who received financial incentives from politicians in exchange for electoral support also have a probability 13 percentage points higher of perceiving the majority of politicians as corrupt.

⁹ Theoretically, the estimated probabilities range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that there are no changes in the probability of perceiving half or all of the politicians as corrupt and 1, where this perception is true. The independent variables are shown on the vertical axis and their estimated effects on the probability of perceiving half or all of the politicians as corrupt are represented by points plotted on the horizontal axis. The horizontal bars on both sides of these points represent the confidence interval of the predicted change in the probability of perceiving half or all of the politicians as corrupt. Bars that do not cross the vertical red line "0.00" are statistically significant with a 95% confidence interval.

¹⁰ The variable of political ideology was included in the model to control for the respondents' political positions.




Figure 3.4. Factors Associated with the Perception of Corruption Among Politicians in Nicaragua, 2016

These findings corroborate the impact of support for political parties and, undoubtedly, the direct experience with corruption in assessments of how corrupt Nicaraguan politicians are. However, other variables that could be expected to be associated with these perceptions did not turn out to be significant in the additional multivariate analyses not presented here.¹¹

Evaluation of the Government's Efforts to Combat Corruption

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer in Nicaragua includes a question to measure citizens' evaluation of the government's performance in its efforts to combat corruption. The measure in question is shown below and the answers ranged from 1 to 7, where 1 means "not at all" and 7 represents "a lot".

N9. To what extent would you say the current government is combatting government corruption?

The responses, which ranged from 1 to 7 in the original scale, were recoded in such a way that 1 to 3 are considered as a negative, while 5 to 7 are considered favorable opinions of the government's performance. The results indicate that more than half of people who responded to the survey positively (5-7) viewed the government's efforts to combat corruption, while a little less than a third (30.9%) negatively (1-3) evaluated Ortega's government in its work against corruption. More specifically, 23.5% of the people said that the government fights corruption "a lot" (7). To this is added the 16.9% and 15.6% who scored the efforts of the government between 5 and 6, respectively on the scale of 1 to 7. At the opposite end, 15.1% said that the government fights corruption "not at all" (1), followed by a 7.7% who chose a score of 2 and an 8.1% who chose a score of 3.

¹¹ These variables were included in previous versions of the model but were removed because they did not show any statistically significant relationship with opinions about corruption.

When these answers are put in a historical perspective, the data reveal an interesting and surprising trend, considering the political context of Nicaragua. According to Figure 3.5, which reveals the averages of this question on a modified scale from 0 to 100 since 2004, Nicaraguans have been evaluating the government's performance in combating corruption in an increasingly positive manner. For example, in 2006 and 2008, the average of the evaluation of the current government for its efforts to combat corruption was less than 35 points (on a scale of 0 to 100). That average score increases significantly to 41.5 points in 2010, and then shoots up from 2012, maintaining an average above 57 points between 2012 and 2016.




Figure 3.5. Evaluation of the Performance of the Government's Efforts to Combat Corruption, Nicaragua, 2004-2016

The 2016 results do not show a significant change with respect to 2014, but confirm a trend that, in general terms, is clearly favorable to the government. Many Nicaraguans see the current government as committed to the fight against corruption. To what are these opinions attributed? It is difficult to know without considering Nicaragua's current political context. By 2016, Ortega's government and the FSLN have consolidated power in Nicaragua and the presidential couple is perceived as the only ones who hold political leadership in the country (Jarquin, 2016; Peraza, 2016). In fact, and according to the results of the AmericasBarometer, the president enjoys a level of confidence that is above average in Latin America. The Nicaraguan president obtained a level of confidence averaging 62.4 on a scale of 0 to 100, while the regional average, with all the countries included in this round, was 42.7.¹² Taking these results into account, it is possible that these conditions favor the evaluations that citizens make about the government's performance in terms of transparency.

¹² The question about trust in the president was the following: **B21A**. To what extent do you trust the President?

IV. Corruption Victimization in Nicaragua

For several years, LAPOP has measured corruption victimization through a series of questions that explore everyday experiences of bribery that citizens may have experienced in various contexts. The corruption committed by public officials in Nicaragua is not limited to bribes (Peñailillo et al., 2009), but asking about bribery is a very valuable approach when measuring how much the average resident in Nicaragua is victimized by acts of corruption in daily life. The incidents of victimization explored in the survey range from bribes requested by police officers to those collected by municipal officials and public employees, and include experiences with corruption in the health and education systems. The concrete wording of all the questions regarding experiences with corruption is included below.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...			
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?	--	0	1
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?	--	0	1
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If the answer is Yes → ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	999999	0	1
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If the answer is Yes → ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If the answer is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes
If the answer is No → mark 999999 If the answer is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?			
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If the answer is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1

The results of the questions about corruption victimization are presented in two groups. First, the data on corruption victimization by the police, public employees, and military officers are displayed. In these cases, the questions about victimization were asked of all respondents because it is assumed that the majority of citizens have had some type of interaction with said representatives in the public sector.¹³ Second, we present the data for which there is a filter question to determine if the interviewee had any interaction with a public official. These cases include a) having official dealings in the municipality or local government, b) having a job, c) having gone to court, d) having used state medical services, and e) having a child in school.

¹³ In Nicaragua, as well as in several Latin American countries, the military tends to have more interaction with citizens, given that they are regularly called on to support surveillance or provide assistance to civilians in cases of disaster.




Figure 3.6. Corruption Victimization by the Police, Public Employees and the Military in Nicaragua, 2016

A little over 12% of Nicaraguans surveyed report being victims of corruption by the police, while 6.1% said the same regarding public employees and only 2.6% report that a military officer or a soldier asked them for a bribe. Corruption of the police constitutes the highest proportion of victimization in Nicaragua, given that these results refer to the entire population interviewed.

On the contrary, among the people who have had interactions with certain public officials (see Figure 3.7), the highest rate of corruption victimization is found in those who interacted with municipal and local government offices (12.3%). These are followed by those who had to go to court, where 10.3% had to pay a bribe.¹⁴ On the other hand, 6.3% of people who said they had children in school reported being victims of corruption in that school, while 5.3% of those who went to a health center had to make illegal payments to be served. Finally, only 3.5% of people who have a job say they have been victims of an act of corruption at their work. It is important to keep in mind that the percentages in Figure 3.7 refer only to people who fulfilled the previous condition of having interacted in that context (going to a municipal or local government office, going to court, having a job, using health services, and having children in school). Therefore, the percentages according to the whole population are even lower. For example, 4.8% of the entire population surveyed would have been victims of corruption in municipal and local governments, while only 1% of all Nicaraguans consulted would have faced corruption in the courts of justice. Similarly, 1.7% of the total population would have been bribed at work, while 3% of all Nicaraguans would have had to pay extra to receive health services in public establishments, and 2.6% would have paid a bribe at their children's school.

¹⁴ Figure 3.7 reveals a high confidence interval because the number of people who said they went to court is low.




Figure 3.7. Corruption Victimization in the Local Government, at Work, in Court, in Public Health Centers and Schools, Nicaragua, 2016

Therefore, putting these data in perspective, bribes carried out by the police constitute the most frequent type of corruption in Nicaragua, with one in eight citizens identifying as victims of corruption during the year prior to the survey. How do you compare this data regarding police corruption with previous years? Comparing the data from the last 12 years shows a substantial increasing trend, especially since the last measurement of the AmericasBarometer in 2014. As can be seen in Figure 3.8, less than 4% of citizens reported having been victims of police corruption in 2004. That percentage almost tripled in 2008. Despite the fact that between 2010 and 2012 the number of cases of police corruption were reduced, the proportion of individuals victimized by police corruption in 2014 was 8.6% and has risen by almost four percentage points in 2016.




Figure 3.8. Victimization by Police Corruption, Nicaragua, 2004-2016

A similar tendency is observed in cases of corruption by government employees in general. As Figure 3.9 reveals, the proportion of people who claimed to have been victims of corruption by government employees is the highest it has been in the AmericasBarometer's more than 12 years of measurements. In fact, the victimization rate in 2016 has doubled compared to 2004 and shows an acceleration in the prevalence of corruption cases since 2012.




Figure 3.9. Reported Collection of Bribes by Government Employees, Nicaragua, 2004-2016

All of the above results refer to specific incidents of corruption in different contexts and at the hands of different public officials and employees. However, to more accurately understand the overall prevalence of corruption victimization in Nicaragua, a variable was created to consolidate all reports of bribery collected in the survey. The variable is a summary measure that takes a value of 1 if the respondent was asked to pay any bribe, and a value of 0 if the respondent reported not having been asked to pay a bribe by any government official. This is the measure used by LAPOP, its analysts, and some academics to study the problem of corruption through public opinion polls in the region (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013; Sabet, 2012; Bohn, 2012; Seligson, 2002). According to the results presented in Figure 3.10, one in five people living in Nicaragua (20.1%) has been a victim of corruption in the year prior to the 2016 survey. The majority of cases (12.1% with respect to the total number of people interviewed) include victims of only one act of corruption, usually at the hands of the police or public employees; but a little more than 7% of the total of respondents have been repeatedly victimized by corruption in the same year. This means that seven out of every hundred Nicaraguans face more than one act of bribery or corruption by various public officials during the same year.

In any case, the percentage of general corruption victimization in Nicaragua 2016 constitutes the highest level reported in the AmericasBarometer measurements since 2012 and, judging by the data, indicates an aggravation of a problem that until a few years ago seemed to be effectively combatted. In fact, these findings suggest that after a significant reduction in the general levels of corruption between 2010 and 2012, when the percentage of victimization reached 11.4%, Nicaraguans have since faced a substantial increase in the amount of abuses by corruption. This trend is consistent with the trends shown in the previous paragraphs and correspond to corruption victimization by the police and public employees. In fact, it is logical to think that the magnitude of corruption by the police and public employees determines to a large extent the general trajectory of the levels of corruption; however, the latter is not limited to those, especially when Nicaraguans interact with a large number of institutions.




Figure 3.10. Overall Experience with Corruption, Nicaragua, 2004-2016



Moreover, when comparing the results of Nicaragua to data of the countries in the region included in the 2016/17 round, it can be seen that this country registers above-average levels of corruption victimization. According to the data reported by the AmericasBarometer's 2016/17 round, the average percentage of corruption victimization for the entire region was 17.3%. As can be seen in Figure 3.11, Nicaragua is above that average with a percentage of victimization higher than that reported in countries such as Colombia, Panama, or Jamaica. Moreover, a look at the regional results from the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2014 show Nicaragua well below the average of all countries at that time and among the countries with low comparative levels of corruption (Coleman and Zechmeister, 2015). The significant increase in the reporting of incidents of corruption in Nicaragua in 2016 therefore implies that this Central American country has suffered a setback in the fight against corruption that is unusual in comparative terms. These findings coincide with indicators from Transparency International pointing to a regression in efforts promoting integrity in public institutions (Transparency International, 2017). In any case, the findings of the 2016 survey indicate a worrying phenomenon in the country, not only because of the increase in the incidence of bribes, but also because of the magnitude of this increase compared to previous years.




Figure 3.11. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2016/17

To better understand the phenomenon of corruption victimization, a multivariate logistic regression analysis was carried out using general corruption victimization as the dependent variable. The analysis seeks to identify the factors that are associated with the condition of being a victim of different types of bribes in Nicaragua. As usual, the analysis incorporates the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents, but also includes factors that may increase the likelihood that a person will be a victim of corruption, such as levels of

community participation and interaction with public officials. In addition, following the practice of LAPOP (Cohen et al., 2017), the number of children and the condition of receiving remittances from abroad were included as factors associated with corruption victimization; in this case, it can be expected that people who receive money from abroad are more likely to be victims of corruption. The literature on corruption usually points to certain, more structural, variables among the determinants of corruption (Nieuwbeerta et al., 2003). In this case, only factors that were obtained through the survey and that refer to personal experiences are included.




Figure 3.12. Factors Associated with Being a Victim of Corruption in Nicaragua, 2016

Figure 3.12 shows the changes in the probability of having been a victim of corruption in Nicaragua according to a maximum change in each of the independent variables (that is, from its lowest value to the highest).¹⁵ The results indicate that, for 2016, the factors associated with the probability of being a victim of corruption are the following. First, the level of wealth: as people have more economic resources, the probability of being a victim of corruption is higher. Second, the number of children the respondent has seems to play an important role in the likelihood of being a victim of corruption. Third, people to whom politicians have offered favors in exchange for votes seem to be more susceptible to being victimized by corruption. And fourth, participation in community activities: Nicaraguans who are more active in the community are more likely to face requests for bribes. Figure 3.13 clearly shows some of these trends. It is worth noting the impact of attempts of vote buying by politicians. As can be seen, 50% of Nicaraguans who have been targeted were victims of corruption, in contrast to the only 18.2% of Nicaraguans whom politicians have not tried to buy in elections.

¹⁵ The same methodology used to create Figure 3.4 is used here.




Figure 3.13. Corruption Victimization by Wealth Quintile, Respondent's Number of Children, if a Politician has Offered Favors for Votes, and Community Participation, Nicaragua, 2016

These findings illustrate the role of clientelistic political networks in the prevalence of corruption in the country. It would not be bold to affirm, in light of these data, that the management of transparency in public administration in Nicaragua passes, in part, for the control of existing clientelistic networks among political officials (Cruz et al., 2017).

Justification of Paying Bribes

The prevalence of corruption is accompanied in many cases by the willingness of some people to participate in it in order to shorten procedures or escape the consequences of the application of law. It may be that citizens pay bribes because they think it is the best way to solve problems and get what is expected of public officials. This has been pointed out by several academics on the subject of corruption (Chayes, 2017; Sarsfield, 2012). For this reason, the AmericasBarometer includes a question to explore how willing Nicaraguans are to justify bribes or, as they say in the country, "pay a bite." The measure in question was formulated to respondents in the following way:

EXC18. Do you think that given the way things are something paying a bribe is justified?
(0) No (1) Yes

Approximately one in four Nicaraguans think it is justified to pay a bribe in 2016 (see Figure 3.14). When analyzing the data using a multivariate logistic regression to identify some of the factors

associated with these opinions, two variables emerge as the most significant: age and the condition of having been a victim of corruption.¹⁶




Figure 3.14. Justification of Paying a Bribe, Nicaragua, 2016




Figure 3.15. Justification of Paying a Bribe by Age Group and Corruption Victimization, Nicaragua, 2016

¹⁶ For the results of the regressions in this chapter, see the online appendix on the LAPOP website.

In the first case, younger citizens tend to justify the payment of bribes more frequently than any other age group in Nicaragua. Almost 28% of people between the ages of 16 and 25 years old justify the payment of a bribe, especially in comparison to people between 35 and 46 years of age and those between 56 and 65 years of age, where justification of corruption does not exceed 18%. This means that young Nicaraguans, who are just entering the labor force, would be more willing to endorse acts of corruption than any other demographic group. However, the factor that turned out to be more strongly associated with attitudes justifying the payment of bribes is having been the victim of an act of corruption. As shown in Figure 3.15, one out of every three people (34.4%) who were asked for a bribe, and paid it, justify the payment. This contrasts with almost 21% of non-victims who would justify corruption.¹⁷

How do these opinions of justifying corruption in Nicaragua compare with opinions in other countries? Regional data from the AmericasBarometer 2016/2017 reveal that this Central American country has one of the highest percentages of approval for the payment of bribes in the entire region, and is the third highest in Central America (see Figure 3.16). With the notable exceptions of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Honduras, and Panama, in most countries, citizens do not justify bribes as much as in Nicaragua.

¹⁷ Other variables included in the model, such as having been offered favors by politicians or sympathizing with the ruling party, did not turn out to be significant.




Figure 3.16. Justification of Paying Bribes by Country, 2016/2017

In light of all the above data, the relatively high proportion of victims that would justify corruption in Nicaragua may indicate two things. In the first place, many of the Nicaraguans who have participated in acts of corruption do so voluntarily. It would not be strange to think, therefore, that in some cases, corruption occurs at the initiative of the victim. Secondly, it can also be thought that many of the people who initially did not agree to pay bribes to officials to obtain services, or to eliminate a legal obstacle, end up justifying the acts of corruption given the conditions that

surround them. In any case, the high levels of justification of corruption constitute an obstacle in the search for transparency in public management in Nicaragua, and indicate the magnitude of the challenge involved in combating corruption that affects the country's citizens daily.

V. The Relationship between Corruption Victimization and Support for Institutions and Democracy

Previous studies using data from LAPOP have shown the impact that corruption victimization has on support for the political system (Seligson, 2006; Orces, 2009; Seligson, 2002). Considering the increase in incidents of corruption and the decline in transparency indicators in Nicaragua in recent years, this chapter closes with an examination of current data on the impact that corruption has on democracy and on the country's institutions.

To do this, multivariate regression analyses were carried out to determine whether being a victim of corruption impacts, on one hand, support for the political system and, on the other, the degree of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the country. In both cases, the answer is affirmative. Chapter 3 of this report has already presented the results of the impact of corruption victimization on support for the political system at the regional level.¹⁸ Therefore, this section only shows how that impact is expressed concretely. As can be seen in Figure 3.17, support for the political system is significantly lower among people who have experienced requests for bribes by public officials, compared to people who have not faced such requests, in the year prior to the survey.

¹⁸ How the scale of support for the political system was constructed is explained in this chapter.




Figure 3.17. Political System Support and Satisfaction with the Functioning of Democracy in Nicaragua by Corruption Victimization, 2016

On the other hand, the data also indicate that experiencing corruption has a significant impact on Nicaraguans' level of satisfaction with respect to the functioning of the country's democracy.¹⁹ This relationship was corroborated by a linear regression analysis, in which the impact on opinions regarding the functioning of democracy was evaluated by controlling for other demographic and political factors.

In any case, the findings of the 2016 AmericasBarometer for Nicaragua confirm what has already been pointed out in the chapter on political legitimacy in this report, as well as studies on the impact of corruption on politics. Corruption, in this case found in various areas of public life in the country, continues to have a substantial impact on the country's political culture. Many Nicaraguans appreciate less the role that democracy plays in the country and express a lower degree of loyalty to the political system, precisely because they have been victims of daily corruption or bribes in some of the country's institutions. The foregoing means that it is crucial to consider the lack of transparency as one of the fundamental threats to the establishment of a culture conducive to democracy in the country.

¹⁹ Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is based on a recoding to 0-100, of the following question: **PN4.** In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied**, or very **dissatisfied** with the way democracy works in Nicaragua? Very satisfied is recoded as 100 and Very dissatisfied as 0.

VI. Conclusion

Corruption continues to be a serious problem in Nicaragua. Most people believe that at least half or more of the politicians are corrupt. In addition, reports of being a corruption victim have increased significantly with respect to previous years, and have placed Nicaragua among the countries with the highest percentages of corruption victimization in the region. However, perceptions tend to be less critical when compared to other countries; most citizens perceive that the government is doing a good job in the fight against corruption. The data also indicate that one in four Nicaraguans justifies the payment of bribes, also one of the highest rates found in the region.

These findings paint a complex panorama from the point of view of political culture in Nicaragua. The data confirm what other studies have pointed out: corruption erodes visions of democracy and support for the political system; but, at the same time, many people seem willing to justify corruption, to evaluate the government positively despite the setbacks in victimization indicators, and to excuse some of its politicians. In this sense, it is very important to work to generate awareness about the implications and consequences of corruption and bribes in daily life, to produce changes in the attitudes that are behind the behavior that fosters and perpetuates the lack of transparency.

Chapter 4.

The Media, Freedom of the Press and Freedom of Expression in Nicaragua

Eduardo Marengo

I. Introduction

The media plays a key role in a democratic system since they facilitate access to information and the exchange of ideas. In this way, the media not only helps citizens form opinions, but can also influence public policies (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Sen, 1999; Hamilton, 2016). The existence of diversity among mass media is important since competition can work as a counterbalance, reducing the risks of the distortion of information, as can happen when there is not sufficient plurality in media. In the same way, the existence of diverse points of view in the media enriches the democratic discussion in the public sphere (Stiglitz 2008: 140-150). Likewise, a free press can also function as an early warning system to prevent famines, since the media can disseminate information about the early effects of droughts and floods, as well as the nature and impact of unemployment, forcing authorities to take public action (Sen 1999: 181). The media can also contribute to the accountability of political leaders and help prevent corruption, since they act as auditors of public power (Stiglitz, 2008: 140; Hamilton, 2016).

In Nicaragua, after 10 years of governance by President Daniel Ortega, the media landscape has undergone significant changes. While the number of independent media has been reduced, the media linked to the President Ortega's government have increased.¹ This is largely attributed to the implementation of the Communication Strategy since 2006, by President Ortega's government, which aims to communicate directly with the electorate, arguably without the mediation of media critical of President Ortega's government and management (Marengo, 2010). President Ortega has not given a press conference to independent media in the last ten years he has governed the country.

In recent years, a group of independent journalists and media critics in Nicaragua have systematically denounced the reductions of access to public information, as well as reductions in the freedoms of the press and of expression; the latter a result of the direct purchase of television stations, control of several radio stations by the governing party, cases of attacks against journalists, and when journalists are directly or indirectly denied access to press conferences and/or interviews with public officials (CEJIL et al., 2016). Freedom House evaluates the freedom of the press in Nicaragua as partially free, with a rating of 55 points on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is less free and 100 more free (Freedom House, 2017). On the other hand, in recent years, allies of Nicaragua's government have expressed, in various television appearances, that there is

¹ For a detailed discussion on the new media landscape in Nicaragua, see: López, Julio. "Los medios de la familia presidencial nicaragüense", *Onda Local*, October 10, 2017, available online: <https://ondalocal.com.ni/especiales/305-los-medios-de-la-familia-presidencial-nicaraguense/>; and Miranda, Wilfredo. "Una década de asedio a la libertad de prensa en Nicaragua", *Confidencial*, January 17, 2018, available online: <https://confidencial.com.ni/una-decada-de-asedio-a-la-libertad-de-prensa-en-nicaragua/>

unrestricted freedom of expression in the country and that the proof of this is that those who speak of the lack of freedom of expression can openly vent this criticism thanks to the freedom of expression and through the various forms of mass media.²

Taking into account this national context of media polarization in Nicaragua, this chapter examines patterns in Nicaraguan news consumption, citizens' perceptions of the media and freedom of expression, and the possible impact of these perceptions on levels of support for democracy and the political system.

II. Main Findings

- The majority of Nicaraguans (56.7%) report following the news daily.
- About 2 out of every 5 citizens claim to be informed through television. Among these people, almost 70% identify Channel 10 as their preferred means to stay informed, which represents 46.1% of respondents who claim to consume media.
- Half of Nicaraguans in 2014 and 2016 think that freedom of expression in the media remains the same. On the other hand, there is a decrease in the percentage who say freedom of expression has increased, from 38% in 2014 to 33% in 2016.
- The vast majority of Nicaraguans say it is important or very important that there are independent media in Nicaragua. And, although two thirds think that the media well represents the different opinions that exist in the country, more than half of citizens also think that the media is controlled by a few economic or political groups.
- Frequent consumption of news, positive evaluations of levels of press freedom, thinking that the media represent diverse opinions, and that the media are controlled by a few economic or political groups, are factors positively associated with reporting trust in the media.
- More than two thirds of Nicaraguans think that one must be careful not to talk about politics. This represents a significant increase compared to the 55% who reported this attitude in 2014.
- The fear of talking about politics is more frequent among women, Nicaraguans older in age, those with low levels of education, and those who believe that there is both very little freedom of expression and very little freedom to express political opinions.
- Confidence in the media and the perception that the media represent a plurality of opinions increases support for democracy, being afraid to talk about politics diminishes it.
- Trust in the media, the perception that freedom of the press has increased, the perception that the media represent a plurality of opinions, believing that there is sufficient freedom of expression, and not being afraid to talk about politics increases support for Nicaragua's political system.

² For example, see: Ortega, Pedro. "Periodistas celebran que en Nicaragua hay irrestricta libertad de prensa", *El 19 Digital*, March 1, 2016, available online at: <https://www.el19digital.com/articulos/ver/titulo:39354-periodistas-celebran-que-en-nicaragua-hay-irrestricta-libertad-de-prensa>

III. Media Consumption

What are the characteristics of Nicaraguan news consumption? To what form of media do they most frequently turn? Are there differences in demographics and political preferences depending on the type of media preferred to inform one's self on the happenings in the country? In this context, the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer explores Nicaraguan mass media consumption behavior.

To investigate this issue, the AmericasBarometer survey asks this question:

G10. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]**
 (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never

A first finding is that, in 2016, Nicaraguans show enthusiasm for keeping abreast of the news. As shown in Figure 4.1, 56.7% say they follow the news daily, 28.9% indicate they follow the news a few times a week, 2.6% follow the news a few times a month, 6.8% say they rarely follow the news, and 5% say never.




Figure 4.1. Frequency of Following the News, Nicaragua 2016

Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of news consumption among Nicaraguans since 2010. The results indicate that in the 2010-2016 period, the percentage of Nicaraguan citizens who follow the news on a daily basis has decreased, going from 62% to 57% in that period. At the same time, those who follow the news a few times a week went from 18% to 29% between 2010 and 2016. Meanwhile, those who never follow the news decreased from 10% to 5% in the same period. Although the results indicate that the majority still follow the news every day, there is a notable 5% decrease in those who follow the news daily.




Figure 4.2. Frequency of Following the News (2010-2016)

What are the characteristics of citizens who report greater news consumption? Figure 4.3 shows the differences in the percentage of daily news consumption among demographic and socioeconomic groups. The results show that daily news consumption is more frequent among older citizens, those with higher levels of wealth, and those with higher levels of education. Residents of urban areas also follow the news more often than rural residents.³

³ There are no differences in the frequency of daily news consumption between women and men. The consumption of daily news by level of education disappeared when it is controlled by demographic and socioeconomic factors in a logistic regression model.




Figure 4.3. Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors Associated with the Consumption of Daily News, Nicaragua 2016

What are the forms of media citizens use to stay informed? To explore this question, the AmericasBarometer survey asked the following question:

HAICR1. Could you tell me, what is your main source of information about the country's situation?

- (01) TV
- (02) Newspaper
- (03) Radio
- (04) Church
- (05) Community center
- (06) School
- (07) Family members
- (08) Coworkers or school colleagues
- (09) Friends
- (10) Neighbors
- (11) Internet outlets (excluding newspaper)
- (12) Social Media (for example, FourSquare, Twitter, Facebook)

The answers to this question presented in Figure 4.4 reveal that 78.1% of Nicaraguans use television to stay informed of national news, 10.5% use radio, 4.3% mention newspapers, 4.8% webpages or

social media, and 2.3% receive their news through the Church, community centers, schools, family, work colleagues or classmates, or friends or neighbors.




Figure 4.4. Principal Source of National News, Nicaragua 2016

In 2016, the AmericasBarometer also inquired which television channels Nicaraguans most often watch to stay informed. The 78.1% of respondents who reported using television to stay informed of national news were asked the following question⁴:

HAICR1TV. And what television channel do you watch most frequently to stay informed on the country's situation?

- (501) Canal 2, Televiscentro
- (502) Canal 4
- (503) Canal 6
- (504) TN8 o Canal 8
- (505) Canal 9
- (506) Canal 10
- (507) Canal 11
- (508) Canal 12
- (509) Viva 13
- (510) Vos TV Canal 14
- (511) 100% Noticias Canal 15
- (512) CDNN 23
- (513) Canal EXTR@PLUS.37
- (514) Canal Asamblea Nacional TV
- (515) Local channel
- (577) Other

⁴ It is important to note that the interviewers did not read any of these possible pre-coded responses and that it was the respondents who spontaneously gave their answers regarding the media they most frequently use for the news.

Figure 4.5 indicates that among the people who are informed through television, 69.7% do so through Channel 10, whose "Acción 10" newscast specializes in news coverage of negative events, or what is known in Nicaragua as a Nota Roja (Red Note), which includes coverage of violent acts, traffic accidents, street brawls, and sensational news in general.⁵ The programming of Channel 10 also includes popular telenovelas and talk shows.




Figure 4.5. Television Channel Most Watched for National News

IV. Opinions About Mass Media

How do Nicaraguans evaluate the media in the country? According to the data analyzed in Chapter 2, almost half of Nicaraguans (47%) think that there is very little freedom of the press, while a third

⁵ The Nota Roja (Red Note) is a phenomenon that has attracted the attention of academics and media critics in the country over the last decade. In 2006, an analysis of the content of the production of Notas Rojas on three television stations (Channel 2's Noticieros 22-22, Channel 8's "noticiero independiente," and Channel 10's newscast Accion 10), showed that this journalistic coverage focuses on street violence, traffic accidents, deaths, and domestic violence (Wallace, 2006: 92). Also, this analysis documented that the studied telenovelas resorted to images of violence and close-ups of injured persons, wounded persons, and corpses (Wallace, 2006: 114). Academic research has also highlighted that the media often "takes advantage of, and promotes, a climate of disrespect for human rights" (Wallace, 2006: 121). Among the human rights that may be at stake in this type of journalistic coverage are those related to honor, presumption of innocence, right to image and to privacy. For example, in 2006, a monitoring of Channel 2's Noticieros 22-22 and Channel 8's "noticiero independiente" showed that 62% of the analyzed Red Notes referred to the commission of criminal acts, and the newscast imputed charges on the involved citizens (Laguna, Sánchez and Reyes, 2006). This type of journalistic coverage, which in certain cases can violate ethical principles in journalism, has led communication scholars to make a call to remove the "Nota Roja" and for journalistic self-regulation (Rothschuh, 2011: 150), which have been vain to-date.

(32%) think there is enough and 21% think there is too much. By means of the following question, citizens are asked if in the 12 months prior to the survey, press freedom has increased, remained the same, or decreased.

NICMEDIA1. In the last twelve months, do you think that freedom of expression in the media has increased, stayed the same or decreased?

(1) Increased

(2) Stayed the same

(3) Decreased

Since this question was also included in 2014, Figure 4.6 compares the answers with the 2016 data. The results indicate that half of Nicaraguans in 2014 and 2016 think that freedom of expression in the media remains the same. On the other hand, there is a decrease in the percentage who think that freedom of the press has increased, from 38% in 2014 to 33% in 2016. At the same time, an increase is seen in the percentage who think that freedom of expression has decreased, from 11% in 2014 to 16% in 2016.




Figure 4.6. Perceptions of Freedom of Expression in the Media, Nicaragua 2014-2016

To further explore the perceptions of freedom of expression in the media, the AmericasBarometer also inquired about the importance that citizens give to the existence of independent media in Nicaragua:

NICMEDIA2. What do you think of independent media (that are not affiliated with the government)? That these types of media exist is:

- (1) Very important (2) Important (3) Fair
(4) Not important (5) Not important at All

Figure 4.7 compares the answers to this question between 2014 and 2016. The majority of Nicaraguans say that it is important or very important to have independent media. However, some regression is observed between 2014 and 2016. For example, in 2014, 59% considered it important that there were independent media in Nicaragua, which dropped to 49% in 2016, a change of 10 percentage points. Similarly, in 2014, 11% answered that the importance of having independent media was “not important nor unimportant,” a percentage that grew to 15% in 2016. Likewise, the group that thinks that independent media is not important grew from 1% to 5% between 2014 and 2016.




Figure 4.7. The Importance of Independent Media, Nicaragua 2016

The AmericasBarometer also examines whether citizens think that the media well represent the diverse opinions found in Nicaragua using the following question:

MEDIA3. Information reported by the Nicaragua news media is an accurate representation of the different viewpoints that exist in Nicaragua. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The respondents answered using a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates "strongly disagree" and 7 indicates "strongly agree." To simplify the interpretation of results, those who answered 5, 6 or 7 are coded as agreeing, while those who give a response at the midpoint of 4 or less are coded as disagreeing.

As Figure 4.8 shows, about two thirds of Nicaraguans think that the news media well represents the different opinions that exist in the country.




Figure 4.8. Media Represents the Different Opinions in the Country, Nicaragua 2016

Who are those who think that the media in Nicaragua represent a plurality of opinions? A logistic regression analysis reveals that young people, those who think that freedom of the press has increased, and those who positively evaluate President Ortega are more likely to believe that the media represent diverse opinions compared to Nicaraguans with 56 or more years of age, who think that freedom of the press has diminished or who negatively evaluate President Ortega's performance.⁶ These differences are shown in Figure 4.9.⁷

68.8% of Nicaraguans between 16 and 25 years of age think that the media represent a plurality of opinions, compared with 56.8% and 59.8% of Nicaraguans over 56 years of age. The vast majority (73.1%) of Nicaraguans who think that press freedom has increased also think that the media represent diverse opinions, compared to less than half (45.2%) of those who think that freedom of the press has decreased. A similar pattern in views of the media is observed among those who think that President Ortega is doing a very good job (73.4%) and those who think that the President is doing a very bad job (42.9%), with the latter tending to express their disagreement with the idea that the media represent the diverse opinions found in the country.

⁶ The regression model is based on the recoding of the dependent variable (MEDIA3) on a scale of 0-100, and the recoding of the independent variables to 0 and 1. The recoded independent variables include, gender, age, level of education, level of wealth, place of residence (urban versus rural), frequency of news consumption, evaluation of the change in level of press freedom, importance of media independence, and evaluation of President Ortega's performance. We control for presidential approval given the relationship between the political environment and the media discussed in the introduction to this chapter.

⁷ There are no significant differences between the other variables included. For the results of the regressions in this chapter, see the online appendix on the LAPOP website.




Figure 4.9. Factors Associated with the Perception that the Media Represent Diverse Opinions in the Country, Nicaragua 2016

In addition to a press that well represents the diverse opinions that may exist in the country, it is also important for democracy that the media can disseminate information without being controlled by economic or political groups. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer survey shows the extent to which Nicaraguans think that the media are controlled by economic or political groups. For this, the questions MEDIA4 and MEDIA4B were formulated to be administered randomly. Half of the respondents answered question MEDIA4 and the other half answered question MEDIA4B. The respondents answered the questions using a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates "strongly disagree" and 7 indicates "strongly agree". To simplify the interpretation of results, those who answered 5, 6 or 7 are again coded as agreeing, and those who give a response at the midpoint of 4 or less are coded as disagreeing.

MEDIA4. The Nicaragua's news media are controlled by a few economic groups. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

MEDIA4B. The Nicaragua's news media are controlled by a few political groups. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The distribution of opinions on these questions is presented in Figure 4.10. Although the vast majority of Nicaraguans think that the media well represent the diverse opinions that exist in the country, we note that more than half also think that the media are controlled by a few economic (57.6%) or political groups (55.3%).




Figure 4.10. Mass Media is Controlled by a Few Economic or Political Groups, Nicaragua 2016

What are the characteristics of those who tend to think that the media in Nicaragua are controlled by a few economic or political groups? To address this question, we use a logistic regression to examine the factors that distinguish between those who agree with the idea that the media is controlled by a few economic or political groups and those who disagree.⁸ The model takes into account the same demographic and socioeconomic variables, as well as attitudes towards the media and President, which were previously included in the analysis of factors that influence citizen views on the representation of diverse opinions by the media.⁹ The analysis reveals that the only factors that are significantly correlated with opinions of who controls the media are the frequency of news consumption, the importance given to independent media, and presidential approval (see Figure 4.11). Agreement with the idea that the media are controlled by a few economic or political groups is more frequent among those who follow the news daily (59.4%) and those who believe it is important (59.3%) or very important (58.1%) that the media be independent. Interestingly, those who evaluate President Ortega's performance as very good (63.3%) report thinking that the media are controlled by economic or political groups with the highest frequency.

⁸ The answers to questions MEDIA4 and MEDIA4b are combined. Independent regression analyses for each variable produce the same results.

⁹ As explained before, all independent variables are recoded from 0-1.




Figure 4.11. Factors Associated with the Perception that the Media are Controlled by a Few Economic and Political Groups, Nicaragua 2016

The quality of democracy depends not only on how citizens view the media in terms of levels of plurality and independence, but also on the extent to which they can rely on the media as legitimate sources of information. As shown in Chapter 2, Nicaraguans report the highest levels of trust in the media in comparison to the rest of the countries included in the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer. The level of trust in the Nicaraguan media has increased consistently since 2006. However, it is worth asking if the opinions of the media analyzed in this chapter influence the level of trust that Nicaraguans have in the media. We examine this question with a logistic regression analysis that seeks to determine the factors that may explain the differences between Nicaraguans who trust or do not trust in the media¹⁰. The independent variables analyzed in this regression include demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as gender, age, level of education, level of wealth, and place of residence (urban vs. rural). To evaluate the relationship between the attitudes analyzed thus far in this chapter and trust in media, the following variables are added to the model: frequency of news consumption, perception of the level of press freedom, importance given to media independence, evaluation of the media plurality, view of who controls the media and presidential approval¹¹.

Figure 4.12 and 4.13 show the factors that are significantly associated with a greater likelihood of trusting in the media. Factors positively associated with the probability of reporting confidence in the media include the frequent consumption of news, positive perceptions of the level of press

¹⁰ Following the model in Chapter 2, we recoded the variable B37 (confidence in the media) from 0 "do not trust" to 100 "trust".

¹¹ As explained before, all independent variables are recoded from 0-1.

freedom in Nicaragua, belief that the media represent diverse opinions and that the media are controlled by a few economic or political groups. According to Figure 4.12, 72.7% of Nicaraguans who follow the news daily express trust in the media, compared to 45.7% of those who never follow the news. Those who believe that press freedom in Nicaragua has increased (75.2%) and that the media represent diverse points of view (79.7%) also express trust in the media more frequently compared to those who believe that freedom of the press has decreased (51.4%) or do not believe that there is representation of diverse viewpoints in the media (49.5%). Interestingly, those who believe that the media are controlled by few economic or political groups have more confidence in the media (76.3%) than those who disagree with this idea (59.6%).




Figure 4.12. Opinions about the Media Associated with Trust in the Media, Nicaragua 2016

The approval of President Ortega's work also increases the likelihood of trusting the media. As can be seen in Figure 4.13, there is a difference of almost 20 percentage points in the rate of trust in the media among Nicaraguans who believe that President Ortega is doing a very good job (72.8%) and a very bad job (56.2%). In 2014, a regression analysis also showed that a positive approval of presidential performance is associated with greater trust in the media (Coleman, 2015: 213).




Figure 4.13. Presidential Approval and Confidence in the Media, Nicaragua 2016

V. Perceptions of Freedom of Expression in Nicaragua

In conjunction with freedom of the press, another fundamental democratic freedom is the right of citizens to express their opinions openly. As shown in Chapter 2, almost half of Nicaraguans (49%) think that there is very little freedom of expression in the country, while one third (35%) believe there is enough and 26% believe there is too much. At the same time, 63% think that there is very little freedom to express political opinions without fear among friends, 32% think there is enough, and 13% think there is too much. Since 2014, the AmericasBarometer has included an additional question about freedom of expression in Nicaragua to measure the perceptions of citizens regarding political discussions:

NICFEAR. What best describes your attitude toward political discussions? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) Speaking about politics is normal among my friends
- (2) One needs to be careful when speaking about politics, even among friends
- (3) **[DON'T READ]** It depends on the circumstances

Figure 4.14 shows the results for 2014 and 2016, which indicate that more than two-thirds of Nicaraguans feel that they must be careful in talking about politics with friends. This represents a significant increase compared to the 55% that reported this attitude in 2014. A little more than a third of respondents in 2014 and 2016 reported the belief that talking about politics is normal.




Figure 4.14. Attitude about Political Discussions, Nicaragua 2014-2016

With interest in knowing the individual characteristics that can explain who are more likely to express fear of talking about politics in 2016, a logistic regression analysis¹² was carried out, controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables such as gender, age, level of education, level of wealth, and place of residence (urban versus rural). The analysis also controls for variables that can be related to perceptions about political discussions: the frequency of news consumption, opinions about the level of press freedom, perceptions about freedom of expression (general and political), interest in politics and presidential approval.¹³ Figure 4.15 shows that only the demographic and socioeconomic variables of gender, age, and level of education significantly impact the probability of being afraid to talk about politics. Women (66.8%) express fear of talking about politics more frequently than men (58.5%). Nicaraguans aged 56 or older more frequently report having to be careful when discussing political issues compared to younger cohorts. At the same time, Nicaraguans with the lowest levels of education are the ones who express the greatest fear when talking about politics. Although young people and Nicaraguans with higher education express low levels of fear of talking about politics, they are the demographic groups that most frequently report concern about the level of freedom of expression in the country (see Chapter 1).

¹² The independent variable is recoded from 0 = thinks that talking about politics is normal or depends on the situation and 100 = thinks that we should be careful in talking about politics.

¹³ As explained before, all independent variables are recoded from 0-1.




Figure 4.15. Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors Associated with Fear of Speaking About Politics, Nicaragua 2016

Nicaraguans who believe that there is very little freedom of expression and, more specifically, very little freedom to express political opinions, more frequently report fear of talking about politics than those who feel there is enough or too much freedom of expression (see Figure 4.16).¹⁴

¹⁴ The frequency of news consumption, opinion of the level of press freedom, and interest in politics have no significant effect on the fear of talking about politics. However, those who believe that talking about politics is normal tended to report a greater degree of approval for the president's performance.




Figure 4.16. Evaluation of Freedom of Expression and Fear of Talking about Politics, Nicaragua 2016

The results also indicate that the fear of talking about politics is much more frequent among Nicaraguans who disapprove of President Ortega's performance (see Figure 4.17). About three-quarters of the people who negatively evaluate the president say they are afraid to discuss their political opinions, compared to 60.6% or less of those who positively assess the president's performance.




Figure 4.17. Evaluation of President's Performance and Fear to Speak about Politics, Nicaragua 2016



VI. The Impact of Perceptions of the Media and Freedom of Expression on Support for Democracy and the Political System

Freedom of the press and of expression are fundamental to the quality of democratic governance. In this section, the impact of experiences with and attitudes about freedom of the press and media on Nicaraguan support for democracy and the political system is examined.¹⁵ Figure 4.18 shows that while trust in the media and the perception that the media represent diverse opinions increase support for democracy, being afraid to talk about politics decreases support.¹⁶ Average support for democracy, on a scale of 0-100, is 65.7 among those who trust in the media and 54.3 among those who do not. A similar difference in support for democracy exists between those who believe that the media represent the different opinions that exist in Nicaragua (65.4) and those who do not (56.4). People who feel that talking about politics is normal report a greater support for democracy (66.7) than Nicaraguans who feel that they have to be careful when talking about politics or that it depends on the circumstance (60.1). Interestingly, believing that the media are controlled by a few economic or political groups also increases support for democracy, which suggests that Nicaraguans possibly take for granted that the media in some way represent the interests of its owners. These findings demonstrate how important freedom of the press and trust in the media are as elements that contribute to greater support for democracy in Nicaragua, meaning a weakening in press freedom also weakens citizen support for democracy.

¹⁵ Linear regressions are used to analyze the relevant variables about freedom of the press and the media in support of democracy and the political system. Dependent variables are recoded to a scale of 0-100. The independent variables included in these models are: frequency of news consumption, trust in the media, perception of the state of press freedom, perception of media plurality, perception of the level of control of media by economic or political groups, perceptions about the freedom of expression in general and freedom of political expression, and fear of talking about politics. The models also control for demographic and socioeconomic variables, interest in politics, and presidential approval. As previously explained, all independent variables are recoded from 0-1.

¹⁶ Of the demographic and socioeconomic variables, only age has a significant effect on support for democracy. The more years a Nicaraguan has on average, the higher his support for democracy.




Figure 4.18. Attitudes about the Media Associated with Support for Democracy, Nicaragua 2016

In regards to support for the political system, Figure 4.19 shows that trust in the media, the perception that press freedom has increased, and that the media represent diverse opinions increases support for Nicaragua's political system.¹⁷ Those who trust in the media report an average of 68.4 in political system support, on a scale of 0-100, while those who do not trust the media report an average of 50.8. A similar difference in support for the political system is observed between those who believe that press freedom has increased (68.9) and those who think it has decreased (47.9), and among Nicaraguans who think that the media represent a plurality of opinions (67.7) compared to those who do not (53.8). Believing that the media is controlled by a few economic or political groups also increases support for the political system.

¹⁷ The variable with the greatest influence in support for the political system is the approval of the president's performance. Interest in politics also positively influences system support. While women support the system more than men, low levels of education are associated with greater support for the political system.




Figure 4.19. Attitudes about the Media Associated with Support for the Political System, Nicaragua 2016

Some attitudes about the state of freedom of expression in Nicaragua also influence support for the political system. As seen in Figure 4.20, support for the political system is higher among those who think that the current level of freedom of expression in Nicaragua is sufficient (68.4) or too much (71.7), compared to those who think there is very little freedom of expression (55.7). A similar pattern is seen in the level of support for the political system among Nicaraguans who think that the current level of freedom to express political opinions without fear is sufficient (70.5) or too much (72.6), compared to those who think that there is very little freedom to express political opinions (56.2). Support for the political system is also greater among Nicaraguans who are not afraid to talk about politics (66.8) compared to those who feel they have to be careful when talking about this topic (60.8).




Figure 4.20. Attitudes about Freedom of Expression Associated with Support for the Political System, Nicaragua 2016

VII. Conclusion

Most citizens in Nicaragua keep abreast of the country's news and do not observe major changes in terms of press freedom (half of the respondents said that it has remained the same), although there is a certain percentage of the population who observes a deterioration in the freedom of the press over time (reaching 16% in 2016). Likewise, the results show that, in Nicaragua, citizens believe in the importance of the existence of independent media and, in general, feel that the media represent diverse opinions in the country, but most citizens also report that the media is controlled by a few economic and political groups. In this sense, citizens in Nicaragua recognize the existence of a certain level of pluralism in the media. However, at the same time, they are aware that the media are linked to economic or political groups. It is very striking that greater trust in the media is associated with greater approval of President Ortega's performance, which demonstrates to his critics the importance of influencing or controlling important sources of media, especially television, since these are Nicaraguans' main sources of information.

One of the most relevant findings of the analysis carried out is that freedom of the press and levels of trust in the media are significant factors for the level of support that citizens have for democracy and Nicaragua's political system. Positive perceptions of press freedom and plurality, as well as trust in the media, are associated with greater support for democracy and the political system. On



the other hand, fear of talking about politics significantly decreases support for democracy and the political system. In the same way, those who think that press freedom has decreased support the political system to a much lesser extent, in comparison to those who think that press freedom has remained the same or has increased. This finding reveals that an institutional environment more favorable to freedom of the press would further strengthen support for Nicaragua's political system. Moreover, Nicaraguans who express no fear in talking about politics display greater support for the political system in comparison to those who are afraid to talk about politics.

However, most Nicaraguans express fear of talking about politics and believe they should be careful in talking about politics, even among friends. This reveals a certain atmosphere of self-censorship for fear of reprisals in Nicaragua, something that is detrimental to a democratic political culture.

In summary, the findings suggest that an institutional environment more favorable to the development of independent media, access to public information, and respect for freedom of expression would strengthen support for democracy, the Nicaraguan political system, and support a democratic political culture.

Chapter 5.

Citizen Participation in Nicaragua

José Miguel Cruz

I. Introduction

Citizen participation is fundamental for the strengthening of democracy and the exercise of citizens' civil and political rights. Academic literature in political science emphasizes the importance of all people being able, in different ways, to participate in the decision-making that affects their daily lives and in public spaces (Lipset, 1981; Dahl, 1973; Barber, 1984). This is especially true in the area of local government decisions. In contrast to the political decisions that affect the broader population, the participation of citizens in decision-making processes at the local level, as well as in the implementation of policies, is crucial for governance and political order (Michels and De Graaf, 2010; Manaf et al., 2016).

In Latin America, the issue of the importance of citizen participation emerged as part of the wave of democratization at the end of the 20th century (Garretón, 2004). The political spaces opened by the establishment of democratic regimes not only ensured the constant celebration of electoral events, but also generated a series of initiatives for citizens to participate in decision-making at the local level. However, the opening of political spaces did not necessarily automatically guarantee the participation of citizens in them. Strong authoritarian traditions in the political culture of some societies were difficult to change (Diamond, 1993). In the same way, the institutional apparatus of many Latin American states was designed for the concentration of power and centralism in decision-making (Selee, 2004), which generally ignored the participation of citizens in the geographical and social peripheries, and generated difficulties to meet the demands that arose from them. The processes of democratization, therefore, set in motion reforms leading to decentralization in decision-making, which sought to promote the involvement of citizens. As Willis, Garman and Haggard (1999) state, decentralization was seen as a way for greater accountability and transparency in the processes of government, which favored the participation of groups historically marginalized by authoritarian regimes.

However, not all citizen participation initiatives necessarily imply higher levels of democracy (Brysk, 2000) and not all countries went through the processes of citizen participation in hand with decentralization and democratization. In the processes of transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the third wave, Nicaragua is a special case (Anderson and Dodd, 2005).¹ First of all, because in the long road of political transition between the Somoza dictatorship in the seventies and the establishment of the electoral democracy that culminated in the election of Violeta Chamorro in 1990, this Central American country experienced a process of revolution and civil war, with foreign intervention, that significantly modified the relationship between the State and its citizens (Walker, 2000). And second, because the Sandinista Revolution promoted levels of

¹ The so-called "third wave" is a global trend of democratization that took place in the last two decades of the twentieth century, in which around 60 countries in Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa experienced transitions from authoritarian governments to some form of democracy. The term was coined by Samuel Huntington (1991) to differentiate it from previous waves that occurred in the 20th century.

citizen participation of a political nature that, although they were supposedly aimed at consolidating a type of participatory democracy (Williams, 1994), were framed within a scheme of authoritarian centralism (Booth et al., 2015) that left little room for political dissent.

This particular experience of Nicaragua marked the political behavior of citizens in a profound way. Not only did it create a culture of participation and involvement in public affairs that was not generated in other Central American countries (Booth et al, 2015; Lehoucq, 2012), but it also survived a period of revolution and, in a way, continues to play a role in the political dynamics of the country, even as various observers wonder about the democratic nature of the current regime (Jarquin, 2016).

This chapter analyzes the results of the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer questions that have to do with citizen participation at the local level. First, we examine the data that have to do with participation in the municipal meetings and the relationship with trust in local government. Then, the levels of Nicaraguans' involvement in various social organizations, such as religious groups, women's associations and corporatist organizations, such as Councils of Citizen Power, are examined. Citizen participation in protest activities is then studied. Finally, the data on the relationship between involvement of Nicaraguans in public affairs and support for democracy and the political system is analyzed.

II. Main Findings

The results of the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer for Nicaragua indicate that:

- A little more than half of Nicaraguan citizens (51.3%) trust municipal governments. Trust in local government has been increasing since 2008 and in 2016 reaches the highest level of confidence registered by the AmericasBarometer.
- Likewise, Nicaraguans' participation in local government has been increasing since 2012. By 2016, almost 16% of the people said that they had attended a session organized by the municipality.
- The participation rate of Nicaraguans in town hall meetings is among the highest in the region.
- Trust in the municipality plays a fundamental role in the willingness of citizens to participate in open town councils or municipal meetings.
- A little more than half of Nicaraguans consulted (51.4%) positively assessed the quality of municipal services.
- Those consulted tend to participate more in religious organizations than in any other type of associations or groups in Nicaragua. However, the percentage of people actively participating in churches has decreased significantly since 2006.
- Participation in other types of organizations is, in general, very low. But in the case of parent associations, the results show a gradual but significant increase between 2012 and 2016. In the case of parent associations, the percentage of people who attended association meetings once a week increased from 3.6% in 2012 to 6.5% in 2016.

- Despite the above, in general, the average participation in community organizations in Nicaragua is comparatively greater than in most of the countries in the region.
- Participation in community organizations is associated with gender: women participate more than men; age: middle-aged adults are more involved; and, especially, with political affiliation: Sandinista sympathizers show higher levels of participation than any other political group.
- The participation of Nicaraguans in organizations promoted by the government of a corporatist nature, such as Councils of Citizen Power and Family Cabinets, is generally low, but is strongly linked to sympathy for the FSLN and its aid programs.
- 6.1% of Nicaraguans have participated in a social protest in the year prior to the survey. However, this percentage has been declining since 2010 and is one of the lowest compared to other countries in the region.
- The likelihood of participating in public protests is strongly linked to the support for the FSLN and participation in government corporatist organizations.
- Participation in Councils of Citizen Power and Family Cabinets has a positive effect on support for the political system and satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Nicaragua.
- However, participation in such organizations has no effect on support for democracy as a political regime. In this case, only participation in civil society organizations favors support for democracy as the preferred political system.

III. The State of Citizen Participation in Municipalities

To understand the level of citizen participation in meetings held by the municipality and local government, it is important to begin in understanding the degree of trust respondents have in the municipal government and the country's other political institutions. The battery of questions used is shown below. The respondents answered using a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates "none" and 7 indicates "a lot." To simplify the discussion of results, those who answered a 5, 6 or 7 are coded as trusting, and those who give a response at the midpoint of 4 or less are coded as not trusting.

B10a. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Electoral Council?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?
B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

In the case of trust in the mayor's office of the place where the respondent lives, a little more than half of the people consulted, 51.3%, expressed having some level of trust in the office (see Figure 5.1). This means that, in general terms, municipal governments are well perceived by citizens in Nicaragua. However, these results also indicate that municipal governments are not the

institutions in which citizens trust most. In fact, Nicaraguans show more trust in the National Assembly, the National Police, the President and, especially, in the Armed Forces.

In general, the 2016 AmericasBarometer survey in Nicaragua reveals that the majority of this country's citizens tend to trust their institutions. Of all the public institutions included in the measurement, only the Supreme Electoral Council received positive responses of public trust below 50%.




Figure 5.1. Trust in Nicaragua's Political Institutions, 2016

The data also reveals a growing trend of trust in municipal governments, which is part of a general trend in favor of institutions in Nicaraguan public opinion. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, since 2010, there has been a slight but consistent increase in the percentage of people who trust their municipal government. In 2008, the proportion of the population that expressed trust in their municipal government was more than a third (37.2%), probably as a result of the problems that

surrounded that year's municipal elections (Peraza, 2016). Since then, the data show a recovery of public trust, reaching its highest level in 2016 with more than half of Nicaraguans expressing trust in their municipal governments.




Figure 5.2. Trust in Municipal Governments in Nicaragua, 2004-2017

How are these trends explained? It is difficult to know within the limits of this report, but examination of levels of citizen participation in municipal affairs can provide clues about the increasing levels of trust in local government. For this, a question about citizen participation in municipal meetings was included:

NP1. Have you attend to a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No

The results presented in Figure 5.3 indicate that only 15.7% of Nicaraguans said they had attended a town hall meeting or open session of the municipal council in the last year before the 2016 survey. Despite the apparent low level of participation, the data compared to previous years indicate that there has been a consistent increase in the participation rate in municipal meetings since 2012. However, the data show that these levels are not the highest recorded in Nicaragua since the AmericasBarometer. As can be seen in Figure 5.3, in 2004, the level of citizen involvement in municipal council meetings was 16.4%. The increase of 2016, therefore, constitutes a recovery of levels reported prior to 2006.




Figure 5.3. Attendance of Municipal Meetings in Nicaragua, 2004-2016

A comparison of these results with data from other countries in the region in the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer allows us to put these findings into perspective. As can be seen in Figure 5.4, although only a fraction of citizens participate in public municipal meetings, Nicaraguans tend to be participants in their municipalities more frequently than in most Latin American and Caribbean countries included in the current round. Only Venezuela (22.1%), the Dominican Republic (20.5%), Brazil (17.6%), and Guatemala (17.3%) have higher percentages of attendance at municipal meetings than in Nicaragua.² It is interesting to see, also, that in Central American countries with much more consolidated democratic systems (such as Panama and Costa Rica), attendance at municipal council meetings is much lower than in Nicaragua.

A cross of these results by region of the country show that in 2016 almost 20% of the respondents in the South Pacific attended a municipal meeting, while in the North and Caribbean region of the country, the percentage of participation was 17.9% and 16.8% respectively. The lowest percentages of attendance at municipal meetings were registered in the metropolitan area of Managua and the North Pacific with 12.8% in each. However, despite the different percentages, the differences by region do not become statistically significant, and therefore it is not possible to say that participation differs significantly by region.

² In fact, given the confidence intervals, only Venezuela and the Dominican Republic differ significantly from Nicaragua.




Figure 5.4. Municipal Meeting Attendance by Country, 2016/2017

A simple cross between the results of attendance at municipal council meetings and trust in the municipality reveals what several studies have pointed out over the years (Seligson, 1980; Putnam, 1994): that participation in the activities of the municipal government is associated with higher levels of trust in municipal governments. Figure 5.5 shows the percentages of respondents who trust in the municipality. As can be seen, 64.5% of Nicaraguans who have attended a municipal

meeting trust the municipality's government while only 48.7% of people who have not attended a municipal meeting report trust in the municipal government.³




Figure 5.5. Trust in the Municipal Government by Attendance at Municipal Council Meetings in Nicaragua, 2016

In a similar line of questioning, how satisfied are Nicaraguans with the services provided by their municipal governments? To obtain information on this point, the AmericasBarometer survey included the following question:

SGL1. Would you say that the services provided by the municipal government are: **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Very good	(2) Good	(3) Neither good nor bad (Fair)
(4) Bad	(5) Very bad	

More than half of Nicaraguans positively evaluate the quality of municipal services in 2016. According to the data shown in Figure 5.6, 51.4% of Nicaraguans think that the quality of services offered by the local government is good or very good; a little more than a third (34.1%) thought that services are average and only 14.5% evaluate services as bad or very bad. A breakdown of these results according to the region of country indicates that, as expected, there are certain important differences. For example, in the metropolitan area of Managua and in the municipalities of the northern zone, more than 55% of those surveyed gave a positive evaluation of the services provided by their respective local governments. In contrast, in the municipalities of the North Pacific, positive evaluations do not exceed 43%. In the rest of the regions, positive evaluations of the services provided by municipal governments oscillates around 50%.

³ In this analysis it is important to remember that responses above three are considered as trusting in the government. In the analysis, demographic and socioeconomic factors were controlled for.




Figure 5.6. Evaluation of Services Provided by Respondents' Corresponding Municipal Governments in Nicaragua, 2016

In summary, the results regarding the opinions about municipal governments and citizen participation municipal meetings show a positive overall balance for Nicaragua's local governments. Nicaraguans today trust more in their municipal governments than in the past and, in general, evaluate the services they provide positively. Although only 15.7% have attended a town hall or municipal meeting in the last year, that percentage constitutes the highest in the last 12 years and is among the highest rates of local participation in the region. How are these trends explained? The following pages delve into the subject of other types of citizen participation in Nicaragua, which can provide insights into the willingness of citizens of this Central American country to involve themselves in public affairs.

IV. Citizen Participation in Social Organizations

How much do Nicaraguans participate in social organizations? As is well known, social participation is not limited to one type of organization or one class of activity. The AmericasBarometer approaches the issue of participation by asking about a series of specific organizations. These do not exhaust the diversity of groups in which citizens can get involved, but they include some of the most common, which allows us to establish a measure of how much respondents are involved in collective activities. The questions that refer to citizen participation in the questionnaire appear below and address religious organizations, parent associations, and community committees in various forms and political movements.

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat “once a week”, “once or twice a month”, “once or twice a year”, or “never” to help the interviewee]				
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CP7. Meetings of a parents’ association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CP8. Meetings of a community improvements committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organizations? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
NICCP14. ¿Reuniones de un CPC, Consejos de Poder Ciudadano? Asiste...	1	2	3	4
NICCP14. Meetings of a CPC, Council of Citizen Power? Do you attend them...?				
NICCP15. ¿Reuniones de un Gabinete de la Familia? Asiste...	1	2	3	4
NICCP15. Meetings of Family Cabinet Do you attend them...				
CP20. [WOMEN ONLY] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4

In general, the results indicate that Nicaraguans participate in religious organizations more frequently than any other type of organization, with a third of respondents (33.2%) reporting attending a weekly religious meeting (see Table 5.1). Beyond religious meetings, the data indicate that, in reality, most citizens report very little participation in other types of organizational meetings.⁴ In the secular sphere, parent associations attract more participation than community organizations (community improvement committees) or political organizations (political parties). In addition, it is interesting to note that the groups that attract the least percentage of participation are women’s groups or associations.⁵

⁴ Due to its particularity in the case of Nicaragua, the results of the participation questions in partisan spaces (NICCP14 and NICCP15) are analyzed in the following section.

⁵ The percentages shown only refer to the total of women in the sample.

Table 5.1. Attendance at Organization Meetings in Nicaragua, 2016
(In percentages)

Type of Organization	One time a week	One or two times a month	One or two times a year	Never
Religious Organization	33.2	16.6	9.5	40.7
School Based Parent Associations	6.5	36.2	9.1	48.2
Community Improvement Board or Committee	4.4	16.6	11.7	67.3
Political Party or Movement	4.5	10.2	9.1	76.1
Women's Group or Association	3.4	7.7	4.9	84.0

How do these levels of participation compare with the past? In order to provide insight into the trends in citizen participation, the results of the AmericasBarometer's questions regarding attendance to meetings of religious organization, parent associations, and community improvement groups since 2004 were graphed.⁶ To facilitate their understanding, the data was recoded on a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the highest level of citizen involvement. Figure 5.7 reveals interesting patterns. On one hand, participation in religious organizations has registered a slight but significant decline since 2006. In other words, there are fewer people participating in religious activities in 2016 compared to a decade ago. On the other hand, participation in parent associations and community organizations has seen evident increases since 2008. In the case of parent associations, the average participation score went from 28 in 2008 to 34 in 2016, while in the case of community organizations, the score went from 17 in 2008 to 20 in 2016. In any case, while the data suggest an increase in citizen's secular activities, it does not reach the level of religious involvement.

⁶ The other questions were not included because there is no data for all the years.




Figure 5.7. Participation in Religious Organizations, Parent Associations and Community Improvement Groups in Nicaragua, 2004-2016

In order to compare the levels of participation in Nicaragua with those of other countries and establish the factors associated with them, a variable of community participation was created that precisely integrates the results of the three questions related to religious, school, and community participation. The variable averages the scalar data from 0 to 100 and offers results that also oscillate in the same way: averages close to zero mean little citizen participation while degrees close to 100 represent a lot of participation. Figure 5.8 reveals the average participation for the countries in the 2016/17 round and, as can be seen, Nicaragua has a participation rate of 33.5, which is significantly above the regional average (29.6). This means that Nicaraguans tend to be more involved in social organizations and activities than citizens of most countries in the region. These findings are in line with expectations that, based on recent history, Nicaraguans tend to show more citizen participation than in various countries in the region.




Figure 5.8. Community Participation by Country, 2016/2017

What are the factors associated with citizen participation in Nicaragua? The results of a linear regression carried out controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables, together with a series of social and political variables, reveal five factors that are worth highlighting.⁷ First, women are much more involved in community affairs than men. Second, adults whose ages range from 36

⁷ For the results of the regressions in this chapter, see the online appendix on the LAPOP website.

to 45 tend to participate more than other age groups, especially the young and the elderly.⁸ Third, Nicaraguans who have been victims of crime tend to participate more in social organizations than people who have not been victims. Fourth, citizens residing in the North Pacific region show lower levels of participation than any other area of the country, especially in comparison with those who reside in the country's North and Central region (see Figure 5.10). And fifth, interestingly, citizens who declared their support for the governing party, the FSLN, show greater involvement in organizations than the rest of the population.




Figure 5.9. Community Participation by Sex, Age, Crime Victimization and Support for the FSLN in Nicaragua, 2016

⁸ In fact, age was significant at a level of $p < 0.1$ in the multivariate regression model. However, the results by age are presented to show trends.




Figure 5.10. Community Participation by Region in Nicaragua, 2016

These findings, in general, coincide with what previous studies have found regarding variables associated with Nicaraguan participation (Coleman and Zechmeister, 2015; Bateson, 2012). However, it is very interesting to find the effect that political support for the governing party has in favor of community participation. This is part of the popular mobilization practices that the political group has exercised since the 1980s and which, according to some analysts, have been promoted in recent years through extensive networks of electoral clientelism (The Carter Center, 2011; Cruz et al., 2017).

V. Participation of a Political Nature: Government corporatist organizations and participation in protests

Within the framework of citizen participation of a political nature, it is important to analyze the role played by the so-called Councils of Citizen Power and Family Cabinets. The CPCs, as they are popularly called by the Nicaraguan population, were formed by the government of President Daniel Ortega in 2007 and has had as their purpose the organization and participation of the Nicaraguan people "in the integral development of the nation in an active and direct manner" to support "the plans and policies of the President of the Republic aimed at developing these objectives."⁹ These councils were organized as grassroots committees with different levels of organization beginning in the communities as the base unit and ending with the National Cabinet of Citizen Power as the national coordinating unit. This cabinet responds directly to the President of the Republic. For the observers of the Nicaraguan political process, the Councils were part of a strategy of President Ortega's government to ensure the continuity of the Sandinista political

⁹ The text of the law creating the Cabinets and Council of Citizen Power can be found here: [http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb.nsf/\(\\$All\)/45B8626344F8E110062573D700655C46?OpenDocument](http://legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb.nsf/($All)/45B8626344F8E110062573D700655C46?OpenDocument).

project and the perpetuation of the president in power (Almendrez, 2009). In 2013, the government decided to create another figure of community participation that replaced the CPCs. These new organizations were inaugurated as "Family Cabinets," which, in a way, replaced and expanded the role of CPCs.¹⁰ According to the existing information, the Family Cabinets sought the "strengthening of capacities and organization at the community level," from the family nucleus.¹¹ According to critics, the Family Cabinets arose in response to the exhaustion of the CPCs and the government's need for their continuity to maintain mechanisms of participation favorable to their political project.¹² In any case, the CPCs and the Family Cabinets are part of a model of participation strongly directed by the State, which is unique in the case of Nicaragua given its territorial scope.¹³

However, Nicaraguan citizens did not show greater involvement in this type of organization compared to community improvement committees or parent associations. As can be seen in Table 5.2, less than 6% of people surveyed said they attended a Family Cabinet or CPC meeting in the last year. The majority of Nicaraguans, on the other hand, report that they never attended meetings of these organizations during the 12 months prior to the survey.

Table 5.2. Attendance to Meetings of the CPC or Family Cabinets in Nicaragua, 2016 (In percentages)

Type of Organization	Once a week	One or two times a month	One or two times a year	Never
Councils of Citizen Power	3.7	11.1	7.1	78.0
Family Cabinet	5.1	9.8	6.9	78.2

To identify the demographic, socioeconomic and political factors associated with participation in government corporatist organizations, a variable was first created from the questions regarding CPCs and Family Cabinets, after which a linear regression was run using the variable of participation in government organizations as a dependent variable.¹⁴ In the creation of the participation variable, and as is the practice in the LAPOP reports, the responses of the individual questions were recoded in scales from 0 to 100, where 100 represents a high frequency of participation. The results of both questions were then averaged in such a way that average scores close to zero represent little participation, while scores close to 100 mean high participation.

The results of the regression give very interesting results. None of the demographic or socioeconomic factors such as gender, age, educational level, level of wealth, or place of residence (urban or rural) were found to be significant. In other words, levels of participation in the government's corporatist organizations are similar regardless of the individual characteristics of the people. Likewise, other variables such as ideology or experiences of victimization do not seem

¹⁰ In practice, however, some citizens distinguish CPCs from Family Cabinets, while others understand them as synonyms.

¹¹ See: <http://www.lavozdelsandinismo.com/nicaragua/2012-12-07/informa-rosario-sobre-la-creacion-de-los-gabinetes-de-la-familia-salud-y-vida/>.

¹² See: Miranda Aburto, Wilfredo. 2013. From CPCs to Family Cabinets. *Confidencial*, February 23. At: <http://confidencial.com.ni/archivos/articulo/10408/de-los-cpc-a-los-gabinetes-de-la-familia>.

¹³ Venezuela is another country where there is a similar model in the form of "Colectivos" or "Collectives".

¹⁴ For the results of the regressions in this chapter, see the online appendix on the LAPOP website.

to play an important role in the levels of pro-government participation. The only factors that have an effect on levels of participation in government organizations are support for the Sandinistas and the respondent's level of participation in community organizations. According to Figure 5.11, people who report supporting the FSLN show an average participation score (21.7), double the average of people who are not Sandinista supporters (10.1). This finding seems to confirm the strong corporatist sentiment embodied in the Presidency of the Republic's promotion of these types of organizations.




Figure 5.11. Participation in Government Organizations by Support for the FSLN in Nicaragua, 2016

On the other hand, the data indicate a significant level of correlation between general participation in community organizations and participation in the corporatist organizations of the State (Figure 5.12). This explains the fact that, as shown in previous pages (see Figure 5.9), the followers of the government party usually register higher levels of citizen participation in general. As stated above, the strong involvement of the government in the organization of citizen participation in Nicaragua is unique in the region, perhaps with the exception of Venezuela, and shows the important effect it has on other forms of citizen participation, even that of a religious nature.¹⁵

¹⁵ It is important to remember that the current government is presented in public messages as a "Christian" government.




Figure 5.12. Participation in Government Organizations by Community Participation in Nicaragua, 2016

On the other hand, the survey data show indications of the instrumental character of corporatist participation in government organizations. Community participation and participation in organizations promoted by the government were crossed with the question of whether the person receives government assistance.¹⁶ Judging from the role that citizen involvement usually plays, it would be expected that people receiving government assistance would report greater participation in community and government-sponsored organizations. The results indicate that this assumption is valid only for participation in corporatist organizations. As shown in Figure 5.13, there are no differences in participation in community organizations by the condition of receiving government assistance. In contrast, participation in organizations such as CPCs or Family Cabinets seems to be subject to receiving government assistance. Those who receive government assistance are significantly more involved in the government's corporatist associations than those who do not receive government assistance. This suggests a certain transactional nature in the participation of some citizens in the groups promoted by the FSLN administration. However, when the data of community and corporatist participation was crossed with a question that measured political clientelism,¹⁷ in the buying of votes in elections, the results did not indicate significant differences in any of the types of participation. The foregoing suggests that offerings of benefits in exchange for votes did not influence the disposition of community and corporatist participation.

¹⁶ The question was formulated as follows: “**WF1**. Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions?”

¹⁷ The question was formulated as follows: “**CLIEN1NA**. And thinking of the last presidential elections of 2016, did anybody offer you a favor, present or benefit in exchange for your vote?”




Figure 5.13. Community and Government Participation by Condition of Receiving Assistance from the Government in Nicaragua, 2016

Another area of political participation is social protest. For Nicaragua, the AmericasBarometer included a question to find out if the surveyed citizens had participated in a social protest in the twelve months before the survey. The question was formulated as follows:

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes (2) No

The results show that the majority of Nicaraguans did not participate in any social protest in the twelve months prior to the survey. Only 6.1% indicate that they participated in a demonstration or public protest during this time. According to a logistic regression carried out to identify the variables associated with social protest, the results do not indicate substantial differences in citizen participation in protests by demographic variables. However, when variables of a more social and political nature were included, differences appear with respect to one dimension: support for or no support for the ruling party. As can be seen in Figure 5.14, people who express their sympathy with the FSLN more frequently responded that they did participate in a public protest. In the same way, people who have high levels of participation in the government's corporatist organizations (Councils of Citizen Power and Family Cabinets) also tend to be more involved in public demonstrations than people who are not involved in the Family Cabinets and CPCs.




Figure 5.14. Participation in Social Protests by Condition of Supporting the FSLN and Level of Participation in Government Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016

Other variables of a social nature did not turn out to be significantly associated with involvement in social protests. Conditions such as having been a victim of corruption or crime and having negative opinions about the government's performance, the economy, or democracy were not associated with participation in protests. Participation in social protests was also not associated with attitudes of fear (or not) of talking about politics.¹⁸ It must be remembered that the survey question under consideration does not establish whether the protests are against the government. Therefore, the above suggests that many people who participate in social protests in Nicaragua do not do so to protest government measures. They participate in support of the government's policies and to defend the government. In this sense, the government's effort in forming the networks of organizations affiliated with the president would have an impact on social mobilization in favor of the ruling party. Therefore, whenever a contentious issue appears on the public agenda in Nicaragua, it is common to see public demonstrations that express support for the government.¹⁹ This reinforces the particularity of the Nicaraguan case in terms of social participation.

¹⁸ The question about fear of talking about politics was the following: "**NICFEAR**. Which perspective best describes your attitude towards political discussions? [Read alternatives] (1) Talking about politics is normal among my friends; (2) You have to be careful talking about politics, even among friends; (3) [DON'T READ] Depends on the circumstances."

¹⁹ For example, the construction of the interoceanic canal, see: <http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2015/01/18/nacionales/1767093-marchas-a-favor-y-en-contra-del-canal-marchas-a-favor-y-en-contra-del-canal>.

However, the series of AmericasBarometer surveys detects a reduction in the percentage of people who say they have participated in social protests since 2010, when the question was included in the questionnaire for the first time. As Figure 5.15 shows, the percentage of people who report having attended a public demonstration or protest decreased from almost 10% in 2010 to 6.1% in 2016, with the most notable fall between 2012 and 2014.




Figure 5.15. Participation in Protests in Nicaragua, 2010-2016

When comparing the percentages of participation in public demonstrations in Nicaragua with the rest of the countries in the region included in the 2016/2017 round, the data show that this Central American country ranks among the lowest levels of participation (see Figure 5.16). The regional average of participation in protests (with the case of Nicaragua corresponding to public demonstrations of support for the government) by country is 9.4%. Nicaragua is below this average. This puts the results of protests in Nicaragua in perspective and suggests that despite the government's intervention in the issue of citizen participation and the legacy of the Revolution, many citizens in the country are retreating from public demonstrations in the streets.




Figure 5.16. Participation in Protests by Country, 2016/17

VI. Citizen Participation and Support for the Political System and Democracy

In this section we analyze the impact that the variables of citizen participation can have on support for the political system and democracy. Specifically, it examines whether the greater involvement of citizens in different forms of participation has any effect on the way in which people perceive the political system and are satisfied with the performance of democracy. For this, two multivariable linear regression analyses were carried out. The first one had the purpose of identifying the factors of citizen participation associated with support for the Nicaraguan political system.²⁰ The objective of the second regression analysis was to study if these participation factors have any effect on citizens' satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the country.²¹

The results of these two analyses indicate that, apart from the factors related to the economy, crime, and corruption, the variables of citizen participation in community organizations and, especially, in the government's corporatist organizations (CPCs and Family Cabinets) are significantly associated with support for the political system. On the one hand, people who participate more actively in religious organizations, parent associations, and community committees tend to support the political system more than people who do not get involved in such organizations (see Figure 5.17). On the other hand, Nicaraguans who are involved in the government's CPCs and Family Cabinets are also significantly more likely to see the Nicaraguan political system positively. Both results make sense, especially the one that points out the importance of participation in government corporatist associations. They constitute a mechanism that allows citizens to establish a direct link with the current regime and, therefore, many citizens feel committed to the political system. Other types of participation, such as attending municipal council meetings or participating in protests, did not turn out to be related to support for the political system.

²⁰ It is worth remembering here that support for the political system was measured by integrating questions of trust in the country's institutions. See Chapter 6 of this report for the details of the construction of the scale.

²¹ Satisfaction about the performance of democracy was measured by converting the results of the following question to a scale from 0 to 100: “**PN4**. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied**, or very **dissatisfied** with the way democracy works in Nicaragua?”




Figure 5.17. Support for the Political System by Level of Participation in Community and Government Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016

But what about satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Nicaragua? Are citizens more satisfied with how democratic institutions operate in the country as a result of their own political involvement? The answer is yes, but only to the extent that people participate in the corporatist organizations of the Nicaraguan State. In other words, as Figure 5.18 shows, people who participate in CPCs and Family Cabinets tend to express more satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in Nicaragua than people who do not participate in these groups. The other variables of citizen participation and politics did not turn out to be significantly associated with satisfaction with democracy.²² This suggests that the corporatist organizations developed by the government constitute a crucial source of legitimacy for the current Sandinista government. The fact that people participate in the Councils of Citizen Power, as well as in the Family Cabinets, contributes to keeping them satisfied with the prevailing political order.

²² However, the data revealed that the people most satisfied with democracy are those who occupy the most disadvantaged strata of the socioeconomic scale in Nicaragua. Specifically, people who have no or little schooling and people who occupy the lowest wealth quintiles are those who appear more satisfied with the functioning of democracy.




Figure 5.18. Satisfaction with Government Performance by Participation in Government Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016

The effect of corporatist participation becomes even more evident when, using a multivariate linear regression, the effect of citizen participation variables on the opinion that democracy is the best form of government was analyzed.²³ In this case, the variable of participation in government organizations loses its effect and the only variable that remains significantly associated with support for democracy as a preferred regime is participation in community organizations (religious, parent, and community improvement, see Figure 5.19). In other words, participating in CPCs or Family Cabinets does not mean that Nicaraguans support democracy in the abstract. What does cause citizens to support a democratic regime is participation in civil society organizations: churches, schools, and the community.

²³ The variable is a scale from 0 to 100 from the results of the question: “**ING4**. Changing the subject again, democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”




Figure 5.19. Support for Democracy by Participation in Community Organizations in Nicaragua, 2016

VII. Conclusion

The results of the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer on citizen participation in Nicaragua reveal interesting trends. Confidence in local governments has improved with respect to previous years and the participation of citizens in municipal meetings has increased. However, municipalities do not figure as the most trusted government institutions in Nicaragua. The Armed Forces and the President receive the highest levels of citizen trust.

In the same way, the results indicate that although citizen participation in civil society organizations is relatively low, Nicaragua shows one of the highest levels of participation in these type of organizations compared to other countries in the region. In addition, Nicaragua exhibits organizations of a corporatist nature, promoted by the government, whose citizen participation in them is strongly influenced by political sympathies and social welfare networks established by the government of Daniel Ortega.

These networks of organizations and political benefits also have an impact on social protests, since those who report having participated in public demonstrations also tend to express sympathy for the FSLN party. These same networks have a significant impact on the legitimacy of the political system and on how citizens view institutions. This places Nicaragua as a special case in regards to citizen participation.

Chapter 6.

Democratic Orientations in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin with LAPOP

I. Introduction

Plato's *Republic* posed a question with which philosophers and political scientists still grapple: what makes democracy stable? One ingredient in democracy's success is its ability to generate legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if mass support for the democratic system begins to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas from 2006 to 2017, and analyzes the factors that shape these attitudes and the democratic orientations that they undergird.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. Political legitimacy, or "system support," has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects that the political system and its institutions represent. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Among contextual explanations, one perspective holds that certain cultures grant democratic institutions greater legitimacy. According to this view, Latin America's corporatist institutions disadvantage democracy (Wiarda 2003). For other scholars, economic development heavily influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Lipset 1963). Economic development often increases education, which typically correlates with the expression of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009; Carlin 2006; Carlin and Singer 2011). Still others argue that the institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005). Interestingly, institutional configurations in the Latin American region seem to yield election winners who are less supportive of democratic rules of the game (Carlin and Singer 2011; Singer forthcoming). Since most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving, mean levels of diffuse support for the political system are often theorized to be stable in the short run.

Perceptions of legitimacy, however, may not always be static within and across individuals. Citizens' experiences with the system may change frequently, and can partially determine the degree of legitimacy that citizens accord to the democratic system. In particular, economic hardship, greater personal insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine the legitimacy citizens grant democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011; Seligson 2002, 2006). Indeed, recent

AmericasBarometer reports have linked perceptions of and experience with economic outcomes, the integrity of state officials, and the security situation to citizens' evaluations of the political system (Carlin et al. 2014).

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture. Since broadly inclusive citizenship is a hallmark of democracy (Dahl 1971), political toleration is a central pillar of democratic quality and survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as “the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree.” Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy as well. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

What shapes political tolerance? At the macro level, more developed countries have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), while also tending to display more tolerance on specific issues such as same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2010). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance. At the micro-level, scholars point to many factors including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955).

Legitimacy and tolerance are, therefore, core elements of democratic culture. These attitudes combine to make unique profiles of democratic orientations. To understand how such orientations influence democratic stability, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise levels of pro-democracy orientations high enough so that in hard times the regime can draw on these reserves to sustain itself. In such circumstances, democracy takes on inherent value, and mass democratic orientations prove robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long uninterrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus, the region's pro-democracy reservoirs are likely shallow and may tend to ebb and flow with performance. This report, like others before it, seeks to track the depth of democratic orientations in the Americas over time, gauge their breadth across countries in the region, and analyze how citizens' specific experiences with democratic institutions shape their orientations to democracy.

II. Main Findings

This chapter documents two types of evidence. First, it reports on over-time trends and cross-national patterns in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for the political system reached its highest level in Nicaragua in 2016 (62.8). This is due to increases in levels of trust that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that basic human rights are protected.
- Political tolerance rose in 2016 in Nicaragua, both overall and across each of its components.
- In 2016, for the first time in Nicaragua, orientations conducive to a *stable democracy* dominated, followed by orientations conducive to *authoritarian stability*. The orientations

conducive to democratic stability increased on average in Nicaragua in 2016 compared to 2014.

Second, this chapter considers how citizens' perceptions of and experience with political institutions shape their democratic orientations. The evidence is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Of the factors studied in this report, trust in political parties, in elections, and in the local government are the most powerful predictors of Nicaraguans' democratic orientations – particularly those conducive to stable democracy.
- The extent to which citizens feel their demands for basic political liberties are inadequately met shapes their democratic orientations.
- The perceptions of corruption in Nicaragua increase the probability of an unstable democracy.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III explores Support for the Political System, Political Tolerance, and how they combine to form four distinct profiles of Democratic Orientations: *Stable Democracy*, *Authoritarian Stability*, *Unstable Democracy*, and *Democracy at Risk*. For each, it reports trends from 2004 to 2016/17 and in 2016/17 in Nicaragua. Section IV uses regression analysis to probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold the four Democratic Orientations. Its goal is to compare the predictive leverage of factors that figure prominently in previous chapters of this report. Section V concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their implications.

III. Democratic Orientations across the Region and over Time

Stable democracies need citizens who support their institutions and respect the rights of, i.e. tolerate, dissenters. In other words, legitimacy/system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability. Figure 6.1 summarizes the ways in which this and previous LAPOP studies expect system support and tolerance, in combination, to affect stable democracy. If the majority in a country shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy should be stable, i.e. “consolidated.” Conditions in which the public has high system support but low tolerance do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, could support a more authoritarian model. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in a commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, democracy may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown.

Figure 6.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, data from the 2004 and 2008 AmericasBarometer studies identified serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled then-president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth, and Seligson 2010). Before analyzing these attitudes in combination, let us examine the two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring “system support” – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index¹ created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Responses to each question are based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component are also rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 6.2 compares levels of the system support index and its five components since 2004 in Nicaragua. Support for the political system reaches its highest level in Nicaragua in 2016 (62.8).

¹ For the region as a whole, Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the five variables is very high ($\alpha = .81$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

This is due to increases in levels of trust that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that basic human rights are protected.




Figure 6.2. System Support and Its Components in Nicaragua, 2004-2016

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas today? Figure 6.3 presents levels of system support in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer study. System support is highest in Guyana (65.5 degrees), followed by Nicaragua, Canada, and Costa Rica (62–63 degrees) and, for the third round running, lowest in Brazil (34.1 degrees). At 53.7 degrees, the United States hovers above the regional average (49.7). Nicaragua is between the two countries with the highest levels of support for the political system in comparison with other countries in the region.




Figure 6.3. System Support in the Americas, 2016/17

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the quality and survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus, the AmericasBarometer measures political



tolerance toward those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items:

- D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: *[Probe: To what degree?]*
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with standard LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.²

Figure 6.4 displays the national means on the political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004.

How stable is political tolerance? Political tolerance in Nicaragua increased significantly to 53.1 points after reaching its lowest level in 2014. The increase in political tolerance among Nicaraguans is due to significant increases in all components of this index, which include measures of approval for the right to protest, vote, give speeches, and be a political candidate for those who disagree with the political system.

² Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high (.84) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.




Figure 6.4. Political Tolerance and Its Components in Nicaragua, 2004-2016

The cross-national distribution of tolerance of political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Figure 6.5, which maps countries by mean score on the index from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in Canada and the United States (69.8 and 69.2 degrees on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Peru and Colombia (47.6 and 45.4 degrees, respectively). Although Nicaragua experienced a significant increase in political tolerance between 2014 and 2016, the country is among the countries in the region with intermediate levels of political tolerance.




Figure 6.5. Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2016/17

Support of the political system exhibited greater stability than political tolerance in Nicaragua between 2014 and 2016. Even though system support reached its highest level, it is not statistically different from what was observed in 2014. On the other hand, tolerance has increased significantly on average in Nicaragua with regard to 2014.

Approval of the right to vote of critics of the regime stayed stable at intermediate levels (see Figure 6.6). Nevertheless, 40% agree to limiting the voice and vote of the opposition in Nicaragua (see Figure 6.7, the total of those surveyed who responded 5, 6, or 7 on the scale).




Figure 6.6. Approval of the Right to Vote for those who Criticize the Government, Nicaragua 2004-2016




Figure 6.7. Need to Limit the Voice of Opposition Parties for Progress, Nicaragua 2016

Orientations Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the orientations theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who score above 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who score below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold orientations that place *Democracy at Risk*. An analysis of the regression reveals that Nicaraguans older than 25 years of age have a greater probability of having a profile of attitudes conducive to a democracy in risk than younger Nicaraguans. At the same time, those who identify with the FSLN or approve of the performance of the president have a *lower* probability of having a profile of attitudes of democracy at risk in comparison with people who do not identify with a party or disapprove of the performance of the president.

Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have orientations that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.

How prevalent are these orientations in the Americas? Figure 6.8 reports trends from 2004 to 2016 for Nicaragua. In 2016, orientations conducive to a *stable democracy* dominate for the first time in Nicaragua. Between 2014 and 2016 the percentage with these orientations increased from 29% to 37%. Yet, close to a third of Nicaraguans also report orientations conducive to *authoritarian stability*, even though there is a significant decrease in the percentage with these orientations from 41% in 2014 to 33% in 2016. The percentages of orientations with regards to the profiles of unstable democracy and democracy at risk stayed relatively stable in comparison with 2014.





Figure 6.8. Democratic Orientations over Time in Nicaragua, 2004-2016

The distribution of these orientations in the countries surveyed is shown in Figure 6.9. With respect to the profile of orientations that favors *Stable Democracy* – high system support *and* high political tolerance – the snapshot in Figure 6.7 flags an outlier: Canada. At 61%, Canada leads the region in *Stable Democracy* orientations. Next highest are Guyana (45%), the United States (43%), and Costa Rica (40%). At 13% and 15%, respectively, Brazil and Venezuela have the lowest percentages of citizens with orientations favorable to democratic stability. In Nicaragua, a little more than a third (37%) of the population have a profile of orientations that favor a *stable democracy*, which is significantly larger when compared with the rest of the region.



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2016/17; v.GM_v.07172017

Figure 6.9. Democratic Orientations in the Americas, 2016/17

If we look at the interplay between *Stable Democracy* – the profile most supportive of democratic stability – and *Democracy at Risk* – the profile most threatening to democratic stability –, two patterns emerge. First, in some cases *Stable Democracy* orientations have grown and *Democracy at Risk* orientations have dwindled. In Honduras, for example, we find that the percentage of individuals with *Stable Democracy* orientations has more than tripled its 2012 level while, at the same time, the proportion of individuals with orientations that put *Democracy at Risk* was more than halved. Similar, if less exaggerated, patterns are seen Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic.³

A second pattern is less heartening to democracy's champions. Namely, *Democracy at Risk* orientations are gaining ground over *Stable Democracy* orientations in handful of countries. For example, the percentage of Venezuelans who fit the *Democracy at Risk* profile has nearly doubled since 2012. *Stable Democrats*, by contrast, now make up just 15% of the population, down from 43% in 2006. Parallel, if less pronounced, dynamics have played out in Mexico and in Colombia since 2010.⁴

In short, although the political culture supporting democracy may have thickened in several countries of the hemisphere, it has thinned substantially in others. In Nicaragua, the percentage that exhibit a profile of political orientations conducive to *stable democracy* increased. We next explore why by analyzing how individuals' experience under and judgements of political institutions shape their democratic orientations.

IV. Citizens, State Institutions, and Democratic Orientations

What kinds of citizens are most likely to hold attitudes conducive to stable democracy? As mentioned above, diffuse democratic orientations are considered deep-seated and, thus, quite stable in the short run. However, in the comparatively young democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, citizens' perceptions of and experiences with the institutions of the democratic state may still be crucial predictors of democratic orientations. So which factors are most important to understanding individuals' democratic orientations in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer?

To answer this question, we use fixed-effects multinomial logistic regression to model the four democratic orientations described above as a function of key variables. These include trust in political parties and trust in elections from Chapter 1; perceived deficit of democratic liberties from Chapter 2; corruption victimization, corruption perceptions, and corruption tolerance from Chapter 3; confidence in the media from Chapter 4; confidence in local government from Chapter 5; and satisfaction with local government services, crime victimization, and feelings of insecurity.

³ These cases also show a lowered prevalence of *Authoritarian Stability* attitudes and rising levels of *Unstable Democracy* attitude profiles, i.e. those who are politically tolerant but have withdrawn support for the system.

⁴ Over the decade 2006 to 2016/17, the percentage of Mexicans with an *Authoritarian Stability* attitude profile shrunk from 29.2% to 18.5%. However, *Stable Democracy* attitudes in Mexico fell gradually from 41.1% to 22.6%, *Democracy at Risk* attitudes rose steadily from 13.4% to 28.3%, and *Unstable Democracy* attitudes grew from 16.6% to 30.5%.

The models also control for the five standard socio-economic and demographic variables (gender, age, wealth, education, city size). Analyses are conducted using data from Nicaragua only⁵.




Figure 6.10. Maximal Effects of Predictors of Democratic Attitude Profiles in Nicaragua 2016/17

Figure 6.10 reports the changes in the predicted probability of observing each of the four profiles when we simulate a change of each variable from its minimum value to its maximum value while holding all other variables constant at their means. Such “maximal effects” allow us to compare the relative impact of factors this report has identified as crucial to understanding opinions towards democratic governance.

Let us contrast the first pair of diametrically opposed orientations: *Stable Democracy* (far right column in the figure) – which blends high levels of system support with high levels of political tolerance – and *Democracy at Risk* (far left column in the figure) – which couples low levels of system support and low levels of political tolerance. As Figure 6.10 suggests, the correlates of these profiles are mirror images of each other. For instance, increasing trust in political parties from none to a lot makes a Nicaraguan 23 percentage points more likely to hold orientations that augur in favor of *Stable Democracy* and 15 percentage points less likely to hold orientations that put *Democracy at Risk*. We see similar, if slightly weaker, effects when it comes to the maximal effects of trust in elections and trust in local government. By the same token, when individuals perceive a deficit in basic democratic liberties, it boosts their chances of holding *Democracy at Risk* orientations by 7 percentage points and lowers their chances of hold *Stable Democracy*

⁵ For the results of the regressions in this chapter, see the online appendix on the LAPOP website.

orientations by 12 percentage points. Maximal effects of corruption perceptions affect neither the possibility of observing *Democracy at Risk* orientations nor the possibility of observing *Stable Democracy* orientations by the same margin. Trusting in the media reduces the possibility of observing *Democracy at Risk* orientations by 14 percentage points.

Now let us contrast a second pair of opposing orientations: *Unstable Democracy* – combining low system support with high political tolerance – and *Authoritarian Stability* – melding high system support and low political tolerance. Political trust matters a great deal for both orientations. Increasing trust in elections bolsters the chances of espousing *Authoritarian Stability* orientations and undercuts the chances of espousing *Unstable Democracy* orientations. Boosting confidence in political parties and local government also reduces the possibility of having orientation conducive to *Unstable Democracy*. A perceived deficit of basic liberties appears to have its strongest legitimacy implications for *Unstable Democracy*.

Overall, how citizens evaluate, perceive, and experience their governing institutions shapes their democratic orientations and, in turn, the regime's stability. Our analysis underscores the importance of trust in political parties and elections – institutions tasked with aggregating citizens' political preferences and translating them into democratic representation. Additionally, it highlights the local connection. How highly citizens trust their local governments and rate their services heavily shapes their democratic orientations. Furthermore, the extent to which citizens feel the state supplies basic democratic rights helps determine their democratic orientations. Finally, we note citizens' experiences with and views of corruption and security wield limited predictive power over democratic orientations. Their maximal effects are roughly on par with those of the control variables (≤ 0.06). As past reports have shown, however, these factors are often correlated with system support and political tolerance when analyzed separately (Carlin et al. 2012, 2014).

V. Conclusion

Democracy's future in the Americas hinges on mass support for its institutions and the inclusive nature of democratic citizenship. When citizens broadly view the system as legitimate and tolerate even its most ardent detractors, democracy can achieve remarkable stability. But when this cultural foundation erodes, democracy's fate is less certain. Chapter 1 tracked noteworthy decay, on average in the region, in support for democracy in the abstract and in trust in and attachment to political parties. These outcomes are concerning, yet the set of attitudes that matter for democratic quality and stability is broader. It is also important to track legitimacy, political tolerance, and democratic orientations in the Americas, to compare them across countries, and, most crucially, to understand how citizens' interaction with state institutions shapes democratic orientations. This chapter sought to do just that. Now let us review our findings and ponder what they might mean for democracy's defenders and policymakers in this hemisphere.

A straightforward message from the over-time analyses is that system support and political tolerance do not necessarily trend together. Nor even do all components of these indices. Recall that overall system support stayed stable in Nicaragua, while political tolerance increased. These diverging dynamics can have political implications.



Another noteworthy message this chapter communicates is that democratic legitimacy and political tolerance exhibit volatility in the Americas. Brief analyses of specific cases here suggest that this volatility reflects the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. As mentioned, scholars have used AmericasBarometer data to argue that low levels of legitimacy can be bellwethers of democratic instability (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). Beyond specific levels, however, short-term *volatility* in system support, political tolerance, and/or democratic orientations may also have important implications – positive and negative – for democracy. This is an open question that can only be answered with consistently repeated measurement. Monitoring mass democratic sentiment cross-nationally and over time, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is therefore crucial to understanding democratic stability.

Finally, this chapter's findings have implications for political actors in the region. Political parties, elections, and local government are some of the institutions with which citizens have the most contact. Citizens' trust in these institutions are the three strongest predictors of their democratic orientations. The strength of this relationship makes the findings presented in earlier chapters on declining confidence in parties and low trust in local government particularly relevant; though regional average orientations toward democratic stability have ticked upward, this outcome rests on tenuous grounds. This places a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of the actors who inhabit these institutions. It is thus incumbent upon party leaders to show themselves to be capable, honest, and responsive to citizens (Carlin 2014). Beyond those actors who can influence electoral commissions and other institutions that shape the conduct of elections, raising political knowledge, fostering interpersonal trust, and reaching out to those who voted for the losing candidates can boost trust in elections (Layton 2010) – and political actors can be protagonists of all three. Local politicians may earn greater trust not only by providing better services, but also by reducing neighborhood insecurity, rooting out corruption, and getting citizens engaged in local politics. Finally, while political actors surely have their parts to play in cultivating democratic culture, citizens have parts as well. Becoming and staying informed, and acting to hold politicians and state institutions accountable, remain key duties of democratic citizenship, without which we should not expect the status quo to change for the better.

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Appendices



Appendix A. Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's average trust in political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., stratified and clustered). In bar charts, this confidence interval appears as a grey block, whereas in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts). The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically not statistically significant; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are statistically significant with 95% confidence. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will frequently indicate in the text whether a difference is statistically significant or not.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at zero. When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is statistically significant when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line at zero.

On occasion, analyses and graphs in this report present “region-average” findings. LAPOP's standard is to treat countries as units of analysis and, thus, we weight countries equally in the calculation of region averages.

The dataset used for the analyses in this report was a preliminary version of the cross-time, cross-national merge of the 2004-2016/17 AmericasBarometer surveys. Finalized versions of each survey represented in the dataset are available for free download on the project's website at www.LapopSurveys.org.



Appendix B. Study Information Sheet



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

August, 2016

Dear Sir/Madam:

You have been selected at random to participate in a study of public opinion on behalf of Borge y Asociados. The project is supported by the United States Agency for International Development and Vanderbilt University.

The interview will last approximately 45 minutes.

The objective of the study is to learn your opinions about different aspects of the way things are in Nicaragua. Even though we cannot offer you any specific benefit, we do plan to make general findings available to the media and researchers.

Although you have been selected to participate, your participation in the study is voluntary. You can decline to answer any question or end the interview at any time. The replies that you give will be kept confidential and anonymous. For quality control purposes, sections of the interview may be recorded.

If you have any questions about the study, you can contact Borge y Asociados at 505-2268-7352 or Mara Miranda at the email mmiranda@borgeya.com

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Are you willing to participate?

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Barómetro de las Américas 2016 Cuestionario Nicaragua Versión # 13.0.3.3 IRB Aprobación IRB: 110627

 USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE		 Borge y Asociados	
 Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina	 AmericasBarometer Barómetro de las Américas www.AmericasBarometer.org		 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

LAPOP: Nicaragua, 2016

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PAIS. País:				
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá
27. Surinam	28. Bahamas	29. Barbados	30. Granada	31. Santa Lucía
32. Dominica	33. Antigua y Barbuda	34. San Vicente y las Granadinas	35. San Kitts y Nevis	
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]				
ESTRATOPRI: (501) Metropolitana (502) Centro (503) Norte (504) Pacífico Norte (505) Pacífico Sur (506) Caribe				
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad:				
(1) Grande (más de 75,000)				
(2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 y 75,000) (3) Pequeña (menos de 25,000)				
UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"]: _____				
PROV. Departamento: _____				
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____				
NICDISTRITO. Distrito: _____				
NICSEGMENTO. Segmento censal [código oficial del censo] _____				
NICSEC. Sector [optativo]: _____				
CLUSTER. [Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral]: _____				
[Cada cluster debe tener 6 entrevistas; usar código oficial del censo]				
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]				
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:				
(1) Capital Nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana				
(4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural				
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español				
Hora de inicio: _____				
FECHA. Fecha Día: _____ Mes: _____ Año: 2016				

ATENCION: Es un requisito leer siempre la HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN DEL ESTUDIO y obtener el asentimiento del entrevistado antes de comenzar la entrevista.

Q1. Género [Anotar, NO pregunte]:	(1) Hombre	(2) Mujer
Q2Y. ¿En qué año nació? _____ año (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]		
LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho(a) está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]		
Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada? (1) Correcta (2) Equivocada (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]		

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país?			
[NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO una respuesta]			
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra el terrorismo	17	Otro	70
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888	No responde [NO LEER]	988888

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

Ahora vamos a hablar de su alcaldía...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión del concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la alcaldía está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
NICCP14. ¿Reuniones de un CPC, Consejos de Poder Ciudadano? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
NICCP15. ¿Reuniones de un Gabinete de la Familia? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999	

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA “A” AL ENTREVISTADO]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	No sabe [NO LEER] 888888	No responde [NO LEER] 988888
Izquierda										Derecha	

[RECOGER TARJETA “A”]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?

(1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

CUESTIONARIO A

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares...
[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.

(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado

(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado

No sabe
[NO LEER]
(888888)

No responde
[NO LEER]
(988888)

Inaplicable
[NO LEER]
(999999)

CUESTIONARIO B

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares...
[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:

JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.

(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado

(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado

No sabe
[NO LEER]
(888888)

No responde
[NO LEER]
(988888)

Inaplicable
[NO LEER]
(999999)

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre la Asamblea Nacional y gobierne sin Asamblea Nacional?

(1) Sí se justifica

(2) No se justifica

No sabe
[NO LEER]
(888888)

No responde
[NO LEER]
(988888)

Ahora, yo le voy a leer dos frases. Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga con cuál de las siguientes frases está más de acuerdo

POP5. [Leer alternativas]

(1) Nuestros presidentes deben hacer lo que el pueblo quiere aunque las leyes se lo impidan, [o al contrario],
(2) Nuestros presidentes deben obedecer las leyes aunque al pueblo no le guste.
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a VIC71]
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a VIC71]
(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a VIC71]



VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] [VALOR MÁXIMO ACEPTADO: 20] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
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Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...

	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
VIC71. ¿Ha evitado salir solo(a) de su casa durante la noche?	(1) Sí	(0) No	888888	988888		
VIC72. ¿Ha evitado utilizar el transporte público?	(1) Sí	(0) No	888888	988888	999999 (No usa transporte público)	
VIC74. ¿Ha evitado que los niños o niñas de su casa jueguen en la calle?	(1) Sí	(0) No	888888	988888	999999 (no hay niños/niñas en la casa)	
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”]	(1) Sí	(0) No	888888	988888		

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
PESE1. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor que el de otras colonias o barrios en este municipio? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
PESE2. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor que el de hace 12 meses? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “B” AL ENTREVISTADO]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Nada						Mucho	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]	
Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Nicaragua garantizan un juicio justo? <i>[Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio]</i>	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Nicaragua?	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político nicaragüense?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político nicaragüense?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político nicaragüense?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Supremo Electoral?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser nicaragüense?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas nicaragüenses?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	
NICB51. Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Constitución de Nicaragua?	
VENB51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en que los resultados oficiales de la próxima elección presidencial reflejarán los votos emitidos?	
NICB52. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los Gabinetes de la Familia?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera <i>[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7 NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO]</i>	
[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	

Utilizando la misma escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es “nada” y 7 es “mucho.	
[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]	
PR3DN. Si en su barrio alguno de sus vecinos decide construir o renovar una vivienda sin licencia o permiso, ¿qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	
PR3EN. Y si alguien en su barrio decide construir o renovar una casa, ¿qué tan probable sería que a esa persona le pidieran pagar una mordida?	

Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta...

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]	
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿hasta qué punto los partidos políticos nicaragüenses representan bien a sus votantes?	
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

<p>PR5. ¿Usted cree que el Estado nicaragüense tiene el derecho a tomar la propiedad privada de una persona en nombre del interés nacional incluso si esa persona no está de acuerdo, o cree que el Estado no tiene el derecho a hacerlo?</p> <p>(1) El Estado tiene el derecho de tomar la propiedad (2) El Estado no tiene el derecho (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>NICREFCON4B. Una de las reformas constitucionales permite la re-elección indefinida del Presidente de la República – es decir, que un Presidente puede ser reelegido una y otra vez por tiempo indeterminado. ¿Qué opina usted de la reelección indefinida de un Presidente de la República? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No se debe permitir la reelección indefinida de un presidente (2) Sí se debe permitir la reelección indefinida de un presidente (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Daniel Ortega es...?: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>M2. Hablando de la Asamblea Nacional y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados de la Asamblea Nacional nicaragüense están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?</p> <p>(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>NICM4. Pensando en la Primera Dama de la República Rosario Murillo, si fuese electa como Vice Presidenta, piensa usted que ella haría su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?</p> <p>(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive,</p> <p>SD2NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>SD3NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted...[Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>SD6NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted...[Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER]</p>	

<p>INFRA3. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>INFRA3. Suponga que está en su casa y tiene una lesión muy seria y necesita atención médica inmediata. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que se tardaría en llegar (por el medio más rápido) al centro de salud/hospital más cercano (público o privado)? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay servicios de salud/hospitales cercanos/ No iría a un hospital (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]								

<p>Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la siguiente afirmación</p> <p>POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?</p>	
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Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.	
ROS1. El Estado nicaragüense, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado nicaragüense debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
AOJ22NEW. Para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro hay que aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Y cambiando de tema...

[Continúa usando tarjeta “C”]	
[1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde]	
MEDIA3. La información que dan los medios de comunicación de noticias nicaragüense representan bien las distintas opiniones que hay en Nicaragua. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

CUESTIONARIO MEDIA A	
MEDIA4. Los medios de comunicación de noticias de Nicaragua están controlados por unos pocos grupos económicos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

CUESTIONARIO MEDIA B	
MEDIA4B. Los medios de comunicación de noticias de Nicaragua están controlados por unos pocos grupos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Test A. Set 1.	
[Continúa usando tarjeta “C”]	
[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde, 999999= Inaplicable]	
DST1B1. El gobierno debe gastar más dinero para hacer cumplir los reglamentos de construcción para hacer las viviendas más seguras ante desastres naturales, incluso si esto significa gastar menos en otros programas. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con esta frase?	
[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]	
DRK11. ¿Qué tan probable sería que alguien en su familia inmediata aquí en Nicaragua pueda morir o salir seriamente lastimado en un desastre natural como inundaciones, terremotos o huracanes/deslaves en los próximos 25 años? ¿Cree usted que es...? [Leer alternativas] (1) Nada probable (2) Poco probable (3) Algo probable (4) Muy probable (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
[Nota: la redacción de esta pregunta es un poco diferente a la usada en el resto de países incluidos en esta ronda, a excepción de Colombia y Costa Rica]	
[ENTREGAR TARJETA “N” AL ENTREVISTADO]	
Vamos a usar esta nueva tarjeta. [Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999=Inaplicable]	
ENV1C1. Alguna gente cree que hay que priorizar la protección del medio ambiente sobre el crecimiento económico, mientras otros creen que el crecimiento económico debería priorizarse sobre la protección ambiental. En una escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa que el medio ambiente debe ser la principal prioridad, y 7 significa que el crecimiento económico debe ser la principal prioridad, ¿dónde se ubicaría usted?	
[RECOGER TARJETA “N”]	
ENV2B1. Si no se hace nada para reducir el cambio climático en el futuro, ¿qué tan serio piensa usted que sería el problema para Nicaragua? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy serio (2) Algo serio (3) Poco serio (4) Nada serio (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	

Test A. Set 2.

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]**[ENTREGAR TARJETA “N” AL ENTREVISTADO]**

Vamos a usar esta nueva tarjeta.

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde, 999999= Inaplicable]

ENV1C2. Algunos creen que hay que priorizar la protección del medio ambiente sobre el crecimiento económico, mientras otros creen que el crecimiento económico debería priorizarse sobre la protección ambiental. En una escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa que el medio ambiente debe ser la principal prioridad, y 7 significa que el crecimiento económico debe ser la principal prioridad, ¿dónde se ubicaría usted?

[RECOGER TARJETA “N”]

ENV2B2. Si no se hace nada para reducir el cambio climático en el futuro, ¿qué tan serio piensa usted que sería el problema para Nicaragua? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Muy serio
- (2) Algo serio
- (3) Poco serio
- (4) Nada serio

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Volvemos a usar esta tarjeta de 1 “muy en desacuerdo” a 7 “muy de acuerdo”

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde, 999999= Inaplicable]

DST1B2. El gobierno debe gastar más dinero para hacer cumplir los reglamentos de construcción para hacer las viviendas más seguras ante desastres naturales, incluso si esto significa gastar menos en otros programas. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con esta frase?

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

DRK12. ¿Qué tan probable sería que alguien en su familia inmediata aquí en Nicaragua pueda morir o salir seriamente lastimado en un desastre natural como inundaciones, terremotos o huracanes/deslaves en los próximos 25 años? ¿Cree usted que es...? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Nada probable (2) Poco probable (3) Algo probable (4) Muy probable

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[Nota: la redacción de esta pregunta es un poco diferente a la usada en el resto de países incluidos en esta ronda, a excepción de Colombia y Costa Rica]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Nicaragua?

- (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

PN5. En su opinión, ¿Nicaragua es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?

- (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre?

- (1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “D” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría...

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 No sabe [NO LEER]	988888 No responde [NO LEER]
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente						

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

NICE17. Que las personas usen la violencia física para impedir manifestaciones pacíficas y permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: **[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]**

D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Nicaragua. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?

[RECOGER TARJETA “D”]

	Muy poca	Suficiente	Demasiada	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
LIB1. Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada...Libertad de prensa.	1	2	3	888888	988888
LIB2B. Y Libertad de expresión. ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada?	1	2	3	888888	988888
LIB2C. Y Libertad para expresar las opiniones políticas sin miedo. ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada?	1	2	3	888888	988888
LIB4. Protección a derechos humanos ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada?	1	2	3	888888	988888

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	888888	988888	
EXC7NEW. Pensando en los políticos de Nicaragua, ¿cuántos de ellos cree usted que están involucrados en corrupción? [Leer alternativas] (1) Ninguno (2) Menos de la mitad (3) La mitad de los políticos (4) Más de la mitad (5) Todos (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]						

VB1. ¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? (1) Sí votó [Sigue] (2) No votó [Pasa a VB10] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a VB10] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a VB10]	
VB3N. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? [NO leer alternativas] (1) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco) (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto) (501) Arnoldo Alemán (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista - PLC) (502) Daniel Ortega Saavedra (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional – FSLN) (503) Enrique Quiñonez (Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense - ALN) (504) Fabio Gadea Mantilla (Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente - PLI) (505) Roger Guevara Mena (Alianza por la República - APRE) (577) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No votó) [NO LEER]	
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a POL1] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a POL1] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a POL1]	
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO Leer alternativas] (501) Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) (502) Alianza Unida Nicaragua Triunfa - Partido Frente Sandinista para la Liberación Nacional (incluye los siguientes partidos/organizaciones: FSLN, PLN, PUC, AC, PRN, CCN, PIM, MYATAMARAM, PAL, MLC, ARNIC, PSC, MLCI, Movimiento Arriba por la República, Mov de Evangélicos en la Convergencia, Movimiento Indígena de la Costa del Caribe, Liberales Constitucionales en Convergencia) (503) Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN) (504) Alianza Partido Liberal Independiente (Alianza PLI) (Incluye los siguientes partidos/movimientos: PAMUC, Movimiento Liberal José Santos Zelaya) (505) Alianza Partido Alianza por la República (APRE) (incluye los siguientes partidos: MUNRN, PRP, CGT-1, ADN, UDN, MIRAAN-MIRAAS) (506) Partido Conservador (577) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
NICFEAR. ¿Cuál perspectiva describe mejor a su actitud acerca de discusiones políticas? [Leer alternativas] (1) Hablar de la política es algo normal entre mis amigos (2) Hay que cuidarse de hablar de la política, aún entre amigos (3) [NO LEER] Depende de las circunstancias (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
NICVB24. ¿En qué año serán las próximas elecciones municipales? [NO leer alternativas] (1) 2017 (2) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
NICPOLMUN. ¿Piensa votar en las próximas elecciones municipales del 2017? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
CLIEN1NA Y pensando en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011, ¿alguien le ofreció a usted un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "H" AL ENTREVISTADO] Ahora, cambiando de tema... FOR5N. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro de nuestro país? [Leer alternativas] (1) China (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Singapur (6) Rusia (7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil (11) Venezuela, o (12) México (13) [NO LEER] Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo (14) [NO LEER] Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
[RECOGER TARJETA "H"]	

TEST B. Set 1							
Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en <u>los gobiernos</u> de algunos países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.							
	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	No respon- de [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
MIL10A1. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10E1. El gobierno de Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

Ahora hablemos de organismos internacionales

MIL10OAS1. La OEA, Organización de los Estados Americanos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10UN1. La ONU, Organización de las Naciones Unidas. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

TEST B. Set 2

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en algunas organizaciones internacionales. Para cada una por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	No respon- de [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
MIL10OAS2. La OEA, Organización de los Estados Americanos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10UN2. La ONU, Organización de las Naciones Unidas. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

Hablemos ahora de los gobiernos de algunos países

MIL10A2. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10E2. El gobierno de Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

NICNEW1. ¿En su opinión, en los últimos 12 meses, la capacidad de los ciudadanos de participar en las decisiones del gobierno central de Nicaragua ha...[Leer alternativas] (1) Aumentado? (2) Permanecido Igual? (3) Disminuido? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
NICNEW2. ¿En su opinión, en los últimos 12 meses la capacidad de los ciudadanos de participar en las decisiones del gobierno municipal aquí en su alcaldía ha...[Leer alternativas] (1) Aumentado? (2) Permanecido Igual? (3) Disminuido? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

Ahora le voy a leer algunas situaciones en las que algunas personas creen que está justificado que el esposo golpee a su esposa/pareja y le voy a pedir su opinión....	Aprobaría	No aprobaría, pero lo entendería	No lo aprobaría, ni lo entendería	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
DVW1. La esposa descuida las labores del hogar. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	1	2	3	888888	988888
DVW2. La esposa es infiel. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	1	2	3	888888	988888

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿el siguiente acto de delincuencia ha ocurrido en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/comunidad?	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	
VICBARF. ¿Han ocurrido ataques a mujeres en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/comunidad?	1	2	888888	988888	

Cambiando de tema...

NICHT10. ¿Recientemente se ha escuchado sobre lo que algunos llaman tráfico humano o trata de personas? ¿Ha escuchado algo sobre esto? (0) No (1) Sí (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
NICHT12. Pensando en los últimos cinco años, usted sabe de algún niño o niña de su barrio o comunidad que haya desaparecido? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a NICHT13] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasar a NICHT13] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a NICHT13]	
NICHT12A. Pensando en lo que usted sabe actualmente o ha escuchado, ¿El/la niño/a de su comunidad que desapareció... (1) Fue encontrado/a y devuelto/a a su familia? (2) Sigue desaparecido/a? (3) [NO LEER] Fue encontrado/a sin vida. (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	

<p>NICHT13. Pensando en los últimos cinco años, usted sabe de alguna mujer de su barrio o comunidad que haya desaparecido?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a NICHT14] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a NICHT14] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a NICHT14]</p>	
<p>NICHT13A. Pensando en lo que usted sabe actualmente o ha escuchado, ¿La mujer de su barrio o comunidad que desapareció...</p> <p>(1) Fue encontrada y devuelta a su familia? (2) Sigue desaparecida? (3) [NO LEER] Fue encontrada sin vida (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>NICHT14. Pensando en algún caso de trata de personas del que usted sepa o haya escuchado en su barrio o comunidad en los últimos cinco años, sabe si el incidente fue reportado a la policía? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a WF1] (3) No ha escuchado de ningún caso [Pasa a WF1] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a WF1] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a WF1]</p>	
<p>NICHT15. Pensando en el incidente de trata de personas que me dijo fue reportado a la policía, sabe si: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) El caso fue reconocido por las autoridades como trata de personas (2) El caso fue procesado como otro tipo de incidente, como por ejemplo abandono de hogar (3) O si la policía no hizo nada sobre este caso (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	

<p>WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda periódica en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
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<p>[Usar tarjeta "ED" como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado] ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla a continuación para el código]</p>						
	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o
Ninguno	0					
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17+
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15		
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888					
No responde [NO LEER]	988888					

<p>ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? [NO leer alternativas]</p> <p>(00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	
<p>[Usar tarjeta "Q3C" como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]</p> <p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [NO Leer alternativas]</p> <p>[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]</p> <p>[Si el entrevistado dice "Cristiano" o "Evangélico", sondee para verificar si es católico (opción 1), pentecostal (opción 5) o evangélico no-pentecostal (opción 2). Si no está seguro, seleccione (2).]</p> <p>(01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Santería, Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lionza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)</p> <p>(77) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p>	



<p>OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Trabajando? [Sigue]</p> <p>(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Sigue]</p> <p>(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(4) Es estudiante?[Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar?[Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pasa a Q10G]</p> <p>(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado(a) del gobierno o empresa estatal?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado(a) en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono(a) o socio(a) de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador(a) por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador(a) no remunerado(a) o sin pago?</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> <p>(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p>	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “F” AL ENTREVISTADO]

PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]

Q10G. En esta tarjeta hay varios rangos de ingresos ¿Puede decirme en cuál de los siguientes rangos está el ingreso que usted **personalmente** gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión, sin contar el resto de los ingresos del hogar?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 1,200 córdobas
- (02) Entre 1,201 – 1,850 córdobas
- (03) Entre 1,851 – 2,350 córdobas
- (04) Entre 2,351 – 2,600 córdobas
- (05) Entre 2,601 – 3,250 córdobas
- (06) Entre 3,251 – 3,550 córdobas
- (07) Entre 3,551 – 4,100 córdobas
- (08) Entre 4,101 – 4,900 córdobas
- (09) Entre 4,901 – 5,400 córdobas
- (10) Entre 5,401 – 5,950 córdobas
- (11) Entre 5,951 – 6,850 córdobas
- (12) Entre 6,851 – 7,450 córdobas
- (13) Entre 7,451 – 9,200 córdobas
- (14) Entre 9,201 – 11,250 córdobas
- (15) Entre 11,251 – 15,550 córdobas
- (16) Más de 15,550 córdobas
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
- (999999) Inaplicable (No trabaja ni está jubilado) **[NO LEER]**

Q10NEW. ¿Y en cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 1,200 córdobas
- (02) Entre 1,201 – 1,850 córdobas
- (03) Entre 1,851 – 2,350 córdobas
- (04) Entre 2,351 – 2,600 córdobas
- (05) Entre 2,601 – 3,250 córdobas
- (06) Entre 3,251 – 3,550 córdobas
- (07) Entre 3,551 – 4,100 córdobas
- (08) Entre 4,101 – 4,900 córdobas
- (09) Entre 4,901 – 5,400 córdobas
- (10) Entre 5,401 – 5,950 córdobas
- (11) Entre 5,951 – 6,850 córdobas
- (12) Entre 6,851 – 7,450 córdobas
- (13) Entre 7,451 – 9,200 córdobas
- (14) Entre 9,201 – 11,250 córdobas
- (15) Entre 11,251 – 15,550 córdobas
- (16) Más de 15,550 córdobas
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[RECOGER TARJETA “F”]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
Q11N. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
Q12BN. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = Ninguno, (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? [Contar todos los hijos del entrevistado, que vivan o no en el hogar] _____ [VALOR MÁXIMO ACEPTADO: 20] [Sigue] (00 = Ninguno) [Pasa a ETID] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Sigue] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Sigue]	
¿Cuántos hijos varones y cuántas hijas mujeres tiene? Q12M. [Anotar cantidad de hijos varones] _____ Q12F. [Anotar cantidad de hijas mujeres] _____ (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No tiene hijos) [NO LEER]	
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro- nicaragüense, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

HAICR1. Podría decirme ¿cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? **[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]**

[Si el entrevistado indica "Portales de internet", sondee preguntando el tipo de portales en internet que visita el entrevistado(a) para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 11 o 12]

- (01) TV **[Pasa a HAICR1TV]**
- (02) Periódico **[Pasa a HAICR1DIA]**
- (03) Radio **[Pasa a HAICR1RAD]**
- (04) Iglesia **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (05) Centro comunitario **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (06) Escuela **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (07) Familiares **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (09) Amigos **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (10) Vecinos **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios) **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (12) Redes sociales (por ejemplo, FourSquare, Twitter, Facebook) **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER] [Pasa a WWW1]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER] [Pasa a WWW1]**

HAICR1TV. ¿Y qué canal de televisión mira usted más frecuentemente para informarse de la situación del país? **[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]**

- (501) Canal 2, Telecentro **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (502) Canal 4 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (503) Canal 6 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (504) TN8 o Canal 8 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (505) Canal 9 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (506) Canal 10 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (507) Canal 11 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (508) Canal 12 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (509) Viva 13 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (510) Vos TV Canal 14 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (511) 100% Noticias Canal 15 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (512) CDNN 23 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (513) Canal EXTR@PLUS.37 **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (514) Canal Asamblea Nacional TV **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (515) Canal local **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (577) Otro **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (888888) No sabe **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (988888) No responde **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[Pasa a WWW1]**

HAICR1DIA. ¿Y qué periódico lee usted más frecuentemente para informarse de la situación del país?

[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]

- (501) La Prensa **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (502) El Nuevo Diario **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (503) Confidencial **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (504) Bolsa de Noticias **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (505) El Mercurio **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (506) Q'hubo **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (507) Hoy **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (508) Metro **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (509) Trinchera de la Noticia **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (510) Semanario La Calle **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (511) Periódico local **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (577) Otro **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (888888) No sabe **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (988888) No responde **[Pasa a WWW1]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[Pasa a WWW1]**

HAICR1RAD. ¿Y qué radio escucha usted más frecuentemente para informarse de la situación del país? [NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] (501) Nueva Radio Ya (502) Radio Corporación (503) Radio La Primerísima (504) Radio Maranatha (505) Radio Universidad (506) La Sandino (507) Radio 580 (508) Radio 800 (509) Radio Restauración (510) El Pensamiento (511) Radio Mundial (512) Radio Católica (513) Radio María (514) Radio local (577) Otro (888888) No sabe (988888) No responde (999999) Inaplicable	
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WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
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G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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NICMEDIA1. Durante los 12 meses pasados, ¿ha notado usted que la libertad de expresión en los medios de comunicación ha aumentado, ha permanecido igual o ha disminuido? (1) Ha incrementado (2) Ha permanecido igual (3) Ha disminuido (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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NICMEDIA2. ¿Qué piensa de los medios de comunicación independientes (no afiliados al gobierno)? Que existan estos medios es [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy Importante (2) Importante (3) Regular (4) No Importante (5) Nada Importante (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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PR1. La vivienda que ocupa su hogar es... [Leer alternativas]: (1) Alquilada (2) Propia, [Si el entrevistado duda, decir "totalmente pagada o siendo pagada a plazos/cuota/hipoteca"] (3) Prestada o compartida (4) Otra situación (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R3. Refrigerador	(0) No	(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]

R4A. Teléfono celular (acepta smartphone/ teléfono inteligente)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar “uno”.]	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R7. Horno microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R15. Computadora (acepta tableta/iPad)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R18. Servicio de Internet desde su casa (incluyendo teléfono o tableta)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R1. Televisión	(0) No [Pasa a R26]			(1) Sí [Sigue]	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]
R26. ¿Su vivienda está conectada a la red de aguas negras/desaque/drenaje?	(0) No			(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

FORMATQ. Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico (1) Papel (2) ADGYS (3) Windows PDA (4) STG	
COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	
[Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, complete las siguientes preguntas]	
CONOCIM. Usando la escala que se presenta abajo, por favor califique su percepción sobre el nivel de conocimiento político del entrevistado (1) Muy alto (2) Alto (3) Ni alto ni bajo (4) Bajo (5) Muy bajo	

DESORDEN FÍSICO ¿Hasta qué punto diría usted que el área alrededor del hogar del encuestado/a está afectada por...?	Nada	Poco	Algo	Mucho
IAREA1. Basura en la calle o acera	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IAREA2. Baches en la calle	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IAREA3. Viviendas que tienen verjas/barrotes o rejas de metal en las ventanas	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

DESORDEN SOCIAL ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el área alrededor del hogar del encuestado/a está afectada por...?	Nada	Poco	Algo	Mucho
IAREA4. Jóvenes o niños en las calles sin hacer nada, que andan vagando	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IAREA6. Gente borracha o drogada en las calles	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IAREA7. Personas discutiendo de una forma agresiva o violenta (hablando en un tono de voz muy alto, con enojo)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

TI. Duración de la entrevista [<i>minutos, ver página # 1</i>] _____	
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo.	


Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____ Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios: _____ _____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta A (L1)


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				



Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C






Tarjeta N


1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Medio ambiente es prioridad				Crecimiento económico es prioridad		

Tarjeta D





Tarjeta E



Tarjeta H

Brasil

China

Corea del Sur

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Rusia

Singapur

Venezuela



Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 1,200 córdobas
- (02) Entre 1,201 – 1,850 córdobas
- (03) Entre 1,851 – 2,350 córdobas
- (04) Entre 2,351 – 2,600 córdobas
- (05) Entre 2,601 – 3,250 córdobas
- (06) Entre 3,251 – 3,550 córdobas
- (07) Entre 3,551 – 4,100 córdobas
- (08) Entre 4,101 – 4,900 córdobas
- (09) Entre 4,901 – 5,400 córdobas
- (10) Entre 5,401 – 5,950 córdobas
- (11) Entre 5,951 – 6,850 córdobas
- (12) Entre 6,851 – 7,450 córdobas
- (13) Entre 7,451 – 9,200 córdobas
- (14) Entre 9,201 – 11,250 córdobas
- (15) Entre 11,251 – 15,550 córdobas
- (16) Más de 15,550 córdobas

Tarjeta ED

[NO MOSTRAR, solo para el encuestador]

[Usar tarjeta "ED" como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11		
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17+	
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888						
No responde [NO LEER]	988888						



Tarjeta Q3C

[NO MOSTRAR, solo para el encuestador]

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[NO Leer alternativas]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

[Si el entrevistado dice "Cristiano" o "Evangélico", sondee para verificar si es católico (opción 1), pentecostal (opción 5) o evangélico no-pentecostal (opción 2). Si no está seguro, seleccione (2).]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Santería, Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lionza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(77) Otro

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Paleta de Colores



The AmericasBarometer

The AmericasBarometer is a regional survey carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). LAPOP has deep roots in the Latin America and Caribbean region, via public opinion research that dates back over four decades. Its headquarters are at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. The AmericasBarometer is possible due to the activities and support of a consortium of institutions located across the Americas. To carry out each round of the survey, LAPOP partners with local individuals, firms, universities, development organizations, and others in 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have three core purposes: to produce objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion; to build capacity and strengthen international relations; and to disseminate important findings regarding citizens' experiences with, assessments of, and commitment to democratic forms of government.

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. Other institutions that have contributed to multiple rounds of the survey project include Ciudadanía, Environics, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme. The project has also benefited from grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Open Society Foundation. Collaborations with university partners who sponsor items on the survey also sustain the project. In this most recent round, those contributors included Dartmouth, Florida International University, the University of Illinois, the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello in Venezuela, and several centers at Vanderbilt University.

The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was carried out via face-to-face interviews in 27 countries across the Latin America and Caribbean region, and via the internet in Canada and the U.S. All samples are designed to be nationally representative of voting-age adults and electronic devices were used for data entry in all countries. In all, more than 43,000 individuals were interviewed in this latest round of the survey. The complete 2004-2016/17 AmericasBarometer dataset contains responses from over 250,000 individuals across the region. Common core modules, standardized techniques, and rigorous quality control procedures permit valid comparisons across individuals, subgroups, certain subnational areas, countries, supra-regions, and time.

AmericasBarometer data and reports are available for free download from the project website: www.LapopSurveys.org Datasets from the project can also be accessed via "data repositories" and subscribing institutions at universities across the Americas. Through such open access practices and these collaborations, LAPOP works to contribute to the pursuit of excellence in public opinion research and ongoing discussions over how programs and policies related to democratic governance can improve the quality of life for individuals in the Americas and beyond.

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