



THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO AND IN THE AMERICAS, 2016/17

A Comparative Study of
Democracy and Governance

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February 2018

This study is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of this study are the sole responsibility of the authors and LAPOP and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.



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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the AmericasBarometer. While its primary goal is to represent the voice of the people on a broad range of important issues, the AmericasBarometer also helps guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region. In numerous ways, the AmericasBarometer informs discussions over the quality and strength of democracy in the region.

USAID officers rely on the AmericasBarometer to identify priorities and guide program design. The surveys are often used in evaluations, by comparing results in selected areas with national trends and/or by comparing data across time. The AmericasBarometer alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their country as compared to other countries.

At every stage in the development of the AmericasBarometer, the team realizes another objective of the project: building capacity. In the course of the project, experienced and expert individuals in the field of survey research work alongside and transfer knowledge and skills to students, local researchers, and others. These opportunities come through discussions over the development of the core questionnaire, cross-national collaborations on sample design, training sessions for fieldwork teams and office personnel involved in the surveys, and workshops and presentations on the analysis and reporting of the public opinion data.

The AmericasBarometer is coordinated by a team at Vanderbilt University, which hosts the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the researchers who devote significant portions of their time to this project. At the same time, the AmericasBarometer is a collaborative international project. In the first stage of each round, LAPOP consults with researchers across the Americas, USAID, and other project supporters to develop a core questionnaire. For each individual country survey, subject experts, local teams, and USAID officers provide suggestions for country-specific modules that are added to the core. In each country, LAPOP works with local teams to pre-test the questionnaire in order to refine the survey instrument while making sure that it is written in language(s) familiar to the average person in that country. Once the questionnaire is completed, it is programmed into software for fieldwork and each local survey team is trained according to the same exacting standards. The sample is designed and reviewed by LAPOP and local partners and programmed at this stage. At that point, local teams conduct interviews in the homes of selected respondents across the Latin America and Caribbean region. Throughout the process, LAPOP and these teams stay in constant contact to monitor quality, security, and progress. Once the data are collected, LAPOP audits and processes the files while engaging in conversations with a consortium of individuals and institutions, including USAID, over plans for the dissemination of those data, findings, and reports. A broad network of individuals across the region contributes to the reports that are developed after each round of the AmericasBarometer.

The collaborative nature of the AmericasBarometer improves the project and makes it possible. While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, each round of the project is supported by numerous other individuals and institutions. Thanks to this broad and generous network of supporters, the AmericasBarometer provides a public good for all those interested in understanding and improving democratic governance in the region.

USAID is grateful to the LAPOP team, who assiduously and scrupulously works to generate each round of the AmericasBarometer under the leadership of Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister (Director), Dr. Noam Lupu (Associate Director), and Dr. Mitchell Seligson (Founder and Senior Advisor). We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current students located at Vanderbilt and throughout the hemisphere, to the local fieldwork teams, to all those who took the time to respond to the survey, and to the many expert individuals and institutions across the region that contribute to and engage with the project.

Christopher Strom
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Prologue: Background to the Study

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The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing the public's experiences with democratic governance. The survey permits valid comparisons across individuals, subnational and supranational regions, countries, and time, via a common core questionnaire and standardized methods. Comparative research on democratic governance is critically important to understanding today's realities, anticipating key political challenges, and identifying actionable policy solutions. Around the globe, and in the Americas, democracy is on the defensive against public disillusionment with what it has delivered. Geographically, this round marks a significant expansion of the project into the Caribbean, a region often overlooked and understudied in survey research. Methodologically, this round marks our transition to using electronic devices for fieldwork, and with this the ability to take quality control to new levels, in every country in the project. Substantively, this round of the AmericasBarometer marks the first time in the history of the project in which we detect noteworthy and troubling declines in the average citizen's support for democracy on a number of key indicators.

The 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer is the seventh regional survey produced by LAPOP and the largest to date, covering 29 countries across the Americas. The round began in early 2016 in seven Caribbean countries and data collection in the 29th country concluded in the spring of 2017. The full dataset for this round includes over 43,000 interviews, conducted based on national sample designs and implemented with the assistance of partners across the region.

With roots in survey research dating back to the 1970s, LAPOP has been housed at Vanderbilt University since 2004. LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer were founded by Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, who currently serves as Senior Advisor to LAPOP. The LAPOP research organization includes eight professional staffers, two research fellows, 15 affiliated Ph.D. students, a number of undergraduate students in various roles, and a roster of collaborators and sponsors from within Vanderbilt and across universities, NGOs, and other institutions throughout the Americas.

The AmericasBarometer consists of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in 11 countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the

hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer was implemented in 28 countries. The 2016/17 round marks the largest in scope to date, covering 29 countries across the Americas.

LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets available for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org, free of charge to all. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the project's supporters, who are acknowledged on pages that follow.

In undertaking the AmericasBarometer, our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens, NGOs, public officials and their governments, the international donor and development communities, journalists, and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics and professional associations, while also ensuring that these reports are accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction, sample design, data collection, and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and across countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some prior core items in the 2016/17 survey. To do so, we solicited input from partners across the region and we carefully considered the trade-off between losing a time series for one round versus making space for new content. This process resulted in a first draft of a reduced questionnaire; we then proceeded to gather input into new common content, country-specific questions, and other revisions.

To develop new common content, we solicited input from subject, country, and AmericasBarometer project experts across the Americas. A number of these individuals generously agreed to participate in a set of planning caucus advisory committees organized by topic, and these groups developed proposals for questionnaire revision. A list of these advisory committee members appears below. Based on ideas developed during this period of activity, we conducted a series of question wording and ordering experiments, with support from the Research in Individuals, Politics, & Society lab at Vanderbilt. We presented some of these results to collaborators convened in New York City for a meeting in the spring of 2016. Following discussions at that meeting and additional sponsor requests and input, we then further revised the questionnaire. All new items were piloted in qualitative pre-tests across the Americas. Questionnaires from the project are available online at www.LapopSurveys.org and at the end of each report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology and also with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common “study information sheet” and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project took and



passed certified human subjects protection tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the anonymity guaranteed to each respondent.

With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common strategy to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a typical minimum of 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In 2016, we introduced an exception to this rule with the inclusion of six countries that are part of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS); in these cases, the sample sizes are approximately 1,000. To ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective, we stratify countries by major sub-regions and urban/rural divides, and we use a frequency matching approach to the selection of individuals by gender and age. Detailed descriptions of all samples are available on our website.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and expand the use of technology in the field. For the first time, the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer deployed electronic devices (tablets and phones) for data collection in 100% of the countries surveyed. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field decreases errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track the progress of the survey in real time, down to the timing and location of interviews (which are monitored but not recorded in public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy). For the 2016/17 round, we developed and transferred to partner firms a set of quality control procedures that we call the Fieldwork Algorithm for LAPOP Control over survey Operations and Norms (FALCON ©). Via FALCON, teams working on LAPOP projects are able to verify the location of interviews within programmed geo-fences around work areas; verify interviewer identities via photos and signatures; and verify the quality of the interview via audio and timing files. FALCON allows fieldwork to be reviewed in real time, rather than after fieldwork has been completed, and this means that errors can be more effectively and efficiently remedied, resulting in higher quality data. We believe FALCON represents a revolutionary advance in technologically sophisticated and scientifically rigorous survey research, and we are committed to continuing to transfer knowledge of our advances to others.

Another innovation introduced into the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer is the LAPOP Automated Response Tracker (ART), which facilitates accurate recording of participation rates. While participation rates are useful metadata in public opinion studies, the onerous burden placed on field teams to systematically record this information can lead to errors, and incomplete or poor quality information. ART overcomes these challenges by routinizing the tracking of survey participation. By requiring enumerators to record this information electronically at the time of each contact attempt, we are able to facilitate and assure high quality data on participation rates.

Standardization is critical to the value of a comparative project, and one way we ensure that we meet this objective is by training all fieldwork teams in AmericasBarometer project protocol. Each local fieldwork team is trained by a LAPOP staffer or an experienced affiliate. Our interviewer manuals are available on our website.

Security issues in the field are a constant concern for all those who work in the field of public opinion research. Shifting patterns of crime, insecurity, and instability in certain parts of the region have brought about additional challenges to the safety of personnel working on the project. We take these issues very seriously and, as in past rounds, we worked with local teams during the course of fieldwork for the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 to develop security protocols and, in a

small number of cases, to make substitutions to the original sample for locations that teams on the ground identified as especially dangerous.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we continued our practice of making book-length reports, infographics, and presentations based on survey data accessible and readable to the lay reader. This means that our reports make use of simple charts to the extent possible. Where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of regression analysis, we present results in easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2016/17 round were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled senior data analyst, Dr. Carole Wilson, which allow them to create these graphs using Stata. The analyses in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design and report on the uncertainty around estimates and statistical significance. We include in Appendix A in this report a note on how to interpret the output from our data analyses.

The AmericasBarometer regional and country reports represent the product of collaborations among LAPOP researchers and a set of LAPOP-affiliated experts. The regional (comparative) report focuses on general trends and findings with respect to issues in democratic governance. As in recent years, we were fortunate to work with Dr. Ryan Carlin, Dr. Gregory Love, and Dr. Matthew Singer on the regional report. Selected content from the regional report appears in our country reports. In the country reports, the focus turns toward country-specific trends and findings, yet we often refer to the comparative public opinion landscape. We do so because comparisons across countries frequently provide important insight into country-specific findings. We are grateful to the roster of experts who contributed to the 2016/17 series of country reports. In cases in which USAID commissioned the report, we solicited – and benefited from – USAID input into the selection of topics and feedback on a draft of the report. All AmericasBarometer regional and country reports can be downloaded free of charge from our website.

Each round of the AmericasBarometer involves a multi-year process and the effort of thousands of individuals across the Americas. In each country, we partner with a local firm and we further benefit from input from researchers, country experts, sponsors, and subject experts located in institutions across the Americas. This network is critical to the quality of the AmericasBarometer and its availability as a public good. On behalf of this entire team, we express our hope that the reports and data generated by this project reach and are useful to the broadest possible number of individuals interested in and working on democracy and development.



Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and a significant number of countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by the individual members of the public in the Americas, who, as survey respondents, either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

The AmericasBarometer is made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both institutions. Over the course of this most recent round of the AmericasBarometer, our main contact at USAID, Vanessa Reilly, transitioned to a new position. Chris Strom stepped in as our new point of contact on the project. Both Vanessa and Chris have had a positive impact on the project, especially by amplifying its value and use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt, the Dean of the College of Arts & Science, Dr. Lauren Benton, and the Chair of the Political Science Department, Dr. David Lewis, have championed and supported the project in important ways. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, the Center for Latin American Studies, the office of Sponsored Programs Administration, and the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected efforts associated with the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer came from collaborations with organizations and institutions that include Ciudadanía (Bolivia), the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), Dartmouth University, Environics (Canada), Florida International University, the Inter-American Development Bank, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Foundation (in partnership for this project with Igarapé), the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the United Nations Development Programme, the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (Venezuela), the University of Illinois, and at Vanderbilt University: the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Office for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion, the Research on Individuals, Politics, & Society Lab, and the Trans-Institutional Programs (TIPs) initiative (and the TIPS-Brazil project). We thank the individuals behind all of these collaborations for their work to support, shape, and sustain the AmericasBarometer. On the page that follows, we present the logos of some of the partner institutions that were core to the success of this most recent round of the AmericasBarometer.

Mexico and Central America



Andean/Southern Cone



Caribbean, U.S., and Canada





We thank LAPOP staff who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Sebastián Larrea, Seung Yong Lee, Dr. Daniel Montalvo, Georgina Pizzolitto, Dr. Mariana Rodríguez, and Dr. Carole Wilson. This group was skillfully aided this round by two Research Fellows, Dr. Mollie Cohen and Zach Warner. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science, as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and grants. We thank Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marengo, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in numerous project activities and we thank Roody Reserve for his very effective work with us on the Haiti study.

We take seriously the opportunity to develop new research capacities and train top-notch new scholars in the field of public opinion research. In turn, we benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes the following undergraduate research assistants and Fellows: Jaymee Cole, Miguel Cuj, Pawel Durakiewicz, Julia Gabriel, Caleb Harper, Shelby House, Claire Larson, Alexandra Lynn, Morgan Marquez, Noemi Monnerville, Lizzie Naylor, Lachanda Reid, Hannah Stack, Lawrence Waller, and Michael Zoorob. We want to especially recognize Christine Huang, who has assisted LAPOP in numerous ways over the past several years and who proofread significant portions of this report. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations recently: Dr. Fred Batista, Dr. Mollie Cohen, Dr. Matt Layton, Dr. Trevor Lyons, Dr. Arturo Maldonado, and Dr. Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the project: Gabriel Camargo, Kaitlen Cassell, Oscar Castorena, Claire Evans, Whitney Lopez-Hardin, Sebastián Meyer, Georgia Nilsson, Daniela Osorio, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Facundo Salles, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Adam Wolsky.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries we studied. For the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked many of these individuals to work on a set of advisory committees that formed a planning caucus for questionnaire design. We list the advisory committee members on a following page, and thank them for their work on the committees and, in a number of cases, on other aspects of questionnaire design and testing. We also want to acknowledge some other individuals whose input was very helpful, either with respect to that design phase or the implementation of a particular country study, and/or dissemination of its results. With sincere apologies for anyone we might have inadvertently omitted from this listing, these individuals include Dr. Benigno Alarcón (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Venezuela), Leticia Alcaraz (CIRD), Mark Bynoe (Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana), Dr. John Carey (Dartmouth), Dr. Ricardo Córdova (FUNDAUNGO, El Salvador), Dr. Rosario Espinal (Temple University), Dr. Mario Fuks (UFMG, Brazil), Dr. François Gélinau (Laval University, Canada), Marciano Glasgow (Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana), Dr. Anthony Harriott (UWI, Jamaica), Balford Lewis (Centre for Leadership and Governance, UWI, Jamaica), Dr. Mary Malone (University of New Hampshire), Dr. Keith Neuman (Environics Institute, Canada), Dr. Brendon Nyhan (Dartmouth), Dr. Richard Olson (FIU), Manuel Orrego (CIRD), Nathalia Porto (formerly affiliated with UFMG, Brazil), Nat Stone (POR and Algonquin College, Canada), Dr. Juan Manual Trak (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Venezuela), Patricia Zárate (Institutos de Estudios Peruanos, Peru), and Dr. Thomas Zeitzoff (American University). LAPOP's rigorous procedures for monitoring the quality of fieldwork in real time requires significant effort; we are grateful to Dr. Juan Carlos

Donoso, Dr. Arturo Maldonado, and their teams at 50+1 in Quito and in Lima for their assistance in quality control on a number of the surveys included in this round.

To all the many individuals who contributed to the project, we offer our sincere gratitude. We could not achieve the scope, quality, and impact of the AmericasBarometer without your support.

Liz Zechmeister
Noam Lupu

Nashville, Tennessee
August 2017

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Introduction

Democracy is on the defensive in the Americas and around the world. In a number of places across the Americas, countries have been coping with security and economic crises, and scandals emanating from governments and parties. Among the mass public, skepticism is brewing over the extent to which democracy can succeed in delivering on citizens' expectations and improving the quality of their daily lives. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer taps into this simmering frustration and permits it to be studied in comparative perspective across population subgroups, countries, and time. It also documents some notable signs of resilience. In this same vein, the survey reveals important nuances in challenges to democratic governance across a heterogeneous region. In this way, the AmericasBarometer provides a refined tool with which to make the types of diagnoses and distinctions that are so important to designing and implementing effective policy.

A core focus of the AmericasBarometer is citizens' evaluations of "democratic governance." Democratic governance refers to a system of politics and policy in which citizens' direct, indirect, and representative participation is privileged and enabled via basic freedoms, with the goal of ensuring that states are held accountable for their actions. As the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2013) has defined it, "Democratic governance is governance that takes place in the context of a democratic political system, which is representative of the will and interests of the people and is infused with the principles of participation, inclusion, and accountability" (p. 37). The appeal of democratic governance is derived from its potential to improve the quality of citizens' lives by facilitating efforts to decrease corruption, increase economic development (and decrease poverty), and build strong communities. The legitimacy of democratic governance hinges, at least in part, on how well it delivers on these expectations (Booth and Seligson 2009). For this reason, taking stock of its successes and short-comings requires assessing citizens' varied experiences and evaluations under democratic governance.

In this latest in a series of region-wide reports on the AmericasBarometer, we examine public support for the institutions at the core of democracy, the extent to which citizens feel their countries are succeeding in supplying the basic liberties required of democratic governance, citizens' experiences and evaluations regarding corruption and crime, their involvement with and assessments of local politics, and their general democratic orientations. To do so, we make use of data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer, often in combination with data from prior rounds of the study. Within the report, main findings are presented at the outset of each chapter, and in this introduction, we present a preview of these core results. While Chapters 1 and 2 provide details on important differences across countries, highlighting specific findings for Mexico, Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 cover exclusive issues for the case of Mexico.

To begin with, Chapter 1 considers support in the abstract for the concept of democracy and its two main components: elections and parties. One of the most striking findings in this chapter is a significant decrease in the extent to which the public in the region and in Mexico agrees that democracy, in spite of its shortcomings, is better than any other form of government. In Mexico, support for democracy fell from 70.2% in 2004 to 49.4% in 2017. Mexicans with a higher level of both education and wealth report the greatest support for democracy. Support for executive coups in Mexico in 2017 was 17.0%, remaining stable since 2010. Only 26.2% of Mexicans trust the elections, which represents a drop of more than 4 percentage points compared to the 2014 round and more than 18 percentage points compared to 2012. Trust in political parties decreased to its

lowest level in 2017. Only 13.8% of Mexicans have trust in political parties. Identification with political parties in Mexico fell almost 9 percentage points in 2017. These changes in support for the most basic premises of modern democracy – that the system in the abstract is ideal and that elections are the only legitimate means of alternating governmental power – are found along with low confidence in elections and decreased confidence in political parties.

Chapter 2 presents an analysis of regional trends regarding the two pillars of democracy: support for the political system and political tolerance. Over the years, LAPOP has suggested and found that democracy is based on firmer foundations to the extent that the following conditions are met: the public perceives the political system as legitimate and supports the right to participate of those who may have opinions contrary to policies. On average in Latin America and the Caribbean, the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 detects a decrease in system support. Support for the political system fell on average in Mexico from 52.0 points in 2014 to 45.5 points in 2017. We note a deterioration in components related to respect for institutions, the level of normative support for the system, trust that basic rights are protected and pride in the political system. At the same time, political tolerance of the rights of those who think differently than the mainstream has increased in the region and in Mexico as a whole. Political tolerance increased from 47.1 in 2014 to 54.3 in 2017 in Mexico, both in general and within the confines of each of its components. In 2017, the guidelines leading to a democracy at risk and unstable democracy in Mexico are prevalent. Orientation conducive to democratic stability increased on average in Mexico in 2017 (23%) compared to 2014 (22%).

Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean is facing significant challenges ranging from low levels of trust in elections, parties and political leadership to lack of public freedoms, law enforcement, citizen security and provision of robust services. As the chapters contained herein indicate, and as is evident in the AmericasBarometer data and the country-specific reports based on this project, each country's experience varies significantly from one to the next. Each component of values and democratic governance described in this report can be analyzed in more detail using these tools. However, in general, it can be concluded that the public's continued support for democratic governance depends on whether the region's political system can deliver on its promises. Although the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 identifies a number of trends and troubling results in the experiences and evaluations of the typical citizen on democratic governance in Mexico, it also finds important signs of resilience: democratic orientations leading to a stable democracy have shown a slight increase. This commitment to certain core values are inputs with which those who design public policies can identify ways to stimulate and maintain democratic governance in Mexico and the region.

Chapter 3 analyzes the determinants of the need that Mexican citizens feel for moving out of their neighborhood due to insecurity. According to data from the AmericasBarometer, in Mexico, 18.7% of citizens felt the need to move out of their neighborhood in 2017. After remaining relatively constant between 2012 (15.2%) and 2014 (13.2%), this percentage showed an increase of around 5 percentage points in 2017. Likewise, the perception of insecurity in the neighborhood shows a general upward trend from 2004 (40.8 points) to 2017 (48.1 points). In the international context, Mexico is not badly positioned. Compared with other countries, in 2017 the percentage of Mexicans who felt the need to change neighborhoods due to fear of crime is just above the regional average, below countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. The decision to move is one of the most extreme that individuals take, since it involves considerable economic and emotional costs, which speaks of the significant magnitude of the problem of crime and violence that the country suffers. As discussed in the chapter, those who have been victims of crime are



more likely to feel the need to move out of the neighborhood; those who have more wealth and consume more news in the media, but nuanced when these two variables interact; those who have less schooling, and those who are younger.

Chapter 4 explores the characteristics and determinants of institutional and interpersonal trust in Mexico. Trust is a valuable asset with the potential to transform economic and democratic systems, as shown by a significant number of studies in the literature. Seventeen years after the alternation in federal executive power, in an encouraging context of important structural reforms such as education, energy, labor and the criminal justice system, Mexico requires intuitions and relationships that are anchored in healthy levels of trust that allow individuals to coexist with one another and their institutions. Trust levels according to data from the AmericasBarometer 2017 in Mexico are worrisome and show a significant deficit of “trust” both institutionally and interpersonally. Institutional trust in Mexico shows a significant decrease starting in 2014, rising to 40.7 points in 2017. These levels of institutional trust are associated with the gender of the interviewee and the condition of being a victim of crime and/or corruption. Men rely more on institutions than women. Meanwhile, we show that there is a negative relationship between the condition of being a crime/corruption victim and institutional trust. In terms of interpersonal trust, which remained stable between 2004 and 2014, in 2017, for the first time, there was a significant decrease in the average interpersonal trust reaching 53.3 points, one of the lowest in the region.

Basic freedoms, such as freedom of the press, freedom of expression and basic human rights are critical for the public’s participation and inclusion in the democratic political system. Chapter 5 focuses on the extent to which the public perceives that these freedoms are restricted. As this and Chapter 6 argue, restrictions on basic freedoms can erode the motivation to participate and weaken people’s support for the current government and the democratic system in general. In 2017, Mexicans who believe that their basic rights are protected rose from 44.7 points in 2014 to 37.5 points. Almost half of the public in the Americas believe that there is little freedom of expression in their country; barely more than half believe that there is very little freedom of political expression. In Mexico, 57.6% report that there is little freedom of expression (general) and 62% believe that there is very little freedom of political expression. The reports of lack of availability of basic freedoms are even greater when we focus on the protection of human rights. In Mexico, 70.9% of the public believes that there is very little protection for human rights. On average, throughout the region, almost two thirds of the public say that human rights are not sufficiently protected in their countries. Thus, while democracy promises a set of basic freedoms, a large proportion of the public in the Americas perceives that it is not being completely fulfilled.

Chapter 6 analyzes corruption victimization in Mexico. The corruption victimization rate remains more or less constant from the 2004 round to the 2017 round, although it increases slightly in 2017 compared to 2014. In the year 2017, 29.8% of Mexicans experienced some degree of corruption. Mexican citizens who have experienced some corruption have experienced this dynamic most frequently in their interaction with police (23%) and public officials (11.2%). In comparison to with other countries in the Americas, Mexico ranks fourth in experiences of corruption (29.8%), below Bolivia (40.4%), Haiti (35.8%) and Paraguay (31.0%), and is slightly above Peru (29.6%) and Venezuela (28.6%). Despite occupying fourth place for corruption victimization due to corruption, the country ranks second in the ranking of corruption perceptions in 2017 (77.9 points, only behind Brazil 79.5 points). The point highlighted in Chapter 6 is related to the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in Mexico, the vast majority of Mexicans reject the idea that paying a bribe can be justified occasionally. This is true even among those who were asked for a bribe in

the last year. Thus, while high levels of corruption may have political and economic costs for the country, data from the AmericasBarometer suggest that many Mexican citizens continue to reject the idea that these bribes are simply the cost of completing a formality.

Finally in chapter 7, we explore the levels and frequency of use of social networks in Mexico. In recent years, the study of social networks has focused on their political impact. That is to say, they have examined whether or not through the "likes" on Facebook, or the "retweets" or "favs" on Twitter, an effect is observed on the electoral behavior and attitudes towards certain political phenomena. In 2017, 33% of Mexicans report using the internet daily while only 8% used the internet daily in 2008. The most popular social network in Mexico is WhatsApp: 54% report using this medium, while 46% report have a profile on Facebook and 11% have a Twitter account. Those who access the Internet more frequently and report the use of social networks are generally young, people with higher levels of education, those who have higher levels of wealth, do not have any or only have two children and who reside in urban areas. The digital divide seems to be exacerbated when analyzing variables related to available resources, such as schooling and wealth. This gap persists in variables related to the theory of modernization, such as residing in urban localities and the number of children. This allows us to suppose that digital media do not necessarily serve to give voice to those who do not have it today, but only reinforce the presence of those who already have such means.



Chapter 1.

Support for Electoral Democracy in the Americas

Mollie J. Cohen with LAPOP

I. Introduction

Since the Third Wave democratic transitions of the 1970s and 1980s, electoral democracy has been the status quo system of government in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. More than 100 (mostly) free, competitive, and fair elections for executive positions have been held across the region since the 1980s, with many of them observed by the Organization of American States, international NGOs, and in-country governance organizations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, elections have become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996) when it comes to ascension to political leadership.

Yet, scholars have recently pointed to a democratic “recession” in the developing world, and in the LAC region specifically (Diamond 2015; Puddington 2012; but see Levitsky and Way 2015). Leaders in several countries have curtailed citizens’ rights and press freedoms (see Chapter 2 of this report). A string of corruption scandals¹ across the LAC region has fueled citizens’ already-high skepticism of politicians (see Chapter 3 of this report). Presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have repeatedly sought to extend their time in office beyond established term limits (BBC 2015; *Guardian* 2016a; Sonneland 2016).

The challenge of high quality governance has, in some contexts, been exacerbated by economic slowdown and persistent criminal violence (see also Chapter 4 of this report).² For example, the scarcity of basic goods in Venezuela provoked violent street protests in 2014 (Rodríguez 2016). In 2017, the incumbent administration took arguably illegal steps to tighten the *Chavista* regime’s hold on power (BBC 2017; Rodríguez and Zechmeister 2017). Viewed by citizens as a “self-coup”, this action sparked renewed street protests. The military responded by cracking down on protestors, resulting in numerous deaths (Cawthorne and Ulmer 2017). As another example, high levels of criminal violence in Mexico, Bolivia, and much of Central America, combined with low confidence in law enforcement, have led some citizens to take the law into their own hands (Bateson 2012; Zizumbo 2017). This summary execution of suspected criminals without trial undermines the state and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Zizumbo 2017).

In short, the gradual decay of basic liberties, episodes in which political corruption is exposed and made salient, and the economic and security crises that compound barriers to high quality

¹ Several high-impact scandals have roots in *The Panama Papers*, leaked in April 2016, which implicated politicians across the region in the largest global corruption scandal in history (see *Guardian* 2017). The *lavajato* scandal in Brazil led to the ouster of the president, the investigation of more than a hundred politicians (including her replacement), and arguably aggravated already high perceptions of corruption in Brazil. Even prior to these political bombshells, Layton (2014) made the case that mass protest participation among Brazilians in the wake of the World Cup was driven in large part by perceptions of corruption.

² In 2016/17, 59% of AmericasBarometer respondents in the “LAC-21” countries (see Footnote 11) said that the national economy has gotten worse – the poorest national economic perceptions observed since the study’s inception in 2004 and a notable increase (ten percentage points) since 2014.

governance suggest that citizens in the Americas may have good reason to be disillusioned with democracy. This chapter assesses public support for the *minimal* requirements of democracy – that is, the presence and persistence of elections as the means to select governing representatives – in Mexico and, more generally, in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

II. Main Findings

This chapter assesses public support for the minimal requirements of democracy in Mexico and in the LAC region. Some key findings are:

- Across the region, support for democracy is significantly lower in 2016/17 than in previous years. In Mexico, support for democracy decreased from 70.2% in 2004 to 49.4% in 2017. Mexicans with higher education and wealth level report the greatest support for democracy.
- Support for executive coups in Mexico remains relatively stable in 2017 (17.0%) compared to 17.4% in 2014.
- Trust in political parties decreased to its lowest level in 2017, with only 13.8% of Mexican reporting trust in political parties.
- Trust in political parties remained stable in 2017 (22.8%).
- Partisan affiliation in Mexico has decreased 10 percentage points in 2017.

III. The Basic Tenets of Electoral Democracy

This chapter examines support for tenants of minimal or electoral democracy in the LAC region.³ “Minimalist” definitions of democracy argue that the presence of competitive elections (i.e., with a true possibility of alternations in power) is sufficient to identify a democracy.⁴ For example, in his classic work, Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy as, “...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions... by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (p. 260). Huntington (1991) similarly defines democracies as systems in which “powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes” (p. 7). Diamond (1999) calls systems with “regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage” *electoral* democracies (a minimal level of democracy, which he contrasts with “liberal” democracies, p. 10).⁵

³ This chapter uses the terms “democracy” and “electoral democracy” interchangeably.

⁴ In contrast to this minimalist definition of democracy, “maximalist” definitions argue that the protection of civil liberties is necessary for democracy to flourish. Dahl (1971) theorized that inclusiveness, or public participation, and liberalization, or public contestation, are key features of a democracy, or “polyarchy” (p.7). Public contestation and participation include voting *as a minimum*, but also implicate a free press and citizen participation through non-electoral channels (e.g., protest). Later chapters in this report turn to the supply of civil liberties and quality governance – two key pieces of maximal definitions of democracy. This chapter focuses more narrowly on support for and attitudes around competitive elections, which all scholars agree are necessary, if not sufficient, for democracy.

⁵ Introducing participation requirements complicates the task of classifying electoral democracies. Around the world, many systems recognized as democratic have, or have had, limited access to the franchise. For



In seeking to measure “minimal” democracy, scholars often focus on the *competitiveness* of elections. Following Third Wave democratic transitions, several authoritarian states implemented elections to assuage public demand for democracy and to appease the international community’s demands to liberalize political institutions. However, elections in such contexts often take place on an uneven playing field. Entrenched incumbent rulers and dominant parties have been known to manipulate the rules of competition (e.g., by inconsistently applying electoral law for challengers versus incumbent candidates) and, in extreme cases, election outcomes (e.g., by outright fraud).^{6,7}

In short, minimal or electoral democracies are countries in which competitive elections are held, and have led (or are likely to lead) to alternation in power at the national level. In the years following Third Wave democratic transitions, the vast majority of executive elections in the LAC region have met this minimum standard of democratic competition. However, over the years and including in recent times, some presidents across the region have taken steps to consolidate power behind powerful parties and individuals. For example, presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have sought to extend or eliminate term limits (BBC 2015; *Guardian* 2016a; Sonneland 2016). Viewed in the context of minimal definitions of democracy, these steps have the potential to harm democratic governance by limiting the competitiveness of elections.

The legitimacy and integrity of elections has been repeatedly called into question in the region. In 2016, the Peruvian electoral court was accused of favoritism when it removed high-polling presidential candidates from contention for minor errors in campaign paperwork (Cohen 2016; RPP 2016). Nicaragua’s 2016 election was accompanied by accusations of fraud and an uneven playing field that favored the incumbent party; the circumstances resulted in an election boycott by the opposition (and a landslide victory for the incumbent; see Baltodano 2016). Donald Trump has called into question the integrity of U.S. elections by repeatedly stating that he lost the popular vote due to fraudulent voting during the 2016 presidential contest (BBC 2016). In Ecuador’s 2017 runoff election, the losing opposition candidate argued that the election results had been manipulated and refused to concede, leading to mass street protests (BBC 2017). Finally, in Venezuela, incumbents associated with the *Chavista* regime have been accused of limiting opposition parties’ access to campaign resources and in 2016, the government cancelled gubernatorial elections in what some viewed as an attempt to stop the opposition from gaining power (Cawthorne 2016).

example, in the United States, felons are barred from voting in many instances and in Switzerland women were not able to vote until 1971. Yet, most scholars still classify the contemporary U.S. and pre-1971 Switzerland as electoral democracies. A second complication comes from the ‘universal suffrage’ requirement: Is it sufficient that all citizens have *access* to the franchise, or must all citizens *participate* via the franchise (i.e., through the implementation of mandatory voting, see Lijphart 1999)?

⁶ Scholars have termed these systems, where elections are *held* but where the possibility of alternations in power is limited, “competitive authoritarian” regimes (see, e.g., Levitsky and Way 2010).

⁷ In particular, once they have identified the presence of elections, scholars typically ask whether two or more viable partisan options are present and whether a system has produced an alternation in power in the executive branch to identify electoral competitiveness and distinguish democracies from non-democracies (see Przeworski 1991, Przeworski et al. 2000). Przeworski et al. (2000) indicate that post-transitional regimes must include the alternation of power, and treat systems where elections are held but incumbents never lose power as authoritarian (p.27).

None of these incidents signifies the imminent downfall of democracy; yet, each serves as a reminder that electoral democracy does not always persist. Democracy has been the status quo political system in the Latin America and Caribbean region since the 1970s and 1980s, and since that time, scholars have debated whether and to what extent democracy has “consolidated” in these countries – that is, whether electoral democracy exists as “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996).⁸ At the core of democratic consolidation is the relative stability of the political system. Simply put, regimes that are “consolidated” are likely to persist in the future (Diamond 1994; Schedler 1998).⁹

The persistence of democratic institutions relies in large part on citizen attitudes. Indeed, by defining regime consolidation in terms of its status as “the only game in town,” scholars directly implicate citizens and allude to two distinct sets of attitudes. First, citizens in consolidated democracies must support democratic norms and institutions (e.g., democracy as an ideal; the peaceful transfer of power across party lines; free and fair elections). Second and equally important, citizens in consolidated democracies must *reject* replacing political leaders with means other than elections (e.g., via military coup).

The following sections assess the state of democratic consolidation in Mexico by examining citizens’ support for democracy in the abstract and their rejection of coups.

Support for Democracy in the Abstract

To what extent do individuals in the Americas believe that democracy is the best political system, and how does their support for democracy in 2016/17 compare to past years? Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer project has asked respondents across the Americas the following question assessing support for democracy.¹⁰

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Respondents provided an answer ranging from 1–7, with 1 signifying “strong disagreement” and 7 denoting “strong agreement.” Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of respondents in each country that reports support for democracy (values of five to seven on the seven-point scale). Responses range from a low of 48.4% in Guatemala to a high of 82.4% in Uruguay. The percentage of the public that supports democracy is highest in some of the region’s oldest and most stable democracies (Uruguay, Canada, Argentina, the United States, and Costa Rica), while support for democracy is notably lower in countries that have recently experienced democratic, political or security crises (e.g., Guatemala, Paraguay, Mexico, Haiti, and Honduras).

⁸ Discussions of “democratic consolidation” can be problematic, as they often assume that all countries transitioning from dictatorship, and indeed all countries that hold competitive elections, are moving toward “deepening” democratic quality, when this is not always the case (see, for example, Levitsky and Way 2012).

⁹ The term “democratic consolidation” has been used to describe the prevention of democratic breakdown and the degradation of democratic norms, as well as to denote the “deepening” of democracy (e.g., through the increased protection of civil and other liberties) (see Schedler 1998). As in defining electoral democracy, we define consolidation “minimally” (and, arguably, “negatively”), as the avoidance of regime breakdown.

¹⁰ This question is often referred to as a “Churchillian” question of democratic support, as it is derived from Winston Churchill’s oft-quoted speech from the House of Commons, in which he noted that, “...democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In Mexico, 49.4% of citizens support democracy as the best form of government, placing the country among the countries with the lowest levels of support for democracy in the region.




Figure 1.1. Cross-National Support for Democracy

Figure 1.2 documents the level of support for democracy in Mexico, as it has changed across time. The percentage of Mexican citizens who support democracy as the best form of government decreased since 2004 reaching its lowest level in 2017 (49.4%).




Figure 1.2. Support for Democracy, Mexico 2004-2017

Who is most likely to support democracy? Figure 1.3 shows statistically significant relationships between five demographic and socio-economic subgroups (education, wealth, urban/ rural residence, gender, and age) and support for democracy in Mexico. In all such figures in this chapter, we only show relationships that are statistically significant with 95% confidence. If a category is excluded, this means that it does not significantly predict a particular dependent variable.¹¹

Figure 1.3 shows that, generally, the most educated citizens report support for democracy at higher rates: while 43.3% of those who have primary education and 47.3% of those who do not have any education support democracy, 49.4% of those who have secondary education and 61.3% of those with higher education support democracy¹². Similarly, support for democracy is greater among Mexicans with a higher level of wealth. While 53.7% of Mexicans in the highest quintile of wealth support democracy as a form of government, in the lowest quintile only 43.9% of Mexicans support democracy.

¹¹ See results of the regressions in this chapter in the appendix placed on the LAPOP website.

¹² There are no statistically significant relationships between support for democracy and gender and place of residence (urban and rural).




Figure 1.3. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of Support for Democracy, Mexico 2017

Rules of the Game: Support for Coups under High Crime and Corruption

In addition to support for democracy in theory, acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town” is key to the stability and persistence of democratic governance. This means, in short, that citizens in democratic societies should not support military coups that replace the incumbent democratically elected government with military leadership. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer includes two items that tap participants’ hypothetical willingness to support a military takeover of the government. Half of respondents received the first of the following questions, while the other half was randomly assigned to receive the second:

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d’état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.

- (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified
- (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified

JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.

- (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified
- (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified

Figure 1.4 shows the percentage of respondents in each country who responded that they would support a military coup under each of these circumstances. Support for military coups under high levels of crime ranges from a minimum of 23.3% in the United States to a maximum of 59.3% of respondents in Jamaica. Support for coups under high corruption ranges from 23% in Argentina to 53.2% in both Costa Rica and Jamaica. Support for military coups under high crime is 47.5% in

Mexico, which places the country among the highest ranks in the region. Support for military coups under high corruption is a bit higher (49.9%), also among the highest in the region.

In general, support levels for military coups are lower in Argentina, Uruguay, the United States and Nicaragua. Support for military coups is consistently high compared to the rest of the region in Jamaica, Peru and Mexico.




Figure 1.4. Support for Military Coups under High Crime and High Corruption in the Americas, 2016/17

For cross-time, socio-economic, and demographic analyses, we assess support for military coups, generally, by creating an index of these two variables.¹³ According to Graph 1.5, in Mexico the

¹³ In survey rounds when both questions were asked to all respondents, we generated an additive index, adding responses to both items and dividing through by two for each individual. In 2016/17, we proxy support for military coups, generally, with support for coups under either high crime or high corruption – whichever question the respondent received.

support for military coups has decreased slightly compared to 2014. In 2017, 48.7% of Mexicans support this type of action, reaching its lowest level since 2004.




Figure 1.5. Support for Military Coups in Mexico, 2004-2017

Graph 1.6 shows the support for military coups by age subgroups. In Mexico, the support for military coups is much more common among young Mexicans.




Figure 1.6. Age and Support for Military Coups, Mexico 2017

Support for Executive Coups

In addition to the questions discussed above, the AmericasBarometer in 2016/17 asked all respondents the following question, gauging support for executive coups – that is, the shutdown of legislative bodies by the executive branch:

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament?

(1) Yes, it is justified (2) No, it is not justified

Because takeovers by the executive versus the military imply action by different government actors, we analyze these questions separately. Figure 1.7 shows the distribution of support for executive coups in very difficult times across countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2016/17. Support for executive coups across the region is substantially lower than support for hypothetical coups under high crime or high corruption, averaging 20.5% across the region. Support for executive coups is the lowest in Uruguay (8.7%) and support for executive coups is by far the highest in Peru (37.8%) – a country that experienced an executive coup in 1993. Mexico is among the countries with the least support for executive coups (17.0%).




Figure 1.7. Support for Executive Coups in the Americas, 2016/17

While support for executive coups is lower than support for military coups under high crime or high corruption, Figure 1.8 shows that levels of support for an executive shutdown of the legislature remained stable in the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer in Mexico (17.0%).




Figure 1.8. Support for Executive Coups across, Mexico 2010-2017

Figure 1.9 shows that the demographic and socio-economic predictors of support for executive coups. In Mexico, men are more likely to report that they support an executive coup: while 19.7% of men support these actions, only 14.2% of women report that kind of support.




Figure 1.9. Gender and Support for Executive Coups, Mexico 2017

At the same time, the level of support for a hypothetical military coup in Mexico is relatively higher than other countries in the region, but has declined in recent years. On the other hand, support for executive coups has remained relatively stable in 2017 in Mexico. Although these numbers are important, they are also hypothetical, abstract and general. While respondents express lower support for democracy on average, or more support for hypothetical coups, it is unclear from these analyses whether this overarching displeasure is reflected in opinions about institutions as



they function in respondents' national political contexts. The remainder of this chapter turns to this question.

IV. Support for Democratic Institutions: Elections and Parties

Electoral democracy relies on citizen participation through elections: voters select their representatives and straightforwardly voice their preferences at the ballot box. Public trust and participation in these institutions are therefore important for understanding citizen support for democracy as it functions in the real world and, as well, serve as a signal of citizens' commitment to democracy (a foundational piece of democratic consolidation).

Voters select who governs through their participation in competitive elections. This process permits citizens an indirect role in policy-making under electoral democracy, which occurs "...through the competition and cooperation of elected representatives." (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76). Citizens' preferences are thus mediated through their interactions with political institutions (e.g., elections) and actors (e.g., politicians and parties) in a democracy. Citizen trust in the electoral process as clean, competitive, and fair is therefore foundational to democracy's legitimacy.¹⁴

For voters, democratic elections are an opportunity to punish or reward outcomes from the previous term, and to signal their prospective preferences (see, e.g., Ferejohn 1986; Lewis Beck 1986; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Powell 2000). For elections to produce winners and electoral mandates, some portion of the public must participate in them by voting.¹⁵ Around the world, scholars have observed inequities in who participates: abstainers are often less interested in and more alienated from politics than other citizens (see Karp and Banducci 2008; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014), and those who vote are wealthier and more educated than those who abstain (Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister 2015; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Nadeau et al. 2017).¹⁶

In short, citizens legitimate electoral democracy by trusting in elections as a mechanism to select leaders and by participating in elections. The following sections examine citizen trust and participation in elections in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the goal of better understanding support for electoral democracy in the region.

¹⁴ Scholars argue that trust in elections *among the losers* is potentially more important than democratic support among winners (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 2007).

¹⁵ There is some debate as to what the ideal rate of participation is. While some argue that full participation is a normative good (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997), others (e.g., Rosema 2007; see also Schumpeter 1942) argue that low electoral participation can signal citizen satisfaction with the status quo and may yield better representative outcomes (see also Singh 2016).

¹⁶ Several Latin American countries have sought to minimize these inequities and enforce a view of voting as both a right and a duty by implementing mandatory vote laws (Fornos et al. 2004). Mandatory vote laws arguably reduce unequal participation by income, and scholars have also suggested that compulsory voting can increase citizens' *cognitive* engagement (that is, their knowledge of and interest in politics, see Carlin and Love 2015; Singh 2015; Söderlund et al. 2011). However, increased turnout across demographic subgroups does not necessarily mean increased positive participation in elections. Voters in the LAC region regularly turn out and spoil their ballots to signal their discontent with status quo politics, and levels of spoiled voting are especially high where voting is mandated (Cohen 2017; Power and Garand 2007).

Trust in Elections

In 2004 and every round since 2012, the AmericasBarometer has asked individuals the following question:

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

Responses range from 1-7, with 1 indicating “no trust” and 7 denoting “strong trust.” Figure 1.10 shows the percentage of individuals who trust elections (values of five to seven on the seven-point scale) in each country where the question was asked in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer study. The percentage of respondents who report trust in elections ranges widely, from 18.5% in Haiti to 73% in Uruguay. There are no clear trends in the ranking of countries. For example, Nicaragua’s 2016 election was accompanied by accusations of fraud culminating in a boycott of the election by opposition parties; yet, trust in elections is fourth from the highest in the region in that country. In Colombia in contrast, only 24% of respondents report trust in elections, although elections have been regularly certified as clean from fraud by international observers in recent years. Mexico is among the countries with the lowest levels of trust in elections.




Figure 1.10. Percentage of Respondents Who Trust Elections in the Americas, 2016/17

In Mexico, 26.2% of the citizens trust elections, according to the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer (see Figure 1.11). This level represents a decreased of 2.2 percentage points since 2014.




Figure 1.11. Trust in Elections, Mexico 2012-2017

In terms of who is most likely to trust elections, the results in Figure 1.12 shows that Mexicans with low levels of education express higher levels of trust in elections than those with secondary or university education. Similarly, those with low levels of wealth are more likely to trust elections more than wealthier Mexicans. Trust in elections is greater among Mexicans living in rural areas compared to urban residents.




Figure 1.12. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Trust in Elections, Mexico 2017



Participation in Elections

In addition to supporting and trusting elections in theory, democracy requires citizen participation in elections to select winners. To measure electoral participation, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents in each country the following question:

VB2. Did you vote in the (first round of the) last **presidential/general elections** of (year of last presidential/general elections)?
(1) Voted
(2) Did not vote

Figure 1.13 shows the distribution of reported voter turnout in each of the countries in the study. Reported turnout ranges from 52.5% in the 2016 general election in Jamaica to 89.3% in Peru's 2016 general election.¹⁷ Unsurprisingly, reported turnout is the highest in countries where mandatory vote laws exist and are strictly enforced (Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador; see Fornos et al. 2004) and is substantially lower in countries where voting is voluntary (e.g., Chile, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Colombia). Mexico is in the middle of the ranking with 68.7% of citizens reporting to have participated in the last general elections.

¹⁷ As in most studies of electoral behavior, turnout is over-reported by several percentage points in the AmericasBarometer study. For example, official turnout in the first round Peruvian election in 2016 was 81.8% of eligible voters, and official turnout in the 2016 US elections was 60.2% of eligible voters. Turnout over-reporting can be caused by social desirability (voting is seen as normatively desirable, and interviewees lie to appear to be good citizens) and faulty memory (individuals do not remember what they did during the last election, so incorrectly guess that they turned out to vote).




Figure 1.13. Turnout in the Americas, 2016/17

Who participates in elections? There are some interesting patterns in Figure 1.14. All age cohorts, except young Mexicans (age 18-25) report high levels of participation in general elections (70% or higher). Mexicans between 18 and 25 years of age report a participation rate of only 31.0%. Similarly, women report a higher turnout than men.




Figure 1.14. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Turnout, Mexico 2017

Less than 26.2% of respondents in Mexico report trusting elections, which have been the status quo system for selecting leaders for well over 30 years on average across the region. This figure is somewhat disconcerting given elections' central role in democratic governance. Yet, citizens still participate in elections at high rates across the region. While turnout has somewhat remained stable over time, around 70% of voting-age individuals in Mexico still report participating in recent presidential elections.

Trust in Political Parties

Citizens' preferences about policy are filtered not only through elections, but also through elected representatives and the political parties into which they are organized. The founders of the United States viewed the presence of "factions" as undesirable but inevitable in a republic (see Federalist No. 10). While parties are not mentioned explicitly in most countries' constitutions (Stokes 2002), scholars agree that party organizations are important for both politicians and voters. By organizing legislators into groups with similar policy preferences, parties are able to overcome coordination problems and enact legislation efficiently rather than building new coalitions for each piece of proposed legislation (Aldrich 1995). This has led some (see, e.g., Schattschneider 1967) to argue that representative democracy needs political parties, especially institutionalized parties (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995), to work.

Parties also serve an important role for citizens. By organizing politics on policy lines, parties enable voters to identify a "team" that aligns with their preferences. At their best, then, parties facilitate citizen participation in the democratic process and ensure high quality representation.

However, political parties are not always associated with positive outcomes. At their worst, strong parties divide politicians and citizens into fiercely oppositional groups, resulting in legislative gridlock. On the other hand, parties are not able to effectively organize the political space when they lack leadership and staying power. High turnover (or 'volatility') in the partisan options

competing over time is especially relevant in some of Latin America's weak party systems, where levels of partisan replacement over time are notably high (see, e.g., Cohen, Salles, and Zechmeister 2017; Roberts 2014). Further, the perception that politics is a dirty business and parties protect their members who engage in corruption might lead to relatively low trust in parties in an age of high salience corruption scandals (Canache and Allison 2005).

This section examines citizen interactions with political parties, specifically trust and participation in political parties in the Americas. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer study has asked participants the following question:

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

Response categories ranged from 1 to 7, with one signifying no trust and seven indicating high trust in political parties. Figure 1.15 shows the percentage of respondents that reported trusting parties (values of five and higher). The percentage of participants reporting trust in political parties ranges from 7.5% in Peru to 35% in Nicaragua. Compared to the countries of the region, Mexico exhibits a low level of trust in political parties (13.8%).




Figure 1.15. Percentage that Trusts Political Parties in the Americas, 2016/17

Figure 1.16 shows that trust in political parties has decreased in Mexico since 2004: while 32.5% of Mexicans trusted political parties in 2004, only 13.8% reported trusting them in the 2016/17 round. Indeed, the levels of trust in political parties in the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 are the lowest observed since the study's inception in Mexico. Between 2014 and 2017, trust in political parties in Mexico decreased significantly by more than 4 percentage points.




Figure 1.16. Trust in Political Parties, Mexico 2004 - 2017

With respect to who is more or less likely to trust political parties, Figure 1.17 shows that education has a strong, negative effect. Whereas 18.9% of those with no formal schooling report trusting parties, only 3.4% of those with a university education trust parties in Mexico. Similarly, wealthy individuals report significantly less trust in parties (10.8%) than the poorest participants (19.6%). Rural dwellers are more likely to trust parties than urban residents. In general, young people report significantly less trust in political parties – 15% of those aged 18-45 report trust in political parties, while almost 24% of Mexicans 66 years of age and older report trusting political parties.¹⁸

¹⁸ All relationships remain significant controlling for the other demographic and socioeconomic factors, except gender.




Figure 1.17. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Trust in Political Parties, Mexico 2017

Partisanship

Trust in parties is a relatively low cost expression of an individual's commitment to the party system. It is substantially easier to express support for parties in general than it is to express an identification with a partisan organization. The following section examines this higher-cost variable, attachment to a partisan organization. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer surveys have asked respondents the following question:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes (2) No

Figure 1.18 shows that levels of partisanship in the Americas vary widely, from 5.9% of Guatemalans reporting partisanship to 44.4% of Uruguayans. As one might expect, levels of partisanship are highest in some of the countries where party systems are quite stable, with the same parties and coalitions competing over time (e.g., Uruguay, the Dominican Republic) and are lowest in some countries where parties change substantially across elections (e.g., Guatemala, Peru). However, there are some notable exceptions to this rule: for example, both Chile and Mexico, two of the region's most stable party systems, have some of the lowest rates of partisanship in the region. This may be due to citizens' feelings of alienation from the party options and specifically the belief that the parties are too stable and do not represent the relevant spectrum of voter preferences (see, e.g., Siavelis 2009). In Mexico, 18.8% of citizens sympathize with a political party in 2017, which locate the country in the lower part of the regional ranking.




Figure 1.18. Partisanship in the Americas, 2016/17

Figure 1.19 shows rates of partisan identification in Mexico over time. On average, 18.8% of individuals reported belonging to a political party in 2017, nine percentage points fewer than reported partisanship in the 2014 AmericasBarometer round, and the lowest rate of partisanship ever recorded in an AmericasBarometer study in Mexico in the last 10 years. More people identify with parties as the elections approach (Michelitch and Utych, forthcoming), which may explain the relatively high levels of party identification in 2008 and 2014.




Figure 1.19. Partisanship, Mexico 2006-2017

Given low average levels of partisanship, who reports belonging to political parties? Figure 1.20 shows that older Mexicans are more likely to sympathize with a political party than younger citizens. Only about 12% of citizens aged 18 to 25 years old report sympathizing with a political party. Similarly, women are less likely to sympathize with a political party than men.¹⁹




Figure 1.20. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Political Partisanship in Mexico 2017

¹⁹ There are no statistically significant differences between partisan identification and education, wealth or place of residence.

V. Conclusion

How robust is support for electoral democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2017? The analyses in this chapter provide some reasons to be concerned about the depth of citizens' commitment to democracy as a system for the selection of political leaders. On average across the region, support for democracy in the abstract declined precipitously in the last two years, while support for executive coups increased substantially. These downward trends in support for basic democratic values suggest that the public has become more cynical in their views of electoral democracy as an ideal.

When it comes to attitudes toward institutions that are central to representative democracy, public confidence and engagement stayed constant for some while it declined for others. In 2017, 26% of Mexican citizens' expressed confidence in the elections and 13.8% reported trusting political parties. In 2017, the average adult in Mexico has a much lower probability of identifying with a political party: while about 27.7% identified with a political party in 2014, in 2017 that figure is only 18.8%.

It is worth noting that low support for core democratic institutions is not the only way to measure citizen commitment to democratic values and practices. While public opinion on the indicators explored in this chapter is low and/or has declined, Chapter 6 shows that one measure of commitment to democratic values, tolerance of the rights of minority groups and viewpoints, increased in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2016/17. This may, in fact, be a silver lining to citizen frustration with elections and the menu of options they offer: when individuals find their confidence in democracy, elections, and parties degraded, they may become more supportive of political participation by a broad swath of the public.



Chapter 2.

Democratic Orientations in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin with LAPOP

I. Introduction

Plato's *Republic* posed a question with which philosophers and political scientists still grapple: what makes democracy stable? One ingredient in democracy's success is its ability to generate legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if mass support for the democratic system begins to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas from 2006 to 2017, and analyzes the factors that shape these attitudes and the democratic orientations that they undergird.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. Political legitimacy or "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects that the political system and its institutions represent. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Among contextual explanations, one perspective holds that certain cultures grant democratic institutions greater legitimacy. According to this view, Latin America's corporatist institutions disadvantage democracy (Wiarda 2003). For other scholars, economic development heavily influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Lipset 1963). Economic development often increases education, which typically correlates with the expression of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009; Carlin 2006; Carlin and Singer 2011). Still others argue that the institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005). Interestingly, institutional configurations in the Latin American region seem to yield election winners who are less supportive of democratic rules of the game (Carlin and Singer 2011; Singer forthcoming). Since most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving, mean levels of diffuse support for the political system are often theorized to be stable in the short run.

Perceptions of legitimacy, however, may not always be static within and across individuals. Citizens' experiences with the system may change frequently, and can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord to the democratic system. In particular, economic hardship, greater personal insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine the legitimacy citizens grant democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011; Seligson 2002, 2006). Indeed, recent

AmericasBarometer reports have linked perceptions of and experience with economic outcomes, the integrity of state officials, and the security situation to citizens' evaluations of the political system (Carlin et al. 2014).

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture. Since broadly inclusive citizenship is a hallmark of democracy (Dahl 1971), political toleration is a central pillar of democratic quality and survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as “the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree.” Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy, as well. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

What shapes political tolerance? At the macro level, more developed countries have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), while also tending to display more tolerance on specific issues such as same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2010). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance. At the micro-level, scholars point to many factors including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955).

Legitimacy and tolerance are, therefore, core elements of democratic culture. These attitudes combine to make unique profiles of democratic orientations. To understand how such orientations influence democratic stability, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise levels of pro-democracy orientations high enough so that in hard times the regime can draw on these reserves to sustain itself. In such circumstances, democracy takes on inherent value and mass democratic orientations prove robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long uninterrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus, the region's pro-democracy reservoirs are likely shallow and may tend to ebb and flow with performance. This report, like others before it, seeks to track the depth of democratic orientations in the Americas over time, gauge their breadth across countries in the region, and analyze how citizens' specific experiences with democratic institutions shape their orientations to democracy.

II. Main Findings

This chapter documents two types of evidence. First, it reports on over-time trends and cross-national patterns in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for the political system dropped on average in 2017 in Mexico. Components tapping beliefs about system support and rights protection deteriorated most.
- Political tolerance rose in 2017 in Mexico, both overall and across each of its components.
- Orientations conducive to democracy at risk and unstable democracy are dominants in 2017 in Mexico. Orientations conducive to democratic stability increased on average in Mexico in 2017 compared to 2014.



Second, this chapter considers how citizens' perceptions of and experience with political institutions shape their democratic orientations. The evidence is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Of the factors studied in this report, trust in political parties and trust in elections are the most powerful predictors of individuals' democratic orientations – particularly those conducive to stable democracy.
- Citizens' judgements of local government influence democratic orientations. Trust in local governments matters, in particular, for orientations that place democracy at risk. Satisfaction with local government services matters most for orientations linked to unstable democracy and democracy at risk.
- The extent to which citizens feel their demands for basic political liberties are inadequately met shapes their democratic orientations, increasing the orientations to the unstable democracy and reducing the orientations of an authoritarian stability.
- Perceptions of and experiences with corruption have only modest relevance with respect to citizens' democratic orientations.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III explores Support for the Political System, Political Tolerance, and how they combine to form four distinct profiles of Democratic Orientations: *Stable Democracy*, *Authoritarian Stability*, *Unstable Democracy*, and *Democracy at Risk*. For each, it reports trends from 2004 to 2016/17 and in 2016/17 in Mexico. Section IV use regression analysis to probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold the four Democratic Orientations. Its goal is to compare the predictive leverage of factors that figure prominently in previous chapters of this report. Section V concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their implications.

III. The Media

Stable democracies need citizens who support their institutions and respect the rights of, i.e. tolerate, dissenters. In other words, legitimacy/system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability. The ways in which this and previous LAPOP studies expect system support and tolerance, in combination, to affect stable democracy are summarized in Figure 2.1. If the majority in a country shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy should be stable, i.e. "consolidated." Conditions in which the citizenry has high system support but low tolerance do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, could support a more authoritarian model. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in a commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, democracy may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown.

Figure 2.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

| | High Tolerance | Low Tolerance |
|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|
| High System Support | Stable Democracy | Authoritarian Stability |
| Low System Support | Unstable Democracy | Democracy at Risk |

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, data from the 2004 and 2008 AmericasBarometer studies identified serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth, and Seligson 2010). Before analyzing these attitudes in combination, let us examine the two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring “system support” – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index¹ created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

| |
|---|
| I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. |
| B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.) |
| B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? |
| B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)? |
| B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? |
| B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? |

Responses to each question are based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component are also rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 2.2 compares levels of the system support index and its five components since 2004 in Mexico. Figure 2.2 compares the levels of the system support index and its five components since

¹ For the region as a whole, Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the five variables is very high ($\alpha = .81$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

2004 in Mexico. Support for the political system reaches its lowest level in Mexico in 2017 (45.5). This is due to a decrease in several of the components of the index: respect for institutions, support for the system, protection of basic rights and pride in political system.




Figure 2.2. System Support and Its Components, Mexico 2017

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas today? Figure 2.3 presents levels of system support in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer study. System support is highest in Guyana (65.5 degrees) followed by Nicaragua, Canada, and Costa Rica (62-63 degrees) and, for the third round running, lowest in Brazil (34.1 degrees). At 53.7 degrees, the United States hovers above the regional average (49.7). Mexico ranks among the countries with the lowest levels of support for the political system in the region.




Figure 2.3. System Support in the Americas, 2016/17

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the quality and survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus, the AmericasBarometer measures political



tolerance toward those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items:

- | |
|--|
| <p>D1. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: <i>[Probe: To what degree?]</i></p> |
| <p>D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.</p> |
| <p>D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</p> |
| <p>D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?</p> |

As with standard LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.²

Figure 2.4 displays the national means on the political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer in Mexico since 2004.

How stable is political tolerance? Political tolerance in Mexico increases significantly to 54.3 points after a period of stability between 2010 and 2014. However, political tolerance for the country remains below the averages observed between 2004 and 2008. The increase in political tolerance among Mexicans are due to significant increases in all the components of this index, which includes measures of citizens approval of the right to protest, vote, give speeches and be a political candidate of those who disagree with the political system.

² Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high (.84) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.




Figure 2.4. Political Tolerance and Its Components, Mexico 2017

The cross-national distribution of tolerance of political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Figure 2.5, which maps countries by mean score on the index from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in Canada and the United States (69.8 and 69.2 degrees on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Peru and Colombia (47.6 and 45.4 degrees, respectively). In 2017, after the increase in political tolerance between 2014 and 2017, Mexico ranks among the countries with average levels of political tolerance.

Political tolerance appears no more stable than system support in the Mexico from 2014 to 2017. Unlike system support, however, tolerance has risen on average in the Mexico and region since 2014.




Figure 2.5. Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2016/17

Orientations Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the orientations theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who score above 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who score below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold

orientations that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have orientations that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.

How prevalent are these orientations in Mexico? Figure 2.6 reports the trends between 2004 and 2017 for Mexico. In 2017, orientations to a *Democracy at Risk* or *Unstable Stability* in are dominants in Mexico. The percentage of Mexicans with these orientations increases between 2014 and 2017. The *Authoritarian Stability* profile dropped 13 points. At the same time, the percentages of individuals with orientations leading to an *Unstable Democracy* and a *Stable Democracy* increase. Regarding the profile of a *Stable Democracy*, we see that although there is a slight increase in 2017, the percentage of citizens with this orientations decreases since 2008, year in which a significant decrease is observed compared to the rounds of 2006 and 2004.




Figure 2.6. Democratic Orientations, Mexico 2017

With respect to the profile of orientations that favors *Stable Democracy* – high system support and high political tolerance – the snapshot in Figure 2.7 flags an outlier: Canada. At 61%, Canada leads the region in *Stable Democracy* orientations. Next highest are Guyana (45%), the United States (43%), and Costa Rica (40%). At 13% and 15%, respectively, Brazil and Venezuela have the lowest percentages of citizens with orientations favorable to democratic stability. Mexico with a little less than a quarter (23%) of the population has orientations that favors a *Stable Democracy*, a percentage that is significantly lower than other countries in the region.




Figure 2.7. Democratic Orientations in the Americas, 2016/17

If we look at the interplay between *Stable Democracy* – the profile most supportive of democratic stability – and *Democracy at Risk* – the profile most threatening to democratic stability –, two patterns emerge. First, in some cases *Stable Democracy* orientations have grown and *Democracy*

at Risk orientations have dwindled. In Honduras, for example, we find that the percentage of individuals with *Stable Democracy* orientations has more than tripled its 2012 level while, at the same time, the proportion of individuals with orientations that put *Democracy at Risk* was more than halved. Similar if less exaggerated patterns are seen Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic.³

A second pattern is less heartening to democracy's champions. Namely, *Democracy at Risk* orientations are gaining ground over *Stable Democracy* orientations in handful of countries. For example, the percentage of Venezuelans who fit the *Democracy at Risk* profile has nearly doubled since 2012. *Stable Democrats*, by contrast, now make up just 15% of the population, down from 43% in 2006. Parallel, if less pronounced, dynamics have played out in Mexico and in Colombia since 2010.⁴

In short, although the political culture supporting democracy may have thickened in several countries of the hemisphere, it has thinned substantially in others. In Mexico, the percentage of citizens that exhibit political orientations conducive to a *Stable Democracy* slightly increased. We next explore why by analyzing how individuals' experience under and judgements of political institutions shape their democratic orientations.

IV. Citizens, State Institutions, and Democratic Orientations

What kinds of citizens are most likely to hold attitudes conducive to stable democracy? As mentioned above, diffuse democratic orientations are considered deep-seated and, thus, quite stable in the short run. However, in the comparatively young democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, citizens' perceptions of and experiences with the institutions of the democratic state may still be crucial predictors of democratic orientations. So which factors are most important to understanding individuals' democratic orientations in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer?

To answer this question, we use fixed-effects multinomial logistic regression to model the four democratic orientations described above as a function of key variables. These include trust in political parties and trust in elections from Chapter 1; perceived deficit of democratic liberties from Chapter 5; corruption victimization, corruption perceptions, and corruption tolerance from Chapter 6; crime victimization and feelings of insecurity from Chapter 3. The models also control for the five standard socio-economic and demographic variables (gender, age, wealth, education, city size). Analyses are conducted using data from Mexico only.⁵

³ These cases also show a lowered prevalence of *Authoritarian Stability* attitudes and rising levels of *Unstable Democracy* attitude profiles, i.e. those who are politically tolerant but have withdrawn support for the system.

⁴ Over the decade 2006 to 2016/17, the percentage of Mexicans with an *Authoritarian Stability* attitude profile shrunk from 29.2% to 18.5%. However, *Stable Democracy* attitudes in Mexico fell gradually from 41.1% to 22.6%, *Democracy at Risk* attitudes rose steadily from 13.4% to 28.3%, and *Unstable Democracy* attitudes grew from 16.6% to 30.5%.

⁵ Full results available in the online at LSPOP's website.




Figure 2.8. Maximal Effects of Predictors of Democratic Attitude Profiles, Mexico 2017

Figure 2.8 reports the changes in the predicted probability of observing each of the four profiles when we simulate a change of each variable from its minimum value to its maximum value while holding all other variables constant at their means. Such “maximal effects” allow us to compare the relative impact of factors this report has identified as crucial to understanding opinions towards democratic governance.

Let us contrast the first pair of diametrically opposed orientations: *Stable Democracy* (far right column in the figure) – which blends high levels of system support with high levels of political tolerance – and *Democracy at Risk* (far left column in the figure) – which couples low levels of system support and low levels of political tolerance. As Figure 2.8 suggests, the correlates of these profiles are mirror images of each other. For instance, increasing trust in political parties from none to a lot makes one 43 percentage points more likely to hold orientations that augur in favor of *Stable Democracy* and 28 percentage points less likely to hold orientations that put *Democracy at Risk*. We see similar, if slightly weaker, effects when it comes to the maximal effects of trust in elections and trust in local government. By the same token, when individuals perceive a deficit in basic democratic liberties, it boosts their chances of holding *Democracy at Risk* orientations by 21 percentage points and lowers their chances of hold *Stable Democracy* orientations. Maximal effects of corruption perceptions have no statistical significant effects.

Now let us contrast a second pair of opposing orientations: *Unstable Democracy* – combining low system support with high political tolerance – and *Authoritarian Stability* – melding high system support and low political tolerance. Figure 6.8 suggests the drivers of these orientation profiles, again, mirror each other in key ways. Political trust matters a great deal for both orientations. Bolstering trust – in political parties, elections, and local governments – bolsters the chances of espousing *Authoritarian Stability* orientations and undercuts the chances of espousing *Unstable Democracy* orientations. But evaluations of local government services matter as well. Indeed citizens who are most satisfied with local services are 22 percentage points less likely than citizens least satisfied to evince orientations conducive to *Unstable Democracy* but have no statistically

significant effects on orientations conducive to *Authoritarian Stability* and *Stable Democracy* orientations. A perceived deficit of basic liberties appears to have its strongest legitimacy implications for *Unstable Democracy* and increases the chances of observing orientations conducive to an *Unstable Democracy*.

Overall, how citizens evaluate, perceive, and experience their governing institutions shapes their democratic orientations and, in turn, the regime's stability. Our analysis underscores the importance of trust in political parties and elections – institutions tasked with aggregating citizens' political preferences and translating them into democratic representation. Additionally, it highlights the local connection. How highly citizens trust their local governments and rate their services heavily shapes their democratic orientations. Furthermore, the extent to which citizens feel the state supplies basic democratic rights helps determine their democratic orientations. Finally, we note citizens' experiences with and views of corruption and security wield limited predictive power over democratic orientations. Their maximal effects are roughly on par with those of the control variables (≤ 0.06). As past reports have shown, however, these factors are often correlated with system support and political tolerance when analyzed separately (Carlin et al. 2012, 2014).

V. Conclusion

Democracy's future in the Americas hinges on mass support for its institutions and the inclusive nature of democratic citizenship. When citizens broadly view the system as legitimate and tolerate even its most ardent detractors, democracy can achieve remarkable stability. But when this cultural foundation erodes, democracy's fate is less certain. Chapter 1 tracked noteworthy decay, on average in the region, in support for democracy in the abstract and in trust in and attachment to political parties. These outcomes are concerning, yet the set of attitudes that matter for democratic quality and stability is broader. It is also important to track legitimacy, political tolerance, and democratic orientations in the Americas, to compare them across countries, and, most crucially, to understand how citizens' interaction with state institutions shapes democratic orientations. This chapter sought to do just that. Now let us review our findings and ponder what they might mean for democracy's defenders and policymakers in this hemisphere.

A straightforward message from the over-time analyses is that system support and political tolerance do not necessarily trend together. Nor even do all components of these indices. Recall that overall system support fell largely due to flagging faith that courts guarantee a fair trial and that the system protects citizens' basic rights. Yet respect for regime was stable and normative commitments to them increased. Such diverging dynamics can have political implications. In this instance, robust respect for and commitment to democratic institutions can anchor the system if reformers seek to craft policies to improve the justice system. Pairing this conclusion with rising tolerance for public dissent, policymakers may, indeed, find fertile ground for their reforms.

Another noteworthy message this chapter communicates is that democratic legitimacy and political tolerance exhibit volatility in the Americas. Brief analyses of specific cases here suggest this volatility reflects the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. As mentioned, scholars have used AmericasBarometer data to argue that low levels of legitimacy can be bellwethers of democratic instability (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). Beyond specific levels, however, short-term *volatility* in system support, political tolerance, and/or democratic orientations may also have important implications – positive and negative –



for democracy. This is an open question that can only be answered with consistently repeated measurement. Monitoring mass democratic sentiment cross-nationally and over time, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is therefore crucial to understanding democratic stability.

Finally, this chapter's findings have implications for political actors in the region. Political parties, elections, and local government are some of the institutions with which citizens have the most contact. Citizens' trust in these institutions are the three strongest predictors of their democratic orientations. The strength of this relationship makes the findings presented in earlier chapters on declining confidence in parties and low trust in local government particularly relevant; though regional average orientations toward democratic stability have ticked upward, this outcome rests on tenuous grounds. This places a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of the actors who inhabit these institutions. It is thus incumbent upon party leaders to show themselves to be capable, honest, and responsive to citizens (Carlin 2014). Beyond those actors who can influence electoral commissions and other institutions that shape the conduct of elections, raising political knowledge, fostering interpersonal trust, and reaching out to those who voted for the losing candidates can boost trust in elections (Layton 2010) – and political actors can be protagonists of all three. Local politicians may earn greater trust not only by providing better services, but also by reducing neighborhood insecurity, rooting out corruption, and getting citizens engaged in local politics. Finally, while political actors surely have their parts to play in cultivating democratic culture, citizens have parts, as well. Becoming and staying informed and acting to hold politicians and state institutions accountable remain key duties of democratic citizenship, without which we should not expect the status quo to change for the better.



Chapter 3.

The Harmful Effects of Insecurity: Feeling the Need to Move to a Different Neighborhood

Vidal Romero and Gustavo Guajardo

I. Introduction

Since the beginning of the so-called war on drugs during President Felipe Calderón's presidential term and its continuance during the government of President Enrique Peña Nieto, more than 200,000 homicides have been reported in Mexico (through June 2017). The average annual rate of homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants is 1,433 for the period 2006-2017.¹

Likewise, high-impact crimes such as extortion and kidnapping have increased notably in recent years. The National Survey of Victimization and Perception of Public Safety (ENVIPE) estimates a rate of 28,202 victims per 100 thousand inhabitants for 2015 (23.3 million affected citizens in total), a figure similar to 2013 and 2014, but which has shown a growing trend since 2010 (EnviPe, 2016)².

This context of insecurity and violence has impacted many of Mexico's inhabitants' decision making. There is evidence that shows the negative impact of insecurity on the economy (Jaitman, 2015, Magaloni et al., 2013, Soares, 2006), as well as the negative effect of insecurity on people's sense of fear (Warr, 2000; Magaloni et al., 2012); which, in turn, negatively impacts citizens' health and well-being.

In addition, insecurity complicates the conditions of governance in societies, which affects the performance of governments (Romero et al., 2016). Similarly, there are studies that relate low political participation with increasing insecurity (Trelles and Carreras, 2012, García-Ponce, 2015, Law, 2015) and effects have also been documented at the level of the political system. There is evidence of the negative effect of insecurity on citizens' satisfaction with the functioning of democracies and their trust in them, although it is important to note that it has not been proven that insecurity negatively affects trust in democracy as a political system (Lafree and Tseloni, 2006, Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010).

All these negative effects of insecurity provoke modifications in individuals' decisions and behavior. This includes work-related decisions as well. For example, it becomes less attractive to work in certain areas of a city, perform work at night or take on safety-related jobs. Citizens tend to limit nighttime outings, the practice of sports in dangerous areas, and visits to places of interest that are considered unsafe.

Data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey³ show that, due to fear of crime, 35.5% of respondents limited their visits to recreational spaces, 35.2% stopped going to commonly-

¹ Data from the Executive Secretariat of the National Security Commission (Secretariado Ejecutivo de la Comisión Nacional de Seguridad).

² See <http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/enchogares/regulares/envipe/2016/>

³ Of these questions, only change of address was included in 2016. The rest is for 2012.

frequented shopping centers, 15.2% felt the need to move to a different neighborhood, and 4.3% changed jobs. The wording of these AmericasBarometer variables is as follows:

| |
|---|
| VIC43. Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the last 12 months, have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime? (1) Yes (0) No |
| VIC40. Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the last 12 months ... have you avoided buying things that you like because they may get stolen? (1) Yes (0) No |
| VIC41. Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the last 12 months... Have you limited the places where you go for recreation? (1) Yes (0) No |
| VIC45. Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the last 12 months... have you changed your job or place of study out of fear of crime? (1) Yes (0) No |

Among the consequences of insecurity is the need felt by some Mexicans to change their residence due to fear of crime. This is a decision that involves multiple costs for people, so we would expect it not to be taken lightly. Other precautions such as placing an additional lock on the door of a home or deciding to drive on one street and not on the other would be considered before changing their residence.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on describing and explaining the expression of individuals' need to move, or not, from their neighborhood or *colonia* for fear of crime. For this, we use the data from the most recent round of the AmericasBarometer.

II. Main Findings

With regard to the variables related to the perception of insecurity, we see a demonstrated need to move to a different neighborhood due to fear of crime and the implied costs that come with such a move. The percentage of respondents who responded affirmatively to this variable grew from 2014 to 2017, with 18.7% of Mexicans in 2017 saying they had considered changing neighborhoods due to fear of crime. This represents just over 22 million people - more than the number of inhabitants in the State of Mexico and more than twice the number of inhabitants of Mexico City.

From a logistic model, we find that level of wealth, level of news consumption, having been a victim of crime in the past, level of schooling, the interaction of wealth level with news consumption and age are statistically significant variables that serve to explain the sensation of a need to move to a different neighborhood.

The most important factor that explains why some Mexicans felt the need to move to a different neighborhood was prior crime victimization, which increases the probability of moving from 11.6% to 34.5%. Having a higher level of schooling and being older, on the other hand, reduce the likelihood of changing neighborhoods.

The interaction between citizens' wealth level and news consumption shows a differentiated effect by level of wealth. While at the lowest level of media consumption, people with the highest level

of wealth are more likely to have felt the need to move to a different neighborhood or *colonia* (37.2%), this probability decreases as consumption of news increases (to 20.8%). On the other hand, the probability of having felt the need to move increases as news consumption grows for individuals with medium and low levels of wealth, which suggests that, between levels of wealth, there is a different way of processing information or of going to different sources to get their news.

We found that, in contrast to having been the victim of a crime, the neighborhood's characteristics, the sex of the interviewee, the number of children, the personal economic situation and even the urban-rural contrast are not significant variables.

III. Need to Move Due to Insecurity

The AmericasBarometer 2017 survey in Mexico contains an important group of variables on security issues. The questions cover topics such as victimization, perceptions and changing activities out of fear of crime. Figure 3.1 shows the case of one of the security variables that contains data for all rounds of the AmericasBarometer: perception of insecurity in the neighborhood. We note that the figure shows a general upward trend from 2004 (40.8 points) to 2017 (48.1 points), but that it decreases from the peak of 2014 (51.6 points)⁴.




Figure 3.1. Perception of Insecurity in the Neighborhood, Mexico 2004-2017

The AmericasBarometer includes a question about whether citizens felt the need to move out of a neighborhood or *colonia*: "Out of fear of being a victim of crime, in the last twelve months... have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?". Unlike the variable of perception of insecurity in the neighborhood, this variable grew from 2014 to 2017, where 18.7% of

⁴ The perception of insecurity is coded on a scale ranging from 0 to 100.

the citizens of Mexico felt the need to move to a different neighborhood or *colonia* during 2017 (Figure 3.2).




Figure 3.2. Have You Felt the Need to Move to a Different Neighborhood Due to Crime, Mexico 2017

The proportion of individuals who feel the need to move out of a neighborhood or *colonia* out of fear of crime (18.7%) is not trivial given that it represents just over 22 million people. This number is greater than the number of people who live in the State of Mexico; and more than twice the number of inhabitants in Mexico City.

Substantively, this need felt by citizens to change neighborhood of residence represents a major failure on the part of the Mexican State at all levels of government, since it has not managed to establish security conditions for its inhabitants, one of its basic obligations.

The need to move to a different neighborhood or *colonia* out of fear of crime has changed over time. After remaining relatively constant between 2012 (15.2%) and 2014 (13.2%), we can see an increase as we approached 2017. If we had the data prior to 2012, it would have been possible to explore whether, at the same level of news consumption, the tendency to want to change neighborhoods was growing between 2010 and 2012. In addition, we would have been able to determine whether or not it was associated with the violence of the bloodiest years of the war on drugs.




Figure 3.3. Felt the Need to Move to a Different Neighborhood Due to Fear of Crime, Mexico 2012-2017

It is certain that a level of perfect security is practically impossible to achieve and would not be profitable in terms of social welfare. The reason for perfect security's lack of profitability has to do with the marginal cost of providing security, that is, the cost of fighting each additional unit of crime increases as more units of crime are fought, so it would be excessively expensive relative to the expected benefits of the measure (Becker, 1968). It is then a problem of degree, that is, the degree of insecurity that the inhabitants and the state are willing to tolerate and allow. In the context of our analysis, this has to do with the relationship between the cost of providing security and the number of inhabitants of a society who want to move out of a neighborhood or *colonia* to escape insecurity.

In the international context, Mexico is not badly positioned at the moment. Compared with other countries in 2017, the percentage of Mexicans who felt the need to move to a different neighborhood due to fear of crime is just above the regional average, below countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama.




Figure 3.4. Feeling the Need to Move to a Different Neighborhood Due to Fear of Crime in the Americas, 2016/17

If we look at Figure 3.5, we find that there is a positive relationship between homicide rates and the percentage of people who say they feel the need to move from a neighborhood or *colonia* for fear of crime. The most violent countries such as El Salvador and Honduras have a considerable percentage of people who feel the need to move to a different neighborhood due to fear of crime. However, countries such as Guatemala, Panama, and Mexico that actually demonstrated a lower homicide rate during 2015 present a similar percentage of people who have felt the need to move

to a different neighborhood due to fear of crime. This may be due to a greater fear of violence or a greater sense of risk and vulnerability to crime.




Figure 3.5. People Who Gave Felt the Need to Move to a Different Neighborhood out of Fear of Crime (2016/17) and Homicides in 2015

Like many issues related to security and public opinion, the need to move to a different neighborhood has an "objective" and a "subjective" component. The latter is more related to the information that people obtain from the media and social networks, whether electronic or physical (Romero, et al., 2013).

The positive relationship between homicide rates and the percentage of people who felt the need to move to a different neighborhood due to fear of crime (Figure 3.5) gives us the space to affirm that the feeling of wanting to change neighborhoods analyzed in this chapter is not only part of subjective feelings but is also based on real facts.

Certainly, not all people who feel the need to move to a different neighborhood will do so. Moving involves two types of sequential judgments. First, it must be determined that it is, in fact, necessary to change neighborhoods. The question that we have analyzed so far refers to this first aspect. Second, once it is decided that there must be a change in neighborhoods, the execution will depend on available resources. Moving involves an economic and emotional cost. Some people can afford it where others cannot.

There are no precise and incontrovertible data on the number of people in Mexico who have moved because of insecurity. There are, however, some approximations that give us an idea of the magnitude of the problem. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center of Norway estimates that there were around 160,000 displaced persons at the country level from 2007 to 2011; Mestries (2014) indicates 230,000 displaced persons between 2006 and 2012; Rubio and Pérez (2015)

estimate the number of displaced persons at 311,000. The data from the National Victimization Survey (ENVIPE) records between 513,000 and 592,500 displaced persons between 2011 and 2014.

IV. Determinants of the Need to Move to a Different Neighborhood

To identify the variables that determine the need to move out of a neighborhood due to insecurity, we specify a logit regression model using the data from the 2017 AmericasBarometer survey for Mexico.⁵ The regression data consider 1,492 observations valid for the year 2017 on a sample that for that year consisted of 1,563 observations.⁶

The dependent variable of the model is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not the interviewee feels the need to move to a different neighborhood due to insecurity (*vic43*), which we described in the previous section.

As explanatory variables we include the following:

Wealth Quintiles (*quintall*): The measure of relative wealth was obtained from indicators on the quantity and type of goods in the respondent's household, on the basis of which an index was created using the main components⁷. We hope that, all things being equal, individuals who have greater wealth will have greater economic freedom to face the costs related to changing neighborhoods. Therefore, those who are in possession of greater wealth are expected to have a higher probability of feeling the need to move to a different neighborhood.

News Consumption (*gi0*): This variable is coded on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates lower daily news consumption and 5 indicates higher daily news consumption from individuals. Keeping everything constant, our hypothesis is that higher news consumption should be associated with a greater probability of feeling the need to change neighborhood. The mechanism we assume is that a higher level of news consumption implies a greater exposure to negative news about security, which would increase the perception that it is necessary to move.

Victim of Crime (*vic1ext*): This is a binary variable that indicates whether the individual has been the victim of an act of crime (1), or not (0), in the last 12 months. Given the direct impact of the crime, we would expect that having been a victim of crime increases the need to move to a different neighborhood.

Neighborhood Characteristics: This index approximates the conditions of the area in which the individual lives. It is composed of 6 variables that show how the interviewer assesses the neighborhood's characteristics: if there were garbage or holes in the street, houses with metal

⁵ Originally, we specified a logit model with robust standard errors and clusters by municipalities. When determining that the differences between the coefficients without the implementation of clusters and robust errors were minimal and non-systematic, we opted for the simplest model.

⁶ The data, modifications to variables, different specifications of the model, analysis of assumptions and all the necessary information to replicate the estimates are available on the link that we provide.

⁷ For more information on the LAPOP indicator, see the methodological notes from (Córdova 2009) <http://vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806es.pdf>



bars, drunk people or individuals on drugs, etc.⁸ Our hypothesis is that neighborhoods in worse conditions (perceived) are associated with a higher level of crime and a greater perception of insecurity, so that worse neighborhoods should positively influence/increase (?) the need for people to move out of their neighborhood.

Male: This variable takes a value of 0 when the individual is a woman and a value of 1 when the individual is a man. A priori, we do not have a clear expectation about the relationship between gender and feeling the need to move out of the neighborhood.

Urban (*ur*): This variable indicates whether the dwelling is in a municipality classified as urban (1), or not (0). INEGI considers that an urban municipality has at least 2,500 inhabitants. We suppose that within an urban locality there are more options to move by size and heterogeneity of its different zones. Living in a rural town and moving to escape insecurity probably means changing location; which implies relatively higher costs. Also considering that crime and insecurity are lower in rural areas, we would expect that those who live in urban areas are more likely to feel the need to move.

Age (*q2*): Measures the age of the individual in years. Our hypothesis with regards to this variable is that younger age is associated with a greater need to move out due to fear of crime. This hypothesis speaks to two reasons. First, young people are expected to be more prone to risk, so they would be more open to making a decision that involves considerable uncertainty, such as changing neighborhoods. At the same time, they are more likely to have less family and a greater horizon of time during which they may rebuild their lives. Second, older people are expected to consider higher costs when assessing their need to move to a different neighborhood due to fear of crime. In general, older people are responsible for larger families, have children, have purchased a home, and may find fewer opportunities to find a new job, to name a few examples.

Perception of Personal Economic Situation (*idio2*): The variable takes values that go from 1 to 3 and has been recoded so that 1 indicates a "worse" personal economic situation and 3 indicates a "better" personal economic situation than 12 months ago. We assume that greater optimism about one's personal economic situation provides greater freedom to change neighborhoods, which is expected to have an impact, all things being equal, in feeling the need to move.

Number of Children (*q12*): It is expected that having more children will make a family more concerned about insecurity and increase sensitivity to risk, so it stands to reason that an increase in the number of children should cause an increase the need to move due to insecurity. Although it is also true that a higher number of children reduces a family's economic capability to fund the move due to increased moving costs, which would present as the opposite effect to the previous one. In principle, we do not have any method of estimating which effect will be greater.

Level of Schooling (*edr*): It is expected that more schooling is associated with a lower propensity to move because of the question of sophistication. Those who have more schooling should be less likely to make extreme decisions, keeping wealth levels and news consumption levels constant.

⁸ The estimation of the main components, diagnosis of the regression, analysis of assumptions and document to replicate the data can be found in:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/rp1ly4hrmwnfv98/AAAAXlNouW1_e5V7YHhLb3FDa?dl=0.

Skin Tone (*colorr*): The interviewee's skin color is recorded by the interviewer from the color palette used in the AmericasBarometer survey. Our aim is to reaffirm that skin color is related to the wealth level - in addition to other variables. Therefore, we would expect a positive relationship with the need to move out of the neighborhood.

Interactions: Seeking to clarify under what conditional effects the wealth level is a determining factor in the decision to change neighborhoods, we created three interactive terms: Quintiles of Wealth-News Consumption (Interaction 1), Quintiles of Wealth-Victim of Crime (Interaction 2) and Quintiles of Wealth-Neighborhood Characteristics (Interaction 3).

Figure 3.6 shows the results of the logit regression model. We find that wealth levels, news consumption levels, having been the victim of a crime, level of schooling, the interaction between wealth, news consumption and age are statistically significant variables when explaining the feeling of needing to change neighborhoods⁹.




Figure 3.6. Predictors of Feeling the Need to Move to a Different Neighborhood Due to Fear of Crime, Mexico 2017

⁹ See this chapter's regression results in the appendix located on the LAPOP website.




Figure 3.7. Predicted Margins (95%) for Interviewee's Age, Mexico 2017

We find that as people's age increases, keeping everything else constant, the probability of feeling the need to move out of the neighborhood decreases. This result confirms our initial hypothesis. The lower relative costs for young people to move away and their greater propensity to take risks with respect to older individuals explain this result (Figure 3.7). Level of schooling (Figure 3.8) also explains the propensity of individuals to feel the need to move. The lower the level of schooling, the more likely it is that the individual will feel the need to move to a different neighborhood or neighborhoods. As we pointed out before, the explanation probably has to do with the level of sophistication in determining which actions to take in the face of insecurity. The difference between not having schooling and a having post-secondary level may seem relevant, but as the intervals in the graph indicate, the difference does not seem to be significant.




Figure 3.8. Predicted Margins (95%) for Interviewee's Level of Education, Mexico 2017

The results of the model show evidence of direct and indirect effects of insecurity on the need to move out of the neighborhood, but surprisingly we do not find that the context in which individuals live has any effect on feeling the need to move.

In terms of crime victimization, a direct consequence of insecurity, we find a strong effect - the most relevant of all the variables - on the probability of feeling the need to move. All things being equal, an individual who has not been a victim of crime has an 11.6% chance of feeling the need to move. However, if you have been a victim of crime, then the probability goes up to 34.5%, an increase of almost 23.0%.

In terms of indirect effects, we find an important effect of news consumption, differentiated by level of wealth. Figure 3.9 shows the model's predictions in terms of wealth levels and news consumption, keeping the rest of the variables constant at their mean. We can observe that for low levels of news consumption, those who possess greater wealth have a much higher probability of feeling the need to move with respect to those who have less wealth (37.2% in comparison to 6.1%). However, as news consumption increases, these two segments (low and high wealth levels) process things differently and/or consume different information. On the one hand, individuals in the highest wealth quintiles use the information to cushion the need to move because of insecurity, which becomes significantly reduced (from 37.2% to 20.8%). On the other hand, the information in the segment with less wealth generates a stronger feeling of the need to move to a different neighborhood due to insecurity. This could imply that news has an amplifying effect on people in lower wealth quintiles while having an attenuating effect among those who have more wealth.

The explanation may be associated with the consumption of different media information. In this case, we would suppose that individuals who possess lower levels of wealth consume more sensationalist media; or perhaps that those with higher levels of wealth consume media that minimizes information on insecurity.

One explanation, which may be complementary to the previous ones, for the difference is that those with higher and lower wealth levels process information differently. In the case of people with greater wealth, the cognitive process leads to less fear of insecurity, while we can see the inverse effect among those with a lower level of wealth. This inverse effect encourages them to have more fear of insecurity. Differentiating between these explanations is the subject of future research.




Figure 3.9. Predicted Probabilities Based on News Consumption and Wealth Levels, Mexico 2017

To better understand the meaning and magnitude of the independent variables in our model, we created hypothetical scenarios. Leaving the variables at their mean, we find that for an average individual in the sample, the probability of thinking about changing neighborhoods is 17.01%. For that same individual, if we compare the lowest level of news consumption with the highest, the probability increases from 6.1% to 22.5% respectively. Education, related to greater wealth and different ways of processing information, shows a range of 13.2% to 24.6%, where 13.2% is the probability for the same individual with the highest level of education. The most relevant effect remains that of victimization. For the average individual in the sample, not having been a crime victim is associated with an 11.6% probability of feeling the need to change address, while for a victim it increases up to 34.5%.

It is also relevant to understand which variables – out of those we thought influenced the individual to feel the need to move out of their neighborhood due to insecurity – do not matter. An interesting finding of the model is that the interviewee's perception of his/her neighborhood's conditions has no effect on his/her feeling the need to move to a different neighborhood. However, it does have a positive effect if the interviewee has been a victim of crime. This implies that the feeling we study is not triggered by the context, but by direct experiences with crime, which would be a direct effect.

Regarding sociodemographic variables, the gender of the interviewee is not a determining factor with regard to feeling the need to move. It is equally likely that, on average, both women and men will want to feel the need to change their residence due to insecurity. In the same way, number of children, one's personal economic situation and even the contrast between urban and rural areas are overshadowed by the individual's previous experience of having been the victim of a crime. Contrary to our hypothesis, higher education is negatively related to the likelihood of feeling the need to move, which presents an interesting contrast with wealth since, in the sample, wealth increases along with the level of schooling.

V. Conclusion

The data presented in this chapter serve to demonstrate the magnitude of Mexico's insecurity situation and the failure of the Mexican government's security policy. Regardless of the data on combating crime, the aforementioned circumstances have not made citizens feel safe in their neighborhoods.

A very high proportion of individuals feel the need to move from their neighborhood due to insecurity (18.7% or more than 22 million citizens). Some who would like to make a move actually make the move happen while others do not carry it out because of the economic and emotional costs.

This need is not randomly distributed among the population. Rather it affects more deeply those who have already been victims of crime insecurity, those who are younger, less educated and who, at the same time, have greater wealth and less news consumption, as well as those who they have less wealth and demonstrate greater news consumption. We do not find evidence that the context of the neighborhood matters. However, direct experiences of victimization matter a great deal.

The number of individuals who would like to move reported in the AmericasBarometer survey is much higher than the number of displaced persons reported by different reports on the subject. This indicates that there are millions of Mexicans who cannot escape violence, which can be even worse than being displaced by violence.



Chapter 4.

Institutional and Interpersonal Trust in Mexico

Pablo Parás

I. Introduction

The topic of social capital has been addressed in specific chapters in the Americas Barometer reports - Mexico in 2004, 2006 and 2014 and as part of a chapter in 2008. In the 2010 report, we analyzed only the structural component of social capital. Social capital is a complex concept comprised of two dimensions with three components (Parás 2013). The cognitive dimension contains two components, trust and reciprocity. The structural dimension includes a third component, participation. In this report, we analyze the trend over time as well as the determinants of institutional and interpersonal trust.

Barber defines trust as “the socially learned and confirmed expectations that people have for each other and for the institutions in which they live [and] that determines their fundamental understanding of their lives” (Barber 1983: 163). Trust is a relevant concept that determines of the majority of social interactions, and sufficient levels of trust has a positive impact on individuals and societies.

Trust plays a fundamental role in a democratic society because it is a determinant of human behavior and therefore of social relationships. McConkie points out that “there may not be a variable that so thoroughly influences interpersonal and group behavior as trust” (1975 quoted in Tway). Rotter confirms its importance by stating that ‘the entire fabric of everyday life and of the social order is woven together by trust-buying gas, paying taxes, going to the dentist, taking a plane-almost all of our decisions involve trusting someone else’ (1971: 443). The literature on social capital has broadly documented the positive impact of trust in democracy (Inglehart 1997, Baron et al 2001, Paldam 2000, Paxton 2002, Cruz 2003) as well as economic development and growth (Person and Tabellini 2006, Parts 2003), the performance of economic and political institutions (Henson and Jerome 2007) and in human capital (Coleman 1988).

Trust, in addition to the impact described so far, is also an important determinant of the structural component of social capital, that is, participation. *“Keeping the rest constant, people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, contribute more readily to charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations give blood more frequently, comply more fully with their tax obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtue”* (Putnam 2000: 137).

Given the statement above, we maintain that trust is something important, powerful and desirable. And for this reason, the questions addressed in this chapter are relevant: how much institutional and interpersonal trust exists in Mexico? What is the trend of trust in Mexico after the alternation of 2000? In comparison with the other countries in the hemisphere: are levels of trust in Mexico high or low? And what are the determinants of trust in Mexico?

II. Main Findings

- Levels of institutional trust in Mexico vary significantly according to the institution in question. Some institutions such as the army have high levels of trust in comparative terms. Others, such as political parties, show the opposite: very low levels of trust when compared to levels of other countries in the region.
- Institutional trust in Mexico shows a significant decrease starting in 2014.
- The levels of institutional trust in Mexico are associated with the gender of the interviewee and the condition of being a victim of corruption and crime or not. Men, more than women, trust institutions. It has been confirmed that there is an inverse relationship between having been asked for a bribe (*mordida*) by a police officer or government employee and the condition of being a victim of crime with institutional trust.
- The average level of interpersonal trust in Mexico remained stable between 2004 and 2014. However, between 2014 and 2017, we can observe a significant decrease in the average level of interpersonal trust for the first time.
- When comparing levels of interpersonal trust in Mexico with other countries in the region, it is possible to observe that Mexico occupies the second to last place with statistically comparable levels with Venezuela, the nation occupying last place.
- As we have observed with regard to levels of institutional trust, gender (men) and level of education (highest) directly determine the 2017 levels of interpersonal trust in Mexico. Wealth shows a positive relationship with levels of interpersonal trust and, for individuals from whom a public official solicits a bribe (*mordida*), we observe an inverse relationship.

III. Institutional Trust

Trust is a condition specific to the reference subject and their interactions with others. That is to say, an individual can trust some subjects and distrust others. It is also a matter of degree. That is why a multi-referenced trust measurement is desirable. The LAPOP AmericasBarometer uses a seven-point scale to measure various institutions' trust levels. Below is the text version of nine LAPOP measures that we analyzed in this chapter. These measures look at levels of trust with regard to the following institutions: judicial power, armed forces, congress, police, political parties, executive power, local government, media, and elections.

On this card, there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly]**

| | | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|-------|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Not at all | | | A lot | | | |

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7, or choose a point in between the two.)

B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?

B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?

B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

The levels of institutional trust in Mexico vary significantly according to the institution in question. Figure 4.1 shows the average of institutional trust on a scale of 0-100.¹ As has been documented for many years in this and other surveys, the armed forces are among the institutions with the greatest levels of trust in Mexico. In 2017, trust in the military was significantly higher than trust in the other institutions reported. It is followed by a group of three institutions with comparable average scores, each scoring slightly below 50 points. These institutions are the media, local government and congress. Below these and with trust levels of around 35 points are the judiciary and elections, and the last three places in descending order and with scores of less than 30 points are occupied by the police, the executive branch and political parties.

¹ Variables were recoded to a 0-100 scale, where values close to 0 mean low levels of trust and values close to 100 mean high levels of trust. Originally, questions were asked using a 1-7 scale, where 1 represents “Not at All” and 7 represents “A lot” of trust.




Figure 4.1. Institutional Trust Levels, Mexico 2017

With the series of data from the AmericasBarometer, we are able to answer two relevant questions about institutional trust in Mexico: How has it evolved over time and how does it compare with the trust levels of the other countries in the hemisphere? Many of the questions about institutional trust have been asked in the LAPOP surveys in Mexico since the series began in 2004. Figure 4.2 shows the trend over time of the armed forces' average rating as well as those of congress, the national police, and political parties since 2004 as well as trust in elections since 2014. In all cases, we observe a similar story. More specifically, we note comparable average scores between 2004 and 2012 and a significant decrease thereafter. Although the events coincide, this turning point in institutional trust in Mexico do not relate to the termination of the PANista administrations and the return of the PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional* or Institutional Revolutionary Party) to the presidency.




Figure 4.2. Trust in Five Institutions, Mexico 2004-2017

Another way to analyze the trends of institutional trust in Mexico is through the creation of an additive index that we can compare over time. This index has been created by adding the responses to the four the institutions for which information is available since 2004.² In this index, we include trust in the armed forces, the Congress, the National Police and political parties. The range of this trust index was standardized, so it takes values from 0 to 100, where 100 is the highest trust level in institutions possible.³ Figure 4.3 compares the average of the index over time. Statistically speaking, we observe that the average is similar between 2004 and 2012, and there is a significant decrease in the average institutional trust in Mexico as of 2014 with a clear downward trend.

² The index does not include trust in elections given that this question was included in the AmericasBarometer in 2012.

³ Cronbach's alpha statistic gave a scale reliability of 0.76.




Figure 4.3. Institutional Trust Index, Mexico 2004-2017

To give us an idea of whether or not the levels of institutional trust in Mexico are high or low, we compare trust in the four institutions for Mexico with the same measures of trust for the rest of the countries included in the 2016/17 survey. As shown in Figure 4.4 (top left), of the countries where trust in the armed forces is measured, Mexico is among the countries with a high level of trust (64.8 points). We observe the same dynamic in the case of the Mexican people's trust in Congress (44.3 points, a level that is higher than the average for the region).

The other two institutions compared in Figure 4.4 are the ones that receive the worst evaluation by Mexican citizens: the national police and political parties. The decrease in trust in these institutions is a phenomenon that we observe in a large part of the region (see Chapter 1). Even so, there are two major differences in the case of Mexico that are worth highlighting. The first one is that with respect to both institutions, Mexico occupies last place in the rankings. In the case of trust in the police, Mexico shows, along with Venezuela, one of the lowest levels of trust. As for political parties, Mexico is among the four countries with the lowest level of trust. In both cases, the levels of trust with regard to these key actors as shown by the results of the AmericasBarometer seem to indicate that they are recognized more as a “burden” than an “asset” by the Mexican population.




Figure 4.4. Institutional Trust in the Americas, 2016/17

To explore the possible determinants of institutional trust in Mexico, we analyzed the differences in trust levels of different segments of the population using the Institutional Trust Index as presented in Figure 4.3. The average for institutional trust is similar among men and women, among people with different levels of education and wealth, and among people in localities of all sizes. Where we do find significant differences (since the gray areas of the margin of error do not intersect) is with respect to the condition of being a victim of corruption or crime. As expected and documented in previous years of the AmericasBarometer survey in Mexico and other

academic studies (Seligson 2002 and Parás 2013, for example), individuals who report having been victims of corruption or crime in recent years twelve months report lower levels of institutional trust. This figure is relevant because in Mexico, as we discuss in this report, the incidence of both types of victimization is high (see Chapters 3 and 6).




Figure 4.5. Differences across Demographic Segments of the Institutional Trust Index, Mexico 2017

A second step in exploring determinants of institutional trust is to use a multivariate linear regression model (OLS) estimating the institutional trust index for 2017 as a dependent variable⁴. This allows us to confirm if the differences across segments shown in the previous chart are maintained when controlling for other variables. The model's estimates are shown in Figure 4.6. As we can see, the levels of institutional trust are determined by the request of bribes (*mordidas*), the condition of having been a victim of crime and being a man. For these cases, the relationship is the reverse. With the exception of being a man, institutional trust decreases among individuals from whom a public official or a police officer requested a bribe (*mordida*) or who were victims of crime. Institutional trust increases if the person is male.

⁴ See results of the regressions in this chapter in the appendix located on the LAPOP website.



Figure 4.6. Predictors of Institutional Trust, Mexico 2017

IV. Interpersonal Trust

To complement our analysis of trust in Mexico, we analyze interpersonal trust - a complementary component correlated to institutional trust. The AmericasBarometer uses the following question to measure trust among individuals:

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?

(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy

As discussed above, trust is situational and referential, therefore a measure of interpersonal trust using a single indicator is limited. It would be ideal, as in the case of institutional trust, to have questions about trust in different types of individuals (i.e. neighbors, ordinary people on the street, collaborators, etc.). Even so, it is relevant to monitor and understand interpersonal trust levels in Mexico. As in the previous section, we analyze this indicator in comparative terms (trend over time and against the other countries in the hemisphere) and we explore and discuss their determinants.

The average level (0-100) of interpersonal trust in Mexico using the IT1 variable from the AmericasBarometer has remained stable between 2004 and 2014 with values between 56 and 60 points. During these years, there is no statistical difference between the data. The only significant difference registered by the series is between 2014 and 2017, where scores for trust at its highest point fell from 59.3 points in 2014 to 53.3 points in 2017. This was the first time a score lower than 56 points was reported. As with institutional trust, it may be that the most recent data document the beginning of a negative trend of trust levels in Mexico. These data contribute to what seems to be a state of discouragement or climate of adverse opinion that is reflected in most of the

indicators measured by the AmericasBarometer and analyzed in this report. It will be very important to see if the trend is confirmed or reversed in the next measurement of the AmericasBarometer.




Figure 4.7. Interpersonal Trust, Mexico 2004-2017

When comparing Mexico's interpersonal trust with other countries in the region, we find that we occupy one of the last places, with trust levels that are statistically comparable to those of Venezuela – the nation that currently occupies last place (see Figure 4.8). Twenty-two of the 29 countries have higher and statistically significant trust levels than Mexico – most of those nations being located in the Caribbean and Central America.




Figure 4.8. Interpersonal Trust in the Americas, 2016/17

Figure 4.9 explores the differences in interpersonal trust averages for different segments of the population. The average level of interpersonal trust in Mexico in 2017 is significantly higher for men than for women. Regarding education, we can observe a direct relationship in that as the interviewee's education level increases, interpersonal trust levels also increase. A similar relationship exists with respect to levels of income: the greater the interviewee's wealth, the greater the levels of interpersonal trust.

By size of locality, interpersonal trust levels are comparable in cities of different sizes but the levels of this indicator are significantly lower in rural areas. Unlike other studies and previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, we did not observe any statistically significant differences in trust levels when comparing victims (of corruption and crime) with those who were not victims. This is an interesting and unexpected fact that deserves more investigation. There are two possible explanations. The first has to do with the “normalization” of the phenomena of corruption and crime in the country, where the situation of being a victim has reached such high levels of incidence or regularity that it no longer has a differentiated impact on individuals. The second explanation has to do with how measurements of interpersonal trust using a single question is not sufficient to capture the phenomenon. Therefore, no differences are found in individual conditions such as being or not being a victim of corruption and crime. This last explanation is less likely because differences by gender, education, and income, which have also been detected in previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, were present.




Figure 4.9. Differences in Interpersonal Trust by Demographic Segments, Mexico 2017

In the logistic model that we present in Figure 4.10 and in which we have recoded interpersonal trust as a dependent variable⁵, it is possible to observe that in the LAPOP data for 2017, income, gender (men) and level of education are direct predictors of interpersonal trust. Regarding individuals from whom a public official solicited a bribe (*mordida*), the relationship is the reverse. The other variables within the model (age, size of the city, victimization of corruption and crime victimization) were not statistically significant.

⁵ The interpersonal trust variable (IT1) was recoded so that "1" is "trustworthy" (grouping the Very and Somewhat trustworthy categories) and "0" is "Not trustworthy at all" (grouping A little trustworthy and Not trustworthy at all).

Interestingly, data from previous years did not show significant differences in interpersonal trust levels between men and women. One possible interpretation of this change is that men maintain their level of trust, but women show a significant decrease in comparison with the historical data of the AmericasBarometer (see Figure 4.11). This is interesting given that men tend to report higher levels of corruption and crime victimization greater than women do, and these levels can become determinants of trust.




Figure 4.10. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust, Mexico 2017




Figure 4.11. Trends in Interpersonal and Institutional Trust by Gender, Mexico 2004-2017

V. Conclusion

Trust is a valuable asset with the potential to transform the potential of economic and democratic systems as shown by a significant number of studies in the literature. The last 17 years in Mexico have brought many alternations in federal executive power and an encouraging context of important structural reforms in areas such as education, energy, labor and the criminal justice system. Therefore, Mexico requires institutions and relationships that are anchored in healthy levels of trust that allow individuals to live together and to coexist with their institutions in a productive manner.

Trust levels measured by the most recent round of the AmericasBarometer that we analyzed in this chapter are worrisome and show a significant deficit of institutional and interpersonal “trust”. It is crucial that we direct our work in such a way that in the medium term, the downward trend in trust in Mexico will be stopped and we will aspire to reach levels of trust comparable to the average of the countries in the region. It will be key to work on reducing levels of corruption and crime victimization that directly and significantly affect trust between Mexicans and their institutions.



Chapter 5.

Perceptions of Mexican Citizens' Liberties and Basic Rights

Carlos A. López

I. Introduction

Since the AmericasBarometer began measuring perceptions of basic liberties and rights in the Americas, there have been numerous changes in the hemisphere, derived mainly from the emergence of various social actors whose relevance has grown, further enriching and valuing LAPOP's effort to measure this evolution.

In case of Mexico, the opening up of society in favor of democratic liberties has faced unprecedented challenges. As of the present moment, there is debate and action in the public sphere not only between public power and society, but also with the participation of powerful groups of private, licit and illicit interests whose weight and importance are crucial to an analysis of what occurs in people's daily lives and their perspective of life in their community.

Along with these considerations, it is important to ask: how powerful has the effect of discontent with the political regime's performance been in influencing the perspective that public opinion in Mexico has regarding rights and freedoms in the country? Is there a relationship between Mexicans' growing concern surrounding insecurity and crime and their perceptions of what occurs in the country with regard to basic freedoms and rights? Has the perspective of respect for citizens' basic rights been modified under the premise of authority's lack of efficiency in providing services for people? Does it make sense for people to continue supporting freedoms that they perceive have no "utility" in order to diminish the inefficiency and corruption perceived as constant in the political system? Understanding and measuring these issues is vital to understanding the problems of social interactions in a community. Seligson (2006) clearly illustrates where a country is headed and what its perspective on development is according to the rules of the game and institutional performance on which they rely (Krishna, 2002). In light of the dissatisfaction that permeates our society, it is important to consider that basic freedoms and rights are not only goals and guarantees that are apparently far removed from the daily life of people, but fundamental initiatives aimed at improving citizens' quality of life and crucial to establishing positive hope for the future.

II. Main Findings

Analyzing the data related to the topics of interest of this chapter, we highlight the following aspects:

- On average, from 2004 to 2017, Mexicans who believe that their basic rights are protected fell from 53.7 points to 37.5 points.

- The perception that basic rights are not sufficiently protected in Mexico is accentuated in urban areas and among the sector with the highest level of education and among the highest income population (socioeconomic level, quintiles of wealth distribution).
- With respect to Mexicans' attitudes towards the freedoms of others, we demonstrate that support for gay rights has increased from an average of 57 to 60.7 from 2004 to 2017. It is also worth noting that public support for gays to be able to hold public office rose from an average of 47.1 in 2004 to 55.6 points in 2017. Along the same lines, support for the right to vote for people who criticize the government rose from 61.8 in 2004 to 66.3 points in the 2017 measurement.
- On the contrary, we see a decrease over time with respect to affording people who criticize the government the right to be candidates in Mexico - a level that fell from 54.7 in 2004 to 42.8 in 2017. Aligned with the previous figure, support for those people who are critical of the government delivering a speech in public has fallen from 56.2 in 2004 to 47.3 in 2017.
- The variables that measure the relevant topics of the perception of liberties in Mexico, we may observe that 44% of Mexicans maintain that there is very little freedom of the press. 62% think that there is very little freedom to express public opinions without fear. 70% consider that there is very little freedom of expression. Finally, 63.7% indicate that the level of protection of human rights is very poor in our country. These concerns resulting from the 2017 round of surveys take place within the framework of 16 years of alternation in the Mexican presidency. More than 20 years of institution building (such as the Electoral Institute, human rights commissions and the various bodies whose mission is to ensure transparency) have sought to fortify the public debate and the rights of citizens.

III. Perceptions of Rights

The AmericasBarometer has constantly measured various aspects related to basic rights and civil liberties. Thanks to this effort, there is a valuable stockpile of public perceptions of these issues on the continent and in Mexico. This chapter presents the results obtained in the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer in Mexico and the evolution they have had in recent years. Let us first review the results of the variable "protection of basic rights", the question is presented in the questionnaire as follows:

On this card, there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

B3. ¿ To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Mexico?

The question points out the protection of a citizen's basic rights without specifying the meaning or content of these rights. However, it should be noted that within this ambiguity lies part of the richness of the measurement since citizens' awareness has become more sophisticated over the years. We can now see that the concept of basic rights is as varied as the interpretations that each person can/would want to grant. Today, electoral competition seems more normal and the diversity of options against what took place in 2004, when the country had just experienced its first transition from a government run by the PRI at the federal level to an opposition party.

Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of Mexicans' perception regarding the protection of basic rights. The 1-7 scale has been transformed to reflect an evaluation from 0 to 100, which we can observe in the graph is the average at which we arrived via the aforementioned transformation since 2004.

We can observe the highest value in the series in 2004, a value which reflects an average of 53.7 points (on a scale from 0 to 100). As of that moment, the survey shows a constant decrease (with the exception of 2012) that culminates in 37.5 points in the year 2017.




Figure 5.1. Perception that Citizens' Basic Rights Are Protected, Mexico 2004-2017

What are the elements that provide us with a better understanding of the reasons behind the poor perception of efficiency with respect to the protection of citizens' rights? Upon investigating this measurement's composition, crossed with relevant sociodemographic variables, we were able to distinguish differences of greater relevance by analyzing people's education levels (Figure 5.2). The gap between people with basic (primary) and higher education is close to 5 points. This indicates that the more highly educated population in possession of more knowledge is more critical of the situation regarding basic freedoms in the country.




Figure 5.2. Perception that Basic Rights Are Protected by Education Level, Mexico 2017

In Figure 5.3, we demonstrate that there are also notable differences by age groups, wherein the 30-49 age group expresses lower levels of perception that the basic rights of citizens in Mexico are protected. There is a difference of just over 8 points between the perception of older Mexicans about the protection of basic rights and the average for the youngest age group.




Figure 5.3. Perception that Basic Rights Are Protected by Age Group, Mexico 2017

It is noteworthy to mention that despite the differences shown by education level and age, the general feeling among Mexicans is one of dissatisfaction meaning that Mexicans in general show

levels of perception that the basic rights of citizens are poorly protected by the political system. We can observe this dynamic in Figure 5.4, which shows that Mexico falls among the lowest rankings of countries examined in the surveys. It is likely that this critical vision is related to a generalized attitude of discontent with the functioning of the political system in Mexico and that is mediated by other issues such as insecurity, failures in the administration of justice, lack of solid and sustainable economic growth, the high perception of corruption, etc.




Figure 5.4. Perception that Basic Rights Are Protected in the Americas, 2016/17

Figure 5.5 shows the determinants of Mexicans' perceptions of the protection of their basic rights. The independent variables are: type of location (urban or rural), gender (man or woman), age, level of education, perception of the household economic situation, percentage of the population that believes that crime is the main problem in the country and the evaluation of how corrupt politicians are in Mexico.¹

We can observe that there is a relevant variable for the positive perception of the protection of citizens' rights: the perception about the economic situation, this means that those who consider that the economy is going well for their family are more likely to express that the citizens' basic rights are being duly protected by the Mexican political system (positive predictor). In the opposite narrative, the determinant of a negative evaluation of basic rights protection is the perception that politicians are corrupt (inefficiency of the system).




Figure 5.5. Predictors of Perceptions that Basic Rights Are Protected, Mexico 2017

Next, variables that express the feelings of public opinion regarding the rights of others are analyzed. Unlike the variable B3 protection of basic rights of citizens, in which the performance of the political system in the protection of the aforementioned rights is evaluated, in the following questions we inquire into notions of tolerance towards those who think differently, the opponents of the system, and those who have opinions and/or identities perceived as different. The questions are presented in the questionnaire as follows:

¹ See regression results in the online appendix.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|-------------------------|---|---|---|----|
| <p>Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove...</p> | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Strongly Disapprove | | | | | Strongly Approve | | | | |
| <p>D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Mexico's form of government, not just the current (incumbent) government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]</p> | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.</p> | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Mexico's form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</p> | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?</p> | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of gays, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</p> | | | | | | | | | |
| <p>D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?</p> | | | | | | | | | |

Figure 5.6 presents the historical series of question D1, which measures the opinion of Mexicans regarding the voting rights of people who are critical of the government system. The variable presents transformed values in the scale of 0 to 100, where the higher value of the mean reflects more support towards the attitude in question, in this case, the support for the right to vote of the people who are critical of the system. As seen in the graph, the approval of the right to vote for those who criticize the government has decreased since 2004. In that year, we see that the level reaches an average of 57.0 points in favor of support only to drop in 2014 where we can see that the approval level fell to 53.2 points. This trend gets interrupted in 2017 when the maximum value of support at 60.7 points is reached. It should be noted that no significant differences are observed when crossing with sociodemographic information in 2017. This means that support for this right is a generalized issue within the context of national public opinion.




Figure 5.6. Approval for the Right to Vote of those that Criticize the Government, Mexico 2004-2017

We will now focus on citizens' opinions regarding the right to protest for those who criticize the form of government (Figure 5.7). Since 2004, approval levels of the right to protest by people who criticize the form of government has decreased in general, reaching its lowest point of approval in 2014 with 54.8 points. In the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer, this figure reaches its maximum value with 66.3 points of support, which represents an increase of more than 11 points. In 2017, about 7 out of 10 Mexicans support the right for those who criticize the form of government to express themselves peacefully.

Regarding the sociodemographic analysis, approval levels of the right to protest for those who criticize the form of government by Mexicans with higher education (67.9 points) in comparison with Mexicans without schooling (54.2 points) stands out. The data observed seem to coincide with what we have noted in relation to the right to vote for those who criticize the form of government. This dynamic indicates a public opinion that is respectful of others - at least with regard to one's political rights.




Figure 5.7. Approval for the Right to Protest of those who criticize the Government, Mexico 2004-2017

Figure 5.8 shows the evolution over time of the approval of the right to be candidates for positions of popular election by critics of the system of government. In this case, levels of support were reduced from 54.7 points in 2004 to 42.8 points in 2017 – nearly a 12-point drop. The approval of the right to be a candidate for those who criticize the form of government varies considerably according to the level of education of the people. While approval levels of those with higher education are at 51 points, the level of support for people without education is only at 42.4 points.

Unlike what has been observed regarding support of the right to vote of critics of government (Figure 5.5), the right to be candidates and voted into office (Figure 5.8) by those who criticize the government does not reach the same approval levels with the Mexican population. This can be traced to dissatisfaction with the political system and the identification that public opinion could have with respect to the social actors involved in elections, qualifying them as “more of the same”. Another approach from a different perspective could be the low level of enthusiasm that those identified as independent “candidates” have aroused, which with some exceptions, are seen by broad groups of the population as components of the same political system that they criticize.




Figure 5.8. Approval for the Right to be a Candidate of those who criticize the Government, Mexico 2004-2017

Figure 5.9 shows a visible decrease in approval levels for the right to deliver a public speech by those who are critical of the form of government between 2004 and 2014. Throughout this decade, we can observe a decrease in approval levels of close to 16 points (from 56.2 to 40.6). In 2017, however, we see a slight recovery in the average of almost 7 points (47.1 points).

It is worth reiterating that education levels play a relevant role in levels of support for this particular group of people. Those who have higher education show an approval level of 51.6 points compared to 45.2 points of those who have only a basic level of education (primary). The rest of the sociodemographic variables do not show significant differences. It is likely that the explanation for this decrease over time is related, along with what we have seen with regard to support for the right to be elected, to the erosion of politics, due to the perception of inefficiency and corruption that tarnishes all (or almost all) members of the political and ruling class in Mexico.




Figure 5.9. Approval for the Right to Deliver a Speech in Public by those who criticize the Form of Government, Mexico 2004-2017

The following two questions on tolerance include elements that shore up and enrich the discussion on rights and how the role of minorities is perceived throughout new cultural realities developing in Mexico. The two questions are also evidence of the level of sophistication that the discussion of public issues has reached in the country. The rights of gays have become the subject of much public debate with a greater presence in the last 15 to 20 years in Mexico, although the organization and struggle of the organized groups from the LGBTTI communities² have been in existence for quite some time, some stretching as far back as the first half of the 20th century.

Throughout the various rounds of the AmericasBarometer, we have investigated public opinion perceptions surrounding these issues in Mexico. Specifically, since 2004, we have closely examined various research questions regarding tolerance and respect towards different minority groups.

Figure 5.10 shows the results over time of levels of support for gay people to have for the right to apply for public office. We observe that an average level of support of 47.1 points in 2004 and that level has grown steadily until reaching to 55.6 points in 2017. This represents growth of more than 8 points in the last 12 years.

When looking at the relationship with sociodemographic variables, the most relevant factor is the difference in the level of approval by people who reside in urban and rural areas, where the former has a difference of 8 points from the approval levels of people who live in rural areas. Regarding education level, Mexicans with higher education support the right of gay people to run for public office to a greater extent (64.2 points) in comparison to the 31.7-point approval level of Mexicans who have no education at all or the 40.4-point approval level from those people with basic education.

² LGBTTI refers to Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transexuals, Transgender and Intersexuals.




Figure 5.10. Approval of the Right of Homosexuals to Run for Public Office, Mexico 2004-2017

Support for the right to marry for same-sex couples in Mexico has been measured consistently since 2010. The data obtained in the time series shown in Figure 5.11 indicate that in general, the population's level of support is on the rise (with the exception of what occurred during the 2014 measurement). Approval levels for same-sex couples' right to marry grew from 37.8 points in 2004 to 51.8 points in 2017.

This level of support varies slightly between the different categories of relevant sociodemographic variables: we can observe a slight majority in urban areas compared to rural areas and among people of higher education compared to Mexicans with a lower level of education.

These indicators show that tolerance towards these communities, although still low, has grown and this can be a starting point for public conversations related to these minorities and others, whose rights should be part of everyday life in Mexico.




Figure 5.11. Approval for the Right to Marry for Same-Sex Couples, Mexico 2010-2017

Finally, Figure 5.12 shows the results of a linear regression, where the dependent variable is a "tolerance index" constructed from the sum of the values obtained in the variables D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, and D6, the higher the value reached in the index, we assume that people are more tolerant of the rights whose data have been presented throughout this chapter; The explanatory variables are the wealth quintiles (income), level of education, age, type of location (urban or rural), gender, crime as the main problem of the country and perception of politician corruption in Mexico.

The estimates show a positive relationship between the tolerance index, people's wealth and education level, indicating that a higher level of wealth and a higher level of schooling have a positive influence on tolerance for the rights of others. On the other side of the spectrum, the only negative predictor in the model indicates that age negatively affects the tolerance index: the older the individual, the less tolerance they have for the rights of others (in this case, critics of the system of government and gays). Intuitively, the data seem to be inscribed in the reviews of different sources that suggest that being young and a higher level of schooling seem to prepare citizens better to enter into more complex discussions regarding rights and freedoms in Mexico and the rest of the hemisphere.




Figure 5.12. Lineal Regression with the Tolerance Index as the Dependent Variable, Mexico 2017

In the next section, we will analyze different topics related to basic freedoms in order to have a more complete picture of the condition of rights and freedoms in Mexico.

IV. Perceptions of Freedoms

Access to diverse information, freedom of expression and the right to participate are critical for democracy. These basic freedoms are fundamental for the ability of citizens to form, express and introduce their preferences in government (Dahl 1971, pp. 2-3, see also Beetham 2005, Bollen 1991, Bollen and Paxton 2000, Diamond and Morlino 2004, among others).³ In other words, the provision and protection of civil liberties are foundational to the functioning of a receptive representative democracy.

The central question of this section is: to what extent do Mexican citizens feel that their political system fails to offer a sufficient degree of freedom of the press, of expression, of political expression, and of human rights? Although this question calls attention to the lack of basic freedoms, it is also possible that people perceive that too much freedom exists. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer anticipated this possibility by allowing people to respond in this way. These data are presented in several graphs, but the main focus of this chapter is the extent to which the public finds that there is a shortfall in the supply of basic freedoms.

In the AmericasBarometer, several questions related to freedoms were asked. In this section, we will present the results of the 2017 measurement in Mexico, which are presented in four variables that, in our opinion, complete the perceptions of rights that were discussed in previous pages and

³ There are many positive externalities of free media and freedom of expression. See discussion in Färdigh (2013).

thus have a comprehensive vision of what takes place in the sphere of public opinion. The questions included in the questionnaire are as follows:

| | Very Little | Enough | Too much |
|--|-------------|--------|----------|
| LIB1. Do you believe that nowadays in the country we have very little, enough or too much freedom of press? | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| LIB2B. And freedom of expression. Do we have very little, enough or too much? | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| LIB2C. And freedom to express political views without fear. Do we have very little, enough or too much? | 1 | 2 | 3 |

Figure 5.13 shows public opinion perceptions in Mexico regarding freedom of the press in the country in 2017. We can observe that 57.6% of Mexicans think that there is very little freedom of the press in the country. 24.6% believe that it is sufficient and 17.8% of Mexicans believe that there is too much freedom of the press.

When breaking down perceived levels of freedom of the press by sociodemographic variables, we did not identify any relevant differences. It is striking that in a political regime that tries to work within transparent democratic rules and that has prosecutors dedicated to protecting the work of the press, almost 5 out of 10 interviewees consider that there is little freedom of the press.




Figure 5.13. Opinion with regard to Freedom of the Press, Mexico 2017

Figure 5.14 shows the proportion of people reporting whether there is very little, enough, or too much freedom to express political opinions. Not surprisingly, there is some similarity to what we find when analyzing the measure of general expression. In Mexico, 6 out of 10 people consider to

be very little freedom in the country to express political opinions (62.0%). Along the same lines, 24.4% note that freedom of political expression is sufficient and 13.6% state that is too great.

Are some people more likely than others to indicate that there is an insufficient level of freedom to express political views in Mexico? We found that people with higher levels education are inclined to state that there is more freedom to express opinions of a political nature compared to Mexicans without education or who possess a basic education. In the same vein, younger people (18 to 29 years old) express that there is more freedom to express political opinions in contrast to other age groups. This data seems to be in agreement with what has been expressed regarding freedom of the press in Mexico: there is little or at least it is considered to be insufficient on the part of public opinion.




Figure 5.14. Opinion with regard to Freedom to Express Political Views

Figure 5.15 shows the results of the AmericasBarometer survey regarding perception of current levels of freedom of expression that exist in Mexico – specifically the freedom to express political opinions publicly without being censored or sanctioned by any authority. To summarize the results obtained, 7 out of 10 Mexicans perceive there to be very little freedom of expression in the country, 20.4% believe that there is enough and 9.5% that there is too much freedom of expression.

In this evaluation, there do not seem to be relevant differences among different groups across the sociodemographic variables. A very critical perspective of the public opinion of the country in this subject is observed across all sociodemographic variables. Once again, the data seem to be consistent with what was observed in the previously related variables that measure aspects of freedom: public opinion in Mexico perceives that there is little freedom, and even less freedom to express political ideas and opinions without feeling afraid to do so.




Figure 5.15. Opinion with regard to Freedom of Expression, Mexico 2017

While concerns about deficiencies in the level of freedom of the press and freedom of expression are high in Mexico, data from the AmericasBarometer 2017 reveal that concerns about human rights are even more pronounced. To assess the public's assessment of the provision of human rights protection, we asked citizens the following question:

| | Very Little | Enough | Too much |
|---|-------------|--------|----------|
| LIB4. Human rights protection. Do we have very little, enough or too much? | 1 | 2 | 3 |

In 2017, 70.9% of Mexicans report that there is very little protection for human rights in their country, 29.1% think it is enough, and only 7.2% say it is too much protection. All sociodemographic groups express criticism with respect to this topic and no relevant differences by age group, education or place of residence exist.




Figure 5.16. Opinion with regard to Level of Protection for Human Rights, Mexico 2017

Figure 5.17 shows the results for each country in this measurement. In Canada, only 19% of people report that there is very little protection for human rights in their country. The United States and Uruguay continue, with 37% and 45% respectively, reporting very little protection to human rights. Although these three countries are concentrated in the lower part in similar graphs presented earlier in this chapter, these values nonetheless highlight the fact that far fewer people – in general – report that sufficient protection for human rights exist. In the great majority of cases (all but four countries), more than 50% of the population reports that there is a deficit in the protection of human rights in the country. Mexico is among the countries with the lowest percentage of citizens who believe there is sufficient protection for human rights in the country.




Figure 5.17. Evaluations of Protection for Human Rights in the Americas, 2016/17

In summation, we observe that perception of public opinion regarding levels of freedoms in Mexico is very critical. Although some reasons can be anticipated as to why this is the case, (such as poor evaluation of government performance, institutional weakness, presence of crime, etc.), it will be necessary to investigate the components of this generalized dissatisfaction in greater depth.

V. Conclusion

The study of public opinion is one of the best ways to debunk myths that tend to take root in public discussions in countries where the opening up of and functioning of democratic rules are proceeding at a slow pace. In Mexico, this has been proven with the rigorous and disciplined effort offered by the data obtained from the AmericasBarometer. In the topics covered in this chapter, we have immersed ourselves in the scenarios of dissatisfaction and criticism of public opinion that observes with distrust and a certain level of disenchantment what is happening in the country with regard to the rights and basic freedoms of citizens.

According to what was observed in the previous pages, public opinion in Mexico is torn between the legitimate aspiration to and support for individual rights (with the exceptions recorded towards those who aspire to play by the rules of a political system they consider to be inefficient) and the recognition that the effort to create guarantees around and broad protection for the basic liberties of citizens has been insufficient.

In the discussion regarding whether or not perceptions reflect a portion of the “objective reality”, the information collected by the AmericasBarometer over time regarding liberties seems to be supported by external validation such as Freedom House data, which indicate a decrease of 65 to 62 points between 2016 and 2017 in the liberties indicator, pointing out that Mexico is considered a “partially free” country with restricted press freedom due to the various episodes that are experienced in the country, ranging from the censorship and pressures of various government actors until the intimidation and murder caused by criminal groups and/or their accomplices in the political class. Reporters Without Borders ranks Mexico as 147 out of 180 countries evaluated in terms of freedom of the press.

Along the same lines, discontent with the efficiency around the protection of human rights and the basic freedoms of citizens finds support in international evaluations. Mexico ranks 88 out of 113 countries evaluated in terms of the rule of law and respect for the law according to World Justice Project. This same organization ranks Mexico as 42 of 108 in the category of having transparency in government.

Along with this justified concern and critical outlook of public opinion in Mexico, there is a large amount of tolerance in and among social groups. This tolerance can serve as a foundation for the rules of democracy to have greater weight in the formation of relationships among Mexicans. However, this hope for a better future cannot be made into an excuse to not conduct a deeper analysis that creates a better understanding of the discontent and social irritation in the country.

Chapter 6. Corruption in Mexico

Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Belinda Amador

I. Introduction

Although Mexicans do not worry about corruption in the same way that they worry about insecurity and the economy¹, large cases of corruption have occupied the citizens' attention and the owners of major newspapers over time. The most direct consequence of the cases of corruption that comes to light is the damage to Mexicans' levels of trust by highlighting the daily corruption in which public officials and citizens in general participate and are involved.

The abuse of power and the violation of the rule of law can have serious consequences for the social, economic and political development of countries. A significant number of economists, for example, have noted that corruption can hinder economic development (Ugur, 2014) and a fair distribution of wealth (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002)². When corruption spreads within a state, funds typically aimed at fighting poverty, improving public services, and promoting the industry can be used inefficiently (Delavallade, 2006; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), or directly co-opted by the actors in power (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Likewise, in these contexts, the rule of law can become contingent (Bailey, 2009), eroding the trust necessary for the development and maintenance of private investment (Fukuyama, 1996, Gaviria, 2002). In social terms, corruption can impede an equitable distribution of justice (Fried, Lagunes, & Venkataramani, 2010, SD Morris & Klesner, 2010, Stephen D. Morris, 2008, Pharr, 2000, Rose-Ackerman, 1999), erode the subjective well-being of individuals (Tavits, 2008), and even deteriorating trust among citizens (Rothstein, 2013, Rothstein & Eek, 2009, Rothstein & Varraich, 2017).

Finally, corruption also has important political consequences. It can erode citizen involvement in politics (Chong, De La O, Karlan, & Wantchekon, 2015; McCann & Dominguez, 1998; Stockemer, LaMontagne, & Scruggs, 2013), erode the quality of political representation (Luna & Zechmeister, 2005; Warren, 2004), and erode the rule of law (Bailey, 2009; Malone, 2010). Likewise, it can reduce citizens' satisfaction with democracy in general (Bailey & Paras, 2006, Booth & Seligson, 2009, SD Morris & Klesner, 2010, Seligson, 2002, 2006), with the specific political regime (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003), and with democratically elected officials (Fackler & Lin, 1995, Peters & Welch, 1980).

In this chapter, we explore how Mexicans experience and perceive corruption in the country, as expressed in the AmericasBarometer 2017. We will focus on three distinct but interrelated dimensions of corruption: victimization experiences, attitudes towards corruption, and perceptions of the prevalence of corruption.

¹ While approximately 30.74% of Mexicans consider that the most important problem in the country is the economy and 12.31% consider it to be crime, 9.46% of the country's citizens consider that corruption is the most pressing problem facing Mexico.

² However, it should be noted that Jong-sung and Khagram (2005) found evidence that inequality can also affect corruption.

The first dimension, *victimization experience*, focuses on the experiences of corruption that citizens face in their daily lives. The second dimension, *attitudes towards corruption*, refers to the degree to which citizens are tolerant of corruption. The third dimension, *perceptions of prevalence of corruption*, refers to the extent to which citizens perceive that corruption is widespread among the political class.

It is important to note that, although these dimensions are related, they also emerge through different processes. Corruption experiences, for example, may arise from the context and individual characteristics of the interviewees. That is, citizens who live in high-risk contexts or who have certain patterns of behavior may cause them to be more likely to be involved in acts of corruption. On the other hand, citizen attitudes towards corruption can arise from the values, culture, and the experiences of the participants. Finally, perceptions of corruption, in addition to being determined by experiences, may be influenced by large-scale corruption events and/or national scandals with which respondents do not necessarily have direct experience. In other words, the different dimensions analyzed here allow us to examine different angles of a phenomenon – corruption – which has put the Mexican government and other countries on the continent in check.

In general, the results of this chapter show that, although Mexico is among the countries with the highest levels of real and perceived corruption, Mexicans have not normalized it to the level that citizens of other countries have. Likewise, they show that the contexts of crime and insecurity can increase both the risk that citizens will participate in an act of corruption and that they may justify this type of event.

II. Main Findings

The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows: First, with respect to the main findings, the following patterns were found:

- Three out of ten Mexicans surveyed say they have been victims of corruption in at least one instance in 2017. This represents a slight increase compared to the 2014 round.
- The Mexican citizens who have experienced corruption have suffered more frequently in their interaction with police (23%) and public officials (11.2%) of corruption.
- Mexico ranks fourth in experiences of corruption (29.8%), below Bolivia (40.4%), Haiti (35.8%) and Paraguay (31.0%), and is slightly above Peru (29.6%) and Venezuela (28.6%).
- Despite occupying fourth place in corruption victimization, the country ranks second in the ranking of perception of corruption in 2017 (77.9 points - behind Brazil by 79.5 points).
- Around 22% of Mexicans believe that payment of bribes can be justified. This percentage, however, is not statistically distinguishable from the regional average (20.79%). It is uncertain whether Mexican society will normalize corruption or develop a reactive intolerance to it.

Second, factors that lead citizens to have different levels of exposure to corruption and different perceptions of how widespread it is are considered. The evidence from these analyzes is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Men participate more frequently in acts of corruption.
- Mexicans who have a darker skin tone are more likely to experience an act of corruption than their lighter-skinned counterparts.
- People who live in areas with the highest number of murders are more prone to corruption. In addition, Mexicans who were victims of crime tend to experience more acts of corruption.
- The factor most associated with the probability that a Mexican justifies corruption is if the latter has experience with these practices. Having paid a bribe in the last 12 months is associated with an increase in the probability that an average Mexican justifies corruption.
- Living in a neighborhood where homicides occur is associated with an increase in the likelihood that a citizen will think that paying a bribe is justifiable.
- The factors significantly associated with the perception of corruption among Mexicans are their experiences with corruption and their political identity.
- Individuals who have previously experienced or participated in bribes tend to perceive more corruption than those who have not participated in these acts.
- The most right-wing individuals perceive less corruption than the individuals who identify themselves as leftists. This suggests that, in addition to having an experiential component, perceptions of corruption in Mexico have a political component.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

Over time, the AmericasBarometer surveys have used a set of questions that seek to measure citizens' experiences with corruption. Specifically, they try to recover data surrounding requests for payment of bribes to citizens by government agents - this being the most common form of corruption experienced by citizens. To avoid ambiguous questions, direct interpellations were formulated as: *"In the last 12 months, have any public employees requested a bribe?"* Similar questions were included about the demand for bribes by local governments, agents of the police, military, schools, public works, courts, public health services and hospitals. In the case of the police, public employees, and the military, the AmericasBarometer asked all interviewees about their experiences with corruption. In the case of the rest of the instances, only those who had contact with the instances in question were asked. For example, citizens were asked, "Have you processed a document in the local government within the last 12 months?" Only if they answered "yes", they were then asked: *"Over the last year while you processed a document in the local government, such as a permit, for example, we you asked to pay any amount of money in addition to what is required by law?"*:

| | N/A Did not try or did not have contact | No | Yes |
|--|---|----|-----|
| Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life... | | | |
| EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? | -- | 0 | 1 |

| | N/A Did not try or did not have contact | No | Yes |
|---|---|----|-----|
| EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? | -- | 0 | 1 |
| EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe? | -- | 0 | 1 |
| EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law? | 999999 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months? | 999999 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? | 999999 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe? | 999999 | 0 | 1 |
| EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months? | 999999 | 0 | 1 |

It is important to note that the questions that refer to the police, public employees, public works and the military (EXC2, EXC6, EXC13, and EXC20) collect information about requesting bribes without asking if it was paid or not. On the other hand, the rest of the questions (EXC11, EXC14, EXC15, EXC16) ask if the person paid a bribe without clarifying whether the citizen initiated the act of corruption or was a victim of it.



Therefore, when used in conjunction, these questions should only be interpreted as an indicator that the citizen was involved in an act of corruption and not necessarily that a government agent requested a bribe or that a citizen, in fact, paid a bribe. For this reason, in this section we refer to the experiences with corruption that citizens have.

In Figure 6.1, the figure on the left shows the percentage of Mexicans who were asked to pay or had to pay a bribe in each area of government. This measures the percentage in which the general population faces acts of corruption. Or, seen in another way, the sources of the average Mexican's corruption experience.

The most common way citizens encounter corruption is in their dealings with the police. 23% of Mexicans reported having received requests for bribes from police officers in 2017. In a distant second, 11.2% of citizens reported this type of request by a public official. That is, from the perspective of the average Mexican, corruption occurs more frequently in conjunction with police, public officials and municipal officials. It is interesting to note that only two out of every hundred Mexicans received requests for bribes from a military agent. This could be due to the greater control that the State has over the members of this institution. It could also be due, however, to the fact that military action is infrequent in comparison to police action.

It is necessary to remember that these general percentages are not only influenced by the prevalence of corruption, but also by the frequency with which the average Mexican interacts with the different levels of government. Due to the fact that the AmericasBarometer also asks about the contact that citizens had with certain government agencies, it is possible to obtain specific percentages for those who had contact with different government agencies. The figure on the right in Figure 6.1 shows these percentages. This information is useful to obtain an approximate idea of the areas in which citizens experience a greater risk of being part of an act of corruption³.

The difference in percentages is noticeable when we restrict the analysis to the citizens who had interactions with the different government agents. For example, while only 1.7% of the total population surveyed said they had to pay a bribe in court, 23.6% of Mexicans who had interaction with a court had to pay a bribe.⁴ In the same way, although only 5.9% of the general population reported having paid a bribe to local government, 18.5% of those who interacted with this level of government experience an act of corruption.⁵ The same phenomenon can be seen inside hospitals. While 1.8% of Mexicans experienced an act of corruption in a public hospital, of the people who attended medical services in the state (40% of Mexicans), 3.7% were involved in an act of corruption. On the other hand, 7.7% of respondents with children of school age paid a bribe and 5.4% of respondents who work were asked for a bribe in their workplace.

³ Questions about bribery requests by police, public employees and soldiers do not specify if there were any dealings with them, so the values for these three groups are identical in the two graphs.

⁴ This difference is due to the fact that to appear in a court is an uncommon event. Only 7.55% of the Mexicans surveyed had direct contact with this institution in 2017.

⁵ Again, this is because only one in three respondents reported having any interaction with the municipal government.




Figure 6.1. Experiences with Corruption by Context, Mexico 2017

It can be seen that Mexicans experience corruption in several situations. From this battery of questions, it is possible to build an additive index that shows the total number of instances in which Mexicans reported having been the victim of an act of corruption between 2016 and 2017.

Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of Mexicans who experienced none, one, two, or three or more forms of corruption. In Mexico, almost 30% of the surveyed population responded having experienced at least one instance of corruption; 17.1% reported having experienced a corruption situation in only one instance; 7.6%, in two instances; and 5% had three or more instances of corruption in the last 12 months (Figure 6.2).




Figure 6.2. Percentage of Mexicans that Experienced Situations of Corruption, Mexico 2017

This rate of corruption victimization has remained more or less constant from the 2004 round to the 2017 round, although it increased slightly in 2017 compared to 2014. In 2017, 29.8% of Mexicans experienced a corruption situation (Graphic 6.3).




Figure 6.3. Experiences with Corruption, Mexico 2004-2017

Comparing data from other countries in the region (Figure 6.4), Mexico ranks fourth in experiences with corruption (29.8%), below Bolivia (40.4%), Haiti (35.8%) and Paraguay (31.0%), and it is slightly above Peru (29.6%) and Venezuela (28.6%). Mexico is in the group of countries that significantly exceeds the regional average (19.02%). On the contrary, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Grenada are the three countries with the lowest percentage of corruption experiences. It should be noted that Mexico doubles the regional average in solicitation of bribes by the police and public

employees, and payment of bribes in the courts. Additionally, it is below the regional average in requesting bribes from soldiers.⁶




Figure 6.4. Experiences with Corruption in the Americas, 2016/17

⁶ The regional average of corruption experiences is 19.02%. The average regional percentage of victimization of corruption by the police is 10.6%, while in Mexico it is 23%. In Latin America, approximately 10.26% of citizens who go to court are involved in an act of corruption. Mexico doubles this percentage with 23.6%. On the other hand, the regional average of corruption victimization by public employees is 6.16%. The one in Mexico is 11.2%. On the other hand, the regional average of victimization due to corruption of soldiers is 3.34%. In Mexico, this average is only 2%.



To have greater certainty about the profile of individuals who tend to experience acts of corruption, individual and contextual characteristics can be analyzed through logistic regression – an effective evaluation tool to measure the degree to which some variables affect the probability that a citizen will experience an act of corruption.

The independent variables are sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents and whether they reside in an urban or rural area. We also include two aspects that could be related to the experience of corruption.

First, we consider whether the respondents are in a situation in which the government transfers economic goods to them, given that citizens who are in a relationship of this type with the State may face incentives to pay bribes in exchange for not losing their benefits. For this reason, we include a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent or someone in their house receives periodic help in money, food or products from the government, without counting the pensions, and 0 otherwise.

Second, we consider whether the respondents are in a context of high insecurity. First, this indicator is included following Bailey (2009) who proposes that it is possible that citizens who are in contexts of high insecurity are in a balance in which corruption has normalized among public officials. Secondly, because it is possible that citizens are facing situations of corruption as a form of secondary victimization. We include two variables to explore these relationships: a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the citizen lives in a neighborhood where homicides occur and 0 if no homicides occur as well as a variable of the same type that takes the value of 1 if the citizen was a victim of a crime in the last twelve months.

Figure 6.5 shows the results of the regression.⁷ We recall that the dependent variable – experience with acts of corruption – does not detail if the citizen initiated the act of corruption or was only the victim of a bribe by an agent, so we must be cautious with its interpretation.

The results show that women are less likely than men to experience acts of corruption.⁸ The event may be due to the fact that those who request the payment of a bribe assume that men will pay more easily than women. The effect of residency in urban or rural areas is not significant, which means that residency has no relation to petitions or payment of bribes. Age is not a relevant variable either, except when the person is 56 years old or older, where the probability of experiencing acts of corruption decreases. It is possible that this is because older people do not frequently process documents or have contact with State agents.

The impact of skin tone is a suggestive finding. Mexicans who have a darker skin tone have a higher probability of experiencing an act of corruption than their light-skinned counterparts. This fact may reflect some discrimination on the part of those who request the payment of a bribe who may perceive dark-skinned people as more vulnerable targets.⁹

On the other hand, wealth does not seem to be associated with a greater propensity to acts of corruption. This is an unexpected result, since it is the individuals with the greatest purchasing

⁷ See results of the regressions in this chapter in the appendix located on the LAPOP website.

⁸ The probability of an average Mexican being bribed or paying a bribe is 36.22% (± 4.26), while that of an average Mexican is 19% (± 3.06 %).

⁹ People with darker complexions have 43.65% (± 1.42 %) probability of experiencing acts of corruption, while people with whiter complexions have only 20.64% (± 5 %).

power who, in theory, can offer or pay more easily for a bribe. In the same way, education level does not seem associated with the experience of corrupt practices. The little relevance of education stands out, since it would be expected that people with less education would be an easier target for those officials who want to extract resources through these means. Likewise, it is surprising that, contrary to what was found by Singer, Carlin and Love (2015), we do not find evidence that people who receive economic assistance from the government are significantly more likely to experience acts of corruption¹⁰.




Figure 6.5. Predictors of Experiencing Corruption, Mexico 2017

With regard to the context of security, people who live in areas with the highest number of murders seem to be more likely to experience an act of corruption. In the same way, Mexicans who were victims of a crime tend to receive more requests for bribes or are made to pay them. This relationship could be explained by the poor quality of governance and the weak rule of law that promote both crime and corruption. In this way, the data is consistent with the idea that contexts of disorder and insecurity may give rise to a certain normalization of corruption in government (Bailey 2009).

IV. Justification: Do Mexicans Believe that Corruption is Justifiable?

So far, data from the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer suggest that the request for or payment of bribes are quite common in Mexico. In this context, it could be worrisome that citizens normalize this type of behavior. That is to say that they may consider corruption to be the natural way in which citizens interact with the government and vice-versa. In other words, it can be seen as a behavior that helps governments and citizens to grease the bureaucratic wheels when it becomes so inefficient that it impedes daily activities (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Méon & Weill,

¹⁰ However, it is important to note that the direction of the effect in Mexico is opposite to that proposed by Singer, Carlin and Love (2015). The lack of significance of the effect could simply be due to measurement error or to the need to gather a greater number of observations to identify this effect.

2010). Therefore, the question to answer is whether or not, given the conditions of the country, Mexicans see corruption as a necessary evil.

In this regard, the AmericasBarometer consults its respondents on whether, as things stand, the payment of bribes is justified.

| | No | Yes |
|--|----|-----|
| EXC18. Do you think given the ways things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified? | 0 | 1 |

Figure 6.6 shows that around 22% of Mexicans believe that, in fact, as things stand, payment of bribes could be justified. Figure 6.7 shows that although the percentage of Mexicans justify corruption decreased after 2008, it has remained relatively stable since then.




Figure 6.6. Payment of Bribes are Justified, Mexico 2017




Figure 6.7. Corruption Tolerance, Mexico 2006-2017

In and of themselves, these figures are worrisome. However, in order to give us an idea of "to what extent" Mexicans normalize corruption, it is necessary to compare the country with the rest of the countries of Latin America.

Figure 6.8 shows the degree to which citizens justify corruption in a comparative perspective. As we can see, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador (where corruption is also relatively prevalent - see Figure 6.4) are the countries with the highest proportion of citizens that justify paying bribes. In contrast, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil are the countries where the proportion of citizens is lower. At a difference of only 1.2%, Mexico is very close to the regional average.¹¹

In general, four types of countries seem to emerge. Those where corruption seems to be *normalized*. That is to say, nations where there are degrees of victimization and justification significantly higher than the regional average (for example, Haiti, Ecuador, and Honduras). Countries with *relatively permissive* societies in a relatively orderly state. To clarify, this means a nation where victimization is significantly lower than the regional average, but the justification is significantly higher than the regional average (Panama and Jamaica). This means that in 2016/17, both the victimization and the justification for victimization were significantly lower than the average for the region (Uruguay, El Salvador and Brazil). Finally, countries with societies in a state of *reactive intolerance* to corruption (Guatemala, Peru and Venezuela). That is, countries where victimization by corruption is significantly higher than the regional average and the justification for corruption is significantly below average. Given that the percentage of Mexicans that justify corruption (22.0%) is not statistically distinguishable from the region's average (20.7%), it is uncertain whether, in the next few years, Mexican society will normalize corruption or develop a reactive intolerance.

¹¹ Meanwhile in Mexico, 22.04% of citizens justify corruption. In the region as a whole, 20.79% of citizens justify this type of behavior.




Figure 6.8. Corruption Tolerance in the Americas, 2016/17

Although this graph gives us valuable information about the social environment throughout Latin America, it does not allow us to investigate the factors associated with the justification of corruption at the individual level. To understand which individuals are more likely to justify acts of corruption, it is necessary to analyze by means of a logistic regression the probability that an interviewee answers that “as things are sometimes justified paying a bribe” (the dependent variable presented in the Graph 6.9).

As in the previous section, we focused on the sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents and their place of residence – i.e. in an urban or rural area. Likewise, we examined the impact that the contexts of violence and government assistance have on individuals. Again, these contexts are important because citizens could face strong incentives to pay bribes and, therefore, be more likely to justify this behavior. Citizens who live in neighborhoods with homicides and/or who have been victims of crime may justify corruption to a greater degree because they face more desperate circumstances.

For their part, citizens who receive economic assistance from the government may be more likely to justify the fact that citizens pay for bites for two reasons. First, because they could have more contact with the government and know more about the effectiveness or inefficiency of the bureaucracy. Second, since the welfare of citizens who receive economic aid from the government depends directly on the state, they could derive a greater benefit from "greasing the wheels of bureaucracy" and, therefore, being more prone to justify corruption.

Finally, we evaluate the impact of the experience with acts of corruption in the attitudes of citizens. This is to explore if there is evidence at the individual level consistent with the idea that corruption normalizes corruption.

As Figure 6.9 shows, the data provide support for this last hypothesis. By far, the factor most strongly associated with the likelihood that a Mexican justifies corruption is if he had experiences with acts of corruption in the last twelve months. In fact, the model estimates that having to pay a bribe in the last 12 months is associated with a dramatic increase in the probability that an average Mexican justifies corruption. This may be due to the fact that citizens who most justify corruption are more likely to participate in it, or that citizens are prone to adopt attitudes that justify their behavior.




Figure 6.9. Predictors of Corruption Tolerance, Mexico 2017

With respect to sociodemographic factors, Figure 6.9 shows that, keeping other variables constant, men and citizens in the upper wealth quintiles are the ones who most justify corruption.



Specifically, men are more likely to justify corruption than women, and Mexicans in the highest wealth quintiles are more likely to justify corruption than Mexicans in the lowest quintiles.

The hypothesis about people receiving economic assistance from the government is not supported in Mexico. The relationship is not only contrary, but also not significant. That is to say, Mexicans who receive government support are neither more nor less likely to justify acts of corruption, contrary to what might be expected.

Finally, contexts of violence have a significant effect on the degree to which citizens justify corruption, even after controlling for their individual experiences of corruption and insecurity. Indeed, living in a neighborhood where homicides occur is associated with a 4% increase in the likelihood that a citizen will think that, given the circumstances, paying a bribe is justified. As in the previous section on personal experiences, the results suggest a relationship between criminal violence and corruption.

V. Perceptions: How much Corruption do Mexicans Perceive among the Political Elites?

The frequency with which bribery is requested in Mexico makes it possible to foresee that citizens, including those who have not suffered these illicit acts, see corruption practices as usual. Mexicans, like the inhabitants of several American countries, are not immune to scandals that have involved senior government officials (Carlin, Love, & Martínez-Gallardo, 2015). Thus, it is necessary to go a little beyond personal experiences and also analyze the perception of Mexicans about corruption in general.

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents to consider how common corruption is among public officials. Specifically, the text of the question is as follows:

EXC7NEW. Thinking of the politicians of Mexico... how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption?

(1) None (2) Less than half of them (3) Half of them (4) More than half of them
(5) All

Following LAPOP's standard procedure, the answers to this question (EXC7) were recoded on a scale of 0 to 100, in which 0 represents the perception that "no official is corrupt" and 100 represents the perception that "all politicians are involved in corruption." The results show that the average Mexican considers that corruption is a common practice among public officials. That is to say, they believe that more than half of politicians are involved in corruption. A little less than 80% believe that more than half (or all) of public officials are involved in acts of corruption, 16.1% think that only half, and less than 7% that are less than half or none of the corrupt government agents (Figure 6.10).




Figure 6.10. Perceptions of Corruption, Mexico 2017

Once again, although these figures are worrisome, to give us an idea of how much corruption Mexicans perceive, it is necessary to compare Mexico with the rest of the countries of Latin America. Within the comparison, considerable variation is found in Figure 6.11, as well as with direct experience with corruption (Figure 6.4). Mexico ranks second with a corruption perception level of 77.9 points (on a scale of 0 to 100). The first place is Brazil (79.5 points) and in third place Panama (76.7 points). On the other hand, countries that perceive less corruption are Uruguay (53.2 points), Nicaragua (58.0 points) and Costa Rica (59.5 points).




Figure 6.11. Perception of Corruption in the Americas, 2016/17

The ordinary least squared regression analysis presented in Figure 6.12 shows the main variables that affect the perception of corruption in Mexico. As before, we coded our dependent variable on a scale from 0 to 100 where higher numbers indicate higher levels of perceived corruption. And just as before, we include the two contextual factors (violence and economic support from the government) and demographic variables. The reason why contextual factors are included is because they could give additional information to participants about the prevalence of corruption.

This could be the case if, for example, citizens who receive economic support from the government or those who live in particularly violent areas are more often witnesses of acts of corruption (perhaps because both occur in areas where corruption is highest).

On this occasion, in addition to these three groups of variables we include the political ideology of the interviewee. This is to explore whether perceptions of corruption in Mexico are guided more by political intuitions than by experiences, individual demographic characteristics or risk factors.




Figure 6.12. Factors Associated with Perception of Corruption, Mexico 2017

The results of the regression show two variables that significantly affect the perception of corruption. The first is the experience with acts of corruption - i.e. the individuals who have paid or asked for bribes tend to perceive greater corruption among politicians. This means that personal experiences with bribes affect the general evaluation of corruption among the political class, even when the two concepts do not coincide at all.

The second factor that affects the perception of corruption significantly is ideology. The more to the right a Mexican is on the political-ideological spectrum, the less he evaluates his public officials as corrupt. We find that, controlling for all other factors, if individuals position themselves as an extreme rightist, they are less likely to perceive government agents as more corrupt than individuals who assume a position on the extreme left. These results confirm that Mexicans' perceptions of corruption are guided to a greater extent by political institutions and values than by individual demographic characteristics or contexts of violence.

It is interesting to note that both the experience of corruption and the ideology of the right are the only variables that significantly impact the perception of corruption. Individual characteristics such as age, gender, skin tone, education level and wealth do not seem to have a significant effect on the impression that Mexicans have about the level of corruption of public officials. Surprisingly, the belief that bribes are sometimes justifiable does not affect this perception.



Contrary to what we observed in previous sections, neither being a victim of crime, nor residing in a neighborhood where murders have been recorded, nor living in an urban area (vs. rural) seem to be associated with a Mexican who perceives that corruption it is more or less extended. Finally, Mexicans receiving government assistance do not seem to perceive significantly more corruption than those who do not. This is contrary to the idea that those who have greater contact with the bureaucracy perceive higher levels of corruption. Therefore, in conclusion, in 2017, perceptions of corruption seem to have been influenced more by experiences of corruption and political identities than by other variables.

VI. Conclusion

As noted in previous reports, corruption is a common activity for Mexicans. The AmericasBarometer asks questions about these illicit activities, be it requests for bribes from officials or the payment of bribes by citizens in various branches of government, and this has shown the different areas in which it can develop corruption.

In general, approximately three out of ten Mexicans have been victims of corruption in 2017. Within the different instances in which citizens can experience acts of corruption, we show how the police are the government agents most reported by the general population. However, restricting the analysis only to citizens who had contact with the institutions that the AmericasBarometer survey asks, it can be seen that courts are the areas where corruption events occur most frequently. This translates into the fact that the police is the institution that most victimizes the average Mexican. However, the courts are the bodies within which citizens are most at risk of being victimized.

Regarding personal experiences with corruption, Mexico ranks fourth in the Americas, surpassing the regional average by almost 12 percentage points.

In general, women are less likely to participate in acts of corruption, but no other personal characteristic, including wealth, is significant. Government assistance does not appear as a factor associated with personal experience with corruption. One of the most interesting findings we presented was that people with darker skin tone are more likely to receive requests for bribes or have to pay bribes than their lighter-skinned counterparts. Sadly, this could suggest discriminatory treatment towards these people by public authorities. We also observe evidence that bribes are more frequent in contexts of violence and insecurity. This suggests that a significant number of victims of crime in Mexico are also prey to secondary victimization by the authorities.

Regarding attitudes towards corruption, a significant portion of Mexicans (22%) consider that bribery to be justified under certain circumstances. In relation to the rest of America, Mexico is above the average of victimization, but very close to the average regarding justification of bribes, so we can not conclude if in the future the country will be in the group of countries that normalize the corruption or that maintain a reactive intolerance in the face of corruption.

Regarding the demographic variables associated with the justification of bribery, we find that men with greater wealth are the ones who tend to justify the bribes (*mordidas*) to a greater extent. The most relevant result was that participating in an act of corruption is one of the factors that most increases the probability of justifying corruption. Likewise, we return to show that the contexts of

violence are related to the justification of bribes. In other words, being forced to pay a bribe or living in a context of violence seems to normalize corruption.

Finally, regarding perceptions about the prevalence of corruption, the average Mexican evaluates politicians as corrupt and thinks that this is a habitual dynamic among the political class. Just under 80% of Mexicans believe that more than half of politicians are involved in acts of corruption and almost 42% believe that all politicians are corrupt.

When exploring the factors related to the perception of corruption among the Mexicans surveyed, we found that the only relevant variables are previous experiences with bribes and political ideology. In this way, the results suggest that perceptions of corruption in Mexico are guided more by political intuitions and personal experiences with bribes than by other contextual and demographic variables.

To recapitulate, contrary to what has been found in other countries, in Mexico, contact with the government through assistance does not seem to affect the participation and justification of bribes, nor in the perception of corruption among public officials. The security context, as the literature suggests, appears to be associated with the participation and justification of acts of corruption. However, it does not seem to affect citizens' perceptions.

In summation, with respect to Mexico, the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer shows that, although the request for bribes can vary between the different levels of government and between individuals, it continues to be a daily problem in the lives of Mexicans. A positive sign is that, although Mexico's levels of corruption and perception of corruption exceed the region's average, its inhabitants still do not seem to have normalized this phenomenon. It is important for civil society to take advantage of this phenomenon to mobilize public opinion to generate institutional reforms that are able to beat the high levels of corruption in the country.



Chapter 7.

Digital Gap: Social Determinants of the Use of the Internet and Social Media in Mexico

Alejandro Díaz-Domínguez¹

I. Introduction

In recent years, the study of social networks has focused on their political impact. That is to say, if through the “likes” on Facebook, or the “retweets” or “favs” on Twitter, we may observe an effect on the electoral behavior and attitudes towards certain political phenomena. Some examples are the estimation of political ideology through Facebook (Bond and Messing 2015), the ideological affinity through Twitter (Barberá 2015), be it among the elites, the citizenry or the opinions discussed between groups of experts. In fact, it is not enough to know whether or not the use of networks affects political behavior, but rather to know the type of social network that indicates a differentiated effect in politics, as observed in local networks versus global networks. Within the context of elections questioned in authoritarian regimes (Reuter and Szakonyi 2015), it is even feasible to find specific effects of the digital movements themselves employed during civic protests of the modification of a law (Haggart 2013), in the articulation of digital demands during the development of presidential elections (Díaz Domínguez and Moreno 2015) or realization of massive protests during student movements (Sajuria 2013).

Beyond the undeniable importance of these effects, perhaps it is convenient to examine a previous step that has not been very recurrent in this literature - specifically the exploration of the determinants of the use of the Internet and social networks (Swigger 2013; Quintelier 2015; Dominguez and Moreno 2015, Reuter and Szakonyi 2015). It seems relatively simple to imagine the group of demographic characteristics that are associated with the use of the Internet and social networks, such as those found in the theory of modernization (Norris and Inglehart 2004) and in the literature on access to socialization channels stated in terms of available resources (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Given the nature of social networks, which demand a basic knowledge base that involves not only knowing how to read but also how to effectively use a computer or cell phone, knowing these characteristics would help to explore not only the long-awaited expansion in Internet access, but also the deepening of the digital divide (Farrell 2012). In other words, it would be the most educated population segments, with a higher standard of living in terms not only of income but wealth, understood in a broader sense, who live in urban areas and those who do not have or have a number of children that does not exceed two. These segments would be candidates for shaping these “digital social bases” (Swigger 2013, Reuter and Szakonyi 2015).

In the case of Mexico, the available empirical evidence suggests that the profile of these segments does seem to be related to young people, educated, interested in politics and located on the left in the political spectrum (Moreno and Mendizábal 2013, Díaz Domínguez and Moreno 2015). Additionally, other instruments have already shown the frequency with which citizens use the Internet and social networks. A survey conducted by the Mexican Internet Association (AMIPCI)

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in September 2011 revealed that young people (under 25 years old) are the ones who make up half of Internet users; that one in four minutes devoted to social networks by the Mexican public focused on Facebook and that the main place to connect was the home (AMIPCI 2011).

These relationships have been modified over the last five years. Whereas 40% of people who connect are younger than 35, three-quarters of the people interviewed think that the Internet has modified their life habits. Although Facebook remains the same as the most popular social network, 8 out of 10 Internet users use WhatsApp. While the home is confirmed as the place to connect *par excellence*, the notable change is that currently more than half of users connect through devices mobile phones (AMIPCI 2016).

Along the same lines, the National Youth Surveys conducted by the INEGI report a gradual growth in the consumption of Internet and social networks by young people between 18 and 29 years. For example, in the year 2000, 6.2% of young people reported having Internet access at home, a percentage that rose to 20.1% in 2005 and 28.5% in 2010. The results highlight Baja California, Mexico City, and Nuevo León as the entities with the greatest access, while Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero as the entities with the smallest (INEGI 2011).

Mexico City deserves special mention since it has experienced a growing digital development with respect to the number of Internet users and social networks in comparison with other cities in the country. A survey conducted in November 2013 in Mexico City revealed that one-third of the inhabitants of the city use the Internet daily, a fifth send emails every day, a fifth access Facebook every day, and just under 10% use Twitter daily (Varela and Associates 2013).

In summation, these demographic breakdowns reveal that the youngest citizens are those who consume more Internet and social networks, while the elderly are the ones with the lowest digital consumption. Education is another relevant factor, since having primary education is related to limited access to the Internet and less use of social networks, compared to those who attend university. Finally, economic, financial and household infrastructure also seem to play an influential role in accessing the Internet and networks, as well as their frequency of use.

Other reports about users of social networks during the presidential elections of 2012, made from data from a national survey conducted in November 2011, indicated that the networks would have some effects on politics. 23% of respondents said they were open to following election campaigns through social networks. Meanwhile, 20% showed a willingness to support their preferred candidates using the networks (Moreno and Mendizábal 2012).²

II. Main Findings

- In 2017, 33% of Mexicans reported using the Internet daily, while only 8% used the Internet daily in 2008.
- The most popular social network in Mexico is WhatsApp: 54% of Mexicans report using this means of communication.
- 46% of Mexicans report having a profile on Facebook.
- 11% of Mexicans report using Twitter.

² National survey conducted by the newspaper Reforma in November of 2011.

- Those who access the Internet more frequently and report the use of social networks are generally people with higher levels of education, who are young, who have higher levels of wealth, do not have or only have two children and who reside in urban areas. The digital divide seems to be exacerbated by analyzing variables related to available resources, such as schooling and wealth.
- This gap persists in variables related to the theory of modernization, such as residing in urban localities and the number of children.
- The above allows us to suppose that digital media do not necessarily serve to give voice to those who do not have it today, but only reinforce the presence of those who already have such means.

III. Internet and Social Media in Mexico According to the AmericasBarometer

The frequency of Internet use has increased notably since 2008, a round in which the AmericasBarometer measured this phenomenon in Mexico for the first time. As shown in Figure 7.1, a decade ago seven out of ten interviewees reported never having accessed the Internet, while ten years later, less than four out of ten reported this same behavior. Ten years ago, 17% of Mexicans used Internet daily or sometimes a week, today 48% of Mexicans use the Internet weekly. In short, the change has been remarkable.

The data on the frequency of Internet use are based on the results of the question “www1”³:

WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet?

(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never

³ The number of responses to the options “do not know” or “did not answer” added 7 cases, a figure equivalent to 0.5% of the entire sample.




Figure 7.1. Frequency of Internet Use, Mexico 2008-2017

The way in which we communicate and access information has changed drastically. For example, as shown in Figure 7.2, in the year 2017, 46.2% of Mexicans have a profile on Facebook and 54% use WhatsApp to communicate. Just to give us an idea of the magnitude of this change, 38% of the people interviewed stated having a conventional or landline telephone in this last round of the AmericasBarometer in Mexico, which suggests that, in effect, the means through which we communicate have varied considerably. As shown in Figure 7.2, within the so-called social networks there are also preferences in their use.

The data on the use of Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp were gathered by asking the following questions:⁴

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|--------|
| I2. Do you have Facebook? | (1) Yes | (2) No |
| I3. Do you have Twitter? | (1) Yes | (2) No |
| I4. Do you use WhatsApp? | (1) Yes | (2) No |

⁴ The number of responses to the “do not know” or “did not answer” options does not exceed 0.6% of the entire sample.




Figure 7.2. Frequency of Internet Use, Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, Mexico 2017

With regard to the sociodemographic characteristics of Internet users and social networks, the most frequent population using the Internet is the youngest, the most educated population and those who live in urban areas. A slightly different pattern is also detected between men and women, where women use the Internet less frequently (see Figure 7.3).

This same social group - that is to say, young people, people with a higher level of education and who live in urban areas - are the ones who, in a greater proportion, claim to have a Facebook profile (see Figure 7.4). As indicated in Figure 7.4, there is a positive relationship between wealth levels and having a presence on these social networks, a minimal difference between men and women. In summation, in Mexico, eight out of ten young people between 18 and 25 years old, eight out of ten people who have completed their university studies, half of those who live in large cities and three out of every four people in the maximum wealth quintile have a profile on Facebook.




Figure 7.3. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Internet Users, Mexico 2017




Figure 7.4. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Facebook Users, Mexico 2017

Although the pattern is repeated among those who have a Twitter account, it should be noted that the percentages of users are lower. In the case of Twitter users, one fifth of young people between 18 and 25 years old, one third of the population with university studies, one fifth of Mexicans living in large cities and about a third of those who live in the city who are members of the maximum wealth quintile, have an account in this social network as shown in Figure 7.5.

Finally, as shown in Figure 7.6, that although the population segments that use the most popular social network known as WhatsApp are still young, educated, urban-dwelling and with higher levels of wealth, their use is more widespread throughout the Mexican population. Here we can observe that 80% of young people between 18 and 25 years old report using this system of messages, voice, and video, but it is also used by 73% of Mexicans between 26 and 35 years of age and by 55% of adults of between 36 and 45 years of age.




Figure 7.5. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Twitter Users, Mexico 2017




Figure 7.6. Sociodemographic Characteristics of WhatsApp Users, Mexico 2017

Likewise, although 85% of those who completed university level education use WhatsApp, so do 66% of those who have secondary and upper secondary education. Among the urban population, 60% use WhatsApp and 60% of Mexicans in the third wealth quintile report using this network, reaching 80% of those who are located in the highest wealth quintile. In short, it seems that the expansion of usage of WhatsApp is a major contributing factor in making this social network the favorite of the 18+ Mexican population.

An interesting fact to know is the number of the 18+ population who has an account on more than one social network. The data from this round of the AmericasBarometer for Mexico reveal that almost everyone who has Twitter uses WhatsApp (99%) and has Facebook (97%). However, only 25% of those who have Facebook use Twitter, while 88% of those who have Facebook use WhatsApp.

Finally, among the users of WhatsApp, 25% do not use Facebook or Twitter. In short, Twitter users are those who report a greater presence in social networks, while users of WhatsApp are the ones who focus more on this single social network, leaving Facebook users in an intermediate category.

In terms of frequency of Internet use, Twitter users report daily Internet access in 81% of cases, Facebook users declared a daily use of the Internet by 62%, while WhatsApp users reported daily access to the Internet in 55% of cases.

This means that Twitter users are again the most frequent users of the Internet, followed by Facebook users and then by those who use WhatsApp. Although the latter have less access to the network than other users of social networks, it should be emphasized that it is 55%, a non-negligible figure, since it represents more than half of the users of the most popular social network in Mexico.



Determinants of Internet and Social Network Use

The main determinants of the use of the Internet and social networks that different investigations propose are related to concepts derived from the modernization theory (Norris and Inglehart 2004), such as the number of children and the size of the place of residence. Likewise, the determinants are related to the resources available to access certain socialization channels (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), such as a higher education level and a better economic position/higher wealth levels.

Based on the available evidence, it is plausible to assume that there are no differences between women and men in terms of the use of the Internet and social networks. However, there are also reasons to think that the gender gap in terms of resources available to men and women can play an important role, as in the ideological differences from the analysis of comments extracted from Facebook (Bond and Messing 2015).

Regarding number of children as determinants of the use of Internet and social networks, it is expected that having fewer children allowed respondents to spend more time on digital media (Bond and Messing 2015, Reuter and Szakonyi 2015), although it is plausible that the need for heads of household or adults in the home to provide Internet for their children or children of school and/or university age implies greater access to the Internet and therefore to social networks.

With regard to urban areas, a greater provision of Internet services is expected, with greater coverage and digital penetration than in rural areas. This does not imply that there is no access to the Internet and presence of users of social networks among the rural population, but it is expected in comparison with large cities, that the influence of the latter is prevalent (Reuter and Szakonyi 2015, Díaz Domínguez and Moreno 2015).

Regarding the age of the users as determinants of the use of Internet and social networks, we expect that the population of young people will be the most inclined to use these digital media, not only because they were practically born when this technology was already present (Farrell 2012; Swigger 2013; Sajuria 2013), but because they have shown greater skill in their use of them (Farrell 2012, Quintelier 2015, Reuter and Szakonyi 2015).

Additionally, we expect that people with higher education levels not only have greater access to the Internet, but also more actively use the Internet and social networks because schools, in addition to the home, provide them with ample access. Additionally, the Internet and social networks have also become a means of socialization among those who still attend classes (Swigger 2013, Reuter and Szakonyi 2015) and can serve as a useful mechanism in reducing the costs of collective action in the face of events that involve public actions (Haggard 2013, Sajuria 2013, Quintelier 2015, Díaz Domínguez and Moreno 2015).

We also expect to see that people identified as indigenous use the Internet less frequently and have less presence in social networks, given the limitations of the infrastructure of the communities they live in and the material restrictions in terms of possession of goods, cell phones or computers with an Internet connection.

Finally, the geographic scope can also play a relevant role in the determinants of the frequency of Internet use and access to social networks. In particular, it is to be hoped that regions with greater

economic development and infrastructure will have a positive influence on facilitating frequency and digital access (Reuter and Szakonyi 2015).

Variables and Methods

To analyze the determinants of Internet and social network use, four dependent variables were analyzed: a) frequency of Internet use (www1), measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is never and 5 is daily; b) whether or not you have Facebook (i2); c) whether or not you have Twitter (i3) and d) whether or not you use WhatsApp (i4). The last three with values 1 and 0, where 1 is that you have that social network and 0 that you do not.

Among the explanatory variables were used the gender of the person or user (q1), coded as a binary variable where 1 indicates that the person is a woman and 0 indicates the person is a man⁵. Other variables we tracked include level of education (edr) from 0 to 3, where 0 is none, 1 is primary, 2 is secondary (and basic secondary education), and 3 is higher education. Our results show that 3% report not having education, 24.6% report having primary education, 56.9% report having secondary education and 15.1% report having higher education. We also accounted for the variable of age (age) by measuring six groups: young people from 18 to 25 years of age, from 26 to 35 years of age, contemporary adults from 36 to 45, 46 to 55 and 56 to 65 years of age, as well as adults older than 66 or even older.⁶

Also included as an independent variable is the level of wealth that the person has expressed in an index created from the possession of various basic and luxury goods, as well as access to different services in the home (Córdova 2008). The size of the locality (size) is also considered as a variable independent of the model. This variable is composed of five categories: rural area, small city, medium city, large city, and national capital.

A variable of ethnicity is also included. This dichotomous variable takes the value 1 if the person identifies as indigenous and 0 for the rest of the people. According to data from the AmericasBarometer in Mexico, 12.2% of those interviewed identify themselves as indigenous. The number of children is also considered (q12), a variable that takes values between 0 and 16, with a national average of two children. It is important to mention that those who report having between zero and three children represent 79.8% of the sample.

Finally, we consider the geographic regions in which the country is divided (estratopri), this is Centro Occidente, Centro, Sur, and Norte, the latter serving as a reference category. The Central West region includes Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Nayarit. For its part, the Centro region is made up of Mexico City, Hidalgo, the State of Mexico, Morelos, Puebla, Queretaro, and Tlaxcala. The South region includes Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatan. Finally, the Northern region, which serves as a reference category, includes Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Zacatecas.

⁵ In the AmericasBarometer sample, 50.4% of the interviewees are women and 49.6% are men, which represents the country's gender distribution.

⁶ The first group represents 21.8%, the second 23.1%, the third 17.5%, the fourth 18%, the fifth 10.2% and the last 9.4%.

Results of the Multivariate Econometric Analysis

To estimate the determinants of frequency in the use of the Internet we used an ordinary least squares regression. Binary logistic models were used to estimate use of Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp. It is important to specify that when comparing the linear model with the results obtained through an ordered logistic model, no changes were observed in coefficient signs or in significant variables.

The results of the estimated models are presented in Figures 7.7 to 7.9. In each chart, the importance of each explanatory variable is described⁷, described in the previous section⁸. The importance of the variables in each model is represented in the aforementioned figures. In the figures, the points represent the estimated impact for each variable. When a point is located to the right of the vertical axis 0, it is a positive relationship and when it is located on the left, it signifies a negative relationship. The statistical significance is captured by a confidence interval when it does not cross the vertical axis 0 (with a probability of 0.05 or less)⁹.




Figure 7.7. Determinants of Frequency of Internet Use, Mexico 2017

⁷ The explanatory variables were standardized to go from 0 to 1.

⁸ The estimation of the constant term is excluded in the graphs.

⁹ See results of the regressions in this chapter in the appendix located on the LAPOP website.




Figure 7.8. Determinants of Facebook use, Mexico 2017




Figure 7.9. Determinants of Use of the Social Network Twitter, Mexico 2017




Figure 7.10. Determinants of Use of the Social Network WhatsApp, Mexico 2017

The results of the estimations suggest that the variables derived from both the theory of modernization and access to resources are those that show a greater impact on the frequency of Internet use and presence in social networks. Particularly, there are five variables whose positive impact remains in the four models: a higher level of education, lower age, being a member of the highest wealth quintiles, a larger place of residence and a smaller number of children. In addition, there are two other variables that show an impact on the models: the persons identified as indigenous and those who live in the southern region of the country.

In particular, people who identify themselves as indigenous are associated with a lower frequency of Internet use and a lower probability of being present on Twitter, which partially meets theoretical expectations. The same people are not associated with presence on Facebook and WhatsApp, where no relationship is observed.

Contrary to expectations, those living in the Southern region are more likely to frequently use the Internet and have a higher probability of using WhatsApp compared to residents of the Northern region of the country, a region that is assumed to have greater economic development and better infrastructure. One possible explanation may be due to the growing digital coverage in the country, but this does not seem to match the reports of the National Youth Survey 2010 (INEGI 2011), which has the southern states occupying the last places of access Internet among young people from 18 to 29 years old. Hence, this finding deserves further exploration, especially in relation to telephone services, which in their new data plans already integrate without additional charge access to social networks and particularly to WhatsApp.

Three variables deserve special mention that do not have any statistical impact on the four presented models. These are: the gender of the people and the Midwest and Center regions. Perhaps gender differences could be shown if the condition of a woman is accompanied by a condition that is clearly associated with limitations on access to available resources, as is the case with women who work in the home.

As for the regions mentioned earlier, these do not seem to be statistically differentiated from the Northern zone, which perhaps suggests the prevalence of specific urban localities over complete regions, as could happen with the lack of statistical distinction between the North region with Monterrey, the West Center with Guadalajara, or the Centro region with the capital of the country. Here perhaps the relevant variable is the size of the locality more than the region itself, at least with regard to these three zones.

In order to know the impact of significant variables on the frequency of use of the Internet and social networks, Figures 7.11, 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14 show these effects through the calculation of predicted values and estimated probabilities for each dependent variable.

Figure 7.11, which shows the impact on the frequency of Internet use, shows that the digital gap in terms of age between the youngest and the elderly. While the latter hardly uses the Internet, the former uses it, all else being equal, several times a week.




Figure 7.11. Effects of Internet Usage Determinants, Mexico 2017



We observe the same pattern among those with no education and those who have a university education, as well as between the first and the last wealth quintile. The gap in terms of the size of the place of residence is not as wide but it is clear: citizens in rural areas do not reach the monthly frequency, while in urban areas this frequency is already exceeded. Finally, we emphasize that the frequency of Internet use declines with the birth of the third child compared to those who reported not having or having one child.

Figure 7.12 shows the effects of the significant variables in the use of Facebook, with the digital gaps in education and age, where the probability of having Facebook when having a higher level of education is 65%, while the base without studies part of the 20%. In the age variable, the probability among the youngest is close to 80% while it does not even reach 20% among the elderly.

The gap in terms of wealth is seen among the quintiles located at the extremes, around 30% for the bottom and more than 60% for the top. Again, the size of the locality does not present such a drastic gap, but there are about 20 points of difference between rural areas and the capital of the country. Finally, regarding the number of children, a marked difference cannot be seen until after the fifth, which only involves 4% of the sample.




Figure 7.12. Effects of Facebook Use Determinants, Mexico 2017




Figure 7.13. Effects of Twitter Use Determinants, Mexico 2017

Figure 7.13 shows the effects of significant variables on having a Twitter account. In practically all the variables, that is to say among the most educated, the youngest, the wealthiest or those who live in urban areas, do not have children or are not indigenous, the probability is around 20 points. In contrast, their opposites are located in percentages less than five or in the best case at 10% probability. It is appropriate to remember that the survey showed 11% of people having a Twitter account.

Figure 7.14 shows the marginal effects of the significant variables with respect to WhatsApp. The gap between those who use WhatsApp or not is marked in education, with around 20% among those who did not report studies to almost 80% among university students. With respect to age,

the statistic is 30% for older adults but 75% among the youngest age group. Finally, the gap is also notable in terms of wealth beginning at 40% in the first quintile and rising to around 75% in the top quintile.

On the other hand, we can see that the gap between rural and urban areas reaches 20 points, although it is not clearly discernible among the number of children, but it does reach ten points for those living in the Southern region compared to the North, which serves as a category reference.




Figure 7.14. Effects of WhatsApp Use Determinants, Mexico 2017

All of the above suggests that the digital divide seems to be exacerbated across variables related to available resources and maintained in less depth. However, the divide persists in the variables related to the theory of modernization, except for the partial evidence found among the indigenous population and the evidence to the contrary to geographical areas, particularly in the Southern region of the country.



Finally, we explored alternative specifications not included in this chapter. We considered variables such as being a housewife, political ideology in self-placement along the left-right axis (Bond and Messing 2015, Díaz Domínguez and Moreno 2015), religious variables (Díaz Domínguez and Moreno 2015) and employment status.

In all cases, the inclusion of the variable of being a housewife negatively impacted both the frequency of Internet use and presence in the three social networks, leading the woman variable to be positive and significant (models not shown but available with the author). This can be explained by the gender gap's heavy impact, given that housewives have much fewer possibilities, both in terms of time and resources, to access the digital world.

Political ideology was not significant for any model, perhaps because in the dates close to the execution of the survey, local electoral campaigns were not yet in a peak period that would have favored the activation of this variable.

Religious variables such as attendance of religious services, church groups and importance of religion in the person's life, provided us some interesting results: attendance of church groups favoring the use of social networks and the importance of religion seems to be diminishing, perhaps in accordance with the idea of church groups as a vehicle for socialization and the importance of religion as a spiritual vehicle, although such relationships require further exploration.

Finally, we observed that employment status does have a negative impact on the use of WhatsApp, perhaps in alignment with the literature on the available resources. The specifications mentioned above are only intended to set a possible future agenda in research on the digital divide, without constituting more than a preliminary work that undoubtedly will require additional theoretical and empirical work.

IV. Conclusion

The following conclusions about the digital divide and its social determinants are merely attempts to understand the drastic changes that have we have observed both in the use of the Internet and social networks in recent years.

The available evidence suggests that, in effect, the set of variables related to available resources seems to dramatically broaden the digital divide, while the variables linked to the theory of modernization also increase that gap, although much less spectacularly. Although it is true that both groups of variables are similar, it is interesting to note that one group has greater effects than the other, although in both cases the final impact is the same: the extension of the aforementioned digital divide.

We will see whether or not these digital media will serve to give voice to those who do not have one today or if they will only reinforce the presence of those who already have access to the means to be heard in the digital world (Farrell 2012; Sajuria 2013).

Without forgetting that there are differences between different types of social networks (the great penetration of WhatsApp versus Twitter is perhaps the best example for the Mexican case), it

seems that the evidence around the demographic characteristics of digital consumption analyzed here supports the reinforcement hypothesis.

Perhaps a greater penetration could aid in promoting a greater digital democratization in the near future in such a way that these social bases are extended beyond young people, the highly educated, those with abundant material resources, and those residing in urban localities. Currently, 51% of Mexican households have access to the Internet while 70% of people said they use their cell phone to view content online (IFT 2016). This also suggests that the necessary infrastructure targets both households and people.

If the expansion of the digital world gained more ground against the mere reinforcement of those who already have resources to access and be heard in that world, then we could see a reduction in the digital divide. However, the tension between “the diffusion of private life” and “the digital social desirability” would remain to be clarified.

On the one hand, there is a growing tendency to reduce the separation between the private and public spheres through the dissemination of personal life in social networks. This activity challenges boundaries of digital privacy, which may have beneficial effects on greater assessment of freedom of expression for example (Swigger 2013). On the other hand, one of the possible limitations of the impact of social networks use in politics could be that those with minority opinions could choose to disguise them or simply stop sharing their opinion with the goal of avoiding unnecessary friction – creating a sort of “digital social desirability” if you will (Farrell 2012).

Exploring this type of tension could lead to a fruitful research agenda. Some pioneering works in this agenda explore the spiral of silence on Facebook where safeguarding one's reputation in a wide-spread environment of personal life can generate silence (Moreno and Sierra 2016). It is important to remember that the study of this population must be assessed fairly since its composition generally differs to a certain extent from the open population. However, it is important to explore dilemmas like these, especially among generations (educated and urban) that as the years pass will have been the main participators in social networks.

Although the studies with big data on Facebook (Bond and Messing 2015) or Twitter (Barberá 2015) must also be taken with fairness, they are relevant for the design of new ways to gather information in surveys to the open population, where empirical study of the digital divide will continue to be appropriate. In fact, studies like the ones mentioned allow us to continue following an agenda of comparison between the attitudes of the citizenry and attitudes of the elites – only now in the digital world.

Another promising future study, although not clearly linked to political attitudes, would be one related to the impact of WhatsApp as a mechanism of information and political socialization. Although theoretically and logistically complex, the literature that is used in the relationships between cell phones and politics (Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013) could help make both the theoretical framework and the design of research and data collection more convenient.

Finally, although the hypothesis of reinforcement of those who have available resources is the leading one, what one would expect is that, as coverage and penetration of Internet services and access to social networks advance, social bases of digital consumption could be expanded and advance the utopia of expansion of access to the digital world.

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Appendices



Appendix A. Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's average trust in political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., stratified and clustered). In bar charts, this confidence interval appears as a grey block, whereas in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts). The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically not statistically significant; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are statistically significant with 95% confidence. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will frequently indicate in the text whether a difference is statistically significant or not.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at zero. When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is statistically significant when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line at zero.

On occasion, analyses and graphs in this report present “region-average” findings. LAPOP's standard is to treat countries as units of analysis and, thus, we weight countries equally in the calculation of region averages.

The dataset used for the analyses in this report was a preliminary version of the cross-time, cross-national merge of the 2004-2016/17 AmericasBarometer surveys. Finalized versions of each survey represented in the dataset are available for free download on the project's website at www.LapopSurveys.org.



Appendix B. Study Information Sheet



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

February 4, 2017

Dear Sir/ Madam:

You have been selected at random to participate in a study of public opinion on behalf of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados and Vanderbilt University.

The interview will last approximately 35 minutes.

The objective of the study is to learn your opinions about different aspects of the way things are in Mexico. Even though we cannot offer you any specific benefit, we do plan to make general findings available to the media and researchers.

Although you have been selected to participate, Sir/Ma'am, your participation in the study is voluntary. You can decline to answer any question or end the interview at any time. The replies that you give will be kept confidential and anonymous. For quality control purposes, sections of the interview may be recorded.

If you have any questions about the study, please do not hesitate to contact DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados at 55751250 of Mexico City or Carlos López at the email clo@dataopm.net.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Are you willing to participate?

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Barómetro de las Américas 2017 Cuestionario México Versión # 16.0.2.1 Aprobación IRB # 170077

| | | |
|---|---|--|
|  USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE | |  Opinión Pública y Mercados |
|  Latin American Public Opinion Project Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina |  AmericasBarometer Barómetro de las Américas www.AmericasBarometer.org |  VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY |

LAPOP: México, 2017

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| | | | | |
|---|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| PAIS. País: | | | | |
| 01. México | 02. Guatemala | 03. El Salvador | 04. Honduras | 05. Nicaragua |
| 06. Costa Rica | 07. Panamá | 08. Colombia | 09. Ecuador | 10. Bolivia |
| 11. Perú | 12. Paraguay | 13. Chile | 14. Uruguay | 15. Brasil |
| 16. Venezuela | 17. Argentina | 21. Rep. Dom. | 22. Haití | 23. Jamaica |
| 24. Guyana | 25. Trinidad & Tobago | 26. Belice | 40. Estados Unidos | 41. Canadá |
| 27. Surinam | 28. Bahamas | 29. Barbados | 30. Granada | 31. Santa Lucía |
| 32. Dominica | 33. Antigua y Barbuda | 34. San Vicente y las Granadinas | 35. San Kitts y Nevis | |
| IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] | | | | |
| ESTRATOPRI: (101) Norte (102) Centro-Occidente (103) Centro (104) Sur | | | | |
| ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad [población en edad de votar, según censo; modificar por cada país, usando número de estratos y rangos de poblaciones apropiados]: | | | | |
| (1) Grande (más de 100,000) (2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 - 100,000) | | | | |
| (3) Pequeña (< 25,000) | | | | |
| UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"]: _____ | | | | |
| PROV. Estado: _____ | | | | |
| MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____ | | | | |
| MEXDISTRITO. Distrito: _____ | | | | |
| MEXSECELECT. SECCION ELECTORAL:: _____ | | | | |
| MEXSEC. Sector: _____ | | | | |
| CLUSTER. [Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral]: _____ | | | | |
| [Cada cluster debe tener 6 entrevistas; usar código oficial del censo] | | | | |
| UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país] | | | | |
| TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: | | | | |
| (1) Capital Nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana | | | | |
| (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural | | | | |
| IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español | | | | |
| Hora de inicio: _____: | | | | |
| FECHA. Fecha Día: _____ Mes: _____ Año: 2017 | | | | |
| ATENCION: Es un requisito leer siempre la HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN DEL ESTUDIO y obtener el asentimiento del entrevistado antes de comenzar la entrevista. | | | | |

| | | | |
|--|--------|--|--------|
| A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? | | | |
| [NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO una respuesta] | | | |
| Agua, falta de | 19 | Impunidad | 61 |
| Caminos/vías en mal estado | 18 | Inflación, altos precios | 02 |
| Conflicto armado | 30 | Los políticos | 59 |
| Corrupción | 13 | Mal gobierno | 15 |
| Crédito, falta de | 09 | Medio ambiente | 10 |
| Delincuencia, crimen | 05 | Migración | 16 |
| Derechos humanos, violaciones de | 56 | Narcotráfico | 12 |
| Desempleo/falta de empleo | 03 | Pandillas | 14 |
| Desigualdad | 58 | Pobreza | 04 |
| Desnutrición | 23 | Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) | 06 |
| Desplazamiento forzado | 32 | Salud, falta de servicio | 22 |
| Deuda externa | 26 | Secuestro | 31 |
| Discriminación | 25 | Seguridad (falta de) | 27 |
| Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción | 11 | Terrorismo | 33 |
| Economía, problemas con, crisis de | 01 | Tierra para cultivar, falta de | 07 |
| Educación, falta de, mala calidad | 21 | Transporte, problemas con el | 60 |
| Electricidad, falta de | 24 | Violencia | 57 |
| Explosión demográfica | 20 | Vivienda | 55 |
| Guerra contra el terrorismo | 17 | Otro | 70 |
| No sabe [NO LEER] | 888888 | No responde [NO LEER] | 988888 |

| | |
|--|--|
| SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses ? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses ? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |

| | |
|---|--|
| Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio/delegación... | |
| NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal/delegacional durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |

| Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado] | | | | | | | |
|---|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------|--------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Una vez a la semana | Una o dos veces al mes | Una o dos veces al año | Nunca | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] | Inaplicable [NO LEER] |
| CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|--------|--------|--------|--|
| CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | | |
| CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | | |
| CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste... | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 | |

| | |
|--|--|
| IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
|--|--|

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “A” AL ENTREVISTADO]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | No sabe [NO LEER] 888888 | No responde [NO LEER] 988888 |
| Izquierda | | | | | | | | | | Derecha | |

[RECOGER TARJETA “A”]

| | |
|--|--|
| PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
|--|--|

CUESTIONARIO A

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares...

[Leer alternativas]

| | | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|
| JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia. | (1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | (2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | No sabe [NO LEER] (888888) | No responde [NO LEER] (988888) | Inaplicable [NO LEER] (999999) |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|

CUESTIONARIO B

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares...

[Leer alternativas]

| | | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|
| JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción. | (1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | (2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado | No sabe [NO LEER] (888888) | No responde [NO LEER] (988888) | Inaplicable [NO LEER] (999999) |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|

| | | | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso? | (1) Sí se justifica | (2) No se justifica | No sabe [NO LEER] (888888) | No responde [NO LEER] (988888) |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|

| | |
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| VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a VIC71] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a VIC71] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a VIC71] | |
| VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delictual en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] [VALOR MÁXIMO ACEPTADO: 20] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |

| | | | | | |
|---|--------|--------|----------------------|--------------------------|--|
| Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted... | | | | | |
| | Sí | No | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] | |
| VIC71. ¿Ha evitado salir solo(a) de su casa durante la noche? | (1) Sí | (0) No | 888888 | 988888 | |
| VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “comunidad”] | (1) Sí | (0) No | 888888 | 988888 | |
| VICBAR4A. ¿Ha sido usted o alguien de su familia inmediata (hijos, esposo, esposa) víctima de extorsión en los últimos 12 meses? | (1) Sí | (0) No | 888888 | 988888 | |

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| AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “B” AL ENTREVISTADO]

| | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|-------|----------------------|--------------------------|
| En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es el escalón más bajo y significa NADA y el 7 es el escalón más alto y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. [Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente] . | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 888888 | 988888 |
| Nada | | | | | | Mucho | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] |
| [Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde] | | | | | | | | |
| Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. | | | | | | | | |
| B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de México garantizan un juicio justo? [Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio] | | | | | | | | |



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| B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de México? | |
| B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político mexicano? | |
| B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político mexicano? | |
| B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político mexicano? | |
| B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser mexicano(a)? | |
| B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas? | |
| B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional? | |
| B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía? | |
| B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos? | |
| B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente? | |
| B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipio/delegación? | |
| B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación? | |
| B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país? | |
| Utilizando la misma escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es “nada” y 7 es “mucho.” | (888888) No sabe (988888) No responde |
| PR3DN. Si en su barrio alguno de sus vecinos decide construir o renovar una vivienda sin licencia o permiso, ¿qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades? | |
| PR3EN. Y si alguien en su barrio decide construir o reformar una casa, ¿qué tan probable sería que a esa persona le pidieran pagar un soborno? | |

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

| | |
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| M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados federales están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, SD2NEW2. ¿Está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER] | |
| SD3NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted... [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER] | |
| SD6NEW2. ¿Y con la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted... [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No utiliza) [NO LEER] | |

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| <p>INFRA3. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>INFRA3. Suponga que está en su casa y tiene una lesión muy seria y necesita atención médica inmediata. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que se demoraría en llegar (por el medio más rápido) al centro de salud/hospital más cercano (público o privado)? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay servicios de salud/hospitales cercanos/ No iría a un hospital (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

| | | | | | | | | |
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| Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera en donde el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 888888 | 988888 |
| Muy en desacuerdo | | | | | | Muy de acuerdo | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] |
| [Anotar un número 1-7, 888888 = No sabe, 988888= No responde] | | | | | | | | |
| Le voy a leer algunas frases. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. | | | | | | | | |

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| <p>ROS1. El Estado mexicano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |
| <p>ROS4. El Estado mexicano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |
| <p>ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |
| <p>EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |
| <p>EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |
| <p>AOJ22NEW. Para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro hay que aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |

Y cambiando de tema...

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>[Continúa usando tarjeta “C”]</p> <p>[1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde]</p> | |
| <p>MEDIA3. La información que dan los medios de comunicación de noticias mexicanos representan bien las distintas opiniones que hay en México. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |
| <p>MEDIA4. Los medios de comunicación de noticias de México están controlados por unos pocos grupos económicos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p> | |



Test A. Set 1.

[Continúa usando tarjeta "C"]

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde, 999999= Inaplicable]

DST1B1. El gobierno debe gastar más dinero para hacer cumplir los reglamentos de construcción para hacer las viviendas más seguras ante desastres naturales, incluso si esto significa gastar menos en otros programas. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con esta frase?

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

DRK11. ¿Qué tan probable sería que usted o alguien en su familia inmediata aquí en México pueda morir o salir seriamente lastimado en un desastre natural como inundaciones, terremotos o huracanes en los próximos 25 años? ¿Cree usted que es...? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Nada probable (2) Poco probable (3) Algo probable (4) Muy probable

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER]

(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "N" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Vamos a usar esta nueva tarjeta.

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888= No responde, 999999=Inaplicable]

ENV1C1. Alguna gente cree que hay que priorizar la protección del medio ambiente sobre el crecimiento económico, mientras otros creen que el crecimiento económico debería priorizarse sobre la protección ambiental. En una escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa que el medio ambiente debe ser la principal prioridad, y 7 significa que el crecimiento económico debe ser la principal prioridad, ¿dónde se ubicaría usted?

[RECOGER TARJETA "N"]

ENV2B1. Si no se hace nada para reducir el cambio climático en el futuro, ¿qué tan serio piensa usted que sería el problema para México? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy serio

(2) Algo serio

(3) Poco serio

(4) Nada serio

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER]

(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]

Test A. Set 2.

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "N" AL ENTREVISTADO]

Vamos a usar esta nueva tarjeta.

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde, 999999= Inaplicable]

ENV1C2. Alguna gente cree que hay que priorizar la protección del medio ambiente sobre el crecimiento económico, mientras otros creen que el crecimiento económico debería priorizarse sobre la protección ambiental. En una escala de 1 a 7 en la que 1 significa que el medio ambiente debe ser la principal prioridad, y 7 significa que el crecimiento económico debe ser la principal prioridad, ¿dónde se ubicaría usted?

[RECOGER TARJETA "N"]

ENV2B2. Si no se hace nada para reducir el cambio climático en el futuro, ¿qué tan serio piensa usted que sería el problema para México? [Leer alternativas]

(1) Muy serio

(2) Algo serio

(3) Poco serio

(4) Nada serio

(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]

(988888) No responde [NO LEER]

(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “C” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Volvemos a usar esta tarjeta de 1 “muy en desacuerdo” a 7 “muy de acuerdo”

[Anotar 1-7, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde, 999999= Inaplicable]

DST1B2. El gobierno debe gastar más dinero para hacer cumplir los reglamentos de construcción para hacer las viviendas más seguras ante desastres naturales, incluso si esto significa gastar menos en otros programas. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con esta frase?

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

DRK12. ¿Qué tan probable sería que usted o alguien en su familia inmediata aquí en México pueda morir o salir seriamente lastimado en un desastre natural como inundaciones, terremotos o huracanes en los próximos 25 años? ¿Cree usted que es...? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Nada probable (2) Poco probable (3) Algo probable (4) Muy probable

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

(999999) Inaplicable **[NO LEER]**

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en México?

(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligr la salud de la madre?

(1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría

(888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**

(988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “D” AL ENTREVISTADO]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría...

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------|---|----|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 888888 No sabe [NO LEER] | 988888 No responde [NO LEER] |
| Desaprueba firmemente | | | | | | | Aprueba firmemente | | | | |

[Anotar 1-10, 888888= No sabe, 988888 = No responde]

E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?

D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de México, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: **[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]**

D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.

D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de México. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?

D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los gayes. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?



[RECOGER TARJETA “D”]

| | Muy poca | Suficiente | Demasiada | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] | |
|--|----------|------------|-----------|----------------------|--------------------------|--|
| LIB1. Usted cree que ahora en el país tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada...Libertad de prensa. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| LIB2B. Y Libertad de expresión. ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| LIB2C. Y Libertad para expresar las opiniones políticas sin miedo. ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| LIB4. Protección a derechos humanos ¿Tenemos muy poca, suficiente o demasiada? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 888888 | 988888 | |

| | INAP No trató o tuvo contacto | No | Sí | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] | |
|---|--|----|----|----------------------|--------------------------|--|
| Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria... | | | | | | |
| EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses? | -- | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno)? | -- | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado un soborno o mordida? | -- | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/delegación en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley? | 999999 | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses? | 999999 | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (o soborno) en los juzgados en este último año? | 999999 | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud? | 999999 | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |

| | INAP No trató o tuvo contacto | No | Sí | No sabe [NO LEER] | No responde [NO LEER] | |
|--|--|----|----|-------------------------|--------------------------|--|
| EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 999999 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) en la escuela o colegio? | 999999 | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |
| EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)? | | 0 | 1 | 888888 | 988888 | |

| | |
|--|--|
| EXC7NEW. Pensando en los políticos de México, ¿cuántos de ellos cree usted que están involucrados en corrupción? [Leer alternativas] (1) Ninguno (2) Menos de la mitad (3) La mitad de los políticos (4) Más de la mitad (5) Todos (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
|--|--|

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar:

| | |
|--|--|
| VICBAR7. Han ocurrido asesinatos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a FEAR11] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a FEAR11] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a FEAR11] | |
| VICBAR7F. ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año? (1) Una vez a la semana (2) Una o dos veces al mes (3) Una o dos veces al año (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |
| FEAR11. Pensando en su vida diaria, ¿cuánto temor siente usted de ser víctima directa de homicidio? ¿Siente usted mucho temor, algo de temor, poco temor, o nada de temor? (1) Mucho temor (2) Algo de temor (3) Poco temor (4) Nada de temor (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| CAPITAL1. ¿Usted está a favor o en contra de la pena de muerte para personas culpables de asesinato? (1) A favor (2) En contra (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| IGA1. En su opinión, ¿quién debería tener el liderazgo en la reducción de los homicidios en este país? [Leer alternativas] (1) El gobierno federal (2) La municipalidad (3) Los empresarios (4) Los ciudadanos (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| IGAAOJ22. En su opinión, ¿para reducir los homicidios en este país es más importante que el gobierno invierta en... (1) Medidas de prevención, como oportunidades de educación y trabajo para la gente? (2) O aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |



| | |
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| VB1. ¿Está empadronado(a) para votar? [SOLO SI NO COMPRENDE PREGUNTE: ¿Tiene credencial para votar?] (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| INF1. ¿Tiene usted CURP? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2012? (1) Sí votó [Sigue] (2) No votó [Pasa a VB10] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a VB10] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a VB10] | |
| VB3N. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2012? [NO leer alternativas] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco) (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto) (101) Enrique Peña Nieto - Compromiso por México (PRI, PVEM) (102) Andrés Manuel López Obrador - Movimiento Progresista (PRD, PT, Movimiento ciudadano) (103) Josefina Vázquez Mota - PAN (104) Gabriel Quadri de la Torre - Nueva Alianza (177) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No votó) [NO LEER] | |
| VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a POL1] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a POL1] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a POL1] | |
| VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO Leer alternativas] (101) PAN / Partido Acción Nacional (102) PRI / Partido Revolucionario Institucional (103) PRD / Partido de la Revolución Democrática (104) PVEM / Partido Verde Ecologista de México (105) PT / Partido del Trabajo (106) PANAL/ Partido Nueva Alianza (108) Movimiento Ciudadano (109) MORENA / Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (177) Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |
| POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |

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| <p>MEXCV1. En algunos países el voto es obligatorio, es decir, los ciudadanos están obligados a votar por ley. En otros países, el voto es voluntario, y los ciudadanos pueden decidir si quieren votar o no en las elecciones. ¿Sabría decirme usted si el voto en México es obligatorio o voluntario?</p> <p>(1) Obligatorio [Sigue] (2) Voluntario [Pasa a FOR5N] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a FOR5N] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a FOR5N]</p> | |
| <p>MEXCV2. En algunos países donde el voto es obligatorio, el gobierno puede penalizar a quienes no votan. En otros países no hay ninguna penalidad por no votar en las elecciones. ¿En México hay alguna penalidad por no votar en las elecciones?</p> <p>(1) Sí, hay una penalidad por no votar (2) No, no hay ninguna penalidad por no votar (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p> | |

[ENTREGAR TARJETA “H” AL ENTREVISTADO]

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| <p>Ahora, cambiando de tema...</p> <p>FOR5N. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro de nuestro país? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) China (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Singapur (6) Rusia (7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil (11) Venezuela (13) [NO LEER] Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo (14) [NO LEER] Otro (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| [RECoger TARJETA “H”] | |

| TEST B. Set 1 | | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en <u>los gobiernos</u> de algunos países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión. | | | | | | | |
| | Muy confiable | Algo confiable | Poco confiable | Nada confiable | No sabe/ no tiene opinión | No responde [NO LEER] | Inaplicable [NO LEER] |
| MIL10A1. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
| MIL10E1. El gobierno de Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
| Ahora hablemos de organismos internacionales | | | | | | | |

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| MIL10OAS1. La OEA, Organización de los Estados Americanos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
| MIL10UN1. La ONU, Organización de las Naciones Unidas. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |

TEST B. Set 2

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en algunas organizaciones internacionales. Para cada una por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

| | Muy confiable | Algo confiable | Poco confiable | Nada confiable | No sabe/ no tiene opinión | No respon- de [NO LEER] | Inaplicable [NO LEER] |
|---|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| MIL10OAS2. La OEA, Organización de los Estados Americanos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
| MIL10UN2. La ONU, Organización de las Naciones Unidas. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |

Hablemos ahora de los gobiernos de algunos países

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|--------|--------|--------|
| MIL10A2. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|--------|--------|--------|

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|--|---|---|---|---|--------|--------|--------|
| MIL10E2. El gobierno de Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión? | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 888888 | 988888 | 999999 |
|--|---|---|---|---|--------|--------|--------|

Cambiando de tema. Vamos a hablar ahora sobre las normas y reglamentos para la construcción de casas y edificios

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| CCQ1. ¿Según lo que usted sabe o ha oído, en su ciudad, hay normas o reglamentos de construcción? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a CCQ3] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a CCQ3] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a CCQ3] | |
| CCQ2. Y también según lo que usted ha visto y oído, diría que esas normas o reglamentos se aplican... [Leer alternativas] (1) Siempre (2) Casi siempre (3) Algunas veces (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |
| CCQ3. ¿Y hay normas o reglamentos que regulen el uso del suelo o la tierra en esta ciudad donde usted vive? (1) Sí [Sigue] (2) No [Pasa a MEXUS1] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a MEXUS1] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a MEXUS1] | |
| CCQ4. Y también según lo que usted ha visto y oído, diría que esas normas o reglamentos se aplican... [Leer alternativas] (1) Siempre (2) Casi siempre (3) Algunas veces (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |

Cambiando de tema...

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| MEXUS1. Hablando en términos generales, de las siguientes palabras, ¿cuál describe mejor sus sentimientos hacia Estados Unidos? [Leer alternativas 1 y 2] (1) Confianza (2) Desconfianza (3) [NO LEER] Indiferencia (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
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MEXUS2. Y de las siguientes palabras, ¿cuál describe mejor sus sentimientos hacia Estados Unidos? **[Leer alternativas 1 y 2]**

- (1) Admiración
- (2) Desprecio
- (3) **[NO LEER]** Indiferencia
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

VIA1. Ahora, si piensa en los Estados Unidos, cuáles dos palabras vienen a su mente? **[NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO DOS respuestas] [Nota de programación: programar para aceptar dos alternativas y no más]**

- (1) Dinero/dólar
- (2) Trump
- (3) Migrantes/indocumentados
- (4) Racismo
- (5) Compras, ofertas de productos (ropa, calzado, electrónicos)
- (6) Familia que vive allá
- (7) Soledad de vivir allá
- (8) Policía/migra (border patrol)
- (9) Narcotráfico
- (10) Drogas
- (11) Obama
- (12) Trabajo
- (13) Inglés
- (14) Consumismo
- (15) Comercio
- (16) Orden
- (17) Frontera
- (18) Muro
- (19) TLC/NAFTA
- (20) Discriminación
- (21) Maltratos
- (22) Oportunidades
- (77) Otra respuesta
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[NOTA: esta variable está codificada en la base de datos como: VIA1_# - la cantidad de variables es la misma que la cantidad de categorías de respuesta -. Si la persona entrevistada seleccionó la opción #, la variable es codificada como 1, 0 si la persona entrevistada no seleccionó dicha opción. Si la persona entrevistada dijo No saber o No respondió, entonces todas las variables fueron codificadas como No sabe o No responde]

WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda periódica en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones?

- (1) Sí (2) No
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa Prospera, ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa?

- (1) Sí (2) No
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]** (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[Usar tarjeta “ED” como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, bachillerato/profesional técnico/media superior, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

| | 1 ^o | 2 ^o | 3 ^o | 4 ^o | 5 ^o | 6 ^o | |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--|
| Ninguno | 0 | | | | | | |
| Primaria | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| Secundaria | 7 | 8 | 9 | | | | |
| Bachillerato/Profesional Técnico/Media Superior | 10 | 11 | 12 | | | | |
| Universitaria | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18+ | |
| Superior no universitaria | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | | | |
| No sabe [NO LEER] | 888888 | | | | | | |
| No responde [NO LEER] | 988888 | | | | | | |

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? **[NO leer alternativas]**

- (00) Ninguno
- (01) Primaria incompleta
- (02) Primaria completa
- (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto
- (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo
- (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta
- (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa
- (07) Universitaria incompleta
- (08) Universitaria completa
- (888888) No sabe **[NO LEER]**
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

[Instrucciones de programación para HAMQ1 – HAMQ4: El orden de las preguntas HAMQ1, HAMQ2, HAMQ3, HAMQ4 debe ser aleatorio, de manera que aparezcan en distinto orden, es decir, no todos los participantes deben obtener la secuencia HAMQ1, HAMQ2, HAMQ3, HAMQ4]

A continuación voy a leerle una serie de frases. Para cada una por favor dígame qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con cada frase. Si no está seguro/a, puede decir “no estoy seguro/a”.

MEXHAM1. Si un adulto mejicano pasa hambre, el gobierno es el culpable de que esta persona pase hambre. **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) No estoy seguro/a **[Acepta “No sabe”]**
- (2) Muy en desacuerdo
- (3) En desacuerdo
- (4) Ni de acuerdo o en desacuerdo
- (5) De acuerdo
- (6) Muy de acuerdo
- (988888) No responde **[NO LEER]**

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| <p>MEXHAM2. Si un adulto mejicano pasa hambre, las organizaciones sin fines de lucro, iglesias o la sociedad civil son culpables de que esta persona pase hambre. [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No estoy seguro/a [Aceptar “No sabe”] (2) Muy en desacuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Ni de acuerdo o en desacuerdo (5) De acuerdo (6) Muy de acuerdo (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXHAM3. Si un adulto mejicano pasa hambre, el sector privado, incluyendo las grandes corporaciones/empresas, son culpables de que esta persona pase hambre. [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No estoy seguro/a [Aceptar “No sabe”] (2) Muy en desacuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Ni de acuerdo o en desacuerdo (5) De acuerdo (6) Muy de acuerdo (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXHAM4. Si un adulto mejicano pasa hambre, ninguna otra persona o entidad es culpable de que esta persona pase hambre, excepto él o ella misma. [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No estoy seguro/a [Aceptar “No sabe”] (2) Muy en desacuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Ni de acuerdo o en desacuerdo (5) De acuerdo (6) Muy de acuerdo (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |

[Instrucciones para programación: El orden de las preguntas HAMQ5 y HAMQ6 debe ser aleatorio, de manera que aparezcan en distinto orden, es decir, no todos los participantes deben obtener la secuencia HAMQ5, HAMQ6, pero deben realizarse luego de las preguntas anteriores HAMQ1-HAMQ4.]

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| <p>Ahora voy a leerle otras frases. Podría decirme para cada una de ellas qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está usted con cada frase. Si no está seguro/a, puede decir “no estoy seguro/a”.</p> | |
| <p>MEXHAM5. Si un adulto mejicano no tiene acceso a atención médica adecuada, el culpable es el gobierno. [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No estoy seguro/a [Aceptar “No sabe”] (2) Muy en desacuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Ni de acuerdo o en desacuerdo (5) De acuerdo (6) Muy de acuerdo (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXHAM6. Si un adulto en edad de votar, no puede votar en una elección libre y justa en México, el culpable es el gobierno. [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) No estoy seguro/a [Aceptar “No sabe”] (2) Muy en desacuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Ni de acuerdo o en desacuerdo (5) De acuerdo (6) Muy de acuerdo (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |

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| <p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes</p> <p>(4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante</p> <p>(3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |

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| <p>[Usar tarjeta "Q3C" como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado]</p> <p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [NO Leer alternativas]</p> <p>[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]</p> <p>[Si el entrevistado dice "Cristiano" o "Evangélico", sondee para verificar si es católico (opción 1), pentecostal (opción 5) o evangélico no-pentecostal (opción 2). Si no está seguro, seleccione (2).]</p> <p>(01) Católico</p> <p>(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).</p> <p>(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).</p> <p>(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).</p> <p>(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).</p> <p>(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Santería, Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).</p> <p>(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)</p> <p>(12) Testigos de Jehová.</p> <p>(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)</p> <p>(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)</p> <p>(77) Otro</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
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| <p>OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Trabajando? [Sigue]</p> <p>(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Sigue]</p> <p>(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(4) Es estudiante? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pasa a Q10G]</p> <p>(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Pasa a Q10NEW]</p> | |
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| <p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Asalariado(a) del gobierno o empresa estatal?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado(a) en el sector privado?</p> <p>(3) Patrono(a) o socio(a) de empresa?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador(a) por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador(a) no remunerado(a) o sin pago?</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> <p>(999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p> | |
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[ENTREGAR TARJETA “F” AL ENTREVISTADO]

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| <p>PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]</p> <p>Q10G. En esta tarjeta hay varios rangos de ingresos ¿Puede decirme en cuál de los siguientes rangos está el ingreso que usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión, sin contar el resto de los ingresos del hogar?</p> <p>[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso</p> <p>(01) Menos de \$1,100</p> <p>(02) Entre \$1,100 - \$1,600</p> <p>(03) Entre \$1,601 - \$2,100</p> <p>(04) Entre \$2,101 - \$2,450</p> <p>(05) Entre \$2,451 - \$2,900</p> <p>(06) Entre \$2,901 - \$3,300</p> <p>(07) Entre \$3,300 - \$3,650</p> <p>(08) Entre \$3,651 - \$4,150</p> <p>(09) Entre \$4,151 - \$4,450</p> <p>(10) Entre \$4,451 - \$4,750</p> <p>(11) Entre \$4,751 - \$5,350</p> <p>(12) Entre \$5,351 - \$6,200</p> <p>(13) Entre \$6,201 - \$7,050</p> <p>(14) Entre \$7,051 - \$8,400</p> <p>(15) Entre \$8,401 - \$11,050</p> <p>(16) Más de \$11,050</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER]</p> <p>(988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> <p>(999999) Inaplicable (No trabaja ni está jubilado) [NO LEER]</p> | |
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| <p>Q10NEW. ¿Y en cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$1,100 (02) Entre \$1,100 - \$1,600 (03) Entre \$1,601 - \$2,100 (04) Entre \$2,101 - \$2,450 (05) Entre \$2,451 - \$2,900 (06) Entre \$2,901 - \$3,300 (07) Entre \$3,300 - \$3,650 (08) Entre \$3,651 - \$4,150 (09) Entre \$4,151 - \$4,450 (10) Entre \$4,451 - \$4,750 (11) Entre \$4,751 - \$5,350 (12) Entre \$5,351 - \$6,200 (13) Entre \$6,201 - \$7,050 (14) Entre \$7,051 - \$8,400 (15) Entre \$8,401 - \$11,050 (16) Más de \$11,050</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
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[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

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| <p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
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| <p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>Q11N. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (7) Unión civil (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |



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| <p>Q12BN. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____</p> <p>00 = Ninguno, (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? [Contar todos los hijos del entrevistado, que vivan o no en el hogar] _____ [VALOR MÁXIMO ACEPTADO: 20] [Sigue]</p> <p>(00 = Ninguno) [Pasa a VAC1] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] [Sigue] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] [Sigue]</p> | |
| <p>¿Cuántos hijos varones y cuántas hijas mujeres tiene?</p> <p>Q12M. [Anotar cantidad de hijos varones] _____</p> <p>Q12F. [Anotar cantidad de hijas mujeres] _____</p> <p>(888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (No tiene hijos) [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>VAC1. Pensando en las madres, padres o cuidadores de los niños y niñas que usted conoce en este vecindario/comunidad, ¿sabe si ellos cuidan que los niños y niñas tengan sus vacunas al día?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXINF1. Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas sobre el jefe o jefa de familia. Por jefe o jefa de familia nos referimos a la persona que más aporta o tiene la responsabilidad de mantener este hogar económicamente. ¿Es usted el jefe o jefa de familia?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXINF4. ¿El jefe/jefa de familia tiene Registro Federal de Causantes o RFC?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXINF5. ¿El jefe/jefa de familia tiene seguro social, cobertura México como ISSSTE, IMSS, seguro popular, seguro estatal?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXINF6. ¿La empresa o negocio en donde trabaja el jefe/jefa de familia es familiar?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable (Jefe/a de familia no trabaja) [NO LEER] [Pasa a MEXINF8]</p> | |
| <p>MEXINF7. ¿La empresa o negocio en donde trabaja el jefe/jefa de familia da facturas fiscales?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p> | |
| <p>MEXINF9. ¿En la empresa o negocio donde trabaja el jefe o jefa de familia a los empleados les pagan por nómina y les retienen impuestos o les pagan en efectivo sin comprobante?</p> <p>(1) Les pagan por nómina/retienen impuesto (2) Les pagan en efectivo sin comprobante (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER]</p> | |

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| MEXINF8. ¿El jefe de familia es miembro de algún sindicato? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-mexicana, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| [SE PREGUNTA A CADA ENTREVISTADO SÓLO UNO DE LOS TRATAMIENTOS. APLICAR CADA PREGUNTA ALEATORIAMENTE A 1/3 DE LA MUESTRA] | |
| EXPERIMENTO 1 - TRATAMIENTO 1 | |
| MEXIIET1. En México, existen diferentes comunidades indígenas. Por lo tanto, el censo de población pregunta a las personas sobre su identidad y su lengua para conocer más sobre las personas indígenas. De acuerdo con su cultura, ¿usted se considera indígena? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |
| EXPERIMENTO 1 - TRATAMIENTO 2 | |
| MEXIIET2. En México, existen programas especiales del gobierno para las personas indígenas. Algunas escuelas dan preferencia a los indígenas. Otros programas del gobierno dan servicio médico y materiales de construcción a las personas indígenas. De acuerdo con su cultura, ¿usted se considera indígena? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |
| EXPERIMENTO 1 - TRATAMIENTO 3 | |
| MEXIIET3. En México, existe mucho maltrato y discriminación hacia las personas indígenas. Además, los indígenas tienen menos educación e ingresos que el resto de la población y muchos de ellos viven en la pobreza. De acuerdo con su cultura, ¿usted se considera indígena? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] (999999) Inaplicable [NO LEER] | |
| WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| I2. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Facebook? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |



| | |
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| I3. ¿Tiene usted cuenta de Twitter? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
| I4. ¿Usa usted Whatsapp? (1) Sí (2) No (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |

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| G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
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| PR1. La vivienda que ocupa su hogar es... [Leer alternativas]: (1) Alquilada (2) Propia, [Si el entrevistado duda, decir “totalmente pagada o siendo pagada a plazos/cuota/hipoteca”] (3) Prestada/cedida o compartida (4) Otra situación (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] | |
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

| | | | | | | |
|---|-----------|------------|------------|----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| R3. Refrigerador (nevera) | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R4.Teléfono convencional/fijo/residencial (no celular) | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R4A. Teléfono celular (acepta smartphone/ teléfono inteligente) | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar “uno”.] | (0) No | (1) Uno | (2) Dos | (3) Tres o más | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R6. Lavadora de ropa | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R7. Horno microondas | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R8. Motocicleta | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde |
| R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R15. Computadora (acepta tableta/iPad) | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R18. Servicio de Internet desde su casa (incluyendo teléfono o tableta) | (0) No | | | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe | (988888) No responde |

| | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------|---|---|
| R1. Televisión | (0) No [Pasa a SENT1] | (1) Sí [Sigue] | [NO LEER] (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | [NO LEER] (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |
| R16. Televisor de pantalla plana | (0) No | (1) Sí | (888888) No sabe [NO LEER] | (988888) No responde [NO LEER] |

SENT1. Sólo una pregunta más: ¿quién cree usted que nos envió a hacer esta encuesta?

[NO leer alternativas; Aceptar SOLO una respuesta]

| | | | |
|--|--------|------------------------------------|--------|
| El Gobierno Nacional | 1 | Una organización de investigación | 14 |
| El Gobierno Estatal | 2 | Un periódico/medio de comunicación | 15 |
| El Gobierno Municipal/Local | 3 | Una universidad | 16 |
| La Presidencia de la República | 4 | Una empresa privada | 17 |
| El Congreso | 5 | Un organismo internacional | 18 |
| El INEGI – Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía | 6 | Dios, o una organización religiosa | 19 |
| La Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público | 7 | DATA-OPM | 20 |
| La Secretaría de Educación | 8 | LAPOP/ Barómetro de las Américas | 21 |
| La Secretaría de Economía | 9 | Universidad de Vanderbilt | 22 |
| La Secretaría de Gobernación | 10 | El Gobierno de los Estados Unidos | 23 |
| Otra oficina de gobierno | 11 | Donald Trump | 24 |
| Una ONG | 12 | Nadie | 66 |
| Un partido político | 13 | Otro | 77 |
| No sabe [NO LEER] | 888888 | No responde [NO LEER] | 988888 |

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

| | | |
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| FORMATQ. Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico (1) Papel (2) ADGYS (3) Windows PDA (4) STG | | |
| COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada] | | |
| Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____ | | |
| [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, complete las siguientes preguntas] CONOCIM. Usando la escala que se presenta abajo, por favor califique su percepción sobre el nivel de conocimiento político del entrevistado (1) Muy alto (2) Alto (3) Ni alto ni bajo (4) Bajo (5) Muy bajo | | |

| DESORDEN FÍSICO ¿Hasta qué punto diría usted que el área alrededor del hogar del encuestado/a está afectada por...? | Nada | Poco | Algo | Mucho |
|--|------|------|------|-------|
| IAREA1. Basura en la calle o acera | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |

| | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| IAREA2. Baches en la calle | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| IAREA3. Viviendas que tienen barrotes o rejas de metal en las ventanas (incluye reja perimetral, alambre de púas y similares) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |

| DESORDEN SOCIAL ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el área alrededor del hogar del encuestado/a está afectada por...? | Nada | Poco | Algo | Mucho |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| IAREA4. Jóvenes o niños en las calles sin hacer nada, que andan vagando | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| IAREA6. Gente borracha o drogada en las calles | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| IAREA7. Personas discutiendo de una forma agresiva o violenta (hablando en un tono de voz muy alto, con enojo) | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |

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| TI. Duración de la entrevista [<i>minutos, ver página # 1</i>] _____ | |
| INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____ | |
| SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer | |
| COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo. | |

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| <p>Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.</p> <p>Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____</p> <p>Firma del supervisor de campo _____</p> <p>Comentarios: _____</p> <p>[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____</p> <p>[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____</p> |
|---|




Tarjeta A


| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|---|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Izquierda | | | | | Derecha | | | | |



Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C






Tarjeta N

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medio ambiente es prioridad | | | | | Crecimiento económico es prioridad | |

Tarjeta D





Tarjeta H

Brasil

China

Corea del Sur

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

Rusia

Singapur

Venezuela

Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$1,100
- (02) Entre \$1,100 - \$1,600
- (03) Entre \$1,601 - \$2,100
- (04) Entre \$2,101 - \$2,450
- (05) Entre \$2,451 - \$2,900
- (06) Entre \$2,901 - \$3,300
- (07) Entre \$3,300 - \$3,650
- (08) Entre \$3,651 - \$4,150
- (09) Entre \$4,151 - \$4,450
- (10) Entre \$4,451 - \$4,750
- (11) Entre \$4,751 - \$5,350
- (12) Entre \$5,351 - \$6,200
- (13) Entre \$6,201 - \$7,050
- (14) Entre \$7,051 - \$8,400
- (15) Entre \$8,401 - \$11,050
- (16) Más de \$11,050

Tarjeta ED

[NO MOSTRAR, solo para el encuestador]

| | | | | | | | |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|
| [Usar tarjeta “ED” como apoyo. NO mostrar la tarjeta al encuestado] ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, bachillerato/profesional técnico/media superior, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla a continuación para el código] | | | | | | | |
| | 1^o | 2^o | 3^o | 4^o | 5^o | 6^o | |
| Ninguno | 0 | | | | | | |
| Primaria | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| Secundaria | 7 | 8 | 9 | | | | |
| Bachillerato/Profesional Técnico/Media Superior | 10 | 11 | 12 | | | | |
| Universitaria | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18+ | |
| Superior no universitaria | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | | | |
| No sabe [NO LEER] | 888888 | | | | | | |
| No responde [NO LEER] | 988888 | | | | | | |

Tarjeta Q3C

[NO MOSTRAR, solo para el encuestador]

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[NO Leer alternativas]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

[Si el entrevistado dice "Cristiano" o "Evangélico", sondee para verificar si es católico (opción 1), pentecostal (opción 5) o evangélico no-pentecostal (opción 2). Si no está seguro, seleccione (2).]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Santería, Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lanza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(77) Otro

(888888) No sabe

(988888) No responde



Paleta de Colores

| | |
|-----------|--|
| 1 |  |
| 2 |  |
| 3 |  |
| 4 |  |
| 5 |  |
| 6 |  |
| 7 |  |
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| 11 |  |

The AmericasBarometer

The AmericasBarometer is a regional survey carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). LAPOP has deep roots in the Latin America and Caribbean region, via public opinion research that dates back over four decades. Its headquarters are at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. The AmericasBarometer is possible due to the activities and support of a consortium of institutions located across the Americas. To carry out each round of the survey, LAPOP partners with local individuals, firms, universities, development organizations, and others in 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have three core purposes: to produce objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion; to build capacity and strengthen international relations; and to disseminate important findings regarding citizens' experiences with, assessments of, and commitment to democratic forms of government.

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. Other institutions that have contributed to multiple rounds of the survey project include Ciudadanía, Environics, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme. The project has also benefited from grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Open Society Foundation. Collaborations with university partners who sponsor items on the survey also sustain the project. In this most recent round, those contributors included Dartmouth, Florida International University, the University of Illinois, the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello in Venezuela, and several centers at Vanderbilt University.

The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was carried out via face-to-face interviews in 27 countries across the Latin America and Caribbean region, and via the internet in Canada and the U.S. All samples are designed to be nationally representative of voting-age adults and electronic devices were used for data entry in all countries. In all, more than 43,000 individuals were interviewed in this latest round of the survey. The complete 2004-2016/17 AmericasBarometer dataset contains responses from over 250,000 individuals across the region. Common core modules, standardized techniques, and rigorous quality control procedures permit valid comparisons across individuals, subgroups, certain subnational areas, countries, supra-regions, and time.

AmericasBarometer data and reports are available for free download from the project website: www.LapopSurveys.org Datasets from the project can also be accessed via "data repositories" and subscribing institutions at universities across the Americas. Through such open access practices and these collaborations, LAPOP works to contribute to the pursuit of excellence in public opinion research and ongoing discussions over how programs and policies related to democratic governance can improve the quality of life for individuals in the Americas and beyond.

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VANDERBILT

