The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America

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Summary. — Does democracy suffer when corruption is high? Unfortunately, most studies of corruption have been descriptive, making it difficult to develop a well-supported answer to this question. There are, of course, quantitative corruption measures, but the most popularly used of them are measures of corruption perception aggregated at the national level, rather than corruption experience at the individual level. It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the impact of corruption from such data. This paper proposes a corruption–victimization measure based on a survey research approach to the measurement problem, and discusses (in a non-technical fashion) its strengths and limitations. The paper then presents data from studies conducted by the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), and demonstrates the impact of corruption victimization on belief in the legitimacy of the political system, a critical element in democratic political stability.

Key words — corruption, Latin America, survey research, democracy

1. CORRUPTION AS A THREAT TO DEMOCRACY: IS THERE A LINK?

Widespread corruption is increasingly seen as one of the most significant threats to deepening democratization in Latin America (and indeed much of the democratizing Third World). In a recent study, Weyland (1998) views that democracies in Latin America are threatened by an exponential growth in corruption that has occurred since the dictators of the past have left the scene. He argues forcefully that corruption has increased a great deal under democracy in Latin America, and points to several factors that are responsible for the increase. First, he argues that the dispersion of power in the hands of many (as has occurred as dictatorships have been replaced by democracies) has widened the opportunity for bribery. In effect, there are many more “veto players” today than those under the military, and therefore, there has been an increase in the number of palms that need to be greased. Second, neoliberal reforms have involved opening many areas of the economy to bribery, especially those involving sales of public corporations. Third, the increasing numbers of neopopulist leaders, who win elections based on personal appeals through television, are driving aspiring politicians to corrupt practices in order to collect the funds needed to pay for TV time.

How might corruption threaten democratization? This is the link that has not yet been specified, but this paper attempts to do so. Many claims have been made that corruption is bad for democratization, but most of those are impressionistic. Case studies, especially that of Venezuela, are suggestive. In that country, the two mainstream political parties that had shared political power for decades were swept aside by a populist candidate (and former military man). It has been argued that the fundamental cause was public outrage over the widely perceived corruption of the traditional party system (Canache, 2002; Canache & Kulischek, 1998). The upshot has been severe social
turmoil, an ephemeral coup d’etat, and, most importantly, a steady weakening of democratic guarantees (especially the separation of powers) in that country. At the same time, it is also true that over a decade of abysmal economic performance also had weakened support for the mainstream parties, so one cannot be certain if corruption played a central role in the decline of democracy in Venezuela. Moving beyond case studies, there is limited cross-national research that links corruption and democracy, but the causal arrows have been reversed. One key study (Treisman, 2000), for example, has shown that over the long run, democratic countries become less corrupt, but the reverse has not been shown, namely, that highly corrupt countries experience weakened democratization or even democratic breakdown.

Perhaps the most extensive empirical study to date on the relationship between corruption and democratization is the work of della Porta. In a series of papers focused on European countries, corruption has been shown to decrease satisfaction with democracy (della Porta, 2000; della Porta & Mény, 1996). More recent work, looking at Latin America, has also pointed to weakening of democracy as a result of corruption (Gingerich, 2004). In Japan, Pharr (2000) has shown that corruption by public officials lowers public confidence in democracy. And in Italy, research has shown that voters can punish corrupt politicians, although they do not always do so (Golden & Chang, 2001, 2004).

These studies, while certainly suggestive of a link between corruption and democratic weakening, suffer from a number of weaknesses, as this paper discusses below. In particular, there are two main difficulties: First, the studies focus on the perception of corruption rather than acts of corruption themselves, thus leaving open the possibility that even if corruption is at low levels, if perception is that it is high, democracy could be weakened. Second, and more important, the studies do not demonstrate the mechanism by which corruption could impact democracy. This paper, by developing a corruption—victimization measure at the level of the individual and by showing how corruption victimization erodes belief in the legitimacy of the political system, hopes to draw the link more tightly.

The specific argument made in this paper is that corruption weakens democracy by undermining citizen trust in their regimes, in effect, delegitimizing them. Once that happens, citizens can seek alternatives to democracy, through support for the return of military rule, or through support for populist but anti-democratic figures such as Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Unlike dictatorships, that can employ almost unlimited coercion to stay in power, democracies rely on popular legitimacy to stay in power, as Lipset and others have argued (Easton, 1975; Kornberg & Clarke, 1992; Lipset, 1961). If Weyland is right, and corruption is on the rise, one can expect that the nascent democracies in Latin America, and by extension the democratizing world, will have an even greater difficulty in establishing and retaining their right to govern. One of the major limitations that authoritarian regimes have in establishing their own legitimacy is that more often than not they operate as kleptocracies, in which the state is corrupt to its core, and citizens know it. In a similar fashion, democracies, based as they are on expectations of accountability, may weaken their own legitimacy when corruption is rampant.

Is there evidence for this linkage between corruption and the erosion of legitimacy? In fact, the classic research in the field, widely respected for many years, argued persuasively for precisely the reverse relationship. From that point of view, corruption serves a very constructive purpose in developing countries by establishing functional clientelistic ties that bind constituents to public officials, allowing relatively low-cost circumvention of dysfunctional bureaucracies. In that way, corruption was seen as having a positive impact on political systems. As Huntington (1968, p. 69) put it most succinctly in this classic statement: “the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized honest bureaucracy.” The view that corruption helps “grease the wheels” of dysfunctional bureaucracies is prominent not only in the work of Huntington and classic works such as V.O. Key’s Southern Politics published in 1949, but also in many more recent studies (Heidenheimer, Johnston, & LeVine, 1989). In short, according to this view, corruption is just what the doctor ordered for the Third World.

Is this argument accurate and does corruption help “grease the wheels” of the public bureaucracy, thus making it more agile, functional, and most importantly more responsive to public demands? If it does, then one would expect that more corruption would lead to greater accountability and a public that is more satisfied with the political system.
More recent research, empirically based, takes the opposite approach, one that is consistent with international donor concerns that corruption is not only unhelpful, but it can do serious damage to both economic growth and democratic development (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Unfortunately, there are few empirically based studies on the subject, and the ones that do exist, do not test corruption itself, but only perceptions of corruption. One study on 10 Central and Eastern European countries and Russia supports the linkage, finding that greater perceived corruption relates to lower trust in democratic institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). A more recent study (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003), based on 16 countries, including the United States, Japan, New Zealand, and countries in Western and Eastern Europe, concludes that “corruption undermines citizens’ faith in their governments.” In the present paper, these findings will be supported, but with a direct measure of corruption experienced by individuals who live in the countries being studied rather than with an index of perception of the degree of corruption constructed by external observers.

In order to establish the linkage between corruption and the erosion of support for democracy, the paper dwells on the issue of the measurement of corruption. Early on in the international efforts to increase transparency to fight corruption, it became evident that in order to know precisely where to expend resources and how to measure the degree of program success, it was going to be very important to be able to measure the magnitude of corruption. However, unlike programs in other areas—for example, health, where there are universally accepted objective indicators like infant mortality rates and life expectancy—there is not as yet any universally accepted standard for measuring corruption. But, unless it is known how much corruption there is, whether it is increasing or declining, little can be done to target efforts to reduce it.

In the absence of reliable data on corruption, it is difficult to target anti-corruption spending. More important, perhaps, it is that without reliable and specific information on corruption, one cannot determine what impact, if any, anti-corruption efforts are having, which is, after all, “the bottom line.”

Although constrained by the limited space available in the format dictated by these short research notes, this paper will respond to the challenge of developing better measures of corruption in the following six sections:

1. A brief examination of the widespread use of corruption perception measure;
2. a discussion of an alternative measure of corruption experience;
3. an exploration into the level of corruption detected by the corruption-victimization series, using data from several countries drawn from the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP);
4. an examination of the data to find out who the victims of corruption are;
5. a discussion of the research that hypothesizes about the positive and negative effects of corruption on governance, providing evidence that shows just how dangerous corruption is for democratic consolidation, that is, that corruption matters;
6. and finally, the paper will show how corruption levels vary substantially within countries.

2. THE CHALLENGE: MEASURING CORRUPTION

It is not surprising that, until recently, corruption research has been largely descriptive rather than empirical. Given its sub rosa nature, corruption is inherently an extremely difficult phenomenon to measure—thus presenting a large obstacle for those researchers attempting to study it. In other areas of development, it is easy to have participants or outsiders list accomplishments. For example, health workers can report on the number of vaccines administered or healthy babies delivered. We cannot ask, however, for police officers to report on the number of bribes they take in a given week or for customs officials to report on how much duty goes uncollected. The need to get some handle on the level of corruption has led, over the years, to pursuing different approaches to solving this problem, but each approach has suffered from its own limitations.

The early efforts were based on official police and court records. One simply counted the number of arrests and convictions for corruption in a given country. The main difficulty with that approach, of course, was the spuriousness of the measure; the more vigilant the authorities, the more arrests and convictions, producing a corruption index that was almost completely independent of the corruption level itself. For example, in highly corrupt countries, there may be virtually no enforcement, and
therefore, very little corruption is reported, while in “squeaky clean” countries, there may be frequent arrests and convictions for even minor infractions. For the most part, this approach has been abandoned.

In order to overcome the measurement problem inherent in using official records, two newer approaches have been taken—each with its own limitations, however. The first is that carried out by Berlin-based Transparency International (TI) with its annual highly respected and widely used corruption–perception index (CPI). TI is dedicated to generating public support for anti-corruption programs and enhancing transparency and accountability in government. In recent years, the index has been greatly strengthened due to the use of multiple sources of data and multi-year averages, thus increasing the reliability of the measure. The CPI remains the most widely used measure of corruption, akin to the Freedom House measure of democracy. Most economists rely upon the CPI when they examine the impact of corruption on growth and investment.

The results of the TI index for Latin America in 2002 are shown in Figure 1. The index ranges from a high of 10, in which the country is considered to be “highly clean” to a 0, for countries that are considered to be “highly corrupt.” The 2002 report ranks 102 countries, and finds 70 countries—including many of the world’s most poverty stricken—that score less than 5 out of a possible 10. For comparison, it is important to note that the countries with a score of higher than 9 are Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Iceland, Singapore, and Sweden. As seen in Figure 1, no Latin American country scores that high, with Chile scoring the highest, 7.5. Only one other country scores above 5, Uruguay (at 5.1), while all other Latin American countries do worse, placing them among the bottom 70 countries out of the 102 on the list. It is obvious from this information that corruption in Latin America, at least as measured by the TI perception index, is a serious problem.

As illuminating as these results may seem to be, we need to consider their limitations. The scores are based upon a series of surveys conducted by different organizations and include a measure from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Pricewaterhouse Cooper’s Opacity Index, and data from Freedom House. These data sources rely heavily upon the impressions of international business people, who are reasonably good, albeit limited, sources of data. The great strength of these data sources is also a weakness—they tap into the perceptions of individuals engaged in international business and thus are good at evaluating business trans-
actions, but they are weak at tapping into the whole range of activities pursued by the citizens of the countries being evaluated. These activities are not business related and thus require a different kind of data. Moreover, a problem with data from such sources is that it is difficult to separate stereotyping from reality. These indexes do not attempt to report on how frequently bribery actually occurs in the countries being studied but on how corrupt the respondents perceive the countries to be. Of course, this may be based on their own experience or on what they happened to have heard about a specific country. Consider Paraguay—long considered by most experts on Latin America to be an endemically corrupt country. It is also a country with very little foreign investment and very few international business arrangements. According to the World Bank, for example, net private capital inflows for Paraguay in 2000 was a negative $16 million and total foreign direct investment was only $82 million in an economy with a GDP of $6.9 billion. Foreign direct investment in Paraguay amounts to only about 1% of the GDP, a level only one-sixth of that of its neighbor Brazil. How many of the respondents in the surveys of business people used by the data sources whose perceptions were incorporated into the CPI had actually conducted business in Paraguay? The chances are, not many. Rather it is likely that the ratings of Paraguay are based largely upon a stereotype which may or may not be closely linked to reality. Furthermore, while TI draws on 15 different sources for its data, Paraguay's results emerge from consulting only three sources because so few data sources have a large enough sampling of business people to enable Paraguay to be given a score. Finland, on the other hand, with a population nearly identical to that of Paraguay, was rated by eight sources. Indeed, an inspection of the number of sources used for Latin American countries as a whole reveals that, with the exception of the largest and richest, most were rated by only a handful of sources, raising doubts about the reliability of the information.

A further complication with the CPI is that it may suffer from an "endogeneity problem." That is, the results of the CPI may be strongly influenced by factors other than direct observation by participants. Consider the case of Argentina. In 1995, when Argentina was the darling of the development community, having progressed rapidly in its privatization programs, it was scored at 5.2 on a 0-to-10 scale by TI. By 2002, however, the Argentine economy was in ruins, and its score had plummeted to 2.8. If Argentina had retained its 1995 corruption score, it would have been ranked second in all of Latin America and near the top of the developing world. But by 2002, it had fallen into the bottom half in Latin America. Was that precipitous fall in the index, reflecting a putative increase in corruption, a function of a sudden real increase in corruption or did those who responded to the CPI surveys begin to note a discrepancy between low economic performance and the TI score of reasonably low levels of corruption? If so, it may well be that corruption levels were, in reality, not much different in 2002 than they had been in 1995 but that respondents to the TI surveys felt the need to adjust their corruption scores to match the level of Argentina’s economic performance. In other words, it is likely that the TI corruption measure on Argentina declined not because corruption increased, but because the poor performance of the economy told observers that corruption must be higher than they thought it had been. On the other hand, if we assume that the TI index for Argentina was actually picking up on a sudden increase in corruption over the period 1995–2002, then this would imply that decelerated growth actually increased corruption. However, the logic of the research from the World Bank and others has been just the opposite; namely, that high levels of corruption retard growth. If poor economic performance is the cause of corruption rather than the other way around, then anti-corruption programs would be irrelevant since the “fix” for corruption would be to spur economic growth.

In recent years, a very widely used alternative to the TI measure has emerged from the World Bank Institute, which has been releasing a series of “governance indicators” that include a measure of “control of corruption.” These indicators are widely cited as the best available measures of national governance. The results for Latin America are shown in Figure 2. Do we learn something new from these data that we did not know from the TI measure? It is obvious from comparison with the TI results shown in Figure 1 that the two scores correspond very closely. Indeed, the rank–order correlation (Spearman’s rho) between the two measures is an almost perfect 0.96. Rarely do the social sciences produce such consistent results in indexes based on perception, and we
are left with the impression of great precision of measurement in these two apparently independent sources. Careful examination of the two data sources reveals, however, that they rely on most of the very same sources from which they derive their indexes, explaining why they arrive at similar conclusions. The problems noted with the CPI, then, are also to be found in the World Bank Institute ‘control of corruption’ measure.

The lesson from this examination of TI’s CPI and the World Bank Institute’s Corruption-Control Index is that one ought to interpret their results with care, while recognizing that they are probably the best measures currently available for a worldwide ranking. If a general notion of the level of corruption in a country is needed, these measures are, at least for the moment, the best source. They allow international agencies to target the countries with the highest levels of corruption and, of course, can provide an important tool for investors who want to know what they are likely to confront if they invest in a specific country. Unfortunately, however, the measures are of limited utility for much of what anti-corruption programs are trying to accomplish in transparency and anti-corruption programs because they provide only a national aggregate measure, with no breakdowns by type or locus of corruption. These measures do not reveal, for any of the countries, those who are most likely to be affected by corruption—making it very difficult to design a cost-effective anti-corruption strategy. Similarly, an aggregate measure for a country does not allow development practitioners to measure the impact of specific anti-corruption programs. Equally frustrating, the TI and WBI measures are limited in that they are presented as relative scores (i.e., ranks and percentiles).

Consider the situation where the worldwide trend is toward improvement, and an individual country has done better from one year to the next; if others have also improved, the impression will be given that the country in question has stagnated. Moreover, the aggregate, nationwide measures make it impossible to know if corruption does in fact erode confidence in the political system, as the World Bank argues, or if it has the positive impacts that Huntington claimed for it. Moreover, national aggregate measures of corruption do not allow for an examination of regions or groupings within a country. It is risky to assume that corruption is uniform throughout a country, and the data presented in this paper will show that it is in fact not. If anti-corruption programs want to target certain geographic hot spots of corruption, for example, then national aggregate measures like the CPI are not helpful. If such programs want to target certain groups demographically, socioeconomically, or occupationally, the CPI cannot help.

How to solve the problem of finding a measure of corruption that is both valid and subnational? A new approach has been taken by Harvard’s Susan Pharr, who constructs an index based on newspaper reports of corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2001 Score</th>
<th>2002 Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>8.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>8.00</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>5.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>Honduras</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1.26</td>
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Figure 2. World Bank Institute Corruption-Control Index, 2001/2002.
One advantage of this method is that the newspaper articles report where the corruption occurred and who was involved. Unfortunately, this measure alone cannot overcome the problem of validity. The accusations reported in the articles may be entirely the invention of the newspaper staff, whose motivations for making the accusation may vary from a desire to increase circulation to an effort to weaken one party or candidate and strengthen another. Indeed, the newspaper may publish stories on alleged acts of corruption because the paper is “on the take” from some political or business group that wants to make its opponents look bad. The classic example of this comes from Mexico, where Excelsior, for decades regarded as the “newspaper of record” in that country, was subsequently found to have been on the payroll of the PRI (the ruling party) for decades.

3. MEASURING CORRUPTION VICTIMIZATION

Recently, a more promising method has been developed that largely overcomes both of the limitations of the previously mentioned methods. The new approach has been inspired by crime-victimization surveys, which have become the mainstay of sociological investigation into crime. Criminologists have long recognized that official reports of crime are highly unreliable because of the likelihood that the data have been manipulated. Police chiefs who want new patrol cars from their local governments have a strong incentive to help justify the request by providing “evidence” that a crime wave has hit the town. To develop this evidence, the police chief may tell his/her officers to become especially aggressive when enforcing the law, or it may be that the figures themselves have been cooked. Alternatively, politicians who want new patrol cars from their local governments have a strong incentive to help make it appear that crime is on the wane, and salary raises for the police force might subtly be made contingent upon less aggressive policing.

In order to overcome these intractable problems, criminologists have increasingly come to rely upon victimization surveys, which are widely regarded as providing a more accurate tally of crime rates. That approach is the inspiration for the current movement to use surveys of national populations to estimate corruption levels. Internationally, this approach has been spearheaded by the UN Center for International Crime Prevention. Implemented in 1987, the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) now includes 55 countries, with samples of between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents per country. In 1996, for the first time, a question was included in the surveys on bribe victimization.

The UN approach represented a good start, but a broader series of questions is to be preferred since anti-corruption projects need much more detailed information about the nature and level of corruption than a single question could provide. That is precisely the reason behind the approach that the LAPOP began applying in 1996 and the World Bank began using in 1998. These efforts, which may also incidentally ask about perception of corruption, focus on actual citizen experience (i.e., victimization) with public sector corruption. A review of the approach used by the World Bank has been presented as a conference paper (Kaufmann, 1998). The World Bank studies have been carried out in Nicaragua, Honduras, and, more recently, Ecuador, and, by 2003, have been carried out in many other countries around the world. The World Bank surveys generally include samples of the national public, but also include specialized samples of “service users” and of government officials. In that way, they are able to get at corruption from a variety of angles. Moreover, the World Bank has made efforts to calculate the cost of corruption by asking respondents to indicate the value of the bribe solicited or paid. The World Bank surveys, however, do not include questions on attitudes toward democracy, thus making it impossible to see how corruption might affect democracy.

The effort has been to measure corruption and its impact. Corruption is measured by direct personal experience with it. In the course of a public opinion survey of democratic values and behaviors, which is generally applied to a probability sample (i.e., “random sample”) of the country being studied, a module of questions on corruption experience has been developed and refined since its first application in 1996. In this approach, respondents are asked a series of questions recording their experience with corruption over the year immediately prior to the survey. A study of longer time frames can be attempted, but not only is the reliability of memory over long periods problematic, it is also especially important to limit the time frame so that the impact of
anti-corruption projects and programs can be picked up in subsequent measurements. These surveys, then, include both the key “independent variable” (i.e., corruption victimization) and the key “dependent variable” (i.e., trust in the system of government) so that the impact of the former on the latter can be measured, controlling for other factors (e.g., respondent income, education, gender, region, party affiliation, etc.).

The forms of corruption measured were decided upon based on focus groups and were ones that were found to be most commonly experienced in Latin America. The items have varied from questionnaire to questionnaire, but the following questions are common to a number of them:

— being stopped by a police officer for a trumped-up infraction of the law;
— being asked to pay a bribe \(^8\) to a police officer;
— observing a bribe being paid to a police officer;
— observing a bribe being paid to a public official;
— being asked to pay a bribe to a public official;
— being asked to pay an illegal fee to expedite a transaction at the municipal government;
— being asked to pay a bribe at work;
— being asked to pay a bribe in the court system;
— paying bribes to a public utility to avoid paying the full bill;
— being asked to pay a bribe in the school system; and
— being asked to pay a bribe for services in the public health/hospital system.

The reader will note that most of the items in the series focus on corruption directly experienced by the respondents but that some of them focus on the respondents’ observations when bribes were being paid by others. We have labeled this as “indirect” or “vicarious” corruption. In each country where the survey has been applied, it was found that direct, personal experience with corruption is less frequent than indirect or vicarious experiences. The reason for this could be that individuals may be underreporting their own experience with corruption out of fear that reporting it could get them into some sort of legal trouble. Focus-group research has shown that an underreporting problem exists but is surprisingly limited. On the other hand, saying that one observed someone else paying a bribe might be a way of actually reporting one’s own bribery experience with the advantage of deniability. Yet, it may be possible that these reports of observed acts of corruption could be inflated—reporting more on perception than reality. In analyzing the data in this paper, the focus is almost entirely on the direct forms of corruption.

A second observation about the series of questions relates to corruption in schools and in public health. Focus-group research demonstrated that users of these services tend to be very well aware of the rules of the game. If, for example, primary education is supposed to be free, many citizens consider it corrupt behavior if fees are demanded by the teachers, even if the purpose of the fee is to purchase books or supplies that ought to come from the state. For that reason, the original questionnaire series referred to “improper payments” in the schools or health clinics. However, some critics of these questions suggested that these payments were not really signs of corruption but merely a reflection of the poor state of public financing of human services. In order to focus directly on corruption itself, these items have been altered in the most recent administrations of the questionnaire, and the term “improper payments” was dropped and “bribes” substituted. This change resulted in a small decline in reported acts of corruption in the health service and a somewhat larger decline of reported acts of corruption in the school system. Yet, even with these adjustments the levels remain distressingly high, as will be shown below.

The analysis of the corruption–victimization data has been carried out in two ways. First, when the particular form of corruption is the focus (in order, perhaps, to develop an anti-corruption campaign targeted to each specific form of corruption), individual items are chosen to be analyzed so that the particular form of corruption can be highlighted. The second approach is to form an overall scale of corruption so that the total experiences can be examined and linked to their impact on individual variables, such as political legitimacy. When formed as a scale, the items have been found to be reliable (Cronbach Alphas of around 0.75, depending on the country).

In approach to corruption victimization presented here, national samples have been used. The World Bank, however, which has also carried out national samples of corruption victimization, has included specialized samples of individuals in various sectors, such as the business world or various sectors of the state. The
advantage of the World Bank approach is that it allows an even finer-grained targeting of anti-corruption efforts; the disadvantage, of course, is cost.

(a) Limitations of the corruption–victimization measure

No system of measuring attitudes or behaviors is without limitations, and the corruption–victimization measure suffers from two of them, which will be pointed out here.

—Are all survey respondents who report having paid a bribe really “victims?” Perhaps some bribe payers are not victims at all but in fact are willing participants in the transaction, deliberately seeking to circumvent rules and regulations in order to advance their own objectives. Such individuals, then, may not be “victims” but willing “clients” in a patron/client relationship with the bribe taker. On the other hand, if the system were both fair and efficient, there would be little reason for citizens to become clients. If the police did not regularly stop motorists in Latin America who have done nothing wrong, then there would be no reason to offer to pay a bribe. Similarly, in instances when the motorist actually commits a traffic infraction and seeks to avoid a ticket and the corresponding fine, an honest police officer would not demand or accept a bribe. If the public sector were both fair and efficient, individuals could easily obtain the service they are seeking (e.g., a permit from the local government) and there would be no need to pay a bribe. Additionally, if one sought to avoid paying a large, legally established fee for a service and the public officials were honest, no bribe would be accepted. In short, while it is always possible to view corruption “victims” as corruption “partners,” bribery would be largely futile if not for the inefficiency and complicity of a corrupt public sector.

—The survey approach is flawed because it measures only low-level corruption, but is incapable of measuring much high-level corruption. This critique is valid, but only to a limited degree. It is true that surveys of the public do not measure—nor do they attempt to measure—high-level corruption (e.g., bribes paid to ministers or legislators). But, it would be a serious error to assume that low-level corruption is not strongly correlated with the degree of corruption at the top. It is simply not reasonable to imagine that a political system that is very corrupt at the level of day-to-day transactions (police, local government, schools, banks, etc.) would be squeaky clean at the top. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine the reverse situation with a highly corrupt senior administration combined with an absence of corruption down on the street. Since there seems to be no reasonable way to directly measure high-level corruption (rather, only the perception of that corruption), the victimization approach used by the Latin American Public Opinion may be the best instrument currently available.

(b) Perception and corruption victimization: Are they linked?

The corruption–victimization surveys always also ask at least one question regarding the respondent’s perception of corruption and therefore provide for a test of the putative linkage between corruption perception (the basis of the TI CPI) and the fact of corruption as experienced by residents of the countries included in the TI series. Are the two linked? Yes and no. By examining Figure 3, one can see that as corruption victimization increases, there is a significant increase in the perception of corruption on the part of individuals in the countries included in this series. Yet, it is important not to overstate this finding because on a 0–100 scale, for all four countries in this sample, all averages are in the 60–70 range for respondents who have not had any direct personal corruption experiences within the 12 months prior to their being surveyed. In other words, even though respondents to these surveys have not been personally affected by corruption, at least in the year prior to the survey, they nonetheless generally view corruption as being extensive in their countries. In contrast (with the exception of Paraguay), even among those who had been victimized two or more times in the past year, the increase in the level of perception of corruption is quite small, generally fewer than 10 points on a 100-point scale. More troubling still for those who wish to rely on corruption perception is the case of El Salvador, where those who had experienced the highest frequency of corruption had a somewhat lower perception of the degree of corruption than those who had been victimized only one time.

These findings caution us to be very careful when estimating corruption on the basis of
perception rather than experience since the two may not have a close fit. Moreover, in countries in which a major effort to reduce corruption has been successful, it may well be that the campaign to do so heightens awareness of corrupt practices and therefore might produce an increase in the perception of corruption precisely at the time when actual corruption is declining. The point becomes even more obvious in Figure 4, where a direct effort was made to see how a perception-based measure tracks with actual corruption experience. As is evident from the results, although corruption varies substantially from country to country in the six-country sample, perception has only a weak relationship to victimization levels. If one were to use perception as the measure, for example, one would conclude that there is more corruption in El Salvador than in Bolivia, when in fact it is very clearly the other way around. The actual TI ranking for these countries does correctly show that Bolivia is worse than El Salvador, but while Bolivia scores 2.2 on the 1–10 scale (see Figure 4), El Salvador scores only slightly better at 3.4. The corruption–victimization scale in Figure 4 shows that Bolivia has a level of corruption more than four times that of El Salvador.

However, these comparisons do not make the indexes generated by TI and the World Bank obsolete, as they are the only ones currently available for many countries. When using these broad measures for specific developmental purposes, however, considerable care must be taken or these measures of perception could become reified.

(c) Corruption victimization in six Latin American countries

(i) How frequent is it?

The surveys of Latin America reveal that corruption is widespread and emerging in many different forms, some more frequently experienced than others. This paper, which can only highlight a small portion of the data because of space limitations, focuses on direct corruption victimization rather than observed corruption.

One very common way in which corruption affects Latin Americans is through the very officials who should be involved in controlling it—namely, the police force. The results shown in Figure 5 reveal that over one in four Bolivians have been stopped annually by a police officer and asked to pay a bribe. In contrast, this happens to only 3% of the population of El Salvador. Respondents in these countries were also asked about being asked to pay a bribe by a public official, and the comparative results are shown in Figure 6. Once again, consider the extremes—El Salvador has a 4% corruption–vic-
timization rate and Bolivia has a 28% rate. But also consider the consistency with which the countries are ordered; the only difference between bribes solicited by police and bribes solicited by the more generic “public employees” is that in the later instance, data are available from Paraguay, which is found to have corruption levels somewhat lower than Bolivia but higher than Ecuador. The overall pattern that emerges here is the large gap in corruption victimization between Central America and South America, with the former being far lower than the latter.

The survey also collected information on instances of corruption in specific settings. For example, respondents were asked questions about being asked to pay a bribe at work (Figure 7). What is striking about these results is
how much lower they are than those of public-sector corruption (compare with figures above). It might be assumed that these low levels are a function of the fact that significant percentages of respondents are not employed (i.e., students, retired, unemployed) and thus did not have the opportunity to be subjected to work-place bribery. If, however, the analysis is limited to employed respondents, corruption levels do increase, but not by much, leading to the con-
clusion that corruption in the workplace is simply not as common as it is in interactions with the public sector (as shown in Figures 5 and 6). Bribery in the courts varies widely from country to country (as shown in Figure 8). In places like El Salvador, it seems to be very uncommon, whereas in Paraguay, it is very frequent.  

Recently, the World Bank Institute has been focusing on bribery at the level of users of services. In the questions analyzed thus far, all citizens are, at least in some fashion, users of police services. But not all (or even most) citizens make use of the court system. In order to focus on users of public services, the LAPOP has recently been adding questions to its survey. The respondents are first asked if they use the service, and then they are asked if they have had to pay a bribe to use that service. Questions have been asked regarding bribery when carrying out a transaction at the local municipal government, using the court system, sending children to public schools, and accessing a public health service (e.g., clinics and hospitals). The results for Ecuador are shown in Figure 9 and are very disturbing. It should be kept in mind that Ecuador has already shown itself to be a high-corruption country, at least when compared to Central America, based on the LAPOP data and also when considered from the World Bank Institute perspective (Ecuador ranks last in Latin America on corruption control in the World Bank data). The survey results for Ecuador show that one-fifth of its adult citizens who carry out a transaction with the local government pay bribes when doing so, over one-quarter of the users of courts have been asked to pay bribes, and over one-third who use public health services and two-fifths of users of public education facilities pay bribes there.  

These results are disheartening as they indicate that those who use a public service in Latin America need to expect to be asked to pay a bribe.

(d) Who are the victims? Variation within countries

Victimization by corruption is not uniform across the populations of the countries in which it occurs. On the whole, males are much more likely to be victimized by corruption than females. As shown in Figure 10, for the general item on having a public employee solicit a bribe, in every country except Honduras, males are significantly more likely to be corruption victims than females. In El Salvador, although the overall level of corruption is relatively low, the gap is proportionately very wide. However, this is largely because males make greater use of many public services than females. As
shown in Figure 11, in Ecuador, where the survey data make it possible to focus on the subset of service users, the gender gap is much narrower and males are not significantly more likely to be victimized than females in Ecuador (among users of the municipality, courts, and health services) but only somewhat more likely to be victimized by the school system.

Those seeking bribes know where to find the “deep pockets.” Figure 12 shows that as income increases, the probability of being a corruption victim increases sharply. Those with higher incomes are two or three times more likely to be victimized by corruption than those with low incomes. Of course, those with higher incomes invariably have more business to transact, more permits and permissions to request, and as a result, come into more frequent contact with the public bureaucracy. Indeed, they may be more likely to be seeking
ways to pay bribes in order to acquire a given service. At the highest income levels, victimization seems to taper off, at least in Ecuador and Paraguay, perhaps because the individuals involved are wealthy enough to be able to use political influence to achieve what they need out of the system and do not have to confront outright bribery. It may also be that at the highest level of income in the survey, respondents have more to hide, and therefore they reduce their reporting of corruption. Since the surveys do not measure the dollar value of bribes, it may be that while the rich pay bribes more frequently than the poor, that the relative cost to them is lower than it is for the poor, making bribery regressive. This has been a finding of the World Bank.

There is also a life-cycle effect that determines who the corruption victims are likely to be. Typically, the youngest respondents in the surveys are somewhat less likely to be corruption victims. Once they move out of their parents’
homes and set up their own families, however, they have greater contact with the bureaucracy, and corruption victimization increases. On the other hand, once Latin Americans age and begin to withdraw from active engagement with the larger society, corruption victimization falls. In El Salvador (Figure 13), corruption victimization peaks abruptly in the 21–30 year age group, and then falls off sharply. In Bolivia (Figure 14), where there are much higher overall levels of corruption than El Salvador, the peak is also reached in the 20s but continues high until middle age, when it then falls sharply.

Although there are many other demographic and socioeconomic patterns that corruption victimization follows—a number of which are found in the various country-focused reports
of the LAPOP—only one remaining key finding will be covered in this brief overview. Urbanization greatly increases exposure to corruption. In Bolivia, corruption is much higher in urban areas than it is anywhere else in the country (Figure 15). In Honduras, the same pattern is found, but in this case, the results compare three different measures of corruption: hearing or observing corruption, being a victim, and a combined index. All three measures show the same general pattern (Figure 16).

The findings from Honduras in the figure provide clear guidance to those who wish to examine sub-national variation in corruption. Even though both Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula are the country’s only large urban areas, the corruption victimization in the Tegucigalpa area, the seat of the central government, is far

![Figure 15. Corruption victimization and urbanization: Bolivia.](image1)

![Figure 16. Corruption victimization and urbanization: Honduras.](image2)
higher than that found in San Pedro Sula. The appropriate conclusion from this finding is that it is not urbanization per se but the presence of government that has had the major impact on corruption levels. But, it is important not to lose sight of other factors, including regional traditions that influence the level of corruption. It has already been shown, for example, that corruption victimization varies by age and income, and other reports in the series have shown that it varies by wealth as well. What happens when all of these factors are controlled for, and corruption levels are examined net of them? Figure 17, which shows graphical variation in corruption in Nicaragua, reveals that there is a hot spot that includes the country’s capital, Managua. But it is also clear that regional traditions play a role; otherwise, it would be impossible to explain the very low level of corruption victimization in the department of León, which borders on Managua, and the high level of corruption in the department of Chinandega on its other border. It is also clear that regional traditions matter in Bolivia, where the department of Oruro has higher corruption levels than the national capital, La Paz. The results shown in Figure 18 are presented along with their “confidence intervals,” which is really the margin of error produced by the sample. This means that the average corruption score shown for each department, represented by the square box, is surrounded by a band above and below the point that represents the range in which, 95% of the time, the actual average would be found if the survey had interviewed the entire population. Confidence intervals help distinguish differences among departments that are merely a function of the sample design and those that are true differences. Thus, as Figure 18 demonstrates, for example, Oruro and La Paz have significantly more corruption than El Beni, but Cochabamba’s confidence interval overlaps that of La Paz, and therefore, the two should be assumed to be insignificantly different from each other.

An overall pattern emerges in these findings; those who use the public sector more frequently are more likely to be victimized by it. This seems to be a trivial truism, until one pauses to think about the impact this has on the political system—the more Latin Americans use their government the more likely they are to be victimized by it. The implications for eroding public confidence are obvious and will be shown empirically below.

Figure 17. Corruption experience in Nicaragua: residuals controlled for age, income, education, and wealth.
4. CORRUPTION ERODES POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

One of the most frequently heard comments is that corruption erodes trust and confidence in the political system. Typical of those who decry the negative effects of corruption, the World Bank frequently argues the thesis, “Corruption violates the public trust and corrodes social capital... Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy.” (World Bank, 1997, pp. 102–104). Unfortunately, although the Bank presented substantial evidence that corruption negatively affects the economy, it provided no support for the claims that minor corruption (or even major corruption) erodes political legitimacy. While the Bank has presented a great deal of evidence on the level of the independent variable (corruption), it has presented no corresponding evidence on the dependent variable (political legitimacy). The more recent World Bank Institute studies, as reported above, use a multi-index measure of governance, including perceptions of corruption worldwide, and have found that per capita incomes are lower and infant mortality and adult illiteracy are higher when governance is poor (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 1999). Yet once again, there is no effort to link corruption on the one hand and political legitimacy on the other.

Corruption surveys, though embryonic, appear to be the most promising of the efforts undertaken to date to test the corruption/erosion of the legitimacy thesis. As discussed in this study, these surveys obtain corruption experience data at the level of the individual while simultaneously obtaining information from those same individuals about their belief in the legitimacy of their government. The analytical task, then, becomes searching for the connections between corruption experience and legitimacy beliefs after appropriate control variables are introduced.

Latin America, where currently there is extensive attention focused on corruption, is a good place to test the hypothesized relationship between corruption and legitimacy for two reasons (Tulchin & Espach, 2000). First, as shown at the outset of this paper, this is a region of the world frequently found to have high levels of corruption. Second, Latin America has long had problems of political stability, suffering a seemingly endless succession of coups through much of its history (Seligson & Carrión, 2002). If, as Easton (1975) and also Lipset (1994) and Lipset and Lenz (2000) have argued, legitimacy is a fundamental requisite for democratic stability, then it is plausible that legitimacy is questionable in many Latin American countries. From an empirical point of view, considerable evidence exists to show that legitimacy levels remain low in many countries in
the region despite 10 or more years of democratic rule (Seligson, 2000).

Legitimacy is measured in the surveys by a scale of diffuse support attempting to tap into confidence in the key institutions of government (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982; Seligson, 1983). The scale is based on five items, each scored on a metric of 1–7. The items, initially developed in studies of Germany and the United States and refined in several studies of Latin America, sought to tap into generalized support for the basic institutions of government rather than support for the incumbent government (Muller, Seligson, & Turan, 1987). Respondents were asked (1) “To what extent do the courts guarantee a fair trial?” (2) “How much respect do you have for the political institutions of the country?” (3) “How much pride do you feel living under the political system of the country?” (4) “How much support do you have for the political system of the country?” and (5) “How much trust do you have in the police?” In order to make the metric consistent with the range of the corruption-experience measure, the items were summed into an overall scale and transformed into a 0–100 basis. The overall scale was reliable for each country as well as for the pooled data (Pooled standardized item Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.78; mean interitem \( r = 0.37 \)).

The first task is to determine if corruption has a negative or positive impact on legitimacy. When a citizen pays a bribe to either receive a public service or to avoid sanctions from an accused violation of law, two reactions could emerge depending upon how the bribery is perceived. On the one hand, the bribe could be viewed as a “user fee,” much like the fee one would willingly pay to use a toll road or a campground. Those who pay such fees might view the assessment and payment as an entirely legitimate transaction, implying no negative evaluation of the political system. Indeed, an individual who pays a “processing fee” in order to facilitate the granting of a driver’s license, for example, might be pleased with a system that allows the granting of such licenses even when the requisite requirements (vision test, driving skills test, etc.) have not been met. Or the individual may feel that the salaries paid to public officials are properly kept low so that overall taxes remain low, but those who use the service ought to legitimately pay these user fees so as to supplement the salaries of public officials.

Those asked to pay bribes may have an entirely different reaction to the experience, viewing the bribe not as an appropriate user fee, but as what economists call a “DUP,” a directly unproductive profit-seeking activity, otherwise known as rent seeking. When a municipal clerk asks for a payment above and beyond the officially established fee to process a birth certificate, the payment represents a surplus value above that of the established price, and hence can be considered rent-seeking behavior. Rent seeking is possible only because those demanding the rent (in the form of a bribe) have been given state license (unofficially) to do so. We can predict, therefore, that individuals who view such fees as rent seeking are likely to form negative views about the state.

The empirical results to test these two possible reactions are presented in detail in a study (Seligson, 2002) in which several countries from the data set are examined. For the purposes of this brief summary, the results of Nicaragua, which parallel those from the other countries, can be examined. The overall legitimacy scale declines steadily as corruption victimization increases, declining from above the national mean for those who had not been victimized by corruption to one standard deviation below the national mean (Figure 19). One especially relevant item from the legitimacy scale, the belief that people can get a fair trial, clearly demonstrates that corruption does erode confidence in the system (Figure 20).

These results show that those who experience corruption are less likely to believe in the legitimacy of their political system, thus confirming the World Bank speculation and refuting the Huntington hypothesis. Research with these data sets have found that corruption victims are also less likely to exhibit high levels of interpersonal trust, a possible important social–psychological contributor to belief in legitimacy. Interpersonal trust has been linked to successful efforts to build civil society and, as Putnam (1993) terms it, to “make democracy work.”

These findings demonstrate that there are real costs to corruption overlooked by the functionalists who argued for the positive benefits of it and by those who believe the clientelistic ties based on corruption can breed political stability. They do not, of course, demonstrate that government operates less efficiently as a result of widespread corruption, for to do so would involve a study beyond the scope of public opinion and take us back to the economic literature. Some of the survey data do, however, allow us to determine respondent beliefs about
the efficacy of corruption and then to determine the impact of that belief on system support.

In the Nicaragua survey, we asked a straightforward operationalization of the functionalist argument: “Do you believe that the payment of bribes facilitates getting things done with the bureaucracy?” Among the 85% of the sample who responded to this question, 60% agreed with it, indicating fairly strong support within Nicaragua for the belief that bribery works. Moreover, belief in the functionality of corruption is positively associated with our index of victimization by corruption ($r = 0.21$; sig. < 0.001), suggesting that those who have direct experience with corruption are more likely to believe that it gets them what they need. Yet, belief in the efficacy of corruption does not translate into a positive view of the political system—quite the contrary, in fact. Those who agree that corruption helps get things done with the bureaucracy are significantly less likely to believe in the legitimacy of the political system.
These results show that corruption erodes support for the system even among those who recognize that it may have some utility in overcoming bureaucratic barriers.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In order for political systems to function reasonably well, actions taken by leaders need to be viewed as legitimate. If not, the “degrees of freedom” with which decision makers have to operate are reduced considerably. Immobilism is a potential outcome of political systems in which the public does not believe in the legitimacy of the system. In extreme cases, which have frequently occurred in Latin America, governments are swept aside by popular protests or military coups that are supported by much of the public.

This paper has emphasized the importance of measuring corruption experience in order to be able to show who its victims are and to demonstrate that those who saw corruption as building ties between rulers and the ruled were wrong. Corruption does indeed erode the legitimacy of democracies. It follows that if corruption increases, as Wayland argued, at the outset of this paper, erosion of support should also be occurring. It is also shown in this paper that corruption lowers interpersonal trust, presumably negatively affecting civil society relations.

On the positive side, there is some recent evidence that over the very long run democratic countries become less corrupt, but the observed effect took place over half a century, more years than many fragile democracies may have to spare (Treisman, 2000). It would be the ultimate irony that an artifact of the rise of democracy itself may help contribute to its own weakening in the developing world. That is all the more reason to be concerned about the problem of corruption and to find ways of reducing its prevalence.

NOTES

1. This section draws on Seligson (2002).

2. These efforts are explained in detail in the TI website. The specific document that presents the methodological issues is www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi_framework.html.

3. These data are easily available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm. The original data are listed as a 0–100 percentile rank and have been converted here to a 0–10 score to correspond to the CPI 0–10 format.

4. The WB web site (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.html) states: “As discussed in detail in the accompanying papers, countries’ relative positions on these indicators are subject to margins of error that are clearly indicated in the data files and graphs downloadable below.” One reviewer of this paper argued that the WB measures are “objective scales,” when in fact, the WB states on its web site that the indicators “reflect the statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of a large number of enterprise, citizens, and expert survey respondents.” These measures should not be confused with the WB studies of corruption experience.

5. Homicide rates, however, are used as reliable indicators of one form of extreme crime. Only in places like South Africa under apartheid, where the murder of blacks was often not reported by the police, or in countries undergoing civil wars where record-keeping functions often break down entirely, are these rates unreliable.


7. The surveys reported on in this project are all national probability samples carried out at various times from 1998 through 2002 in El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Bolivia. A web site is currently being constructed where this data can be easily accessed. The samples each have between 2,500 and 3,000 respondents, except for Paraguay, which included only 1,463. The first survey, conducted in Nicaragua, was developed with Casals and Associates. I would like to thank Dr. Sergio Dias Briquets of Casals and Dr. Andrew Stein, now of the US Department of State, for assistance in that early work. Dr. Orlando Pérez of Central Michigan University has assisted in more recent studies in Honduras and Ecuador.

8. The word for “bribe” in Spanish differs among the countries sampled. In Central America, the survey generally used “mordida” while in South America the
word “coima” was utilized. In both areas, however, the additional term “soborno” was utilized.

9. Some respondents might have worked at some point during the year prior to the interview but were not working when the survey took place. Those individuals, therefore, could have been subjected to corruption at some point during the year prior to the survey.

10. Ecuador is excluded from this series because a slightly different question was used there.

11. The original wording of the school and health questions referred to “improper payments” rather than bribes in particular, while the question dealing with local government focused on “payments above what the law requires.” In a subsequent study in Ecuador, it was found that if the word “bribe” was substituted for these phrases, the reporting of corruption decreased somewhat. For example, in a special sample focusing on 15 municipalities in Ecuador (N = 4,500), bribery in the municipality was found to be 17.4% compared to the 19% reported in Figure 11.

12. This pattern is also observed in the other countries in the series, but the inclusion of all six countries in the line chart of Figure 12 makes it very difficult to read.

REFERENCES


