

THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN JAMAICA: 2006

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Table of Contents

Index of Tables and Figures iii

Executive Summary vii

Preface xi

Foreword xiii

I. Context 1

References 7

II. Data and Methods 9

 2.1 Sample Design 9

 2.2 Instruments for Data Collection 11

 2.3 Fieldwork 12

 2.4 Data Processing 12

 2.5 Definition of the Variables for the Analysis 13

 2.6 Results from the Sample and Description of the Respondents 13

III. Conceptions of Democracy 21

 3.1 Introduction 21

 3.2 Definitions of Democracy in Jamaica 24

 3.3 Predictors of the Meanings Jamaicans Attach to the Concept of Democracy 27

 3.4 Relationship between Conceptualization and Attitude to Democracy 30

 3.5 Conclusion 31

References 32

IV. Support for Democracy 35

 4.1 Introduction 35

 4.2 Measuring Citizen Support 35

 4.3 Support for the Political Community 36

 4.4 Support for the Principles of the Regime 39

 4.4.1 Support for the Idea of Democracy 39

 4.4.2 Support for Non-Democratic Options 43

 4.4.3 Support for Democratic Principles 45

 4.4.4 Social Activism 47

 4.4.5 Acts of Civil Disobedience 49

 4.5 Tolerance 53

 4.5.1 Political Tolerance 55

 4.5.2 Determinants of Tolerance in Jamaica 57

 4.5.3 Social Tolerance 59

 4.5.4 Support for Homosexual Rights among LAPOP Countries 60

 4.6 Support for the performance of the regime 67

 4.7 Support for the Political System 68

 4.7.1 Support for Key Institutions 68

 4.7.2 Generalized System Support 70

 4.7.3 Predictors of System Support 73

 4.8 Support for Stable Democracy in Jamaica 77

 4.9 Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy 80

 4.9.1 Conclusion 83

References 84

APPENDIX IV CHAPTER 4 – SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY 85

V. Corruption in Public Affairs 89

 5.1 Context 89

5.2 Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption	89
5.2.1 Measuring Corruption Perception.....	92
5.2.2 Factors Influencing Perception of Corruption in Jamaica	94
5.3 Victimization by Acts of Corruptions	97
5.4. Justification of Corruption	102
5.4.1 Identifying Who Justifies.....	103
5.4.2 Defining and Treating with Corruption	104
5.5 Corruption, Democracy and Development: The Connection and the Concern.....	108
References	110
APPENDIX V CHAPTER 5 – CORRUPTION VICTIMIZATION.....	112
VI. Criminology and Crime Victimization	113
6.1 Introduction.....	113
6.2 Extent of Crime Victimization.....	115
6.3 Comparative Perspective on Crime Victimization.....	116
6.4 Types of Crime Victimization.....	117
6.5 Determinants of Crime Victimization.....	118
6.6 Sense of Security and National Wellbeing among Jamaicans	120
6.7 Drugs and Gang Activities in Communities	123
6.8 Conclusions.....	125
APPENDIX VI CHAPTER 6 – CRIME VICTIMIZATION.....	126
VII. Local Government.....	127
7.1 Context.....	127
7.2 Ranking Community Problems.....	128
7.3 Support for Local Government	132
7.4 Evaluation of Responsiveness.....	134
7.5 Citizens’ Involvement with Parish Council	137
7.6 Community Action.....	141
7.7 Predictors of Community Participation.....	143
7.8 Evaluation of Efficiency	144
7.9 Overall Satisfaction with Parish Council	147
7.10 Conclusion	149
APPENDIX VII CHAPTER 6 – LOCAL GOVERNMENT.....	150
VIII. Voting Behaviour.....	151
8.1. Elections and the Political System	151
8.2 Voter Participation	152
8.3 Reasons for Not Voting.....	156
8.4 Support for Government	160
8.5 Conclusion	167
APPENDIX VIII CHAPTER 8 – VOTING BEHAVIOUR	168
IX. Social Capital in Jamaica	169
9.1 Community Participation as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica.....	170
9.2 Community Activism as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica.....	177
9.3 Inter-Personal Trust as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica	180
9.4 Determinants of Interpersonal Trust	182
9.5 Conclusion	184
APPENDIX IX CHAPTER 9 – SOCIAL CAPTITAL IN JAMAICA.....	185
APPENDIX A: Precision of Results	187
APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE	189

Index of Tables and Figures

Index of Tables

Table I.1 Selected Social and Economic Indicators, 2000-2005.....	1
Table I.2 Jamaica's General Election Results, 1944-2002.....	3
Table II.1 Characteristics of the Sample and the 2001 Census (18 years of age and above).....	14
Table III.1 Pre-Coded Items of the Conception of Democracy Series.....	22
Table III.2 Analytical framework for alternative conceptions of democracy	24
Table IV.1 Operational Definitions for the Different Levels of Legitimacy	36
Table IV.2 Average Trust in Values, Institutions and Organizations in Jamaica and Costa Rica, 2006.....	69
Table IV.3 Theoretical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in Institutionally Democratic Politics	78
Table IV.4 Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Jamaica - 2006...	79
Table VIII.1 Voter Turnout 1972-2002.....	151

Index of Figures

Figure II.1 Distribution of respondents, Jamaica 2006	10
Figure II.2 Distribution of respondents by gender	15
Figure II.3 Distribution of respondents by age	16
Figure II.4 Distribution of respondents by level of education	17
Figure II.5 Distribution of respondents by region.....	18
Figure II.6 Distribution of respondents by index of wealth	19
Figure II.7 Distribution of Respondents by Income Levels	20
Figure III.1 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy held by Jamaicans, 2006	25
Figure III.2 Comparative Perspective of Alternative Conceptions of Democracy, 2006	26
Figure III.3 Definitions of Democracy by Wealth in Jamaica, 2006	28
Figure III.4 Definitions of Democracy by Sex in Jamaica, 2006.....	29
Figure III.5 Definitions of Democracy by Size of City in Jamaica, 2006.....	30
Figure III.6 Definitions of Democracy by System Support in Jamaica, 2006	31
Figure IV.1 Comparative Perspective on Citizens' Pride in Nationality	37
Figure IV.2 Sense of National Pride Among Jamaicans, 2006, Scale 0 -100.....	38
Figure IV.3 Sense of National Pride by Trust in the Justice System in Jamaicans, 2006, Scale 0-100.....	39
Figure IV.4 Regime Preference among Jamaicans, 2006	40
Figure IV.5 Comparative Perspective of Regime Preference by LAPOP Countries, 2006	41
Figure IV.6 Citizens Endorsement of Democracy as the Ideal System of Government, Jamaica 2006, Scale 1 -7.....	42
Figure IV.7 Preference for Democracy by Age of Respondents.....	43
Figure IV.8 Preference for Participatory Government in Jamaica, 2006.....	44
Figure IV.9 Preference for Electoral Democracy in Jamaica, 2006.....	45
Figure IV.10 Attitude of Jamaicans to the Principle of Rule of Law, 2006.....	46
Figure IV.11 Citizens Attitude in Support of Positive Actions.....	48

Figure IV.12 Citizens Attitude in Support of Positive Actions.....	49
Figure IV.13 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Social and Political Actions.....	50
Figure IV.14 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Measures by Wealth	51
Figure IV.15 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Measures by Age	52
Figure IV.16 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Measures by Trust in the Justice System.....	53
Figure IV.17 Attitudes to Jamaicans to Selected Basic Rights of Fellow Citizens, National Tolerance Index, 2006.....	55
Figure IV.18 Comparative Average Score in Political Tolerance Index by Country, 2006	56
Figure IV.19 Political Tolerance by Level of Schooling	57
Figure IV.20 Political Tolerance by Interpersonal Trust	58
Figure IV.21 Political Tolerance by Sex	59
Figure IV.22 Citizens' Attitudes to the Enjoyment of Basic Democratic Rights by Fellow Citizens.....	60
Figure IV.23 Comparative Perspective on Citizens Support for Homosexual Rights, 2006	61
Figure IV.24 Support for Homosexual Rights by Interpersonal Trust.....	62
Figure IV.25 Support for Homosexual Rights by Wealth.....	63
Figure IV.26 Support for Homosexual Rights by Level of Tolerance.....	64
Figure IV.27 Support for Homosexual Rights by Sex	65
Figure IV.28 Support for Homosexual Rights by Area of Residence.....	66
Figure IV.29 Support for Homosexual Rights by Level of Education.....	67
Figure IV.30 Citizens Level of Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy in Jamaica – 2006.....	68
Figure IV.31 Averages for Support for Democracy Measures for Jamaica – The Seligson Index, 2006.....	71
Figure IV.32 Comparative Average Scores in System Support Index, 2006.....	72
Figure IV.33 Support for the System by Efficacy of Government	73
Figure IV.34 Support for the System by Sex	74
Figure IV.35 Support for the System by Age Group	75
Figure IV.36 Support for the System by Area of Residence.....	76
Figure IV.37 Support for the System by Regime Preference.....	77
Figure IV.38 Support for a Stable Democracy from a Comparative Perspective, 2006	80
Figure IV.39 Support for a Stable Democracy by Age	81
Figure IV.40 Support for a Stable Democracy Satisfaction with Democracy	82
Figure IV.41 Support for a Stable Democracy by Crime Victimization.....	83
Figure V.1 Citizens' Ranking of National Problems in terms of Seriousness	91
Figure V.2 Perceptions of Prevalence of Corruption	93
Figure V.3 Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption by Extent of Corruption Victimization ..	95
Figure V.4 Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption by Age	96
Figure V.5 Mean percentage of experience with corruption.....	98
Figure V.6 Comparative Perspective on Percentage of Population Victimized by Corruption	99
Figure V.7 Percentage Victimized by Corruption by Age Group.....	100
Figure V.8 Percentage victimized by Corruption by Sex.....	101
Figure V.9 Percentage victimized by Corruption by Wealth.....	102
Figure V.10 Percentage of Population Supporting Bribe Giving.....	103
Figure V.11 Citizens' Acquiescence with Corruption by Age Group	104
Figure V.12 Citizens' Attitude to Act of Corruption of Member of Parliament.....	105

Figure V.13 Citizens' Attitude to a Mother Giving Bribe for Services	106
Figure V.14 Citizens' Attitude to Politician using Office in the Interest of Family Member	107
Figure V.15 System Support by Corruption Victimization.....	109
Figure VI.1 Respondents Victimized by Crime	116
Figure VI.2 Comparative Perspective on Crime Victimization, LAPOP, 2006	117
Figure VI.3 Types of Crime Victimization among Jamaicans.....	118
Figure VI.4 Crime Victimization by Wealth.....	119
Figure VI.5 Crime Victimization by Gender	120
Figure VI.6 Sense of Security among Jamaicans.....	121
Figure VI.7 Possible Impact of Crime on National Wellbeing.....	122
Figure VI.8 Citizens Account of the Extent to which Gangs affect their Neighbourhood	123
Figure VI.9 Proportion of the Population Witnessing Drug Transaction in Neighbourhood	125
Figure VIII.1 Voter Participation.....	152
Figure VIII.2 Factors Influencing Respondents Decision to Vote.....	153
Figure VIII.3 Voting by Gender.....	154
Figure VIII.4 Voting by Age Group.....	155
Figure VIII.5 Voting by Self-Ascribed Ideological Position	156
Figure VIII.6 Reason for not Voting in last General Election	157
Figure VIII.7 Identification with Political Party	158
Figure VIII.8 Respondents' Party Identification.....	159
Figure VIII.9 Party Affiliation of Candidate for whom Respondent Voted in last Election	160
Figure VIII.10 Indicators of Government's Efficacy.....	162
Figure VIII.11 Citizens' Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Current Government.....	163
Figure VIII.12 Comparison of Efficacy of the Current Government.....	164
Figure VIII.13 Mean efficacy score by age-group.....	165
Figure VIII.14 Mean efficacy score by personal economic situation	166
Figure VIII.15 Mean efficacy score by evaluation of state of the economy.....	167
Figure IX.1 Average Citizens' Participation on Civic Organization	171
Figure IX.2 Frequency of Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations	172
Figure IX.3 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Sex	173
Figure IX.4 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Denomination.....	174
Figure IX.5 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Age.....	175
Figure IX.6 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Education	176
Figure IX.7 Average Citizens' Participation in Civic Organization and Civic Participation Index	177
Figure IX.8 Citizens' Level of Participation in Community Projects.....	179
Figure IX.9 Citizens' Participation in Public Protest and Demonstration During the Last Year	180
Figure IX.10 Reported Level of Trust among Community Members.....	181
Figure IX.11 Comparative Perspective on Inter-Personal Trust	182
Figure IX.12 Inter-Personal Trust by Age	183
Figure IX.13 Interpersonal Trust by Area of Residence	184

Executive Summary

Since 1962 when it achieved its independence, Jamaica has changed governments relatively peacefully. The fact that Jamaica has a fairly stable democracy is remarkable considering the serious challenges associated with relatively high levels of political violence during the 1970s and 1980s, crime and prolonged economic problems.

The data presented in this report presents a picture of the Jamaican democracy during June to September of 2006, when the field work was undertaken. The data were collected at a period of political transition, less than three months after former Prime Minister P.J Patterson handed over the reigns of government to the first female Prime Minister of the country, Portia Simpson-Miller, in March 2006. Mrs. Simpson-Miller is a populist who leads a government that has been in power following four unprecedented consecutive electoral victories. While Mrs. Simpson-Miller remains a popular leader in the country, her party, the Peoples National Party (PNP), has been losing its popular appeal in favour of the opposition party, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP).

This context is, therefore, important as many of the findings in this report may well reflect the existential political realities of the Jamaican society. For instance, one key finding is that Jamaica has an exceptionally high degree of political tolerance, strong support for democracy and low levels of trust in partisan political institutions. Whether these and other findings contained in this report will persist remains to be seen in follow-up studies.

Chapter 1 provides the context for the study by focusing on the socioeconomic and socio-political factors that influenced Jamaican politics up to the time when the survey was being conducted.

Chapter 2 describes the methodology used to present technical information on the survey as well as demographic details of the sample and the population. This was a self-weighted sample design representative of the voting population in terms of gender, age and geographic distribution, based on the 2001 Population Census of Jamaica. Total sample size was 1595 and fieldwork was carried out between June and September 2006.

Chapter 3 examines and tries to make sense of Jamaicans' conceptions of democracy. The data show that, as in the case of other Latin American countries, Jamaicans defined democracy, predominantly, in normative terms. Jamaica's ranking with regards to empty and negative definition is, on the other hand, relatively high, with nearly a third of the population being unable to define the term or providing a pejorative meaning.

Chapter 4 assesses support for democracy focusing on, among others, important dimensions of democracy, political and social tolerance, support for the political system and support for a stable democracy in Jamaica. The data reveal that Jamaicans are extremely patriotic and overwhelmingly prefer the democratic system of government over all other regime types. Another important finding is there is relatively high degree of confidence in core public institutions. However, a low level of trust is accorded to partisan political organizations. Nonetheless, paradoxically, support for the political system on a whole is average when compared to countries in Latin America. Jamaica's support for a stable democracy score, 36.2%,

is high when compared with some other countries in the Americas. In fact, only three countries in LAPOP surveys have higher scores than Jamaica.

It should be noted that crime victimization was found to be an influential factor in determining citizens' support for a stable democracy. Persons who reported being recently victimized are more supportive of a stable political system than those not affected by crime in the past year. In general, the political attitudes of Jamaicans indicate that the prospect for the stability of the Jamaican democracy over time is highly favourable.

In relation to tolerance, while Jamaicans have an extremely high level of political tolerance, social tolerance is lower as was exhibited in the low levels of tolerance for homosexual rights.

Chapter 5 focuses on corruption in public affairs. Corruption at all levels of the society has been a serious concern of Jamaicans for many years, and successive governments have taken public office with the stated aim of cleaning up corruption. Jamaica received a low score of 3.6 out of 10 in the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.

The data from the survey show a widely held perception that corruption is common in Jamaica. Of the nearly 96 per cent of respondents who consider it to be common, 57.7% feel corruption was very common. The other four per cent acknowledged its existence but considered it to be uncommon (2.4%) or very uncommon (1.8%). Interestingly, corruption seems to be most prevalent in the health and education sector and in work place settings. Nearly 22 per cent of those surveyed reported that they have been asked to pay a bribe in their dealings with the public health facility. Twenty per cent said they were exposed to some corrupt practices at work and about 18 per cent reported being asked for a bribe in their interaction with the school system.

Among the LAPOP countries, only Bolivia, Mexico and Haiti reported higher levels of corruption, with Haiti at the top of the list with an index of 50 per cent, 13 percentage points higher than Mexico. Chile and Columbia were the only countries with a single digit index, scoring 9.4 and 9.7 per cent respectively. Additionally, males being more likely to be victimized than females and persons in the 30 to 44 age group are much more likely to be victims of corruption than those below thirty and those in the over forty-five age group.

Jamaican attitudes towards corruption are somewhat contradictory in that although corruption is generally seen as wrong, it may be justified by many if it is seen as a means of earning a living.

Chapter 6 looks at criminality and crime victimization in Jamaica. Crime, especially violent crime, is one of the most serious social problems in Jamaica. Jamaica has one of the highest violent crime rates in the world. Yet, when compared to other countries in Latin America, Jamaicans report a surprisingly low rate of victimization of just 10 per cent. Jamaica is ranked virtually at the bottom of the list in this LAPOP, 2006 study. In regard to the types of victimization, robbery (with or without violence) and home burglary, account for 78 per cent of acts of crime faced by victims. The incidence of rape and sexual assault is alarmingly high, with 1.3 per cent of the population reporting being victimized by these acts. Violent crimes such as murder and felonious wounding are mostly an urban problem.

However, other criminal acts such as burglary and robbery are now quite pervasive in the Jamaican society. Over 70 per cent of respondents indicated that they felt reasonably safe in their neighbourhood. Only about 13 per cent report having experienced the selling of drugs in their neighbourhood in the past year. One in five felt very safe in their community while about one in ten indicated that their areas were very unsafe.

When asked to assess the extent of gang activities in their neighbourhood, 41.3 per cent of the sample reported that their respective communities have been affected by some amount of gang-related activities and eight per cent believed their community was affected a 'great deal'. Overall, the data indicate that generally there is a strong sense of fear and insecurity regardless of gender and place of residence. Additionally, acts of violence in Jamaica have shifted from property crime to violent crime

Chapter 7 addresses the issue of local decentralization of governance in Jamaica. The findings from this study show that citizens' participation in the affairs of local government in Jamaica, at the official level, is generally low. In addition, there is a high level of dissatisfaction with the performance of local government institutions. Only 37 per cent of respondents who have done business with the Parish Councils gave their local authority a passing grade.

On the other hand, involvement in the non-formal sphere, that is, participation in addressing community problems, is relatively high. These findings corroborate the view that of a growing tendency for citizens to collaborate more at the level of civil society in their attempt to resolve their community problems rather than to depend on state and its agencies. Further, decentralization of services and access to local public officials has not promoted the greater access, sensitivity, responsiveness and organizational effectiveness that are assumed to result from devolution and the reform of local government.

Chapter 8 examines voter behaviour in Jamaica. The chapter looks at voter turnout, voter participation and advances explanations for variations in voter participation. It also addresses the level of support for the incumbent government. The results indicate that the main determinants of voting in the last general elections were age, area size or size of city and ideology. It was also found that the main reasons for voting include: the plans of the candidate, the political party and the quality of the candidate. The main reasons for not voting include: a lack of interest in voting, the respondent was below the voting age and respondent did not believe in the political system.

The results also indicate that most Jamaicans self-identified as centrist and show greater support for the PNP than the JLP. With respect to support for government, Jamaicans gave a low rating on a number of policy issues with an overall low score on the efficacy index. However, in relation to efficacy of government Jamaica ranks somewhere in the middle of the thirteen countries, between Peru and Panama.

The final chapter, Chapter 9, is concerned with social capital in Jamaica. Community participation is highest in church organizations. Women, older persons and the less educated are more likely to participate in churches. Evangelicals have the highest level of participation. Regarding those who report having participated in solving a community problem, about 62 per cent said they have donated money or material and nearly 78 per cent reported to have given their

own labour in addressing such neighbourhood problems. Community members generally trust one another, with 71 per cent expressing confidence in persons in their neighbourhood. Interpersonal trust in Jamaica is likely to be higher among older people and those who live in rural areas. Among the countries in the 2006 LAPOP study Jamaica ranked in the middle with regards to interpersonal trust, with a mean of almost 59 points.

Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) democracy and governance surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past two decades. LAPOP findings have been a crucial tool to USAID missions in diagnosing the nature of the democratic challenge; sparking policy dialogue and debate within Latin American countries; monitoring on-going USAID programs; and evaluating and measuring USAID performance in supporting democracy and good governance in the region. The reports have often served as the “voice” of citizens on the quality of democracy. We hope that this 2006 study also proves to be useful to policy-makers, democracy advocates, donors and practitioners.

The decision to undertake democracy surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean emerged from the USAID country missions, where field democracy officers have increasingly depended on them as a management and policy tool. The depth and breadth of the questionnaire allows us to look beyond simple questions and examine complex relationships related to gender, ethnicity, geography, economic well-being, and other conditions, and delve deeply into specific practices and cultures to identify where our assistance might be most fruitful in promoting democracy. The surveys represent a unique USAID resource, as a comparative, consistent, and high quality source of information over time. USAID is grateful for the leadership of Dr. Mitchell Seligson at Vanderbilt University, his outstanding Latin American graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and the participation and expertise of the many regional academic and expert institutions that have been involved in this project.

Two recent trends in these surveys have made them even more useful. One is the addition of more countries to the survey base, using a core of common questions, which allows valid comparisons across systems and over time. The second, and even more important, is the introduction of geographically or project-based “over-sampling” in some of the countries where USAID has democracy programs. The result is a new capability for USAID missions to examine the impact of their programs in statistically valid ways by comparing the “before and after” of our work, and also comparing changes in the areas where we have programs to changes in areas where we do not have them. These methodologies should provide one of the most rigorous tests of program effectiveness of donor interventions in any field.

Promoting democracy and good governance is a US government foreign policy priority, and our investment of both effort and money is a substantial one. Democratic development is a relatively new field of development, however, and our knowledge of basic political relationships and the impact of donor assistance are still at an early phase. It is critical that we be able to determine which programs work and under what circumstances they work best, learning from our experience and constantly improving our programs. To meet this challenge, USAID has undertaken a new initiative, the Strategic and Operational Research Agenda, (SORA). With the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences, SORA has already incorporated the insights of numerous experts in political science and research methodology into our work. The LAPOP democracy surveys are a critical component of this evaluation effort. We hope their findings will

stimulate a dialogue among governments, NGOs, scholars and the public that will help, in the long run, to solidify democracy in Latin America.

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Foreword

The AmericasBarometer, 2006: Background to the Study

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I am very pleased to introduce to you the 2006 round of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviours in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. The first effort was in 2004, when eleven countries were included, and all of those studies are already available on the LAPOP web site. The present study reflects LAPOP's most extensive effort to date, incorporating 20 countries. For the first time, through the generosity of a grant from the Center for the Americas, it was possible to include the United States and Canada. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the core funding to enable to study to incorporate much of Latin America and the Caribbean, so that in 2006, as of this writing, the following countries have been included: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica. The sample and questionnaire designs for all studies were uniform, allowing direct comparisons among them, as well as detailed analysis within each country. The 2006 series involves a total of publications, one for each of the countries, authored by the country teams, and a summary study, written by the author of this Foreword, member of the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and other collaborators. We embarked on the 2006 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study could not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, it would also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what was becoming the "UNDP Democracy Support Index." The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

The UNDP-sponsored event was then followed by a meeting of the country teams in Heredia, Costa Rica, in May, 2006. Key democracy officers from USAID were present at the meeting, as well as staffers from LAPOP at Vanderbilt. With the background of the 2004 series and the UNDP workshop input, it became fairly easy for the teams to agree to common core

questionnaire. The common core allows us to examine, for each nation and across nations, such issues as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, civil society participation and social capital, the rule of law, participation in and evaluations of local government, crime victimization, corruption victimization, and voting behaviour. Each country study contains an analysis of these important areas of democratic values and behaviours. In some cases we find striking similarities from country-to-country, whereas in other cases we find sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. Prior to coming to Costa Rica, the author of this chapter prepared for each team the guidelines for the construction of a multi-stage, stratified area probability sample with a target N of 1,500. In the Costa Rica meeting each team met with Dr. Polibio Córdova, President of CEDATOS, Ecuador, and region-wide expert in sample design, trained under Leslie Kish at the University of Michigan. Refinements in the sample designs were made at that meeting and later reviewed by Dr. Córdova. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes in each country publication.

The Costa Rica meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual.

Another agreement we struck in Costa Rica was that each major section of the studies would be made accessible to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate and tri-variate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied. We also agreed on a common graphical format (using chart templates prepared by LAPOP for SPSS 14). Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All senior investigators in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are deidentified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica prepared a common set of data entry formats, including careful range checks, using the U.S. Census Bureau's CPro software. Third, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 100 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 100 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be reentered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, in very few cases did that happen in the 2006 **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2006 round is that we used handheld computers (Personal Digital Assistants, or PDAs) to collect the data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2006 survey. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaire was pretested extensively in each country. In many cases we were able to send LAPOP staffers to the countries that were new to the **AmericasBarometer** to assist in the pretests. Suggestions from each country were then transmitted to LAPOP at Vanderbilt and revisions were made. In most countries this meant now fewer than 20 version revisions. The common standard was to finalize the questionnaire on version 23. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. When the drafts were ready, the next step in our effort to maximize quality of the overall project was for the teams to meet again in plenary session, this time in Santo Domingo de Santo Domingo, Costa Rica. In preparation for that meeting, held in November 2006, teams of researchers were assigned to present themes emerging from the studies. For example, one team made a presentation on corruption and democracy, whereas another discussed the rule of law. These

presentations, delivered in PowerPoint, were then critiqued by a small team of our most highly qualified methodologists, and then the entire group of researchers and USAID democracy staffers discussed the results. That process was repeated over a two-day period. It was an exciting time, seeing our findings up there “in black and white,” but it was also a time for us to learn more about the close ties between data, theory and method. After the Costa Rica meeting ended, the draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project, who read and critiqued each draft study. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID democracy officers for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labour of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 27,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

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At LAPOP Central, the burden of the project fell on Pierre Martin Dominique Zéphyr, our LAPOP Research Coordinator and Data Analyst. Dominique worked tirelessly, almost always seven days a week, on virtually every aspect of the studies, from their design through their implementation and analysis. He also had central responsibility for preparing the training material for the teams for the data analysis and for handling the data audits and merging of the data bases. Dominique also served as Regional coordinator of the Caribbean countries, and personally did the pretesting and interviewer training in each of them. Finally, he worked as co-collaborator on the Haiti study. Julio Carrión of the University of Delaware served as Regional

Coordinator for Mexico, Central America and the Andes. He managed this while also serving as co-collaborator of the Peru study. The members of the LAPOP graduate research team were involved in every aspect of the studies, from questionnaire design, data audits and overall quality control. I would like to thank them all: María Fernanda Boidi, Abby Córdova Guillén, José Miguel Cruz, Juan Carlos Donoso, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana Orces, and Vivian Schwarz-Blum. Their Ph.D. programs at Vanderbilt are being supported by USAID, the Vanderbilt University Center for Latin American and Iberian Studies and the Department of Political Science. My colleague Jon Hiskey participated in our weekly meetings on the surveys, adding his own important expertise and encouragement. Our web master, María Clara Bertini, made sure that our efforts were transparent, and has done an outstanding job managing the ever-growing web page of LAPOP and the AmericasBarometer. Héctor Lardé and Roberto Ortiz were responsible for cover design and text formatting, and did so with great attention to detail.

Critical to the project’s success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied who worked tirelessly to meet what at times seemed impossible deadlines. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below:

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Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University ●Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES, Guatemala
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova (Salvadoran national), Executive Director of FundaUngo, El Salvador ●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director of IUDOP (Public Opinion Institute) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) ●José Rene Argueta, Ph.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Prof. Manuel Ortega-Hegg, Director of the Centro de Análisis Socio-Cultural (CASC) at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA), Managua, Nicaragua ●Marcelina Castillo Venerio, Centro de Análisis Socio-cultural (CASC), Universidad Centroamericana. (UCA)
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Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology Science at Temple University
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mark Bynoe, Director, School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Guyana ●Ms. Talia Choy, Lecturer, Department of Government and International Affairs, University of Guyana.
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dominique Zephyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University ● Yves François Pierre, Groupe de Recherche en Sciences Sociales (GRESS)

Country	Researchers
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Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor at the Universidad de los Andes
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December, 2006

I. Context

Tourism, bauxite and foreign remittances have been the foremost pillars of the Jamaican economy in recent years. However, several other elements have been important to its sustenance in national and international environments that have at various times influenced it positively or negatively and have thereby affected citizen's lives and livelihood as well as their response.

Early years of economic liberalization were accompanied by sharp increases in inflation in the early 1990s and a serious crisis among financial institutions resulted during the second half of the 1990s. Some institutions failed or were closed by the government and others were provided with large injections of funding to keep them afloat as the government expressed a desire to avert a total crash to protect savers' resources. Today the government exhibits a close monitoring regime with regard to the operations of the banking and financial sector following that 1990s experience.

Table I.1 points to some basic economic and other indicators. These indicators – some more than others – are relevant to the political context.

Table I.1 Selected Social and Economic Indicators, 2000-2005

Variables	Unit	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Population	'000 persons	2,597.1	2,612.4	2,621.5	2,635.7	2,648.2	2,660.7
Labour force	'000	1,105.3	1,104.8	1,208.2	1,189.7	1,194.8	1,191.1
Life expectancy (at birth)	Years	72.2	72.0	72.0	72.3	73.3	73.3
Infant mortality rate (live births)	Per '000	24.5	24.5	24.5	24.5	19.2	19.2
Total unemployment rate	%	15.5	15.0	14.2	11.4	11.7	11.3
Literacy rate+	%	79.9	79.9	79.9	79.9	79.9	79.9
++GDP per capita (current)	US\$	2922.3	3046.8	2810.2	3012	3237.2	3387.5
Exports as % of GDP (current)	%	18.1	16.7	14.7	14.6	16.0	15.8
Imports as % of GDP “	%	46.2	46.7	45.7	44.8	44.8	49.0

Sources: Planning Institute of Jamaica. *Jamaica – Economic and Social Survey*. Kingston (various years). ++ *World Development Report 2003*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. *Human Development Report 2005*. New York: UNDP. ECONSTATS, <http://www.econstats.com/weo/C019.htm>

An official government publication, the *Economic and Social Survey*, published annually by the Planning Institute of Jamaica, notes that “2002 was highlighted by the economy achieving its third consecutive year of economic growth...” It adds that “Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by an estimated 1.0 per cent, following the 1.7 per cent increase in 2001 and 0.7 per cent increase in 2000.” Also noted are an inflation rate of 7.3 per cent (the sixth successive year of single digit inflation), falling interest rates and comparatively high levels of net international reserves despite setbacks such as flood rains, the continuing after-effects of the 2001 terrorist attack on the USA, and widening current account and fiscal deficits. It reported a marginal

increase in the rate of unemployment of a fraction of a percentage point compared to 2001 (PIOJ, 2003, p. iv).

Although the PNP administration ended its borrowing relationship with the International Monetary Fund as a formal policy objective some years earlier, it is significant that the 2002 *Survey* notes too:

During 2002, the policy focus was growth acceleration within a stable macroeconomic environment. This was guided by the Staff Monitored Programme of the International Monetary Fund. (p. iv)

Involvement by external agencies, notably the IMF, has been one of the elements that scholars and other observers have cited in linking the management of Jamaica's economic sector and the sources of external assistance with the directions in the nation's politics and democratic process.

Within the context of continuing liberalization policies – some aspects of which failed (Ramjeesingh, 2004) - and despite problems over the years, the economy recorded 1.4% growth in 2005. On the other hand, because of the ravages of hurricanes, fires, drought, and record international crude oil prices, inflation was 12.9 per cent or outside of the single digit inflation figures that the administration has sought to maintain (PIOJ, 2006).

In terms of sectoral performance, mining (including the bauxite industry) grew by 2.8 per cent while tourism with 3.4 per cent had its fourth year of growth following the decline in 2001. The rise in the cruise sector and problems in some competitor destinations following hurricane damage, partly accounted for the growth in Jamaica's tourism sector (see PIOJ, 2006). In recent years major tourism interests have publicly cited the high levels of crime and violence as a worrying problem for the sector. In the meantime, "Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry" which has been traditionally an important area of the economy and significant source of foreign exchange (agriculture) declined by 7.3 per cent.

Among its main macro-economic targets for 2005-2006 were real GDP growth of 3.6 per cent, a rate of inflation of 9.0 and balanced fiscal accounts. The attainment of these required "the absence of external and domestic shocks to production" but achievement fell short because of problems such as rising prices for crude oil on the international market.

It is also noteworthy that the standard of living of the Jamaican people maintained its momentum of improvement between 2002 and 2004 during which time the proportion of households living below the poverty line fell to 16.9% or a reduction of 2.8%. The *Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions* also notes as an outstanding national achievement that of universal enrolment in the education system at the early childhood level (STATIN/PIOJ, 2006). Other notable indices were the high level of migration and declining birth and death rates (PIOJ, 2006).

Jamaica is, in terms of population size (approximately 2.7 million), the largest of the English-speaking Caribbean countries and has been widely recognized for the vibrancy of its democratic system of government although aspects of the political culture and direction have attracted criticism from internal and external sources from time to time.

Important constitutional changes in 1944 – that arriving with the advent of universal adult suffrage – and 1962 (the independence constitution) cleared the path for wide popular participation and for Jamaican leadership to undertake the primary if not altogether full responsibility for the country’s own destiny (see Nettleford, 1971; Munroe, 1972).

The systematic substitution between only two major political parties – the People’s National Party (PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) – as victor or victim at the polls over a prolonged period within the modern ‘democratic’ process under universal suffrage is itself notable. Generally, although there was no constitutional requirement stipulating a maximum tenure of two terms for a party in government, seemingly by tacit agreement the electorate adhered to a maximum of two terms for each party, and thereby sustained a strong two-party democracy, with third parties having no place in the substantive equation after the 1940s. Under Jamaica’s constitution, general elections are due within five years or – in extenuating circumstances (e.g., after the major hurricane that devastated the country in September 1988) – this period may be extended by three months. The JLP won in 1980 and served the last of the two-term stints. The PNP refused to contest the 1983 election in which the JLP therefore secured all seats in the House of Representatives but the PNP maintained its dialogue with the people through specially called forums. The PNP was returned to power in 1989 and since then has formed the government under three leaders serving for various lengths of time.

The change from two-term stints came with a mandate for the PNP in the 1989 and in three subsequent elections - 1993, 1997, 2002 (see Table I.2). The PNP was led in the 1989 elections by Michael Manley while the three succeeding elections saw the PNP being led by Percival J. Patterson. Patterson retired as party president and prime minister early in 2006, thereby giving way to a keen four-way party leadership contest from which Jamaica’s first female prime minister, Portia Simpson-Miller emerged.

Table I.2 Jamaica’s General Election Results, 1944-2002

Year	No. of seats	Accepted ballots cast (%)			Accepted ballots (%)			
		JLP	PNP	Ind.	JLP	PNP	Ind.	
1944	32	22	5	5	41.4	23.5	35.1	52.7
1949	32	17	13	2	42.7	43.5	13.8	63.8
1955	32	14	18	-	39.0	50.5	10.5	63.9
1959	45	16	29	-	44.3	54.8	0.9	65.4
1962	45	26	19	-	50.0	48.6	1.4	72.3
1967	53	33	20	-	50.7	49.1	0.3	81.5
1972	53	16	37	-	43.4	56.4	0.2	78.2
1976	60	13	47	-	43.2	56.8	-	84.5
1980	60	51	9	-	58.9	41.1	0.1	86.1
1983	60	60	-	-	89.7	-	10.3	28.9
1989	60	15	45	-	43.3	56.6	0.1	77.6
1993	60	8	52	-	38.1	61.3	0.6	66.7
1997	60	10	50	-	38.9	56.2	4.9	64.5
2002	60	26	34	-	-	-	-	-

Source: 1944-1997 excerpted from – STATIN. (2000). *Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica 1999*. Kingston, p. 48.

A significant shift in economic policy approach from the 1990s was the strengthening of the process towards liberalization of the Jamaican economy in the context of globalization. The country had suffered its most devastating hurricane disaster in living memory in 1988 and in the mid-1990s a failure of the financial sector was only partly contained by government intervention and the associated offer of rescue funding packages for financial institutions (see, e.g., PIOJ. *Economic and Social Survey*) that some sectors of the society felt had put a dent into public expenditure on social programs while enormously increasing the public debt.

Recent years have seen a decline in the confidence in political institutions, falling levels of electoral participation (elections of 1993, 1997, 2002 – see Table I.2), and allegations of official corruption, lack of transparency in government, a weakening of traditional trade unions which have had close ties with the major political parties. In late 2006, the country had been preparing for early local government and general elections in a context in which levels of criminal activity continued to be high but official reports pointed to positive growth in investment in the economy and overall growth. Both the local and general elections did not take place in 2006. The general elections are due to take place on August 27, 2007. It is not yet clear when the local government elections will be held.

The 1962 constitution limited the possibility of electoral success for a third political party in Jamaica and made for a powerful prime minister while enshrining the British sovereign as the head of the state and offering only qualified legal recognition of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the population (Lewis, 2001; Munroe, 1972). The constitution has remained substantially in place although amendments have been carried out from time to time to permit the state to conduct its business in relation to the economy and attend to, for instance, various rights-based social demands.

Following the deep polarization of the electorate along ideological lines during the 1970s and for some time later, it was promoted in some quarters that that sort or level of adversarial politics and the violence that it attracted on the ground ought to be consigned to history. For the PNP too, the idea of a rift or separation between the public and private sectors had to be superseded. The differences between the two major parties from the point of view of ideology and policy approaches today are not fundamental.

Jamaica, with other English-speaking countries, operating through Caribbean Community (CARICOM), has in recent times continued to pursue and strengthen – especially on the platform of PNP administrations headed by Prime Minister P. J. Patterson who retired in 2006 - the efforts to abandon key remaining vestiges of British colonial control (Boxill 1997). These include the abandonment of the British sovereign as official head of the country and the appeal to the British Privy Council as the final court of appeal in criminal and other cases. Indeed, the recent launch of the Caribbean Court of Justice at central headquarters in Trinidad is partly a realization of the latter process. Media reports and a growing body of literature would indicate that the opposition JLP has been cautious in any commitment in these initiatives but has nevertheless raised constitutional reform as one of its major policies.

Other recent directions in reform that have attracted much debate have included, for instance, pieces aimed at offering greater access to public information, and structuring the flow of political party funding. Significant public sector and local government reform (for this latter, see, e.g., PIOJ, 2006) processes have engaged legislators in recent years.

Crime and violence has been viewed as one of Jamaica's major problems for a number of years. Indeed, much has been written about the link between organized crime and drugs in the country. The drugs trade and organized crime in Jamaica are said to be responsible for a considerable amount of the violent crime in the country (Harriott 2003). However a significant proportion of Jamaica's crime problem has also been seen as closely linked to politics and a culture prevailing for decades in which political henchmen or area 'dons' distributed patronage and exact their own justice among the poorest communities in the society. Efforts by politicians to indicate that they are not attached to or that they are detaching themselves from such forces have not been altogether convincing (Levy & Chevannes, 2001; Robotham, 2001; Meeks, 2001 & 2006; Bogues, 2006 - for relevant analysis). Governments rule but they depend on the "tactical support" of 'dons' or 'area leaders' (Meeks, 2001). Within this sort of structure and also along with the influence of a complex of other factors, elections and election campaigning in Jamaica has long been accompanied by marked increases in violence, the most extreme period of which was that leading up to the general elections in 1980 which continues to serve as a sort of benchmark of what can occur. However, the most recent elections from the 1990s have witnessed a marked reduction in violence and killings when compared to the period of highly polarized politics from the early 1970s to 1980. Local voluntary election observers (e.g., Citizens Action for Free and Fair Elections – CAFFE) and foreign observer groups (e.g., the USA's Carter Center) have also offered a relatively clean bill of health regarding the conduct of the electoral process. Additionally, legislative action and restructuring and sharpening of the role of, for example, the Electoral Advisory Committee and related institutions, have been notable.

Beyond elections and campaigning for particular polls, other activities have included riots and road blocks to appeal to politicians to attend to national and local problems. The so-called 'gas riots' of 1999 virtually shutdown road transportation and many businesses throughout the country for approximately three days. The immediate ostensible inspiration for the riots was the government's imposition of a sharp increase in the price of petroleum but evidence of political instigation was reported. Fires were started along major and minor roadways, for example, and manned by rioters. Blocking roads with old tyres, old vehicles, by cutting down trees and using various other materials along with these has become a common feature of political and social protest by communities or persons who feel the government or their political representatives are not sufficiently responsive to their calls for protection against violence, better roads, housing, water supplies and so on. Sometimes, associated violence increases if opposed groups encounter each other or when the security forces move to remove barriers and secure order.

Despite the serious levels of violence and violent crime, there has been a rejection in some quarters, including civil society and specific human rights groups, of the call, for instance, to give police powers to the military or to reintroduce the hanging of offenders. Suggestions that the military be transformed into a sort of regular police force or be included in the established force have not been accommodated. Most recently, in 2006, there was a tendency towards a reduction

in number of the most violent crimes compared to 2004 and 2005 as official police reports illustrate.

Not unrelated to this element of crime and the impact it has on politics and the society is the fact that some observers maintain that Caribbean political institutions, while dominated by middle class elements, continue to be influenced significantly by multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank (Lewis, 2001). The Jamaican state is thereby compromised in what it can attempt and achieve (Lewis, 2001). Several sources point to a central political role of the IMF in the politically tense second half of the 1970s and 1980 (see, e.g., Girvan, 1980). Furthermore declining political participation; frustration with the parliamentary system of politics; changes in leadership; conversion to neo-liberal economic policies by political parties which have traditionally represented labour; and changing relations between labour, business and government will affect the political economy of the region in the twenty-first century (Bryan, 2000). More recent works in the early years of the twenty-first century focusing on Jamaica have recorded this decline in political participation and so on.

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II. Data and Methods

This study on the “Political Culture of Democracy: Jamaica 2006”, is part of a multinational study being undertaken in twenty countries in the Caribbean and Latin America, coordinated by Professor Mitchell Seligson of the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University. The study in Jamaica was carried out by the Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work at the University of the West Indies, Mona, coordinated by Professor Ian Boxill.

The procedures used by participating countries in the study were based on standard ones, with some adaptations based on the particular needs of each country. This chapter outlines the methods used in the sample design, fieldwork, data management activities and analysis of the data.

2.1 Sample Design

For the purposes of this survey, the population of interest consisted of all Jamaican citizens, 18 years or older residing in the country. The sample was self-weighted and was designed to be representative of the voting population in terms of gender, age and geographic distribution based on the 2001 Population Census of Jamaica. In terms of geographic or spatial distribution, the island was stratified into three (3) divisions, namely:

1. Kingston Metropolitan Region (KMR)

This stratum includes Kingston, Urban St. Andrew, Portmore and Spanish Town, all of which comprise the main urban centre of Jamaica. The areas are contiguous. The number of EDs in this stratum is 1,369 and the population of voting age is 469,353 or 0.30 of the target group (persons 18 years or age or older).

2. Parish Capitals and Main Towns

Unlike the KMR, these areas are not contiguous but are nevertheless fairly homogenous in terms of the target group’s knowledge and practice of democracy in Jamaica. The size of the target group in this stratum is 427,803 persons or 0.27 of the total voting age population.

3. Rural Area.

Like stratum 2, rural areas are not contiguous. The size of this stratum is 677,926 persons or 0.43 of the total target group.

Figure II.1 shows the map of Jamaica with the distribution of respondents by parish and constituency.




Figure II.1 Distribution of respondents, Jamaica 2006

Source: LAPOP, 2006 (Map Produced by: Mona GeoInformatics Institute).

Within each stratum, EDs were identified and the size of each determined. The size of an ED is determined by the number of private dwellings within its borders. In general, there is a one to one correspondence between dwellings and households. In inner-city areas, however, the number of households usually exceeds the number of dwellings. It should be noted that a “household” consists of one person who lives alone, or a group of persons, who, as a unit, jointly occupies the whole or part of a dwelling, who have common arrangements for housekeeping, and who generally share at least one meal per day. The household may be comprised of related persons only, of unrelated persons or a combination of both.

A sample of EDs was then selected within each stratum, with probability proportional to size. The number of EDs selected within each stratum is directly related to the size of the target group

in the respective stratum. For example, 30% of EDs was selected from stratum 1 which has 30% of the target group.

Within each selected ED, a number of clusters were established. A cluster consists of 40 adults who live in adjoining or neighbouring dwellings. In urban EDs, there is an average of four clusters per ED whereas in rural EDs there is an average of three clusters per ED.

Within each selected ED, a systematic sample of one cluster in three was selected. Each interviewer was given a random start, and s/he was required to select the cluster that corresponds to the random start, and then every 3rd cluster thereafter. If a random start was two, for example, the interviewer was required to interview eight persons from cluster two and eight persons from cluster five, for urban EDs (10 persons from each selected cluster for rural EDs), according to the quota sample design which had been established earlier. The constraint on the sample was that only *one* adult *should* be selected from each household.

Having selected a 1 in 3 systematic sample of clusters from each selected ED, a 1 in 3 systematic sample of households was further selected. Within each selected household in each selected cluster, one adult was selected and interviewed.

The selection of eight (or 10) persons from a selected cluster was consistent with the quota controls as shown in figures 1 and 2.

In summary, the EDs were selected from each stratum with probability proportional to size (PPS), then a systematic sample of clusters was selected from each ED. Further a systematic sample of households was selected from each selected cluster. A quota sample of the target group was then selected from each cluster with the constraint that only *one* person was selected from each selected household. The sample was self-weighted (see table 2), and the degree of stratification ensured that the sample was representative of the target group. The selection of the EDs by probability proportional to size also ensured objectivity and diversity.

2.2 Instruments for Data Collection

The main instrument used for data collection was a questionnaire (Appendix). The fieldwork was supported by maps of the designated areas, listing sheets and descriptions of the clusters along with interviewer instructions.

Most of the questions were used in the instruments across the twenty countries that participated in this study. In addition, some country-specific questions were included. In the case of the Jamaica study, these questions were identified with the prefix JAM in the variable name.

Instruments used by the interviewers during the fieldwork exercise also included maps and listing sheets. The maps used were those obtained from the Statistical Institute of Jamaica (STATIN) 2001 Population Census. The maps indicated the starting point and the route for each area to the interviewers. Interviewer instructions included the guideline that every other dwelling should be visited within a cluster.

Listing sheets were provided which identified the quotas to be met. Interviewers also used these listing sheets to list the dwellings visited, names of eligible potential respondents and details of completed interviews, and the quota criterion which the interview filled.

2.3 Fieldwork

Training was conducted on the sample design and survey instruments for a team of 63 interviewers and field supervisors. The questionnaire was pilot tested before the team of interviewers went into the field. The data collection was carried out via face-to-face interviews over a period of four months – June to September, 2006. Most interviewers worked in teams of two or three persons, along with an assigned supervisor.

In this survey, non-sampling errors were confined to:

- a) refusals
- b) not at home
- c) non responses to selected questions

The number of refusals was relatively small. These were not confined to any particular age group, gender or social class. Most of the refusals were from the middle and upper middle income areas. These persons are generally uncooperative in all types of surveys and censuses.

The main reasons given for refusals were:

1. the questionnaire was too long and hence, too time consuming,
2. the subject matter was too sensitive

Some members of the target group were not at home during ‘normal’ working hours when the interviewers called. These are persons who are gainfully employed. As a result, the survey is biased in favour of the unemployed, underemployed and self employed. In order to reduce this bias to a minimum, a concentrated effort was made to interview most persons on Saturdays and Sundays when most respondents were ‘at home’.

Many persons did not respond to particular questions because they were deemed to be too sensitive and private. Included in these questions were:

- PROT2 - Participation in public demonstration or protest
- JC1, JC4, JC10, JC12, JC 13 – Justification of a military take over
- PP2 – Personal political work
- JAMVB3 - JAMVB7 – Political party respondent voted for
- JAMVB11 – Political party respondent is identified with
- Q10 – Income of respondent

2.4 Data Processing

Questionnaires received were given identification numbers and logged. The data were entered using the Census and Survey Processing System (CSPRO) package. This software has been designed for processing censuses and surveys by the U.S. Census Bureau and is available as public domain software. Prior to the start of the survey, a training session was conducted by LAPOP in the use of CSPRO. During the pilot phase of the survey, data entry tests were

conducted and modifications made to the Jamaica data dictionary based on the test questionnaires. The use of CSPRO provided cross-checks on the range of values being entered and the flow of responses to questions which had skips.

The data files were exported to the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), and merged to form the main dataset for Jamaica. During this phase, data audits were conducted. SPSS was used in the production of tables and charts for analysis.

2.5 Definition of the Variables for the Analysis

In analyzing the data, additional variables were defined for the purposes of grouping respondents, regressions or creation of indices. These variables include:

Gender: A value of 1 was used for males in regressions using this dummy variable.

Age group: This was used to examine age groups by recoding the age variable.

Education: This was created based on the number of years at each level of education based on the categories on the questionnaire

Indices were created and these are defined in the related chapters of this report.

2.6 Results from the Sample and Description of the Respondents

The sample design had the aim of providing a representative sample of the Jamaican population over 18 years of age. A total of 1,595 interviews were conducted. Table II.1 presents a comparison of the characteristics of the study sample with the 2001 census. In the cases of gender, overall average age, marital status, and completion of secondary education or higher, the percentages are similar. The information from the 2001 census for the percentage with telephone and computer access is based on household data. The large increase in cellular access may be due to changes in legislation and access since 2001 when the census was conducted.

Table II.1 Characteristics of the Sample and the 2001 Census (18 years of age and above)

Characteristics	2001 Census	LAPOP 2006 Survey
(N)	2,638,076	1,595
Gender		
% Males	48.4	50.3
Average age (years)	40.3	43.0
% < 30 years of age	33.5	23.3
Marital Status		
% Single	55.0	46.9
% In union	40.1	44.4
Education		
Average years completed		9.72
% Some Secondary or higher	67.8	72.7
Labour force participation		
% in the labour force	67.4	67.9
Selected artifacts		
% with telephone (land line)	45.5*	34.9
% with telephone (cellular)	13.8	88.6
% with computer	11.9	26.6
% with automobile		31.3
Region		
% Kingston Metropolitan	52.0	21.1
% Parish capitals / main towns		22.3
% Rural areas	48.0	56.6
*Number of households		

Figures II.2 to II.6 show the distribution of respondents by gender, age, level of education, region and wealth respectively.




Figure II.2 Distribution of respondents by gender

Figure II.2 illustrates the gender distribution of the sample. The distribution of 50.3% males is comparable with the 2001 census which had 48.4% males in the population.




Figure II.3 Distribution of respondents by age

Figure II.3 illustrates the distribution of the age variable in the sample. The overall average age in the sample (43.0 years) is relatively close to the average age of the population (40.3 years) in the 2001 census. There is a relatively large percentage difference between those less than 30 years of age in the census and the sample.




Figure II.4 Distribution of respondents by level of education

As seen in Figure II.4, the majority of respondents have completed some secondary education (50.7%) which is slightly higher than the 2001 census which showed 47.8% of the population having completed at least some secondary education.




Figure II.5 Distribution of respondents by region

In terms of geographic area, the 2001 census showed 48.0% living in rural areas. In this study, the percentage of respondents living in rural areas was 56.6%, as illustrated in Figure II.5.




Figure II.6 Distribution of respondents by index of wealth

Figure II.6 depicts the distribution of respondents by index of wealth. The wealth index was measured using capital goods ownership and constructed using variables which recorded ownership of items including television sets, motor vehicles, washing machines, microwaves, refrigerators and the availability of telephone land line and indoor running water. In terms of total monthly household income, including remittances, as shown in Figure II.7, most respondents fell in the low to middle income categories.




Figure II.7 Distribution of Respondents by Income Levels

Design Effects

The precision of the results and the efficiency of the sample were relatively good as shown by the design effects in Appendix A.

III. Conceptions of Democracy

3.1 Introduction

The sentiments expressed in a quotation attributed to George Orwell, that

“It is almost universally felt that when we call a country democratic we are praising it; consequently, the defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy, and fear that they might have to stop using the word if it were tied down to any one meaning”

have been widely acknowledged in discussions in comparative political science and public opinion studies of democracy. Indeed, the word democracy is quite an elastic concept and as a consequence, “can mean all things to all people” (Bratton, 2002, p. 6). Inquiries into the meanings that people attach to the term have therefore, been quite prevalent in recent times (Mishler, 2000), with more and more studies attempting to assess people’s attitudes to democracy within the context of the definitions they ascribe to the term. When an individual expresses a level of support for democracy, for example, it should ideally be possible to establish quite precisely, what conception of democracy is being supported. Otherwise, the responses obtained in such studies might seem unintelligible and the related findings open to doubt (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004).

In the 2006 round of LAPOP surveys, two items were introduced into the questionnaire for the purpose of ascertaining the varied conceptions of democracy that are held by citizens of the different countries being studied. The first question which is repeated in the series of items, DEM13A-C, is a multi-response, open-ended question which required respondents to provide up to three alternative descriptions of what democracy means to them. Interviewers were required to pose the question:

Dem 13: *In a few words, what does democracy means to you?*

Respondents were to be asked to select from a list of pre-established codes, the definitions that best reflect the answers provided by the respondents. The thirty-five codes shown in Table III.1 resulted from the pre-testing of this open-ended question and the subsequent grouping of the possible meanings according to considerations of liberty, economic outcomes, suffrage, equality, participation, state of law, non-military government, war or invasion and options to account for instances where no meaning is given or where uncoded definitions are given. The other item:

Dem 13D: *Of these meanings of democracy you have offered, in your opinion, which is the most important?*

is included with the aim of creating a single variable out of the three possible responses provided in the 13A – C series, and in the process, establishing the most important meaning the respondent attached to the concept of democracy. In cases where a single definition is provided, this is taken to be the presumptive most important meaning.

Table III.1 Pre-Coded Items of the Conception of Democracy Series

DEM13. In a few words, what does democracy mean to you? (NOTICE: DO NOT READ CHOICES. ACCEPT UP TO THREE ANSWERS. AFTER THE FIRST AND SECOND RESPONSE ASK, "DOES IT MEAN SOMETHING ELSE?").			
		Probe: Does it mean something else?	Probe: Does it mean something else?
	DEM 13A	DEM 13B	DEM13C
It does not have any meaning	0	0	0
Liberty:			
Liberty (without specifying what type)	1	1	1
Economic Liberty	2	2	2
Liberty of expression, voting, choice and human rights	3	3	3
Liberty of movement	4	4	4
Liberty, lack of	5	5	5
Being independent	6	6	6
Economy:			
Well-being, economic progress, growth	7	7	7
Well-being, lack of, no economic progress	8	8	8
Capitalism	9	9	9
Free trade, free business	10	10	10
Employment, more opportunities of	11	11	11
Employment, lack of	12	12	12
Voting:			
Right to choose leaders	13	13	13
Elections, voting	14	14	14
Free elections	15	15	15
Fraudulent elections	16	16	16
Equality:			
Equality (without specifying)	17	17	17
Economic equality, or equality of classes	18	18	18
Gender equality	19	19	19
Equality to the laws	20	20	20
Racial or ethnic equality	21	21	21
Equality, lack of, inequality	22	22	22
Participation:			
Limitations of participation	23	23	23
Participation (without saying which type)	24	25	26
Participation of minorities	25	25	25
Power of the people	26	26	26
Rule of Law:			
Human rights, respect rights	27	27	27
Disorder, lack of justice, corruption	28	28	28
Justice	29	29	29
Obey the law, less corruption	30	30	30

Non-military government	31	31	31
Live in peace, without war	32	32	32
War, invasions	33	33	33
Other answer	80	80	80
DK/NK	88	88	88
Code (if R gives only an answer, 13B and 13C are codified with 0. If he gives two answers, 13C is codified with 0. (If he gives only one answer, Mark it and Go to A1).	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
DEM13D. Of these meanings of democracy you have said, in your opinion, which is the most important: (ASK ONLY IF TWO OR THREE)		DEM13D	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

The thirty-five codes in the response grid above (Table III.1) were re-classified by LAPOP into the following four overarching categories:

1. **Instrumental or utilitarian conceptions of democracy** – These are definitions which are based upon the assessment of economic or political performance.
2. **Normative or axiomatic conceptions of democracy** – These are not linked to economic calculations and outcomes. They are based on citizens understanding of the processes, practices or values that are associated with democracy.
3. **Pejorative or negative conceptions of democracy** – Definitions held by those who feel that democracy as a bad idea.
4. **Empty conceptualization of democracy** – Categorize those who cannot attribute a meaning and those stating ‘other meaning’ as their answer.

Table III.2 shows the definitions included in each of these four categories and their relevant codes.

Table III.2 Analytical framework for alternative conceptions of democracy
Codes for question responses are in parenthesis

Pejorative conceptions of democracy (0)	Empty, diffuse or not-specified conceptions of democracy (1)	Instrumental or utilitarian conceptions of democracy (2)	Normative or intrinsic conceptions of democracy (3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liberty, lack of (5) - Well being, lack of, no economic progress (8) - Employment, lack of (12) - Fraudulent elections (16) - Equality, lack of, inequality (22) - Limitations of participation (23) - Disorder, lack of justice, corruption (28) - War invasions (33) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It does not have any meaning (0) - Other answer (80) - DK/NK (88) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic Liberty (2) - Well being, economic progress, growth (7) - Capitalism (9) - Free trade, free business (10) - Employment, more opportunities of (11) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liberty (without specifying what type) (1) - Liberty of expression, voting, choice and human rights (3) - Liberty of voting (4) - Being independent (6) - Right to choose leaders (13) - Elections, voting (14) - Free elections (15) - Equally (without specifying) (17) - Economic equality or equality of classes (18) - Gender equality (19) - Equality to the laws (20) - Racial or ethnic equality (21) - Participation (without saying which type) (24) - Participation of minorities (25) - Power of the people (26) - Human Rights, respect rights (27) - Justice (29) - Obey the law, less corruption (30) - Non-military government (31) - Live in peace without war (32)

In this chapter of this report, we analyze the meanings that Jamaicans attach to the concept of democracy by, firstly, examining how their responses are distributed across the four categories described above. This will be followed by an examination of these definitions from a comparative perspective by looking at similarities and differences in the way that democracy is defined according to these categories in other LAPOP countries. In the next section, we will examine the explanatory value of selected demographic, socio-economic and contextual variables in determining the way Jamaicans define democracy, followed by an assessment of how citizens' conceptions of democracy are associated with their attitudes towards the institutions and system of democracy.

3.2 Definitions of Democracy in Jamaica

Figure III.1 provides a breakdown of respondents' understanding of democracy according the conceptual framework described earlier. As shown, nearly two out of three respondents (63.9 per cent) attach a normative definition to the concept. So for the majority of Jamaicans, the term is understood, on the one hand, in terms of democratic values such as liberty, freedom of expression, equality and human rights and on the other, in terms of generally accepted democratic

practices such as elections, voting and participation. The next largest group was the ‘empty’ category, comprising those respondents who were unable to provide a definition or indicated that democracy had no meaning. Those reporting a utilitarian and a negative understanding stood at 5.3 and 4.1 per cent respectively.





Figure III.1 Alternative Conceptions of Democracy held by Jamaicans, 2006

From a comparative perspective, it can be seen from the information presented in Figure III.2 that the general pattern of the distribution of definitions according to the four categories is quite similar to that of other LAPOP countries. Generally, the attribution of normative meanings is the largest category followed by the empty conceptualization classification.

Conceptual illiteracy¹ in Jamaica is high (26.6 per cent) when compared to countries like Chile (15.8 per cent) and Costa Rica (17.4 per cent) but average when the empty category scores of countries like El Salvador (43.1 per cent) and Honduras (35 per cent) are factored in the aggregate value for this indicator.

Negative conceptions of democracy by Jamaicans are relatively high, Jamaica being among the five LAPOP Countries, in which more than four per cent of respondents define the concept with pejorative terms.

¹ Defined in terms of the relative size of the ‘Empty’ category.



Source: LAPOP, 2006

Figure III.2 Comparative Perspective of Alternative Conceptions of Democracy, 2006

3.3 Predictors of the Meanings Jamaicans Attach to the Concept of Democracy

Efforts to determine the factors that influence the meanings that are attributed to democracy by Jamaicans involved the development of a logistic regression model comprising the variables listed in the first column of Table III.A1 in the appendix at the end of this chapter.

In this model, the reference category was the 63.9 per cent of Jamaicans who reported a normative conceptualization of democracy. As the result in the level of significant column shows, the only significant difference between people with negative understandings of democracy and those with normative conceptions is their level of wealth. Wealth was also found to be statistically significant in determining whether or not Jamaicans ascribe an empty rather than a normative definition.

In order to examine the influence of wealth, respondents were classified into two groups based on the approximate value of their household inventory of capital goods. Using the approximate value of the nine indicators of wealth, the original wealth variable was re-coded in two groups. Group 1 included households with a list of lower value items and group 2, comprising those with an inventory with a higher value, which defines them as being the wealthier in society.

The bars Figure III.3 show that wealthier persons are likely to entertain a normative rather than a negative conception of democracy. The predictive power of wealth in determining an empty instead of a normative understanding of democracy is also obvious from the relevant bars in the chart. Wealthier persons define democracy mostly in terms of normative or economic and political considerations, while the less wealthy are less likely to be able to provide a definitive meaning for the concept.




Figure III.3 Definitions of Democracy by Wealth in Jamaica, 2006

Among Jamaicans who were categorized as ‘empty’ based on their lack of, or limited understanding of democracy, sex and size of city were found to be significant predictors of differences from those who defined democracy in a normative way.

Figure III.4 shows the graphical representation of conception by sex. The relative lengths of the dark blue bar and the bar with the lighter shade of blue indicate the influence of sex in determining the probability of citizens expressing an empty rather than a normative understanding of democracy. Females are likely to have an empty understanding of democracy more often than they would have a normative one.




Figure III.4 Definitions of Democracy by Sex in Jamaica, 2006

The significant effects of the size of the city in which respondents reside are illustrated in Figure III.5. Size of city determines differences in definition in both the empty and the utilitarian categories. Persons living in large cities are more likely to attribute empty conceptualizations rather than normative ones. With regards to those with utilitarian understanding, small city dwellers are more likely to offer utilitarian rather than normative definitions.




Figure III.5 Definitions of Democracy by Size of City in Jamaica, 2006

3.4 Relationship between Conceptualization and Attitude to Democracy

It can be argued that the meaning a person attaches to the concept of democracy should have some influence on that person’s regime preference and on the level of support he or she accords to the system of democracy. A concluding exercise for this chapter involved an examination of the relationship between citizens’ definition of democracy and their overall support for the system.

For the two variables, the correlation coefficient (.1)¹ reveals an exceedingly weak association. Figures III.6 shows the joint presentation of conception of democracy with system support. This chart shows a pattern of difference in the way democracy is defined and the level of support for the system. Persons with a utilitarian conceptualization express marginally higher support for the system of government. Those with a pejorative understanding of democracy indicated the lowest average support for the system.

¹ Eta, (nominal-ordinal).




Figure III.6 Definitions of Democracy by System Support in Jamaica, 2006

3.5 Conclusion

There is marked similarity in the way respondents in the different LAPOP countries understand democracy in the 2006 survey. Jamaicans, like the Latin Americans, defined democracy, predominantly, in normative terms. Jamaica's ranking with regards to empty and negative definition is, on the other hand, relatively high, with nearly a third of the population being unable to define the term or providing a pejorative meaning. This points to a need for some sort of national programme to inform this section of the populace of the meaning and virtues of democracy. Given the established influence of wealth and area of residence on citizens' conceptualization of this regime type, such programme should target rural dwellers where the need for intervention is greatest. With regards to the impact of wealth on a positive understanding of democracy, there seems to be a need to facilitate a more equitable economic climate in which, among other things, the enjoyment of basic capital goods is more accessible to the populace. Indeed, the consolidation of a democracy that is defined in terms of values such as liberty, equality, rule of law and free elections will inevitably require broad citizens' support for this system of government. This in turn will depend on the pervasion of a clear and positive understanding of the concept of democracy among the populace.

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APPENDIX III CHAPTER 3 – ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Table III. A1
Factors Explaining the Meanings Jamaicans Attach to the Concept of Democracy
Logistic Regression Results, 2006

Alternative concepts of democracy		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Negative	Intercept	-1.578	1.002	2.479	1	.115			
	Sex	-.092	.289	.101	1	.750	.912	.518	1.607
	Age	.007	.009	.653	1	.419	1.007	.989	1.026
	Education	.008	.042	.036	1	.849	1.008	.928	1.096
	Wealth	-.302	.080	14.286	1	.000	.739	.632	.865
Empty	Area	.349	.444	.619	1	.431	1.418	.594	3.382
	Area Size	-.248	.132	3.549	1	.060	.780	.603	1.010
	Intercept	1.429	.432	10.965	1	.001			
	Sex	.254	.126	4.085	1	.043	1.289	1.008	1.648
	Age	-.006	.004	2.372	1	.124	.994	.986	1.002
Utilitarian	Education	-.032	.018	3.112	1	.078	.969	.935	1.004
	Wealth	-.288	.035	68.049	1	.000	.750	.700	.803
	Area	-.210	.179	1.375	1	.241	.811	.571	1.151
	Area Size	-.171	.054	9.893	1	.002	.843	.757	.938
	Intercept	-3.345	.879	14.492	1	.000			
Utilitarian	Sex	-.044	.240	.034	1	.854	.957	.597	1.533
	Age	.004	.008	.213	1	.645	1.004	.988	1.019
	Education	-.016	.034	.225	1	.636	.984	.920	1.052
	Wealth	-.007	.064	.010	1	.919	.993	.876	1.127
	Area	-.039	.330	.014	1	.906	.962	.503	1.838
	Area Size	.243	.126	3.718	1	.054	1.275	.996	1.632

a The reference category is: Normative.

IV. Support for Democracy

4.1 Introduction

Over the past two decades, there has been a virtual proliferation of research initiatives aimed at clarifying the relationship between key dimensions of citizens' political attitude and the durability of the democracy in which they live. Questions about the importance of citizens' support have been extensively addressed, and invariably, there has been strong support for the notion that broad popular acceptance of the legitimacy¹ of the system is critical for the maintenance of a stable democracy (Canache, 2002; Dalton, 1999; Seligson, 2004). Indeed, history has taught us that even staunchly democratic regimes can become vulnerable if anti-democratic opposition forces are successful in undermining citizen support for that system of government (Cullel, Benavides, Gomes & Kikut, 2003). Keeping track of citizen support can therefore be an effective means of assessing the state of a democracy – gauging the extent to which the system is in the process of fracturing, stabilizing or consolidation.

In this chapter, we examine the issue of citizens' support for democracy in Jamaica. Our methods of analysis and the attendant assumptions are based primarily on methodologies developed by Mitchell Seligson to address questions of system support in different regimes. The chapter is divided into five sections. In section 1, we describe a model of system support that will provide the framework for this analysis of citizens' attitude to democracy in Jamaica. The subsequent sections and sub-sections assess system legitimacy by analyzing indicators of the different dimensions of citizens' support identified in the model, followed by an evaluation of existing levels of support for a stable democracy in Jamaica.

Our analysis is limited by the unavailability of national comparative information, given that this is the first Jamaican study of this type. An attempt is made, nevertheless, to present a comparative perspective in relation to key indicators by utilizing data obtained in similar studies of countries in the Americas.

4.2 Measuring Citizen Support

Easton (1975)² identified three levels at which citizens' support for democracy may be assessed. At the most abstract level, the point of diffuse support, the analysis focuses on the extent to which citizens believe in the existence of, and identify with the 'political community'. The concern at level 2 is with 'system support' where legitimacy is based on citizens' satisfaction with the rule of law, the existing structure of power and the overall right of the regime to govern. At the third level is the support for the incumbent authority. This third level of legitimacy is quite specific and is contingent on citizens' evaluation of the performance of government and public officials.

¹ Seymour Martin Lipset defined legitimacy as 'the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society. (*Political man: The social basis of politics*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981, p.77. Simply put, it is citizens' confidence in their government right to rule.

² See David Easton. (1965). *A systems analysis of political life*. New York, John Wiley.

This framework was later adapted by Pipa Norris in 1999.³ The upper and the lower levels were maintained as in Easton (1975). However, the second tier (support for the political regime) was divided into three sub-levels in an attempt at addressing the issue of regime legitimacy in more precise terms. So, support for the political regime was re-defined in terms of support for principles of the regime, support for performance of the regime and support for the institutions and the system as a whole.

Table IV.1 outlines the five levels of legitimacy in a democracy that have evolved out of the works of David Easton and Pipa Norris. It also identifies indicators that have been proven to be valid and reliable measures of these dimensions of citizen support in similar studies undertaken by the Latin American Public Opinion Project. Support for democracy in Jamaica is examined at all five levels of legitimacy in this report. However, only levels one to four will be examined in this chapter. A detailed examination of citizens’ evaluation of the performance of the incumbent authorities and their trust in public officials will be undertaken in a subsequent chapter.

Table IV.1 Operational Definitions for the Different Levels of Legitimacy

LEVELS OF LEGITIMACY		OPERATIONAL DIMENSIONS
1	Support for the political community	Degree to which citizens identify with their nation – sense of pride in being a citizen
2	Support for the principles of the regime	Belief in the rules and values of democracy – embraces tolerance and due process; rejection of authoritarian options
3	Support for the performance of the regime	Level of satisfaction with the performance of democracy
4	Support for the system/institutions of the regime	Trust in the institutions, support for the system
5	Support for the political authorities/actors	Citizens evaluation of the performance of the incumbent authorities, their trust in public officials

4.3 Support for the Political Community

Political legitimacy at this level is labeled as ‘diffuse support’ (Easton, 1975) because of the abstract nature of this form of system legitimacy. It is, in effect, an unconditional support for the political system - a kind of support that is based more on citizen’s perception of what the system is or represents, rather than how it actually functions (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982). This ‘basic attachment to nation’ (Norris, 1999, p. 10), is assumed to exist if there is broad agreement among members of a society about the territorial boundaries of the state and there is a strong sense of identification with this political community.⁴ To determine the extent to which a political community exists in Jamaica, responses to the following question, are analyzed.

*B43. How proud are you to be a Jamaican?*⁵

³ Norris, P. (Ed.). (1999). *Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁴Norris (1999) argues that citizens’ agreement about the boundaries of their political community is central to the maintenance of stability in a democracy. Where there is greater loyalty to clans or tribes rather than to ‘artificially constructed post-colonial political boundaries’, as is the case of many African countries, support for national institutions and systems tends to be fragile (Mattes, 2004).

⁵ This measure of diffuse support has been extensively used in similar studies in other countries. It has been used repeatedly by the LAPOP and in studies such as the World Values Survey.

This item measures national pride as a proxy for attachment to nation and by extension, a measure of the level of commitment to, or sense of inclusion in the political community. Respondents were required to locate their sense of pride in seven-point scale ranging from 1, indicating no pride in nation to 7, signifying a high sense of national pride. This 1-7 scale was then converted to an easier to interpret 0-100 metric-format scale.⁶

The analysis of responses to this question reveals that Jamaicans are highly proud of their nationality. As shown in Figure IV.1, expressions of national pride averaged nearly ninety-two on the 100-point scale described above. This implies the existence of a strong sense of political community among Jamaicans. Comparatively, Jamaica ranks at the middle of the list of countries participating in the LAPOP 2006 survey, having a similar average as Mexico and about six points less than the Dominican Republic, the country with the highest mean national pride.




Figure IV.1 Comparative Perspective on Citizens' Pride in Nationality

⁶ Scale conversion is accomplished by reducing each score by 1 and then dividing by 6 to create a new range of 0-1. A metric scale is then obtained by multiplying by 100. All subsequent scales in this report are re-calibrated in this manner.

The intensity of this loyalty to nation among Jamaicans is highlighted by the fact that about three out of four Jamaicans indicated that they were extremely proud of their nationality by locating their response on the 7 point scale, indicating that they have ‘a lot of’ pride in their nation. Most of the remaining respondents (15 per cent) chose either 5 or 6 on the scale (Figure IV.2).




Figure IV.2 Sense of National Pride Among Jamaicans, 2006, Scale 0 -100

Further analysis of the issue of citizens’ support for the political community involved the design of a linear regression model to establish the factors that best explain national identity and sense of pride among Jamaicans. Table IV.A1⁷ shows the demographic, socioeconomic and attitudinal variables that were included in the model and the related statistics. The results show that only trust in the justice system was found to have a statistically significant effect on sense of national pride. Figure IV.3 depicts the relationship between national pride and confidence in the justice

⁷ This is located in Appendix 4 at end of this chapter. Significant factors are those that are highlighted, with level of significance of .05 or less.

system, showing that, on a whole, national pride increases as trust in the system increases. There seems to be slight ambiguity, however, on the part of those with very high sense of trust in the justice, where national pride tends to decrease slightly as national pride increases.




Figure IV.3 Sense of National Pride by Trust in the Justice System in Jamaicans, 2006, Scale 0-100

4.4 Support for the Principles of the Regime

This second level of legitimacy is examined in terms of citizens’ attitude to the key democratic principles of the regime. Analysis is done at both the abstract and the more concrete level. Firstly, support for the idea of democracy, or more precisely, the degree to which democracy is valued as a form of government is examined. This is followed by an examination of respondents’ attitudes in support of the democratic principles of due process and the rule of law. Questions relating to respondents’ respect for civil liberties and the political freedom of fellow citizens are then examined, as part of the focus on the issue of tolerance.

4.4.1 Support for the Idea of Democracy

In our attempt at gauging the level of support for the idea of democracy, we analyzed responses to the following question, commonly referred to as the Preference for Democracy (PFD) item:

DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree the most?

1. To people like me, it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic.
2. Democracy is preferable to any other type of government.
3. In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one
4. Don't know.

As shown in Figure IV.4, Jamaicans overwhelmingly express a preference for democracy as a system of government. Three out of four respondents indicated that democracy is preferable to any other form of government while only one out of ten feels that there may be instances when an authoritarian regime can be better. Thirteen per cent did not believe it mattered whether the regime was democratic or not.




Figure IV.4 Regime Preference among Jamaicans, 2006

Figure IV.5 presents comparative information on findings relating to regime preference in other LAPOP countries. As depicted, Jamaica obtained a fifth place position in the ranking of countries according to the percentage of its citizens who selected democracy as their preferred system of government.




Figure IV.5 Comparative Perspective of Regime Preference by LAPOP Countries, 2006

These findings in support of democracy are corroborated by the responses to a similar item in the survey, which required respondents to locate their choice of democracy as a preferred system of government on a 7-point scale. Results in response to the following question were quite similar:

ING4 - Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

As shown in Figure IV.6, the response pattern of this question is nearly identical to that of the PFD item. Three out of four respondents expressed strong endorsement for the idea that democracy is next to none as their choice of regime type, by selecting 5, 6 or 7 on the 7-point scale. As the bars on the chart indicate, virtually all of the respondents located their answers on or above the 50-point reference mark on the 1-7 point scale, with the modal preference falling on the 7th point.




Figure IV.6 Citizens Endorsement of Democracy as the Ideal System of Government, Jamaica 2006, Scale 1 -7

A logistic regression model comprised of the independent variables shown in Table IV.A2 in Appendix 4, was analyzed to identify the factors with statistically significant outcomes with regard to regime preference (DEM2) among Jamaicans. Age is the only factor that is significant, with older persons more likely to prefer democracy than younger ones (Figure IV.7).




Figure IV.7 Preference for Democracy by Age of Respondents

4.4.2 Support for Non-Democratic Options

This pervasiveness of attitudes in support of democracy among Jamaicans is further highlighted in responses to items:

DEM11 Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?
 (1) Iron fist (2) Participation for all (8) Doesn't respond

AUT1 There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected by the vote, others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, that is, the popular vote, is always the best. What do you think? [Read]
 (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected
 (2) Electoral democracy is the best
 (8) DK/DR

Figure IV.8 shows that nearly 87 per cent of respondents opined that the country's problems should be solved with the participation of all the citizens.




Figure IV.8 Preference for Participatory Government in Jamaica, 2006

Figure IV.9 highlights that, given the options of an unelected strong leader and one chosen by popular vote, 84 per cent vouched for electoral democracy, even with the recognition that the elected leader might not always be an effective one.




Figure IV.9 Preference for Electoral Democracy in Jamaica, 2006

Despite the forgoing evidence of strong democratic orientations among Jamaicans, however, there were citizens who expressed a clear preference for non-democratic forms of government and others who indicated indifference or uncertainty when questioned as to their regime preference. Those who were unambiguous in their preference for an authoritarian regime, for an iron fist government or for a strong unelected leader accounted for 9.7, 8.8 and 10.2 per cent of respondents, respectively (See Figures 4,8 & 9 above). Compared to the percentages of citizens with a preference for democratic processes and values, and when matched with similar indicators for other LAPOP countries, these numbers are relatively small, indicating a comparatively weak support among Jamaicans for non-democratic regime options.

4.4.3 Support for Democratic Principles

We will now examine attitudes relating to some specific principles of democracy. We start by analyzing responses to questions focusing on the rule of law and the right to due process – rights that are deemed to be fundamental to any democracy. To determine the extent to which Jamaicans recognize and support these rights, we analyzed responses to the following question:

AOJ8 *In order to capture criminals, do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or occasionally, they can operate at the margin of the law?*

1. They should always respect the law.
2. Can operate at the margin of the law occasionally.
3. Don't know

Results presented in Figure IV.10 indicate a very strong support for the rule of law among Jamaicans. About 70 per cent of those expressing an opinion on the issue felt that the law should always be obeyed. It was assumed that persons who were the victim of a crime within the past twelve months would be less inclined to advocate for strict compliance with the law in fighting crime. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. No significant difference in attitude was found to exist between those who were victimized and those who were not. This issue will be further examined in chapter six, where the focus will be on the crime victimization and the rule of law.




Figure IV.10 Attitude of Jamaicans to the Principle of Rule of Law, 2006

4.4.4 Social Activism

Our analysis of the support for the principles of democracy among Jamaicans included an examination of attitudes towards certain courses of action often taken by certain members of democratic societies. Firstly, we will examine support for some licit activities aimed at influencing policy or social change. These have been labeled as ‘positive actions’ in similar studies. This will be followed by an analysis of attitudes to some acts of civil disobedience and certain actions which may also be taken for good causes but are activities that are prohibited by the laws of Jamaica. Citizens’ attitudes to these actions were captured in responses to the following question:

Questions Used to Measure Citizens Attitude to Social Activism among Jamaicans

Now we are going to use another card. This card had a 10-point scale, which goes from 1-10 where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve.

I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly would you approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Doesn't know
Strongly disapprove									Strongly approve	

- E5. That people participate in legal demonstrations.
- E8. That people participate in an organization or group to try to address community problems.
- E11. That people work on electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate.
- E15. That people participate in the closing or blocking of roads.
- E14. That people squat on other peoples property.
- E2. That people take control of factories, offices and other buildings.
- E3. That people participate in a group wanting to carry out violent overthrow of an elected government.
- E16. That people take the law into their own hands when the State does not punish criminals

There is a high level respect for the right of citizens to exercise the basic democratic right to participate in organizations of their choice, to address community related problems, to participate in legal demonstrations and to work in political campaigns. As shown Figure IV. 11, the right to join organizations received the highest level of approval, an average of 86 out of the possible 100 points.




Figure IV.11 Citizens Attitude in Support of Positive Actions

Our attempt at detecting the factors that determine respondents support for citizens’ participation in these activities involved the creation of an ‘index of support for constructive involvement’¹ and the use of a linear regression model to identify determinants of such support. The average score on these indicators was 77 points. Regression outcomes displayed in Table IV.A4 in Appendix 4. Tolerance was the only statistically significant predictor in this model. Figure IV.12 shows that on a whole, the higher the individual’s level of tolerance, the greater the likelihood of their support for citizens’ right to participate in these activities.

¹ This is the mean of the aggregated values of items E5, E8 and E11(cases with < 1 missing value). All variables scored above .50 (E5r=.79, E8r=.82 and E11r=.59) and therefore were included in the Constructive Involvement Index. The cronbachs alpha was a relatively low .55.




Figure IV.12 Citizens Attitude in Support of Positive Actions

4.4.5 Acts of Civil Disobedience

When it comes to the use of acts of civil disobedience as means of achieving social objectives, the findings are quite dissimilar to the forgoing results. On a whole, Jamaicans reject of the use of illicit measures as means of protest. The blocking of streets is illegal in Jamaica. This method of social protest had become so prevalent in Jamaica in the 1980s and 90s, that the government was able to obtain broad citizen and opposition support for the introduction of legislation to outlaw such practices. As depicted in Figure IV.13, only about 20 per cent of respondents support the use of road blocks as a protest measure. The illegal occupation of private property is even more strongly opposed, with only 11 per cent of the sample supporting squatting, and only about 10 per cent supporting the taking over of buildings and offices as an act of civil disobedience.

Twenty four per cent of those surveyed expressed their support of vigilante actions in cases where the State fails to prosecute and punish criminals. With regard to citizens' attitude to acts of insurrection, only about nine per cent of respondents indicated their support for the use of seditious measures to achieve political goals. Although the smallest category, this statistic should

nevertheless cause concern because what is evident from responses to DEM series of questions and confirmed here, is that nearly one out of ten Jamaicans report antidemocratic tendencies and about the same proportion feel that it is desirable to remove a government by seditious means.




Figure IV.13 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Social and Political Actions

An index of support for these actions, the outcome of the mean of the average of these five indicators (cases with < 3 missing value, cronbach's alpha of .73) was also developed and regression analysis used to determine the variables that are associated with the support for the use of these illicit activities. As shown in Table IV. A5, wealth, age, trust in the justice system and tolerance were found to be statistically significant predictors of support for these actions.

Figure IV.14 depicts the influence of a person’s wealth, operationalized in terms of the inventory of capital goods owned. The less wealthy, that is, individuals with smaller inventory of the items of durable good that are use to estimate wealth are more likely to support the use of these activities to achieve social and political objectives in Jamaica (Figure IV.14).




Figure IV.14 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Measures by Wealth

Figure IV.15 depicts the predictive power of age in determining citizens' support for these actions. Younger persons are much more likely to support acts of civil disobedience and illegal protest activities than older ones.




Figure IV.15 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Measures by Age

As indicated by Figure IV.16, however, persons who are more likely to support these measures are those with least amount of confidence in the justice system. Historically, attempts to curb these activities involve the use of the security forces, which quite often results in the excessive use of force. It seems though, that the problem could be more effectively addressed through education and justice system reform. Citizens will be less inclined to participate in illegal protest actions if they understand how the system works and are confident that it will work for them in a timely and fair manner.




Figure IV.16 Citizens Attitude in Support of Illicit Measures by Trust in the Justice System

4.5 Tolerance

By definition, tolerance is the willingness to recognize and respect the civil liberties of fellow citizens, even those with whom there is strong disagreement. Citizens must exhibit a sufficiently high level of tolerance for a democracy to function harmoniously and remain as a cohesive political community. This is not saying that tolerance is a prerequisite for stability. In fact, a society can remain stable for an extended period of time although there is a high degree of intolerance in the population. Rather, an indicator of the level of tolerance is a useful measure of the strength of a democracy, which in turn may have implications for the consolidation of the democracy itself and the stability of the system on the whole. As argued in Seligson (2004):

Tolerance is indispensable (in) socially, economically, culturally, and politically diverse and plural societies: while in the political sphere persons belong to the same community of citizens – all with equal rights - in the rest of their social life individuals belong to very different, unequal and even disconnected worlds. Tolerance is, to a certain extent, the adhesive that binds society (in)to the political community. (p.36)

Tolerance is crucial to the maintenance of a democracy. It is central to the process of conflict resolution in arriving at compromise in an environment of competing views and interests. A vibrant democracy depends on the input of those with opposing positions. The extent to which the system entertains and protects the rights of those holding differing positions determines the viability of opposition groups. A strong opposition is essential to the democratic process. Here we assess the extent to which Jamaicans are tolerant of the positions of others, especially those that are unpopular and are held by minorities.

The intense partisan political conflicts that occurred in Jamaica at the turn of the 1970s were primarily the result of a failure on the part of some individuals to accept the right of others to the party affiliation of their choice. In response to widespread political violence that obtained, the authorities imposed a state of emergency in 1975 which had the effect of significantly curtailing the democratic rights of all Jamaicans. The General Elections of 1976, for example, were conducted in a context in which the emergency powers of the Government gave it the right to censure the press, ban marches and other means of protest and most importantly, restrict the right of the opposition to conduct its political campaign. There has, in fact, been a remarkable improvement in the sense of tolerance among the various political groups and factions in recent times. However, the noticeable pervasion of social intolerance among the populace has been a cause of great concern; hence the pertinence of this issue of tolerance in a study of this type.

A number of measures have been developed to estimate level of tolerance in a society.² The Latin American Public Opinion Project approach involves the use of the four core questions from the Political Culture of Democracy in Jamaica: 2006 survey instrument, reproduced in Box IV.1 below:

Box IV.1 Core Questions Used to Measure Level of Tolerance among Jamaicans

Respondent is given the card and the following instructions:

(This card has a 10-point scale which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 mean that you strongly approve.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Doesn't Know
Strongly disapprove									Strongly approve	

The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in Jamaica. (Please tell me how strongly you approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.)

- D1. There are people who speak negatively of the Jamaican form of government, not just the current government but the form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**?
- D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views?
- D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **seek public office**?
- D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people going on television **to make speeches**?

² See James L. Gibson, "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance : Must Tolerance be 'Least Liked'," *American Journal of Political Science*, 36, May (1992), pp. 560-77

Respondents' attitudes to these dimensions of political tolerance are summarized in Table IV. 7. The analysis of responses on an item by item basis indicates that, with the exception of the rights of homosexuals, Jamaicans are highly tolerant of the rights of others, especially those with whom they disagree. In an attempt to simplify the interpretation and communication of information captured on the 10-point scale displayed above, responses were re-categorized on the familiar 100-point scale and averages calculated.

4.5.1 Political Tolerance

We start by looking at indicators of political tolerance (Figure IV.17). Right to demonstrate received the highest level of approval, 79 out of the possible 100 points. This is followed closely by the right to vote with 75 points. Respondents were less supportive of persons using the public media to express opposing views and to hold public office. The 68 points obtained on these indicators are, nevertheless, quite high when compared with other countries in Latin America.




Figure IV.17 Attitudes to Jamaicans to Selected Basic Rights of Fellow Citizens, National Tolerance Index, 2006

A tolerance index, computed as the mean of responses to the first four items in Box III. 1 above³, worked out to be 72.7. Comparatively, this indicates an exceptionally high level of tolerance when compared to countries in Latin American. As depicted in Figure IV.18, Jamaica tops the list of countries in this indicator of tolerance, a full 10 points higher than that of Costa Rica, the country with the next highest score. Compared to most of these countries, Jamaica has had the longest period of uninterrupted, partisan alternation in government, representative type democracy; a factor that might be helpful in explaining these results.




Figure IV.18 Comparative Average Score in Political Tolerance Index by Country, 2006

³ The question on homosexual rights has been left out of mix in similar LAPOP studies. The average score of these items have been confirmed to represent a reliable measure of tolerance, yielding Cronbach alpha of as high as .87.

4.5.2 Determinants of Tolerance in Jamaica

In an attempt at identifying the factors that explain political tolerance in Jamaica, a linear regression model was developed, comprising the control variables listed in Table IV.A6. As the results indicate, education, interpersonal trust and sex are a positive and statistically significant factor.

As indicated by Figure IV.19, there is a positive relationship between a person’s education and their level of tolerance. So as level of schooling increases, so should the individual’s level of tolerance.




Figure IV.19 Political Tolerance by Level of Schooling

And as Figure IV.20 shows, the higher a person's the level of interpersonal trust, the higher the probability that such an individual will have a high level of tolerance.




Figure IV.20 Political Tolerance by Interpersonal Trust

Also, the notion that men tend to be more tolerant than women (Golebiowska, 1999) has been corroborated by the findings of this study. As shown in Figure IV.21, the average tolerance scores for men are slightly higher than that for women.




Figure IV.21 Political Tolerance by Sex

4.5.3 Social Tolerance

Social tolerance focuses on respect for the personal choices and lifestyles of others rather than on their acceptance of the rights to participate in political activities. The issue of homosexual rights has been widely debated both in Jamaica and internationally and so the following item focusing on this topic was included in the LAPOP survey instrument as a basis for determining levels of social tolerance in the different countries:

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to seek public office?

Figure IV.22 shows a summary of responses of this item in relation to the indicators of political tolerance. It highlights the fact that attitudes in support of the rights of homosexuals are strongly at variance to those relating to the acceptance of political rights of others. Fewer than 20 per cent of those responding to this question on homosexual rights feel that individuals with such lifestyle choices should be accorded the basic right of seeking public office. Stated inversely to emphasize the pervasiveness of these homophobic attitudes, approximately eight out of ten Jamaicans reject the idea that homosexuals should be accorded the basic democratic right to seek public office.




Figure IV.22 Citizens’ Attitudes to the Enjoyment of Basic Democratic Rights by Fellow Citizens

4.5.4 Support for Homosexual Rights among LAPOP Countries

Examined comparatively, this finding is exceptional for two reasons. Firstly, at the national level, this measure of support for homosexual rights is only about one fourth of the political tolerance index. And secondly, compared to other LAPOP countries, Jamaica reported the highest level of political tolerance in the 2006 survey but as indicated by Figure IV. 23 are ranked nearly at the bottom of the chart in terms of public support for homosexual rights.




Figure IV.23 Comparative Perspective on Citizens Support for Homosexual Rights, 2006

This low level of support could partly be explained from a respect for the rule of law perspective and the culture. Homosexual acts, even between consenting adults, are illegal in Jamaica and there have been reported cases of the enforcement of this law in recent time. Further, the popular culture is replete with anti-homosexual sentiments. In fact, some of most successful reggae artists often use the stage and their lyrics to agitate for the killing of homosexuals. Finally, it is taboo even to express support for the rights of homosexuals in Jamaica.

Factors Predicting Jamaicans Attitude to Homosexual Rights

A linear regression model was developed to identify the factors that determine citizens’ attitude on this issue of homosexuals’ rights. Results are presented in Table IV.A7, appended at the end of this chapter. Virtually all the factors included in the model were found to be statistically significant.

Figure IV.24 shows the relationship between citizens' level of trust in their neighbours and their propensity to support homosexual rights. High levels of interpersonal trust is associated with greater support for homosexual rights




Figure IV.24 Support for Homosexual Rights by Interpersonal Trust

Wealthier persons -- those with a higher inventory of the items of capital goods used to measure wealth -- are more likely to support homosexual rights than the less wealthy (Figures IV.25).




Figure IV.25 Support for Homosexual Rights by Wealth

And as expected, the higher individuals' level of tolerance, the greater the likelihood they will be supportive of the basic rights of homosexual.




Figure IV.26 Support for Homosexual Rights by Level of Tolerance

As Figure IV.27 shows, females are more likely to be supportive of the rights of homosexuals than males.




Figure IV.27 Support for Homosexual Rights by Sex

Also, as Figure IV.28 shows, persons living in rural areas are generally more supportive of the rights of homosexual than those living in urban areas.




Figure IV.28 Support for Homosexual Rights by Area of Residence

Education was also found to be a strong determinant of social tolerance. As Figure IV.29 shows, the higher a persons level of schooling the more likely they will support the rights of homosexuals.




Figure IV.29 Support for Homosexual Rights by Level of Education

4.6 Support for the performance of the regime

Studies on political support in western democracies have shown that it is not unusual for there to be a high level of support for democracy as a form of government yet low satisfaction with the way the system works. Hence the practice of some scholars to examine citizens' evaluation of the performance of a regime as separated dimension from that of their support for democracy as an ideal form of government.⁴ In this study, respondents were asked to report their evaluation of the performance of the current regime in their answer to the following question:

*PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy is works in Jamaica?*⁵

⁴ See the discussion of Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 'Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis, in Norris (1999).

⁵ This question has been extensively used to measure support for the performance of democratic regimes. In addition to the many LAPOP studies, it has been used in regional democratic values surveys such as the Eurobarometer, the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer and the Latinobarometer.

Figure IV.30 summarizes the responses to this question. As shown, more Jamaicans are satisfied with the way democracy is working than those who are dissatisfied. Of the 53 per cent of respondents expressing satisfaction, about 53 per cent were reported being satisfied while just fewer than four per cent were very satisfied. Feelings of dissatisfaction were moderate, with little less than six per cent reporting intense dissatisfaction with the performance of their democracy.




Figure IV.30 Citizens Level of Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy in Jamaica – 2006

4.7 Support for the Political System

The aim of this section is, firstly, to examine political legitimacy for specific institutions of government in Jamaica. We will then describe a composite measure of ‘system support’ which we will use to gauge citizens’ ‘generalized sense of legitimacy’ of the political system.

4.7.1 Support for Key Institutions

Institutional legitimacy is determined, in part, by asking respondents to express their level of confidence in key institutions in Jamaica. The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a battery of questions requiring respondents to locate their trust in each institution in a 1-7 scale, ‘1’ indicating no trust and ‘7’ a lot of trust.

Table IV.2 below shows a sorted list of the results of these system support indicators. Level of trust in public institutions among Jamaicans is moderately high. The unambiguous sense of national pride described earlier, is buttressed by a relatively high degree of trust in core institutions and organizations of society. At the top of the chart are the church, the mass media and the army, all registering support that place them at the upper end of the 100-point scale. One half of the rest of the organizations received marginal support, scoring an average of just around 50-points on the scale. It is not unusual for the ratings of political parties and other partisan organizations to fall below the 50-point mark on this scale in similar studies in Latin America (Achard & Gonzalez, 2004). In the case of Jamaica, the key institutions of political administration -- central and local government, political parties, the parliament and the electoral system all fall at the bottom of the chart, all scoring below 50 on the 100-point scale. This indicates a relatively low level of trust in these bodies when compared with other institutions in Jamaica.⁶ Interestingly, overall confidence in the political system ranks on the higher end of the list, averaging 54, a full 14 points greater than the mean support for these political bodies.

Included in Table IV.2 are comparative trust scores for selected institutions in Costa Rica, the country in the region that LAPOP has consistently reported high levels of support for these institutions. Costa Ricans report a greater sense of pride in their nationality than Jamaicans. They also consistently express a greater level of confidence in their institutions of government.

Table IV.2 Average Trust in Values, Institutions and Organizations in Jamaica and Costa Rica, 2006

Item	Institution	Jamaica		Costa Rica
		N	Average	Average
B43	Pride in being Jamaican	1565	91.5	97.0
B20	Church	1560	75.8	64.0
B12	The Army	1447	69.8	71.0
B37	Mass Media	1554	61.5	68.0
B6	Support the Political System	1521	53.8	72.0
B1	Courts of Justice	1307	52.2	53.4
B2	Political Institutions	1523	51.2	75.0
B31	Supreme Court	1327	51.0	57.0
B11	Electoral Office	1498	50.7	67.0
B10A	Judicial System	1529	44.7	53.0
B18	Police	1570	44.7	42.0
B4	Pride in Political System	1543	44.0	70.0
B3	Protection of Citizens Basic Rights	1521	43.8	52.0
B13	The Parliament	1524	41.3	49.0
B32	Parish Council	1445	41.2	49.0
B47	Elections	1536	39.0	61.0
B21	Political Parties	1543	36.0	36.0

⁶ Mean score for Central Government, Parish Council (local authority), political parties, elections and Parliament is 39.9 on the 100-point scale.

4.7.2 Generalized System Support

Given that political institutions are integral components of the broader institutional framework of society, there might be an inclination to assume that high levels of support for key institutions should naturally translate into equally high levels of popular support for the political system on a whole. This, however, may not necessarily be the case. There is, consequently, a need to further investigate the issue of generalized support, given its importance in this discussion on the stability of the democratic system. Indeed, level of system support determines the extent to which citizens recognize the authority of institutions to make decisions and take actions that are binding on the nation as a whole. So, low level of support can point to a problem of legitimacy, which in turn might impact negatively on political stability.

To obtain a more conclusive measure of the state of system legitimacy in Jamaica, the Seligson’s Index of Support for Democracy is analyzed.⁷ This index measures generalized support and is based on Easton’s notion of ‘diffuse support’ and Lipset’s conceptualization of ‘legitimacy’. It is a composite measure that is designed to capture the key dimensions of system support – respect for political institutions, pride to live under the current political system, belief that the courts guarantee a free trial, belief that basic human rights are protected and support for the political system on the whole. Its calculation is based on respondents’ answers of the five questions on the survey instrument focusing directly on these issues. These are shown, with instructions, in Box IV.1 below⁸. The familiar seven-point scale was used to capture respondent’s attitudes on each item. The system support index is obtained by aggregating the response values, calculating the mean score and then re-calibrating this average on the 0-100 metric scale.

Box IV.2 Items used in the Seligson’s Index of Support for Democracy

Respondent is given the card and the following instructions:

Now we will use a card ... This card has a 7-point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1 meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7 meaning A LOT. For example, if I ask you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don’t like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all						A lot	Doesn’t know

⁷ See Mitchell A. Seligson, ‘On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some Evidence from Mexico.’ Social Indicators Research 12 (January 1983b): 1-24. It is a composite measure, designed to capture the key dimensions of system support – respect for political institutions, pride to live under extant political system, belief that the courts guarantee a free trial, belief that basic human rights are protected and support for the political system.

⁸ This index has been widely used to measure system support and its validity and reliability have been repeatedly confirmed. In terms of reliability, for example, in nine similar studies conducted in Costa Rica between 1978 and 2004, Cronbach’s Alpha was always above the .70 threshold, ranging as high as .79 in one instance. In this study, Cronbach’s Alpha was .79, identical to Costa Rica’s coefficient in its 2006 report.

- B1. To what extent do you think the courts of justice in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial?*
- B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?*
- B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?*
- B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?*
- B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?*

Figure IV.31 displays outcomes in relation to individual items and the resulting system support index. It shows that, in the case of Jamaica, strong national pride and a somewhat enthusiastic support for national institutions did not translate into strong sense of support for the system of government. Looking at the items individually, support for the political system, for the effectiveness of courts and respect for the political institutions received average scores that were just marginally above the 50-point mark. Pride in the political system and respondents' evaluation of the extent to which basic rights are protected obtained average scores of 44 out of 100. Low scores on these items have had the effect of pulling the Seligson index down to less than 50 on the scale for the Jamaican case.




Figure IV.31 Averages for Support for Democracy Measures for Jamaica – The Seligson Index, 2006

This measure of 48.9 points on the Seligson’s 100-point index indicates a relatively low level of support for the political system compared to other countries in the Americas. Figure IV.32 shows comparative data for Latin America. Jamaica lags at the bottom of the list, with countries like Costa Rica and Mexico scoring as much as 15 and 11 points higher respectively, on this indicator.

Jamaica is a typical case of a situation in which high national pride, an exceptionally high degree of tolerance and high sense of trust in some key institutions did not manifest themselves in high overall system support.




Figure IV.32 Comparative Average Scores in System Support Index, 2006

4.7.3 Predictors of System Support

In an attempt at deepening our understanding as to the variables that best explain system support in Jamaica, we analyzed a linear regression model made up of the factors displayed in the first column in Table IV.A8 which is appended at the end of this chapter.

Efficacy of Government, sex, area of residence, regime preference and age were found to be statistically significant determinants of system support. Figure IV.33 shows the linear relationship between citizens' evaluation of the efficacy of the government and support for the system. Persons who are positive in their assessment of the performance of the government are more likely to express high support for the system.




Figure IV.33 Support for the System by Efficacy of Government

Sex was also found to be statistically significant with males being more supportive of the system than females. Figure IV.34 shows however that this difference is marginal, given the less than one point difference between the sexes on the Seligson's scale.




Figure IV.34 Support for the System by Sex

The coefficient for age turned out to be a positive and an influential factor in determining system support. Therefore, as age increases, support for the system should also increase. As the graph in Figure IV.35 depicts, older persons are more supportive of the system than younger ones.




Figure IV.35 Support for the System by Age Group

Figure IV.36 shows the influence of where persons reside on their level of support for their system of government. As the relative size of the bars indicates, rural dwellers are more supportive of the system than those living in urban areas.




Figure IV.36 Support for the System by Area of Residence

The other statistically significant factor for predicting a persons' support for the system is their regime preference. Citizens who prefer democracy over other regime types are more likely to be supportive of the system than those with no particular preference or those who prefer an authoritarian regime (Figure IV.37)




Figure IV.37 Support for the System by Regime Preference

4.8 Support for Stable Democracy in Jamaica

The further examination of this issue of system stability involved the creation of a composite indicator aimed at capturing citizens' attitudes in support of a stable democracy in Jamaica. This new measure of the strength and well-being of a democracy is computed by combining the system support index with the political tolerance index to create a 'support for a stable democracy' variable. As indicated elsewhere in this report, the durability of a democracy is influenced, on the one hand, by the extent to which there is popular recognition of the legitimacy of the system of government and, on the other, the degree to which people recognize and are respectful of the rights and liberties of, especially, those with whom they disagree. It is reasonable to assume then, that system stability is more likely in situations where these two features of a stable democracy exist concurrently at a comparatively high level. In this section we examine the joint effect of these two factors on the prospect for system stability in Jamaica.

Table IV.3 shows a model⁹ that will facilitate the joint analysis of these two dimensions of system stability. Both variables are dichotomized by recoding their 0-100 scales into two categories of ‘Low’, which includes all scores on the original scale which were equal to or less than 50 and ‘High’, to include all cases above 50. The two-by-two table below outlines the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance that are assumed to exist in a democratic society. Cell 1 represents correspondence between high system support and high tolerance, a case of a highly stable democracy. Where system support is high but tolerance is low, as represented in cell 2, the system may remain stable due to the influence of strong citizen support. However, democratic rule may be compromised by the restriction of certain rights and liberties of minorities in attempts to appease the majority or simply to protect the regime from oppositional activities. So despite an environment of pervasive democratic attitudes, an authoritarian regime may develop, characterized by stability but also by widespread violation of civil liberties.

Low system support, as exhibited by persons populating cells 4 and 5, does not necessarily lead to the suppression of basic rights. However, it is likely to result in instability and in cases where tolerance is low to an eventual breakdown in democracy.

Table IV.3 Theoretical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in Institutionally Democratic Politics

level of SYSTEM SUPPORT	level of POLITICAL TOLERANCE	
	HIGH	LOW
HIGH	Stable Democracy (1)	Authoritarian Stability (2)
LOW	Unstable Democracy (3)	Democracy at Risk (4)

Results from the cross-tabulation of the dichotomized system support and the political tolerance index for Jamaica are displayed in Table IV.4. Citizens who support a stable democracy, 36 per cent of the sample, are more than three times as many as those who do not, the just over 11% in cell 4. This situation in which only a minority exhibit low system support and low tolerance augurs well for stability since a larger group in this cell could indicate the possibility of democratic breakdown. The majority of respondents, approximately 42 per cent, reported high level of tolerance but low system support. Theoretically, low level of legitimacy is linked to

⁹ From Mitchell A. Seligson. Towards a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America, ‘ *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe*, 11 (2), 2000, pp. 5-29

instability. However, the concurrence of high level of political tolerance among these individuals is a positive for system durability because the prevalence of values and attitudes that are respectful and supportive of the positions of minorities could mean that opposition forces are afforded greater opportunities to agitate, which might eventually lead to the deepening of democracy. The attitudes of just about 10 per cent of respondents are tabulated in the cell 2, indicating a tendency towards authoritarian stability.

Table IV.4 Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Jamaica - 2006

level of SYSTEM SUPPORT	level of POLITICAL TOLERANCE	
	HIGH	LOW
HIGH	Stable Democracy (1) 36.2%	Authoritarian Stability (2) 10.3%
LOW	Unstable Democracy (3) 42.3%	Democracy at Risk (4) 11.2%

Assessed comparatively, Jamaica’s support for a stable democracy score, 36.2%, is high when matched with some other countries in the Americas. As shown in Figure IV.38, the country is out performed by only three other nations in the Region, with Costa Rica at the top of the list with 50.2%, and Mexico and Dominican Republic with 41.3% and 38.3% respectively. Ecuador is at the bottom of the list with a mere 12 per cent of its population strongly supporting a stable democracy.




Figure IV.38 Support for a Stable Democracy from a Comparative Perspective, 2006

4.9 Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy

Table IV.A9 displays the control variables that were included in a logistic regression model and statistical outcomes. Age was positive and significant in explaining support for a stable democracy. So, an individuals' support for stability in the political system is likely to increase as their age increases (Figure IV.39).




Figure IV.39 Support for a Stable Democracy by Age

And as Figure IV.40 shows, individuals who are satisfied with the way their democracy is working are more likely to support a stable democracy than those who are not.




Figure IV.40 Support for a Stable Democracy Satisfaction with Democracy

Also, crime victimization was found to be an influential factor in determining citizens' support for a stable democracy. Persons who reported being recently victimized are more supportive of a stable political system than those not affected by a crime in the past year (Figure IV.41).




Figure IV.41 Support for a Stable Democracy by Crime Victimization

4.9.1 Conclusion

The key findings of this section of the study are consistent with the anecdotal account of the attitude of Jamaicans to democracy. Firstly, Jamaicans are deeply patriotic and overwhelmingly prefer the democratic system of government over all other regime types. Secondly, there is relatively high degree of confidence in core public institutions, and despite the low level of trust that is accorded to partisan political organizations, support for the political system on a whole is average when compared to countries in Latin America. Overall, the political attitudes of Jamaicans indicate that the prospect for the stability of the Jamaican democracy is highly favourable.

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APPENDIX IV CHAPTER 4 – SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

Table 1V. A1
Factors Explaining National Pride among Jamaicans – Results of the Linear Regression

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	97.456	7.117		13.694	.000
Female	.569	1.932	.015	.295	.768
Rural	-1.528	1.942	-.039	-.787	.432
Age	-.077	.079	-.058	-.965	.335
Plans to migrate	2.438	2.187	.059	1.115	.266
Not_Satisfied_with_income	-1.451	2.083	-.037	-.697	.486
Voted for ruling party	-1.974	1.952	-.050	-1.011	.312
Not_Satisfied_with_democracy	-.779	2.094	-.020	-.372	.710
Victimized by crime	-.292	3.170	-.005	-.092	.927
Trust in the justice system	.090	.033	.139	2.738	.006
Interpersonal trust	-.022	.039	-.028	-.560	.576
Wealth	-.514	.541	-.054	-.949	.343
Victimized by corruption	-.833	.926	-.045	-.899	.369
Education	-.062	.270	-.013	-.231	.817
R ² = .036 Adjusted R ² = .006					

Table IV. A2
Factors Explaining Preference for Democratic Regime in Jamaica – Results of the Logistic Regression

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95.0% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Area	.128	.168	.586	1	.444	1.137	.818	1.579
Sex	.094	.164	.327	1	.568	1.098	.796	1.516
Education	.020	.023	.756	1	.384	1.020	.975	1.068
Age	.014	.006	6.590	1	.010	1.014	1.003	1.025
Wealth	.007	.043	.023	1	.880	1.007	.925	1.095
Constant	.861	.552	2.430	1	.119	2.365		

Table IV. A3
Factors Explaining Support for Constructive Involvement – Results of the Linear Regression

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	52.844	4.987		10.597	.000
Preference for Democratic Regime	3.504	2.473	.038	1.417	.157
Interpersonal trust	.043	.031	.038	1.385	.166
Wealth	-.680	.415	-.047	-1.639	.101
Tolerance	.299	.033	.247	8.964	.000
Female	-2.099	1.586	-.036	-1.323	.186
Rural	-.261	1.630	-.004	-.160	.873
Education	.348	.221	.047	1.579	.115
Age	-.059	.052	-.032	-1.122	.262

Table IV. A4
Factors Explaining Support for Illicit Measures – Results of the Linear Regression

	Non-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	38.646	3.188		12.121	.000
Preference for Democratic Regime	-2.638	1.564	-.046	-1.687	.092
Interpersonal trust	-.036	.020	-.052	-1.835	.067
Wealth	-1.116	.266	-.122	-4.196	.000
Female	.402	1.008	.011	.399	.690
Rural	.538	1.032	.015	.521	.602
Education	-.092	.140	-.020	-.654	.513
Age	-.173	.033	-.150	-5.187	.000
Trust in the justice system	-.041	.017	-.066	-2.388	.017

Table IV. A5
Factors Explaining Political Tolerance in Jamaica – Results of the Linear Regression

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	51.043	4.307		11.851	.000
Support for Constructive Involvement	.197	.023	.239	8.646	.000
Female	-3.060	1.338	-.063	-2.286	.022
Rural	1.638	1.360	.034	1.205	.229
Victimized by crime	-3.306	2.199	-.041	-1.503	.133
Wealth	1.812	1.406	.037	1.289	.198
Age	-.018	.045	-.012	-.399	.690
Education	.398	.185	.065	2.156	.031
Interpersonal trust	.135	.026	.146	5.190	.000

Table IV. A6
Factors Explaining Support for Homosexual Rights – Results of the Linear Regression

	Non-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-27.182	5.771		-4.710	.000
Interpersonal trust	.113	.036	.089	3.155	.002
Wealth	1.307	.484	.079	2.703	.007
Tolerance	.203	.039	.148	5.259	.000
Female	3.697	1.831	.056	2.019	.044
Rural	4.037	1.874	.060	2.154	.031
Education	.496	.253	.059	1.961	.050
Age	.039	.061	.019	.643	.521

Table IV. A7
Factors Explaining System Support in Jamaica – Result of the Linear Regression, 2006

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	23.815	3.553		6.703	.000
Efficacy of the current government	.504	.026	.479	19.452	.000
Female	-2.120	1.086	-.048	-1.952	.051
Rural	3.548	1.097	.080	3.233	.001
Wealth	.817	1.147	.018	.712	.476
Preference for Democratic Regime	10.239	2.591	.152	3.952	.000
Interpersonal trust	-.005	.001	-.001	-.011	.991
Age	.156	.036	.112	4.316	.000
Education	.029	.147	.005	.198	.843
Victimized by crime	-3.400	2.119	-.052	-1.713	.333
Corruption Victimization	-1.038	.540	-.048	-1.924	.055

a Dependent Variable: Seligson's System Support Index

Table IV. A8
Factors Explaining Support for Stable Democracy in Jamaica – Result of the Logistic Regression, 2006

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95.0% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Female	-.162	.122	1.761	1	.185	.851	.670	1.080
Rural	.184	.126	2.137	1	.144	1.202	.939	1.538
Victimized by crime	.457	.211	4.696	1	.030	1.580	1.045	2.390
Satisfaction with democracy	-.875	.129	46.324	1	.000	.417	.324	.536
Age	.014	.004	11.938	1	.001	1.014	1.006	1.022
Education	-.002	.017	.009	1	.925	.998	.965	1.032
Wealth	-.015	.032	.228	1	.633	.985	.925	1.049
Constant	-1.179	.377	9.763	1	.002	.308		

V. Corruption in Public Affairs

5.1 Context

On the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Jamaica received a score of 3.6 out of 10. This index measures the degree of corruption among public officials within countries around the world, as perceived by business people and country analysts. Scores can range from '0' signifying highly corrupt, to '10' indicating an almost clean slate as far as corruption is concerned. Jamaica's score of 3.6 placed the country 64th among the 158 countries surveyed. Within the Caribbean, Jamaica was fourth behind Barbados, which scored 6.9, and Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba, both with a score of 3.8. Ranked below Jamaica were the Dominican Republic and Haiti with indices of 3.0 and 1.8 respectively.

Public reaction to Jamaica's designation was mixed, with commentators opining that in reality, corruption was either higher or lower than the level indicated by this measure. The government's acknowledgement of the extent and seriousness of the problem was, however, made clear when in her inaugural address to Parliament, the Prime Minister assured the nation of a priority of her administration in her assertion that: "I want to pledge to the Jamaican people to work tirelessly to eradicate corruption and extortion. I am committed to their eradication" (JIS, 2006).

Indeed, corruption is a serious national problem in whatever form or extent it exists. It misallocates scarce resources, distorts transaction cost and negatively impacts on investment climate and the national image on a whole. More specifically, it undermines the authority and effectiveness of a nation's democratic institutions and processes. Hence the inclusion of a series of questions in the LAPOP 2006 survey to probe citizens attitudes and experiences on the issue of corruption in public life.

In this chapter, we focus on three themes: Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption; Acquiescence to Corruption and Corruption Victimization.

5.2 Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption

Although government officials often deny allegations of widespread corruption, many Jamaican scholars maintain otherwise (see Charles, 2003; Harriott, 2000; Munroe, 1999). Prominent constitutional lawyer, Dr. Lloyd Barnett, in a 1999 publication by the Carter Centre, stated:

Over the 50 years of representative government in Jamaica, it has been generally alleged and often assumed, without the substantiation of specific allegations and proven cases that a considerable amount of corruption exists in national affairs. The political experience is that the parties in opposition have usually accused the party in power of conducting a corrupt administration. Historically, when the accusing party has gained power and established Commissions of Inquiry to conduct a widespread investigation of the previous administration very little has been unearthed to substantiate the allegations...The rumours are, however, too

persistent and the statements made in private by reliable persons too frequent to ignore the allegations (Barnett, 1999).

Also, the Jamaican public has consistently displayed a keen interest in the discourse on corruption on various radio talk show programmes and other fora. This interest is indeed justified. Most Jamaicans have been exposed through the popular media, to claims of rampant corruption in the form of bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism and cronyism. Many have been victim of, or have participated in some act of corruption. It is not surprising, therefore, that corruption has been identified in the LAPOP 2006 Survey as being among the top six most serious problems facing Jamaica today. As Figure V.1 shows, corruption ranks very high -- behind crime and violence, unemployment, poverty and a weak economy -- in terms of seriousness as a national problem.




Figure V.1 Citizens' Ranking of National Problems in terms of Seriousness

The present reality of Jamaica is that the laws governing acts of political corruption – the Jamaica Constitution, the Corruption Prevention Act of 1931 and the Representation of the Peoples Act of 1944 – are weak in some instances and/or not enforced in others. Recent amendments to the Corruption Prevention Act are an indication of possible strengthening of anti-corruption laws. Further, some of the main entities monitoring corruption in Jamaica such as the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption have reported challenges in the execution of this duty. For instance, it is popularly alleged that some of these challenges include, on the one hand, political victimization of officers who pursue corrupt officials and on the other, poor support by the Jamaican public in the form of evidence when these cases are prosecuted.

5.2.1 Measuring Corruption Perception

Persistent assertions of corruption appear to indicate a lack of integrity or honesty on the part of elected and other public officials; a perception that there is widespread misuse of public office for private gain. To measure the extent of this perception of a prevalence of corruption in Jamaica, the following question was posed to those surveyed in this study:

EXC7 Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, is corruption among public officials (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon?

Figure V.3 shows the distribution of responses for this item. As indicated, the perception that corruption is common is widespread. Of the nearly 96 per cent of respondents who consider it to be common, 57.7% feel corruption was very common. The other four per cent acknowledged its existence but considered it to be uncommon (2.4%) or very uncommon (1.8%).

These statistics corroborate the findings of the most recent study of Transparency International which reported widespread perception of high levels corruption in Jamaica.




Figure V.2 Perceptions of Prevalence of Corruption

These findings are remarkable for two reasons. Firstly, over the last decade, civil society, government and business leaders, as well as international development agencies and multilateral institutions have been developing and implementing strategies to combat corruption in Jamaica. Despite this collaboration to “clean up” corrupt spaces processes, objects and subjects, and notwithstanding reports of some success, the perception of corruption remains widespread among significant segments of the Jamaican population. This finding seems to suggest that much more needs to be done to combat the problem of corruption or at least to address the issue of citizen perception of corruption – two separate but seemingly conflated problems.

Secondly, the pervasiveness of the idea that Jamaica is a highly corrupt state may be explained by the influence and ‘integratedness’ of popular media in Jamaica. The popularity of interactive talk radio, television programmes and ‘letters to the editor’ fora in the national newspapers have been instrumental in giving significant exposure to allegations of corruption, often with little or no corroborative evidence.

5.2.2 Factors Influencing Perception of Corruption in Jamaica

In all societies, members will perceive some amount of corruption among their public officials. In the case of Jamaica, however, the percentage of the population indicating that corruption is very common is alarmingly high. In this section, we sought to establish the distinguishing characteristics of the nearly 58 per cent of the population (see Figure V.2 above) who hold the view that corruption is ‘very common’ in Jamaica. Here we categorized respondents into two groups; one comprising those who feel corruption is very common and the other, of those indicating that corruption exists but that it is just common or even uncommon. Outcomes of the analysis of a logistic regression model comprising the independent variables shown in Table V.A1 in Appendix 5 were examined. As the highlighted rows in this Table shows, number of times victimized by corruption and age are statistically significant determinants of the perception that corruption is very common.

On a whole, persons who experience more acts of corruption are more likely to hold the view that corruption is very common among public officials in Jamaica. Nevertheless, as Figure V.3 shows, perception level falls with multiple victimizations. One possible explanation for this could be that those persons who are victimized at all the public agencies specified are themselves corrupt and are active and willing participants in the acts of corruption. Their denial of the prevalence of these acts is therefore as self-serving as is the behaviour of the public officials who inappropriately use their office for illegitimate gain.




Figure V.3 Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption by Extent of Corruption Victimization

The negative influence of age on whether persons hold the view that corruption is very common, just common or uncommon is depicted in Figure V.4. Perception of corruption decreases with age in all age groups.




Figure V.4 Perception of the Prevalence of Corruption by Age

Given the empirical evidence present in development literature that corruption has wide implications for investment prospects, good governance and poverty, the current findings are problematic for Jamaica. If perception, however, is to be used as a reliable tool to measure corruption in Jamaica, further studies looking at the meanings and interpretations surrounding representations of corruption may be required to properly deconstruct the concept to derive a more valid and robust illustration of perceptions of the Prevalence of Corruption. A post-positivist approach may also need to be included to gather deep data and thick description. Furthermore, a more expansive conceptual framework, including political culture (material rituals/practices, beliefs, attitudes, values, institutions, power and discourse), forms of consciousness, social relations and the wider socio-cultural, political, ideological, historical and institutional structures and processes) which condition and/or determine perceptions of reality in Jamaica which uses discourse analysis (see Waller, 2006) and Culture (See Harrison and Hungtinton) as a unit of analysis would certainly prove useful in further exploring and explicating the findings of this research project.

5.3 Victimization by Acts of Corruptions

This study also attempted to estimate the extent of actual corruption victimization in the Jamaican population. Corruption victimization is operationalized in terms of direct personal experience with any corrupt act or proposal. Those surveyed were asked the series of questions (see Box V.2 below) to measure their experience with corruption.

Box V.2. - Questions regarding Corruption Victimization

- EXC2 Did any police official ask you for bribe during the last year?
- EXC6 During the last year, did any public official ask you for a bribe?
- EXC11 Did you have any official dealings in the parish council during the last year, to process any kind of document (like a licence for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?
- EXC13 Are you currently employed? At your workplace, did anyone ask you for an inappropriate payment during the last year?
- EXC14 During the last year, did you have any business in the courts? Did you have to give a bribe at the courts during the last year?
- EXC15 Did you use the public health services during the last year? In order to be assisted in a hospital or clinic during the last year, did you have to give a bribe?
- EXC16 Did you have a child attending school during the last year? Did you have to give a bribe at school during the last year?
- EXC17 Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity cut off?

Interestingly, reported exposure to or experience with corruption is low compared to the very high level of perception of corruption reported earlier in this chapter. As can be seen in Figure V.5, corruption appears to be most prevalent in the health and education sector and in workplace settings. Nearly 22 per cent of those surveyed reported that they have been asked to pay a bribe in their dealings with the public health facility. Twenty per cent said they were exposed to some corrupt practices at work and about 18 per cent reported being asked for a bribe in their interaction with the school system.




Figure V.5 Mean percentage of experience with corruption

It is well known that doing business with public sector institutions and agencies involve certain challenges. These organizations are highly bureaucratic, unresponsive and inefficient. Their employees are often underpaid and as a result often use their position to gain additional income. This usually involves their participation in corrupt activities, mostly in the form of bribe taking, as a reward for expediting certain services.

Some corrupt practices are now so common and widely accepted that in many instances they are viewed as the legitimate way of doing business. Indeed, many Jamaicans often welcome the invitation to engage in corrupt practices because it means that they won't have to join the unending queues, or wait for long periods for services. A culture of corruption has developed to the extent that there is broad understanding that clients will pay additional sums of money to receive the very services that these organizations are meant to offer for free or for a stipulated price. Those who refuse to pay often find themselves trapped in a never-ending web of bureaucracy. Hence the broad support for these corrupt practices among Jamaicans.

The further analysis of the data on corruption victimization involved the creation of an index of the seven acts of corruption reported on in Figure V.5 above. Responses to these items were initially captured on a 0 to 7 points scale. In creating the index, however, the relatively few

responses that were located at the sixth and the seventh points on the scale were collapsed into the fifth, resulting in a five-point index of corruption victimization.

In order to facilitate easy cross-country comparison on this issue, this corruption measure was calibrated to treat all victims of corruption in the as equal, not taking into consideration the number of times they were victimized. The unit of analysis, therefore, was people who had at least one experience with corruption during the previous year.

Percentage victimization on this measure for Jamaica was comparatively high, at 34 per cent. As shown in Figure V.6, Jamaica ranks fourth among the LAPOP countries on this index. Only Bolivia, Mexico and Haiti reported higher levels of corruption, with Haiti at the top of the list with an index of 50 per cent, 13 percentage points high than Mexico. Chile and Columbia were the only countries with single digit index, scoring 9.4 and 9.7 per cent respectively.




Figure V.6 Comparative Perspective on Percentage of Population Victimized by Corruption

Determinants of Corruption Victimization

Regression analysis results further describe the association between corruption victimization in the past year and selected independent variables. As Table V. in Appendix shows, age, sex and wealth have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of been a victim of corruption.

As shown in Figure V.7 persons in the 36 to 45 age group are much more likely to be victims of corruption than those below thirty and those in the over forty-five age group.




Figure V.7 Percentage Victimized by Corruption by Age Group

There is also a statistically significant relationship between victimization by acts of corruption and sex, with males being more likely to be victimized than females (Figure V.8).




Figure V.8 Percentage victimized by Corruption by Sex

With regards to the effect of wealth, measured by stock of capital goods, persons with more wealth are more likely to be victims of corruption than the less wealthy (Figure V.6).




Figure V.9 Percentage victimized by Corruption by Wealth

5.4. Justification of Corruption

To assess the extent to which Jamaicans acquiesce with acts of corruption, respondents were surveyed for their attitudes on the issue of bribe-giving by asking the following EXC items:

EXC18 Do you think that the way things are, sometimes giving a bribe is justified?

EXC19 Do you think that in our society, giving bribes is justified because of the poor public service or do you think it is not justified?

The bars in Figure V.10 indicate that on both items, those who feel that giving bribes is justified sometimes and under certain conditions is more than half of those surveyed. Nearly fifty six per cent of respondents say the poor state of the public services is enough justification for giving bribes.




Figure V.10 Percentage of Population Supporting Bribe Giving

5.4.1 Identifying Who Justifies

Results of the logistic regression analysis in Table V.A3 show that age is the only factor that is statistically significant in determining a persons' propensity to justify corrupt practices in Jamaica. The negative influence of age on whether a person supports or rejects acts of corruption is depicted in Figure V.11. Support decreases with age except among those in the 36-55 age group.




Figure V.11 Citizens' Acquiescence with Corruption by Age Group

5.4.2 Defining and Treating with Corruption

The three scenarios in BOX V.1 were used to further determine citizens' attitude to certain acts of corruption. The focus here is on gauging the level of tolerance to corruption in Jamaica.

Box V.1 Questions Used to Measure Attitude to Corruption in Jamaicans

Please tell me if you consider the following actions as

- 1) *corrupt and liable to be punishable;*
- 2) *corrupt but justified under the circumstances;*
- 3) *not corrupt*

DC1: A Member of Parliament accepts a bribe of ten thousand dollars from a company. Do you think that what the M.P. did is (a) Corrupt and should be punished? (b) Corrupt but justified? (c) Not corrupt?

DC10: A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time waiting, she pays a bribe of \$5,000 to an official. Do you

think that what the woman did is (a) Corrupt and should be punished? (b) Corrupt but justified? (c) Not Corrupt?

DC13: An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is (a) Corrupt and should be punished? (b) Corrupt but justified? (c) Not Corrupt?

The distribution of responses to each of these items is depicted in Figures V.12 to V.14 below. Properly understood, all the scenarios outlined above are considered corrupt practices. That 91.5% of the respondents hold the view that the first scenario is corrupt is a clear indication that Jamaicans understand what corruption is, accept that it falls outside the domain of legally acceptable behaviour and are thus in agreement that it is an act which deserves to be punished (Tables V.12).




Figure V.12 Citizens' Attitude to Act of Corruption of Member of Parliament

Figure V.13 shows a breakdown of answers to the scenario in DC10. Of the 85 per cent of respondents who defined the act to be corrupt, some 57 per cent indicated that though corrupt, it is justified for a parent to offer a bribe to expedite personal transactions at a government office.




Figure V.13 Citizens' Attitude to a Mother Giving Bribe for Services

With regards to the third scenario, nearly 38 percent of respondents view a politician using his position and influence to gain employment for a relative as corrupt, but justified. Interestingly, an alarmingly high percentage - 34% of respondents do not consider such acts of a politician to be corrupt at all and close to three out of ten feel that they should be treated with impunity.




Figure V.14 Citizens' Attitude to Politician using Office in the Interest of Family Member

It is clear from these scenarios that when the corrupt act is undertaken by, or involves a non-official for the purposes of livelihood/survival, it is overwhelmingly viewed as a corrupt but justified act and thus tolerated. It may even be overlooked as an act of corruption. At the same time, it is clear from the evidence that, for a significant segment of the Jamaican population, a public official benefiting or engaging in corrupt practices is intolerable. This is even while a still large majority may see it as justified in certain circumstances. In other words, what we may be seeing here is an extraordinary situation where Jamaicans maintain an ambiguous, if not contradictory response to corruption. This is where, in particular circumstances, many Jamaicans will not only tolerate corruption but justify it as a means of resolving their livelihood. Many will go as far as failing to consider some acts as corruption but rather as merely a functional tool in their armoury of weapons to make their personal dealings or daily lives easier.

The paradox of the Jamaican response and attitude to corruption, reflected in the incongruity of these findings may seem bizarre to many outsiders, but they are hardly surprising in a society

imbued with enormous complexity. Noted Jamaican criminologist, Anthony Harriott, for example, argues that Jamaicans have shifted the definitional boundaries of what is socially regarded as crime (Harriott 2000). In this regard, many citizens now traverse, with great fluidity; the boundaries between legality and extra legality (see also Johnson, 2005). It becomes obfuscated in certain circumstances. Indeed, the historical ‘integratedness’ of crime in the society has led to a normalization of criminality and an increasing accommodation to illegal activities; in short, Jamaicans, in many instances, have come to not only accept but also justify criminality and illegality.

It bears repeating that the data analyzed did not indicate any significant relationship between acquiescing to corruption and wealth, education, gender or region. This suggests the extent of the pervasiveness of the tolerance of corruption in Jamaica.

This acquiescing to corruption holds negative implications for the process of governance in Jamaica and makes the state machinery appear inept. Certainly, the historico-political moment space where the distance between legality/extra legality became blurred will need to be explored with some urgency to redraw these boundaries and reshape the country’s destiny in this regard.

5.5 Corruption, Democracy and Development: The Connection and the Concern

It can be concluded that Jamaicans are generally aware of what constitutes corruption, perceive it to be pervasive in society, report relatively high levels of victimization and consider it to be wrong but justified in certain circumstances

These findings have implications for the stability of the democratic system and national development on a whole in Jamaica. It has been aptly argued that:

... corruption weakens democracy by undermining citizen trust in their regimes, in effect, de-legitimizing them... Unlike dictatorships, that can employ almost unlimited coercion to stay in power, democracies rely on popular legitimacy to stay in power If...corruption is on the rise, one can expect that the nascent democracies in Latin America, and by extension the democratizing world, will have an even greater difficulty in establishing and retaining their right to govern. One of the major limitations that authoritarian regimes have in establishing their own legitimacy is that more often than not they operate as cleptocracies, in which the state is corrupt to its core, and citizens know it (Seligson, 2006, p. 382).

Similar arguments have been proposed by international organizations such as the World Bank in the claim that:

Corruption violates the public trust and corrodes social capital. . . Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy (World Bank, 1997, pp. 102-104).

There is also cross-national evidence that corroborates the view that widespread corruption is perhaps one of the most fundamental threats to democratic consolidation in the Third World (see Treisman, 2000; della Porta, 2000; della Porta & Mény, 1996; Gingerich, 2004; Golden & Chang, 2001).

Fortunately, data of the current survey (2006) have not indicated that Jamaicans' support for the system is adversely affected by the number of times they have been victimized by acts of corruption (Figure V.15).




Figure V.15 System Support by Corruption Victimization

Nevertheless, the results of this survey highlight some of the prevailing discourses of corruption in Jamaica. Its findings are useful not only to academics keen to better understand and explain this phenomenon but also to policy makers whose task it will be to design proper intervention strategies to combat corruption, foster greater transparency in government and strengthen Jamaican democracy with the hope of engendering development.

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APPENDIX V CHAPTER 5 – CORRUPTION VICTIMIZATION

Table V.A1
Factors Explaining the Perception that Corruption is Prevalent in Jamaica – Result of the Logistic Regression, 2006

Independent Variable	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Female	-.077	.111	.475	1	.491	.926
Rural	.081	.113	.520	1	.471	1.085
Wealth	.041	.118	.118	1	.731	1.042
Education	.110	.060	3.380	1	.066	1.116
Age Group	-.330	.072	20.888	1	.000	.719
Preference Democratic Regime	-.243	.175	1.928	1	.165	.784
Victim of Crime	.222	.058	14.487	1	.000	1.248
Constant	.777	.289	7.228	1	.007	2.174

Table V.A2
Factors Explaining Corruption Victimization in Jamaica – Result of the Linear Regression, 2006

Independent Variable	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.623	.149		4.185	.000
Age	-.005	.002	-.075	-2.599	.009
Education	-.004	.008	-.016	-.543	.587
Wealth	.257	.058	.125	4.402	.000
Female	-.134	.056	-.066	-2.410	.016
Rural	.013	.056	.007	.238	.812

Table V.A3
Factors Explaining Acquiescence with Corruption in Jamaica – Result of the Logistic Regression, 2006

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95.0% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Wealth	.098	.117	.705	1	.401	1.104	.877	1.389
Female	-.125	.112	1.254	1	.263	.883	.709	1.098
Rural	.086	.113	.584	1	.445	1.090	.874	1.360
Age	-.020	.004	29.422	1	.000	.980	.973	.987
Education	.023	.015	2.328	1	.127	1.024	.993	1.055
Constant	.837	.273	9.387	1	.002	2.308		

VI. Criminology and Crime Victimization

6.1 Introduction

Crime and violence have been a problem in the Caribbean for many years. Whilst it would have been helpful to present accurate crime data for each territory, studies suggest that crime and violence have been severely under reported. However the problem of escalating crime, its' causes, consequences and curtailment have emerged as a primary cause of public outcry and a major area of concern for the region's administrations since the 1990s. Specifically, they have been the focal point at a conference for the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Heads of Government, at its Twenty-Second Meeting held in Nassau, The Bahamas in July 2001. At this forum, the crime problem was examined in terms of its implications for public safety and for the social and economic well-being of the people of the region¹.

The crime rates vary in structure and complexity across different countries of the region. In 1998 for example, the total rate of total crimes ranged from a high of 10, 177 incidents per 100,000 citizens in Grenada to a low of 1,170 per 100,000 in Trinidad. Using the available data for 1998, the exact ranking of countries from highest to lowest crime rates is as follows: Grenada (10, 177/100,000), Dominica (8,845/100,000), the Bahamas (3,779/100,000), St. Kitts and Nevis (5,543/100,000), Barbados (3,779/100,000), Jamaica (1,870/100,000), Guyana (1,355/100,000) and Trinidad and Tobago (1,170/100,000). It should be emphasized that these are the rates for reported crimes. In Jamaica approximately 20% of all crimes are reported to the respective police services, but little is known about the level of reporting in other countries in the region.²

In examining crime and violence during a twenty-year period in the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean, the region experienced crime rates that were lower in the 1990's when compared to the 1980's, except for some of the most serious violent crimes such as murder, rape and robbery. Some countries' violent crimes tend to demonstrate considerable volatility (St. Kitts, Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago) and over the two decades a number of countries have been subject to sharp increases in violent crime. The traditional pattern of criminal offending in the Caribbean has been characterized by low rates of violent crime and relatively high rates of property crime. Generally, in most states of the region the ratio of violent crime to property crime tends to vary from 1:5 and 1:10. This is similar to the pattern in industrialized countries. This pattern changed dramatically in Jamaica, where in 2000 violent crimes accounted for 41% of all crimes.³

Since the 1980's at least four Commonwealth Caribbean countries have experienced periods of very high homicide rates. A rate of 20/100,000 maybe regarded as high by Latin American standards. However by Commonwealth Caribbean standards, this rate is very high as they usually

¹ A. Harriott, F. Brathwaite & S.Wortley (2004). Crime and criminal justice in the Caribbean. Kingston: Arawak Publications.

² Ibid

³ Ibid

experience, on average, a rate for the region of below 12/100,000. The homicide trends indicate a strong relationship between drug trafficking and homicidal violence. A dramatic shift has occurred in drug trafficking with cocaine superseding *Cannabis Sativa* (Marijuana) as the primary drug. The period of rapid acceleration in the murder rate corresponds with the period of the greatest expansion (and competitiveness) in the cocaine and cocaine derivative business and their transshipment through the region. Associated with the cocaine distribution are organized crimes and more complex inter-island and international crime network. The literature has indicated that there is a strong association between the drug problem and gun use in criminal activity.⁴

Crimes that are centered on drug activities tend to encourage other types of crimes. Drug trafficking provides established channels and systems for moving all types of illegal imports such as guns and the funds to purchase them. Some Caribbean countries are confronted by increasingly complicated crime problems as there is now an emergence of new crimes such as extortion, kidnapping, computer-aided crimes, sophisticated ‘white collar’ and corporate crimes. Along with these developments, there are also new forms of criminal organizations. These organizations include transnational networks that gain their existence through the formulation of drug trafficking, local organized crime and the involvement of members of powerful groups and elites in various forms of criminal offending.⁵

Evidence of the rise in the cocaine trade can be examined through the statistics taken in the year 2000. It has been reported that in 2000 while Cocaine accounted for 85% of the Caribbean illicit Drug Market, Cannabis accounted for only 13%. In 1980, Jamaica and Belize had an estimated area cultivated with ganja that was five times the present size of 2650 hectares. Jamaica has been referred to as the “top ganja” producer in the world between 1968 and 1981; but has not made the top ten⁶ since the year 2000.

Jamaica however remains one of the countries where crime and violence is of great concern. Reports in the 1970’s through to 1990’s revealed that in Jamaica there has been an increase in gang feuds, gang vendettas and easy access to guns. In fact, reports on the 1970’s increase in violent crime rates in Jamaica and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI) revealed that these rates were comparable to, or exceeded, those of the U.S. The pattern of violent crime (heavily gang, drug, and gun-related) in these two territories parallels that of the U.S. Jamaica and the U.S Virgin Islands are said to have some of the highest homicide rates and overall violent crime rates in the Americas.⁷

A 2002 report from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, noted that Drug Trafficking in Jamaica has contributed to the increasing crime rate. Jamaica is one of the channels that facilitates the transportation of cocaine taken from Latin America to North America. One of the

⁴ Ibid

⁵ UNODC. Latin America and the Caribbean.

www.unodc.org/pdf/annual_report_2005/fieldoffices_LA_caribbean.pdf- 2006-03-16

⁶ A. Harriott, F. Brathwaite & S.Wortley (2004). *Crime and criminal justice in the Caribbean*. Kingston: Arawak Publications.

⁷ K. de Albuquerque & J. L. McElroy (1999). A longitudinal study of the Caribbean. <http://www.saintmarys.edu/~jmcelroy/Crime.LOG.htm>

major problems that the US State Department Trafficking in Persons has with Jamaica is that the country violates the international laws on human trafficking and this places Jamaica as one of the worst in abiding by this law.⁸

In this chapter we examine the issue of crime victimization among the Jamaican populace. The impact of violence on its victims, the nature and extent of gang activities in communities and the issue of perceived insecurity will be examined.

6.2 Extent of Crime Victimization

We start our analysis by examining the extent of crime victimization within the Jamaican population. In response to the following question,

VICI: *“Have you been a victim of some act of criminality in the last twelve months?
(1) Yes, (2) No, (8) Don’t Know*

Only about ten per cent of respondents reported being a victim of a criminal act in the last twelve months. This corroborates findings of a much earlier study which places average crime victimization rate at close to 10 per cent (Harriott et al, 1996).

⁸ A. Harriott, F. Brathwaite & S. Wortley. (2004). *Crime and criminal justice in the Caribbean*. Kingston: Arawak Publications.




Figure VI.1 Respondents Victimized by Crime

6.3 Comparative Perspective on Crime Victimization

When compared to other countries in the Caribbean, Jamaica has one of the highest violent crime rates in the Caribbean and Latin American region. However, when compared to other countries in Latin America, Jamaicans report a surprisingly low rate of victimization of just 10 per cent. As Figure VI.1 shows, with this level of victimization, Jamaica is ranked virtually at the bottom of the list in this LAPOP, 2006 study.




Figure VI.2 Comparative Perspective on Crime Victimization, LAPOP, 2006

6.4 Types of Crime Victimization

Serious crime rate has been on the rise in Jamaica for the past decades. Rates of violent crime increased from 254.6 incidents per 100,000 citizens in 1977 to 633.4 per 100,000 by the year 2000. The murder rate moved from 19.2 per 100,000 to 39 per 100,000 in the same period. In 2004, Jamaica was ranked as a country with one of the highest murder rates in the Caribbean (Harriott et al 2004). By 2005, the country’s murder rate was reported to be among the highest in the world. The LAPOP, 2006 survey sought to identify acts of crime victimization. The breakdown that have been reported in response to the question:

VIC2: To what type of criminal act were you subject?

- (1) Robbery without aggression or physical threat, (2) Robbery with aggression or physical threat, (3) Physical aggression without robbery, (4) Rape or sexual assault, (5) Kidnapping, (6) Damage to property, (7) Robbery at your home (88) Don’t know, and (99) Inappropriate (not a victim).”

As depicted in Figure VI.3 robbery (with or without violence) and home burglary account for 78 per cent of acts of crime faced by victims. The incidence of rape and sexual assault is alarmingly high, with 1.3 per cent of the population reporting being victimized by these acts. Put another way, this is greater than one in every one hundred persons in the population.




Figure VI.3 Types of Crime Victimization among Jamaicans

6.5 Determinants of Crime Victimization

It is widely argued that Jamaica’s crime problem is predominantly an inner-city phenomenon -- a possible explanation for such a low national victimization rate. We examined the extent to which this data set supports this and some other hypotheses on crime and violence in Jamaica by creating a regression model, shown in Table VI.A1 in the appendix at the end of this chapter. The results indicate that wealth and gender are the two most important factors in explaining crime victimization. In addition, Figure VI.4 shows that wealthier individuals are more likely to be victims of crime. Figure VI.5 indicates that men are more likely to be victims of crime than women.




Figure VI.4 Crime Victimization by Wealth




Figure VI.5 Crime Victimization by Gender

6.6 Sense of Security and National Wellbeing among Jamaicans

High rates of crime impact not only those who are victimized but also on others who realize the increased likelihood that they also might be victimized. In an earlier study, Harriott et al (1998) found that approximately 40% of the population believed that they were at high risk for crime and had great levels of anxiety about being victims of physical violence. This fear of violence has also been noted by de Albuquerque & McElroy (1999) who found a high sense of insecurity especially in urban areas.

To evaluate the sense of security among the Jamaican population as a result of exposure to crime, respondents were asked:

AOJ11 *Speaking of the place or neighbourhood where you live and considering the possibility of being a victim of assault or robbery...do you feel very safe, safe, unsafe or very unsafe?*

The distribution of responses on this item is depicted in Figure VI.6. Over 70 per cent of respondents indicated that they felt reasonably safe in their neighbourhood. One in five felt very safe in their communities while about one in ten indicated that their areas were very unsafe.

Results from the 2006 survey indicated that the percentage of males who were victims of crime was slightly higher than females. But although women stand at an almost equal probability of being victims of crime as men, it has been found that the fear of victimization is usually higher among women than among men (Harriott et al 1997). While there was a slightly greater number of females who indicated they felt somewhat unsafe or unsafe in response to item AOJ11, this gender difference in sense of security did not manifest itself in a statistically significant way in this study (Table VI.A2 in end of chapter appendix).




Figure VI.6 Sense of Security among Jamaicans

Respondents were also polled for their opinion on the issue of the potential impact of the high crime rate on national well-being. The breakdown of responses to the following question is shown in Figure VI.7.

AOJ11A. *And, speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being?*

Virtually all of those questioned, 96 per cent of the sample, felt that a high crime rate was a threat to the national well-being.




Figure VI.7 Possible Impact of Crime on National Wellbeing

6.7 Drugs and Gang Activities in Communities

Police reports indicate that in the 1980s most of the murders in Jamaica were linked to domestic disputes. By the 1990s, however, there was a shift from the high incidence of domestic-dispute-related homicide to significant increase in the number of murders that are linked to gang and drug related feuds. The LAPOP 2006 study examined the issue of drug and gang related activities in the communities surveyed. When asked to assess the extent of gang activities in their neighbourhood, 41.3 percent of the sample reported that their respective communities have been affected by some amount of gang-related activities (Figure VI.8). Only eight per cent believed their community was affected a ‘great deal’.




Figure VI.8 Citizens Account of the Extent to which Gangs affect their Neighbourhood

Unlike crimes such as robbery and burglary, violent crimes, such as murder, are predominantly an inner-city phenomenon. The year 2005 was outstanding as far as murders that were linked to

gang-related activities are concerned. The figure for that year stood at 37 per cent, more than three times what it was in 2004. The Kingston Metropolitan Area was most affected by these gangs and had the highest murder rate. About 60 per cent of all murders take place in this general area. The Jamaica Constabulary Communication Network reported a marked reduction in such murders in 2006, due primarily to the targeting of gangs in the policing of these communities.

These gangs were originally connected to the two major political parties. This situation has contributed to the inability of successive governments to arrest the growth of crime in many urban areas in Kingston and St Andrew. The presence of illegal guns in these communities has made some of the communities virtually ungovernable, particularly during elections. The violence resulting from the link between politics and criminal activities has forced both the PNP and JLP, with the assistance of civic leaders, to sign “peace agreements” as a means of restoring law and order to these communities.

However, as the state resources and the government contracts that were the traditional source of finance dwindled, these gangs turned to drugs as their source of funding. In 1988, the U.S. instituted a wide-scale deportation of Jamaican immigrants convicted of a variety of offences. By the end of 1996, over 6,000 Jamaicans had been returned from foreign countries, the majority for drug related offences (Becker, 1996). Upon their return, many of these "deportees" moved swiftly to introduce or develop drug enterprises in their communities, often with international links in the country from which they were deported (de Albuquerque & McElroy, 1999).

The LAPOP 2006 study examined the problem of community members' involvement in illegal drug activities. When asked if they have seen anyone selling drugs in their neighbourhood in the past year, only about 13 per cent of respondents answered in the affirmative (Figure VI.9).




Figure VI.9 Proportion of the Population Witnessing Drug Transaction in Neighbourhood

6.8 Conclusions

This chapter has examined violence in the form of direct victimization, public opinion on safety, the presence of gangs, victimization based on gender, crime in the urban and rural areas and views on the political system. The results indicated that, generally, there is a strong sense of fear and insecurity regardless of gender and place of residence. These results support other studies which points to the fact that acts of violence in Jamaica have shifted from property crime to violent crime.

APPENDIX VI CHAPTER 6 – CRIME VICTIMIZATION

Table V1.A1 Factors Explaining Crime Victimization-Result of Logistic Regression, 2006

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95.0% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Wealth	.115	.048	5.838	1	.016	1.122	.115	.048
Female	-.396	.184	4.636	1	.031	.673	-.396	.184
Rural	-.045	.185	.058	1	.809	.956	-.045	.185
Age	.008	.005	2.208	1	.137	1.008	.008	.005
Education	.004	.025	.030	1	.862	1.004	.004	.025
Constant	-2.403	.605	15.762	1	.000	.090		

Table V1.A2 Factors Explaining Sense of Security - Result of Logistic Regression, 2006

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95.0% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Rural	-.377	.409	.849	1	.357	.686	.308	1.529
Age	.002	.009	.042	1	.837	1.002	.985	1.019
Education	-.038	.037	1.060	1	.303	.963	.896	1.035
Size of City	.206	.118	3.061	1	.080	1.229	.976	1.547
Female	.288	.266	1.169	1	.280	.750	.445	1.263
Wealth	-.032	.070	.210	1	.647	.969	.845	1.110
Constant	3.130	.728	18.462	1	.000	22.867		

VII. Local Government

7.1 Context

Jamaica's local government system was founded by the British in the latter half of seventeenth century. Up to the 1940s, the structure of local representation was parish-based and operated on the principle of maximizing economic and political autonomy at this parish level. With the advent of universal adult suffrage in 1944, however, the number of eligible voters increased significantly from about 60,000 persons in the pre-1944 restricted franchise era, to over 663,000 in 1947 elections. This necessitated the sub division of parishes into smaller parochial divisions in order to maintain a voter-to-elected official ratio that would facilitate the best possible political representation. This development led to the birth of the local 'Parish Council' system, as currently exists in Jamaica today.

In October 1994, the Government of Jamaica established a Local Government Reform Unit under the Local Government Reform Act, 2001. This body was mandated to address development planning, infrastructure upgrading, capacity building, research and legislation with the aim of enhancing participatory governance at the local level (Ministry, 2001 & 2002; PIOJ, 2006; MLGE, 2006a). A new legal framework was viewed as particularly needed because local government was still guided by outdated legislation including the 1843 Town and Communities Act, the 1886 Poor Relief Act, the 1901 Parish Councils Act, the 1931 KSAC Act, and the 1957 Town and Country Planning Act (Ministry, 2002).

By 2005 several local authorities had begun to prepare Local Sustainable Development Plans. In the case of the Kingston and St. Andrew Corporation, Jamaica's most populous area, the completed plan drew support from the World Bank in a collaboration in capacity building through training in financial management and the training of Parish Councillors (local elected officials) in public administration (PIOJ, 2006).

Strategies to develop participatory governance were initiated through consultations with a range of interest groups. These consultations were conducted in collaboration with the Ministry of Local Government, Community and Sport (MLGCS), the Local Government Reform Unit (LGRU), the Social Development Commission (SDC), the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies (SALISES) at the UWI, and Parish Councils/Parish Development Committees (PCs/PDCs) (PIOJ, 2006).

In the overall reform strategy, the Parish Infrastructure Development Programme has had a focal responsibility in implementing the reform tasks under a five-year programme and this focus has been further sharpened recently. Its central objective is that of improving the capacity of Jamaica's thirteen (13) Parish Councils or local authorities (comprising of 227 division) to deliver basic services and maintain parish infrastructure within the framework of the Jamaican government's Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) (MLGE, 2006a).

Despite noticeable improvement in the areas of focus of the Reform Programme, "there is still a crying need to advance the local governance reform process further to reflect the new realities of the national, regional and world economies and to realize the imperatives of modern service

delivery” (Ministry, 2002).¹ Concerns about a commitment to the devolution of power, uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of local authorities and the capacity of these authorities to perform the designated roles and tasks, have been central to discussions relating to this dimension of Jamaica’s political system and culture.

In this chapter, we examine citizens’ opinions on certain issues relating to the character, functions and performance of the local government system in Jamaica.

7.2 Ranking Community Problems

The way citizens respond to community-based problems is assumed to be influenced by the way they perceive and define these problems, and how they rate them in terms of the seriousness of their impact at both the individual and the community level. In this study, respondents were asked to indicate their assessment of the most serious problem confronting their community by responding to the following question:

MUNI2 *In your opinion what is the most serious problem at present in this Parish Council Division?* [NOTE: DON’T READ THE RESPONSES. ACCEPT ONLY A SINGLE RESPONSE]

Figure VII.1 shows how respondents’ opinions on this issue are distributed among the problems identified. Close to one in three assessed poor road conditions to be the most serious problem. This is followed by limited economic means in the division (22%) and lack of water, nearly 13 per cent. All other response categories were in single digits, with poor administration being the largest, attracting about eight per cent of respondents who selected this option.

¹ This was the context in which the Minister tabled a Green Paper on “Local government reform: A regional framework for local governance and development” in parliament in June 2001.




Figure VII.1 Citizens' Evaluation of the Most Serious Problem in their Parish Council Division

In Figure VII.2, major problems are stacked according an urban/rural classification scheme. The definition of problems, as can be seen, is influenced by area of residence. The unavailability of water (67.7%) and the poor quality of service (66.7%) are more serious problems for rural dwellers while insecurity (70.7%) and the unavailability of sanitary amenities (70.0%) were the major concerns of those in urban areas.




Figure VII.2 Most Serious Local Problem by Area

Our examination of citizens' specification of the most serious local problem included analysis to determine the extent to which problems that are identified as the most serious at the national level correspond with those that are so classified at the parochial level. This involved a comparison of responses given to item MUN12 above, with those given to a question in which respondents were asked for their opinion as to the most serious problem facing the country on a whole.

Table VII.1 shows the eight most serious national problems identified by respondents. Crime and violence is seen, predominantly, as the most serious problem in Jamaica on a whole. Close to one in three respondents identified this as the number one national problem. Unemployment is the only other issue that received double digit endorsement as the major problem.

Table VII.1
Eight Most Serious National Problem, Jamaica - 2006

National Problem	N	%
Crime and Violence	978	62.6
Unemployment	298	18.9
Weak Economy	72	4.6
Poverty	66	4.2
Corruption	34	2.2
Poor Administration	32	2.0
Poor road condition	14	.9
Lack of water	11	.7

It is obvious from the information in Table VII.2, that there is a marked difference in the way problems are prioritized at the local versus the national level. At the local level, infrastructural problems predominate in importance. Road and water supply are apparently seen as problems to which the parochial authorities should attend. Issues such as security, job creation and poverty alleviation are categorized as tasks for the national administration. Importantly, macro economic problems are classified as being very serious at both levels, which is understandable, given that the national economy impacts on the wellbeing all citizens, albeit with different severity.

Table VII.2
Most Serious Problem at Local Level Compared to National Percentages, Jamaica - 2006

Major Problem	Local	National
Poor road conditions	32.1	.9
Weak Economy	22.0	4.6
Lack of water	12.5	.7
Poor Administration	7.6	2.0

The decentralization of governmental functions and responsibilities has been justified primarily on the premise that the resulting close proximity between the citizenry and local public officials should promote greater sensitivity and responsiveness and as a consequence, greater organizational effectiveness. In this section we examine if citizens support such devolution and their evaluation of the effectiveness of their local government institutions.

7.3 Support for Local Government

In this analysis, respondents' willingness to commit more of their own income, through taxes, to fund the operations of their local authorities was used as a proxy for citizens' support of their local institutions. As Figure VII.3 indicates, 19 per cent of respondents expressed their willingness to pay more taxes to finance their parish council, if increased funding would result in better quality service.




Figure VII.3 Citizens' Willingness to Paying More Taxes to Fund Parish Council Activities

Item LGL2 on the questionnaire was more specific in soliciting respondents support for their local authorities. It asked:

LGL2. *In your opinion, should the parish council be given more money and more responsibility or should the national government assume more responsibility and provide local services?*

- 1. More money to parish council*
- 2. National government should assume greater responsibility*
- 3. Nothing should change*
- 4. More to parish council if it provides better services*

Figure VII.4 shows that nearly the same percentage (18%) feels that more money should be given to local institutions if that will enhance their performance. Forty five per cent support more funding without conditions while about seven per cent support the status quo. Approximately 30 per cent of respondents expressed their unambiguous preference for the central government rather than the parish council providing local services.




Figure VII.4 Citizens Attitudes in Support of Local Government

7.4 Evaluation of Responsiveness

First we present findings pertaining to respondents’ evaluation of the responsiveness of their parish council division. This assessment was made on the basis of community members’ perception of the council’s effort to solve the most serious problem identified by respondents. Responses to the question:

MUN13. *How much has the Parish Council done to solve this problem?*
 1. A lot 2. Some 3. Little 4. Nothing 8. DK 9. NA

Figure VII.5 depicts the distribution of responses according to the evaluation dimensions given in the item above. It shows that an astonishing number of Jamaicans rate their local authority poorly in terms of its effort in solving the most serious local problem. Nearly 89 per cent of respondents

feel that their Parish Council has done nothing at all or little in resolving the problem they rank as most serious. Only one in a hundred rated the council highly for their effort and 10 per cent believed it had at made some attempt to solve the problem.




Figure VII.5 Effectiveness of Parish Council Division in terms of Effort to Resolve Most Serious Problem

The further probing of the issue of responsiveness involved the analysis of responses to the following item:

NP1B. *To what degree do you think Parish Councillors pay attention to what people ask for in these meetings?*²

1. Very much. 2. Somewhat. 3. Very little. 4. Not all. 8. DK.

² This question is linked to a preceding item which inquired as to whether or not respondent had attended meetings called by parish council within the year of the survey.

Respondents were more positive when asked to assess the responsiveness of their Parish Council as it relates to their experiences in raising issues in meetings and having these problems attended to by the council. Figure VII. 6 shows that those feeling the council has done nothing at all or very little was about six out of ten, certainly a little less than the nearly eight out of ten that relates to the more general question above.




Figure VII.6 Effectiveness of Parish Council Division in terms of Response to Problems Raised in Council Meeting

7.5 Citizens' Involvement with Parish Council

In this section we examine the nature and extent of citizens' involvement with their local authority. As indicated earlier, the devolution of governmental operations has been justified on the basis that local administration engenders greater community engagement in the affairs of government which creates the likelihood of greater satisfaction with the services offered by the various public bodies. Here we examine the issue of citizens' participation in the affairs of their Parish Council.

As shown in Figure VII.7, less than one in ten respondents reported that they attended the meeting of their Parish Council.




Figure VII. 7 Percentage of Citizens Attending Parish Council Meeting, Jamaica -2006

Figure VII.8 presents a comparative picture of attendance to Parish Council meetings within LAPOP countries. Jamaica assumes a close median position on this indicator, obtaining a higher rank than Costa Rica, a Latin American country that usually scores highly on such democracy

measures. Ranked at the top on this measure is the Dominican Republic, with a score of nearly 30 out of a possible 100 points, which is more than two times the mean of the LAPOP countries on this indicator.




Figure VII. 8 Comparative Perspective on Attendance to Parish Council Meeting, Jamaica -2006

The percentage of respondents who have participated in decisions relating to the budget of the council was numerically insignificant, only about one-half of one per cent (Figure VII.9).




Figure VII.9 Percentage of Citizens Participating in Drafting Parish Council Budget, Jamaica -2006

The extent of citizens' involvement in the form of demand-making on their Parish Council was also examined in this study. When asked:

NP2 Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or parish councillor of the parish council within the past 12 months?

less than 13 per cent of the respondents acknowledged that they have sought help from their local authority (Figure VII.10)




Figure VII.10 Percentage of Respondents Requesting Help from Local Authority

This relatively low rate of demand-making by citizens on their Parish Council is consistent with a trend described in Munroe and Bertram (2006) where it is explained that shrinking public resources have, over the years, resulted in the reduced capacity of political representatives to satisfy the demands and expectations of their constituents. This has led to a progressive decline in clientilistic politics, which was characterized by political favouritism in the allocation of state resources, which in turn has meant an overall reduction in the reliance of the populace on the resources of state institutions.

Figure VII.11 shows demand-making from a comparative perspective among LAPOP countries. Jamaica's figure of 12.6 per cent is just about two percentage points below the LAPOP average of 14.6 per cent. At the top of the list on this indicator of community involvement is Peru with 21.2 per cent and Panama at the other extreme with about 10 per cent.




Figure VII.11 Comparative Perspective on Demand-Making at the Community Level among LAPOP Countries

7.6 Community Action

On a whole, citizens’ participation in the affairs of local government in Jamaica, at the official level, is generally low. However, as the breakdown of responses and the comparative perspective on the following item indicate, participation in addressing community problems is relatively high. Only about four out of ten respondents reported having participated in activities that helped solved some community problem (Figure VII.12).




Figure VII.12 Percentage of Respondents Helping to Solve Community Problem

However, as shown in Figure VII.13, when compared to other LAPOP countries, Jamaica ranks favourably in terms of citizen involvement in problem solving initiatives in their communities.




Figure VII.13 Comparative Perspective on Citizens Participation in Solving Community Problems, LAPOP, 2006.

7.7 Predictors of Community Participation

In relation to predictors of community participation, control variables and outcomes of a linear regression analysis are appended at the end of this chapter. The only factor which was statistically significant in determining a persons' level of participation in community activities was wealth. As Figure VII.14 shows, mean participation among wealthier persons is much higher than among those with low inventory of the capital goods used to estimate citizens' wealth.




Figure VII.14 Community Participation by Wealth

7.8 Evaluation of Efficiency

Parish council effectiveness was assessed in terms of citizens' evaluation of the institutions' efficiency in attending to the services requested by community members and members' level of satisfaction with the quality of service provided. Figure VII.15 shows distribution responses to the question:

SGL2 How have they treated you or your neighbours when you have had dealings with the parish council?

Of those who did business with the council, most were generally satisfied with the way they were treated. More than six out ten expressed their overall satisfaction. However, less than four per cent of the respondents expressed a highly favourable assessment, indicating that they were treated very well. Those evaluating the quality of service to be 'very bad' was about 12 per cent of the sample.





Figure VII.15 Respondent Evaluation of Treatment Received from Parish Council

Of those whose business with the council involved the search for solution to specific problems, about 50 per cent reported having had their problem solved (Figure VII.16).



FigureVII.16 Percentage of Respondents Reporting having had their Problem Solved

When asked to indicate assessment of the quality of services provided by the council by responding to the following question:

SGL1 Would you say that the services the parish council is providing are very good, good, neither good nor poor (fair), poor, or very poor?

the majority rated the services provided by their council to be either mediocre or poor. Just about 14 per cent offered the positive assessments, of good or very good (Figure VII.17).




Figure VII.17 Respondents' Evaluation of Quality of Service Offered by Parish Council

7.9 Overall Satisfaction with Parish Council

When asked to express their level of satisfaction with the services provided by their parish council, only 37 per cent of respondents who have done business with the council gave their local authority a passing grade. As Figure VII.18 shows, this is an extremely low rating when this indicator is compared with that of other LAPOP countries. Jamaica ranks at the bottom of the list, ahead of only Haiti, among the seventeen countries in the survey of 2006. Jamaica's 37 per cent is roughly 13 percentage points below the mean and median score for these countries surveyed.




Figure VII.18 Comparative Perspective on Citizens' Satisfaction with Local Government, LAPOP, 2006.

In an attempt at determining the factors that relate to community members satisfaction with the services offered by their Parish Council, we analyzed a linear regression model made up of the factors displayed in the first column in Table VII.A2 which is appended at the end of this chapter. The coefficient for evaluation of the state of the national economy was positive and it was the only statistically significant factor. But as the line graph in Figure VI.19 shows, a positive relationship exists only with regards to those providing a moderate evaluation of the state of the Jamaican economy. The relationship is negative for those giving extremely low or very high ratings.




Figure VII.19 Satisfaction with Parish Council Services by Evaluation of State of the Economy

7.10 Conclusion

It can be concluded that there is a definite role for local authorities in the delivery of certain services, given the marked difference in the way citizens classify their problems in terms of importance at the local versus the national level. It was seen also that level of participation in the affairs of local government in Jamaica is very low and those who reported involvement with their council expressed general dissatisfaction with the quality of service received. However, citizens' involvement in the search for solutions for community problems is, comparatively, high. These findings confirm suggestions of a growing tendency for citizens to collaborate more at the level of civil society in their attempt to resolve their community problems rather than to depend on state and its agencies.

On the basis of respondents' opinions on the performance of their Parish Council, it can be argued that on a whole, closer proximity of citizens to their local public officials has not promoted the greater sensitivity, responsiveness and organizational effectiveness that are assumed to result from devolution and related programmes of local government reform.

APPENDIX VII CHAPTER 6 – LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Table VII. A1 Factors Explaining Community Participation in Jamaica – Result of the Linear Regression, 2006

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	19.902	16.277		1.223	.222
Convince_others_to_vote	-7.406	6.118	-.034	-1.211	.226
Wealth	13.206	6.045	.062	2.185	.029
Female	3.250	5.691	.016	.571	.568
Rural	13.030	8.032	.062	1.622	.105
Education	-.172	.781	-.007	-.221	.825
Age	.047	.188	.007	.252	.801
Area size	-2.921	2.501	-.045	-1.168	.243
Did_not_work	.191	.116	.045	1.648	.100
Listen_radio	35.337	23.701	.041	1.491	.136
Watch_TV	-20.452	27.361	-.021	-.747	.455

a Dependent Variable: NP1R

Table VII. A2 Factors Explaining Satisfaction with Parish Council Services in Jamaica – Result of the Linear Regression, 2006

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1 (Constant)	17.699	4.460		3.968	.000
Wealth	2.776	1.539	.056	1.803	.072
Female	1.908	1.444	.039	1.322	.187
Rural	.727	2.015	.015	.361	.718
Education	.263	.200	.043	1.314	.189
Age	.061	.048	.039	1.253	.210
Area size	.789	.639	.051	1.235	.217
Economy - SOCT1r	.178	.031	.173	5.645	.000
Self - IDIO1r	.059	.032	.056	1.803	.072

a Dependent Variable: SGL1r

VIII. Voting Behaviour

In this chapter we examine voter behaviour in Jamaica. In particular, we focus on voter turnout, voter participation and explanations for variations in voter participation. Finally, we examine support for the incumbent government. To set the context, we begin with an examination of elections and the political system.

8.1. Elections and the Political System

Since 1944 when Jamaica achieved universal adult suffrage, the country has had an unbroken record of democratic elections at the national level. Indeed, Munroe and Bertram (2006) state that, with the exception of 1983, when the main opposition party, the People's National Party (PNP), boycotted the elections, average turnout of the electorate for national elections exceeded 70% of all eligible voters. This is true up to 1993 when the turnout dipped below 70% of all eligible voters. Part of the fluctuation in turnout may be due to the fact that, unlike some countries in Latin America, voting in Jamaica is not compulsory.

Table VIII.1 Voter Turnout 1972-2002

Election Year	Percentage voter turnout
1972	78.2
1976	86.1
1980	86.9
1983	28.9
1989	77.6
1993	66.7
1997	66.1
2002	60.0
2002 (LAPOP data)	48.0

Source: T. Munroe & A. Bertram. 2006. Adult Suffrage and Political Administrations in Jamaica 1944-2002. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers; LAPOP 2006 survey.

Despite what appears to be widespread respect for electoral outcomes and support for the democratic methods of governance, the Jamaican political system has been characterized by what the late Jamaican political scientist Carl Stone (1989) called 'clientilistic politics'. By this we refer to a situation in which political parties, once they are elected 'look after' those who have voted for them by starting special projects or providing financial support to the communities or individuals. This has led to a type of political arrangement that has been characterized by a high level of violence between the two main political parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the PNP. This violence has been most concentrated in inner-city communities in the Kingston Metropolitan Area.

A phenomenon that has emerged as a result of these sharp political differences is the presence of partisan enclaves called 'garrisons'. These 'garrisons' are virtually 100% in support of a particular political party and people who support other political parties are usually driven out of such communities. The electoral violence reached a peak in 1980, when hundreds of Jamaicans

were murdered because of the conflict between political parties, in part due to tensions from the cold war between the USA and the USSR.

Since the 1993 elections, political violence has decreased significantly. In fact, in the last election in 2002 there were just a few incidents of political violence. According to Munroe and Bertram (2006), voter apathy appears to be developing as clientilism recedes because of the reduced resources of the State. The poor economic performance of the Jamaican economy and what appears to be a general dissatisfaction with the development of the country has resulted in many Jamaicans turning away from voting.

8.2 Voter Participation

In response to the question ‘Did you vote in the last general elections?’ 48 per cent answered in the affirmative (Figure VIII.1). This figure is much lower than the actual turnout of 60 per cent for 2002. Part of the reason for the lower figure is that many of those interviewed would not have been eligible to vote in the 2002 election.




Figure VIII.1 Voter Participation

As can be seen from Figure VIII.2, voters were motivated to vote based upon the plans of the government candidate (49.1 per cent), followed by the political party of the candidate (36.5 per cent) and 14 per cent of respondents claiming to vote on the basis of the qualities of the candidate. These responses run counter to a widely held view among Jamaican political commentators that in Jamaica, allegiance to a political party is the most important determinant of voting behaviour.




Figure VIII.2 Factors Influencing Respondents Decision to Vote

In regard to the characteristics of voters, Figure VIII.3 shows that an approximately equal percentage of men and women said that they voted in the last election.




Figure VIII.3 Voting by Gender

Determinants of Voting Behaviour in Jamaica

Our attempt at determining the factors that influence voter participation among Jamaicans involved the development of a logistic regression model comprising the variables specified in Table VIII.A1 which is appended at the end of this chapter. Age and ideology were the only significant factors in this model.

Older persons were more likely to vote than younger people. As shown in Figure VIII.4, the likelihood of voting increased with age, except for the 36-45 and the 46-55 age-groups, where the voting rates are approximately the same.




Figure VIII.4 Voting by Age Group

Self-ascribed ideological position was also found to be a significant determinant of voter participation. To measure ideology we used a Left-Right ten-point scale, where 1 indicates left and 10 is right. The average score for Jamaicans' ideological self-identification was 6, which suggests a centrist political ideology. As Figure VIII.5 shows, persons considering their political tendencies to be to the centre on the political spectrum are much more likely to exercise their franchise in general elections. Persons on the right reported higher voter turnout than those on the left, an indication that Jamaicans on the right tend to entertain greater belief in a concrete expression of democracy than those on the left.




Figure VIII.5 Voting by Self-Ascribed Ideological Position

Interestingly, sex, wealth and education did not appear to be good determinants of voter turnout.

8.3 Reasons for Not Voting

Despite the fact that many respondents voted in the last election, quite a relatively large number indicated that they did not vote. The question that this begs is: Why? Figure VIII.6 shows that of those who said that they did not vote the four main reasons that they gave were a lack of interest in voting (39.6%), other reasons (15.7%), below the voting age (10.0%) and did not believe in the political system (9.1%).




Figure VIII.6 Reason for not Voting in last General Election

These findings are consistent with those of political scientists who point to the growing apathy and disconnectedness that has come to characterize the Jamaican political landscape. Munroe and Bertram (2006) argue that part of this apathy may be due to the decline in clientilistic politics, resulting from the fact that the Government has been unable to provide spoils to its supporters in a way that it used to in the pre-1990s era. Also, there has been growing disaffection with problems of governance, crime and economic development. The result is that many persons simply feel that their vote will make no difference, as they will have little or no influence beyond their vote.

Despite these feelings of apathy and alienation, however, a large percentage of the population said that they identify with a political party. In response the question:

VB10 Do you currently identify with a political party?

forty five per cent of the sample responded in the affirmative (Figure VIII.7).




Figure VIII.7 Identification with Political Party

And as Figure VIII.8 indicates, of those respondents who acknowledged their identification with a political party, a greater percentage identified with the PNP (58.4%) than the JLP (34.6%).




Figure VIII.8 Respondents' Party Identification

8.4 Support for Government

The Jamaican political system is parliamentary rather than presidential. In other words, the Prime Minister is not chosen directly by the voters but by members of the party. He or she is usually a senior party member who has had a good record of winning his or her seat in parliament. Nonetheless, general elections do take on the appearance of presidential elections as the party leader plays a significant role in determining the election of the party.

In this section we examine the extent to which strong identification with the ruling PNP translate into strong support for the incumbent government. Figure VIII.9 shows that the PNP, then led by P.J. Patterson, received the majority of the votes in the 2002 elections. The JLP, which was then led by Edward Seaga is the only other party that made an impression at the polls. The National Democratic Movement (NDM) and other parties attracted few votes, supporting the view that Jamaica is really a two-party democracy.

In early 2006 P.J. Patterson stepped down as Prime Minister and turned the government over to Portia Simpson-Miller, the most popular politician in the country. The results regarding support for the incumbent government might therefore reflect a mixture of Patterson’s and Simpson-Miller’s leadership of the government.




Figure VIII.9 Party Affiliation of Candidate for whom Respondent Voted in last Election

In determining support for the incumbent government we asked the series of questions in the box below and respondents were asked to locate their evaluation on the seven-point scale on card ‘A’.

BOX VIII.1

Respondent is given the card and the following instructions:

Now we will use a card ... This card has a 7-point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1 meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7 meaning A LOT. For example, if I ask you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
Not at all						A lot		Doesn't know

- N1. To what extent would you say the current Government combats poverty?*
- N3. To what extent would you say the current Government protects democratic principles?*
- N9. To what extent would you say the current Government combats government corruption?*
- N10. To what extent would you say the current Government protects human rights?*
- N11. To what extent would you say the current Government improves citizen security?*
- N12. To what extent would you say the current Government combats unemployment?*

Responses to these questions dealing with the extent to which respondents felt that the government had been reducing poverty, unemployment and corruption, protecting human rights and democratic principles and improving citizen security were captured on the 1-7 shown and converted to the easier to understand 0-100 metric format. Figure VIII.10 displays the results. In relation to the question, “To what extent would you say the current Government combats poverty?” the mean score was 34.1 on the 100-point scale, suggesting that government has had a low rate of success in relation to this issue. With respect to the question, “To what extent would you say the current Government protects democratic principles?” the mean was 49.1 indicating a general feeling that the Government had done moderately on this issue. For “To what extent would you say the current Government protects human rights?” the mean was 46.2 again below the 50-point line on the scale. Likewise, a relatively low mean score of about 40 point was given for the question “To what extent would you say the current Government improves citizen security?”

However, it is with respect to combating corruption and unemployment that the government received the lowest ratings. The mean score for these items were 30.1 and 24.6 points respectively.




Figure VIII.10 Indicators of Government’s Efficacy

To determine citizens’ overall assessment of the performance of the Government and to facilitate comparison with other LAPOP countries, an efficacy index was computed using responses from questions N1, N3, N9, N10, N11 and N12. The efficacy index for Jamaica was slightly over 37 points.

Further analysis of the issue of citizens’ assessment of the efficacy of the current government involved the analysis of responses to item M1:

“Speaking in general of the current government, how would you describe the work being done by the PNP?”

Figure VIII.11 summarizes the answers to this question. Sixty per cent of respondents gave the government a favourable rating, with about 46 per cent assessing its performance to be fair. Nearly 33 per cent believed the government’s performance was “bad” or “very bad”.




Figure VIII.11 Citizens' Evaluation of the Efficacy of the Current Government

Figure VIII.12 shows that Jamaica ranks somewhere in the middle of the thirteen countries, between Peru and Panama in relation to citizens' evaluation of the efficacy of the government.




Figure VIII.12 Comparison of Efficacy of the Current Government

In addition, Figure VIII.13 shows, mean efficacy scores also varied by age-group with the 30-34 giving the highest ratings and the 18-29, the lowest.




Figure VIII.13 Mean efficacy score by age-group

Furthermore, as is shown in Figure VIII.14, the evaluation of government performance also varied by evaluation of personal economic situation, with those more satisfied with their economic situation expressing more support for the government.




Figure VIII.14 Mean efficacy score by personal economic situation

Finally, Figure VIII. 15 shows that person’ view of the state of the economy also figured in the how they rated government. The most positive rates came from those who had more positive assessments of the economy .




Figure VIII.15 Mean efficacy score by evaluation of state of the economy.

8.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we have shown that the main determinants of voting in the last general elections were age, area size or size of city and ideology. We have also shown that the main reasons for voting include the plans of the candidate, the political party and the quality of the candidate. The main reasons for not voting include a lack of interest in voting, the respondent was below the voting age and respondent did not believe in the political system.

The survey also showed that most Jamaicans self-identified as centrist, ideologically, and indicate greater support for the PNP than the JLP. Finally, in regard to support for government, respondents rated the government low on a number of policy issues and gave it an overall low score on the efficacy index. People who were poor, younger and had more negative views of the state of the economy were most likely to rate the government poorly.

APPENDIX VIII CHAPTER 8 – VOTING BEHAVIOUR

Table VIII.A1. Forecasters of Voter Turnout in the last Elections: Results of the Logistic Regression

vb2_r		B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
1.00	Intercept	-2.899	.529	30.025	1	.000			
	Sex	.031	.133	.053	1	.817	1.031	.795	1.338
	Age	.044	.005	91.790	1	.000	1.045	1.036	1.055
	Education	-.011	.019	.375	1	.540	.989	.953	1.025
	Wealth	-.014	.035	.155	1	.694	.986	.921	1.056
	Urban/rural	.050	.186	.071	1	.790	1.051	.730	1.514
	Area size	.112	.059	3.621	1	.057	1.119	.997	1.256
	Ideology	.075	.027	7.952	1	.005	1.078	1.023	1.137
	AOJ11 ¹	.002	.077	.000	1	.983	1.002	.862	1.164

Table VIII.A2. Forecasters of Efficacy of the Current Government: Results of Regression

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	20.926	3.459		6.050	.000
Wealth	-.891	1.209	-.021	-.737	.461
Female	2.019	1.137	.048	1.776	.076
Rural	-1.639	1.612	-.038	-1.017	.309
Education	-.083	.156	-.015	-.530	.596
Age	.079	.038	.059	2.094	.036
Area size	.771	.499	.058	1.544	.123
Economy - SOCT1r	.209	.025	.230	8.304	.000
Self - IDIO1r	.077	.026	.084	3.027	.003

a Dependent Variable: Efficacy of the current government

¹ AOJ11 is a measure of fear of being victimized. The question was asked the following way: “Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of falling victim to an assault or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK”

IX. Social Capital in Jamaica

It is widely argued that the active participation of citizens in the organizations of civil society is critical to the building and maintenance of a strong and stable democracy (Burns, 2001; Crotty, 1991; Edwards & Foley, 1997; Putman, 2000; Shlozman, 1999; Vargas-Cullell & Rosero-Bixly, 2004). This assertion of a link between the level citizen's involvement and the well-being of a democracy can be traced back to the 19th century in the works of theorists such as James Madison (*The Federalist*), Alexis de Tocqueville (*Democracy in America*), and John Dewey (*School & Society*). It is Pierre Bourdieu, however, who has been credited for introducing the contemporary usage of the term 'social capital' (Everingham, 2001)¹ in describing the aggregate involvement of individuals in community groups and organizations and the collective actions that evolve from such association. James Coleman and Robert Putman later popularized the concept in their promotion of the idea of building social capital as a way of enhancing political institutional performance and in turn, fostering social and economic development.

Despite the problem of slightly differing definitions among theorists in their use of the term social capital, it is generally accepted that the concept subsumes notions of interpersonal trust, - the "strong and pervasive norms of reciprocity", impenetrable and strong social networks – these must operate at the family, community and national levels, and a strong sense of personal worth (Putman, 2005). So, unlike other forms of capital that are located in the actors, social capital is located "in their relations with other actors" (Coleman, 1988). From a Caribbean viewpoint, Thomas (1996, p. 16) argues that social capital embodies:

those voluntary means and processes developed within civil society which promote development for the collective whole. These means and processes serve to: reduce costs or impediments to social interaction (e.g., self-help); advance the pursuit of the collective aspects of social development (e.g., empowerment); engender social bonding (e.g., courtesy, devotion, trust, confidence, respect for laws, and regulations and others)...

In this chapter we assess the state of democracy in Jamaica from this Tocquevillean perspective, by examining the popularity of selected associative activities that are proposed to contribute to the building of a nation's stock of social capital. Our emphasis is on the key dimensions social capital – social participation and interpersonal trust.

¹ Bourdieu places the source of social capital, not just in social structure but in social connections (Portes, 1998).

9.1 Community Participation as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica

We begin with an examination of the level of citizen’s involvement in their community by analyzing responses to the series of survey items shown in Boxes IX.1 and IX.2 below. The first series of items, CP6 to CP10 and CP13, measure intensity of citizen’s participation by determining the frequency at which they attend those civil society organizations mentioned in the respective questions. The Box IX.2 series operationalize participation in terms of community activism, focusing on respondent’s level of involvement in activities that are aimed at facilitating community development.

Box IX.1 Survey Items used to Measure Level of Participation among Jamaicans

Now I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.

<i>ITEM</i>	<i>Once a week</i>	<i>Once or twice a month</i>	<i>Once or twice a year</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>DK</i>
<i>CP6. The meetings of any religious organization? You attended them ...</i>	1	2	3	4	8
<i>CP7. The meetings of a parents association at school? You attended them ...</i>	1	2	3	4	8
<i>CP8. The meetings of a committee or council for community improvements? You attended them ...</i>	1	2	3	4	8
<i>CP9. The meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? You attended them ...</i>	1	2	3	4	8
<i>CP10. The meetings of a labour union? You attended them ...</i>	1	2	3	4	8
<i>CP13. The meetings of a political party or movement?. You attended them ...</i>	1	2	3	4	8

As Figure IX.1 shows, attendance at meetings of religious organizations obtained the highest average participation of 64.2 per cent, followed by a distant 29.2 per cent for those attending parent teachers’ association meetings.

An examination of citizens’ behaviour as it relates to the attendance at parent’s association meeting reveals that 46% of the respondents in the sample said they have never attended such meetings while only 3% said they have attended at least once a week.




Figure IX.1 Average Citizens' Participation on Civic Organization

Further analysis of respondents' frequency of attendance to meeting of religious organizations is shown in Figure IX.2. Roughly 42% of the respondents in the study said they attended meetings of a religious organization at least once per week while 13% stated that they have never done so. Relatively high level of attendance to church related functions is a manifestation of the significance of religion in the lives of the Jamaican people. As is the case universally, church attendance is an importance ritual in the practice of religion.




Figure IX.2 Frequency of Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations

Our attempt at identifying the factors that explain participation in the affairs of religious organizations involved the creation of regression model comprising the control variables shown in Table IX.A1. The statistically significant factors are sex, denomination, age and level of education.

As can be seen from the relative height of the bars in Figure IX.3, females attend church-related meetings at much greater frequency than males.




Figure IX.3 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Sex

With regards to denominational differences in the attendance of the meetings of religious organizations, Catholics attend with less frequency than members of all other denominations. Persons identifying themselves as evangelicals reported the highest level of participation in church activities (Figure IX.4).




Figure IX.4 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Denomination

The effect of age is also quite evident from the line graph in Figure IX.5 below. Older persons participate in church activities much more frequently than younger individuals. As indicated by the straightness of the line, there is a consistent pattern of increase in attendance in successive age groups.




Figure IX.5 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Age

Figure IX.6 below depicts the influence of education on church participation among Jamaicans. The less educated attend meetings with greater frequency than persons with higher level of schooling.




Figure IX.6 Attendance to Meeting of Religious Organizations by Education

With regards to other community organizations, attendance to political party meetings averaged nine per cent. And, despite the long history, partisan political connection, national visibility and the strength of the trade union movement in Jamaica, average attendance to labour union meeting averaged a mere three per cent (Figure IX.1 above).

A civic participation index, computed as the mean of responses to items C7 – C10 and C13 in Box IX.1 above², worked out to be a low mean of 12.9 points (Figure IX.7).

² The question relating to attendance to the meetings of religious organization has been left out of mix because of its low score in the component.




Figure IX.7 Average Citizens' Participation in Civic Organization and Civic Participation Index

9.2 Community Activism as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica

Box IX.2 shows the items use to determine level of participation in community projects (proxies for community activism) and the distribution of responses. As shown in the shaded cell, about thirty nine per cent of respondents reported that they contributed or have tried to contribute to the solution of a problem in their community.

Box IX.2 Survey Items used to Measure Community Activism among Respondents and Distribution of Responses

Now I am going to ask you a few questions about your community and the problems it faces.

	YES	NO	DK/DR	N/A
<i>ITEM</i>				
CP5. <i>In the past year, have you contributed or tried to contribute toward the solution of a problem in your community or in your neighbourhood?</i> <i>(1) Yes [continue] (2) No [Go to CP6]</i> <i>(8) DK/DR [Go to CP6]</i>	38.7	60.3	1.0	-
CP5A. <i>Have you donated money or material to help address a problem in your community or in your neighbourhood?</i>	23.6	14.1	.6	61.7
CP5B. <i>Have you contributed with your own work or manual labour?</i>	29.6	8.32	.4	61.7
CP5C. <i>Have you been attending community meetings about some problem or improvement?</i>	17.8	19.1	1.4	61.7
CP5D. <i>Have you tried to help organize a new group to resolve a neighbourhood problem or to bring about any improvement?</i>	13.2	24.0	1.1	61.7

The results of the further analysis of the CP5 to CP5D series of questions (Box IX.2) are depicted in Figure IX.8 below.³ Of those respondents indicating that they have participated in the solution of a community problem about 62 per cent said they have donated money or material and nearly 78 per cent reported to have given their own labour in addressing such neighbourhood problems.

³ These results represent only valid responses to the questions.




Figure IX.8 Citizens' Level of Participation in Community Projects

Level of community activism was also measured in terms of participation in protests and public demonstrations. When asked,

PROT2 During last year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it sometimes, almost never or never?

about forty eight per cent of respondents said that they have never recently participated in any form of protest or public demonstration (Figure IX.9). Only 24.3 per cent reported having done so sometimes during the last year.




Figure IX.9 Citizens' Participation in Public Protest and Demonstration During the Last Year

9.3 Inter-Personal Trust as an Indicator of Social Capital in Jamaica

In the preceding sections, we examined citizens' involvement in community activities as an indicator of social capital. Social collaboration among neighbours is, however, highly dependent upon the extent to which community members trust each other; hence a focus on the issue of inter-personal trust in this section of the report. In order to measure this dimension of social capital, respondents were asked:

IT1. Now speaking of the people from your community, would you say that they are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy?

As indicated by Figure IX.10 community members generally trust one another, with 71 per cent expressing confidence in persons in their neighbourhood. Only seven per cent of respondents described community members as being untrustworthy.




Figure IX.10 Reported Level of Trust among Community Members

Figure IX.11 shows how Jamaica fares in comparison to other states in the LAPOP study for 2006. Responses were converted to the metric scale to facilitate easy comparison. On this scale, Jamaica ranked moderately with regards to interpersonal trust with a mean of almost 59 points. For that period Costa Rica ranked the highest with 67 points and Haiti ranked the lowest with an average of 42 points.




Figure IX.11 Comparative Perspective on Inter-Personal Trust

9.4 Determinants of Interpersonal Trust

A linear regression model comprising of key control variables was analyzed to determine the factors that best explain a community’s inventory of inter-personal trust. Table IX.A2 shows the results of this analysis (appended at the end of this chapter). Age and area of residence were the only statistically significant factors.

As indicated by the coefficient, the relationship between interpersonal trust and age is positive. This means that as age increases, a person’s sense of trust in others of the community will also increase (Figure IX.12).




Figure IX.12 Inter-Personal Trust by Age

Area of residence was also a significant determinant of citizens' level of trust. Rural dwellers are more likely to be more trusting of their neighbours than those living in urban areas (Figure IX.13).




Figure IX.13 Interpersonal Trust by Area of Residence

9.5 Conclusion

The results of this study show that community participation is highest in church organizations. Women, older persons and the less educated were more likely to participate in churches. Evangelicals had the highest level of participation. In relation to community participation, many Jamaicans reported that they contributed or have tried to contribute to the solution of a problem in their community by donating money, material or their own labour. In respect of interpersonal trust, the overwhelming majority of Jamaicans indicated that they trusted their neighbours. Jamaica ranked somewhere in the middle with regards to interpersonal trust among Latin American countries in the LAPOP project. Interpersonal trust in Jamaica is likely to be higher among older people and those who live in rural areas.

APPENDIX IX CHAPTER 9 – SOCIAL CAPITAL IN JAMAICA

**Table IX.A1 Factors Explaining the Attendance of Meetings of Religious Organizations
-Result of the Linear Regression, 2006**

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	50.231	5.829		8.617	.000
Wealth	1.381	1.998	.019	.691	.489
Female	15.961	1.884	.224	8.471	.000
Rural	3.200	1.919	.045	1.667	.096
Preference Regime	2.530	2.919	.023	.867	.386
Age	.326	.062	.170	6.066	.000
Education	-.668	.258	-.075	-2.587	.010
Denomination (Catholic)	-2.522	.782	-.086	-3.225	.001

**Table IX.A2 Factors Explaining Level of Interpersonal Trust among Community Members
-Result of the Linear Regression, 2006**

	Un-standardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	42.714	3.919		10.900	.000
Wealth	.688	1.466	.013	.469	.639
Female	-2.059	1.400	-.040	-1.471	.142
Rural	5.553	1.414	.107	3.927	.000
Victimized by crime	3.085	2.280	.037	1.353	.176
Corruption victimization	-.029	.706	-.001	-.041	.967
Education	2.057	1.104	.054	1.864	.063
Age	2.340	.472	.140	4.960	.000

APPENDIX A: Precision of Results

All surveys are affected by two types of errors: non-sampling errors and sampling errors. The non-sampling errors are those that are committed during the gathering and processing of the information. These errors can be controlled by constructing a good measurement instrument, good interviewer training, good field supervision, and with good programs to input data such errors can be controlled but they cannot be quantified. Nonetheless, the comparison of the result of the sample with the population gives an idea if those errors have generated biases that might make the sample unrepresentative of the population. The use of hand-held computers that have been employed in the AmericasBarometer 2006 in some of the countries studied likely reduces these errors by allowing for consistency checks during the actual process of interviewing. In addition, eliminating the process of data entry eliminates errors at this stage as well. With the traditional process of paper questionnaires, it is necessary to code the questionnaires in the office and to clean the data, which is also a process that can generate error. With paper questionnaires, this process goes on only weeks after the data have been collected. Correcting the errors detected in the office during the cleaning process, or by programs that detect errors, still leaves many of those errors uncorrected or uncorrectable.

On the other hand, sampling errors are a produce of chance and result from the basic fact of interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When a sample is selected, it must be realized that this is only one of the many possible samples that could be drawn. The variability that exists between all of these possible sampling errors could be known only if all possible samples were drawn, which is obviously impossible for practical and cost reasons. In practice, what one does is to estimate the error based on the variance obtained from the sample itself.

In order to estimate the sampling error of a statistic (e.g., an average, percentage or ratio), one calculates the standard error, which is the square root of the population variance of the statistic. This permits measurement of the degree of precision of the elements of the population under similar circumstances. To calculate this error, it is very important to consider the design of the sample. The Design Effect, DEFT, indicates the efficient of the design employed in relation to a design of simple random sampling (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the standard error obtained by the both designs (complex and SRS) is the same; that is to say, the complex sample is as efficient as the SRS with the same sample size. If the value is greater than 1, the complex sample produces an error larger than that obtained by SRS.

$$DEFT = EE_{complex} / EE_{SRS}$$

In the table below are presented the confidence intervals (95%, that is 1.96 of the EE), and the design effects (DEFT). The table shows also the statistical value of the question (mean or percentage). The EE are estimated by STATA 9. The extreme values originate in a high degree of homogeneity within each cluster. In other words, in these cases there is an important spatial segregation of people according to their socio-economic situation, and this reduces the efficiency of the cluster sampling.

It is worth noting that the sampling error is usually 10% to 40% larger than what would have been observed by SRS. For example, in the case of Costa Rica, the important system support index, (PSA5) has a sampling error of 0.66. That means that confidence interval at 95% (given by the 1.96 of the EE) for the average of this index (64.0) goes from 62.7 to 65.3. According to the DEFT from the table, this interval is 26% greater than that which would have been obtained by SRS.

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Error	Error est.	Deft
	Wealth			itlr			Corvic		
Mexico	4.93	0.10	2.12	58.61	1.21	1.62	37.12	1.99	1.63
Guatemala	3.19	0.22	4.25	59.09	1.40	1.87	18.02	1.36	1.37
El Salvador	3.37	0.13	2.71	62.25	1.22	1.48	13.36	1.05	1.29
Honduras	3.28	0.21	4.23	67.21	1.32	1.65	16.09	1.76	1.91
Nicaragua	2.43	0.24	5.73	60.22	0.98	1.24	17.99	1.26	1.38
Costa Rica	5.78	0.08	2.01	66.98	1.32	1.60	19.33	1.13	1.11
Panama	2.70	0.21	4.40	49.43	0.99	1.33	11.26	1.27	1.57
Colombia	3.68	0.13	2.93	62.72	1.34	1.66	9.73	0.93	1.21
Ecuador	3.79	0.25	8.20	55.16	1.31	2.33	29.37	1.55	1.84
Bolivia	2.83	0.17	5.56	46.99	0.89	1.61	32.35	1.21	1.42
Peru	3.24	0.30	6.87	42.98	0.80	1.12	30.27	1.33	1.12
Chile	5.13	0.09	2.02	58.95	1.61	2.02	9.43	0.81	1.08
Dominican Rep.	3.74	0.17	3.75	60.36	1.36	1.68	17.68	1.32	1.35
Haiti	1.71	0.18	4.16	42.12	2.09	2.61	50.09	2.50	2.02
Jamaica	4.08	0.09	1.76	58.94	0.95	1.43	34.04	2.18	1.84

Country	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft	Average	Error est.	Deft
	PSA5			tol			Efigob		
Mexico	60.80	0.83	1.57	56.25	1.10	1.65	43.89	1.19	1.90
Guatemala	52.21	0.76	1.37	52.71	0.82	1.29	33.75	1.04	1.55
El Salvador	55.36	0.91	1.71	55.76	0.69	1.10	43.85	1.11	1.66
Honduras	55.03	0.97	1.91	46.21	1.40	2.20	32.16	0.64	1.26
Nicaragua	45.34	1.14	1.97	53.49	2.34	3.49	32.20	0.97	1.76
Costa Rica	63.97	0.66	1.26	62.20	1.04	1.37	43.05	0.84	1.34
Panama	46.63	1.00	1.82	48.00	1.41	2.25	40.68	0.99	1.67
Colombia	56.99	1.00	1.83	51.83	1.14	1.60	48.88	1.19	1.90
Ecuador	37.68	1.06	2.60	46.27	0.90	1.83	20.43	0.67	1.77
Bolivia	51.60	0.69	1.89	43.16	0.61	1.49			
Peru	43.92	0.64	1.23	53.55	1.11	1.78	33.83	0.86	1.56
Chile	53.18	0.94	1.67	56.31	1.81	2.37	51.43	1.12	1.99
Dominican Rep.	57.65	0.78	1.36	58.94	1.15	1.39	55.04	0.84	1.26
Haiti	41.61	1.41	2.39	62.09	1.20	1.74	31.79	1.01	1.93
Jamaica	48.87	0.92	1.58	72.67	1.11	1.81	37.49	0.84	1.53

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE

Version # 23a IRB Approval# 060187

	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES MONA CAMPUS DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY & SOCIAL WORK
	 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

The Political Culture of Democracy: Jamaica, 2006

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Country: Mexico 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panama 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil. 21. Dominican Republic 22. Haiti 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad	COUNTRY	23
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]	IDNUM	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
ESTRATOPRI: 1.KMR, 2. Parish Capitals/Main Towns, 3. Rural Areas	ESTRATOPRI	23 <input type="checkbox"/>
Parish 01. Kingston 08. St. James 02. St. Andrew 09. Hanover 03. St. Thomas 10. Westmoreland 04. Portland 11. St. Elizabeth 05. St. Mary 12. Manchester 06. St. Ann 13. Clarendon 07. Trelawny 14. St. Catherine	JAMPARISH	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
CONSTITUENCY: _____	JAMCONSTIT	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

AREA: _____	AREA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
PSU (E.D)	PSU	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
CLUSTER _____	CLUSTER	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Household Numbers (See listing sheets)	SEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UR 1. Urban 2. Rural	UR	<input type="checkbox"/>
Area Size: 1. National Capital (Metropolitan area) 2. Large City 3. Medium City 4. Small City 5. Rural Area	SIZE	
Questionnaire language: (1) English	JAMDIOMA [IDIOMAQ]	1
Start time: ____:____ [Don't enter]		-----
Date Day: ____ Month:____ Year: 2006	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ OUT THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.

Q1. Sex (note down; do not ask): (1) Male (2) Female

Q1

A4 [COA4]. To begin with, in your opinion, what is the most serious problem the country faces?

A4

[DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ACCEPT ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]

Water, lack of	19	Inflation, high prices	02
Roads in poor condition	18	Politicians	59
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack of	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime, violence	05	Drug trafficking	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment, lack of job opportunities	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Popular protests (strikes, road, blocks, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Malnutrition	23	Health services, lack of provision	22

Forced displacement	32	Kidnapping	31
External debt	26	Security (lack of)	27
Discrimination	25	Terrorism	33
Drug addiction	11	Land to farm, lack of	07
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Transportation, problems of	60
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Violence	57
Electricity, lack of	24	Housing	55
Demographic explosion	20	Other	70
War against terrorism	17	Doesn't know	88

DEM13. In a few words, what does democracy mean to you? [NOTICE: DO NOT READ CHOICES. ACCEPT UP TO THREE ANSWERS. AFTER THE FIRST AND SECOND RESPONSE ASK, "DOES IT MEAN SOMETHING ELSE?"] .

	1 ^o Response DEM13A	Probe: Does it mean something else?	Probe: Does it mean something else?
		2 ^o Response DEM13B	3 ^o Response DEM13C
It does not have any meaning	0	0	0
Liberty:			
Liberty (without specifying what type)	1	1	1
Economic Liberty	2	2	2
Liberty of expression, voting, choice, and human rights	3	3	3
Liberty of movement	4	4	4
Liberty, lack of	5	5	5
Being independent	6	6	6
Economy:			
Well being, economic progress, growth	7	7	7
Well being, Lack of, no economic progress	8	8	8
Capitalism	9	9	9
Free trade, free business	10	10	10
Employment, more opportunities of	11	11	11
Employment, lack of	12	12	12
Voting:			
Right to choose leaders	13	13	13
Elections, voting	14	14	14
Free elections	15	15	15
Fraudulent elections	16	16	16
Equality:			
Equality (without specifying)	17	17	17
Economic equality, or equality of classes	18	18	18
Gender equality	19	19	19
Equality to the laws	20	20	20
Racial or ethnic equality	21	21	21
Equality, Lack of, inequality	22	22	22
Participation:			
Limitations of participation	23	23	23
Participation (without saying which type)	24	24	24
Participation of minorities	25	25	25
Power of the people	26	26	26
Rule of Law:			
Human Rights, respect rights	27	27	27
Disorder, lack of justice, corruption	28	28	28
Justice	29	29	29
Obey the law, less corruption	30	30	30
Non-military government	31	31	31
Live in peace, without war	32	32	32
War, invasions	33	33	33
Other answer	80	80	80
DK/NA	88	88	88
Code (if R gives only an answer, 13B and 13C are codified with 0. If he gives two answers, 13C is codified with 0. [If he gives only one answer, Mark it and Go to A1])	DEM13A <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13B <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	DEM13C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

<p>DEM13D. Of these meanings of democracy you have said, in your opinion, which is the most important? [ASK ONLY IF TWO OR THREE ANSWERS WERE GIVEN TO THE PREVIOUS QUESTION. WRITE THE ANSWER CODE.] 88. DK 99. NA</p>	DEM13D	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Now, changing the subject...**[After each question, repeat “every day”, “once or twice a week”, “rarely”, or “never” to help the respondent]**

How frequently do you ...	Every day	Once or twice a week	Rarely	Never	DK		
A1. Listen to the news on the radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1	
A2. Watch the news on TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2	
A3. Read the news in newspapers	1	2	3	4	8	A3	
A4i. Read the news on the Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i	

<p>SOCT1. Now, speaking of the economy... How would you describe the country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know</p>	SOCT1	
<p>SOCT2. Do you think that the country’s current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn’t know</p>	SOCT2	
<p>IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn’t know</p>	IDIO1	
<p>IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (8) Doesn’t know</p>	IDIO2	

Now, moving to a different topic...Sometimes, people and the communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and they request help from a government official or agency in order to solve them.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...?	Yes	No	DK/DR		
CP2. A Member of Parliament	1	2	8	CP2	
CP4A. Any local authorities (caretaker, parish	1	2	8	CP4A	

councilor)					
CP4. Any ministry, public institution or local government institution	1	2	8	CP4	

PROT1. Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or protest? Have you done it sometimes, almost never or never? [If the answer is “Never” or “DK”, Mark 9 in PROT2 and Go to CP5]	(1) Sometimes	(2) Almost never	(3) Never	(8) DK		PROT 1
PROT2. During last year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it sometimes, almost never or never?	(1) Sometimes	(2) Almost never	(3) Never	(8) DK	(9) N/A	PROT 2

<i>Now I am going to ask you a few questions about your community and the problems it faces.</i>	Yes	No	DK/DR	N/A	
CP5. In the past year, have you contributed or tried to contribute toward the solution of a problem in your community or in your neighbourhood? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [Go to CP6] (8) DK/DR [Go to CP6]	1	2	8		CP5
CP5A. Have you donated money or material to help address a problem in your community or in your neighbourhood?	1	2	8	9	CP5A
CP5B. Have you contributed with your own work or manual labour?	1	2	8	9	CP5B
CP5C. Have you been attending community meetings about some problem or improvement?	1	2	8	9	CP5C
CP5D. Have you tried to help organize a new group to resolve a neighbourhood problem or to bring about any improvement?	1	2	8	9	CP5D

Now I am going to read out a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” once or twice a year,” or “never” to help the respondent]**

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	
CP6. The meetings of any religious organization? You attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6

CP7. The meetings of a parents association at school? You attend them....	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. The meetings of a committee or council for community improvements? You attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. The meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? You attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. The meetings of a labour union? You attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. The meetings of a political party or movement? You attend them...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13

LS3. Changing the subject, in general, how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK	LS3
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IT1. Now, speaking of the people from this community, would you say that they are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy? (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK	IT1
--	------------

SHOW CARD # 1

L1. (Left-Right Scale) Now, changing the subject.... On this sheet there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Today, when we speak of political tendencies, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, and thinking of your own political tendency, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Left									Right	(DK=88)

NOTE: COLLECT CARD # 1

Now let's talk about your parish council	
NP1. Have you attended a function or other meeting organized by the parish councilor in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember	NP1

<p>NP1B. To what degree do you think parish councilors pay attention to what people ask for in such meetings? [Read options] (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Very little (4) Not at all (8) DK</p>	<p>NP1B</p>	
<p>NP2. Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or parish councilor of the parish council within the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/Doesn't remember</p>	<p>NP2</p>	
<p>SGL1. Would you say that the services the parish council is providing are ...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know</p>	<p>SGL1</p>	
<p>SGL2. How have they treated you or your neighbors when you have had dealings with the parish council? Have they treated you very well, well, neither well nor badly, badly or very badly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor badly (4) Badly (5) Very badly (8) Doesn't know</p>	<p>SGL2</p>	
<p>LGL2. . In your opinion, should the parish council be given more money and more responsibility or should the national government assume more responsibility and provide local services? (1) More money to the parish council (2) National government should assume greater responsibility (3) Nothing should change [do not read] (4) More to the parish council if it provides better services [do not read] (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't respond</p>	<p>LGL2</p>	
<p>LGL3. Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the parish council/local government so that it could provide better services, or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so? (1) Willing to pay more (2) Not worth it (8) Doesn't know</p>	<p>LGL3</p>	
<p>MUNI2. In your opinion what is the most serious problem at present in this parish council division? NOTE:[DON'T READ THE RESPONSES] [ACCEPT ONLY A SINGLE RESPONSE] (00) None [go to MUNI5] (01) Lack of water (02) Lack of road repair (03) Lack of security, delinquency (04) Lack of public sanitation (05) Lack of services (06) The economic situation, lack of funds, aid (10) Poor administration (11) Neglect of the environment (77) Other (88) DK/DR</p>	<p>MUNI2</p>	
<p>MUNI3. How much has the parish councilor done to solve this problem? [Read the options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) Nothing (8) DK (9) NA</p>	<p>MUNI3</p>	
<p>MUNI5. Have you ever participated in drafting the parish council's budget? (1) Yes, has participated (0) Has not participated (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>MUNI5</p>	
<p>MUNI6. How much confidence do you have that the parish councilor's office manages funds well? [Read the options] (3) A lot (2) Some (1) Little (0) None (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>MUNI6</p>	

MUNI8. Have you carried out any official dealings or requested any document at the parish council in the past year? (1) Yes [continue] (0) No [go to MUNI11] (8) DK/DR [Go to MUNI11]	MUNI8
MUNI9. How were you treated? [Read the options] (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) DK/DR (9) N/A	MUNI9
MUNI10. Did they resolve your problem or request? (1) Yes (0) No (8) DK/DR (9) N/A	MUNI10
MUNI11. How much influence do you think you have on what the parish council does? Would you say a lot, some, little, or no influence? 1. A lot 2. Some 3. Little 4. None 8. DK/DR	MUNI11
MUNI15. How interested do you think the parish councilor is in the people's participation in the work of the parish council? [Read options] (3) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (1) Little interested (0) Not at all interested (8) DK/DR	MUNI15

Now let's change the subject. Some people say that, in some circumstances, a military take-over through an overthrow of the government would be justified. In your opinion, would a military take over be justified in the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]**

JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over would be justified	(2) A military take-over would not be justified	(8) DK	JC1
JC4. When there are many social protests.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	JC4
JC10. When there is high crime.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	JC10
JC12. When there is high inflation, with excessive price rises.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	JC12
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) It would be justified	(2) It would not be justified	(8) DK	JC13

JC15. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for the Prime Ministers to close down the parliament, or do you think there can never be a sufficient reason to do so?	(1) Yes	(2) No	(8) DK	JC15
JC16. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds to dissolve the Supreme Court, or do you think that there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes	(2) No	(8) DK	JC16

<p>I am going to read out various statements. Taking into account the current situation of the country, I would like you to tell me with which of the following statements you most agree.</p> <p>POP1. [READ THE OPTIONS]</p> <p>1. It is necessary for the progress of the country that our Prime Ministers limit the voice and vote of the opposition parties, [or on the contrary],</p> <p>2. Even if they delay the progress of the country, our Prime Ministers should not limit the voice and vote of the opposition parties.</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p>POP1</p>	
<p>POP2. [READ THE OPTIONS]</p> <p>1. The Parliament slows down the work of our Prime Ministers, and should be ignored, [or on the contrary],</p> <p>2. Even when it hinders the work of the government, Our Prime Ministers cannot pass over the Parliament,</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p>POP2</p>	
<p>POP3. [READ THE OPTIONS]</p> <p>1. The judges frequently hinder the work of our Prime Ministers, and they should be ignored, [or on the contrary],</p> <p>2. Even when the judges sometimes hinder the work of our Prime Ministers, their decisions should always be obeyed.</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p>POP3</p>	
<p>POP4. [Read alternatives]</p> <p>1. Our Prime Ministers ought to have the necessary power to act in favour of the national interest, [or on the contrary],</p> <p>2. Our Prime Ministers' power ought to be limited so that our freedoms are not placed at risk.</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p>POP4</p>	
<p>POP5. [READ ALTERNATIVES]</p> <p>1. Our Prime Ministers ought to do what the people want, even if the laws would prevent them from doing so, [or on the contrary],</p> <p>2. Our Prime Ministers ought to obey the laws even if the people don't like it.</p> <p>8. DK/DR</p>	<p>POP5</p>	

<p>VIC1. Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [continue] (2) No [go to AOJ8] (8) DK [go to AOJ8]</p>	<p>VIC1</p>	
<p>VIC2. What kind of crime were you the victim of? [DON'T READ THE OPTIONS]</p> <p>(1) Robbery without physical aggression or threat</p> <p>(2) Robbery with physical aggression or threat</p> <p>(3) Physical aggression without robbery</p> <p>(4) Rape or sexual assault</p>	<p>VIC2</p>	

<p>(5) Kidnapping (6) Damage to property (7) Home burglary 77) Other (88) DK (99) N/A (was not a victim)</p>		
<p>AOJ1 Did you report the incident to any institution? (1) Yes [Skip to AOJ8] (2) Did not report it [continue] (8) DK/DR [skip to AOJ8] (9) N/A (was not a victim)[Skip to AOJ8]</p>		<p>AOJ1</p>
<p>AOJ1B. Why didn't you report the incident? [DON'T READ THE OPTIONS] (1) It doesn't serve any purpose (2) It is dangerous and for fear of reprisal (3) Didn't have any evidence (4) It wasn't serious (5) Didn't know where present the report (8) DK (9) N/A (Was not a victim)</p>		<p>AOJ1B</p>
<p>AOJ8. In order to capture criminals do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or occasionally, they can operate at the margin of the law? (1) They should always respect the law (2) Can operate at the margin of the law occasionally (8)DK</p>		<p>AOJ8</p>
<p>AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighbourhood where you live, and thinking of the possibility of falling victim to an assault or a robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? [Read the options] (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK</p>		<p>AOJ11</p>
<p>AOJ11A. And, speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? [Read the options] (1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) NS/NR</p>		<p>AOJ11A</p>
<p>AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty party? [Read the options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR</p>		<p>AOJ12</p>
<p>AOJ16A. In your neighbourhood, have you seen anyone selling drugs in the past year? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK</p>		<p>AOJ16A</p>
<p>AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighbourhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a great deal, somewhat, little or none? (1) A great deal (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK</p>		<p>AOJ17</p>

AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this neighbourhood (village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are the ones that are involved in crime. What do you think?
 (1) Police protects (2) Police involved in crime (8) DK

Regarding the official dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the following institutions at some time, do you feel very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied? **(REPEAT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS IN EACH QUESTION)**

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	[Don't read] Didn't have any official dealings	DK/DR	
ST1. The Police	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. The courts	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. The Office of the Public Defender	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3
ST4. The Parish Council	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

[GIVE CARD "A" TO THE RESPONDENT]

Now we will use a card...This card has a 7-point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like watching television, if you do not like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, on the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Ensure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all				A lot			Doesn't know

	Note down a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know
B1. To what extent do you think the courts of justice in Jamaica guarantee a fair trial? (Probe: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose the number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose the number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)	B1
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Jamaica?	B2
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Jamaica?	B3

	Note down a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Jamaica?	B4
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Jamaica?	B6
B10A. To what extent do you trust the system of justice?	B10A
B11. To what extent do you trust the Electoral Office?	B11
B12. To what extent do you trust the Army?	B12
B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?	B13
B14. To what extent do you trust the Central Government?	B14
B15. To what extent do you trust the Public Defender's Office?	B15
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?	B18
B20. To what extent do you trust the Church?	B20
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?	B21
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?	B31
B32. To what extent do you trust the Parish councilor's office of your parish?	B32
B43. To what extent are you proud of being Jamaican?	B43
B16. To what extent do you trust the Attorney General?	B16
B19. To what extent do you trust the Office of the Auditor General?	B19
B37. To what extent do you trust the media?	B37
B42. To what extent do you trust the tax office?	B42
B47. To what extent do you trust the elections?	B47

Now, using card "A", please answer the following questions

Now, on the same scale, (<i>continue with card A: 1-7 point scale</i>)	Note down 1-7, 8 = DK
N1. To what extent would you say the current Government combats poverty?	N1
N3. To what extent would you say the current Government promotes and protects democratic principles?	N3
N9. To what extent would you say the current Government combats government corruption?	N9

Now, on the same scale, (<i>continue with card A: 1-7 point scale</i>)	Note down 1-7, 8 = DK	
N10. To what extent would you say the current Government protects human rights?		N10
N11. To what extent would you say the current Government improves citizen security?		N11
N12. To what extent would you say the current Government combats unemployment?		N12

[COLLECT CARD A]

M1. Speaking in general of the current government, would you say that the work being done by PNP government is: READ OPTIONS (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/DR	M1
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[Give card B]: Now we will use a similar card, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” I am going to read out various statements and I would like you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Strongly disagree						Strongly	Doesn't know
agree							

Note down a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don't know

ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	ING4
PN2. Despite our differences, we Jamaicans have many things that unite us as a country. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	PN2
DEM23. There can be democracy without political parties. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	DEM23

COLLECT CARD B

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way in which democracy works in Jamaica? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR	PN4
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PN5. In your opinion, is Jamaica very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?
 (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic
 (4) Not at all democratic (8) DK/DR

PN5

[GIVE THE RESPONDENT CARD “C”]
 Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point scale, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly would you approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve					Doesn't know

	1-10, 88	
E5. That people participate in legal demonstrations.		E5
E8. That people participate in an organization or group to try to address community problems.		E8
E11. That people work on electoral campaigns for a political party or candidate.		E11
E15. That people participate in the closing or blocking of roads.		E15
E14. That people squat on other people's property.		E14
E2. That people take control over factories, offices and other buildings.		E2
E3. That people participate in a group wanting to carry out a violent overthrow of an elected government.		E3
E16. That people take the law into their own hands when the State does not punish criminals.		E16

[DON'T COLLECT CARD “C”]

Now we are going to talk about some actions the State can take. We will continue using a 1-10 scale. Please use card C again. On this scale, 1 means strongly disapprove and 10 means strongly approve.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove								Strongly approve		Doesn't know

	1-10, 88
D32. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting public protest?	D32
D33. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of a law prohibiting the meetings of any group that criticizes the Jamaican political system?	D33
D34. To what extent would you approve or disapprove if the government decided which television programs can be viewed?	D34
D36. To what extent would you approve or disapprove if the government decided which books are allowed in public school libraries?	D36
D37. To what extent would you approve or disapprove if the government banned any media that criticized it?	D37

The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in Jamaica. Please continue using the 10-point scale [card C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve					Doesn't know

	1-10, 88
D1. There are people who speak negatively of the Jamaican form of government, not just the current government but the form of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale: <i>[Probe: To what extent?]</i>	D1
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	D2
D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to seek public office ?	D3
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people going on television to make speeches ?	D4
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to seek public office?	D5

COLLECT CARD "C"

<p>DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree the most: (1) To people like me, it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic. (2) Democracy is preferable to any other type of government (3) In some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>DEM2</p>	
<p>DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation? (1) Iron fist (2) Participation for all (8) Doesn't respond</p>	<p>DEM11</p>	

<p>AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected by the vote. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, that is, the popular vote, is always the best. What do you think? [Read] (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected (2) Electoral democracy is the best (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>AUT1</p>	
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<p>PP1. During elections, some people try to convince others to vote for some party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? [read the options] (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>PP1</p>	
<p>PP2. There are persons who work for some party or candidate during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2002? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>PP2</p>	

<p>Please tell me if you consider the following actions as 1) corrupt and liable to be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; 3) not corrupt.</p>		
<p>DC1. For example: A Member of Parliament accepts a bribe of ten thousand dollars from a company. Do you think that what the M.P. did is [Read the options]: 1) Corrupt and should be punished 2) Corrupt but justified 3) Not corrupt DK=8</p>	<p>DC1</p>	
<p>DC10. A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to waste time waiting, she pays a bribe of \$5,000 to an official. Do you think that what the woman did is [Read the options]: 1) Corrupt and should be punished 2) Corrupt but justified 3) Not corrupt DK=8</p>	<p>DC10</p>	

<p>DC13. An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the politician is [Read the options]:</p> <p>1) Corrupt and should be punished 2) Corrupt but justified 3) Not corrupt DK=8</p>	DC13
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	No	Yes	DK	N/A	
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in life...					
EXC2. Did any police official ask you for bribe during the last year?	0	1	8		EXC2
EXC6. During the last year, did any public official ask you for a bribe?	0	1	8		EXC6
EXC11. During the last year, did you have any official dealings with in the parish council? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: During the last year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	0	1	8	9	EXC11
EXC13. Are you currently employed? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: At your workplace, did anyone ask you for an inappropriate payment during the last year?	0	1	8	9	EXC13
EXC14. During the last year, did you have any business in the courts? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to give a bribe at the courts during the last year?	0	1	8	9	EXC14
EXC15. Did you use the public health services during the last year? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: In order to be assisted in a hospital or a clinic during the last year, did you have to give a bribe?	0	1	8	9	EXC15
EXC16. Did you have a child in school during the last year? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to give a bribe at school during the last year?	0	1	8	9	EXC16
EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity cut off?	0	1	8		EXC17
EXC18. Do you think that the way things are, sometimes giving a bribe is justified?	0	1	8		EXC18

	No	Yes	DK	N/A	
EXC19. Do you think that, in our society, giving bribes is justified because of the poor public services or do you think it is not justified?	(0)	(1)	(8)		EXC19

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) very common, (2) common, (3) uncommon, or (4) very uncommon? (8) DK/DR					EXC7
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Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is transmitted to the people...					
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States? [Don't read, George Bush] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					GI1
GI2. What is the name of the Prime Minister of Jamaica? [Don't read: Portia Simpson Miller] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					GI2
GI3. How many constituencies does Jamaica have? [Don't read: 60] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					GI3
GI4. How long is the government's term of office in Jamaica? [Don't read: 5 years] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					GI4
GI5. What is the name of the president of Brazil? [Don't read, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, also accept "Lula"] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer					GI5

<p>VB1. Are you registered to vote? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (8) DK</p>	<p>VB1</p>	
<p>VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections? (1) Voted [<i>continue</i>] (2) Did not vote [<i>go to VB4</i>] (8) DK [<i>go to VB6</i>]</p>	<p>VB2</p>	
<p>JAMVB3 [VB3]. For which party did you vote for Member of Parliament in the last general elections? [DON'T READ THE LIST] 0.None (Blank ballot or vote canceled) 1. PNP 2.JLP 3.NDM 77. Other 88. Doesn't know [<i>go to VB8</i>] 99. N/A (didn't vote) (After this question, Go to VB8)</p>	<p>JAMVB3</p>	
<p>VB4. [Only for those who did not vote] [Do not read the options] Why did you not vote in the last general elections? [Note down only a single response] 1 Lack of transport 2 Sickness 3 Lack of interest 4 Didn't like any candidate 5 Doesn't believe in the system 6 Lack of an identity card 7 Was not located in the electoral rolls 10 Was below the voting age 11 Arrived late and polling station was closed 12 Had to work/Lack of time 13. Physical incapacity or handicap 14. Other reason (88) DK/DR (99) N/A (Voted) [After this question, go toVB6]</p>	<p>VB4</p>	
<p>VB8. [For those who voted] When you voted, which of the following three reasons was the most important reason for your vote? [Read all] [Only accept one answer] (1) The qualities of the candidate (2) The political party of the candidate (3) The plan of government of the candidate (8) DK (9) NA (Didn't vote)</p>	<p>VB8</p>	
<p>VB6. Did you vote in the last Parish Councilor elections? 1. Yes [<i>Continue</i>] 2. No. [<i>Go to VB10</i>] 8. DK [<i>Go to VB10</i>]</p>	<p>VB6</p>	
<p>JAMVB7. For which party did you vote for Parish councilor in the last elections? 0.None (Blank ballot or vote canceled) 1. PNP 2.JLP</p>	<p>JAMVB7</p>	

3.NDM 77. Other 88. Doesn't know 99. N/A (didn't vote)			
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VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes (2) No [Go to POL1] (8) DK [Go to Pol1]	VB10	
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JAMVB11. Which political party do you identify with? [Don't read the list] 1. PNP 2. JLP 3. NDM 77 Other 88. DK 99. NA	JAMVB11	
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POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? 1) A lot 2) Some 3) Little 4) None 8) DK	POL1	
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POL2. How often do you discuss politics with other people? (Read the options) 1) Daily 2) A few times a week 3) A few times a month 4) Rarely 5) Never 8) DK	POL2	
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USE CARD "B" AGAIN.

Now we are going to talk about some attitudes that people have. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means strongly disagree and 7 means strongly agree , to what extent do you agree with the following statements?	Scale						DK/ DR	
	Strongly disagree					Strongly agree		
AA1. A very effective way of correcting employee's mistakes is to reprimand them in front of other employees. To what extent do you agree with this practice?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	AA1
AA2. The person who contributes most money to the home is the one who should have the final word in household decisions. To what extent do you agree?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	AA2
AA3. At school, children should ask questions only when the teacher allows it. To what extent do you agree?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	AA3
AA4. When children behave badly, the parents are occasionally justified in giving them a spanking.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	AA4

COLLECT CARD "B"

Now, moving to a different topic...

Have you ever felt discriminated against or treated in an unjust manner because of your physical appearance or the way you talk in any of the following places?

DIS2: In governmental offices (courts, ministries, conference centre etc) 1) Yes 2) No 8) DK/NA	DIS2	
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DIS3: When you looked for a job in a company or business 1) Yes 2) No 8) DK/NA 9) N/A	DIS3
DIS4: In meetings or social events 1) Yes 2) No 8) DK/NA	DIS4
DIS5: In public places (in the street, market, commercial or business place) 1) Yes 2) No 8) DK/NA	DIS5

Now, I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes.

ED. What was the last year of education you completed?

_____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university) = _____ total number of years
[Use the table below for the code]

	1	2	3	4	5	6	
None	0						ED
Primary/Preparatory	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secondary	7	8	9	10	11		
5th form	12	13					
University/Tertiary	14	15	16	17	18+		
Doesn't know/Doesn't respond	88						

Q2. What is your age? _____ years	Q2	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Q3. What is your denomination? [don't read options] (1) Catholic (2) Non-Catholic Christian (including the Jehovah Witnesses) (3) Other non-Christian (5) Evangelical (4) None (8) Doesn't know or doesn't want to say	Q3		

<p>[Show the list of ranges on Card E] Q10. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? (00) No income (01) Less than \$5,000 (02) \$5,001- \$10,000 (03) \$10,001- \$20,000 (04) \$20,001- \$30,000 (05) \$30,001- \$45,000 (06) \$45,001- \$60,000 (07) \$60,001 - \$80,000 (08) \$80,001 - \$150,000 (09) \$150,001-\$250,000 (10) \$250,001 and above (88) DK/DR COLLECT CARD E</p>	<p>Q10</p>	
<p>Q10A. Does your family receive remittances from abroad? If “No→ Mark 99, Go to Q10C 99. N/A If “Yes” →Ask: How much per month? (use the codes of question Q10 if answer the amount in national currency; if answer the amount in foreign currency, write down the amount and specify the currency)_____</p>	<p>Q10A</p>	
<p>Q10B. To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from abroad? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/NA (9) N/A</p>	<p>Q10B</p>	
<p>Q10C. Do you have close relatives who lived before in this household and are now living abroad? [If answer “Yes”, Ask where] (1) Yes, in the United States only (2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries (3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States) (4) No (8) DK/DR</p>		
<p>Q14. Do you have any intentions to go to live or work in another country in the next three years? 1) Yes 2) No 8) DK/DR</p>	<p>Q14</p>	
<p>Q10D. The salary that you receive and the total family income [Read the options]: 1) Is enough, you can save 2) Is just enough, you can not save 3) Is not enough, you can not pay your bills 4) Is not enough, you can not cover your basic needs 8) [DON'T READ THIS OPTION] DK/DR</p>	<p>Q10D</p>	
<p>Q11. What is your marital status? [DON'T READ OPTIONS] (1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>Q11</p>	

Q12. How many children do you have? _____ (0 = none) **Q12**
 DK.....8

JAMETID. Do you consider yourself, black, chinese, mixed, white or of another race?
 (1) White (2) Chinese (3) Indian (4) Black (5) Mixed
 (6) Other (8) DK/DR **JAMETID**

JAMETIDA. Do you think your mother is or was White, Chinese, Indian, Black or Mixed?
 (1)White (2) Chinese (3)Indian [(4)Black [(5)Mixed (6)Other
 (8)DK/DR **JAMETIDA**

JAMLENG1. What language have you spoken at home since childhood? **JAMLENG1**
(ACCEPT ONLY ONE OPTION)
 (1) English only 2) Patois only 3) Both (English and Patois) (4)
 Other (8) DK/DR

To conclude with the interview, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[READ OUT ALL ITEMS]**

R1. Television set	(0) No	(1) Yes	R1		
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	R3		
R4. Land line (Conventional telephone)	(0) No	(1) Yes	R4		
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	R4A		
R5. Vehicle	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	R5
R6. Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	R6		
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	R7		
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	R8		
R12. Drinking water indoors	(0) No	(1) Yes	R12		
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	R14		
R15. Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes	R15		

<p>OCUP1. What is your main occupation? [Don't read the options; if answer that doesn't have a job or unemployed, ask what was his/her prior job (note code) and mark "No" in the following question (OCUP4)]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Professional, manager 2. Technician 3. Office worker 4. Sales person 5. Farmer 6. Farmhand 7. Handicraft worker 8. Domestic servant 9. Other services 10. Skilled worker 11. Unskilled worker 12. Student [Go to MIG1] 13. Housewife [Go to MIG1] 14. Retired/with independent means [Go to MIG1] 88. DK/DR 	<p>OCUP1</p>	<p><input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/></p>
<p>OCUP4. Are you currently working?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes [Continue] 2. No [Go to DESOC2] 8. DK/DR [Go to MIG1] 	<p>OCUP4</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A salaried employee of the government? 2. A salaried employee in the private sector? 3. Owner or partner in a business? 4. Self-employed? 5. Unpaid worker? 8. DK/DR 9. N/A 	<p>OCUP1A</p>	
<p>OCUP1B1. Besides you, how many employees are there in the place where you work? [Read the options]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Less than 5 employees (2) 5 to 9 employees (3) 10 to 19 employees (4) 20 to 100 employees (5) More than 100 employees (8) DK/DR (9) N/A 	<p>OCUP1B1</p>	
<p>OCUP1C. Do you have [health] insurance?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 8. DK/DR 9. N/A 	<p>OCUP1C</p>	

DESOC2. [ONLY IF ANSWER 'NO' GO TO OCUP4] =>For how many weeks during the last year were you unemployed? _____ weeks (8) DK (9) N/A	DESOC2	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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MIG1. During your childhood, where did you live mainly? In the country? In a town? Or in a city?: 1.In the country 2.In a town 3.In a city 8. DK/DR	MIG1	
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MIG2. Five years ago, where did you live? [Read options] 1. In the same parish council [Go to TI] 2. In another parish council in the country [Continue] 3. In another country [Go to TI] 8. DK/DR [Go to TI]	MIG2	
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MIG3. The place where you lived 5 years ago was: 1) A town or city smaller than this one (2) A town or city larger than this one (3) A town or city like this one (8) DK (9) NA (did not migrate)	MIG4	
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Time interview ended _____ : _____ TI. Duration of interview <i>[minutes, see page # 1]</i> _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature _____ *Date* ____ / ____ / ____


Field supervisor's signature _____

Comments:


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Signature of the person who verified the data _____


Card # 1



Card "A"



Card "B"



Card "C"

**Strongly
approve**

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

**Strongly
disapprove**

1

Card E

- (00) No income**
- (01) Less than \$5,000**
- (02) \$5,001- \$10,000**
- (03) \$10,001- \$20,000**
- (04) \$20,001- \$30,000**
- (05) \$30,001- \$45,000**
- (06) \$45,001- \$60,000**
- (07) \$60,001 - \$80,000**
- (08) \$80,001 - \$150,000**
- (09) \$150, 000 to \$249,999**
- (10) \$250,000 and above**
- (88) DK/DR**