

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO AND IN THE AMERICAS, 2018/19: TAKING THE PULSE OF DEMOCRACY

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the AmericasBarometer. While its primary goal is to represent the voice of the people on important issues, the AmericasBarometer also helps guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region. In numerous ways, the AmericasBarometer informs discussions over the quality and strength of democracy in the region.

USAID relies on the AmericasBarometer to inform strategy development, guide program design, and in evaluating the context in which we work in the region. The AmericasBarometer alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to key challenges and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their country, as compared to other countries. As a 'barometer', the project gives important insights on long term trends that can identify democratic backsliding and highlight upswings in norms and attitudes for further study.

At every stage of AmericasBarometer, the team realizes another objective of the project: building capacity. In the course of the project, experienced and expert individuals in the field of survey research work alongside and transfer knowledge and skills to students, local researchers, and others. These opportunities come through discussions over the development of the core questionnaire, cross-national collaborations on sample design, training sessions for fieldwork teams and office personnel involved in the surveys, and workshops and presentations on the analysis and reporting of the public opinion data.

The AmericasBarometer is coordinated by a team at Vanderbilt University, which hosts the LAPOP research center and core team. At the same time, the AmericasBarometer is a collaborative international project. In the first stage of each round, LAPOP consults with researchers across the Americas, USAID, and other project supporters to develop a core questionnaire. For each individual country survey, subject experts, local teams, and USAID officers provide suggestions for country-specific modules that are added to the core. In each country, LAPOP works with local teams to pre-test the questionnaire in order to refine the survey instrument while making sure that it is written in language(s) familiar to the average person in that country. Once the questionnaire is completed, it is programmed into software and each local survey team is trained according to the same exacting standards. Samples are designed and reviewed by LAPOP and local partners. As data collection proceeds, LAPOP and the local teams stay in close contact to monitor quality, security, and progress. Once the data are collected, LAPOP audits and processes the files while engaging in conversations with a consortium of individuals and institutions, including USAID, over plans for the dissemination of those data, findings, and reports. A large network of individuals across the region contributes to the reports that are developed after each round of the AmericasBarometer.

The collaborative nature of the AmericasBarometer improves the project and makes it possible. While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, each round of the project is supported by numerous other individuals and institutions. Thanks to this

broad and generous network of supporters, the AmericasBarometer covers the Americas and provides a public good for all those interested in understanding and improving democratic governance in the region.

USAID is grateful to the LAPOP team, who assiduously and scrupulously works to generate each round of the AmericasBarometer, currently under the leadership of Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister (Director) and Dr. Noam Lupu (Associate Director). We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current students located at Vanderbilt and throughout the hemisphere, to the local fieldwork teams, to all those who took the time to respond to the survey, and to the many expert individuals and institutions across the region that contribute to and engage with the project.

Stephanie Molina
Democracy and Human Rights Team
Office of Regional Sustainable Development
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

Introduction to the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu

The pulse of democracy in the region remains weak. Citizen support for democracy is critical to sustaining free and fair systems and bolstering against democratic backsliding. Yet support for democracy declined in the last round of the AmericasBarometer (2016/17) and remains low in this round, fielded between late 2018 and early 2019. Public satisfaction with how democracy is performing has also declined, while support for executive coups (i.e., the executive shuttering congress) has continued to grow. Political legitimacy – the extent to which the public views their country's basic core institutions and processes as worthy of respect and confidence – remains below the midpoint in the average country in the Americas.

In the midst of this milieu of doubt regarding the value of democracy and the capacity of political institutions, social media are on the rise. Globally and in the Latin America and Caribbean region, analysts are asking whether social media on the whole help or hinder democratic processes and democracy itself. Findings from the AmericasBarometer's new social media module allow us to see how widespread social media are, and who uses them (the younger, the more urban, and the more educated). They also allow us to see distinctions among the political attitudes held by those who use social media frequently. In brief, frequent social media users tend to adhere more to core democratic values but also tend to be more disaffected in their satisfaction with democracy and their confidence in core political institutions.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP is a unique tool for assessing the public's experiences with democratic governance. The survey permits valid comparisons across individuals, subnational and supranational regions, countries, and time, via a common core questionnaire and standardized methods. Comparative research on democratic governance is critically important to understanding today's realities, anticipating key political challenges, and identifying actionable policy solutions.

The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer represents the 8th round of this project. The questionnaire contains a common core that allows us to assess the extent to which citizens support democratic values, perceive a sufficient supply of basic liberties, experience the rule of law, engage in political life, support their system of government, use social media, and more.

Fieldwork for the latest round of the AmericasBarometer began in late 2018 and continued into the summer of 2019. At this time, 20 countries are included in the round. For the first time since their initial inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, we selected not to conduct surveys in Venezuela and Haiti due to instability and related concerns about interviewer safety. We will revisit this decision as circumstances change. For now, the full dataset for this round includes over 31,050 interviews, conducted across urban and rural settings and implemented with the assistance of partners and fieldwork organizations across the Americas.

Questionnaire content reflects input from a wide range of project sponsors and stakeholders. The surveys were pretested in each country via cognitive interviews and programmed into Survey to Go software for fieldwork. The samples are nationally representative and also programmed into the e-instrument. All fieldwork teams used e-devices for fieldwork and were trained in the project's protocols and in quality control. To monitor quality, we applied LAPOP's FALCON (Fieldwork Algorithm for LAPOP Control over survey Operations and Norms). All interviews were audited at least once to ensure the following: that interviewers were in the sampled location, enumerators were those who attended training, questions were read correctly, interview protocols were followed, and contact attempts were recorded efficiently and accurately. All datasets were audited and processed by our team. The data and project reports are publicly and freely available at the project website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Each round of the AmericasBarometer involves a multi-year process and the effort of thousands of individuals across the Americas. In each country, we partner with a local fieldwork organization and we further benefit from input from researchers, country experts, sponsors, and subject experts located in institutions across the Americas. This network is critical to the quality of the AmericasBarometer and its availability as a public good. On behalf of this entire team, we express our hope that the reports and data generated by this project reach and are useful to the broadest possible number of individuals interested in and working to improve democracy and development across the Americas.

Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister is Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University and Director of LAPOP. Dr. Noam Lupu is Associate Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University and Associate Director of LAPOP.

Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across the Americas requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. We thank all the members of the public who took the time to assist with pretests and to respond to the final questionnaire. We are grateful for their generosity and willingness to share their beliefs and experiences. Just as important to recognize are our partner survey organizations and fieldwork teams, whose unflagging efforts have been crucial to the success of this project. The fieldwork in Mexico this round 2018/19 was carried out by our partner institution DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados. We are grateful to them for their entire time and work on this project.

The AmericasBarometer is made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. Over the course of the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer, we benefited from leadership and guidance offered by Stephanie Molina, Chris Strom, and Madeline Williams. At Vanderbilt, the Dean of the College of Arts and Science, Dr. John Geer, and the Chair of the Political Science Department, Dr. Alan Wiseman, have championed and supported the project in important ways. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the Department of Political Science, the Center for Latin American Studies, the Office of Sponsored Programs Administration, and the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected efforts associated with the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer came from collaborations with organizations and institutions that include Ciudadanía (Bolivia), Environics (Canada), Florida International University, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the University of Southern California, and at Vanderbilt University: the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and the Trans-Institutional Programs (TIPs) initiative.

We thank the “LAPOP Central” team who collectively has put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. For this round, these exceptional individuals included, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Dr. Fernanda Boidi, Dr. Oscar Castorena, Dr. Jonathan Hiskey, Sebastián Larrea, Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Georgina Pizzolitto, Dr. Camilo Plata, Alexa Rains, Maita Schade, and Dr. Carole Wilson. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who manages all financial aspects of this project. We also owe thanks to Heather Selke for her help on various administrative aspects of the project. We are grateful, as well, to Eduardo Marenco, working from his home in Nicaragua, who assisted in a number of ways with our Central America fieldwork.

We take seriously the opportunity to develop new research capacities and train top-notch new scholars in the field of public opinion research. In turn, we benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer was a terrific group of young scholars. This includes the following undergraduate research assistants and Fellows: Grace Adcox, Allison Booher, Anaïs Boyer-Chammard, Alexa Bussmann, Haley Feuerman, Sarah Graves, Hannah Hagan, Bianca Herlory, Victoria Herring, Darby Howard, Maria Loaiza, Miriam Mars, Brielle Morton, Sael Soni, Joy Stewart, and Elsa Young. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations recently: Dr. Oscar Castorena, Dr. Gui Russo, and Dr. Sheahan Virgin. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the

project: Kaitlen Cassell, Claire Evans, Rachael Firestone, Meg Frost, SangEun Kim, Sebastian Meyer, Daniela Osorio Michel, Emily Noh, Mariana Ramírez Bustamante, Facundo Salles Kobilanski, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Adam Wolsky.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries we studied, as well as experts in these countries. The list of experts to whom we owe thanks is extensive. Among the many who shared subject and country expertise for this round, we would like to acknowledge Leticia Alcaráz, Dr. George Avelino, Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Dr. Julio Carrión, Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Dr. Rosario Espinal, Dr. Miguel García, Dr. François Gelineau, Dr. Jonathan Hiskey, Balford Lewis, Dr. Germán Lodola, Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Dr. Jana Morgan, Dr. Keith Neuman, Dr. Pablo Parás, Dr. Rosario Queirolo, Dr. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Dr. Gui Russo, and Patricia Zarate. To craft the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer questionnaire, we applied an open consultation model, in which we invited proposals and input from the political science community and other researchers. We appreciate all the excellent ideas that were submitted and worked to include as many as possible. We are grateful to all who participated in this process. We also express our gratitude to Dr. Mitchell Seligson for founding the AmericasBarometer project and for all the many ways his expert advice benefited this latest round of the survey.

To all of these individuals, and those whose names we may have inadvertently omitted, we offer our sincere gratitude. We could not achieve the scope, quality, and impact of the AmericasBarometer project without your support.

Liz Zechmeister
Noam Lupu

Nashville, Tennessee
August 2019

Chapter 1.

Support for Electoral Democracy in the Americas and in Mexico¹

Oscar Castorena² and Sarah L. Graves³ with Carlos López^{4,5}

I. Introduction

Electoral democracy is the predominant framework for politics in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The principal threats to this system of government have changed over time. Immediately following the Third Wave of democratization of the 1970s and 1980s, observers worried about a new military seizure of power or a return to dictatorial rule. In contrast, contemporary concerns for democracy in the region focus on various forms of democratic backsliding, such as overreach by powerful executives⁶ and the deinstitutionalization of democratic politics and society.⁷

Within this context, some worry about the development and persistence of electoral authoritarian regimes that feature regular elections marred by manipulation of votes or harassment of the opposition⁸. Related, scholars have suggested that a democratic “recession” or wave of autocratization is underway,⁹ including within the LAC region.¹⁰

The LAC region has seen backsliding caused by, and permitting, disregard for the rule of law, among other factors. In the region, instances of backsliding are often accompanied by revelations

¹ The AmericasBarometer survey in Mexico is nationally representative of all adults of voting age. Data collection took place between January 28th and March 27th, 2019. During this period, 1580 citizens or permanent residents in Mexico 18 years of age and older were surveyed. The interviews were face to face, at the place of residence of the respondents, who were selected through a stratified multi-stage sample with sex and age quotas at the household level. For more information and technical data of the study, consult: www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/.

² Oscar Castorena is a Ph.D. in Political Science at Vanderbilt University and an associate researcher at LAPOP.

³ Sarah L. Graves is a student at Hanover College in Indiana and a Fellow of Leadership Alliance at LAPOP during the summer of 2019.

⁴ Carlos López is founding partner of DATA Public Opinion and Markets and coordinator of the AmericasBarometer Study in Mexico. He has a master's degree in Political and Social Studies from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

⁵ Some text in this chapter is taken, with permission, from a previous report published by LAPOP (Cohen 2017). We thank Mollie Cohen for her effort in that earlier project and for her permission to build on that work.

⁶ Bermeo 2016.

⁷ Morgan 2018.

⁸ Levitsky and Way 2010.

⁹ Diamond and Plattner 2015, Lührmann and Lindberg 2019.

¹⁰ Almagro 2019; Goldfrank 2017; but see Van Dyck 2017.

of corruption or “an escalation of authoritarian tendencies, populism, and violence”.^{11,12} Recent presidents in a number of countries, such as Peru, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, have sought to weaken the other branches of government and the capacity of international organizations to keep them in check.¹³ Further complicating democratic consolidation and maintenance is the fact that countries in the region are grappling with problems such as economic hardship and crime. For example, transnational organized crime groups in Mexico and several Central American countries have exacerbated corruption, insecurity and violence.¹⁴ These problems of insecurity as well as economic downturns, cast as failures of democratic regimes, can create the fertile conditions for the rise of authoritarian alternatives.

Figure 1.1 provides an overview of the state of democracy in the Latin America and Caribbean region as interpreted through indices (ratings) from the V-Dem project¹⁵ and Freedom House, which rely on expert evaluations.¹⁶ The data in these projects complement the public opinion surveys analyzed in the remainder of the report. Along with each country’s latest score, the figure also plots the score from two years prior.^{17,18} This provides a sense of the recent change in electoral democracy in each country. There is notable variation across countries in the advance and retreat of democracy in this relatively short two-year period. While the ratings are created using different methodologies, they point to similar conclusions.¹⁹ According to both measures, the highest quality democracies in the region are Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Chile. At the other extreme, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala rank at the bottom. Mexico is right in the middle of the distribution, above most of its Central American neighbors (especially those that are part of the “northern triangle”), but notably below most of the countries of the Southern Cone.

¹¹ Peru’s president resigned in March just ahead of a vote on impeachment on corruption charges. In Nicaragua, widespread protests against the government of President Daniel Ortega were suppressed violently, with over 300 people killed. In Guatemala, efforts by President Jimmy Morales to undermine and expel the U.N.-backed International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) prompted widespread protests and expressions of international concern.

¹² Almagro 2019, p.6.

¹³ Sullivan et al. 2019 p.5.

¹⁴ Sullivan et al., 2019 p.1.

¹⁵ Coppedge et al. 2019

¹⁶ For more information on the methodologies of the V-Dem and Freedom House scores, see <https://www.v-dem.net/en/reference/version-9-apr-2019/> and <https://freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-freedom-world-2018>.

¹⁷ Freedom House provides ratings for each country in its annual *Freedom in the World* report. These ratings are based on the previous calendar year such that the 2019 ratings reflect events in 2018 and so on. Therefore, the V-Dem and Freedom House scores summarized in Figure 1.1 cover the same period.

¹⁸ The left panel of Figure 1.1 shows the values of the V-DEM Electoral Democracy Index for the years 2016 (squares) and 2018 (circles). The differences between the years, for each country, are represented by arrows. This arrow is red if there was a decline in the index between years, and green if the democratic indicator shows improvement. Similarly, the Freedom House data presented in the right panel show ratings for 2017 (squares) and 2019 (circles). Green and red arrows are also used to indicate improvement or decline, respectively, in the democratic indicator for each country. When there is no colored arrow, the values of the two measures are the same (circles and squares are superimposed), indicating no trend.

¹⁹ The ratings provided by Freedom House are originally coded such that a value of one represents the most free and a value of seven represents the least free. We reverse the coding here so as to facilitate comparison with other democracy measures.

Ecuador had the largest improvement in V-Dem's electoral democracy index of the 18 countries included here and was also one of the three countries to see an improvement in Freedom House's freedom rating. In early 2017, a referendum saw Ecuadorians vote to bring back presidential term limits, placing constraints on executive power. At the other end of the spectrum, Nicaragua experienced the largest decline in democracy, according to both the Freedom House and V-Dem measures.²⁰ Nicaragua's democratic backsliding is evident – among other ways – in its holding of hundreds of political prisoners, arrested by paramilitary forces controlled by the Ortega government, for protesting against the regime. This type of capture and detention of citizens as political prisoners undermines basic human rights that should be guaranteed to citizens in a democratic system.²¹




Figure 1.1. State of Democracy in the LAC-18 Region

A central question for scholars and policymakers concerns the factors behind democratic consolidation and, likewise, behind democratic backsliding. Theoretical work in political science holds that the endurance and quality of democratic governments rests, in part, on the political attitudes of their citizens. Without popular support, democratic regimes in crisis are more prone to experience breakdowns or democratic backsliding.²²

²⁰ Another country experiencing notable declines in democracy, but not included in the 18 countries studied in this report, was Venezuela. The decision not to include Venezuela in the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer survey was influenced by the levels of insecurity associated with the country's political and economic instability, which complicated fieldwork in the 2016/17 round.

²¹ Almagro 2019.

²² Lipset 1959, Easton 1965.

Recent empirical work has found evidence for a causal relationship between citizens' opinions and the endurance of democracy in a country.²³ That is, the mass public's support for democracy has a positive effect on the resilience and nature of democracy. We use this insight, that citizens' attitudes and beliefs about democracy are consequential for democracy's endurance and growth, as the starting point for this report's assessment of public support for democracy in general and public evaluations of democracy in practice in the LAC region.

II. Main Findings

A summary of this report's key findings is as follows:

- In Mexico, support for democracy in 2019 is lower than the support for democracy-prior to 2016. On average, Men and elderly citizens express more support for democracy.
- Support for executive coups increased in 2019 in Mexico compared to 2016, reaching its highest point in the AmericasBarometer that has been conducted in Mexico since 2010. Support for executive coups is greater among people with a lower level of schooling, and the poorest.
- Mexicans' satisfaction with democracy increased significantly in 2019 compared to 2016. Older and poorer people express greater satisfaction with democracy in the 2019 measurement.
- Over half the LAC public believes their country is democratic. Across countries, the percentage that believe that their country is a democracy ranges from 52.3% to 67.3%. In Mexico, 65.8% believe that their country is a democracy.

III. Basic Tenets of Electoral Democracy

While there exist multiple conceptualizations and definitions of democracy,²⁴ this report focuses on *electoral democracy*. In his classic work, Schumpeter provides a definition of electoral democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote".²⁵ While other definitions provide more comprehensive conceptualizations with additional dimensions,²⁶ this minimalist definition addresses the most basic tenet of democracy: rule by competitively elected leaders. This definition also directly relates to the principal threats that have challenged democratic government in the contemporary LAC region. The first is the risk that unelected actors, such as the military, seize political power from elected officials. The second is the risk that executives go

²³ Claassen 2019.

²⁴ Diamond 1999.

²⁵ Schumpeter 1942, p.260.

²⁶ See Dahl 1971.

beyond their mandate and seek to rule unilaterally, undermining congresses elected by the people to legislate.

The following sections assess the state of public support for electoral democracy in the LAC region as well as the extent to which the public tolerates or rejects military and executive coups.

Support for Democracy in the Abstract

To what extent do individuals in the Latin America and the Caribbean region believe that democracy is the best political system, and how does their support for democracy in 2018/19 compare to past years? Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer project has asked respondents across the Americas the following question to assess support for democracy:²⁷

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Respondents provide an answer ranging from 1-7, with 1 signifying “strongly disagree” and 7 denoting “strongly agree.” We consider responses on the agree side of the scale, that is values of 5-7, to indicate support for democracy.

Figure 1.2 displays the percent of individuals in each country that expresses support for democracy in 2018/19.²⁸ Support for democracy ranges from a low of 45% in Honduras to a high of 76.2% in Uruguay. The percent of the public that supports democracy is highest in some of the region’s most stable democracies (Uruguay, Costa Rica). Support for democracy is lowest in Guatemala and Honduras. In Mexico, 62.7% of the citizens support democracy as the best form of government, which places the country in fifth place in regional ranking, only below Uruguay, Costa Rica and Argentina, with a percentage of support to democracy similar to Chile.

²⁷This question is often referred to as a “Churchillian” question of democratic support, as it is derived from Winston Churchill’s oft-quoted speech from the House of Commons, in which he noted that, “...democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time (Churchill 1947).”

²⁸ See Annex A, “Explanation of the Graphs in this Study” for a description of how to read this and other graphs in the report.




Figure 1.2. Cross-National Support for Democracy

Figure 1.3 displays the relationship between the percentage of citizens in each country who strongly support democracy and that country's score in V-Dem's electoral democracy index. Generally, there is a positive relationship between the two measures (Pearson's correlation = .64). That is, although the analysis here is descriptive and not a test of a causal relationship, the pattern is consistent with previous research that identifies public support as a critical ingredient for the vitality of democracy.²⁹

²⁹ Claassen 2019.




Figure 1.3. Support for Democracy and the Level of Democracy

On average a majority (57.7%) of citizens in Latin America and the Caribbean region indicated support for democracy in the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer. This level of support is similar to that recorded in the 2016/17 round, when support for democracy registered a significant and worrying decline in the region, compared to previous years.

The level of support for democracy in Mexico over time is shown by Figure 1.4. Although most Mexicans have shown support for democracy since the beginning of the study in 2004, the percentage that recognizes democracy as the best form of government has declined to a historic low in 2016 (49.3%). The 2019 value shows a recovery of more than 13 percentage points. The change could be related to the expectations generated by a new government whose public approval was high.




Figure 1.4. Support for Democracy, Mexico, 2004-2019

Who is most likely to support democracy? Figure 1.5 indicates statistically significant relationships between three demographic and socio-economic subgroups (wealth, gender, and age) and support for democracy in Mexico. In all such figures of demographic and socio-economic correlates in this report, we only show relationships that are statistically significant with 95% confidence. If a socio-demographic variable is excluded from the figure, this means we did not find significant differences in a particular dependent variable across the values of that socio-demographic variable.

Figure 1.5 illustrates that, generally, wealthier and more educated citizens report higher rates of support for democracy than do their younger and poorer counterparts. Women are less likely to express support for democracy than men. Older individuals are also more likely to report support for democracy than younger citizens. Age is a particularly significant predictor of support for democracy, exhibiting the largest differences across values of the variable compared to the other correlates. While only 58.7% of those between 26 and 35 years support democracy, 70.5% of those 66 years old or older support democracy.




Figure 1.5. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of Support for Democracy, Mexico 2019

Rules of the Game: Tolerance of Military Coups

In addition to support for democracy in the abstract, acceptance of the basic rules of electoral democracy as “the only game in town” is key to stability and persistence of democratic governance.³⁰ This means, in short, that citizens in democratic societies should not tolerate military coups that replace the incumbent democratically elected government with military leadership. The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer includes two items that tap willingness to tolerate a military takeover of the government. A randomly drawn half of respondents received the first of the following questions, while the other half was randomly assigned to receive the second:

³⁰ Linz and Stepan (1996) use the phrase “the only game in town” to refer to the consolidation of democracy. With respect to the role of public opinion, they state, “Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from prodemocratic forces (16).”

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

	A military take-over of the state would be justified	A military take-over of the state would not be justified
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	1	2
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	1	2

Figure 1.6 shows the percentage of respondents that said that they would find a military coup justifiable under each of these circumstances. We consider those who express this view to be “tolerant” of military coups under particular circumstances. Tolerance for military coups under conditions of high crime ranges from a low of 23% in Uruguay to a high of 65% in Jamaica. Tolerance for coups under high corruption ranges from 23.8% in Uruguay to a high of 58.3% in Jamaica.

More generally, levels of tolerance for military coups are lowest in Uruguay, Colombia, Panama, Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador. Tolerance for coups is the highest in Jamaica, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, Honduras, and Guatemala. In Mexico, support for military coups during periods of high crime is 44%, which places the country in fifth place out of the 18 countries that were part of the AmericasBarometer study in the 2018/19 round. Support for military coups under high levels of corruption reached 42.5%, placing Mexico in fifth place regionally. These opinions are reflective of debates regarding heightened levels of crime and corruption, especially when these topics were part of the 2018 electoral campaign and the campaign promises of the current government.




Figure 1.6. Tolerance for Military Coups during High Crime and High Corruption, 2018/19

Figure 1.7 shows the change in tolerance for military coups in Mexico across time. Levels of tolerance for military coups during periods of high crime have decreased from 63.0% in 2006 to 44.0% in 2019. This could be related to the positive expectations resulting from the 2018 election and the new national government. Compared to the 2016 round, tolerance to military coups under high levels of crime has remained constant. Meanwhile, levels of support for military coups during periods of high corruption have marginally decreased by 7.8 percentage points, from 50.3% in 2016 to 42.3% in 2019. These indicators seem to support the citizens' evaluations of the new government: high levels of trust in the new authorities but low levels of trust in the institutions.




Figure 1.7. Tolerance for Military Coups, Mexico 2004-2019

Figure 1.8 shows tolerance for military coups by demographic and socio-economic subgroups. For the sake of parsimony, we present results only for tolerance of coups in contexts of high crime, because the relationships between socio-demographic categories and tolerance of coups under high corruption are substantively similar to those reported here. In Mexico, women are slightly more likely than men to express tolerance for a hypothetical coup, as are those in the lowest wealth quintile (compared to those in the two wealthiest quintiles). Older individuals and those with post-secondary education are less likely to express tolerance for military coups than their younger and less educated counterparts.




Figure 1.8. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Tolerance for Military Coups, Mexico 2019

Tolerance of Executive Coups

The AmericasBarometer in 2018/19 asked all respondents the following question, to gauge tolerance of executive coups - that is, the shutdown of legislative bodies by the executive branch:

	Yes, it is justified	No, it is not justified
JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress?	1	2

Figure 1.9 shows the distribution of tolerance for executive coups in very difficult times across countries in the LAC region in 2018/19. Tolerance for executive coups across the region is generally lower than tolerance for coups by the military under conditions of high crime or corruption. The variation in tolerance for executive coups across countries is notable, the lowest being in Uruguay (9.2%) and highest in Peru (58.9%). Mexico is the second country with the highest support for executive coups with 28.1% saying they are justified.

Not only is the Peruvian case an outlier in terms of average tolerance for executive coups, it also registered the largest increase in the measure from the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer

(21.1 percentage points.). This dramatic shift in the public's tolerance for unilateral assertions of power by the executive reflects recent political developments in the country.³¹




Figure 1.9. Tolerance for Executive Coup, 2018/19

While tolerance for executive coups is lower than tolerance for military coups during periods of high crime or high corruption, Figure 1.10 shows that levels of tolerance for an executive shutdown

³¹ See Ramírez Bustamante and Zechmeister 2019.

of the legislature increased substantially in the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer in Mexico, from 17.0% to 28.1%. The results of this round also recorded the highest level of tolerance for executive coups observed in Mexico. A very worrying trend.




Figure 1.10. Tolerance for Executive Coups, Mexico 2010-2019

Figure 1.11 shows that the demographic and socio-economic predictors of tolerance for executive coups are similar to those found in the analysis of tolerance for military coups. The wealthiest (27.3%) and most highly educated (23.1%) are significantly less likely to tolerate executive coups than the poorest (32.0%) and least educated (36.0%). There are no significant differences in tolerance for executive coups among the age cohorts nor were there differences between sexes or urban and rural residents.




Figure 1.11. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Tolerance for Executive Coups, Mexico 2019

In summary, the moderate levels of support for democracy and the tangible levels of tolerance for coups provide reasons to be concerned about the state of public support for electoral democracy in Mexico. The remainder of this report addresses how respondents feel about the way that democracy is functioning in their national context.

IV. Evaluation of Democracy

Electoral democracy rests on a stronger foundation to the degree that citizens are satisfied with how their democracy is performing in practice. It is also important to consider whether citizens believe their system is a democracy, or whether they feel the system has slid too far away from that ideal to warrant the label. In general, satisfaction with democracy and the condition of democracy in the political system are important for understanding citizen support for democracy, serve as a foundation of citizens' commitment to democracy (a fundamental component for democratic consolidation).

Satisfaction with democracy “is an indicator of support for the performance of the democratic regime”.³² In other words, it is a measure of the evaluations made by the people of the political regime³³. Satisfaction falls under the concept of “specific” support, based on its “relationship to members’ satisfaction about the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities of the system they belong to” (Easton 1975, p. 437). Specific support is “possible only under conditions

³² Linde and Eckman 2003, p. 399.

³³ Klingeman 1999.

in which the culture permits the members to entertain the notion that the authorities can be held responsible for what happens in the society..." and "... when these [perceived benefits or satisfactions] decline or cease, support will do likewise" (Easton 1975, pp. 438-9). In short, levels of satisfaction are mediated by interactions with political authorities and institutions.

Electoral democracy is more legitimate, in the eyes of the public, to the extent there is a high degree of satisfaction with democracy and to the extent that citizens perceive their system to be a democracy.

The following sections examine satisfaction with democracy and assessments of the democratic status of political systems in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the goal of better understanding specific support for electoral democracy in the region and in Mexico.

Satisfaction with Democracy

Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer has asked respondents across the Americas the following question about satisfaction with democracy:

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Mexico?

Respondents provide an answer ranging from 1-4, with 1 signifying "very satisfied" and 4 signifying "very dissatisfied." In the analyses that follow, we grouped the data, so that responses of "very dissatisfied" are "dissatisfied" are coded together as dissatisfaction, and responses of "very satisfied" and "satisfied" are coded together as satisfaction.

Figure 1.12 displays the percentage of respondents in each country that reports satisfaction with democracy. The percentage of citizens who are satisfied with democracy ranges widely, from 26.1% in Panama to 59.5% in Uruguay (the only country that exceeds 50%). Mexico is among the three countries with the highest percentage of people satisfied with democracy (46.4%). The average percentage for the entire LAC-18 region in the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer is 39.6%.




Figure 1.12. Satisfaction with Democracy 2018/19

In Figure 1.13 shows the percentage of Mexicans satisfied with democracy over time. The percentage in the 2019 round (46.4%) is significantly higher than the percentage of Mexicans satisfied with democracy in the 2016 round (26.5%), although it is lower than levels of satisfaction reported in the period between 2004 and 2008.




Figure 1.13. Satisfaction with Democracy, Mexico 2004-2019

In terms of who is most likely to be satisfied with democracy, the results in Figure 1.14 show that, on average, those with more education and (to a marginal degree) wealth are more critical of democracy in their country than those with less education and those in lower wealth quintiles.




Figure 1.14. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy, Mexico 2019

Democratic Status of Political System

While satisfaction with democracy is a key element democratic governance, citizens' evaluations of their country as being democratic or not provide additional insight into how they view their country's political system. If they do not believe it to be a democracy, then they are more likely to give poor evaluations and be less satisfied. In nine countries included in the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer, the survey asked respondents the following question as a follow-up to the question of whether they were satisfied with democracy:

	Yes	No
DEM30. In your opinion, is Mexico a democracy?	1	2

Figure 1.15 shows that evaluations of countries as democratic ranges from only 52.3% in Honduras to 67.3% in Paraguay. The majority of the nine cases cluster around percentages in the mid-60s, and 65.8% in Mexico. As we had conjectured earlier, those who report that their country is not a democracy also have a high tendency to say that they are dissatisfied with how democracy works in the country. Among those who disagree with the statement that their country is a democracy, 79.4% report being dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in their country. Among those who do agree that their country is a democracy, opinion is divided about the quality of that democracy: 50.2% report being dissatisfied and 49.8% report being satisfied with democracy as it functions in their country.




Figure 1.15. Evaluations of Countries as Democratic 2018/19

Who is more likely to report that their country is democratic? Figure 1.16 indicates that the demographic and socio-economic features associated with the belief that Mexico is democratic are similar to those associated with satisfaction with democracy. Poorer and older individuals are more likely to believe their country is a democracy while those with no education or only a primary education are more likely to state their country is democratic than those with secondary or post-

secondary education. Rural individuals are also more likely to believe their country is a democracy. The difference between men and women is not statistically significant.




Figure 1.16. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Evaluation of Country as Democratic, Mexico 2019

V. Conclusion

What is the state of support for electoral democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2019? The analyses presented in this chapter provide some reasons to be concerned about the depth of citizens' commitment to democracy as a system, both in general support and satisfaction. On average, across the region, support for democracy has remained relatively stable over the last two rounds of the AmericasBarometer. However, this near-term stability has occurred after a decline in previous years. In contrast, the belief that executive coups are justified in difficult times has increased substantially over the last four rounds of the AmericasBarometer in the LAC region.

Trends in Mexico have mirrored these regional trends. Support for democracy in the 2019 survey is the lowest since the measurements began. Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy is also low, although somewhat higher than in 2016. Finally, although support for military coups remains at the lowest historical levels, around three out of every ten Mexicans would still tolerate a hypothetical executive coup.

The overall downward casting trend in support for the basic tenets of democracy and diminished levels of system support may leave the public increasingly open to undemocratic leaders who offer

action in times of crisis. Given the link between public opinion and democratic stability³⁴, the stagnation of public support for democracy in the region in general, and in Mexico in particular, is troubling.

³⁴ Claassen 2019.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1. Trends in Democratic Indicators by Country (2016/17 to 2018/19)

Country	Support for Democracy (ING4)	Tolerance for Military Coup under High Crime (JC10)	Tolerance for Military Coup under High Corruption (JC13)	Tolerance for Executive Coup (JC15A)	Satisfied with Democracy (PN4)
Mexico	13.4*	-4.2	-7.7*	10.9*	19.9*
Guatemala	0.4	-0.8	-6.1*	-1.6	-0.5
El Salvador	3.9*	-3.5	-5.2	1.7	-4.2*
Honduras	-6.1*	3.0	9.9*	6.0*	-2.5
Nicaragua	-6.4*	8.1*	6.7*	1.8	-15.2*
Costa Rica	0.9	-3.3	-18.1*	-1.6	-4.8*
Panama	-5.4*	-3.1	1.5	2.6	-12.0*
Colombia	6.8*	-8.1*		0.8	-2.1
Ecuador	1.5	10.6*	11.3*	2.2	-13.3*
Bolivia	-6.5*	4.3	6.0*	2.5	-4.3
Peru	-3.5*	-2.7	6.4*	21.1*	-2.7
Paraguay	2.6	-4.8	-9.5*	-1.5	9.8*
Chile	2.8	0.3	-1.3	-1.7	8.7*
Uruguay	-6.3*	-1.5	-3.6	0.6	-8.1*
Brazil	7.9*	-0.5	0.7	3.1	19.9*
Argentina	-6.1*	2.0	2.3	2.0	-12.2*
Dominican Republic	-2.8	-0.2	-0.9	5.1*	5.4*
Jamaica	-4.6*	5.7*	5.1	5.5*	-4.7*

Variables recoded as dichotomous as described in the text of the chapter. The numerical values are the differences in the percentages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds for each country.

* Denotes significant differences at p<0.05.

Chapter 2.

Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas and in Mexico

Oscar Castorena¹ and Brielle Morton² with Vidal Romero^{3,4}

I. Introduction

One ingredient in democracy's success is its ability to generate public support for core institutions and processes. The former – support for core institutions – is often referred to as "political legitimacy" or "system support." The latter – support for democratic processes – refers to citizens' commitment to the use of those institutions in ways consistent with a liberal democracy. For example, confidence in elections is one expression of political legitimacy, while the belief in extending the franchise to all adults regardless of their beliefs is one expression of support for core democratic processes.

Political legitimacy or "system support" has long been a focus of public opinion research in both new and developed democracies because a decline in mass support could result in political instability.⁵ Political systems with low levels of legitimacy will be ill equipped to weather periods of crisis. Moreover, legitimacy matters at the level of political institutions as it can prevent interbranch crises,⁶ a key threat to the stability of democracy in the region. Along with concerns about the stability of democratic regimes, previous research has found that system support is important for the ability of political leaders to carry out their work successfully.⁷ Political environments with high trust in the regime provide leaders with more leeway to govern effectively as they can count on a "reservoir" of support.⁸ Conversely, in low trust environments, poor performance and political scandals can mean that governments quickly lose the broad support of the people to rule.

The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region's recent experiences with crises of economic hardship, insecurity, and corruption highlight the significance of political legitimacy for regime stability and policy outcomes. The case of Brazil provides a useful example. A period of economic

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⁴ Some text in this chapter is taken, with permission, from a previous report published by LAPOP (Carlin 2017). We thank Ryan Carlin for his efforts on that earlier project and for his permission to build on that work.

⁵ Dalton 2004.

⁶ Helmke 2010.

⁷ Hetherington 1998.

⁸ Easton 1975, Lipset 1963.

contraction and the *Lava Jato* corruption scandal mired the government of Dilma Rousseff, resulting in her impeachment in 2016. The sacking of the president, however, was not enough to restore public trust in the Brazilian government. Rousseff's successor, Michel Temer, had previously served as her vice president; as Acting President, Temer sustained approval ratings in the single digits and the public grew distrustful of the Congress, as the corruption scandal engulfed nearly every sector of the country's political class.⁹ Persistent low levels of political legitimacy fueled the rise of an anti-establishment populist leader, Jair Bolsonaro, whose election ironically may have restored public confidence in democratic processes at the same time that his leadership style presents a challenge to the country's democracy.

Along with basic regime survival and stability, political legitimacy is necessary for a regime to govern effectively and for society to flourish. This is especially relevant for two challenges facing the region: migration and insecurity. Previous research has connected the quality of democracy and citizens' confidence in their government institutions to intentions to emigrate.¹⁰ In contexts where the government has, through economic mismanagement, corruption, or repression, failed to secure diffuse political support, citizens may decide to emigrate (exit) rather than attempt to exercise their voice as a strategy to change the government.¹¹ Political legitimacy is also relevant for the ability of governments to address problems of insecurity. Previous research has identified trust in law enforcement institutions as an important factor in citizens' support for vigilante justice.¹² Although such extra-judicial actions may reduce crime in the short term, vigilantism ultimately undermines the state's monopoly on violence as well as its ability to maintain a strong criminal justice system.

While political support is necessary for the survival and effectiveness of a regime, political tolerance is an essential component of democratic political culture. Because democracy entails pluralism, it also entails disagreement and dissent. The extent to which governments respect the rights of the opposition and regime critics to participate is commonly held as a measure of the quality of a democracy.¹³ Nicaragua and Honduras are illustrative of the relevance of political tolerance to democracy. Both countries are rated low, and have experienced declines, in the V-Dem electoral democracy index as of 2018.¹⁴

These two countries have experienced recent episodes of government repression of political dissidents. In Honduras, a protest movement recently formed in response to irregularities in the 2017 presidential elections that saw the incumbent, Juan Orlando Hernández, reelected. The government has met these protests with repressive actions. As of January 2018, 31 people had been killed in post-election violence according to the National Commission of Human Rights in Honduras, with state actors implicated in a number of these deaths.¹⁵ In Nicaragua, what began as

⁹ <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/07/28/the-temer-government-in-brazil-lacks-the-legitimacy-required-to-reform-its-way-back-to-recovery/>

¹⁰ Hiskey et al. 2014, Meyer and Taft-Morales 2019.

¹¹ Hirschman 1970.

¹² Zizumbo-Colunga 2017.

¹³ Dahl 1971.

¹⁴ For information about the V-Dem Varieties of Democracy data consulted for this report and the methodology of that project, see <https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-9/>.

¹⁵ See also Haugaard 2018.

anti-austerity protests in the spring of 2018 were also met with repression by government and paramilitary forces. State actions have included the taking of political prisoners. As of 2018, over 300 people had been killed in the political unrest.¹⁶ These recent events highlight the importance of political tolerance on the part of governments and their publics. Citizen commitment to the rights of political dissidents can temper the ability of governments to engage in acts of repression with impunity.

This report provides a cross-time analysis of support for the political system and political tolerance among the citizens of the LAC region and in Mexico from 2004 to 2019. Two dimensions of political legitimacy are analyzed—diffuse and specific. Diffuse support for regime institutions is assessed by analyzing system support over time, cross-nationally, and demographically. Specific support is assessed by analyzing levels of trust in political institutions over time.

II. Main Findings

Some key findings include:

- In the 2019 round, support for the political system in Mexico increased by 9.6 points when compared to the 2016 round of the AmericasBarometer. Mexico is now the nation with the second-highest level of system support, only after Costa Rica (59.2). Despite the increased support for the political system, the specific components of the system support index have not yet fully returned to the level in the mid-2000s, with the exception of the political system support question.
- Support for the political system is higher among those with lower education, less wealth, residents of rural areas, and older age groups.
- There has been an increase in the levels of trust in Mexican institutions in 2019 when compared to previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer. The most notable increase is in the level of trust in the executive. Trust in the current President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (66.6 in 2019) is more than double the level of trust registered during the presidency of Enrique Peña Nieto (26.3 in 2016).
- The Mexican institution with the lowest level of trust, on average, is the political party system (32.2 degrees). Only 1 in 3 Mexicans trust this institution. is the institution with the next lowest level of trust is the National Police (35.1 degrees).
- The Armed Forces had the highest level of trust in 2019 (65.6 degrees). The country ranks after Ecuador (71.2) and Brazil (68.6) in trust of the Armed Forces. Trust in the National Police in Mexico (35.1 degrees), is the lowest in the region.
- Political tolerance has slightly decreased in Mexico (54.5 in 2016 and 50.4 in 2019). The decrease is higher among Mexicans that express support for guaranteeing the right of

¹⁶ Human Rights Watch 2019.

those who criticize the government to make a speech and for dissidents to retain the right to vote.

- The oldest and least wealthy respondents indicate lower levels of political tolerance.
- Support for the political system in Mexico is mainly explained by trust in local government, followed by external efficacy, trust in the executive and political tolerance. Trust in the community is not correlated to levels of support for the system.

III. System Support

Citizen support for the concept of democracy is a vital to the endurance of democratic regimes. Yet, while this aspect of political support is important, it is just one of the ways in which regimes are legitimate in the minds of their citizens. In what follows, and setting aside support for democracy in the abstract, we provide an analysis of the multifaceted concept of political legitimacy as it operates in the LAC region.

LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of support for the political system. Political legitimacy, or “system support,” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.¹⁷ While specific support concerns evaluations of incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects that the political system and its institutions represent.

LAPOP’s measure of system support captures the diffuse support for regime institutions that is central to democratic survival.¹⁸ We operationalize the concept of system support through an additive index.¹⁹ This index uses broad questions about political institutions in diffuse terms, rather than personal feelings towards any specific institution or actor. The questions are as follows:

¹⁷ Easton 1975.

¹⁸ Booth and Seligson 2009.

¹⁹ The system support index is the mean of five questions from the questionnaire: B1, B2, B3, B4, and B6. A Cronbach’s alpha score is used to determine the reliability of combining the questions into a singular index. The system support alpha score is 0.80, which is high and evidence of scale reliability for the index.

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Mexico guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Mexico?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the Mexican political system?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the Mexican political system?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the Mexican political system?

For each question, we rescale the original 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("a lot") scale to run from 0 to 100, such that 0 is the least support for the political system and 100 is the most support for the political system. This follows LAPOP's standard coding and can be interpreted as measuring support in units, or degrees, on a continuous scale running from 0 to 100.

Figure 2.1 shows mean responses for the system support index across time in Mexico (the graph at the left of the first row) alongside mean scores for each of its five constituent components. After more than a decade of downward trends, support for the political system in Mexico recovered significantly in 2019. System support in Mexico in 2019 is 10 points higher (55.4) than it was in 2016 (44.8); however, it is still not higher than the level of support recorded in 2006 (60.8).

The increase is driven by improvements in all the index components. Compared to 2016, the greatest increase is observed in the levels of "pride in the political system" (B4), by 13.2 points (from 41.6 in 2016 to 54.8 in 2019) and support for the political system which is at its highest level since the series began (71.8).

These results could imply positive expectations from a large part of Mexicans towards the new government that took office at the end of 2018 and gives the government a good margin to work with. There could be consequences, however, if those expectations are not met.




Figure 2.1. System Support and Its Components, Mexico 200-2019

Not surprisingly, given cross-national heterogeneity in political systems, there are differences in support for the political system by country. Figure 2.2 shows levels of system support for the eighteen LAC countries surveyed in the 2018/19 round. Costa Rica has the highest average level of support at 59.2 degrees and Peru has the lowest average at 41.8 degrees. Mexico (55.4 degrees) is in second place after Costa Rica.




Figure 2.2. System Support, 2018/19

For the interested reader, we provide the country-level trends from the previous round of the AmericasBarometer for system support in the appendix. For the sake of parsimony, we will only comment on some findings from this analysis here. In a few cases, there are considerable shifts between the 2016/17 and 2018/19 rounds of the AmericasBarometer. Interestingly, these shifts appear to have some relation to the timing of elections. The countries experiencing the largest positive shifts in the system support index from 2016/17 to 2018/19 are Mexico (+10.6 degrees), Brazil (+8.5 degrees), Paraguay (+4.4 degrees), and Colombia (+3.1 degrees). These four countries also held presidential elections in the spring to fall of 2018 prior to the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer

fieldwork. At the other end, the countries with the largest negative shifts in system support are Nicaragua (-11.0 degrees), Honduras (-4.4 degrees), Panama (-4.1 degrees), and Argentina (-4.0 degrees). At the time of fieldwork, these countries had last held presidential elections in 2016, 2017, 2014, and 2015 respectively. Together, these sets of results suggest that elections play an important role in replenishing citizens' "reservoir" of support for their political system.

To analyze the relationship between the recency of elections and the dynamics of system support, Figure 2.3 plots the shift in average system support between the last two rounds of the AmericasBarometer (y-axis) and the months since the last presidential election at the time of survey fieldwork for the 2018/19 round (x-axis). The figure shows, on average, large positive shifts among the countries that have experienced elections within the last 20 months.

In general, there appears to be a significant correlation between time since the last presidential election and changes in system support (Pearson's correlation = -.47). Honduras stands out as one exception – a case with a relatively recent election, but declines in system support. Costa Rica likewise exhibits a similar pattern, but unlike Honduras, is already at a relatively high level of system support to begin with, as demonstrated in Figure 2.2. Finally, Nicaragua's decrease in system support is significantly greater than one would expect if only election timing mattered. These cases remind us that, while the holding of elections is important to system support, how elections are conducted and political leadership matter as well.




Figure 2.3. Changes in System Support and Recent Elections

Along with contextual factors, individual characteristics are also statistically significant predictors of levels of support for the political system, as shown in Figure 2.4.²⁰ In Mexico in 2019, there is a

²⁰ For all demographic figures in this report, we evaluate statistical significance using the 95% confidence intervals from the bivariate analysis between the socio-demographic category and the variable of interest.

negative relationship between support for the political system and wealth, education, age, and place of residence (urban vs rural). On average, greater levels of wealth and education express lower system support. Individuals from rural settings have an average system support of 60.6 units out of 100, compared to a mean of 54.1 for individuals from urban settings. On average, older individuals express a higher level of system support compared to younger individuals: those 66 and older register at 61.2 units versus 53.0 units for those between 26 and 35. There are no gender differences in system support in Mexico.




Figure 2.4. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of System Support, Mexico 2019

IV. Specific Institutions and Actors

The system support index is a diffuse, or broad, indicator of political legitimacy. For a more comprehensive evaluation, we can also analyze specific indicators of support by looking at other political institutions and actors.

As in prior AmericasBarometer studies, the following questions were included in the 2018/19 study asking about confidence in a set of specific institutions:²¹

B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

²¹ Again, we recoded responses from their original 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”) scale, so that the measures in this report run from 0 to 100.

B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

Figure 2.5 shows levels of trust among Mexicans for each institution from 2004 to 2019. In 2019, trust in the executive in Mexico was more than double the level observed in 2016 (from 26.3 to 66.6 in the 0 to 100 scale). This is the highest level of trust in the executive since 2008 when the question was included in the AmericasBarometer for the first time. Trust in the Congress increased to 52.6 degrees, political parties to 33.2 degrees, and the elections to 49.3 degrees. Although trust in these institutions increased in comparison to 2016, their levels are not the highest since 2004. Furthermore, although trust in political parties has improved, the level of trust is still low (33.2 degrees); that is only 1 in every 3 Mexicans trust the political parties.




Figure 2.5. Trust in Institutions in Mexico (I), 2004-2019

The AmericasBarometer has asked several questions about institutional trust to capture public sentiment about public and social institutions. The responses are scaled from 0 to 100 degrees where higher averages indicate greater institutional confidence:

B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?

B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?

B32. To what extent do you trust your municipality?

In Mexico, the level of trust in the local government increased (51.7 degrees) compared to 2016 (47.6 degrees). However, this level is significantly lower than the values observed in the previous rounds. Trust in the Armed Forces (65.6) remains stable in 2019. However, trust in this institution is at a relatively lower level than its maximum level (72.4 degrees) observed in 2006, showing in some extent the costs of joining the fight against drug trafficking. The low level of trust in the National Police - which changed from being the Federal Police to the National Guard in Mexico in 2018 - is more worrying, given the security crisis that faces the country. Despite an increase from 31.5 degrees in 2016 to 35.1 degrees in 2019, the level is still very low. Confidence in the elections increased substantially from 2016 to 2019, most likely due to the results of the 2019 federal elections in which a new party managed to win the presidency and the majority of the seats in Congress.




Figure 2.6. Trust in Institutions in Mexico (II), 2004-2019

As shown in Figure 2.7, trust in the National Police and in the Armed Forces in Mexico are ranked in opposite positions compared to other countries in the region. On one hand, the Mexican Armed Forces have a relatively high level of trust (65.6 degrees), only below Ecuador (71.2 degrees) and Brazil (68.6 degrees). On the other hand, the National Police, now the National Guard, is the least trusted institution in the LAC region. Trust in the local government in Mexico is slightly above the regional average, in sixth place in the regional ranking.

Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, 2018/19




Figure 2.7. Trust in Institutions, 2018/19

To what extent are citizens' evaluations of these specific institutions related to expert evaluations of institutional performance? We can provide one answer to this question by looking at confidence in elections. Figure 2.8 plots the country mean level of trust in elections from the AmericasBarometer 2018/19 round and the country's mean score on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index for the 2012–2018 period. The Electoral Integrity Project creates this index using expert surveys of electoral processes.²² There is a positive correlation between the two measures (Pearson's correlation = .61), indicating that experts and the mass public correspond in their evaluations of how elections are conducted in their country. Honduras stands out as a case where the public and expert evaluations exhibit particularly low levels of trust in the integrity of elections.




Figure 2.8. Mass Public and Expert Evaluations of Elections

Since these indicators capture the specific support dimension of political legitimacy (tapping into citizen trust of specific political actors and institutions), one ought to expect variation across time within a given political system. For example, trust in the president should ebb and flow along with the executive's performance in office. In this way, trust in the executive displayed substantial variation across countries in direction and magnitude of changes from 2016/17 to 2018/19. These ranged from a large positive shift in Mexico (+40.3 degrees) to a decline of 19.5 degrees in Nicaragua. The top four countries with the largest increases in trust in the executive each experienced recent presidential elections: Mexico, Brazil (+32.9 degrees), Paraguay (+17.2 degrees), and Colombia (+17.0 degrees). These countries also experienced statistically significant increases in the other three trust indicators (with the exception of trust in elections in Paraguay and trust in the national legislature in Colombia and Paraguay). At the other end, two countries experienced statistically significant declines across all four indicators: Nicaragua and Honduras. The largest decline in trust in elections (-11.6 degrees) was registered in Honduras; as mentioned above,

²² Norris and Grömping 2019.

Honduras was the site of a protest movement in response to perceptions of malfeasance in the 2017 elections.

V. Political Tolerance

This section shifts focus to a different dimension of democratic legitimacy outlined by Norris: support for regime principles.²³ Regime principles in this context refer to democratic ideals such as political competition, alternate sources of information, and universal suffrage.²⁴ Following the work of Booth and Seligson, we use citizen commitment to political tolerance as a measure of support for regime principles.²⁵ In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as “respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree.”²⁶

Political tolerance is measured here by asking about citizens’ approval of the right of people with dissenting political opinions to participate in politics. Specifically, the questions ask about rights to vote, peacefully demonstrate, run for office, and make televised speeches. The following questions are used to generate a political tolerance index:²⁷

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Mexico’s form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Mexico form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?

In Mexico, political tolerance has remained fairly constant since 2004. Though there was a slight decrease in 2014, the average level of tolerance has since returned to 50 degrees on the 0 to 100 scale, as shown in Figure 2.9. Citizens have the highest approval for maintaining the right to peacefully protest for those who criticize the government, with an average of 61.0 out of 100 in

²³ Norris 1999.

²⁴ Dahl 2008, Schmitter and Karl 1991, Diamond 1999.

²⁵ Booth and Seligson 2009.

²⁶ Seligson 2000, p. 5.

²⁷ The political tolerance index is created using the mean score of the D series: D1, D2, D3, and D4. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.82, a high score that indicates scale reliability for the political tolerance index. For the analyses in this report, we rescaled responses from their original 1 to 10 scale to run from 0 to 100, as per LAPOP’s standard.

2019. The lowest values are registered for approval of critic's right to run for office, at 40.2 out of 100 in 2019.




Figure 2.9. Political Tolerance and Its Components, Mexico, 2004-2019

How does political tolerance vary by country? Figure 2.10 shows the cross-national distribution of mean levels of political tolerance on the 0-100 scale. Jamaica has the highest average level of tolerance at 60.6, while Colombia has the lowest average at 48.0 units. Most countries in the region have levels of political tolerance around the mid-point on the 0-100 scale. Mexico (with 50.4 units in the 0 to 100 scale) is below the regional average, just 2.4 points above Colombia, the country with the lowest level of political tolerance in the AmericasBarometer in 2018/2019.




Figure 2.10. Political Tolerance, 2018/19

An analysis of trends from the 2016/17 to 2018/19 round at the country level, (data are detailed in the appendix), reveals considerable stability in the political tolerance index. Shifts in the political tolerance index ranged only from -4.1 to +3.5 degrees (on the 0-100 scale). In fact, there are only four countries with statistically significant increases in their index averages: El Salvador (+3.5 degrees), Peru (+2.7 degrees), Colombia (+2.5 degrees), and Honduras (+2.2 degrees). There are also only five cases that experienced statistically significant declines since the 2016/17 wave: Mexico (-4.1 degrees), Brazil (-3.6 degrees), the Dominican Republic (-3.0 degrees), Uruguay (-2.8 degrees), and Panama (-1.7 degrees). It is worth noting that the two cases with the greatest declines in their

political tolerance index average (Mexico and Brazil) also exhibited the greatest increases in measures of system support and trust in political institutions discussed above.

Figure 2.11 shows variation in political tolerance by socio-economic and demographic groups.²⁸ In the case of Mexico, the level of education is the strongest predictor of political tolerance: those with higher education tend to express more political tolerance. The results indicate an average level of tolerance of 55.3 units for the highest education level compared to an average level of 49.4 for primary education. Political tolerance decreases as people age. The youngest age cohort has an average level of tolerance of 54.7 units compared to 47.6 units for the oldest cohort. The highest wealth quintile is more politically tolerant (55.7) than the lowest quintile (49.9). There is a marginal difference between urban and rural residents and women and men, but the differences are not statistically significant.



Figure 2.11. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of Political Tolerance, Mexico 2019

VI. Dimensions of Democratic Legitimacy

This section analyzes the relationship between system support and five other dimensions of political regime legitimacy.²⁹ As discussed in the previous sections, the system support index is a measure of diffuse support for regime institutions. The political tolerance index is a measure of diffuse support for regime principles. To capture evaluations of regime performance, we look at another diffuse indicator, external efficacy – how much someone believes their government

²⁸ As in the earlier analyses, we evaluate statistical significance using the 95% confidence intervals from the bivariate analysis between the socio-demographic category and the variable of interest.

²⁹ Norris 1999.

representatives care about their concerns as an individual. In addition, we consider three indicators of support for specific institutions: trust in the executive (measured with trust in the president, trust in local government, trust in the public community (i.e., interpersonal trust). The specific measures are as follows:

System Support Index: B1, B2, B3, B4, B6 - (see section on System Support)

Political Tolerance Index: D1, D2, D3, D4 - (see section on Political Tolerance)

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?

B32. To what extent do you trust the local government?

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?³⁰

We ran a regression analysis to determine the relationship between system support and these other five dimensions of democratic legitimacy. We control for the same socio-economic and demographic indicators analyzed earlier, and country-fixed effects (coefficients for control variables are not shown in Figures 2.12 and 2.13). All five support indicators have a positive, significant relationship with system support, according to a 95% confidence interval, as shown in Figure 2.12. This indicates that as external efficacy, political tolerance, trust of the executive, community, and local government increase, so does the average level of support for the political system. The highest correlations with system support are between trust in the president (coefficient = 24.6³¹), in the local government (19.7), and external efficacy (12.0). Two of the specific indicators, trust in local government and executive, have particularly strong correlations with system support.

³⁰ Trust in the community has been reverse coded from its original scale in the survey so that higher values in that variable indicate higher levels of trust and lower levels indicate lower trust.

³¹ Given the way the variables are coded, the regression coefficients can be interpreted as the predicted change in the dependent variable, on the 0-100 scale, given a min-to-max change in the independent variable.




Figure 2.12. Correlates of System Support, 2018/19

Figure 2.13 replicates the analysis for Mexico. The variable that has the most impact on system support is trust in local government, more than trust in the executive. This is a relevant result, since Mexico is traditionally seen as a political system with a strong executive and relatively weak local governments. Trust in the community is not statistically significant as a determinant of system support.




Figure 2.13. Correlates of System Support, Mexico 2019

Figure 2.14 shows that support for the system is greater among those who strongly agree with external effectiveness (64.7 degrees versus 40 degrees among those who strongly disagree). Similarly, support for the system is higher among those with higher levels of political tolerance

(58.6) than among those with lower tolerance levels (52.85). Support for the system increases as confidence in the executive increases: ranging from 38.4 degrees of support among those who do not trust the executive to 63.6 degrees among those who trust a lot. Finally, support for the system is also greater among those with strong trust in their municipality (75.1) compared to those who do not trust at all (34.6). Trust in the community is not statistically significant.




Figure 2.14. System Support and Democratic Legitimacy, Mexico 2019

The empirical evidence presented here affirms that there exist important connections between a general measure of political support (political legitimacy) and other diffuse and specific indicators of democratic legitimacy. These results affirm the validity of the system support index, as a means by which one can evaluate the level of political legitimacy within a mass public. The results also suggest that trust in specific institutions may spill over into more diffuse trust and, of course, vice versa. That is, the fate of political legitimacy is connected not only to general assessments of political institutions and processes, but also to the evaluations that individuals develop of specific political actors and agencies.

VII. Conclusion

Democracy is stronger to the degree that citizens express support for its institutions and support for democratic processes. When citizens broadly view the system as legitimate and tolerate even its most ardent detractors, democratic governments are empowered to function in ways that are both effective and inclusive. However, when this cultural foundation is fragile, democracy's fate is less certain. Given the importance of these beliefs and attitudes by the mass public, we tracked the legitimacy of democratic regimes and levels of political tolerance in the Americas, compared

them across countries, and provided an analysis of the socio economic and demographic factors that influence these attitudes. We also considered the relevance of context, including elections, to changes in public opinion over time.

One conclusion from the cross-time analyses is that system support and political tolerance do not necessarily trend together, nor even do all components of these indices. Recall that overall system support fell in the previous decade largely due to flagging faith that courts guarantee a fair trial, that the system protects citizens' basic rights, and pride in the political system. Yet respect for the country's political institutions and normative commitments to liberal democracy, as operationalized by political tolerance, were more stable.

Another noteworthy finding from this report is that political legitimacy and to a lesser extent political tolerance exhibit short-term volatility in the Americas. Analyses of specific cases here suggest this volatility reflects real-time political processes, namely elections and turnovers in executive power as well as violent government crackdowns of protest movements. It is worth noting that the two cases that experienced the largest positive shifts in system support from 2016/17 (Mexico and Brazil), were also the two cases with the largest declines in average political tolerance. This indicates that these two important components of democratic legitimacy can trend in opposite directions, at least in the short term. Recent work on democratic political culture in the region has highlighted the willingness of citizens to delegate greater authority to popular executives (whose popularity can bolster system support) and support greater control on political dissent.³² This dynamic poses a challenge for the development of a political culture conducive to stable democratic government, as both support for the political system and political tolerance are necessary for the legitimacy of democratic regimes.

With a new government elected in 2018, system support has been improving in Mexico. In the 2018/2019 of the AmericasBarometer, there has been an increase in support for the system, pride in the political system, trust in the institutions, but not in the political tolerance. Mexicans are giving their government an opportunity to make the regime work. When citizens perceive that the government legitimately responds to their needs and follows the democratic rules, we can expect higher levels of support for the political system in Mexico.

Presidents and local governments are some of the institutions that are most visible in citizens' day-to-day lives. Levels of trust in these institutions are the strongest predictors of overall system support. Incumbent governments at the local and national level have the opportunity to make positive impacts on citizens' commitment to the democratic regime, i.e. building the "reservoir" of support. This places a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of the actors who inhabit these institutions. It is thus incumbent upon political leaders to show themselves to be capable, honest, and responsive.

Another factor that can serve to build the "reservoir" are regular elections. Our analyses provide evidence that elections are instruments for reinvigorating the legitimacy of political institutions, as long as they are perceived to operate in ways that are free of bias and irregularities. Otherwise, they can generate frustration and protests.

³² Carlin and Singer 2011, Singer 2018.

Appendix

**Appendix Table 1. Cross-National Trends in System Support Indicators
(2016/17 to 2018/19)**

Country	Courts Guarantee Fair Trial (B1)	Respect Institutions (B2)	Basic Rights Protected (B3)	Proud of Living Under Political System (B4)	Should Support Political System (B6)	System Support
Mexico	6.9*	9.5*	7.9*	13.2*	15.8*	10.6*
Guatemala	-1.0	-1.5	-3.7*	-4.2*	-5.0*	-3.0*
El Salvador	-0.8	-0.3	-2.7*	-2.1	1.4	-0.8
Honduras	-2.8*	-5.2*	-3.7*	-4.4*	-7.2*	-4.4*
Nicaragua	-5.7*	-10.4*	-12.4*	-13.0*	-13.8*	-11.0*
Costa Rica	-2.7*	0.2	-4.3*	-4.4*	-4.0*	-3.1*
Panama	-3.8*	-1.5	-5.1*	-4.8*	-5.5*	-4.1*
Colombia	2.9*	1.9	0.7	3.9*	6.4*	3.1*
Ecuador	-1.7	-2.6*	-6.5*	-4.0*	-2.6*	-3.4*
Bolivia	0.1	0.8	-0.7	-2.3	-1.3	-0.6
Peru	-1.3	-2.1	-3.1*	-2.8*	-1.5	-2.1*
Paraguay	3.7*	4.8*	3.1*	4.0*	6.6*	4.4*
Chile	2.8*	3.0*	1.8	2.2	4.0*	2.8*
Uruguay	-0.6	-1.0	-2.1	-4.5*	-3.8*	-2.6*
Brazil	5.5*	8.7*	7.1*	8.2*	13.0*	8.5*
Argentina	-5.1*	-2.1	-3.8*	-3.7*	-5.3*	-4.0*
Dominican Republic	0.5	-2.8	-0.8	-5.9*	-5.2*	-2.8*
Jamaica	0.8	2.6*	0.7	3.1*	-0.7	1.4

Variables coded from 0-100. Numerical entries are differences in country averages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds.

* Denotes differences significant at p<0.05.

**Appendix Table 2. Cross-National Trends of Trust in Specific Institutions
(2016/17 to 2018/19)**

Country	Trust in National Legislature (B13)	Trust in Political Parties (B21)	Trust in Executive (B21A)	Trust in Elections (B47A)
Mexico	9.0*	10.4*	40.3*	15.2*
Guatemala	-1.4	0.2	-12.4*	-3.3*
El Salvador	-2.5*	-2.3*	-2.5	-1.1
Honduras	-9.1*	-5.8*	-9.7*	-11.6*
Nicaragua	-13.3*	-8.7*	-19.5*	-6.9*
Costa Rica	-9.1*	-5.4*	1.2	-5.6*
Panama	-5.2*	-1.7	-9.7*	-3.0*
Colombia	1.1	4.4*	17.0*	5.5*
Ecuador	-5.3*	-1.3	-13.0*	-4.5*
Bolivia	-2.9	-1.1	-3.4	-7.8*
Peru	-9.5*	-2.0*	5.8*	-4.3*
Paraguay	2.3	4.3*	17.2*	1.5
Chile	1.5	3.4*	-1.7	3.2*
Uruguay	-2.9*	-2.2	-7.8*	-3.6*
Brazil	9.7*	4.9*	32.9*	10.3*
Argentina	-4.5*	-2.0	-12.0*	-2.4
Dominican Republic	-4.6*	-0.8	-15.8*	-3.5*
Jamaica	-2.3	-0.7	0.1	-1.7

Variables coded from 0-100. Numerical entries are differences in country averages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds.

* Denotes differences significant at p<0.05.

**Appendix Table 3. Cross-National Trends in Political Tolerance Indicators
(2016/17 to 2018/19)**

Country	Right to Vote (D1)	Peaceful Demonstration (D2)	Run for Public Office (D3)	Make Speeches (D4)	Political Tolerance
Mexico	-3.5*	-5.4*	-3.1*	-4.2*	-4.1*
Guatemala	0.4	-3.9*	2.0	-1.8	-0.8
El Salvador	3.0*	3.6*	4.1*	3.4*	3.5*
Honduras	1.3	3.3*	2.7*	1.6	2.2*
Nicaragua	1.2	-1.5	-0.2	0.2	-0.3
Costa Rica	0.1	1.0	-0.1	1.8	0.7
Panama	-3.7*	-3.1*	-0.6	0.6	-1.7*
Colombia	3.7*	2.4	1.4	2.7	2.5*
Ecuador	0.6	1.4	-0.2	1.6	0.9
Bolivia	-1.6	-1.9*	0.2	0.6	-0.8
Peru	3.6*	1.0	3.3*	3.6*	2.8*
Paraguay	0.7	-3.3*	1.2	-0.8	-0.5
Chile	1.0	-0.4	2.9*	1.9	1.4
Uruguay	-5.3*	-5.2*	-0.2	-0.5	-2.8*
Brazil	-4.3*	-6.0*	-0.2	-3.7*	-3.6*
Argentina	-0.9	-1.6	2.3	1.6	0.2
Dominican Republic	-5.9*	-7.7*	0.9	0.9	-3.0*
Jamaica	-0.3	-1.9	2.1	1.1	-0.4

Variables coded from 0-100. Numerical entries are differences in country averages between 2018/19 and 2016/17 rounds.

* Denotes differences significant at p<0.05.

Chapter 3.

Social Media and Political Attitudes in the Latin America and Caribbean Region

Noam Lupu¹, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister²,
and Mariana V. Ramírez Bustamante³ with Pablo Parás⁴

I. Introduction

In the last decade, social media use has expanded around the world, including in the Americas⁵. And increasingly, people access the news through social media. On the one hand, social media can play a positive role in expanding access to timely information. On the other, social media can help spread misinformation, intimidation, and hostile rhetoric.

Given these dueling currents, it is challenging to determine whether social media improves or undermines the quality of democracy overall. One way to study this is to compare the attitudes and evaluations expressed by social media users and non-users. If social media users are less supportive of democracy and its institutions, this could mean that information spread via social media erodes democratic attitudes. Conversely, if social media users largely support democratic politics, their use of the platform may spread goodwill toward the system and counterbalance the negative experiences and evaluations that circulate in the general public.

Research on this topic has so far yielded mixed results, as well as reasons to be concerned about the attitudes held by social media users. Some scholars find a positive relationship between social media use and political cynicism (e.g., lower trust in political institutions and satisfaction with democracy), while others find weaker or no evidence of this connection.⁶ Still, most of the research on these topics has focused on the more developed democracies of North America and Western Europe.

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⁵ Data on social media penetration in Latin America are available at <https://www.statista.com/statistics/244930/social-network-penetration-in-latin-america/>

⁶ On a positive connection between social media and cynicism, see Ceron 2015, Ceron and Memoli 2016, Johnson and Kaye 2015, and Yamamoto and Kushin 2013; but also see Hanson et al. 2013 and Yamamoto, Kushin, and Dalisay 2017.

Within the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, little is known about who uses social media and what political attitudes they hold. Looking at eight countries in the region, one study finds that social media users tend to be more educated, more urban, wealthier, and more interested in politics.⁷ Other studies suggest that social media users in the region are less satisfied with democracy, more politically tolerant and democratic, and more likely to protest.⁸ But these studies analyze data from nearly a decade ago, use blunt yes/no social media access measures, and focus on a subsample of countries in the region.

By analyzing an original module of questions in the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer, this chapter provides foundational evidence about these phenomena in the LAC region and in Mexico.⁹

Globally, the most popular social media platforms are Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp.¹⁰ We developed the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer social media module to focus on these three platforms. In analyzing this module, we first present descriptive data on usage across the region and in Mexico. We then profile social media users in Mexico, providing a description of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, their propensity to use social media frequently, and their engagement with political information on these platforms. Finally, we analyze the connections between social media use and political attitudes, including political tolerance, support for democracy, trust in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy.

II. Main Findings

The main findings in this chapter are as follows:

- WhatsApp is the most used social network in Mexico. 55.1% of the voting age population use this social network. 47.9% use Facebook. Given that 64.4% of adults in the LAC region use WhatsApp and 56.2% use Facebook, Mexico is below the regional average in the use of Facebook and WhatsApp.
- Twitter is used infrequently in the LAC region: the highest percentage of adult Twitter users is in Argentina, at 13%. In Mexico, 7.6% of voting age respondents use Twitter.
- The typical social media user in the Mexico is young, wealthy, and educated.

⁷ Salzman 2015.

⁸ Gainous, Wagner, and Gray 2016; Salzman 2018; Valenzuela et al. 2016.

⁹ Questions on social media use were also asked in the 2019 AmericasBarometer surveys of the U.S. and Canada, but these countries are not analyzed here.

¹⁰ Data on the popularity of social media platforms worldwide are available at <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/>. Although WhatsApp is primarily a messaging platform, we include it as a social media platform because of the way it is commonly used in the LAC region. Studies show that WhatsApp is widely used there for sharing news and information, coordinating political activities and discussing political issues (Bradshaw and Howard 2018). In Argentina's 2019 election campaign, for instance, WhatsApp was considered an important campaign tool (Gian 2018; Miri 2019). WhatsApp also played a key role in the 2018 election campaigns in Brazil (Capetti 2019; Nemer 2018).

- Among social media users in Mexico, WhatsApp is used with the greatest frequency: 79.9% of WhatsApp users use the platform daily (compared to 60.6% for Facebook and 38.3% for Twitter).
- In Mexico, about 1 in 3 WhatsApp users report viewing political information on the platform a few times a week or daily. On Twitter and Facebook, 63.4% and 71.0% respectively, report the same.
- Frequent users of social media in the region are more politically tolerant and somewhat more supportive of democracy in the abstract, but they also express more cynicism: they are less satisfied with democracy and less trusting of core political institutions.

III. How Widely Used Are Social Media?

In the LAC region, WhatsApp is the most commonly used social media platform, followed by Facebook and then Twitter. Figure 3.1 shows region-wide average usage rates for each platform.¹¹ On average across the LAC region, 64.4% of adults report using WhatsApp. At a close second, 56.2% of adults indicate that they use Facebook. Trailing significantly in usage is Twitter: fewer than 1 in 10 adults (7.9%) in the LAC region use Twitter.

¹¹ For each platform, we identify users with a combination of two sets of survey questions. First, we identify users as those who respond positively to the questions, SMEDIA1/SMEDIA4/SMEDIA7. Do you have a Facebook/Twitter/WhatsApp account? Then, we recode as non-users those who respond “never” to the follow-up questions, SMEDIA2/SMEDIA5/SMEDIA8. How often do you see content on Facebook/Twitter/WhatsApp?



Figure 3.1. Social Media Use, the LAC Region and Mexico, 2018/19

Internet access and social media engagement vary across countries. Table 3.1 reports the proportion of adults in each country who have cellphones in their homes, home internet access,

and use each social media platform.¹² Where available, we also report statistics on smartphone penetration.¹³ The majority of adults have a cellphone (averaging around 90% across the LAC region). In contrast, home internet access is more limited and varies significantly across countries. At 73.7%, Brazil has the largest proportion with access to internet at home, while this rate is comparatively low in Nicaragua and Guatemala, at less than 25%.

There are substantial differences in WhatsApp user rates across countries in the LAC region. Costa Rica has the largest proportion of WhatsApp adult users at 81.6%. Uruguay and Argentina also have high rates, with 80% and 78.9%, respectively. In contrast, WhatsApp is far less widely used in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras, at less than 48% of adults. WhatsApp use is higher when home access to the internet is higher: for the region as a whole, the correlation between the proportion of adults in a country who use WhatsApp and the proportion with internet access at home is a strong 0.93.¹⁴ Further, WhatsApp usage is higher where more people have cellphones: the country-level correlation between the proportion of adults who use WhatsApp and the proportion who have cellphones in the home is 0.86.

Table 3.1. Internet Access and Social Media Usage by Country, 2018/19

Countries	Smartphone ownership	Cellphone in home	Home internet service	WhatsApp users	Facebook users	Twitter users
Argentina	65.0	92.5	70.9	78.9	67.3	12.9
Bolivia	--	93.7	42.1	63.5	57.9	5.6
Brazil	54.0	95.4	73.7	76.2	59.8	8.5
Chile	72.0	97.0	70.3	75.5	62.9	9.2
Colombia	56.0	92.8	48.2	62.7	59.6	10.5
Costa Rica	--	96.3	67.9	81.6	66.6	8.0
Dom. Rep.	--	88.9	42.7	68.2	61.9	9.5
Ecuador	--	90.5	51.4	60.2	66.9	11.2
El Sal.	--	86.9	35.5	56.0	56.2	6.7
Guatemala	--	81.6	23.9	47.6	43.2	6.5
Honduras	--	86.4	25.1	46.9	44.6	4.8
Jamaica	--	94.2	55.0	68.1	45.9	4.5
Mexico	42.0	82.2	45.7	55.1	47.9	7.6
Nicaragua	--	84.5	22.2	47.7	48.1	5.8
Panama	--	84.0	35.2	56.7	34.6	5.8
Paraguay	--	95.8	44.1	69.3	60.5	8.0
Peru	41.0	86.5	37.5	58.6	61.4	7.6
Uruguay	--	95.6	70.0	80.0	66.5	9.8

Note: Smartphone ownership data come from Pew Research Center (2018); all other data are from the AmericasBarometer 2018/19.

¹² Household assets are measured using two AmericasBarometer survey items included in a battery that begins, “Could you tell me if you have the following in your house”: R4A. Cellular telephone (accept smartphone), R18. Internet from your home (including phone or tablet).

¹³ Pew Research Center 2018.

¹⁴ Since 2016, WhatsApp can be used on a smartphone or computer, through a web interface or via an app.

Social media platform usage tends to coincide. That is, Facebook usage is high where WhatsApp use is high. With respect to Facebook usage, we again find that Argentina, Ecuador, and Costa Rica have comparatively high user rates. Again, we see comparatively low usage rates in Guatemala and Honduras. Panama and Jamaica stand out as unusual cases in which WhatsApp usage substantially outstrips Facebook penetration: 56.7% of Panamanians and 68.1% of Jamaicans use WhatsApp, whereas only 34.6% and 45.9%, respectively, use Facebook. Table 3.1 also shows that, although Twitter usage is not especially widespread in the LAC region, usage rates vary across countries, from 4.5% in Jamaica to 12.9% in Argentina.

At the individual level, many social media users are engaged in more than one type of social media.¹⁵ Indeed, Figure 3.2 shows the majority of Facebook and WhatsApp users are multi-platform users. 44% of adults in the LAC region are both Facebook and WhatsApp users and, of those a small proportion (7% of adults) also are Twitter users. At the same time, Figure 3.2 usefully highlights that a sizable proportion of citizens in the average LAC country, 30%, do not use any of these social media platforms.¹⁶




Figure 3.2. Overlap in Use of Social Media Platforms in the LAC region, 2018/19

¹⁵ Due to space constraints in the El Salvador survey, the AmericasBarometer randomly assigned each respondent to be asked about only one of the three social media platforms. As a result, we do not have information about users of multiple platforms for that country, and it is omitted from the data in Figure 3.2.

¹⁶ In analyses of the region, we follow LAPOP's standard practice and weight each country equally. Averages for the region, then, can be interpreted as values that one would expect to find in the average country in the region.

IV. Who Uses Social Media?

The average social media user in Mexico is younger (35 or below), more likely to live in an urban setting, has a relatively higher economic status, and has more years of education than average. There is no tangible gender divide in WhatsApp and Facebook social media use; however, there is a gender and urban/rural gap between Twitter users and non-users. These conclusions are based on Table 3.2, which draws from the AmericasBarometer dataset. Alongside these basic statistics, the table presents the proportion of WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter users (vs. non-users) who live in urban areas and are male, as well as their mean age, wealth, and education.

Table 3.2. Characteristics of social media users, Mexico 2019

Characteristics	General population	WhatsApp		Facebook		Twitter	
		Users	Non-users	Users	Non-users	Users	Non-users
Urban (%)	79.94	81.24	78.22	81.54	78.39	91.67	78.86
Male (%)	20.06	18.76	21.78	18.46	21.61	8.33	21.14
Mean Age	49.05	49.94	47.81	50.60	47.86	64.17	47.73
Mean Wealth	50.95	50.06	52.19	49.40	52.14	35.83	52.27
Mean Years of Education	42	35	50	33	50	33	43

Notes: Bolded figures indicate statistically significant differences between users and non-users. Wealth is measured by quintiles, 1-5.

The percentage of WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter users who live in urban areas in Mexico is greater than the percentage of non-users who live in urban areas. However, the differences are only statistically significant for Twitter. The average social media user also belongs to higher economic strata. Twitter users tend to be the most affluent, with wealth levels above the national average of 3.0 quintiles. Furthermore, social media users have a higher average number of years of education in comparison to non-users. There does not seem to be any substantial difference between the percentage of male users and non-users of WhatsApp and Facebook. This is not the case for Twitter, which has a much higher percentage of male users than male non-users. Social media users are, on average, younger than non-users.

V. How Frequently Do They Use Social Media?

The availability of social media has changed how people communicate, interact, and consume different kinds of information, including political information.¹⁷ According to scholars, social media are “soft news” sources, where political content is an ancillary interest. That is, most social media users “are not necessarily seeking information about public affairs” when they make use of these platforms.¹⁸ However, given that political content does circulate through these channels, many social media users will tend to see some amount of news about politics and related information.

¹⁷ Graber and Holyk 2011; Tucker et al. 2017.

¹⁸ Baumgartner and Morris 2010: 28-9.

Not all social media account holders use it at the same rate, in general or to access political information. To gauge how often social media account holders use these platforms, and how often they see political information on WhatsApp, Facebook, or Twitter, we included the following questions within the AmericasBarometer social media module:

SMEDIA2. How often do you see content on Facebook?
SMEDIA3. How often do you see political information on Facebook?
SMEDIA5. How often do you see content on Twitter?
SMEDIA6. How often do you see political information on Twitter?
SMEDIA8. How often do you use WhatsApp?
SMEDIA9. How often do you see political information on WhatsApp?

Among those with social media accounts, frequency of viewing content differs substantially depending on the social platform they use. Account holders could indicate that they engage in general content and/or political information on these social platforms daily, a few times a week, a few times a month, a few times a year, or never.

Considering information in general, Figure 3.3 shows the frequency with which respondents reported viewing content on different social media platforms. The upper panel of the graph presents results for the region as a whole, while the lower panel show data for only Mexico. Frequently viewing content on WhatsApp and Facebook is very common among users in both Mexico and the LAC region in general, while this behavior is comparatively less common on Twitter.¹⁹

¹⁹ Questions SMEDIA2, SMEDIA5, and SMEDIA8 were recoded so that those respondents who report never seeing content on Facebook and Twitter, and those who indicate never using WhatsApp, are considered as non-users of these social media platforms.





Figure 3.3. Frequency of Social Media Use, the LAC Region and Mexico, 2018/19

In fact, among WhatsApp users in Mexico, 79.9% report using it daily, and while 17.1% report using it a few times a week. Facebook users also tend to use the platform frequently: more than half of the Facebook users check its content daily (60.6%), and almost one-third (31.5%) do so a few times a week. In contrast, among Twitter users 38.3% view content on this social media platform daily, while 31.7% do so a few times a week.

What individual-level characteristics predict social media use, versus non-use? We consider five demographic and socioeconomic factors that may affect the propensity to use social media: place of residence, gender, age, education, and wealth.²⁰ The dependent variable, Social Media User, is based on responses to the three questions about holding accounts from Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. This dichotomous measure distinguishes between those individuals who use accounts from one or more of these platforms, compared to those who do not engage with any social media account.²¹

Figure 3.4 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis that regresses social media use on measures of place of residence (urban vs. rural), gender (female vs. male), age, education, and wealth. For all such analyses in this report, country fixed effects are included but not shown. The dots in Figure 3.4 are the predicted changes in the probability of the dependent variable taking on the value of "1" (social media user), given a change from the minimum to maximum value on the independent variable. The 2019 results demonstrate that, on average, younger, more educated, and wealthier individuals in Mexico are more likely to be social media users. Gender and place of residence (urban vs rural) are not significant predictors of social media use.




Figure 3.4. Factors Associated with Social Media Use, Mexico 2019

²⁰ Age and education are measured in years, rescaled to 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the youngest or the lowest level of education, and 1 the oldest or the highest level of education. Wealth is an ordinal variable, rescaled to 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the lowest level of wealth, and 1 the highest level of wealth. Place of residence is coded 1 for urban and 0 for rural. Gender is coded 1 for female and 0 for male.

²¹ Account-holders who say they never access content on any of these platforms are considered non-users.




Figure 3.5. Social Media Use by Socio-Demographic Variables, Mexico 2019

Figure 3.5 shows the percentage of social media users for each category of the significant predictors from the previous analysis. Within in the poorest quintile 41.8% are users of social media, while the percentage of users reaches 83.7% in the richest quintile. Something similar happens with educational levels: 11.4% of Mexicans without education use social media platforms, while 87.4% of Mexicans with higher education use them. The use of these platforms reaches 88.8% of the youngest Mexican, while only 16.6% of those in the oldest Mexicans (66 years of age and older).

What individual-level characteristics predict high use of social media? In order to answer that question, we created a second measure, also based on the three questions about frequency of use. This measure, "High Social Media Use" is a dichotomous variable that distinguishes between those users who access content on any one or more of these platforms (WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter) a few times a week or daily, and those individuals who have one or more social media accounts but do not often access any of them (that is, they have accounts but access social media only a few times a month, or a few times a year).

Figure 3.6 shows the results of a logistic regression analysis that regresses high use of social media (vs. low use) on the same set of demographic and socioeconomic factors. The results indicate that, on average in Mexico in 2019, none of the independent variables in the regression model predicts the frequency of social media use.




Figure 3.6. Factors Predicting High (vs. Low) Social Media Use, Mexico 2019

VI. Political Engagement on Social Media

Those who view content on social media vary in the extent to which they encounter political information. Figure 3.7 displays, for the region as a whole (upper panel) and for Mexico (lower panel), the frequency of viewing political information on WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter, among those who are social media users. In Mexico, there is a higher tendency for Facebook and Twitter users to view political information on a regular basis while WhatsApp users report viewing political information less often. More specifically, 31.4% of Facebook users report viewing political information on the platform daily, while 39.6% view this type of information a few times a week. A similar proportion of Twitter users, 31.7%, indicate that they view political information on this social media daily and a similar proportion do so a few times a week. Users view political information on WhatsApp less often. Although more than half of those who use WhatsApp mention that they never view political information on this social media platform (55.3%), nearly 1 in 3 WhatsApp users regularly access political information via the platform (i.e. 11.5% "Daily" plus 16.5% "A few times a week" totals 28%). This is a reminder that the platform is used not only for connecting with friends and family on apolitical matters, but also for the dissemination of political opinions and content.





Figure 3.7. Frequency Viewing Political Information on WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter, LAC and Mexico, 2018/19

What individual-level factors explain frequently viewing political information on social media? To answer this question, we created a “high frequency of viewing political information measure” by compiling answers to the questions about the three social media platforms. This new variable, “high frequency of viewing political information” distinguishes among social media users who use one or more account to view political information a few times a week or daily, and those who engage in political content on social media a few times a month, a few times a year, or never. We then analyzed the predictors of this dependent variable with the same model (that is, the same socioeconomic and demographic factors) used in the analysis of predictors of high social media use.

Figure 3.8 shows the results of this logistic analysis that regresses high political information consumption on social media on these demographic and socioeconomic factors. The results show that, on average in Mexico in 2019, those with higher levels of education, are more likely to view political information more frequently in social media. On the contrary, older individuals are less likely view political information on social media. Variables like gender, wealth and place of residence are not statistically significant predictors of the probability of political information consumption via social media (among social media users).




Figure 3.8. Factors Associated with Frequent Viewing of Political Information on Social Media, Mexico 2019

As Figure 3.9 shows, the use of social media to access political information is more common amongst those with a higher education (81.1%) than those with a primary education (48.6%). Age is also influential: younger people report greater use of social media for the consumption of political information than older people (16.6% for Mexicans 66 years old or more).




Figure 3.9. Frequent Viewing of Political Information on Social Media by Socio-Demographic Variables, Mexico 2019

VII. Social Media Use and Political Attitudes

Do frequent social media users express different political opinions than those who use social media less, or who do not have any social network account? To assess this, we consider in our analysis those who have one or more of the three social media accounts considered in this report: WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter.²² We use the same coding as in the prior section, to distinguish among those who access social media often (those with accounts who access any one or more of them a few times a week or daily) and those who do not access social media very frequently (those with accounts who access them a few times a month or a few times a year). We also include non-users: those who do not hold any social media account (those who indicate that they do not have a Facebook, Twitter, or WhatsApp account) and those who have an account but never access it. We consider several different political attitudes: political tolerance, support for democracy in the abstract, satisfaction with democracy, and trust in various institutions.

The results, in Figure 3.10, show that high social media users are more tolerant, and more supportive of democracy as a system of government than are low social media users or non-users. This trend can be seen both for the region (upper panel of Figure 3.10) but is not observed in Mexico (lower panel of the figure). On average in Mexico, 48.3% of high social media users display high levels of tolerance, while that rate is 43.9% among low social media users, and 43.3% for non-

²² See the percentage of high and low social media users, and non-users by country in the appendix material found on our project website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

users.²³ The differences between frequent users, less-frequent users and non-users are not statistically significant. The difference between high users and sporadic users is also statistically insignificant. 62.8% of high social media users support democracy, compared to 56.1% of low social media users, and 63.2% of non-users.²⁴ The difference between support for democracy among high users of social networks and both low social media users and non-users is not statistically significant.

²³ This variable was measured with LAPOP's political tolerance index, which is calculated based on the degree to which individuals disapprove or approve of the right of regime critics to exercise the right to vote, the right to participate in peaceful demonstrations, the right to run for office, and the right to make speeches (D1-4). This 0-100 index was rescaled so that values from 51 to 100 are considered "tolerant", and 0-50 are not.

²⁴ This variable was measured with the following question: ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? [scale from 1 Strongly disagree to 7 Strongly agree]. This variable was rescaled as follows: from 5 to 7 are coded as supporting democracy, and response 1-4 are not.




Figure 3.10. Tolerance Level, and Support for Democracy by Type of Social Media Use and Non-Users, LAC and Mexico 2018/19

Figure 3.11 shows that social media users are less satisfied with how democracy is working in their country.²⁵ Among high social media users, 37.7% report that they are satisfied with the way

²⁵ We measure satisfaction with democracy with PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)? [1 Very satisfied 2

democracy works in their country, while 39.2% of low social media users and 43.8% of non-users are satisfied with how democracy works in their country. The differences between the two groups of social media users (high and low) on the one hand and non-users on the other are statistically significant – but the slight difference between high and low users is not. A similar trend is observed in Mexico (lower panel). Among high social media users, 42.6% report that they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Mexico, while 48.7% of low social media users and 52.2% of non-users are satisfied with how democracy works in their country. The difference between frequent users of social networks and those who do not use them is statistically significant.

Satisfied 3 Dissatisfied 4 Very dissatisfied]. We code respondents who chose (1) or (2) as satisfied with democracy.




Figure 3.11. Satisfaction with Democracy by Type of Social Media User and Non-account Holders, LAC and Mexico 2018/19

High social media users are also less trusting in the country's institutions in the region as a whole (upper panel of Figure 3.12) and in Mexico (lower panel).²⁶ As Figure 3.12 displays, among high social media users in Mexico, 42.8% of them trust in Supreme Court, while 35.9% of low social media users, and 59.1% of non-users express trust this institution. Similarly, 36.8% of high social media users trust mass media. That rate is 47.5% among low social media users and 51.5% among non-users.²⁷ Likewise, 40.6% of high social media users indicate that they trust in local government, while this proportion is 40.0% among low social media users and 52.4% among non-users.

²⁶ Trust in political institutions was analyzed in this section based on the following questions: **B31**. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice? **B37**. To what extent do you trust the mass media? **B32**. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government? **B13**. To what extent do you trust the National Congress? **B21A**. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister? **B47A**. To what extent do you trust elections in this country? Respondents answered on a 1-7 scale, and we code responses (5), (6), and (7) as indicative of trust.

²⁷ We note that this result updates and reverses a finding presented in Salzman (2015), where no clear link was found between social media use and trust in the media.




Figure 3.12. Trust in Institutions by Type of Social Media User and Non-account Holders in the LAC Region and Mexico, 2018/19

Furthermore, we see that 39.3% of high social media users in Mexico trust in the National Congress, while 46.2% of low social media users and 52.9% of non-users report trust in this political institution. In addition, 64.3% of high social media users in Mexico trust the President, while this proportion is 54.8% among low social media users, and to 69.8% among non-users. Finally, 36.6% of high social media users express their trust toward elections in their country, yet this proportion rises to 42.5% among low social media users, and 50.9% among non-users. In general, in Mexico, those who use social media frequently trust institutions less than those who use them sporadically or not at all.²⁸

VIII. Conclusion

WhatsApp and Facebook are the most popular platforms, although the usage varies across countries social media is widely used in Mexico. 47.9% of adults in Mexico use Facebook and 55.1% use WhatsApp. However, Twitter, a common platform in many parts of the world, is not as widely used in Mexico (7.6%).

In Mexico, the average social media user is younger, relatively wealthier, and relatively better educated, compared to the average non-user.

Among social media users, there are also notable differences in how frequently they use it and how often they engage with political information on social media. Most WhatsApp and Facebook users use these platforms frequently, but Twitter users tend to use it less frequently.

Users in Mexico see political content on the platforms less frequently. This is especially true among users of WhatsApp, who tend to use the platform very frequently but see political content on it infrequently. Facebook users are substantially more likely to report seeing political content on the platform on a frequent basis. Again, it is primarily the younger, more educated, and wealthier individuals who see political content on social media frequently.

How is the use of social media related to democratic attitudes and evaluations? While frequent social media users are more tolerant and somewhat more supportive of democracy in the abstract, they are also less satisfied with how democracy works in their country, and less trusting in the political institutions. In Mexico, frequent social media use does not seem to have an exclusively positive or negative effect on political attitudes. While it is positively associated with some democratic attitudes, it seems to also promote more cynicism and distrust of fundamental democratic institutions. The continuing spread of social media will clearly shape politics in Mexico, but its effects on democratic attitudes at this point seem mixed.



²⁸ See online appendix for regressions that control for individual-level characteristics in predicting the relationship between social media and trust in political institutions in the LAC region, 2018/19.



Appendix



Appendix Table A1. Social Media Use by Country

Country	High Social Media Usage	Low Social Media Usage	Non-Users
Mexico	58.51	2.74	38.75
Guatemala	48.84	5.98	45.19
El Salvador	36.7	3.72	59.57
Honduras	47.79	4.87	47.34
Nicaragua	50.19	6.6	43.21
Costa Rica	82.89	1.34	15.77
Panama	57.69	1.74	40.57
Colombia	65.83	3.75	30.42
Ecuador	69.59	3.34	27.08
Bolivia	65.49	2.39	32.12
Peru	64.6	4.09	31.31
Paraguay	70.44	1.72	27.83
Chile	77.74	1.35	20.91
Uruguay	82.16	1.33	16.51
Brazil	77.21	2.41	20.38
Argentina	82.11	1.11	16.78
Dominican Republic	70.91	2.25	26.84
Jamaica	66.33	4.49	29.18
Regional Average	65.34	3.06	31.6

Regression Figures (Figure 3.12)







Chapter 4.

Effects of Neighborhood Extortion on the Evaluation of the Government and the Democratic System

Vidal Romero¹ and Marisol Torres²

I. Introduction

In addition to the rise in homicides and violence that Mexico has suffered since 2007, related to drug trafficking organizations, high proportions of citizens are also exposed to other negative dimensions of crime and violence, such as extortion. According to data from the AmericasBarometer, 18.9% of Mexicans were victims of extortion during 2018.

In this chapter we analyze the negative effects of being a victim of extortion on several dimensions that are fundamental for the good health of a political system, in addition to public safety, such as: trust between citizens (IT1); presidential approval (M1); the evaluation of democracy (PN4); and support for democracy (ING4).

Previous work in the literature has analyzed how victimization, in general, negatively affects several relevant dimensions. In the case of Mexico, Trelles and Carreras³ and Ley⁴ show that crime victims are less likely to participate politically, although Bateson finds a positive effect of victimization on political participation in analyzing survey data from five continents.⁵

Likewise, multiple studies have shown that crime victimization reduces trust in public institutions⁶ and the credibility of government messages.⁷ Castorena and Zechmeister find that those who have been victims of a crime show greater concern about public safety, compared to those who have not been victimized.⁸ Regarding the evaluation of the government leaders, the effects are mixed. On the one hand, Bravo and Romero et al. report a negative effect of crime victimization on presidential approval;⁹ while Ley finds no significant effects.¹⁰

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³ Trelles and Carreras 2012.

⁴ Ley 2013.

⁵ Bateson 2012.

⁶ Ceobanu et al. 2011; Corbacho et al. 2012; Cruz 2008; Fernández and Kuenzi 2010; Pérez 2003.

⁷ Romero et al. 2015.

⁸ Castorena and Zechmeister 2015.

⁹ Bravo 2012; Romero et al. 2016.

¹⁰ Ley 2013.

Extortion approximates the State's loss of territorial control. It involves an exchange of "protection" (from the same criminals who "protect") for resources. It is a kind of informal tax. This is, in some way, the same relationship that the citizen has with the State.

In addition to the direct damage extortion causes to citizens, extortion can have indirect negative effects on the citizens' evaluation of their governments and, more importantly, can deteriorate opinion of a nation's democratic regime. In other words, it can erode the citizen-government and citizen-regime relationship.

In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the key findings related to extortion in Mexico, compared over time and with the rest of the countries on the continent, as reported by the 2019 AmericasBarometer survey. Next, we analyze the negative effects that extortion has, in the case of Mexico, on the evaluation of the government and the democratic regime. In the end, we discuss the main implications of our research.

II. Key Findings

- The population that was victimized by extortion in the one-year period prior to the survey decreased slightly between 2016 (19.6%) and 2018 (18.9%), but still constitutes a very high percentage of victimization.
- Satisfaction with democracy decreases 7.2 percentage points, and support for democracy 5.7 percentage points, when one has been a victim of extortion.
- Citizens trust other people less when they have been the victims of extortion.
- Citizens do not punish the Executive when they have been victims of extortion.
- The overall picture is very troubling: victimization by extortion is eroding support and satisfaction with Mexico's democratic regime.

III. Extortion in Mexico

In Mexico, extortion tends to be linked to organized crime. After a series of events in recent decades, criminal organizations, traditionally dedicated to illicit drug trafficking, had to diversify their activities in order to face increasing competition. These other criminal activities include extortion, kidnapping, human trafficking, and theft. What happened? The strictest security measures implemented in Colombia and the Caribbean expanded opportunities in the market for Mexican cartels;¹¹ the democratization of Mexico, and, with it, the fall of the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which fragmented corrupt agreements among different government parties and criminal organizations, hindering the creation and maintenance of local criminal monopolies.¹² Lastly, the war against drug trafficking declared by ex-President Felipe

¹¹ Bagley 2012; Shirk and Wallman 2015.

¹² Trejo and Ley 2017.

Calderón in 2006 broke the existing balance between drug cartels and fragmented the command structures by removing the heads of the organizations.¹³ These changes in the international drug market, the insistence on a useless drug prohibition system, and the fragmentation of power in Mexican politics modified the position and structure of organized crime. While in 2005, the government only had seven identified drug cartels, the country is now disputed by around nine organizations and more than 37 criminal cells.¹⁴

The incidence of extortion is strongly related to the dispute over territory among criminal organizations. The pursued ideal by these drug trafficking organizations is a monopoly of control that allows them to hide from the State, be protected from other criminal groups, and extract profits from illegal activities. However, this degree of control requires the cooperation of the community to maintain it. In return, the cartels redistribute part of the profits made to secure such cooperative relationships: they lend or give cash, build roads and churches, or pay for town festivals, to name a few examples. In return, when a region is in dispute, the timeline is shortened. The establishment of cooperative relationships is difficult and extortion of the population becomes an alternative for criminal organizations. The cartels require extra resources to sustain their fights for territory and, knowing that the enemy groups are also going to do it, neither group refrains from extorting the population. Sometimes, extortion is demanded with the promise of providing protection against other criminals and drug traffickers become the guarantors of order,¹⁵ which is equivalent to a non-State entity imposing order in the territory.

Other factors that affect the decision between preying on or providing assistance include the cartel's relationships with the State, the criminal organization's structure and type of leadership, the proximity of the territory to the border, and its classification as a drug transit territory or a production area. Extorting, among other activities, becomes easier when cartels act in complicity with the State. The stability of the *capo* (cartel leader) and a clear hierarchical structure provide strength and cohesion to the criminal group, decreasing the probability of a dispute over the territory, either because internal conflicts are avoided or other cartels refrain from attacking. The territories closest to the United States border are most coveted due to their proximity to the illicit drug market in the neighboring country, which is why they are more disputed and require more cooperation from the population to keep them under control. Finally, transit territories do not require collaboration with anyone, making extortion more convenient. On the contrary, drug production requires the population's workforce and vigilance to keep the area secure.¹⁶

Extortion is the consequence of a State that is not capable of providing security to its citizens and that, on occasions, is replaced in its role as protector by the criminal groups themselves. It is expected that this situation will have repercussions on citizens' opinions about the government and the institutions that are not guaranteeing the State's own integrity.

Beginning in 2016, the AmericasBarometer included a new question with the goal of measuring victimization by extortion (VICBAR4A). The question is formulated as follows:

¹³ Calderón et al. 2015; Osorio 2015; Phillips 2015.

¹⁴ Information requests to the Attorney General of the Republic of Mexico, folio 0001700142006 and folio 0001700287915.

¹⁵ Magaloni et al. 2019

¹⁶ Ibid.

	Yes	No
VICBAR4A. Have you or someone from your immediate family (children, spouse) been the victim of extortion in the last 12 months?	1	0

In the two years that this question has been used, a slight decrease is seen in the proportion of people who report being victimized by extortion, going from 19.6% in 2016 to 18.9% in 2018. If we extrapolate this percentage to the country's total adult population, we find that around 16 million Mexicans have been victims of extortion.

The data from the AmericasBarometer, due to the phrasing of the question, most likely also considers failed extortion attempts, in addition to the cases in which extortion was carried out. In addition, it should be specified that the type of extortion implies a wide menu of options. In any case, the perception of individuals that the government should protect them is equivalent, when an extortion attempt is successful and when it fails.

Thus, the context is very problematic for Mexico in terms of extortion. The high incidence of extortion generates feelings of fear and vulnerability in the population, which affects health issues and generates multiple economic costs.

IV. Negative Impact of Extortion on the Evaluation of the Government and Democratic Regime

To determine the potential negative externalities of being a victim of extortion on the government and the democratic regime, we use regression models with an identical set of independent variables which analyze the effect of being a victim of extortion on four dependent variables: interpersonal trust (IT1), presidential approval (M1), support for democracy (ING4), and the functioning of democracy (PN4).

Our first dependent variable is interpersonal trust. An area's inhabitants learn to trust each other when they interact with each other. However, when there are disruptive factors, such as crime, it is understandable to perceive others as a possible aggressor. Interpersonal connection and support can become stronger when people have been victimized by crime, but the circle of trust is likely to shrink.

The AmericasBarometer asks the following question to measure interpersonal trust:

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?

The responses are recorded on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means the respondent does not have any trust in the people around them and 4 indicates that they trust others very much. Figure 4.1 shows that the majority of Mexicans have little (34.4%) or some (32.6%) trust in the people around

them, while only one in ten said they did not trust other Mexicans at all and two out of ten report finding themselves at the other extreme, with high levels of trust in others.




Figure 4.1. Interpersonal Trust, Mexico 2019

The second dependent variable we use is the evaluation of the president's performance. The AmericasBarometer also seeks to measure the approval of each country's president. In Mexico's case, respondents were asked their opinion regarding the performance of President López Obrador, whose administration began on December 1, 2018, meaning that he was only in office between two to four months at the time of the survey. This opinion is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, going from "very bad" to "very good", and answers the following question:

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is...?:

Levels of crime can be an important factor on the level of presidential approval. In existing work, there are discrepancies as to whether criminal victimization has a negative effect on government approval. Some work indicate that crime victimization increases a country's citizens' public safety concerns,¹⁷ and that the government's messages are less credible among crime victims,¹⁸ while others find no relationship between crime and presidential approval. Regarding specific cases, Rodríguez found that Hugo Chávez's approval decreased due to an increase in crime,¹⁹ as based on the 2008 AmericasBarometer. However, the 2010 data from the same survey points to a lack of relationship between crime and the Venezuelan president's approval.²⁰ Romero finds no effect from crime victimization on the approval of Felipe Calderón, the Mexican president in 2010, but

¹⁷ Castorena and Zechmeister 2015.

¹⁸ Romero et al. 2015.

¹⁹ Rodríguez 2010.

²⁰ Pérez 2013.

reports that when a member of the household of the interviewed individual was the victim of a crime, then approval for the president is negatively affected.²¹ Ley has the same findings as Romero using Mexican public opinion two years later, finding that, in 2012, there is no relationship between crime and the president's popularity in Mexico.²² However, Bravo, also using data from the AmericasBarometer, finds that, in a subset of twenty countries on the continent where the survey is conducted, there is a negative effect on presidential approval reflected by those who have been victims of crime.²³

As seen in Figure 4.2, 70.4% of people have a good opinion of the president's performance, that is, López Obrador has high approval. Only 3.7% of Mexicans negatively view his performance ("very bad" and "bad" categories). Note that the highest proportion of respondents are in the "good" category, which is a kind of soft approval of his performance.




Figure 4.2. Presidential Approval, Mexico 2019

The third variable that we analyze is satisfaction with democracy. This political system is understood as a means to improve the well-being of citizens. Democracy is not an end in itself. When these expectations are not met, there may be dissatisfaction with the political regime in which one lives. The literature shows evidence of a relationship between being a victim of crime and trust in government institutions.²⁴ The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer for Mexico asks the following question in order to measure satisfaction with democracy:

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied** or very **dissatisfied** with the way democracy works in Mexico?

²¹ Romero 2013.

²² Ley 2013.

²³ Bravo 2012.

²⁴ Ceobanu et al. 2011; Corbacho et al. 2012; Cruz 2008; Fernández and Kuenzi 2010; Pérez 2003.

The distribution of opinions is very worrying. Satisfaction with democracy appears to be divided and leans toward dissatisfaction. Among respondents, 53.6% say they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Mexico, while 46.3% report feeling satisfied or very satisfied. However, it is important to note that, as reported and explained in Chapter 5 of this report, this indicator shows a significant rebound in this round of the AmericasBarometer with respect to a downward trend that began in 2008.




Figure 4.3. Satisfaction with Democracy, Mexico 2019

Finally, we analyze support for democracy as a regime (beyond its performance). Knowing to what extent democracy is the “only game in town” is one way to find out how consolidated a democracy is, that is, what proportion of the population considers democracy to be the best form of government? People may be dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their own country, but this is different from saying that they prefer some kind of authoritarianism. However, constant dissatisfaction can go to the extreme of attacking the democratic system of governance. In line with the previous question, the survey asks the following question:

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The levels of crime and victimization can affect citizen political participation. On one hand, faced with high levels of crime, people stop going to vote for fear of being victims of some form of aggression. On the other, political participation can take the form of protests against the government's inability to deal with crime. Political participation can be a reflection of support for democracy. Some studies have found evidence that, in Mexico, people decrease their political participation when crime increases;²⁵ however, based on a survey conducted on five continents,

²⁵ Ley 2013; Trelles and Carreras 2012.

Bateson finds a strong positive relationship between crime victimization and political participation.²⁶

Figure 4.4 shows that more than half of Mexicans (62.7%) say they support democracy as the best form of government (categories 5, 6, and 7 on the scale of 1 to 7); while only 16.3% strongly disagree with the phrase that democracy is better than any other form of government (categories 1, 2, and 3 on the scale of 1 to 7). The remaining 21% are ambivalent in their support for their country's prevailing system of governance (category 4 on the 1 to 7 scale).




Figure 4.4. Support for Democracy, Mexico 2019

Impact of Extortion

To verify and quantify the effect of extortion (VICBAR4A) on the four dependent variables described in the previous section, we used ordinary least squares regression models to estimate the relationship of the dependent variable with various explanatory variables. This enables the estimation of which dimensions are negatively affected by victimization and which are not, in addition to estimating the magnitude of the impact.

The model specification considers an identical set of explanatory variables, making the models more comparable to each other. In this section, we describe the independent variables, present the four regression models, and, finally, analyze the relative effect of extortion on each dependent variable.

The included control variables consider the perception of the economic situation (SOCT2); political interest (POL1); type of locality, urban or rural (UR); sex of the respondent (Q1); age (Q2);

²⁶ Bateson 2012.

level of wealth (QUINTALL); and years of education (ED). The variables were recoded to a 0 to 1 scale, so that the coefficients of the regressions represent the change in the dependent variable, between the minimum and maximum value of the independent variables.

The first model considers satisfaction with democracy as a dependent variable (PN4). Figure 4.5 shows the coefficients for each variable. It is displayed, as in all the chapters in this volume, with the black dot marking the point estimate and the horizontal lines showing the statistical confidence interval of 95% (this is identical for each dependent variable analyzed).

We can see how being a victim of extortion has a significant and negative effect on the level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. This shows one of the most harmful effects that crime is having in Mexico.




Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Satisfaction with Democracy, Mexico 2019

As a second specification, we use support for the democratic regime (ING4) in a general way, without specific reference to Mexico. Figure 4.6 displays the coefficients. Here we also find a negative effect of victimization by extortion: being a victim of extortion has a negative relationship with one's level of support for the democratic system of governance, compared to those who have not been victims. This result, which is statistically significant, would imply that criminality results in even greater damage to democracy in Mexico. It not only erodes the perception of the regime's performance in the country, but erodes the perception of the type of regime itself.




Figure 4.6. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy, Mexico 2019

Figure 4.7 shows the results of the model on the determinants of interpersonal trust (IT1). Here, extortion also has a negative effect on citizens' levels of interpersonal trust. This implies that, with everything remaining constant, victims of extortion tend to trust people in their own community less.




Figure 4.7. Factors Associated with Interpersonal Trust, Mexico 2019

Finally, Figure 4.8 considers the evaluation of the President's performance (M1). In this case, unlike the previous ones, the variable of extortion victimization is not significant for alpha levels less than

0.10. That is, at least at the time of the survey (January–March 2019), when President López Obrador was only in office a few months, victimization by extortion did not seem to hurt perceptions of the president's performance in office.




Figure 4.8. Factors Associated with Presidential Approval, Mexico 2019

Figure 4.9 shows the interaction of extortion with each of the four independent variables depicted in the estimated models. As observed in the figure, the level of satisfaction with democracy is lower among citizens who have been victims of extortion (42.1 points), compared to those who have not been victims (47.3 points). Similarly, support for democracy is lower among Mexicans who reported being victims of extortion (61.5 points), compared to those who have not been victims (65.1 points). Interpersonal trust is around 4 points lower among those who have been victims of extortion (51.7 points), compared to those who have not been victims (55.4 points). Finally, as shown in the regression model, the differences in the level of support for the president's performance between those who have been victims and who have not been victims of extortion are not statistically significant.




Figure 4.9. Effect of Extortion on Key Variables, Mexico 2019

V. Conclusion

In this chapter we analyze the effect that victimization by extortion has on four fundamental variables to explain the condition of the nation: satisfaction with (PN4) and support for democracy (ING4), presidential approval (M1) and interpersonal trust (IT1).

In the case of Mexico, in addition to the economic and health costs for individuals, victimization by extortion is generating strong effects at the level of the government regime.

To the extent that citizens are satisfied with and support the democratic system, government leaders have a reasonable base from which to implement public policies that, ideally, benefit in the aggregate. Furthermore, there will be a climate in which citizens will impose limits on the government based on the rule of law.

Presidential approval legitimizes the actions of the executive and gives it the scope to implement public policies that may have costs in the short term, or for specific groups, but that are positive in the long term and for the whole of society.

Interpersonal trust facilitates relationships among individuals, the creation of organizations and, with this, more and higher quality social capital.

The deterioration of some of the variables that we analyze implies worse conditions for the consolidation of a democratic regime based on the rule of law, which results in worse conditions for the welfare for citizens.

It is especially worrying that a deterioration is taking place in satisfaction with the democratic regime, in line with what previous works have shown.²⁷ Even more worrying is that support for democracy is eroding in Mexico due to victimization by extortion, a different result than that found by Ceobanu et al. for ten Latin American countries with data from 2006, and using victimization by all kinds of crimes.²⁸ If this result is consistent for other countries in the region in this round of the AmericasBarometer, it is possible that the persistence of insecurity in Latin America is finally affecting support for democracy.

We did not find effects of victimization by extortion on the evaluation of the President's performance, for which there is mixed evidence in the literature.²⁹ This implies that, at least at the time of the survey, citizens tend to locate the cause of criminal activity with the government system, and not in the performance of the president, as such.

These circumstances, as other work has shown,³⁰ tend to lead to citizen preferences for heavy-handed policies that restrict individual liberties and human rights, and the coming to power of governments that embrace this approach.

In the case of Mexico, the increasing militarization of public safety tasks is an example of this. Citizen pressure for a solution to the problem of insecurity, which has worsened since 2007, and multiple failed attempts by different government administrations have encouraged the current government to try to solve the problem by increasing the role of the military in public safety. This policy will hardly solve the problem and, in addition, has as a potential collateral effect of a deterioration in human rights and, consequently, in citizen perceptions of this institution.

²⁷ Parás et al. 2007; Cruz 2008; Fernández and Kuenzi 2010.

²⁸ Ceobanu et al. 2011.

²⁹ Bravo 2012; Ley 2013; Romero et al. 2016.

³⁰ E.g. Holland 2013; Romero and Phillipson 2015.

Chapter 5.

Support in Mexico for Military and Executive Coups

Pablo Parás and Carlos López¹

I. Introduction

For the first time since the 2000 alternation away from one-party rule, Mexico has a leftist president. The 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer captures an interesting juncture, where the chief executive enjoys great acceptance and popularity and has decided to lean heavily on the military to implement programs and execute a large number of tasks.² This chapter explores whether this context impacts public perceptions, attitudes, and preferences, specifically trust in the military and tolerance of coups.

As already discussed in the first chapter of this report, the issue is relevant because, as data from the AmericasBarometer indicate, support for executive coups in Latin America increased between 2012 and 2017.³ In the 2019 round, the tolerance for coups d'état by the executive in Mexico increased considerably. In comparative terms, Mexico ranks second in the region after Peru, the country where the president dissolved congress in September 2019.⁴ On the other hand, there is no increase in observed support for military coups in Mexico, even though there remains a high level of trust in this institution.

The phrasing of the questions on coups in the AmericasBarometer measures the degree of public tolerance for military or presidential coups or self-coups, for different hypothetical situations the country could face, such as economic crises or scenarios of high levels of corruption or insecurity.

After the main findings, the chapter describes the historical and comparative levels of trust in the Armed Forces and executive approval. Later, we discuss support in Mexico for military and executive coups, exploring the main determinants of the latter since the reasons for their increase in the most recent round of the AmericasBarometer are not clear. Before we conclude, we include an epilogue where we show relevant indicators that speak to the climate of public opinion in Mexico at the time the data in the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer were collected.

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² Among others, in the current government, the army has been in charge of the following tasks: police work, transportation of fuel, monitoring of fuel pipelines, construction and operation of an airport, distribution of medicine, cleaning beaches (sargassum), delivery of books to public schools, containment of migrants at the southern border and the integration of the national guard.

³ Cohen 2017.

⁴ For more information on the case of Peru, see LAPOP's Topical Brief, Issue No. 035, of the AmericasBarometer. <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB035.pdf>

II. Key Findings

The main findings of this chapter are as follows:

- In Mexico, the level of trust in the Armed Forces has been stable for the last fifteen years and is high compared to other countries in the region.
- The current president begins his government with the highest levels of approval seen in the AmericasBarometer in Mexico, and with the highest comparative level among the region's presidents.
- Support for military coups in Mexico, in the face of high corruption and crime appear to be declining, achieving its lowest historical level in 2019. However, in comparative terms, Mexico occupies the fifth place of greatest tolerance for coups on both indicators.
- There is a notable growth in support for potential coups by the executive against Congress and the judiciary, placing Mexico among the countries with the greatest support for these expressions of authoritarianism among the nations included in the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer.
- According to the reviewed evidence, the factors that are potential explanations of this support for coups by the executive are low levels of education and, mainly, approval of the current government: both factors positively influence this phenomenon. On the contrary, those who say they are in a good economic situation are those who most visibly express their opposition to potential authoritarian coups by the executive.

III. Trust in the Armed Forces and Presidential Approval

Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer has measured the trust that citizens have in different institutions and political actors. To do this, it uses a ladder-type scale "with steps numbered from one to seven, in which 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 is the highest step and means A LOT." For analysis and reporting, the seven-point scale is transformed into an *average* that ranges from 0 to 100, where zero means that respondents have "no" trust in that institution and 100 have "complete" trust in that institution.

Figure 5.1 displays trust in different institutions, according to the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer. As you can see, the president is the first in terms of trust (66.6 points), closely followed by the Armed Forces (65.6 points). Below these two institutions we have the following institutions with values that are significantly lower: the Catholic Church (57.3 points), the Supreme Court of Justice (54.4 points), local governments (51.7 points), Congress (52.6 points), the media (50.8 points), the police (35.1 points), political parties (33.2 points) and the Protestant Church (27.1 points).

It is very important to point out that, historically, trust in the president has not occupied the first positions, which were almost always occupied by the Armed Forces and the Catholic Church. In fact, in past rounds of the AmericasBarometer and among these same institutions, trust in the president occupied fourth place in 2008, 2010, and 2012, fifth place in 2014, and sixth place in 2016/17. Here, we have a first indicator that the position of the executive is unique in this last measurement. Later in this section, we will discuss Presidential approval in more detail.




Figure 5.1. Institutional Trust in Mexico, 2019

The percentage of Mexicans that trust the Armed Forces in Mexico has remained stable over time. In Figure 5.2, we can see that even though the percentage of citizens that trust the Armed Forces has decreased slightly since 2014, and displays its lowest level in 2019, the differences are not statistically significant. In other words, in Mexico, trust in the Armed Forces has been constant over the last fifteen years. This is relevant and interesting given that, in this period, with four different presidents, the strategic use of this institution has varied considerably. The period of the "war against drug trafficking" by President Felipe Calderón and the current "multiple use"

approach by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador are of note. The fact is that, in Mexico, trust in the Armed Forces seems to be independent of the prominence of the institution in public life or the tasks entrusted to it by the executive.




Figure 5.2. Trust in the Armed Forces in Mexico, 2004-2019

It is worth asking how the level of trust in the military in Mexico compares with the level of trust in this institution in other countries in the region. Figure 5.3 displays the levels of trust in the Armed Forces according to the last round of the AmericasBarometer in sixteen Latin American countries. It is observed that Mexico ranks third after Ecuador and Brazil, with trust levels comparable to Jamaica and Guatemala, and levels of trust ten points or more higher than the rest of the listed countries. Clearly, the level of trust in the Armed Forces in Mexico is high when compared to other countries in the region.




Figure 5.3. Trust in the Armed Forces, 2018/19

At the beginning of this section, we saw that in 2019 levels of trust in Mexico's president are atypically high. Let us now describe the level of presidential approval that the AmericasBarometer series measures with the following question:

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is...?:
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad

Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of citizens who are somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the president's performance since 2004. Field work for the AmericasBarometer is carried out in the first quarter of each year reported, so the 2004 and 2006 data correspond to the fourth and last year of President Vicente Fox, the 2008 to 2012 data to President Felipe Calderón, and the 2014 to 2016/17 data to the second and fourth years of President Enrique Peña Nieto. The data from the 2019 round coincide with the first year of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador's presidency. There are slight variations in the percentage of citizens that say they are satisfied with the president's work in the case of the first two presidents mentioned, with a significant drop in the Peña Nieto period, but the data point that stands out is the very high level of approval enjoyed by the current president in relation to that of his predecessors, with 70% of citizens reporting being satisfied or very satisfied with his work.




Figure 5.4. Presidential Approval in Mexico, 2004-2019

Before López Obrador, the president with the highest percentage of citizens who approved of his performance was Felipe Calderón, at the end of his administration, with 45.9% of citizens being very satisfied or satisfied with the president's performance; the current president begins his term in office with 70.3% of citizens reporting being satisfied or very satisfied, twenty-five percentage points above the percentages of other presidents. The high percentage of citizens that approve of the president's performance was maintained throughout 2019, however, at the beginning of 2020 it has suffered a fall,⁵ as has been extensively documented by various surveys.

⁵ The data from other surveys, as well as a “poll of polls”, can be consulted at <https://oraculus.mx>

This high popularity is likely to have an impact on the climate of public opinion reflected in many of the other indicators collected by the AmericasBarometer. Presidential approval is strongly related to economic evaluations⁶, to partisanship⁷, ideology⁸ (), and the evaluation of specific areas of government⁹ . Later in this chapter, we specifically analyze whether the high presidential approval impacts the tolerance of an executive coup d'état and, in an epilogue at the end of the chapter, we explore, in general terms, if there were changes in other indicators of perception, which, as a whole, document a moment of "favorable climate" in terms of public opinion for the new administration.

What is the level approval for the current president as compared to other countries in the region? Figure 5.5 shows that, out of the eighteen countries that included the indicator in 2019, Mexico occupies first place for presidential approval, fifteen points or more above the countries with the next highest levels of approval and forty or more points above those in the bottom half of the ranking. It is the first time that this has happened in the eight rounds in which the AmericasBarometer has taken place in Mexico. Even though, in 2019, it captures the beginning of a government led by a charismatic candidate who has sought the presidency since 2006, the data speak clearly to the strong and positive position that the new president enjoyed in public opinion at the beginning of his administration.

⁶ Buendía 1996; Kinder and Keiwiet 1981.

⁷ Fiorina 1981.

⁸ Moreno 2003.

⁹ Parás and Coleman 2006.




Figure 5.5. Presidential Approval, 2018/19

IV. Support in Mexico for Military Coups

Since the 2004 round, the AmericasBarometer has measured support for military coups in various hypothetical situations. For this, the following introduction is read to the survey respondent: "Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified..." and the interviewer is instructed to read the different hypothetical situations along with the following response options (i.e., YES it would be justified or it would NOT be justified). Table 5.1 shows the historical series of data for the different hypothetical situations that have been measured. Not all situations were included in all years.

Table 5.1. Support for Military Coups in Mexico for Different Hypothetical Situations, 2004-2019

Hypothetical Situation	Year (%)							
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2019
High Unemployment	-	17.2	18.0	22.5	19.7	-	-	-
Many Social Protests	28.6	27.0	28.1	-	-	-	-	-
High Inflation	31.3	25.1	26.3	-	-	-	-	-
High Corruption	49.4	52.9	54.0	57.0	46.5 ²	52.2	50.3	42.5 ³
High Crime	49.0 ¹	63.1	64.1	60.5	51.4 ¹	47.3 ¹	48.3 ¹	44.0 ¹

Notes:

¹ Significantly lower than 2006, 2008, and 2010 data.

² Significantly lower than 2010.

³ Significantly lower than 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014, and 2016.

Three points can be highlighted in Table 5.1. The first is that there are clear differences in support for military coups according to the hypothetical situations in question. In three of these scenarios, unemployment, social protests, and high inflation, support is relatively low and remained stable in the 2004-2008 period, during which these questions were asked. About a fifth of the country's adults justified a military coup in the event of high unemployment, and just under a third believed the same in the cases of social protests and high inflation. As shown in the table, these scenarios were measured in the first rounds of the AmericasBarometer and were no longer included in 2008 and/or 2012. In contrast, the percentage of respondents that justify a military coup when there are high levels of crime or corruption is significantly higher than that of the three scenarios just described. In most years, support for military coups in situations of high corruption or crime is around half of the adult population, and it exceeds 60% for crime between 2008 and 2010.

The second point to note is that, in the most justified scenarios (corruption and crime), there are variations over time. In both cases, a slight increase is observed between 2004 and 2010. In the case of crime, a contrary trend is observed starting in 2012 and, for corruption, levels of support do not follow a specific trend during this same period. It is also observed that, with the exception of 2014 and 2016, there is a greater justification for coups for high levels of crime than for corruption; this difference is significant in 2006 and 2008. The data seem to be consistent with the most salient issues on the public agenda, and which LAPOP has documented throughout its series as the main problems in Mexico: insecurity, violence, and corruption. What is relevant is

that public opinion seems to show a certain "despair" in being unable to find less costly solutions than a coup.

Finally, we highlight the fact that these two series of higher or greater justification for military coups had their lowest levels of support in 2019, a round in which the level of support for a coup d'état by the executive doubled. This could seem paradoxical given that the levels of insecurity and violence in Mexico have not decreased and the fight against corruption was one of the current president's principal campaign promises.

To close this section, we show the percentage of citizens that support military coups in the face of high corruption and crime compared to other countries in the region. Figure 5.6 shows Mexico's place in the region in terms of the percentage of citizens that justify military coups. In both cases, corruption and crime, Mexico is in fifth place in the ranking of the highest percentages of support for military coups. In the case of corruption, there is greater tolerance in Jamaica and Peru and comparable percentages in Honduras, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Bolivia. The situation is similar in regards to crime, with greater support in Jamaica and Peru and similar percentages in Ecuador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Honduras.




Figure 5.6. Support for Military Coups due to Corruption and Crime, 2018/19

V. Support in Mexico for Presidential Coups

The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer asked all respondents the following question in order to measure tolerance for executive coups, signifying potential support for the closure of the National Congress by the executive branch (the President of the Republic):

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress and govern without Congress?
 (1) Yes, it is justified (2) No, it is not justified

Figure 5.7 shows that the levels of acceptance for the executive to close the legislature increased considerably in the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer, from 17.1% to 28.1%, and this is the highest score recorded since this variable began being measured in 2010. This tolerance of a coup by the executive against the legislature is of special interest considering that the president's own political party has control (majority) in the two chambers that make up the federal Congress (deputies and senators), which leads us to the hypothesis that the components of government seem to be evaluated differently by the public, despite sharing party and political identity.




Figure 5.7. Support for Presidential Coups, Mexico 2010-2019

Figure 5.8 shows us which sociodemographic groups express greater tolerance towards a potential coup by the executive against the legislature. There are visible differences by level of education and level of wealth.




Figure 5.8. Support for a Presidential Coup against Congress by Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables, Mexico 2019

Finally, tolerance for executive coups is evaluated based on satisfaction with the president's performance. As shown in Figure 5.9, a higher percentage of citizens that consider the president's performance as good or very good support the closing of Congress by the Executive (31.3%), compared to 21.3% of those who rate the President's performance as very bad, bad, or average. This statistically significant difference is 10 percentage points higher among those who approve of the current president's performance.




Figure 5.9. Support for Presidential Coups against Congress by Satisfaction with Presidential Performance, Mexico 2019

Tolerance for executive coups against the judiciary was also measured in the most recent round of the AmericasBarometer:

JC16A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court and govern without the Supreme Court?
 (1) Yes, it is justified (2) No, it is not justified

The levels of tolerance for the President to dissolve the judiciary are shown in Figure 5.10. Similar to what is observed in the tolerance towards the dissolution of the legislature, there is a notable growth in tolerance for the actions of the president in the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer, with an increase of 20 percentage points (from 12% to 32%) between the 2012 measurement (the data prior to the 2019 round) and the most recent survey.




Figure 5.10. Support for Presidential Coups against the Supreme Court of Justice, Mexico 2010-2019

Which sociodemographic groups stand out for their greater tolerance of a possible coup (dissolution) of the judiciary by the president in Mexico? Figure 5.11 indicates that the percentage of citizens with secondary or higher education, greater wealth, and younger age have a lower tolerance for a presidential dissolution of the judiciary in a crisis and ruling without the Nation's Supreme Court of Justice.




Figure 5.11. Support for Executive Coups against the Supreme Court of Justice According to Demographic and Socioeconomic Variables, Mexico 2019

Support for an executive coup against the Nation's Supreme Court of Justice is lower among those who are least satisfied with presidential performance (23.9%), compared to 35.5% of citizens that rate the president's performance as good or very good. The difference between the two groups is 11.6 percentage points and is statistically significant.




Figure 5.12. Support for a Presidential Coup against the Supreme Court of Justice According to Satisfaction with Presidential Performance, Mexico 2019

Figure 5.13 shows the distribution of tolerance for executive coups (against the legislature and judiciary), using the data from the 2018/19 round of surveys compared to other countries in the region. The variation in the level of tolerance for executive coups against their respective Congresses among countries is notable, being the lowest in Uruguay (9.2%) and the highest in Peru (58.9%), that is, the highest level of tolerance represents a 6-fold increase in comparison to the lowest. Mexico is the country with the second highest level of support for executive coups against the legislature, with 28% of respondents indicating support.

In the case of a potential coup against the judiciary, Mexico is in seventh place, with a higher tolerance value than that observed in the variable of a coup against Congress. Everything indicates that the dissolution of the judiciary is more tolerated than a coup against the legislative powers among the countries in the region. Mexico had not occupied such a prominent ranking in past rounds of the AmericasBarometer.




Figure 5.13. Support for Executive Coups against Congress and the Judiciary, 2018/19

VI. Factors Associated with Executive Coups

In this section, we will review some factors and segments of the population that express greater tolerance for executive coups against other branches of government: legislative and judicial. For this, a binary logistic regression analysis will be employed where, for both cases, the dependent variable will be support/tolerance for these coups, and the explanatory (predictors) included will be sex (female), approval of the president, crime victimization, good financial situation, education (where value 1 will be a basic education), and age (where the value of 1 is assigned to those aged 50

or over). It should be noted that, as done with the dependent variables, the independent variables have been recoded on a scale from 0 to 1 for this analysis.¹⁰

The results of the regression for tolerance of an executive coup against Congress in case of a crisis are shown in Figure 5.14. In this model, the only significant predictor is government approval: the higher the approval, the greater the tolerance for a self-coup. On the contrary, schooling (years of education) is a predictor that affects tolerance negatively, this indicates that the more education one has, the less likely one is to support a coup against Congress. It should be mentioned that some variables that could be considered relevant for tolerance, such as the being the victim of a crime, were not significant in the model, although it should be noted that the interaction with other variables in the exercise could be one of the causes of this result.




Figure 5.14. Predictors of Support for an Executive Coup against Congress, Mexico 2019

As Figure 5.15 shows, support for a presidential coup against the National Congress is lower among those with a higher level of education (23.1%), than those with a primary level of education (36%) or no education (55.2%). Conversely, 31.3% of Mexicans who consider the President's performance to be very good and 31.3% of Mexicans who consider the President's performance to be good, support the closing of Congress by the Executive, compared to a lower percentage of those that consider the president's performance to be bad (8.35%) or very bad (23.5%).

¹⁰ For Figures 5.14 and 5.16, the original variables were recoded on a scale of 0 to 1.




Figure 5.15. Support for Executive Coups against Congress According to Sociodemographic Variables, Mexico 2019

For the regression that includes tolerance for an executive coup against the judiciary as a dependent variable (Figure 5.16), we observe a behavior similar to the coup against Congress model: two variables with significant effect, education, which negatively impacts the dependent variable (that is, more schooling means less citizen support for such an action), and approval of the president positively influences the decision to tolerate the dissolution of the Judiciary.




Figure 5.16. Predictors of Support for an Executive Coup against the Supreme Court of Justice, Mexico 2019

As Figure 5.17 shows, support for executive coups against the Supreme Court of Justice is less frequent among those with higher levels of education (22.7%), than those with a primary level of education (44.4%) or no education (71.4 %). Likewise, 40.1% of Mexicans in the first (lowest) wealth quintile support executive coups against the Supreme Court, compared to 23.4% of Mexicans in the fifth (highest) wealth quintile. The approval of the president's performance also influences support for an executive coup against the Supreme Court: Mexicans who least approve of the president's performance report less support for these coups (27.8%), compared to Mexicans who report that the president's performance is very good (36.1%).




Figure 5.17. Support for Executive Coups According to Sociodemographic Variables, Mexico 2019

VII. Epilogue: The 2018-2019 Climate of Public Opinion in Mexico

In this section, we discuss the “climate of opinion” captured by the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer. Using the following indicators, we present additional data contrasting perceptions and realities on three themes: the economy, corruption, and democracy.

Perception of personal economy (IDIO2). Do you think that **your** economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was **12 months** ago?

Economic situation (Q10D). The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
- (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
- (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
- (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time

Perception of corruption (EXC7). Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is:

- (1) Very common
- (2) Common
- (3) Uncommon or
- (4) Very uncommon?

Experiences with corruption: victimization indicator based on bribe solicitation.

Satisfaction with Democracy (PN4). In general, would you say that you are **very satisfied**, **satisfied**, **dissatisfied** or **very dissatisfied** with the way democracy works in Mexico?

Satisfaction with health services: SD6NEW2. And with the quality of public medical and health services? Are you (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied

Our reading is Mexico's 2019 data capture a moment of *electoral euphoria*, understood as an "exaggerated feeling of well-being that manifests itself as intense joy, not adequate to reality, accompanied by great optimism,"¹¹ produced, in this case, by the results of the 2018 presidential elections. In our experience, movements so broad and marked in public opinion due to electoral results had only been observed in Mexico in 1997, with the victory of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas of the PRD in the city of Mexico and with the 2000 presidential alternation in power, when Vicente Fox, of PAN, defeated the PRI after 70 years of power.

The indicators of the AmericasBarometer in Mexico are usually stable with slight movements between biennial rounds that, in many cases, show an upward or downward trend. This is the case of personal economic perceptions (upper left corner of Figure 5.18), which shows a slight and constant increase in perceptions of deterioration of individuals' personal economies, from 25.9% in 2006 to 53.7% in 2016. In 2019, however, there is a marked turning point of 30 points in the percentage of this economic pessimism, which drops to 24.6%, the lowest level in the series. An indicator of Mexicans' personal economy, which can be considered less subjective, is shown in the upper right corner of Figure 5.18. The percentage of Mexicans that respond that their income is not enough and that they have experienced some economic difficulties, has remained at the same level, statistically speaking, between 2006 and 2019 (with the exception of 2008, which was significantly lower because the percentage of those that reported they went through great difficulties increased). These economic indicators suggest that perceptual optimism has no equivalent in reality; that is, that the favorable climate of public opinion in the beginning of 2019 in Mexico is mainly reflected in subjective indicators.

Regarding corruption, a similar trend is observed: even when perceptions improve, reality does not change. The percentage of Mexicans that consider that corruption among public officials is generalized or very generalized has remained at levels above 80% since 2008 but decreased significantly in 2019 from 83.1% to 72.5%. One of the main campaign themes of the current president was the fight against corruption, so this result is not very surprising. What is interesting is that the percentage of Mexicans that have been the victim of some act of corruption, which is discussed in depth in the next chapter of this report, remains stable, that is, there is no fall as seen in the perceptions of corruption among public officials. Once again, the political-electoral situation seems to impact perception but not reality.

Finally, we highlight an inflection point in satisfaction with democracy (lower left corner) that had been marking a clear downward trend. This indicator, which showed consistent levels between 2004 and 2008, with around 50% of citizens reporting satisfaction with democracy, presents a downward trend thereafter until reaching its lowest level of 26.5% in 2016. In 2019, however, it recovers twenty percentage points and reaches 46.4%, a percentage that is statistically similar to the initial levels seen in the series. This recovery, or change in trend, is absent in respondents' satisfaction with public services, which is less abstract and closer to the reality of the common citizen. In the lower left corner, as an example, we present the percentages of Mexican citizens

¹¹ Real Academia Española: <https://dle.rae.es/euforia>

that say they are satisfied or very satisfied with health services, where there is a slight downward trend that reaches its lowest level in 2019.

This epilogue is intended to provide additional clues to the strong and positive positioning of the chief executive and the impact this may have on individuals' perceptions and attitudes. It is likely that the significant increase in tolerance for a self-coup in Mexico has more to do with the "moment" of a charismatic political actor, than with a change in attitudes among Mexicans. Its purpose is also to look expectantly at the next round of data and see if they maintain the sense of the perceptual inflection points discussed in Figure 5.18 or return to the historical levels seen prior to 2019.

Political Culture of Democracy in Mexico, 2018/19




Figure 5.18. Relevant Indicators about the Climate of Public Opinion in Mexico, 2019

VIII. Conclusion

The AmericasBarometer data from the 2019 round captures a particular moment in Mexican public opinion that seems to significantly affect the perceptions, preferences, and attitudes of Mexicans. These changes can be classified as positive or negative.

Compared to previous data from the LAPOP series, in early 2019, Mexicans express positive changes, such as improvements in personal economy, less government corruption, or a greater satisfaction with democracy. However, these perceptions are not reflected in indicators that may be considered less subjective or closer to reality: the average Mexican continues to have difficulties meeting their needs with their wages, continues to experience the same levels of victimization by corruption, and is somewhat more dissatisfied with some public services.

The data suggests a *moment* of “electoral euphoria”, which has a greater impact on perceptual indicators and seems that this *moment* has a lot to do with the position and popularity of the current president. Evaluation of the president's performance is at the highest historical level (twenty-five points above the highest rating of other Mexican presidents in the series). Also, for the first time, it ranks first in terms of institutional trust (at levels comparable to the Armed Forces) and, also for the first time, ranks highest in presidential approval in the region (fifteen points above second place and sixty points above last place).

But we also find perceptions that can be considered negative, such as the fact that support for or tolerance of executive coups, that is, justifying a presidential dissolution of Congress has doubled and support for the dissolution of the Supreme Court of Justice has tripled. In analyzing the data, we find that presidential approval is a significant determinant of tolerance in both cases (along with a low level of educational and negative economic situation, in the case of the judiciary), the evidence then suggests that support for the president does not necessarily equate to a show of sympathy for other powers that make up Mexico's government.

The reviewed evidence seems to point to a weakening of democratic institutions and highlights the figure of a leader who enjoys wide trust and support, above the power structures and political participation built in Mexico during the last 25 years. It will be necessary to pay attention to see if this moment creates new paths for the country's public life and, if so, in what direction it leads us.

Chapter 6.

Corruption at Dawn of the Fourth Transformation

Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga¹ and Benjamín Martínez-Velasco²

I. Introduction

Around the world, corruption³ impedes economic growth, erodes political institutions, impairs citizens' trust in government, and costs human lives.⁴ It is not surprising that in Latin America and the Caribbean, corruption is one of the most concerning problems for citizens. Mexico is not the exception. For more than ten years, and to date, Mexicans consider corruption as one of the country's main problems.⁵ Thus, since coming to power in 2018, the new President of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), has pointed to corruption as the main culprit for the country's problems and combating this problem as the main tool through which his movement will achieve, what he has called, the fourth transformation of national public life (4T).⁶ How did the main indicators of corruption behave during the first months of the government transition in Mexico?

The AmericasBarometer, carried out in Mexico between January 30 and March 27, 2019, provides a unique opportunity to examine the different dimensions that corruption involves during the awakening of the 4T, not only in an absolute way, but also in a relative way over time. That is, taking into account the immediate regional and recent historical context.

Specifically, this chapter analyzes three general dimensions of corruption: experiences with acts of corruption, citizens' justification for paying bribes, and Mexicans' perceptions of the prevalence of corruption. The first dimension, called experiences with victimization of corruption, refers to how citizens experience daily corruption. The second, citizen justification for the payment of bribes, refers to the tolerance that citizens have towards corruption. Finally, the third, called Mexicans' perceptions of the prevalence of corruption, refers to the citizen's perception of the prevalence and extent of corruption among the political class. The three dimensions are correlated; however, they are different and arise through different processes. Corruption experiences emerge from the social and individual contexts in which citizens are inserted.⁷

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³ Broadly understood as the use and abuse of some faculty or power for their own benefit. For a more detailed conceptual discussion, review Fein and Weibler 2014.

⁴ Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiengson 2000; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Saleh, Campos, and Dimova 2016; Tavits 2008.

⁵ Singer, Carlin, and Love 2015; Zizumbo-Colunga and Amador 2018.

⁶ AMLO has defined this 4th transformation as a radical change in the way representatives and bureaucrats live and behave at all levels of government. De facto, President AMLO's speech emphasizes political agency as the mechanism of change to achieve a reduction in corruption.

⁷ De Graaf 2007.

Cultural factors, as well as values and experiences, give rise to citizen attitudes towards corruption.⁸ Finally, perceptions of corruption exist primarily as a result of scandals or major incidences of corruption that citizens experience indirectly.⁹ In this chapter, we describe the state of these three factors at the dawn of the 4T in a comparative perspective.

II. Key Findings

The most important findings are summarized below:

- There was no significant decrease in the prevalence of acts of corruption observed in the three months after which the new government took office. Mexico continues among the three countries in which corruption is most frequently experienced. If anything, there is a significant increase in corruption victimization involving public employees (+3.3%).¹⁰
- As in previous rounds, from the perspective of the average citizen, corruption most often comes from police officers. Courts and public roads continue to be the riskiest areas for those who fear experiencing an act of corruption.
- After a slight reduction in 2017, in 2019, the prevalence of corruption recovered to the levels seen in the first round of the AmericasBarometer (2004).
- However, a reduction in tolerance for corruption was found. It is estimated that 83.1% of citizens do not justify paying bribes, which represents a significant reduction, by almost 7%, compared to the previous round.
- Despite the above, Mexico remains in eighth place in countries where corruption is most justified, among the countries surveyed, suggesting an international trend.
- Likewise, there was a significant reduction of 7.5% in the perception of corruption, compared to the last round.
- While, during the previous round, Mexico ranked second as the country in which citizens perceived the most corruption, in this round Mexico fell to eighth place, showing a behavior very similar to that of Brazil, where there was also a regime change.

⁸ Pena López and Sánchez Santos 2013.

⁹ Heidenheimer 1996.

¹⁰ It is important to qualify this result, noting that President AMLO and his movement do not control all state and municipal governments, and most corrupt interactions take place at this level. That said, it is also important to recognize that during the 2018 election, President AMLO and his party took control of the following: the Presidency of the Republic, the majority in the chamber of deputies, the majority in the chamber of senators, the executive positions in 7 states, the governments of 346 municipalities, and control of 20 of the 32 local congresses. This gives the movement unprecedented power and responsibility. If there is a time and place where the political agency could bring about change, it is this. The absence of radical changes sheds light on the limits of the political agency to fight corruption.

Regarding the different determinants of corruption, it was found that:

- People exposed to environments with more criminality are also more involved in acts of corruption.
- Those who experience acts of corruption are also more likely to justify the payment of bribes.
- Older people and women are the demographic groups least involved in acts of corruption.
- Experiences with corruption, mistrust in municipal governments, and higher levels of wealth predict the justification for paying bribes.
- Being a woman, being older, or having a higher level of education predict lower levels of justification for paying bribes.
- A class divide has been generated in perceptions of corruption. People with more purchasing power perceive more corruption, while people with less purchasing power perceive less. This is independent of identification with President AMLO.
- Corruption has been politicized. People who are more interested in politics and who more frequently follow the news perceive more corruption.
- Attitudes towards AMLO do not seem to divide citizens' perception of corruption. Opponents and supporters of AMLO agree that corruption in Mexico has become widespread among public officials.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

Since the first round of the AmericasBarometer, one of the main topics of interest in the survey has been evaluating the extent to which citizens have experienced acts of corruption. Given the high prevalence of bribery in the region, and to avoid ambiguities, the AmericasBarometer asks citizens about their experience with this type of act. First, LAPOP asks respondents whether they have been victimized by police, public employees (in general), or soldiers [EXC2, EXC6, and EXC20]. LAPOP then asks citizens if they have had contact with any specific areas of government. Only if the respondent answers yes, they are asked if they had to pay a bribe when dealing with that area of government [EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15, EXC16].

Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If it is yes, In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your

municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?

EXC13. ¿Do you work? If it is yes, ask the following:

In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?

EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts?

If it is yes, ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?

EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?

If it is yes, ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?

EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months?

If it is yes, ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?

It is important to note the difference between the first three and last three questions. The first three questions capture corrupt requests from top to bottom. That is, experiences where an official requested a bribe, regardless of whether the bribe was paid or not, and without counting the acts in which the citizen offered a bribe without being asked for it. The second set of questions only considers whether the citizen paid a bribe, regardless of whether the bribe in question was offered by the citizen or required by the public official. Given the above, it is important to underline that the account of the total reported events analyzed in the following pages be understood as an estimation of citizen exposure to incidences of corruption.

As a first step in describing the state of corruption in Mexico, the prevalence of the average citizen's experiences with corruption in their contacts with different actors in the public sector is estimated. As shown on the left of Figure 6.1, 24.7% of citizens had at least one police officer request a bribe from them. This type of corruption ranks first among the general population, followed by bribes requested by public employees (14.5%), local governments (7.4%), at work (3.1%), at school (3%), by personnel in the military (2.9%), in the courts (2.3%) and, finally, at health centers (1.9%).

As a second step, to identify the spaces in which citizens are most at risk of being engaged in an act of corruption, the prevalence of these events is estimated taking into account only the citizens who ventured into each of the spaces asked by the survey. As shown on the right of Figure 6.1, it is found that 24.7% of respondents were required to pay a bribe by the police, followed by 24% who were asked to pay a bribe in the courts, while 22.2% were asked by the local government, 14.5% by public employees, 7.7% at school, 5.3% at work, 3.9% at health centers, and 2.9% by the military. For both the general population and those who had the greater opportunity to be asked, corruption occurred mostly with police officers, in the courts, and with local government employees.




Figure 6.1. Experiences with Corruption by Public Officials, Mexico 2019

These results are very similar to those of the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer. However, there is a significant increase of 3.3 percentage points in the percentage of citizens that reported that a public employee asked them for a bribe.¹¹ In the previous round, 11.2% of the respondents reported having been victims of a bribery request; in this round, 14.5% of citizens reported having been victims of a corrupt request.

Figure 6.2 shows the number of institutions in which Mexican citizens experienced acts of corruption in the last twelve months. As Figure 6.2 shows, 67.8% of citizens did not experience any act of corruption in the twelve months prior to the survey, 16.6% of citizens experienced acts of corruption on at least one occasion, 9.2% reported having experienced an act of corruption on two occasions, and 6.3% reported experiencing corruption three or more times.¹²

¹¹ Section 6.1 of the Appendix shows the evolution in the number of citizens reporting that they were asked to pay a bribe by public employees. As shown, 2019 is the round with the highest prevalence of bribery in that sector.

¹² Strictly speaking, this indicator captures the number of institutions from which corruption originates from the perspective of the average citizen. It does not capture the net frequency of experiences of corruption. That said, it is the best indicator available within the AmericasBarometer to assess the frequency with which acts of corruption occur within the Americas.




Figure 6.2. Percentage of Mexicans that Experienced Corruption, Mexico 2019




Figure 6.3. Experiences with Corruption, Mexico 2004-2019

In total, in 2019, 32.2% of citizens experienced at least one act of corruption in the last twelve months. As the Figure 6.3 shows, the prevalence of total corruption has been relatively stable since 2008.¹³ Levels of corruption reported in this round are significantly lower than that recorded in 2006, significantly higher than that recorded in 2014, and practically the same as that measured in

¹³ Although total corruption remained stable, corruption from public employees did not. As mentioned before, this specific type of corruption rose significantly by 3.3%. Review Section 6.1 in the Appendix.

the first round of the AmericasBarometer.¹⁴ Overall, the data are not consistent with the expectations of those who argued that the political agency of the movement led by President AMLO would be enough to dramatically reduce levels of corruption in the country.

How does Mexico compare to other countries in the region? Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of citizens in each country in the region that experienced at least one act of corruption in the last 12 months. The reference line shows the average percentage for the region as a whole.




Figure 6.4. Experience with Corruption, 2018/19

¹⁴ To assess significance, we use a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is whether the person was involved in at least one act of corruption, with years as the independent variables.

Mexico is ranked second in the region with the percentage of citizens involved in an act of corruption, only after Bolivia (38%). Guatemala and Argentina are countries that are closer to the region's average (18.74%), while Uruguay (5.9%) and Chile (8.8%) are the countries where corruption seems to be less frequent. In 2019, the average Mexican citizen was five times more likely to experience an act of corruption than the average Uruguayan or Chilean citizen.

It is worth asking, then, which Mexicans are more likely to report having experienced an act of corruption? To answer this question, a logistic regression model is specified where the dependent variable is the report of acts of corruption in the last 12 months and the independent (explanatory) variables are four dimensions theoretically associated with corruption, as well as respondent demographic characteristics. The first dimension studied is double victimization. In other words, it examines whether citizens in poorer economic and security conditions are more likely to be victimized by acts of corruption. These indicators are included following Bailey (2009), who proposes that it is possible that citizens located in contexts of high insecurity are in a circumstance in which corruption has been normalized among public officials. Second, it is possible that citizens experience acts corruption as a form of secondary victimization. This occurs, for example, when public officials see those who need help addressing an urgent problem as easy victims, or because citizens use bribes as a tool to make their interaction with the government more efficient.¹⁵ The included questions are:

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income:

- (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
- (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
- (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
- (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time

VIC1EXT. ¿ Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in the last 12 months in your neighborhood?

Citizens who are in financial trouble (because their salary or income is not enough on which to live and they are struggling or greatly struggling) and/or living in places where there are more homicides, are expected to be more likely to become embroiled in acts of corruption.¹⁶ On the one hand, it is because in contexts in which the state is slow, inflexible, or ineffective, crises can increase the incentives that motivate citizens to try to "grease the wheels of the state" through bribes. On the other hand, it is because in contexts where there are officials who seek to extract revenue, higher levels of need could increase the willingness of citizens to pay bribes. If this is the

¹⁵ Hunt and Laszlo 2005; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Wei 2000.

¹⁶The variables were dichotomously coded: VICBAR7 takes the value of 1 if the citizen lives in a neighborhood where homicides occur and 0 if not; VIC1EXT takes the value of 1 if the citizen was a victim of a crime in the last twelve months and Q10D takes the value of 1 if the salary or income is not enough on which to live and they are struggling or greatly struggling and 0 if their salary or income is enough on which to live.

case, it is with these citizens that corrupt officials may face less resistance when demanding a bribe.¹⁷

The relationship of citizen dependence towards the state is also examined. In certain contexts, the provision of economic aid by the state can lead to acts of corruption, either citizens participating in acts of corruption to access the resources that the government distributes or public officials using this mechanism to extract revenue from citizens.¹⁸ To the extent that government dependency is connected to the probability of a citizen experiencing an act of corruption, a positive effect of this variable is expected. To measure the dependency of citizens, the following question is included:¹⁹

MEXWF1_19. Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security?

The third dimension evaluated in the model is political identity. We analyze if the willingness of citizens to recognize an act of corruption is influenced by political affiliation, or by the level of trust in the government. To measure this dimension, the following group of variables is included:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

VB11. Which political party do you identify with?

VB3N. Who did you vote for in the last presidential election of 2018?

L1. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

It is expected that citizens who endorse left-wing ideologies, voted for AMLO, identify with MORENA, or who exhibit the most trust in their municipal government, are less likely to report experiencing an act of corruption.

As a fourth dimension, the degree to which citizens' values and morals impact their willingness to be immersed in or report acts of corruption is evaluated. Here, the expectations are not so clear. Citizens with a greater adherence to orthodox values may be less likely to initiate acts of corruption. However, at the same time, they may be more likely to report corruption. In any case, it is important to measure this dimension, given the importance that the new government has given to the dissemination of moral values as a strategy to fight corruption.²⁰ To do so, the following three questions are included:

¹⁷ Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Justesen and Bjørnskov 2014.

¹⁸ Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Singer, Carlin, and Love 2015; Stokes 2009.

¹⁹ The variable MEXWF1_19 takes the value 1 if the respondent or someone in their household receives periodic assistance with money or food from the state and 0 if they do not receive help from the state.

²⁰ Ortiz Millán 2019.

EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Q5B. Could you please tell me: how important is religion in your life?

Finally, demographic variables such as area of residence (urban vs. rural), age, gender, education, level of wealth, and respondent skin tone are included in the model. They are included for their value as controls and for their importance as substantive determinants.²¹

Figure 6.5 displays the results of the statistical model mentioned above. In the figure, the black dots reflect significant effects and the white points reflect non-significant effects, that is, effects that are not statistically distinguishable from zero at a confidence interval of 95%. If the point is to the right of the red line, there is a positive relationship between the variables and, if it is to the left, there is a negative relationship.




Figure 6.5. Predictors of Experiencing an Act of Corruption, Mexico 2019

In line with the hypothesis of double victimization, it is found that individuals who report having been victims of crime or who report having homicides in their neighborhood are also more likely to have experienced acts of corruption. However, no evidence is found to suggest that those who do not have enough income and are experiencing financial problems are more likely to experience acts of corruption.²²

²¹ Chaudhuri 2012; Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001.

²² Besides the mechanisms mentioned during the description of the model, it is important to note that the association between crime and corruption victimization could be due to the fact that citizens that are victims of both phenomena live in low rule of law contexts. Although a control was included for whether the citizens live in a rural or urban area, it is impossible to rule out this possibility entirely.

Taking into account government contact, there is no evidence that citizens who receive support through governmental programs are more likely to experience acts of corruption. However, the evidence suggests that citizens who distrust municipal governments experience more corruption. Regarding political identity, there is no evidence to suggest that identifying with MORENA, or any other political party, increases the propensity to experience acts of corruption.

Regarding values, it is found that the people who more likely justify the payment of bribes are also those who experience more corruption. This effect may be due to a rationalization phenomenon, which probably reduces a possible effect of cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, no evidence was found that the respondents' democratic preferences or religiosity were associated with higher or lower levels of experiencing bribery. Finally, among the demographic variables, it is identified that women are less likely to experience acts of corruption than men and that older people are also less likely to experience acts of this nature. This may be due to some intrinsic factor of respondents belonging to these demographic groups, but it could also have an environmental explanation, where officials are less likely to ask them to pay bribes.

IV. Justification. Do Mexicans Believe that Corruption Is Justifiable?

In addition to assessing the prevalence of corruption, it is also important to know the degree to which corruption is tolerated by society as an acceptable form of interaction between public officials and citizens. Measuring this dimension is critical because it is only possible to consolidate an honest political system when there is a broad social consensus that corruption is not justifiable. To assess the degree of social tolerance for corruption, the AmericasBarometer included the following item:

EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?

As observed, the question measures the percentage of citizens who justify corruption. Figure 6.6 shows that, while 83.1% of citizens do not justify the payment of bribes, 16.9% of them do.




Figure 6.6. Justification for Paying Bribes, Mexico 2019

Figure 6.7 shows how the percentage of citizens that justify corruption has developed over time. In 2019, Mexico displays its lowest levels of justification for corruption in the history of the AmericasBarometer. Although, in 2016, there was an increase of 4.5 percentage points in relation to 2014, the percentage of citizens who justify corruption in 2019 fell again to a level even lower than in 2014.




Figure 6.7. Justification of the Payment of Bribes, Mexico 2006-2019

Figure 6.8 comparatively shows the levels of justification for corruption among the different countries that participated in the 2019 round of the AmericasBarometer. Again, the shaded bar

shows the percentage of citizens in Mexico that justify corruption and the vertical line shows the general average for the entire region. Despite its proportion of citizens who have experienced acts of corruption, Mexico is very close to the regional average (17.14%) in terms of justification, close to Bolivia (18.2%), whose citizens also report high levels of victimization by corruption. Meanwhile, Jamaica (28.5%) and Honduras (26.9%) are the countries in which a greater proportion of their citizens justify corruption. Interestingly, despite the historical reduction in the percentage of Mexicans that justify corruption, it is important to note that Mexico is in the same position as it was in the 2016 round (eighth). This means that not only Mexicans, but also Latin Americans as a whole, have reduced their tolerance for corruption. Which Mexicans justify corruption the most?




Figure 6.8. Justification of the Payment of Bribes, 2018/19

To better understand the profile of people who justify acts of corruption, a logistic regression model was carried out. In this model, the dependent variable is the justification of acts of corruption. The independent variables are indicators from five groups of variables theoretically associated with the justification of corruption, as well as a series of respondent demographic characteristics. The first dimension includes rationalization, which in this case considers having experienced an act of corruption.²³ People who have experienced an act of corruption are expected to be more willing to justify corruption. This justification helps the individual who has offered or agreed to participate in an act that they consider morally reprehensible from feeling a sense of discomfort, what some psychologists call cognitive dissonance.²⁴

The second dimension considers criminal, economic, and political victimization. Again, these variables are included to assess whether the justification for corruption comes from citizens in worse contexts. In other words, if corruption is conceived by citizens as a way to “grease the wheels of the state” and thus deal with economic, political, and security situations that sometimes seem unbearable. In this regard, three variables were included: if the individual reports the occurrence of homicides in their neighborhood, if the citizen reports that their economic situation has worsened in the last 12 months (IDIO2), and if the citizen reports that their municipal government is not trustworthy. In summary, people from contexts with higher levels of victimization are expected to be more likely to justify acts of corruption.

The third dimension considers the participation of citizens in social programs. This variable was included to assess whether, in the Mexican context, citizens who participate in these programs are more likely to be victims of political extortion in order to be included or remain in these programs.²⁵

The fourth dimension included the degree of religiosity and support for democracy. This, with the aim of contrasting the degree to which citizen justification of corruption comes from a utilitarian origin or a moral one, as the government of President AMLO has proposed. In this sense, the relationship between this dimension and the justification of corruption is expected to be negative.

The fifth and final dimension that was included in the model refers to political identity. Supporters of the current government are expected to be less likely to justify corruption given AMLO's discourse. This dimension includes variables related to identification with a political party or having voted for President AMLO. These variables were included due to the importance of political leadership as a determinant of citizens' political attitudes.²⁶

Finally, demographic variables such as the area where the respondent lives (urban vs. rural), age, gender, education, wealth, and the skin tone of the respondent are considered in the model. This, again, is due to the value these variables provide to function as controls and due to their own ability to explain the phenomenon of corruption.

²³ The EXCTOT variable was recoded, using the value 1 if the respondent was the victim of an act of corruption and 0 if they were not.

²⁴ Festinger 1957.

²⁵ Singer, Carlin, and Love 2015.

²⁶ Zaller 1992.




Figure 6.9. Predictors of Justifying the Payment of Bribes, Mexico 2019

Figure 6.9 shows the results of the statistical model mentioned above. It is found that people who were victims of some act of corruption are more likely to justify the payment of bribes. As previously stated, this may be due to a rationalization process, which helps people deal with the potential conflict generated by the idea that corruption is improper, leading them to find a rational justification for believing that acts of corruption are actually a necessary evil.

Regarding double victimization, in this particular case, the presence of homicides in the neighborhood and being in a disadvantageous economic situation seem to be unrelated to justifying the payment of bribes. However, we do find that citizens who view their government as less reliable are more likely to justify corruption. This could indicate that citizens who expect to find obstacles in the government are those who are most willing to use corruption to “grease the wheels” of the state.

Although our results do not rule out the existence of corruption in social programs, they do suggest that participants in social programs do not justify corruption to a greater or lesser extent than citizens who do not participate in these programs. Finally, the results suggest that women are less likely to justify the payment of bribes and that people who report higher incomes are more likely to justify them. It is also the case that older people are less likely to justify such payments.

V. Perception. How Much Corruption Do Mexicans Perceive Among Political Elites?

Finally, to complement the measures of experience with and justification of corruption, LAPOP also includes a measure of citizen perceptions of corruption. Measuring citizen perceptions is very important because these can affect the degree to which citizens support both the democratic system and the government, in turn.²⁷ To measure citizens' perceptions of corruption in this round, LAPOP included the classic question measuring perceptions of corruption, which was previously included from 2004 until 2014:²⁸

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is: (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon
or (4) Very uncommon?

This question goes beyond the narrow personal experience (captured by EXCTOT), allowing citizens to report the extent to which, from their subjective perception, corruption has spread through government institutions and the public officials operating in them.




Figure 6.10. Perception of Corruption among Public Officials, Mexico 2019

As Figure 6.10 shows, the average Mexican considers corruption to be a common practice among public officials. Among respondents, 49.8% of them perceive that corruption among officials is very widespread, 22.7% perceive that it is somewhat widespread, 19.9% that it is not very

²⁷ Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013.

²⁸ To be precise, LAPOP randomly assigned half of the respondents to answer the classic question (EXC7) and the other half to answer the EXC7NEW question. Section 6.2 in the Appendix provides a brief analysis of these questions in a comparative perspective.

widespread, and only 7.5% of the sample believe that corruption is not at all widespread.²⁹ While these numbers are troubling, it is important to note that, over the years, there have been times when there have been higher levels of perception of corruption. Figure 6.11 shows the trend of perceptions of corruption in Mexico from 2004 to now.




Figure 6.11. Perceptions of Corruption of Public Officials, Mexico 2004-2019³⁰

As can be seen in Figure 6.11, for ten years there was a slow but steady upward trend in perceptions of corruption. In this round, however, there is a significant reduction in perceptions of corruption. The degree to which citizens perceive that corruption is widespread throughout the government decreased by 4.2 percentage points with respect to the historical average, and by 5 percentage points with respect to the levels measured in 2016.³¹ In light of this reduction in perceptions of corruption in Mexico, where does the country stand in relation to the rest of the countries in the region? Figure 6.12 displays the levels of perception of corruption across the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

²⁹ As shown in Figure A2 in the Appendix, only 24% of citizens think that absolutely all politicians are corrupt.

³⁰ In 2017, the EXC7 question was replaced with EXCNEW (estimate of the number of corrupt politicians). Chart A4 shows the trend over time, including this year.

³¹ A reduction of 7.5 percentage points from levels is also detected in the 2016/2017 round, when EXC7NEW levels are compared across survey rounds. See Figure A4 in the Appendix.




Figure 6.12. Perception of Corruption among Public Officials, 2018/2019

As Figure 6.12 shows, Peru, Argentina, and Colombia are the countries in which citizens perceive higher levels of corruption. Surprisingly, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Uruguay are the countries with the lowest citizen perceptions of corruption.³² In contrast to past rounds, in which Mexico was

³² These levels change dramatically when analyzing the EXC7NEW question. When done in this way, Panama, Peru, and Guatemala are the countries where the most politicians are perceived to be involved in corruption, and Costa Rica, Uruguay, and the United States are the countries where the fewest politicians are thought to participate in corruption. See Figure A3 in the Appendix.

among the five countries where citizens perceived the most corruption, with an average of 71.6, the country falls to eighth place in this round.³³ This drop could indicate that, after the change of government, citizens have observed lower levels of corruption. However, this decline is also consistent with a politically motivated perception of corruption.

Who in Mexico perceives higher and lower levels of corruption among public officials? To answer the question, once again an OLS regression model is carried out, where the dependent variable is the degree to which the citizen perceives that corruption is widespread in public service and the independent variables are five factors theoretically associated with perceptions of corruption.

As a first dimension, personal experience is considered. On the one hand, if citizens base their assessments on what they personally experience, it would be expected that experiences and perceptions of corruption are strongly connected³⁴). On the other hand, if citizens are aware that corruption has economic impacts, citizens who are experiencing a worse personal economic situation are expected to generalize their experience and assume that there are higher levels of corruption.

The second dimension includes variables related to citizens' exposure to and connection with political discourse. The following questions were included to measure this dimension.

GION. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet?

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

If Mexicans' perceptions of corruption are informed by the media or by political actors who analyze daily events, people who read the news and/or are interested in politics are expected to be the most likely to perceive more corruption.

As a fourth dimension, citizens' political identification with the government are included. On one hand, it is expected that the less ideological alignment citizens have with governing entities, the less citizens perceive them to be corrupt. However, when political leaders are dedicated to promoting the belief that corruption is rampant and pervasive, the closer the government and the governed are, the more likely citizens are to follow their political discourse. To measure this dimension, some of the previously reviewed variables were used, including citizen distrust of the municipal government, whether the citizen voted for AMLO in the recent election, as well as approval of President AMLO's performance.

If citizens downplay the corruption of the political group with which they identify, a negative relationship must be found between people's ideological/political alignment with the government and perceptions of corruption. If citizens absorb the political discourse of the group with which

³³ In both measures (EXC7 and EXC7NEW), Mexico falls significantly in the ranking. Using EXC7NEW as an indicator, Mexico went from the second highest country in relation to citizen perceptions of corruption in 2016 to the eleventh in 2019. See Figure A3 in the Appendix.

³⁴ Jacobs and Potenza 1991.

they identify, we must find the opposite effect. This is due to the insistence of President AMLO to highlight the corruption of his predecessors.

Finally, other socio-demographic variables, such as place of residence (urban/rural), education, wealth, gender, and respondent skin tone, are considered in the regression model. Figure 6.13 shows the results of the model.




Figure 6.13. Predictors of the Perception of Corruption, Mexico 2019

As Figure 6.13 shows, there is little evidence that perceptions of corruption are related to personal experiences with corruption. On the contrary, the perception of corruption seems to be constituted by what citizens hear in the media and among their political networks. Citizens frequently exposed to the news (daily or at least once a week) tend to perceive that corruption is more widespread.

Likewise, in line with those who affirm that the new government's discourse has opened a gap among social classes, it is found that citizens in the highest wealth quintiles tend to perceive more corruption than citizens in the lowest quintiles. This is worrying in the context of a region where class gaps have brought and kept governments in power that have acted against democratic institutions and values.

Finally, counter to the idea that the low perceptions of corruption in Mexico are a direct product of the charismatic leadership that President AMLO exercises among his followers, there is no evidence that citizens who voted for AMLO and/or approve of him more tend to perceive less corruption. It is difficult to identify the precise cause of this null effect; however, it could be due to differences in the locus of causality of corruption in the country between AMLO supporters and detractors. While the former could locate corruption among AMLO's opponents, the latter could

be locating corruption within the government itself. A deeper analysis would be necessary to identify the origin of these null results.³⁵

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, an analysis was conducted of the evolution of the three dimensions of corruption measured in the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer: experiences of corruption, citizens' justification for the payment of bribes, and the perceptions of Mexicans regarding the prevalence of corruption. The way in which corruption in Mexico has evolved over time and the way in which it compares with other countries in the region were analyzed. In addition, the importance with which different theoretical dimensions influence the three dimensions of corruption was evaluated.

Regarding the prevalence of corruption, it is found that the so-called 4th transformation does not seem to have produced a radical decrease in corruption. At least, this is not the case three months after the inauguration of the new executive. We did not see a reduction in total victimization, but we did see an increase in the number of citizens from whom public employees request bribes. The results indicate that, once again, the police continue to be the main source of corrupt requests. Acts of corruption involve police officers more frequently than any other official. That said, once contact with the government is taken into account, the courts remain as one of the government spaces where corruption most frequently occurs. On the one hand, the data seem to justify both President AMLO's criticism of the judiciary and the new reforms that seek to deepen the courts' professionalization.³⁶ We will have to wait to see if these reforms produce the expected results. On the other hand, these findings emphasize the urgency of providing better training for the police, instead of simply replacing this civilian security corps with a militarized one.

It could be argued, of course, that the increase in demands for bribes by public employees is due to the electoral campaign that preceded the transition and not the transition itself. However, the data collected by LAPOP in past rounds is not consistent with this argument. When the AmericasBarometer (Mexico) was carried out during the pre-electoral period of 2012, measured corruption was 2.8% less than the previous round. Even when corruption was measured just 17 days after the 2006 election, corruption by public employees was only 0.77% higher than that recorded in the previous round. If 4T is to be successful, it is urgent to plan institutional and public policy reforms to directly attack corruption.

Regarding the determinants of the probability of citizens experiencing an act of corruption, there is strong evidence of a link between insecurity and corruption for the second time.³⁷ Crime victims who live in neighborhoods with more homicides are also more likely to experience an act of corruption, even controlling for their economic, demographic, political, and ethnic characteristics.

³⁵ In section 6.2 of the Appendix, we re-specified the model presented in Figure 6.13 using the EXC7NEW question (perception of the number of politicians involved in corruption) as a dependent variable. Here, too, we find that wealthier citizens perceive politicians to be more corrupt. That said, unlike the model presented above, when analyzing the determinants of EXC7NEW, we find that the right-wingers and citizens who perceive that their personal economy has worsened tend to perceive that politicians are more corrupt.

³⁶ Ortega 2020.

³⁷ Also see Zizumbo-Colunga and Amador 2018.

Likewise, it is found that citizens whose political position is opposed to the government are more likely to report having experienced acts of corruption. It is difficult to know whether this pattern is due to a systematic use of power to extract resources from opponents, to preferential treatment of political supporters, or simply because opponents have political incentives to report corruption. More research would be necessary to delve into this result.

In terms of attitudinal determinants of corruption, it is found that the most important predictor of experiencing corruption is one's subjective tolerance of it. Citizens with different democratic or religious values are not found to have a different propensity to participate in acts of corruption. Finally, in accordance with the literature on the subject, we find that women³⁸ and older people³⁹ tend to experience fewer incidences of corruption than young men. In general, our results show only weak evidence in favor of the political discourse that links morality and ideology to corruption. The results suggest that corruption responds more to demographic and utilitarian factors (specifically the provision of security) than to moral or ideological factors. It seems that it is not only necessary to fight corruption to improve security, it is also necessary to fight crime to prevent citizens from using corruption as a tool to safeguard their rights.

In contrast to what was found regarding experiences with acts of corruption, there is a strong decrease in the degree to which Mexicans perceive and justify corruption. In fact, Mexico reached historical lows in both variables. At the social level, this could be interpreted as a result of the shift in political discourse by both President AMLO and the elites in power. However, the evidence at the individual level is mixed. While those who trust their municipal governments are found to be less likely to justify corruption, contrary to the notion that political elites shape the degree to which citizens accept or oppose corruption, there is no evidence that those who voted for AMLO, identify with the left, or are immersed in partisan activism, justify corruption less. There is also no evidence that democratic or religious values influence citizens' tolerance of corruption. Demographic factors are those that best explain citizen attitudes towards corruption. The women who are more educated, richer, and older tend to justify corruption to a lesser extent than younger men with little education. Again, the data suggest that opposition to corruption stems from demographic factors, rather than political or moral values.

³⁸ Chaudhuri 2012; Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001; Swamy et al. 2001.

³⁹ Torgler and Valev 2006.

Appendices

A.6.1. General

Figure A1 illustrates a comparative distribution of the number of bribes solicited by public employees across the different rounds of the AmericasBarometer in Mexico. As can be seen graphically, 2019 has been the year with the highest number of requests for bribes since 2008.




Figure A1. Solicitation of Bribes by Public Employees, Mexico 2004-2019

A.6.2. Comparative Analysis of the Perception of Corruption

As discussed in the body of the text, this year LAPOP exposed citizens, at random, to two versions of the question on perceptions of corruption. The two versions are:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is: (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon
or (4) Very uncommon?

EXC7NEW. Thinking of the politicians of Mexico how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption?

(1) None (2) Less than half of them (3) Half of them (4) More than half of them (5) All

The two questions are similar, given that they inquire about citizens' perception of the prevalence of corruption, but they are different in that: a) they refer to different objects of evaluation (officials vs. politicians) and b) they use response options encompassing different levels of abstraction. Figure A2 illustrates the distribution of the two questions. As can be seen in Figure A2, the

distribution is unimodal and has a tail to the left, for both measurements. It is also observed that more citizens perceive corruption as very widespread among officials, while, in the case of politicians, the majority of citizens perceive that more than half or all are corrupt.




Figure A2. Perception of Corruption among Public Officials and Politicians, Mexico 2019

In Figure A3, citizens' perceptions of corruption regarding public officials and politicians, in their respective countries, are compared internationally. Mexico is above the average in both scales of perception of corruption, with 72.5% of citizens affirming that corruption of public officials is somewhat or very widespread and with 65.4% of citizens responding that more than half or all politicians are corrupt.




Figure A3. International Comparison of Perceptions of Corruption

Figure A4 shows citizens' perceptions of corruption regarding public officials and politicians in Mexico through the different rounds of the AmericasBarometer.




Figure A4. Perception of Corruption of Public Officials and Politicians, Mexico 2004-2019

Figure A5 shows the results of the statistical model mentioned above. It is found that, in the case of corruption among public officials, personal experience does not influence the perception of corruption. However, citizens who perceive themselves to be economically worse do perceive greater corruption among politicians.

Regarding citizen contact with political discourse, it is found that citizens frequently exposed to the news (daily or at least once a week) perceive greater corruption among public officials, but not among politicians.

Regarding religiosity and democratic commitment, there is no evidence of any possible effect on the perception of corruption, either among public officials or politicians. Finally, it is found that among people who belong to the highest wealth quintiles, there is a greater perception of corruption among public officials, but not among politicians.




Figure A5. Comparative Explanatory Models of the Perception of Corruption (Public Officials and Politicians), Mexico 2019

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Appendices

Appendix A. Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's average trust in political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., stratified and clustered). In bar charts, this confidence interval appears as a grey block, whereas in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts). The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically not statistically significant; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are statistically significant with 95% confidence. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will frequently indicate in the text whether a difference is statistically significant or not.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at zero. When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is statistically significant when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line at zero.

On occasion, analyses and graphs in this report present "region-average" findings. LAPOP's standard is to treat countries as units of analysis and, thus, we weight countries equally in the calculation of region averages.

The dataset used for the analyses in this report correspond to the cross-time, cross-national merged 2004-2018/19 and Mexico cross-time merged dataset of the AmericasBarometer surveys. Finalized versions of each survey represented in the dataset are available for free download on the project's website at www.LapopSurveys.org.

Appendix B. Study Information Sheet



January, 2019

Dear Sir/ Ma'am:

You have been selected at random to participate in a study of public opinion on behalf of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados. The project is supported by Vanderbilt University.

The interview will last approximately 45 minutes.

The objective of the study is to learn your opinions about different aspects of the way things are in Mexico. Even though we cannot offer you any specific benefit, we do plan to make general findings available to the media and researchers.

Although you have been selected to participate, Sir/Ma'am, your participation in the study is voluntary. You can decline to answer any question or end the interview at any time. The replies that you give will be kept confidential and anonymous. For quality control purposes of my work, sections of the interview may be recorded.

If you have any questions about the study, please do not hesitate to contact DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados at 55751250 of Mexico City with Carlos López or at the email clo@dataopm.net.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Are you willing to participate?

Appendix C. Questionnaire

NOTA:

Módulos experimentales (marcados en gris) son considerados adicionales al Barómetro de las Américas y no serán puestos a disposición pública por un mínimo de dos años, después de ese período las personas interesadas pueden contactarse con LAPOP con preguntas sobre cómo tener acceso a estos datos.

Barómetro de las Américas 2018/19 Cuestionario México Versión # 12.0.2.5 Aprobación IRB #: 170077



LAPOP: México, 2019

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PAIS. País:				
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá
27. Surinam	28. Bahamas	29. Barbados	30. Granada	31. Santa Lucía
32. Dominica	33. Antigua y Barbuda	34. San Vicente y las Granadinas	35. San Cristóbal y Nieves	
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]				
ESTRATOPRI: (101) Norte (102) Centro-Occidente (103) Centro (104) Sur				
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad [población en edad de votar, según censo; modificar por cada país, usando número de estratos y rangos de poblaciones apropiados]:				
(1) Grande (más de 100,000)		(2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 - 100,000)		
(3) Pequeña (< 25,000)				
UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"]: _____				
PROV. Estado : _____				
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____				
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]				
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:				
(1) Capital Nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña				
(5) Área rural				
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español				
Hora de inicio: _____				
FECHA. Fecha Día: _____ Mes: _____ Año: 2019				
ATENCION: Es un requisito leer siempre la HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN DEL ESTUDIO y obtener el consentimiento del entrevistado antes de comenzar la entrevista.				
Q1. Género [Anotar, NO pregunte]: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer				

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años **[Anota la edad. No puede ser menor de 18 años]**

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país?

[NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO una respuesta]

Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflictos armados	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra el terrorismo	17	Otro	70
No sabe [NO LEER]	888888	No responde [NO LEER]	988888

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace **doce meses**?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace **doce meses**?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio/delegación...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal/delegacional durante los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	


CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888		
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999	

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable?

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "A" AL ENTREVISTADO]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.



[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado
(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO A

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares...
[Leer alternativas]

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	No sabe [NO LEER] (888888)	No responde [NO LEER] (988888)	Inaplicable [NO LEER] (999999)
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CUESTIONARIO B

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares...
[Leer alternativas]

JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.

(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	No sabe [NO LEER] (888888)	No responde [NO LEER] (988888)	Inaplicable [NO LEER] (999999)
---	--	----------------------------	--------------------------------	--------------------------------

[PREGUNTAR JC15A Y JC16A A LA MUESTRA COMPLETA EN EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA Y MÉXICO]

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	No sabe [NO LEER] (888888)	No responde [NO LEER] (988888)	
--	---------------------	---------------------	----------------------------	--------------------------------	--

JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación y gobierne sin la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	No sabe [NO LEER] (888888)	No responde [NO LEER] (988888)	
--	---------------------	---------------------	----------------------------	--------------------------------	--

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a VICBAR7]

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a VICBAR7]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a VICBAR7]

VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] _____ [VALOR MÁXIMO ACEPTADO: 20]	
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	

VICBAR7. ¿Han ocurrido asesinatos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	
(1) Sí [Sigue]	(2) No [Pasa a VICBAR4A]
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a VICBAR4A]	
(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a VICBAR4A]	

VICBAR7F. ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año?	
(1) Una vez a la semana	(2) Una o dos veces al mes
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]	

	Sí	No	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]	
VICBAR4A. ¿Ha sido usted o alguien de su familia inmediata (hijos, esposo, esposa) víctima de extorsión en los últimos 12 meses?	(1) Sí	(0) No	888888	988888		

MEXSEC1. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, ha escuchado o leído sobre casos de desapariciones forzadas de personas ya sea en las noticias, la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, las revistas o Internet?

(1) Sí [Pasa a MEXSEC2]

(2) No [Pasa a MEXSEC4]

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a AOJ11]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a AOJ11]

MEXSEC2. ¿Cuál de las siguientes instituciones o grupos cree usted que son los principales responsables de estas desapariciones? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Organizaciones criminales NO relacionadas con el narcotráfico

(2) Organizaciones relacionadas al narcotráfico

(3) Fuerzas militares

(4) Policía Nacional

(5) Policía Local

(6) Personas conocidas o familiares de las víctimas

(7) Otro [NO LEER]

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER]

(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]

MEXSEC3. ¿Además de [nombre del grupo mencionado], que otra institución o grupo cree usted es responsables de estas desapariciones? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Organizaciones criminales NO relacionadas con el narcotráfico

(2) Organizaciones relacionadas al narcotráfico

(3) Fuerzas militares

(4) Policía Nacional

(5) Policía Local

(6) Personas conocidas o familiares de las víctimas

(7) Otro

(8) Nadie más [NO LEER]

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER]

(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]

MEXSEC4. En los últimos 12 meses, ¿algún conocido o miembro de su familia, ha sido víctima de algún tipo de desaparición forzada?

(1) Sí

(2) No

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER]

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?

(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a)

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B" AL ENTREVISTADO]

B0. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888	
Nada							Mucho	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde]

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de México garantizan un juicio justo?

[*Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio*]

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de México?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político mexicano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político mexicano?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Protestante?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?

B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación?

B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipio/delegación?

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?

B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador es...?: [**Leer alternativas**]

(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (888888) No sabe
[NO LEER] (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive,

SD2NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas?

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a)
 (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
 (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) **[NO LEER]**

SD3NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted...[**Leer alternativas**]

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a)
 (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)?
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
 (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) **[NO LEER]**

SD6NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted...[**Leer alternativas**]

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a)
 (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
 (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) **[NO LEER]**

INFRAZ. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Menos de 10 minutos
 (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos
 (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora
 (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas
 (5) Más de 3 horas
 (6) **[NO LEER]** No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

ROS4. El Estado mexicano debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

[ALEATORIZAR EL ORDEN DE APARICIÓN DE REDIST1, REDIST2A Y REDIST3]

REDIST1. El gobierno debe gastar más en ayudar a los pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

REDIST2A. Está bien que los ricos paguen mucho en impuestos pero reciban poco en servicios del Estado. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

REDIST3. La mayoría de los desempleados podría encontrar un trabajo si quisiera. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

EFF10. Usted siente que el gobierno toma en cuenta las opiniones de las personas como usted al diseñar o reformar los beneficios públicos, como servicios y transferencias sociales. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

EFF11. Usted cree que recibiría fácilmente los beneficios públicos que brinda el Estado, en caso de necesitarlos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

AOJ22NEW. Para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro hay que aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

[Continúa usando tarjeta “C”]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

DST1B. El gobierno debe gastar más dinero para hacer cumplir los reglamentos de construcción para hacer las viviendas más seguras ante desastres naturales, incluso si esto significa gastar menos en otros programas. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con esta frase?

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

DRK1. ¿Qué tan probable sería que usted o alguien en su familia inmediata aquí en México pueda morir o salir seriamente lastimado en un desastre natural como inundaciones, terremotos o huracanes en los próximos 25 años? ¿Cree usted que es...? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Nada probable (2) Poco probable (3) Algo probable (4) Muy probable

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “N” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Vamos a usar esta nueva tarjeta.

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

ENV1C. Alguna gente cree que hay que priorizar la protección del medio ambiente sobre el crecimiento económico, mientras otros creen que el crecimiento económico debería priorizarse sobre la protección ambiental. En una escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa que el medio ambiente debe ser la principal prioridad, y 7 significa que el crecimiento económico debe ser la principal prioridad. ¿dónde se ubicaría usted?

[RECOGER TARJETA “N”]

ENV1CALT. Imagine que el gobierno nacional tiene dos opciones para implementar la protección del medio ambiente: Por un lado, puede darle recursos a su gobierno municipal, para que implemente esa protección. Por otra parte, puede darle fondos a otros grupos, como organizaciones no gubernamentales u organizaciones comunitarias que pueden decidir cómo implementar y administrar la protección. El gobierno solo puede llevar a cabo una de estas dos opciones. ¿Cuál prefiere usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Darle recursos a gobierno municipal

(2) Darle recursos a organizaciones no gubernamentales u organizaciones comunitarias

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

ENV2B. Si no se hace nada para reducir el cambio climático en el futuro, ¿qué tan serio piensa usted que sería el problema para México? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy serio

(2) Algo serio

(3) Poco serio

(4) Nada serio

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Ahora, para hablar de otros temas...

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en México?

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

DEM30. ¿En su opinión, México es una democracia?

(1) Sí (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “D” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaba o desaprueba...

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 No sabe [NO LEER]	988888 No responde [NO LEER]
Desaprueba firmemente										Aprueba firmemente	

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de México, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: **[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]**

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de México. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

	Muy poca	Suficiente	Demasiada	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
LIB1. Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada...Libertad de prensa.	1	2	3	888888	988888
LIB2C. Y Libertad para expresar las opiniones políticas sin miedo. ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada?	1	2	3	888888	988888

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?	--	0	1	888888	988888
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno)?	--	0	1	888888	988888
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado un soborno o mordida?	--	0	1	888888	988888

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/delegación en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (o soborno) en los juzgados en este último año?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) en la escuela o colegio?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)?		0	1	888888	988888	

CUESTIONARIO A

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO B

EXC7NEW. Pensando en los políticos de México, ¿cuántos de ellos cree usted que están involucrados en corrupción? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Ninguno

(2) Menos de la mitad

(3) La mitad de los políticos

(4) Más de la mitad

(5) Todos

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

VB1. ¿Está empadronado(a) para votar? **[SOLO SI NO COMPRENDE PREGUNTE:** ¿Tiene credencial para votar?] (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

INF1. ¿Tiene usted CURP?

(1) Sí (2) No
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas **elecciones presidenciales** de 2018?

(1) Sí votó **[Sigue]**
 (2) No votó **[Pasa a VB10]**
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a VB10]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a VB10]**

VB3N. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2018? **[NO leer alternativas]**

(00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco)
 (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto)
 (101) Andrés Manuel López Obrador – Morena Juntos Haremos Historia
 (102) Ricardo Anaya Cortés - PAN
 (103) José Antonio Meade Kuribreña - PRI
 (104) Jaime Rodríguez Calderón “El Bronco” – Independiente
 (177) Otro
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
 (999999) Inaplicable (No votó) **[NO LEER]**

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]** (2) No **[Pasa a POL1]**
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a POL1]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a POL1]**

VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO leer alternativas]**

(101) PAN / Partido Acción Nacional
 (102) PRI / Partido Revolucionario Institucional
 (103) PRD / Partido de la Revolución Democrática
 (104) PVEM / Partido Verde Ecologista de México
 (105) PT / Partido del Trabajo
 (106) PANAL/ Partido Nueva Alianza
 (108) Movimiento Ciudadano/MC
 (109) MORENA / Movimiento Regeneración Nacional
 (177) Otro
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
 (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?

(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) No votaría
 (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente
 (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno
 (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO A

CLien4A. A veces en México, candidatos o personas de partidos políticos ofrecen favores, dinero, regalos u otros beneficios a individuos a cambio de que voten por ellos. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba usted este tipo de actividad? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Aprueba firmemente
- (2) Aprueba
- (3) No aprueba pero lo entiende
- (4) Desaprueba
- (5) Desaprueba firmemente

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

CLien1N. Pensando en las últimas elecciones nacionales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció un favor, regalo u otro beneficio **a alguna persona que usted conoce** para que lo apoye o vote por él?

- (1) Sí
- (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CLien1NA. Y pensando en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2018, ¿alguien le ofreció **a usted** un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto?

- (1) Sí
- (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO B

CLien4B. A veces en México, candidatos o personas de partidos políticos ofrecen favores, dinero, regalos u otros beneficios a individuos a cambio de que voten por ellos. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba usted este tipo de actividad? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Aprueba firmemente
- (2) Aprueba
- (3) No aprueba pero lo entiende
- (4) Desaprueba
- (5) Desaprueba firmemente

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

Cambiando de tema...

VB50. Algunos dicen que en general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?

- (1) Muy de acuerdo
- (2) De acuerdo
- (3) En desacuerdo
- (4) Muy en desacuerdo

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO A

VB51. ¿Quién cree usted que sería más corrupto como político: un hombre, una mujer, o ambos por igual?

- (1) Un hombre
- (2) Una mujer
- (3) Ambos por igual

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

VB52. Y si le toca a un político o a una política manejar la economía nacional, ¿quién va a hacer el mejor trabajo; un hombre, una mujer o no importa?

(1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer

(3) No importa

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

VB58. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con la siguiente frase? Cuando la madre trabaja fuera de la casa, los hijos sufren. **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo

(4) Muy en desacuerdo

(888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe

(988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre?

(1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CUESTIONARIO B

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de algunos países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	No responde [NO LEER]	Inaplicable [NO LEER]
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10E. El gobierno de Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

MEXWF1_19. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda periódica en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones por jubilación o retiro?

(1) Sí (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa Prospera, ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa?

(1) Sí (2) No

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, bachillerato/profesional técnico/media superior, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

(0) 0 años	Ninguno / No tengo educación
(1) 1 año	1er año de primaria
(2) 2 años	2do año de primaria
(3) 3 años	3er año de primaria
(4) 4 años	4o año de primaria
(5) 5 años	5o año de primaria
(6) 6 años	6o año de primaria
(7) 7 años	1er año de secundaria
(8) 8 años	2o año de secundaria
(9) 9 años	3er año de secundaria
(10) 10 años	1er año de Bachillerato/Profesional Técnico/Media Superior
(11) 11 años	2o año de Bachillerato/Profesional Técnico/Media Superior
(12) 12 años	3er año de Bachillerato/Profesional Técnico/Media Superior
(13) 13 años	1er año de universidad/Superior no universitaria
(14) 14 años	2o año de universidad/Superior no universitaria
(15) 15 años	3er año de universidad/Superior no universitaria
(16) 16 años	4o año de universidad/Superior no universitaria
(17) 17 años	5o año de universidad
(18) 18 años	6o año de universidad o más
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	
(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

Q3CN. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[NO Leer alternativas]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

[Si el entrevistado dice "Cristiano" o "Evangélico", sondee para verificar si es católico (opción 1), pentecostal (opción 5) o evangélico no-pentecostal (opción 2). Si no está seguro, seleccione (2).]

(01) Católico **[Sigue]**

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). **[Sigue]**

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). **[Sigue]**

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). **[Sigue]**

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Santería, Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). **[Sigue]**

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) **[Sigue]**

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) **[Pasa a Q5B]**

(77) Otro **[Sigue]**

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Sigue]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Sigue]**

Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]		
(1) Más de una vez por semana	(2) Una vez por semana	(3) Una vez al mes
(4) Una o dos veces al año	(5) Nunca o casi nunca	
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	
(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]		
Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas]		
(1) Muy importante	(2) Algo importante	
(3) Poco importante o	(4) Nada importante	
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]	

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]		
(1) Trabajando? [Sigue]		
(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Sigue]		
(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pasa a Q10A]		
(4) Es estudiante? [Pasa a Q10A]		
(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pasa a Q10A]		
(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pasa a Q10A]		
(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pasa a Q10A]		
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10A]		
(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10A]		

[Usar tarjeta OCUP0IT como apoyo, NO mostrar al encuestado]		
OCUPOIT. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? [SONDEAR: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?] [NO leer alternativas]		
(1) Directores y gerentes		
(2) Profesionales científicos e intelectuales		
(3) Técnicos y profesionales de nivel medio		
(4) Personal de apoyo administrativo		
(5) Trabajadores de los servicios y vendedores de comercios y mercados		
(6) Agricultores y trabajadores calificados agropecuarios, forestales y pesqueros		
(7) Oficiales, operarios y artesanos de artes mecánicas y de otros oficios		
(8) Operadores de instalaciones y máquinas y ensambladores		
(9) Ocupaciones elementales		
(10) Ocupaciones militares		
(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe		
(988888) [NO LEER] No responde		
(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable		

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]		
(1) Asalariado(a) del gobierno o empresa estatal?		
(2) Asalariado(a) en el sector privado?		
(3) Patrono(a) o socio(a) de empresa?		
(4) Trabajador(a) por cuenta propia?		
(5) Trabajador(a) no remunerado(a) o sin pago?		
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]		
(988888) No responde [NO LEER]		
(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]		

FORMAL. Por este trabajo, ¿realiza usted o su empleador contribuciones para su pensión, jubilación o AFORE?		
(1) Sí		
(2) No		
(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe		
(988888) [NO LEER] No responde		
(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable		

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?		
(1) Sí (2) No		
(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]		

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "F" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Q10NEW. ¿Y en cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?
[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$620
- (02) Entre \$620 - \$1,200
- (03) Entre \$1,201 - \$1,600
- (04) Entre \$1,601 - \$2,000
- (05) Entre \$2,001 - \$2,400
- (06) Entre \$2,401 - \$2,800
- (07) Entre \$2,801 - \$3,400
- (08) Entre \$3,401 - \$3,800
- (09) Entre \$3,801 - \$4,300
- (10) Entre \$4,301 - \$4,800
- (11) Entre \$4,801 - \$5,400
- (12) Entre \$5,401 - \$6,400
- (13) Entre \$6,401 - \$7,600
- (14) Entre \$7,601 - \$9,300
- (15) Entre \$9,301 - \$13,000
- (16) Más de \$13,000
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?

- (1) Sí **[Sigue]**
- (2) No **[Pasa a Q10CUS]**
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a Q10CUS]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a Q10CUS]**

[Preguntar sólo a los que contestaron "(1) Sí" en Q14]

Q14F. ¿Qué tan probable es que usted se vaya a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?

[Leer alternativas]

- (1) Muy probable
- (2) Algo probable
- (3) Poco probable
- (4) Nada probable
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

Q10CUS. ¿Tiene usted amigos cercanos o familiares cercanos viviendo actualmente en los Estados Unidos?

- (1) Sí **[Sigue]**
- (2) No **[Pasa a EXPERIMENTO IMMIG]**
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a EXPERIMENTO IMMIG]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a EXPERIMENTO IMMIG]**

Q16. **[Sólo para los que contestaron "(1) Sí" en Q10CUS]** ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos?

[Leer alternativas]

- (1) Todos los días
- (2) Una o dos veces por semana
- (3) Una o dos veces por mes
- (4) Rara vez
- (5) Nunca
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[NOTA DE PROGRAMACIÓN: asignar cada tratamiento (A, B, C) con sus respectivas preguntas de seguimiento del experimento IMMIG en forma aleatoria a 1/3 de los que respondieron “Sí” en Q10CUS, O asignar cada tratamiento con sus respectivas preguntas de seguimiento del experimento IMMIG en forma aleatoria a 1/3 de los que respondieron “No” en Q10CUS, O asignar cada tratamiento con sus respectivas preguntas de seguimiento del experimento IMMIG en forma aleatoria a 1/3 de los que respondieron “No sabe o No responde” en Q10CUS].

EXPERIMENTO IMMIG – TRATAMIENTO A

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Para la siguiente pregunta utilizaremos la escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa “muy en desacuerdo” y 7 significa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

En los últimos 12 meses, las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos pararon a miles de mexicanos. Pensando en estos mexicanos, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con las siguientes afirmaciones?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888 = No responde, Inaplicable = 999999]

IMMIGUS1A. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **pasan por un proceso justo**.

IMMIGUS2A. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **obtienen resultados justos**.

IMMIGUS3A. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **son tratados con respeto**.

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

Q14USA. Y hablando de los Estados Unidos, ¿qué tan probable es que usted se vaya a vivir o trabajar en los Estados Unidos en los próximos tres años?: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Muy probable
- (2) Algo probable
- (3) Poco probable
- (4) Nada probable
- (888888) No sabe [NO LEER]
- (988888) No responde [NO LEER]
- (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]

EXPERIMENTO IMMIG – TRATAMIENTO B

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Para la siguiente pregunta utilizaremos la escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa “muy en desacuerdo” y 7 significa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

En los últimos 12 meses, las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos pararon a miles de mexicanos **y los ubicaron en centros de detención o cárceles por días, semanas o meses**. Pensando en estos mexicanos, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con las siguientes afirmaciones?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888 = No responde, Inaplicable = 999999]

IMMIGUS1B. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **pasan por un proceso justo**.

IMMIGUS2B. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **obtienen resultados justos**.

IMMIGUS3B. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **son tratados con respeto**.

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

Q14USB. Y hablando de los Estados Unidos, ¿qué tan probable es que usted se vaya a vivir o trabajar en los Estados Unidos en los próximos tres años?: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Muy probable
- (2) Algo probable
- (3) Poco probable
- (4) Nada probable

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

EXPERIMENTO IMMIG – TRATAMIENTO C

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "C" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Para la siguiente pregunta utilizaremos la escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa "muy en desacuerdo" y 7 significa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

En los últimos 12 meses, las autoridades de inmigración de los Estados Unidos pararon a miles de mexicanos **y no les dieron la oportunidad de presentar sus casos ante un juez**. Pensando en estos mexicanos, ¿qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con las siguientes afirmaciones?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]

[Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888 = No responde, Inaplicable = 999999]

IMMIGUS1C. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **pasan por un proceso justo**.

IMMIGUS2C. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **obtienen resultados justos**.

IMMIGUS3C. Hablando en general, los mexicanos que son parados por las autoridades migratorias de los Estados Unidos **son tratados con respeto**.

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

Q14USC. Y hablando de los Estados Unidos, ¿qué tan probable es que usted se vaya a vivir o trabajar en los Estados Unidos en los próximos tres años?: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Muy probable
- (2) Algo probable
- (3) Poco probable
- (4) Nada probable
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

Q14H. ¿En los últimos 5 años, ha vivido usted como migrante en otro país?

- (1) Sí **[Sigue]**
- (2) No **[Pasa a Q15US]**
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a Q15US]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Pasa a Q15US]**

[Sólo para los que contestaron "(1) Sí" en Q14H]

Q14H2. ¿En qué país? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Estados Unidos **[Pasa a Q10D]**
- (2) Canadá **[Sigue]**
- (3) México **[Sigue]**
- (4) América del Sur **[Nota: acepte Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guayana Francesa, Guyana, Islas Malvinas, Paraguay, Perú, Surinam, Uruguay, y Venezuela]** **[Sigue]**
- (5) América Central **[Nota: acepte Belice, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, y Panamá]** **[Sigue]**
- (6) El Caribe **[Nota: acepte Cuba, Jamaica, República Dominicana, y otros países de El Caribe]** **[Sigue]**
- (7) España **[Sigue]**
- (8) Algún otro país europeo, excluyendo España **[Sigue]**
- (9) En algún otro sitio **[Sigue]**
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** **[Sigue]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]** **[Sigue]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

[No preguntar a los que contestaron "(1) Estados Unidos" en Q14H2]

Q15US. ¿Ha vivido usted alguna vez como migrante en los Estados Unidos?

- (1) Sí
- (2) No
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**
- (999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar
- (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades
- (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades
- (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) ¿Aumentó?
- (2) ¿Permaneció igual?
- (3) ¿Disminuyó?
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.

	No	Sí	No sabe [NO LEER]	No responde [NO LEER]
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	888888	988888

FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	888888	988888	
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Q11N. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Soltero
 (2) Casado
 (3) Unión libre (acompañado)
 (4) Divorciado
 (5) Separado
 (6) Viudo
 (7) Unión civil
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

Q12BN. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____

00 = Ninguno
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-mexicana, codificar como (4) Negra]**

(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

GI0N. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Algunas veces al año (5) Nunca
 (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
 (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

SMEDIA1. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Facebook?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]**
 (2) No **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**
 (888888) No sabe **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**
 (988888) No responde **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**

SMEDIA2. ¿Con qué frecuencia ve contenido en Facebook? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente **[Sigue]**
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana **[Sigue]**
 (3) Algunas veces al mes **[Sigue]**
 (4) Algunas veces al año **[Sigue]**
 (5) Nunca **[Pasa a SMEDIA4]**
 (888888) No sabe **[Sigue]**
 (988888) No responde **[Sigue]**
 (999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA3. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve información política** en Facebook? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana
 (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Algunas veces al año
 (5) Nunca
 (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
 (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
 (999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA4. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Twitter?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]**
 (2) No **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**
 (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**
 (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**

SMEDIA5. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve contenido** en Twitter? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente **[Sigue]**
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana **[Sigue]**
 (3) Algunas veces al mes **[Sigue]**
 (4) Algunas veces al año **[Sigue]**
 (5) Nunca **[Pasa a SMEDIA7]**
 (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Sigue]**
 (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Sigue]**
 (999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA6. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve información política** en Twitter? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana
 (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Algunas veces al año
 (5) Nunca
 (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
 (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
 (999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA7. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de WhatsApp?

(1) Sí **[Sigue]**
 (2) No **[Pasa a R3]**
 (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a R3]**
 (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a R3]**

SMEDIA8. ¿Con qué frecuencia usa WhatsApp? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente **[Sigue]**
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana **[Sigue]**
 (3) Algunas veces al mes **[Sigue]**
 (4) Algunas veces al año **[Sigue]**
 (5) Nunca **[Pasa a R3]**
 (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Sigue]**
 (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Sigue]**
 (999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

SMEDIA9. ¿Con qué frecuencia **ve información política** en WhatsApp? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Diariamente
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana
 (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Algunas veces al año
 (5) Nunca
 (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
 (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
 (999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

Podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R3. Refrigerador (nevera)	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R4A. Teléfono celular (acepta smartphone/ teléfono inteligente)	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R7. Horno microondas	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R15. Computadora (acepta tableta/iPad)	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R18. Servicio de Internet desde su casa (incluyendo teléfono o tableta)	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R1. Televisión	(0) No [Pasa a PSC1]		(1) Sí [Sigue]	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No		(1) Sí	(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]	(988888) No responde [NO LEER]
					(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]

PSC1. ¿Cuál es la **principal** fuente de agua que usan para **tomar o beber** los miembros de su hogar? **[NO leer alternativas. Marcar solo una respuesta]** **[Si menciona que usa distintas fuentes, pedir la que usa más]** **[Si dice solamente cañería/tubería o red pública SONDEAR si es dentro (1) o fuera del hogar (2)]**

- (01) Agua de la llave dentro de la casa
- (02) Agua de la llave o red pública en el patio
- (03) Conexión irregular a red pública
- (04) Pileta de uso público
- (05) Pozo entubado/pozo perforación (con bomba)
- (06) Pozo excavado cubierto/ aljibe (sin bomba)
- (07) Pozo excavado descubierto (sin bomba)
- (08) Manantial cubierto
- (09) Manantial descubierto
- (10) Recolección de agua de lluvia
- (11) Agua embotellada (botellón/botellas de agua)
- (12) Carreta con tanque pequeño/tambor
- (13) Pipa
- (14) Río, arroyo, canal, canales de riego
- (77) Otro
- (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
- (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

PSC2. ¿Cuál es la **principal** fuente de agua usada en su hogar para otros propósitos, tales como **cocinar y lavarse las manos?** **[NO leer alternativas. Marcar solo una respuesta]** **[Si menciona que usa distintas fuentes, pedir la que usa más]** **[Si dice solamente cañería/tubería o red pública SONDEAR si es dentro (1) o fuera del hogar (2)]**

- (01) Agua de la llave dentro de la casa **[Sigue]**
- (02) Agua de la llave en el patio **[Sigue]**
- (03) Conexión irregular a red pública **[Sigue]**
- (04) Pileta de uso público **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (05) Pozo entubado/pozo/ perforación (con bomba) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (06) Pozo excavado cubierto/ aljibe (sin bomba) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (07) Pozo excavado descubierto (sin bomba) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (08) Manantial cubierto **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (09) Manantial descubierto **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (10) Recolección de agua de lluvia **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (11) Agua embotellada (botellón/botellas de agua) **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (12) Carreta con tanque pequeño/tambor **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (13) Pipa **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (14) Río, Arroyo, canal, canales de riego **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (77) Otro **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe **[Pasa a PSC11]**
- (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde **[Pasa a PSC11]**

[Preguntar sólo si hay acueducto/cañería/tubería – Si la respuesta a pregunta PSC2 fue (01) (02) o (03)]

PSC7. ¿Cuántos días por semana recibe agua por la red pública?

- (0) Menos de una vez por semana
- (1) Un día por semana
- (2) Dos días por semana
- (3) Tres días por semana
- (4) Cuatro días por semana
- (5) Cinco días por semana
- (6) Seis días por semana
- (7) Siete días por semana
- (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
- (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde
- (999999) **[NO LEER]** Inaplicable

[Preguntar sólo si hay acueducto/tubería - Si la respuesta a pregunta PSC2 fue (01) (02) o (03)]

PSC8. ¿Cuántas horas de agua al día tiene cuando tiene el servicio?

Anotar cantidad de horas _____ [Atención, si dice en minutos o fracción, redondear a horas] [Máximo valor aceptado: 24]

[Refiere al suministro a través del acueducto/cañería/tubería, con independencia del sistema de acopio hogareño que pueda tener]

(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe

(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable

[Preguntar sólo si hay acueducto/tubería - Si la respuesta a pregunta PSC2 fue (01) (02) o (03)]

PSC9. ¿Durante las últimas cuatro semanas, cuántas veces fue interrumpido el servicio normal de agua?

[Anotar número] _____ [Máximo valor aceptado: 50]

(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe

(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable

[Preguntar sólo si respondió (1) o (2) en pregunta PSC2]

PSC10. En ocasiones, la gente no paga los recibos de agua por distintas razones: no creen que sea importante, creen que el agua debería ser gratis o porque no pueden pagarla. ¿De los últimos 6 recibos de agua que recibió, dejó de pagar alguno?

[Si dice "Sí" preguntar cuántos y anotar número] _____

[Valores aceptados: 1 - 6]

(0) No

(7) [NO LEER] No pagó porque no recibió el recibo

(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe

(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable

PSC11. ¿El baño o servicio sanitario de esta vivienda está conectado a [Leer alternativas] [Sondear si es necesario. Atención, opciones (1) a (5) y (7) implican conexión a red o descarga hacia exterior de la vivienda]

(1) Sistema de alcantarillado o drenaje [Pasa a PSC12]

(7) Conectado a planta/sistema de tratamiento [Pasa a PSC12]

(2) Fosa séptica fuera de la casa [Pasa a PSC12]

(3) Entubado hacia arroyo/ curso de agua [Pasa a PSC12]

(4) Otra respuesta [Descarga hacia otro lugar] [Pasa a PSC12]

(5) Descarga a lugar desconocido/no está seguro [Pasa a PSC12]

(6) Pozo o fosa no conectado a ningún sistema [Sigue]

(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe [Pasa a PSC12]

(988888) [NO LEER] No responde [Pasa a PSC12]

[Preguntar sólo si no tiene desagüe fuera de la vivienda, respuesta (6) en PSC11]

PSC11A. ¿Qué utilizan en su hogar como baño? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Letrina mejorada con ventilación

(2) Letrina de pozo con inodoro

(3) Letrina de pozo sin inodoro / pozo abierto

(4) Baño de composta/ baño / letrina seca/ecológica

(5) Cubeta

(6) Letrina colgante

(7) No usa infraestructura o usa arbusto o campo/superficie

(77) Otro

(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe

(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

(999999) [NO LEER] Inaplicable

PSC12. ¿Usted comparte este baño con otros hogares?

(1) Sí (2) No
(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe
(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

PSC13. Por favor, me podría decir, ¿cómo eliminan la basura en esta vivienda?

[NO leer alternativas. Marcar todas las que correspondan] [Sondear si se trata de recolección de basura domiciliaria formal (01) o informal (02) y para reciclaje formal (12) o informal (13)]

(01) Recolección domiciliaria de basura (pasa servicio municipal de recolección)
(02) Recolección domiciliaria de basura (pasa servicio informal de recolección)
(03) La deposita en contenedores públicos
(04) La lleva al basurero municipal
(05) La entierra
(06) La prepara para abono/hace compost
(07) La quema
(08) La tira en terreno baldío o en curso de agua
(09) La tira en otro/cualquier lugar
(10) Recicla en su hogar (no abono)
(11) Lleva a centro de recepción para reciclado
(12) Recolección domiciliaria para reciclaje (municipal)
(13) Recolección domiciliaria para reciclaje (informal)
(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe
(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

PSC3. Voy a mencionar algunos problemas con los que muchos mexicanos hemos tenido que lidiar en los últimos años. ¿Cuáles de estos ha experimentado usted personalmente, o alguien de su hogar, en los últimos tres años? [Leer alternativas. Marcar todas las que correspondan]

(0) [NO LEER] Ninguno
(1) Sequías que tengan como consecuencia cortes o falta de agua
(2) Cortes de energía eléctrica (luz)
(3) Inundaciones
(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe
(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

PSC4. ¿Quién cree que es el principal responsable de las sequías que tienen como consecuencia cortes o falta de agua? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Gobierno federal
(2) Gobierno estatal
(3) Gobierno municipal [NO LEER: incluye gobierno de usos y costumbres indígenas]
(4) Empresa proveedora del servicio de agua
(5) Cambio climático o condiciones climáticas extremas
(6) La gente/nosotros mismos
(77) [NO LEER] Otras respuestas
(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe
(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

PSC5. ¿Quién cree que es el principal responsable de los cortes de energía eléctrica? [Leer alternativas]


(1) Gobierno federal
(2) Gobierno estatal
(3) Gobierno municipal [NO LEER: incluye gobierno de usos y costumbres indígenas]
(4) Empresa proveedora del servicio eléctrico
(5) Cambio climático o condiciones climáticas extremas
(6) La gente/nosotros mismos
(77) [NO LEER] Otras respuestas
(888888) [NO LEER] No sabe
(988888) [NO LEER] No responde

PSC6. ¿Quién cree que es el principal responsable de las inundaciones? [Leer alternativas]

- (1) Gobierno federal
- (2) Gobierno estatal
- (3) Gobierno municipal **[NO LEER: incluye gobierno de usos y costumbres indígenas]**
- (5) Cambio climático o condiciones climáticas extremas
- (6) La gente/nosotros mismos
- (77) **[NO LEER]** Otras respuestas
- (888888) **[NO LEER]** No sabe
- (988888) **[NO LEER]** No responde

Para finalizar...

INTERVAL. En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es nada interesante, y 10 es muy interesante, ¿qué tan interesante le resultó a usted esta entrevista?



Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

FORMATQ. Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico

- (1) Papel
- (2) ADGYS
- (3) Windows PDA
- (4) STG

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____
(97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]

Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista : _____

[Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, complete las siguientes preguntas]

NOISE1. ¿Había alguien más presente durante la entrevista, además del entrevistado?

(0) No **[Pasa a CONOCIM]**

(1) Sí, pero en otra habitación/ a la distancia **[Sigue]**

(2) Sí, cerca del entrevistado pero sin interferir **[Sigue]**

(3) Sí, interfiriendo /participando esporádicamente **[Sigue]**

(4) Sí, interfiriendo mucho / poniendo en riesgo la entrevista **[Sigue]**

NOISE2. ¿Quién(es) estaba(n) presente(s)? [Marcar todas las que correspondan]

- (1) Esposo/esposa/pareja
- (2) Hijo/a (niño/a)
- (3) Hijo/a (adulto/a)
- (4) Padres/ suegros/ padres adoptivos
- (5) Otro pariente (niño)
- (6) Otro pariente (adulto)
- (7) Otra persona no pariente (niño)
- (8) Otra persona no pariente (adulto)
- (9) Otro niño (no se sabe vínculo)
- (10) Otro adulto (no se sabe vínculo)
- (888888) No sabe
- (999999) Inaplicable

CONOCIM. Usando la escala que se presenta abajo, por favor califique su percepción sobre el nivel de conocimiento político del entrevistado

(1) Muy alto (2) Alto (3) Ni alto ni bajo (4) Bajo (5) Muy bajo

TI. Duración de la entrevista **[minutos, ver página # 1]** _____

INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____

SEX. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____


Firma del supervisor de campo _____


Comentarios: _____

[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____


[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____


Tarjeta A






Tarjeta C





Tarjeta D



Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$620
- (02) Entre \$620 - \$1,200
- (03) Entre \$1,201 - \$1,600
- (04) Entre \$1,601 - \$2,000
- (05) Entre \$2,001 - \$2,400
- (06) Entre \$2,401 - \$2,800
- (07) Entre \$2,801 - \$3,400
- (08) Entre \$3,401 - \$3,800
- (09) Entre \$3,801 - \$4,300
- (10) Entre \$4,301 - \$4,800
- (11) Entre \$4,801 - \$5,400
- (12) Entre \$5,401 - \$6,400
- (13) Entre \$6,401 - \$7,600
- (14) Entre \$7,601 - \$9,300
- (15) Entre \$9,301 - \$13,000
- (16) Más de \$13,000

Tarjeta OCUPPOIT [NO MOSTRAR, solo para el encuestador]

1 Directores y gerentes

Directores ejecutivos, personal directivo de la administración pública y miembros del poder ejecutivo y de los cuerpos legislativos

Directores administradores y comerciales

Directores y gerentes de producción y operaciones

Gerentes de hoteles, restaurantes, comercios y otros servicios

2 Profesionales científicos e intelectuales

Profesionales de las ciencias y de la ingeniería

Profesionales de la salud

Profesionales de la enseñanza

Especialistas en organización de la administración pública y de empresas

Profesionales de tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones

Profesionales en derecho, en ciencias sociales y culturales

3 Técnicos y profesionales de nivel medio

Profesionales de las ciencias y la ingeniería de nivel medio

Profesionales de nivel medio de la salud

Profesionales de nivel medio en operaciones financieras y administrativas

Profesionales de nivel medio de servicios jurídicos, sociales, culturales y afines

Técnicos de la tecnología de la información y las comunicaciones

4 Personal de apoyo administrativo

Oficinistas

Empleados en trato directo con el público

Empleados contables y encargados del registro de materiales

Otro personal de apoyo administrativo

5 Trabajadores de los servicios y vendedores de comercios y mercados

Trabajadores de los servicios personales

Vendedores

Trabajadores de los cuidados personales

Personal de los servicios de protección (bomberos, policías)

6 Agricultores y trabajadores calificados agropecuarios, forestales y pesqueros

Agricultores y trabajadores calificados de explotaciones agropecuarias con destino al mercado

Trabajadores forestales calificados, pescadores y cazadores

Trabajadores agropecuarios, pescadores, cazadores y recolectores de subsistencia

7 Oficiales, operarios y artesanos de artes mecánicas y de otros oficios

Oficiales y operarios de la construcción excluyendo electricistas

Oficiales y operarios de la metalurgia, la construcción mecánica y afines

Artesanos y operarios de las artes gráficas

Trabajadores especializados en electricidad y la electrotecnología

Operarios y oficiales de procesamiento de alimentos, de la confección, ebanistas, otros artesanos y afines

8 Operadores de instalaciones y máquinas y ensambladores

Operadores de instalaciones fijas y máquinas

Ensambladores

Conductores de vehículos y operadores de equipos pesados móviles

9 Ocupaciones elementales

Limpiadores y asistentes

Peones agropecuarios, pesqueros y forestales

Peones de la minería, la construcción, la industria manufacturera y el transporte

Ayudantes de preparación de alimentos

Vendedores ambulantes de servicios y afines

Recolectores de desechos y otras ocupaciones elementales

10 Ocupaciones militares

Oficiales de las fuerzas armadas

Suboficiales de las fuerzas armadas

Otros miembros de las fuerzas armadas

Paleta de Colores



The AmericasBarometer 2018/19

The AmericasBarometer is a regional survey carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). LAPOP has deep roots in the Latin America and Caribbean region, via public opinion research that dates back over four decades. Its headquarters are at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. The AmericasBarometer is possible due to the activities and support of a consortium of institutions located across the Americas. To carry out each round of the survey, LAPOP partners with local individuals, firms, universities, development organizations, and others in 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have three core purposes: to produce objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion; to build capacity and strengthen international relations; and to disseminate important findings regarding citizens' experiences with, assessments of, and commitment to democratic forms of government.

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. Other institutions that have contributed to multiple rounds of the survey project include Ciudadania, Environics, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme. The project has also benefited from grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Open Society Foundation and academic institutions in the continent.

The 2018/19 AmericasBarometer was carried out via face-to-face interviews in 18 countries across the Latin America and Caribbean region, and via the internet in Canada and the U.S. All samples are designed to be nationally representative of voting-age adults and electronic devices were used for data entry in all countries. In all, more than 31,000 individuals were interviewed in this latest round of the survey. The complete 2004-2018/19 AmericasBarometer dataset contains responses from over 300,000 individuals across the region. Common core modules, standardized techniques, and rigorous quality control procedures permit valid comparisons across individuals, subgroups, certain subnational areas, countries, supra-regions, and time.

AmericasBarometer data and reports are available for free download from the project website: www.LapopSurveys.org. Datasets from the project can also be accessed via "data repositories" and subscribing institutions at universities across the Americas. Through such open access practices and these collaborations, LAPOP works to contribute to the pursuit of excellence in public opinion research and ongoing discussions over how programs and policies related to democratic governance can improve the quality of life for individuals in the Americas and beyond.

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