

Latin American Public Opinion Project


LAPOP

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
Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina

Democracy Audit:

Nicaragua, 1999



Crime Victimization in Nicaragua, 1999



By

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Executive Summary

Democracy requires a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of the principles underlying freedom of speech, media, and assembly; rights of political parties, rule of law, human rights, and the like. Such norms do not evolve overnight.¹

Many political scientists believe that one key factor that enables democracies to survive is having a democratic political culture. This study explores the political culture of democracy in Nicaragua, by undertaking an audit of the views of its citizens. It does so by allowing Nicaraguans, over 2,500 of them, to speak for themselves in personal, face-to-face interviews that were conducted in late 1999. In this introduction and executive summary, some of the main findings are reported upon, the details of which are contained in the chapters that follow.

- The sample was designed to represent the entire country, and as such interviews were conducted in 16 of the country's 17 departments and autonomous regions. The selection of respondents accomplished via probability criteria, based upon the 1995 national census. In total, interviews took place in 69 distinct municipalities, and 100 sample segments (defined as voting precincts, or "Juntas Receptoras de Voto").
- The field work was carried out by Borge & Associates of Managua and San José, Costa Rica. The entire effort was coordinated under the Latin American Public Opinion Project of the University of Pittsburgh.
- In earlier studies in this series of public opinion surveys, specialized groups have been interviewed because of their importance in USAID's programming. Those groups have included teachers, members of NGOs, lawyers, etc. In the 1999 survey, there was special interest in the judicial sector, given the many initiatives in this area. A sample of local level judges, district level judges and appeals court judges was drawn, as well as a sample of prosecutors. In total, 124 of these individuals were successfully interviewed.
- Within the national sample, those respondents living in the USAID municipal project areas were given a special code, so that in each analysis comparisons could be made between those individuals and the rest of the national sample.

¹Seymour Martin Lipset, "Conditions for Democracy," *Extensions* Spring (1998), 3-13.

- The study also took cognizance of the possible impact of Hurricane Mitch, by assigning to each respondent a code indicating the level of physical damage caused by the Hurricane in the department in which the interview was conducted.
- The survey compared the results of the 1999 survey, with the prior surveys of 1991 (limited largely to the Managua area), 1995 and 1997. The surveys produced very similar demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
- The world-wide concern with the problem of crime is particularly acute in Latin America if we consider that the region has the dubious distinction of having the highest rates of crime and violence in the whole world. Crime levels have been linked to problems in the stability of democracy. A search of recent Interpol homicide records available at the University of Pittsburgh has made it possible to place the Nicaraguan case in comparative perspective. Nicaragua is among the most violent countries for which data could be obtained.
- The 1999 survey asked questions about crime for the first time in this series. It was found that 14% of the Nicaraguan population reported that they had been crime victims within the last year. When the identical question was asked in a national survey of El Salvador in 1999 by the University of Pittsburgh, 22% of the population said that it had been a crime victim, a rate that is nearly one-third higher than in Nicaragua.
- Generally speaking, world-wide, crime rates are higher in urban rather than in rural areas. In Nicaragua, Managua has the highest crime rates nation-wide. The other areas, which in Nicaraguan terms, are "high crime," are Masaya and Chinandega, and parts of the urban samples in the Atlantic coast.
- At the low end of crime are the departments of Rivas, Chontales and Boaco with 4-5% victimization rates.
- Victimization not only varies by location, but, to a limited extent, by demographic and socioeconomic factors. Males, for example, are significantly more likely to be victims than females.
- More highly educated Nicaraguans are far more likely to be victims of crime than less well educated Nicaraguans.
- Victimization is also more common among wealthier Nicaraguans than it is among poorer people.
- Yet, urbanization plays a far greater role than personal characteristics. This means that net of urbanization levels (i.e., once urbanization is controlled for), these demographic and socio-economic variables play no significant role.

- Robbery is the most common crime, but it is important to note that violent crimes are also very common. The categories of robbery with assault, assault, rape, and kidnaping, total 45.5% of all crime.
- The survey also found that the majority of crimes go unreported to the authorities.
- The only determinant of reporting crimes that counts is the degree of urbanization of the department. Surprisingly, however, the degree of urbanization *reduces* to a significant degree the reporting of crime. This suggests that even though urban areas universally have a higher density of public institutions to which crimes could be reported, it is those who live in more rural areas who are more likely to report crimes.
- What reasons do victims give for not reporting crime? A majority of crime victims feel that reporting a crime is useless, so they do not bother to do so.
- Nearly two-thirds (64%) of respondents who had had dealings with the police said that they were treated very well, or well. This suggests a rather high level of satisfaction. However, crime victims are significantly less satisfied than non-victims.
- Only two factors explain satisfaction with treatment by the police: 1) urbanization, and 2) victimization.
- Satisfaction levels with the courts was significantly higher than with the police.
- Satisfaction with treatment by the courts was, as in the case of the police, directly related to urbanization; the higher the level of urbanization the lower the satisfaction with the courts. Victimization, however, had no impact on satisfaction with the courts. Education does play a role in explaining satisfaction with the courts; the higher the level of education, the more the satisfaction.
- The survey also asked about the “procuraduría penal,” which can be translated as the “Attorney General’s Office.” Understandably, most Nicaraguans had no contact with this office, and as a result, only 18% of the sample had an opinion.
- In Nicaragua the Office of the Public Defender was recently created. In the survey, only 30% of the respondents had heard of this office. An even smaller proportion, 25%, knew what the functions of this office were.
- The survey also sought to determine if Nicaraguans believe in the right to a public defender for those who cannot afford a lawyer. Nicaraguans overwhelmingly support this right.
- Democracy rests on a common understanding and acceptance of the rules of the game. Among the key rules are those related to the justice system. Only two-fifths

of Nicaraguans believe that the law needs to be followed strictly, even if to do so means allowing a criminal to go unpunished. The majority of the population would approve violation of the laws in these circumstances. The mass public and the judiciary differ strongly on this matter. The judges and prosecutors were nearly unanimous in a strict adherence to the law.

- Nicaraguans clearly prefer order to liberty, not surprisingly given the tumultuous history of the past twenty years.
- Both the public and the judges are in agreement that search warrants are needed to enter a house.
- What are the factors that make Nicaraguans more or less supportive of due process guarantees? The only significant predictor was being a crime victim, which reduced support for due process. These findings are very important. They suggest that crime in Nicaragua may result in a weakening of democracy.
- A number of questions in the survey focused on Nicaraguan's evaluation of the justice system. An overall item asked if the criminal justice system was very good, good, fair, poor or very poor. Most people felt that the system was only "fair," with an approximately equal proportion feeling that it was good or bad.
- Among the mass public, the young are significantly more positive in their evaluation of the criminal justice system than are older Nicaraguans. This is certainly a positive sign.
- Wealthier Nicaraguans have a lower opinion of the criminal justice system than do the poorer.
- There exists a much stronger belief in defendants' ability to defend themselves among the judiciary than among the mass public. Among the mass public, this perception does not vary by age, gender, education or wealth.
- For the mass public and for all of the judiciary groups except the prosecutors, a larger percentage of respondents believe that the executive interferes improperly with the judiciary than who believe that it does not. But, it is important to note that over one-third of the mass public had no opinion on this item.
- Among those who gave an opinion, only a minority thought that the judiciary, the prosecutors and the legislature had become more efficient over the last year, with the most negative rating given to the legislature.
- A series of three items was asked to the judicial sample alone. The first one asked which of a list of possible reforms in the penal code would be the most important. Oral trials are viewed as the most important by the sample.

- Increasingly, solutions of governance are being sought at the local level. In many countries in Latin America, major efforts are underway to bring government closer to the citizen. The survey contained a number of questions measuring citizens participation in and satisfaction with local government. A key aspect of the overall perception of local government in Nicaragua is captured by the subset of items focusing on legitimacy. The first item in this series asks: "In your opinion, who has responded better to help solve the problems of this community. Would it be the central government, the legislature or the municipality?" The municipality was selected far more than any other response.
- In the 1997 municipal project areas, both primary and secondary phases, respondents were more likely to have selected the municipality than have the respondents in the non-project areas. Respondents in the secondary project area were also more likely to select the municipality in 1999 than were respondents in the non-project area. These findings appear to provide further evidence of the centrality of local government in Nicaragua as well as some evidence for the impact of the USAID project. But, these findings are tempered by others.
- In 1997, majorities of respondents in all three areas said that they would like to see an increase in responsibility and funding for local government. But, in all three areas this majority declined between 1997 and 1999, so that in the non-project areas and in the primary phase areas, the majority declined to become a minority.
- Nicaraguans are willing to pay more taxes to their local governments, and in 1997, those in the project areas were more willing than those in the rest of Nicaragua. By 1999, however, this percentage had fallen sharply in all areas. Now, less than one-third of Nicaraguans are prepared to pay more taxes to local government in order to obtain better services.
- The more severe the hurricane damage, the less willing Nicaraguans are to pay more taxes. However, even after controlling for the impact of "Mitch," the project areas report a *lower* willingness to pay more taxes than the non-project areas.
- It was found that in the entire sample, 63% of respondents said that the mayor had done "nothing" to resolve the most pressing local problems. It is disappointing to see that among the first phase project respondents, the mayor is given a grade even lower than the nation as a whole.
- Most Nicaraguans have little trust in the ability of their local government to manage public funds.
- Age and income play little role in determining views on this subject, but more highly educated Nicaraguans do express a more trusting view.

- Respondents were asked if they had participated in any municipal meeting over the past 12 months, including “cabildos abiertos” (i.e., open town meetings), municipal sessions or other meetings convoked by the municipal council. Participation has gone up in each survey year, but the differences are not large and are statistically insignificant. The trend, however, is in a positive direction.
- Attendance at meetings can often be a very passive experience. But when citizens make demands on their local officials, a far greater level of effort and involvement is implied. The surveys included an item to measure this form of local government participation. It is here, in this vital area of citizen participation, that the impact of the municipal project is most clearly seen. For the non-project municipalities of Nicaragua, about 15% of the voting-aged population had made a demand within the last year. But by 1999, demand-making had risen substantially to over 18%, above the national average. Furthermore the second phase project began in 1997 at about the national average, but increased sharply by 1999. Here we have some strong evidence that the municipal project is having an impact in an important area of civil society life. Perhaps citizens in these areas are less content with local services because the project has increased their expectations; evidently it has increased their demand-making activities.
- Between 1997 and 1999 satisfaction with municipal services fell in both the municipal project areas and the nation as a whole, with a similar rate of decline in each.
- Respondents were also asked about the treatment they have received at the hands of local government. In the nation and in the project areas, satisfaction declined between 1997 and 1999. Furthermore, declines were approximately similar in all areas.
- Most citizens believe that they personally have no influence over municipal decisions. Furthermore, the municipal project seems to have made no difference in this perception. This suggests that whereas local governments may have become more efficient in collecting taxes, they seem not to have made citizens feel empowered to participate in the decisions as to how the funds should be spent.
- Overall, the results of the study of local government suggest that there is much work to be done on municipal government in this country. The limited resources expended at the local level no doubt are a cause of great frustration on the part of citizens who would like to see their municipal government becoming capable of responding better to their needs.
- The 1999 survey included a number of items attempting to directly measure support for democracy. Perhaps the most direct measure asked: “With which of the following phrases are you most in agreement: 1) democracy is preferable to any other form of government, 2) for people like me, a democratic or non-democratic

regime doesn't make a difference, 3) under some circumstances, an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one." Less than one-in-ten Nicaraguans expressed support for authoritarian rule over democracy. In contrast, only a little more than half (54%) of the population selected democracy as preferable over any other form of government. For over one quarter of the population, democracy or dictatorship makes no difference, and for another 10%, they had no opinion.

- In comparative perspective, looking at 17 other countries in Latin America where this same question was asked, Nicaragua scores well, with only five of the seventeen cases with a higher proportion of the population expressing a preference for democracy.
- Age is positively associated with support for democracy. That is to say, older Nicaraguans are more supportive of democracy than younger Nicaraguans. This finding is understandable, but disturbing nonetheless. The young in Nicaragua have not lived through the Somoza dictatorship, while the older citizens have. These results suggests that, among other things, the school system needs to do a better job of educating Nicaraguans about the authoritarian nature of their own recent history.
- Among the poor in Nicaragua, slightly less than a majority of the population prefers democracy, whereas among those with the highest incomes, nearly 80% do.
- Participation in meetings of the local government is significantly associated with a preference for democracy. Those who participate in such meetings are significantly more likely to prefer democracy to those who do not.
- Whereas only a bit more than half of the mass public supported democracy, nine-out-of-ten members of the judicial sample did so.
- Most Nicaraguans believe that without a legislature democracy cannot function.
- Similarly, most Nicaraguans believe that parties are necessary for democracy to function.
- As expected, when the judiciary is compared to the mass public, there is stronger support for these quintessential democratic institutions.
- Two-thirds of the public would support democracy over an unelected strong-man. Once again, however, age has an impact on these views on democracy, with the young less committed to democracy than the old.
- Nearly three-quarters of the population reject strong-man rule.

- Voting turnout in the municipal project areas does not differ significantly from the rest of the country, but with turnout so high, one would not expect them to. Similarly, very little variation is noted by the major demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
- Only a very small percentage of Nicaraguans do not believe that it is important to vote in municipal elections.
- Three forms of civil society participation, church groups, school groups and community development groups, are by far the most popular organizations in Nicaragua.
- There is little change in civil society participation from 1991-1999, except in the pattern of steady increases in church group participation.
- Church group participation among the Nicaraguan public was virtually identical to that of the appellate judges, but the other members of the judiciary had somewhat lower participation in this activity. When it comes to school-related groups, each of the judiciary groups except the district judges have higher participation than the public. A major difference emerges in the community development organizations, professional organizations, and civic associations. There, the judiciary participation is much higher than the mass public.
- In terms of community problem-solving participation, in 1997 the municipal project areas (both phases) were considerably behind the nation, but by 1999, this gap has disappeared. Perhaps the municipal project has served to stimulate this form of participation. It is of note that the first phase, which has had a longer time to operate, saw the larger increase.
- Donation of money, labor and attending meetings was very common in the 1991 survey (which again, asks for prior activity, which could have covered the Sandinista years). From 1995 on, however, these activities declined considerably. What is notable is that in 1999, donation of money and donation of labor increased from the previous survey. Attendance at meetings has held very constant, as has organization of a new group after its decline from the 1991 survey. The overall impression from these data is that community problem solving in Nicaragua is high, with citizens regularly donating their money, labor and time to get things done. No notable pattern for the USAID municipal project area emerges for these variables.
- A core theory in the field of democracy is that civil society participation matters. We find is that while not all of the democratic values studied here were influenced by participation, most of them were. Problem-solving participation is a far more active form of participation than merely attending meetings. Participation significantly increased the preference for democracy over authoritarian rule.

- Overall, then, the study has found that civil society participation in Nicaragua is relatively high. Voting turnout in particular is unusually high. The judiciary, as a group, exhibits much higher levels of civil society participation than does the mass public. Those who participate more in problem-solving activities at the local level are significantly more supportive of democracy. This finding suggests that civil society organizations can be a good vehicle for strengthening democracy in Nicaragua.
- Given Nicaragua's turbulent history, with three dramatic regime change shifts in the 1979-1990 period, the issue of stability is an important one. The stability of a political system, and its ability to weather crises without succumbing to breakdown has been directly linked to legitimacy, or system support. The effectiveness of the Nicaraguan political system in terms of delivering economic growth and increased welfare to its citizens has been limited and therefore the ability of the democratic system to engender legitimacy significantly constrained. During the period 1965-1990, annual growth averaged -3.3%, the second lowest in the world; only Kuwait, after its invasion and occupation by Iraq did worse. More recently, however, Nicaragua's picture has improved. For example, the World Bank reports that in the period 1996-97, the average per capita growth rate increased to an astonishing 10.4%.
- System support was relatively high in 1991, but fell to its lowest point in 1995 after years of disappointing economic growth. Looking at Managua alone, since 1995, however, there has been a steady recovery of system support, with the highest levels being reached in 1999, the year of the latest survey.
- The increase in support for the courts is the largest and most impressive of any of the gains made in support.
- There has also been a systematic increase in system support, country-wide, in the 1995-1999 period, with the most notable and statistically significant increase being in the 1995-1997 period. The increase is most notable in the court system, an area of special attention for USAID. Similarly, belief that rights are protected by the system also shows a steady increase. The remaining two items show increases from 1995 to 1997, but some decline between 1997 and 1999. Those declines, however, are within the confidence levels of the sample, and so do not necessarily mean an actual decline in support. The important finding is that since 1997, system support has been in the positive end of the continuum.
- In terms of the Hurricane's impact, no significant association at all was uncovered, indicating that those areas that suffered more damage from Mitch were no more likely to have high or low system support than those that had less damage.
- It was expected that the judiciary would score very high in the belief that Nicaraguans get a fair trial, and this is the result that emerged. Whereas the public

was slightly below the negative/positive division, the judiciary were uniformly well above it. The judiciary was also, not surprisingly, more positive on institutions. What did emerge as a major surprise is that the judiciary was quite mixed in its belief that the Nicaraguan system protects the basic rights of its citizens. Indeed, among the local judges and district judges, support from the judiciary was *below* that of the public. In terms of pride, the picture was quite mixed, with the appellate judges and especially the prosecutors expressing higher levels of pride in the Nicaraguan system of government than the mass public, but once again, the district and local judges being far more negative.

- Overall, the Nicaraguan judiciary is not of one mind on system support, with the district and local judges expressing views more negative than the other judicial sectors, and in some instances even more negative than the public. This may be because in their daily work they see that the poor are often not well protected by the system.
- No statistically significant difference in system support emerged between the project areas and the rest of the country.
- In terms of the expanded series of system support questions, the election council (Consejo Supremo Electoral) has suffered a steady decline in trust, while the other institutions, although highest in 1991, do not change much over the remaining years in the series.
- The Catholic Church is given the highest level of trust by the population of any institution. Newspapers, a key institution for free speech, also scores very well. At the other extreme are political parties, which, while improving from 1995 to 1997, still scored at the very bottom. The comptroller general, the police, and the criminal prosecutors all scored in the moderate range, below the mid-point of 50 with the exception of the criminal prosecutors, about whom we asked opinions for the first time in 1999. It is of note that the Comptroller General's office declined in confidence, as did the President, perhaps as a function of the noisy public dispute between them. More troubling is the sharp decline in confidence in municipal government between 1997 and 1999, a subject dealt with in greater depth earlier in this report.
- Systems may be politically stable for long periods of time, undergirded by high levels of system support. But such systems are not necessarily democratic. In order for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. There has been a major transition in political tolerance over the period 1991-1999. There have been systematic and statistically significant increases in tolerance over this decade. In 1991, on two of the four variables, the right to run for office and the right to free speech (i.e., to appear on TV and make a speech) scored below the mid-point on

the scale. By 1997 that had increased above this level, and by 1999 had increased still further. Support for the right to vote also increased during this period, but the increase was not as high, probably because this was already, in 1991, a right supported by most Nicaraguans. Only the right to protest has not changed much, but this was the right most strongly supported in 1991, and it is likely that it has already reached its high point. We do not expect tolerance to average higher than these levels.

- Each sector of the judiciary is more tolerant than the public. It is of note that the most tolerant group are the local judges.
- A comparison between the USAID project areas and the rest of the country reveals significantly higher tolerance in the project areas.
- Tolerance rose substantially in both project areas between 1997 and 1999, but did not increase for the rest of the country. Without those areas, national tolerance remained unchanged between 1997 and 1999, although it is still in the positive end of the continuum and high compared to prior years. In sum, it does seem that the municipal development project has been responsible for an important increase in political tolerance in Nicaragua.
- The theory behind this study of system support and political tolerance is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must both believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as a quintessential definition of democracy. The combination of values that seem conducive to stable democracy has increased steadily since 1995, reaching its highest ever recorded level in 1999.
- Compared to other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, Nicaragua has moved up substantially since 1995, and is far ahead of a number of other countries, especially Bolivia and Peru.

These conclusions are in some ways the starting point for further analysis. The raw data are available for inquiry by anyone interested in democratic development in Nicaragua. The survey data could be reanalyzed to answer other questions not covered in this report, such as comparisons across regions.

Chapter I. Introduction and Methodology

Background

Nicaragua is an emerging democracy in Latin America that has experienced numerous challenges. In this, it is not alone. According to Freedom House, in 1999, while 26 countries increased their level of democracy, 18 declined. Venezuela, for example, saw its legislature closed in 1999, and, according to Freedom House, “exited the ranks of Free countries.”² Ecuador began the year 2000 with a popular-military overthrow of an elected president. Nicaragua has experienced many challenges as well, and, according again to Freedom House, was one of only three countries in Latin America, to have seen its level of democracy decline in 1999 (the others being Venezuela, as already mentioned and Honduras).

The Freedom House measures are based on press reports and other sources of elite information that provide one view of democracy. To find out what Nicaraguans themselves think about democracy, one has to ask them, and this is what has been done by the University of Pittsburgh on a regular basis since 1991. This report is a sequel to several earlier studies on the democratic attitudes and behaviors of Nicaraguans. The first survey, funded with the support of several private foundations, was conducted in 1991 as part of the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project. That survey included samples of the metropolitan areas of the six Spanish-speaking countries of Central America.³ Reports on various aspects of that survey have appeared in academic publications. The survey of Nicaragua was confined to Managua, with a small additional set of interviews taking place in León, Granada and Masaya. In 1995 a follow-up study was conducted with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and produced a book-length study published in Spanish in Nicaragua in 1996.⁴ USAID then requested an

²Adrian Karatnycky, “The 1999 Freedom House Survey: A Century of Progress,” *Journal of Democracy*, 11, no. 1 January (2000), p. 190.

³See chapters in Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). For a study of voting, for example, see Mitchell A. Seligson, et al., “Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis,” in *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*, ed. by John A. Booth (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 151-82.

⁴See Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías, “Nicaragua 1991-1995: Una Cultura Política en Transición,” and Ricardo Córdova Macías and Mitchell A. Seligson, “El Desencanto con la Política y los Partidos en Nicaragua,” in *Cultura Política y Transición Democrática en Nicaragua*, ed. Ricardo Córdova Macías and Gunther Maihold (Managua: Fundación Ebert, Fundación Guillermo Ungo, Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses y Centro de Análisis Socio-Cultural, 1996).

analysis of the 1991 and 1995 data sets, which produced a report for AID focused on its concerns in the democracy area.⁵

In 1997 a national sample of public opinion in the democracy area was undertaken by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project at the request of USAID. The questionnaire used in that study was based upon the earlier surveys conducted in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. The results of that study were analyzed in a report delivered to USAID, with a summary version prepared and delivered to various public fora and the GON in 1997.⁶

The present study represents the most recent in this long series of efforts to track and interpret democratic values and behaviors in Nicaragua. In this report, the focus will be on the 1999 survey of public opinion, but where appropriate, comparisons will also be made to the earlier surveys. The 1999 study, it should be noted, is the most comprehensive of the series, since the questionnaire has been expanded to incorporate new items developed in connection with the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project in Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala. In addition, new items focusing on the justice sector were developed especially for the 1999 Nicaragua survey to enable a more in-depth look at opinion and practice in this crucial dimension of democracy. Finally, a special subsample (to be described in detail below) of the administration of justice sector was drawn and data were collected from it. Comparisons in this study will include this special subsample and the nation as a whole.

Finally, since a significant portion of USAID's programming concerns local government, an analysis is contained here comparing municipalities that have been the focus of USAID's efforts versus the rest of the country. The details of that subset will be described below.

The purpose of this first chapter is to provide some details of the methodology, as well as information on the samples to be compared in the report. The full questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A. The reader interested primarily in the substantive conclusions should proceed immediately to Chapter II. It is important, however, for those

⁵Mitchell A. Seligson, *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*, Report to USAID (Managua, Nicaragua, January, 1996). In that report, comparisons were made with the 1994 CID-Gallup surveys conducted by USAID. The study contained data on the population as a whole as well as data on numerous special groups. Some of those same groups were also surveyed in the USAID study of 1997. Differences in the wording of the questions used by CID-Gallup in 1994 from the 1991, 1995 and 1997 studies, however, limit the utility of comparison between the University of Pittsburgh and the CID-Gallup studies.

⁶Mitchell A. Seligson, *Democratic Values in Nicaragua: 1991-1997*, Report to USAID/Nicaragua (Pittsburgh, PA., 1997).

who wish to understand the methodological apparatus, to take a careful look at this chapter so as to have a complete grasp of the data base that underlies this study.

Sample Design

The 1999 survey of democratic values for Nicaragua involved an effort to accomplish many goals, and as a result the sample design was necessarily complex. In this section the sample design is briefly described. The sample was divided into two main strata: 1) the national population, and 2) the sample of the judicial sector. In addition, embedded within the national sample is the sample of USAID municipalities.

National Sample Design⁷

The single most important goal of the survey was to provide another “snapshot” of Nicaraguan attitudes toward democracy and their participation in the democratic life of the country. The reason the current sample is referred to as “another snapshot” is that this survey replicates earlier work conducted by the University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project. The first survey was conducted in 1991, and covered Managua, Granada, León and Masaya (sample N = 704). While that survey was not national in scope, it provided a solid baseline for the surveyed areas, covering over 43 per cent of the national population. In 1995, as noted above, a second study was carried out with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Germany) and conducted by the Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüense (IEN). That sample, unlike the 1991 study, was national in scope (sample N = 1,200), and can be directly compared to the 1997 and 1999 surveys undertaken for the present study, even though the sample size for 1995 was smaller and was not designed to enable the drawing of conclusions at the level of the department.⁸ The 1997 and 1999 fieldwork was carried out by the firm of Borge & Associates under the able guidance of Marco Lacayo, supervised by Dr. Orlando J. Pérez of the Central Michigan University and the author of this report.

⁷This section draws upon the 1997 report.

⁸The 1995 study as reported on here has been weighted by the data contained in the 1995 national population census, information that was not available at the time the 1995 sample was constructed. This means that some of the results presented here referring to the 1995 survey differ from the published information from that survey. However, all of the information contained in the 1997 report to USAID included the weight factors for the 1995 survey and therefore is directly comparable to the present report. The 1997 and 1999 surveys, as explained below, are also weighted based upon the 1995 population census, although these samples designs differed somewhat from the 1995 study. The interested reader should refer to the previously cited publications that were based on the 1995 study.

In order to talk about public opinion of Nicaraguans with any accuracy, it is best to work with a national sample, and that is what has been collected for this study, as well as the studies in 1995 and 1997. The 1997 and 1999 have identical sample designs. In November 1999, a total of 2,500 Nicaraguans were interviewed in their homes. The goal of the national sample was not only to allow for an analysis of public opinion for the country as a whole, but to be able to talk about Nicaragua's individual departments, since the political histories and levels of development of each department vary so much.⁹ In the United States, for example, public opinion studies often compare opinions in the South to those of the Northeast. In Nicaragua, the current survey allows comparisons among each of the departments.¹⁰ However, since the sample size within each department is relatively small (150 interviews), the confidence intervals for opinions expressed there are considerably wider than for the national sample, as is explained below. This means that we have less precise information at the level of the department than at the level of the nation.

The 1997 and 1999 studies were conducted in each of the departments of the country, with the exception of Río San Juan, which was excluded for cost considerations. Río San Juan contains 1.6% of the population of the country, and outside of a small urban concentration, the population is very widely scattered and thus costly to interview. The exclusion of Río San Juan means that the findings presented here actually refer to the 98.4% of the population of the country. In each Department six voting precincts (Juntas Receptoras de Votos, JRVs) were selected at random, and within each of those precincts an average of 25 interviews were conducted for a total target of approximately 150 interviews per department. Managua, with its large population, was an exception, in which 300 interviews were conducted divided among 12 JRVs because of its demographic and political importance. For the overall national sample, we can speak about the results with considerable accuracy: 95% of the time, the results of our sample will be no more than approximately 2% higher or lower of the views of the entire voting-age Nicaraguan population. As is well known, the precision of the sample depends on the number of interviews conducted, which is independent of the size of the population from which the sample is drawn as long as the size of the population is large. It is for this reason that the precision of the sample declines when the departmental data are examined in comparison

⁹The idea for the sample design for Nicaragua used in this study was first developed for a 1996 study of perception of and experience with corruption in Nicaragua. The current study represents a refinement of that initial design. See Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*, A Report to USAID, Nicaragua (Crystal City, VA.: Casals and Associates, 1997) and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study* (Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, 1999). Both of those studies are available in Spanish and English at the following web site: http://www.casals.aa.psiweb.com/espanyol/Publicaciones/nicaragua_spanish.pdf.

¹⁰Technically speaking, each department constitutes a separate "stratum" in the sample.

to the results at the national level. At the level of the Department, with samples of 150 interviews, the level of accuracy is much lower, about $\pm 8\%$. Thus, while we can feel quite confident in the accuracy of our results at the national level, the information at the departmental level is less precise because the range of error due to the smaller size of the sample is wider. Nonetheless, it is possible to say meaningful things about the individual departments when wide variation is found among them. Subtle variation in opinion will not be detected by our survey at the Departmental level, except for Managua, where our results are accurate at the $\pm 5.6\%$ level as a result of the large sample size.

The Atlantic region of Nicaragua has always presented survey researchers with serious challenges. Zelaya was incorporated into Nicaragua in 1894, but in the mid-1980s was divided into two regions, renamed Región Autónoma Atlántico Norte (RAAN) and Región Autónoma Atlántico Sur (RAAS). This is a vast region of more than half the territory of Nicaragua, yet contains only 10.9% of the population. Much of the population is accessible only by small boat or helicopter. The costs of providing a region-wide random sample of this region would have been extraordinarily high, so it was decided to represent it by concentrating the survey in three main population centers, Rama, Bluefields, and Puerto Cabezas and their surrounding neighborhoods. A total of 250 interviews was conducted in the Atlantic region, 100 in RAAN and 150 in RAAS. Two JRVs produced the interviews for Puerto Cabezas, with three Juntas each being utilized for Rama and Bluefields. In the latter two, the sample covers the urban area as well as surrounding rural areas.

While the sample designs for 1997 and 1999 had as a target 150 interviews per department, for the overall results to faithfully represent the proportion of the national population contained in each department, it is necessary to weight the sample. Thus, the results presented in this paper reflect the *weighted* sample, accurately portraying a picture of Nicaragua. Sample weights are given in Table I.1 below.

Reviewing Table I.1 the reader will note that each of the departments is listed in column 1, followed by the definitive published census population figures for 1995 in column 2. These figures are then rendered as percentages in column 3. Column 4 shows how many respondents were interviewed in each department in 1997 and 1999. The remaining columns show how the sample size was then weighted to adjust the sample to match the national population. In 1995 the sample design did not rely upon an equal number of respondents for each department, and the survey was conducted before the census figures were released, so the weights were different for that survey. Finally, the 1991 sample is left unweighted as it was not designed to represent the nation, as noted above. Whenever results are presented in this report, they will be presented for the *weighted* samples.

Table 1.1**Sample Design for 1997 and 1999 Surveys**

1. Department	2. 1995 Population (census data)	3. % of Population	4. Survey N	5. Fraction of national pop	6. Desired N: (#5 * 2,500)	7. Weight factor (#6/#4)
Managua	1,093,760	25.51%	300	0.2551	638	2.126
Matagalpa	383,776	8.95%	150	0.0895	224	1.492
Chinandega	350,212	8.17%	150	0.0817	204	1.362
León	336,894	7.86%	150	0.0786	197	1.310
Masaya	241,354	5.63%	150	0.0563	141	0.938
RAAS	272,252	6.35%	150	0.0635	159	1.058
RAAN	192,716	4.50%	100	0.0450	113	1.125
Jinotega	257,933	6.02%	150	0.0602	151	1.003
Estelí	174,894	4.08%	150	0.0408	102	0.680
Granada	155,683	3.63%	150	0.0363	91	0.605
Nueva Segovia	148,492	3.46%	150	0.0346	87	0.577
Carazo	149,407	3.49%	150	0.0349	87	0.582
Rivas	140,432	3.28%	150	0.0328	82	0.547
Chontales	144,635	3.37%	150	0.0337	84	0.562
Boaco	136,949	3.19%	150	0.0319	80	0.532
Madriz	107,567	2.51%	150	0.0251	63	0.418
Total	4,286,956	100.00%	2,500	1	2,500	

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INEC, *Resumen Censal: VII Censo nacional de población y III de vivienda, 1995*. Managua, Nicaragua, Diciembre, 1996. The table and sample excludes Nicaragua's least populous Department, Río San Juan, with 70,143 people, or 1.6% of the entire national population of 4,357,099. RAAN covers Puerto Cabezas, and RAAS covers Bluefields and Rama. Slight variation in the weighted numbers can emerge as a result of rounding error.

It should be noted that in the 1996 study on perceptions of corruption in Nicaragua, which used a similar sample design, the preliminary census tabulations were utilized (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INEC, *Censos nacionales 1995, 25 de abril, 1995*. Cifras Oficiales Preliminares, Recuento Manual, Nicaragua, Septiembre, 1995). See Mitchell A. Seligson, *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*, A Report to USAID, Nicaragua (Washington, D. C.: Casals and Associates, March, 1997).

Special Sample of the Judicial Sector

In earlier studies in this series of public opinion surveys, specialized groups have been interviewed because of their importance in USAID's programming. Those groups have included teachers, members of NGOs, lawyers, etc. In the 1999 survey, there was special interest in the judicial sector, given the many initiatives in this area. For example, Florida International University is implementing a project to modernize the criminal procedure and the penal code (among others). Checchi & Co., is helping to establish the first-ever Public Defender's Office and an independent Attorney General's Office in Nicaragua. In a related effort, the State University of New York, Albany (SUNY-Albany) is helping to modernize the National Assembly.¹¹ USAID requested a sample to be drawn from four groups:

- ▶ Magistrados de Apelaciones. These are the appeals courts for cases ruled on by the court of first instance (Juez de Primera Instancia).
- ▶ Jueces de Distrito. These are the district judges, who rule on serious civil and criminal cases in which the penalties exceed three years in prison. These judges are located in county seats and have the capacity to overturn decisions taken by the "Juzgados Locales" (see below).
- ▶ Jueces Locales. These are the courts of first instance for cases in which the penalties are less than three years imprisonment. Each municipality of the country has one of these judges.
- ▶ Procuradores. These are the state prosecutors, sometimes called "fiscales."

USAID requested a survey of 100 respondents comprised of the above four categories. The University of Pittsburgh believed, however, that a larger sample of 200 (50 in each category) would allow for a more precise comparison, not only with the national sample of the population, but among the four categories listed above. Every effort was made to achieve this higher goal, but, alas, this was not to be, as only 124 individuals from the judicial sample were interviewed. The reasons for this result are explained below.

The lists given to the University of Pittsburgh of the four categories of respondents in the judicial sector contained a total of 360 names. These lists were provided to the interview teams that were dispersed throughout the country, and each team was given five days to make appointments with those individuals who fell into their geographic sector.

¹¹Each of these organizations was consulted during the questionnaire design phase of this project.

For the judiciary, the timing of the survey was not ideal. Considerable tension existed because of serious conflicts between the executive and the Comptroller General. This conflict eventually culminated in the arrest and jailing of the Comptroller General. According to Borge Associates, the firm that carried out the fieldwork, of the 360 names on the list, 140 refused to respond because they believed that it would be imprudent for them to do so in light of their judicial position. An additional 55 potential respondents, all prosecutors, refused to answer because they stated that they had been explicitly instructed not to do so by their superiors. An additional 54 respondents began to reply, but found the questions too sensitive and suspended the interview in mid-stream. The remainder of the missing cases were a product of the inability of the interviewers to locate the respondents during the five-day period allotted for doing so. In 1997 it was easier to interview judges because the interviewers were allowed to include “jueces suplentes” (alternate judges) in their sample, but those names were not on the lists provided by USAID this year. In the end, 124 interviews were carried out, including 35 appellate judges, 29 district judges, 32 local judges and 28 prosecutors.

Municipal Project Areas

USAID/Nicaragua has a municipal development project operating in several municipalities. In order to capture the impact of those projects at the level of the Nicaraguan citizen, it is helpful to compare the opinions of those who live in the project areas with those who do not. It was decided by USAID in the 1997 round of surveys not to draw a special sample of these areas, but to designate the areas after the national sample randomly selected municipalities in Nicaragua. In order to be able to compare the residents of these municipalities to the general population, the residents in each of the project areas that were also included in the national sample were given a special code in the data file. Since 1997, however, the municipal projects have been expanded considerably, so a direct comparison between them in 1997 and 1999 is not possible. Rather, the comparisons shown in this report will be between the municipal project municipalities and the remainder of the sample. Table I.2 shows the breakdown of the survey into those areas that were included in the first phase of the municipal development project and those included in the second phase.¹² These results are for the unweighted sample, so their size is not meant to reflect the sizes of the population of these areas. As can be seen, a total of 500 of the 2,500 interviews were conducted in the first phase municipalities and 200 in the second phase.

¹²The list of municipalities was provided by Claudio Belli of PADCO de Nicaragua.

Table I.2. Municipal Project Areas and the Overall Sample

	No project	First phase	Second phase	Total
1 MURRA	25			25
2 JALAPA	50			50
3 SAN FERNANDO	25			25
4 DIPILTO	25			25
5 OCOTAL	25			25
6 TOTOGALPA	25			25
7 SOMOTO	50			50
8 SAN LUCAS	25			25
9 SAN JUAN	25			25
10 PALACAGUINA	25			25
11 PUEBLO NUEVO	25			25
12 CONDEGA	25			25
13 ESTELI	75			75
14 SAN NICOLAS	25			25
15 WIWILI	25			25
16 CUA BOCAY	25			25
17 YALI	25			25
18 SAN RAFAEL NORTE	25			25
19 JINOTEGA		50		50
20 MATAGALPA		50		50
21 RIO BLANCO	25			25
22 MATIGUAS	25			25
23 SAN DIONISIO	25			25
24 CIUDAD DARIO		25		25
25 SANTO TOMAS	25			25
26 SANTO DOMINGO	25			25
27 ACOYAPA	25			25
28 JUIGALPA		50		50
29 COMALAPA	25			25
30 CAMOAPA			25	25
31 SAN LORENZO	25			25
32 BOACO		50		50
33 TEUSTEPE	25			25
34 SAN JOSE REMATES	25			25
35 SOMOTILLO	25			25
37 CHINANDEGA		50		50
38 CORINTO			25	25
39 CHICHIGALPA		25		25
40 POSOLTEGA			25	25
41 EL JICARAL	25			25
42 TELICA	25			25
43 LEON		50		50
44 LA PAZ CENTRO	25			25
45 NAGAROTE			25	25
47 MANAGUA	300			300
48 GRANADA		100		100
49 NINDIRI	25			25
50 MASAYA	75			75
51 LA CONCEPCION	25			25
52 SAN MARCOS			25	25
53 MASATEPE	25			25
54 DIRIAMBÁ			50	50
55 DOLORES	25			25
56 JINOTEPE		25		25
57 LA CONQUISTA	25			25
59 SAN JORGE	25			25
60 RIVAS		25		25
61 ALTAGRACIA	25			25
62 BELEN	25			25
63 BUENOS AIRES	25			25
64 TOLA	25			25
65 NANDAIME			25	25
66 BLUEFIELDS	100			100
67 PUERTO CABEZAS	100			100
68 DIRIOMO	25			25
69 EL RAMA	50			50
	1,800	500	200	2,500

The first phase sample of municipal project areas does not differ significantly from the national population as a whole in gender, age, or education, the most basic parameters on which comparisons are made in this study. This is shown in Table I.3. The second phase sample, however, is older than the general population, with an average age of 39, compared to the non-project areas of 36. This difference, while statistically significant, however, is not large, but when analyzing the project areas, it is important to keep it in mind, and to control for it as needed.

Table I.3. Characteristics of the Samples

		Education (in years)	Sex	Age
No project	Mean	7	50%	36
	N	1800	1800	1800
	Std.	4	1	15
	Deviation			
First phase	Mean	7	50%	36
	N	500	500	500
	Std.	4	1	15
	Deviation			
Second phase	Mean	7	50%	39
	N	200	200	200
	Std.	4	1	17
	Deviation			
Total	Mean	7	50%	36
	N	2500	2500	2500
	Std.	4	1	15
	Deviation			

Hurricane Mitch

Nicaragua was devastated by Hurricane Mitch in the fall of 1998. In Nicaragua, natural disasters have been linked in the press to public dissatisfaction with the political system, the prototypical case being the 1972 earthquake and its connection to the eventual downfall of the Somoza regime. In order to see if the Hurricane left any political after effects that might have had an impact on democratic values and behaviors, a control variable was introduced reflecting the impact of “Mitch” on the municipality in which the interview was conducted. That is, for each respondent in the 1999 survey, a number was assigned reflecting this impact. The number utilized was provided by USAID and is the most recent count of homes damaged or destroyed by the hurricane.¹³ The raw number was used rather

¹³The sources of this data are: “Inventario Preliminar de Requerimientos para la Reconstrucción y Transformación del País, 1999-2001, Gobierno de Nicaragua, November, 1998, and “Prioridades de los Gobiernos Locales Relacionadas con la

than a percipitized index since the hurricane was likely perceived by individuals through a visual examination of its destruction rather than on an index basis. When various levels of satisfaction with government services, etc. are examined in this study, the hurricane damage information will be examined to see what impact, if any, it had on perceptions. An indication of the extent of the damage is shown in Figure I.1, which is based on the damage data at the municipal level, aggregated and averaged at the departmental level. This aggregation allows us to examine nation-wide patterns of damage.




Figure I.1
Damage from Hurricane Mitch

Extreme	Severe	Moderate	Little
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Comparison of the Samples: Basic Demographic and Socio-Economic Information

Before embarking upon the analysis of the data, it is important to compare the four years of samples with which we are working in order to note any important differences among them in their basic demographic and socio-economic characteristics.¹⁴ In 1991 and again in 1995, the sample method used was “probability selection at the level of the household,” which meant that within a given household, respondents were selected entirely based upon a random calculation (normally, the respondent in the household who would next be celebrating a birthday). Cost factors, however, limited the ability of the survey teams to return to the household if that individual was not present. As a result, such a sampling methodology tends to oversample those who are more likely to be at home, in this case females, and undersample those who are less likely to be found at home, in this case males. In 1997 and 1999, in order to eliminate this bias, a “quota” sample technique was used, in which the interviewers were instructed to use a procedure by which they would interview a sample that was comprised of an equal proportion of females and males. Figure I.2 shows the distribution of the national samples for each year. As expected, in 1991 and 1995, females were somewhat oversampled, but in 1997 and 1999, the percentages reflect the almost perfect 50-50 split.

¹⁴Note that in the 1997 report, comparisons were made for Managua only, while the comparisons here are for the entire country, except, as noted earlier, for 1991, where the survey was largely Managua-based.




Figure I.2
Distribution of Samples by Sex

Age is another key demographic parameter, and as shown in Figure I.3, the samples are very similar to each other, with the age of each averaging about 35 years. In Nicaragua, voting age is set by law at sixteen, so the samples covered everyone from 16 through the oldest respondents found (in this case, one respondent of 95 years of age).




Figure I.3
Average Age of Respondents per Sample

Finally, the samples are also very similar in their average levels of education. Figure I.4 shows that the average ranged between seven and eight years, except for 1995, when the average fell to 6 years.




Figure I.4
Average Years of Education per Sample

Conclusions

This chapter has explained the methodology utilized in gathering the public opinion data that will be reported upon in this study. The availability of data from 1991, 1995, 1997 and 1999 allows comparison over time, covering in effect, Nicaragua's first decade of competitive democracy. In addition, the 1999 data set contains a special sample of the judicial sector. The focus of the report that follows will be on the 1999 survey, but where relevant, comparisons will be made with prior years.

Chapter II: Crime and the Administration of Justice

The world-wide concern with the problem of crime is particularly acute in Latin America if we consider that the region has the dubious distinction of having the highest rates of crime and violence in the whole world.¹⁵ Homicide rates usually are considered to constitute a reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported. It is estimated that the homicide rate in Latin America is of 30 murders per 100,000 persons per year, whereas it is about eight in the United States, about two in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. This means that in the region there are 140,000 homicides each year. According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in other places in the world.¹⁶ Moreover, according to Gaviria and Pages, the homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America but the differences are growing larger.¹⁷

Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber *et. al* found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by Sub-Saharan African countries. There are, however, important differences among the countries of the region included in their study.¹⁸ Only Argentina and Chile experienced a decline in their homicide rates since the early 70s. Colombia experienced the most significant increase in the homicide rate, jumping from an average of 16 intentional homicides per 100,000 population during the period 1970-74 to over 80 in the period 1990-94. Another finding to be noted is that several small countries

¹⁵These introductory paragraphs in which comparative data are presented draw on Mitchell A. Seligson and Dinorah Azpuru, "The Demography of Crime in Guatemala," Seminario Internacional sobre la Población del Istmo al Fin del Milenio (Jacó, Costa Rica, October 20-22, 1999).

¹⁶ See Carta Económica, Octubre 1998 (Guatemala, Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Nacionales, CIEN). Fajnzylber, P. Lederman, D. and Loayza, N. Determinants of Crime Rates in Latin America and the World: An Empirical Assessment. Diagnóstico de la Violencia en Guatemala, 1999 (Guatemala, CIEN).

¹⁷ Gaviria, A. and Pagés, C., 1999. *Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America* (Washington, D.C., Interamerican Development Bank).

¹⁸ Fajnzylber, P., Lederman, D. and Loayza, N. A total of 34 countries were included in their study. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that are included are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad & Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba and El Salvador

(Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua and El Salvador) have had intentional homicide rates in excess of 20 per 100,000 population, higher than most large Latin American countries.¹⁹

Violence has been a serious problem in Nicaragua for decades. During the Somoza dictatorship street crime was not much of an issue, perhaps because it was punished so severely, but state abuse of human rights was. Then came the revolution that unseated the Somozas, and the “Contra War” that followed. By the estimates of the author of this report, that period was among the most violent episodes experienced in the hemisphere, far exceeding the proportional cost in lives of World War II and the actual cost in lives in the Viet Nam War for the United States, for example.²⁰ Today, with democracy restored and political violence largely gone, it is street crime that is of growing concern to the Nicaraguan population. Economic concerns still far outweigh issues of crime; this is not surprising given the extremely serious deterioration suffered by the economy in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Overwhelmingly, when asked about the most important problem facing them, Nicaraguans state that it is unemployment and poverty and inflation.²¹ Yet, in the surveys that form the data base for this study, crime has clearly become a more serious concern for Nicaraguans. When asked in 1991 (in the Managua-based sample) to name the most serious problem in the country (question A4), only .7% of respondents mentioned crime. In 1995 this figure had grown to 1.3% in 1997 to 1.7% and in 1999 to 4.6%. While this is still a small percentage, over the decade it has risen more than six times. Other, related issues have also emerged. For example, drug use was not mentioned in 1991, was noted by .7% of the population in 1997 and 1.3% in 1999. Since the survey question only allowed the respondent to specify the most important problem, it is not surprising that economic issues dominated our list, crowding out references to other issues such as crime and drugs.

It is difficult to obtain reliable data on crime world-wide, given the widely varying mechanisms used in reporting throughout the world. The IDB has concluded, however, that homicide is a crime that is more likely to be reported consistently than other crimes. A search of recent Interpol records available at the University of Pittsburgh has made it

¹⁹ Of the smaller countries, only Costa Rica has shown a decrease in homicide rates. Only Argentina, Chile and Costa Rica showed a decrease in homicide rates.

²⁰ See Mitchell A. Seligson and Vincent McElhinny, “Low Intensity Warfare, High Intensity Death: The Demographic Impact of the Wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua,” *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, Vol. 21, no. 42 (1996), 211-41. Also available in Spanish as Mitchell A. Seligson and Vincent McElhinny, “Guerra de Baja Intensidad, Muerte de Alta Intensidad: Impacto Demográfico de las Guerras en El Salvador y Nicaragua,” in *De Los Mayas a la Planificación Familiar: Demografía del Istmo*, ed. by Luis Rosero Bixby, Anne Pebley and Alicia Bermúdez (San José, Costa Rica 1997: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 1997), pp. 73-96.


²¹ Inflation, a major concern in the earlier surveys, has declined dramatically as a concern in 1997 and even more so in 1999.

possible to place the Nicaraguan case in comparative perspective. Table II.1 contains a compilation of recent homicide data. As can be seen, Nicaragua is among the most violent countries for which data could be obtained.

Table II.1. Homicides: Nicaragua in Comparative Perspective:
Ranked from Low to High Rate per 100,000

Country	Year	Homicides	Rate per 100,000
Korea (Republic of)	1995	630	1.50
Singapore	1994	51	1.74
China	1993	25,380	1.95
Israel	1995	117	2.08
Spain	1995	958	2.43
Poland	1996	1,178	3.05
Panama	1996	98	3.66
Chile	1995	521	3.90
Argentina	1995	1,327	4.02
France	1995	2,563	4.42
India	1991	39,174	4.61
Italy	1995	2,782	4.90
Canada	1995	1,518	5.13
Ecuador	1989	748	7.13
United States of America	1995	21,597	8.22
Peru	1991	1,942	8.65
Paraguay	1996	693	13.93
Venezuela	1994	4,733	22.14
Nicaragua	1996	1,114	25.56
Honduras	1995	1,615	28.80
South Africa	1995	22,306	54.08
Colombia	1995	25,398	72.36

The data in this table can be see comprehended more easily if they are converted into a chart, as is done in Figure II.1

**Figure II.1****Homicide Rate: Nicaragua in Comparative Perspective**

Victimization Rates in Nicaragua

Is there an objective basis for this increased concern with crime? The 1999 survey was the first in the University of Pittsburgh series to ask about crime victimization, so comparative data with prior years do not exist (question VIC1). Figure II.2 shows that 14% of the Nicaraguan population reported that they had been crime victims within the last year.²² When the identical question was asked in a national survey of El Salvador in 1999 by the University of Pittsburgh, 22% of the population said that it had been a crime victim, a rate that is nearly one-third higher than in Nicaragua.




Figure II.2
Victim of Crime in Last Year?

²²The phrasing of the question on victimization can affect the magnitude of the response to this item. The Latinbarometer, for example, uses a different phrasing and produces a higher level of victimization.

These national figures vary considerably within Nicaragua.²³ Generally speaking, world-wide, crime rates are higher in urban rather than in rural areas. In Nicaragua, as can be seen in Figure II.3, Managua has the highest crime rates nation-wide.²⁴ But note that RAAS and RAAN are highly rural areas, but the sample we have drawn is largely urban. For example, the RAAN sample was concentrated in the port city of Puerto Cabezas, and comes as close second to Managua. This means that it is inappropriate to consider all of RAAN as a high crime area since the sample there does not cover the entire autonomous region. The only other areas, which in Nicaraguan terms, are “high crime,” is Masaya and Chinandega. A cluster of eight departments including Nueva Segovia, Carazo, Madriz, RAAS, Granada, León, Estelí, Jinotega, and Matagalpa, comprise the middle-range, of 8-13% victimization. Finally at the low end are Rivas, Chontales and Boaco with 4-5%

²³As noted in Chapter 1, the sample sizes for each department are relatively small, only 150 cases, except for Managua at 300. This means that the confidence interval in the crime rates are fairly wide, as shown in the table below, which presented the weighted sample (and therefore the larger or small department sample size than the actual sample) for consistency with the presentations in the rest of this study. This table should be read as follows. The crime rate in Managua could be as low as 17.9% or as high as 24.2% (see the last two columns of the table).

Confidence Intervals of Crime Victimization Per Department

	N	Mean	95% Confidence Interval for Mean	
			Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1 Managua	636	21.1	17.9	24.2
2 León	195	12.8	8.0	17.5
3 Chinandega	204	16.7	11.5	21.8
4 Granada	90	11.5	4.8	18.2
5 Masaya	141	14.0	8.2	19.8
6 Carazo	87	10.7	4.1	17.3
7 Rivas	82	4.0	-.3	8.3
8 Matagalpa	224	12.7	8.3	17.1
9 Jinotega	150	11.3	6.2	16.5
10 Nueva Segovia	87	8.7	2.6	14.7
11 Madriz	63	8.0	1.1	14.9
12 Estelí	102	10.0	4.1	15.9
13 Boaco	80	2.7	-.9	6.3
14 Chontales	84	4.0	-.3	8.3
15 RAAS	159	11.3	6.3	16.3
16 RAAN	113	20.0	12.5	27.5
Total	2,496	14.0	12.6	15.4

²⁴Urban population data drawn from República de Nicaragua, *Resumen Censal: VII Censo nacional de población y III de vivienda, 1995*. Diciembre, 1996, p. 9.

victimization rates. The reader is reminded that these results are all based on the weighted samples; confidence interval information is contained in the footnote.




Figure II.3
Crime Victimization by Department: 1999

These results can be seen more clearly on a map of Nicaragua. In the map below, Figure II.4 the bright red represents the highest crime areas, grey the lowest crime areas. Río San Juan is blank because no interviews were conducted there. But once again, note that the sample for the Atlantic zone, summarized as “Zelaya” in this map, is based largely on urban areas, where crime tends to be higher.




Figure II.4
Crime Victimization in Nicaragua, 1999

14-21%	11-13.9%	8-11%	< 8%

Victimization not only varies by location, but, to a limited extent, by demographic and socioeconomic factors. Males, for example, are significantly more likely to be victims than females, but the difference is rather small in substantive terms as Figure II.5 shows.



Figure II.5
Victimization and Gender

Age, on the other hand, has no significant association with victimization, but there is a pattern, nonetheless. Figure II.6 shows that those in the middle years are more likely to be crime victims than the young or the old.



Figure II.6
Victimization and Age

More highly educated Nicaraguans are far more likely to be victims of crime than less well educated Nicaraguans, as is shown in Figure II.7. Those with a university education are twice as likely to have been crime victims as those who have no education. Income, on the other hand, has no relationship to victimization (chart not shown).




Figure II.7
Victimization and Education

Victimization is also more common among wealthier Nicaraguans than it is among poorer people. To determine this relationship, an overall index of wealth is used based upon ownership household appliances.²⁵ Figure II.8 shows the relationship.

²⁵This measure will be used elsewhere in this report as well. It is constructed from item R1 through item R6 (see the questionnaire in the appendix). These items include ownership of: a color TV, a black-and-white TV, a refrigerator, telephone, a car or a truck and a washing machine. In each case, the items were recoded into have (code 0) and do not have (code 100). If the respondent owed more than one of these items, these were merely counted as "have." An overall scale was constructed based on the six items, and if a respondent gave a non-missing response to four or more, the index was based upon the average of those four. In this way, all but 2 respondents in the 1999 survey had a valid score of wealth, in contrast to 8% missing on the family income question (item Q10). The overall index was then recoded into a range of 0-5, or a total of six cut-points to reflect the original six items.



Figure II.8
Victimization and Wealth

The above analysis is not definitive because it fails to consider the important connections between education and wealth on the one hand, and urbanization on the other. Urban Nicaraguans are more highly educated and wealthier than rural Nicaraguans. It may be, therefore, that the finding that victimization is more common among the wealthier, more highly educated population is merely an artifact of the greater wealth and education found in urban Nicaragua. To test for this possibility, the 1995 census data showing the proportion of urban vs. rural respondents in each department were added to the survey.²⁶ When urbanization levels were entered into the equation, the other variables became insignificant, as is shown on the following multiple regression analysis. Table II.2 contains the results. For those not schooled in multivariate analysis, this table can be daunting, but what it is saying is rather straight forward. If one looks at the last column, labeled "sig.," what we find is that only one variable, "% urban in department," is a significant predictor of crime victimization at the individual level. The other variables such as age, education, sex, wealth

²⁶This was done by assigning to each respondent the urbanization percentage of the department in which he or she resides.

and monthly income, each fall to insignificance (i.e., the coefficient is smaller than .05). This means that net of urbanization levels (i.e., once urbanization is controlled for), these demographic and socio-economic variables play no role.

Table II.2. Multiple Regression of Factors Explaining Crime Victimization

	Unstandardized Coefficients	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	5.767	3.787		1.523	.128
DPTURB % urban in department	.145	.032	.097	4.531	.000
AGE Age	-.189	.580	-.007	-.326	.744
ED Education	.145	.192	.019	.753	.452
Q1 Sex	-2.420	1.448	-.035	-1.672	.095
ARTIFACR Wealth	.930	.663	.035	1.403	.161
Q10 Monthly Income	.516	.390	.032	1.326	.185

Dependent Variable: VIC1R

The above analysis was re-run including a measure of the extent of urbanization within the municipality in which each respondent resided at the time of the interview. Examining the relationship between the degree of urbanization at the department level and crime vs. urbanization at the municipal level produces a similar result (similar strength of association). But, when both variables are included as predictors of crime, it is the departmental level of urbanization that remains the significant predictor, the municipal level falling to insignificance.

The overall conclusion from this analysis is that urbanization at the level of the department is the main factor that explains victimization levels in Nicaragua. It is important to keep that in mind in this analysis of the criminal justice system, because it means that urban Nicaraguans, all things being equal, would have a far greater need to seek recourse to that system than rural Nicaraguans.

The Nature of Crime in Nicaragua

Thus far, the focus has been on overall victimization levels. The survey provides data that allows us to look at the types of crimes suffered by Nicaraguans. Figure II.9 shows the results for the subset of Nicaraguan crime victims in the 1999 survey.²⁷ Robbery is the most common crime, but it is important to note that violent crimes are also very common. Adding up the categories of robbery with assault, assault, rape, and kidnaping, totals 45.5% of all crime. Furthermore, rape is widely under-reported in most of the world, and would probably add substantially to the violent crime percentages. In order to distinguish between violent and non-violent crime and the potential differential impact that they may be having in Nicaragua, in future analysis in this study, crime is divided into these

²⁷ A total of eight respondents did not specify the type of crime, and these were deleted from the chart shown here.

two categories. But, as will be shown, frequency of reporting of crime in Nicaragua is not linked to this distinction.




Figure II.9
Frequency of Types of Crime in Nicaragua, 1999

Accessing the Criminal Justice System: Reporting of Crime

There are many factors that can deter a crime victim from reporting the act to the authorities. In most countries, victimization rates far exceed the reported crime levels because of under-reporting. In the present study, only one class of crimes are invisible to the survey, and that is homicide, since we obviously could not interview those who had been murdered. All other crimes, however, had the possibility of being reported here even if respondents were inhibited from reporting some crimes, especially rape and domestic violence.

We asked each respondent who reported having been a victim of crime if they reported it to some agency or institution (question AOJ1). Figure II.10 shows that the majority of crimes go unreported.




Figure II.10
Reporting of Crime to Authorities

Surprisingly, violent crime is just as likely to be reported as non-violent crime, as the Figure II.11 shows.




Figure II.11
Reporting of Crime by Violent/Not-Violent

What factors play a role in determining whether a crime victim will report the crime or let it go unreported? An examination of demographic (gender, age) and socio-economic factors (education, income and wealth) reveal insignificant differences. The only determinant that counts is the degree of urbanization of the department. Surprisingly, however, the degree of urbanization *reduces* to a significant degree the reporting of crime, as shown in Figure II.12. This suggests that even though urban areas universally have a higher density of public institutions to which crimes could be reported, it is those who live in more rural areas who are more likely to report crimes. This also suggests that crime rates in urban areas may be even higher than has been indicated thus far in this report.




Figure II.12
Reporting of Crime and Urbanization

Where do Nicaraguans go when they want to report a crime? Overwhelmingly, as shown in Table II.3 (question AOJ1a) victims report crime to the police.

Table II.3 To Whom is Crime Reported?

	Percent
1 Police	93.8
2 Prosecutors	0
3 Courts	3.0
4 Peace Commissions	1.4
5 Ombudsman	1.4
6 Friends	.4
Total	100.0

It has already been shown that demographic and socio-economic factors do not influence reporting rates, but urbanization does. What reasons do victims give for not reporting crime? We asked this question (AOJ1b), and Figure II.13 shows the results. As can be seen, a majority of crime victims feel that reporting a crime is useless, so they do not bother to do so. This response suggests some lack of confidence in the judicial system, something that can be tested with other data from the survey, as shown later in this chapter.




Figure II.13
Reasons for Not Reporting Crime

Perceived Treatment by the Criminal Justice System

As noted above, over half of the crime victims in our survey did not report the crime of which they were a victim, and half of those said that they did not do so because it would have been “useless” to do so. This raises questions about the perceptions and experiences Nicaraguans have with the criminal justice system. The survey asked (question AOJ2) how the respondent was treated when he/she dealt with the police. Nearly two-thirds (64%) of respondents who had had dealings with the police said that they were treated very well, or well. This suggests a rather high level of satisfaction. However, crime victims are significantly less satisfied than non-victims (sig. < .01). Yet, it is important to examine satisfaction with the police in the broader context of demographic, and socio-economic, as well as the urbanization variable that has already proven to be a key in explaining victimization rates. In the multivariate analysis that follows in Table II.4, it is shown that only two factors explain satisfaction with treatment by the police: 1) urbanization, and 2) victimization. Once again, while the table is complex, for our purposes we need concentrate only on the last column. There it is shown that urbanization and victimization are the only significant predictors of satisfaction with treatment by the police. The more urban the department, the *lower* the satisfaction (and as we already know, the higher the victimization rate). Crime victims are less satisfied by their treatment than non-victims, even when controlling for other factors.

Table II.4. Factors Explaining Satisfaction with Treatment by the Police

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	
(Constant)	65.254	4.130		15.799	.000
DPTURB % urban in department	-.253	.032	-.228	-7.843	.000
AGE Age	0.361	.612	.017	.591	.555
ED Education	0.012	.192	.002	.062	.951
Q1 Sex	-.573	1.511	-.011	-.380	.704
ARTIFACR Wealth	0.017	.658	.004	.106	.916
Q10 Monthly Income	.274	.389	.023	.705	.481
VIC1R Victim of a crime	-0.016	.018	-.081	-2.893	.004

Dependent Variable: AOJ2R Treatment by police

The survey also asked about satisfaction with treatment by the courts (question AOJ3). Satisfaction levels with the courts was significantly higher than with the police, but the difference in substantive terms was small (an average of 51 for the police and 56 for the courts, on a 0-100 scale). Satisfaction with treatment by the courts was, as in the case of the police, directly related to urbanization; the higher the level of urbanization the lower the satisfaction with the courts. Victimization, however, had no impact on satisfaction with the courts. Education does play a role in explaining satisfaction with the courts; the higher the level of education, the more the satisfaction. Table II.5 shows the regression results.

Table II.5. Factors Explaining Satisfaction with the “juzgados”

	Unstandardized Coefficients	B Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
(Constant)	58.312	4.856		12.009	.000
DPTURB % urban in department	-.109	.039	-.108	-2.770	.006
AGE Age	-.587	.710	-.032	-.828	.408
ED Education	.465	.228	.087	2.038	.042
Q1 Sex	.353	1.794	.007	.197	.844
ARTIFACR Wealth	.450	.780	.025	.576	.565
Q10 Monthly Income	.155	.459	.014	.337	.736
VIC1R Victim of a crime	-0.12	.023	-.021	-.550	.583

Dependent Variable: AOJ3R Treatment by the courts

The survey also asked about the “procuraduría penal,” which can be translated as the “Attorney General’s Office.” Understandably, most Nicaraguans had no contact with this office, and as a result, only 18% of the sample had an opinion. Of those who had, satisfaction levels were similar to that of the police, but lower than the “juzgados.”

In Nicaragua the Office of the Public Defender was recently created. In the survey (question AOJ5), only 30% of the respondents had heard of this office. An even smaller proportion, 25%, knew what the functions of this office were. Figure II.14 shows the perceptions of the functions among those who responded to this question. This was an open-ended question (i.e., a fixed list of responses were not provided). It seems that among the one-quarter of the population who has heard of this office, most understand its functions.




Figure II.14
Functions of the Public Defender

The survey also sought to determine if Nicaraguans believe in the right to a public defender for those who cannot afford a lawyer (see question AOJ12). Nicaraguans overwhelmingly support this right as is shown in Figure II.15.




Figure II.15
Support for Public Defenders for Indigent

The survey also asked Nicaraguans to tell us from whom they would seek help if accused of a crime and could not afford to pay a lawyer (question AOJ13). Figure II.16 shows the responses, which are quite varied. The option, “bufete popular” can be translated as “public legal services clinics.”




Figure II.16
From whom would you seek help if accused?

Understanding of Due Process Rights

Democracy rests on a common understanding and acceptance of the rules of the game. Among the key rules are those related to the justice system. It is of interest to see how much of a consensus there is on these issues among the public, and to compare these views with those of the special sample of the judiciary that was gathered for this survey.

In the 1999 survey, three items were added to test this understanding (questions AOJ8, AOJ9, AOJ9). The first item asked if the authorities should strictly follow the law, even if this means not punishing criminals. The second item asked if the police must wait to obtain a search warrant before entering a home. The last item asked the respondent to choose between living in an ordered society, even if this means limiting some freedoms, or should all rights and freedoms be respected, even if this means some disorder. The full text

of these items is contained in the appendix. Figure II.17 shows the results. There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from these results. First, it is clear that only two-fifths of Nicaraguans believe that the law needs to be followed strictly, even if to do so means allowing a criminal to go unpunished. The majority of the population would approve violation of the laws in these circumstances. Second, the mass public and the judiciary differ strongly on this matter. The judges and prosecutors were nearly unanimous in a strict adherence to the law.




Figure II.17
Support for Due Process: Public vs. Judicial Elite

The third conclusion relates to the last of the three items in the series. Here the public and the judiciary are in substantial agreement, with the only difference of opinion emerging from the local judges. Nicaraguans clearly prefer order to liberty, not surprisingly given the tumultuous history of the past twenty years. Nonetheless, Nicaragua once had an abundance of social control under the Somoza dictatorship and under the FSLN national emergency decrees, but very little democracy, and it is distressing to see that both the public and the judiciary are willing to trade freedom for order.

Finally, both the public and the judges are in agreement that search warrants are needed to enter a house. Here we see much stronger support for this key tenet of due process. In sum, on two of the three items related to due process, the majority of the mass public are willing to accept the trade-off of order over liberty.

What are the factors that make Nicaraguans more or less supportive of due process guarantees? It is best to determine this by creating an overall index of support for due process, based on the three variables analyzed above.²⁸ To make this determination, multiple regression analysis was employed, in which the wealth, age, education, sex, monthly income and victimization were used as predictors. As shown by the last column in Table II.6, the only significant predictor was being a crime victim.

Table II.6. Factors that Explain Support for Due Process Rights

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	54.743	2.704		20.247		.000
ARTIFAC Indicator of Wealth	-.021	.029	-.017	-.705		.481
AGE Age	-.703	.447	-.035	-1.573		.116
ED Education	.276	.149	.046	1.849		.065
Q1 Sex	-1.526	1.119	-.029	-1.364		.173
Q10 Monthly Income	-.084	.300	-.007	-.281		.779
VIC1R Crime victim	-.035	.016	-.045	-2.159		.031

Dependent Variable: SPTDUE Support for Due Process [mean.2 aoj8r,9r,10r]

These findings are very important. They suggest that crime in Nicaragua may result in a weakening of democracy. Crime victims are less supportive of the overall index of due process, which is not surprising. They have been victimized by the system and are not sympathetic to the rights of suspected criminals. But, this also makes them less supportive of basic due process liberties, the very foundation of democracy.

Evaluation of the Criminal Justice System

A number of questions in the survey focused on Nicaraguan's evaluation of the justice system. An overall item (aoj14) asked if the criminal justice system was very good, good, fair, poor or very poor. Figure II.18 shows that most people felt that the system was only "fair," with an approximately equal proportion feeling that it was good or bad.

²⁸The index involved summing the recoded aoj8, aoj9 and aoj10, and taking a mean. If at least two of the three questions were answered, the respondent was assigned a score based on the mean of those two items. If all three items were missing, the case was coded as missing.

Among the mass public, the young are significantly more positive in their evaluation of the criminal justice system than are older Nicaraguans. This is certainly a positive sign. Figure II.19 shows the results.




Figure II.19
Evaluation of Criminal Justice System

Wealthier Nicaraguans have a lower opinion of the criminal justice system than do the poorer, as is shown in Figure II.20. This is likely a function of a concern on the part of the wealthier citizen that criminals are “getting away with it.” Evaluation of the criminal justice system does not vary significantly by education or gender.




Figure II.20
Evaluation of the Criminal Justice System
and Income

Not surprisingly, the officers of the court are much more likely to have a positive evaluation of the criminal justice system. Figure II.21 shows that each of the judicial sector respondent groups had a significantly more favorable attitude than did the public at large. Even so, it is notable that on the 0-100 scale, the judicial sector scored around 60, indicating that even in this sector there was not an especially positive view.




Figure II.21
Evaluation of Criminal Justice System:
Public vs. the Judiciary

A more specific question was asked (AOJ15) about the criminal justice system. We asked what chance do defendants have to defend themselves. Figure II.22 shows a much stronger belief in defendants' ability to defend themselves among the judiciary than among the mass public. Among the mass public, this perception does not vary by age, gender, education or wealth.




Figure II.22
Can accused defend themselves?

The last item in this series (AOJ16) asked not about the rights of the accused, but of the victim. We wanted to know to what degree Nicaraguans believe that victims can defend their interests. Figure II.23 shows that on average, both the public and the judicial sector believe that they can, but the judicial sector has a significantly more positive opinion on this issue.




Figure II.23
Can victims defend their interests?
Public vs. Judicial Sector

There is no significant difference in opinion on the ability of victims to defend their interest based on education or gender, and there is only a slight difference based on age (older are more positive). Income is significantly related, with wealthier individuals believing that they can defend their interests more than poorer people do, but the difference is not very great.

Issues of Governance

The 1999 Nicaragua questionnaire included a series of items (see the JF series) to measure public opinion on a number of prominent issues being debated in the country. Unlike the analysis performed above, these issues do not directly relate to any overall theoretical concern about democracy, but respond to more particular concerns regarding policies and programs. Some of these items were directed to the judicial sample alone. The results are presented below.

Breaches in the Separation of Powers

Many reforms have been enacted in recent years, including the 1995 reforms to the 1987 constitution and the “Ley Marco.” Perhaps because of this, one concern in Nicaragua is the perception that some branches of government are interfering with the functions of other branches. This concern was captured by three items in the survey (JF1, JF2, JF3). The first of these items asked if the respondents believe that the executive branch of government is improperly involved with the affairs of the judicial sector. The second question focused on the same issue, but was concerned with executive interference with the Prosecutor’s Office. Finally, the last item asked if the executive was improperly interfering with the legislature.

The results are presented by comparing the mass public sample to the judiciary sample. Figure II.24 shows the results for the question focused on the judiciary. As can be seen, for all groups except the prosecutors, a larger percentage of respondents believe that the executive does interfere improperly than who believe that it does not. But, it is important to note that over one-third of the mass public had no opinion on this item.




Figure II.24
Does Executive Improperly Interfere
with the Judiciary?

In seeking to explain these results, the first hypothesis is that they were a function of partisan preferences. To test this thesis, a variable was created (based on question VB3) to distinguish between respondents who stated that they had voted for President Alemán in the 1996 presidential election versus those who voted for other parties. Since many respondents were too young in 1996 to cast a vote or did not vote or would not say for whom they voted, 40% of all cases are missing for this new variable. Among the valid cases, however, no significant difference was encountered among Alemán voters vs. those who voted for other parties.

Further exploration of the data set revealed that views on executive interference with the judiciary were not based on gender, income or wealth. They were, however, strongly associated with education, as is shown in Figure II.25. Keep in mind, however, that this relationship excludes the 35% of the mass public sample that gave no opinion on this item.




Figure II.25
Belief that Executive Interferes Improperly
with the Judiciary: by education

The opinions on the other two items in this series are very similar and the responses strongly associated with each other (a correlation of $r > .50$). The associations with the other variables (socio-economic status, vote, etc.) are virtually identical, and will not be shown here. Figure II.26 shows the overall results for the those who had an opinion. As can be seen, the highest level of belief in improper executive interference is with the legislature.




Figure II.26
Belief in Improper Executive Interference with...

Efficacy of Government Institutions

The next set of questions in this series asked about the efficacy of the judiciary, the prosecutor, and the legislature. The question asked respondents to compare current performance with performance of the prior year (i.e., 1998). Figure II.27 shows the results. It is important to note that once again on these items many respondents (over one-quarter) gave no opinion. As the figure shows, among those who did give an opinion, only a minority thought that the institutions in question had become more efficient over the last year, with the most negative rating given to the legislature.




Figure II.27
Have Institutions Become More Efficient?

Comparisons of these same data with the judicial sample shows that on the first two items, the judiciary is much more positive. As Figure II.28 shows, however, strong majorities of both the public and the judiciary do not think that the legislature has become more efficient.




Figure II.28
Have Institutions Become More Efficient:
Public vs. Judiciary

Evaluation of the Functioning of the Judiciary

The final series of questions asked both to the public and the special judicial sample provided an evaluation of the judiciary (questions JF7, JF8, JF9). The first item asked if the prosecutors are or are not carrying out a useful function. Figure II.29 shows that nearly one-third of the public has no opinion, while nearly half have a positive view. The opinions of the special sample of the judiciary produces much lower non-response, and a more positive view. Not surprisingly, virtually all of the prosecutors themselves responded in a positive manner (only one prosecutor respondent “don’t know,” the rest responded positively).




Figure II.29
Do Prosecutors Carry Out a Useful Function?

The evaluation of the functioning of the courts is shown in Figure II.30. Both the public and the judicial sample have average scores on the positive end of the 0-100 continuum, but the judicial sample scores significantly higher. It should also be noted that about one-quarter of the public had no opinion on this issue, compared to only about 5 percent of the judicial sample.




Figure II.30
Evaluation of Functioning of Courts:
Public vs. Judicial Sample

Similar results are found for the last item in this series, where respondents were asked to evaluate the functioning of the Office of the Attorney General (JF9). Fully one-third of the public had no opinion, versus 22% of the appeals judges, 10% of the district judges, 6% of the local judges and only 4% of the prosecutors. Figure II.31 shows once again that the special sample is more favorable, but both samples average in the positive end of the continuum.




Figure II.31
Evaluation of the Office of the Attorney General:
The Public vs. Judicial Sample

Special Module for the Judicial Sample

A series of three items was asked to the judicial sample alone. The first one (JF 10) asked which of a list of possible reforms in the penal code would be the most important. The results appear in Table II.7. As can be seen, oral trials are viewed as the most important by the sample.

Table II.7 Most Important of Penal Code Amendments				
	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1 Oral Trials	55	44.4	45.8	45.8
2 Rapid Justice	24	19.4	20.0	65.8
3 Justice without cost	3	2.4	2.5	68.3
4 Protect Human Rights	12	9.7	10.0	78.3
5 Impartial Justice	26	21.0	21.7	100.0
Total	120	96.8	100.0	
88 DK	4	3.2		
	124	100.0		

The second question (JF11) asked how important is it to reform the penal code? On this item, as shown in Table II.8, there was strong agreement, with 85% of those who gave an opinion agreeing strongly.

Table II.8 Importance of Penal Code Amendments

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1 Very	103	83.1	85.1	85.1
2 Some	8	6.5	6.6	91.7
3 Little	9	7.3	7.4	99.2
4 None	1	.8	.8	100.0
Total	121	97.6	100.0	
8 DK	3	2.4		
	124	100.0		

Finally, the last item (JF12) asked what is the most important obstacle to the efficient functioning of the judiciary? This was an open-ended item, and many responses were given. They are summarized in Table II.9. The most common response was “economic problems.” This response no doubt reflects the sense that many of the key facilities needed by the judiciary are not present in much of Nicaragua.

Table II.9 Obstacles to Judiciary Performance

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
7 Impunity	9	7.3	9.4	9.4
8 Lack of justice	1	.8	1.0	10.4
9 Economic problems	64	51.6	66.7	77.1
10 Low salaries	5	4.0	5.2	82.3
11 Corruption	3	2.4	3.1	85.4
17 Lack of governability	1	.8	1.0	86.5
19 Polarization	5	4.0	5.2	91.7
20 Failure to comply	5	4.0	5.2	96.9
21 Independence of powers	2	1.6	2.1	99.0
24 Lack of communication	1	.8	1.0	100.0
Total	96	77.4	100.0	
88 DK	28	22.6		
	124	100.0		

Chapter III. Democracy and Local Government

Increasingly, solutions of governance are being sought at the local level. In many countries in Latin America, major efforts are underway to bring government closer to the citizen. In Bolivia, this process is very advanced, with significant portions of the national budget and important decision-making power transferred to local governments.²⁹ In other countries the process is far more incipient. Considerable variation exists within Central America.³⁰ In Nicaragua, efforts have been underway to decentralize government, but the scope of that effort is far less comprehensive than in Bolivia. The central government has resisted efforts to decentralize, and some have suggested that earlier progress has been undermined.

The 1997 and 1999 surveys, as noted in Chapter 1 of this study, covered all departments in Nicaragua. In so doing, they also covered some of the municipalities included in the USAID-supported effort to decentralize government. Table III.1 lists each of the departments in the country, and the distribution of municipal projects included in the 1999 sample.

Table III.1. Distribution of Municipal Projects in the 1999 Sample

DPT Department		MUNPROJ AID Municipal Project Area			Total
		0 Non-project	1 Project: Primary Phase	2 Project: Secondary Phase	
	1 Managua	638			638
	2 León	98	66	33	197
	3 Chinandega	34	102	68	204
	4 Granada	15	60	15	90
	5 Masaya	70	70		140
	6 Carazo	29	15	44	88
	7 Rivas	68	14		82
	8 Matagalpa	112	112		224
	9 Jinotega	100	50		150
	10 Nueva Segovia	87			87
	11 Madriz	63			63
	12 Estelí	102			102
	13 Boaco	40	27	13	80
	14 Chontales	56	28		84
	15 RAAS	159			159
	16 RAAN	113			113
	Total	1,784	544	173	2,501

Note: Sample does not total 2,500 because of rounding of weighted sample.

²⁹See Mitchell A. Seligson, *Bolivia's DDPC Program: An Impact Audit*, Report for USAID, Bolivia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1999).

³⁰See Proyecto Estado de La Nación, *Estado de la Región, 1999, Informe 1* (San José, Costa Rica, 1999), Chapter 8.

In the 1997 report, some attention was given to a comparison of the USAID target municipalities versus the nation as a whole. In that report, some positive differences did emerge, but the municipal project was very new at the time and only a relatively small number of respondents in the survey were included within the project areas as specified at that time. It was therefore difficult to attribute the greater levels of participation found in the project areas to the project itself. By 1999, however, the survey included a larger number of project areas, and the effort to strengthen municipalities has had more years to operate. It may be possible, therefore, that project impacts, if any, may be more readily detected by the 1999 survey. As shown in the above table, a total of 717 respondents (weighted) of the 2,500 total sample were in project areas, 544 of those in the first phase area and an additional 173 in the second phase. In this chapter, a comparison is made between those municipalities and the rest of the country.

Comparisons between the municipal project areas and the rest of the country are complicated by the fact that the municipal project sample was not selected especially for this study. Rather, once the national sample was selected, the subset of municipalities in which interviews were conducted was identified. This procedure does not guarantee that the subsample of project municipalities will be representative of the project municipalities as a whole. More important, by removing those municipalities from the national sample, it distorts that sample so that it no longer represents the nation as a whole. It would have been far better to have drawn a separate sample of project areas, and a definitive study of the impact of the municipal development program would require such a sample. But funding for such a sample was not available to the University of Pittsburgh on this occasion. As will be shown below, some key differences between the characteristics of the municipality project sample areas and the rest of the nation did emerge in the analysis. In order to draw valid conclusions, those differences had to be controlled for statistically.

A further complication that affects some of the data presented here is that the series of items on municipal government added in 1999 for the first time (MUN12, MUN3, MUN16, MUN17) do not allow for comparison with prior years. Thus, we cannot yet see if there has been a shift in a positive or negative direction in the project municipalities compared to the rest of the country. However, for the core items the series NP1 through LGL3, we have data for 1995, 1997 and 1999, so comparisons can be made.

The first order of business in this chapter is to give the reader a clear idea of the scope, purpose and reported project results of the USAID program. The following pages come directly from the most recent (1998) report on this activity as prepared by PADCO, Inc. in cooperation with Development Associates, Inc.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Nicaragua contracted PADCO, Inc., with Development Associates (DA) as a subcontractor, to implement the Municipal Decentralization and Development Project (MDDP). The Project contributed to the Strategic Objective of "more political participation, transparency and compromise"; and the Result "more accountable and responsive

government. The Project was implemented between October 30, 1995 and October 30, 1998.

The MDDP contained two mutually reinforcing components. First, the “strengthening of municipalities” component provided training and technical assistance directly to municipalities, as well as financial resources provided through a capital fund. Fourteen (14) municipalities, eleven of which were department capitals, benefitted from this sustained assistance. Second, the “promotion of decentralization” component supported changes in municipal legislation. All Nicaraguan municipalities benefitted from the legal and institutional changes achieved through this component.

PADCO fielded a Chief of Party and a core permanent team to implement the MDDP, and also contracted short-term technical assistance as necessary. An MDDP Consultative Committee, consisting of representatives of the **National Association of Nicaraguan Municipalities (AMUNIC)**, the Nicaraguan Municipal Development Institute (INIFOM), the Emergency Social Investment Fund (FISE), and USAID/Nicaragua, guided Project implementation.

The MDDP sought to achieve four lower-level results, which are discussed below.

Result 1: Broader support for legislation to strengthen municipal authority and increase municipal participation in formulating and implementing policies affecting local government.

Assistance focused on AMUNIC, the representative voice of municipalities at the national level. At the beginning of the Project, AMUNIC was unable to effectively plan its activities and did not have a stable source of finance. Initial assistance involved limited operational support to AMUNIC.

The MDDP phased this form of assistance out as it supported implementation of a more comprehensive Institutional Development Strategy and Plan. This Strategy and Plan included developing the organization administratively, creating a sustainable source of finance from the municipal sector, and supporting legislative research and promotion.

Key results of the Project³¹ include the following:

³¹The MDDP team monitored Project results via a comprehensive Project Monitoring and Evaluation System. This System made extensive use of indicators and targets. Key indicators are presented in this Executive Summary and elsewhere in this volume. A

AMUNIC is now a stable organization, with a sustainable source of finance and an appropriate system of financial management.

AMUNIC's income quadrupled from 1995 to 1998. A full 84% of income comes from the member-municipalities.

During the life of the Project, AMUNIC developed the capacity to convene National Congresses and Assemblies, as well as to publish monthly newsletters. These mechanisms help develop unified municipal positions on key issues.

AMUNIC, with PADCO assistance, prepared and promoted broad discussion of proposed reforms to the Municipal Law, as well as three additional pieces of pending legislation. Among its other benefits, the reformed Municipal Law (approved in August 1997) permits the transfer of water, sanitation and electrical services to the municipalities.

Other Project supported attempts to improve the legislative framework for municipal government have been less successful, however. With MDDP assistance, AMUNIC prepared and promoted the General Municipal Tax Law, the Fiscal Transfer Law and the municipal Budget Regulation. Of these, only the Fiscal Transfer Law has been discussed in committee in the National Assembly. None has reached the agenda for debate during a plenary session. While increasing political polarization has hindered due consideration of these proposed laws, the main impediment to their passage is the low priority which many members of the legislative and executive branches accord to the local government issues.

The MDDP also worked with other Government of Nicaragua (GON) institutions as development partners. The MDDP supported the efforts of the National Sectorial Decentralization Commission chaired by INIFOM. The Project assisted FISE with the preparation of contracts signed with the municipalities for the funding of investment projects under the MDDP Capital Fund. The Project team presented the MDDP Municipal Financial Management System to the Office of the Controller General. This Office supports the application of this System in municipalities throughout Nicaragua. Finally, the MDDP supported a series of workshops/seminars sponsored by the Municipal Affairs Commission of the National Assembly to discuss and strengthen municipal legislation.

Result 2: Improved Municipal Capacity to Generate Revenues and Manage Financial Resources in an Accountable Manner

To achieve this Result, PADCO first assisted municipalities with general organizational development. At the beginning of the Project, MDDP municipalities suffered from overly centralized decision-making, limited teamwork, inadequate or nonexistent administrative and financial systems and procedures, and inadequate understanding of the roles and responsibilities of mayors and the

comprehensive presentation of MDDP indicator results is presented in Volume II Annexes.

municipal council. The team responded by assisting municipalities develop and approve a Manual of Organization and Functions, and a Manual of Internal Control, and training staff in their use.

The MDDP team next addressed municipal revenue generation and financial management. At the beginning of the Project, municipalities typically were not taking full advantage of their revenue potential and were heavily subsidizing municipal services. Budget preparation bore little relation to budget execution. Capital investment was neglected. Finally, local officials lacked a clear understanding of the municipality's financial situation.

PADCO addressed this situation by developing and helping municipalities internalize the MDDP Municipal Financial Management System. This System includes computerized modules for Program Budget, Asset Accounting, Income, and Expenditures. The System also integrated and incorporated two other modules developed independently of the MDDP: the Municipal Property Tax Project (SISCAT), and the Unified Tax Registry System (SISREC), both of which assist in increasing revenue collections.

Key results included the following.

All 14 participating municipalities have institutionalized the MDDP Municipal Financial Management System, along with the Property Tax and Tax Registry modules, as the basis for financial management.

Participating municipalities have increased current income from C\$90.6 million at the beginning of the project to C\$113.4 in 1998. In 6 of the project municipalities, revenues increased an average of 76.3% over the period 1995-1998. These increases resulted from improvements made in tax collection.

Participating municipalities have improved their internal savings rates – the percentage of locally generated resources available for capital investment projects.

For the 14 municipalities in total, in the base year current expenditures exceeded current income. (This negative rate of internal savings indicated that municipalities were financing some of their current expenses out of capital income such as donations.) By 1998, however, current income was exceeding current expenditures. In 1998 alone, this improvement freed up a total of C\$ 10.7 million for capital investments in the 14 MDDP municipalities.

Result 3: Strengthened Municipalities in Order to Successfully Undertake Decentralization Efforts

PADCO helped strengthen municipalities via three complementary approaches. First, PADCO assisted in leadership training. Too many local elected officials are currently driven by ideology, favoritism and political loyalty, rather than by a vision of what is best for their municipality as a whole. Such leadership issues were especially pronounced in the first year of Project implementation, as Nicaragua held municipal elections. In previous local elections, voters often lacked a clear picture of how different candidates viewed the problems and priorities in their communities. The MDDP

addressed this situation via a series of workshops, both for all hopefuls prior to elections as well as for elected candidates prior to assuming office. PADCO subsequently led 14 mayors and other officials on a leadership study tour in cities in the southwest United States and Mexico.

Second, PADCO helped municipalities improve their provision of basic services. Principal problems at the outset of the Project included low coverage levels, a lack of cost recovery, as well as unsanitary garbage disposal sites and slaughterhouses. PADCO addressed this situation by preparing and training officials in use of a Handbook for the Operation of Public Municipal Services. The team also provided technical assistance and training in analyzing costs and setting user fees. Finally, the MDDP capital fund projects in the 14 municipalities were oriented toward either garbage collection and disposal (eight projects) or improvements in other basic services (six projects).

Third, PADCO assisted municipalities in urban planning and investment programming. At the start of the Project, MDDP municipalities were largely reactive and not proactive in their approach to planning and investment programming. Plans (where they existed) were not realistic, while most local projects were formulated, contracted and executed without meaningful municipal involvement. PADCO addressed this situation by helping municipalities -- with extensive citizen and council member participation -- develop multi-year Municipal Investment Plans (MIPs). The ongoing MIP exercise was linked to the annual budgeting cycle. From these plans, municipalities then selected one project to seek financing via the MDDP Capital Fund. PADCO further helped municipalities implement these investments by preparing eligibility studies, seeking approval, designing, bidding, contracting, and executing the projects. PADCO also provided training in urban planning and land use control.

Results achieved in the MDDP municipalities included the following.

All 14 municipalities prepared multi-year MIPs. These plans were developed with citizen participation and were formally adopted by the municipal councils. Projects financed by the Capital Fund were selected from those included in the MIP's

MDDP municipalities also experienced average increases in potable water service coverage from 79.5% in the base year to 86.9% in 1998, and wastewater service coverage from 28.5% in the base year to 29.3% in 1998.

Solid waste collection coverage increased significantly: from average population coverage levels of 63.0% during the base year, to 77.5% by 1998.

The percentage of solid waste collection costs covered by user fees increased from 34% on average at project inception to approximately 45% in 1998 in selected municipalities.

Result 4: Improved citizen participation in local government decision making related to the allocation of resources and the planning and provision of services.

All 14 municipalities had some experience with citizen participation prior to the MDDP. However, almost all previous efforts were sporadic, improvised, project-specific, and not part of programmatic efforts to involve the community in broader efforts to plan and manage development of the municipality. Additionally, many community organizations were politicized, municipal structures were inadequate, and town meetings were poorly planned.

PADCO addressed this situation by helping municipalities strengthen their capacity to address community participation, promoting the creation of the Community Relations Office and training its personnel. The Project also trained community leaders. Finally, municipalities learned to build community participation into their ongoing planning, investment programming, and budgeting processes.

A study carried out by Mitchell A. Seligson of University of Pittsburgh highlights the increasing effectiveness of community participation at the local level. The study concluded that citizen participation in municipal affairs in Nicaragua is relatively high when compared to other countries in Central America. In addition, the study revealed that almost half of the population believes that municipalities respond better to community problems than the central government. The sample for the study was broken down by municipalities participating versus those not participating in the MDDP Project. In Project areas, 70 percent of the respondents were positive about services provided by the local government, while in non-project areas only 50 percent responded in this way.

With MDDP support and PADCO assistance the municipalities have increased the number of community meetings to improve citizens participation in local development. However, the Project could not substantially increase the number of participants per meeting (7% in 1997) thus not achieving the 18% intended target. This last result was in fact due to the late initiation of the community development activities which were delayed to the second year of the project. PADCO management considered that in order to have an effective community participation process in the local government, it was necessary to have the municipalities organized in order to effectively respond to the community needs.

PADCO thus successfully achieved all four Project results. The MDDP served as a cornerstone of USAID/Nicaragua's efforts to support the GON in achieving more accountable and responsible government.

Legitimacy of Local Government

The survey contained a number of questions measuring citizens participation in and satisfaction with local government. A key aspect of the overall perception of local government in Nicaragua is captured by the subset of items focusing on legitimacy. Specifically, our interviewers had respondents compare local government to national

government, in order to see which one they thought was the most effective. The first item in this series (LGL1) asks: "In your opinion, who has responded better to help solve the problems of this community. Would it be the central government, the legislature or the municipality?" The results are summarized in Table III.2, and are also shown in Figure III.1.

Three observations are central and very important. First, the municipality is selected far more than any other response. This suggests the centrality of local government in the minds of Nicaraguans. Second, in the 1997 project areas, both primary and secondary, respondents are more likely to have selected the municipality than have the respondents in the non-project areas. Third, respondents in the secondary project area were also more likely to select the municipality in 1999 than were respondents in the non-project area. These findings appear to provide further strong evidence of the centrality of local government in Nicaragua as well as some evidence for the impact of the USAID project. But, these findings are tempered by an across-the-board *increase* of substantial proportions of respondents saying that no form of government helps solve local problems. This increase in alienation is greatest in the project areas as opposed to the non-project areas.

Moreover, in 1999, the primary project area has a *lower* proportion of respondents who selected the municipality as the level of government that has responded best to community problems.

Table III.1 Which Level of Government Best Resolved Community Problems?

		1997	1999
Non-project	Central government	12.6%	11.6%
	Legislature	7.5%	7.9%
	Municipality	55.2%	49.2%
	None	21.1%	25.7%
	All the same	3.7%	5.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
Project: Primary Phase	Central government	9.3%	10.0%
	Legislature	4.1%	6.2%
	Municipality	61.7%	47.4%
	None	21.3%	33.7%
	All the same	3.7%	2.8%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
Project: Secondary Phase	Central government	10.1%	10.4%
	Legislature	3.8%	4.3%
	Municipality	65.2%	54.0%
	None	16.5%	28.2%
	All the same	4.4%	3.1%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%




Figure III.1
Which Level of Government
Best Solves Local Problems?

How can these results be interpreted? They suggest that Nicaraguans are increasingly disillusioned with local government, even though strong majorities recognize that it is the level of government most responsive to local problems. The results also suggest, and here the interpretation is more speculative, that the local government project may have

inadvertently been causing an increase in expectations that are not being met, and thus the project itself may be producing greater disillusionment. Is there support for this view? As the results of other questions in the survey will show, the answer is a clear “yes.” Local needs in Nicaragua are extraordinarily great and municipal resources to solve those needs very limited. With only a tiny proportion of the national budget allocated to local government, citizens and public officials alike are expressing frustration.

The second question in this series reinforces the conclusions developed above. In that item (LGL2), we asked respondents if more responsibility and funding should be given to the municipality or if the central government should take over more responsibility. The results are shown in Table III.3. Once again, we have very important results here. First, in 1997 majorities of respondents in all three areas said that they would like to see an increase in responsibility and funding for local government. Second, in all three areas this majority declined between 1997 and 1999, so that in the non-project areas and in the primary phase areas, the majority declined to become a minority. Third, only in the secondary phase of the project was the decline minimal and a majority (56%) retained its desire for a stronger local government. Fourth, in each area the big “winner” in terms of support was the central government. In other words, Nicaraguans increasingly giving up on local government, even though a majority still supports it over central government.

Table III.3. Increase Responsibility and Funding to Municipality?

		1997	1999
Non-project	More to municipality	53.0%	45.5%
	More to central government	24.4%	34.7%
	Don't change anything	7.7%	10.9%
	More to municipality if give better service	14.9%	8.9%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
Project: Primary Phase	More to municipality	50.1%	40.2%
	More to central government	24.2%	34.4%
	Don't change anything	7.4%	16.0%
	More to municipality if give better service	18.4%	9.4%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%
Project: Secondary Phase	More to municipality	57.4%	55.5%
	More to central government	19.1%	29.7%
	Don't change anything	8.0%	10.3%
	More to municipality if give better service	15.4%	4.5%
	Total	100.0%	100.0%

The final item in this series measuring the legitimacy of local government (LGL3) asks if respondents would be willing to pay more taxes to their municipality if they could get better service. The results are shown in Figure III.2.³² There it is shown that majorities of Nicaraguans are willing to pay more taxes to their local governments, and that in 1997, those in the project areas were more willing than those in the rest of Nicaragua. By 1999,

³²The coding scheme on this variable allowed for a response, “yes, I am willing, but only if I had a job or the money to pay the taxes.” In recoding this response for presentation here, we categorized this as a “willing to pay.”

however, this percentage had fallen sharply in all areas. Now, less than one-third of Nicaraguans are prepared to pay more taxes to local government in order to obtain better services.




Figure III.2
Willingness to pay more taxes:
Project vs. Non-Project, 1997 vs. 1999

These results, however, may have been influenced by impact of Hurricane Mitch. In fact, nation-wide it was found that a correlation (albeit a weak one) exists between hurricane damage and willingness to pay more taxes. The more severe the hurricane damage, the less willing Nicaraguans are to pay more taxes. However, even after controlling for the

impact of “Mitch,” the above differences in the 1999 data remain almost unchanged.³³ That is, the project areas report a lower willingness to pay more taxes than the non-project areas.

Most Serious Local Municipal Problem

The 1999 survey asked an open-ended question on in which respondents were asked to name the most serious problem in their municipality (question MUN2). These responses were noted and coded by our survey team. A total of 29 separate problems were listed. To make the presentation easier to comprehend, however, the problems were grouped into a small number of categories, as is shown in Figure III.3. As can be seen, an assortment of issues related to services were mentioned the most often.




Figure III.3
Main Problem in Municipality

³³Controls were introduced by running an ANOVA and using hurricane damage at the municipal level as a covariate.

When compared to the municipal project areas, as shown in Figure III.4, these results are similar, but it is notable there is a higher percentage of respondents who focused on the lack of services, indicating an increased awareness of the importance of municipal services in these areas.




Figure III.4
Main Problem in Municipality

The interested reader might wish to see the full range of responses that were grouped into the above categories. Table III.4 shows these original responses from the entire sample, listed in descending order of frequency. The original Spanish-language wording is used. Only the first ten problems were mentioned by 2% or more of the respondents.

Table III.4 Most important problem in municipality, entire sample

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
CALLES MALAS	580	23.2	25.6	25.6
FALTA DE GOBERNABILIDAD	372	14.9	16.4	42.0
DESEMPLEO	348	13.9	15.3	57.3
FALTA DE LUMINARIAS	209	8.4	9.2	66.5
DELINCUENCIA	183	7.3	8.1	74.6
PROBLEMAS ECONOMICOS	133	5.3	5.9	80.4
LA BASURA	118	4.7	5.2	85.6
POBREZA	91	3.6	4.0	89.6
ALCANTARILLADOS MALOS	73	2.9	3.2	92.8
DESCUIDO DEL ORNATO	50	2.0	2.2	95.0
PROBLEMAS ECOLÓGICOS	22	.9	1.0	96.0
DROGADICCIÓN	22	.9	1.0	97.0
PROBLEMA PROPIEDAD	13	.5	.6	97.6
CORRUPCIÓN	13	.5	.6	98.2
INFLACIÓN	9	.4	.4	98.6
FALTA DE CRÉDITO	7	.3	.3	98.9
POLARIZACIÓN	5	.2	.2	99.1
BAJOS SALARIOS	3	.1	.1	99.3
FALTA DE TIERRAS PARA SEMBRAR	3	.1	.1	99.4
DESALOJOS	3	.1	.1	99.5
FALTA DE JUSTICIA	2	.1	.1	99.6
ALTA TASA DE NATALIDAD	2	.1	.1	99.7
FALTA DE MORALIDAD	2	.1	.1	99.8
INCUMPLIMIENTO DE LAS LEYES	2	.1	.1	99.9
IMPUNIDAD	1	.0	.1	99.9
INDEPENDENCIA DE PODERES	1	.0	.0	100.0
FALTA DE COMUNICACIÓN	1	.0	.0	100.0
PROBLEMAS CON REARMADOS	0	.0	.0	100.0
Total	2270	90.8	100.0	
NINGUNO	217	8.7		
NS/NR	13	.5		
Total	230	9.2		
	2500	100.0		

Action of Mayor to Resolve the Problem

The above question was followed by one that asked how much the mayor of the municipality has done to resolve the problem (question MUN3). Nicaraguans were very negative in their reply. It was found that in the entire sample, 63% of respondents said that the mayor had done “nothing” to resolve the problem. When the responses to this question are transformed into a 0-100 scale, and comparisons are made among the nation vs. the two phases of the municipal program, Figure III.5 shows the results. As can be seen, the most recent phase of the municipal program gives the mayors the best “grade.” Even among those respondents, however, the score averages only 23 on the 0-100 scale. It is

disappointing to see that among the first phase project respondents, the mayor is given a grade even lower than the nation as a whole.




Figure III.5
How Much has Mayor Done to
Resolve Most Important Municipal Problem:
Comparison to Project Areas

These findings suggest that it is important to examine more closely the municipal project areas and compare them to the rest of the country. Table III.5 below compares the basic parameters of income and education for the non-project areas, and the two municipal project phases. In terms of the characteristics of the respondents, the three sample areas are not very different. As can be seen in the table, the average education of the three areas hovers in the 6-7 year range. In terms of the average monthly income, based on the ranges given in the questionnaire (see item Q10), the three areas are in a virtual "dead heat." What does vary, however, are the ecological characteristics of the municipalities. The second phase is much less urban than the first phase or the non-project areas. And in terms of the impact of Hurricane Mitch, the first phase experienced a far higher level of loss in terms of houses damaged. It may be this last factor that has made respondents in the first phase

area so much more dissatisfied with the performance of their mayors.

Table III.5. Comparison of Means of the Non-Project Areas and Municipal Project Areas

AID Municipal Project Area	ED Education*	Q10 Monthly Income	MURBCNT % of municipal population in urban areas*	DANO Houses damaged by 'Mitch'*
0 No project	6.8	4.3	56.6	244
1 First phase	6.5	4.4	62.4	847
2 Second phase	7.3	4.3	49.4	151
Total	6.8	4.3	57.3	369

*=Sig. < .001

It is possible to control statistically for the impact of urbanization and Hurricane Mitch damage by running what is called an “analysis of covariance.” When this is done, as is shown in Table III.6, the difference between the project areas and the rest of the country is reduced, but remains significant (sig. = .03). Examining the column labeled “mean” in the table below, we see that after adjusting for the impact of urbanization and “Mitch” the variation in satisfaction with the mayor declines considerably.

Table III.6 Analysis of Covariance: How much has mayor done to solve the problem?

AID Municipal Project Area	Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound	Upper Bound
0 No project	18.041	0.648	16.77	19.311
1 First phase	14.651	1.77	12.342	16.69
2 Second phase	19.106	2.019	15.148	23.065

a Evaluated at covariates appeared in the model: MURBCNT % of municipal population in urban areas = 55.4957, DANO Houses damaged by 'Mitch' = 326.73. Main effects sig. = .03.

These findings can be displayed in a figure, as is shown in Figure III.6. There it is seen that even though the gap between the project and non-project area has declined when compared to the uncontrolled figure shown above, the differences still persist.




Figure III.6
How much has mayor done to solve the problem?
Controlled by urbanization and impact of “Mitch”

Confidence in the Financial Management Ability of the Municipality

One of the major problems faced by democracies is building and maintaining public confidence in their efficacy. Citizens pay taxes and wonder how their money is being managed. In the 1999 survey, we asked how much confidence the respondents had in the management of public funds at the municipal level (question MUNI6). Figure III.7 shows that most Nicaraguans have little trust in the ability of their local government to manage public funds. Only a little more than one-quarter of respondents gave a favorable reply

(“some trust” or “a lot of trust”). A relatively small 7.7% of respondents did not give an opinion on this item.




Figure III.7
Trust in Management of Municipal Funds

Comparison of the project areas produces similar results to those shown above. When no controls are introduced, the first phase of the project area manifest *lower* confidence in management of funds at the municipal level than the rest of the country, but the municipios in the second phase of the project are significantly more confident than either of the other two strata. Once controls for urbanization and “Mitch” are introduced, however, these differences fall to insignificance, even though the first phase project area remains lower in confidence than the country as a whole. In Figure III.8, the question has been converted to a 0-100 scale.




Figure III.8
Trust in management of municipal funds:
Project vs. Non-Project Municipalities
After controlling for Urbanization and "Mitch"

For the more technically minded, Table III.6 shows these results in terms of confidence intervals, after correction for urbanization and the hurricane.

Table III.6 Trust in management of municipal funds, with controls					
		Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
AID Municipal Project Area				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
0	No project	35	.702	34	37
1	First phase	32	1.435	29	34
2	Second phase	36	2.198	31	40

a Evaluated at covariates appeared in the model: MURBCNT % of municipal population in urban areas = 55.9870, DANO Houses damaged by 'Mitch' = 319.91. Main effect = NS.

Age and income play little role in determining views on this subject, but more highly educated Nicaraguans do express a more trusting view, as is shown in Figure III.9, which uses the entire 1999 sample.




Figure III.9
Trust in the Management of Municipal Funds:
by Education

Are Municipal Projects Beneficial?

The final item (MUN17) in this new series of items on municipal government asked if in the opinion of the respondent, municipal projects were beneficial. Figure III.10 shows the results for the national sample (all municipalities, including the project municipalities). As can be seen, Nicaraguans are divided on this question, with a bit more than half viewing the projects as not beneficial.




Figure III.10
Are Municipal Projects Beneficial?

When comparisons are made with the municipal project area, results are similar to what has been shown above, namely, the first phase project areas are lower in their belief in the beneficial nature of the projects than the rest of the nation, while the second phase projects are higher. When controls for urbanization and the impact of Hurricane Mitch are introduced, the differences are mitigated, but they do not disappear entirely. Figure III.11 shows that a significantly smaller percentage of the respondents living in the first phase municipalities believe that the projects carried out by their municipal government are beneficial. The differences are not large in substantive terms, but in light of the efforts to improve municipal governance by the USAID project, these findings are disturbing. As a further effort to examine these findings, the political factor of support/opposition to the incumbent government was introduced as a covariate (not shown), but this did not change the results.³⁴ It may well be that there are other reasons beyond Hurricane Mitch and

³⁴This was done by examining as a control variable vote in the last national presidential election. Unfortunately, the survey did not contain election data at the municipal level, which may have helped explain these findings.

urbanization that are responsible for this result, and it would be important for those involved in the project to suggest what these reasons might be.




Figure III.11
Are municipal projects beneficial?
Controlled for Urbanization and “Mitch”

Evaluation of Local Government: Original Series

In 1994 the University of Pittsburgh at the request of USAID’s RHUDO conducted a Central America-wide evaluation of participation in and satisfaction with municipal government.³⁵ In that study, a series of questions was developed to measure citizen participation in local government, satisfaction with local government, and legitimacy of local government. When the 1995 survey was conducted in Nicaragua, these items were added, and were included in 1997 and 1999. This gives us an opportunity to compare change (if any) over time, while also examining the USAID municipal project impact. In the analysis

³⁵Mitchell A. Seligson, *Central Americans View Their Local Governments*, Report to USAID, Regional Office for Urban Development and Housing (RHUDO) (Guatemala City, Guatemala, 1994).

below, the results on those items will be presented. The central interest is change over time. This result is facilitated by the fact that an examination of these data revealed no significant impact of Hurricane Mitch, so that whatever differences emerge between 1997 and 1999 are not Hurricane-related.

Participation in Municipal Meetings

Respondents were asked if they had participated in any municipal meeting over the past 12 months, including “cabildos abiertos” (i.e., open town meetings), municipal sessions or other meetings convoked by the municipal council (question NP1). The results are shown in Figure III.12. As can be seen, participation has gone up in each survey year, but the differences are not large and are statistically insignificant. The trend, however, is in a positive direction.




Figure III.12
Participation in Municipal Meetings:
1995, 1997, 1999

The question now arises as to how have the project areas fared over these four years compared to the nation as a whole? Upon examination of the files it was determined that the 1995 sample of respondents from project municipalities was too small to be meaningful. That sample, with a total N of 1,200 respondents, was less than half the size of the 1997 and

1999 samples. Only 42 respondents were included in what were to become phase one project municipalities in the 1995 survey and 8 respondents in what were to become second phase project municipalities. As a result, it is necessary to limit this analysis to the 1997 and 1999 samples. The results are shown in Figure III.13. As can be seen, the residents of the first phase project municipalities have slightly higher levels of participation than the non-project municipalities. The real shift was in the second phase project areas. In 1997 their levels were about the same as the rest of the country, but by 1999 they had experienced a dramatic and significant increase. Presumably this increase is because of the project itself, which in its second phase may have had a stronger emphasis on direct citizen participation than did the first phase. Once again, those involved with the project will need to examine these data and interpret their significance.




Figure III.13
Participation in Municipal Meetings:
Project vs. Non-Project, 1997 and 1999

Demand-Making

Attendance at meetings can often be a very passive experience. But when citizens make demands on their local officials, a far greater level of effort and involvement is implied. The surveys included an item (NP2) to measure this form of local government participation.

It is here, in this vital area of citizen participation, that the impact of the municipal project is most clearly seen. Figure III.14 shows the comparison of the project and non-project areas for 1997 and 1999. For the non-project municipalities of Nicaragua, about 15% of the voting-aged population had made a demand within the last year. In the first phase areas, however, in 1997, this figure was *lower*, only about 12%. This finding suggests that the municipalities in which the first phase project was started, began at a lower level of demand-making participation than the nation as a whole. But by 1999, demand-making had risen substantially to over 18%, above the national average. Furthermore the second phase project began in 1997 at about the national average, but increased sharply by 1999. Here we have some strong evidence that the municipal project is having an impact in an important area of civil society life. Perhaps citizens in these areas are less content with local services because the project has increased their expectations; evidently it has increased their demand-making activities.





Figure III.14
Demand-Making on Local Government:
Project vs. non-project, 1997 and 1999

Satisfaction with Local Government's Response to Demand-Making

Respondents who made demands on local government were asked if they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the response to their demands (NP2A). Figure III.15 shows the results. Several findings stand out. First of all, in non-project areas, satisfaction *fell* between 1997 and 1999. Second, first phase respondents are *less* satisfied than the non-project areas respondents. Third, and here the sample is small so the results are not especially reliable, the most satisfied respondents are in the second phase project municipalities.

**Figure III.15**

Satisfaction with Response to Demand-Making on Local Government:

Project vs. non-Project, 1997 and 1999

Overall Satisfaction with Municipal Service

The next series of items moved away from participation and focused on satisfaction. The first item (SGL1) asked for the degree of satisfaction with municipal services. Figure III.16 shows the results, which show declining satisfaction with municipal services across the board. Between 1997 and 1999 satisfaction fell in both the municipal project areas and the nation as a whole, with the rate of decline similar in each. These declines may be a function of Hurricane Mitch which affected Nicaragua generally, even though its direct impact in terms of loss of life and property were heavier in some areas than in others. Nonetheless, one would have hoped that in the municipal project areas declines in satisfaction would have been mitigated, but they were not.




Figure III.16
Satisfaction with Municipal Services:
Project vs. Non-Project, 1997 and 1999

Treatment by Local Government

Respondents were also asked about the treatment they have received at the hands of local government (SGL2). Figure III.17 shows the results. A very similar pattern to the one just displayed emerges. In all areas, satisfaction declined between 1997 and 1999. Furthermore, declines were approximately similar in all areas.




Figure III.17
Satisfaction with Treatment by Local Government:
Project vs. Non-Project, 1997 and 1999

Perceived Influence over Municipal Decisions

In another section of the questionnaire two items were included to measure citizen perception of their influence over municipal decisions (INFL2, INFL3b). As can be seen in Figure III.18, most citizens believe that they personally have no influence over decisions at either level. Furthermore, the municipal project seems to have made no difference in this perception. This suggests that whereas local governments may have become more efficient in collecting taxes, they seem not to have made citizens feel empowered to participate in the decisions as to how the funds should be spent.




Figure III.18
How much influence do you have
on municipal decisions

Figure III.19 shows this same relationship with a focus on the influence of community groups on municipal decisions. As can be seen, the pattern is nearly the same.




Figure III.19
How much influence do community groups have on municipal decisions?

Conclusions

This chapter has provided a detailed look at citizen participation in and views about local government in Nicaragua. It has done so by comparing the results from the 1999 national sample to prior studies, and has also looked at the impact of the USAID municipal project. Overall, the results suggest that there is much work to be done on local government in this country. The limited resources expended at the local level no doubt are a cause of great frustration on the part of citizens who would like to see their municipal government becoming capable of responding better to their needs. Discussion of these results with mayors, legislators, AMUNIC and central government officials would seem to be the order of the day if one is to hope for a future in which citizens are more participant in and satisfied with local government in Nicaragua.

Chapter IV. Support for Democracy

The 1999 survey included for the first time a number of items attempting to directly measure support for democracy. Perhaps the most direct measure (DEM2) asked: “With which of the following phrases are you most in agreement: 1) democracy is preferable to any other form of government, 2) for people like me, a democratic or non-democratic regime doesn’t make a difference, 3) under some circumstances, an authoritarian government could be preferable to a democratic one.” In this question the choices are clear, even if we do not know what the respondents had in mind when they selected “democracy” or an “authoritarian regime,” a subject which will be explored below.

The basic results for the population as a whole are summarized in Figure IV.1. A number of important findings emerge. First, less than one-in-ten Nicaraguans expressed support for authoritarian rule over democracy. In contrast, only a little more than half (54%) of the population selected democracy as preferable over any other form of government. For over one quarter of the population, democracy or dictatorship makes no difference, and for another 10%, they had no opinion.





Figure IV.1
Preference for Democracy or Authoritarian Rule

What do these numbers mean? One way we can give them meaning is to place Nicaragua in comparative context. To do so it is possible to turn to data made available by the Inter-American Development Bank, as shown in Figure IV.2. The identical question was used in that survey, which was conducted in 1997 in each of the seventeen Spanish-speaking mainland countries of Latin America. Unfortunately, the samples are not national, but vary from country-to-country. For example, in Brazil, the sample represents only about one-quarter of the population, while in Honduras it represents nearly the entire population. Furthermore, the samples do not correctly reflect the national levels of education and other key socio-economic and demographic parameters. The results shown here have been adjusted to correct for the education bias, but not for other biases. The variation between these results and the University of Pittsburgh sample being analyzed here is likely largely due to errors in the Latinbarometer sample design, and to the fact that the data presented below were from 1997 and our data are from 1999. What is of relevance here is the position of Nicaragua versus the other countries in the region. As can be seen, Nicaragua scores relatively well, with only five of the seventeen cases with a higher proportion of the population expressing a preference for democracy.



Source: IDB Latinbarometer, 1997

Figure IV.2
Preference for Democracy

Factors Explaining a Preference for Democracy

Why do some Nicaraguans prefer democracy over all other systems, while others do not? To answer this question, the variable being analyzed was recoded to contrast those who prefer democracy versus those who don't care either way or who prefer dictatorship. Those who expressed no opinion were excluded from the analysis. Using this coding, 60% of the respondents preferred democracy while 40% did not. In order to answer the question

a multivariate analysis was conducted.³⁶ The analysis did not find any significant impact of Hurricane Mitch, nor did the gender of the respondent, his/her level of education, or voting participation. The only variables that were significantly associated with a preference for democracy were: age, income, ideology, attendance at municipal meetings, and urbanization. As will be shown below, these findings each have important implications for Nicaraguan democratization.


Figure IV.3 shows the bi-variate relationship between age and democracy. Keep in mind that the multivariate analysis has already found that age is a significant predictor of preference for democracy even after all other factors (gender, income, urbanization, etc.) have been controlled for. These results show that age is positively associated with support for democracy. That is to say, older Nicaraguans are more supportive of democracy than younger Nicaraguans. This finding is understandable, but disturbing nonetheless. The young in Nicaragua have not lived through the Somoza dictatorship, while the older citizens have. This means, however, that as these younger voters, without the memory of the authoritarian past, come to make up a larger and larger segment of the population, support for democracy will (*ceteris paribus*) decline. These results suggests that, among other things, the school system needs to do a better job of educating Nicaraguans about the authoritarian nature of their own recent history.

³⁶The appropriate procedure is logistic regression rather than OLS regression since the dependent variable, preference/non-preference for democracy is a dichotomy.

The results of the logistic regression are as follows:

		Variables in the Equation					
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1	DPTURB Urbanization	.010	.003	11.299	1	.001	1.010
	DANO Mitch	.000	.000	2.159	1	.142	1.000
	ED Education	.026	.016	2.513	1	.113	1.026
	Q1(1) Sex	.197	.124	2.529	1	.112	1.218
	Q2 Age	.013	.005	8.014	1	.005	1.014
	Q10 Income	.132	.033	15.680	1	.000	1.141
	L1 Ideology	.077	.023	11.423	1	.001	1.081
	NP1R(1) Muni Particip.	-.408	.174	5.505	1	.019	.665
	VB2(1) Voting	.346	.235	2.157	1	.142	1.413
	Constant	-1.736	.423	16.821	1	.000	.176

a Variable(s) entered on step 1: DPTURB, DANO, ED, Q1, Q2, Q10, L1, NP1R, VB2.



Sig. < .001

Figure IV.3
Age and Preference for Democracy

Income has an even stronger association with a preference for democracy, as is shown in Figure IV.4. These results reveal that among the poor in Nicaragua, slightly less than a majority of the population prefers democracy, whereas among those with the highest incomes, nearly 80% do.




Figure IV.4
Income and Preference for Democracy

Ideology is associated with a preference for democracy, but not in any easily interpretable way.³⁷ Figure IV.5 shows the results of the analysis. The pattern that is displayed shows stronger support for democracy on the right than on the left. This is a complete reversal of patterns found elsewhere in the world, where the left is normally more strongly associated with democracy than the right. It may well be that these results are a function of Nicaragua's unique recent history, in which the Chomorro government was seen by many as being a democratic alternative to the Sandinistas, yet that was a right-of-center government.

³⁷Ideology is based on variable L1, which has a 10-point scale. The scale was recoded into 1-3= left, 4-6=center, and 7-10 = right.





Figure IV.5
Ideology an Preference for Democracy

Finally, participation in meetings of the local government is significantly associated with a preference for democracy, as is shown in Figure IV.6. As can be seen, those who participate in such meetings are significantly more likely to prefer democracy to those who do not.



Sig. < .001

Figure IV.6
Participation in Municipal Meetings and
Preference for Democracy

Preference for Democracy: The Public vs. the Judiciary

Earlier in this study comparisons were made between the public and the special sample of the judiciary. It was found there that the judiciary was far more consistent in its support of democratic norms related to due process rights. A comparisons of the public and the judiciary on the issue of an overall preference for democracy reveals the same pattern, as is shown in Figure IV.7. Whereas 60% of the mass public supported democracy (here we have eliminated the “don’t knows”), nine-out-of-ten members of the judicial sample did so.




Figure IV.7
Preference for Democracy:
Public vs. Judicial Sector

Support for Institutional Requisites of Democracy

The 1999 Nicaragua survey included two new questions that attempted to gauge the degree of support that Nicaraguans have for two key democratic institutions: the legislature and political parties. Figure IV.8 shows that most Nicaraguans believe that without a legislature democracy cannot function.




Figure IV.8
Does Democracy Require a Legislature?

Similarly, most Nicaraguans believe that parties are necessary for democracy to function, as shown in Figure IV.9.




Figure IV.9
Does Democracy Require Parties?

As expected, when the judiciary is compared to the mass public, there is stronger support for these quintessential democratic institutions. As shown in Figure IV.10, however, this is not the case for the district judges, whose support for the legislature is about the same as the mass public, and local judges whose support for parties is on par with that of the public.




Figure IV.10
Democracy Requires a Legislature and Parties:
Public vs. Judiciary

The factors associated with support for the legislature and for parties is similar to what was shown above for the overall measure of support for democracy. Education and gender had no impact. Wealth, however, was linked, with those who are wealthier showing greater support. Ideology has the same relationship as well.

Trade-Offs Implications for Democratic Rule

Democracy involves numerous trade-offs. Citizens often have to compromise their own preferences to accommodate the wishes of the majority. Beyond the issue of conforming to majority rule is the generalized issue of what Rose has termed the “Churchill

hypothesis.”³⁸ That is, Churchill, famous for countless quotable turns of phrase, stated in the British House of Commons in 1947:

Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.

Democracy is often very slow to operate, inefficient, cumbersome, and disorderly, but it does protect the civil liberties and human rights of its citizens better than any other political system. In the Nicaragua survey we wanted to know how citizens view this trade-off. Question DEM7 asked respondents with which of the following two views they are more in agreement: 1) in a democracy, there is a lot of efficiency and order, or 2) in a democracy there is a lot of inefficiency and disorder. Figure IV.11 shows that nearly two-thirds of Nicaraguans consider democracy to be an efficient and orderly system.




Figure IV.11
Democracy:
Efficiency and Order or Inefficiency and Disorder

³⁸Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

The judiciary, not surprisingly, is even more likely to believe that democracy is orderly and efficient. Figure IV.12 shows the results.




Figure IV.12
Democracy, Efficiency and Order:
Public vs. Judicial Sample

Having established that strong majorities of Nicaraguans view democracy in a positive light, we now turn to the specific trade-offs they may be forced to make in order to sustain it. The 1999 survey included three questions on this subject (AUT1, AUT3, AUT4). The first asked what should be done when democracy does not function. In those circumstances, should the country have a strong-man leader who does not have to be elected? Figure IV.13 shows the results for the mass public sample. As can be seen, two-thirds of the public would support democracy over an unelected strong-man.




Figure IV.13
Democracy vs. Strong Leader

Once again, age has an impact on these views on democracy, with the young less committed to democracy than the old, as shown in Figure IV.14. Gender and education play no role, nor does ideology.




Figure IV.14
Democracy vs. Strong-man Rule:
Impact of Age

The second question was similar and produced similar results. We asked if Nicaragua needs a strong-man to create order or a consensual leader (AUT3). Figure IV.15 shows the results. Nearly three-quarters of the population reject strong-man rule.




Figure IV.15
Strong-Man vs. Consensual Leader

The last item in the series (AUT4) did produce a somewhat higher support for an authoritarian response. In this question we asked with which of the following two views the respondent agreed more: 1) The only way to get the country to move ahead is to eliminate with a strong hand those who cause problems, or 2) For the country to move ahead it is necessary to take everyone into account, even those who cause problems. Figure IV.16 shows the result. For this question, about one-third of Nicaraguans are prepared to use strong-hand tactics against trouble-makers.




Figure IV.16
For Country to move ahead, trouble-makers
should be dealt with by:

The variable that best predicts these views is ideology, organized into left, center and right. Figure IV.17 shows these results. The Nicaraguan right, in contrast to the pattern found in many countries, is more tolerant of “trouble-makers” than is the Nicaraguan left.




Figure IV.17

**Tactics to use against trouble-makers:
strong hand vs. take into account all views**

When we examine the public in comparison to the special judicial sample, the results closely conform to expectation, as shown in Figure IV.18. The judges are more likely to favor avoiding using strong-hand tactics than the public as a whole, but the prosecutors, true-to-form, have views similar to those of the public. Even so, it is notable that the majority of the prosecutors say that a strong-hand should not be used to deal with trouble-makers.

Citizen Responsibilities in a Democracy

Democracy implies responsibilities as well as rights. Among the major responsibilities are voting, obeying the law, paying attention to politics, participation in community decisions and paying taxes (questions RC1 to RC5). In both 1997 and 1999 we asked our respondents how important it was to do these things. Overwhelmingly, they said that they were “very important.” As Figure IV.19 shows, however, there has been a small but statistically significant decline from 1997 to 1999. The original coding was transformed into a 0-100 scale for clarity of presentation.




Figure IV.19
Importance of Democratic Responsibilities:
1997 vs. 1999

Conclusions

This chapter has shown that there is strong support for democracy and democratic norms in Nicaragua. Citizens support democracy in general and with respect to many of its specific dimensions. It has also been shown that the judiciary sample expresses even stronger support for democracy than does the general public. We now turn to political participation, a key component of democratic behavior.

Chapter V. Democratic Participation

Many experts on democracy have argued that active citizen participation lies at its core. After all, if citizens don't participate in politics, then elites will make all decisions for their own benefit, and instead of democracy, oligarchy or dictatorship will emerge. In a prior chapter municipal government participation was examined. In this chapter the participation of Nicaraguans in voting as well as civil society will be examined. As in prior chapters, comparisons will be made across the data sets in the period 1991 to 1999. Contrasts between the USAID municipal development areas and the rest of the country will also be made.

Voting Behavior

For many years, studies of participation were limited to voting behavior alone. Today we are aware that many other kinds of participation are as important, perhaps more important, than the act of voting. We are also aware that is difficult to interpret the meaning of non-voting, since those who abstain may be alienated from the system, and may be expressing that alienation via abstention, or they may be entirely content with the system, and don't want to bother to vote. In the case of the United States, where turnout is often half or less than the population of eligible voters, a number of studies have shown that abstention is not an expression of alienation. In Nicaragua, as shown in Figure V.1, turnout has been very high. Survey turnout figures normally do not match actual turnout figures because voters sometimes under or overstate their voting behavior. It is interesting to note, however, that the 1997 and 1999 surveys both referred to the same election (November, 1996) and in theory the survey should have shown similar results (see variable VB2). To our delight, in fact the survey results did just that, differing by only 1 percentage point, a remarkable stability in survey results, well within the sampling error of the data set.




Figure V.1
Voting Turnout in Election Prior to Survey Year:
1991-1999

The results for the 1995 survey reflect the results of the 1994 elections. The survey question asked by IEN in that case was ambiguous, as it asked “Did you vote in the past elections?” The intention was to ask about the Presidential election, but respondents justifiably could have been thinking about the 1994 or the prior presidential elections. The 1994 elections, which excluded voting for the president, had a turnout rate in the neighborhood of 45 per cent, and were confined to the RAAN and RAAS regions. That is probably why the 1995 survey reports much lower voting than do the other surveys, which referred to the presidential election.

Voting turnout in the municipal project areas does not differ significantly from the rest of the country, but with turnout so high, one would not expect them to. Similarly, very little variation is noted by the major demographic and socio-economic characteristics.

The 1999 survey also asked about the importance of voting in municipal elections. The results are shown in Figure V.2. As can be seen, only a very small percentage of Nicaraguans do not believe that it is important to vote in those elections.




Figure V.2
How Important is Voting in Municipal Elections?

Civil Society Participation

The survey contained an extensive series of questions on participation in civil society. The survey asked respondents about their frequency of participation in religious groups, school-related associations, community development associations, professional associations, unions, cooperatives, and civic associations (see the series CP6 -121). In each case the interviewers noted if the participation was frequent, once in a while, almost never, or never. In the presentation of these results, these gradations are converted to the now-familiar 0-100 scales to facilitate presentation.³⁹

³⁹The coding scheme used was: frequently coded as 100, once in a while as 66, almost never as 33 and never as 0. This provides a balance across the 0-100 range.

The results for the 1991-1999 period are shown in Figure V.3. This chart contains a great deal of information. Two important patterns stand out. First, it shows that three forms of civil society participation, church groups, school groups and community development groups, are by far the most popular organizations in Nicaragua. Second, there is little change from 1991-1999, except in the pattern of steady increases in church group participation. This is a pattern found elsewhere in Central America, especially in Guatemala and El Salvador, coinciding with a sharp rise in evangelical sects. In Nicaragua, however, the proportion of the sample that identifies themselves as “evangelical” has remained relatively steady in the 1991-1999 period in our survey data (17.5% in 1999), so the increase is not a function of a shift in religions, but rather it appears to be an increase in participation within existing religious frameworks. This increase is substantial enough that it merits closer study, especially when contracted to the lack of increase in other forms of civil society life. No clear pattern emerged in the comparison of the municipal project areas with the rest of the country (results not shown).




Figure V.3
Civil Society Participation in Nicaragua:
1991-1999

Comparisons of the public with the special judicial sector sample are shown in Figure V.4. Church group participation among the Nicaraguan public was virtually identical to that of the appellate judges, but the other members of the judiciary had somewhat lower participation in this activity. When it comes to school-related groups, each of the judiciary groups except the district judges have higher participation than the public. A major difference does emerge in the community development organizations, professional organizations, and civic associations. There, the judiciary participation is much higher than the mass public. One would expect the members of the judicial sample to be more active in professional associations than the public as a whole because the former are all professionals. Yet, the far more active participation of the judicial sample in these other organizational forms of civil society is more likely to be explained by their status as community leaders.




Figure V.4
Civil Society Participation in Nicaragua:
Public vs. Judiciary, 1999

In the 1997 study of democracy in Nicaragua the basic patterns showing the demographic and socio-economic patterns of participation were explored. The 1999 survey has very similar results, so there is no need here to replicate that information here.

Community Problem-Solving Participation

Participation in community groups alone is not enough to resolve most problems in a poor country like Nicaragua. Resources are so scarce that citizens must donate their own time, money and labor if they want to get things done. We call this kind of activism, “community problem-solving participation.” We asked (question CP5) about this form of participation in each survey. Figure V.5 shows the results.




Figure V.5
Participation in Community Problem -Solving:
Entire sample, 1991-1999

Since the participation was much higher in 1991, we thought that this might have been a function of the Managua-based focus of that sample, but even when Managua alone is compared for each survey, 1991 was the high year, but the differences are not as great as in the prior figure. Figure V.6 shows these results. The 1991 survey, then, is the outlier. It was taken shortly after a decade of Sandinista rule had come to an end. During this period, there was considerable state emphasis on active community participation, and perhaps this is why the 1991 results are so high.




Figure V.6
Participation in Community Problem-Solving:
Managua alone, 1991-1999

The comparisons of the USAID project areas with the nation as a whole shows some interesting changes. Figure V.7 shows that in 1997 the municipal project areas (both phases) were considerably behind the nation, but by 1999, this gap has disappeared. Perhaps the municipal project has served to stimulate this form of participation. It is of note that the first phase, which has had a longer time to operate, saw the larger increase.




Figure V.7
Participation in Community Problem-Solving:
Nation vs. Municipal Project Areas, 1997 & 1999

The survey includes a series of questions asking about specific forms of problem-solving participation. These data are for the entire country. When the analysis was re-run for Managua only, in order to increase comparability with the 1991 survey, the same patterns emerged. Here we show the results for the nation as a whole. The comparisons of each form of problem-solving participation for the 1991-1999 period are shown in Figure V.8. Donation of money, labor and attending meetings was very common in the 1991 survey (which again, asks for prior activity, which could have covered the Sandinista years). From 1995 on, however, these activities declined considerably. What is notable is that in 1999, donation of money and donation of labor increased from the previous survey. Attendance at meetings has held very constant, as has organization of a new group after its decline from the 1991 survey. The overall impression from these data is that community problem solving in Nicaragua is high, with citizens regularly donating their money, labor and time to get things done. No notable pattern for the USAID municipal project area emerges for these variables.




Figure V.8
Forms of Community Problem-Solving:
1991-1999

Participation and Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?

A core theory in the field of democracy is that civil society participation matters. Specifically, many analysts have argued that participation encourages people to think democratically by learning about the way other people think and act. In chapter IV of this study, we have already reviewed a number of key measures of democratic beliefs. We can use those as dependent variables and civil society participation as independent variables in an analysis of the impact of participation on democratic values. What we find is that while not all of the democratic values studied in chapter IV were influenced by participation, most of them were.

In Figure V.9 the impact of various forms of problem-solving participation on democracy is shown for the 1999 survey.⁴⁰ Problem-solving participation is a far more active form of participation than merely attending meetings. As can be seen, in each case except for the donation of money, participation significantly increased the preference for democracy over authoritarian rule.

⁴⁰This series begins with a filter question, CP5, which asks if the respondent has done something to help resolve a community problem. Those who said “no” were coded as not having done each of the four activities that follow.




Figure V.9
Problem-Solving Participation and
Support for Democracy

A similar pattern is found for the variable (dem4) that asks if a legislature is necessary for the functioning of democracy. As shown in Figure V.10, with the exception of donating money, all of the other forms of community problem-solving activities are related to a significantly stronger belief in democracy. It needs to be noted, however, that the differences are not very large in absolute terms.




Figure V.10
Problem-Solving Participation and
Belief that Democracy Cannot Function without Legislature

Another measure of belief in democracy examined in chapter IV was the one that asked the respondent if democracy implied efficiency and order or inefficiency and disorder (AUT7). Figure V.11 shows the results. As can be seen, with the exception of the last question, organization of new groups, each of the other three forms of problem-solving participation are related to significantly higher support for democracy.




Figure V.11
Problem-Solving Participation and
Belief that Democracy Implies Efficiency and Order

Another of the democratic values examined in Chapter IV was belief in strong-man rule vs. democratic leadership (AUT3). Figure V.12 shows the now-familiar pattern; higher participation relates to greater belief in democratic governance.




Figure V.12
Problem-Solving Participation and
Does Nicaragua Need a Strong-Man to Rule?

Conclusions

Civil society participation in Nicaragua is relatively high as was shown in the 1997 report. Voting turnout in particular is unusually high. This chapter has also shown that levels of participation have not changed much since 1997. The judiciary, as a group, exhibits much higher levels of civil society participation than does the mass public. It has also been shown that those who participate more in problem-solving activities at the local level are significantly more supportive of democracy. This finding suggests that civil society organizations can be a good vehicle for strengthening democracy in Nicaragua.

Chapter VI. System Support and Tolerance

Up until this point in this study, the focus has been on democratic values and behaviors, without regard to the issue of the stability of democracy. Given Nicaragua's turbulent history, with three dramatic regime change shifts in the 1979-1990 period, the issue of stability is an important one. In this chapter, that issue is explored. The first part of the chapter deals with system support, or the legitimacy of the political system. The second part deals with political tolerance. The final part looks at the relationship between these two variables in the 1991-1999 period in Nicaragua.

The stability of a political system, and its ability to weather crises without succumbing to breakdown has been directly linked to legitimacy.⁴¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, one of the leading theorists in the area of democratic stability defined legitimacy as "the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society".⁴² Lipset hypothesized, based primarily upon his observation of the impact of the Great Depression on Europe, that systems viewed by their citizens as being legitimate would survive a crisis of effectiveness (e.g. when the economy takes a nosedive), but those that were seen as illegitimate would tend to collapse under the stress of economic crisis. Lipset refers specifically to Germany, Austria and Spain as examples of fundamentally illegitimate systems that experienced breakdowns of democracy when buffeted by a crisis of effectiveness. The United States and Great Britain, however, survived the Great Depression without political breakdown, because of the legitimacy of these systems.⁴³

Lipset recognized that once a system achieved a high degree of legitimacy there was no guarantee that it would not eventually lose it. Just as political systems can undergo a

⁴¹This discussion draws upon several papers, including Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 (2000, forthcoming).

⁴²Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, expanded ed., originally published 1961, p. 77. Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John Charles Torres. "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy." *International Social Science Journal* 136 (May 1993): 155-75. See also, Seymour Martin Lipset. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited." *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994): 1-22.

⁴³For more recent statements on this subject see Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, and John Charles Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy," *International Social Science Journal* 136 (May 1993), 155-75; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited," *American Sociological Review* 59 (February 1994), 1-22; and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Excerpts from Three Lectures on Democracy," *Extensions*, (Spring) 1998, 3-13.

crisis of effectiveness, so too could they undergo crises of legitimacy. Indeed, Lipset (1959:78) explicitly pointed out that long-term crises of effectiveness could erode legitimacy because legitimacy itself depended upon the ability of the system to "sustain the expectations of major groups." Consequently, "a breakdown of effectiveness, repeatedly or for a long period will endanger even a legitimate's system stability."⁴⁴ And Juan Linz (1978:16) makes much the same point in his treatise on the causes of the breakdown of democracies: "Obviously no government is accorded legitimacy in this sense by all its citizens, but no government can survive without that belief on the part of a substantial number of citizens...."⁴⁵

The effectiveness of the Nicaraguan political system in terms of delivering economic growth and increased welfare to its citizens has been limited and therefore the ability of the democratic system to engender legitimacy significantly constrained. During the period 1965-1990, annual growth averaged -3.3%, the second lowest in the world; only Kuwait, after its invasion and occupation by Iraq did worse.⁴⁶ This record contrasted with an average annual growth rate of 1.5% for the lower middle-income group of countries of which Nicaragua then formed a part according to the World Bank. It would not at all be surprising if Nicaraguan citizens had reservations about the legitimacy of governments that were in power during this period of poor economic performance. More recently, however, Nicaragua's picture has improved. For example, the World Bank reports that in the period 1996-97, the average per capita growth rate increased to an astonishing 10.4%.⁴⁷ CEPAL reports a growth rate of between 4 and 5% for the period 1995-1998, with an estimate of 6.0% for 1999 and a projection of 5.0% for 2000.⁴⁸ One would hope that, over time, steady improvements in the economy and the welfare of its citizens would result in a slow, but steady, building of the legitimacy of the system. But the distribution of the current growth to the poorer sectors has been very uneven, and many sectors of the population live in poverty.

In this chapter, belief in the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan system of government will be described. As a result of a long-term research project at the University of Pittsburgh, a scale of legitimacy called "Political Support/Alienation" (PSA) has been developed, based initially on studies in the 1970s in Germany and the United States, but later expanded to all of Central America, Peru, Paraguay, Venezuela and Bolivia.⁴⁹ The scale attempts to tap

⁴⁴Lipset, 1981, p. 80.

⁴⁵Linz, Juan J, and Alfred Stepan, editors. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore, MD., 1978, p. 16.

⁴⁶World Bank. *World Development Report, 1992*. Washington, D. C.: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 219.

⁴⁷World Bank, 1998/99, p. 191.

⁴⁸CEPAL News, Vol XX, January 2000, No. 1, p. 1

⁴⁹Mitchell A. Seligson, "On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico." *Social Indicators Research* 12 (January 1983b): 1-24; Mitchell A. Seligson, and Edward N. Muller, "Democratic Stability and Economic Crisis: Costa Rica 1978-1983," 301-26, September, *International Studies Quarterly*, 1987; in translation as: Mitchell

the level of support citizens have for their system of government, without focusing on the incumbent regime itself. The core of this scale rests on five items, and each item has utilized a seven-point response format, ranging from "not at all" to "a great deal." The full Spanish text of the items are given in the questionnaire that can be found as an appendix to this study. The numbering system used in the questionnaire as well as in the data base is reproduced here to enable the interested reader to further explore the data. The questions were as follows:

- B1. To what extent do you believe that the courts in Nicaragua guarantee a fair trial?
- B2. To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Nicaragua?
- B3. To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Nicaraguan political system?
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Nicaragua?
- B6⁵⁰. To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Nicaragua?

Comparisons 1991-1999, Managua Only

As noted in Chapter I of this report, the surveys of 1995, 1997 and 1999 were all national in scope. The 1991 survey, however, concentrated mainly on Managua with selected interviews in surrounding departments. In this first examination of the data, we will limit all of the surveys to the Managua area so that they will be directly comparable. The data are once again scored in the 0-100 system used throughout this report. Figure VI.1 shows the results. Several comments are in order. First, as already noted in this study, 1991 was a high-point for Nicaragua, coming as it did as the Contra War was being resolved and the Chomorro administration was in its "honeymoon" period, both domestically and internationally. These factors, no doubt, accounts for the high level of support in that year. By 1995, however, with Nicaragua in the depths of economic recession and many serious conflicts remaining unresolved between Sandinistas and the governing coalition, support tumbled to its lowest level of the decade. Second, since 1995, there has been a

A., Seligson, and Edward N. Muller, "Estabilidad Democrática y Crisis Económica: Costa Rica, 1978-1983." *Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos* 16-17, no. 2 (1990): 71-92, 2.; Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam, and Mitchell A. Seligson. "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 26 (May 1982): 240-64.; Mitchell A. Seligson, *Political Culture in Paraguay: 1996 Baseline Study of Democratic Values*. Asunción, Paraguay: CIRD, 1997. Mitchell A. Seligson, *Democratic Values in Nicaragua: 1991-1997*. Report to USAID/Nicaragua. Pittsburgh, PA., 1997.

⁵⁰There is no question 'B5' in this study. Earlier versions of the PSA series included additional items, including B5, but that item (and others) were dropped as they were shown to be less essential to measuring the basic concept. In order to retain consistency of comparisons with prior work, the original numbering system retained in this study for this series and all others presented in these pages.

steady recovery of system support, with the highest levels being reached in 1999, the year of the latest survey. Third, the increase in support for the courts is the greatest and most impressive of any of the gains made in support.




Figure VI.1
System Support: Core Five Items
1991-1999, Managua Only

System Support, 1995-1999, Entire Country

We now turn our attention away from the Managua area and look at the country as a whole. These results are shown in Figure VI.2. The results are similar to those that have already been shown. Specifically there has been a systematic increase in system support, country-wide, in the 1995-1999 period, with the most notable and statistically significant increase being in the 1995-1997 period. The increase is most notable in the court system, an area of special attention for USAID. Similarly, belief that rights are protected by the system also shows a steady increase. The remaining two items show increases from 1995 to 1997, but some decline between 1997 and 1999. Those declines, however, are within the confidence levels of the sample, so do not necessarily mean an actual decline in support.




Figure VI.2
System Support: Core Five Items
1995-1999, Entire Country

In order to obtain an overall picture of these core items of system support, an index was created.⁵¹ Figure VI.3 shows the results. As can be seen, nation-wide system support increased from 1995 to 1997, but then leveled off from 1997-1999, with no significant difference emerging. *The important finding is that since 1997, system support has been in the positive end of the continuum, as shown by the horizontal line in the figure.* As pointed out above, the individual items did change, with an increase in the area of courts and rights, and a decline in pride and support, leaving the 1997-99 overall measure statistically unchanged.

⁵¹The index sums up the five items and takes an average. Respondents who answered fewer than five questions, but at least three, were assigned a score based on the mean of those three. If fewer than three questions were answered, the respondent was coded as "missing."




Figure VI.3
System Support Index, 1995-1999:
Entire Country

The Hurricane and System Support

In order to test for the impact of Hurricane Mitch, the level of support (as shown in the overall index above), and the measure of hurricane damage were correlated for the 1999 survey. No significant association at all was uncovered, indicating that those areas that suffered more damage from Mitch were no more likely to have high or low system support than those that had less damage. Concern that system support would be adversely affected by the Hurricane is not justified by these results, unless the nation as a whole decreased its support independent of the level of damage wrought by the Hurricane. Since that sort of impact is tied up with all of the other factors influencing system support, one cannot partial out the nation-wide hurricane impact from other nation-wide factors (such as presidential performance).

The Judicial Sample and the Mass Public

The survey data also allow for a comparison of the public with the special sample of the judicial sector. Figure VI.4 shows the results. It was expected that the judiciary would score very high in the belief that Nicaraguans get a fair trial (the first set of bars to the left in the figure), and this is the result that emerged. Whereas the public was slightly below the negative/positive division of 50, the judiciary were uniformly well above it. The judiciary was also, not surprisingly, more positive on institutions. What did emerge as a major surprise is that the judiciary was quite mixed in its belief that the Nicaraguan system protects the basic rights of its citizens. Indeed, among the local judges and district judges, support from the judiciary was *below* that of the public. In terms of pride, the picture was quite mixed, with the appellate judges and especially the prosecutors expressing higher levels of pride in the Nicaraguan system of government than the mass public, but once again, the district and local judges being far more negative. The same pattern emerges in the last item on support. Overall, then, the Nicaraguan judiciary is not of one mind on system support, with the district and local judges expressing views more negative than the other judicial sectors, and in some instances even more negative than the public. This may be because in their daily work they see that the poor are often not well protected by the system.




Figure VI.4
System Support, Core Items:
Public vs. Judiciary, 1999

System Support and the Municipal Project

A test was run to see residents of the municipal project areas (phase 1 or 2) expressed any higher system support than those in the non-project areas. The findings are negative; no statistically significant difference emerged between these areas and the rest of the country, as the support scale average between 50 and 51 in all three.

Other Dimensions of System Support

The survey contained a very broad array of questions measuring support for various institutions in Nicaragua. These are items b10 through b26 in the 1999 survey. Many of these items were included in 1995 and again in 1997, but most were not in 1991. In Figure VI.5 the 1991, 1995, 1997 and 1999 results are shown for these items. Only four non-core items were used in 1991, the election tribunal, the army, the legislature and the central government. The data shown are for the 1991 sample, which was concentrated in Managua, while for 1995, 1997 and 1999 the results are for the country as a whole. It is of note that the election council (Consejo Supremo Electoral) has suffered a steady decline in trust, while the other institutions, while highest in 1991, do not change much over the remaining years in the series. Some have said that in recent years this institution has not had the high quality staff that it did in the early 1990s. Finally, it is not surprising that views of the Central Government fluctuate more than the other variables since this question is focused on the incumbents in office rather than the institutions themselves.




Figure VI.5
System Support, Common Non-Core Items:
1991-1999

Another block of items was generally common to the surveys administered from 1995 through 1999, although not all were used in each year. Figure VI.6 shows the results for these questions (B15-B23b). In Nicaragua, as in the other countries in the University of Pittsburgh series of surveys, the Catholic Church is given the highest level of trust by the population of any institution. The Church, however, is not a public institution that we are tracking because of its direct relevance to democracy. Rather, the inclusion of this item gives us a standard against which to measure other institutions. As can be seen, newspapers, a key institution for free speech, also scores very well. At the other extreme are political parties, which, while improving from 1995 to 1997, still score at the very bottom. The comptroller general, the police, and the criminal prosecutors all scored in the moderate range, below the mid-point of 50 with the exception of the criminal prosecutors, about whom we asked opinions for the first time in 1999. It is of note that the Comptroller General's office declined in confidence, as did the President, perhaps as a function of the noisy public dispute between them. More troubling is the sharp decline in confidence in municipal government between 1997 and 1999, a subject dealt with in greater depth earlier in this report.




Figure VI.6
System Support, Common Non-Core Items:
1995-1999

The municipal project areas vs. the rest of the country can be compared for confidence in municipal government for 1999. Figure VI.7 shows the results. As can be seen, the differences are statistically insignificant.




Figure VI.7
Trust in Municipal Government 1999:
Municipal Project Areas vs. The Country

Political Tolerance⁵²

Systems may be politically stable for long periods of time, undergirded by high levels of system support. But such systems are not necessarily democratic. In order for a political system to be both stable and democratic, its citizens ought not only believe in the legitimacy of the regime, but also be tolerant of the political rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. When majorities of citizens are intolerant of the rights of others, the prospects for minority rights are dim indeed. As Przeworski has argued, in democracies, citizens must agree to “subject their values and interest to the interplay of democratic institutions and comply with [as yet unknown] outcomes of the democratic process.”⁵³ For this reason it is important to measure the tolerance of Nicaraguan citizens and to examine

⁵²The section of the theory of political tolerance and its link to stable democracy is drawn from earlier discussion of this topic in prior reports on Nicaragua and other countries in the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.

⁵³Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 51.

the levels encountered within various demographic, geographic and political sub-sets of the population.

The political science literature on political tolerance is vast, and while it was initially concentrated on the United States the studies have now been broadened to include many democratizing countries around the world. Two basic approaches to the measurement of political tolerance have been used in these studies. One of these is called the “least-liked-group” approach.⁵⁴ It was utilized by USAID Nicaragua in 1994 as part of its effort to measure democracy in that country. In this method, respondents are given a list of groups, normally including extremist groups of the left and right, as well as other potentially unpopular groups such as homosexuals. The respondent selects the group that he/she likes the least, and then is asked a series of questions about his/her willingness to extend a variety of political rights and civil liberties to members of that group.⁵⁵ The primary limitation of this approach, however, is that in many countries significant portions of the respondents refuse to select any group. This occurs for many reasons, but the net result is that for those respondents, no tolerance information is obtained. For example, in a recent study of South Africa, only 59% of the respondents were willing to name a group.⁵⁶ The same problem occurred in Nicaragua when USAID used the method in a survey conducted by C.I.D. Gallup (Costa Rica). About half the respondents did not mention any group.⁵⁷ There is another important limitation to this approach and that is since each respondent can select a different group, it is difficult to compare intolerance levels across individuals. For example, in a country like Germany, where fascist parties have been outlawed since Germany redemocratized after World War II, it would be difficult to compare intolerance responses to those who selected the Nazi Party, for example, with those who selected a feminist organization. That is, we would tend to accept a higher level of intolerance for the civil liberties of a banned political group, than for a reformist, completely legal social organization. A further complication with this methodology is that it is difficult to compare intolerance levels across countries since the groups that are salient in one country would likely be different in another. For example, asking about tolerating members of the

⁵⁴ John L. Sullivan, James E. Pierson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982).

⁵⁵ For an application of this methodology to minorities in Israel and Costa Rica see: Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, “Arabs in Israel: Political Tolerance and Ethnic Conflict,” *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19 (February 1983), 55-66; Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, “Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica,” *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1983b), 385-404; and Mitchell A. Seligson, and Dan Caspi, “Threat, Ethnicity and Education: Tolerance Toward the Civil Liberties of the Arab Minority in Israel (in Hebrew),” *Megamot* 15 (May 1982), 37-53.


⁵⁶ James L. Gibson, and Amanda Gouws, “Social Identity Theory and Political Intolerance in South Africa,” Draft, Department of Political Science, University of Houston (1998).

⁵⁷ See Mitchell A. Seligson, *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. (Managua, Nicaragua: United States Agency for International Development, 1996).

Sandinista Party would make considerable sense in Nicaragua, but make no sense in Bolivia.

The other main method of measuring tolerance is to ask a set of questions that refer to the same group or groups. This method was pioneered many years ago in the United States, where the focus was on tolerance towards communism.⁵⁸ This approach worked well, so long as communists were perceived as a threat in the United States, but once the threat of communism receded, it was impossible to assume that lowered levels of intolerance toward communists were an indication of a general decline of intolerance. It became evident that a more general approach was needed so that comparisons could be made across time and across countries. That is the approach taken by the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project.⁵⁹ The four-item series on tolerance that we developed reads as follows:

This card has a scale from 1 to 10 steps, with 1 indicating that you disapprove a lot and 10 indicating that you approve a lot.



⁵⁸Samuel C. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

⁵⁹Even though different measures have been utilized in the study of tolerance, it turns out that they all seem to capture the same underlying dimension. For evidence of this, see James L. Gibson, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance Be 'Least-Liked?'," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 May (1992): 560-77.

The questions that follow are to learn your opinion about different ideas that people have who live in Nicaragua.

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the governments of Nicaragua, not only the current government, but the system of Nicaraguan government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10), would you approve or disapprove the right to vote of these people? Please read me the number.

D2. Thinking still of those people who only say bad things about the Nicaraguan system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove that those people can carry out peaceful demonstrations with the purpose of expressing their points of view?

D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that the people who only say bad things about the Nicaraguan system of government be allowed to run for public office?

D4. Thinking still about those people who only say bad things about the Nicaraguan system of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of them appearing on television to make a speech?

In the discussion that follows, these items will be analyzed. Since the question avoided the filter of the least-liked-group, all respondents were asked each item, and most gave an answer.

Levels of Tolerance in Nicaragua

There has been a major transition in political tolerance over the period 1991-1999. As shown in Figure VI.8, there have been systematic and statistically significant increases in tolerance over this decade. In 1991, on two of the four variables, the right to run for office and the right to free speech (i.e., to appear on TV and make a speech) scored below the mid-point on the scale. By 1997 that had increased above this level, and by 1999 had increased still further. Support for the right to vote also increased during this period, but the increase was not as high, probably because this was already, in 1991, a right supported by most Nicaraguans. Only the right to protest has not changed much, but this was the right most strongly supported in 1991, and it is likely that it has already reached its high point. We do not expect tolerance to average higher than these levels; they are no higher in the United States.




Figure VI.8
Political Tolerance, 1991-1999

The overall scale of tolerance, combining the four measures shown above, reveals a consistent pattern of increase over the decade, as is shown in Figure VI.9.




Figure VI.9
Political Tolerance Scale, 1991-1999

The impact of socio-economic and demographic factors on tolerance was covered in prior reports in this series. Here we focus only on new issues.

Tolerance of the Judiciary vs. the Mass Public

It is to be expected that those involved with the judiciary would be more sensitive to constitutional rights than the public as a whole, and that is what is found. Figure VI.10 shows that each sector of the judiciary is more tolerant than the public. It is of note that the most tolerant group are the local judges. Since the judicial sample is more highly educated than the public and since higher education is normally associated with increased political tolerance, it could be that the increased level of tolerance found among the judiciary is a function of education. An analysis of covariance was conducted and found that even after education is controlled for, the differences between the public and the judiciary persist.




Figure VI.10
Tolerance: Public vs. Judiciary

A comparison between the USAID project areas and the rest of the country reveals significantly higher tolerance in the project areas. Figure VI.11 shows the results. The primary phase of the project exhibits higher levels of tolerance than the second phase. The question, in light of prior findings on the municipal project, is why is tolerance higher in the project areas than the non-project area? Those involved with the project implementation might have the answer to this question.




Figure VI.11
Tolerance: Project vs. Non-Project Areas

One possible explanation of the higher tolerance in the project areas might be differences in education levels between the project vs. the non-project areas. Since education is associated with tolerance, once education is controlled for, the difference between the project and non-project areas might disappear. In fact, education is a significant covariate in an ANOVA analysis, but, as shown in Figure VI.12, even when education is controlled for, the basic differences in tolerance remain.⁶⁰

⁶⁰The ANOVA results are as follows:

Dependent Variable: TOL Tolerance mean.2

AID Municipal Project Area		Mean	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower Bound	Upper Bound
0	Non-project	58.931	.693	57.572	60.290
1	Project: Primary Phase	67.212	1.177	64.904	69.520
2	Project: Secondary Phase	62.740	2.128	58.567	66.913

Evaluated at covariates appeared in the model: ED Education = 7.38.

Project sig. < .001, education sig = .019.




Figure VI.12
Tolerance: Project vs. Non-Project Areas
After controlling for education

The final possibility that could explain the higher tolerance in the project areas is that tolerance in those areas was already high and did not change as a potential results of the project. We can test for that possibility by comparing 1997 results with those of 1999. Figure VI.13 shows the results. As can be clearly seen, tolerance rose substantially in both project areas between 1997 and 1999, but did not increase for the rest of the country. Indeed, the national increase in tolerance shown in prior figures seems to be largely concentrated in the project areas. Without those areas, national tolerance remained unchanged between 1997 and 1999, although it is still in the positive end of the continuum and high compared to prior years. In sum, it does seem that the municipal development project has been responsible for an important increase in political tolerance in Nicaragua.




Figure VI.13
Tolerance: Project vs. Non-Project
1997 vs. 1999

System Support and Tolerance: Leading Indicators of Democratic Stability⁶¹

The theory behind this study of system support and political tolerance is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must both believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions and also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed a quintessential definition of democracy.

⁶¹This theoretical discussion in this section again draws on the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project studies in Nicaragua and elsewhere. The data, of course, are from the new Nicaragua survey of 1999 and prior surveys in the series.

In prior studies emerging from the University of Pittsburgh project, the relationship between system support and tolerance has been explored in an effort to develop a predictive model of democratic stability. In this study, I draw on that earlier discussion in order to remind the reader (or to present for the first time to those who have not seen those studies) what these relationships are.⁶² Table VI.1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.⁶³

⁶²This framework was first presented in Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías, *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador* (San Salvador: IDELA, 1993). See also Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova M., *El Salvador: De la Guerra a la Paz, una Cultura Política en Transición* (San Salvador: IDELA y FUNDAUNGO, 1995). The Nicaragua study, based on the 1991 and 1995 data sets is found in Mitchell A. Seligson, *Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995*. (Managua, Nicaragua: United States Agency for International Development, 1996). The discussion in this report draws directly on the explanatory material contained in the 1996 study. For a recent statement of this thesis see Mitchell A. Seligson, "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2 (2000, forthcoming).

⁶³The scale ranges from 0-100, so the most natural cut-point is 50. In actuality, since the zero also counts as a valid value in the scale, there are 101 points to the scale, and the arithmetic division would be 50.5. In this and other studies we have used 50 because it is more intuitive.

Table VI.1
Theoretical Relationship Between
Tolerance and System Support
in Institutionally Democratic Polities

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

Let us review each cell, one-by-one. Political systems populated largely by citizens who have high system support and high political tolerance are those political systems that would be predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under those conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are likely to enjoy stable democracy.⁶⁴

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, then the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchical) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

⁶⁴Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table, and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But, systems in which the mass public neither support the basic institutions of the nation, nor support the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, that incongruence might have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens.⁶⁵

⁶⁵Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3, August, 1993, pp. 777-792. A different version appears as "Cultura política y democratización: vías alternas en Nicaragua y Costa Rica." In Carlos Barba Solano, José Luis Barros Horcasitas y Javier Hurtado, *Transiciones a la democracia en Europa y América Latina*. México: FLACSO y Universidad de Guadalajara, 1991, pp. 628-681. Also appears as "Paths to Democracy and the Political Culture of Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua," Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp. 99-130.

Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Nicaragua

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of this chapter by examining the joint distribution of the two variables. First, it should be noted that system support and tolerance are positively associated with each other (for 1999, $r = .06$, sig. $< .01$). This means that those who are more tolerant are more supportive of the system. This is certainly an encouraging sign since it suggests that, at least in this case, all good things can go together. But the more profound question is to examine in detail how the two variables interrelate. To do this, both variables are dichotomized into "high" and "low."⁶⁶ The overall index of tolerance was utilized, but the scale was divided into high and low at the 50-point. System support is scaled in a similar way, and split at the 50-point to distinguish between high and low.⁶⁷

The results for the Nicaragua 1999 survey are shown in Table VI.2.⁶⁸ As can be seen, about one-in-three Nicaraguans are both supportive of their political system and express political tolerance. This is the largest cell, and the highest level ever recorded in the Nicaragua surveys over the 1991-1999 period. A bit more than one-fifth fall in the "democratic breakdown" cell. These are individuals with low system support and low tolerance. Finally, between about a fifth and a quarter of Nicaraguans fall into the "unstable democracy" or "authoritarian stability" cells.

⁶⁶If the variables were left in their original 0-100 format, the table would potentially have 100 cells in each direction, making it impossible to read and interpret.

⁶⁷It is important to note that the results presented here differ from those in some earlier presentations of the University of Pittsburgh Public Opinion Project. In many of those presentations the expanded scale of items was utilized, whereas here the focus is on the core list. In addition, in this study an algorithm is used for missing data (i.e., non-response) so as to minimize the number of missing cases in the overall scale. In the tolerance scale, when two or more of the four items are answered, the overall scale score is based on the valid responses. If fewer than two are answered, the case is scored as missing. For the system support measure, a valid score is accepted when at least three of the five questions are answered. As a result of these changes, the percentages reported in the following tables vary somewhat from some earlier reports and publications.

⁶⁸The total sample size for the table is 2,283 (weighted).

Table VI.2
Empirical Relationship Between
Tolerance and System Support
in Nicaragua, 1999

System support	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 32%	Authoritarian Stability 16%
Low	Unstable Democracy 30%	Democratic Breakdown 22%

We can place these data in comparative perspective to just how impressive Nicaragua's gains have been. In Figure VI.14, selected data from the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project are shown. Nicaragua has moved up substantially from where it stood at its low-point in 1995. Comparisons with Bolivia show how much greater support for stable democracy there is in Nicaragua, and how far Nicaragua has come since 1995.




Figure VI.14
Attitudes Favoring Stable Democracy:
Nicaragua in Comparative Perspective

An overall view of the evolution of democratic values is presented in Table VI.3. There it can be seen that the combination of values that seem conducive to stable democracy has increased steadily since 1995. It can also be seen that the authoritarianism cell has been declining, although not in an even manner.

Table V1.3
Empirical Relationship in Nicaragua Between
Tolerance and System Support
1991-1999^a

		Tolerance							
System support									
	High				Low				
High	Stable Democracy				Authoritarianism				
	1991: 28%	1995: 19%	1997: 30%	1999: 32%	1991: 36%	1995: 18%	1997: 23%	1999: 16%	
Low	Unstable Democracy				Democratic Breakdown				
	1991: 19%	1995: 35%	1997: 25%	1999: 30%	1991: 17%	1995: 28%	1997: 22%	1999: 22%	

^aThese percentages are based on the five core items (B1, B2, B3, B4, B6) of the system support scale rather than the nine- and eleven-item series reported on elsewhere. Note that a rounding error for the 1991 data produced a variation of 1% in two of the 1991 cells from earlier reports.

Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed the levels of system support and political tolerance in Nicaragua. It has found that after a steep decline measured by the 1995 survey, system support recovered and rose into positive territory by 1997, with not much change since then. System support was not affected by the hurricane, nor were there any differences between the overall sample and the municipal project areas. The judiciary, however, expressed higher level of system support. Political tolerance has increased markedly in Nicaragua since the early 1990s. Tolerance levels are now at all-time highs, especially in the areas of the right to vote and the right to run for office. The judicial sector expresses even higher tolerance, in general. The municipal project areas were especially tolerant, far more so than the rest of the nation. The chapter concluded by showing that the combination of attitudes of high system support and high tolerance that are thought to be conducive for democracy has been increasing, and by 1999 reached it highest levels yet measured. In comparative terms, Nicaragua scores very well on these variables.

Appendix: Questionnaire

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versión 14: viernes, 1 de agosto de 2003 (14:40 h.)

Universidad de Pittsburgh Encuesta de Opinión Pública

Número del Cuestionario: _____ ID |__|__|__|__|

Estrato:

1. Público

2. Jueces

3. Fiscales/Procuradores

ESTRATO|__|__|__|

Departamento: _____

DPT|__|__|

Municipio: _____

MUNI|__|__|

Nº de Junta Receptora de Votos: _____ JRV |__|__|__|__|__|__|__|

Tipo de Zona: Rural = 1 Urbana = 2

ZONA |__|

DAÑO. Daño del huracán "Mitch" [llenar en la oficina]

DAÑO |__|

Sr. (a): Estamos haciendo una encuesta por parte del Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos de la Universidad de Pittsburgh para conocer las opiniones de la gente sobre diferentes aspectos de la situación nacional. Usted ha sido seleccionado(a) por sorteo para hacerle una entrevista y quisiéramos pedirle que colabore con nosotros. La naturaleza confidencial de todas sus respuestas será respetada. Nos interesa su opinión como parte de la percepción global del público.

Q1 1. Hombre 2. Mujer	Q1	
Q2: ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? __ __ __	Q2	
ED: ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó? [Ejemplos: Ninguna = 0; Primaria completa = 6; 3 de secundaria = 9; Secundaria completa = 12; 4 de universidad = 16] [PONER EN RUEDA EL NUMERO]	ED	
Ninguna 0		
Escuela (primaria) 1 2 3 4 5 6		
Colegio (secundaria) 7 8 9 10 11		
Universidad 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19		

A1. Para empezar, ¿Escucha frecuentemente algún programa de noticias por radio? 0. No 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	A1	
A2. ¿Ve frecuentemente algún programa de noticias por televisión? 0. No 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	A2	
A3. ¿Acostumbra leer frecuentemente algún periódico? 0. No 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	A3	
A4. En su opinión ¿Cuál es el problema más grave que enfrenta el país? [No leer lista, sino usar código. Si menciona más de uno, pregunta por el más importante]: 1. Desempleo (Falta de trabajo); 2. Inflación, altos precios, costo de la vida 3. Pobreza; 4. Delincuencia; crimen; 5. Peligro de golpe de estado; 6. Falta de tierra para cultivar; 7. Falta de crédito; 11. Corrupción; 12. Problemas ecológicos; 13. La droga; 14. Grupos armados 15. La violencia doméstica 16. El problema de la Propiedad. 17. gobernabilidad y polarización 18. FSLN no deja gobernar 19. la conducta en el poder del Pdte. 20. incumplimiento de las leyes 21. Derechos humanos 22. Falta de moralidad/principios religiosos 50. NO HAY PROBLEMAS; 88. NS/NR Otro: _____	A4	

[BRINCAR CP1-CP4 PARA MUESTRA ESPECIAL, Y SEGUIR CON CP5]

A veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolverse por sí solos. Algunos tratan de resolver tales problemas pidiéndole ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno ¿Alguna vez a pedido Ud. ayuda o cooperación ... ?					
	Sí	No	NS	Inap	
CP1. Del presidente de la República?	1. Sí	2. No	(8)	9	CP1
CP2. De algún diputado de la Asamblea Nacional?	1. Sí	2. No	(8)	9	CP2
CP3. Del alcalde?	1. Sí	2. No	(8)	9	CP4
CP4. De alguna agencia u oficina del gobierno nacional?	1. Sí	2. No	(8)	9	CP4

Ahora le voy a leer algunas preguntas sobre esta comunidad y los problemas que tiene.		
CP5. ¿Alguna vez ha contribuido o ha tratado de contribuir a resolver algún problema de la comunidad o de los vecinos de aquí? 1. Sí (seguir con CP5a) 2. No (Pase a próxima pagina, CP6) 8.NS	CP5	
CP5a. ¿Ha donado dinero o materiales para ayudar con algún problema o con alguna mejora? 1. Sí 2. No 8.NS 9. No aplica	CP5a	
CP5b. ¿Ha dado su propio trabajo o mano de obra? 1. Sí 2. No 8.NS 9. No aplica	CP5b	
CP5c. ¿Ha asistido a reuniones sobre algún problema o sobre alguna mejora? 1. Sí 2. No 8.NS 9. No aplica	CP5c	
CP5d. ¿Ha tratado de ayudar Ud. a organizar algún grupo nuevo para resolver algún problema local, o para buscar alguna mejora? 1. Sí; 2. No: 8.NS 9. No aplica	CP5d	

Ahora le voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si Ud. asiste a reuniones de ellos frecuentemente, de vez en cuando, casi nunca o nunca, de:		
CP6. ¿De algún comité o sociedad de la Iglesia o templo? 1. Frecuentemente 2. De vez en cuando 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS	CP6	
CP7. ¿De una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela? 1. Frecuentemente 2. De vez en cuando 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS	CP7	
CP8. ¿De un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? 1. Frecuentemente 2. De vez en cuando 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS	CP8	
CP9. ¿De una asociación de profesionales, negociantes o productores? 1. Frecuentemente 2. De vez en cuando 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS	CP9	
CP10. ¿De un sindicato? 1. Frecuentemente 2. De vez en cuando 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS	CP10	
CP11. ¿De una cooperativa? 1. Frecuentemente 2. De vez en cuando 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS	CP11	
CP12. ¿De alguna asociación cívica (como grupo de mujeres, comisión de paz, etc.)? 1. Frecuentemente 2. De vez en cuando 3. Casi nunca 4. Nunca 8. NS	CP12	
INFL1 [Viejo CP15a]. ¿Cuanta influencia cree que tiene Ud. sobre las decisiones que toman los grupos comunales de este lugar? ¿Diría que Ud. tiene mucha influencia, poca o nada de influencia? [Sondeo: Si pregunta "cuales grupos", contesta "los ONGs, y grupos cívicos"] 1. Mucha 2. Poca 3. Nada 8. NS	INFL1	
INFL2. ¿Cuanta influencia cree que tiene Ud. sobre las decisiones que toma el gobierno municipal? ¿Diría que Ud. tiene mucha influencia, poca o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Poca 3. Nada 8. NS	INFL2	
INFL3. ¿Cuanta influencia cree que tiene Ud. sobre las decisiones que toma el gobierno central? ¿Diría que Ud. tiene mucha influencia, poca o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Poca 3. Nada 8. NS	INFL3	
INFL3A. ¿Cuánta influencia cree Ud. que los grupos de esta comunidad tienen sobre las decisiones que toma el gobierno central? ¿Diría Ud. que estos grupos tienen mucha influencia, poca o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Poca 3. Nada 8. NS	INFL3A	
INFL3B. ¿Cuánta influencia cree Ud. que los grupos de esta comunidad tienen sobre las decisiones que toma el gobierno municipal? ¿Diría Ud. que estos grupos tienen mucha influencia, poca o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Poca 3. Nada 8. NS	INFL3B	
INFL4. Algunas personas dicen que los ciudadanos NO deben exigir cuentas a los gobernantes. Otras personas dicen que los ciudadanos SI deben exigir cuentas a los gobernantes. ¿Ud que opina? 1. No deben exigir cuentas 2. Si deben exigir cuentas 8. NS/NC	INFL4	

L1. En esta hoja hay una escala que va de izquierda a derecha. Cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, se dice que una persona es de izquierda o que es de derecha. Dígame, por favor, según el sentido que "la izquierda" y "la derecha," en política, tienen para Ud., ¿en que punto de la escala se colocaría Ud.? Ponga una X en la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición. Izquierda _____ Derecha 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 88 NS	L1	
LS3. Ahora, algunas opiniones: ¿Hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría Ud. que se encuentra muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? 1.Muy satisfecho 2.Algo satisfecho 3.Algo insatisfecho 4.Muy insatisfecho 8. NS	LS3	
IT1. Hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente en general es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, o nada confiable? 1. Muy confi. 2. Algo confi. 3. poco confi. 4. Nada confi. 8. NS/NR	IT1	
IT2. ¿Cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente se preocupa solo por sí misma, o cree que la mayoría de las veces la gente trata de ayudar al prójimo? 1. Preocupa por sí misma 2. Ayudarle al prójimo 8. NS/NR	IT2	
IT3. ¿Cree que la mayoría de la gente trataría de aprovecharse de Ud. si se les presentara la oportunidad, o cree que no se aprovecharían? 1. Si se aprovecharían 2. No se aprovecharían 8. NS/NR	IT3	
CCI2. En general, ¿cómo considera que le han tratado cuando ha tenido que tratar con una oficina del gobierno? Le han tratado muy bien, bien, mal, o muy mal? 1. Muy Bien 2. Bien 3. Mal 4. Muy mal 8. NS/NR 9. No trataron con el gobierno	CCI2	
M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría Ud. que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Alemán es: muy bueno, bueno, regular, malo o muy malo? 1. Muy Bueno 2. Bueno 3. Regular 4. Malo 5. Muy Malo 8.NS/NR	M1	
Ahora vamos a hablar de la Alcaldía de este municipio...		
NP1. ¿Ha tenido usted la oportunidad de asistir a un cabildo abierto, una sesión municipal u otra reunión convocada por la Alcaldía o concejo municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? 1. Sí 2. No 8. No sabe/ no recuerda	NP1	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal de la Alcaldía durante los últimos 12 meses? 1. Sí (pasar a NP2A) 2. No. (Pasar a SGL1) 8. No sabe/ no recuerda (Pasar a SGL1)	NP2	
NP2A. ¿Quedó contento con la respuesta que le dieron? 1. Sí 2. No 8. No sabe/no respuesta 9. Inap	NP2A	

SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la Alcaldía está dando a la gente son excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos o pésimos? 1. Excelente 2. Bueno 3. Regular 4. Malo 5. Pésimo 8. No sabe	SGL1	
SGL2. ¿Como considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la Alcaldía para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, regular, mal o pésimo? 1. Muy bien 2. Bien 3. Regular 4. Mal 5. Pésimo 8. No sabe	SGL2	
LGL1. En su opinión, ¿quien ha respondido mejor para ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad? Sería ¿El gobierno central? ¿La Asamblea? o ¿La Alcaldía? 1. El gobierno central 2. La Asamblea 3. La Alcaldía 4. Ninguno 5. Todos igual 8. No sabe/ no contesta [No leer #4 o #5]	LGL1	
LGL2. En su opinión ¿se le debe de dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la Alcaldía, o debemos dejar que el gobierno central asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales (agua, basura, etc.)? 1. Más a la Alcaldía 2. Más al gobierno central 3. No cambiar nada 4. Más a la Alcaldía si dan mejores servicios 8. No sabe [No leer # 3 o # 4]	LGL2	
LGL3. ¿Estaría dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la Municipalidad para que ésta pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más? 1. Más impuestos para mejor servicios 2. No vale la pena pagar más NO LEER: 3. Sí, si hubiera empleo/dinero 8. No sabe	LGL3	
MUNI2. En su opinión, ¿cuál es el problema más importante que tiene este municipio en la actualidad? 99. Ninguno [pase a MUNI6] [TEXTUAL]_____.	MUNI2	
MUNI3. ¿Cuánto ha hecho el alcalde por resolver ese problema? 3. Mucho 2. Algo 1. Poco 0. Nada 8. NS	MUNI3	
MUNI6. ¿Cuánta confianza tiene Ud. en que la alcaldía maneje bien los fondos municipales? 3. Mucha confianza 2. Algo de confianza 1. Poca confianza 0. Ninguna 8. NS	MUNI6	
MUNI7. En su opinión, ¿los proyectos que ejecuta su alcaldía benefician a personas como Ud. o su familia? 1. Sí benefician 0. No benefician 8. NS	MUNI7	
VIC1. ¿Ha sido Ud. víctima de una agresión física o de algún hecho delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? 1. Sí [siga] 2. No [Pasar a AOJ2, próxima pagina] 8. NS	VIC1	
VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de crimen sufrió Ud.? [Si más de un crimen, marcar sólo el más serio] 1. Robo sin agresión o amenaza física 2. Robo con agresión o amenaza física 3. Agresión física sin robo 4. Violación o asalto sexual 5. Secuestro 6. Daño al patrimonio Otro (especifique) _____	VIC2	
AOJ1. [Si ha sido víctima] ¿Denunció Ud. el hecho a alguna institución? 1. Sí [siga] 2. No lo denunció [Pasar a AOJ1B, próxima pagina] 8. NS	AOJ1	

AOJ1A. ¿Ante que agencia o institución denunció Ud. el crimen? 1. Policía 2. Procuraduría 3. Juzgados 4. Comisiones de paz 5. Defensoría Pública 6. Amigos u otros 8. NS	AOJ1A	
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? 1. No sirve de nada 2. Es peligroso, miedo de represalias 3. No tenía pruebas 4. No fue grave 5. No sabe adónde denunciar 8. NS 9. Inap (no fue víctima)	AOJ1B	
AOJ2. ¿Cómo diría que lo atienden en la policía cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos? 1. Muy bien 2. Bien 3. Mal 4. Muy mal 8. NS 9. Nunca hizo trámites	AOJ2	
AOJ3. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en los juzgados, por lo general, cómo lo atienden? 1. Muy bien 2. Bien 3. Mal 4. Muy mal 8. NS 9. Nunca hizo trámites	AOJ3	
AOJ4. Cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto en las oficinas de la Procuraduría Penal, cómo lo atienden? 1. Muy bien 2. Bien 3. Mal 4. Muy mal 8. NS 9. Nunca hizo trámites	AOJ4	
AOJ5. Hace poco se crearon los Defensores Públicos. ¿Ha oído Ud. de los Defensores Públicos? 1. Sí 2. No (pasar a AOJ8) 8. NS (pasar a AOJ8)	AOJ5	
AOJ5A. ¿Que función realizan los Defensores Públicos? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] 1. Acusar los delincuentes 2. Defender a todas las personas 3. Defender a los políticos 4. Defender a aquellos que no tengan plata Otro _____ 88. NS 99. Inap	AOJ5A	
AOJ8 ¿Con cuál de las siguientes frases está Ud. más de acuerdo? 1. La autoridad debe ajustarse estrictamente a la ley, aun a costa de no castigar a un delincuente; o 2. La autoridad debe tratar de castigar a los delincuentes, aun a costa de no ajustarse estrictamente a la ley. 8. NS	AOJ8	
AOJ9. Cuando se tienen serias sospechas acerca de las actividades criminales de una persona, ¿cree usted que: 1. Se debería esperar a que el juzgado dé la orden de allanamiento, o 2. La policía pudiera entrar la casa de esta persona sin necesidad de una orden judicial. 1. Se debería esperar 2. La policía puede entrar 8. NS	AOJ9	
AOJ10. ¿Qué cree usted que es mejor? 1. Vivir en una sociedad ordenada aunque se limiten algunas libertades, o 2. Respetar todos los derechos y libertades, aún si eso causa algo de desorden. 1. Vivir en sociedad ordenada 2. Respetar derechos y libertades 8. NS	AOJ10	

AOJ11. ¿Hablando del lugar o barrio donde Ud. vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿Se siente Ud. muy seguro, más o menos seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro. 1. Muy seguro 2. Más o menos seguro 3. Algo inseguro 4. Muy Inseguro 8. NS	AOJ11	
AOJ12. ¿Cree Ud que aquí en Nicaragua, cuando alguien es acusado de algun delito, ellos tienen el derecho de ser defendidos por un abogado, aún cuando no tengan la plata para pagarlo, o cree que no tienen ese derecho? 1. Sí tiene el derecho 2. No lo tiene 8. NS	AOJ12	
AOJ13. ¿A quien recurriría Ud. si fuese acusado de un delito y no tuviera la plata para pagar un abogado privado? 1. Defensoría pública 2. Procuraduría Penal 3. Bufete Popular 4. Unos amigos 8. NS	AOJ13	
AOJ14. Considera Ud. que el sistema de justicia penal en Nicaragua es: 1. Muy Bueno 2. Bueno 3. Regular 4. Malo 5. Muy Malo 8. NS	AOJ14	
AOJ15. Hablando de los juicios penales, ¿Cuánta posibilidad de defenderse cree Ud que tiene el acusado? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de posibilidad de defenderse? 1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8. NS	AOJ15	
AOJ16. Pensando siempre en los juicios penales, ¿Cuánta posibilidad tiene la víctima de defender sus intereses? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de posibilidad de defender sus intereses? 1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8. NS	AOJ16	
JF1. Si hablamos de las funciones propias de la rama ejecutivo, ¿El ejecutivo se mete indebidamente en los asuntos propios del sector judicial, o no se mete indebidamente? 1. Se mete 2. No se mete. 8. NS	JF1	
JF2. ¿El ejecutivo se mete indebidamente en los asuntos propios de La Procuraduría, o no se mete indebidamente? 1. Se mete 2. No se mete. 8. NS	JF2	
JF3. ¿El ejecutivo se mete indebidamente en los asuntos propios de La Asamblea Nacional, o no se mete indebidamente? 1. Se mete 2. No se mete. 8. NS	JF3	
JF4. Comparado con el año pasado, ¿cree Ud. que el sector judicial es más eficaz o menos eficaz? 1. Más eficaz. 2. Menos eficaz 8. NS	JF4	
JF5. Comparado con el año pasado, ¿cree Ud. que La Procuraduría es más eficaz o menos eficaz? 1. Más eficaz. 2. Menos eficaz 8. NS	JF5	
JF6. Comparado con el año pasado, ¿cree Ud. que La Asamblea Nacional es más eficaz o menos eficaz? 1. Más eficaz. 2. Menos eficaz 8. NS	JF6	

JF7. En su opinión, ¿los fiscales/procuradores están llevando acabo un papel útil, o cree que su rol es inútil? 1. Útil 2. Inútil 8. NS	JF7	
JF8. Cree Ud. que las cortes funcionan muy bien, algo bien, algo mal o muy mal? 1. Muy bien 2. Algo bien 3. Algo mal 4. Muy mal 8. NS	JF8	
JF9. Cree Ud. que La Procuraduría funciona muy bien, algo bien, algo mal o muy mal? 1. Muy bien 2. Algo bien 3. Algo mal 4. Muy mal 8. NS	JF9	
JF10-JF13 SOLO PARA MUESTRA ESPECIAL, PARA EL PUBLICO, BRINCAR A JC1		
JF10. En su opinión ¿Cuál de las siguientes reformas es la más importante para reformar elCodigo Procesal Penal? 1. Que los jucios sean orales 2. Que la justicia sea rápida y expedita 3. Que el acceso a la justicia sea gratuito 4. Que se protejan eficazmente los derechos humanos 5. Que la aplicación de la justicia sea por igual Otro _____ 88. NS 99. Inap	JF10	
JF11. ¿Cómo cuánto de reformas necesita el Código Penal? ¿Diría que necesita mucha, algo, poco o nada? 1. Mucho 2. Algo 3. Poco. 4 Nada 8. NS 9. Inap	JF11	
JF12. En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el obstáculo más grande que enfrenta el funcionamiento eficaz del sector judicial? [anotar]_____ 88. NS 99. Inap	JF12	
JF13. En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el obstáculo más grande que enfrenta el funcionamiento eficaz de La Procuraduría? [anotar]_____ 88. NS 99. Inap	JF13	
Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder. En su opinión bajo qué situaciones se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder.		
JC1. Se justifica o no si el desempleo es muy alto. 1. Se justifica 2. No se justifica 8.NS	JC1	
JC4. Se justifica o no si hay muchas huelgas estudiantiles en las universidades 1. Se justifica 2. No se justifica 8.NS	JC4	
JC9. Se justifica o no si hay un gran número de huelgas por trabajadores . 1. Se justifica 2. No se justifica 8.NS	JC9	

DÉLE LA TARJETA "A" AL ENTREVISTADO

Ahora vamos a usar esta tarjeta...Esta tarjeta contiene una escalera de 7 gradas; cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1-NADA hasta 7- que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a Ud. no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta **mucho** ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre **nada** y **mucho** Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a Ud. ver televisión? Léame el número. (ASEGÚRESE QUE EL ENTREVISTADO ENTIENDA CORRECTAMENTE).

NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8

Ahora, usando la tarjeta "A," por favor conteste estas preguntas.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los tribunales de justicia de Nicaragua garantizan un juicio justo? [SONDEE: Si Ud. cree que los tribunales no garantizan en nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia escoja el número 7.] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B1	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Nicaragua? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B2	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político nicaragüense? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B3	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político nicaragüense? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B4	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político nicaragüense? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B6	
B10. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los partidos políticos? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B10	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Consejo Supremo Electoral? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B11	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ejército? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B12	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en La Asamblea Nacional ? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B13	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el gobierno central? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B14	
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría General de la República? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B15	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Policía? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B18	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B20	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B21	

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Presidente? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B21A	
B22. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el gobierno municipal? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B22	
B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B23	
B23A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B23A	
B23B. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los Procuradores Penales? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B23B	
B24. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que las últimas elecciones fueron libres, o sea que la gente pudo votar por el candidato que prefería? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B24	
B25. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que las últimas elecciones fueron limpias, o sea sin fraude? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8	B25	
B26. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que el Gobierno Central responde a las necesidades de la gente? NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO NS = 8 RECoger LA TARJETA "A"	B26	

ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO TARJETA "B"

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera de 10 gradas, que van de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que Ud. desaprueba firmemente y el 10 indicando que Ud. aprueba firmemente. Estas preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Nicaragua. Favor de usar la escalera "B" de 10 gradas para contestar.

DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS

FIRMEMENTE

FIRMEMENTE

D1. Hay personas que solamente hablan mal de la forma de gobierno Nicaragüense. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba Ud. el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número:(SONDEE: ¿Hasta que punto?) DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	D1	
D2. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal de la forma de gobierno Nicaragüense, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba el que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	D2	
D3. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que a las personas que sólo hablan mal de la forma de gobierno Nicaragüense, les permitan postularse para cargos públicos? DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	D3	

D4. Pensando siempre en aquellas personas que solamente hablan mal de la forma de gobierno Nicaragüense, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que salgan en la televisión para hacer un discurso? DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO No Recoja Tarjeta "B"	D4	
Ahora le voy a leer una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera hasta que punto aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan estas acciones. Use siempre la escalera de 10 gradas Usar la tarjeta "B"		
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver problemas de las comunidades. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades privadas. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	E14	
E2. Que las personas se apoderen de fábricas, oficinas u otros edificios. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	E3	
C3. ¿Si se pasara una ley que prohibiera las manifestaciones públicas, con qué firmeza la aprobaría o desaprobaría? DESAPRUEBA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 APRUEBA 88= NS MUCHO MUCHO	C3	

DEM4. Hay gente que dice que sin la Asamblea Nacional no puede haber democracia, mientras que hay otra gente que dice que la democracia puede funcionar sin la Asamblea Nacional. ¿Con cuál frase está ud. más de acuerdo? 1. La democracia no puede funcionar sin la Asamblea Nacional 2. La democracia si puede funcionar sin la Asamblea Nacional 8. No sabe	DEM4	
DEM5. Hay gente que dice que sin partidos políticos no puede haber democracia, mientras que hay otra gente que dice que la democracia puede funcionar sin partidos. ¿Cuál frase está más cerca de su manera de pensar? 1. La democracia no puede funcionar sin partidos 2. La democracia puede funcionar sin partidos 8. No sabe	DEM5	
DEM7. Y de estas dos frases, ¿ con cuál está mas de acuerdo? 1. En una democracia hay bastante eficiencia y orden. 2. En una democracia hay bastante ineficiencia y desorden. 8. No sabe	DEM7	
AUT1. En algunas ocasiones, la democracia no funciona. Cuando esto sucede, hay personas que dicen que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa Ud.? 1. Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ver con elecciones 2. La democracia electoral es siempre lo mejor 8. NS	AUT1	
AUT3.¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está usted de acuerdo? 1.Lo que Nicaragua necesita es un hombre fuerte y decidido que ponga orden o 2.Lo que el país necesita es un hombre que sepa dialogar con todos los sectores de la población 8. NS	AUT3	
AUT4. 1.La única forma de sacar el país adelante es eliminar con mano dura a los que causan problemas o 2.Para que el país salga adelante es necesario tomar en cuenta a todas las personas inclusive aquellas que causan problemas 8. NS	AUT4	
Hay diferentes opiniones en cuanto a las responsabilidades de los ciudadanos en una democracia. ¿Que tan importante es:		
RC1. Pagar impuestos: 1. Muy importante 2. Algo importante 3. No importante 8. NS	RC1	
RC2. Votar en elecciones nacionales: 1. Muy importante 2. Algo importante 3. No importante 8. NS	RC2	
RC3. Obedecer las leyes: 1. Muy importante 2. Algo importante 3. No importante 8. NS	RC3	
RC4. Poner atención a lo que pasa en la vida política: 1. Muy importante 2. Algo importante 3. No importante 8. NS	RC4	

RC5. Participar en la toma de las decisiones políticas que afectan a su comunidad: 1. Muy importante 2. Algo importante 3. No importante 8. NS	RC5	
GI1. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el Presidente de los Estados Unidos ? (Clinton) 0. No correcto (o no sabe) 1. Correcto	GI1	
GI2. ¿Recuerda cómo se llama el jefe de gobierno de México? (Ernesto Zedillo) 0. No correcto (o no sabe) 1. Correcto	GI2	
GI5. ¿Recuerda como se llama el Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional? (Ivan Escobar Fornos) 0. No correcto (o no sabe) 1. Correcto	GI5	
GI7. ¿Recuerda cual partido político tiene más diputados ahora en la Asamblea Nacional? (Alianza Liberal) 0. Incorrecto (o no sabe) 1. Correcto	GI7	
GI8. ¿Recuerda como se llama el alcalde de su municipio? 0. Incorrecto (o no sabe) 1. Correcto	GI8	
GI9. ¿Recuerda como se llama uno de los diputados de este Departamento? 0. Incorrecto (o no sabe) 1. Correcto	GI9	
GI10. ¿Cree que la situación de los derechos humanos ha mejorado desde 1996? 1. Sí 2. Lo Mismo 3. No 8. NS	GI10	
GI11. ¿Ud. se siente mejor informado hoy sobre la situación de derechos humanos que en 1996? 1. Sí, mejor 2. Lo mismo 3. No mejor 8. NS	GI11	
GI12. ¿Cree Ud. que los casos de violación de derechos humanos han sido resuelto 1. A su debido tiempo 2. Demasiado lento 8. NS	GI12	
URG21B7. ¿Ud. piensa que vale la pena votar, o que no vale porque a final de cuentas siempre es lo mismo? 1. Sí vale la pena 2. No vale la pena 8.NS	URG 21B7	
DM1. Considera Ud. que ¿En Nicaragua hay discriminación contra las mujeres? 1. Si 2. No 8. NS/NR	DM1	
DM1A. Según su opinión, ¿Cuál es el problema más importante que enfrentan las mujeres? [no leer alternativas] 1. Acoso sexual 2. Violencia intra-familiar 3. Les pagan menos que los hombres 4. Tienen menos oportunidades de trabajo Otro _____ 88. NS	DM1A	
DM1B. ¿Cuál de las siguientes organizaciones cree Ud. que es más eficaz en resolver los problemas de la mujer? 1. Instituto Nicaragüense de la Mujer (INIM) 2. Comisarías de la Mujer 3. Red de mujeres contra la violencia Otra _____ 88. NS	DM1B	
Ahora, vamos a hablar de las elecciones....		

VB1. ¿Estaba usted inscrito para votar en las pasadas elecciones? 1. Sí 2. No [pasar a VB6] 8. NS	VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales (octubre de 1996) ? 1. Sí 2. No [pasar a VB6] 8. NS		
VB3. [Si votó] ¿Por cuál partido votó por Presidente? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] 1. Alemán (Alianza Liberal, PLC y Aliados) 2. Ortega (FSLN) 6. Otro 3. Camino Cristiano Nicaragüense (C.C.N.) 7. Votó en nulo (blanco) 4. Partido Conservador 8. No responde, no quiere decir 5. MRS 9. No aplica (no votó)	VB3	
VB6. ¿Es Ud. miembro de algún partido político? 1. Sí 2. No 8. NR	VB6	
VBM. ¿Que tan importante es votar en las elecciones municipales? ¿Diría que es.... 1. Muy importante 2. Algo importante 3. No importante	VBM	
PP55. [PP2 en 1991]. Hay personas que trabajan por uno de los partidos o candidatos durante las campañas electorales. ¿Ha trabajado para algún candidato o partido en estas elecciones o en las pasadas? 1. Sí trabajó 2. No trabajo 8. NS/NR	PP55	
Q3. ¿Cual es su religión? 1. Católica (practicante) 2. Católica (no practicante) 3. Evangélica 4. Otra. 5. Ninguna	Q3	
¿Podría decirme si en su casa (o en su finca) tienen: [LEER TODOS]		
R1. Televisor a color? 0. No. 1. Uno 2. Dos o más 8. NS/NR	R1	
R2. Televisor en blanco y negro? 0. No. 1. Uno 2. Dos o más 8. NS/NR	R2	
R3. Refrigerador (Mantenedora)? 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R3	
R4. Teléfono? 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R4	
R5. Automóvil o camión? 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R5	
R6. Lavadora? 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R6	
R7. Horno de Microondas? 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R7	
R8. Motocicleta (Moto)? 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R8	
R9. Tractor? 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R9	
R10. Energía eléctrica 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R10	
R11. Agua potable 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R11	
R12. Piso de la habitación : 1. Tierra 2. Madera 3. Cemento, ladrillo, terrazo, embaldosado	R12	
R13. Bicicleta 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R13	
R14. Alcantarillado (o aguas negras) 0. No. 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R14	
R15. Recolección de Basura 0. No 1. Sí 8. NS/NR	R15	


OCUP1. ¿En que trabaja Ud.? (sondear para poder codificar entre las categorías abajo): Si desocupado(a), anotar ocupación normal. 1. Profesional (ingeniero, médico, enfermera, abogado, Profesor/maestro, contador, etc.) 2. Oficinista (sector público como secretaria) 3. Oficinista (sector privado, como secretaria) 4. Obrero de fabrica, otro trabajo físico urbano, transportista, vendedor ambulante 5. Obrero rural (trabajador agrícola) o pesquero 6. Dueño de finca (o trabaja en finca familiar) 10. Alquila tierra rural para cultivar 11. Dueño de negocio (tienda, restaurante, fabrica) 12. Estudiante 13. Ama de casa 14. Jubilado 15. Soldado o Policía 16. Empleado(a) doméstico(a) 17. Vive de rentas, rentista Otro: _____ 88.NS	OCUP1	
DESOC1 ¿Ha estado desocupado durante el último año? 0. No [Pasara a Q10] 1. Sí [Seguir con DEOC2] 9. Estudiante, ama de casa, jubilado	DESOC1	
DESOC2. [Para los que dicen Sí] ¿Por cuántas semanas durante el último año no ha tenido trabajo? _____ [01 = 1; 00= no fue desocupado; 52 = 1 año]	DESOC2	
Q10. En cual de los siguientes rangos ubicaría Ud. el ingreso total mensual de las personas de su hogar? [MOSTRAR TARJETA C] 0. Nada (ama de casa, desocupado) 5. De 1,001 a 1.500 1. Menos de 250 Córdobas 6. De 1,501 a 2,000 2. De 251 a 500 7. De 2,001 a 4,000 3. De 501 a 750 10. 4,001 y más 4. De 751 a 1,000 88. NS/NR (RECoger TARJETA C) 5. De 1,001 a 1,500	Q10	
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? 1. Soltero(a) 2. Casado(a) 3. Unión libre (unido(a); acompañado(a) 4. Divorciado(a) 5. Separado(a) 6. Viudo(a) 8. NS/NR	Q11	
Q12. ¿Cuántos hijos tiene Ud.? _____	Q12	
Hora terminada: HORA _____ : _____	Tiempo de entrevista: _____ MINUTOS	TI

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada acabo con la persona seleccionada.

Nombre del Entrevistador _____ Firma del Entrevistador _____

Fecha _____ Revisión del supervisor de campo _____

Tarjeta “A”



Tarjeta “B”

Aprueba	10
	9
	8
	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
	1
Desaprueba	

Tarjeta C.

- 0. Nada (ama de casa, desocupado)
- 1. Menos de 250 Córdobas
- 2. De 251 a 500
- 3. De 501 a 750
- 4. De 751 a 1,000
- 5. De 1,001-1,500
- 6. De 1,501 a 2,000
- 7. De 2,001 a 4,000
- 8. De 4,001 y más