



THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN JAMAICA AND IN THE AMERICAS, 2016/17

A Comparative Study of
Democracy and Governance

Anthony A. Harriott, Ph.D
University of West Indies, Mona

Balford A. Lewis
University of West Indies, Mona

Nicole L. Hinton
LAPOP Caribbean Coordinator and Report Editor
Vanderbilt University

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.
LAPOP Director and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University



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THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES
AT MONA, JAMAICA

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A Comparative Study of Democracy and Governance

By:

Anthony A. Harriott, Ph.D.
Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government,
UWI, Mona

Balford A. Lewis
Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government,
UWI, Mona

Nicole L. Hinton
LAPOP Caribbean Coordinator and Report Editor
Vanderbilt University

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.
LAPOP Director and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University

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THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES
AT MONA, JAMAICA

INVESTIGATIVE TEAM

Investigation

Professor Anthony A. Harriott, PhD.

Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, UWI, Mona

Balford A. Lewis,

Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, UWI, Mona

Fieldwork Coordination

Balford A. Lewis

Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government, UWI, Mona

Research and Editorial Support

Paul Martin, PhD.

General Coordination and Report Editor

Nicole Hinton

Research Coordinator, LAPOP

Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. USA

LAPOP Director and Series Editor

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.

Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA

Errata: A small error was found throughout the section entitled *Community and Police Response to Allegations of Human Trafficking* in part IV of Chapter 5 of the printed version of this report.

Text and captions of that section have been edited in this electronic version.

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the AmericasBarometer. While its primary goal is to represent the voice of the people on a broad range of important issues, the AmericasBarometer also helps guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region. In numerous ways, the AmericasBarometer informs discussions over the quality and strength of democracy in the region.

USAID officers rely on the AmericasBarometer to identify priorities and guide program design. The surveys are often used in evaluations, by comparing results in selected areas with national trends and/or by comparing data across time. The AmericasBarometer alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their country as compared to other countries.

At every stage in the development of the AmericasBarometer, the team realizes another objective of the project: building capacity. In the course of the project, experienced and expert individuals in the field of survey research work alongside and transfer knowledge and skills to students, local researchers, and others. These opportunities come through discussions over the development of the core questionnaire, cross-national collaborations on sample design, training sessions for fieldwork teams and office personnel involved in the surveys, and workshops and presentations on the analysis and reporting of the public opinion data.

The AmericasBarometer is coordinated by a team at Vanderbilt University, which hosts the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and the researchers who devote significant portions of their time to this project. At the same time, the AmericasBarometer is a collaborative international project. In the first stage of each round, LAPOP consults with researchers across the Americas, USAID, and other project supporters to develop a core questionnaire. For each individual country survey, subject experts, local teams, and USAID officers provide suggestions for country-specific modules that are added to the core. In each country, LAPOP works with local teams to pre-test the questionnaire in order to refine the survey instrument while making sure that it is written in language(s) familiar to the average person in that country. Once the questionnaire is completed, it is programmed into software for fieldwork and each local survey team is trained according to the same exacting standards. The sample is designed and reviewed by LAPOP and local partners and programmed at this stage. At that point, local teams conduct interviews in the homes of selected respondents across the Latin America and Caribbean region. Throughout the process, LAPOP and these teams stay in constant contact to monitor quality, security, and progress. Once the data are collected, LAPOP audits and processes the files while engaging in conversations with a consortium of individuals and institutions, including USAID, over plans for the dissemination of those data, findings, and reports. A broad network of individuals across the region contributes to the reports that are developed after each round of the AmericasBarometer.

The collaborative nature of the AmericasBarometer improves the project and makes it possible. While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, each round of the project is supported by numerous other individuals and institutions. Thanks to this broad and generous network of supporters, the AmericasBarometer provides a public good for all those interested in understanding and improving democratic governance in the region.

USAID is grateful to the LAPOP team, who assiduously and scrupulously works to generate each round of the AmericasBarometer under the leadership of Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister (Director), Dr. Noam Lupu (Associate Director), and Dr. Mitchell Seligson (Founder and Senior Advisor). We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current students located at Vanderbilt and throughout the hemisphere, to the local fieldwork teams, to all those who took the time to respond to the survey, and to the many expert individuals and institutions across the region that contribute to and engage with the project.

Christopher Strom
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prologue: Background to the Study

Elizabeth Zechmeister, Ph.D.
Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Political Science
& Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

and

Noam Lupu, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Political Science
& Associate Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

Vanderbilt University

The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing the public's experiences with democratic governance. The survey permits valid comparisons across individuals, subnational and supranational regions, countries, and time, via a common core questionnaire and standardized methods. Comparative research on democratic governance is critically important to understanding today's realities, anticipating key political challenges, and identifying actionable policy solutions. Around the globe, and in the Americas, democracy is on the defensive against public disillusionment with what it has delivered. Geographically, this round marks a significant expansion of the project into the Caribbean, a region often overlooked and understudied in survey research. Methodologically, this round marks our transition to using electronic devices for fieldwork, and with this the ability to take quality control to new levels, in every country in the project. Substantively, this round of the AmericasBarometer marks the first time in the history of the project in which we detect noteworthy and troubling declines in the average citizen's support for democracy on a number of key indicators.

The 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer is the seventh regional survey produced by LAPOP and the largest to date, covering 29 countries across the Americas. The round began in early 2016 in seven Caribbean countries and data collection in the 29th country concluded in the spring of 2017. The full dataset for this round includes over 43,000 interviews, conducted based on national sample designs and implemented with the assistance of partners across the region.

With roots in survey research dating back to the 1970s, LAPOP has been housed at Vanderbilt University since 2004. LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer were founded by Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, who currently serves as Senior Advisor to LAPOP. The LAPOP research organization includes eight professional staffers, two research fellows, 15 affiliated Ph.D. students, a number of undergraduate students in various roles, and a roster of collaborators and sponsors from within Vanderbilt and across universities, NGOs, and other institutions throughout the Americas.

The AmericasBarometer consists of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in 11 countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the

hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer was implemented in 28 countries. The 2016/17 round marks the largest in scope to date, covering 29 countries across the Americas.

LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets available for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org, free of charge to all. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the project's supporters, who are acknowledged on pages that follow.

In undertaking the AmericasBarometer, our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens, NGOs, public officials and their governments, the international donor and development communities, journalists, and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics and professional associations, while also ensuring that these reports are accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction, sample design, data collection, and reporting.

With respect to questionnaire construction, our first step in developing the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and across countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some prior core items in the 2016/17 survey. To do so, we solicited input from partners across the region and we carefully considered the trade-off between losing a time series for one round versus making space for new content. This process resulted in a first draft of a reduced questionnaire; we then proceeded to gather input into new common content, country-specific questions, and other revisions.

To develop new common content, we solicited input from subject, country, and AmericasBarometer project experts across the Americas. A number of these individuals generously agreed to participate in a set of planning caucus advisory committees organized by topic, and these groups developed proposals for questionnaire revision. A list of these advisory committee members appears below. Based on ideas developed during this period of activity, we conducted a series of question wording and ordering experiments, with support from the Research in Individuals, Politics, & Society lab at Vanderbilt. We presented some of these results to collaborators convened in New York City for a meeting in the spring of 2016. Following discussions at that meeting and additional sponsor requests and input, we then further revised the questionnaire. All new items were piloted in qualitative pre-tests across the Americas. Questionnaires from the project are available online at www.LapopSurveys.org and at the end of each report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology and also with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common "study information sheet" and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project took and

passed certified human subjects protection tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the anonymity guaranteed to each respondent.

With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common strategy to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a typical minimum of 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In 2016, we introduced an exception to this rule with the inclusion of six countries that are part of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS); in these cases, the sample sizes are approximately 1,000. To ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective, we stratify countries by major sub-regions and urban/rural divides, and we use a frequency matching approach to the selection of individuals by gender and age. Detailed descriptions of all samples are available on our website.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and expand the use of technology in the field. For the first time, the 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer deployed electronic devices (tablets and phones) for data collection in 100% of the countries surveyed. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field decreases errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track the progress of the survey in real time, down to the timing and location of interviews (which are monitored but not recorded in public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy). For the 2016/17 round, we developed and transferred to partner firms a set of quality control procedures that we call the Fieldwork Algorithm for LAPOP Control over survey Operations and Norms (FALCON ©). Via FALCON, teams working on LAPOP projects are able to verify the location of interviews within programmed geo-fences around work areas; verify interviewer identities via photos and signatures; and verify the quality of the interview via audio and timing files. FALCON allows fieldwork to be reviewed in real time, rather than after fieldwork has been completed, and this means that errors can be more effectively and efficiently remedied, resulting in higher quality data. We believe FALCON represents a revolutionary advance in technologically sophisticated and scientifically rigorous survey research, and we are committed to continuing to transfer knowledge of our advances to others.

Another innovation introduced into the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer is the LAPOP Automated Response Tracker (ART), which facilitates accurate recording of participation rates. While participation rates are useful metadata in public opinion studies, the onerous burden placed on field teams to systematically record this information can lead to errors, and incomplete or poor quality information. ART overcomes these challenges by routinizing the tracking of survey participation. By requiring enumerators to record this information electronically at the time of each contact attempt, we are able to facilitate and assure high quality data on participation rates.

Standardization is critical to the value of a comparative project, and one way we ensure that we meet this objective is by training all fieldwork teams in AmericasBarometer project protocol. Each local fieldwork team is trained by a LAPOP staffer or an experienced affiliate. Our interviewer manuals are available on our website.

Security issues in the field are a constant concern for all those who work in the field of public opinion research. Shifting patterns of crime, insecurity, and instability in certain parts of the region have brought about additional challenges to the safety of personnel working on the project. We take these issues very seriously and, as in past rounds, we worked with local teams during the course of fieldwork for the AmericasBarometer 2016/17 to develop security protocols and, in a

small number of cases, to make substitutions to the original sample for locations that teams on the ground identified as especially dangerous.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we continued our practice of making book-length reports, infographics, and presentations based on survey data accessible and readable to the lay reader. This means that our reports make use of simple charts to the extent possible. Where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of regression analysis, we present results in easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2016/17 round were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled senior data analyst, Dr. Carole Wilson, which allow them to create these graphs using Stata. The analyses in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design and report on the uncertainty around estimates and statistical significance. We include in Appendix A in this report a note on how to interpret the output from our data analyses.

The AmericasBarometer regional and country reports represent the product of collaborations among LAPOP researchers and a set of LAPOP-affiliated experts. The regional (comparative) report focuses on general trends and findings with respect to issues in democratic governance. As in recent years, we were fortunate to work with Dr. Ryan Carlin, Dr. Gregory Love, and Dr. Matthew Singer on the regional report. Selected content from the regional report appears in our country reports. In the country reports, the focus turns toward country-specific trends and findings, yet we often refer to the comparative public opinion landscape. We do so because comparisons across countries frequently provide important insight into country-specific findings. We are grateful to the roster of experts who contributed to the 2016/17 series of country reports. In cases in which USAID commissioned the report, we solicited – and benefited from – USAID input into the selection of topics and feedback on a draft of the report. All AmericasBarometer regional and country reports can be downloaded free of charge from our website.

Each round of the AmericasBarometer involves a multi-year process and the effort of thousands of individuals across the Americas. In each country, we partner with a local firm and we further benefit from input from researchers, country experts, sponsors, and subject experts located in institutions across the Americas. This network is critical to the quality of the AmericasBarometer and its availability as a public good. On behalf of this entire team, we express our hope that the reports and data generated by this project reach and are useful to the broadest possible number of individuals interested in and working on democracy and development.

Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and a significant number of countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by the individual members of the public in the Americas, who, as survey respondents, either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

The AmericasBarometer is made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both institutions. Over the course of this most recent round of the AmericasBarometer, our main contact at USAID, Vanessa Reilly, transitioned to a new position. Chris Strom stepped in as our new point of contact on the project. Both Vanessa and Chris have had a positive impact on the project, especially by amplifying its value and use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt, the Dean of the College of Arts & Science, Dr. Lauren Benton, and the Chair of the Political Science Department, Dr. David Lewis, have championed and supported the project in important ways. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, the Center for Latin American Studies, the office of Sponsored Programs Administration, and the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected efforts associated with the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer came from collaborations with organizations and institutions that include Ciudadanía (Bolivia), the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA), Dartmouth University, Environics (Canada), Florida International University, the Inter-American Development Bank, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Foundation (in partnership for this project with Igarapé), the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the United Nations Development Programme, the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (Venezuela), the University of Illinois, and at Vanderbilt University: the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Office for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion, the Research on Individuals, Politics, & Society Lab, and the Trans-Institutional Programs (TIPs) initiative (and the TIPs-Brazil project). We thank the individuals behind all of these collaborations for their work to support, shape, and sustain the AmericasBarometer. On the page that follows, we present the logos of some of the partner institutions that were core to the success of this most recent round of the AmericasBarometer.

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AT MONA, JAMAICA



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Liz Zechmeister
Noam Lupu

Nashville, Tennessee
August 2017

2016/17 AmericasBarometer Planning Caucus Advisory Committee Members

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*denotes committee chair

Introduction

Democracy is on the defensive in the Americas and around the world. In a number of places across the Americas, countries have been coping with security and economic crises, and scandals emanating from governments and parties. Among the mass public, scepticism is brewing over the extent to which democracy can succeed in delivering on citizens' expectations and improving the quality of their daily lives. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer taps into this simmering frustration and permits it to be studied in comparative perspective across population subgroups, countries, and time. The survey also documents some notable signs of resilience. In this same vein, the survey reveals important nuances in challenges to democratic governance across a heterogeneous region. In this way, the AmericasBarometer provides a refined tool with which to make the types of diagnoses and distinctions that are so important to designing and implementing effective policy.

A core focus of the AmericasBarometer is citizens' evaluations of "democratic governance." Democratic governance refers to a system of politics and policy in which citizens' direct, indirect, and representative participation is privileged and enabled via basic freedoms, with the goal of ensuring that states are held accountable for their actions. As the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2013) has defined it, "Democratic governance is governance that takes place in the context of a democratic political system, which is representative of the will and interests of the people and is infused with the principles of participation, inclusion, and accountability" (p. 37). The appeal of democratic governance is derived from its potential to improve the quality of citizens' lives by facilitating efforts to decrease corruption, increase economic development (and decrease poverty), and build strong communities. The legitimacy of democratic governance hinges, at least in part, on how well it delivers on these expectations (Booth and Seligson 2009). For this reason, taking stock of its successes and short-comings requires assessing citizens' varied experiences and evaluations of democratic governance.

In the latest in a series of region-wide reports on the AmericasBarometer, we examine public support for the institutions at the core of democracy, the extent to which citizens feel their countries are succeeding in supplying the basic liberties required of democratic governance, citizens' experiences and evaluations regarding corruption and police-community relations, their assessment of lottery scamming, human trafficking, and marijuana decriminalization, and their general democratic orientations. To do so, we make use of data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer, often in combination with data from prior rounds of the study. Within the report, main findings are presented at the outset of each chapter, and in this introduction, we present a preview of these core results. Though Chapters 1, 2, and 6 provide some detail on important variation across countries while highlighting Jamaica, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, cover exclusive issues for Jamaica.

To begin, Chapter 1 considers support for the abstract concept of democracy and two of its most fundamental components: elections and parties. One of the most striking findings in this chapter is a significant decline in the extent to which the public in the region, as well as in Jamaica, agrees that democracy, despite its flaws, is better than any other form of government. Since 2012, support for democracy in Jamaica decreased around 18 percentage points, and Jamaicans with the lowest levels of wealth report the lowest support for democracy at 47.9%. Reinforcing the scepticism of the value of democracy versus other forms of rule, in 2016/17 compared to 2014, the average member of the public is more likely to support extralegal actions (i.e., coups) to remove elected

leaders from office, and the story is not different for Jamaica. Support for a military coup takeover increased by 7.2 percentage points in Jamaica in 2017. The decline in support for the most basic premises of modern democracy – that the system in the abstract is ideal and that elections are the only legitimate way to alternate power – are found alongside low levels of trust in elections and voter participation in Jamaica.

Basic liberties, such as freedom of the media, expression, and fundamental human rights, are critical to the public's engagement and inclusion in the democratic political system. Chapter 2 focuses on the degree to which the public perceives these basic freedoms to be restricted. As this chapter and Chapter 6 argue, restrictions in basic liberties may undermine motivations to participate and erode individuals' support for the incumbent administration and the democratic system more generally. In 2017, 47% of Jamaicans believe there is very little freedom of the press. Likewise, 61% of Jamaicans perceive that there is very little freedom of expression, and a higher proportion feels there is very little freedom to express political opinions without fear. Reports of deficits in the supply of basic liberties are even greater when the focus is on human rights protection: on average, more than three fourths of Jamaicans state that human rights are insufficiently protected in their country. Thus, while democracy promises a set of basic freedoms, a large proportion of Jamaicans perceive that it is falling short in this regard.

Democratic governance and public confidence in democratic institutions are stronger to the extent that public officials and politicians refrain from corrupt behaviours. The AmericasBarometer asks individuals whether a public official recently has requested a bribe, a phenomenon we call “corruption victimization” because such requests violate the right of individuals to receive fair and equal treatment by those who officiate government programs and policies. Chapter 3 documents that, in a twelve-month period in Jamaica, one in ten adults, on average, is asked to pay at least one bribe. This proportion has not changed much since 2014. While it is encouraging that corruption victimization has not increased on average, the fact that neither has it declined shows us that, once it takes root, corruption is difficult to eradicate from a political system. When evaluating political leadership with respect to corruption, we see widespread cynicism: most Jamaicans believe that a significant number of politicians are corrupt. Countries in which citizens report more political corruption are also those with higher levels of corruption victimization. They also tend to be those in which corruption scandals have plagued the highest levels of office in recent times. By calling out these violations, the public has the potential to provide an important check on corruption's pervasiveness within the system. This chapter also examines views on anti-corruption agencies in Jamaica, and finds that overall, Jamaicans' evaluations of the performance of these agencies is positive.

Chapter 4 takes up the topic of police and community relations. Many initiatives in Jamaica attempt to tackle the longstanding conflictual relationship between police and citizens, and the analysis in Chapter 4 provides a picture of citizen's attitudes on the current situation. Citizen trust in police falls just below the mid-point at 43.9 points, leaving a middling impression of the work of the police. However, 64.8% of Jamaicans report that police come to their neighbourhood to help, and even more (74%) report that the interests of community members align with those of the police. Moreover, Jamaicans, on average, are willing to work with police to combat crime, and think that a closer working relationship between police and citizens would reduce crime. These results present a promising opportunity for addressing the escalating crime rate in Jamaica through strengthening citizen-police relations.

Chapter 5 turns our focus to lottery scamming, human trafficking, and marijuana decriminalization. A clearer understanding of citizens' perspectives on these issues is critical in developing efforts and refining policies and programmes for addressing these problems. Lottery scamming and the trafficking of persons remain significant forms of organized crimes facing authorities in Jamaica. Further, they are two core problems on which the government has been collaborating with external partners, notably the United States, in efforts to reduce their prevalence and impact. Among the significant findings on lottery scamming, the recent AmericasBarometer study finds that the majority of Jamaicans (75%) believe that it is a "very serious" problem in Jamaica. Regarding the severity of the problem in respondents' area of residence, persons in Cornwall consider scamming to be a much greater problem at the community level than those in all other areas in Jamaica. Also, heard or known arrests for scamming in Cornwall are three times greater than for all other counties. Furthermore, in contemporary times human trafficking has emerged as an area of significant concern. The vast majority of Jamaicans (88%) report that human trafficking is a moderate or serious problem for the country. In the case of marijuana decriminalization, the Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2015, relaxes prohibition on the substance for medicinal and research purposes, and the possession or use of specified small quantities for recreational use is no longer a criminal offence. Among those surveyed, almost 42% of respondents reported that they have previously used marijuana. Approximately 90% support its legalization for medical and research endeavours. Interestingly, most respondents expressed a belief that use of the drug among the populace will increase as a result of the amended marijuana legislation.

Chapter 6 concludes the volume with an analysis of region-wide trends regarding two pillars of democracy: support for the political system and political tolerance. Over the years, LAPOP has hypothesized and found that democracy rests on firmer grounds to the extent that the following joint conditions are met: the public perceives the political system to be legitimate and it supports the right to participate of those who may hold diverging political views. In Jamaica, the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer detects an increase in system support, with respect of institutions and support of the political system improving the most. Though system support, when examining regionally, is below the midpoint in Jamaica. On average, political tolerance of the rights of dissenters has increased. We suspect that public frustration with middling performance levels of the political system breeds support for the rights of those most critical of the regime to participate in politics. Given the nature of these shifts, the region as a whole has not slipped toward a set of orientations that might place democracy at risk, and instead, Jamaica has increased in the orientation of "stable democracy." LAPOP views democracy at risk when large numbers of individuals in the public lack both system support and political tolerance. In Jamaica, 22% of individuals display that high-risk orientation in their responses to our survey. A higher proportion of Jamaicans report high system support and high political tolerance, a profile conducive to democratic stability. In fact, in 2017, this "stable democracy" democratic orientation in Jamaica has rebounded from the level to which it fell in 2014 (17%); it has now doubled to 33%, a figure similar to what we found in 2012 (37%). To be sure, democracy in Jamaica would be more robust and secure if more than one in three Jamaicans expressed high support for both their political system and high levels of political tolerance. Yet, we interpret these 2016/17 findings to suggest that, with the exception of an extreme case such as Venezuela, democratic breakdown is not a widespread prospect in the region.

Democracy in the Latin America and Caribbean region is facing a critical set of challenges, from low public trust in elections, parties, and political leadership to deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties, the rule of law, citizen security, and robust service provision. As the chapters within note,

and as is evident in the AmericasBarometer datasets and the country-specific reports based on this project, experiences of individual countries vary significantly one to the other; each component of democratic values and governance described in this report, and more, can be analysed in greater detail using these resources. Yet, overall, we can conclude that the public's continued support for democratic governance depends crucially on whether the region's political systems can deliver on its promises. While the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer identifies a number of concerning trends and outcomes in the typical citizen's experiences and evaluations of democratic governance in the region, it also finds some important signs of resilience in that democratic orientations conducive to stable democracy have shown a slight rebound. This willingness to engage and these commitments to certain core values are assets on which policymakers can draw as they identify ways to bolster and maintain democratic governance in Jamaica and across the region.

Chapter 1.

Support for Electoral Democracy in the Americas

Mollie J. Cohen with LAPOP

I. Introduction

Since the Third Wave democratic transitions of the 1970s and 1980s, electoral democracy has been the status quo system of government in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region. More than 100 (mostly) free, competitive, and fair elections for executive positions have been held across the region since the 1980s, with many of them observed by the Organization of American States, international NGOs, and in-country governance organizations. In Latin America and the Caribbean, elections have become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996) when it comes to ascension to political leadership.

Yet, scholars have recently pointed to a democratic “recession” in the developing world, and in the LAC region specifically (Diamond 2015; Puddington 2012; but see Levitsky and Way 2015). Leaders in several countries have curtailed citizens’ rights and press freedoms (see Chapter 2 of this report). A string of corruption scandals¹ across the LAC region has fueled citizens’ already-high skepticism of politicians. Presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have repeatedly sought to extend their time in office beyond established term limits (BBC 2015; Guardian 2016a; Sonneland 2016).

The challenge of high quality governance has, in some contexts, been exacerbated by economic slowdown and persistent criminal violence.² For example, the scarcity of basic goods in Venezuela provoked violent street protests in 2014 (Rodríguez 2016). In 2017, the incumbent administration took arguably illegal steps to tighten the Chavista regime’s hold on power (BBC 2017; Rodríguez and Zechmeister 2017). Viewed by citizens as a “self-coup”, this action sparked renewed street protests. The military responded by cracking down on protestors, resulting in numerous deaths (Cawthorne and Ulmer 2017). As another example, high levels of criminal violence in Mexico, Bolivia, and much of Central America, combined with low confidence in law enforcement, have led some citizens to take the law into their own hands (Bateson 2012; Zizumbo 2017). This summary execution of suspected criminals without trial undermines the state and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Zizumbo 2017).

¹ Several high-impact scandals have roots in *The Panama Papers*, leaked in April 2016, which implicated politicians across the region in the largest global corruption scandal in history (see *Guardian* 2017). The *lavajato* scandal in Brazil led to the ouster of the president, the investigation of more than a hundred politicians (including her replacement), and arguably aggravated already high perceptions of corruption in Brazil. Even prior to these political bombshells, Layton (2014) made the case that mass protest participation among Brazilians in the wake of the World Cup was driven in large part by perceptions of corruption.

² In the AmericasBarometer 2016/17, 59% of AmericasBarometer respondents in the “LAC-21” countries (This group only includes countries that the AmericasBarometer has surveyed consistently since 2006: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) said that the national economy has gotten worse – the poorest national economic perceptions observed since the study’s inception in 2004 and a notable increase (ten percentage points) since 2014.

In short, the gradual decay of basic liberties, episodes in which political corruption is exposed and made salient, and the economic and security crises that compound barriers to high quality governance suggest that citizens in the Americas may have good reason to be disillusioned with democracy. This chapter assesses public support for the *minimal* requirements of democracy – that is, the presence and persistence of elections as the means to select governing representatives – in Jamaica and, more generally, in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

II. Main Findings

This chapter assesses public support for the minimal requirements of democracy in Jamaica and in the LAC region. Some key findings are:

- Across the region, support for democracy is significantly lower in 2016/17 than in previous years. In Jamaica, support for democracy also decreased. Jamaicans with lower levels of education or wealth report lower levels of support for democracy.
- In 2017, support for executive coups in Jamaica continued to be on the rise since 2010. There is less support for coups among those with higher levels of education and wealth.
- Trust in political parties increased in Jamaica by 9% in 2017. Less educated Jamaicans are more likely to trust political parties over Jamaicans that are more educated. In addition, age cohorts who are 36 and older increasingly express trust in political parties.
- Partisan affiliation in Jamaica remained the same in 2017.

III. The Basic Tenets of Electoral Democracy

This chapter examines support for tenants of minimal or electoral democracy in the LAC region and in Jamaica.³ “Minimalist” definitions of democracy argue that the presence of competitive elections (i.e., with a true possibility of alternations in power) is sufficient to identify a democracy.⁴ For example, in his classic work, Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy as, “...that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions... by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (p. 260). Huntington (1991) similarly defines democracies as systems in which “powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes” (p. 7). Diamond (1999) calls systems with “regular, competitive, multiparty elections with universal suffrage” electoral democracies (a minimal level of democracy, which he contrasts with “liberal” democracies, p. 10).⁵

³ This chapter uses the terms “democracy” and “electoral democracy” interchangeably.

⁴ In contrast to this minimalist definition of democracy, “maximalist” definitions argue that the protection of civil liberties is necessary for democracy to flourish. Dahl (1971) theorized that inclusiveness, or public participation, and liberalization, or public contestation, are key features of a democracy, or “polyarchy” (p.7). Public contestation and participation include voting as *a minimum*, but also implicate a free press and citizen participation through non-electoral channels (e.g., protest). Later chapters in this report turn to the supply of civil liberties and quality governance – two key pieces of maximal definitions of democracy. This chapter focuses more narrowly on support for and attitudes around competitive elections, which all scholars agree are necessary, if not sufficient, for democracy.

⁵ Introducing participation requirements complicates the task of classifying electoral democracies. Around the world, many systems recognized as democratic have, or have had, limited access to the franchise. For

In seeking to measure “minimal” democracy, scholars often focus on the competitiveness of elections. Following Third Wave democratic transitions, several authoritarian states implemented elections to assuage public demand for democracy and to appease the international community’s demands to liberalize political institutions. However, elections in such contexts often take place on an uneven playing field. Entrenched incumbent rulers and dominant parties have been known to manipulate the rules of competition (e.g., by inconsistently applying electoral law for challengers versus incumbent candidates) and, in extreme cases, election outcomes (e.g., by outright fraud).^{6,7}

In short, minimal or electoral democracies are countries in which competitive elections are held, and have led (or are likely to lead) to alternation in power at the national level. In the years following Third Wave democratic transitions, the vast majority of executive elections in the LAC region have met this minimum standard of democratic competition. However, over the years and including in recent times, some presidents across the region have taken steps to consolidate power behind powerful parties and individuals. For example, presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have sought to extend or eliminate term limits (BBC 2015; *Guardian* 2016a; Sonneland 2016). Viewed in the context of minimal definitions of democracy, these steps have the potential to harm democratic governance by limiting the competitiveness of elections.

The legitimacy and integrity of elections have been repeatedly called into question in the region. In 2016, the Peruvian electoral court was accused of favouritism when it removed high-polling presidential candidates from contention for minor errors in campaign paperwork (Cohen 2016; RPP 2016). Nicaragua’s 2016 election was accompanied by accusations of fraud and an uneven playing field that favoured the incumbent party; the circumstances resulted in an election boycott by the opposition (and a landslide victory for the incumbent; see Baltodano 2016). Donald Trump has called into question the integrity of U.S. elections by repeatedly stating that he lost the popular vote due to fraudulent voting during the 2016 presidential contest (BBC 2016). In Ecuador’s 2017 runoff election, the losing opposition candidate argued that the election results had been manipulated and refused to concede, leading to mass street protests (BBC 2017). Finally, in Venezuela, incumbents associated with the Chavista regime have been accused of limiting opposition parties’ access to campaign resources and in 2016, the government cancelled gubernatorial elections in what some viewed as an attempt to stop the opposition from gaining power (Cawthorne 2016).

example, in the United States, felons are barred from voting in many instances and in Switzerland women were not able to vote until 1971. Yet, most scholars still classify the contemporary U.S. and pre-1971 Switzerland as electoral democracies. A second complication comes from the ‘universal suffrage’ requirement: Is it sufficient that all citizens have access to the franchise, or must all citizens participate via the franchise (i.e., through the implementation of mandatory voting, see Lijphart 1999)?

⁶ Scholars have termed these systems, where elections are held but where the possibility of alternations in power is limited, “competitive authoritarian” regimes (see, e.g., Levitsky and Way 2010).

⁷ In particular, once they have identified the presence of elections, scholars typically ask whether two or more viable partisan options are present and whether a system has produced an alternation in power in the executive branch to identify electoral competitiveness and distinguish democracies from non-democracies (see Przeworski 1991, Przeworski et al. 2000). Przeworski et al. (2000) indicate that post-transitional regimes must include the alternation of power, and treat systems where elections are held but incumbents never lose power as authoritarian (p.27).

None of these incidents signify the imminent downfall of democracy; yet, each serves as a reminder that electoral democracy does not always persist. Democracy has been the status quo political system in the Latin America and Caribbean region since the 1970s and 1980s, and since that time, scholars have debated whether and to what extent democracy has “consolidated” in these countries – that is, whether electoral democracy exists as “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996).⁸ At the core of democratic consolidation is the relative stability of the political system. Simply put, regimes that are “consolidated” are likely to persist in the future (Diamond 1994; Schedler 1998).⁹

The persistence of democratic institutions relies in large part on citizen attitudes. Indeed, by defining regime consolidation in terms of its status as “the only game in town,” scholars directly implicate citizens and allude to two distinct sets of attitudes. First, citizens in consolidated democracies must support democratic norms and institutions (e.g., democracy as an ideal; the peaceful transfer of power across party lines; free and fair elections). Second and equally important, citizens in consolidated democracies must reject replacing political leaders with means other than elections (e.g., via military coup).

The following sections assess the state of democratic consolidation in Jamaica by examining citizens’ support for democracy in the abstract and their rejection of coups.

Support for Democracy in the Abstract

To what extent do individuals in the Americas and in Jamaica believe that democracy is the best political system, and how does their support for democracy in 2016/17 compare to past years? Since its inception, the AmericasBarometer project has asked respondents across the Americas the following question assessing support for democracy¹⁰:

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Respondents provided an answer ranging from 1-7, with 1 signifying “strong disagreement” and 7 denoting “strong agreement.” Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of respondents in each country that reports support for democracy (values of five to seven on the seven-point scale). Responses range from a low of 48.4% in Guatemala to a high of 82.4% in Uruguay. The percentage of the public that supports democracy is highest in some of the region’s oldest and most stable democracies (Uruguay, Canada, Argentina, the United States, and Costa Rica), while support for democracy is notably lower in countries that have recently experienced democratic, political or security crises (e.g., Guatemala, Paraguay, Mexico, Haiti, and Honduras). Slightly more than half of

⁸ Discussions of “democratic consolidation” can be problematic, as they often assume that all countries transitioning from dictatorship, and indeed all countries that hold competitive elections, are moving toward “deepening” democratic quality, when this is not always the case (see, for example, Levitsky and Way 2012).

⁹ The term “democratic consolidation” has been used to describe the prevention of democratic breakdown and the degradation of democratic norms, as well as to denote the “deepening” of democracy (e.g., through the increased protection of civil and other liberties) (see Schedler 1998). As in defining electoral democracy, we define consolidation “minimally” (and, arguably, “negatively”), as the avoidance of regime breakdown.

¹⁰ This question is often referred to as a “Churchillian” question of democratic support, as it is derived from Winston Churchill’s oft-quoted speech from the House of Commons, in which he noted that, “...democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

citizens (55.8%) in Jamaica support democracy as the best form of government. Comparing its position regionally, Jamaica is in a mid to low position in the Americas.




Figure 1.1. Cross-National Support for Democracy

Figure 1.2 documents the level of support for democracy in Jamaica as it has changed across time. This and all other cross-time and sub-group analyses in this chapter use data from Jamaica only. Support for democracy declined significantly in 2014 from majority levels, and the downward trend continued in 2017, as shown in the figure.




Figure 1.2. Support for Democracy over Time in Jamaica

Who is most likely to support democracy? Figure 1.3 shows statistically significant relationships between five demographic and socio-economic subgroups (education, wealth, urban/rural residence, gender, and age) and support for democracy in Jamaica. In all such figures in this chapter, we only show relationships that are statistically significant with 95% confidence. If a category is excluded, this means that it does not significantly predict a particular dependent variable.¹¹

The figure shows that more educated and wealthier Jamaicans have higher levels of support for democracy. Nearly 68% of those with a post-secondary level of education or higher support democracy. Those in the lowest quintile of wealth have lower levels of support for democracy (46.9%) compared to those in the third, fourth, and fifth quintiles of wealth (55.7%, 58.4%, and 63%, respectively).

¹¹ There are no statistically significant relationships between support for democracy and gender, age, and place of residence (urban and rural). See regression results in the online appendix.




Figure 1.3. Demographic and Socio-Economic Correlates of Support for Democracy in Jamaica

Rules of the Game: Support for Coups under High Crime and Corruption

In addition to support for democracy in theory, acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town” is key to the stability and persistence of democratic governance. This means, in short, that citizens in democratic societies should not support military coups that replace the incumbent democratically elected government with military leadership. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer includes two items that tap participants’ hypothetical willingness to support a military takeover of the government. Half of respondents received the first of the following questions, while the other half was randomly assigned to receive the second:

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.

- (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified
- (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified

JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.

- (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified
- (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified

Figure 1.4 shows the percentage of respondents in each country that replied that they would support a military coup under each of these circumstances. Support for military coups under high levels of crime ranges from a low of 23.3% in the United States to a high of 59.3% of respondents in Jamaica. Support for coups under high corruption ranges from 23% in Argentina to 53.2% in both Costa Rica and Jamaica. Support for coups in Jamaica is consistently high compared to the rest of the region.




Figure 1.4. Support for Military Coups under High Crime and High Corruption

For cross-time, socio-economic, and demographic analyses, we assess support for military coups, generally, by creating an index of these two variables.¹² Figure 1.5 shows increasing support for

¹² In survey rounds when both questions were asked to all respondents, we generated an additive index, adding responses to both items and dividing through by two for each individual. In 2016/17, we proxy support for military coups, generally, with support for coups under either high crime or high corruption – whichever question the respondent received.

military coups in the last 10 years in Jamaica. In 2017, 56.4% of Jamaicans support this type of action.




Figure 1.5. Support for Military Coups across Time in Jamaica

Figure 1.6 shows support for military coups by demographic and socio-economic subgroups. There is less support for military coups among those with higher levels of education and wealth, urban residents, males, and older aged cohorts. Less than half of Jamaicans with post-secondary education levels, in the highest wealth quintile, or 56 years or older support a military coup takeover.




Figure 1.6. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Support for Military Coups in Jamaica

Support for Executive Coups

In addition to the questions discussed above, the AmericasBarometer in 2016/17 asked all respondents the following question, gauging support for executive coups – that is, the shutdown of legislative bodies by the executive branch:

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress/Parliament and govern without Congress/Parliament?

(1) Yes, it is justified (2) No, it is not justified

Because takeovers by the executive versus the military imply action by different government actors, we analyse these questions separately. Figure 1.7 shows the distribution of support for executive coups in very difficult times across countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2016/17. Support for executive coups across the region is substantially lower than support for hypothetical coups under high crime or high corruption, averaging 20.5% across the region. Support for executive coups is the lowest in Uruguay (8.7%) and support for executive coups is by far the highest in Peru (37.8%) – a country that experienced an executive coup in 1993. Comparatively, Jamaicans have middling to low support (18.4%) for a shutdown of legislative bodies by the executive branch.




Figure 1.7. Support for Executive Coups

While support for executive coups is lower than support for military coups under high crime or high corruption, Figure 1.8 shows that levels of support for an executive shutdown of the legislature doubled since 2010, with 18.4% of Jamaicans supporting a congressional shutdown.




Figure 1.8. Support for Executive Coups across Time in Jamaica

Figure 1.9 shows that among the demographic and socio-economic predictors of support for executive coups, those with post-secondary education (12.7%) have the lowest levels of support, and support is highest among those in the first wealth quintile (26.6%).¹³




Figure 1.9. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Support for Executive Coups in Jamaica

¹³ There are no statistically significant relationships between support for executive coups and gender, age, and place of residence (urban and rural).

On balance, these metrics of minimal support for democracy, support for democracy in theory and the iffy support of coups, suggest declining public support for democracy in the region. Support for democracy in theory, for example, declined in 2017. Additionally, levels of support for hypothetical coups, military and executive, increased in 2017 in Jamaica. Although these figures are noteworthy, they are also hypothetical, abstract, and general. While respondents express lower support for democracy on average, or more support for hypothetical coups, it is unclear from these analyses whether this overarching displeasure is reflected in opinions about institutions as they function in respondents' national political contexts. The remainder of this chapter turns to this question.

IV. Support for Democratic Institutions: Elections and Parties

Electoral democracy relies on citizen participation through elections: voters select their representatives and straightforwardly voice their preferences at the ballot box. Public trust and participation in these institutions are therefore important for understanding citizen support for democracy as it functions in the real world and, as well, serve as a signal of citizens' commitment to democracy (a foundational piece of democratic consolidation).

Voters select who governs through their participation in competitive elections. This process permits citizens an indirect role in policy-making under electoral democracy, which occurs "...through the competition and cooperation of elected representatives." (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76). Citizens' preferences are thus mediated through their interactions with political institutions (e.g., elections) and actors (e.g., politicians and parties) in a democracy. Citizen trust in the electoral process as clean, competitive, and fair is therefore foundational to democracy's legitimacy.¹⁴

For voters, democratic elections are an opportunity to punish or reward outcomes from the previous term, and to signal their prospective preferences (see, e.g., Ferejohn 1986; Lewis Beck 1986; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Powell 2000). For elections to produce winners and electoral mandates, some portion of the public must participate in them by voting.¹⁵ Around the world, scholars have observed inequities in who participates: abstainers are often less interested in and more alienated from politics than other citizens (see Karp and Banducci 2008; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014), and those who vote are wealthier and more educated than those who abstain (Carlin, Singer and Zechmeister 2015; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Nadeau et al. 2017).¹⁶

¹⁴ Scholars argue that trust in elections *among the losers* is potentially more important than democratic support among winners (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 2007).

¹⁵ There is some debate as to what the ideal rate of participation is. While some argue that full participation is a normative good (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997), others (e.g., Rosema 2007; see also Schumpeter 1942) argue that low electoral participation can signal citizen satisfaction with the status quo and may yield better representative outcomes (see also Singh 2016).

¹⁶ Several Latin American countries have sought to minimize these inequities and enforce a view of voting as both a right and a duty by implementing mandatory vote laws (Fornos et al. 2004). Mandatory vote laws arguably reduce unequal participation by income, and scholars have also suggested that compulsory voting can increase citizens' cognitive engagement (that is, their knowledge of and interest in politics, see Carlin and Love 2015; Singh 2015; Söderlund et al. 2011). However, increased turnout across demographic subgroups does not necessarily mean increased positive participation in elections. Voters in the LAC region

In short, citizens legitimate electoral democracy by trusting in elections as a mechanism to select leaders and by participating in elections. The following sections examine citizen trust and participation in elections in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the goal of better understanding support for electoral democracy in the region.

Trust in Elections

In 2004 and every round since 2012, the AmericasBarometer has asked individuals the following question:

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

Responses range from 1-7, with 1 indicating “no trust” and 7 denoting “strong trust.” Figure 1.10 shows the percentage of individuals who trust elections (values of five to seven on the seven-point scale) in each country where the question was asked in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer study. The percentage of respondents who report trust in elections ranges widely, from 18.5% in Haiti to 73% in Uruguay. There are no clear trends in the ranking of countries. For example, Nicaragua’s 2016 election was accompanied by accusations of fraud culminating in a boycott of the election by opposition parties; yet, trust in elections is fourth from the highest in the region in that country. In contrast, in Colombia, only 24% of respondents report trust in elections, although elections have been regularly certified as clean from fraud by international observers in recent years. Jamaicans have lower levels of trust in elections compared to the rest of the region.

regularly turn out and spoil their ballots to signal their discontent with status quo politics, and levels of spoiled voting are especially high where voting is mandated (Cohen 2017; Power and Garand 2007).




Figure 1.10. Percentage of Respondents Who Trust Elections

In Jamaica, an average of 31.8% of citizens trust elections, according to the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer (see Figure 1.12). Trust in elections was highest in 2012 at 43.6%, it declined substantially in 2014 to 24.5%, but increased slightly in 2017.




Figure 1.11. Trust in Elections over Time in Jamaica

In terms of who is most likely to trust elections, the results in Figure 1.12 show a positive relationship with age. The older cohorts have more trust in elections than the younger cohorts.¹⁷ Of Jamaicans aged 18-25 years, 23.9% trust elections, whereas 47.9% of Jamaicans 66 years or older trust elections.




Figure 1.12. Demographic Predictors of Trust in Elections in Jamaica

¹⁷ There are no statistically significant relationships between trust in elections and levels of education or wealth, gender, and place of residence (urban and rural).

Participation in Elections

In addition to supporting and trusting elections in theory, democracy requires citizen participation in elections to select winners. To measure electoral participation, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents in each country the following question:

VB2. Did you vote in the (first round of the) last **presidential/general elections** of (year of last presidential/general elections)?

- (1) Voted
- (2) Did not vote

Figure 1.13 shows the distribution of reported voter turnout in each of the countries in the study. Reported turnout ranges from 52.5% in the 2016 general election in Jamaica to 89.3% in Peru's 2016 general election.¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, reported turnout is the highest in countries where mandatory vote laws exist and are strictly enforced (Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador; see Fornos et al. 2004) and is substantially lower in countries where voting is voluntary (e.g., Chile, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Colombia).

¹⁸ As in most studies of electoral behavior, turnout is over-reported by several percentage points in the AmericasBarometer study. For example, official turnout in the first round Peruvian election in 2016 was 81.8% of eligible voters, and official turnout in the 2016 US elections was 60.2% of eligible voters. Turnout over-reporting can be caused by social desirability (voting is seen as normatively desirable, and interviewees lie to appear to be good citizens) and faulty memory (individuals do not remember what they did during the last election, so incorrectly guess that they turned out to vote).




Figure 1.13. Turnout across Countries

Who participates in elections in Jamaica? There are some interesting patterns in Figure 1.14. As education increases, voter turnout decreases. The reverse happens with age, as age increases, voter turnout also increases. In addition, females (56%) report a higher voter turnout rate compared to males (48.9%).¹⁹

¹⁹ There are no statistically significant relationships between voter turnout and levels of wealth and place of residence (urban and rural).




Figure 1.14. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Turnout in Jamaica

Less than 32% of respondents in Jamaica report trusting elections, which has been the status quo system for selecting leaders for well over 30 years on average across the region. This figure is somewhat disconcerting given elections' central role in democratic governance. Yet, citizens still participate in elections at high rates across the region. While turnout has decreased somewhat over time, more than 50% of voting-age individuals in Jamaica still report participating in recent presidential elections.

Trust in Political Parties

Citizens' preferences about policy are filtered not only through elections, but also through elected representatives and the political parties into which they are organized. The founders of the United States viewed the presence of "factions" as undesirable but inevitable in a republic (see Federalist No. 10). While parties are not mentioned explicitly in most countries' constitutions (Stokes 2002), scholars agree that party organizations are important for both politicians and voters. By organizing legislators into groups with similar policy preferences, parties are able to overcome coordination problems and enact legislation efficiently rather than building new coalitions for each piece of proposed legislation (Aldrich 1995). This has led some (see, e.g., Schattshneider 1967) to argue that representative democracy needs political parties, especially institutionalized parties (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995), to work.

Parties also serve an important role for citizens. By organizing politics on policy lines, parties enable voters to identify a "team" that aligns with their preferences. At their best, then, parties facilitate citizen participation in the democratic process and ensure high quality representation.

However, political parties are not always associated with positive outcomes. At their worst, strong parties divide politicians and citizens into fiercely oppositional groups, resulting in legislative gridlock. On the other hand, parties are not able to effectively organize the political space when they lack leadership and staying power. High turnover (or 'volatility') in the partisan options competing over time is especially relevant in some of Latin America's weak party systems, where levels of partisan replacement over time are notably high (see, e.g., Cohen, Salles, and Zechmeister 2017; Roberts 2014). Further, the perception that politics is a dirty business and parties protect their members who engage in corruption might lead to relatively low trust in parties in an age of high salience corruption scandals (Canache and Allison 2005).

This section examines citizen interactions with political parties, specifically trust and participation in political parties, in the Americas. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer study has asked participants the following question:

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

Response categories ranged from 1 to 7, with one signifying no trust and seven indicating high trust in political parties. Figure 1.15 shows the percentage of respondents that reported trusting parties (values of five and higher). The percentage of participants reporting trust in political parties ranges from 7.5% in Peru to 35% in Nicaragua. Jamaica is sixth from the top of the chart with 22.5% of Jamaicans trusting political parties.




Figure 1.15. Percentage that Trusts Political Parties across Countries

Figure 1.16 shows that trust in political parties increased in Jamaica in 2017 to 22.5% after there was a sharp decrease in 2014. Levels of trust in 2017 are similar to 2006 when the survey first asked this question.




Figure 1.16. Trust in Political Parties over Time in Jamaica

With respect to who is more or less likely to trust political parties, Figure 1.17 shows those with no or primary levels of education over those with secondary or more education are more likely to trust political parties in Jamaica. There is also a positive relationship with age and trust in the political parties. Trust in political parties increases among Jamaicans who are 36 and older.




Figure 1.17. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Trust in Political Parties in Jamaica

Comparatively, Jamaicans have greater levels of trust in political parties than other countries in the region, but fare much lower in rates of voter turnout. In Jamaica, confidence in political parties is still much lower than the trust found in elections and participation in said elections, which mirrors the regional trend as well.

Partisanship

Trust in parties is a relatively low cost expression of an individual's commitment to the party system. It is substantially easier to express support for parties in general than it is to express an identification with a partisan organization. The following section examines this higher-cost variable, attachment to a partisan organization. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer surveys have asked respondents the following question:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes (2) No

Figure 1.18 shows that levels of partisanship in the Americas vary widely, from 5.9% of Guatemalans reporting partisanship to 44.4% of Uruguayans. As one might expect, levels of partisanship are highest in some of the countries where party systems are quite stable, with the same parties and coalitions competing over time (e.g., Uruguay, the Dominican Republic) and are lowest in some countries where parties change substantially across elections (e.g., Guatemala, Peru). However, there are some notable exceptions to this rule: for example, both Chile and Mexico, two of the region's most stable party systems, have some of the lowest rates of partisanship in the region. This may be due to citizens' feelings of alienation from the party options and specifically the belief that the parties are too stable and do not represent the relevant spectrum of voter preferences (see, e.g., Siavelis 2009). Comparatively, Jamaica ranks as one of the top countries in the region for partisanship, with 41% of Jamaicans identifying with a political party.




Figure 1.18. Partisanship across Countries

Figure 1.19 shows rates of partisan identification in Jamaica over time. The highest level of partisanship was found in 2008 at 58.5%. There was a substantial decline in 2010 to 42.9%. This is approximately where those identifying with a party remain through 2017.




Figure 1.19. Partisanship across Time in Jamaica

Who reports belonging to political parties? Figure 1.20 shows the demographic and socio-economic features associated with partisanship in Jamaica. Those with post-secondary levels of education identify less with a political party more so than Jamaicans with secondary education levels. We also see a positive linear relationship with age and partisanship, though this trend does not hold for those aged 66 years or more.




Figure 1.20. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Political Partisanship in Jamaica

V. Conclusion

How robust is support for electoral democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2017? The analyses in this chapter provide some reasons to be concerned about the depth of citizens' commitment to democracy as a system for the selection of political leaders. On average across the region, support for democracy in the abstract declined precipitously in the last two years, while support for executive coups increased substantially. These downward trends in support for basic democratic values suggest that the public has become more cynical in their views of electoral democracy as an ideal.

When it comes to attitudes toward institutions that are central to representative democracy, public confidence and engagement stayed constant for some while it increased for others. Support for democracy decreased in Jamaica, and support for coups among Jamaicans increased. Looking at the data from an optimistic perspective, we note that trust and participation in elections remained relatively stable from 2014 to 2017, though still quite low in Jamaica. Moreover, only two out of five individuals in the Latin America and Caribbean region expressed confidence in elections. Clearly, there is room for improvement. Efforts to make such improvements might benefit from the prioritization of some countries over others: in Colombia, Brazil, and Haiti, less than 25% of the mass public reports trusting elections. Trust in political parties is even lower and, further, has been declining. In this latest round of the AmericasBarometer, fewer than one out of five individuals in the Latin American and Caribbean region reported trust in political parties. In 2016/17, the average adult in the region is substantially less willing to express an identification with a political party: whereas about 36% identified with a political party in 2014, today that figure is only 27%.

It is worth noting that low support for core democratic institutions is not the only way to measure citizen commitment to democratic values and practices. While public opinion on the indicators explored in this chapter is low and/or has declined, Chapter 6 shows that one measure of commitment to democratic values, tolerance of the rights of minority groups and viewpoints, increased in the Latin America and Caribbean region in 2016/17. This may, in fact, be a silver lining to citizen frustration with elections and the menu of options they offer: when individuals find their confidence in democracy, elections, and parties degraded, they may become more supportive of political participation by a broad swath of the public.

Chapter 2.

The Supply of Basic Liberties in the Americas

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and LAPOP

I. Introduction

Access to a diversity of information, freedom of expression, and the right to participate are critical to democracy. These basic liberties are fundamental to citizens' ability to form, express, and insert their preferences into government (Dahl 1971, pp. 2-3; see also Beetham 2005, Bollen 1991, Bollen and Paxton 2000, Diamond and Morlino 2004, among others).¹ In other words, the supply and protection of civil liberties are foundational to the functioning of responsive representative democracy.

Public space for the open exchange of socio-political information has been eroding in a number of countries in the Latin American region, among other places around the world (Cooley 2015). The reasons are varied and, further, reports suggest significant differences across countries and over time. One source of information on the state of basic liberties is the Freedom House organization. Freedom House asks experts to assess the extent to which countries provide a range of civil liberties, including freedoms to voice opinions, to participate in social and political life, and to access fair treatment by public institutions.

Freedom House aggregates these basic liberties assessments into a Civil Liberties rating. Since 2004, the year LAPOP's AmericasBarometer was launched, Freedom House has downgraded the Civil Liberties ratings of seven out of 32 Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries.² In other words, just over one-fifth of the LAC region has witnessed a decrease in the supply of basic liberties over the last 14 years. And yet other countries in the region have not experienced this same negative trajectory with respect to their Civil Liberties score. Importantly, expert ratings are not based on the experiences of the average citizen. In fact, we know little about how the average citizen experiences and perceives the supply of basic liberties in the Americas.

The question at the core of this chapter is the following: To what extent do citizens of the region feel that their political systems fail to supply a sufficient degree of freedom of the media, of expression, of political expression, and of human rights? While this question focuses our attention on deficiencies in basic liberties, it is also possible for individuals to perceive there to be too much freedom in one or more of the aforementioned areas. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer anticipated this by allowing individuals to respond in this way. These data are presented in some figures in the chapter, but the principal focus here is on the extent to which the public finds there to be a deficit in the supply of basic freedoms. As an additional analysis at the end of the chapter, we examine

¹ There are many other positive externalities of a free media and freedom of expression; see discussion in Färdigh (2013).

² Source: Freedom House. Analysis is based on subtracting the average Civil Liberties rating for each country across 2004-2005 from the average rating across 2016-2017. The countries whose Civil Liberties ratings were downgraded in 2016-17 related to 2004-05 are the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Eight countries' ratings improved across this time span: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Haiti, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines.

the extent to which perceiving deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties (negatively) predicts presidential approval, electoral support for the incumbent, and individuals' inclination to participate in elections.

II. Main Findings

Analyses in this chapter reveal that many in the mass public in the Americas perceive significant deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties, from freedom of the press to the right to express opinions without fear to the protection of human rights. The chapter also documents significant variation across countries, individuals, and time. In the penultimate section, the chapter documents a robust negative relationship between perceptions of deficits in the supply of basic liberties and support for the incumbent administration. Not only are democracies stronger to the extent that governments oversee more open political spaces and more extensive liberties, but so too are the governments themselves. The main findings from the analyses in this chapter can be summarized as follows:

- In Jamaica, 47% of individuals report that there is very little freedom of the press. On average, 44% of individuals in the Americas believe there is very little freedom of the press.
- The extent to which citizens perceive there to be a deficit of freedom of the press varies significantly across countries; these country results correlate strongly with expert ratings regarding lack of freedom of the press.
- In Jamaica, 37.9% report trusting the media. Trust in the media has decreased in Jamaica across rounds of the AmericasBarometer.
- Nearly half the public in the Americas believes there is very little freedom of expression in their country; just over half believes there is very little freedom of political expression. In Jamaica, 61% report very little freedom of (general) expression and 66% report very little freedom of political expression.
- In Jamaica, 78% of individuals report that there is very little protection of human rights. On average across the region, nearly two-thirds of the public feels there is very little protection of human rights.
- To the degree that individuals perceive deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties, they express lower approval of the president and a lower likelihood of voting for the incumbent.

Considering Jamaica, who is more likely to perceive there to be serious limitations in the degree to which basic liberties are supplied? Among other findings, the analyses in this report document that:

- Jamaicans who have secondary levels of education are more likely to report that there is very little freedom of the press and very little protection of human rights, over Jamaicans with post-secondary levels of education.
- Those who have less wealth are more likely to report that there are deficiencies in the supply of freedom of the press.
- Jamaicans 66 years or older are less likely to report that there is very little freedom of political expression than those who are younger.

III. The Media

Freedom of the press has declined around the world over the last ten years. By 2016, only 31% of the world's countries were characterized as having a "free" press by the Freedom House organization (Freedom House 2017).³ The Americas are faring better than the global average: of 35 countries ranked by the Freedom House, 16 (46%) have "free" media environments.

However, freedom of the press is restricted (rated by the Freedom House as only "partly free") in 14 LAC countries (Antigua & Barbuda, Guyana, El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Colombia, Guatemala, and Paraguay), while in five countries – Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, Venezuela, and Cuba – the press is categorized as "not free" (Freedom House 2017). Moreover, across the Americas, concerns about the concentration of media ownership have become salient (see, e.g., Mendel, Castillejo, and Gómez 2017). In addition, in March 2017, the Inter American Press Association denounced a spectrum of hostilities, ranging from harassment to murder, toward those working to generate and distribute media in the region.⁴ Journalists have experienced alarming levels of violence, including homicide, especially in Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.⁵ Populist leaders have threatened and targeted critical members of the press in countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.⁶

Supply of Freedom of the Press

The 2016/17 round of the AmericasBarometer included several questions about citizens' perceptions of the media. One question asked about the extent to which there is very little, enough (sufficient), or too much freedom of the press.⁷ The wording was as follows:

	Very little	Enough	Too much
LIB1. Do you believe that nowadays in the country we have very little, enough or too much freedom of press?	1	2	3

On average across the Americas, 44% of the public reports that there is very little freedom of the press, 24% believes there is too much, and 32% of the public is content with the amount of freedom

³ The Freedom House categorizes countries' freedom of the press levels as "free", "partly free", or "not free" based on input provided by analysts who score countries on 23 questions that fall into three categories that capture the legal, political, and economic environment (see freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2017-methodology).

⁴www.clarin.com/mundo/sip-denuncio-amenazas-hostigamiento-prensa-america-latina_0_B1akCElpg.html

⁵ cpj.org/killed/

⁶www.washingtonpost.com/world/americas/in-tiny-ecuador-populist-president-restrains-press/2012/01/23/gIQAHBmQNQ_story.html?utm_term=.70b0c54a5d8e; cpj.org/2017/04/journalists-covering-venezuela-protests-harassed-a.php; freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/nicaragua; see also Freedom House (2017).

⁷ The question was not asked in the six OECS countries included in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer or in Guyana.

accorded to the press.⁸ These proportions vary significantly across countries, as shown in Figure 2.1. In Canada, only 11% report that there is very little freedom of the press, and nearly three out of every four individuals (74%) feel there is a sufficient amount of freedom of the press. At the other end of the figure, there are nine countries in which one out of every two individuals, or more, reports very little freedom of the press: El Salvador, Bolivia, Panama, Guatemala, Colombia, Mexico, Ecuador, Honduras, and Venezuela. In the latter case, Venezuela, 67% of the mass public perceives there to be very little freedom of the press.

Jamaica falls in the middle of the ranking of countries in Figure 2.1. Just under half (47%) of Jamaicans report that there is very little, 21% report that there is too much, and 32% report that there is a sufficient level of freedom of the press in their country.




Figure 2.1. Assessments of Freedom of the Press, 2016/17

To what extent do the mass public's perceptions correspond to expert ratings of the objective media environment in each country? This question is important to ask, because it is not a given that assessments made by scholars or other practitioners will match citizens' perceptions of the quality of democracy (Pinto, Magalhaes, and Sousa, 2012). To test for expert-citizen

⁸ Excluding the U.S. and Canada, across only those Latin American and Caribbean countries in which the question was asked, the mean proportion that reports there is very little, sufficient, or too much freedom of the press is 47%, 29%, and 25% (numbers do not add to 100 due to rounding).

correspondence, we examine the relationship between the percentage of citizens who indicate there is a deficit with respect to freedom of the press (reported in Figure 2.1) and the Freedom House freedom of the press rating for each country (data from Freedom House 2017; higher values indicate lower levels of freedom of the press). As Figure 2.2 shows, public perceptions concerning limits on the supply of freedom of the press tend to correspond fairly well to expert assessments of the extent to which freedom of the press is limited. The correlation between the two measures is moderately high: 0.76.




Figure 2.2. Correspondence between Expert Ratings and Proportion of Individuals Reporting Very Little Freedom of the Press in the Americas

In Jamaica, who is more likely to perceive there to be an insufficient degree of freedom of the press? To answer this question, we analyse the extent to which there are differences in the proportion of Jamaicans who report “very little” supply of freedom of the press, by core demographic and socio-economic subgroups: gender (female versus male), urban (vs. rural) residency, age, education, and wealth. As is the case throughout this chapter, only statistically significant differences are depicted in graphs; if one of these five demographic and socio-economic factors is not shown in a graph, it is not a statistically significant predictor.

As Figure 2.3 shows, place of residence, education, and wealth are correlated with the tendency to report that there is very little freedom of the press in Jamaica.⁹ Jamaicans living in rural areas (48.7%) tend, somewhat more than Jamaicans living in urban areas (46.5%), to feel there is very little freedom of the press. Of those with secondary levels of education, 49.7% think there is very little freedom of the press, while a lower percentage (39.7%) of those with post-secondary education report very little freedom of the press. Finally, those Jamaicans with the lowest level of wealth are more likely to report that there is very little freedom of the press.

⁹ There are no statistically significant relationships between little freedom of the press and gender and age. Results from this regression analysis are available in the online appendix.




Figure 2.3. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Perceiving Very Little Freedom of the Press in Jamaica

Trust in the Media

From 2004 to present day, AmericasBarometer surveys have asked about trust in the media using the question reproduced below. Respondents answered on a 1-7 scale where 1 indicates "not at all" and 7 indicates "a lot". For the sake of the analyses here, those who responded with a 5, 6, or 7 are coded as trusting, and those who give a response at the mid-point of 4 or lower are coded as not trusting the mass media.

B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?

Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of individuals in each country who trust in the media, according to data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer. Trust in the media is highest in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Costa Rica, and lowest in Haiti, Jamaica, Colombia, and the United States. Less than half of Jamaicans (37.9%) trust the media. At the individual level across the Americas as a whole, there is only a weak connection between trust in the media and belief that there is very little freedom of the press (Pearson's correlation=-0.04). This suggests that low levels of freedom of the press do not necessarily erode or otherwise correspond to public confidence in the media. It may be that, in many cases, citizens do not see the press as complicit in closing media space.




Figure 2.4. Trust in the Media by Country, 2016/17

According to the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer regional report by LAPOP, trust in the media, on average, in Latin America and the Caribbean has declined over time since 2004. What has happened to trust in the media over time in Jamaica? To answer this question, Figure 2.5 displays the average proportion of Jamaicans who trust the media across all rounds of the AmericasBarometer since 2006. More than half of Jamaicans trusted the media in 2006. However, trust in media steadily fell to a low of 37.9% in 2017, after a high of 58.3% in 2010.




Figure 2.5. Trust in the Media over Time in Jamaica

IV. Freedom to Express Opinions

Another fundamental freedom is that of individual expression. In the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer, respondents were asked to evaluate whether there is very little, enough, or too much freedom of expression in the country.¹⁰ The question was asked about both freedom of expression in general and about freedom of political expression, as follows:

	Very little	Enough	Too much
LIB2B. And freedom of expression. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3
LIB2C. And freedom to express political views without fear. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3

The next two sub-sections present results on these two measures. Once again, the discussion is focused around understanding to what degree and among whom there are perceptions of a deficit of liberty.

Perceptions of Freedom to Express Opinions in General

Nearly half the public in the Americas (49%) believes there is very little freedom of expression in their country. On the other hand, 34% report that there is a sufficient degree of freedom of

¹⁰ As with all questions in the LIB series, the question was not asked in the six OECS countries or in Guyana.

expression, and 17% say there is too much.¹¹ Of course, these averages mask significant cross-national variation.

Figure 2.6 shows the proportion of individuals who give each assessment – very little, sufficient, or too much – for each country in which the question was asked in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer. As with freedom of the media, the country with the smallest number reporting “very little” freedom is Canada, where just 14% report that there is a deficit with respect to freedom of expression in the country. Once again, perceptions of deficits in liberty are also comparatively low in the United States and Uruguay: 19% and 23%, respectively, feel that there is very little freedom of expression. In contrast, in 12 countries, more than 50% of people report that there is very little freedom of expression: Panama, Peru, Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, Ecuador, Mexico, El Salvador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Honduras. In Jamaica specifically, 61% report very little freedom of expression, 24% report sufficient levels, and 15% report too much freedom of expression.




Figure 2.6. Assessments of Freedom of Expression, 2016/17

¹¹ These values are calculated including the U.S. and Canada; for the LAC region (the LAC-21, minus Guyana), 52% of individuals report very little, 31% report sufficient, and 17% report too much freedom of expression.

Perceptions of Freedom to Express Political Opinions

Freedom to express political opinions is particularly important in a democracy. The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer therefore asked a second question about whether citizens feel free to express political opinions without fear.¹² On average across all of the Americas, 54% believe that there is very little freedom of political expression in the Americas, while 32% believe there is sufficient, and 14% believe there is too much of this type of liberty.¹³

Figure 2.7 presents a side-by-side comparison of the Jamaicans public's assessment of the amount of freedom of general expression and freedom of political expression. As the figure shows, Jamaicans report, on average, less freedom to express political opinions without fear (66.2%), in comparison to general opinion expression (61.1%).




Figure 2.7. The Supply of Freedoms of Expression in Jamaica

Figure 2.8 shows the proportion of individuals in each country who report that there is very little, sufficient, or too much freedom to express political opinions. Not surprisingly, there is some similarity to what we found in analysing the general expression measure. For example, once again, reports of very little freedom are lowest in Canada, the United States, and Uruguay. In 13 countries, more than 1 out of 2 (that is, more than 50%) of individuals report that there is a deficit of freedom to express political opinions without fear: Panama, Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, Jamaica, Honduras, Ecuador, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Colombia. It is noteworthy that Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala are three of the countries that have experienced extraordinarily

¹² The question was not asked in the six OECS countries or in Guyana.

¹³ If the U.S. and Canada are excluded, the figures for the LAC-21 region (minus Guyana) for very little, sufficient, and too much freedom of political expression are 57%, 28%, and 15%, respectively.

high levels of threats and violence (including homicide) targeted at individuals associated with the media.¹⁴




Figure 2.8. Assessments of Freedom of Political Expression, 2016/17

Considering public opinion in Jamaica, are some individuals more likely than others to express that there is an insufficient degree of freedom to express political views without fear? Analysis of the data reveals significant differences by level of education and age.¹⁵ Figure 2.9 displays these results. Considering education levels, on average, those who have post-secondary education are somewhat less likely to report that there is very little freedom of political expression compared to those with secondary education. In addition, Jamaicans 66 years or older are significantly less likely to report that there is very little freedom of political expression than those who are younger.

¹⁴ See, e.g., freedomhouse.org/article/persecution-and-prosecution-journalists-under-threat-latin-america

¹⁵ We do not find significant results for a test of urban (vs. rural) place of residence, gender, or wealth as predictors of this variable.




Figure 2.9. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Reporting Very Little Freedom of Expression in Jamaica

V. Human Rights

While concerns about deficiencies in levels of freedom of the press and of expression are elevated in the Americas, data from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer reveal that concerns about human rights are even more pronounced. To gauge the public's assessment of the supply of human rights protection, individuals were asked the following question:

	Very little	Enough	Too much
LIB4. Human rights protection. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3

Across the Americas, on average, 64% of the public reports that there is very little protection of human rights in their country. Put differently, nearly two out of every three individuals in the Americas believes that general human rights are insufficiently protected in their country. Only 27% report that there is a sufficient level of protection of human rights, and just 9% report that there is too much protection of human rights.¹⁶

¹⁶ If the U.S. and Canada are excluded, the values in the LAC-21 region (minus Guyana) for the percent believing there is very little, sufficient, or too much protection of human rights are 67%, 23%, and 9% (values do not add to 100 due to rounding).

Figure 2.10 shows the results for each country on this measure. In Canada, only 19% of individuals report that there is very little protection of human rights in the country. The United States and Uruguay are next, with 37% and 45% respectively reporting very little in terms of protection of human rights. While these three countries have clustered in the lower end in similar graphs presented earlier in this chapter, these values nonetheless underscore the fact that far fewer individuals – in general – report that there is a sufficient amount of protection of human rights. In the vast majority of cases (all but four countries), more than 50% of the population reports that there is a deficit in human rights protection in their country. Jamaica is second from the bottom, just above Haiti, with 78% of Jamaicans reporting that there is very little protection of human rights.




Figure 2.10. Assessments of Protection of Human Rights, 2016/17

Figure 2.11 presents statistically significant differences by key subgroups in Jamaica. Those with primary and secondary education are more likely to report that there is a deficit with respect to protection of human rights than those with post-secondary education. Those within wealth quintiles 4 and 5 are less likely to report that there is very little in terms of human rights protection in their country compared to those in wealth quintile 3.




Figure 2.11. Demographic and Socio-Economic Predictors of Reporting Very Little Protection of Human Rights in Jamaica

VI. Deficit of Basic Liberties Index

Large numbers of individuals across the Americas express concern that there is very little in the supply of basic liberties, from freedom of the press to freedoms of expression to the protection of human rights. At the same time, there is significant variation across countries. In some countries, a minority expresses concern that there is a deficit of a given freedom, while in others it is an overwhelming majority. In this section, the public's assessments regarding the supply of liberties are condensed into a summary "basic liberties deficit" index. Continuing the focus on those who report that there is an undersupply of liberty, this index is generated by adding together – at the individual level – reports that there is "very little" (versus any other response) for each of the four basic liberties measures.¹⁷ Those additive scores are then scaled on the index to run from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates that an individual responded that there is "very little" in the supply of all 4 basic liberties examined in this chapter – media, general expression, political expression, and human rights protection. At the other end of the index, a score of zero indicates that an individual did not report that there is very little of any of these basic liberties. Figure 2.12 shows the mean scores for each country on this summary index.

¹⁷ The construction of this index is justified by the fact that the measures "hang" together well; the alpha statistic is 0.69 for the four dichotomous measures for the pooled data including the U.S. and Canada.




Figure 2.12. Basic Liberties Deficit Score, 2016/17

The “Basic Liberties Deficit” Index captures the degree to which a country’s populace is discontent (perceives very little) with respect to the supply of basic liberties. The scores in Figure 2.12 range from a low of 14.9 degrees in Canada to a high 69.1 degrees in Venezuela. In the majority of countries – Nicaragua, Panama, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Jamaica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, and Venezuela – the mean degree of perceived inadequacy in the supply of basic liberties is above the mid-point (>50) on the 0 to 100 scale.

Does a deficiency in the supply of basic liberties have consequences for individuals' assessments of the government and their engagement in politics? Mishler and Rose (2001) argue and find evidence that the supply of liberties is related to regime support, so there is reason to expect such a connection here. The creation of the Basic Liberties Deficit index permits individual-level analysis of the extent to which deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties are, in this case, related to presidential approval and voting intentions. In this section, we conduct analyses focused on the data from the Jamaica 2017 AmericasBarometer survey. In LAPOP's regional report for the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer, the analyses are conducted for the region as a whole; the results there show that, across the region on average, deficits in basic liberties predict lower support for the executive.

In Jamaica, deficits in basic liberties are strongly (and negatively) related to executive approval. Figure 2.13 shows a line graph of the relationship between the Basic Liberties Deficit Index and Executive Approval in Jamaica. The figure documents that perceptions of deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties are strongly and negatively related to presidential approval. Moving from perceiving there to be no deficiencies (a minimum score on the summary index) to deficiencies across all four types of liberties predicts a decrease of more than 7 units of executive approval.




Figure 2.13. Basic Liberties Deficit and Executive Approval in Jamaica

If perceiving widespread deficits in basic liberties affects executive approval, we might also expect this to predict vote intentions (see Power and Garand 2007). The AmericasBarometer asks respondents for their vote intention, if an election were held that week. The principal options, which are analysed here, are to not vote (i.e., abstain), to vote for a candidate associated with the incumbent, to vote for an opposition candidate, or to nullify/invalidate the vote. Because this variable has four outcome categories, it is appropriate to analyse it using a multinomial logistic regression. Figure 2.14 presents the change in predicted probabilities for the independent variables included in this analysis – the five demographic and socio-economic variables assessed throughout this chapter and the basic liberties deficit measure – from the regression analysis. For

each variable on the y-axis, the figure shows the predicted change in the probability of observing each outcome – abstain, vote incumbent, vote opposition, nullify vote.¹⁸




Figure 2.14. Basic Liberties Deficit and Vote Intention in Jamaica, 2017

Figure 2.14 documents that, compared to Jamaicans who do not perceive a deficit in basic liberties, those who perceive a maximum degree of deficit have a ten percent lower probability of voting for a candidate associated with the government in office. The perception of a significant and wide deficit in the supply of basic freedoms tends to motivate people in the opposite direction of supporting the government of the day.

VII. Conclusion

The public perceives significant deficits in the supply of basic liberties across the Americas in general and in Jamaica, specifically. The citizens' perspective mirrors expert ratings: reality on the ground is much as it is described by those who are tracking the extent to which basic liberties – freedom of the media, of expression, and general human rights – are respected in the Americas. This was noted within the chapter, when comparing the public's assessments of deficiencies in the supply of freedom of the press and the Freedom House's scores on the same topic (see Figure 2.2). This conclusion also holds when considering the broader Basic Liberties Deficit Index (a 0-100 measure of the mass public's assessment of the extent to which basic liberties are under-supplied). The Basic Liberties Deficit Index and the Freedom House's Civil Liberty Rating (where higher scores reflect lower amounts of liberty) for the countries analysed in this chapter are robustly connected; the Pearson's correlation between the two is 0.73.

¹⁸ All other variables are held constant at their means as each probability is predicted.

As this chapter has documented, there is significant variation in citizens' experiences with the supply of basic liberties across countries in the Americas and across sub-groups in Jamaica. With respect to countries, there are some countries in which the mean on the Basic Liberties Deficit Index is quite low; among these countries are Canada, the United States, Uruguay, and Costa Rica (see Figure 2.12). On the other hand, the public reports widespread deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties in a number of countries, including Bolivia, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, and Venezuela. Jamaica is not far from countries reporting deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties. When considering subgroups, those with low levels of education are substantially more likely to feel there is an insufficient supply of freedom of the press and of expression.

Deficiencies in the supply of basic liberties matter. An adequate supply of basic liberties is necessary for citizens to deliberate and engage in politics. As citizen engagement in politics is fundamental to modern representative democracy (see the discussion in Chapter 1 of this report), so too are civil liberties critical to democracy. Deficits in the supply of basic liberties matter because they affect individuals' evaluations of the political system and their willingness to engage in it (see, e.g., Mishler and Rose 2001). As this chapter has demonstrated, those who perceive higher deficits in the supply of basic liberties report more negative evaluations of the executive and are more likely to report an intention to vote against the incumbent. The more a government succeeds in maintaining open political spaces, the more positive citizens' orientations are toward it.

It may also be that perceptions of too much liberty matter. As noted at the start of this chapter, a detailed analysis of those who report that an over-supply of any particular type of freedom is not within the scope of this chapter's core objectives. However, it is important to keep in mind that, in a number of cases, there are non-trivial minorities in the public who express concern that there is too much of a particular liberty. In Jamaica, for example, 28% of individuals report too much freedom of the press, 15% report too much freedom of political expression, and 14% report too much human rights protection. One might wonder whether these perspectives represent a threat to the full exercise of democratic rights by others in the country. To address this question, we examined – for the Latin America and Caribbean region – the extent to which the tendency to report that there is “too much” of a particular freedom is associated with lower degrees of tolerance for the rights of regime critics to participate in politics.¹⁹ In brief, in three of the four cases (freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and freedom of political expression), the analyses reveal that those who perceive too much freedom are distinctly less tolerant than those who perceive there to be a sufficient amount of that freedom.²⁰ In short, there is reason to be concerned not only about the degree to which the public perceives deficits in the supply of basic

¹⁹ The political tolerance measure is an additive index based on the degree to which individuals disapprove or approve of the right of regime critics to exercise the right to vote, the right to participate in peaceful demonstrations, the right to run for office, and the right to make speeches. This index served as the dependent variable in four regression analyses. In each, we predicted political tolerance with the gender, urban (vs. rural) place of residence, education, age, wealth, country dummy variables, and dummies variables for those who said there was “too little” and those who said there was “too much” of a given freedom (the comparison category is those who responded “sufficient”). The analyses are available in the online appendix to LAPOP's 2016/17 AmericasBarometer regional report.

²⁰ Interestingly, those who perceive there to be too little freedom of expression (general or political) are also less tolerant as well, but only at the slimmest of margins, compared to those who report that there is a sufficient supply of that liberty. In short, while statistically significant, there is not a substantial difference between those who report very little and those who report sufficient freedom of expression in these analyses.



liberties, but also with respect to the proportion of the public that believes there is too much freedom.

Chapter 3.

Citizens' Opinions on Corruption and Anti-Corruption Agencies in Jamaica

Balford A. Lewis and Anthony A. Harriott

I. Introduction

In Jamaica, anti-corruption efforts have prevailed as a 'good governance' imperative for a number of years. These policy and programmatic efforts rest on the premise that extant levels of corruption are an 'obstacle' to meaningful and sustainable national development (World Bank, 2015). Corruption weakens the institutional foundation on which economic growth, social justice, and political stability depend and, where it persists as an endemic condition, it invariably causes a distortion of development priorities and outcomes. Furthermore, it undermines the rule of law and citizens' right to fair and equal treatment before the law and due process. Irrespective of its form and scope, corruption is presumed to generate outcomes that are pernicious to the wellbeing of society. And needless to say, the more pervasive the problem the more 'corrosive' its impact on societal institutions.

During the period under review, the press has been active in exposing some alleged grand corruption in the state and government. Also notable are the activities of the anti-corruption entities which are the focus of attention in sections of this chapter. The Office of the Contractor General (OCG), and the Auditor General's Department (AGD) remain active in similarly highlighting some of the instances of maladministration and abuses of power by state and government actors. Examples of these actions include the investigation of the St. Ann Parish Council, as well as a first time contractual arrangement between the Ministry of National Security and a privately owned entity, for the latter to procure used vehicles for the Jamaica Constabulary Force. In addition, investigations by the Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) of senior state administrative actors in the Manchester Parish Council in mid-2016 was an unusual measure for a police unit¹, a move seen by some as a welcomed, starting signal toward efforts of tackling grand corruption.

In this effort to better understand and treat the problem in Jamaica, we seek to determine the nature and extent of corruption, firstly, in terms of citizens' perception of its prevalence among the nation's political leaders. Then we estimate the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens' direct and self-reported personal experiences with certain corrupt acts or proposals in their dealings with public officials. Further examination of the problem includes a more rigorous analysis of the data, including the development and testing of regression models, with the aim of identifying the factors that might influence both perceptions of corruption and citizens' likelihood of being a participant in corrupt dealings.

¹ The Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) Act was passed by the Jamaican House of Representatives in January 2018. This Act will establish an independent body to fight crime and corruption in Jamaica, transforming MOCA into an elite law-enforcement investigative agency, operating autonomously of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF).

II. Main Findings

On questions pertaining to citizens' attitudes to corruption and anti-corruption agencies, the main findings in the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer for Jamaica are as follows:

- The belief that politicians are corrupt is near total in its prevalence. Some 97% of those surveyed believe Jamaican politicians are involved in some form of corruption. Three out of four Jamaicans feel that half or more of their politicians are corrupt.
- There is no change in the rate of corruption victimization when results of the 2017 survey are compared to those of the 2014 round. One in ten Jamaicans reported that they have been subjected to corruption within the past 12 months.
- Men are two times more likely than women to be solicited for bribes, as well as younger persons are more likely than those in the older age cohorts.
- Tolerance for bribery has declined in Jamaica over time; the percentage of individuals who find bribery to be justified decreased in 2017 relative to 2014.
- Average levels of trust in the major governmental anti-corruption agencies range from 46 to 59 points on a 0-100 point scale. The Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) enjoys the highest level of trust.
- Trust in the Office of Utilities Regulation, the Office of the Contractor General, and the Independent Commission of Investigations increased between 2014 and 2017.
- Jamaicans' evaluation of the performance of state anti-corruption agencies is positive overall, with between 58% and 71% of individuals reporting that they are "very" or "somewhat" satisfied.
- As the major civil society anti-corruption organization in Jamaica, the National Integrity Action (NIA) is reasonably well known, with 47% of Jamaicans reporting that they have heard of the NIA. Of those who have heard of the organization, 82% are "very" or "somewhat" satisfied with their work.

III. The Problem of Corruption in Jamaica

Cross-national research initiatives examining the problem of corruption have been consistent in categorizing Jamaica as a country that is seriously afflicted by corruption, at levels that place it in the middle of the pack in the low-performing Americas region.² Transparency International (TI) assigns participating countries a rating on its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) based on "the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians." On this index, Jamaica has been rendered a 'highly corrupt' designation every year since it first participated in these TI surveys in 2002. In 2016, Jamaica's score on the Corruption Perceptions Index was 39 out of 100. This measure is based on perceived levels of public sector corruption on a scale from 0 to 100, with zero being highly corrupt, and 100 being very clean. On the basis of this score, Jamaica was ranked 83rd out of 176 countries included in the index in that year (Corruption Perceptions Index, 2016). As shown in Table 1, Jamaica's rank has remained somewhat stable in

² See https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/corruption_perceptions_index_2016

recent years, varying from 87 in 2010 to 83 in 2016. The exception in rank happened in 2015 when Jamaica was 69th and the corresponding CPI score was at its highest, 41.

Table 3.1. Transparency International's CPI and Country Rank, Jamaica 2010 - 2016

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
CPI Score	33	33	38	38	38	41	39
Rank	87	86	83	83	85	69	83

Of relevance also are findings reported in Transparency International's 2017 study, *People and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean*, which examines survey data regarding experiences with and perceptions about corruption across 20 countries³ (Pring 2017). In that survey, when asked about personal experiences with corruption,⁴ 21% of Jamaicans reported having paid a bribe in the past 12 months. This score was relatively low compared to other LAC region countries, as Jamaica was ranked fourth best in this measure, and better than the region's average 'bribe-paying rate' of 29%. With respect to perceptions of corruption, Jamaica was ranked the sixth most corrupt country, based on the percentage of people who thought that the level of corruption had increased over the past 12 months (Pring 2017).⁵ Sixty-eight percent of Jamaicans reported that corruption had "increased somewhat" or "increased a lot" in the past 12 months.

Admittedly, high levels of corruption perception might not necessarily be indicative of widespread actual corruption. Nonetheless, the perception of the integrity of a country's political and other public officials is a critical requirement for good democratic governance. In this regard, corruption perception has routinely been a topic of interest in the AmericasBarometer series of studies.

In order to evaluate citizens' perception of the prevalence of corruption among politicians in Jamaica, responses to the following question are analysed:

EXC7NEW. Thinking of the politicians of Jamaica... how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) None	(2) Less than half of them	(3) Half of them
(4) More than half of them	(5) All	

As the results in Figure 3.1 indicate, 97.1% of those surveyed believe that some politicians are involved in corruption. Three out of four Jamaicans feel that half of politicians or more are corrupt.

³ Surveys were administered in 20 countries, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

⁴ "How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift or provide a favour for: a teacher or school official; a health worker or clinic or hospital staff; a government official in order to get a document; a government official in order to receive [utilities] services; a police officer; or a judge or court official?"

⁵ Respondents were asked, "In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in this country increased, decreased, or stayed the same?"




Figure 3.1. Perceptions of the Prevalence of Corruption among Politicians in Jamaica

IV. Measuring Corruption Victimization

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and validated in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, to avoid ambiguity we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as this: "Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in public schools, at work, in courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption is most frequent. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of crime victimization, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The complete series of items that was used to determine the extent of citizens' experience with corruption is shown in the grid below. Items EXC11 to EXC16 are applicable only to subjects who are employed, who have had contact with the specified agencies, or who have accessed particular government services, while EXC2, EXC6, and EXC20 were posed to all respondents.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...			
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the parish council office? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your local government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	999999	0	1
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	999999	0	1
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1

We start by measuring corruption victimization simply in terms of whether people have been victimized or not, and exposure to corruption in the 12 months before the survey. Figure 3.2 shows

results based on responses to the series of questions above. The majority of Jamaicans report that they haven't been subjected to corruption within the past 12 months. However, one in ten Jamaicans report being a corruption victim, reporting one or more forms of victimization.




Figure 3.2. Total Index of Corruption Victimization, 2017

Figure 3.3 illustrates change in reported victimization over four rounds of the survey, 2010 – 2017. The rate of victimization for 2017 is similar to that of the 2014 study, and marginally higher than the measures found in 2012 and 2010.




Figure 3.3. Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption, 2010-2017

Analysis was used to establish the factors that determine the likelihood that an individual might be a victim of corruption. To do this, we analyse corruption victimization by core demographic and socio-economic subgroups: gender (female vs. male), urban (vs. rural) residency, age, education, and wealth. The graph presents only factors that are statistically significant, as in other chapters in this report, though all five variables are analysed.⁶ Of the variables included in the model, the four factors displayed in Figure 3.4 were found to be strongly related. Gender is the most important predictor, with men being more likely to be victimized than women. Persons with higher levels of education are more likely to be victimized as well. However, this likelihood is statistically significant only when persons with secondary education are compared to those with post-secondary schooling. Wealthier persons are generally more likely to have direct personal experience with corrupt acts or proposals than the less wealthy, but the results reveal here a statistically significant difference only across those in the 2nd and 5th quintiles.




Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Level of Education, Wealth, Sex and Age

V. Corruption Permissiveness in Jamaica

The fact that it is widely held that corruption pervades the public sphere and also that reported victimization is relatively low does not necessarily suggest that corruption is generally abhorred. In the case of Jamaica, for example, it has been argued that an overly bureaucratic and highly inefficient public sector provides an ideal environment for corruption. In fact, it is broadly

⁶ Regression analyses are reported in the online appendix.

accepted that in some instances, the making of illegal payments has become necessary for the timely delivery of most basic services.

Bribe giving and taking is perceived to be so commonplace among some public officials that it is considered by some to be the accepted way of doing business with the entities they represent. So although such acts are generally known to be illegal, they might be justified on some expediency-explained pretext (Pring 2017). In this section, we seek to further understand the dynamics of corruption by assessing the extent to which Jamaicans tolerate (find justifiable) acts of corruption. We do so by surveying citizens' attitudes toward bribe-giving with the following item:

EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?

As Figure 3.5 indicates, 26.7% of Jamaicans feel that paying a bribe is justified sometimes and under certain conditions.




Figure 3.5. Percentage of Population Justifying Acts of Corruption

Figure 3.6 shows that there has been a notable decline in tolerance for corruption since 2006. In this 2017 study, the proportion of Jamaicans expressing their acquiescence with bribery as a mean of getting things done is about 26.7%, more than a 50% decline since 2006, and a statistically significant drop from the more than 32% reporting this attitude in 2014.




Figure 3.6. Justification of Acts of Corruption in Jamaica, 2006-2017

In Jamaica, who expresses more tolerance toward corruption? Results reveal that gender and age are statistically significant in determining a persons' propensity to justify corrupt practices. The charts in Figure 3.7 show that males are more likely than females to justify paying a bribe. In addition, there is a negative linear relationship between age and support for acts of bribery. That is, those in the younger age cohorts are more likely to justify paying a bribe than those in the older cohorts.




Figure 3.7. Justification of Acts of Corruption by Sex and Age

VI. Citizens' Awareness of and Attitudes towards Local Anti-Corruption Entities

In this section, citizens' awareness of and attitudes toward the state and civil society bodies involved in corruption prevention efforts are assessed. The focus is on estimating trust and satisfaction as a means to estimate the efficacy of these anti-corruption entities. Level of trust in a particular societal institution is a good measure of the extent to which that body is functioning according to the expectations of the citizenry. Also, the more public confidence citizens have in these institutions, the greater the likelihood that there is approval for the authority of these organizations to take action (Diamond, 2007).

This section considers attitudes toward the following seven state agencies which share the mandate of combating corruption:

- The Offices of Utilities Regulation (OUR) - established to ensure that consumers are provided with a satisfactory quality of service at a reasonable cost as well as to maintain transparent, consistent, and objective rules that govern the operation of utility service providers and in doing so to act independently and impartially.
- The Office of the Contractor General (OCG) - seeks to ensure the efficient award of public sector contracts and that the processing of such contracts is fair and free from corruption.
- The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) - formed by an act of parliament to investigate actions by the security forces and other state agencies that cause death, injury, or abuse of persons' rights.
- The Major Organized Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) - established in 2014 and aimed at combating serious organized crime and reducing corruption.
- The Office of the Public Defender (OPD) - investigates complaints brought against the state by persons.
- The Auditor General's Department (AGD) – responsibility for seeing that the government's financial management is efficient and follows policies and rules.
- The Director of Public Prosecution - exists to provide Jamaica with an independent and effective criminal prosecution capability which is both fair and just.

The following battery of items was asked of each respondent in the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer study. For these questions, Jamaicans were asked to provide a response of 1 to 7 where 1 means they trust the institution "not at all" and 7 means they trust the institution "a lot." For ease of interruption, these responses are rescaled to fit a 0 to 100 point scale. The average level of trust is displayed in the figures below.

JAMB50. To what extent do you trust the Office of Utilities Regulations (OUR)?
JAMB51. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Contractor General (OCG)?
JAMB52. To what extent do you trust The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM)?
JAMB53. To what extent do you trust the Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA)?
JAMB54. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Public Defender?
JAMB55. To what extent do you trust the Auditor General's Department?
JAMB56. To what extent do you trust the Director of Public Prosecution?

The first three questions of the series are examined across time in Figure 3.8. Trust in all institutions increased from 2014 to 2017. Views on trust remain middling for the Offices of Utilities Regulations and the Contractor General, whereas trust in the Independent Commission of Investigations is above the mid-point in 2017.




Figure 3.8. Trust in Selected Public Oversight Bodies

Next the remaining institutions in the question series for 2017 are presented. Levels of trust hover just above the midpoint for the Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency, the Public Defender, Auditor General's Department, and the Director of Public Prosecution (Figure 3.9), showing levels of middling trust.




Figure 3.9. Trust in State Anti-corruption Investigative Bodies

In addition to the levels of trust in these institutions, satisfaction with these institutions is examined. See below for the battery of questions asked of each respondent.

Regarding official dealings that you or someone from your family may have had with the following institutions at some time, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? [REPEAT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN EACH QUESTION]	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
ST1. The National Police [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4
JAMST11. Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4
JAMST12. The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4
JAMST14. Office of the Contractor General (OCG) [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4
JAMST15. The Auditor General's Department [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4
JAMST16. The Director of Public Prosecution [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4
JAMST17. The Jamaica Customs Department [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4

For Figure 3.10, the answer options are recoded to reflect the percentage of those answering that they are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied when they have had an official dealing with the institution. Among all institutions, Jamaicans are most satisfied with Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency and the Independent Commission of Investigations at 71.3% and 69.1%,

respectively. Comparatively, Jamaicans are least satisfied with the Jamaica Customs Department, where 58.2% report “very” or “somewhat” satisfaction with official dealings in this institution. Overall, there are about two-thirds of Jamaicans who had official dealings with these institutions and report satisfactory levels.




Figure 3.10. Level of Satisfaction with the Performance of State Anti-corruption Investigative Bodies

VII. Attitudes towards Non-Governmental Actors

One civil society organization that has been at the forefront of the fight to combat corruption and build integrity in public affairs is the National Integrity Action (NIA). This body was registered in 2011 and attained ‘full-chapter’ status with Transparency International (TI) in 2015. In keeping with its mandate, it is engaged in strengthening public awareness and underlining the demand for new laws to reinforce transparency and accountability in governance; ensuring that laws are enforced

and that state anti-corruption agencies operate effectively; creating firmer institutional partnerships between churches, youth, and communities; and, building stronger national and international partnerships in the quest to free Jamaica of corruption. The overall goal is to “build integrity in Jamaica through the persistent promotion of transparency, accountability in the conduct of government, businesses and the wider society” (National Integrity Action).

The following questions were asked to measure citizens’ awareness and satisfaction with this non-governmental anti-corruption organization:

The National Integrity Action (NIA) is the non-governmental organization involved in promoting activities aimed at combating corruption and building integrity.

JAMNIA1. Have you ever heard of National Integrity Action or the NIA?

JAMNIA2. How satisfied are you with the work of the NIA?

(1) Very satisfied	(2) Somewhat satisfied
(3) Somewhat dissatisfied	(4) Very dissatisfied

As shown by the charts in Figure 3.11, 47.2% of Jamaicans report that they have heard of the NIA. And, of this percentage, 82.4% are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with their work. The figure shows that only 6.4% of those who have heard of the NIA are very dissatisfied with their work.




Figure 3.11. Knowledge of and Satisfaction with work of the National Integrity Action

VIII. Conclusion

Cross-national research initiatives examining the problem of corruption have been consistent in categorizing Jamaica as a country afflicted by high levels of corruption. For example, the Transparency International (TI) surveys have accorded Jamaica a ‘highly corrupt’ designation every year since the country was first included in these surveys in 2002. In 2016, Jamaica’s score on the Corruption Perceptions Index was 39 out of 100. On the basis of this score, Jamaica was ranked 83rd out of 176 countries included in the index in that year.

In this study, the problem was assessed in terms of citizens' perception of its prevalence among the nation's political leaders, and then by estimating the prevalence of corruption victimization, measured in terms of citizens' direct reported personal experience with certain corrupt acts or proposals in their dealings with public officials. It was found that the perception that corruption is widespread among politicians is pervasive in the population. Ninety-seven percent of those surveyed believe Jamaican politicians are involved in some form of corruption. Three out of four Jamaicans feel that half or more of their politicians are corrupt. Regarding corruption victimization, one in ten Jamaicans reported that they have been subjected to one or more corrupt deal within the past 12 months. The study also finds no change in rate of corruption victimization when results of the 2017 survey are compared with those of the 2014 round. Men are two times more likely than women to participate in corruption, as well as younger persons more than those in the older age cohorts.

Citizens' attitudes toward the state and civil society bodies involved in corruption prevention efforts, in terms of level of trust in and satisfaction with these anti-corruption entities, were evaluated. Average levels of trust in the major governmental anti-corruption agencies ranges from 46 and 59 points on a 0-100 point scale. The Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) enjoys the highest level of trust. Respondents' evaluation of the performance of the state anti-corruption agency is generally positive overall.

As the major civil society anti-corruption organization in Jamaica, the National Integrity Action (NIA), is reasonably well known, with 47.2% of Jamaicans reporting having heard of the NIA. Of this percentage, 82.4% express satisfactory levels of their work.

Chapter 4.

Police-Community Relations in Jamaica: Attitudes and Perceptions of the Police in a Context of Increasing Public Insecurity

Anthony A. Harriott and Balford A. Lewis

I. Introduction

Police-community relations in Jamaica have typically been problematic. This situation has been most acute in the urban poor communities, where policing has been marked by poor service responsiveness and insufficient regard for citizens' rights – in particular their due process rights. This problematic relationship has resulted in ineffective policing and a persistently prevalent feeling of insecurity among Jamaicans.

This insecurity may become more or less intense depending on the situation in the country. At the time of writing this report (approximately one year after the data collection was completed), Jamaica was experiencing a spiral of homicides and other violent crimes. In response to this development and the related pressure from various interests groups and public opinion, the government declared a state of emergency in the hot-spot parish of St. James. In these conditions, the government has had to greatly rely on the military to contain out-of-control violent crime.

Longstanding concerns about the conflictual relationship between the police and citizens have led, over the years, to a number of initiatives aimed at “reducing misunderstandings and tension between law enforcement officials and the communities they serve” (National Crime Prevention Strategic Plan, 2007-2011). Several notable efforts by the government, the private sector, and civil society groups signal a national commitment to improving police-citizen relations. In 2004, the Inner-City Development Committee of the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce released a revised edition of the Code of Conduct for Police-Citizen Relations (JIS 2004). The 2005-2008 Corporate Strategy of the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) emphasised a shift towards community-based policing (CBP) to improve police-citizen relations (JIS 2005). According to this official document, Community-Based Policing was to be the main thrust of the JCF. Successive commissioners of police have since expressed their fidelity to CBP or some variant of it.

Additionally, a variety of USAID programs, as well as several others, have focused on supporting community policing. The initial effort was focussed on the Grants Pen area of Kingston and ultimately, should have been rolled-out across the island (McLean, J. et. al. 2008). Another such USAID-supported program, the Community Empowerment and Transformation Project (COMET) works with organizations in several communities to implement community policing programs and increase community involvement (USAID 2008). The British Department for International Development (DFID) is currently implementing two programs that seek to improve police-citizen relations, among other endeavours. The Caribbean Anti-Corruption Programme aims to decrease police corruption and increase transparency, and the Citizen Security and Justice Programme focuses on increasing security and safety in violent urban communities (UKAID Development Tracker 2017). Moreover, the Ministry of National Security, with the support of the Inter-American

Development Bank and other development partners including DFID and the Canadian government, established the Citizen Security and Justice Programme. The Crime Prevention Committee created under this program has been instrumental in improving police-community relations in several crime prone communities (Government of Jamaica 2009).

Moreover, the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is Jamaica's only full-time national police organization. It is suffused with a paramilitary culture that is based on policing through control and is at odds with the community policing focus on partnership and policing by consent (Meeks, 2001; Chambers 2014). The foundational differences between this longstanding culture and the relatively recent approach of community policing creates challenges for the improvement of police-citizen relations. Additionally, high levels of mistrust exist between citizens and the police. Citizens view the police as incapable of providing them with basic protection (Harriott 2000). The 'control through force' culture of the JCF led to frequent accusations of due process violations and occasional high profile incidents of police brutality. For example, the events of 2010 resulted in the deaths of 72 persons, and was the subject of a commission of enquiry (Simmonds, Harris and Harriott 2016). These violations have led to the deterioration of police-citizen relations and further complicated attempts at improvements.

Further complicating the issues, efforts to reinstate community policing have not been made fully operational (Chambers 2014). Most noticeably, implementation has been uneven between communities and among the JCF, as many officers within the police force are not convinced that it is the best method of policing (IBTCI 2012). Uneven implementation is also a result of the fact that donor funds are allocated to specific pilot sites where community policing is implemented and embraced. Unfortunately, the ensuing police efforts to build citizen relationships are primarily conducted in order to gather intelligence, rather than to support citizen safety (MNS 2008). Perhaps most alarming is that while citizens have reported higher levels of trust in the police (IBTCI 2012), police brutality and killings have not simultaneously decreased. In fact, killings have increased since the implementation of community policing programs (Amnesty International 2011). Moreover, resistance to reforms within the JCF, a dependence on donor-funding, and the limited capabilities of Jamaica's justice system pose challenges to community policing and other potential improvements to police-citizen relations.

The escalating rate of serious crimes and increasing citizen insecurity have highlighted the need to build a "culture of a cooperative police-citizens working relationship" as a means of controlling crime and enhancing citizen security. This chapter examines the issue of police-community relations in Jamaica, focusing on citizens' attitudes to and perceptions of the police, and on their willingness to participate in efforts to improve neighbourhood security by way of improving relationships with the police.

II. Main Findings

The key findings on the relationship between the police and the people in Jamaica are:

- The percentage of Jamaicans who agree that the authorities can cross the line in efforts to catch suspected criminals has doubled between 2008 (13.6%) and 2017 (27.9%).
- Average level of trust in the police is 43.9 points on a 0-100 point scale. This is 10 points higher than in 2014.

- The majority of Jamaicans (64.8%) report that when the police come to their neighbourhood, they come to help.
- Nearly 74% of Jamaicans, feel that the interests of people in their neighbourhood are in common with those of the police.
- Sixty-five percent of Jamaicans express a willingness to work with the police in their community to combat crime.
- Nearly 83% of Jamaicans feel that a closer working relationship between police and the community would reduce crime, “a lot” or “somewhat.”
- Four out of 10 Jamaicans express the view that the police are involved in criminal activities.

III. Rule of Law in Jamaica

In 2006, the AmericasBarometer first asked whether citizens approve of authorities crossing the line to catch criminals or if they should always abide by the law. The following question continued to be asked each round, except in 2014:

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line

Figure 4.1 shows that, in 2017, 27.9% of Jamaicans support authorities occasionally crossing the line to catch criminals, while the majority (72.1%) think the police should always abide by the law.




Figure 4.1. Respect for Rule of Law in Jamaica, 2017

Examining the trend over the last 10 years, Figure 4.2 shows that beliefs towards authorities crossing the line declined by more than half in 2008, but steadily increased each round to reach levels close to those reported in 2006.




Figure 4.2. Support for Side-stepping the Rule of Law in Jamaica, 2006-2017

Who is more likely to support authorities occasionally crossing the line? Figure 4.3 shows that Jamaicans within the 56-65 age cohort are less likely to support this idea than Jamaicans aged 18-25 years, 26-35 years, or 36-45 years. Those within higher wealth quintiles, 4 and 5, support authorities occasionally crossing the line more than the lowest wealth quintile. Lastly, there is a positive linear relationship with education levels and the support for authorities crossing the line to catch criminals. Thirty-eight percent of Jamaicans with a post-secondary education support this idea.¹

¹ See regression results in the online appendix.




Figure 4.3. Support for Side-stepping the Rule of Law by Age, Wealth and Level of Education

The police carry out important functions in a democratic society. They are expected to act in a fair, impartial, efficient, and effective way to carry out their law enforcement and security-related responsibilities. Citizen trust of the police is based on the belief that they can be relied upon to act competently, to wield their authority in a fair way, and to provide equal justice and protection across society.

Since 2006, the AmericasBarometer has asked the question below to gauge trust in the police among the citizenry. Respondents report a number from 1 to 7 where 1 is “not at all” and 7 is “a lot.”

B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?

Figure 4.4 displays the range of responses for Jamaica in 2017. About 20% of Jamaicans indicate that they have no trust in the police whatsoever, while 9.4% of respondents report trusting the police “a lot.”




Figure 4.4. Trust in the Police in Jamaica, 2017

In Figure 4.5, the responses to B18 are rescaled to fit a 0 to 100 point scale, showing average degrees of trust in police. Between 2014 and 2017, there was an increase in the level of citizens' trust in police. However, trust still remains below the mid-point, illustrating a culture of low levels of trust in the police in Jamaica.




Figure 4.5. Trust in the Police, 2006-2017

When examining who is more likely to trust the police, several patterns are detected. Figure 4.6 shows there is a positive relationship between age and trust in the police. Also, those aged 55 years or less fall towards lower levels of trusting the police, comparable to the national average, but Jamaicans 56 years or more are above the midpoint and express highest values for trust in the

police. Regarding wealth and trust in the police, there is a negative relationship. Those in the 4th and 5th wealth quintiles have lower levels of trust than those in the two lowest wealth quintiles. Moreover, urban residents express statistically significant less trust in the police than rural residents, but not by much. Lastly, there is a negative relationship between education and trust in the police. Those with no education or primary education levels express middling views on trust of the police, higher than those with a secondary or post-secondary education.




Figure 4.6. Citizens' Trust in the Police in Jamaica by Age, Wealth, Place of Residence and Level of Education

IV. Police-Community Relations

First, we look at police response times as reported by the respondents. Since the 2014 AmericasBarometer, the survey asks the respondent, if their house is being burglarized, to evaluate the likely amount of time it would take the police to arrive at their house. Here is the question along with the responses provided:

INFRAX. Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) Less than 10 minutes
- (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes
- (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour
- (4) More than an hour and up to three hours
- (5) More than three hours
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** There are no police/they would never arrive

Figure 4.7 shows the responses to this question for the last two rounds in Jamaica. One in three Jamaicans report that the police would arrive in less than an hour, with the most common response being that the police would be there in less than 30 minutes. However, nearly one in five Jamaicans report that the police would take more than three hours or would never arrive.




Figure 4.7. Anticipated Police Response Time, 2014-2017

Next we look into citizens' views towards the police at a finer level. First, the report examines whether Jamaicans think that the police protect citizens from crime or if Jamaicans think the police are involved in crime themselves. Here is the question from the survey:

AOJ18N. Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think?

- (1) Police protect people from crime or
- (2) Police are involved in crime

As Figure 4.8 indicates, about four out of 10 Jamaicans report that the police are involved in criminal activity, while six out of 10 Jamaicans think the police protect people from crime.




Figure 4.8. Citizens' Views on Role and Activities of the Police in Jamaica

The following patterns emerge from further analysis of those who think police protect residents from crime. As shown in Figure 4.9, those residing in the urban areas have less faith in the police protecting residents from crime. Younger cohorts feel the same. About half of those aged 18 to 35 years think police protect them from crime, whereas the majority (74%) of those aged 66 years or more think the police protect them from crime. Lastly, Jamaicans with no education or primary education levels are more likely to believe that the police will protect people from crime.




Figure 4.9. Percentage of Citizens who Think that Police Protect Residents by Place of Residence, Age, and Level of Education

Additionally, the 2017 AmericasBarometer for Jamaica asks about perceptions of the intentions and interests of the police regarding the communities they serve, the likely effects of closer police-citizen working relations on crime, and their willingness to cooperate with police on community projects to combat crime. The following questions were first asked in Jamaica in 2008 and again in 2010 and 2017:

Now I'm going to ask a few questions to get your views on relations between police and citizens in Jamaica...		
JAMPOLICE1N. When the police come into your neighbourhood do you usually feel that they are there to help you, or that they are there to abuse you? (1) Help (2) Abuse (3) Both help and abuse		
JAMPOLICE2. Do you feel that the interests of the police and the interests of the people in your neighbourhood are basically opposed, or that you have a lot in common with the police—that you share similar interests? (1) Interests opposed (2) A lot in common, share similar interests		
JAMPOLICE3. Do you think that a closer working relationship between police and persons in your community could help reduce crime, or would that make no difference? [Read alternatives] (1) Yes, would help a lot (2) Yes, would help somewhat (3) No, would not help, make no difference		
JAMPOLICE4. Suppose a government programme were developed for this purpose. Would you be willing to work closely with the police on community projects to fight crime, or would you feel hesitant to do that? [Read alternatives] (1) Very willing (2) Willing (3) Somewhat hesitant (4) Very hesitant		

Considering the 2017 data, results for the first question (JAMPOLICE1N) in the series are displayed in Figure 4.10. More than one in four Jamaicans reports that the police come to their neighbourhood to abuse them. However, the majority of Jamaicans (64.8%) report that the police come to their neighbourhood to help.




Figure 4.10. Citizen Perceptions of Police Actions and Intentions in Communities

The second question of the battery (JAMPOLICE2) asks whether community and police interests align. As shown in Figure 4.11, a majority, nearly 74%, of Jamaicans feel the interests of people in their neighbourhood are in common with those of the police. This is an increase from 2010, when 66% of Jamaicans responded that the community and police shared interests. On the other hand, one in four Jamaicans feel the police have interests that are in opposition to those of community members.




Figure 4.11. Opinions on Alignment of Citizen-Police Interests

Figure 4.12 provides an analysis of who reports that the interests of the police and community members are shared. Jamaicans within the age cohorts of 56 years or more report the highest levels of shared interest between the police and community members. Those with no education or primary levels of education are also more likely to report high levels of shared interest. Almost 84% of Jamaicans with no education or primary education levels supporting the idea that police share the same interests as community members.




Figure 4.12. Perceptions that the Interests of the Police and Community Members are Shared, by Age and Level of Education

The third question (JAMPOLICE3) in the battery looks at whether citizens think a working relationship with the police would help lower crime levels in the neighbourhood. A majority of Jamaicans feel that a closer working relationship between police and the community would reduce crime, “a lot” or “somewhat.” Similar reports were found in 2010, but in 2017 we detect a 9 percentage point increase in those reporting that closer relationships would reduce crime “a lot.”




Figure 4.13. Perception of the Potential Benefits of Citizen-Police Collaboration for Crime Control

Figure 4.14 examines which segments of the population are more likely to think that a closer relationship with the police would reduce crime. There is a positive linear relationship between age and those who believe that closer relations with the police would reduce crime. Older age cohorts, more than the younger cohorts, think that having a working relationship with the police in their community would lead to a reduction in crime. Jamaicans with secondary levels of education have favouring views, but statistically lower than Jamaicans with no education, or primary, or post-secondary levels of education.




Figure 4.14. Perceptions of the Potential Benefits of Citizen-Police Collaboration for Crime Control by Age and Level of Education

The last question in the series (JAMPOLICE4) examines the willingness of Jamaicans to work with the police to combat crime. Figure 4.15 shows that 65% of Jamaicans are willing to work with police, 22.9% are somewhat hesitant, and 12.1% are very hesitant to work with the police in their community to combat crime.




Figure 4.15. Citizen Attitudes toward Cooperation with the Police in Crime Control Initiatives

V. Conclusion

Concerns about the conflictual nature of police-citizen relations in Jamaica have persisted despite longstanding state and civil society initiatives aimed at reducing mistrust and tension between law enforcement officials and the communities they serve. The escalating serious crime rate and associated citizen insecurity have highlighted the need to build a cooperative police-citizen relationship as a means of controlling crime and enhancing citizen security. In this chapter, the issue of police-community relations in Jamaica was examined, focusing on citizens' attitudes to and perceptions of the police, and on their willingness to participate in efforts to improve neighbourhood security by way of a better working relationship with the police.

The study finds decreasing support for rule of law, measured in terms of the use of legal means to apprehend suspected criminals. The results show that the percentage of respondents agreeing that the authorities can cross the line to catch suspected criminals has doubled over the period 2008 (13.6%) to 2017 (27.9%). On the issue of trust in the police, average trust levels were 43.9 points on a 0-100 point scale in 2017, 10 points higher than trust levels in 2014. Four out of 10 Jamaicans, nonetheless, expressed the view that the police officers are involved in criminal activity.

On questions about the prospect for improved police-citizen cooperation in combating crime, the results are favourable. The majority of respondents (65%) report that when the police come to their neighbourhood, they come to help, and nearly 74% feel that the interests of people in their community are in common with those of the police. Sixty five percent of respondents expressed willingness to work with police in their community to combat crime, and nearly 83% feel that a closer working relationship between police and the community would reduce crime, “a lot” or “somewhat.”

Chapter 5.

Lottery Scamming, Human Trafficking, and Marijuana Decriminalization in Jamaica: Experiences and Attitudes of the Citizenry

Balford A. Lewis and Kenisha V. Nelson

I. Introduction

This chapter presents results relating to topical issues covered on the 2017 AmericasBarometer survey of Jamaica. The focus is on three activities and issues: lottery scamming, human trafficking, and marijuana decriminalization. The first two have been singled out for special attention, firstly because of the presumed relationship between citizens' attitudes on these illegal practices and the potential for success of measures taken to contain or reduce them. Secondly, the reported increases in the incidence and the reach of these organized criminal activities are purported to have a serious negative impact on national security, the country's international image, and its investment and development prospects. Some have argued that failure to bring these crimes under control, despite the relentless campaign involving collaboration between Jamaican and U.S. law enforcement entities, is due in part to some level of citizen support for these activities in the communities in which they occur. Regarding the topic of marijuana decriminalization, the recently enacted 'Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2015' has significantly changed the way the law treats the use of this plant, both for recreational and medical purposes. In the following sections, we examine citizens' knowledge, attitudes, and experiences pertaining to these activities and issues, as a means of better understanding and taking those views into consideration as policy and programmatic interventions are considered, implemented, and evaluated.

II. Main Findings

Regarding attitudes, perceptions, and experiences pertaining to lottery scamming, human trafficking, and marijuana decriminalization, the main findings in the 2017 round of the AmericasBarometer for Jamaica are as follows:

- The majority (75%) of Jamaicans believe that lottery scamming is a very serious problem in Jamaica, whereas only 2% think it is not at all a problem.
- Residents in Cornwall report greater concern for lottery scamming in their community, as well as higher reports of knowing someone arrested for this illicit activity.
- Human trafficking is a concern, with nearly 88% reporting it as a moderate or serious problem in Jamaica. However, 68% of Jamaicans do not view human trafficking as a problem in their community.
- Jamaicans feel females are at a higher risk of being trafficked in Jamaica over males.

- There is widespread support for legalization of marijuana for medicinal and research endeavours, with nearly 90% of Jamaicans expressing this policy preference.

III. Lottery Scamming

Lottery scamming – familiarly referred to as ‘lotto scam’ in Jamaica, is a form of advanced fee fraud in which the perpetrators extort money from mainly vulnerable and trusting elderly U.S. citizens by informing them by telephone and/or e-mail that they have won the lottery but must send a processing fee in order to collect their winnings. Estimated to be a \$300 million (USD) scamming enterprise, the practice was originally identified as starting in the parish of St. James in western Jamaica. However, according to law enforcement sources, these activities have now spread to most parishes on the western end of the Island. Lottery scamming currently represents a growing form of organized crime, and is a major factor behind the spate of murders in those areas. In addition, international media, including the U.S. network, Fox News, and the British network, BBC, have latched on to the issue. The “beware of 876” (area code) campaign and related website established in March 2012 have focused much unfavourable attention on Jamaica (CAPRI, 2012).

Efforts to control the problem have included the passing of the Law Reform (Fraudulent Transactions) (Special Provisions) Act 2013 and the establishment of an Anti-Lottery Scam Task Force that incorporates Jamaican and U.S. law enforcement institutions. This has resulted in a number of arrests and the extradition of several high profile actors to the U.S. to face trial. Another important component of the campaign has been educational. Educational efforts included the rollout of a social media-linked website that is geared toward building citizens’ awareness of the forms and seriousness of the problem (see Henry, Jamaica Gleaner, 23 May 2017).

This section examines citizens’ perception of the seriousness of the problem of lottery scamming in Jamaica. It also seeks to assess the efforts of the police to control the problem, based on respondents’ knowledge of arrests of alleged perpetrators in their neighbourhoods.

Citizens’ Perceptions of the Seriousness of the Problem of Lotto Scamming

To evaluate the seriousness of lottery scamming, the 2017 AmericasBarometer in Jamaica asked respondents first about the issue nationally and then within their community. The following question was asked of all respondents:

Changing the topic again. I am now going to ask you some questions about the practice of lottery scamming in Jamaica.

LSCAM1. Based on what you have seen and heard, how serious of a problem do you believe lottery scamming is in Jamaica? Do you consider it very serious, somewhat serious, not so serious, or not serious at all of a problem?

- (1) Very Serious
- (2) Somewhat Serious
- (3) Not so serious
- (4) Not serious at all

Figure 5.1 shows the perceptions of Jamaicans on lottery scamming in their country. Three out of four Jamaicans report the problem of lottery scamming to be “very serious.” Whereas 2.2% of Jamaicans report the problem to be “not serious at all.” The overwhelming majority views lottery scamming as a serious issue in Jamaica.




Figure 5.1. Respondents' view on the Seriousness of Lottery Scamming in Jamaica

The next question probes for perceptions of the seriousness of lottery scamming in respondent's community.

LSCAM2. Thinking about the community in which you live, do you consider lottery scamming a very serious, somewhat serious, not so serious, or not serious at all problem in your area?
 (1) Very Serious
 (2) Somewhat Serious
 (3) Not so serious
 (4) Not serious at all

Findings show less concern among respondents regarding lottery scamming within their communities compared to their views on the nation. The majority (70.3%) of respondents report that lottery scamming is not a serious issue where they live. However, nearly a third of Jamaicans consider lottery scamming to be a “very” or “somewhat” serious community problem (Figure 5.2).




Figure 5.2. Perception of Seriousness of Lottery Scamming in the Community in Jamaica

Perception of Seriousness by Regions

Next we examine these previous questions by regions in Jamaica. Both LSCAM1 and LSCAM2 are rescaled to fit a 0 to 100 point scale where larger values indicate higher levels of seriousness and smaller values indicate lower levels of seriousness. The figures below show the mean value by region.

As shown in Figure 5.3, the mean levels of seriousness of lottery scamming in Jamaica are fairly consistent across regions, with the average view on the issue falling between “somewhat serious” and “very serious.” Citizens residing in Surrey report the highest concern for lottery scamming in Jamaica, though not by much.




Figure 5.3. Mean Levels of Perception of Seriousness of Lottery Scamming in Jamaica, by Region

In Figure 5.4, the seriousness of lottery scamming by region is displayed. Cornwall¹ shows the highest average level of concern about the seriousness of the problem, with the typical (mean) opinion falling in between “somewhat serious” and “not so serious.” Residents within KMR express the next highest levels of seriousness, albeit still low, about lottery scamming in their community with a mean hovering around the response of “not so serious.”

¹ Cornwall is the westernmost of Jamaica’s three counties and consists of the parishes of Hanover, St. Elizabeth, St. James, Trelawny, and Westmoreland.




Figure 5.4. Mean Levels of Perception of Seriousness of Lottery Scamming in Respondent's Community in Jamaica, by Region

Knowledge of Arrests of Alleged Scammers

The next question examines whether a respondent has known or heard of anyone who has been arrested for lottery scamming in their community.

LSCAM3. Do you know or have heard of anyone from your community who has been arrested for lottery scamming?

(1) Yes
 (2) No

Figure 5.5 shows that 13.3% of respondents reported knowing someone from their community who has been arrested for lottery scamming.




Figure 5.5. Knowledge of Arrest of Alleged Perpetrators of Scamming in Jamaica

When examining LSCAM3 at a regional level, the results show that respondents residing in the region of Cornwall know or have heard of someone being arrested more than any other area in the country. This finding matches the level of concern for “lotto scam” in their community. Almost one in three residents of Cornwall reported knowledge of arrest for scamming (Figure 5.6).




Figure 5.6. Knowledge of Arrest of Alleged Perpetrators of Scamming in Jamaica, by Region

IV. Human Trafficking

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) defines “human trafficking as the acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them” (UNODC, 2004). According to the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression and Punishment) Act of Jamaica (2007), trafficking occurs whether or not consent is given; a person is considered the victim of trafficking as long as the elements of activity (e.g., recruitment), means (e.g., forced) and purpose (e.g., exploitation) are established, and there is further evidence of movement ‘within’, ‘from’ and ‘into’ the country. The 2007 Act was passed after the setting up of the National Taskforce against Trafficking in Persons (NATFATIP) in 2005. The act was amended in 2009, and in 2013 to account for new international prescriptions. The 2013 amendment adjusted the definition of human trafficking and increased the severity of penalties for offenders. The penalty adjustments included imprisonment of up to 20 years for an offender and an additional 10 years if, for example, the offender had committed an earlier offence under the Act or used an offensive weapon. An expanded definition of ‘exploitation’ to include ‘debt bondage’ was also approved (see Ministry of Justice, 2013; also 2007 & 2009).

The U.S. 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report retained Jamaica in tier two of its three-tier rating system because, although Jamaica had made increased attempts at reinforcement by ensuring the conviction of two traffickers, pursued trafficking cases against 13 alleged traffickers, and conducted investigations into “40 potential new...cases,” the government fell short of the minimum requirements for eradicating the problem (2017 Trafficking in Persons Report).

Nonetheless, the government continues to highlight its efforts in capacity building as a means of strengthening its capability to identify, investigate, and assure conviction in alleged cases of trafficking in persons. The head of the Jamaica Constabulary Force’s (JCF’s) Anti-Trafficking in Persons Unit (ATPU), noted that 563 JCF members including about 128 in 2015–2016 had been trained to combat TIP. The ATPU head also informed the Jamaica Information Service (JIS) that since the JCF started its anti-trafficking efforts in 2005 more than 10,000 persons in other agencies had been trained (Irving/JIS, 2017).

Citizens' Perceptions about the Seriousness of the Problem of Human Trafficking

The next section examines perceptions of human trafficking in Jamaica. A battery of questions included in the 2017 AmericasBarometer for Jamaica covered this topic. The survey first asks respondents their level of concern about human trafficking before providing them with additional information on the topic and asking follow-up questions.

HUM1. How much concern do you feel about human trafficking?

- (1) A great deal of concern
- (2) A lot of concern
- (3) A moderate amount of concern
- (4) A little concern
- (5) No concern

Figure 5.7 shows that more than half of the respondents have “a great deal of concern” for human trafficking. About one in five respondents reported having “no” or “a little” concern for the problem.




Figure 5.7. Level of Concern about the Problem of Human Trafficking in Jamaica

Some researchers feel that the concept of human trafficking attracts too many interpretations and includes too many categories of persons and thereby loses much of its clarity and precision (e.g., Kidane, 2011; Pourmokhtari, 2015). In response to the need for conceptual clarity, the AmericasBarometer included several additional questions. In particular, respondents were given a definition of human trafficking and asked follow-up questions about their levels of concern both for the country as a whole, and in their community. This module is reproduced in the textbox below.

Now, I will give you the definition of trafficking and then ask you to give me your opinion on this issue.

Trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, and retention of persons by the use of threats or force, abduction or deception, as well as abuse of power, with exploitation, including forced labour or forced prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation. Victims of trafficking are treated as possessions and are forced to work against their will through physical force or threats against them or their families. Victims of trafficking are often lied to about the type of work they will perform or the amount of money and benefits they will receive. People can be trafficked at home, anywhere in Jamaica, or another country. This is what we mean by human trafficking.

Based on this description of human trafficking ...

PROSTIT10EXTAB. How serious is the problem of human trafficking **in Jamaica?** **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) A serious problem
- (2) A moderate problem
- (3) A slight problem
- (4) It is not a problem

PROSTIT10EXTBB. How serious is the problem of human trafficking in your neighbourhood or community? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) A serious problem
- (2) A moderate problem
- (3) A slight problem
- (4) It is not a problem

Figure 5.8 displays the results to the first question regarding concern of human trafficking as an issue in their country. A majority of Jamaicans see human trafficking in Jamaica as a problem. Nearly three in four respondents view human trafficking as a “serious” problem, and one in six view it as a “moderate” problem; in sum, a total of 87.9% perceive it as a problem of moderate or serious degree. As a comparison of the results across Figures 5.7 and 5.8 demonstrates, concerns for human trafficking are more elevated when it is more precisely defined and individuals are asked about the issue as it pertains to their country.




Figure 5.8. Perception about the Seriousness of the Problem of Human Trafficking in Jamaica

Marked differences are found when levels of seriousness about human trafficking in respondents' communities are compared with levels of concern at the national level. Of respondents surveyed, 11.3% report human trafficking to be a “serious” problem in their community, representing a stark difference to the reports of national concern. Figure 5.9 shows that a majority (68.1%) of respondents report that human trafficking is “not a problem” in their own community. The gap between local and national levels of concern for human trafficking is worrying. The next sections examine if respondents hear or talk about human trafficking on the news or with others, and these results provide perspective on the concern gap.




Figure 5.9. Perception about the Seriousness of the Problem of Human Trafficking in Respondents' Community in Jamaica

Sources of Information on Human Trafficking

The media are the window through which the public gains information on many issues; through its report on issues, the media have the ability to shape our understanding of topics such as human trafficking. Information about the problem can also be obtained through public discourse. With the aim of ascertaining the citizens' sources of knowledge on the topic of human trafficking, the following two questions:

HUM2. Have you heard or read anything about human trafficking on the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers, magazine, or the internet within the last 12 months?

HUM3. Have you had a conversation with anyone about human trafficking within the last 12 months?

As shown in Figure 5.10, slightly more than four out of five respondents (81%) have heard about human trafficking through media sources in the last 12 months. This result suggests a majority of Jamaicans are exposed about the idea of human trafficking. The frequency for which this occurs is uncertain. However, this could suggest that Jamaicans are primed to consider human trafficking to be an abstract concern, one that may operate at a distance from the average citizen.




Figure 5.10. The Media as a Source of Information about Human Trafficking in Jamaica

Figure 5.11 presents results on whether Jamaicans had discussions about human trafficking in the last year. Fewer report having a conversation about human trafficking than reported to have heard about it on the news. Nearly three out of 10 respondents (31.4%) report having had a conversation about the topic in the last year.




Figure 5.11. Private Conversations as a Source of Information about Human Trafficking in Jamaica

Assessment of Vulnerability of Categories of Persons to Trafficking

An Office of the Children Registry summary lists 163 reports of child trafficking from 2007 to 2015 in Jamaica. Of these reports, 91% were females, 8% males, and the remaining were 'unknown' (OCR general information).²

The AmericasBarometer in Jamaica asks about perceptions of risks for individuals who may enter into human trafficking. The respondents are asked to give a response on a 1 to 10 point scale, where 1 denotes "no risk" and 10 denotes "high risk." For purposes of analysis, responses are rescaled to fit a 0 to 100 point scale; values on this scale can be considered degrees of risk perception.

<p>How much do you believe that the following people are at risk of becoming victims of human trafficking in Jamaica? Using this new card, assess the risk on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that there is no risk that the person becomes a victim of trafficking and 10 means that the risk is very high.</p>										
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 Don't know [DON'T READ]
No risk						High risk				988888 No answer [DON'T READ]

PROSTIT11A. How much risk do you believe adult women face?

PROSTIT11B. How much risk do you believe teenage girls face?

PROSTIT11C1. How much risk do you believe young girls from rural areas face?

PROSTIT11C2. How much risk do you believe young girls from urban areas face?

Again, we are talking about the risk on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means that this is no risk that the person becomes a victim of trafficking and 10 means that the risk is very high.

PROSTIT11D. How much risk do you believe adult men face?

PROSTIT11E. How much risk do you believe teenage boys face?

PROSTIT11F1. How much risk do you believe young boys from rural areas face?

PROSTIT11F2. How much risk do you believe young boys from urban areas face?

Figure 5.12 displays the levels of risk respondents report for each type of person who may fall into human trafficking. Overall, the figure shows that levels of perceived risk are higher for females than males. Also, levels of risk for all groups except adult males fall above the midpoint, toward higher levels of risk for trafficking. Respondents have the highest levels of concern for teenage girls (88.5 degrees), and the lowest levels of concern for adult men (43.5 degrees). There is slightly more concern for young females and males in rural areas than both genders in urban areas.

² Data for 2015 are preliminary.




Figure 5.12. Perception of Vulnerability to Human Trafficking by Sex and Area of Residence in Jamaica

Personal Information about Victims of Human Trafficking

Lastly, the survey asks respondents if they have heard of possible human trafficking victimizations within their community.

You may have heard of individuals who have gone missing from communities from time to time ...

PROSTIT12N. Thinking about the last five years, do you know of a teenager in your neighbourhood or community who disappeared?

(1) Yes **[Continue]**
 (2) No **[Skip to PROSTIT14A]**

PROSTIT12BN. Was the teenager a male or female?

(1) Male
 (2) Female

PROSTIT12AN. Thinking about what you currently know or have heard, the teenager who disappeared from your neighbourhood or community...**[Read alternatives]**

(1) was found or returned to the family?
 (2) is still missing?
 (3) was found dead.

Figure 5.13 shows that the majority of Jamaicans do not report hearing of a missing teen. However, slightly fewer than one in six Jamaicans (15%) report such a case in their neighbourhood in the past five years.




Figure 5.13. Knowledge of Missing Teenager in Jamaica

In terms of gender distribution of the teenagers reporting a disappearance in the respondents' community, 65% were females (Figure 5.14).




Figure 5.14. Gender of Missing Teenager in Jamaica

Twenty-five percent of respondents report that the teenagers who disappeared were found or returned to the family. Sadly, 30.9% of respondents reported the teenagers were found dead (Figure 5.15). And, the plurality, 43.8%, of respondents who know of a missing teen, expressed that the teen is still missing.




Figure 5.15. Fate of Missing Teenager in Jamaica

Community and Police Response to Allegations of Human Trafficking

To learn more about the public's awareness and engagement in incidents of human trafficking, the subsequent follow-up questions were asked of each respondent who indicated having heard of a human trafficking case in their neighborhood or community in the past five years (8% of respondents):

PROSTIT14B. Do you know whether the incident was reported to the police?

(1) Yes [\[Continue\]](#)

(2) No [\[Skip to LSCAM1\]](#)

PROSTIT15N. Thinking about the incident of human trafficking that was reported to the police, do you know if the incident: [\[Read alternatives\]](#)

(1) Was classified as a case of human trafficking by the police

(2) Was processed as another type of incident, such as running away from home

(3) Or if the police did nothing about this case

Figure 5.16 shows that 62.8% of respondents expressed that the incident was reported to the police and 37.2% reported that it was not.




Figure 5.16. Handling of Trafficking Case in Jamaica

Of those who responded that the incident was reported to the police, 36% expressed that the incident was classified by the police as a case of human trafficking. Forty-six percent of respondents to that question indicated that the situation was processed as another type of incident, and 18% of respondents report that the police did nothing about the trafficking case (Figure 5.17).




Figure 5.17. Response to Reported Human Trafficking Incident by the Police in Jamaica

V. Attitudes to Recent Changes to Marijuana Legislation in Jamaica

Jamaica's initial Dangerous Drugs Act (1948), as amended in 1987, stipulated that it was illegal to cultivate, use, trade in, or export ganja (marijuana). Under this legislation a person found with the drug was liable on conviction before a circuit court to:

“...a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both such fine or imprisonment; or...
...on summary conviction before a Resident Magistrate...to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars for each ounce of ganja [but] such a fine shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars: or...
Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years; or
...to both such fine and imprisonment. (The Dangerous Drugs Act, 1948, Part IIIA)”

Additionally, the old law stipulated that every person who as an “occupier of any premises knowingly permits those premises to be used for the smoking of ganja” or is involved “in the management” of a premise used for such smoking, or has “any pipes or other utensils” used for smoking ganja, or “smokes or otherwise smokes ganja” was liable to a maximum fine of \$5,000 for a first offence or to a maximum term of twelve months in prison or both. However, for a second or subsequent offence the fine was a maximum of \$10,000 or two years in prison or both. On the contrary, within the framework of amendments the law allowed for exemptions for medicinal use; as section II stated, the term “‘ganja’ includes all parts of the plant known as cannabis sativa...but does not include medicinal preparations made from that plant.” (The Dangerous Drugs Act, Part IIIA).

Recently passed amendments contained within The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act (2015) provided for a substantial decriminalization of this law. Under the new regime, possession of less than two ounces of ganja is no longer a criminal offence requiring a court appearance and will not be listed on one's criminal record. Instead, the police can issue a ticket to a person having less than two ounces, for which a period of 30 days is allowed for payment of the \$500 fine. Any person, regardless of age, who has two ounces or less and whom the police think is dependent on the drug would also be required to pay the \$500 fine and, in addition, be directed to the National Council on Drug Abuse for interventions services. Persons found in possession of over two ounces of marijuana are liable for arrest and, “if found guilty, sentenced to a fine or to imprisonment or both” which will be documented on their criminal record. Failure to pay an imposed fine will require a court appearance that could lead to community service or a fine of \$2,000 and a documented criminal offence.

Additionally, the 2015 Act approved the possession of marijuana for “medical or therapeutic purposes as recommended or prescribed” by “health practitioner or class of practitioners approved by the Minister of Health” or for “scientific research...by an accredited institution or is approved by the Scientific Research Council of Jamaica.”

The law prohibits smoking marijuana within five metres of a public place, consistent with the regulation governing the ban on smoking in public, generally. Smoking is allowed “in places that are licensed for the smoking of ganja for therapeutic purposes” and Rastafarians are also permitted to smoke in line with their sacramental use of marijuana, in areas “registered as places of Rastafarian worship” (MOJ fact sheet, Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 2015).

At the inception of the new legislative regime, the then Portfolio Minister for National Security told parliament that decriminalization would assist in crime reduction initiatives by freeing up police time to attend to other crime-related activities. Furthermore, it would serve as an incentive for people to seek legal outlets for their activities, as their ganja-linked criminal record would be cleared. The minister added that “a legal regime for production and distribution of ganja eliminates the monopoly that organized criminals now have in this area and consequently reduces their funding for criminal enterprise” (JIS, 2015). This section looks at citizens’ attitudes on changes in the legislation, focusing on the perceived impact of its amended provisions on crime and insecurity, and other related issues such as the use and abuse of other illegal drugs.

Opinions on the Possible Impacts of Marijuana Decriminalization

The series of questions below provides respondents with a statement, and the respondent is to indicate on a 1 to 7 point scale their level of agreement, where 1 indicates “strongly disagree” and 7 indicates “strongly agree.”

Now I'm going to read some statements that reflect different views on the use of marijuana and marijuana decriminalization or legalization. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements. We will again use the 1-7 scale, where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 “strongly agree.”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888 Don't know [DON'T READ]	988888 No answer [DON'T READ]
Strongly disagree					Strongly agree			

[Note down 1-7, 888888 = Don't know, 988888=No answer]

MAR14. Marijuana is harmful to health. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

MAR15N. Marijuana use leads to the use of hard drugs such as cocaine or crack. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

MAR3BN. Decriminalization or legalization of the use of marijuana will produce more crime and insecurity in the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

MAR3DN. People should be allowed to freely smoke marijuana if they so desire. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 5.18 displays the percentage of respondents agreeing with each statement about marijuana and marijuana legalization (values of five to seven on the seven-point scale). The chart (Figure 5.18) shows the most support for the following statement: “people should be allowed to freely smoke marijuana if they so desire,” with 54.8% of respondents indicating agreement. Among respondents, 40.9% agree that legalization of marijuana will produce more crime, and 42.7% think marijuana leads to use of harder drugs. Lastly, 47.9% of respondents think marijuana use is unhealthy. Overall, most of these results show middling agreement among Jamaicans.




Figure 5.18. Percentage Agreement with Selected Statements on the Impact of the Amended Dangerous Drugs Act in Jamaica

The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 2015 provided for the establishment of the Cannabis Licensing Authority (CLA) with a specific role to establish, license, and regulate Jamaica's legal marijuana and hemp industry. It limits the growing of marijuana, allowing for each household to grow a maximum of five plants and also for five plants to be grown by each household in multi-household premises. The government is given the authority to collect licensing and permits fees from research entities and from visitors with certified medical needs (MOJ fact sheet, Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 2015).

The survey asked respondents about their attitudes toward marijuana production and whether the state should have some level of control in the production and distribution of marijuana. The following question was asked of all respondents:

MAR20N. Do you think that the growing and distribution of marijuana for personal use should be absolutely prohibited; or allowed, but the state should regulate its production and trade; or that the State should not regulate these activities at all?

- (1) Marijuana should be prohibited
- (2) The state should strongly regulate
- (3) The state should regulate some but private companies should be in charge
- (4) No regulation at all

Figure 5.19 shows a small minority (8.2%) think that marijuana should be prohibited. The chart also shows that 62.5% think the state should have some role in regulating the production of marijuana, either strongly regulating it or regulating with private companies in charge. About a third (29.3%) think the state should not regulate marijuana production at all.




Figure 5.19. Positions on the Extent of State Regulation of Marijuana in Jamaica

The new law also permits the use of marijuana for research by accredited tertiary or other approved institutions, and for the treatment of “terminal or serious chronic illnesses.” [MOJ Fact Sheet, Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 2015]. Along with the aforementioned items, respondents were asked about their support for this provision, and to give their perspectives on the possible impact of decriminalization on drug use in general, and among minors.

MAR1A. Recently, the Jamaican Government approved legislation to legalize marijuana use for medicinal and scientific purposes. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the legalization of marijuana for medicinal and scientific purposes?

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

MAR4N. What effect do you think the marijuana legislation will have on the smoking of marijuana in Jamaica? Do you think marijuana use will increase a lot, will increase somewhat, will remain the same, will decrease somewhat or would decrease a lot?

- (1) Will increase a lot
- (2) Will increase somewhat
- (3) Will remain the same
- (4) Will decrease somewhat
- (5) Will decrease a lot

MAR4AN. Do you think that, with the decriminalization of marijuana in Jamaica, the use of marijuana among teenagers under 18 will increase a lot, increase somewhat, remain the same, decrease somewhat or decrease a lot?

- (1) Would increase a lot
- (2) Would increase somewhat
- (3) Would remain the same
- (4) Would decrease somewhat
- (5) Would decrease a lot

When asked about their views on the use of marijuana for medicinal and scientific purposes in Jamaica, the majority of respondents supported the legalization of marijuana for these purposes. Figure 5.20 shows that only about 10.4% of respondents disagree with this legal measure or have no strong opinion on the issue.




Figure 5.20. Level of Support for the Legalization of Marijuana for Medical and Research Endeavors in Jamaica

Figure 5.21 shows that a majority of respondents think marijuana use will increase at some level after the new legislation. 27.8% percent think marijuana use will remain the same and 10.8% think marijuana use will decrease (a lot or somewhat) with the new legislation.




Figure 5.21. Effects of Amended Dangerous Drugs Act on Marijuana Smoking in Jamaica

When asked to share their views on marijuana use among teenagers as a result of the new legislation, 48.1% of respondents report that teenagers will use marijuana a lot more, and similarly 17.3% of respondents think that teenagers' use of marijuana will increase somewhat. Nine percent believe the use of marijuana will decrease a lot among teenagers given the new legislation (Figure 5.22).




Figure 5.22. Effects of Amended Dangerous Drugs Act on Marijuana Smoking by Minors in Jamaica

To wrap up this section, we evaluate the widely held perception that marijuana use is pervasive among Jamaicans. The extent of marijuana use among the populace is probed by asking the following questions.

MAR10N. Have you ever used marijuana?

(1) Yes **[Continue]**

(2) No **[Skip to MAR13]**

MAR11N. Do you currently use marijuana? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) No

(2) Yes, sometimes

(3) Yes, frequently

As depicted in Figure 5.23, 41.9% of Jamaican adults report having used marijuana some time in past. Of those who report that they had used marijuana, 51.8% report that they were not using marijuana currently, 24.2% report that they were using it sometimes, and 23.9% use marijuana frequently.




Figure 5.23. Prevalence of Marijuana Use among the Populace in Jamaica

Answers to the following question about knowledge of marijuana use by friends and relatives indicate widespread usage of marijuana in Jamaica.

MAR13. Do you have friends or relatives who you know use marijuana? **[Read alternatives]**

(0) None

(1) One

(2) Two or more

As shown in Figure 5.24, four in five respondents (79.4%) report knowing two or more people who use marijuana.




Figure 5.24. Marijuana Use among Friends and Relatives of Respondents in Jamaica

VI. Conclusion

Attitudes, perceptions, and experiences pertaining to lottery scamming, human trafficking, and marijuana decriminalization were examined on the premise that clearer understanding of citizens' views on these activities and issues is critical in developing and evaluating effective policy and programmatic interventions.

Lottery scamming and the trafficking of persons remain significant forms of organized crimes facing authorities in Jamaica and are both issues that the government has been collaborating on with external partners, notably the U.S., in efforts to reduce and contain these problems. Among the significant findings on lottery scamming, the survey revealed that the majority of Jamaicans believe that it is a problem in Jamaica, with 75% considering lottery scamming to be "very serious." Only 2% of Jamaicans report that the problem is "not serious at all." Interestingly, the average rating of the seriousness of the problem nationally was similar across all counties. However, on questions about the severity of the problem in respondents' area of residence, the results show that persons in Cornwall consider scamming to be a much greater problem at the community level than those in all other areas. Also, the prevalence of known arrests for scamming in Cornwall is three times greater than all other counties.

The problem of human trafficking has emerged as an area of significant concern in Jamaica, in particular with concerns about its impacts on women and children. Concerns about trafficking in the abstract and as a general problem for the country are elevated. However, two of three Jamaicans (68%) did not view human trafficking as a problem in their own community. In the case

of marijuana decriminalization, the Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2015 relaxes prohibition on the substance for medicinal and research purposes and the possession or use of specified small quantities for recreational use is no longer a criminal offence. Among those surveyed, almost 42% of respondents reported that they had previously used marijuana. Approximately 90% support its legalization for medical and research endeavours. Of note too, is that most respondents felt that use of the drug among the populace will increase as a result of the amended marijuana legislation.

Chapter 6.

Democratic Orientations in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin with LAPOP

I. Introduction

Plato's *Republic* posed a question with which philosophers and political scientists still grapple: what makes democracy stable? One ingredient in democracy's success is its ability to generate legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if mass support for the democratic system begins to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas from 2006 to 2017, and analyzes the factors that shape these attitudes and the democratic orientations that they undergird.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. Political legitimacy or "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects that the political system and its institutions represent. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Among contextual explanations, one perspective holds that certain cultures grant democratic institutions greater legitimacy. According to this view, Latin America's corporatist institutions disadvantage democracy (Wiarda 2003). For other scholars, economic development heavily influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Lipset 1963). Economic development often increases education, which typically correlates with the expression of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009; Carlin 2006; Carlin and Singer 2011). Still others argue that the institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005). Interestingly, institutional configurations in the Latin American region seem to yield election winners who are less supportive of democratic rules of the game (Carlin and Singer 2011). Since most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving, mean levels of diffuse support for the political system are often theorized to be stable in the short run.

Perceptions of legitimacy, however, may not always be static within and across individuals. Citizens' experiences with the system may change frequently, and can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord to the democratic system. In particular, economic hardship, greater personal insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine the legitimacy citizens grant democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011; Seligson 2002, 2006). Indeed, recent AmericasBarometer reports have linked perceptions of and experience with economic outcomes,

the integrity of state officials, and the security situation to citizens' evaluations of the political system (Carlin et al. 2014).

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture. Since broadly inclusive citizenship is a hallmark of democracy (Dahl 1971), political tolerance is a central pillar of democratic quality and survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree." Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy, as well. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

What shapes political tolerance? At the macro level, more developed countries generally have more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), while also tending to display more tolerance on specific issues such as same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2010). External threats and security crises, as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance. At the micro-level, scholars point to many factors including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955).

Legitimacy and tolerance are, therefore, core elements of democratic culture. These attitudes combine to make unique profiles of democratic orientations. To understand how such orientations influence democratic stability, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise levels of pro-democracy orientations high enough so that in hard times the regime can draw on these reserves to sustain itself. In such circumstances, democracy takes on inherent value, and mass democratic orientations prove robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long uninterrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus, the region's pro-democracy reservoirs are likely shallow and may tend to ebb and flow with performance. This report, like others before it, seeks to track the depth of democratic orientations in the Americas over time, gauge their breadth across countries in the region, and analyze how citizens' specific experiences with democratic institutions shape their orientations to democracy.

II. Main Findings

This chapter documents two types of evidence. First, it reports on over-time trends and cross-national patterns in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- In Jamaica, system support increased on average in 2017. Components tapping beliefs about respecting institutions and supporting the political system improved most.
- Political tolerance rose in 2017 in Jamaica, both overall and across most of its components.
- Orientations conducive to authoritarian stability decreased; orientations conducive to democratic stability increased on average in Jamaica in 2017.

Second, this chapter considers how citizens' perceptions of and experience with political institutions shape their democratic orientations. The evidence is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Of the factors studied in this report, trust in political parties, local government, and elections are the most powerful predictors of Jamaicans' democratic orientations – particularly those conducive to stable democracy.
- Perceptions of corruption have only modest relevance with respect to Jamaicans' democratic orientations.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III explores Support for the Political System, Political Tolerance, and how they combine to form four distinct profiles of Democratic Orientations: Stable Democracy, Authoritarian Stability, Unstable Democracy, and Democracy at Risk. For each, it reports trends from 2006 to 2017 and in 2017 in Jamaica. Section IV use regression analysis to probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold the four Democratic Orientations. Its goal is to compare the predictive leverage of factors that figure prominently in previous chapters of this report. Section V concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their implications.

III. Democratic Orientations across the Region and over Time

Stable democracies need citizens who support their institutions and respect the rights of, i.e. tolerate, dissenters. In other words, legitimacy/system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability. The ways in which this and previous LAPOP studies expect system support and tolerance, in combination, to affect stable democracy are summarized in Figure 6.1. If the majority in a country shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy should be stable, i.e. "consolidated." Conditions in which the citizenry has high system support but low tolerance do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, could support a more authoritarian model. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in a commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, democracy may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown.

Figure 6.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, data from the 2004 and 2008 AmericasBarometer studies identified serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and

Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth, and Seligson 2010). Before analyzing these attitudes in combination, let us examine the two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring “system support” – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index¹ created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?

Responses to each question are based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component are also rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation. Figure 6.2 compares levels of the system support index and its five components since 2006 in Jamaica. Overall, we see increases in 2017 from 2014. System support increases by 6 degrees in Jamaica. In addition, larger increases were found for the following two components: respect for institutions and support for the political system.

¹ For the region as a whole, Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the five variables is very high ($\alpha = .81$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.




Figure 6.2. System Support and Its Components in Jamaica, 2006-2016/17

How does support for the political system vary across the Americas today? Figure 6.3 presents levels of system support in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer study. System support is highest in Guyana (65.5 degrees) followed by Nicaragua, Canada, and Costa Rica (62-63 degrees) and, for the third round running, lowest in Brazil (34.1 degrees). At 53.7 degrees, the United States hovers above the regional average (49.7). Similarly, Jamaica ranks toward the middle with 48.4 degrees of system support.




Figure 6.3. System Support in the Americas, 2016/17

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the quality and survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerate dissent. Thus, the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance toward those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items:

- D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: **[Probe: To what degree?]**
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with standard LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.²

Figure 6.4 displays the national means for Jamaica on the political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2006. Like system support, measures for tolerance also increased in 2017. There are increases for overall tolerance, as well as the rights to conduct peaceful demonstrations, vote, and run for office. The largest increase is for the right to peaceful demonstrations.

² Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high (.84) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.




Figure 6.4. Political Tolerance and Its Components in Jamaica, 2006-2016/17

The cross-national distribution of tolerance of political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Figure 6.5, which maps countries by mean score on the index from the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in Canada and the United States (69.8 and 69.2 degrees on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Peru and Colombia (47.6 and 45.4 degrees, respectively). Jamaica's position increased to third most tolerant in 2017, with 60.2 degrees.




Figure 6.5. Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2016/17

Both political tolerance and system support appear to be slightly higher in the Jamaica from 2014 to 2017.

Orientations Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the orientations theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who score above 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who score below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold orientations that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have orientations that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.

How prevalent are these orientations in the Americas? Figure 6.6 reports trends from 2006 to 2017 for Jamaica. There is an increase in stable democracy in 2017 and decreases in all other orientations. Nearly doubling from 2014, a third of Jamaicans fall into the stable democracy profile. The profiles of unstable democracy and democracy at risk decreased by 8% and 7%, respectively. The cross-national distribution of these orientations is shown in Figure 6.7.




Figure 6.6. Democratic Orientations over Time in Jamaica, 2006-2016/17

With respect to the profile of orientations that favors *Stable Democracy* – high system support *and* high political tolerance – the snapshot in Figure 6.7 flags an outlier: Canada. At 61%, Canada leads the region in *Stable Democracy* orientations. Next highest are Guyana (45%), the United States (43%), and Costa Rica (40%). At 13% and 15%, respectively, Brazil and Venezuela have the lowest percentages of citizens with orientations favorable to democratic stability. Jamaica is in the middle to high range at 33% of *Stable Democracy* profiles.




Figure 6.7. Democratic Orientations in the Americas, 2016/17

If we look at the interplay between Stable Democracy – the profile most supportive of democratic stability – and Democracy at Risk – the profile most threatening to democratic stability –, two patterns emerge. First, in some cases Stable Democracy orientations have grown and Democracy at Risk orientations have dwindled. In Honduras, for example, we find that the percentage of

individuals with *Stable Democracy* orientations has more than tripled since 2012, while, at the same time, the proportion of individuals with orientations that put *Democracy at Risk* was more than halved. Similar, less exaggerated patterns are seen in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic.³ In Jamaica, *Stable Democracy* doubled in 2017, but *Democracy at Risk* decreased at a lower rate.

A second pattern is less heartening to democracy's champions. Namely, *Democracy at Risk* orientations are gaining ground over *Stable Democracy* orientations in handful of countries. For example, the percentage of Venezuelans who fit the *Democracy at Risk* profile has nearly doubled since 2012. *Stable Democrats*, by contrast, now make up just 15% of the population, down from 43% in 2006. Parallel, if less pronounced, dynamics have played out in Mexico and in Colombia since 2010.⁴

In short, although the political culture supporting democracy may have thickened in several countries of the hemisphere, it has thinned substantially in others. An increase in political orientations conducive to stable democracy occurred in Jamaica. We next explore why by analyzing how individuals' experience under and judgements of political institutions shape their democratic orientations.

IV. Citizens, State Institutions, and Democratic Orientations

What kinds of citizens are most likely to hold attitudes conducive to stable democracy? As mentioned above, diffuse democratic orientations are considered deep-seated and, thus, quite stable in the short run. However, in the comparatively young democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, citizens' perceptions of and experiences with the institutions of the democratic state may still be crucial predictors of democratic orientations. So which factors are most important to understanding individuals' democratic orientations in the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer?

To answer this question, we use fixed-effects multinomial logistic regression to model the four democratic orientations described above as a function of key variables. These include trust in political parties and trust in elections from Chapter 1; perceived deficit of democratic liberties from Chapter 2; corruption victimization, corruption perceptions, and corruption tolerance from Chapter 3; as well as the following variables: crime victimization and feelings of insecurity; and satisfaction with local government services and trust in local government. The models also control for the five standard socio-economic and demographic variables (gender, age, wealth, education, urban/rural). Analyses are conducted using data from Jamaica only.⁵

³ These cases also show a lowered prevalence of *Authoritarian Stability* attitudes and rising levels of *Unstable Democracy* attitude profiles, i.e. those who are politically tolerant but have withdrawn support for the system.

⁴ Over the decade 2006 to 2016/17, the percentage of Mexicans with an *Authoritarian Stability* attitude profile shrunk from 29.2% to 18.5%. However, *Stable Democracy* attitudes in Mexico fell gradually from 41.1% to 22.6%, *Democracy at Risk* attitudes rose steadily from 13.4% to 28.3%, and *Unstable Democracy* attitudes grew from 16.6% to 30.5%.

⁵ Full results available in the online appendix.




Figure 6.8. Maximal Effects of Predictors of Democratic Attitude Profiles in Jamaica, 2016/17

Figure 6.8 reports the changes in the predicted probability of observing each of the four profiles when we simulate a change of each variable from its minimum value to its maximum value while holding all other variables constant at their means. Such “maximal effects” allow us to compare the relative impact of factors this report has identified as crucial to understanding opinions towards democratic governance.

Let us contrast the first pair of diametrically opposed orientations: Stable Democracy (far right column in the figure) – which blends high levels of system support with high levels of political tolerance – and Democracy at Risk (far left column in the figure) – which couples low levels of system support and low levels of political tolerance. As Figure 6.8 suggests, the correlates of these profiles are mirror images of each other. For instance, increasing trust in political parties from none to a lot makes one 45 percentage points more likely to hold orientations that augur in favor of Stable Democracy and 24 percentage points less likely to hold orientations that put Democracy at Risk. We see similar effects when it comes to the maximal effects of trust in elections and trust in local government.

Now let us contrast a second pair of opposing orientations: Unstable Democracy – combining low system support with high political tolerance – and Authoritarian Stability – melding high system support and low political tolerance. Figure 6.8 suggests the drivers of these orientation profiles, again, mirror each other in key ways. Political trust matters a great deal for both orientations. Bolstering trust – in political parties and local governments – bolsters the chances of espousing Authoritarian Stability orientations and undercuts the chances of espousing Unstable Democracy orientations. However, maximal effects of corruption perceptions raise the probability of observing Unstable Democracy orientations by 9 percentage points.

Overall, how citizens evaluate, perceive, and experience their governing institutions shapes their democratic orientations and, in turn, the regime's stability. Our analysis underscores the importance of trust in political parties and elections – institutions tasked with aggregating citizens' political preferences and translating them into democratic representation. Finally, we note citizens' experiences with and views of corruption and security wield limited predictive power over democratic orientations. As past reports have shown, however, these factors are often correlated with system support and political tolerance when analyzed separately (Carlin et al. 2012, 2014).

V. Conclusion

Democracy's future in the Americas hinges on mass support for its institutions and the inclusive nature of democratic citizenship. When citizens broadly view the system as legitimate and tolerate even its most ardent detractors, democracy can achieve remarkable stability. But when this cultural foundation erodes, democracy's fate is less certain. Chapter 1 tracked noteworthy decay, on average in the region, in support for democracy in the abstract and in trust in and attachment to political parties. These outcomes are concerning, yet the set of attitudes that matter for democratic quality and stability is broader. It is also important to track legitimacy, political tolerance, and democratic orientations in the Americas, to compare them across countries, and, most crucially, to understand how citizens' interaction with state institutions shapes democratic orientations. This chapter sought to do just that. Now let us review our findings and consider what they might mean for democracy's defenders and policymakers in this hemisphere.

A straightforward message from the over-time analyses is that system support and political tolerance do not necessarily trend together in the Americas, though they do, overall, for Jamaica. All components of these indices may not follow similar trends, regionally. Recall that overall system support in the Americas fell largely due to flagging faith that courts guarantee a fair trial and that the system protects citizens' basic rights. Yet respect for the regime was stable and normative commitments to them increased. Such diverging dynamics can have political implications. In this instance, robust respect for and commitment to democratic institutions can anchor the system if reformers seek to craft policies that improve the justice system. Pairing this conclusion with rising tolerance for public dissent, policymakers may, indeed, find fertile ground for their reforms.

Another noteworthy message that this chapter communicates is that democratic legitimacy and political tolerance exhibit volatility in the Americas. Brief analyses of specific cases here suggest this volatility reflects the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. As mentioned, scholars have used AmericasBarometer data to argue that low levels of legitimacy can be bellwethers of democratic instability (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). Beyond specific levels, however, short-term volatility in system support, political tolerance, and/or democratic orientations may also have important implications – positive and negative – for democracy. This is an open question that can only be answered with consistently repeated measurement. Monitoring mass democratic sentiment cross-nationally and over time, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is therefore crucial to understanding democratic stability.

Finally, this chapter's findings have implications for political actors in the region. Political parties, elections, and local government are some of the institutions with which citizens have the most contact. Citizens' trust in these institutions are the three strongest predictors of democratic

orientations. The strength of this relationship makes the findings presented in earlier chapters on declining confidence in parties and low trust in local government particularly relevant; though regional average orientations toward democratic stability have ticked upward, this outcome rests on tenuous grounds. This places a lot of responsibility on the shoulders of the actors who inhabit these institutions. It is thus incumbent upon party leaders to show themselves to be capable, honest, and responsive to citizens (Carlin 2014). Beyond those actors who can influence electoral commissions and other institutions that shape the conduct of elections, raising political knowledge, fostering interpersonal trust, and reaching out to those who voted for the losing candidates can boost trust in elections (Layton 2010) – and political actors can be protagonists of all three. As the 2016/17 AmericasBarometer regional report by LAPOP indicates, local politicians may earn greater trust not only by providing better services, but also by reducing neighborhood insecurity, rooting out corruption, and getting citizens engaged in local politics. Finally, while political actors surely have their parts to play in cultivating democratic culture, citizens have parts, as well. Becoming and staying informed, and acting to hold politicians and state institutions accountable remain key duties of democratic citizenship, without which we should not expect the status quo to change for the better.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's average trust in political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., stratified and clustered). In bar charts, this confidence interval appears as a grey block, whereas in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts). The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically not statistically significant; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are statistically significant with 95% confidence. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will frequently indicate in the text whether a difference is statistically significant or not.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at zero. When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is statistically significant when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line at zero.

On occasion, analyses and graphs in this report present "region-average" findings. LAPOP's standard is to treat countries as units of analysis and, thus, we weight countries equally in the calculation of region averages.

The dataset used for the analyses in this report was a preliminary version of the cross-time, cross-national merge of the 2004-2016/17 AmericasBarometer surveys. Finalized versions of each survey represented in the dataset are available for free download on the project's website at www.LapopSurveys.org.

Appendix B. Study Information Sheet

Centre for Leadership & Governance,
University of the West Indies, Mona



V VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

January 29, 2017

Dear Sir/ Madam:

You have been selected at random to participate in a study of public opinion on behalf of Centre for Leadership and Governance, University of the West Indies. The project is supported by USAID and Vanderbilt University.

The interview will last approximately 45 minutes.

The objective of the study is to learn your opinions about different aspects of the way things are in Jamaica. Even though we cannot offer you any specific benefit, we do plan to make general findings available to the media and researchers.

Although you have been selected to participate, Sir/Ma'am, your participation in the study is voluntary. You can decline to answer any question or end the interview at any time. The replies that you give will be kept confidential and anonymous. For quality control purposes, sections of the interview may be recorded.

If you have any questions about the study, please do not hesitate to contact Balford Lewis at 322-7089, or at the email balfordlewis@yahoo.com.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Are you willing to participate?

Appendix C. Questionnaire

AmericasBarometer 2017 Jamaica Questionnaire Version # 18.0.3.2 IRB Approval # 170076



LAPOP: Jamaica, 2017

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PAIS. Country:				
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada
27. Suriname	28. Bahamas	29. Barbados	30. Grenada	31. Saint Lucia
32. Dominica	33. Antigua and Barbuda	34. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	35. Saint Kitts and Nevis	
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]				
ESTRATOPRI: (2301) KMA (2302) Surrey (except Urban St Andrews and Kingston) (2303) Middlesex (2304) Cornwall				
ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality [voting age population according to the census; modify for each country, using the appropriate number of strata and population ranges]:				
(1) Large (more than 200,000)		(2) Medium (between 100,000-200,000)		
(3) Small (< 100,000)				
UPM [Primary Sampling Unit]: _____				
PROV. Parish:				
(2301) Kingston	(2306) St. Ann	(2311) St. Elizabeth		
(2302) St. Andrew	(2307) Trelawny	(2312) Manchester		
(2303) St. Thomas	(2308) St. James	(2313) Clarendon		
(2304) Portland	(2309) Hanover	(2314) St. Catherine		
(2305) St. Mary	(2310) Westmoreland			
MUNICIPIO. Constituency: _____				
JAMSEGMENTO. E.D. Segment [official census code] _____				
CLUSTER. [Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: _____ [Every cluster must have 6 interviews; use the official census code]				
UR. (1) Urban	(2) Rural			
TAMANO. Size of place:				
(1) National Capital (Metropolitan area)	(2) Large City	(3) Medium City		
(4) Small City	(5) Rural Area			
IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (2) English				

Start time: _____

FECHA. Date Day: _____ Month: _____ Year: 2017

ATTENTION: It is compulsory to always read the STUDY INFORMATION SHEET and obtain consent before starting the interview.**Q1. Sex [Record but DO NOT ask]: (1) Male (2) Female****Q2. How old are you? _____ years [RECORD AGE IN YEARS COMPLETED. Age cannot be less than 18 years]**

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are: [Read alternatives]

(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied

(3) Somewhat dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

A4. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem faced by the country? [DO NOT read alternatives; Accept only ONE answer]

Armed conflict	30	Inequality	58
Bad government	15	Inflation, high prices	02
Corruption	13	Kidnappings	31
Credit, lack of	09	Land to farm, lack of	07
Crime	05	Malnutrition	23
Discrimination	25	Migration	16
Drug addiction; consumption of drugs	11	Politicians	59
Drug trafficking	12	Popular protests (strikes, blocking roads, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Population explosion	20
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Poverty	04
Electricity, lack of	24	Roads in poor condition	18
Environment	10	Security (lack of)	27
External debt	26	Terrorism	33
Forced displacement of persons	32	Transportation, problems of	60
Gangs	14	Unemployment	03
Health services, lack of	22	Violence	57
Housing	55	War against terrorism	17
Human rights, violations of	56	Water, lack of	19
Impunity	61	Other	70
Don't know	888888	No answer	988888

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

Now, let's talk about your local government...

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, parish council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Don't know [DONT READ]	No answer [DON'T READ]	Inapplicable [DON'T READ]
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	
CP20. [WOMEN ONLY] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999


IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?

(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy
(3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

[GIVE CARD "A" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.



TAKE BACK CARD "A"

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?

(8888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (9888888) No answer [DON'T READ]

QUESTIONNAIRE A

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified...[Read alternatives]:

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)	Inapplicable [DON'T READ] (999999)
-------------------------------------	--	--	----------------------------------	---------------------------------	------------------------------------

QUESTIONNAIRE B

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified...[Read alternatives]:

JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)	Inapplicable [DON'T READ] (999999)
--	--	--	----------------------------------	---------------------------------	------------------------------------

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the Prime Minister of the country to close the Parliament and govern without Parliament?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)	
---	--------------------------	-----------------------------	----------------------------------	---------------------------------	--

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?	(1) Yes [Continue]	(2) No [Skip to AOJ8]		
(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to AOJ8]				
(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to AOJ8]				
VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? _____				
[Fill in number] _____ HIGHEST NUMBER ACCEPTED: 20				
(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]	(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]			
(999999) Inapplicable [DON'T READ]				

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?	(1) Should always abide by the law	(2) Occasionally can cross the line		
(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]	(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]			
AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe ?				
(1) Very safe				
(2) Somewhat safe				
(3) Somewhat unsafe				
(4) Very unsafe				
(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]	(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]			
AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read alternatives]				
(1) A lot	(2) Some	(3) Little	(4) None	
(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]	(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]			

AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighbourhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?

(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

AOJ18N. Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? [Read alternatives]

(1) Police protect people from crime or (2) Police are involved in crime
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

Regarding official dealings that you or someone from your family may have had with the following institutions at some time, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? [REPEAT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN EACH QUESTION]

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	[Don't read] Didn't have any official dealings	[Don't read] Don't know	[Don't read] No answer
ST1. The National Police [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888
JAMST11. Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA) [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888
JAMST12. The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888
JAMST13. The Office of the Public Defender [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888
JAMST14. Office of the Contractor General (OCG) [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888
JAMST15. The Auditor General's Department [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888
JAMST16. The Director of Public Prosecution [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888
JAMST17. The Jamaica Customs Department [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4	999999	888888	988888

[GIVE CARD "B" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. [Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Not at all						A lot	Don't know [DON'T READ]	No Answer [DON'T READ]

Note down a number 1-7, or 888888 Don't know and 988888 No answer

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7, or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?

B43. To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican?

B12. To what extent do you trust the Jamaica Defence Force?

B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?

B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

B21A. To what extent do you trust the Prime Minister?

B32. To what extent do you trust the local government?

B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?

B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

JAMB50. To what extent do you trust the Office of Utilities Regulations (OUR)?

JAMB51. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Contractor General (OCG)?

JAMB52. To what extent do you trust The Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM)?

JAMB53. To what extent do you trust the Major Organised Crime and Anti-Corruption Agency (MOCA)?

JAMB54. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Public Defender?

JAMB55. To what extent do you trust the Auditor General's Department?

JAMB56. To what extent do you trust the Director of Public Prosecution?

Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is "Not at all" and 7 is "A lot"....

**(888888) Don't know
(988888) No answer
[DON'T READ]**

PR3DN. If in your neighbourhood one of your neighbours decides to build or renovate a house without a license or permit of approval. How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?

PR3EN. If someone in your neighbourhood decides to build or renovate a house, how likely do you think it is that they would be asked to pay a bribe to get a license or permit, or to ignore the construction altogether?

[TAKE BACK CARD "B"]

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of Prime Minister Andrew Holness? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

M2. Now speaking of Parliament, and thinking of members of Parliament as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the members of Parliament are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly?

(1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (4) Poorly
 (5) Very poorly
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

And thinking about this city/area where you live...

SD2NEW2. Are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied**, or very **dissatisfied** with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied
 (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ] (999999)
 Inapplicable (Does not use) [DON'T READ]

SD3NEW2. And with the quality of public schools? Are you... **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied
 (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ] (999999)
 Inapplicable (Does not use) [DON'T READ]

SD6NEW2. And with the quality of public medical and health services? Are you... **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied
 (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ] (999999)
 Inapplicable (Does not use) [DON'T READ]

INFRAX. Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Less than 10 minutes
 (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes
 (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour
 (4) More than an hour and up to three hours
 (5) More than three hours
 (6) **[DON'T READ]** There are no police/they would never arrive
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]
 (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

INFRA3. Suppose you are in your house and you experience a very serious injury and need immediate medical attention. How long do you think it would take you, by the fastest means, to get to the nearest medical center or hospital (public or private)? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Less than 10 minutes
 (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes
 (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour
 (4) More than an hour and up to three hours
 (5) More than three hours
 (6) **[DON'T READ]** There is no such service available / I wouldn't go to one
 (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]
 (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

[GIVE CARD "C" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

Now we will use a ladder where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	888888	988888
Strongly disagree				Strongly agree			Don't know [DON'T READ]	No answer [DON'T READ]

[Note down 1-7, 888888 = Don't know, 988888=No answer]

I am going to read some statements. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.

ROS1. The Jamaican government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The Jamaican government should implement **strong** policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

AOJ22NEW. To reduce crime in a country like ours, punishment of criminals must be increased. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

And changing the subject...

[Continue using Card “C”]

[1-7, 888888= Don’t know 988888= No answer]

MEDIA3. Information reported by the Jamaican news media is an accurate representation of the different viewpoints that exist in Jamaica. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

MEDIA4. The Jamaica news media are controlled by a few big corporations. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

TEST A. Set 1

[Continue using Card “C”]

[Note down 1-7, 888888= Don’t know, 988888 = No answer, 999999= Inapplicable]

DST1B1. The government should spend more money to enforce building codes to make homes safer from natural disasters, even if it means spending less on other programs... How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

[TAKE BACK CARD “C”]

DRK11. How likely do you think it is that you or someone in your immediate family here in Jamaica could be killed or seriously injured in a natural disaster, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, landslides, or storms, in the next 25 years? Do you think it is... **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Not likely (2) A little likely (3) Somewhat likely (4) Very likely

(888888) Don’t know **[DON’T READ]**

(988888) No answer **[DON’T READ]**

(999999) Inapplicable **[DON’T READ]**

[GIVE CARD “N” TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

Now, we are going to use this new card

[Note down 1-7, 888888= Don’t know, 988888 = No answer, 999999= Inapplicable]

ENV1C1. Some people believe that protecting the environment should be given priority over economic growth, while others believe that growing the economy should be prioritized over environmental protection. On a 1 to 7 scale where 1 means that the environment should be the highest priority, and 7 means the economic growth should be the highest priority, where would you place yourself?

[TAKE BACK CARD “N”]

ENV2B1. If nothing is done to reduce climate change in the future, how serious of a problem do you think it will be for Jamaica? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) Very Serious
- (2) Somewhat Serious
- (3) Not so serious
- (4) Not serious at all
- (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
- (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**
- (999999) Inapplicable **[DON'T READ]**

TEST A. Set 2

[TAKE BACK CARD "C"]

[GIVE CARD "N" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

We are going to use this new card...

[Note down 1-7, 888888= Don't know, 988888 = No answer, 999999= Inapplicable]

ENV1C2. Some people believe that protecting the environment should be given priority over economic growth, while others believe that growing the economy should be prioritized over environmental protection. On a 1 to 7 scale where 1 means that the environment should be the highest priority, and 7 means the economic growth should be the highest priority, where would you place yourself?

[TAKE BACK CARD "N"]

ENV2B2. If nothing is done to reduce climate change in the future, how serious of a problem do you think it will be for Jamaica? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) Very Serious
- (2) Somewhat Serious
- (3) Not so serious
- (4) Not serious at all
- (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
- (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**
- (999999) Inapplicable **[DON'T READ]**

[GIVE CARD "C" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

We will use this card again; it goes from 1 "strongly disagree" to 7 "strongly agree"

[Note down 1-7, 888888= Don't know, 988888 = No answer, 999999= Inapplicable]

DST1B2. The government should spend more money to enforce building codes to make homes safer from natural disasters, even if it means spending less on other programs... How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

[TAKE BACK CARD "C"]

DRK12. How likely do you think it is that you or someone in your immediate family here in Jamaica could be killed or seriously injured in a natural disaster, such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, landslides, or storms, in the next 25 years? Do you think it is...?

[Read alternatives]

- (1) Not likely (2) A little likely (3) Somewhat likely (4) Very likely
- (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
- (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**
- (999999) Inapplicable **[DON'T READ]**

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied** or very **dissatisfied** with the way democracy works in Jamaica?


(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied
 (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger?

(1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified
 (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

[GIVE CARD "D" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you *strongly disapprove* and 10 means that you *strongly approve*. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove...



[Note down 1-10, 888888= Don't know, 988888= No answer]

E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the current (incumbent) government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: **[Probe: To what degree?]**

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.

D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?

[TAKE BACK CARD "D"]

	Very little	Enough	Too much	Don't know [DON'T READ]	No answer [DON'T READ]
LIB1. Do you believe that nowadays in the country we have very little, enough or too much freedom of press?	1	2	3	888888	988888
LIB2B. And freedom of expression. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3	888888	988888
LIB2C. And freedom to express political views without fear. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3	888888	988888
LIB4. Human rights protection. Do we have very little, enough or too much?	1	2	3	888888	988888

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ]	No answer [DON'T READ]	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...						
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	888888	988888	
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	888888	988888	
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	888888	988888	
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the parish council office? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your local government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1	8888888	988888	
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 999999 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	999999	0	1	888888	988888	
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	888888	988888	
EXC7NEW. Thinking of the politicians of Jamaica... how many of them do you believe are involved in corruption? [Read alternatives] (1) None (2) Less than half of them (3) Half of them (4) More than half of them (5) All (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]						

VB1. Are you registered to vote?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

INF1. Do you have a voter registration identification card?

(1) Yes (2) No

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections of 2016?

(1) Voted [Continue]

(2) Did not vote [Skip to VB10]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to VB10]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to VB10]

VB3N. Who did you vote for in the last general election of 2016? [DO NOT read alternatives]

(00) None (Blank ballot)

(97) None (null ballot)

(2301) PNP (People's National Party)

(2302) JLP (Jamaica Labour Party)

(2303) NDM (National Democratic Movement)

(2304) MGPPP (Marcus Garvey People's political Party)

(2377) Other

(8888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Inapplicable (Didn't vote) [DON'T READ]

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes [Continue]

(2) No [Skip to POL1]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to POL1]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to POL1]

VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DO NOT read alternatives]

(2301) PNP (People's National Party)

(2302) JLP (Jamaica Labour Party)

(2303) NDM (National Democratic Movement)

(2304) MGPPP (Marcus Garvey People's political Party)

(2377) Other

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Inapplicable [DON'T READ]

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?

(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

VB20. If the next general elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Read alternatives]

(1) Wouldn't vote

(2) Would vote for the current (incumbent) candidate or party

(3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration

(4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

[GIVE CARD "JAM1" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

Now I am going to read you a list of things people typically need at different stages of their lives. For each item, indicate whether you feel the GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE for providing it to all as a basic citizen benefit, or you feel INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE for providing it for themselves. As shown on this card, you can use any number between 1 and 10 to indicate your views.

[Note down 1-10, 888888= Don't know, 988888= No answer. Make sure respondent understands s/he can use any number between 1 and 10.]

JAMINGV1. The first item is..."Adequate health and medical care"...Should the individual or the government be responsible for providing this?	
JAMINGV3. Employment training and retraining	
JAMINGV6. Adequate housing, a decent place to live	
JAMINGV7. Financial assistance to poor families	
JAMINGV9. Employment, a decent job	
JAMINGV11. Financial assistance to tertiary (university-level) students	

[TAKE BACK CARD "JAM1"]

Now I'm going to ask a few questions to get your views on relations between police and citizens in Jamaica...

JAMPOLICE1N. When the police come into your neighbourhood do you usually feel that they are there to help you, or that they are there to abuse you?

(1) Help (2) Abuse (3) Both help and abuse

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

JAMPOLICE2. Do you feel that the interests of the police and the interests of the people in your neighbourhood are basically opposed, or that you have a lot in common with the police—that you share similar interests?

(1) Interests opposed (2) A lot in common, share similar interests

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

JAMPOLICE3. Do you think that a closer working relationship between police and persons in your community could help reduce crime, or would that make no difference? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Yes, would help a lot

(2) Yes, would help somewhat

(3) No, would not help, make no difference

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

JAMPOLICE4. Suppose a government programme were developed for this purpose. Would you be willing to work closely with the police on community projects to fight crime, or would you feel hesitant to do that?

[Read alternatives]

(1) Very willing (2) Willing (3) Somewhat hesitant (4) Very hesitant

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

[GIVE CARD "H" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

Now, changing the topic...

FOR5N. In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be the model for the future development of our country? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) China

(2) Japan

(3) India

(4) United States

(5) Singapore

(6) Russia

(7) South Korea

(10) Brazil

(11) Venezuela, or

(12) Mexico

(13) **[DON'T READ]** None/we ought to follow our own model

(14) **[DON'T READ]** Other

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**

(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

[TAKE BACK CARD "H"]

TEST B. Set 1

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust **the governments** of some countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trustworthy	Somewhat trustworthy	Not very trustworthy	Not at all trustworthy	Don't know/ No opinion	No answer [DON'T READ]	Inapplicable [DON'T READ]
MIL10A1. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10E1. The government of the United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
Now, talking about international organizations...							
MIL10OAS1. The OAS, Organization of the American States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10UN1. The UN, United Nations. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

TEST B. Set 2

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust **some international organizations**. For each of them, please tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.

	Very trustworts y	Somewha t trustwort hy	Not very trustworts y	Not at all trustworts y	Don't know/ No opinion	No answer [DON'T READ]	Inapplicabl e [DON'T READ]
MIL10OAS2. The OAS, Organization of the American States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10UN2. The UN, United Nations. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10A2. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999
MIL10E2. The government of the United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	888888	988888	999999

Let's talk now about the governments of some countries...

Changing the subject,

The National Integrity Action (NIA) is the non-governmental organization involved in promoting activities aimed at combating corruption and building integrity.

JAMNIA1. Have you ever heard of National Integrity Action or the NIA?

(1) Yes [Continue]

(2) No [Skip to PROSTIT5N]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to PROSTIT5N]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to PROSTIT5N]

JAMNIA2. How satisfied are you with the work of the NIA? [Read alternatives]

(1) Very satisfied

(2) Somewhat satisfied

(3) Somewhat dissatisfied

(4) Very dissatisfied

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Inapplicable [DON'T READ]

Now changing the subject again,

PROSTIT5N. Have you recently heard about parents that let their children live or work with another person in exchange for money?

(0) No [Skip to HUM1]

(1) Yes [Continue]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to HUM1]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to HUM1]

PROSTIT7. Do you know of a child or children who have been sent to live or work with another person in exchange for money?

(0) No [Skip to HUM1]

(1) Yes [Continue]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to HUM1]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to HUM1]

(999999) Not applicable [DON'T READ] [Skip to HUM1]

PROSTIT8. What kind of relationship do you have with this child or children? [Read alternatives]

(1) Family Member

(2) Friend

(3) Neighbour

(4) Co-worker

(5) Acquaintance

(7) [DON'T READ] Other

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Not applicable [DON'T READ]

I'm now going to ask you some questions about the trafficking of people, or what is called "Human Trafficking."

HUM1. How much concern do you feel about human trafficking? [Read alternatives]

(1) A great deal of concern

(2) A lot of concern

(3) A moderate amount of concern

(4) A little concern

(5) No concern

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

HUM2. Have you heard or read anything about human trafficking on the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers, magazine, or the internet within the last 12 months?

(1) Yes

(2) No

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

HUM3. Have you had a conversation with anyone about human trafficking within the last 12 months?

(1) Yes

(2) No

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

Now, I will give you the definition of trafficking and then ask you to give me your opinion on this issue.

Trafficking is the recruitment, transportation, and retention of persons by the use of threats or force, abduction or deception, as well as abuse of power, with exploitation, including forced labour or forced prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation. Victims of trafficking are treated as possessions and are forced to work against their will through physical force or threats against them or their families. Victims of trafficking are often lied to about the type of work they will perform or the amount of money and benefits they will receive. People can be trafficked at home, anywhere in Jamaica, or another country. This is what we mean by human trafficking.

Based on this description of human trafficking ...

PROSTIT10EXTAB. How serious is the problem of human trafficking in Jamaica? [\[Read alternatives\]](#)

- (1) A serious problem
- (2) A moderate problem
- (3) A slight problem
- (4) It is not a problem
- (888888) Don't know [D]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

PROSTIT10EXTBB. How serious is the problem of human trafficking in your neighbourhood or community?

[Read alternatives]

(1) A serious problem
(2) A moderate problem
(3) A slight problem
(4) It is not a problem
(8888888) Don't know [P]

(666666) Don't know [DON'T READ] (666666) No answer [DON'T READ]

[GIVE CARD "G" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

How much do you believe that the following people are at risk of becoming victims of human trafficking in Jamaica? Using this new card, assess the risk on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that there is no risk that the person becomes a victim of trafficking and 10 means that the risk is very high.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	888888 Don't know [DON'T READ]	988888 No answer [DON'T READ]
No risk					High risk						

PROSTIT11A. How much risk do you believe adult women face?

PROSTIT11B. How much risk do you believe teenage girls face?

PROSTIT11C1. How much risk do you believe young girls from rural areas face?

PROSTIT11C2. How much risk do you believe young girls from urban areas face?

Again, we are talking about the risk on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 means that there is no risk that the person becomes a victim of trafficking and 10 means that the risk is very high.

PROSTIT11D. How much risk do you believe adult men face?

PROSTIT11E. How much risk do you believe teenage boys face?

PROSTIT11F1. How much risk do you believe young boys from rural areas face?

PROSTIT11F2. How much risk do you believe young boys from urban areas face?

[TAKE BACK CARD “G”]

You may have heard of individuals who have gone missing from communities from time to time ...

PROSTIT12N. Thinking about the last five years, do you know of a teenager in your neighbourhood or community who disappeared?

(1) Yes [Continue]

(2) No [Skip to PROSTIT14A]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to PROSTIT14A]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to PROSTIT14A]

PROSTIT12BN. Was the teenager a male or female?

(1) Male

(2) Female

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Not applicable [DON'T READ]

PROSTIT12AN. Thinking about what you currently know or have heard, the teenager who disappeared from your neighbourhood or community...[Read alternatives]

(1) was found or returned to the family?

(2) is still missing?

(3) was found dead.

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Not applicable [DON'T READ]

PROSTIT14A. Have you heard of a human trafficking case in your neighbourhood or community in the past five years?

(1) Yes [Continue]

(2) No [Skip to LSCAM1]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to LSCAM1]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to LSCAM1]

PROSTIT14B. Do you know whether the incident was reported to the police?

(1) Yes [Continue]

(2) No [Skip to LSCAM1]

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Skip to LSCAM1]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Skip to LSCAM1]

(999999) Not applicable [DON'T READ] [Skip to LSCAM1]

PROSTIT15N. Thinking about the incident of human trafficking that was reported to the police, do you know if the incident: [Read alternatives]

(1) Was classified as a case of human trafficking by the police

(2) Was processed as another type of incident, such as running away from home

(3) Or if the police did nothing about this case

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Not applicable [DON'T READ]

Changing the topic again. I am now going to ask you some questions about the practice of lottery scamming in Jamaica.

LSCAM1. Based on what you have seen and heard, how serious of a problem do you believe lottery scamming is in Jamaica? Do you consider it very serious, somewhat serious, not so serious, or not serious at all of a problem?

(1) Very Serious

(2) Somewhat Serious

(3) Not so serious

(4) Not serious at all

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

LSCAM2. Thinking about the community in which you live, do you consider lottery scamming a very serious, somewhat serious, not so serious, or not serious at all problem in your area?

(1) Very Serious
(2) Somewhat Serious
(3) Not so serious
(4) Not serious at all
(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

LSCAM3. Do you know or have heard of anyone from your community who has been arrested for lottery scamming?

(1) Yes
(2) No
(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

[GIVE CARD "C" TO THE INTERVIEWEE]

<p>Now I'm going to read some statements that reflect different views on the use of marijuana and marijuana decriminalization or legalization. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements. We will again use the 1-7 scale, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 "strongly agree."</p> <p style="text-align: center;">[Note down 1-7, 888888 = Don't know, 988888=No answer]</p>
<p>MAR14. Marijuana is harmful to health. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>
<p>MAR15N. Marijuana use leads to the use of hard drugs such as cocaine or crack. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>
<p>MAR3BN. Decriminalization or legalization of the use of marijuana will produce more crime and insecurity in the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>
<p>MAR3DN. People should be allowed to freely smoke marijuana if they so desire. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?</p>

[TAKE BACK CARD "C"]

MAR20N. Do you think that the growing and distribution of marijuana for personal use should be absolutely prohibited; or allowed, but the state should regulate its production and trade; or that the State should not regulate these activities at all?

(1) Marijuana should be prohibited
(2) The state should strongly regulate
(3) The state should regulate some but private companies should be in charge
(4) No regulation at all
(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

MAR1A. Recently, the Jamaican Government approved legislation to legalize marijuana use for medicinal and scientific purposes. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the legalization of marijuana for medicinal and scientific purposes?

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Neither agree nor disagree
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

MAR4N. What effect do you think the marijuana legislation will have on the smoking of marijuana in Jamaica? Do you think marijuana use will increase a lot, will increase somewhat, will remain the same, will decrease somewhat or would decrease a lot?

- (1) Will increase a lot
- (2) Will increase somewhat
- (3) Will remain the same
- (4) Will decrease somewhat
- (5) Will decrease a lot

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

MAR4AN. Do you think that, with the decriminalization of marijuana in Jamaica, the use of marijuana among teenagers under 18 will increase a lot, increase somewhat, remain the same, decrease somewhat or decrease a lot?

- (1) Would increase a lot
- (2) Would increase somewhat
- (3) Would remain the same
- (4) Would decrease somewhat
- (5) Would decrease a lot

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

MAR10N. Have you ever used marijuana?

- (1) Yes **[Continue]**
- (2) No **[Skip to MAR13]**

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** **[Skip to MAR13]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]** **[Skip to MAR13]**

MAR11N. Do you currently use marijuana? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) No
- (2) Yes, sometimes
- (3) Yes, frequently

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**
(999999) Inapplicable **[DON'T READ]**

MAR13. Do you have friends or relatives who you know use marijuana? **[Read alternatives]**

- (0) None
- (1) One
- (2) Two or more

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

Year _____ (primary/preparatory, secondary, 6th form/ "A" level, University/Tertiary If UWI, University/Tertiary if other universities) = total number of years **[Use the table below for the code]**

	1 ⁰	2 ⁰	3 ⁰	4 ⁰	5 ⁰	6 ⁰	
None	0						
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11		
6th form/ "A" level	12	13					
University/Tertiary If UWI	14	15	16	17+			
University/Tertiary if other universities	12	13	14	15	16+		
Don't know [DON'T READ]	888888						
No answer [DON'T READ]	988888						

ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete?

[DO NOT read alternatives]

- (00) None
- (01) Primary incomplete
- (02) Primary complete
- (03) Secondary incomplete
- (04) Secondary complete
- (05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
- (06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
- (07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
- (08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
- (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
- (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) More than once per week
- (2) Once per week
- (3) Once a month
- (4) Once or twice a year
- (5) Never or almost never
- (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
- (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

Q5B. Could you please tell me: how important is religion in your life? **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) Very important
- (2) Somewhat important
- (3) Not very important
- (4) Not at all important
- (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
- (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

[Use card “Q3C” for back-up only. Do NOT show card to the interviewee.]

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? **[DO NOT read alternatives]**

[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]

[If interviewer says “Christian” or “Evangelical”, probe to verify if he is catholic (option 1), Pentecostal (option 5) or non-pentecostal evangelical (option 2). If he is unsure, select (2)].

(01) Catholic

(02) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).

(03) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i).

(05) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) LDS (Mormon).

(07) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Santería, Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).

(10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).

(12) Jehovah's Witness.

(04) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)

(11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).

(77) Other

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**

(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Working? **[Continue]**

(2) Not working, but have a job? **[Continue]**

(3) Actively looking for a job? **[Skip to Q10NEW]**

(4) A student? **[Skip to Q10NEW]**

(5) Taking care of the home? **[Skip to Q10NEW]**

(6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work **[Skip to Q10G]**

(7) Not working and not looking for a job? **[Skip to Q10NEW]**

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** **[Skip to Q10NEW]**

(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]** **[Skip to Q10NEW]**

OCUP1A. In this job are you: **[Read alternatives]**

(1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise?

(2) A salaried employee in the private sector?

(3) Owner or partner in a business?

(4) Self-employed?

(5) Unpaid worker?

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**

(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

(999999) Inapplicable **[DON'T READ]**

[GIVE CARD “F TO THE INTERVIEWEE”]

[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]

Q10G. In this card there are several income ranges. Can you tell me into which of the following ranges fits the income you **personally** earn each month in your work or retirement or pension, without taking into account the income of other members of the home?

[If the respondent does not understand, ask: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]

(00) No income
 (01) Less than \$6,500
 (02) \$6,500 - \$9,500
 (03) \$9,501 - \$12,500
 (04) \$12,501 - \$17,700
 (05) \$17,701 - \$22,000
 (06) \$22,001 - \$25,000
 (07) \$25,001 - \$29,800
 (08) \$29,801 - \$34,300
 (09) \$34,301 - \$39,700
 (10) \$39,701 - \$47,300
 (11) \$47,301 - \$55,000
 (12) \$55,001 - \$65,000
 (13) \$65,001 - \$78,000
 (14) \$78,001 - \$103,500
 (15) \$103,501 - \$168,000
 (16) More than \$168,000

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

(999999) Inapplicable (not working and not retired) **[DON'T READ]**

Q10NEW. And into which of the following ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?

[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?"]

(00) No income
 (01) Less than \$6,500
 (02) \$6,500 - \$9,500
 (03) \$9,501 - \$12,500
 (04) \$12,501 - \$17,700
 (05) \$17,701 - \$22,000
 (06) \$22,001 - \$25,000
 (07) \$25,001 - \$29,800
 (08) \$29,801 - \$34,300
 (09) \$34,301 - \$39,700
 (10) \$39,701 - \$47,300
 (11) \$47,301 - \$55,000
 (12) \$55,001 - \$65,000
 (13) \$65,001 - \$78,000
 (14) \$78,001 - \$103,500
 (15) \$103,501 - \$168,000
 (16) More than \$168,000

(888888) Don't know [DON'T READ]

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

TAKE BACK CARD "F"

Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances (financial support), that is, economic assistance from abroad?

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**

(988888) No answer [DON'T READ]

<p>Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? (1) Yes (2) No (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: [Read alternatives] (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [Read alternatives] (1) Increased? (2) Remained the same? (3) Decreased? (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>Q11n. What is your marital status? [Read alternatives] (1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (Living together) (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (7) Civil union (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>Q12C. How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____ (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>Q12BN. How many children under the age of 13 live in this household? _____ 00 = none, (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>Q12. Do you have children? How many? [Include all respondent's children] _____ [HIGHEST NUMBER ACCEPTED: 20] [Continue] (00 = none) [Skip to VAC1] (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] [Continue] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ] [Continue]</p>	
<p>How many sons and how many daughters do you have? Q12M [Write down total number of sons] _____ Q12F [Write down total number of daughters] _____ (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ] (99999) Inapplicable (does not have children) [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>VAC1. Thinking about mothers, fathers, or caregivers of children that you know in this neighbourhood/community, do you know if they care that their children are up to date on vaccines? (1) Yes (2) No (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	
<p>ETID. Do you consider yourself black, Indian, white, Chinese, mixed or of another race? [If respondent says Afro-Jamaican, mark (4) Black] (1) White (4) Black (5) Mixed (2306) Indian (2309) Chinese (7) Other (888888) Don't know [DON'T READ] (988888) No answer [DON'T READ]</p>	

WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Daily
 (2) A few times a week
 (3) A few times a month
 (4) Rarely
 (5) Never
 (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
 (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

GI0. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]:**

(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month
 (4) Rarely (5) Never
 (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]** (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

PR1. Is the home in which you reside... **[Read alternatives]**

(1) Rented
 (2) Owned **[If respondent has doubts, say "paid off completely or being paid for in regular mortgage payments"]**
 (3) Shared
 (4) Another situation
 (888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**
 (988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[Read out all items]**

R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R4A. Cellular telephone. (Accept smartphone)	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R6. Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R12. Drinking water pipe to the house	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R14. Indoor bathroom/toilet	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R15. Computer (Accept tablet, iPad)	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)
R18. Internet from your home (include phone or tablet)	(0) No			(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)

R1. Television	(0) No [Skip to FORMATQ]	(1) Yes [Continue]	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)	
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No	(1) Yes	Don't know [DON'T READ] (888888)	No answer [DON'T READ] (988888)	Inapplicable [DON'T READ] (999999)

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

FORMATQ. Please indicate the format in which **THIS** specific questionnaire was completed.

- (1) Paper
- (2) ADGYS
- (3) Windows PDA
- (4) STG

COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent] _____

(97) Could not be classified [Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]

Time interview ended _____ : _____

[When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please complete the following questions]

CONOCIM. Using the scale shown below, please rate your perception about the level of political knowledge of the interviewee.

- (1) Very high
- (2) High
- (3) Neither high or low
- (4) Low
- (5) Very low

PHYSICAL DISORDER

To what extent would you say the area around the interviewee's home is affected by...?

Not at all **Little** **Somewhat** **Very much**

IAREA1. Garbage in the street or the sidewalk

(1) (2) (3) (4)

IAREA2. Potholes in the street

(1) (2) (3) (4)

IAREA3. Households with bars/grills in windows (includes metal fences, barbwire and similar items)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

SOCIAL DISORDER

To what extent would you say the area around the interviewee's home is affected by...?

Not at all **Little** **Somewhat** **Very much**

IAREA4. Youth or kids in the streets with nothing to do, wandering around

(1) (2) (3) (4)

IAREA6. People drunk or under the influence of drugs in the streets

(1) (2) (3) (4)

IAREA7. People arguing in a violent or aggressive manner in the street (talking loudly, with anger)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____

INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____

SEX1. Note interviewer's sex: (1) Male (2) Female

COLOR1. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature _____ Date ____ / ____ / ____


Field supervisor's signature _____


Comments: _____

[Not for PDA/Android use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____


[Not for PDA/Android use] Signature of the person who verified the data _____


Card A (L1)






Card C





Card D



Card H

Brazil

China

South Korea

United States

India

Japan


Mexico

Russia


Singapore

Venezuela

Card “JAM1”



Card G



Card F

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than \$6,500
- (02) \$6,500 - \$9,500
- (03) \$9,501 - \$12,500
- (04) \$12,501 - \$17,700
- (05) \$17,701 - \$22,000
- (06) \$22,001 - \$25,000
- (07) \$25,001 - \$29,800
- (08) \$29,801 - \$34,300
- (09) \$34,301 - \$39,700
- (10) \$39,701 - \$47,300
- (11) \$47,301 - \$55,000
- (12) \$55,001 - \$65,000
- (13) \$65,001 - \$78,000
- (14) \$78,001 - \$103,500
- (15) \$103,501 - \$168,000
- (16) More than \$168,000

Card ED

[Do NOT show to interviewee]

[Use card “ED” for back-up only. Do NOT show card to the interviewee.]

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

_____ Year _____ (primary/preparatory, secondary, 6th form/ “A” level, University/Tertiary
If UWI, University/Tertiary if other universities) = _____ total number of years **[Use the table below for
the code]**

	1⁰	2⁰	3⁰	4⁰	5⁰	6⁰	
None	0						
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11		
6th form/ “A” level	12	13					
University/Tertiary If UWI	14	15	16	17+			
University/Tertiary if other universities	12	13	14	15	16+		
Don’t know [DON’T READ]	888888						
No answer [DON’T READ]	988888						

Card Q3C

[Do NOT show to interviewee]

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? [DO NOT read alternatives]

[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]

[If interviewer says “Christian” or “Evangelical”, probe to very if he is catholic (option 1), Pentecostal (option 5) or non-pentecostal evangelical (option 2). If he is unsure, select (2)].

(01) Catholic

(02) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).

(03) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i).

(05) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) LDS (Mormon).

(07) Traditional Religions or Native Religions (Santería, Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan Traditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).

(10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).

(12) Jehovah's Witness.

(04) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)

(11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).

(77) Other

(888888) Don't know **[DON'T READ]**

(988888) No answer **[DON'T READ]**



Color Palette



The AmericasBarometer

The AmericasBarometer is a regional survey carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). LAPOP has deep roots in the Latin America and Caribbean region, via public opinion research that dates back over four decades. Its headquarters are at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. The AmericasBarometer is possible due to the activities and support of a consortium of institutions located across the Americas. To carry out each round of the survey, LAPOP partners with local individuals, firms, universities, development organizations, and others in 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere. These efforts have three core purposes: to produce objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion; to build capacity and strengthen international relations; and to disseminate important findings regarding citizens' experiences with, assessments of, and commitment to democratic forms of government.

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. Other institutions that have contributed to multiple rounds of the survey project include Ciudadanía, Environics, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, and the United Nations Development Programme. The project has also benefited from grants from the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Open Society Foundation. Collaborations with university partners who sponsor items on the survey also sustain the project. In this most recent round, those contributors included Dartmouth, Florida International University, the University of Illinois, the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello in Venezuela, and several centers at Vanderbilt University.

The 2016/17 AmericasBarometer was carried out via face-to-face interviews in 27 countries across the Latin America and Caribbean region, and via the internet in Canada and the U.S. All samples are designed to be nationally representative of voting-age adults and electronic devices were used for data entry in all countries. In all, more than 43,000 individuals were interviewed in this latest round of the survey. The complete 2004-2016/17 AmericasBarometer dataset contains responses from over 250,000 individuals across the region. Common core modules, standardized techniques, and rigorous quality control procedures permit valid comparisons across individuals, subgroups, certain subnational areas, countries, supra-regions, and time.

AmericasBarometer data and reports are available for free download from the project website: www.LapopSurveys.org Datasets from the project can also be accessed via "data repositories" and subscribing institutions at universities across the Americas. Through such open access practices and these collaborations, LAPOP works to contribute to the pursuit of excellence in public opinion research and ongoing discussions over how programs and policies related to democratic governance can improve the quality of life for individuals in the Americas and beyond.

USAID/Jamaica
142 Old Hope Road,
Kingston 6
Jamaica, W.I.
Phone: (876) 702-6445 / Fax: (876) 702-6385
kingstondir@usaid.gov

