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

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Volume IV

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2014-2015

Funding for significant portions of the AmericasBarometer project has come from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support for the AmericasBarometer also include the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme, and Vanderbilt University. Insights reports are solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other funding institution.

Foreword

The LAPOP *Insights* series was developed in 2008 as a means to disseminate short reports on key findings from the AmericasBarometer to audiences across the Americas and beyond.

The series publishes original research by LAPOP team members and affiliates on various topics such as crime, corruption, civic engagement, gender violence, and tolerance.

The series also serves as a capacity-building platform: while working with LAPOP faculty and senior staff through the report production process, contributors hone skills related to the application of rigorous approaches to the analysis of survey data and to writing reports that are accessible to non-experts in the methods used or subjects covered.

The *Insights* series contains two main types of reports: "standard" reports (2008-present), which act as policy and/or issue briefs on a particular topic, and "topical" reports (2013-present), which are short analyses that dialogue with a current event or development in the region. Each report is published in Spanish and English, and when appropriate, Portuguese.

LAPOP distributes e-versions of the *Insights* reports via Twitter, Facebook, its website, and an opt-in subscriber email listserv. The opt-in *Insights* listserv distribution list consists of over 2,000 individuals; LAPOP's Twitter account is followed by over 3,000 individuals, and LAPOP's *Insights* webpages are viewed approximately 10,000 times per year. The reports are frequently cited in the news and are used as a resource by scholars, analysts, practitioners, and policymakers throughout the hemisphere.

In this volume we offer a compilation of the LAPOP *Insights* reports that were published from 2014 to 2015.

Liz Zechmeister, Ph.D.
Director of LAPOP
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, TN
March, 2016.

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Violence and Migration in Central America

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Executive Summary. Over the past decade, much of Central America has been devastated by alarming increases in crime and violence. For most of this timeframe, migration from many of these same countries to the United States increased as well, at least until the 2008 financial crisis deflated migration numbers. In the following *Insights* report, we examine the possible relationship between high levels of violence and Central Americans' migration intentions. Though conventional views of the motivations behind migration tend to highlight economic and familial factors as the principal causes of migration, we find that crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity among Central Americans also play a significant role in determining the extent to which an individual considers migration as a viable strategy. Nonetheless, in the face of consistently high levels of crime and violence, perceptions of insecurity among Central Americans over the past ten years have been declining, suggesting perhaps a populace that has become accustomed to a high crime context and thus one less inclined to let crime influence future migration patterns.

The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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Homicide rates, and crime more generally, have been on a tragically steady rise across much of Central America over the past several years. With the increasing presence of drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and the proliferation of street gangs, citizen security in countries like Honduras and El Salvador has evaporated.

In this *Insights* report we examine one potential consequence of these increased levels of crime and violence – migration.[1] Through analysis of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey data[2], we examine whether fear of crime and crime victimization seems to be driving some Central Americans to seek a better life in another country. Given the role of criminal organizations in fueling much of the violence, and the pervasive corruption that tends to accompany these criminal organizations, we also examine the linkages between perceptions of corruption, as well as personal experiences with corrupt officials, and intentions to migrate.

Figure 1. Intentional homicide rate per 100,000 population (2000-2011)



Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "UNODC Homicide Statistics." <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html>

Crime, Violence and Migration in Central America

As evident in Figure 1, violent crime in Central America, and Honduras and El Salvador in particular, has reached unprecedented levels. At the same time, the past ten years has also witnessed an equally significant rise in migration rates for many of these same countries. In fact, the number of Central American migrants to the U.S. between 2000 and 2010 increased over 50 percent, faster than any other migrant-sending region in Latin America (Stoney and Batalova 2013). This overall increase occurred despite a drop in migration rates following the 2008 global financial crisis, which greatly diminished the level of demand for migrant labor in the U.S. market.

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php

[2] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

Many observers have posited a connection between Central America's rising crime rates and the significant outflow of migrants from the region. A recent report in *The Guardian* claims that "[e]xtreme violence in Central America is sending a surge of refugees fleeing north to Mexico" and likens this "exodus" to that of citizens fleeing a civil war (Tuckman 2013). More rigorous work on this question also finds a significant effect for violence and political instability on migration in cases such as Nicaragua during the Contra war (Lundquist and Massey 2005) and Guatemala during the height of its civil war (Morrison and May 1994). Indeed, currently the leading migrant-sending countries in the region, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, are also those confronting the highest levels of crime and violence. All of these countries, however, also have pre--established migration networks, making unclear the precise connection between crime, violence, and the migration decision.

Through analysis of AmericasBarometer survey data from 2004 through 2012, we attempt to clarify the relationship between crime and migration after taking into account the more conventional predictors of migration such as age, gender, income, and one's level of connectedness to a migration network.[3]

Figure 2. Migration Intentions, Crime Victimization and Perception of Insecurity in Central America



Of particular interest for understanding the impact of crime on Central American migration rates is the degree to which being a victim of crime versus simply feeling unsafe in one's neighborhood leads to migration. For while the number of those directly affected by crime in Central America is staggering, there are even greater numbers of Central Americans who feel unsafe in their neighborhoods even though they may not have been personally victimized by crime. Therefore, identifying the relative impact each factor has on migration becomes essential for a complete assessment of crime's impact on regional migration patterns.

[3] In addition to the extensive work on the causes of migration by such scholars as Massey, et al. (2005), Arnold, et al. (2011) explore this question in a previous issue of *Insights*.

In order to explore these linkages, we analyze responses to the following AmericasBarometer item that has been asked in each survey since 2004:

Q14: Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?

As Figure 2 illustrates, the percentage of Central Americans who reported such intentions was quite steady from 2004 through 2008, hovering around 22%. Migration intentions have declined steadily since 2008, however, falling to just under 15 percent in 2012. Such a drop is consistent with reports of widespread declines in migration rates across Mexico and Central America following the onset of the 2008-09 global financial crisis that greatly diminished the level of demand for migrant labor in the U.S. market.

Figure 3. Migration Intentions, Perception of Insecurity and Crime Victimization in Central America, 2012



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2012

Interestingly enough, Figure 2 also reveals an even sharper decline in feelings of insecurity among Central Americans in recent years, with a drop of close to 15 percentage points between 2004 and 2012 despite the rising levels of actual crime and violence during this time. Crime victimization, meanwhile, though dipping slightly between 2010 and 2012, remained several points higher than it was in 2004, mapping more closely to the homicide data revealed in Figure 1.

Delving deeper into these cross-time patterns we find that El Salvador is the only country where fear of crime remained steady from 2004-2012, with roughly 42% of respondents stating that they felt insecure in their neighborhoods. In all the other countries, fear of crime declined over this time period, even in Honduras, the country that witnessed the sharpest increase in homicides.[4] These contrasting trends of actual and perceived levels of insecurity suggest that Central Americans may have become increasingly desensitized to

[4] In 2004, 36.6% of Honduran respondents reported feeling insecure in their neighborhoods, yet in 2012 this percentage had dropped to 23%.

high levels of crime, or made behavioral adjustments in their daily lives to avoid victimization, and thus are now less likely to feel unsafe in their neighborhoods.

The question these contrasting trends of violence and perceived insecurity raises for this report is the extent to which either, or both, help explain current and future migration patterns across Central America. As we see in Figure 3, in some countries there does appear to be a connection between levels of perceived insecurity and migration intentions. Respondents in El Salvador, for example, were most likely to report feeling unsafe in their neighborhood in 2012 and also the most likely to report having intentions to migrate. El Salvador, though, is a country with an extensive migration history so it is unclear whether this high level of insecurity is in fact causally related to the equally high level of migration intentions.

Conversely, notwithstanding the country's unprecedented levels of violence, individuals in Honduras were among the least likely of Central American respondents to report feeling unsafe in their neighborhood and also ranked very low in reported migration intentions.[5] At this aggregate level, though, personal victimization is also strongly correlated with intentions to migrate, suggesting again that both of these crime-related factors may be at work in pushing at least some percentage of Central Americans to consider leaving their native country. To further explore these patterns, though, we must turn to a multivariate analysis of the individual-level determinants of migration intentions among Central Americans.

Modeling Crime's Impact on Migration

In order to effectively identify the unique effects of crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity on Central Americans' migration intentions, we first must incorporate a series of control variables that should theoretically also be associated with one's migration intentions. An abundance of research on the determinants of actual migration has identified two groups of factors that most help distinguish those who migrate from those who do not (e.g., Massey, et al. 2005).

The first, and perhaps most intuitive, are socioeconomic and demographic identifiers of migrants. These include such factors as age, gender, income, and education levels, along with an individual's views of her personal and the national economic situation. We therefore include variables in the following model designed to capture these factors.[6]

[5] The Pearson's correlation between fear of crime and intentions to migrate is .103 (p<..001).

[6] The model also includes country dummy variables. See appendix for the full results from the model.

A second group of predictors of migration concerns an individual's ties with an active migration network. Typically referred to as the "friends and family effect" (Massey, et al. 2005), those individuals who have migrant friends or relatives already living abroad, and particularly those who receive remittances from those friends or relatives, will be far more likely to migrate themselves because such ties reduce the costs of migration. This reduction in cost not only includes the financial help remittances may provide a potential migrant, but also the informational advantages she may get from knowing individuals that have already established themselves in the destination country. In order to model this "friends and family effect" then, we include an item that indicates whether or not a respondent receives remittances as a proxy for a high level of involvement in a migration network. Our expectations for these controls are in line with research that identifies those most likely to migrate as young males with relatively high levels of education and income, as well as those who have existing connections to a migration network.

Of central concern for this report, however, is the impact that high levels of crime have on an individual's migration decision. Here we include a series of variables designed to capture a range of possible effects crime may have on migration. First, we use an item that asked respondents whether they had been victimized by any type of crime in the previous twelve months. The expectation here is clear – all else equal, a respondent who has been victimized will be more likely to consider leaving her country. Similarly, an individual who feels very unsafe when going about her daily life should also be more likely to consider migrating. In order to test this proposition, we include an item that asked respondents to assess how safe they feel in their neighborhood on a 1-4 scale. Finally, we included an item that asked respondents to evaluate their government's anti-crime efforts, expecting that those who do not have much confidence in their government's ability to address the country's crime problem will be more likely to consider migration as well.

Another facet of Central America's crime wave in recent years has been the

Figure 4. Factors explaining migration intentions in Central America, 2012



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2012

consequent increase in corruption, particularly in those countries where drug trafficking organizations have established a presence. Thus citizens may consider high levels of corruption to be at least in part a by-product of the high levels of crime, suggesting that we examine the impact of corruption on the migration decision as well.

To do this, we include an item similar to the "crime victimization" measure that asks respondents whether they had been asked for a bribe in the previous twelve months by a public official. Such concrete evidence of corruption should lead individuals to give greater consideration to migration as a viable life plan in the future. We also include respondents' perceptions of corruption in government, again expecting higher levels of perceived corruption to make someone more likely to consider leaving the country altogether.

> Both crime and corruption victimization are significant predictors of migration intentions suggesting the crime wave in Central America will continue to contribute to

The results of our binary logistic regression model of migration intentions appear in Figure 4. Immediately evident is the significant impact that being a victim of crime and corruption has on the probability an individual will plan to migrate in the near future. The effects for both of these victimization items on migration intentions significantly outweigh the impact the "perceptions" items have. Though higher feelings of insecurity do have a marginally significant effect on the migration decision, this impact is decidedly less than either of the "victimization" items. What these findings suggest, then, is that victims of the current crime wave, as well as those victimized by the pervasive corruption that has accompanied the crime wave, are increasingly likely to consider migration as a viable means of escape from their current situation.

In comparing these individual-level results to the aggregate patterns displayed in Figure 3, we see that countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala seem to support the central finding that crime and insecurity lead individuals to consider emigration. Conversely, when we look at countries like Honduras, with high levels of crime victimization but relatively low levels migration intentions; or Costa Rica where close to a third of respondents reported feelings of insecurity but only 10 percent had plans to migrate, other factors seem to be at play that are diluting the crime-migration relationship.

The individual-level results also find support in the behavior of the control variables included in the model. The powerful effect that receiving

remittances has on the probability of planning to migrate, along with the age and gender profile of the likely migrant, all suggest that our dependent variable, migration intentions, serves as an adequate proxy for migration itself, despite not measuring actual behavior.

Conclusion

In this brief report we have explored the possibility that Central America's recent crime wave has contributed to a growing number of emigrants from the region. More specifically, we investigate whether being victimized by crime or corruption, having strong feelings of insecurity, or both increase the probability an individual will seek to leave her country of origin.

We find that both actual victimization as well as fear of crime are significantly linked to intentions to migrate, although firsthand experience with crime is far more important. Likewise, personal experience with corruption significantly increases the probability that an individual will contemplate leaving his country, but overall perceptions of corruption levels in the country yielded no impact. These findings indicate that in addition to its other tragic consequences, the crime wave currently affecting much of Central America seems also to be contributing to a larger pool of people looking to exit the country.

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Appendix

Table 1. Migration Intentions

	Coefficients	*(t)*
Evaluations of Government Handling of Citizen Security	0.047	(1.21)
Corruption Victimization	0.209*	(6.36)
Perception of Corruption	0.034	(1.01)
Crime Victimization	0.167*	(5.36)
Perception of Insecurity	0.088*	(2.43)
Wealth	-0.014	(-0.29)
Remittance Recipient	0.285*	(9.73)
30-45 years old	0.383*	(8.04)
16-29 years old	0.692*	(14.54)
Years of Education	0.082	(1.72)
Female	-0.183*	(-5.40)
Perceptions of national economic situation	-0.144*	(-3.45)
Perceptions of personal economic situation	-0.109*	(-2.73)
Big city	-0.053	(-1.12)
Medium city	-0.049	(-0.95)
Small city	-0.049	(-1.15)
Rural Area	-0.113*	(-1.99)
Guatemala	0.070	(1.30)
El Salvador	0.240*	(4.00)
Honduras	-0.041	(-0.68)
Nicaragua	0.250*	(4.22)
Panama	-0.193*	(-2.69)
Constant	-2.092*	(-44.39)
F	32.78	
Number of Obs.	8243	

Note: Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<0.05 two-tailed.
Country of Reference: Costa Rica

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Number 102

State Capacity and Democratic Governance in Latin America: A Survey Data-Based Approach to Measurement and Assessment

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Executive Summary. State capacity is a fundamental pre-condition for democratic governance. Without capable institutions, citizens' civil, political, and social rights cannot be realized. In this *Insights* report we demonstrate how data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer can be used to compute and analyze state capacity in Latin America, with a special focus on the cases of Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica for which a more comprehensive series of survey items is available. The results suggest that Latin American states display significant levels of variance in state capacity from cross-national, within-country, and functional perspectives. A subset of the observed patterns run counter established assumptions, with important implications for both policy makers and for areas to focus in future research.

The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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The 2004 UNDP report was not alone in highlighting the "urgency" of the problem of weak and ineffective state institutions in Latin America. Social scientists have recurrently pointed to such deficits as a characteristic trait of Latin American societies, pointing to the highly uneven and ineffective capacity of the state as one of the region's most vexing obstacles in the current era of democratic regimes (see e.g., O'Donnell 1993; Centeno 2002; López-Alves 2000; PNUD 2004; Rotberg 2003, 2007). Weak state capacities have been identified as a root cause of political turmoil, de-institutionalization, and low levels of socioeconomic development (see e.g., Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro 2006; UNDP 2004). In sum, a functioning and sovereign state is a fundamental prerequisite for the realization of democratic citizenship. For these reasons, a diagnosis of democratic governance that is blind to the characteristics and capacity of state institutions is at best incomplete. In this *Insights*[1] report we demonstrate how measures from the 2012 Americas-Barometer[2] can be used to proxy state strength and territorial reach in Latin America. Through this approach we identify important cross-national and sub-national variations in state capacity across the Latin American region.

The practice of conceptualizing states' strength and territorial reach is contested (see e.g. RCP 2012). In this report, we follow Soifer's (2012) strategy in operationalizing the concept (yet, our approach also taps into the relevant dimensions identified by Giraudy 2012 and Kurtz & Schrank 2012, among others). Soifer identifies three dimensions that together define state capacity: a state's coercive capacity, a state's infrastructural capacity, and a state's extractive capacity. Although not explicitly developed to measure these three dimensions, items introduced in the AmericasBarometer's 2012 questionnaire provide proxies that allow for a preliminary comparative analysis of the region's states, on the basis of their coercive and infrastructural capacities.

Figure 1. Comparative State Infrastructural and Coercive Capacity Index



Three additional items available for the cases of Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica then enable us to implement a broader operationalization of the concept, including two additional measures of a state's coercive and infrastructural capacity, and one that taps states' relative extractive capacity. The six items analyzed in this *Insights* Report are displayed in Box 1.

In offering this survey-based approach to measuring state capacity, we hope to add to ongoing efforts to push forward research on this important topic. State capacity has proven difficult to measure in a systematic and reliable way across multiple countries. On the one hand, the quality of government-produced data

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php

[2] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

(which is often used as a proxy for different dimensions of state strength) is itself contingent on states' differential capacity to produce reliable data. On the other hand, an assessment of a state's territorial reach almost by definition needs to be based on data that is available at low levels of territorial aggregation. In this *Insights* Report, we report the initial findings of this new approach to measuring state capacity, relying on a series of indicators from the 2012 AmericasBarometer database, that help overcome these problems.[3]

We begin with a state's coercive capacity. Here we rely on the AmericasBarometer crime and corruption victimization indicators. The underlying assumption of this measure is that lower levels of crime and corruption should be associated with higher levels of state coercive capacity. For the cases of Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica,we complement those two indicators with a third: citizens' willingness to officially report a robbery to the police. This indicator taps the level of confidence one has in the capacity of state officials to enforce the rule of law in their society.

In order to assess a state's infrastructural capacity,we use a single indicator: the percentage of respondents in each country that reported having been issued a national identification card (or a voter-registration card in the Central American cases). Though certainly not designed as a measure of infrastructural capacity, this item offers an indication of how effective the state is in ensuring widespread distribution of this vital official document. In the more detailed analysis of Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, we complement this measure with a second that also seeks to gauge the infrastructural reach of the state by calculating the distance between the closest public school and each respondent's household. Here again, this measure offers us an indication of how comprehensive the state's presence is across its territory.

[3] Specifically, survey data are not endogenous to state capacity and can be assessed at the sub-national level.

Box 1. State Capacity Indicators

VIC1EXT. Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

CORVIC. Index of Corruption Victimization created as a dummy where 1 means that the respondent was asked for or paid a bribe, answering yes to any of the following questions: EXC2, EXC6, EXC11, EXC13, EXC14, EXC15, EXC16 or EXC20.

INF1. Do you have a national identification card?

VB1. Are you registered to vote? [El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama]

[Only in Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica]

COER1. Cuando hace las compras en el almacén/comercio de su barrio, ¿y aunque usted no lo pida, le dan recibo/boleta: (1) Siempre (2) algunas veces (3) casi nunca o (4) nunca?

COER2. Suponga que a alguien de este barrio le roban un aparato de televisión de su casa y que un vecino presencia el robo. ¿Cree que su vecino hará la denuncia a la policía: (1) Siempre (2) algunas veces (3) casi nunca o (4) nunca?

INF5a. Aunque usted no tenga ninguna razón para ir allí, suponga que tiene que ir a la escuela pública más próxima a su hogar. ¿Cuánto se demoraría en llegar a esa escuela a pie?

Finally, to measure a state's capacity for taxation, we rely on an item that asks respondents how often they are offered a sales receipt by clerks when shopping at local stores. Although indirect, this indicator provides an estimate of the levels of (consumer) tax enforcement in a given society.

A Broad Comparative Assessment of State Capacity

State capacity, at least as conceived in Soifer (2012), implies that the three dimensions of state capacity (coercive, infrastructural, and extractive) should be simultaneously present to observe a highly capable state. For this reason, we employ a multiplicative index (instead of an

additive one) that brings together the indicators of coercive and infrastructural capacity discussed in the previous section.

The coercive capacity component involves two simple steps. First, we "normalize" (dividing by the regional average of 2012) each country's crime and corruption victimization indicators and then add these scores together. The infrastructural capacity component is obtained through a similar normalization process (once again, dividing by the regional mean) of the percentage of respondents that reported not having been issued an official identification card. A summary of this index, then, is as follows:

State Capacity Index *=* ***Coercive Capacity*** *(Normalized Crime + Normalized Corruption Victimization) x* ***Infrastructural Capacity*** *(Normalized percentage of respondents who don't have ID card)*

Country scores from the resulting index are displayed in Figure 1 for all of Latin America as well as Jamaica and Haiti. The greater the score, the *lesser* its combined capacity to enforce the rule of law (against crime and against state officials) and to administratively reach its citizens. As is clear from the figure, Latin American countries display significant variation regarding their levels of state capacity. Countries like Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Honduras, Bolivia, and Colombia are among those with the weakest levels of state capacity. Meanwhile, those countries with the most effective states according to our measure include Panama, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay.

In Column 7 of Table 1, we see the relative scores of selected countries at both extremes of the distribution of the indicator, as well as Costa Rica, which offers an example of an intermediate case. Columns 4 through 6 provide the case values for each of the components used in the construction of the index. In Columns 1-3, we see the comparative scores received by these countries from alternative measures of state capacity.

As a validity check, a comparison of the 2012 Failed States Index (compiled by the Institute for Peace), the 2010 Bertelsmann Stateness Index, and countries' GDP per capita levels in 2011 suggests that the index results are generally consistent with these independent assessments of Latin American state institutions. At the same time, although a correlation is observed between the index and a country's wealth (measured through GDP per capita figures), important exceptions exist (e.g. Mexico has a disproportionately low state capacity in relation to its levels of economic wealth).

Table 1. Correlates of States' Coercive and Infrastructural Capacities

	Failed States index 2012 (1)	Bertelsmann Satateness index (2)	GDP per capita (2011) (3)	Corruption victimization (COERCIVE COMPONENT) (4)	Crime victimization (COERCIVE COMPONENT) (4)	% without ID (COERCIVE COMPONENT) (4)	Index of coercive and infrastructural capacity (7)
Chile	43,50	9,20	14394	5,99	13,74	0,50	0,27
Brazil	64,10	8,15	12594	7,46	8,47	1,00	0,40
Uruguay	40,50	10.00	13866	8,20	22,75	0,53	0,42
Costa Rica	49,70	9,40	8647	20,72	17,49	2,37	0,99
Colombia	84,40	7,00	7104	16,13	21,04	5,29	2,45
Honduras	78,50	6,40	2247	25,02	18,72	4,95	2,82
México	73,60	6,95	10047	31,15	23,12	4,30	3,57
Haití	104,90	3,67	726	68,27	19,70	5,97	6.60
Guatemala	79,40	5,55	3178	23,50	20,92	14,43	8.66

State Capacity in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica

In this section we engage in a more detailed empirical analysis of state capacity, by looking at three cases that display strong (Chile), moderate (Costa Rica), and relatively weak state capacity (Colombia). To do so, we expand the analysis to include three additional items that were asked in the AmericasBarometer 2012 surveys in those three countries. Figure 2 displays the relative country positions for these three items (see Box 1 for the wording of COER1, COER2, and INF5a). Regarding the likelihood of receiving a sales receipt

(extractive capacity), the results roughly correspond to those of the overall index, with Chile and Costa Rica having significantly higher scores than Colombia. For the item that asked respondents whether they would file a report with the police after a robbery (coercive capacity), Chile and Costa Rica again score higher than Colombia, but not by a significant margin. Running counter to these results, the third item finds Chile with the lowest score, suggesting its infrastructural capacity, approximated through the physical distance between households and the closest public schools, is weaker than that of Costa Rica and Colombia.

Combining these three additional indicators, we compute a new index of state capacity that incorporates at least one proxy for each of the three conceptual dimensions proposed by Soifer (2012).[4]

Table 2 presents the results for each of the three countries, as well as for two different types of sub-national categorizations: municipalities classified across levels of human development (low; medium; high), and urban municipalities compared to rural ones.

Using this more complete state capacity index, we find that Costa Rica registers a higher score than it did with the previous measure. This results from that country's more even performance across the three functional dimensions of state capacity. In turn, Colombia continues to present low levels of state capacity, particularly in relation to extractive

Figure 2. Additional Indicators of State Capacity



and coercive capacity. Finally, Chile is "penalized" in this new index, by its relatively low levels of infrastructural capacity (especially regarding the territorial spread of its public school network).

Table 2. State Capacity in Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica

	Coercive	Extractive	Infrastructural	Total score
CHILE Average	**66.00**	**50.00**	**70.00**	**231000**
Low Development	1.02	0.96	0.98	0.96
Mid Development	0.97	0.88	1.03	0.88
High Development	1.02	1.14	0.98	1.13
Urban	0.98	1.00	1.02	1.00
Rural	1.08	0.98	0.88	0.93
COLOMBIA Average	**59.00**	**10.00**	**80.25**	**47347**
Low Development	1.07	0.40	1.03	0.44
Mid Development	0.99	0.60	0.98	0.59
High Development	0.93	1.50	0.96	1.33
Urban	0.98	1.00	0.98	0.96
Rural	1.07	0.60	1.04	0.67
COSTA RICA Average	**60.83**	**61.00**	**80.50**	**298722**
Low Development	0.92	1.11	1.02	1.05
Mid Development	1.02	0.97	0.99	0.98
High Development	1.01	0.95	0.99	0.95
Urban	0.95	0.95	0.99	0.90
Rural	1.09	1.10	1.01	1.21

Turning to estimates of state capacity at the subnational level, we see that in Chile and Costa Rica, there exists minimal variation across our distinct categories of municipalities and the respective three dimensions of state capacity. In Colombia, however, we find substantial variation across municipalities with

[4] Once again, a multiplicative approach is used, so that the equations are as follows:

State Capacity Index= Coercive Capacity (COER2+VIC1EXT+CORVIC/3) * Extractive Capacity (COER1) * Infrastructural Capacity (INF1+INF5a/2)

Sub-national State Capacity Index= (Coercive Capacity1 (COER21+VIC1EXT1+CORVIC1/3) * Extractive Capacity1 (COER11) * Infrastructural Capacity1 (INF11+INF5a1/2)) / (Coercive Capacity (COER2+VIC1EXT+CORVIC/3) * Extractive Capacity (COER1) * Infrastructural Capacity (INF1+INF5a/2)) *where "1" represents a given sub-national unit.*

distinct development levels, as well as across urban and rural communities.

Figure 3 displays summary scores for each case and municipal cluster. Costa Rica is the case in which the measure of state capacity presents more evenness across municipalities pertaining to different socioeconomic segments. Strikingly, state capacity in that case seems to be higher in rural areas and (marginally) in less developed municipalities. The latter relates, especially, to the infrastructural and extractive capacity of the Costa Rican state (as operationalized in the measure here). Meanwhile, coercive capacity is relatively lower in rural areas.

Chile presents relatively even state capacity across development categories, and rural and urban municipalities. Even in Chile, though, extractive state capacity is significantly higher in those high development municipalities.

On the other hand, Colombia represents a scenario of very uneven territorial reach of the state. In this case, state extractive capacity is much higher in highly developed and urban municipalities, compared to less developed and rural ones. Thus, like in the case of Chile, higher levels of state capacity relate especially to the state's greater extractive capacity in highly developed municipalities. In terms of infrastructural and coercive capacity, the Colombian state is stronger at lower levels of social development, though the differences here are fairly marginal.

Conclusion and Implications

In this *Insights* Report we have reported on an attempt to employ data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer to better capture state capacity across the Americas. Although some of the analyses are restricted to a particular subset of cases, and based on a series of tentative proxies for three dimensions of state capacity, the results suggest that it may be possible to develop an adequate, survey-based measure of a concept that has been notoriously difficult to measure cross-nationally.

Figure 3. Summary Scores of State Capacity across Municipal Clusters and Urban-Rural Settings



The results of these efforts suggest several conclusions. First, the evidence suggests that state capacity varies widely in the Americas. Such variation is not only cross-national, but also runs across different dimensions of state capacity. The latter type of variance has important, and differing, implications for the realization of civil, social, or political rights in a given society. In a nutshell, in countries in which the infrastructural capacity of the state is low, the provision and delivery of essential social policies (i.e. education) is hindered. In contrast, in cases in which the coercive capacity of the state is low, citizens' most basic civil rights are frequently violated. Finally, where states have low levels of extractive capacity, the regulation of economic activity and the enforcement of property rights is likely to be weak. This is especially important, because states' relative ability to develop higher levels of infrastructural and coercive capacity can be hindered by an endemic lack of resources.

Second, the analysis suggests that territorial and socioeconomic variation is also present within states, and that significant variance is observed even in relatively capable states such as those of Costa Rica and Chile, though to a much lesser extent than in Colombia. Even in those former cases, the state is more able to pursue certain activities (and not others) across social segments and territorial jurisdictions. Interestingly, functional differentiation in contemporary Latin American states does not always run as expected. On the one hand, some states were found to have greater capacity on certain dimensions in the countryside (e.g. infrastructural capacity in the Colombian and Costa Rican countryside). On the other hand, some states have a greater capacity to develop certain functions in the context of low levels of social development (e.g. extractive capacity in Costa Rica, coercive capacity in Colombia) than in more socially developed settings. In sum, the analysis suggests that state capacity is uneven, both functionally and territorially. Moreover, this conclusion suggests that looking at the problem of fostering state capacity as one that entails the need to project state power from the center to the periphery is not always accurate in contemporary Latin America. Certain challenges to state capacity (i.e., that of fostering coercive capacity) are more frequently found at the center, as opposed to in countries' territorial peripheries.

Finally, the analyses suggest that significantly more data should be produced in order to understand the nuances of state capacity in the region. In that regard, this *Insights* report alone cannot provide definitive measures and answers. Yet, we hope to have raised interesting questions and helped to identify important research challenges for future analyses of one fundamental precondition (though a usually forgotten one) for the realization of democratic citizenship: state capacity and territorial reach.

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What Perpetuates Child Servitude? Public Opinion on Children's Domestic Labor in Haiti

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Executive Summary. The widespread practice of sending poor children into involuntary servitude as household servants or *restaveks* in Haiti constitutes a clear violation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UHDR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), both of which Haiti is a party to. Despite these international agreements and domestic labor laws prohibiting child labor, in 2014 an estimated 500,000 children were living as *restaveks*, raising the question of who within Haitian society is working to end such practices? While most Haitians agree that the government should make efforts to eliminate child servitude, levels of support vary dramatically across the country, and are lower in sending and receiving regions. Moreover, light-skinned citizens (who are more likely to receive *restaveks*) and food insecure ones (who are more likely to send their children to work) are less likely to support such efforts. In addition, those who are more attached to the current political system and to their community are less likely to support eliminating the practice. Nonetheless, education and democratic socialization seem to be contributing to changing norms.

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www.AmericasBarometer.org

Though slavery has been illegal in Haiti for centuries, it is estimated that as many as 1 in 10 Haitian children live in modern day involuntary servitude as restaveks—a euphemism literally meaning "to live with" in Haitian creole (Shahinian 2009). A recent survey found that in Port-au-Prince and St. Marc, more than a third of households reported resident servant children (Pierre et al. 2009). High birth rates, very high child poverty and malnutrition, and high rates of parental mortality all contribute to the system of child slavery in Haiti (Balsari et al. 2010). In the wake of the January 2010 earthquake, Haitian children became yet more vulnerable (Balsari et al. 2010; Nicholas et al. 2012). Restaveks—almost all under the age of 15, and three-quarters of them female—provide domestic labor 10-18 hours a day. Some restaveks are orphans, and some are actually purchased on the black market (see, for instance, Skinner 2008). Typically, though, restaveks are sent by their parents to work for more affluent relatives or acquaintances in larger cities, often with the hope that the children will have improved access to resources, food, and education. To the contrary, restaveks typically face physical abuse, neglect, malnutrition, and forced labor, and seldom are allowed to attend school; many also are subject to chronic sexual abuse (for portraits of life as a restavek, and the health problems restavek children face, see Cadet 1998; Leeds et al. 2010; Padgett and Klarreich 2001).[1]

International bodies, NGOs, and local foundations such as the Jean Cadet Restavek Foundation have recently increased efforts to prevent families from sending their children to work as restaveks (e.g., Abrams 2010; Aristide 2000; Shahinian 2009). In 2012, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey in Haiti included two questions to gauge public support for such efforts:[2]

Figure 1. Support for Government and Community Group Efforts to Prevent Children's Servitude as Restaveks



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

RESTAVEK1. Do you think the government should prevent families from sending their child to work as a restavek?

RESTAVEK3. Community Organizations. Do you think your local community organizations should prevent families from sending their child to work as a restavek?

In Figure 1, I examine responses to these two questions. It is perhaps not surprising, but encouraging nonetheless, to find that the great majority of Haitians support efforts to reduce child servitude, regardless of whether the efforts are by government or by community organizations. Support for community group efforts, at 87%, is slightly higher than support

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php

[2] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

Figure 2. Support for Government Efforts to Prevent Child Servitude, by Region and City Size



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for governmental efforts, at 85% while a full 84% of respondents said they supported efforts by both community groups and the government to end this practice. From these data, then, we find widespread approval of both government and community-led actions to end the practice of restaveks. More troubling, though, are the 12% of Haitians that oppose efforts by either citizens or government to end this practice. Understanding who among Haitian society either tacitly or overtly supports continuation of this practice may help in understanding why, in 2014, the practice still exists in the country, seemingly unimpeded either by domestic or international law.[3]

Looking a bit more closely at the data, we find a great deal of regional variation in the degree to which citizens support efforts to end the practice of restaveks. In Figure 2, I examine responses in different areas of Haiti to the first question regarding efforts by government. While only three-quarters of respondents in the metropolitan area of the capital Port-au-Prince say they support such attempts to end child servitude, support is close to unanimous in the northern and southern regions.[4] In the central region and the West department outside the capital, support hovers at middle levels. Support also varies in all regions by the size of the place of residence. While almost no one in small and medium cities opposes government efforts, 10% of those in rural areas, and 17% of those in large cities other than Port-au-Prince do so.

This wide variation provides us the first clue of who among Haitian society supports continuation of this modern form of slavery. The regional patterns evident in Figure 2 likely reflect the extent to which different areas of the country are enmeshed in networks for sending and receiving restaveks. Demand for restaveks may be highest in Port-au-Prince and other cities in the West, Artibonite, and Centre departments, while rural areas typically supply restaveks. If this is in fact the case, that those most involved in the restavek problem are those most inclined to oppose efforts to end it, this represents a potentially important obstacle in the elimination of this practice. For, as is the case with many

[3] The two variables are correlated at .83. Non-response to RESTAVEK1 is 2.0%, and non-response to RESTAVEK3 is 3.0%.

[4] The northern region of the sample design comprises the North, Northwest, and Northeast departments; the central region includes Artibonite and Centre departments; and the southern region includes the Grand'Anse, Nippes, Southeast, and South departments.

issues, it is often the minority with high intensity preferences that wins the day over a majority who may not have such strong feelings on the topic (Dahl 1956).

Who Supports Efforts to End Child Servitude?

To further explore the idea that those individuals most involved in the restavek trade are those most strongly opposed to efforts to end it, I next examine the individual determinants of such beliefs, asking "Who are the biggest supporters and opponents of efforts to prevent child servitude?" Beyond the evident geographic variation, I consider hypotheses related to the possible characteristics of those most likely to be involved in the exploitation of children as restaveks. Several demographic factors may shape attitudes towards child servitude. Household wealth might matter, since the poorest households are likely to be on the sending end, and the wealthiest ones on the receiving end. Education and age may also be related to attitudes towards government efforts. On the one hand, those with the most education may be most likely to receive restaveks; on the other, they may be most socialized to human rights norms opposed to involuntary servitude. By contrast, older citizens may be less socialized to such norms. Finally, I consider the extent to which gender may help us understand attitudes on this issue, though I have no *a priori* expectations with respect to gender.

> Among the lightest-skinned Haitians, only 62% support government efforts to end child servitude, as opposed to 82% and 87% of those with medium and dark skin tones.

Respondents' skin tone also may matter. While the great majority of Haitians are at least partially of African descent, the very small light-skinned minority is socially privileged and has disproportionate access to restaveks (see, for instance, Cadet 1998). As a result, those with lighter skin tones may be less supportive of government efforts to end child servitude.

I examine the role of two final aspects of respondents' personal circumstances.[5] As evident in the AmericasBarometer 2012 report on Haiti, food insecurity is a grave and persistent problem in this country (Smith and Gélineau 2012). Since food insecure families may be more likely to believe they might need to send their children to work, food insecurity may reduce support for efforts to end child servitude. Further, those with young children in their homes may have stronger and more personally engaged feelings, either positive or negative, about the practice of child bondage.

Besides demographics and personal background characteristics, what else could shape support or opposition to efforts to end child servitude? I consider the possible importance of several political attitudes and behaviors. First, those who support government efforts to reduce inequality in general may be ideologically inclined to support efforts to end child servitude in particular.[6] In addition, given that democracy is often linked to human rights, those more supportive of democracy may be more likely to favor ending childhood involuntary servitude.

[5] In an analysis not shown here, I also examined whether those with access to remittances are more supportive of ending servitude, since remittances may provide a buffer of income security. While access to remittances does indeed increase support, the effect is not statistically significant.

[6] However, I considered the possibility that personal ideology on the left-right spectrum is related to the dependent variable, and found little of note.

Figure 3. Determinants of Support for Government Efforts to Prevent Child Servitude: Demographics, Personal Circumstances, and Political Behavior



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I further examine the extent to which support for efforts to end child slavery is associated with the legitimacy of the current political system and with community participation. Both system support and community engagement are typically thought to increase adherence to democratic norms and practices. In addition, those who support the political system may be more likely to support all government initiatives, regardless of their content. Finally, community participation might generate interpersonal trust and the social capital associated with support of significant, socially necessary changes. All of these arguments suggest that Haitians who support their current political system and participate in their communities would be more likely to favor efforts to end the practice of sending children to work as restaveks. However, an alternative relationship is possible. The restavek system—including cultural practices, norms, and networks between sending and receiving families—is tightly woven into the Haitian social fabric. Those that are most attached to the current social and political system might be *more* likely to oppose getting rid of the tradition of child servitude.

In Figure 3, I assess these ideas and the determinants of support and opposition to efforts to end the practice of restaveks. The figure presents standardized logistic regression coefficients. Variables for which the corresponding dot is to the right of the green 0.0 axis are positively associated with support for government efforts to end servitude, while those for which the corresponding dot is to the left of the axis are negatively associated with such support. The bracket surrounding each dot represents the 95% confidence interval of the regression coefficient. When the confidence interval does not overlap the green axis, we can be at least 95% confident that the association in question is statistically significant and not due to chance. Because coefficients are standardized, their relative sizes represent their relative importance as determinants of support for government efforts to prevent child servitude.

The figure reveals, first of all, that geography is very important; the coefficient for Port-au-Prince is the largest in the model, with residents of the capital city, along with the other regions included in the model significantly less likely than those in the north to support efforts to end child servitude.[7] Similarly, residents of both rural areas and large cities other than Port-au-Prince are significantly less likely than those in medium and small cities to support such efforts. The fact that where one lives is the strongest

[7] The omitted region is the northern region; the omitted category for size of place of residence is medium/small cities.

determinant of one's attitudes is consistent with the expectation that those in sending and receiving regions are much more likely to resist change. More generally, the results underscore the importance of networks and socialization in shaping norms. Entirely independent of their own self- or family interest, those living in areas where they may have friends or neighbors sending or receiving restaveks are much more likely to perceive this practice as acceptable and arguably even normal.

Turning to other demographics, wealth is unimportant, but those with higher education are significantly more likely to say that they support efforts to end child servitude than those without any education.[8] Neither gender nor age is significantly related to this attitude.[9] However, skin tone does matter.[10] Looking at the bivariate relationship, I find that only 62% of the lightest-skinned Haitians support government efforts to end child slavery, as opposed to 82% and 87% of those with medium and dark skin tones. These differences persist once controlling for other factors, although the magnitude of the effect is somewhat muted.

Haitians who are most strongly engaged with the current political system and community are 14-17% *less likely* to agree with government efforts to end child servitude.

Contrary to expectations, those who have young children at home are neither more nor less likely to support efforts to end child servitude.[11] However, those in households suffering from food insecurity are significantly less likely to do so, though here again, the effects are relatively minor in size.

Turning to political attitudes and behavior, there are a few key results. First, both those who support democracy and those who believe government should reduce inequality are more likely to agree with government efforts to end childhood slavery in Haiti. Moving from the lowest to the highest levels of support for government efforts to reduce inequality leads the predicted probability to jump from 84% to 92%.[12] Similarly, moving from the lowest to highest levels of support for democracy leads to a jump in predicted probabilities from 85% to 92%.

However, beyond abstract ideals, Haitians who are more attached to the current political system and engaged with their community are actually *less* likely to support ending child labor. These are substantively important associations. At the lowest level of system support, the predicted probability of agreeing with government efforts to end servitude is 95%; at the highest level of system support, the predicted probability is only 78%. Similarly, among those who are least involved in their communities, the probability of supporting government efforts is 94%, versus 80% for those who are most engaged. These findings are troubling in that they suggest that those most actively involved in politics within their communities, who also tend to be most effective in putting forth their views on political issues,

[8] In an analysis not shown here, I considered the possibility of a non-linear relationship between wealth and the dependent variable, but did not find a statistically significant relationship.

[9] In analyses not shown here, I considered the possibility of a non-linear relationship between age and support for government efforts to end servitude. Though those aged 66 and up are substantially less likely to support such efforts, in no analysis was age statistically significant.

[10] Skin tone is coded using variable COLORR, for which the interviewer rated the facial skin tone of each respondent on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 is the lightest, and 11 is the darkest. See the Haiti 2012 questionnaire and Telles and Steele (2012) for further information.

[11] In analyses not shown here, I considered the possibility that the impact of having young children at home varied by family socioeconomic status or food insecurity, but did not find statistically significant effects.

[12] Predicted probabilities are calculated holding all other variables at their mean values.

appear to be more in favor of maintaining the status quo with respect to the restavek practice.

Conclusion

The exploitation of Haitian children's labor through the restavek system is one with tragic consequences for children, families, and society as a whole. Current efforts to discourage families from sending children to work as restaveks, and to find alternative sources of income and food security for families and children, are critical to human rights and human development in this country. But such efforts will only succeed if supported by changing cultural norms across society, especially in a state struggling to shore up its capacity to enforce laws. Thus, the question of who supports efforts to eliminate child servitude has profound implications.

The findings from this report indicate that cultural norms supporting the restavek system may be hard to change. The good news is that majorities of Haitians in every single segment of the population we considered support these efforts. Nonetheless, significant minorities oppose the efforts. Those areas most enmeshed in receiving networks are least supportive of eliminating the practice, while sending regions also have relatively low levels of support for efforts to end servitude. Likewise, support is lower among light skinned citizens, who probably are more likely to be on the receiving end of a restavek network, while among food insecure families, those most likely to be on the sending side of this network, we also find lower support for ending the practice. And most strikingly, those who are most attached to the current political system and most strongly engaged in their communities are also less likely to want to eliminate this system of child slavery.

Nonetheless, norms may change. Education increases support for eliminating the restavek system, as does support for democracy. Perhaps the best hope for eradicating childhood slavery permanently in Haiti relies on long-term human development, education, and inculcation of democracy and democratic norms.

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Appendix

Table 1. Determinants of Support for Government Efforts to Prevent Families from Sending Children to Work as Restaveks, Haiti 2012

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Community Participation	-0.01*	0.01
System Support	-0.02*	0.01
Support for Democracy	0.01	0.00
Support for Government Efforts to Address Inequality	0.01*	0.00
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.02	0.07
Primary Education	0.68	0.62
Secondary Education	0.86	0.58
Higher Education	1.90*	0.75
Female	0.20	0.14
Age	-0.01	0.01
Medium Skin (4-7)	-0.16	0.16
Light Skin (1-3)	-1.03*	0.45
Children in the Home	-0.09	0.17
Food Insecurity	-0.22*	0.10
Port-au-Prince	-4.36*	0.62
Central Region	-2.69*	0.55
Rest of West Department	-3.20*	0.61
Southern Region	-2.36*	0.66
Large City	-1.40*	0.56
Rural Area	-0.81*	0.35
Constant	5.54	1.09
Number of Observations	*1668*	
** p<0.05*		

Note: Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<0.05 two-tailed.
Country of Reference: Costa Rica

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2014

Number 104

When Voting is Compulsory, Who Opposes It? Evidence from Ecuador and Peru

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Executive Summary. In Peru and Ecuador, two countries with compulsory voting and relatively strong penalties and enforcement, citizens overwhelmingly support a change to voluntary voting. Why, then, do these electoral rules remain in force if a strong majority opposes them? I find evidence that those who oppose compulsory voting are different from those who support it. This *Insights* report evaluates differences between supporters and opponents of compulsory voting. The results indicate that differences between the two groups lie not in socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, but in how engaged citizens are with the political process. Supporters of voluntary voting are less interested in politics, do not affiliate with a political party, and tend to be on the left of the ideological spectrum. Conversely, those who support a continuation of their country's compulsory voting laws tend to be more engaged in politics and, in the case of Ecuador, more supportive of current president Rafael Correa.

The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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A higher proportion of countries in Latin America require citizens to vote than in any other region in the world. Indeed, compulsory voting laws—with varying degrees of enforcement—are the rule rather than the exception in Latin America. Recent elections in Peru and Ecuador have brought to the surface a long simmering debate regarding the value of compulsory voting laws for a country's quality of democracy. In Peru's capital city of Lima, a controversial recall election in March of 2013 led one of the country's leading newspapers, *El Comercio*, to call for elimination of compulsory voting laws as a way to provide citizens the freedom to abstain. In Ecuador, on the eve of the country's local elections on February 23, 2014, similar calls for the elimination of compulsory voting were made, with critics pointing to the flaws of the current system that allows voluntary voting for military personnel, citizens older than 65, the disabled, and youths between the ages of 16 and 18, while requiring all other citizens to vote. In an opinion piece in a leading daily, Larreátegui (2013) refers to the compulsory laws as a mechanism that allows neo-populists to bolster their claim of popular support.

Figure 1. Percent who think voting should be voluntary in Peru 2012 and Ecuador 2008



Ironically, lost in much of this debate about the possible benefits and drawbacks of voluntary/compulsory voting laws is an understanding of the views of those most affected by these laws – the voters themselves. Little systematic research explores citizens' views towards laws that compel them to exercise their "right" to vote. This *Insights* report[1] examines just that question through an analysis of specific items included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer[2] survey in Ecuador and the 2012 survey in Peru. In Peru, I also examine the opinions of parliamentarians collected in the last round of surveys by the University of Salamanca's PELA project, a longstanding collaborator of LAPOP.

Peru and Ecuador have compulsory voting laws with relatively strong penalties that are regularly, although not consistently, enforced. This makes them ideal cases with which to better understand how citizens feel about being compelled to vote.

The two AmericasBarometer surveys and the PELA survey include the following items:

Ecuador AB 2008: ecuvb19. Do you think that voting should be voluntary or voting should be kept as compulsory?

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[2] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

Peru AB 2012: cv2. Some people say voting should be voluntary. Others say it should be compulsory. What do you think?

Peru PELA 2011-2016: ELE4. Do you think voting should be kept as compulsory or do you think people should vote only if they want to?

Figure 1 presents the percentage of people who think voting should be voluntary or compulsory by country in the AmericasBarometer. It is clear from this figure that there is overwhelming support for a voluntary voting system in both countries. This inclination in the mass public toward voluntary voting is consistent with viewpoints expressed in the mass media that regularly voice opposition to the countries' compulsory voting requirements. In Peru, however, elites' opinions are divided. PELA data shows that 51.6% of 91 parliamentarians interviewed support a change from compulsory to voluntary voting.

Analysis of these survey items can help tell us if certain segments of the citizenry support compulsory voting and thus may benefit more or be more instrumental in its continuation. The remainder of this *Insights* report analyzes the determinants of support and opposition to compulsory voting in Ecuador and Peru.

I evaluate the socioeconomic and attitudinal characteristics of supporters of voluntary voting as compared to those who support a continuation of compulsory voting in their country. According to proponents of compulsory voting, this electoral rule helps reduce biases in electoral participation by overcoming the socioeconomic obstacles that tend to skew voter turnout patterns in favor of the middle and upper classes. Empirical evidence supports this notion that there are differences in electoral participation among socioeconomic groups in countries with voluntary voting (Lijphart 1997; Power 2009). However, there remains a debate about how much, if at all, do compulsory voting laws reduce these class biases in voting, or, conversely, do they actually create other types of participation biases within a system (Maldonado 2011).

In theorizing over what might distinguish supporters and opponents of compulsory voting, the literature has identified several demographic characteristics and attitudinal variables that are linked to a willingness to turn out to vote under a voluntary system and which may in turn help explain one's position on compulsory voting (Plutzer 2002; Achen 2012; Carreras and Castañeda-Argarita 2012). Factors related to voters' resources, such as education and income, and the costs they face to cast a ballot, such as residency (e.g., urban/rural), have emerged as important predictors of voter turnout. Attitudinal variables related to the voters' need to express their preferences, such as interest in politics, party identification, and ideology, also have been found to play a strong role in the decision to vote or not.

I expect that those citizens who face stronger barriers to participation and have fewer resources are more likely to think that voting should be voluntary. To this end, I include in the analysis below variables that capture differences in age, gender, place of residence, education, political knowledge, income, marital status, and whether a respondent has children or not. The expectation is that female respondents, those living in rural areas, the less well-educated, those with lower incomes, and those with children will be more likely to oppose compulsory voting and support a move to a voluntary electoral participation law, due to the various obstacles they face when compelled to participate in politics.

Similarly, those who have less interest in politics, limited political knowledge, and no party identification should also be more likely to opt for voluntary voting. An alternative to this perspective is that those respondents who are highly engaged in politics and identify with a political party may be more inclined to support voluntary voting. One motivation for these individuals to support voluntary voting is that it would likely remove their

Figure 2. Socioeconomic and Political Correlates of Voting Should be Voluntary, Ecuador 2008



disinterested and unengaged counterparts from the electoral process, thereby making the electoral voice of those already engaged in politics even stronger.

Evidence from Ecuador 2008

Surprisingly, results from a logistic regression model of support for a return to voluntary voting in Ecuador reveal no significant socioeconomic or demographic differences between proponents of voluntary voting and those who support compulsory voting. There are no statistically significant differences between men and women, those living in urban and those living in rural settings, married or not married, between those more educated and less educated, between those who have children and those who do not, and more significantly I do not find differences among people with different incomes in their support for voluntary voting (See Appendix: Table1 for more details).

Where I do find significant differences is in the political profiles of supporters of voluntary voting and those who support a continuation of compulsory voting laws. Figure 2 shows the predicted probability values for the three most significant attitudinal characteristics that help distinguish proponents of voluntary voting from those in favor of compulsory voting: self-identification on a left-right scale, interest in politics, and approval of President Correa's performance in office.

For the left-right identification measure, interestingly, those located on the left are more likely to support voluntary voting than those located on the right. When we look at left-right identifications in Ecuador, we find that Correa has a broad base of supporters, including self-

identified left-leaning and self-identified right-leaning citizens. In 2008, 78% of those on the left and 70% of those not on the left reported having voted for Correa in 2006.

To test more directly whether Correa's supporters prefer or reject voluntary voting, I include a variable that taps approval of Correa's performance. From this analysis we find that all else equal, supporters of Correa are in fact more likely to support compulsory voting than those who oppose him. This result is consistent with the idea that Correa and his supporters recognize the added electoral value that compulsory voting laws can provide the President. These findings also suggest that Correa's electoral fortunes might suffer with a return to voluntary voting, and those who oppose him perhaps recognize this additional benefit that may come with elimination of compulsory voting laws. Clearly more research is needed on this issue to better understand the ideological and partisan motivations behind support for either voluntary or compulsory voting laws.

I also find that those with little interest in politics tend to be more likely to support a return to voluntary voting. From one perspective, at least, it is not surprising that those with no interest in politics would prefer to bring to an end a law that requires them to participate in the electoral process. From another perspective, though, it is perhaps surprising that those respondents with a high level of interest in politics would support compulsory voting, a measure that theoretically dilutes the participation advantage that the politically engaged have over their more apathetic compatriots.

In sum, it does not seem that socioeconomic or geographic factors influence one's support for or opposition to compulsory voting. This null finding is striking given the conventional view that citizens who face obstacles in their efforts to vote are those least likely to support a continuation of mandatory voting rules. Rather, I find the most significant factors to be attitudinal characteristics: those individuals most engaged in politics, those on the right, and supporters of Correa are among the most likely to support retention of the current compulsory voting laws in Ecuador. These findings suggest that support for compulsory voting could be driven by deep-rooted principles about the role the state should play in compelling citizens to exercise their right to vote and, as well, about the likely electoral beneficiaries of compulsory voting laws in Ecuador.

Evidence from Peru 2008

Turning to the case of Peru, I ran a similar logistic regression model to explain support for voluntary voting in 2012. From this analysis, two factors emerge as significant: urban residency and party identification (see

Figure 3. Socioeconomic and Political Correlates of Voting Should be Voluntary, Peru 2012





Appendix: Table 2 for full results). Contrary to the case of Ecuador, there are no statistically significant differences between those who approve of current president Humala's performance and those who do not.

Figure 3 presents the predicted values of support for voluntary voting for urban residency and party identification, controlling for other covariates. From the party identification variable, it appears once again that it is those who are less engaged with politics, at least in the form of identifying with a political party, who are most likely to support a return to voluntary voting. It seems like these citizens have less interest in politics and therefore may see that a return to voluntary voting would allow them to more easily disengage from politics. This result again helps explain, possibly, why compulsory voting laws remain in effect in Peru. Those most opposed to mandatory voting are also those least engaged in politics to begin with.

With respect to the urban/rural result, it is here where we find evidence for the proposition that those who face structural or socioeconomic barriers to participation will be most likely to oppose compulsory voting laws. Here we see that respondents living in rural areas were significantly more likely to support voluntary voting than those respondents living in urban settings. Most likely, rural citizens encounter greater difficulties in reaching the polls due to distance, transportation costs, or limited political information, and thus prefer a system in which they do not have to struggle with these obstacles.

Interestingly, a survey of Peruvian legislators shows that there is a significant difference between parliamentarians from Humala's party and parliamentarians from other parties in their support of voluntary voting. Legislators from the party in government are far more likely to oppose a return to voluntary voting, with only 34.4 percent of those polled calling for an end to the country's compulsory voting law. Conversely, over 61 percent of opposition party legislators called for a return to voluntary voting, representing a stark contrast from their counterparts in the President's party. When controlling for other covariates such as gender, marital status, age, education and income, this difference remains statistically significant at a generous level ($p<0.09$). Further, support for voluntary voting is similar between congressmen and congresswomen, between those who are married and those who are not, and between parliamentarians from different ages and incomes (see Appendix: Table 3 for full results). From this elite level, then, we see a similar outcome in terms of greater support for compulsory voting among those affiliated with the ruling party as we found in Ecuador among supporters of President Correa in society at large.

Conclusion

Overall, in the countries studied here, those who think voting should be voluntary and those who think it should be obligatory are not sharply different in terms of their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Differences do emerge, however, across certain political attitudes that suggest the persistence of compulsory voting in both Ecuador and Peru is, in part, a product of the general lack of interest in politics found in opponents of compulsory voting, while those who support such laws tend to be more interested in and active in their political system. I find that interest in politics, one's ideological position, and party identification help distinguish between opponents and supporters of compulsory voting. Citizens who are less interested in politics, those who self-place on the left of the ideological spectrum in Ecuador, and those who do not identify with a party tend to express greater support for voluntary voting. Conversely, supporters of compulsory voting tend to be more engaged and interested in politics, affiliated with a political party, and residents of urban areas. In Ecuador, those who support president Correa are more likely to support compulsory voting and in Peru we find a similar relationship among parliamentary elites, but not in public

opinion in general. In Peru, legislators belonging to the party in government are more in favor of continuing a system that obliges citizens to vote, but citizens who approve Humala's performance are not different on this issue from those who voice disapproval of his performance.

All of these characteristics, when compared to those of supporters of voluntary voting, seem far more likely to provide a strong and clear voice in favor of compulsory voting, even if that voice only represents roughly 4 out of every 10 members of the voting-age population. What these findings suggest, then, is that there are cases in which the policies and practices of a democratic state do not reflect the will of the majority, but rather the will of an engaged minority, especially when they are on the side of the party in power.

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Appendix

Table 1. Logistic Regression of Support for Voluntary Voting – Ecuador AmericasBarometer 2008

	Coefficient	z-value
Woman	0.070	0.70
Urban	-0.068	-0.66
Married	-0.045	-0.39
Age 26-35	-0.080	-0.68
Age 36-50	0.197	1.27
Age 51+	0.187	0.85
Education	-0.084	-1.02
Income	-0.044	-1.29
Have children	-0.092	-1.05
Interest in politics	-0.152*	-2.56
Rightist	-0.014	-0.10
Leftist	0.363*	2.91
Political knowledge	-0.041	-1.19
Party identification	-0.042	--0.33
Approve Correa's performance	-0.321*	-3.21
Constant	1.295	5.64
Number of Observations	1817	
Pseudo r-squared	0.021	
LR chi2	49.38	

Table 2. Logistic Regression of Support for Voluntary Voting – Peru AmericasBarometer 2012

	Coefficient	z-value
Woman	-0.111	-0.78
Urban	-0.410*	-2.45
Married	0.102	0.54
Age 26-35	0.182	0.86
Age 36-50	-0.038	-0.18
Age 51+	0.191	0.82
Education	0.091	0.81
Income	0.042	1.89
Have children	0.072	0.30
Interest in politics	-0.126	-1.52
Rightist	0.033	0.19
Leftist	0.001	-0.01
Political knowledge	-0.050	-0.53
Party identification	-0.392*	-2.24
Approve Humala's performance	-0.045	-0.32
Constant	0.779	2.11
Number of Observations	1096	
Pseudo r-squared	0.016	
LR chi2	21.55	

Table 3. Logistic Regression of Support for Voluntary Voting – Peru PELA 2011-2016

	Coefficient	z-value
Woman	1.11	1.67
Married	0.488	0.83
Age 41-50	-1.077	0.86
Age 51-60	-0.344	-0.18
Age 61+	-0.042	0.82
Education	0.077	0.81
Income	0.265	1.89
Party	-0.875	-2.24
Constant	-0.485	2.11
Number of Observations	78	
Pseudo r-squared	0.10	
LR chi2	10.83	

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2014

Number 105

Bridging Inter-American Divides: Views of the U.S. Across the Americas

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Executive Summary. The United States has long suffered from an image problem across much of the Americas, due in large part to the many cases of U.S. involvement in Latin American and Caribbean affairs. As these legacies of military and economic interventions perhaps begin to recede in the minds of Latin Americans, the question arises as to what factors influence the views of the U.S. among citizens of Latin America and the Caribbean? In this analysis of 2012 AmericasBarometer survey data, I find that the growing levels of economic and social ties between the U.S. and some countries in the Americas are a source of more positive views of the U.S. Alternatively, citizens living in those countries with fewer direct connections to the U.S. tend to express more negative views of the U.S. This study examines these relationships and the resulting policy implications.

The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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The image of the U.S. among Latin American publics oftentimes has reflected the decidedly mixed legacy of U.S. involvement in Latin American affairs. One recent example of this emerges from the perceived, if not actual, U.S. role in the region's debt restructuring and market-based economic reform agenda of the 1980s. Now more than two decades removed from these watershed, and often painful, economic reforms, a persistent question among observers of inter-American affairs concerns the attitudes of Latin Americans toward the United States. Are their views colored by the "lost decade" experiences of the 1980s or do Latin Americans today view the United States in a positive light given the ongoing expansion of economic and social connections between the two regions?

In this *Insights*[1] report, I examine public opinion in Latin America and the Caribbean toward the United States, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer. Consistent with Baker and Cupery's recent research (2013), I find that the degree to which citizens and countries in Latin America are connected to the United States greatly influences their views of the trustworthiness of the U.S. However, in contrast to Baker's cross-national, aggregate analysis, I offer support for this "connectedness hypothesis" through analysis of individual-level factors, such as receipt of remittances from family members in the U.S., as well as the possible role of ideological affinities with the U.S. in enhancing citizens' positive feelings towards their northern neighbors.

Baker and Cupery (2013) argue that economic exchange with the U.S. (in the form of trade, aid, migration, and remittances) in fact promotes goodwill among Latin Americans. They find support for this hypothesis in analyses of three measures of economic exchange: total trade flows with the U.S. as a percentage of each country's GDP, the amount of aid flowing into each country from the U.S. as a percentage of its GDP, and the effects of migration (by examining migrant workers in the U.S. as a percentage of the local working population and remittances from the U.S. as a percentage of each country's GDP). Relying on survey data collected across Latin America and the Caribbean, I test these ideas with individual-level analyses. My findings offer further support for the idea that as connections among the people of the Americas grow more extensive, trust of their respective countries grows as well.

Figure 1. Trustworthiness of the U.S.



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

The 2012 AmericasBarometer survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

(LAPOP) allows an evaluation of the theoretical perspective that Latin Americans with direct or indirect connections to the U.S. will be more likely to express positive views toward the country, including a high level of trust. In data gathered from over 19,000 individuals across 24 countries, I analyze the following question:

Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust the governments of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.
MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?[2,3]

Figure 1 displays, on a recoded 0-100 scale, average levels of trust in the United States government among citizens of the 24 countries included in the AmericasBarometer survey. The data are coded so that higher values indicate greater trust. Mean levels of trust range from an average of 31.4 in Argentina to an average of 75.6 in Haiti. As one can see from this cross-national graph, trust in the United States government varies greatly across the Americas.

From Figure 1 we can draw some initial inferences regarding these cross-national variations. The countries with the lowest values of trust in the U.S. (Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Argentina) are among those that are furthest away, suggesting that countries with greater physical distance from the U.S., and less extensive migration connections, have less trust in the U.S. Of the ten countries with the greatest values of trust, three are Caribbean countries (Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica) and five are Central American countries (Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica), which further suggests that both physical distance and migration networks are related to higher levels of citizen trust in the United States. Below, I assess whether variation in levels of trust in the U.S. can be explained by cultural or economic connections. First, though, I examine whether basic socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of an individual reveal any more information regarding varying levels of trust across Latin Americans.

Figure 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors of Trust in the U.S.



Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors

Figure 2 shows the results from an OLS regression model that evaluates the extent to which age, quintiles of wealth, education, gender, and urban/rural residence predict individuals' levels of trust in the U.S. Standardized coefficients of these socioeconomic and demographic factors are represented by a dot, with the bars at either end representing the 95% confidence interval

[2] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

[3] Of the 19,184 people who were asked this question, 4,190 responded Don't Know, and 255 chose No Response.

for the estimated effect of each variable. Effects to the left of and never crossing the green 0.0 line are negative and statistically significant, and effects to the right of and never crossing the green 0.0 line are positive and statistically significant.

Urban residence is strongly correlated with less trust in the U.S., as those who live in urban areas have lower levels of trust in the U.S. government. At a less conservative level of statistical significance, it appears that age is positively correlated with trust in the U.S., meaning that there is some evidence that those who are older have higher levels of trust in the U.S. than those who are younger. Quintiles of wealth, gender, and education level are not statistically significant predictors.

Figure 3. An Extended Model Predicting Trust in the U.S.



Economic and Ideological Predictors

Figure 3 assesses individual receipt of remittances, self-identification on a left-right scale, and a country-level variable of trade flows with the U.S. as predictors of trust in the U.S., alongside the socioeconomic and demographic measures from the previous analysis. [4]The individual-level variable of interpersonal trust was also included to control for differences in how trusting individuals generally are.

In this OLS regression model, left-right (liberal-conservative) ideological identification is a strong predictor of trust.[5] According to a January 2012 Gallup poll (Saad 2012), conservatives continue to be the largest ideological group in the U.S., with 40% of polled Americans describing their views as conservative (right-wing), 35% as moderate, and 21% as liberal (left-wing). In short, the U.S. population and public policies tend to be to the right-of-center with respect to the role of the state in the economy. It is noteworthy, then, that people who share this same political view in Latin America are more inclined to trust the U.S. government. Conversely, those who self-identify on the political left are significantly less likely to express trust in the U.S., a finding perfectly consistent with the Latin American left's long-held suspicions of U.S. involvement in the region's political and economic affairs (Pew Research Center 2013). Additionally, it is interesting to note that when ideology is included in the model, it greatly lessens the predictive power of urban residence. This is likely because those who live in urban areas tend to be more politically oriented to the left.

Receipt of remittances is also an important predictor of trust in the U.S.[6,7] Those who

[4] Of the countries included in this analysis, all but Guyana were asked about left-right orientation. In Guyana, the question explicitly referenced a conservative-liberal ideological orientation.

[5] Ideological identification was coded from 1-10, with 1 representing Left and 10 representing Right.

[6] The remittances variable comes from Question Q10A, which asks, "Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?" The data was recoded from 0 to 1, with 0 representing the response No and 1 representing Yes.

[7] Since the data does not specify from which countries these remittances are sent, it cannot perfectly capture the effect of remittances from the U.S. specifically. This is expected to weaken this correlation. However, the U.S. is probably the destination of many of these migrants, and a strong

receive these economic benefits from a family member in the U.S. tend to have more trust in the country. This suggests that Latin American citizens with personal connections to individuals living in the U.S. have greater affinity for the country – a product likely due to both the economic benefits that flow from the U.S. as well as the impact of "social remittances" that help to promote a positive image of U.S. culture in other countries (Levitt 1998). This concept of "social remittances" refers to the transnational communication of cultural aspects of an individual's host culture to friends and family who remain in his country of origin. When a citizen of a Latin American country goes to live in the U.S., his or her letters, emails, and phone calls to family members are likely to include descriptions of U.S. culture, which may cause their family and friends to view the U.S. more favorably. These types of cultural exchanges, then, may help to explain the statistical significance of receipt of remittances in predicting trust in the U.S.

Finally, I examine if citizens in countries that trade more frequently with the U.S., and therefore likely experience national economic benefits as a result of this trade relationship, tend to have higher trust in the U.S. I explore countries' economic interconnectedness with the U.S. by examining the amount of each country's trade with the United States. U.S. Census data provides the total value of imports and exports of each country with the U.S. (in millions of US$) as a percentage of the country's total GDP (United States Census Bureau 2012). This enables me to study the net trade of goods that are directly connected to the U.S. while controlling for the size of the country's economy. As the OLS regression model demonstrates, this measure of trade with the U.S. is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that those respondents living in countries with stronger economic ties to the U.S. are more likely to express trust in the U.S. government.

statistical significance suggests that the effect of remittances sent from the U.S. is very strong.

Implications

Previous studies in the fields of political science and economics have attested to the wariness of Latin American countries to engage with the U.S. because of the harmful nature of past U.S. political aggression and free trade policies (Lowenthal 1993). However, this study of Latin American public opinion data counters that trend. When an individual receives remittances from the U.S., shares ideological values in line with those of Americans, or lives within a country that is highly connected via trade with the U.S. economy, he or she tends to have more trust in the U.S. In short, this report allows us to conclude that increases in the economic or cultural interconnectedness of other countries with the U.S. improve perceptions of U.S. trustworthiness.

These findings have implications for U.S. policymakers who seek to improve the image of the United States internationally. For example, from this work we see that immigration in fact plays a significant role in promoting positive feelings toward the U.S. among Latin Americans. More broadly, if this variation in trust in the U.S. is due to the transfer of "social remittances," increasing cultural interconnectedness of the U.S. with other countries seems to be a sensible means of improving trust in the U.S. Experiencing the positive aspects of U.S. culture in this way likely improves one's view of the U.S. government. This conclusion is further strengthened by the strong relationship between ideology and trust in the U.S. Because ideology is an aspect of culture, one of the traits that countries with similar culture likely share is ideology.

In addition to the impact of cultural interconnectedness on trust in the U.S., being tied economically to the U.S. also is positively related to an individual's perception of U.S. trustworthiness. Thus, the U.S. might consider focusing on improving economic connectedness with countries with which they

desire to improve relations. Further exploring these ideas may have implications for U.S. foreign policy related to countries such as Cuba, a nation with whom the U.S. has engaged minimally in economic terms over the past half-century, or the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership. Indeed, if economic interconnectedness builds trust, and if trust is an important foreign policy goal, then the U.S. might want rethink its embargo with Cuba. In addition, those opposed to free trade deals (often on the left) might take note of the fact that the relations these agreements foster can lead to greater levels of trust among countries. Briefly put, this report suggests it is important to consider and further analyze the policy implications that stem from a finding that increased economic and cultural interconnectedness build trust in the U.S.

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Appendix

	Figure 3		Figure 4		Full Individual Level Model with Country Controls	
	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Trade with U.S.			0.160#	0.085		
Education Level	-0.016	0.010	-0.008	0.012	-0.019	0.011
Age	0.026*	0.008	0.017	0.010	0.021	0.010
Female	0.004	0.008	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.009
Wealth	0.022*	0.009	0.008	0.010	0.016	0.010
Urban	0.016	0.010	0.011	0.010	0.015	0.012
Ideological Identification			0.107*	0.009	0.102*	0.010
Receipt of Remittances			0.032*	0.010	-0.025*	0.010
Mexico	0.069*	0.013			0.068*	0.014
Guatemala	0.152*	0.014			0.146*	0.014
El Salvador	0.180*	0.012			0.173*	0.012
Honduras	0.198*	0.015			0.190*	0.016
Nicaragua	0.111*	0.012			0.108*	0.013
Costa Rica	0.152*	0.011			0.140*	0.012
Panama	0.222*	0.013			0.216*	0.013
Colombia	0.131*	0.013			0.124*	0.014
Ecuador	0.080*	0.013			0.072*	0.014
Bolivia	0.082*	0.018			0.083*	0.018
Peru	0.112*	0.013			0.104*	0.014
Paraguay	0.118*	0.013			0.112*	0.014
Chile	0.065*	0.014			0.073*	0.015
Brazil	0.122*	0.013			0.126*	0.013
Venezuela	-0.009	0.015			-0.009	0.015
Argentina	-0.021	0.014			-0.022	0.014
Dominican Republic	0.239*	0.011			0.233*	0.011
Haiti	0.266*	0.015			0.267*	0.016
Jamaica	0.161*	0.011			0.146*	0.012
Guyana	0.234*	0.012			(dropped)	--
Trinidad & Tobago	0.136*	0.012			0.138*	0.013
Belize	0.082*	0.014			0.075*	0.015
Suriname	0.163*	0.013			0.157*	0.014
Constant	-0.057*	0.010	-0.037	0.084	-0.098*	0.012

Note: Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<0.05, two-tailed; Country of Reference: Uruguay; # Trade with U.S. is significant at p<.06

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The World Cup and Protests: What Ails Brazil?

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Executive Summary. Results from preliminary pre-release 2014 AmericasBarometer survey data from Brazil indicate that the protests ongoing in the country since last year are driven largely by young, single, educated Brazilians, with widespread corruption and violence, and low quality education and healthcare at the top of their list of grievances. Thus, international sporting events like the World Cup have both exacerbated perceptions of systemic corruption among Brazilians and also provided a useful high-profile stage for protesters to voice their discontent. Though the World Cup has reached its finale, preparations for the 2016 Olympic Games promise to continue fueling the underlying societal discontent driving these protests unless political leaders address these deeper, systemic concerns.

The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
www.AmericasBarometer.org

The media attention drawn by the World Cup tournament in Brazil has provided an opportunity to revisit the ongoing social unrest in the country.[1] [2] The protests, which never fully abated after last year's peak during the Confederations Cup, have waned considerably in terms of the number of participants; nevertheless, they continue to draw attention to the issues and concerns which a multitude of Brazilian citizens raised at that time.

A previous *Insights* report (Moseley and Layton 2013) drew on the 2012 AmericasBarometer data to place Brazil's unrest in a regional context and showed the importance of education, interest in politics, and dissatisfaction with local public services as catalysts for participation in protests across the Americas. In this report I draw on the preliminary pre-release AmericasBarometer dataset for Brazil 2014 to more closely analyze Brazil's current wave of protest in particular.[3] I show that young, single, educated Brazilians continue to be the driving force behind many of the protests and that their primary grievances concern the country's widespread corruption and the poor quality of education services.

Figure 1. Protest Participation in Brazil, 2007-2014



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Who Is Protesting in Brazil?

Brazilian media sources conservatively estimate that, at its peak, the 2013 protest movement drew more than 1.4 million Brazilians into the streets in cities across the country,[4] making it the largest popular mobilization in Brazil since the 1992 impeachment movement successfully pushed for the ouster of the sitting president.

Despite the high-profile nature of this past year of protests, we still know relatively little about who among Brazilians is taking to the streets. Do the protesters represent a cross-section of Brazilian society, or are some citizens more active in the manifestations than others? It is to this question that I now turn.

Figure 1 shows the percentage of Brazilian respondents who reported participating in a protest during the year prior to each round of the AmericasBarometer survey.[5] As is clear,

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php

[2] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

[3] The full 2014 AmericasBarometer dataset, which will cover 27 countries in the Americas, will be released to the public in December 2014.

[4] See a useful interactive graphic produced by Globo at: http://g1.globo.com/brasil/protestos-2013/infografico/platb/ [last access 6/24/2014]

[5] In the 2007 and 2008 rounds, the question was asked in two parts. The first question asked if the respondent had participated in a manifestation or public protest at any time in their life, and the follow-up question asked if they had done so over the last year. In 2010 this format changed to simply ask if over the last 12 months the respondent had

protest activity in Brazil witnessed a significant increase in 2013 and early 2014 compared to a similar period in 2011-2012.

More to the point of understanding who is protesting, Table 1 provides a snapshot of the socioeconomic differences between protesters and non-protesters in Brazil over the last year. I conducted difference of means tests on these key individual characteristics to determine where the differences are statistically significant. The results show that respondents who participated in protests in the year leading up to the survey are wealthier,[6] more educated, younger, more often single,[7] and more frequent users of the Internet[8] than non-protesting respondents. The difference in gender ratios is not statistically significant between protesters and non-protesters. Moreover, protesters are only marginally more likely to live in an urban area than non-protesters (p=.06).

Table 1. Protester/Non-protester Differences in Brazil, 2014

	Protester (n=116)	Non-protester (n=1,383)	Difference *(se)*
Women (%)	54.3	49.7	4.6 *(4.6)*
Quintile of Wealth (1-5)	3.5	2.9	0.5 *(0.1)* *
Education (Years Completed)	11.0	8.0	3.1 *(0.4)* *
Urban (%)	92.2	85.9	6.3 *(3.3)*
Age (Years)	31.2	40.3	-9.1 *(1.1)* *
Single (%)	53.4	29.6	23.9 *(4.6)* *
Internet Usage (0-4)	3.1	1.9	1.2 *(0.2)* *

*p<0.05
Note: Estimated means reported. All estimates are design-effect based. Some differences appear too small or too big due to rounding.
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

In the last section I use a multivariate analysis to test the independent effect of each of these individual characteristics as predictors of protest participation in the 2014 data.

Why Are Brazilians Protesting?

In the midst of Brazil's recent social unrest, observers have struggled to identify the source of the public anger. The protests initially began in response to an increase in bus fares; elected officials have responded to the protests by promising political reforms and implementing a government program (*Mais Médicos* [More Doctors]) to hire more medical staff, including a large number of Cuban physicians, to fill posts in public health clinics; and the media have often focused on the vandalism and violence against journalists that have accompanied more peaceful efforts to express dissatisfaction with any number of public services. Consequently, there is understandable confusion over which issues have most strongly mobilized protesters in Brazil.

To provide a preliminary answer to the question of what potentially motivates the protesters, I analyze responses to an open-ended question from the AmericasBarometer

participated in a manifestation or public protest. In all cases, I only report the percentage of respondents who reported participation in the year prior to the survey. In 2007 and 2008, if a respondent reported that they never participated in a protest I coded their response as '0'. The rate of missing responses was 4.53% in 2007, 6.48% in 2008, 0.81% in 2010, 0.27% in 2012, and 0.07% in 2014.

[6] Wealth is measured in relative terms using a battery of questions about household assets. See Córdova (2009) for more details. Higher values reflect more wealth.

[7] In analyses not shown here I found that even when broken out into individual categories, all categories had a lower likelihood of participating in protests than single respondents although given the lack of statistical power given the small size of some groups not all differences were statistically significant. In the model I present, I compare single respondents to all other civil status categories.

[8] Respondents are given a five point response scale in terms of the frequency with which they use the internet: daily, a few times a week, a few times a month, rarely, or never. I recode these responses to a 0 to 4 scale to reflect increasing frequency of internet usage. The 2013 *Insights* report used a variable for sharing political information through a social network; however, this item was not included on the 2014 survey in Brazil.

that asks what the respondent thinks is the most serious problem facing the country.[9] Table 2 presents the four most cited answers for protesters and non-protesters in 2014. Non-protesters were most likely to cite healthcare, violence, corruption, and insecurity as the most serious problem in Brazil. Respondents who participated in a protest in the year leading up to the survey also cited corruption, healthcare, and violence, but paired these with poor quality education services. Notably, even though the concerns of protesters and non-protesters overlap on three issues, each group differs significantly in terms of the importance they place on each issue. For instance, protesters cited corruption as the most serious problem at nearly twice the rate of non-protesters and were much less likely to cite healthcare and violence as the country's most serious problem.

Table 2. Most Serious Problem in Brazil by Protest Participation, 2014 (% Respondents)

Non-protester		Protester	
Healthcare	26.49	Corruption	22.61
Violence	20.01	Healthcare	15.65
Corruption	11.48	Violence	14.78
Insecurity	6.25	Education	11.30

Note: All estimates are design-effect based.
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

The survey also asked respondents about several specific aspects of their satisfaction with public services in the city where they live and the current federal government's performance on a number of issues. Table 3 presents the differences in mean responses between protesters and non-protesters on satisfaction with their city's public transportation system, roads, public schools, and public health services.[10] It also shows mean differences on perceptions of the current federal government's performance combating corruption, improving security, and managing the economy.[11] In all cases, protesters are less satisfied with public services and perceive the government's performance as worse than do non-protesters. These differences, though, are only statistically significant in the case of satisfaction with roads and public schools and perceptions of government performance combating corruption and managing the economy.

Yet the question remains whether these differences between protesters and non-protesters in terms of perceived problems in Brazil will hold after controlling for other individual characteristics. To answer this, I now turn to a multivariate analysis of the question, "Who is protesting in Brazil and why?"

Modeling Protest Participation in Brazil, 2014

In this section, I test a multivariate model of protest participation for Brazil in 2014. I draw on the "resource mobilization model" of protest (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983) developed in the previous *Insights* report for the Latin American region as a whole (Moseley and Layton 2013), but with some adaptations to study the specific case of Brazil using the 2014 data.

Thus far, I have identified a number of potential grievances (the most important problems in Brazil as determined by respondents to the AmericasBarometer survey,

[9] Respondents are asked what they think is the most serious problem in the country. They are not given response options; rather, their open-ended response is placed into one of more than 40 pre-coded categories, including an option for 'other' responses. In Table 1 I present the four categories that receive the largest number of responses. All other responses are then considered together as 'other' responses in the analyses below.

[10] Respondents report whether they are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with each given public service. I recode responses so that any level of satisfaction receives a score of '100' and any level of dissatisfaction receives a score of '0'.

[11] Respondents report to what extent they believe the government achieves each performance objective on a 1 to 7 scale where 1 means 'not at all' and 7 means 'a lot'.

dissatisfaction with public services, and perceptions of poor government performance) that citizens in Brazil have expressed, as well as several individual characteristics (urban/rural residence, gender, age, household assets, years of education, civil status, and self-reported frequency of internet usage) that may help clarify who has protested over the last year and why. In this section, I test these potential explanations together to determine which factors are the most important for identifying the protesters and their motives.[12]

Table 3. Protester/Non-protester Differences on Satisfaction with Public Services and Perceptions of Government Performance in Brazil, 2014

	Protester (n=116)	Non-protester (n=1,383)	Difference *(se)*
Sat. Public Transportation	35.1	37.3	-2.2 *(5.0)*
Sat. Roads	32.8	45.7	-13.0 *(5.3)* *
Sat. Public Schools	37.7	51.0	-13.3 *(4.9)* *
Sat. Public Health	20.7	24.1	-3.4 *(3.9)*
Gov. Combats Corruption	24.3	32.1	-7.9 *(2.8)* *
Gov. Improves Security	30.6	35.2	-4.6 *(2.8)*
Gov. Manages Economy Well	27.7	35.4	-7.8 *(2.9)* *

*p<0.05
Note: Estimated means reported. All estimates are design-effect based. Some differences appear too small or too big due to rounding. For satisfaction with public services, satisfied or very satisfied=100, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied=0. Performance perceptions measured on 1-7 scale, recoded to 0-100 scale.
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

In addition to the factors I have already mentioned, I include the following control variables in the model of protest participation: level of community participation;[13] respondents' level of support for the Brazilian political system;[14] interest in politics;[15] sense of internal and external political efficacy;[16] partisan sympathy;[17] and the respondent's region of residence.

Figure 2 illustrates standardized logit regression coefficients with design-based 95% confidence intervals for the model of protest participation in Brazil from the preliminary pre-release 2014 data. If the estimated coefficient and the entire length of the confidence bar do not cross the red line, then that indicator has a statistically significant effect in the model. That effect is positive if the coefficient point is to the right of the red "zero" line and negative if it is to the left.[18]

[12] I only include measures of satisfaction with public services and perceptions of government performance on the issues where I have shown that there is a statistical difference in the mean opinion between protesters and non-protesters.

[13] Community participation is measured as the average rate of participation across three types of community involvement: religious organizations, parent-teacher organizations, and neighborhood improvement organizations. Respondents can reply that they participate at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.

[14] System support is the average score of the respondent across five indicators scored using a seven point scale: the extent to which the respondent thinks that the courts guarantee a fair trial; the extent to which they respect the country's political institutions; the extent to which they believe that the political system protects basic rights; the extent to which they feel proud to live under their political system; and the extent to which they believe that one should support the political system. Respondents missing a response on more than two indicators are excluded from the average score.

[15] Respondents answer whether they are very, somewhat, a little, or not at all interested in politics.

[16] Internal efficacy is measured using a question that asks respondents to what extent they feel they understand the most important political issues in the country. External efficacy is based on a question that asks to what extent those that govern the country are interested in what people like the respondent think.

[17] Respondents report whether they currently sympathize with any political party. These individuals may be more strongly motivated to participate in the public sphere. I code sympathizers as '1' and non-partisans as '0'.

[18] In two cases, the variables are categorical in nature and the coefficients must be interpreted in relation to the baseline category. For the list of the most important problems, the baseline is healthcare services; for region, the baseline is the Northeast.

Figure 2. Model of Protest Participation in Brazil, 2014



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Key Findings

The results help clarify several aspects of the recent protests in Brazil. In terms of *who* participates, the model suggests that the protesters do in fact tend to be young, single, more educated, interested in politics, and active in their local community.

> Perceptions of corruption and the poor quality of education services are the two problems driving protesters into the streets.

Interestingly, the effect of Internet usage on protest participation is statistically insignificant, a finding that runs counter to recent research (e.g. Moseley and Layton 2013) that finds Internet use, and more specifically involvement in social media networks, strongly related to protest activity. Similarly, the level of respondent wealth and the respondent's gender has no significant effect on the likelihood of reporting participation in protests independent of other personal characteristics.

Another set of significant findings focuses attention on the location of the protests. Many news reports have highlighted *urban* protests, but the model confirms what was shown in Table 1, that the difference between urban and rural residents is statistically insignificant. Moreover, although the model shows that reported protest participation is fairly even across the regions, residents of the Northeast are significantly more likely to report protest participation than residents of the North, Southeast, and South. To reemphasize the point, news reports have focused on the protests that take place in the large urban capitals of the Southeast, but these

results suggest that the unrest is somewhat more prevalent among residents of the Northeast and may be at least as common among rural residents.

In terms of *why* Brazilians are protesting, the model also provides compelling findings. After controlling for individual characteristics of the respondents, it appears that broad perceptions of corruption and the poor quality of education services in Brazil are indeed the two key problems driving the protesters into the streets. Respondents who see corruption or poor quality education services as the most serious problems in the country are significantly more likely to report protest participation than respondents who listed the other top problems.[19] Conversely, satisfaction with public services in their city of residence and perceptions of the current federal government's performance are no longer statistically significant predictors of protest participation after controlling for individual characteristics. This suggests that the protesters are less concerned with specific problems either at the local level or with the current government and are more concerned with systemic failings that such international events as the World Cup can call even greater attention to. Consequently, although it may be possible in any given protest to find participants who have other grievances and objectives, generalized perceptions of the systemic problems of corruption and the poor quality of public education are the driving concerns that seem to be filling the streets and public squares across Brazil.

Conclusion

The results presented here help explain what has motivated the last year of social unrest in Brazil. Brazilians are concerned with the durable, perhaps even intractable, issues that their country faces like corruption, education, healthcare, violence, and insecurity. Of these chief concerns, the results above suggest that broad perceptions of corruption and a poor quality education system are the main catalysts for the crowds of mostly young, single, educated protest participants. International events like the Confederations Cup of 2013, the World Cup of this year, and the Olympic Games of 2016 (to be held in Rio de Janeiro) all tend to call greater attention to these systemic problems, as well as to provide a platform for citizens to demand action to address these issues. Importantly, at least regarding their concerns with corruption and poor quality education services, Brazilian protesters appear to be representing and giving voice to the concerns of many non-protesting Brazilians as well.

These findings also suggest that elected officials and political leaders in Brazil may continue to face significant unrest for some time to come. After all, once the World Cup is over, the systemic grievances of protesters will remain unresolved. Fully addressing the problem of corruption and the structure of the nation's public education system will require more than quick-fix presidential decrees. Given that recent events have begun to increase the presidential election year drama surrounding what had until recently been seen as the inevitable reelection of Brazil's incumbent president, Dilma Rousseff, it seems highly unlikely that the reform legislation that is necessary to address the deeper systemic roots of these problems will emerge from a politicized Brazilian Congress whose members are shifting into campaign mode for their own concurrent reelection efforts. What is more, unless this year's presidential and legislative elections are able to renew the citizenry's faith

[19] The likelihood of protest participation for respondents who cited corruption or poor quality education is not statistically different from respondents who cited insecurity as the top concern because of a lack of statistical power given the number of respondents in each group. Even so, citing corruption or poor quality schools as the top problem is still more substantively meaningful in terms of predicting protest participation.

in the Brazilian political system, the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro will likely once again serve as both a spark and high-profile stage for further protests.

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Appendix

Table A1. Predictors of Protest Participation in Brazil, 2014

	Coefficients	(t)
South	-0.322*	-2.47
Southeast	-0.327*	-2.06
Center-West	-0.078	-0.58
North	-0.283*	-2.25
Urban	0.229	1.61
Quintiles of Wealth	0.157	1.08
Woman	0.112	1.03
Internet Usage	-0.023	-0.13
Single	0.369*	2.81
Years of Education	0.559*	3.21
Age (Years)	-0.491*	-2.61
Community Participation	0.365*	3.11
System Support	-0.057	-0.43
External Efficacy	0.030	0.26
Internal Efficacy	0.183	1.45
Party Sympathizer	0.195	1.82
Interest in Politics	0.315*	2.85
Gov. Manages Economy Well	-0.193	-1.13
Gov. Combats Corruption	-0.109	-0.65
Sat. Public Schools	-0.065	-0.59
Sat. Roads	-0.219	-1.60
Prob- Other	0.126	0.77
Prob- Education	0.178*	2.23
Prob- Insecurity	0.057	0.38
Prob- Corruption	0.272*	2.25
Prob- Violence	0.001	0.01
Constant	-3.184*	-19.17
F	*4.51*	
No. of cases	*1336*	

* $p<0.05$

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2014

Number 107

Colombians' Views of the FARC as a Political Party

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Executive Summary. The peace negotiations currently underway in Colombia between the Juan Manuel Santos government and the guerilla group known as the FARC are setting the conditions for the eventual electoral participation of FARC ex-combatants, including the opportunity for them to run for office. This *Insights* report examines the attitudes of Colombians towards the FARC's formal participation in the country's political system. In particular, I examine respondents' reactions to a hypothetical electoral victory by a FARC ex-combatant in the 2015 local elections. While a majority disapprove of such an outcome, I find that those more satisfied with Colombian democracy and those in favor of peace negotiations are more likely to accept the election of a FARC ex-combatant. These findings could offer a path for the eventual acceptance by most Colombians of the FARC as a legitimate political organization in the post-conflict Colombian system.

The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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In Colombia, democracy and war have coexisted for decades (Nasi 2007). On the one hand, Colombian democracy is one of Latin America's most stable political systems, with uninterrupted, regularly held, largely free and fair elections for the past several decades (Peeler 1985). On the other hand, Colombia has one of the longest running guerrilla movements, with the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) violently opposing the government since the 1960s. On the heels of a particularly violent period in this conflict during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Colombian government began peace negotiations with the FARC in late 2012. As part of these negotiations, the government has created a pathway for FARC ex-combatants to form a political organization and run candidates for office, beginning at the municipal level.

Figure 1. Acceptance of the hypothetical victory of the FARC in the 2015 local elections



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP. 2013: Colombia v1.

In 2013, the AmericasBarometer[1] Colombian survey included an oversample in some of the municipalities most affected by the decades-long conflict between the FARC and the government.[2] In both the national and oversample surveys, respondents were asked several questions about their views of the peace negotiations, the possible political participation of FARC ex-combatants, and the appropriate path for reaching an agreement with this guerrilla group. This *Insights*[3] report examines the data from these items in an effort to better understand the public's receptivity to the incorporation of FARC as a legitimate political organization in the Colombian system, and who among these respondents is most likely to accept an electoral victory by an ex-combatant. To this end, I analyze responses to the following question:

COLESPA8. If in the next local elections, which are in 2015, a FARC ex-combatant is elected as mayor of your municipality, what would you do? 1) Would accept the results; 2) Would not accept the results.[4]

This question taps a critical feature of a truly democratic system in a post-conflict Colombia. Widespread acceptance of electoral outcomes as just and legitimate is a hallmark of any democratic system. Thus understanding the extent to which Colombians would accept a result with which they might not agree is an essential step in evaluating the chances for a

[1] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency. The LAPOP study in Colombia is conducted by Observatorio de la democracia, Universidad de los Andes.

[2] In 2013, the national survey is divided into two samples. The first one is a nationally representative sample of 1,517 adults from 47 municipalities covering all regions. The second one is a sample of 1,505 adults from 63 municipalities, representative of conflict regions. Full results can be found at: http://www.obsdemocracia.org/fileman/files/INFORMES%20COL/2013/Primera%20Encuesta%20Nacional%20sobre%20el%20Proceso%20de%20Paz.pdf

[3] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php

[4] The non-response rate for this question is 13.5%.

relatively smooth transition to a post-conflict democracy.

Figure 1 reveals that a slight majority of those interviewed (53.7%) in the national sample would not accept the results if a FARC ex-combatant were to win a local election. In contrast, I find that in the oversampled conflict areas, a significantly lower percentage of respondents (45.5%) were opposed to such an electoral outcome.[5] In other words, those living in areas most affected by the conflict with the FARC seem to be somewhat more open to pursuing a path that would allow the FARC to become a legitimate player in Colombia's democracy than Colombians living outside the conflict zones.

Figure 2. Preference for a Negotiated Solution with the Guerrillas Over Time



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2013; Colombia v1.

The Determinants of Support for the Democratic Incorporation of the FARC

This section describes the peace negotiations and the attitudes of Colombians regarding the possible paths toward resolution of the conflict. Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer has examined the attitudes of Colombians about the conflict between the guerillas, the government, and anti-guerilla paramilitary groups. Figure 2 reveals a decline in support for a negotiated end to the conflict in 2010.[6] Citizen support for a negotiated peace peaked in 2005 during the height of then president Alvaro Uribe's military campaign against the guerillas.

Notwithstanding the 2010 decline, there remains throughout most of the survey period majority support for a negotiated peace, suggesting that more Colombians than not see the merits of a negotiated approach to ending the conflict.

The 2013 survey provides further evidence of this support for a negotiated resolution to the conflict. When Colombians were asked about the negotiation process under current President Juan Manuel Santos, close to 60% of respondents in the areas most heavily affected by the conflict supported the idea of negotiating with the guerrillas. Support for this strategy was once again somewhat lower in the national sample (53%), yet still a majority.[7]

In an effort to avoid endless negotiations on a long list of issues, Santos' plan has been to narrow the negotiation agenda to only five core issues, plus one operational item of how to implement what has been agreed to. Specifically, these substantive topics are land tenure and rural development; political participation of the FARC; end of the conflict (transitional justice, disarmament, demobilization); solution to the problem of illicit drugs; and reparations to victims. In November 2013, the topic of dealing with the possible political participation of the FARC and guarantees for the political

[5] I run the difference of proportions test to confirm significance. The positive and significant z value (11.74) tells us respondents in oversample are more likely to accept the results than respondents in the national sample.

[6] **COLPAZ1A**. Among the following options to end the conflict with the guerrillas, which is the best? 1. Negotiating. 2. Use military power. 3. Both.

[7] **COLPROPAZ1.** The government of Juan Manuel Santos is leading peace talks with the FARC. To what extent do you support this process? Scale 1-7, where 1 is "not at all" and 7 is "A lot".

opposition was approved by negotiators. The special Colombian AmericasBarometer survey of 2013 included several questions regarding the attitudes of Colombians towards opening opportunities for the political participation of FARC combatants. The first of these questions asked respondents the extent to which they agree with the idea that the government should guarantee the opportunity for formal political participation to FARC ex-combatants.[8] The next question asked about the possibility of reserving seats in the Congress for members of the FARC as part of the agreements.[9] Finally, the survey included two items that asked on a scale from 1 to 10 if Colombians would approve of the FARC being allowed to form their own political party[10] and putting forward candidates in the 2015 elections.[11]

Figure 3 shows the basic results from these items in 2013 AmericasBarometer survey. We find that the views of many Colombians toward the formal political incorporation of the FARC are decidedly negative. In 2013, over 70% of Colombians disagree with the basic idea of allowing the FARC to participate in Colombian politics. Similarly high numbers of respondents disapproved of the three other scenarios offered in the survey items. But we still do not know who among Colombians are most likely to support such a path. It is to this question that I turn in the next section.

Accepting the FARC into Colombia's Democracy

According to Przeworski (1991: 12), a democracy is a system of institutionalized uncertainty in which "actors . . . know what is possible and likely but not what will happen." This uncertainty allows all political actors the hope of winning in the future, and thus incentivizes them to accept losing in the present. Identifying, then, the characteristics of those Colombians who would accept the electoral results if a FARC ex-combatant were the winner of local elections is an important step in assessing the prospects for more widespread acceptance of this possibility in the future.

Even though previous works have explored the role of winners and losers in democracies (Anderson, et al. 2005), we know very little about how this research might apply in a context of a post-conflict transition. I put forth three factors I posit are theoretically important in explaining who might support the electoral incorporation of the FARC. First, those respondents most supportive of democracy in general and democratic values should be more likely to support the political participation of the FARC, even if it were to mean a FARC electoral victory.

Second, and perhaps more intuitively, those individuals who self-identify on the left on a left-right ideology scale would seem more likely to be willing to accept a FARC victory. Third, an individual with direct, personal experience with the conflict will also likely support the political inclusion of the FARC as a more peaceful and productive strategy of ending the conflict once and for all.

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[8] **COLCONCE4**. The Colombian government ought to guarantee FARC excombatants the possibility to participate in politics. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

[9] **COLCONCE5.** The Colombian government should open spaces for political representation (for example having seats in Congress) to some FARC excombatants. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

[10] Thinking about the possibility that the demobilization of the FARC , I am going to read to you some actions that FARC excombatants could do for achieving their political goals. Please tell me to what extent you would approve or disapprove that FARC excombatants would take the following actions:
COLESPA1. Creating a political party. Do you approve or disapprove?

[11] **COLESPA2.** Running candidates in the local elections in 2015 (for mayor and municipal councils).

Figure 3. Attitudes toward FARC's Political Participation, 2013



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2013; Colombia v1.

For a test of the first proposition regarding pro-democratic attitudes and acceptance of a FARC electoral victory, I use the standard AmericasBarometer measures[12] of support for democracy,[13] satisfaction with democracy,[14] and political tolerance. I expect those individuals who believe that democracy is the best system of government, and those satisfied with its operation in Colombia are more likely to accept the results of the democratic game. In a similar sense, those who are more politically tolerant should be more likely to accept because they are willing to accept the basic rights and civil liberties of groups whose viewpoints differ from their own (Seligson 2002, 45-46).

Previous research has found that citizens who are strongly supportive of their political system tend to be more likely to engage in and support conventional forms of political participation such as voting and forming a political party (Norris, 2002:30; Booth and Seligson, 2009). Therefore, individuals with high levels of system support in Colombia should be more inclined to accept electoral results favoring a FARC ex-combatant candidate than those Colombians with low levels of system support.

[12] The following variables are recoded from 0 to 100.

[13] **ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

[14] **PN4.** And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in country?

Moving to the second proposition, the FARC was originally inspired by leftist ideas and agrarian reform (Pizarro Leongómez 2011). Accordingly, individuals who more closely identify with the left on a left-right scale should also be more likely to accept the election of a FARC member in 2015.

Finally, someone who has had direct experience with the armed conflict should also be more likely to accept the election of a FARC candidate. Even though most municipalities in Colombia have suffered in one form or another from the armed conflict, there is great variation in the intensity and influence of the FARC across the country (García y Hoskin 2003).[15] The FARC have operated mostly in the countryside and jungles of the southeastern region of the country. In these areas, the FARC has been able to generate some measure of support among civilians (García 2007; Nasi 2007). Therefore, individuals living in rural areas and those surveyed in the oversampled conflict areas may be more inclined to accept an electoral victory by a FARC ex-combatant. In contrast, those with limited exposure to the actual conflict may be more demanding in the conditions under which they would accept the political participation of ex-combatants.

Additionally, age and education level should affect the probability of accepting such electoral results in 2015. Older, more educated individuals tend, on average, to be committed to the democratic rules of the game (Seligson 2007) and therefore more supportive of a democratic solution to the conflict, even if it means the election of a FARC candidate. I include wealth and gender but have no clear expectations regarding how these variables may affect one's views toward a hypothetical FARC electoral victory.

Figure 4. Determinants of Accepting the Hypothetical Victory of the FARC in Local Elections: Demographics, Conflict Circumstances, and Democratic Attitudes



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2013; Colombia v1.

I also include an item that asked respondents if they have a relative that has been a victim of the conflict. As with wealth and gender, I do not have a priori expectations for this item. Direct experience with the violence in the form of the loss of a loved one may lead an individual to seek revenge and thus favor a military solution or it may increase her desire to simply end the conflict, even if that means a negotiated resolution.

Figure 4 presents the results of a logistic regression of the model outlined above. To interpret the results of this analysis, when the dot is to the right of the green axis, in Figure 4, the corresponding variable is positively associated with acceptance of a FARC electoral victory in local elections, while when a variable's corresponding dot is to the left of the axis, this indicates a negative relationship with acceptance of a FARC victory. The line crossing each dot represents the 95% confidence interval for each estimate. When the confidence interval does not cross the axis at 0.0, we can be reasonably confident in the particular result. Results in Figure 4 support several of the propositions outlined above. Individuals living in rural areas and older, more educated respondents are more likely to accept a

[15] For an idea of this distribution see the classification developed by CERAC http://www.cerac.org.co/es/infograf%C3%ADa/tipologia-del-conflicto-armado-por-municipios.html

hypothetical FARC victory in local elections. Similarly, individuals supporting the peace negotiations also are willing to accept the possibility of being ruled by a FARC ex-combatant.[16] The probability of accepting the electoral results nearly quadruples when we compare a respondent who does not support the peace negotiations at all to one who is highly supportive of the process, holding all other factors constant.[17] Clearly then, there is a strong connection in the minds of respondents between the overall peace process and such details as the eventual inclusion of the FARC in Colombia's formal political arena.

Individuals with a family member affected by the conflict are not significantly distinct from their counterparts with respect to their views of a possible FARC victory. This null finding is perhaps a product of the fact that violence during the conflict was perpetrated by all sides, so while some respondents with family members victimized by the conflict may have been willing to accept a FARC victory, others may have blamed, and never forgiven, the FARC for what happened to their family.

Finally, individuals supportive of democracy, both in the abstract and with respect to the Colombian system, are significantly more likely to accept a FARC electoral victory at the local level. The predicted probability of accepting the electoral results favoring a FARC ex-combatant changes from 33% to 42% when we compare an individual with low and high levels of support for democracy. The effect of the satisfaction with the Colombian democracy is even greater. The predicted probability of accepting the electoral victory in local elections of a FARC ex-combatant goes from 30% to 49% when we compare an individual with very low levels of satisfaction with democracy to one who is highly satisfied... Counter to my expectations though, neither system support nor political tolerance has an effect on the probability of accepting the electoral victory of a FARC ex-combatant.

Finally, and as expected, those who self-identify on the left were significantly more likely to accept a FARC electoral victory than those who placed themselves on the right side of the scale.

Conclusions

The agreement to conclude the internal conflict is far from complete, as of this writing. With the June 15 re-election of President Santos, it appears that his efforts to push for a negotiated resolution to the conflict have received support from a majority of Colombians. What remains uncertain, however, is the degree to which voters will continue to support this process once confronted with the possibility of the formal inclusion of the FARC in the Colombian political system. The results of my analysis offer a cautionary tale for the president as he begins his second term in office and continues pursuit of a negotiated end to the conflict.

At the general level, as evidenced in Figure 2, a consistent majority of Colombians do indeed support a negotiated resolution. But when we move beyond that general measure of public opinion for Santos' strategy we find a more complicated picture. All four of the charts in Figure 3 highlight the strong level of disapproval among Colombians for several specific proposals that would allow for a FARC political presence in the Colombian system. At the local level, though, when presented with the scenario of a FARC electoral victory, about half of respondents to the 2013 AmericasBarometer survey would accept such an outcome. These somewhat contradictory results suggest that while there still remains quite a bit of resentment and opposition to the FARC, there does exist an underlying willingness among many Colombians, particularly those in conflict zones, to accept a political solution to the conflict, even if it means accepting an electoral victory by the FARC. Not surprisingly, those

[16] As a robustness check, I dropped this variable (**colpropaz1**) and run the model again. Results were substantively the same.

[17] These percentages are predicted probabilities, keeping all the other variables in the model at their means.

most likely to support such a route are those most supportive of democracy as a political system.

Given that the FARC has insisted throughout the negotiation process of having conditions in place for their ultimate participation in the electoral process, the results presented in this *Insights* report represent in many ways the next challenge for the Santos administration in sustaining public support for the peace process. These results, based on public opinion data, suggest that a significant number of Colombians would accept an electoral victory by FARC ex-combatants at the local level, even if they would not fully embrace it.

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Appendix

Table 1. Determinants of Accepting the Hypothetical Victory of the FARC: Demographics, Conflict Circumstances, and Democratic Attitudes (Logistic Regression)

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Areas affected by conflict	0.10	0.06
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.12*	0.05
Rural Area	0.16*	0.05
Female	-0.14*	0.04
Age	0.17*	0.05
Years of Education	0.36*	0.06
Relative was victimized by conflict	0.07	0.05
Approve peace negotiations	0.36*	0.05
Ideology	-0.17*	0.05
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.11*	0.05
Support for Democracy	0.14*	0.05
System Support	-0.11	0.06
Political Tolerance	0.07	0.05
Constant	-0.46	0.07
Number of Observations	*2142*	
** p<0.05*		

Note: Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<0.05 two-tail

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2014

Number 108

The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer Executive Summary

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Abstract. The 2014 LAPOP AmericasBarometer is based on interviews with over 50,000 individuals in 28 countries. This *Insights* report presents the executive summary of our newly published regional report, The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer. In the 2014 round, a special emphasis was placed on issues related to crime and insecurity. In addition, the survey included modules related to the economy, corruption, engagement, local government, democracy, and more. Interested readers can find the full report at our website: www.americasbarometer.org. All data from the AmericasBarometer series are also available at that same website free of charge.

*This *Insights* report presents an Executive Summary that was written with input from authors of chapters in the 2014 AmericasBarometer regional report, in particular Ryan Carlin (Georgia State University), Gregory Love (University of Mississippi), Matthew Singer (University of Connecticut), and Mariana Rodríguez (Vanderbilt University).

The Insights Series is co-edited by Jonathan Hiskey, Mitchell A. Seligson and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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The 2014 AmericasBarometer[1] data and the corresponding regional report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)[2]: we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us though first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas.

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: *citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago* (see Map 1 for average feelings of insecurity in the Americas in 2014). We take this fact as a cornerstone for this report, and devote the first three chapters to an assessment of citizens' experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters to address

Map 1. Feeling of Insecurity by Countries, 2014



topics that are considered "core" to the AmericasBarometer project: citizens' assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues of crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective – across time, countries, and individuals – on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a

[1] Funding for the 2014 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

[2] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
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particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region.

The first three chapters demonstrate a number of ways in which the AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens; political pressures to adjust reports; and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information, such as where the crime took place, and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens' experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighborhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens' experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.

Figure 1. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing, 2014



Chapter 1 of the report documents change over time in the region with respect to citizens' perceptions of and experience with crime and violence. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas,

approximately 1 out of every 3 adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity (see Figure 1 for a country-by-country break down).

Interestingly, average overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010.[3] As with just about any measure we examine in this report, we find important differences within and across countries. For example, with respect to crime victimization, Chapter 1 affirms that in 2014, urban locations are more affected by crime than rural areas and notes significant variation in general rates of crime victimization across countries, with Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Venezuela topping the list. Yet, *types* of crime experienced also vary across countries, which is another nuance examined in Chapter 1. For example, in Argentina burglaries are reported as quite common but extortion (blackmail) and murders are not. Brazil, as another example, ranks toward the top of the list of countries in terms of percentages of individuals reporting problems with burglaries, drug sales, extortion, and murder in their neighborhoods. Nicaragua ranks in the top half of countries on burglaries but registers the lowest reported extortion rates in the region, and El Salvador shows the reverse to be the case, ranking in the top half on extortion rates but at the low end on reported burglaries. While crime victimization in general matters, it is important to keep in mind that the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary significantly according to the contexts in which they live.

One persistent theme in this report is that perceptions of insecurity matter independently from crime victimization. These perceptions and assessments of violence in the neighborhood are fueled by personal experiences *and* by the diffusion of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer we added to our standard module questions asking about safety concerns in locations close to the home and daily routines (given that our data affirm, as noted in Chapter 1, that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives). Specifically, the new questions asked how worried individuals are about safety on public transportation and in schools. Slightly more than 1 out of every 3 individuals across the Americas, on average, reports either a high level of fear for the likelihood of a family member being assaulted on public transportation and/or a high level of concern for the safety of children in school.

[3] The trend over time with respect to perceptions of gangs affecting the neighborhood mirrors that we find for crime victimization: it peaked in 2010 and has receded somewhat in recent years, though still the average individual in the region believe his/her neighborhood is affected to some degree or more by gangs.

Chapter 2 makes the point that negative experiences with crime and heightened insecurities alter individuals' daily behaviors, interactions, and satisfaction with their lives under the status quo. We find overwhelming evidence that crime victimization and concerns about violence and gangs in the neighborhood increase the likelihood that individuals avoid certain routes that are perceived to be dangerous and, as well, increase the likelihood that individuals organize with neighbors in response to a fear of crime (see Figure 2 for cross-country percentages in organizing with neighbors for 2014).

Figure 2. Percent of Individuals Having Organized with Neighbors in Their Community out of Fear of Crime across the Americas in 2014



Across the region on average, 2 out of every 5 individuals avoids walking through certain parts of their neighborhood for fear of crime. On the one hand this set of findings demonstrates that individuals proactively seek out solutions to security challenges facing their countries; on the other hand, acts such as changing one's route and organizing with neighbors can be taxing on individuals, both with respect to the effort they require and the psychological toll they exert as one adapts to life under a cloud of crime and insecurity. We indeed find, in the last analyses in Chapter 2, that many factors related to crime victimization and insecurity depress life satisfaction and increase individuals' motivations to leave the country.

What about the effect of crime and insecurity on individuals' political evaluations and preferences? Chapter 3 takes up this topic, focusing on the extent to which citizens of the Americas perceive the state as effectively upholding its charge to provide citizen safety and the rule of law. The chapter begins with a focus on law enforcement efforts at the local level. We find that poor assessments of police effectiveness in the neighborhood are quite common: nearly 1 out of 2 individuals, on

average, expresses dissatisfaction with local police performance and more than 1 out of 3 individuals report that the police would take more than an hour to respond to an average home burglary or not respond at all. Turning to evaluations at the national level, we find that in 2014, trust in courts and in the justice system have decreased to their lowest points in the past decade (see Figure 3). Perceptions of neighborhood insecurity matter significantly for satisfaction with local police efforts and, as well, for evaluations of national government capacity to effectively provide for citizen safety and maintain the rule of law. Concerns with impunity also increased in 2014, reversing a trend by which confidence in the justice system punishes the guilty had been increasing since 2006 for the region on average. Our findings show that insecurity and lack of confidence in the judicial system have important costs for incumbent political leaders.

Figure 3. Average Trust in the National Police, Courts, and Justice System over Time



In the face of rising insecurity and deficits in the perceived effectiveness of law enforcement, courts, and the broader justice system, we find that a majority viewpoint in the region is one that prefers a punitive approach to deter crime. This preference for "hardline" techniques to confront issues of crime and violence increased significantly on average in the region between 2012 and 2014. The importance of confidence in the justice system to punish the guilty (that is, to assure against impunity) is highlighted in several analyses in Chapter 3, which document that crime victims with no or little confidence in the justice system are more supportive of punitive policies (as well as more military involvement in the fight against crime) than those who express higher evaluations of the justice system. We look not only at support for government policies to combat crime, but also at citizen support for circumventing the law and taking matters "into their own hands." Responses to this question give us insight into support for vigilante justice. We find that support for "taking the law into one's own hands" remains low on average for the Latin American and Caribbean region, but nonetheless increased significantly in 2014 compared to previous years (see Figure 4).

Chapter 3 concludes by highlighting a number of factors that individuals should take into consideration when anticipating, developing, or attempting to steer government responses to issues of crime and violence in the region. In particular, we note that despite the considerable rethinking by academics and policymakers of some hardline approaches to crime and violence, support for such tactics remains high among the mass public and in particular among those who are more insecure, are younger, and have lower levels of education.

Figure 4. Average Support for Vigilante Justice in the Americas, 2004-2014



As indicated, Chapters 4 through 7 focus on the broader set of standard dimensions of democratic governance typically considered part of the core thematic focus of the AmericasBarometer project: the economy, corruption, local government, and democratic values and support. In our analyses of these topics we considered not only major developments and notable findings for the region as a whole and over time, but we also considered the relevance of crime and violence to these dimensions.

Chapter 4 focuses on economic trends in the region and notes divergence between objective indicators of household wealth and subjective perceptions of households' financial situations. Objectively, the 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in the Americas own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals; those who are less educated; individuals with darker skin tones; and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey. Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure.

Chapter 4 also looks beyond citizens' personal finances and details how they assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively than it was in recent waves of the survey. Citizen evaluations of the national economy are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Citizen views of the national economy are also weighed down by the security situation in their given country: individuals who live in high crime areas judge national economic performance more harshly.

Figure 5. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Is Sometimes Justifiable?, 2014



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.GM14_0912

Corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. Chapter 5 shows that 1 in 5 people in an average country was asked to pay a bribe in the past year. While several countries saw corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by levels of corruption victimization increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in most previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools, health clinics, and workplaces. Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe; while we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance.

Given the frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes, it is not surprising that many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one bright spot in Chapter 5 is the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally

be justified (see Figure 5). This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So, while high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business.

Figure 6. Trust in Local Government over Time



It is typically the case that the level at which most citizens interact with their government is local. In Chapter 6 we examine political participation in municipal government; evaluations of local services; and citizens' trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals with the greatest and least satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase since 2012 in citizens' evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on local services. On average local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease since 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores are in the middle of the scale.

With regard to trust in local governments the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds a more pessimistic pattern. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004 (see Figure 6). Andean and Caribbean countries along with Brazil have some of the lowest levels of trust in local government in the region, while Venezuela saw the largest drop in trust

between 2012 and 2014 (59.4 to 50.2). The factors that most strongly predict an individual's trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance. We found no differences in trust among people often more marginalized in the Americas, women and people with darker skin tones (in comparison to men and those with lighter skin tones, respectively).

Our comparative report concludes with an assessment of the state of democratic legitimacy and democratic values in the Americas. Under this rubric, Chapter 7 considers support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures of democratic legitimacy. Of special emphasis in this chapter is on the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this chapter permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy with an eye to one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy's legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only somewhat. The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. But since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. Intriguingly, the ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time since our 2012 study. Among law-and-order institutions – armed forces, national police, and the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. Levels of trust in the armed forces and national police institutions appear most volatile where these institutions have recently played highly visible roles in maintaining public order. Individuals whose neighborhoods are increasingly insecure are losing trust in the police and courts. Law and order

institutions, it seems, must earn the public's trust by successfully providing the key public goods of safety and justice.

System support – the inherent value citizens place in the political system – fell in 2014 (see Map 2 for average system support in the Americas in 2014). Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system's ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. Even within the two-year window between 2012 and 2014, several cases exhibit wide swings in support. The results of our analyses suggest system support in the Americas reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system's ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. These contradictory results may signal a desire to insulate a high-performing system from those who denounce it. They nevertheless imply a Catch-22: improving governance may at once enhance the political system's legitimacy but lower political tolerance. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance).

Map 2. System Support in the Americas, 2014



AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2014

Number 109

Political Tolerance Declines in Panama

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Executive Summary. As Panama marks 25 years since the United States military invaded the country, this AmericasBarometer *Insights* report explores the levels and determinants of political tolerance. Tolerance—in theory and in practice—is an important democratic value. Our analysis indicates that political tolerance in Panama has declined significantly since 2004, and that partisanship and system support are the key determinants. While the country has made positive advances toward democratic rule, the evidence presented here reflects a worrying erosion in the political culture of democracy in Panama.

This Insights report was co-edited by Matthew Layton and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
www.AmericasBarometer.org

On December 20, 1989 United States military forces invaded Panama with the stated goal of removing General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power and establishing a democratic regime. Twenty five years later, Panama's political system has made significant strides toward democracy. Five free and competitive national elections, all won by a candidate representing a party out of power, have solidified the country's electoral system. A successful demilitarization process transformed the politicized and powerful Panamanian Defense Forces into a civilian-controlled national police force. The transfer of the Panama Canal and its successful management by Panamanians established sovereignty over the country's most important asset. Furthermore, investment in infrastructure projects such as the expansion of the Panama Canal has led to a decade of extraordinary economic growth (see Pérez, 2011). However, problems such as corruption, weak and inefficient judicial institutions, and unequal distribution of economic growth remain as significant impediments to democratic consolidation. In addition, evidence from the *AmericasBarometer*[1] indicates that the political culture of democracy in Panama has deteriorated since the invasion.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been conducting surveys in Panama since the early 1990s. The first survey, conducted through an urban sample of 500 Panama City residents in 1991, showed significant levels of political tolerance and support for democracy among elites and the mass public. For example, the average level of political tolerance in 1991 among the mass public was a mean of 71 as measured by the LAPOP 0-100 tolerance scale (see Pérez, 1996).[2] Panama remained a part of the LAPOP surveys when the *AmericasBarometer* began in 2004. This *Insights* report[3] shows a precipitous decline in political tolerance as the country marks 25 years since the United States military invasion of Panama.

Figure 1. Political Tolerance Declines in 2014



[1] Funding for the 2014 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

[2] Tolerance is measured by an index based on the following questions: D1. There are people who always speak badly of Panama's form of government, not only the current administration, but the kind of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of these peoples' right to vote? D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their points of view? D3. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people can run for public office? D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that these people appear on television to give speeches? Individuals respond to each question on a 1-10 scale; the questions are combined into a composite scale that is coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates the lowest level of tolerance and 100 indicates the highest.

[3] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php

Tolerance, both in the abstract and in practice, is fundamental to democracy. A key distinction that sets democracy apart from totalitarian regimes is that it requires tolerance of political diversity from its citizens and leaders.

Without tolerance majority rule degenerates into a tyranny that imposes on citizens an oppressive yoke of uniformity in opinion and action. Therefore, tolerance—defined as the willingness to extend democratic rights and privileges to those whom we find most objectionable—is a critical component of democratic values and belief systems.

LAPOP measures political tolerance with a composite indicator, based on a set of questions that ask survey respondents to indicate the extent to which they support extending basic political rights to regime dissidents – that is, to those who criticize the [Panamanian] political system itself, not simply its incumbent government.[4] Figure 1 shows mean levels of political tolerance since 2004. Tolerance levels have declined by 50% from a high of 65 points in 2004 to a low of 32 in 2014. Particularly concerning is the decline of nearly 20 points between 2012 and 2014.

Figure 2 shows the comparative results for political tolerance among the countries of the 2014 *AmericasBarometer*. The recent decline in tolerance places Panamanians next to last among all countries surveyed in 2014. The score for Panama is less than half of those for the United States and Canada, the countries at the top of the rankings. Only Guatemala exhibits levels of political tolerance lower than Panama in 2014.

These results raise the question of why Panamanians express such low levels of tolerance. While a definitive answer to that question is beyond this *Topical Brief*, we are able to explore empirically the factors that statistically impact the levels of tolerance in 2014. Figure 3 shows graphically[5] the results of a regression analysis with the index of political tolerance as the dependent variable, and a number of socio-demographic and attitudinal factors as independent variables. None of the demographic variables, including education,[6] gender,[7] and wealth,[8] are statistically



[4] See footnote 2 for details on the tolerance series.

[5] The independent variables are shown on the vertical axis. Statistical significance is graphically represented by the confidence intervals that do not overlap the vertical line "0" (within the 95% confidence level). When the point, which represents the expected impact of this variable, is situated to the right of the vertical line "0", this indicates a positive relationship while if it is located on the left, this indicates a negative contribution (See Appendix for table with regression coefficients).

[6] Education is measured as the last year of formal schooling.

[7] Gender is classified 0 = men, 1 = women.

[8] Wealth is measured as quintiles of wealth based on possession of capital goods.

significant.[9] Support for political parties and the political system are significant factors.

Support for political parties is measured by a series of dummy variables[10] that distinguish among respondents who express support for the three major political parties in Panama: *Cambio Democrático (*CD*)*, *Panameñista*, and *Partido Revolucionario Democrático* (PRD).[11] Non-identifiers are excluded from the analysis, but a robustness check affirms that the results reported here remain the same than if non-identifiers are included as a separate category in the analysis. CD was the governing party under former President Ricardo Martinelli (2009-2014). The *Panameñista* party won the May 4th, 2014 presidential elections, and thus currently governs Panama. The PRD is the party founded in the 1970s by the military-led regime, which governed the country from 1994-1999 and 2004-2009.





Figure 4 shows the relationship between support for a political party and political tolerance. Supporters of the CD and *Panameñista* parties express less political tolerance than those of the PRD. The national average is 32.1 on a scale of 0-100. PRD supporters are 6 points above the national average and the difference with supporters of the other two parties is statistically significant.

The regression analysis also shows that citizens who support the political system[12] are more likely to express higher levels of political tolerance; figure 5 shows the relationship between support for the political system and tolerance levels.

[9] If we run a basic model with only size of place, wealth, gender, age, and level of education, we also find that none of these variables are significant predictors.

[10] When using dummy variables we must assign one as the reference category. In this case the PRD is the reference category.

[11] The number of respondents who report that they support other parties is sufficiently small that one cannot draw reliable conclusions.

[12] System legitimacy is measured by a scale of support using five questions measured initially by a 1-7 scale, which was transformed to a 0-100 scale for purposes of the analysis. The questions are the following: B1. To what extent do you trust that the courts in [country] guarantee a just trial? B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of [country]? B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are protected by the political system in [country]? B4. To what extent are you proud to live under the political system of [country]? B6. To what extent do you think the political system of [country] should be supported?

Panamanians who express high levels of system support express higher levels of political tolerance by 8 points, and the difference is statistically significant. Thus, an attitude of system support is associated with a high level of political tolerance, a key democratic value, which is encouraging for democratic development in Panama.

However, the overall low levels of political tolerance, and particularly the steep decline over time, are signs of trouble for Panama's democratic political culture. Education and other demographic variables do not appear to influence levels of tolerance. The fact that higher levels of education are not conducive to higher levels of tolerance is particularly troubling for the future of democracy in Panama. The results presented here indicate that partisan affiliation is a key factor in determining levels of political tolerance. Supporters of CD and the *Panameñista* parties are significantly less tolerant of those who express opposition to the political system exercising basic democratic rights. Intolerance toward opponents of the system undermines a fundamental prerequisite for democratic governance. Support for the ability of the opposition to express and exercise basic democratic rights is essential for a democracy to thrive.

Twenty-five years after the United States invaded Panama, the country has made significant strides toward establishing democratic governance. However, the results of the 2014 *AmericasBarometer* provide evidence that the political culture of democracy has eroded in at least one important way over the past ten years, as seen in the significant decline of political tolerance.

Figure 5. Political Tolerance and System Support



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Appendix

Table 1. Determinants of Political Tolerance, 2014

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Education	-0.068	(-1.45)
Age	-0.044	(-1.08)
Gender	-0.016	(-0.38)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.035	(-0.62)
Size of Place	-0.040	(-0.63)
Ideology	0.014	(0.24)
Interpersonal Confidence	0.078	(1.86)
Participated in Protests	0.004	(0.12)
Interest in Politics	0.051	(1.08)
Support for the System	0.150*	(2.38)
Support for CD Party	-0.182*	(-3.69)
Support for Panameñista Party	-0.108*	(-2.15)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
Number of Observations	568	
** p<0.05*		

Note: Coefficients are statistically significant at *p<0.05 two-tail

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AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2015

Number 110

Public Health Services Use in Latin America and the Caribbean

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Executive Summary. This *Insights* report examines individual-level factors that predict the use of public health services in 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries, which were surveyed via the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Across the region, there is significant variation in the percentage of citizens who access public health services. I find that women, those with a greater number of children, those living in rural areas, those who receive government assistance, and those who are poorer are more likely to use public health services. In addition, those who engage in their societies in other ways (e.g., voting) are more likely to access health services. Further, satisfaction with public health services is significantly related to public health care access: those who are more satisfied with its quality are more likely to access a public health service. These findings highlight important factors that governments might take into account when considering improvements to public health care access.

This Insights report was co-edited by Matthew Layton, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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The provision of public healthcare services is an important function for many governments. The availability of public health services plays a key role in ensuring the health-related wellbeing of citizens. Moreover, the public health sector is one of the many tangible services provided by the government that citizens can evaluate, thereby shedding light on one aspect of the government's effectiveness. Prior research has shown that countries in some parts of the Americas fare poorly in comparison with other regions worldwide in terms of equitable outcomes in public health systems (Wallace and Gutiérrez 2005, 394).

A first step to understanding the public's relationship to government-provided healthcare services in the Americas is to assess the characteristics of individuals who currently are more likely to use public health services. Such an analysis can identify factors that governments can consider when seeking to bolster citizen access to these services as part of any effort to extend or improve government provision of social services.

In this *Insights* report[1], I present an analysis of the factors that predict reported citizen usage of public health services. Using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey[2], I focus my research and analyses on the following question, asked of 39,246[3] respondents in 23 countries[4]:

Figure 1. Percent Accessing Public Health Services, 2014



EXC15: Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?

Figure 1 shows the percentages of people who report using public health services over the last twelve months in 23 countries, based on the

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[2] Funding for the 2014 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

[3] **EXC15** is a two-part question. The first part is shown and analyzed here. The second part asks about bribe solicitation and is only asked of those who respond "yes" to the first part (that is, the filter). I code as health care users those who continued on to answer the bribery question (that is, those who say "yes" to the first part of EXC15) and I code as non-users those who did not continue on to answer the bribery question. I exclude respondents who indicated that they did not know or did not answer the bribery question.

[4] For the purposes of this analysis, which specifically examines the Latin American and Caribbean regions, I omit data from the United States and Canada. This decision is typical of many *Insights* reports. At the time of writing this report, data from three countries included in the 2014 AmericasBarometer were not yet available for analysis.

2014 AmericasBarometer. The estimated percentage of citizens using public health services in each respective country is denoted by a dot, and the shaded grey areas indicate the 95% confidence interval around that value. There is significant variation in the percentages of citizens who had recently (in the last year) used public health services: the rates of use range from 66.4% of those surveyed in Venezuela to a mere 29.8% of those surveyed in Trinidad & Tobago. In some ways, the cross-national distribution of responses to this survey question is interesting and perhaps surprising: the figure indicates that 46.6% of those surveyed in Chile, a "high income" country in comparison with the rest of the Latin American region (World Bank 2014a), used public health services, which is nearly identical to the rate of use in Haiti, a "low income" country (World Bank 2014b). Venezuela and Costa Rica are also economically disparate countries with very different political systems, yet their populations' use of public health services is similar at 66.4% and 66.1%, respectively. Despite the cross-national differences, statistical analysis reveals that little of that variation is due to country characteristics.[5] Evidently, there are socioeconomic, demographic, and other individual-level factors that should be explored in order to understand what predicts the use of public health services in Latin American and the Caribbean countries.

Who Uses Public Health Services?

There are a number of individual characteristics that could make one more or less likely to use public health services. In this section, I assess the influence of age, gender, skin tone, urban/rural residence, years of education, and household wealth on the use of public health services.[6]

Previous research suggests that the elderly are more likely to use public health services than those in younger age cohorts because of their greater medical needs (Wallace et al. 2005, 405). McGuire suggests an important connection between women and their children's health (2010, 30). It could thus be expected that on average, women might be more likely to use public health services than men due to their childcare responsibilities, as well as for their own prenatal, childbirth and postnatal care. According to the literature, skin tone[7] is a factor in the Americas that can subject an individual to a significant amount of societal discrimination, potentially having important implications for the use of public health services. Uhlmann et al. find that "preference for light skin and prejudice against dark skin is strongest in Latin America" (2002, 200). Additionally, Perreira and Telles relate the fact that "darker-skinned individuals report poorer physical, mental, and infant health outcomes than lighter-skinned individuals" (2014, 248). The implications of skin-tone are cross-cutting, in that those with darker skin tones might be

[5] Calculating the intraclass correlation shows that only 4.1% of the variance in health services usage is attributable to country-level characteristics; for this reason I focus on individual-level predictors in this report.

[6] Household income is also expected to be a significant predictor of the use of health services according to a broad survey of the literature (Makinen, Waters, Rauch, Almagambetova, Bitran, Gilson, McIntyre, Pannarunothai, Prieto, Ubilla, and Ram 2000; World Bank 2004, 136-137; Regidor, Martínez, Calle, Astasio, Ortega, and Domínguez 2008; Jankovic, Simic, and Marinkovic 2009); however, I focus on household wealth in place of household income because survey respondents tend to be more reluctant to report household income than household assets, leading to significant non-response rates for the income measure. For a more detailed discussion of the formation of the wealth index used as a variable in this report, see Córdova (2009).

[7] This variable is based upon the **COLORR** question in the survey. This measure is unique in that interviewers discretely use a standardized color palette to determine the number on a scale from 1 to 11 that most closely matches the interviewee's skin color, with 1 representing the lightest skin tones and 11 representing the darker skin tones. The question in the survey is: "When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent."

more marginalized[8] and thus less likely to access public services but, at the same time, might face greater needs.

In a study conducted in Greece, researchers found that being located in urban (versus rural) areas provides individuals with a greater availability of public health services (Lahana, Pappa, and Niakas 2011). Thus, it might follow that in Latin America and the Caribbean, the same pattern holds, and a reasonable expectation is that provided with greater sources of public health services, urban residents might be more likely than rural residents to access such services. Jankovic et al. (2009, 394) find that higher levels of education predict use of public health services in their research in Serbia, due to the tendency that education instills in individuals to seek health care when necessary. The same logic could apply to Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, wealth is a variable that previous scholarship suggests can lead to either greater or lesser use of public health services. On the one hand, some research conducted by the World Bank notes that richer groups are associated with higher use of public health services than are poor groups (2004, 136-137). On the other hand, others identify a tendency among wealthier groups towards the private over the public health sector for certain services (World Bank 2004, 136-137; Regidor et al. 2008).

To assess the relevance of these variables – age, gender, skin tone, urban residence, education, and wealth – on access to public health care in the Americas in 2014, I conduct a logistic regression analysis. Figure 2 presents the results. The dots represent estimated standardized coefficients and bars represent the 95% confidence interval for each estimate. If the dot and its corresponding bar fall to the left of the zero line, then the relationship between the independent and dependent variables is interpreted to be both statistically significant and negative; however, if the dot and the bars fall to the right of the zero line, then the relationship between the socioeconomic and demographic predictors and the use of public health services is interpreted to be both positive and statistically significant.

Figure 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors of Use of Public Health Services, 2014



The results show that being female has a positive and statistically significant effect on the use of public health services, consistent with the expectations mentioned above. Age has a similarly positive relationship, consistent with findings noted in previous scholarship, although its effect is not as strong as that of gender. Skin tone is not a significant predictor of the use of public health services, which may confirm that the cross-cutting effects of discrimination and marginalization, on the one hand, and need, on the other hand, cancel each other out on average.

[8] Indigenous identity is a factor that is also important to consider with respect to skin tone, as those who identify as indigenous often have darker skin tones than those who do not identify as such. Those who identify as indigenous are often excluded from many important social services (Lucero 2011); this supports the notion that darker skin tone may be negatively correlated with the use of public health services.

Interestingly, being an urban resident has a negative, statistically significant, effect on the use of public health services in the Americas, which means that those in rural areas are more likely to access public health care services. This result goes against the earlier-stated expectations found in the literature. A possible explanation for the incongruence between those expectations and the results is the notion that those who live in rural settings tend to be poorer; have less ability to seek and additionally less access to private services; and thus have little choice but to use public services when they need to seek health care. An article from *The Economist* discusses the health care landscape in Brazil, in which poorer groups "live in remote rural areas" and "must either pay out of pocket or take their chances in crowded hospital emergency rooms" (Health care in Brazil 2011). However, the article also notes, "private provision mainly covers a rich and young minority" (Health care in Brazil 2011). The article is perhaps microcosmic of the region as a whole. Thus, in the Latin America and Caribbean region, where spending on public health care surpasses that of private health care (Davies and Mazza, 7; Suárez-Berenguela and Vigil-Oliver 2012, 1), it appears that the fact that rural residents are more likely to use public health services than urban residents can be explained by lack of alternative (private) options in rural areas across the Americas.

Also contrary to the expectations derived from my examination of the literature, education is not statistically significant in terms of predicting the use of public health services in the Americas. Household wealth has a comparatively substantial negative and statistically significant relationship with the use of public health services. Likely due to the availability of private options (World Bank 2004, 136-137; Regidor et al. 2008), those who are wealthier are much less likely to access public health services in the Americas than those who are poor.

Additional Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors as Predictors of Use of Public Health Services

In order to further test which factors predict the use of public health services in the Latin America and Caribbean region, I examine four additional individual-level variables and test their relationship with reported use of public health services. These variables are the number of children that an individual has; receipt of government assistance; whether he or she voted; and satisfaction with public health services.

The number of children that an individual has[9] is expected to influence the use of public health services in a positive way, as those with more children are likely to need to seek care more often than those who either have fewer children or do not have children at all.[10] The dependency of children on their parents, especially for health care, would logically influence an individual's need to seek public health services; as McGuire suggests, parents tend to "care for their children in ways that promote health" (2010, 30).

In addition, considering a second variable associated with the need to seek health services, I expect receipt of government assistance[11] to positively correlate with use of public health services, especially given the subsidized nature of public health systems and

[9] The corresponding survey question is **Q12**, which states, "Do you have children? How many?"

[10] There is an additional question in the survey, **Q12Bn**, which states, "How many children under the age of 13 live in this household?" I also tested this variable in place of the **Q12** variable in Figure 2, and the results were nearly identical.

[11] The corresponding survey question is **WF1**: "Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security?" For the purposes of this analysis, I recoded the responses with 0 indicating no welfare received, and 1 indicating welfare is received.

care in the Americas. Conditional cash transfer programs are a form of welfare that is particularly common in Latin America, and receipt of this government aid is actually conditional upon compliance with using certain social services, public health services included (Rawlings 2004, 1).

I also expect indicators of societal engagement to matter. In this case, I examine whether or not a person votes,[12] and I expect it to influence the use of public health services in a positive way. Intuitively, engagement in one aspect of society should translate into participation in other aspects, and if one votes, he or she might be likely to also engage and use social services provided by the government, like public health services.[13]

Finally, I examine the relationship between satisfaction with public health services and access. I expect that satisfaction with public health services[14] might be positively related to the use of public health services, given the fact that if one is satisfied with the public health services available, he or she is more likely to use those services than a dissatisfied individual. However, there is a second way in which such a relationship could be interpreted: it may be that individuals who access public health services find them effective and report greater satisfaction with the quality of those services compared to those who have not had first-hand experience. Given the nature of the analyses in this report, it is only possible to assess whether there is a significant relationship between satisfaction and use, recognizing that such a relationship could be the result of more than one causal process.

Figure 3. The Effect of Individual-Level Factors on the Use of Public Health Services



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.GM04_0912; Country fixed-effects included

Using a logistic regression model similar to that of Figure 2, I test the relationship of the variables just mentioned with use of public health services. The model presented in Figure 3 includes these four new variables in addition to the six variables presented in Figure 2. As before, the dots represent the estimated standardized coefficients and the bars represent the 95% confidence interval for those estimates.

The effects for the gender, skin tone, urban resident, years of education, and quintiles of wealth variables are unchanged with the addition of these four new individual-level factors; however, the effect of age, which was previously statistically significant, is now statistically insignificant, which may suggest that some of its effects are mediated by the variables that are newly included in Figure 3.

Figure 3 reveals that the number of children, consistent with the above expectations, has a

[12] The coding for the voting variable was based on the **VB2** survey question, which reads, "Did you vote in the last presidential election?" The responses were recoded, with 0 indicating that the respondent did not vote, and 1 indicating that the person voted.

[13] McGuire also points out that "considerable evidence is found to suggest that democracy is associated with the more widespread utilization of a range of basic social services" (2010, 51). Thus, it could be that a country-level variable such as the level of democracy may have a positive correlation with access of services such as health care.

[14] **SD6NEW2**, "And the quality of public medical and health services? Are you.." is the survey question from which I recoded the responses. On my scale, 0 indicates dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the quality of public health services, and 1 indicates satisfied or very satisfied.

positive association with the use of public health services. Furthermore, receipt of government assistance, voting, and satisfaction with public health services each have a positive and statistically significant relationship with the use of public health services, also consistent with earlier-stated expectations.

Conclusion

In this report, I use data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer to examine ten individual-level factors that predict the use of public health services in the Americas.

In the Latin America and Caribbean region, women; respondents with (more) children; respondents who reported voting in the last presidential election; recipients of government assistance; and those who are satisfied with public health services are the most likely to use public health services. Conversely, urban residents and the wealthy are among those less likely to use public health services in the Americas. Age, skin tone, and years of education appear to have no statistically significant relationship with the use of public health care.

Urban residents and the wealthy are among those less likely to use public health services in the Americas.

The scope (and, quality) of access to public health services in Latin America and the Caribbean is important, for it is a measure of governmental provision of an important social service. Citizens' experiences with public health care may have important political implications. By attempting to access and using public health services, citizens have one mean by which to evaluate the ability of the government to effectively deliver social services.

If governments wanted to increase the percentage of their citizens using public health services, they might focus their efforts on females and individuals with children, in addition to engaging those already involved in other ways with the government, such as those who vote and those who receive welfare. These types of individuals appear, according to the analyses presented here, as obvious candidates for the use of public health care services in the Americas. On the other hand, the negative relationship of urban residency and wealth to the use of public health services suggests there may be a need to improve the quality of and access to public health services as well.

My results also highlight important questions for future research. In order to further examine other individual-level socioeconomic and demographic factors and their relationship with the use of public health services, it would be worth considering an individual's location within the economy (e.g., formal or informal sector and extent of employment or job security). Such an analysis could provide further insight into the types of groups most likely to use public health services. It would also be interesting to consider whether having to pay a bribe to access health services decreases the likelihood an individual attempts to secure such care. Finally, further research might explore the specific services that individuals are accessing when they use public health services. Such research could provide ways to extend the account of citizen usage of public health care that has been provided here in this report.

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Appendix

Table 1. Predictors of Use of Public Health Services, 2014

	Coefficient	**t**	**Coefficient**	**t**
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.103*	-7.52	-0.082*	-5.88
Years of Education	-0.028	-1.88	0.013	0.86
Urban Resident	-0.054*	-3.46	-0.035*	-2.22
Skin Tone	-0.005	-0.35	-0.027	-1.70
Female	0.247*	22.72	0.245*	21.53
Age (Years)	0.067*	5.32	0.002	0.13
Satisfaction with Public Health Services			0.047*	3.47
Receipt of Government Assistance			0.146*	10.26
Voting			0.080*	6.32
Number of Children			0.132*	8.57
Guatemala	-0.040*	-2.19	-0.034	-1.87
El Salvador	0.031	1.66	0.034	1.84
Honduras	-0.034	-1.74	-0.026	-1.33
Nicaragua	0.038	1.95	0.039*	1.98
Costa Rica	0.122*	6.11	0.125*	6.26
Panama	0.054*	2.69	0.056*	2.72
Colombia	-0.025	-1.20	-0.027	-1.31
Ecuador	0.103*	5.22	0.104*	5.17
Bolivia	-0.025	-0.92	0.011	0.43
Peru	0.111*	4.92	0.110*	4.84
Paraguay	0.047*	2.43	0.053*	2.65
Uruguay	-0.117*	-5.23	-0.078*	-3.47
Chile	-0.028	-1.10	-0.012	-0.47
Brazil	0.093*	4.37	0.096*	4.46
Venezuela	0.133*	5.90	0.137*	6.02
Argentina	0.077*	3.33	0.109*	4.54
Dominican Rep.	0.018	0.89	0.012	0.60
Haiti	-0.069*	-3.41	-0.056*	-2.75
Jamaica	-0.040*	-2.12	-0.024	-1.28
Guyana	-0.062*	-2.97	-0.053*	-2.52
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.272*	-8.41	-0.242*	-7.33
Belize	-0.066*	-3.32	-0.068*	-3.41
Constant	0.005	0.30	0.077*	4.71
F	*44.49*		*44.91*	
Number of Observations	*38,188*		*35,893*	
* p<0.05				

Note: Coefficients with an asterisk are statistically significant at p<0.05, two-tailed.
Country of Reference: Mexico

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2015

Number 111

Political Culture in Costa Rica: Long-term slide continues in attitudes favoring stable democracy

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Executive Summary. The results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer in Costa Rica document a worrisome trend away from a mass public that had largely displayed high levels of attitudes consistent with stable democracy. In assessing two components of a set of attitudes that LAPOP has validated as conducive to democratic stability, we find long-term declines. We also find a recent decline in political tolerance, which we link to partisan conflict that have left their imprint on the Costa Rican public.

This Insights report was co-edited by Daniel Montalvo, Emily Saunders, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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Costa Rica has the longest history of democracy in the Latin American region. However, in recent years, there have been important political changes, including a breakdown of the two-party system, corruption scandals at the highest levels of the political leadership, and a growing discontent of the population with the political elite. Given these changes, one might ask: To what extent do these political changes affect the pillars of Costa Rican democracy, which is so widely admired throughout the world? In this *Insights* report[1] we investigate this question with the most recent data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer,[2] in the context of long-term data.

Figure 1. Attitudes Favorable for Stable Democracy in the Americas



System Support and Political Tolerance

Political legitimacy and political tolerance are two key factors in any functioning democracy, in that they are considered essential for democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1999; Seligson, 2000; Booth and Seligson, 2009). Political legitimacy is also central to the study of political culture and the stability of democracy, allowing us to understand how citizenship is related to the institutions of the state. At the same time, political tolerance is essential for the rights of minorities to be respected. The AmericasBarometer allows us to measure these two dimensions: citizen system support and tolerance for the civil rights and the participation of others.

System support has two principal dimensions: diffuse support and specific support[3] (Easton, 1975; Seligson, 2000). The measurement created by LAPOP and operationalized by the AmericasBarometer captures diffuse support,[4] whose minimum levels are essential for the survival of any of regime (Booth and Seligson, 2009). Political tolerance, for its part, is a fundamental pillar of the survival of a democratic regime. In LAPOP studies, political tolerance is defined as "respect for the political

[1] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[2] Funding for the 2014 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

[3] Traditionally, specific support is measured by questions about the authorities that are in positions of power, while diffuse support refers to a more abstract aspect, for example, the generalized link represented by the political system and those in elected positions.

[4] In addition to the measures of diffuse support, LAPOP provides measures of specific support that are not analyzed in this report.

rights of others by citizens, especially those with whom one may not agree" (Seligson, 2000).

A leading indicator of democratic stability

Over the years of study at LAPOP, we have seen the important effects that system support and political tolerance have on the consolidation and stability of democracy. By combining the index of system support and political tolerance we obtain a leading indicator, "support for stable democracy" (Seligson, 2000; Pérez, Seligson and Booth, 2013). This indicator is based on the fundamental principle that in societies in which the public supports the political system and respects differences, the rules governing political life tend to be respected, and therefore democracy tends to be stable.

Figure 2. Evolution of Favorable Attitudes toward Stable Democracy in Costa Rica 2004-2014



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; Merged 2004-2014 draft 120114

According to this approach, a democracy achieves a high probability of maintaining its democratic stability if the plurality of its citizens—ideally the majority—are those who support the political system and respect the

Figure 3. Evolution of Favorable Attitudes for Stable Democracy in Costa Rica 1978-2014



civil rights of others. In contrast, a system in which there is little system support and low levels of tolerance for the rights of others is one in which there may be willingness to see democracy replaced by with an authoritarian system.

Results

Figure 1 shows the extent to which citizens of the Americas enjoy this combination of favorable attitudes toward democracy.[5] Canada, Uruguay, and the United States have the highest percentages of those surveyed with attitudes favoring democratic stability on the continent, while Peru, Panama, and Guatemala have the lowest. Costa Rica holds the fifth highest position in the hemisphere; the percentage of citizens who combine high system support with high tolerance is 29%.

Despite this relatively high ranking in the context of the Americas, the question is, how has the percentage of Costa Ricans with favorable attitudes toward stable democracy evolved over time? Figure 2 shows the values obtained for this indicator 2004-2014. The data series reflects a decline (although not statistically significant) between 2012-2014. Between 2004 and 2010 the values remained relatively stable at around 45%, but in 2012 and again in 2014, the index fell to its lowest level throughout the entire series, falling below 30%. Over the last 10 years, attitudes that support a stable democracy have fallen to what is, for Costa Rica, worrisome levels, reflecting the deterioration of politics that has impacted public institutions and, as is evidenced by these data, in turn has had negative effects on key democratic values among the population. In an analysis of the last 36 years, we find the percentage of the population with high system support and high tolerance has been reduced by half, comparing current data to data from the late seventies and early eighties (Figure 3).

Figure 4. Determinants of Attitudes Conducive of Stable Democracy in Costa Rica



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; Merged 2004-2014 draft 120114

Figure 5. Evolution of Political Tolerance in Costa Rica



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; Merged 2004-2014 draft 120114

[5] See questions in the Appendix.

The data from 2014 demonstrates a new, marginal decline in the percentage of Costa Ricans with attitudes that support stable democracy. In our analyses, we find that this decrease is due to the increase in the percentage of individuals who have lower democratic values, namely those with high system support and low tolerance. In other words, Costa Ricans by the middle of the second decade of the twenty first century remain somewhat supportive of their political system, but are less tolerant of their opponents (see Figure 5 below). The combination of these factors can undermine the principles of coexistence of citizens in democracy and can create tensions that could ultimately destabilize the system.

The factors that influence this indicator of stable democracy[6] in the case of Costa Rica is examined in Figure 4, which presents the results of a logistic regression (with standardized coefficients). The level of wealth, education, and support for democracy are, according to this analysis, the main significant determinants of this indicator: all of these factors are significantly and positively related to attitudes that favor a stable democracy. At the same time, a positive perception of the work of the president diminishes the probability that an individual will fall into the "stable democracy" category.

The decline of political tolerance is the determining factor in explaining the decrease in the percentage of stable democrats in Costa Rica.[7] As Figure 5 shows, tolerance declined again in 2014, reaching its lowest level across the entire period analyzed. This decrease was approximately 20 points in comparison to the 2010 value (when we observe the highest level of the series) and 6 points below the figure reported in 2012.

Figure 6. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Costa Rica



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; Costa Rica 2014 120114 v1

Observing the descent, it is pertinent to inquire about the factors that explain this attitude. Figure 6 presents a linear regression model (with standardized coefficients) to address this question. The analysis reveals the common finding in studies of tolerance, namely that the wealthier and more educated express higher levels of tolerance. But these factors are basically constant across time, and therefore cannot explain the decline.

The decrease of reported tolerance could be explained perhaps by a unique set of circumstances. In this instance, in response to a resurgence in the polls of an ideological leftist party, the *Frente Amplio*, in the first two months of the campaign season (during the period October and November of 2013) for the

[6] The variable "attitudes conducive to stable democracy" is dichotomous in that the values equal to 100 correspond to cases of individuals who possess both high system support and high system tolerance; and the values that equal 0 correspond to individuals who possess any other of combination of these factors (for example, high system support combined with low tolerance). In addition, it excludes cases of missing values.

[7] In this regard, it is important to mention that even though system support suffered a considerable decline in 2012, the 2014 AmericasBarometer data show that in 2014 these levels returned to the average levels of the last decade, 2004-2014. This is why the most important explanation in the decrease of people in this category of stable democracy is due to low tolerance and not a problem with system support in 2014.

presidential election in February of 2014, many of his opponents categorized candidate José María Villalta as a "communist" and aired several commercials in which they referred to the candidates of the *Frente Amplio* as "Chavistas" and implied their political platform was similar to that of Venezuela. This strategy created a sector of the electorate that saw the *Frente Amplio* as anti-system, yielding a situation in which *Frente Amplio* supporters were met with intolerance among some in Costa Rica. To test this hypothesis, we examine the 2014 data and find that the main opponents of the *Frente Amplio* (the supporters of the PLN party) express lower tolerance levels compared to supporters of the *Frente Amplio* party. This result is expressed in a regression analysis captured in Figure 6. According to the raw 2014 AmericasBarometer data, supporters of *Frente Amplio* reported almost 20 points higher on tolerance (59 versus 41) than those who supported the PLN candidate and 11 points more than those who supported the Libertarian Party candidate (59 versus 48). These data show how perception of an anti-system candidate can produce, in the short term and in the context of an electoral campaign, declines in one of the pillars of citizen support of the democratic political system.

Over the last 36 years, the percentage of the population with high system support and high tolerance has been reduced by half.

Conclusion

Compared to other nations in Latin America and the Caribbean, Costa Rica has a political culture that stands out for its high support for democracy. Nevertheless, if it is compared with its own scores over the last three decades, the tendency of decline in such support over the long term is evident and occurs in a context of great political transformation, one that brought the end of traditional bi-partisan rule, and the election of a new party—*Acción Ciudadana*—to the presidency in 2014. Democratic consolidation combined with significant economic and social achievements in the second half of the 20th century have turned this small nation into a unique case of deep democratic stability. However, over the last decade, dissatisfaction with politics has significantly increased. This raises the question "why is there growing discontent with the countries institutions and politicians in a consolidated democracy?" In producing this report, we have analyzed this question and thus provided insights into contemporary Costa Rican politics and prospects in that country for democratic stability. At the same time, we hope these insights might also help us to further understand why surveys in many mature democracies have shown that they are experiencing long-term declines in system support world-wide.

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Appendix

The construction of indicators of system support and tolerance:

System Support

The indicator of system support is based on a core series of items that use a scale from one to seven to measure "diffuse support" or legitimacy of the political system. The five items read as follows:

B1. To what extent do you think the courts of justice guarantee a fair trial?
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

The items are rescaled to a 0-100 range and combined into a single additive scale, the system support index, also based on a 0-100 metric.

Tolerance

The indicator of political tolerance is based on a core series of items that use a scale from one to ten in which respondents are asked the extent to which they approve "who only say bad things about our system of government" to participate in politics:

D1. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote?
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?

The items were rescaled to a 0-100 range and combined into a single additive scale, the political tolerance index, also based on a 0-100 metric.

Support for Stable Democracy

The indicator of support for stable democracy is based on the combination of the system support and tolerance indicators. First, both indicators are first divided into low (≤50) and high (>50) categories. Then, they are combined into a two-by-two scheme of low or high tolerance and low or high system support:

		System Support	
		Low (≤ 50)	High (>50)
Political Tolerance	Low (≤ 50)		
	High (>50)		Support for Stable Democracy

Finally, scores of high tolerance and system support are recoded into support for stable democracy.

Table 1: Predictors of High System Support and High Tolerance in Costa Rica, 2014

	Coefficient	t
Urban	-0.080	-0.56
Perception of Insecurity	-0.077	-1.25
Victim of Crime	0.075	1.06
Support for Democracy	0.405*	5.09
Corruption Victimization	-0.040	-0.67
Ideology (Left / Right)	0.119	1.93
Political Efficacy	0.023	0.35
Levels of Education	0.248*	2.90
Wealth Quintiles	0.266*	2.97
Skin Color	0.029	0.36
Female	-0.049	-0.64
Age	0.012	0.16
Presidential Job Approval	-0.120*	-2.20
Political Interest	0.056	0.72
Constant	-1.054*	-7.77
F	*5.30*	
Number of Observations	*1,247*	
* p<0.05		

Note: Coefficients with an asterisk are statistically significant at p<0.05, two-tailed.

Table 2: Predictors of Tolerance in Costa Rica, 2014

	Coefficient	t
Wealth Quintiles	0.100*	3.19
Female	0.009	0.38
Age	-0.039	-1.18
Years of Education	0.123*	4.15
Voted for Liberación Nacional	-0.075*	-3.01
Voted for Acción Ciudadana	0.010	0.33
Voted for Movimiento Libertario	-0.001	-0.03
Constant	-0.000	-0.00
F	*7.571*	
Number of Observations	*1,465*	
* p<0.05		

Note: Coefficients with an asterisk are statistically significant at p<0.05, two-tailed.

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What Do Nicaraguans Think of President Ortega's Interoceanic Canal?

By

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Executive Summary.

The government of President Daniel Ortega is pursuing an ambitious plan to build an Interoceanic Canal. The project has generated controversy and protest, but what do the people of Nicaragua think? This *Insights* report shows that the construction of the canal has captured the attention of a significant portion of the Nicaraguan population. Among Nicaraguans, economic preoccupations and the hope for job creation have prevailed over concerns about matters of democratic procedure. At the same time, environmental concerns are salient among canal critics. Further, the canal cannot be constructed without expropriating a significant number of properties and, therefore, the fact that public opinion tilts decisively against the general theme of expropriation matters for the ease with which the national government will be able to execute a canal project.

This Insights report was co-edited by Georgina Pizzolitto, Emily Saunders , Daniel Montalvo, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.

www.AmericasBarometer.org

Upon his reelection in 2011 with a two thirds supermajority in the *Asamblea Nacional*, President Ortega began to seriously pursue an interoceanic canal. Some of the project's allure lies in allowing the government to reassert Nicaraguan sovereignty and to fulfill an historic aspiration that many in Nicaragua have felt for at least a century, if not more.[1] The rationale given by the government and its representatives in the *Asamblea* has centered on the economic benefits that the canal could bring to the country.

Preparations have been underway in the *Asamblea Nacional* to implement a presidential initiative to build the canal since 2012. That year, Law 800 was approved, authorizing a Gran Canal Commission, to supervise the canal construction and operation. A year later, a new law (Law 840) was authorized allowing a contract to build a canal. On the very same day that Law 840 was promulgated, a concession to build a canal was extended to a recently-incorporated Chinese firm (previously unknown in Nicaragua), generating much controversy in the country.

Many features of the process of awarding the concession have been criticized in the Nicaraguan media. These include the lack of public consultation, in particular with indigenous peoples of the *Costa Caribe*. Concerns have also been raised about the lack of competition prior to the concession; the duration of the agreement; lack of feasibility studies; and the potentially negative environmental consequences of the canal, among others. Discontent over the canal has brewed into public protest on over 38 occasions, including a series of protests met with violence by state agents on Dec. 23-24, 2014.

Figure 1. Percentage of Nicaraguans Who Have Heard about the Interoceanic Canal



Have you heard about the agreement to build an Interoceanic Canal in Nicaragua?

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; Nic14_429

How widespread is awareness of the canal and what do Nicaraguans think about this ambitious and controversial initiative? This *Insight*[2]*s* report, which is based on a longer chapter in the forthcoming report on Nicaragua's 2014 LAPOP survey (Coleman forthcoming), provides answers to these questions. The latest AmericasBarometer Nicaragua national survey[3] was conducted in February and March, 2014, and included a series of questions about the canal. The results show that, in early 2014, over three in four Nicaraguans (75.4%) were aware of the intended canal project[4] (Figure 1). This percentage is considerably higher than the level of awareness (30%) of the Constitutional reform that the government was advancing at the same time.

[1] However, critics of the canal have turned that argument on its head, arguing that the terms of a 50 year concession (renewable for another 50 years) granted to HKND, a Chinese firm which has never previously built a canal, has ceded Nicaraguan sovereignty, rather than regained it. See note 15 below.

[2] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.
The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[3] Funding for the 2014 survey mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This *Insights* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

[4] **NICIOC2**. Have you heard about the agreement to build an interoceanic canal in Nicaragua? (1) Yes, (2) No

Figure 2. Positive Aspects of the Interoceanic Canal



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.NIC14_042

Figure 3. Negative Aspects of the Interoceanic Canal



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.NIC14_0429

Since the beginning, and protests aside, public opinion has appeared more positive than negative, reflecting popular hopes for a favorable impact of employment and economic growth. On the negative side, a key public concern has been potentially harmful environmental effects. To assess the public's opinions, the 2014 AmericasBarometer Nicaragua survey included a set of questions asking respondents to identify positive (if any) and negative (if any) aspects of the canal.[5]

As shown in Figure 2, the three most frequently mentioned positive impressions about the canal all pertain to the economy. Nearly three in four Nicaraguans (72.8%) express a belief that employment creation will be a result of the canal project, while over half (51.3%) expect that the canal will help the economy. In a more distant third place among the benefits is the belief that the canal will help tourism in Nicaragua, mentioned by 9.8% of respondents. Figure 3 shows that the concern voiced most often about the canal relates to its potential environmental impact. Over four in ten Nicaraguans (43.4%) indicate a concern about the potential environmental consequences of the canal project. In a distant second place among negative mentions at 11.1% is the duration of the accord, i.e., 50 years renewable for another 50 years. Third among the negative mentions is the effect on property rights (7.8%).

[5] The questions are the following: **NICIOC4**. In your opinion, which are the positive aspects of the Construction of the Interoceanic Canal? (1) No positive aspect; (2) Create jobs, provide more work; (3) Help the economy, more development, more investment; (4) Help the country's sovereignty; (5) Increase the prestige of Nicaragua in the world; (6) Help tourism; (7) Some other positive aspect. **NICIOC5**. In your opinion, which are the negative aspects of the Construction of the Interoceanic Canal?: No negative aspects; (2)The duration of the agreement: 100 Years; (3) Lack of consultation before signing the agreement; (4) Lack of information to citizens on the progress of the canal; (5) Damage to the environment; (6) Effects on property rights, indigenous communities, eviction; (7) Loss or violation of national sovereignty; (8) Disrespect of the law, violations of laws; (9) Some other negative aspect.

Who Supports the Construction of the Canal?

We next explore who supports the construction of the canal. The dependent variable, support for the canal, takes values between 0 and 100 points.[6] Among the possible determinants, we consider: (i) education, as we expect educated people to be less inclined to believe governmental claims about economic benefits (and also to pay attention to different news sources), (ii) skin tone, since those of darker skin tone may feel excluded, given past treatment, and may be dubious about the canal, (iii) wealth, given that poor people might be more desirous of believing claims about job creation, (iv) size of community, to examine the possibility that residents of larger communities might be more inclined to see transportation and tourism jobs being created, (v) age, as we expect that young people may be particularly desirous of employment opportunities and would be tempted by the job-generation arguments of the government, (vi) gender, (vii) canal route, where those closest to a presumed canal route back in February-March might be more supportive of job-creating projects, (viii) political interest, since those most interested in politics are more likely to have picked up on the canal issue in early 2014, (ix) attention to the news, (x) use of the Internet, since the Internet, like attention to the news, might provide alternative channels of getting information, (xi) political knowledge[7], as we expect that those high in political knowledge might be exposed to more criticism about the project and be less supportive as a result, (xii) approval of President Ortega's performance in office, (xiii) confidence in the *Gabinetes de la Familia*, given the close ties of the *Gabinetes* to the FSLN and to the Ortega-Murillo administration, perspectives favorable to the Canal may be picked up – even if indirectly, and (xiv) FSLN partisanship, on the assumption that the party either promotes the canal project or gives cues about "what one is supposed to believe" as a Sandinist.

Figure 4. Determinants of Support for the Canal



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.NIC14_0429

Figure 4 shows the results from the multivariate linear regression. Confidence in the *Gabinetes de la Familia*, and support for President Ortega's performance in office are significant predictors of support for the canal.

[6] To create the dependent variable, a scale was created to reflect the spectrum from positive (nicio4) to negative (nicio5) consequences of the canal. When the multiple positive and negative choices were combined into a single scale of attitudes about the canal, the scale ranges from a value of 0 representing the predominance of negative reactions to the canal idea and no positive options being chosen to a value of 100 representing the prevalence of positive reactions and having chosen *only* positive options. A value of 50 would indicate a balance between positive and negative mentions. For an individual, that value of 50 might imply one positive and one negative selection from the available lists, or perhaps three positive and three negative choices. Values above 50 indicate a preponderance of positive choices over negative choices, and a value below 50 indicate the reverse, i.e., that negative options were chosen more frequently than positive options.

7 Political knowledge is the cumulative number of correct answers to four questions: GI1 What is the name of the current president of the United States? [Barack Obama]; GIX4. In which continent is Nigeria? [Africa]; GI4. How long is the presidential term of office in Nicaragua? [5 years]; GI7. How many representatives does the national assembly have? [90-92, the number can vary, depending on defeated presidential and vice-presidential candidates accepting seats, so three answers were deemed "correct"].

Political interest is also a significant predictor of support for the canal.[8] Another variable that predicts attitudes towards the canal is skin tone: the darker a person's skin tone, the less enthusiastic the respondent is about the canal project. Additionally, it turns out that the closer one lives to the most likely route (as seen in early 2014), the *less* likely one is to support the canal project. These results may well speak to the lack of prior consultation with indigenous communities, with Afro-Caribbean communities and with others potentially affected by the canal.[9]

The Salience of Environmental Concerns within the Interoceanic Canal Debate

It is a constant debate in all developing counties whether the political agenda should prioritize the environment over economic growth. This question has been at the center of the debate around Nicaragua's interoceanic canal project.

In the 2014 LAPOP Nicaragua country study, Coleman (forthcoming) reports that a plurality of Nicaraguans prioritize the environment over economic development.[10] Responses on this issue help to put into context the growing interest in environmental issues in Nicaragua. Taken in the abstract, without drawing attention to governmental claims of massive job creation, 40% of Nicaraguans think they would prefer environmental protection to economic development, and another 38.7% indicate that both should be emphasized equally.

Figure 5. Predictors of the Belief that an Interoceanic Canal Might Threaten the Environment



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.NIC14_0429

Who, though, believes that the canal is likely to represent a threat to the environment? Figure 5 presents the results of a multivariate analysis intended to answer this question. The regression output in that figure reveals that three variables are significant predictors of concern about the environmental consequences of the canal (Figure 5): political knowledge, belief that the environment should be protected over economic development, and *not* being a sympathizer of the FSLN. The more politically knowledgeable the respondent is, the more likely he or she is to mention the environment as a negative concern about the canal. Political knowledge appears to be the strongest determinant of concern about environmental consequences. At the same time, the abstract belief that the environment should be prioritized over economic growth is also a significant predictor, in the same direction, albeit less strongly so. That is, those that favor environmental protection over economic development are more likely to express concern about the potentially negative environmental effects of the canal. A third, significant predictor in a negative direction is being a

[8] In early 2014, political interest was a positive correlate of FSLN partisanship.

[9] Similar results obtain, when examining the determinants of who happens to believe (or doesn't believe) that the canal will generate jobs.

[10] While not specifically designed as a question for the Nicaragua survey, the 2014 AmericasBarometer includes a more generic question about tradeoffs between protecting the environment and economic growth: ENV1. In your opinion, what should be given higher priority: to protect the environment, or promote economic growth? (1) Protect the environment, (2) Promoting economic growth, (3) Both.

sympathizer (past, present or future) of the FSLN, which is associated with a *lower* probability of being concerned about the environmental consequences of the canal. FSLN sympathizers tend to be less concerned than other Nicaraguans about the potentially negative environmental consequences of the canal. It is noteworthy that more frequent use of the Internet is associated with greater concern about the environmental consequences of the canal, although at a level that is not quite significant (at conventional levels) in the multivariate analysis (p = .054).

Figure 6. Attitudes towards expropriation



Public Opinion on Expropriation and the Canal

A canal from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean cannot be constructed without expropriating a significant number of properties. Therefore, public opinion on the general theme of expropriation matters greatly for the ease with which the national government will be able to execute a canal project.[11]

After the announcement of a canal route in early July of 2014, the issue began to appear real and to occasion public comment.[12] Concern about the issue eventually escalated to extensive protests at a regional level in the fall and to demonstrations on a national level by December.[13] Those protests reached a crisis point on December 23, the day after Wang Jing, the head of HKND, and Vice President Omar Halleslevens held an inauguration ceremony for construction associated with the canal. The police arrested between 30 and 50 citizens in El Tule in Southern Nicaragua. Physical force was applied to various protestors, as evidenced in media coverage.[14] Aminta Granera, the Commissioner of the National Police, reported that fifteen police were wounded, and that the police station in El Tule had been sacked and burned, the second allegation being later disproven by the media[15]. No deaths were reported as a result of this conflict, but citizen concern over potential expropriations had reached a boiling point (Salazar and Cerda 2014), stoked by a strong nationalist reaction to the fact the canal was being built by a Chinese businessman and that national autonomy had been sacrificed by the government.[16] Protests over the canal have continued into 2015.

So what do Nicaraguans think about expropriation by the government in the name of national interest? Figure 6 shows that the Nicaraguan public is not convinced that the government has a right to expropriate property, even in the name of the national interest, if owners do not agree. In fact, over nine in ten (91.3%) disagree with

[11] The question included in the 2014 AmericasBarometer is: PR5. Do you believe that the Nicraguan government has the right to seize private property from a person on behalf of the "national interest," even if that person does not agree with it, or do you believe that the government does not have that right? (1) The government has the right to seize private property; (2) The government does not have that right.

[12] See (Vásquez 2014).

[13] (Miranda Oburto 2014b)

[14] López 2014; Olivares 2014; Romero and Rothschuch 2014

[15] Enríquez 2014b; Eliézer Salazar 2014

[16] Illustrative of the concern is that Wang Jing felt compelled on December 22, 2014 to assert that he is not a representative of the government of China (Enríquez 2014a).

expropriations. While at the time of the AmericasBarometer survey in early 2014, support for the canal project was only about one point different on a 100 point scale[17] between those opposing expropriations and those willing to accept them, expropriations had not yet started. Hence, over time, as the threat of expropriations became more serious, those opposing expropriations may come to exhibit substantially less enthusiasm about the Gran Canal. Indeed, as indicated above, some eight months after the LAPOP survey, protests against possible expropriations were becoming common (Navarro 2014; Membreno 2014).

Conclusions

The construction of the canal has captured the attention of Nicaraguans and generated various opinions about the pros and cons of such a project. Among the Nicaraguan population in early 2014, economic preoccupations, and the hope for job creation, were prevailing over concerns about matters of democratic procedure and transparency.

Opinions diverge along political lines. Those who trust the *Gabinetes de Familia* and those who support President Ortega are more likely to support the construction of the canal. On the contrary, those with darker skin tone and those residing in the areas closets to the canal route exhibit less support for the construction of the canal.

Environmental concerns loom large in the minds of those opposing the canal. The analysis presented here shows that Nicaraguans who fear negative consequences for the environment as a result of a canal have more political knowledge and generally tend to favor the environment on economic growth.

A striking result of this analysis is the general resistance that Nicaraguans exhibit towards the concept of expropriation in the name of national interest. Nine out of ten citizens are fully against the expropriations of private properties. Canal construction could face even greater public resistance when expropriations actually begin. Protests through early 2015 have been based on the fear of expropriations, not yet on specific decisions. Of course, it may be that the government will offer compensation sufficient to forestall intense public resistance assuming that expropriations do begin in 2015.

In the end, many factors will come into play as Nicaraguan public opinion over the canal proposal continues to evolve. Will a canal be built at all? How many jobs will it generate? Who will get those jobs, Nicaraguans or others? Who will lose livelihoods as a result of the canal, and who will gain livelihoods? What will be the impact on Lake Cochibolca, Nicaragua's vast fresh water reserve, and on flora and fauna? How many properties will be expropriated at what social cost? Will commitments to indigenous communities be observed and respected?

Few of these issues had come into focus for the general public at the time of the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey. In early 2014, the public was very hopeful about job creation and the economic impact of the canal, but that there was also nascent concern about the potentially negative environmental consequences of the canal. By the time of this writing, those hopes for economic benefits had not dissipated greatly in the general public but concerns had either persisted or grown in certain quarters. Environmentalists have continued to oppose the canal. Protests about expropriations have escalated in areas likely to be affected by construction. And President Ortega has continued to insist that the canal would alleviate poverty at no real risk to Lake Cochibolca or the environment, although toward the end of 2014 his posture had become that no real risk will occur because "the lake is already contaminated" – a posture questioned by local water and environmental authorities (Miranda Aburto 2014b; Álvarez, Álvarez and Hernández 2014).

[17] Such a small difference is not statistically significant.

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Pastors and Politics: Brazilian Public Opinion Regarding Clergy Endorsements of Candidates

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Executive Summary: In the past two decades, observers have noted a steady rise in religious groups' engagement in Brazilian elections. Evangelical and Pentecostal clergy in Brazil often endorse or campaign for candidates, or even run for office. This raises questions about how citizens perceive such efforts. Are clergy endorsements seen as a normal part of the pluralistic give-and-take of democratic politics? Or are they viewed as violations of secular norms? In this report, I explore public opinion from the 2014 AmericasBarometer in Brazil, conducted several months before that year's presidential and legislative election campaign. At the time of the survey, Brazilians in all religious groups broadly opposed political engagement of clergy, yet minorities in each group felt clergy involvement in elections was justified. The analyses in this report show that support for clergy campaigning is related not so much to religious affiliation as to democratic attitudes and system support. Citizens who are more tolerant of contentious politics and more supportive of the current political system are more accepting of such involvement. However, citizens who more strongly support democracy in the abstract are *less* accepting of it.

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Brazil's October 2014 presidential and legislative elections were widely described in the media as a watershed for evangelicals, both politicians and voters. At the presidential level, Marina Silva, a born-again evangelical based in leftist and environmentalist movements, unexpectedly became a candidate a month and a half before the first round election, following the tragic death of Eduardo Campos, her running mate. She rocketed into second place behind the incumbent, Dilma Rousseff and stayed there for most of the remaining campaign, though she was overtaken in the final days before the election and failed to go on to the second round. At the level of congressional races, 2014 saw a 47% rise over 2010 in the number of candidates running using titles indicative of evangelical religious leaders, such as "pastor" (Tavares 2014). In the Chamber of Deputies, the evangelical caucus gained 10 seats over 2010, and now constitutes 16% of the lower chamber.[1] As one sign of the growing evangelical presence, an evangelical became president of the newly instated Chamber of Deputies on February 1, 2015.

Figure 1. Approval for Religious Leaders Campaigning for Candidates in Brazil



Support for religious leaders campaigning for candidates

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; Brazil 2014 v1_W

Evangelicals' growing political presence was also felt among campaign activists and voters. As in other recent elections, many high-profile pastors made known in the media their preferences with respect to presidential and legislative candidates. Within many evangelical congregations, moreover, informal campaigns took place. While the 2014 electoral rules prohibited electoral propaganda and formal campaigning on church property, clergy were able to make their preferences known in both subtle and overt ways, and co-religionist candidates often attended services (*Instruções do TSE* 2014).[2] Data from the 2014 Brazilian Electoral Panel Study indicate that close to half of evangelicals across the country heard their pastor speak about the campaign in the weeks prior to the election (Ames et al. unpublished). While some activities certainly violated electoral rules, many or most of them likely refrained from crossing the lines drawn by the Superior Electoral Tribunal.

Yet even if these activities did not actually violate laws, questions remain regarding what the Brazilian public thinks about clergy endorsements. In this *Insights* report,[3] I explore data from the 2014 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey in Brazil,[4] which asked citizens whether

[1] In the Senate, where first-past-the-post rules disadvantage minority groups, only 4 evangelicals were elected, representing 5% of the body.

[2] The Superior Electoral Tribunal specifically forbade campaigns' use of loudspeakers on church property "when the churches are in operation" (*Instruções do TSE* 2014, 345). In addition, churches were covered by rules prohibiting the "transmission of political advertising" such as signs, flags, or banners in "goods of common use" such as parks and gymnasiums ["*Nos bens…de uso comum…é vedada a veiculação de propaganda de qualquer natureza, inclusive pichação, inscrição a tinta, fixação de placas, estandartes, faixas e assemelhados"*] (206). The question, of course, is what counts as "advertising"; electoral rules and courts have focused largely but not exclusively on churches' display and distribution of printed materials advertising candidates.

[3] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[4] Funding for the 2014 survey mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

they approve or disapprove of the following scenario:

BRAREL1. A priest or pastor supporting or campaigning for a certain candidate at election time.

The scenario described here neatly captures the ambiguity with respect to the legality of church-based and clergy campaigning. Off church property, clergy members' endorsements are covered by free speech protections, though still subject to other electoral norms such as ones related to electoral calendars. On church property, clergy can make their preferences known in many ways without engaging in the kinds of overt "advertising" (much less using a microphone or loudspeaker) prohibited by electoral regulations. At the same time, it is certainly possible to imagine clergy "supporting or campaigning for a certain candidate" in ways that would violate electoral rules.

In Figure 1, I examine citizens' responses on a scale from 1-10, where 1 indicates strong disapproval and 10 indicates strong approval.[5] Note that this survey was conducted in March and April, several months prior to the actual election campaign. It is possible that many citizens' attitudes towards campaigning within churches changed in the run-up to the election, as they themselves became more mobilized, and as they saw their own or other trusted clergy become engaged in elections. Nonetheless, these data provide insights into baseline attitudes.

It is evident that most Brazilian citizens are wary of the involvement of clergy in elections. Half of respondents give the hypothetical scenario the very lowest approval rating, and more than three-quarters give the scenario a rating below 5. At the same time, a small group of Brazilians is accepting of, or even enthusiastic about, the prospect of clergy campaigning.

Religious Affiliation and Support for Clergy Campaigning

Brazil's religious landscape has changed dramatically in the past several decades. Census data show that the percent identifying as Protestant/evangelical rose from 5% in 1970 to 22% in 2010, at the same time that the percent identifying as Catholic fell from 90% to 65%.[6] The growing engagement of churches in elections in Brazil is often perceived as a product of the growth in the number of evangelical congregations, and of evangelicals' increasingly activist political theology. Indeed, research in Catholic parishes indicates that Catholic clergy are much less likely both to make their political views known to congregants, and to run for political office (Oro 2006).

Hence, it would be reasonable to expect norms towards clergy campaigning to vary by religious affiliation, with evangelicals more supportive of such activities. Two alternative mechanisms would lead to such a correlation. Evangelicals might adjust their norms to their actual experiences with their own church leaders. Alternatively, the greater political engagement of evangelical clergy might *result* from lay evangelicals' more permissive attitudes towards clergy politicking.

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[5] Because of the very small percentage of citizens in categories 6-9, Figure 1 combines the percent in all four groups; in total, 10.5% of citizens gave a response of 6, 7, 8, or 9.

[6] Brazilians typically use the term "*evangélico*" for all Protestants and Pentecostals, including members of denominations termed "mainline Protestant" in the United States. The AmericasBarometer question Q3C sorts Protestant respondents by denomination (e.g., Methodist, Baptist) into the broader categories of "evangelical" and "traditional Protestant," yet in most analysis there is little difference in the behavior of these two groups. Throughout this report, I combine the two categories.

In Figure 2, I examine the percentage of citizens in each religious group who approve of clergy campaigning. "Approval" is coded as any response between 6 and 10 on the original response scale. The vertical lines with "whiskers" extending on either side of the estimates represent 95% confidence intervals. The confidence intervals indicate that, contrary to expectations, there are no statistically distinguishable differences across religious groups in acceptance of clergy campaigning.[7] Between 12 and 15% of Catholics, Protestants, and respondents of "other" religions support clergy campaigning, while the great majority of each group reject this behavior. Rejection is even greater among Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, though because of small numbers of individuals in these categories, the confidence intervals are far too large to draw inferences.

Figure 2. Percent Approving of Clergy Campaigning, by Religious Affiliation



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; Brazil 2014 v1_W

If Not Religion, What Explains Support for Clergy Campaigning?

Thus, we have a puzzle: if religious affiliation does not explain why some people find clergy campaigning acceptable and others find it unacceptable, what does?

An answer may lie in understandings of secularism; in attitudes towards democracy; and in perceptions of the legitimacy of the current political system. While Roman Catholicism was the state religion of Portugal and was given privileged status in Brazil's Imperial Constitution of 1824, the Republican Constitution of 1891 legally divorced the state from the church, and also established citizens' rights to free exercise of religion. These two aspects of state secularism have been adopted in every subsequent democratic and non-democratic constitution.

Still, citizens today may perceive state secularism as an aspect of democracy. First, actual respect for civil liberties such as freedom of association, which is key to the free exercise of religion, is better protected under democracy. Second, the procedural legitimacy of democratic politics relies on free and fair competition. Regardless of the actual regulations governing particular elections, many people may perceive churches' "meddling" in elections as democratically illegitimate. In principle, separation of church and state requires only that the *state* neither favor nor repress any religious group, barring a legitimate public reason; it does not necessarily entail that *churches* not take an interest in who wins office, or in what the state does. Nonetheless, many Brazilians may understand the norm that churches should stay out of elections as a component of secularism, and an

[7] Conclusions are broadly the same if we instead examine mean response on the 1-10 scale by religious group. The dependent variable is dichotomized in this analysis simply for ease of presentation and discussion.

element of democratic procedural "fair play." At the same time, those who more strongly believe in the legitimacy of the current political system, independent of democracy in the abstract, may be more likely to support clergy campaigning, since clergy campaigning is an actual feature of Brazil's current political landscape.

Figure 3. Determinants of Support for Clergy Endorsements of Candidates: Political Attitudes, Religious Background, and Demographics



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; Brazil 2014 v2_temp

Thus, I hypothesize that two psychological orientations long studied by LAPOP and others via its AmericasBarometer may predict acceptance (or the lack of acceptance) of clergy campaigning. The first is support for democracy in the abstract; I expect that those who support democracy more strongly may be *less* accepting of clergy engagement in elections.[8] The second is perceptions of the legitimacy of Brazil's current political system; I expect that those who support Brazil's current political system more strongly will be more accepting of clergy endorsements.[9]

Yet other citizens may hold alternative visions of churches' proper role in democratic politics. These people may view churches not as illegitimate meddlers in secular democratic processes, but rather as one civil society actor among many in a contentious, pluralistic electoral marketplace. These citizens may view democratic contests in terms of interest-based competition for resources among diverse constituencies. For these people, religious communities and identity groups constitute simply one more competitor. Thus, I also hypothesize that those who are more tolerant of confrontational participation will be *more* accepting of such politicking.[10]

I also examine the extent to which support for clergy endorsements of candidates is associated with demographics and political socialization. Those living in larger urban areas may be more accepting of clergy campaigning, as religious pluralism is more pervasive in those areas. Those with higher levels of education and greater wealth may be *less* accepting of clergy

[8] This is measured using question ING4, which asks respondents to what extent they agree, on a 1-7 scale, that "democracy may have problems, but it is better than the alternatives."

[9] The AmericasBarometer measures *system support* using responses on a 1-7 scale to questions B1, B2, B3, B4, and B6. In Brazil, these ask to what extent the respondent "believes the courts in Brazil guarantee a fair trial"; "respects Brazil's political institutions"; "believes citizens' basic rights are well-protected by the Brazilian political system"; "feels proud to live under the Brazilian political system"; and "believes people should support the Brazilian political system."

[10] This is an index based on questions E5, E11, and E15. These questions asked to what extent respondents approved, on a 1-10 scale, of people's participation in "protests permitted by law"; in "electoral campaigns for a party or candidate"; and in "blocking streets or highways for protest." The alpha reliability coefficient is .49. This variable is correlated at .16 with support for democracy.

activism, as they may have absorbed more fully democratic secular norms. I also control for religious denomination and for a measure of the importance of religion in the respondent's life. Finally, I test whether attitudes vary by gender and age cohort.[11]

In Figure 3, I present the results of a linear multiple regression model examining how all of these variables are together associated with support for clergy campaigning.[12] The dot corresponding to each variable listed on the left-hand side of the figure represents the variable's regression coefficient, while the horizontal lines with whiskers stretching to either side of each dot represent the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficients. If a variable is to the left of the "0" line, it is negatively correlated with support for clergy campaigning; if it is to the right, it is positively associated with this attitude. When the 95% confidence interval does *not* cross the "0" line, this indicates that we can be 95% confident the relationship found represents one that exists in the general population. When the confidence interval *does* cross the "0" line, however, we cannot reject the possibility that there is no relationship between the variable in question and support for clergy endorsements. All of the independent variables (i.e., the ones listed on the left of the figure) have been recoded on a 0 to 1 scale. Thus, the size of the coefficient represents the number of points we could expect support for clergy campaigning to rise (on a 1-10 scale) if a hypothetical citizen were to move from the minimum to the maximum level of that variable.

Importantly, in Figure 3 we find that nearly the only variables statistically significantly associated with support for clergy campaigning are those related to democracy and the legitimacy of the political system. As hypothesized, those who are more supportive of contentious political participation and of the current political system have higher levels of support for clergy campaigning, while those who are more supportive of democracy in the abstract have lower levels of support for this behavior. Moving from the minimum to the maximum levels of support for contentious participation and support for the current political system is associated with about a two-point rise in support for clergy campaigning, on the 1-10 scale. Meanwhile, moving from the minimum to the maximum level of support for democracy is associated with about a one-point drop in support for clergy endorsements on that scale.

By contrast, none of the religious variables is significantly associated with support for clergy campaigning; neither is the size of the place of residence, education, household wealth, or sex. The analysis does indicate that those aged 46-55 have significantly higher levels of support for clergy campaigning than do those in the youngest age cohort (aged 16-25); why this occurs will remain a question to explore elsewhere.

Conclusion

As Brazil's evangelical groups have grown not only in numerical prominence but in their social and political presence, they have become increasingly politically assertive in electoral campaigns and in policy advocacy. Elsewhere, I have explored the extent to which this advocacy persuades church members and non-coreligionists (Boas and Smith Forthcoming). Beyond effectiveness, though, there are broader questions regarding how such advocacy shapes attitudes towards evangelical groups and politics more generally.

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[11] *Size of place of residence* is based on survey item TAMANO, and is coded so that higher values represent larger areas. *Years of education* is based on item ED. The *index of household goods* is based on items R4, R5, R6, R7, R15, R16, and R18, measuring whether the respondent's household has a landline phone, a car, a washing machine, a microwave oven, a computer, Internet, and a flat screen TV. As discussed above, religious denomination is based on Item Q3C; the *importance of religion* is based on Q5B, and is coded so that higher values represent greater importance of religion. Finally, age cohorts are based on question Q2, and are coded so that respondents aged 16-25 are the baseline category.

[12] See the appendix for full regression results.

Writing in the mid-1800s, following his stays in the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville noted the strength of religious communities in the United States. He argued that this strength was a product of churches' refusal to get involved in politics, and warned that religious groups ultimately hurt their own long-term sustainability when they take sides in partisan politics. In de Tocqueville's words, "When a religion…comes to be united with a government, it must adopt maxims that are applicable only to certain peoples. So, therefore, in allying itself with a political power, religion increases its power over some and loses the hope of reigning over all" (2000 [1840], 284). Writing nearly two centuries later, Putnam and Campbell (2011) argue that the increasing alignment between evangelical Christianity and the Republican Party in the United States has led many young people who reject the politics of the Christian Right to reject Christianity altogether.

In this report, I consider churches' political engagement in a different country context, one Telles (2004) famously called "another America." At baseline before the 2014 Brazilian election campaign started, I find strong resistance to clergy politicking in all religious groups. Here, I ask how this political involvement is related not to the legitimacy of those religious groups, but to that of democratic politics and of the political system. I find that those who more strongly support democracy in the abstract have lower levels of support for clergy engagement in elections, though support for the current political system is *positively* related to acceptance of political engagement by clergy. I argue that such patterns stem from citizens' understandings of the meaning of secularism and of democratic competition and pluralism.

If evangelicalism continues to grow in Brazil, it seems likely that church-based politicking will only become more prominent in the medium-term. Moreover, observers note that evangelical political activism is increasingly ideological and policy oriented, focused on sexual politics and maintaining traditional social hierarchies, rather than simply on promoting evangelical interests. With growing exposure to evangelical activism and ideology, some citizens' attitudes towards such politicking could become more permissive. However, it is also possible – and perhaps more likely – that many citizens will continue broadly to reject such church-based activism. If this is the case, it seems likely that polarization related to religion, politics, and the legitimacy of democratic institutions in Brazil will also rise.

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Appendix

Table 1. Determinants of Support for Clergy Endorsements of Candidates, Brazil 2014

	Coefficient	Standard Error	t	p
Support for Contentious Participation	1.937	0.379	5.120	0.000
Support for Democracy	-0.777	0.211	-3.690	0.000
System Support	1.954	0.373	5.230	0.000
Importance of Religion	-0.508	0.297	-1.710	0.090
Protestant/Evangelical	0.072	0.160	0.450	0.656
No Religion	-0.354	0.231	-1.530	0.127
LDS/Jehovah's Witness	-0.317	0.527	-0.600	0.549
Other Religion	-0.154	0.505	-0.310	0.761
Size of Place of Residence	-0.253	0.322	-0.790	0.433
Years of Schooling	-0.020	0.384	-0.050	0.959
Index of Household Goods	-0.031	0.214	-0.140	0.885
Sex	0.033	0.131	0.250	0.804
Age 26-45	0.105	0.192	0.550	0.585
Age 36-45	0.201	0.172	1.160	0.247
Age 46-55	0.457	0.216	2.120	0.036
Age 56-65	0.152	0.235	0.650	0.518
Age 66+	0.088	0.277	0.320	0.75
Constant	1.991	0.465	4.290	0.000
Number of Observations	1416			
R^2	0.08			
F	4.30			

All variables were recoded from 0-1, with exception of the dependent variable (1-10)

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USAID's Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Approach in Central America Found Effective in LAPOP Impact Evaluation

By Susan Berk-Seligson, Diana Orcés, Georgina Pizzolitto, Mitchell A. Seligson, Carole J. Wilson
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Executive Summary: LAPOP's multi-year, multi-country randomized control trial impact evaluation of the USAID community-centered approach to violence prevention found that the programs have been a success on a wide variety of community-level indicators. The study was based on over 29,000 quantitative interviews and more than 800 qualitative interviews. Results show that outcomes in the treatment communities improved more (or declined less) than they would have if the programs had not been administered. Specifically, LAPOP found that the approach produced a significant reduction in the level expected of crime victimization and violence and also resulted in a significant increase in the level expected of citizens' sense of security. Perception of neighborhood insecurity *and* perception of insecurity when walking alone at night declined more than would be expected without USAID intervention. Levels of satisfaction with police performance and trust in the police have increased significantly over the levels expected in the absence of the treatment. Indirect effects of the programs include strengthening democratic values, which increased significantly over the expected level in the absence of the program. An extensive series of qualitative interviews generated many specific policy recommendations, some of which are summarized in this short report.

The Insights Series is co-edited by Daniel Montalvo, Emily Saunders, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister with administrative, technical, and intellectual support from the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt.
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The countries of Central America — especially "the Northern Triangle" of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (Figure 1) — are among the most criminally violent nations in the world (Figure 2). As part of the U.S. Government's Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has designed and implemented a set of programs to improve citizen security in Central America by strengthening community capacity to combat crime and by creating educational and employment opportunities for at-risk youth.[1] This *Insights* report[2] is taken largely from the Executive Summary of the Impact Evaluation[3] published by LAPOP.[4]

Figure 1. CARSI Impact Evaluation Sites



LAPOP's multi-method, multi-country, multi-year randomized control trial evaluation was designed to contribute to an understanding of the effectiveness of USAID's community-based crime and violence prevention approach. The package of interventions – that is, the "treatment" under evaluation – includes activities such as planning by municipal-level committees; crime observatories and data collection; crime prevention through environmental design (such as improved street lighting, graffiti removal, cleaned-up public spaces); programs for at-risk youth (such as outreach centers, workforce development, mentorships); and community policing. USAID's community-based crime prevention projects are inherently cross-sectoral. That is, they integrate education and workforce development, economic growth and employment, public health, and governance interventions. What follows are the main findings of both the quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the various crime prevention programs.

Overall, the LAPOP study found that in several key respects the programs have been a success. Specifically, based on the results of a classic experimental design, involving randomly selected at-risk treatment and control communities, the outcomes in the treatment communities improved more (or deteriorated less) than they would have if USAID's programs had not been administered. This conclusion is based on direct evidence from extensive survey data gathered from more than 29,000 respondents living in 127 treatment and control neighborhoods and through 848 qualitative stakeholder interviews and 44 focus groups. Collectively these important data allow LAPOP to draw important policy suggestions which will be highlighted in the conclusion.

Quantitative Findings

There are five broad areas in which impact was measured: neighborhood crime and violence; citizens' sense of security; neighborhood disorder; satisfaction with police performance; and democratic values.

[1] See http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/central-america, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/148416.pdf

[2] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[3] For more information and a copy of the regional report see: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/carsi-study.php.

[4] The funding for this study came from USAID.

Figure 2. Homicide Rates in Central America
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Homicide Rate Statistics 2000-2012



Compared to what would be expected without USAID interventions, it is observed, for example, that 19% fewer surveyed residents reported being aware of robberies in their neighborhoods and 25% fewer surveyed residents reported being aware of illegal drug sales in their neighborhoods. When asked about murder, 50% fewer surveyed residents reported being aware of murders in their neighborhoods, when compared to what would be expected without USAID intervention. The impact evaluation also found that perceptions of insecurity were 5% lower and reported feelings of insecurity when walking alone at night in the neighborhood were 11% lower than would be expected when compared to neighborhoods having no USAID intervention.

Encouraging results were also found regarding neighborhood disorder. Compared to what would be expected to be found without USAID intervention, perception of youths loitering as a problem was 8% lower; perceptions of youths in gangs as a problem was 14% lower; and perceptions of gang fights as a problem was 13% lower. When considering how communities are organized to prevent crime, compared to what would be expected without intervention, residents' evaluations of their communities' organization for crime prevention were 18% higher.

In looking at evaluations of police performance, residents' satisfaction with police performance was 5% better and residents' trust in the police was 9% greater than what would be expected without intervention.

Indirect effects of the community-based crime prevention program under the CARSI program can also be seen. Compared to what would be expected without USAID intervention, respondents' levels of interpersonal trust at the community level were 3% higher and their satisfaction with the functioning of democracy was 7% higher.

Qualitative Findings

The qualitative study highlighted five areas in which the respondents identified programmatic successes and/or concerns: the role of schools; gang extrication; the role of family; the role of churches; and the role of the community.

Schools were found to play an important role in crime prevention. Some schools are creating better environments for at-risk youth with the

innovative *Convivencia Escolar* (School Harmony) program in El Salvador and similar programs in the other countries; institutionalization of student leadership groups within schools; and the training of teachers and students in mediation and alternative approaches to conflict resolution.

School leaders can be pivotal. Many teachers and administrators are enthusiastic about the role of school-based, on-site psychologists in improving the behavior of troubled students. As schools begin using less punishment and more psychological counseling and mediation for conflict resolution, they are seeing positive results among troubled youths. Students frequently divulge home abuse and other problems to psychologists, opening the door to assistance. School directors and teachers play a vital role in uncovering child abuse and other kinds of domestic violence in the home, and they have been sensitive to domestic violence situations that adversely affect their students' behavior. One repeatedly mentioned problem is teenage pregnancy, which often leads to female students dropping out of school. Some administrators said that they make allowances for students who care for babies, in order to help enable these young girls to complete their high school education.

USAID's crime prevention programs in Central America have been a success. The outcomes in the treatment communities improved more (or deteriorated less) than they would have if USAID's programs had not been administered.

Even though the quantitative findings indicate that the gang situation in treatment neighborhoods has improved, police officers consistently reported that it was no longer possible for gang members to dissociate themselves from their gangs. In El Salvador for example, police officers reported that the only way out of a gang was in a coffin. Previously, gang members could leave the gangs by, for example, joining a church. More recently, interviewees said, gang members who mature into middle-aged fathers with steady jobs may be expected to perform non-violent services, such as money laundering, for the gang over the course of their lives.

There was near universal agreement in the stakeholder interviews that the major factor associated with youths dropping out of school and joining violent gangs is the "broken home." Children in single-parent households, ones typically headed by mothers, often lack supervision and thus are more at risk of joining gangs. The risk is especially high when the single-mother takes on a partner who is not the biological father of the children, a situation that can push the minor out of the house and into the arms of a gang.

Churches of all denominations play an especially important role in crime and violence prevention. Their youth group programs, some of them funded by USAID, are seen by stakeholders as keeping youths from hanging out on street corners by getting them engaged in socially positive activities (recreational, religious, and job training).

Evangelical pastors were considered by our stakeholders to be especially active in reaching out to youths already in gangs, in an effort to extract them from active membership. They also often serve as mediators between warring gangs, in order to help prevent bloodshed. In addition to pastors, there are also "Christian police officers," who evangelize in the prisons with the hope of counseling gang members before they are released from prison.

The Catholic Church was seen as being effective in reducing crime levels as it engaged in well-established, age-graded programs, beginning in

early childhood and continuing into adulthood. Some of those who have actively participated in the various youth programs graduate to become community leaders as young adults.

Community development association leaders, often members of Municipal Crime Prevention Committees, play a key role in violence prevention efforts. They are willing to share intelligence with police officers, but only if they know and trust them. A dedicated police hotline can be very useful for getting the authorities to show up when a crime is in progress, but apparently largely when the official answering the call was known to the association leaders.

At-risk youth reported that vocational training was the most valuable of the various outreach activities they had participated in, believing it to be the path to a good job and a self-sufficient future. They found computer literacy courses especially valuable, and some said that they would have liked more advanced courses than the ones that were given, and smaller class sizes. Many others expressed appreciation for the music and art programs of those centers, as well as the athletic outlets that they provide.

The Municipal Crime Prevention Committees comprise an innovative structure, one that is supported by USAID. Their importance comes from their ability to galvanize the various stake-holding sectors of the targeted municipalities (specifically, the police, school directors, clergy, community development association leaders, and health service providers) by incorporating representatives of each sector into every committee. These representatives become the link between the municipality and the various communities that have been selected for the crime prevention treatment, by reporting the Committees' plans to community stakeholders.

Policy Recommendations

Considering the documented successes of the USAID-sponsored programs in Central America, this evaluation suggests several ways to bolster these successes. Making community-based crime and violence prevention programs a frontline weapon to improve citizen security is key. So, too, is improving community organizations to address crime and violence.

Schools and families also play a vital role in decreasing instances of crime and violence. Expanding pre-school, after-school, and day-care access for children living in single-parent homes would be beneficial. Working with school administrators is important. Continuing to inform administrators and teachers on important issues such as recognizing signs of abuse in children is necessary. Directing more resources to school security, especially in the form of patrols when students enter and leave school, could prove useful both in cutting down violence in the schools and protecting children from gang members who lurk outside the school grounds. Lastly, given the aforementioned positive role of religious organizations, actively partnering with these organizations to support church-affiliated youth programs is likely to be fruitful.

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Low Levels of External Efficacy Can be Improved by Government Efforts to Deliver Better Outcomes

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Main Findings:

- Average levels of external efficacy in most countries are low
- Education is not a significant predictor of external efficacy
- Age is positively correlated with external efficacy
- Perceptions of government performance and executive approval positively predict external efficacy: those who give the current administration better marks for its efforts on the economy, crime, and corruption report higher levels of external efficacy

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Democracy promises "continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens" (Dahl 1971, p. 1). Traditionally, democracy is thought to foster representative, responsive, and accountable government to and for its citizens. The concept of "external efficacy" captures the extent to which individuals believe their government meets this democratic ideal.[1]

External political efficacy matters because it provides insight into the extent to which the mass public believes the government is attentive to its interests. It also matters because it has consequences for how citizens participate in politics (e.g., Pollock 1983). The first step to understanding external efficacy is to develop a profile of individuals who perceive that the government listens to them. Such an analysis can identify factors that governments can consider when seeking to increase this aspect of democratic legitimacy within their borders.

In this *Insights* report,[2] we examine external efficacy in the Americas (with a focus on the Latin America and Caribbean region) using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer.[3] Specifically, we assess data gathered from national surveys in 27 countries, in which 48,881 respondents were asked the following question:

EFF1: Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 1. External Efficacy Scores (Averages on a 0-100 Scale)



Responses were recorded on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to "strongly disagree" and 7 corresponding to "strongly agree." Those responses have been rescaled from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more external efficacy.

Figure 1 shows average degrees of external efficacy across 27 countries. The country average score is noted as a dot and the gray area indicates the 95% confidence interval. Mean degrees of external efficacy range from 28.0 in Colombia to 49.2 in Suriname. It is interesting to note the substantial difference between Canada (47.7) and the U.S. (31.6), the two neighboring advanced industrialized democracies in North

[1] In contrast, "internal efficacy" focuses on individuals' views of their personal capacity to engage in politics.

[2] Prior issues in the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[3] Funding for the 2014 round came mainly from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Insights* report is produced solely by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

America. This suggests that a country's wealth and age of democracy may not explain cross-national differences in efficacy. Importantly, the national averages for all countries are below the mid-point of 50, which represents a neutral response. From this, we can infer that there is a deficit of external efficacy in the region: on average, the mass public in the Americas does not tend to believe that political leaders care about what they, the people, think.

Figure 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors of External Efficacy



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.M14v_1.0

Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors of External Efficacy

Who is more likely to feel that the government listens to them? Research on the U.S. public has shown that those with more education are more likely to report higher levels of external efficacy (e.g., Pinkleton et al. 2012). We assess whether this finding holds in the Latin America and Caribbean region. We further examine the relationship between external efficacy and the following demographic and socio-economic variables: urban (versus rural) residence, gender (female vs. male), wealth, and age.[4]

Figure 2 illustrates the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, which examines the predicted effects of urban/rural residence, gender, education, wealth quintiles, and age on external efficacy. Each independent variable is scaled from 0 to 1, so that the regression coefficient can be understood as the maximum effect that independent variable is predicted to have on the 0 to 100 efficacy scale. Non-standardized coefficients for each of the independent variables are indicated with a black dot attached to a line indicating the 95% confidence interval for that estimate. Coefficients that lie left of the red "0.00" line have negative relationship to the dependent variable, while those that are on the right of that line have a positive relationship; where the horizontal confidence interval line does not cross zero, the effect is statistically significant.

In the first place, education is not a significant predictor of external efficacy in the Latin America and Caribbean region. This is interesting because it suggests that the relationship between schooling and efficacy found in the U.S. may be unique to well-established, advanced industrialized settings. In addition, we find that gender and wealth are not statistically significant predictors of external efficacy. Place of residence is significant – such that those living in urban areas report lower

[4] Urban is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the respondent lives in an urban region, and 0 if in a rural area. The gender dummy variable takes the 1 value if the respondent is female. The wealth measure is a five-category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions; for more information see Córdova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf). Age is divided by cohort, with respondents grouped into the following categories: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 56-65, and 65+. The United States and Canada are excluded from all multivariate analyses presented here, given that the wealth measure is not available for these countries and given the focus in this series on the Latin America and Caribbean region.

degrees of external efficacy – but, the effect is substantively negligible.[5]

The analysis shows that the only statistically significant and substantively important demographic variable is age, which shows a positive correlation with external efficacy. An increase in age is associated with an increase in external efficacy; specifically, a shift in age from youngest to oldest results in an increase in external efficacy of just over three degrees. While not a tremendously large impact, it is important to keep in mind that levels of efficacy in general are low across the Americas and, from that perspective, an increase in even three degrees is meaningful.

[E]ducation is not a significant predictor of external efficacy in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

Evaluations of Government Performance and Executive Approval as Predictors of External Efficacy

At the start of this report, we indicated that external efficacy can be understood as related to the overarching concept of political legitimacy (on the latter, see Booth and Seligson 2009). But, is external efficacy relevant only to diffuse political support (that is, political legitimacy and related concepts) or might it also be related to specific support for incumbent administrations and policies? Existing scholarship focused on the case of the United States suggests that evaluations specific to incumbents and their policies are not important predictors of external efficacy. For example, Iyengar (1980, p. 255) finds that efficacy has only a moderately positive correlation with satisfaction towards public policies and output and no relationship to attitudes toward the incumbent; thus, he concludes "political efficacy does not appear to be closely intertwined with evaluations of the incumbent government."

Yet, in the Latin America and Caribbean context we might expect factors indicative of specific support – such as evaluations of policy effectiveness and executive approval – to be related to external efficacy, in much the way that specific and diffuse support seem more tightly connected in such contexts (see Booth and Seligson 2009). That is, current performance evaluations may be more consequential for broader evaluations of the system in less established democracies than in more established democracies; the logic behind this is that through time and socialization, older democracies build up stockpiles of diffuse support that are relatively less affected by specific government performance (see discussion in Booth and Seligson 2009, among others).[6]

Using an OLS regression similar to Figure 2, we test the extent to which external efficacy is predicted by evaluations of government performance in three policy areas – the economy, crime, and corruption – and executive approval.[7] The results are shown in Figure 3,

[5] In an analysis we conducted prior to the inclusion of Suriname and the Bahamas in the dataset, we did not observe the negative correlation between urban residence and external efficacy; instead, the effect was insignificant.

[6] Some scholars have found links between actual policy output and efficacy, in ways that support the notion that policy performance and efficacy ought to be linked. For example, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) find that collective efficacy correlates negatively with rates of violence in neighborhoods. Therefore, one could infer that a positive crime evaluation might, in turn, correlate with higher rates of political efficacy. Furthermore, levels of corruption are also shown to have significant negative correlations with rates of political efficacy in a democracy. Anderson and Tverdova (2003) illustrate through a study of sixteen democracies, both young and old, that nations with high levels of corruption tend to have lower levels of political trust and support among their citizens. These findings provide reasons to expect that a positive corruption evaluation will correlate with higher political efficacy.

[7] Executive Approval is measured using the AmericasBarometer variable M1, which asks respondents to

which controls for all previously studied socio-economic, demographic, and country-level variables in addition to the four new variables. Once again the dots represent the estimated non-standardized coefficients and the bars represent 95% confidence intervals for those estimates.

We find that individuals' approval of the executive and their assessments of government efforts with respect to the economy, crime, and corruption all have strong, statistically significant relationships with external efficacy.[8]

The executive approval variable shows a very strong positive correlation with external efficacy, with a maximal increase in executive approval resulting in 18 degrees of increase in efficacy. This result differs from that found by Iyengar (1980) for the case of the United States. In the Latin America and Caribbean region, people who highly approve of the incumbent executive agree to a larger degree that those who govern the country are interested in what they think.

Figure 3. An Extended Model of External Efficacy



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.M14v_1.0

In terms of evaluations of the government's handling of the economy, we expected that there would be a positive correlation between people's assessments on this issue and external efficacy. While there is a lack of literature on the direct relationship between people's evaluations of the government's efforts on the economy and efficacy, our expectations derive from the synthesis of two lines of research. First, Almond and Verba (1963) hypothesize that satisfaction with the political system is positively related to efficacy and, second, Lagos (2001) suggests that the economic situation perceived by the people is positively correlated with people's support for the political system. Taken together, this suggests a connection that runs from economic perceptions to efficacy. Our findings substantiate that there is indeed a relationship between evaluations of incumbent performance on the economy and external efficacy in the Latin America and Caribbean region. In our regression analysis, a maximum increase in one's evaluation of the government's handling of the economy results in 16 degrees of increase in efficacy.

rate the performance of the president (or, in the case of Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, and the Bahamas, the prime minister). Originally on a scale from 1 to 5, the variable is rescaled from 0 (very bad) to 1 (very good). Government Performance: Corruption is measured using the AmericasBarometer variable N9, which asks respondents their opinions on the current administration's job in fighting corruption. Originally on a 1-7 scale, the variable is rescaled from 0 (not at all) to 1 (a lot). Government Performance: Crime is measured using the AmericasBarometer variable N11, which asks respondents their opinions on the current administration's job in improving citizen security. Originally on a 1-7 scale, the variable is rescaled from 0 (not at all) to 1 (a lot). Government Performance: Economy is measured using the AmericasBarometer variable N15, which asks respondents their opinions on the current administration's job in managing the economy. Originally on a 1-7 scale, the variable is rescaled from 0 (not at all) to 1 (a lot).

[8] The number of cases across models in Figure 2 versus Figure 3 drops substantially; this is due in large part to the fact that the question about evaluations of government handling of corruption was not asked in the Suriname or the Bahamas and so these countries fall out of the analysis in Figure 3. When this variable is excluded from the analysis, the number of observations increases, while the size, direction, and statistical significance of the other variables included in the model remain substantively similar.

We find similar effects for evaluations of the incumbent's performance in the areas of crime and corruption. A maximum increase on each of these variables results, in turn, in an 11 and a 15 degree increase in external efficacy. In short, in contrast to what research on the case of the United States has found, evaluations of policy performance appear to have substantial consequences for external efficacy in the Latin America and Caribbean region.[9]

[I]ndividuals' approval of the executive and their assessments of government efforts with respect to the economy, crime, and corruption all have strong, statistically significant relationships with external efficacy.

Conclusion

Previous studies in the field of political science have attributed higher levels of external efficacy to a variety of socio-demographic variables and political factors. Our study of public opinion provides new perspective on understanding this issue in the Latin America and Caribbean region. When an individual approves of the executive and perceives positive government performance with regards to the economy, crime, and corruption, he or she has a greater belief that the government is interested in what he or she thinks.

This leads us to two core conclusions. First, short term factors are relevant to external efficacy in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Governments can bolster perceptions that the system is attentive to individuals by putting forward executives who inspire confidence in themselves and their administration's work in various policy areas.

Second, the findings in this report raise the question of whether executive approval and perceptions of government performance might have a greater impact on external efficacy than actual output in these areas in the Latin America and Caribbean region. That is, for external efficacy, it may be that it is more important for executives to deliver the appearance of assiduous efforts in terms of their jobs in general and their work on specific issue areas, than it is to deliver actual results.

These conclusions have unique implications for politicians seeking to improve the democratic legitimacy of their governments. For example, propaganda and publicity campaigns emphasizing government action against crime and corruption or new programs for the economy may result in higher levels of external efficacy. It may be that such efforts bolster external efficacy regardless of the actual outcomes, though further examination of the correlation between actual and perceived government performance is warranted.

Our results highlight other important questions for future research. For example, it may be interesting to consider whether external efficacy can be bolstered through elevated performance evaluations and executive approval in nondemocratic regimes. Further, Figure 1 presents interesting cross-national variation that

[9] In analyses conducted but not shown here, we also found that the relationship between understanding important political issues (internal efficacy) and external efficacy is statistically significant and positive, though not as strong as the other evaluative variables. This could perhaps point to an interesting relationship between these variables, as understanding the current economic or political climate likely informs one's ability to evaluate it. The complexity of this connection is referenced in Beaumont's (2011, p. 216) study of political learning, where she concludes that political awareness and "sociopolitical learning mechanisms … differently interact with individual background to contribute to political efficacy". Understanding political issues may partially enhance external efficacy, but does not necessarily result in a strong direct relationship between the two variables. Finally, it is interesting to note that rates of education had a negative relationship to external political efficacy when we controlled for internal efficacy in analyses not presented here. This should be a focus for further research.

could be examined more closely on a country-level basis.

While more work remains to be done, an important conclusion from this report is that the factors that predict external efficacy in the Latin America and Caribbean region differ in important ways from the factors that explain this attitude in more established democratic settings such as the United States. While education has been found to positively predict external efficacy in the United States, in the Latin America and Caribbean region, education does not have a positive, significant relationship with external efficacy. Further, while in the United States scholars have argued that short-term factors such as attitudes toward the sitting president and policy evaluations have no or little effect on external efficacy, we find in contrast that these factors are strongly related to the tendency for individuals in the Latin America and Caribbean region to believe that their leaders listen to what people like them think.

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Appendix: Author Biographies

Hannury (Nury) Lee is a College Scholar and rising junior majoring in neuroscience and minoring in child development. She is from South Korea and went to high school in Canada. She serves as secretary for Vanderbilt Students Volunteering for Science (VSVS), as vice president for Medicine, Education, and Development for Low Income Families Everywhere (MEDLIFE), and as a volunteer for Preschool for Children with Autism (PCA). She plans on pursuing a career in medicine and hopes to be able to contribute in better understanding autism spectrum disorders and in alleviating healthcare disparities in developing countries.

Ginny Randall is a rising junior College Scholar from Naperville, IL majoring in Public Policy with a track in Poverty Alleviation and Social Justice, with a double minor in Anthropology and European Studies. On campus, she is the Vice President of Public Relations of Kappa Delta sorority, a Vanderbilt University Tour Guide, a member of the Phi Sigma Pi National Honors Fraternity, and an active participant in the Alternative Spring Break service program. Eventually, she plans on attending graduate school and pursuing a career in international social justice and human rights work.

Jackson Vaught is a rising senior in the College Scholars Honors Program at Vanderbilt University. Originally from Murfreesboro, TN, he is a double major in Political Science in the College of Arts & Science as well as Human & Organizational Development in Peabody College. On campus, his involvement includes Vanderbilt Student Government, Vanderbilt Programming Board, VUcept, and serving as a Resident Adviser on the Ingram Commons, Vanderbilt's freshman campus. His plans after graduation are to work in either the field of human resources or organizational consulting and then to attend law school with a focus on international law.

LAPOP is pleased to note that this report was developed and written by undergraduate students participating in a Vanderbilt University honors seminar in the Spring of 2015. That class, HONS186, was taught by Professor E. J. Zechmeister and Mollie Cohen acted as teaching assistant. Author names are listed here in alphabetical order.

Full results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer and previous rounds can be consulted online at www.LapopSurveys.org. The full data set is available for online analysis or download (in SPSS and Stata formats) at no cost.

Appendix: Complete OLS output for Figures 2 and 3

Independent Variables	**Figure 2**	**Figure 3**
Executive Approval		15.99***
		(0.859)
Government Performance: Corruption		15.34***
		(0.881)
Government Performance: Crime		10.57***
		(0.939)
Government Performance: Economy		18.02***
		(0.902)
Education	-1.127	1.531*
	(0.926)	(0.884)
Age	3.263***	3.505***
	(0.551)	(0.531)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.538	-0.169
	(0.563)	(0.536)
Female	-0.453	-0.329
	(0.303)	(0.309)
Urban	-1.233**	0.596
	(0.536)	(0.507)
Guatemala	3.341**	1.414
	(1.624)	(1.379)
El Salvador	9.768***	0.591
	(1.356)	(1.218)
Honduras	3.282**	-5.028***
	(1.512)	(1.296)
Nicaragua	10.01***	-2.677**
	(1.556)	(1.359)
Costa Rica	5.250***	6.286***
	(1.774)	(1.598)
Panama	10.56***	3.208**
	(1.515)	(1.294)
Colombia	-3.827**	-5.329***
	(1.585)	(1.442)
Ecuador	15.34***	-0.322
	(1.562)	(1.437)
Bolivia	13.11***	4.051***
	(1.432)	(1.264)
Peru	6.674***	5.276***
	(1.525)	(1.441)
Paraguay	3.668**	2.151
	(1.716)	(1.626)
Chile	6.697***	-0.661
	(1.898)	(1.728)
Uruguay	16.58***	7.497***
	(1.489)	(1.285)
Brazil	5.222***	5.027***
	(1.633)	(1.483)

Venezuela	4.720***	8.391***
	(1.703)	(1.386)
Argentina	9.696***	11.81***
	(1.686)	(1.558)
Dominican Republic	13.69***	1.581
	(1.528)	(1.434)
Haiti	4.237***	-2.916**
	(1.595)	(1.362)
Jamaica	1.612	0.491
	(1.462)	(1.326)
Guyana	-2.038	-3.200**
	(1.622)	(1.364)
Trinidad and Tobago	-0.141	-0.0507
	(1.530)	(1.328)
Belize	-2.507*	-4.579***
	(1.469)	(1.322)
Suriname	17.08***	
	(1.530)	
Bahamas	16.96***	
	(1.676)	
Constant	32.69***	6.753***
	(1.301)	(1.221)
Observations	44,263	35,245
R-squared	0.039	0.206

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: For the country fixed effects in the model, the comparison (baseline) category is Mexico.

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Number 116

Amid a Safeguards Policy on Imports, Ecuadorians Opt for Free Trade Agreements

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Main Findings:

- The majority of Ecuadorians (54%) believe the liberalization of the international trade system benefits the country economically
- While 64% of Ecuadorian citizens see an FTA with the rest of Latin America as a positive step, only 50% believe that an FTA with the US would be beneficial. 57% support signing an FTA with Europe, and 55% with China
- Those who consider themselves "right" on the ideological scale, and who perceive their personal economic situation to be improved as opposed to 12 months ago, favor FTAs
- Young people and those living in small towns hold more positive views of FTAs
- Traditionally excluded groups such as women and people with darker skin are less interested in signing FTAs

To what extent do Ecuadorians believe that free trade agreements (FTAs) help improve the economy? As of March 11, 2015, the Ecuadorian government decided to "establish a tariff surcharge, temporarily and non-discriminatorily, in order to regulate the general level of imports…"[1] With this resolution, the government implemented a system of safeguards on around 32% of imports (some 2,800 tariff lines) ranging from 5-45% depending on the type of product, for a period of up to 15 months.

Figure 1. Index of Support of FTAs in Ecuador



Levels of Support of the Liberalization of International Trade

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.ECU14_v2_temp

Although this measure seems to move the country away from the liberalization of international trade, it should be noted that in December 2014, Ecuador's Government and the European Union (EU) signed a multi-party trade agreement in Brussels in an effort to boost and diversify trade in both directions. This agreement, which is expected to come into effect in 2016, is anticipated to benefit Ecuadorian exporters of products ranging from fishing to agriculture, as well as benefits to consumers of automotive and alcoholic beverages.[2]

Although these trade policies seem to contradict one another, and the results of the policies have yet to be seen, one thing is clear: 54% of Ecuadorians express high and medium-high levels of support for liberalizing international trade, while only 18% have medium-low to low support for these policies. The rest (28%) express an average level of support. Figure 1 shows the results for an "index of support for FTAs in Ecuador."[3]

These data come from the last round of the AmericasBarometer in Ecuador. Between January and February 2014, we asked a representative sample of 1,512 Ecuadorians in rural and urban areas in 51 municipalities: *Now let's talk about trade between our country and other countries and regions. I will ask you to what extent the free trade agreements with the rest of Latin America/the Caribbean, Europe, the US, and China would help the Ecuadorian economy. We use the 1-7 scale where 1 means none and 7 means a lot. To what extent do you think the free trade agreements with other Latin American countries would help improve the Ecuadorian economy? What about Europe? The United States? China?*[4]

[1] Extract of Resolution No. 011-2015. The full resolution can be downloaded from the following link: http://www.comercioexterior.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Resoluci%C3%B3n-011-2015.pdf. Last accessed: May 5, 2015.

[2] More information about the settlement is available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-845_en.htm. Accessed May 5, 2015.

[3] This index is created by taking the mean of each individual's set of responses to questions measuring support for an FTA with other countries in Latin America, Europe, the US, and China (B48A-B48D in the questionnaires). The reliability coefficient of the scale is 0.85. The original values ranging from 1-7 were recoded and re-labeled as follows: 1 / 2.25 = "Low", 2.3 / 3.4 = "Medium-low", 3.5 / 4.5 = "Medium", 4.6 / 5.75 = "Medium-High", 6/7 = "High."

[4] Because the question refers to the level of agreement or disagreement with the notion that FTAs can improve the Ecuadorian economy, in this study this measurement is interpreted as equivalent to support for international free trade. It is important to note that although FTAs are generally bilateral or multi-party, in this study, we include the majority of countries and regions with which Ecuador has trade relations, so the index is interpreted as support for the liberalization of international trade as a whole.

In this *Insights*, based on Chapter Six of the report on "The Political Culture of Democracy in Ecuador, 2014" (Montalvo, forthcoming), we discuss responses to survey questions and factors associated with levels of support for FTAs in Ecuador.[5]

What factors influence support for liberalizing international trade in Ecuador?

Ecuadorians believe that an FTA could produce different levels of economic benefit, depending on the region or country with which a treaty is signed, according to this study. Thus, Figure 2 shows that there is a high percentage of people (64%) who see an FTA between Ecuador and other Latin American countries as positive; those numbers are 57% for Europe, 55% for China, and 50% for the United States.[6] What is interesting about these levels of support is that, according to the results of trade balances reported by the Central Bank of Ecuador from January to December, 2014, there is a deficit in non-oil balances with China and the United States as well as with Latin America as a whole.[7] However, Ecuador had a trade balance surplus with the European Union.

Figure 2. Level of Support for FTAs in Ecuador by Country or Region



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.ECU14_v2_temp

These results may suggest that, on average, Ecuadorians support (or lack thereof) for FTAs goes beyond the classic cost-benefit trade relationship. It may be that free trade agreements are symbols of cooperation among countries, and Ecuadorians could be more willing to cooperate with those with whom they identify – for example citizens of other countries of the region, or Spain in the European Union.

[5] The concept of free trade in this study is subjective; i.e., it responds to survey participants' own interpretation of information and not necessarily to the concepts of economic theory. However, support for public policies by citizens is based largely on the perceptions that people have about those policies.

[6] To determine the percentage of people assessed as "positive" to the idea of signing an FTA, the original scale ranging from 1-7, is recoded to a new level where values range from 1 to 4 take a value of 0 and those that range from 5 to 7 take a value of 100.

[7] However, if the trade balance between Ecuador and Latin America is studied separately, there was a surplus in trade with Venezuela and the Central American countries with the exception of Costa Rica and Panama. More information is available at the following link: http://contenido.bce.fin.ec/documentos/Estadisticas/SectorExterno/BalanzaPagos/balanzaComercial/ebca201502.pdf. Accessed May 11, 2015.

On the contrary, citizens may be slightly more reluctant to cooperate with countries like the U.S. or China because they do not identify as strongly with those countries. Another explanation for this phenomenon could be that Ecuadorians believe the terms of a negotiation would be fairer if negotiated with other countries in Latin America, compared to other countries (especially the United States).

To determine the factors that could be related to support for FTAs by Ecuadorians, we consolidated responses regarding all countries and regions into an index of support for the liberalization of international trade, for which the scale is runs from 0 (none) to 100 (a lot).[8] In the next section, we analyze theoretically relevant political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables to assess their relationship with support for FTAs in Ecuador.

Political economic factors

The first factor analyzed is ideological self-identification on the left-right spectrum.[9] Following classical political economy philosophy, it is expected that those Ecuadorians who are located to the left of the scale will demonstrate less support for trade liberalization than those who self-identify on the right. This expectation is primarily due to the idea that those on the left prioritize social over individual welfare, such that they would have greater concern about the negative effects that FTAs may have on employment, the environment, cultural heritage, etc. On the contrary, those who identify as right leaning are assumed to put more emphasis on individual gains that FTAs can bring in terms of access to more varied and cheaper products; as such, greater support for international trade liberalization is expected by this group (Lipset 1960). Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the Ecuadorian population by category, according to their ideological self-identification. As noted, about 35% of Ecuadorians self-identify on the left, while only 19% self-identify on the right, 25% as center, and 21% do not know or did not answer the question.

Figure 3. Percentage of Individuals by Ideological Category, Ecuador 2014



What other factors could influence public support for FTAs? Previous work by Zizumbo and Seligson (2013) suggests that while some authors explore the impact of public opinion elites on international trade (Ehrlich and Maestas 2010), most studies have focused on the

[8] The statistical analysis of reliability of scales suggests that it possible to theoretically group these countries and regions in the index in order to study the factors that explain the different levels of support for FTAs among the citizenry together as a dependent variable. The coefficient of the reliability of scale is, again, 0.85. To build the index, we keep cases that have up to 2 missing values.

[9] The terms "left" and "right" originate from the French Revolution of 1789. In the National Assembly, those who supported the revolution were considered to the left of the President, while those on the right supported the King.

economic interests of the citizenry (Zizumbo and Seligson 2013). However, Using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer, Zizumbo and Seligson demonstrate that the most decisive factor in citizen support for FTAs is one's assessment of how responsible the government is in managing the economy. They argue that the reason for this is that the process of negotiating FTAs is complex and heterogeneous, with ever-changing conditions, and estimating their effects is quite difficult to do. As a result, citizens who trust that the government is doing a good job believe that FTAs could be good for the country. Along these lines, in this study, we evaluate the relationship between presidential job approval and support for FTAs.

Other factors that could influence public support for free trade are sociotropic and idiotropic in nature. In the first case, scholars suggest that the political preference of individuals is based on their perception of the economic situation in the country (sociotropic factor) in general (Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Davidson et al. 2012). In this sense, one might believe that those who think the economy is robust and is ready to compete internationally may support the liberalization of the trade markets. On the contrary, one could expect that those who perceive that the economy is vulnerable may prefer protectionist policies. In the second case, several authors assert that personal economic interests (idiotropic factors) are central to the decision to support foreign trade policies (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001, Hiscox 2002). In that sense, one's personal economic situation could determine support for or rejection of an FTA. In general, it is expected that those who perceive their personal economic situation as good will want less government interference in business affairs. By contrast, those who perceive their economic situation as bad will prefer state protectionism.

Socioeconomic and demographic factors

Finally, it is expected that there are also differences by socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. For example, it is possible that those who live in the countryside and whose incomes depend on small-scale agriculture could have less favorable opinions of FTAs than those who live in the city and would benefit from more varied and cheaper products. Also, it may be expected that younger people have a higher level of support for the liberalization of international markets, as they are more immersed in a globalized world through access to technology than their older counterparts. This could reduce concerns about globalization among those who are young. All of these variables, along with the respondent's sex and level of education are taken into account in the econometric model in order to determine which factors are relevant in explaining support for FTAs among Ecuadorians.[10]

[10] **Presidential job approval** is measured in the variable M1 in the AmericasBarometer. The scale, originally from 1-5, is recoded from 0 (very bad/bad) to 1 (very good). For **"personal economic situation**" the question IDIO2 is used to measure the idotropic variable; originally scaled from 1-3, this is recoded from 0-1 where 0 is the worst personal economic situation and 1 is the best. To look at **"national economic situation,"** (SOCT2) we recode the same way we did the IDIO2 variable. **Ideology** has a special recoding; the original question L1 uses a 1-10 scale from left to right, where 1 means left and 10 means right. Due to the high percentage of people who don't know where they place on the scale, or do not respond (21.5% of respondents), 6 dummy variables are created to make comparisons between groups. In the first category, the respondents 1& 2 on the scale are considered "extreme left." Respondents 3&4 are grouped in the second category called "center left," and 5&6 are considered "center" on the scale. The fourth category is considered "center-right" and corresponds to 7&8, the fifth category is 9&10 and corresponds to "extreme-right." Finally, the category of "no ideology" corresponds to the people who do know or do no answer. For comparison in the model, the base category is "extreme-left." The **gender** variable (Q1) determines whether the respondent is male or female; the original scale is recoded so that 1=woman and 0=man. The **education** variable (ED) measures years of complete education on the interviewee through a table; the original values, 0-18+, are recoded so that 0 means no education and 1 signifies superior. **Age**, Q2, is divided by cohort, and respondents are grouped in the following categories: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-65, 65+. These values are recoded on a scale from 0-1. To measure wealth in five categories, a variable is generated using a series of articles about household possessions, and recoded 0-1; for more information see Cordova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf) For **population size** (ESTRATOSEC), the size of the city of residence is used; large cities (more than 100,000); medium cities (25,000-99,999); and small cities (less than 24,999) are recoded from 1 (small town) to 1 (big city). Finally, **skin**

Political and sociodemographic factors that predict support for FTAs in Ecuador

In order to test which factors are related to support for the liberalization of international trade through FTAs in Ecuador, a linear regression model is analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS). Figure 4 demonstrates the results of this analysis.

Figure 4. Predictors of Support for FTAs in Ecuador, 2014



Each independent variable is recoded on a scale of 0-1, so that the regression coefficient can be understood as the maximum effect each independent variable has on support for FTAs in Ecuador, with that dependent variable coded on a scale of 0-100. Non-standardized coefficients for each of the independent variables are identified with a black dot connected to the horizontal line, which shows a 95% confidence interval for this estimate. Coefficients that are to the left of the red "0.00" line have a negative relationship to the dependent variable, while those to the left of the line have a positive relationship; when the line does not cross the zero point, the effect is statistically significant.

The factors that have a statistically significant relationship in this model are: a) the perception of one's personal economic situation; b) ideology; c) sex; d) age; e) the size of the population of the city; and f) skin tone.

Among the factors that have a positive relationship are perception of personal economic situation and ideological self-identification. As people tend to think their personal economic situation was better in 2014 than 12 months prior to the survey, support for FTAs increases. Likewise, those who identify as ideologically right also have higher levels of belief that FTAs could help improve Ecuador's economy than those on the extreme left.[11] By contrast, older people on the one hand, and those with darker skin tones on the other, adhere less to the idea that FTAs could bring a boon to the Ecuadorian economy. Women, compared to men, express less support for FTAs with other countries. Finally, people living in more populated cities are less inclined to favor liberal trade policies.

Discussion and Conclusion

In times when decisions over Ecuador's foreign trade policy are very active, whether to promote a trade agreement with the European Union or to implement safeguards to around 2,800 imported products, it is important to study the public's assessment of the impact of FTAs on the country's economy. Data from the

color (colorr) is used to measure the skin tone of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 12 (darkest), and is recoded from 0 (darker) to 1 (white).

[11] For comparison in the model, the base category is "extreme-left."

AmericasBarometer are very revealing in this regard.

In the first place, there is more support for the idea of an FTA between Ecuador and the rest of Latin America than with Europe, the US, or China. This could be an issue of identity; some social psychology studies reveal that cooperation is more likely among groups that share an affinity such as historical legacy, language, or even religion (Bandura 1992, Brewer 1996). To the extent that FTAs are understood as a manifestation of cooperation among states, it is possible that Ecuadorians are more likely to implement FTAs with other groups of people with whom they share the same identity than with countries that have less common interests. An alternative (or complementary) explanation is that among Ecuadorians, the terms of negotiation with other countries in Latin America might be anticipated to be more fair, given that with Europe, the US, and China there is greater asymmetry of political economic power.

Traditionally vulnerable groups like women and those with darker skin express less support for FTAs.

In the second place, people who identify on the right of the ideological scale are more willing to accept FTAs than people who identify on the left. This finding coincides with what has been stated in several studies of classical philosophy of political economy. Those who self-identify on the ideological right tend to be more supportive of the idea of free trade and non-intervention of the government in general than those on the left. On the other hand, people on the left usually consider that the state should have a greater role, not only as regulator, but also as an actor of economic development and as a source of protection for infant industries within countries (Zechmeister and Corral 2010).[12]

With respect to the socioeconomic classical theories, this study finds no relationship between support for FTAs and a) wealth quintiles or b) level of education. However, those who perceive their personal economy as being good prefer less government intervention in business affairs (by the measure of FTA support). The same applies to those living in less populated cities. Contrary to what one might have expected, these people support FTAs more than those living in large cities. This could be because many of these people are engaged in commercial activities and agriculture that could benefit by increasing the access of their products to international markets.

Finally, other relevant social factors when supporting FTAs are sex, age, and skin tone. Women and people with darker skin tones tend to be less supportive of FTAs as a positive option for improving the country's economy. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that both women and people with darker skin are members of the vulnerable groups of society. Traditionally, these two groups of people have experienced greater difficulty in accumulating wealth than men and those with lighter skin. Therefore, these people might be more likely to seek protectionist measures by the state, even when it comes to issues such as globalization. It would require further research on this topic to verify this hypothesis empirically. Regarding age, it is possible that younger people more easily support FTAs than older people because they enjoy greater access to the information that globalization provides through social networks and media communication, than do older people.

[12] While this is the classic conception of the left-term terms, these associations are not always found in Latin America (see, for example, Zechmeister and Corral 2010).

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Before taking his position at LAPOP in 2014, Daniel was CEO at PRIME Consulting LLC (a firm specialized in survey research) in Ecuador and the Director of the Center for Global Studies at Universidad San Francisco de Quito – Ecuador, where he was also a professor. He has also worked as a Technical Officer at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and as a Rural Development Specialist at the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture of the Organization for American States.

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Appendix:

Levels of Support for the Liberalization of International Markets, Ecuador 2014

Coefficients	(t)	Standard Error
Presidential Approval	7.190	(1.45)
Perception of personal economic situation	8.693*	(2.67)
Perception of national economic situation	4.466	(1.61)
Center left	-0.924	(-0.30)
Center	4.619	(1.64)
Center right	8.491*	(2.33)
Extreme right	7.227	(1.90)
Don't know/don't respond about ideology	0.838	(0.26)
Female	-2.936*	(-2.27)
Level of Education	0.965	(0.24)
Age	-6.074*	(-2.23)
Wealth Quintiles	4.450	(1.88)
Size of Population	-6.052*	(-2.18)
Skin tone	-19.230*	(-3.46)
Constant	59.397*	(10.47)
F	6.58	
N. of cases	1238	
R-squared	0.07	

* $p<0.05$

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VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2015

Number 117

Effort Trumps Output in Predicting Satisfaction with Democracy

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Main Findings:

- Across the Americas, those in urban settings and with more years of schooling are less satisfied with democracy in their country
- For satisfaction with democracy, evaluations of personal and national economic *output* matter, but only at the margins
- Assessments of the executive's overall job performance and of the administration's *efforts* to manage the economy are even more substantively important predictors of individual satisfaction with democracy

For the latter part of the 20th century, the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region could be viewed as a success story with respect to democratic development (Puddington 2012). Yet, in recent years concern has been expressed that commitment to democratic principles in the region is "wavering" (Puddington 2012). One explanation lies in decreasing citizen satisfaction with what democracy has been able to deliver. Public satisfaction with democracy matters because it can be critical to state legitimacy and democratic stability (Norris 2011; Seligson and Booth 2009).

In this *Insights* report, we examine satisfaction with democracy in the Americas and assess some factors that predict this variable by using data from the 2014 LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey. Contrary to what some might expect, we find that evaluations of personal economic and national economic *output* are not strong predictors of satisfaction with democracy. Rather, evaluations of executive job performance and the perceived government's *efforts* in managing the economy are substantively important, positive predictors of satisfaction with democracy.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey by the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) allows us to evaluate satisfaction with democracy across 25 countries with survey responses based on the following question:

PN4: In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)?

Figure 1. Mean Degrees of Satisfaction with Democracy (0 to 100 Scale), 2014



Figure 1 displays the national average scores with their confidence intervals. In the figure, responses to this question are coded so that higher values correspond to higher levels of satisfaction; the country average scores all lie between "dissatisfied" (33) and "satisfied" (66) on the 0 to 100 scale. More specifically, country mean levels of satisfaction range from a low of 38.3 in Venezuela to a high of 61.5 in Uruguay. Satisfaction with democracy is lowest in Venezuela, Guyana, and Haiti and highest in Uruguay, the Bahamas, and Costa Rica.

While variables associated with individual countries may matter, we see no obvious relationship between national GDP, GDP per capita, GDP growth, and satisfaction with democracy.[1] Therefore in this report, we examine individual-level predictors of satisfaction with democracy.

Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors as Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy

As a first step in our analyses, we model satisfaction with democracy as a function of a set of five socio-economic and demographic variables: urban (vs. rural) residence, gender (female vs. male), years of schooling, wealth, and age.[2] The results of this OLS regression analysis are shown in Figure 2. The independent variables included in the model are listed on the vertical axis (country fixed effects were also included, but are not shown). The maximum estimated impact of each of these variables on satisfaction with democracy is graphically displayed by a dot.[3] Statistical significance is represented by 95% confidence intervals (horizontal bars) that do not overlap the vertical "0" line. Dots to the right indicate that the variable has a positive contribution, while dots to the left indicate a negative contribution.

Figure 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.M14_1.0

The model shows that, at the individual level, urban residency and years of schooling are significantly and negatively related to expressions of satisfaction with democracy. Interestingly, the variable with the strongest maximum predicted effect is years of schooling: those with more schooling have less satisfaction with democracy. Also, individuals who live in urban locations are less likely to be satisfied with democracy. Since the confidence intervals for the coefficients on age, gender, and wealth quintiles intersect the red vertical line, they are not statistically distinguishable from 0. Therefore, we conclude they are not significant determinants of satisfaction with democracy in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

Economic Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy

In what ways do economic factors matter for satisfaction with democracy? We consider two

[1] There are no obvious similarities between the order of countries in Figure 1 and the order of countries in the figures provided by the World Bank based on GDP (-0.2), GDP per capita (0.4), and GDP growth (0.04). For the data visit: http://data.worldbank.org/. It may be that other country-level factors matter, but we leave this for future research.

[2] Urban is coded as 1 if the respondent lives in an urban region, and 0 if the respondent lives in a rural area. The gender dummy variable takes the 1 value if the respondent is female. The wealth measure is a five-category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions; for more information see Córdova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf) Finally, age is measured by cohort, with respondents grouped into the following categories: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-65, and 65+.

[3] Each independent variable is scaled from 0 to 1, which means that the coefficient represents the estimated effect on the dependent variable (satisfaction with democracy, on a 0 to 100 scale) of moving the independent variable from its lowest to the highest value.

possibilities: first, that assessments of economic *output* matter and, second, that assessments of government's performance *efforts* matter.

Existing literature generally supports the notion that individual perceptions of personal and national economic growth are positive contributors to national pride, support for institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and support for democracy (Lockerbie 1993; Seligson and Booth 2009). Lockerbie (1993) suggests that citizens of a country generally believe that the government has a duty to improve not only individual financial situations, but also the financial situation of the nation as a whole. As a result, individuals with negative perceptions of personal and economic growth are likely to become dissatisfied with the way democracy is working (Lockerbie 1993). We test for this possibility by including measures that capture individuals' evaluations of whether their personal and their national economic situations have gotten better, worse, or stayed the same (the latter is the baseline/comparison category in the analysis).[4]

While evaluations of economic output may matter, we draw attention in this report to the notion that evaluations of government's attempts to deliver good performance can also matter. While the incumbent administration is often blamed for poor economic output, many also recognize that economic conditions can be influenced by circumstances outside the executive's control, such as the global economy or domestic institutions (Anderson 2000; Hellwig 2014). At the same time, some scholars believe that a citizen's evaluation of his or her country's institutions and his or her broader political opinions largely stem from evaluations of the current administration (see Norris 1999). For these reasons, evaluations of the executive's general job performance and evaluations of the administration's efforts with respect to the economy may be important predictors of satisfaction with democracy.

Figure 3. An Extended Model of Factors Predicting Satisfaction with Democracy



Figure 3 assesses perceptions of personal economic growth, perceptions of national economic growth, and evaluations of how the government is managing the economy, alongside the socioeconomic and demographic measures from the previous analysis. In addition, we also include a general measure of executive job approval.[5] We also account for

[4] The personal economic performance measure (IDIO1) reads, "Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?" National economic perceptions are measured using item SOCT1, which reads, "Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?" Responses to both items are measured using a three point scale, for analyses presented here the "same" category is used as the baseline.

[5] Executive approval is measured using variable M1, "Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of [President]? Very good, good, neither good nor bad (fair), poor, or very poor." The variable has been recoded so that higher values mean higher executive approval. Government performance with respect to the economy is measured using item N15, which reads, "To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?"

the impact of unmeasured factors related to the differences between individual countries by including country fixed effects not displayed in the figure.

The results in Figure 3 show that presidential approval is a significant and, among the variables we examine, the strongest predictor of satisfaction with democracy. Moving from the minimum to maximum rating on executive approval yields a predicted increase of 21.7 degrees of satisfaction with democracy.

We also find that evaluations of the economic situation – personal and national – matter, to at least some degree. This fits with scholarship suggesting that macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions not only influence evaluations of incumbent administrations, but also of the performance of a country's political system (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Lockerbie 1993). Specifically, while substantively quite small, the significant results depicted in Figure 3 for negative personal and national economic evaluations are in accord with scholarship suggesting that when people experience declines in their economic wellbeing, their belief in the ability of the current political system to satisfy their expectations is eroded (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993).

We do not find that positive perceptions of personal and national economic growth are significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy. Rather, only negative perceptions of personal and national economic growth are significant negative contributors to satisfaction with democracy, which suggests that citizens are more reactive to negative conditions in the economy rather than positive conditions when it comes to evaluating how democracy functions in their respective countries.[6]

"…[C]itizens are more reactive to negative conditions in the economy than positive conditions…"

At the same time that negative evaluations matter, we find that they are relatively weak predictors for satisfaction with democracy, when compared to evaluations of how the government is working to manage the economy. Evaluations of government *efforts* to delivery good economic output are significant and very strong predictors of satisfaction with democracy.[7] Moving from minimum (lowest) evaluations of government performance on the economy to maximum (highest), the model predicts an increase of 13.7 degrees of satisfaction with democracy.

These results for evaluations of government performance support Lockerbie's (1993) notion that citizens place a heavy emphasis on their government's responsibility to at least attempt to improve economic conditions. Lockerbie (1993) rationalizes this phenomenon by stating that individuals who are dissatisfied with how their government is managing the economy are also very likely to become dissatisfied with how democracy works in their country because "short-term evaluations of the government's performance hold considerable sway over levels of political alienation" (Lockerbie 1993, 291). We take this as

Responses were recoded from a 1-7 scale to range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating better performance.

[6] The fact that we find an effect for negative, but not positive, evaluations is supported by some scholarship on emotions, which suggests that people pay more attention to or are more motivated by negative emotions, specifically anger (Valentino et al. 2011).

[7] While multiple factors are considered in regard to democratic satisfaction, other factors are likely also important, for example, government performance in areas such as corruption and crime, but investigating these topics lies outside the scope of this report. We did consider whether diffuse system support is related to satisfaction with democracy in an analyses not reported here and we find a significant relationship; other results remain the same, and so we focus on the more parsimonious model here.

suggesting that perceptions that the government is not effectively working to manage the economy can cause individuals to believe that the system itself – democracy – is failing to function adequately. While outside the scope of this report to assess in more detail, this finding raises a key concern that such dissatisfaction could, in turn, cause individuals to become distrustful of democratic principles and processes more generally.

Conclusions

Previous studies in political science have suggested that citizen satisfaction with how a certain regime functions in a country is strongly influenced by individual perceptions of personal and national economic conditions (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Lockerbie 1993). This study of public opinion data from the Latin America and Caribbean region clarifies this relationship. We find that positive perceptions of personal and national economic growth are not significant predictors of satisfaction with democracy, while negative perceptions are significant, but only relatively weak, predictors.[8] At the same time, presidential approval and evaluations of how the government is managing the economy are very strong predictors of satisfaction with democracy. In short, when it comes to factors that determine satisfaction with democracy, we find that individuals are more concerned about the government's recent *efforts* in general and with respect to improving the economy than they are with assessments of actual economic conditions.

"…[I]ndividuals are more concerned about the government's recent efforts … than they are with assessments of actual economic conditions."

Satisfaction with democracy is crucial to maintaining democratic stability, especially in emerging democracies in the Latin America and Caribbean region (see discussion in Norris 2011). The findings we have presented here have implications for leaders and policymakers who seek to improve individuals' satisfaction with democracy. For example, this study shows that although overall national economic conditions may be improving, if the government is not perceived to be managing the economy well, citizens may still feel dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions in their country. Likewise, economic downturns may not necessarily be accompanied by substantial decreased citizen satisfaction with democracy as long as the government is perceived as working to manage the economy well.

It would be interesting to assess the impact of evaluations of the government's management of crime and corruption on satisfaction with democracy in order to further explore the relationship between perceptions of how the administration is combatting key problems within the country and citizen satisfaction with how democracy is working. Ultimately, our study suggests that the best way to improve satisfaction with democracy may be through changes in the government's management of the issues, more so than through the actual outcomes that are achieved.

[8] The finding for negative assessments suggests public opinion with respect to how a democracy functions is more volatile in bad economic circumstances than good ones.

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Appendix: Complete OLS Regression Output for Figures 2 and 3

VARIABLES	Figure 2	Figure 3
Personal Economy Better		0.266
		(0.322)
Personal Economy Worse		-2.031***
		(0.286)
National Economy Better		0.217
		(0.370)
National Economy Worse		-1.791***
		(0.291)
Government Performance: Economy		13.67***
		(0.519)
Presidential Approval		21.29***
		(0.636)
Female	-0.454**	-0.157
	(0.222)	(0.214)
Urban	2.073***	1.089***
	(0.377)	(0.338)
Age (cohorts)	0.300	0.418
	(0.423)	(0.401)
Education	-3.822***	-2.768***
	(0.701)	(0.654)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.0120	-0.0135
	(0.102)	(0.0927)
Guatemala	7.124***	5.643***
	(1.127)	(1.038)
El Salvador	10.90***	3.434***
	(1.056)	(0.983)
Honduras	3.792***	-2.190**
	(1.081)	(0.977)
Nicaragua	10.65***	2.364**
	(1.091)	(0.957)
Costa Rica	17.30***	18.83***
	(1.224)	(1.120)
Panama	14.34***	7.375***
	(1.216)	(1.064)
Colombia	0.600	-2.421**
	(1.163)	(1.069)
Ecuador	15.21***	3.610***
	(1.232)	(1.044)
Bolivia	9.668***	1.212
	(1.031)	(0.890)
Peru	2.825**	0.00156

	(1.270)	(1.171)
Paraguay	5.606***	1.641
	(1.220)	(1.110)
Chile	10.52***	3.318***
	(1.266)	(1.205)
Uruguay	20.06***	11.88***
	(1.041)	(0.933)
Brazil	3.607***	0.710
	(1.164)	(1.068)
Venezuela	-2.844**	0.241
	(1.358)	(1.119)
Argentina	11.87***	11.90***
	(1.189)	(1.061)
Dominican Republic	5.510***	-4.826***
	(1.113)	(1.009)
Haiti	-1.487	-6.877***
	(1.798)	(1.574)
Jamaica	3.164***	2.391**
	(1.212)	(1.100)
Guyana	-2.622*	-4.681***
	(1.525)	(1.212)
Trinidad and Tobago	11.07***	9.187***
	(1.284)	(1.162)
Belize	6.192***	4.185***
	(1.083)	(0.950)
Suriname	14.83***	5.594***
	(1.064)	(0.964)
Bahamas	19.73***	13.37***
	(1.090)	(0.965)
Constant	43.44***	31.14***
	(1.022)	(0.974)
Observations	43,555	41,285
R-squared	0.081	0.208

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: For the country fixed effects in the model, the comparison (baseline) category is Mexico.

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2015

Number 118

Rethinking Environmental Attitudes in Latin America and the Caribbean

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Main Findings:

- In 21 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), more than 50% of people see environmental protection as a priority
- Traditional measures of socioeconomic status, wealth and education, do not predict support for environmental protection
- Men and rural residents are more supportive of environmental protection than are women and urban residents
- Contextual component: individuals living in wealthier regions of a country are less likely to support environmental protection, than are those in poorer areas, as are individuals living in countries with higher CO_2 emissions

The threats posed by various forms of environmental degradation are some of the most pressing issues of the 21st century.[1] Despite the success of some policy efforts, overcoming the knotty collective action problem that the environment presents will require more concerted efforts at the local, regional, and global levels.[2] An important determinant of the effectiveness of such efforts may very well be public opinion.

While there are many avenues through which one might explore public opinion on the environment, determining who is more inclined to prioritize environmental protection is an important first step. Sustainability efforts require the commitment of resources and can have economic implications. Therefore, this *Insights* report assesses factors that predict individuals' willingness to trade-off economic growth for environmental protection in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region.

The 2014 wave of the AmericasBarometer survey included a new question asked to 35,212 individuals in 23 countries:

ENV1: In your opinion, what should be given higher priority: to protect the environment, or promote economic growth?

Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of responses by country.[3] In 11 of 22 countries, at least 40% of respondents express support for the strict prioritization of environmental protection. Further, in 21 countries more than 50% of respondents support environmental protection or see economic growth and environmental protection as equal priorities. This first glance at the distribution of responses suggests that individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean are fairly supportive of environmental efforts. This is consistent with other research suggesting higher levels of environmental awareness and concern are found in the LAC region compared to other parts of the world.[4] These realities make the Latin America and Caribbean region a particularly interesting context within which to study cross-national and individual-level variation in public opinion toward environmental protection.

Figure 1. Response Proportion for Environmental Support by Country



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.2014_031015

Who Prioritizes the Environment in the Latin America and Caribbean Region?

In theorizing about the determinants of pro-environmental attitudes, previous research has largely centered on Inglehart's post-materialism framework (Inglehart, 1981). The

[1] This perspective has been presented by several organizations, including the United Nations and the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014).

[2] See among others Ostrom, 1990.

[3] While the question was also asked in the United States, this report focuses solely on countries in the LAC region.

4 A 2007-2008 Gallup Poll shows that 11 of the 20 countries with the highest percentage of respondents attributing global warming to human activity are located in Central and South America, and in these 11 countries over 50% of the population reports awareness of global warming, (Pelham 2009).

general notion is that individuals' preferences over issues such as environmental protection shift as individuals acquire wealth. The reason is that economic security allows for more time and resources to be allocated to non-need based interests, like the environment. Thus, the post-materialism framework posits that the lower a person is on the socioeconomic spectrum, the less likely he or she is to prioritize the environment.

Empirical analyses have shown various levels of support for hypotheses related to the post-materialism school. Several studies find statistical support for a positive relationship between post-materialism values and environmental attitudes, but the connection is not all that substantial (e.g. Inglehart, 1981; Gelissen, 2007; Kvaloy, Finseraas, and Listhaug, 2012). Despite only meager evidence, however, the literature on this subject largely continues in this tradition. Franzen and Meyer (2010), for example, develop a derivative of post-materialism which they refer to as the "prosperity hypothesis." They posit that environmental preferences are a function of individuals' income, but the rate at which income affects environmental attitudes decreases as an individual reaches the highest income levels. The practice of offering an adaptation to post-materialism is fairly common in environmental public opinion research. The intuitive appeal appears to outweigh inconsistency in its explanatory power, which leads to the theory's continued importance. Given its continued relevance to discussions of public opinion and the environment, this *Insights* report assesses the extent to which socioeconomic indicators commonly associated with post-materialistic values (fail to) predict public opinion in the Latin America and Caribbean region.[5]

In order to determine the effects of socioeconomic status on support for environmental protection, I use an OLS regression model.[6] The dependent variable is drawn from the ENV1 question; responses to it have been recoded such that a 0 denotes an economic growth answer, 50 denotes a "both" answer, and 100 represents an environmental protection answer.[7] I predict environmental attitudes with five socioeconomic and demographic variables: wealth, education, age, urban (versus rural), and gender (and country fixed effects, included but not shown).[8]

Figure 2 presents the predicted effects with dots, and the 95% confidence intervals are captured by the error bars. If these error bars cross the vertical line denoting 0, the variable's effect on environmental attitudes is not statistically distinguishable from 0. Only those

[5] Some might argue the focus on Latin America and the Caribbean leads to an exclusion of highly industrialized countries, like those of Western Europe and the United States, which then weakens the argument being made against post-materialism. The LAC region, however, varies widely in levels of development not only across countries, but also within countries. While this variation might not capture the entire scope of development, I do think that it is an appropriate region to be exploring socioeconomic status's influence on environmental attitudes.

[6] It is important to note that when employing a multinomial logistic regression framework, the analysis that follows holds for the comparison between environmental protection and economic growth responses, but not for the comparison of economic growth responses to the both answers. Wealth, education, and age are all positively related to giving a "both" answer, while urban residence remains in the negative direction. This would suggest that those who offer an unsolicited answer of "both" are different than those who respond based on given options.

[7] When asked the ENV1 question, respondents were prompted with two response options: promoting economic growth or protecting the environment. Many respondents, however, offered an answer of "both." For the analysis of this report, the coding rule assumes that responding "both" falls in the middle. That said, multinomial logistic regression yields different results when comparing the "both" respondents to others and therefore, an alternative coding scheme might be more appropriate for research that is less interested in the endpoint options and more interested in the "both" response (see footnote 6).

[8] Wealth is measured as quintiles of household possessions, see Córdova, 2009 for more discussion (QUINTAL). The education measure is categorical in nature, where the lowest category measures no education and the highest denotes post-secondary (EDR). Age is measured continuously, in years (Q2). Urban is measured using the country's census data, and is noted by the enumerator (UR). Gender is also noted by the enumerator and not asked of the respondent (Q1).

variables with error bars that do not cross 0 can be said to be related to environmental support. For the analysis, each independent variable is scaled from 0 to 1; this means that the maximum predicted effect of each independent variable on the 0 to 100 dependent variable is represented by the coefficient (the dot). Figure 2 shows that the highest predicted effect of any independent variable on environmental attitudes is -3.67 (for urban), which means that not a single variable included in the model shifts attitudes by more than 4 units on the environmental scale ranging from 0 to 100.

As shown in Figure 2, the traditional socioeconomic factors – relative wealth, age, and education – do not affect individuals' support for environmental protection on average for the LAC region. Wealthier or more educated individuals are no more likely to express a willingness to prioritize the environment than those with lower socioeconomic statuses. This is a striking result, as it is clearly at odds with the predictions of the post-materialism hypothesis. Overall, it does not appear that there is much evidence to support the post-materialism hypothesis in the LAC region.

The only two variables that have a statistically significant relationship with environmental attitudes are those that measure gender and place of residence. Individuals living in urban areas are less likely to express pro-environmental tendencies than those living in rural areas, as are females (less likely) compared to men (more likely). The first finding might be explained by the fact that individuals in rural areas are more directly dependent on the environment and understand the necessity of sustainable practices. It could also be the case that those living in rural areas have more experience with environmental problems as they have less access to more modern environmental protection (i.e. water sanitation, greener energy solutions, etc.).[9]

Figure 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors of Environmental Support



Socioeconomic status does not predict environmental attitudes.

The direction of the coefficient for gender is somewhat surprising given that, while gender is not always found to have an effect on environmental attitudes, in those studies where a relationship is found it is generally the case that women express more environmentally friendly attitudes than men (e.g. Franzen and Meyer, 2010; Kvaloy, et al., 2012). In this sample, however, it appears that females are marginally less willing to sacrifice economic growth for environmental protection. It could be that in the Latin American and Caribbean context, on average women are more aware of what the household needs, and therefore less willing to prioritize the environment; it may be that they are simply more conservative, on average. Either way, future research should

[9] The World Health Organization and UNICEF's 2014 report finds that over 70% of the people without clean water access are living in rural areas (WHO, 2014: 8).

probe into the reasons why those in urban areas and women in the LAC region are less likely to express strong support for environmental protection measures.

Does Context Matter?

Does the context in which one lives help predict individuals' concern about environmental protection? Given that the initial results indicate measures relevant to the post-materialism model (that is, socioeconomic characteristics) do not predict environmental attitudes in Latin America and the Caribbean, in this section I extend the model to incorporate the "objective problems" hypothesis that Inglehart offers as an additional determinant of environmental attitudes (Inglehart, 1995). Inglehart argues that the relationship between post-materialism and environmental attitudes is moderated by individuals' situations as "people are concerned about the environment because they face serious objective problems," (Inglehart, 1995: 57). The idea is that whether or not individuals have personal economic security, they may recognize that their quality of life is not independent of their surroundings (i.e. access to clean water, clean air, etc.). In order to offer a test of the extent to which contextual factors matter, I first incorporate the economic status of each individual's region and country. It could be that individuals living in wealthier areas of a country or in a wealthier country have a higher likelihood of prioritizing the environment, regardless of their own economic situation. Then, in a separate model I assess the relevance of a different type of "objective problem": the level of countries' per capita CO_2 emissions.[10] These measures allow me to test whether contextual factors beyond wealth might affect individuals' willingness to make the trade-off between economics and the environment.

Including the effects of context on individuals' attitudes has become more common in recent literature.[11] For example, Eisenstadt and West (n.d.) test multiple hypotheses of environmental attitudes, one of which they call the "extractivist debate hypothesis." In their analysis, they find that individuals living in areas of Ecuador that have a history of oil extraction express lower levels of environmental concern, while those living in areas that are being considered for future oil extraction projects are more concerned for the environment. This could be characterized as a challenge to the post-materialism framework, as those individuals who have an opportunity to grow the economy with extraction projects are more environmentally concerned. Individuals who are more exposed to oil extraction are less concerned with reversing its effects than those who are being presented with possible extraction sites.

The results for the economic model are shown in Figure 3.[12] As the figure shows, the per capita GDP of a country is not a statistically significant determinant of environmental attitudes. Wealthier nations are no more likely to have individuals who are environmentally supportive than are poorer countries.[13] Further, while the average wealth of a region is

[10] Data from the World Bank in 2010 were used to calculate the measures of national per capita GDP and per capita CO_2 emissions. The regional economic status measure was created by calculating the average of LAPOP's wealth quintile measure for each subnational region. This measure is based on a complex analysis of ownership of household items (see Córdova 2009).

[11] Previous research using contextual variables varies widely across studies, particularly as the population of interest changes. There is a lack of consensus as to how these "objective problems" should influence public opinion towards the environment. For a more detailed discussion of these studies, see Kvaloy, et al., 2012: 14). Kvaloy, et al., 2012 refer this hypothesis as the "objective conditions hypothesis."

[12] Again, the independent variables have been re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. In the models that use aggregate-level data, country-fixed effects are not included. See Appendix for full regression output.

[13] When the average regional wealth indicator is not included in the analysis, the per capita GDP coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This, however, is still in line with the conclusion that wealthier countries are no more likely (maybe less likely) to prioritize the environment over economic growth.

statistically related to environmental protection prioritization, it is in the *opposite* direction predicted by the post-materialism framework. The post-materialism expectation would be that individuals living in poorer contexts would be the most willing to prioritize economic growth, but the analysis instead shows that individuals in poorer regions are more supportive of environmental protection.[14] Overall, the analyses in this report reveal that economic status at the individual, regional, and national level does not correlate with environmental attitudes in the ways expected by the post-material school of thought.

Figure 4 displays the results of a second expanded model that includes the CO_2 emissions measure.[15] The results show that higher CO_2 emissions are related to lower levels of support for environmental prioritization, which is also at odds with Inglehart's "objective problems" expectation.[16] While not a perfect proxy, one might expect that higher CO_2 emissions are linked to poorer air quality. This in turn, would translate into individuals living in countries with higher emissions having more environmentally friendly attitudes, yet no support for that

Figure 3. Extended Economic Model Predicting Environmental Support



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.2014_0310

Figure 4. Extended CO_2 Emissions Model Predicting Environmental Support



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.2014_0310

"objective problems" hypothesis is found in this analysis. One explanation for this contrary finding might be that the countries with the highest per capita emissions are those countries that are most economically dependent on industries that are less sustainable, and therefore less willing to put the environment first. This is consistent with the findings by Eisenstadt and West (n.d.) with respect to the

[14] These results, like those in the earlier model, were produced using OLS Regression with clustered standard errors at the country levels. Since the model incorporates country-level variables, country fixed effects are not included. When using a hierarchical model to account for the nested nature of the data (i.e. individuals in regions/countries), however, the coefficient for average regional wealth remains negative, but it becomes statistically insignificant. While this could be seen as an unstable finding, it still speaks to the conclusion that wealth, at any level, does a poor job of predicting environmental attitudes.

[15] See Appendix for regression output. Since the per capita GDP measure and the CO_2 emissions measures are so highly correlated, these variables had to be used in separate models to avoid being dropped from analysis for multicollinearity.

[16] Similar to Footnote 12, when using hierarchical models – the CO_2 coefficient fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. According to Inglehart, however, these objective conditions measures should still produce positive coefficients – with the countries with the highest emission levels being the most likely to have pro-environmental attitudes.

history of oil extraction and future extraction as potential influences on these attitudes.

At the same time, the per capita CO_2 measure is highly correlated with the per capita GDP measure (r = 0.8), meaning that the individuals living in the highest emitting countries are generally the individuals living in the wealthiest countries in the region. While only a correlation, this further suggests that individuals who have already experienced the economic growth associated with more harmful environmental practices are less willing to sacrifice that economic security. One interpretation of the data, then, is that these individuals are living in a material society, while it is the individuals living in "pre-material" (less industrialized, less developed) conditions who are more willing to prioritize the environment. It is difficult to know whether or not individuals recognize the potentially negative relationship between economic growth and environmental protection, but one explanation for these results might be that individuals who have not been exposed to the economic benefits of industrial expansion are less interested in that possibility if it would jeopardize the security of their environment. Of course, there are also other reasons that could explain the results found in this report, including country-specific factors not taken into consideration in this study of the LAC region. For the sake of brevity, I leave those for future studies.

Conclusion

This *Insights* report uses 2014 AmericasBarometer data to assess the determinants of individuals' willingness to prioritize environmental efforts over economic growth. The report puts the post-materialism school of thought to the test and finds it does a poor job of explaining why so many individuals in the Latin America and Caribbean region express environmentally friendly attitudes. Socioeconomic status, measured by the wealth and education variables, has no effect on such attitudes in the pooled analysis for the LAC region. Age is also not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes. An individual's urban (versus rural) place of residence and gender do predict individuals' environmental attitudes, albeit by relatively small amounts.

These results reveal a hole in our understanding of public opinion and the environment. In a region that is facing other difficulties, why is it that such a large portion of the population is willing to sacrifice much needed economic growth in order to ensure sustainability?

The expansions of the model to test the "objective problems" hypothesis that stems from Inglehart's discussion of the relevance of different contextual factors for environmental attitudes (in one model, regional and national measures of wealth; in another model, a country-level CO_2 emissions variable) provide a step towards answering this question. Individuals in more affluent regional settings are less-likely to support environmental protection than those living in poorer sub-national settings. In addition, the average individual in countries that are contributing more CO_2 emissions is less supportive of environmental protection at the expense of economic growth. It may be that individuals in these circumstances are less willing to sacrifice economic success obtained through industrialization compared to those who have yet to experience or "benefit" from the traditionally less environmentally friendly industries.

Much remains to be done, yet this study reinforces the idea that the contexts within which individuals live need to be taken into consideration. Future research should consider the experience that an individual has with environmental realities (e.g. water shortages and air pollution) and with economic dependence on industries that degrade the environment. By better understanding who is more likely to prioritize the environment, we

can better understand where pro-environmental policies are more likely to resonate with the public, and therefore take a step toward such outcomes as the creation of more efficient and effective campaigns to increase awareness and concerns regarding pressing environmental issues in the region.

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Appendix

Table 1. Predictors of Environmental Attitudes in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014

Variables	Model 1 Individual-level	Model 2 Extended, economic	Model 3 Extended, CO_2 emissions
Age	-1.425	-1.523	-0.163
	(1.275)	(1.299)	(1.290)
Female	-2.836***	-2.816***	-2.811***
	(0.430)	(0.433)	(0.433)
Urban	-3.672***	-0.871	-0.198
	(0.705)	(0.833)	(0.787)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.074	0.336	-0.724
	(0.764)	(0.820)	(0.801)
Education	0.304	0.212	2.573**
	(1.138)	(1.183)	(1.166)
Per Capita GDP		-1.435	
		(1.217)	
Avg. Regional Wealth		-12.532***	
		(4.020)	
CO_2 Emissions			-17.591***
			(1.744)
Mexico	-6.433***		
	(2.128)		
Guatemala	4.295**		
	(2.090)		
El Salvador	-0.286		
	(2.061)		
Honduras	-6.405***		
	(2.141)		
Nicaragua	9.717***		
	(2.006)		
Costa Rica	12.496***		
	(2.343)		
Panama	5.491**		
	(2.323)		
Colombia	23.334***		
	(2.026)		
Ecuador	8.213***		
	(2.163)		
Bolivia	14.980***		
	(2.244)		
Peru	11.762***		
	(2.232)		

Paraguay	11.078***		
	(2.029)		
Chile	6.552***		
	(2.328)		
Uruguay	12.387***		
	(2.075)		
Brazil	20.875***		
	(2.343)		
Venezuela	-5.866**		
	(2.615)		
Argentina	Reference Country		
Dominican Republic	2.758		
	(2.135)		
Haiti	16.451***		
	(2.381)		
Jamaica	-13.502***		
	(2.100)		
Guyana	-2.273		
	(2.380)		
Belize	-12.003***		
	(2.318)		
Constant	54.499***	64.398***	60.993***
	(1.970)	(2.057)	(1.069)
Observations	33,708	33,708	33,708
R-squared	0.058	0.002	0.010

Standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, p*<0.01

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Surveying State Capacity

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Main Findings:

- We propose a new, survey-based strategy for measuring state capacity in Latin America
- This strategy has several important advantages over existing methods, which rely on crude proxies or state-generated data
- Questions from the 2014 AmericasBarometer provide proof of concept, correlating with existing measures and generating plausible rankings
- We highlight some of the payoffs of this approach and point out directions for future research.

State capacity, or the ability of state institutions to effectively implement a basic set of core functions and effectively enforce laws, is a central component of politics.[1] Observers of Latin America often see references to "state failure" and "state crisis," but state capacity also underlies democratic citizenship, domestic security, and effective governance.[2] Thus, accurate assessment of state capacity is necessary for understanding many aspects of contemporary politics in the Americas. Yet as we discuss in this *Insights* report, scholars and analysts currently lack high-quality measures of this core concept, and are forced to rely on crude proxies that are often calculated from state-produced data of uncertain quality, and which can be insensitive to sub-national variation.

This *Insights* outlines a novel approach to measuring state capacity. We first describe the new survey-based strategy we develop, using questions from the 2014 wave of the AmericasBarometer. Second, we show a series of findings at a cross-national level that describe trends across countries and dimensions of state capacity. Third, we demonstrate one way that these data can provide insight into patterns of subnational variation. We close by making the case for the use of this approach in further research, suggesting how it advances on previous attempts to assess state capacity, and identifying some directions for a research agenda that builds on our initial examination.

Measurement Strategy and Country Rankings

In this investigation, we use answers to questions from the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey to assess three dimensions of state capacity at the national level. For each dimension, we provide a graph of country scores, ordered by ranking from least (on the left) effective to most (on the right) effective. The three distinct aspects of the state's capacity that we examine are: its *reach across territory*, its ability to impose *taxation*, and its effectiveness in *provision of property rights*. Our choice of these dimensions derives from an extensive review of the conceptual and methodological literature on state capacity.[3] Though the term "state capacity" is used in many ways by scholars, policymakers, and analysts, we define it as the state's ability to implement basic policies. Therefore we do not incorporate corruption, patronage, or other dimensions of stateness into our definition or into our operationalizations of state capacity.

Reach across territory: To capture the reach of state institutions, we use a question new to the AmericasBarometer survey that asks respondents to estimate (using a five point scale) how long it would take the police to arrive at their home if called to respond to an emergency (answers include: (1) Less than 10 minutes, (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes, (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour, (4) More than an hour and up to three hours, (5) More than three hours) (INFRAX).[4]

[1] This definition is based on Michael Mann's concept of 'infrastructural power' (1984) and draws on the conceptual discussions in Soifer & vom Hau (2008) and Soifer (2012).

[2] The academic scholarship on how state capacity affects these core elements of the political context is vast. For an important initial statement see O'Donnell (1993), and for a previous discussion of this issue in the context of the AmericasBarometer see Luna & Toro (2014).

[3] See among others Soifer (2012), Hanson & Sigman (2013), and Luna & Toro (2014).

[4] INFRAX: "Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? (1) Less than 10 minutes, (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes, (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour, (4) More than an hour and up to three hours, (5) More than three hours." Alternatives read do not include "There are no police/they would never arrive" though as discussed below this was a common response in several countries. At the time this report was written, data was available from 25 of the 28 countries included in the

Figure 1. Reach across Territory (INFRAX)



That responses are correlated very weakly (.09) with LAPOP's items on crime victimization confirms that this question taps something distinct from the state's provision of security.[5] On the other hand, individual responses are correlated at 0.53 with another question asked in eight countries that assesses the response time of fire departments (INFRA2).[6] This suggests that responses to INFRAX adequately tap the overall reach of state institutions over territory.

All but one of the cases cluster into three groups of countries sharing statistically similar mean levels of police response.[7] The highest ranked group includes all countries from Uruguay to Mexico in Figure 1 (12 countries).[8] The second group extends from Brazil to Honduras (seven countries). Finally, police response in Guyana, Nicaragua, and Haiti cannot be statistically differentiated. Venezuela, where some 44% of respondents answer either that police would take over three hours to appear, or do not exist, is an outlier.[9]

AmericasBarometer; all except Barbados, the Bahamas, and Suriname.

[5] Measures of the local crime rate are calculated from responses to VICBAR1 and VICBAR7, which were asked in 23 of the countries.

[6] INFRA2: "Suppose now that your house catches fire. How long do you think it would take the firefighters to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon?"

[7] Here and elsewhere in this note we refer to "clusters" when identifying cases among which significant differences of means are not observed in a Oneway ANOVA procedure that relies on Bonferroni pairwise comparison tests.

[8] Although data from the United States and Canada was available on this dimension of stateness, the other dimensions were not captured in those countries. We therefore limit our focus to Latin American and Caribbean cases exclusively. Notably, the country-level scores for the United States and Canada top the regional rankings on state reach and diverge significantly from all other cases, with most respondents expecting that the police will appear in under 30 minutes.

[9] In figures 1-3 we also display the standard deviations obtained for every indicator and country. In general, our cases display relatively homogeneous levels of variance. The only exception to this trend is our property rights indicator for which standard deviations decrease as state capacity increases. The levels of variance we observe in these three figures can be explained in a variety of ways. Observed variance could be produced either at the individual level and/or by the nesting of individuals within territorial/sub-national units among which state capacity may vary widely. We explore the latter possibility below,

Taxation: To capture the state's ability to impose taxes, we focus on sales taxes, which rank at an intermediate level in terms of ease of collection (Soifer 2012). We use another new question, COER1, which asks respondents to assess (on a four point scale) the likelihood they get a receipt for a purchase in a neighborhood store.[10] This question was asked in ten countries. At the level of the individual respondent, this indicator is correlated with the property rights dimension (described below) only at .12, confirming that it captures a distinct aspect of stateness.

Figure 2. Taxation (COER1)



Country means are shown in Figure 2. Of the ten countries where our taxation question was asked, the clear outlier is Chile, where 58% of respondents report always getting receipts for transactions in neighborhood stores, and another 28% report sometimes getting them. Chile scores significantly higher than every other country in the sample, followed by Uruguay and Belize that cannot be significantly differentiated, and then by Argentina and Paraguay, which are each significantly different from all other countries in the sample. The remaining countries share statistically similar mean levels of taxation with at least one other case; these five of our ten cases hang together at the low end of the rankings.

Table 1. Correlations between our Dimensions and Existing Indicators

	INFRAX	COER1	PRCLEAR
BTI stateness	-0.7 n=21	-0.8 n=8	0.8 n=6
Property rights payments/GDP per capita (WDI)[1]	-0.2 n=7	-0.5 n=4	0.5 n=7
Tax ratio (WDI)	-0.1 n=6	-0.6 n=6	-1 n=2
Net Primary school enrollment (WDI)	-0.3 n=19	-0.3 n=9	0.4 n=8
Improved water source access in rural areas (WDI)	-0.5 n=22	-0.4 n=9	0.0 n=7

where we argue that sub-national variance might carry significant weight in explaining the levels of within-country heterogeneity we observe in Figures 1-3. We intend to explore the sources of variation at the individual level in future research.

[10] COER question wording: "When you shop in a local store/shop in your neighborhood, even if you do not ask for it, would you receive a receipt/cash register receipt/invoice?"

Figure 3. Provision of Property Rights (PRCLEAR)



Provision of property rights: We assess the state's enforcement of property rights using an indicator created from three questions (PR1, PR2, and PR3), which were asked in seven countries. The first, PR1, asks respondents whether they own their home; the second, PR2, asks whether those who do own have a title on that home; and the third, PR3, asks those who rent whether or not they have a rental contract.[11] Combining the affirmative answers to PR2 and PR3, we generate a measure of formal property rights in the housing sector. Because 4.2% of respondents overall (and over 15% of respondents in Panama) responded to PR2 by stating that their titles were "in process," we need to decide how to incorporate this option into our measure. In an abundance of caution, we develop three distinct measures: 1) PRSTRICT groups titles in process with untitled property; 2) PRLAX treats those responses as evidence that property rights are present, with the logic that titles in process reflect salient, if inefficient, property rights administration; and 3) PRCLEAR takes the simplest approach and drops "in process" responses.[12]

Figure 3, shows country scores for PRCLEAR. Chile and Costa Rica have similarly high scores. Over 90% of respondents in both cases have formalized property rights, based on the PRCLEAR measure. Venezuela, Trinidad & Tobago, and Panama cluster together in the middle of the rankings. The remaining three countries at the bottom of the rankings (Guyana, the Dominican Republic, and Belize) display similarly low levels of formalized property rights, with fewer than 70% of respondents in each country indicating that their housing situation is formalized.

[11] PR1: "Is the home in which you reside rented, owned, or borrowed or shared?" PR2: "Does this home have a property title so that it is in your name, or is the title in the name of a bank or another institution?" PR3: "Do you have a rental contract?"

[12] The correlations between the country level scores for these three measures are above 0.9, and the coding rules do not affect the descriptive inferences we draw from the data.

External Validity

Though more systematic comparisons with existing measures are required, it is promising that our national-level findings match conventional wisdom about stateness in the Americas. It gives us some confidence that our measures capture the differences in state capacity across countries, and thus have a certain degree of validity. More confidence in the validity of these new measures derives from the fact that correlations with existing measures of state capacity appear as expected, as seen in Table 1. First, Table 1 shows that all three of our dimensions are well correlated with the stateness dimension of the Bertelsmann Transitions Index (BTI), suggesting that they all tap an underlying common variable. Second, commonly used indicators of state capacity drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI) line up well with each of our dimensions.[13] The WDI measure of property rights payments (as a share of GDP per capita) is well correlated and correctly signed with our property rights dimension, but more weakly correlated with the other dimensions. The tax ratio correlates quite strongly with our measure of tax enforcement. And both primary school enrollment and rural water access are correlated as expected with the INFRAX variable that assesses the reach of state institutions (negatively, because higher values mean less state capacity on this measure). It should be noted, however, that the correlations we report are computed on the basis of an extremely low "n" (that is, a low number of observations at the country level) and should thus be taken as preliminary, but nevertheless suggestive, evidence for the validity of our measures.

[13] The World Development Indicators data was accessed online at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators

The Uneven Reach of the State

Yet much of the interesting variance in stateness is not assessed by the national-level measures discussed thus far. It lies at the *sub-national level*, since states' performance of their core functions varies sharply across society and territory (O'Donnell 1993; Huntington & Wibbels 2014). This variation is not well captured in existing measures of state capacity, which take the country as the unit of analysis, use single indicators of stateness, and ignore sub-national variation. As a result, they do not provide a systematic way to assess whether the state is more effective in particular provinces or municipalities, and whether distinct dimensions of stateness share similar patterns of territorial variation.

Our survey-based strategy for assessing state capacity is unique. It provides the possibility of capturing subnational variation in many aspects of state capacity without relying on data generated by states or crude proxies, and without being limited to particular units of analysis because of data availability. Thus the payoffs from this approach lie in applying the strategy developed in this *Insights* to the sub-national context and examining sub-national variation in state capacity in the Americas. Here, we provide a preliminary exploration of these issues that highlights some of the findings that can be observed from very simple subnational analyses.

To do so, we stratify responses to each question by the size of the locality (as coded in the TAMAÑO variable on each questionnaire) where the respondent lives.[14] Figures 4 through

[14]We drop the responses for the national capital and large metropolitan areas for the purposes of this discussion. We do so for several reasons. First and most directly, they are not relevant to our focus on reach over territory. Second, national capitals and large metropolitan areas are not comparable across countries: some are mega-cities and others (Belmopan, for example) are quite small. Third, those national capitals and large metropolitan areas that are large display significant variation in state capacity within the capital city, making mean scores for the city as a

Table 2. Significant Differences across Tamano by Country and Dimension

Country	INFRAX % sig diff	PRCLEAR % sig diff	COER1 % sig diff
Argentina	**100**	n/a	**66**
Belize	66	**0**	66
Bolivia	**50**	n/a	n/a
Brazil	**33**	n/a	n/a
Chile	**33**	33	**50**
Colombia	**66**	n/a	n/a
Costa Rica	33	66	n/a
Dom. Rep.	**0**	50	n/a
Ecuador	**0**	n/a	n/a
El Salvador	66	n/a	n/a
Guatemala	100	n/a	n/a
Guyana	100	**0**	100
Haiti	66	n/a	n/a
Honduras	**17**	n/a	**33**
Jamaica	**0**	n/a	n/a
Mexico	**0**	n/a	33
Nicaragua	**0**	n/a	n/a
Panama	100	**100**	n/a
Paraguay	**66**	n/a	**0**
Peru	**0**	n/a	66
Trin. & Tob.	**100**	**100**	n/a
Uruguay	**0**	n/a	**66**
Venezuela	**66**	100	**33**

Table shows the percentage of all pairwise comparisons between means by tamaño that are significantly different at .05 level. Bolded cells indicate country-dimensions for which variation across tamaño is non-monotonic or monotonic but decreasing with population size. Due to the reasons more fully elaborated in fn.14, we drop the responses for the national capital and for large metropolitan areas for the purposes of the analysis reported in this table.

6, provided in the appendix to this report, show mean scores by *tamaño* (town size) for each dimension of state capacity by country, and thus reveal the extent to which the state makes its presence felt across the national territory.

A first observation from these data, which holds true across all three dimensions, is that state capacity is not always monotonically associated with locality size; in some cases it can be stronger in smaller towns and rural areas than in urban centers. One possible explanation for this surprising pattern is the effect of provincial *cabeceras* (regional/departmental capitals), many of which are quite small, but which might see relatively higher levels of state capacity because they are a seat of regional government.

whole less informative. We also drop all strata with fewer than 150 responses, leaving between 2 and 4 strata for each country on each dimension of state capacity.

A second observation comes from pairwise comparisons across *tamaño* within each country. We note in Table 2 the number of pairs for which significant differences exist as a share of all pairwise comparisons. As the number of pairs with significant differences increases, the state's reach can be said to be less even. Our data show dramatic variation. Examining the INFRAX (state reach) dimension, we see that Uruguay and Argentina, which have similar mean values and standard deviations at the national level as seen in Figure 1, look very different when one examines the size of the town. In Uruguay, the size of the locality has no significant effect on police response time across any pairwise comparison of values of *tamaño*, while in Argentina, each locality size has a statistically distinct level of police response. Intriguingly, police response time is higher in medium-sized cities than in rural areas, and higher still in large cities; this is the opposite of what one might expect to find if one believed that state capacity was associated with urbanization and that pockets of state weakness were primarily a characteristic of remote rural areas. A similar distinction characterizes Mexico and Bolivia, which have very similar national-level scores. While Mexico's police are homogeneously slow as locality size varies, Bolivian residents report faster response times in medium and small cities than in large cities or rural areas.

Similar diversity in patterns of uneven state reach can be observed on the other dimensions of state capacity as well. On property rights (PRCLEAR), for example, the case of Belize sees no significant differences as *tamaño* varies, while Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela see significant differences across every possible pairwise comparison. Thus, while Figure 3 shows that these countries have relatively similar levels of property rights provision at the national level, they differ quite sharply in the distribution of that provision over territory. Belize displays relatively homogeneous but low levels of property rights provision, while Panama and Venezuela see higher formalization of property rights in more populated areas. The case of Trinidad & Tobago is particularly interesting: the data show that property rights are actually stronger in rural areas than in small cities. This territorial unevenness of state reach, which characterizes all three dimensions of state capacity, is not visible in national-level comparisons and can only be revealed with a data collection strategy sensitive to subnational variation.

[I]n some cases [state capacity] can be stronger in smaller towns and rural areas than in urban centers.

Conclusion

The 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer introduced a series of questions specifically designed to tap different dimensions of state capacity. In this *Insights* report we rely on that series to develop a new measure of state capacity. We close by discussing how this strategy improves on existing methods, identifying some limitations inherent to our approach, and sketching some of the next steps in this research agenda, which has the potential to shed important light on this crucial aspect of politics in the Americas.

Our strategy relies on a multi-dimensional conception of state capacity that separately assesses three analytically distinct components of stateness. In so doing, it improves on existing measures in several important ways. First, many existing measures reduce state capacity to a single dimension – for example, much scholarship (Kurtz 2013; Slater 2010) uses the tax ratio to assess state strength. Yet because the multiple facets of state capacity do not always co-vary closely, there are important reasons to assess state capacity with a multi-dimensional measure (Hanson & Sigman 2013). Second,

many existing measures rely on indirect indicators far removed from the quantity of interest. These include outcomes like literacy (Soifer 2015) or infant mortality (Lee 2015), proxies of service provision like luminosity (Huntington & Wibbels 2014), and crude indicators like GDP per capita (Fearon & Laitin 2003). By contrast, our strategy more directly measures state capacity by assessing the state's *outputs* (the reach of its police, its imposition of sales taxes, and its provision of formal property rights). Third, existing measures are built from state-generated data, the quality of which is correlated with state capacity and affected by agency incentives; thus cross-national comparisons can suffer from heteroskedasticity and systematic measurement error (Herrera & Kapur 2007). Datasets from sources like the World Bank do not alleviate this problem, since those are compiled from records kept by state agencies (Jerven 2013). Our strategy avoids the problems that can arise from reliance on state-generated data by drawing on concrete questions about individuals' experiences with the state. Finally, we should highlight that our measure is based on individuals' reports of their concrete experiences with distinct aspects of the state, rather than their perceptions of state capacity. In designing our measure, then, we avoid the problems of perception-based measures of state capacity like the Transparency International Index and those like the Bertelsmann Transformation Index compiled from expert evaluations.[15]

To be sure, as most public opinion research, our questions reflect people's evaluations of a given phenomenon, not the phenomenon itself. Yet, in this case we are confident that the measures we propose are highly correlated with actual state capacity. Our confidence is based on at least four reasons: a) our measures are based on citizens' evaluations of different dimensions of state capacity, enabling a multidimensional assessment of state capacity that should be more reliable than a one-dimensional approach; b) our measures do not directly ask about state capacity itself (thus avoiding eventual social desirability biases and contamination due to contingent factors such as government approval/popularity, satisfaction with the economy, etc.); c) both the relative stability of standard deviations across mean-levels for each of our indicators, as well as the systematic sub-national level variance we glance at in the Appendix graphs suggest that citizens' evaluations are inter-subjective (i.e. they relate to something "external" to the respondent); and d) our measures display external validity when compared to other available indicators of state capacity that are not based on evaluations.

Of course, this measurement strategy is not without limitations. Its validity depends on high-quality national public opinion samples. Moreover, the analysis of sub-national levels of state capacity requires a sample structure that provides representative results for relevant sub-national units. Both of these limitations make this new strategy costly, especially if one attempts to simultaneously collect data to assess both cross-national and sub-national variation. Additionally, further refinement of question wording and design (e.g. potentially integrating list experiments and other kinds of survey experiments in future measures) might improve on this first effort and increase the reliability of the measure. We might also explore the possibility of creating a single index of state capacity out of the three indicators discussed here. In so doing, the relative merits and drawbacks of alternative aggregation strategies should be assessed.

Yet as the discussion above suggested, the most important payoffs of this strategy lie in its unique ability to capture subnational variation. We have briefly illustrated these payoffs using variation across locality by population size. Because it would require large sample sizes at the local level (so specific localities are "self-represented" in the sample), the

[15] Nor are our measures tainted by attitudes about politics: the highest correlation at the individual level between any of our indicators and sociotropic evaluations of the economy, presidential approval, or ideological leanings is 0.11.

AmericasBarometer's sample structure does not generate sufficient responses in each locality to compare across individual communities. Yet patterns of sub-national variance could be analyzed by aggregating municipal clusters of various types as in Luna and Toro (2013). Besides analyzing territorial variance, we could also focus on the socioeconomic correlates of different levels of observed state capacity. A third set of analyses could examine the co-variation among different dimensions of stateness across territory and society within the countries of the Americas. These are all tasks that we intend to take as we move forward with this agenda. These careful assessments of sub-national variance will also lay the groundwork for solving a sizable problem for scholars and analysts of the state: building a national-level indicator of state capacity that is sensitive to different levels and shapes of sub-national variation. This *Insights* report, then, sets the stage for the concerted analysis of stateness in the Americas that is needed to understand this core dimension of politics in the region.

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Appendix


Taxation by Size of Locality
*Estimations for each case include location sizes for which at least 150 cases are available in each national sample
Large cities
Medium cities
Small cities
Rural areas
Total
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Venezuela
Peru
Guyana
Mexico
Honduras
Paraguay
Argentina
Uruguay
Belize
Chile

Reach across territory by Size of Locality

***Estimations for each case include location sizes for which at least 150 cases are available in each national sample**



Provision of Property Rights by Size of Locality

***Estimations for each case include location sizes for which at least 150 cases are available in each national sample**



AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2015

Number 120

Crime, Corruption and Societal Support for Vigilante Justice: Ten Years of Evidence in Review

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Main Findings:

- In 2014, support for vigilante justice reached a 10-year high
- Suriname, Ecuador, and El Salvador are the countries in which vigilante justice is the most accepted
- Brazil, Bahamas, Uruguay, and Venezuela are the countries in which vigilante justice is the least accepted
- Variations in societal support within the countries of the Americas are linked to the prevalence of crime and police corruption

A number of countries in the Americas have seen individuals and groups of citizens taking the law into their own hands. Cases of vigilante justice[1] have caught the attention of scholars focused on Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico, and, most recently, Brazil and Argentina (Bateson, 2013; De Souza Martins, 1991; Godoy, 2004; Goldstein, 2012). This scholarship finds that countries in the Americas manifest different levels of support for vigilante justice, both across time and space. What countries are most supportive of this phenomenon? How has support for vigilantism changed over the last ten years, and what explains that variation?

In the past six rounds (2004-2014) of the AmericasBarometer, LAPOP has asked citizens:

E16. *How much do you approve or disapprove of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals? (1 strongly disaprove-10 strongly approve).* [2]

In order to measure societies' support for vigilante justice, I calculated each country-year's average support for this phenomenon using the data collected in the 134 studies that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has conducted since 2004 in 27 different countries of the Americas.[3]

Figure 1. Societal Support for Vigilante Justice in the Americas across Time (0 to 100 scale)



Changes in the degree that a particular society supports vigilante justice in any given year might be explained by factors related to the *regional environment*, the *national environment* and the *fluctuating conditions* within a country.[4] Therefore, analyzing the entirety of the data is

[1] Here "justice" is only used to note that the object of these actions is to punish illegal activities.

[2] Following LAPOP standards, I recoded this variable from its original 1 to 10 scale to run from 0 to 100.

[3] This question was not included in Canada in 2008 and the Dominican Republic in 2004.

[4] R*egional environment* refers to those variables that affect the continent as a whole and that vary from survey-wave to survey-wave (e.g., changes in the questionnaire, news of a global impact, the global economy, etc.). The *national national environment* references all characteristics that do not vary from year to year (e.g., geography, institutions, culture, etc.). Finally, the term *fluctuating conditions* points toward those factors that change across time *and* across countries (e.g., prevalence of crime, corruption, the country's economic condition, etc.).

not an easy task. For example, showing the changes in the grand average support for vigilantism over time may reveal differences that can be explained by the inclusion of different countries in different years rather than by changes in regional support for vigilantism. Similarly, comparing the overall average support for vigilante justice across each country over time can produce differences explained by different years being included in each country set rather than true differences in societies' support for vigilantism.[5]

To address these potential problems I created a country-year fixed effects OLS model. This model separates the three different sources of country-year level variance and lets me calculate more precise estimates of societal support for vigilante justice. In doing so, the model allows me to answer the questions asked at the beginning of this report.[6] In this *Insights* report, using the results of this model (see Appendix Table 2), I show: a) the trend in support for vigilante justice across time; b) how countries rank with respect to their support for vigilante justice; and c) which countries in 2014 deviated the most from expectations generated by the statistical model. Finally, I test whether societal support for vigilante justice is sensitive to crime, police corruption, and democratic support.

The Regional Environment of the Americas

Results from the model (Appendix Table 2) show that 2.7% of the country-year variation in support for vigilante justice is explained by yearly changes in the *regional environment* (see footnote 4).[7] Moreover, the results displayed in the appendix (column 1 table 2) allow me to estimate the expected levels of societal support for vigilante justice in every wave of the AmericasBarometer while accounting for differences in the countries sampled.[8]

Figure 1 shows the estimated regional environment produced by the model for each of the waves of the AmericasBarometer and a dotted red line for the grand mean across waves and countries.[9] First, it is worth noting that, as the dotted line shows, Americans (i.e. citizens of the Americas) have not been generally supportive of vigilantism over the last decade (the overall average is around 30.1 out of 100, where lower numbers represent fewer degrees of support). Second, the figure shows that the years 2006, 2010, and 2014 are the years in which the societies of the countries of the Americas have been the most supportive of vigilantism, with 2014 ranking as the year in which Americans were the most supportive of this type of behavior. Indeed, Americans were 2.86 degrees (on the 0 to 100 scale) more supportive ($p<.05$) of vigilante justice in 2014 than in 2012 and 3.62 points more supportive of this type of action than in 2008 (28.76 vs 32.38, $p<.01$).

[5] For example, Mexico was surveyed in 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 and Suriname was surveyed in 2010, 2012 and 2014.

[6] As explained in Appendix 2, to estimate the model I first calculated the country means (using the sample weights for each country-year). Then I used these country means as a new source of data, eliminating individual-level variation. Finally, I ran an OLS model of the 134 country-year observations (for more detail see Appendix 2).

[7] To obtain this percentage, I estimated a model that included only the year dummies. I found an r-squared of .027.

[8] In order to avoid missing data problems I created a merge from the AmericasBarometer Merged 2014 (v2.0) and AmericasBarometer Merged 2004-2012 v16.0 databases.

[9] Table 3 in the appendix shows the seasonally corrected averages in comparison to the naïve averages.

National Environments

63.7% of the country-year variation in societies' support for vigilante justice is explained by factors that have remained stable within each country over the last ten years.[10] These may include cultural and social structures; they may include factors unlikely to change in the middle and long term such as police culture, the overall rule of law, and the institutional design of political and judicial systems.

Using the results from the OLS model, it is possible to estimate the societal support for vigilante justice removing the effect of the time varying regional environment. That is, I use model 1 in the appendix to estimate the portion of societal support for vigilante justice due to the regional environment, and the national environment. Figure 2 shows the estimated average national level of support for each country with the time-varying effect of regional environment removed. We see that the countries of the Americas tend toward a relatively low average (30 out of 100, as shown by the red line). At 39.81, 38.93, and 38.25 degrees, Suriname, Ecuador, and El Salvador have the highest country-average support for vigilante justice in the Americas, respectively. At the other end, at 18.79, 20.37, and 23.53 points, Uruguay, the Bahamas, and Brazil are the countries with the lowest country-average support for vigilante justice in the Americas, respectively.[11]

Figure 2. Seasonally Corrected 2004-2014 Average Societal Support for Vigilante Justice



Atypical Countries in 2014

Besides being influenced by the national environment and the regional environment, a society's support for vigilantism fluctuates year-to-year as a function of the changing conditions within a country. During the last decade, some countries displayed levels of support for vigilante justice that simply do not match what would be expected given the results of the model.

For example, in the most recent wave, Paraguay, Haiti, and Jamaica were the most noticeably atypical cases. Based on the effects of the regional environment and the national environment, one would expect Paraguay to

[10] This estimate comes from the r-squared from a model in which only country dummies are included. Note that, since I aggregated the levels of support of vigilante justice by country-year, individual level variance was removed from the analysis. If this variance was incorporated, stable factors would explain a much lower percentage of the total variance in individual support for vigilante justice.

[11] Note that the Bahamas was only surveyed in one year. See Table 1 for a list of the countries and years surveyed.

report an average level of support of about 30.24 points in the 2014 round. Instead, this country registered a level of 42.12 points in its support for vigilante justice, 11.88 points above expectations. Similarly, Haiti and Jamaica registered 7.10 and 5.99 points higher than expected for 2014.[12] Figure 3 depicts these deviations from a country's trend in support for vigilante justice. These deviations can be attributed to changes within the country, such as shifting levels of crime, impunity, or police abuse like the ones that have taken place in the top four countries in Figure 3 (ABC, 2014; Peachey, 2014). It is precisely the aim of the next section to study how the changing levels of crime, police-corruption victimization and support for democracy influence the fluctuations of societal support for vigilante justice.

Figure 3. Deviations from Expectations



Fluctuating Conditions: Crime, Police, Democracy, and Societal Support for Vigilante Justice

As an important amount (33.6%) of the variation in societal support for vigilantism in the last decade cannot be explained by the regional or the national environment , there are likely other factors influencing this shift. What other fluctuating factors may influence the shifting societal support for vigilantism across the Americas? I propose three variables with which support for vigilante justice might be associated.

First, it is possible that support for vigilantism is a signal of low levels of democratic values.[13] If this is so, we should observe that in the moments in which societies have been more pro-democratic societies they have also been less supportive of vigilante justice.[14] Second, vigilante behavior may be a response to an environment of insecurity;[15] if this is so, the public should be more supportive of vigilante justice in years in which there has been a higher proportion of citizens victimized by crime in their country.

Finally, support for vigilantism may be a response to inefficiency or corruption of the law enforcement institutions of a given country.[16] If this is so, we should find societies to be more supportive of vigilante justice when there is a higher level of corruption victimization.

[12] Conversely, we find Guatemala, Chile, and Trinidad & Tobago which, respectively, scored 5.83, 5.92, and 7.09 score below what would be expected of them for 2014.

[13] For example, Seligson (2003) finds democratic preferences mediate a number of demographic and attitudinal variables related to citizens' support for vigilante justice.

[14] However, note that authoritarian societies could also be opposed to vigilante justice for two reasons. First, they might consider these actions to trespass over the purview of the leader. Second, citizens may be more sympathetic to top-down, extralegal justice than bottom-up, vigilante actions.

[15] For instance, in her individual-level analysis of Central Americans' attitudes towards vigilante justice, Malone (2012) finds fear of crime to be a significant predictor of citizens' support for vigilante justice.

[16] Sabet (2013), for example, finds that dissatisfaction with the police is most strongly determined by direct experiences of corruption and argues that this may influence support for security coproduction.

Figures 4-6. Corruption, Crime, Support of Democracy and Support for Vigilante Justice (Left to Right)



To test whether the data are consistent with each of these views, I included these variables one at the time as independent variables within the country-year fixed effects model (see Appendix Models 2-5).

Results

As can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, the results are consistent with the idea that societal support for vigilantism is sensitive to the shifting levels of crime and corruption. Indeed, there is evidence that the percentage of citizens victimized by police corruption in a given country/year is significantly and positively associated with the level of public support for vigilante justice that the public will manifest in that country/year. A country that experiences an increase of ten percentage points in the percentage of the population victimized by police-corruption in a given year can expect an increase of about 4.6 points in its population's level of support for vigilante justice (Figure 4).

Crime and police corruption are positively associated with societal support for vigilante justice.

Similarly, the percentage of citizens victimized by crime in a country is significantly and positively associated with fluctuations in societal support for vigilante justice across the Americas. A ten percentage point increase in crime victimization is associated with a 3.6 point change in societal support for vigilante justice (Figure 5).

Finally, Figure 6 shows the relationship between societal support for democracy and support for vigilante justice. Although both variables seem to move in the expected direction, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that there is a statistically significant relation between both variables.

Conclusion

In sum, the evidence gathered over the last six rounds of the AmericasBarometer shows that although the Americas have gone through two previous waves of increased support for vigilantism (2006 and 2010), 2014 was the year in

which people in the Americas were the most supportive of vigilante justice. Further, the data show that over the previous decade, the societies of Suriname, Ecuador, and El Salvador have been the most supportive of vigilante justice. Paraguay, Haiti, Jamaica, and the United States are the ones that registered the strongest positive deviations from expectations for 2014. Finally, crime victimization and police corruption are strongly correlated with fluctuating levels of support for vigilante justice across countries, even when stable country characteristics and global variations are accounted for.

Implications

Overall, these results have three main implications for analysts and policy makers. First, the results confirm Layton, Rodríguez, Moseley, and Zizumbo-Colunga's (2014) finding of a rise of support for vigilantism in the Americas. Thus, it is important to bolster scholarly and policy efforts to understand and address this phenomenon. Second, these results imply that the variation we observe in vigilante justice across countries in a given year is due to both factors associated to country conditions and the regional environment. While some countries consistently score high in their support for vigilante justice, Paraguay, the United States, and Haiti scored higher than expected in 2014. Finally, once cultural and year-specific fluctuations are accounted for, variation in social support for vigilante justice seems to be strongly influenced by crime and police corruption. Thus, it seems that politicians will be at least as likely to reduce societal support for vigilante justice by implementing strong anti-police-corruption measures as they will be by implementing effective anti-crime policies.

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Appendix

Table 1. Years and Countries in the AmericasBarometer asked Americans about their support for Vigilante Justice

	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Mexico	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Guatemala	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
El Salvador	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Honduras	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nicaragua	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Costa Rica	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Panama	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Colombia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ecuador	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bolivia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Peru		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Paraguay		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Chile		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Uruguay		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Brazil		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Venezuela		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Argentina			✓	✓	✓	✓
Dominican Republic		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Haiti		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Jamaica		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Guyana		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Trinidad & Tobago				✓	✓	✓
Belize			✓	✓	✓	✓
Suriname				✓	✓	✓
Bahamas						✓
United States		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Canada		✓		✓	✓	✓
Countries Included	10	22	23	26	26	27

2. Model

To estimate the models in Table 2:

a) I estimated the average support for vigilante justice in every country in every year using the appropriate sample weights.
b) Then, I created a new database (eliminating all individual level variance).
c) And fitted an OLS model of the 134 country year observations in which the societal average support for vigilante justice is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean unique to each country and to each survey wave:

$$VJ_{ct} = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{\phi}'\boldsymbol{YEAR}' + \boldsymbol{\theta}'\boldsymbol{COUNTRY}' + e_c$$

Where $\boldsymbol{YEAR}'$ is a vector of dummy variables that uniquely identify each year, $\boldsymbol{COUNTRY}'$ is a vector of dummy variables that uniquely identify each country and e_c is the country-year level error term.

Estimates in Figure 1 are given by $VJ_t = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{\phi_t}$ while countries are set at their means
Estimates in Figure 2 are given by $VJ_c = \beta_0 + \boldsymbol{\theta_c}$ while years are set at their means

d) Then I aggregated each of the independent variables within each country and year. And specified an OLS model of the following form:

$$VJ_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Crime + \beta_2 Corruption + \boldsymbol{\phi}'\boldsymbol{YEAR}' + \boldsymbol{\theta}'\boldsymbol{COUNTRY}' + e_c$$

Where $\boldsymbol{Crime}$ is the country-year's percentage of citizens victimized by crime, $\boldsymbol{Corruption}$ is the country-year's percentage of citizens to whom a police officer has requested a bribe.

Table 2. Effect of Crime Victimization, Police Corruption and Support for Democracy on Societal Support for Vigilante Justice in the Americas from 2004 to 2014

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Victimized by Crime		0.436***			0.322**
		(0.147)			(0.156)
% Victimized by Police Corruption			0.479***		0.342*
			(0.181)		(0.190)
Societal Support for Democracy				-0.141	
				(0.103)	
Guatemala	6.029**	7.207***	9.859***	5.338**	9.636***
	(2.551)	(2.492)	(2.856)	(2.582)	(2.812)
El Salvador	10.20***	11.25***	17.12***	9.855***	15.92***
	(2.551)	(2.485)	(3.594)	(2.544)	(3.584)
Honduras	9.057***	11.13***	13.68***	8.308***	13.89***
	(2.551)	(2.557)	(3.019)	(2.590)	(2.973)
Nicaragua	5.801**	7.886***	12.34***	5.938**	12.01***
	(2.551)	(2.558)	(3.490)	(2.534)	(3.438)
Costa Rica	1.321	3.473	8.281**	2.583	7.884**
	(2.551)	(2.565)	(3.605)	(2.695)	(3.553)
Panama	-1.206	3.847	5.725	-1.271	7.479**
	(2.551)	(2.994)	(3.597)	(2.532)	(3.640)
Colombia	-2.119	-0.525	4.763	-1.632	3.976
	(2.551)	(2.518)	(3.584)	(2.557)	(3.547)
Ecuador	10.88***	9.458***	14.97***	10.68***	12.75***
	(2.551)	(2.506)	(2.906)	(2.536)	(3.055)
Bolivia	4.688*	3.851	4.103*	4.496*	3.652
	(2.551)	(2.476)	(2.470)	(2.536)	(2.440)
Peru	9.258***	6.258**	10.44***	8.447***	7.885***
	(2.688)	(2.782)	(2.630)	(2.732)	(2.869)
Paraguay	-0.414	1.917	3.135	0.422	3.844
	(2.688)	(2.708)	(2.920)	(2.872)	(2.893)
Chile	0.891	2.535	10.20**	1.727	8.755**
	(2.688)	(2.650)	(4.374)	(2.737)	(4.360)
Uruguay	-4.517*	-4.799*	4.004	-2.121	1.363
	(2.688)	(2.593)	(4.138)	(3.192)	(4.269)
Brazil	-9.252***	-6.946**	-1.307	-8.906***	-1.872
	(2.688)	(2.706)	(3.971)	(2.679)	(3.917)
Venezuela	-4.144	-4.979*	1.395	-2.512	-0.803
	(2.688)	(2.607)	(3.334)	(2.922)	(3.450)
Argentina	-0.243	-1.670	4.602	1.922	2.190
	(2.872)	(2.810)	(3.297)	(3.240)	(3.449)
Dominican Republic	8.558***	10.03***	12.79***	9.244***	12.67***
	(2.688)	(2.639)	(3.046)	(2.714)	(2.998)
Haiti	-0.979	0.823	4.702	-1.053	4.412
	(2.688)	(2.662)	(3.368)	(2.668)	(3.317)
Jamaica	0.959	6.465**	8.347**	1.451	10.31***
	(2.688)	(3.190)	(3.814)	(2.692)	(3.871)

Guyana	-0.636	4.824	3.068	-0.134	6.044*
	(2.688)	(3.181)	(2.947)	(2.693)	(3.240)
Trinidad & Tobago	-4.102	-0.175	3.728	-3.395	4.423
	(3.153)	(3.317)	(4.211)	(3.165)	(4.158)
Belize	5.162*	9.416***	10.19***	5.840**	11.92***
	(2.872)	(3.119)	(3.334)	(2.885)	(3.387)
Suriname	11.77***	14.70***	20.05***	12.69***	19.88***
	(3.153)	(3.197)	(4.331)	(3.193)	(4.263)
Bahamas	-7.675	-2.810	-2.438	-7.503	-0.310
	(4.844)	(4.950)	(5.055)	(4.807)	(5.080)
United States	-1.197	1.892	8.879**	0.371	8.428**
	(2.688)	(2.794)	(4.264)	(2.904)	(4.201)
Canada	-0.520	3.054	9.895**	0.988	10.09**
	(2.871)	(3.020)	(4.539)	(3.060)	(4.467)
2006	1.507	1.003	0.661	1.793	0.628
	(1.748)	(1.694)	(1.777)	(1.745)	(1.749)
2008	-0.0383	-0.477	-1.561	-0.0512	-1.459
	(1.740)	(1.684)	(1.765)	(1.727)	(1.738)
2010	1.748	0.0518	0.384	1.610	-0.509
	(1.720)	(1.754)	(1.724)	(1.708)	(1.751)
2012	0.728	-0.179	-0.847	0.620	-1.098
	(1.720)	(1.686)	(1.747)	(1.708)	(1.723)
2014	3.591**	2.879*	1.864	3.270*	1.801
	(1.720)	(1.675)	(1.766)	(1.718)	(1.738)
Constant	26.60***	18.15***	17.92***	36.23***	14.15***
	(2.210)	(3.564)	(3.917)	(7.378)	(4.266)
Observations	134	134	132	133	132
R-squared	0.665	0.692	0.691	0.673	0.704

2004 is the omitted year. Mexico is the omitted country. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3. Seasonally Corrected (Figure 2) Averages vs. Naïve Averages

	Seasonally-Corrected Average	Naïve Average
Mexico	28.04956	27.86065
Guatemala	34.07871	33.88981
El Salvador	38.2509	38.06199
Honduras	37.10642	36.91751
Nicaragua	33.8508	33.6619
Costa Rica	29.37089	29.18199
Panama	26.84375	26.65485
Colombia	25.93068	25.74177
Ecuador	38.9308	38.7419
Bolivia	32.73755	32.54865
Peru	37.30712	37.36943
Paraguay	27.63602	27.69832
Chile	28.94065	29.00296
Uruguay	23.53266	23.59497
Brazil	18.79805	18.86036
Venezuela	23.90514	23.96745
Argentina	27.80636	27.86884
Dominican Republic	36.60773	36.67004
Haiti	27.07082	27.13312
Jamaica	29.0084	29.0707
Guyana	27.41308	27.47538
Trinidad & Tobago	23.94732	24.52503
Belize	33.21202	33.2745
Suriname	39.81686	40.39457
Bahamas	20.37496	22.52138
United States	26.85278	26.91509
Canada	27.52935	27.97803

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Who Approves of Those Who Block Roads to Protest in the Americas?

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Main Findings:

- Compared to those who are older, young persons are significantly more approving of those who block roads in protest.
- Those sympathetic to the executive (those who convey high executive approval) are less supportive of blocking roads as a form of protest.
- Those with high political tolerance (in terms of being sympathetic to regime critics) are more supportive of blocking roads as a form of protest.
- Higher evaluations of government efforts against corruption are associated with more approval of those who block roads in protest.

Tensions ran high in late February of 2015 outside the port city of Paranagua, Brazil, where truck drivers blocked roads to protest high fuel costs and tolls. Despite attempts by the police to subdue the demonstration, the movement spread, and several rural areas in inland Brazil experienced fuel shortages, while farmers reported being unable to transport soy and other products out of overly-replete silos. In a move that testifies to the power of the roadblock tactics, government officials agreed to enter into negotiations with the protestors (BBCa 2015).

Across countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, it is not uncommon for citizens to block roads as a means of participating in the political process (Machado et al. 2011). For example, in the same month that truck drivers in Brazil occupied the streets, protestors in Haiti were blocking avenues in the capital in protest of rising prices of fuel (BBCb 2015). Further, roadblocks became so ubiquitous in Argentina in the late 1990s to today that there is a name for this specialized form of protest, the *piqueteo* (see Moseley 2014).

Figure 1. Average Degrees of Approval for Individuals Who Block Roads in Protest, 2014



Blocking roads as a form of protest is a complex issue that is of high importance in today's global society. On the one hand, it has proven effective for protestors; on the other hand, it entails costs that range from inconvenience to economic loss. In this *Insights* report, we use data from the AmericasBarometer to examine public approval for blocking roads as a form of protest. Specifically, we analyze responses to the following question:

E15: Of people participating in the blocking of roads for protest how much do you approve or disapprove?

Figure 1 shows mean responses by country to this question. The responses (originally on a 1-7 scale) have been recoded to run from 0 to 100 with 0 being "strongly disapprove" and 100 being "strongly approve" of people participating in the blocking of roads in protest.

Average approval is not exceptionally high in any country. Only one country, Paraguay, is above the midpoint, 50 degrees, on the scale. The rest fall below that neutral value. We further see only a moderate level of cross-national variation, with most countries falling within a range between 20 and 40 degrees of approval on the scale. It may be a surprise that Argentina has a relatively low average approval for the blocking of roads for protests, given the prevalence of this type of protest in the country

(Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011; Moseley 2014); in fact, Costa Rica, which has tended to resolve fewer issues through protest (Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011), has a higher mean approval rating for the blocking of roads as a form of protest than Argentina. This leads us to believe that country-level factors may not exert a straightforward influence on respondents' approval. Therefore, in this report we focus on individual-level predictors of approval of the blocking of roads for protest.

Which Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables Predict Approval of Those Who Block Roads as a Form of Protest?

To begin, we consider how approval for blocking roads as a form of protest varies as socioeconomic and demographic profiles change. Specifically, we consider how place of residence (urban or rural), gender, level of education, income, and age predict support for blocking roads in protest.

The average person living in an urban area seems more likely to be inconvenienced by blocked roads that cause traffic snarls, and thus one could hypothesize that urban residence would be associated with lower approval levels of this type of protest. Some research suggests that men are more likely to support protest actions (Olsen 1968; Safa 1990); however, women have nonetheless "constantly influenced politics" because of their role in society and as parents (Labao 1990, 183). This leaves us agnostic over whether gender will predict support for blocking roads as a form of protest. Similarly, some scholars have found that higher levels of education are linked to lower levels of support for disruptive protests, and others have, instead, found a positive relationship between the two (Hall, Rodeghier, and Useem 1986; Olsen 1968). If education has counter-veiling effects, the impact of education could be negligible, or statistically insignificant. With respect to one's financial status, some scholars show that wealth predicts lower levels of support for disorder and protest, which would suggest a negative relationship between wealth and approval of blocking roads as a form of protest (Olsen 1968). Finally, liberalness decreases with age (Olsen 1968), so tolerance of blocking roads as a form of protest may similarly decrease with age.

Compared to those who are older, young persons are significantly more approving of those who block roads in protest.

Keeping in mind these expectations, we used a multivariable linear regression model to examine the relationship between the aforementioned socioeconomic and demographic factors (place of residence, gender, education, wealth, and age[1]) and the dependent variable of approval of blocking roads as a form of protest.[2] The results are presented in Figure 2, which displays the non-standardized coefficients from the analysis. Each of the points represents the change in the dependent variable on its 0-100 scale when the independent variable is changed from its minimum value (0) to its maximum

[1] Urban is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the respondent lives in an urban region, and 0 if the respondent lives in a rural area. The gender dummy variable takes the 1 value if the respondent is female. The wealth measure is a five-category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions; for more information see Córdova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf).Age is divided by cohort, with respondents grouped into the following categories: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-65, and 65+.

[2] Country fixed effects are included but not shown; of the countries shown in Figure 1, the U.S. and Canada are omitted because the wealth measure is not available for these cases.

value (1). If the point's confidence interval does not include zero, we can say that the variable is statistically significant at a 95% confidence level.

Looking at the figure, the results show that urban residence does not have a statistically significant effect on approval of blocking roads as a form of protest in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Moreover, gender plays only a small role in determining support for this variable: women are *slightly* less likely to report approval of roadblock protestors. Education also matters at the margins: an increase in years of schooling implies a small increase in approval for blocking roads for protest. On the other hand, wealth and age are negatively related to the dependent variable. Age has the strongest predicted maximum effect on approval of those who block roads in protest, as the value for the coefficient of this independent variable is the largest relative to the others. [3] As we move from the youngest to the oldest individuals surveyed in the AmericasBarometer, tolerance toward those who block roads in protest drops by over 10 degrees, all else equal.

Figure 2. Socioeconomic and Demographic Predictors of Support for Blocking Roads in Protest



Attitudes and Experiences as Predictors of Approval for Blocking Roads as a Form of Protest

In an attempt to increase our understanding of who expresses greater approval of those who block roads in protest, we focus on three sets of factors: executive approval,[4] political tolerance, and corruption. One perspective that we offer is that those who are more supportive of the sitting executive will be less supportive of this type of protest, while those more sympathetic to the rights of regime opponents will be more supportive of blocking roads in protest.

Assuming that people associate their reverence for the current executive in power with the appropriateness of mobilizing in protest under his or her administration, we expect that an individual will be more likely to consider protesting as inappropriate if he or she supports the government currently in power (as represented by the incumbent executive) (see Anderson and Mendes 2006; Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011). On the other hand, those who are more tolerant of dissidents or critics are more likely to see blocking roads to protest as legitimate exercises of civil rights (Guerin 2004). [5]

[3] In robustness checks not presented here, we checked for non-linear relationships between these demographic variables and our dependent variable. We found no evidence to suggest nonlinear effects, so we have collapsed all variables to represent the linear relationships here.

[4] While most countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region are presidential systems, some (such as Jamaica) have parliamentary rules. In these cases, the approval question asks about approval of the prime minister.

[5] Executive approval is measured using item M1, which reads "Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President/Prime Minister NAME CURRENT EXECUTIVE? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad" All responses were recoded so that higher values mean "more of"—e.g., higher approval.

We also consider a series of variables related to corruption, given the importance of this issue in fueling protest in recent times in the region.[6] Our expectations are nuanced. On the one hand, we expect that those who perceive high levels of corruption and those who are victimized by corruption will be motivated by dissatisfaction with government institutions to support protestors. In particular, we expect individual experiences with corruption to positively predict approval of those who block roads in protest, under the assumption that experiencing injustice on a personal level may motivate support for protest in general. We suspect that actual victimization matters more than perceptions of government corruption, since concrete experiences are likely to resonate much more strongly with an individual than if he or she hears of some nebulous corruption occurring (Seligson 2006; Gingerich 2009; Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011).

On the other hand, we also consider evaluations of government performance on corruption. We see two potential ways this factor could matter. First, this variable could be negatively correlated, in the sense that if the government is doing a poor job of addressing corruption, then people might feel that protesting is justified. Yet, on the other hand, a second relationship is possible, which is that those who see the government as competent may also believe that the government will actually respond to the demands of the protestors, and thus not object to protesters expressing their demands (for more on this general topic, see Andersen and Mendes 2006; Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011).

Figure 3. An Extended Model of Predicting Approval of Those Who Block Roads in Protest



Figure 3 presents our analysis of these additional factors – executive approval, political tolerance, perceptions of political corruption, corruption victimization, and evaluations of the government's management of corruption – which are included alongside the same measures included in the analysis presented in Figure 2.[7,8] We find that tolerance and executive approval both predict support for blocking roads as a form of protest, but in opposite

[6] Corruption victimization is a measure generated from a series of survey items (EXC2 to EXC16) which ask respondents if they have ever been asked to pay a bribe in a variety of circumstances, including school, to be seen at the hospital, or by the police. Individuals who answered yes to at least one of these items were coded as corruption victims; all others were coded as non-victims. Government performance with respect to corruption is measured using N9: "To what extent would you say the current administration combats (fights) government corruption?", and whether officials are corrupt is measured using item EXC7: "Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon?" The set has been recoded so that higher values mean (more) corruption experienced, better management of corruption, and more perceived corruption, respectively, for the three variables.

[7] Tolerance is an additive measure generated using items D1 to D4, which read: "There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? / to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?/ being permitted to run for public office? / appearing on television to make speeches?"

[8] Figure 3 has fewer cases than prior model because item EXC7 (which asks whether the respondent believes that public officials are corrupt) was not asked in the Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad & Tobago, or Suriname in the 2014 round.

directions: as expected, higher executive approval leads to lower support, while higher tolerance leads to significantly more support for those who block roads as a form of protest.

The results support our predictions about the effects of corruption victimization and approval of the incumbent executive, and, as well, demonstrate what for some might be considered counterintuitive results with respect to the impact of evaluations of the government's performance with regard to combating corruption.[9]

We find that the effect of perceived political corruption is statistically insignificant. Yet, corruption victimization is positively correlated with the dependent variable. In other words, those who have been asked for a bribe show stronger support for blocking roads as a form of protest, while perceiving politicians as being more corrupt does not directly affect this attitude.

[H]igher executive approval leads to lower support, while higher tolerance leads to significantly more support for those who block roads as a form of protest.

At the same time, evaluation of the government's action taken toward corruption is positively correlated with the dependent variable; specifically, we find that a change from the minimum to the maximum on that independent variable results in a 3.5 unit increase in the approval of those who block roads in protest. We speculate that corruption evaluations are positively correlated with the dependent variable because those who perceive that the government is performing well also perceive the government as receptive to their complaints.[10]

Conclusions

From our analyses, we found that approval for blocking roads as a form of protest is positively correlated with corruption victimization, tolerance, and evaluations of how the government manages corruption.[11] Executive approval, on the other hand, predicts low levels of support for blocking roads to protest.

The findings are significant for public policy as they suggest that the protests represent more than just dissatisfaction with the government. Rather, protest activity and attitudes supportive of this type of behavior may be a reflection of a well-functioning democracy and respect for democratic values. We see this in this report through the strong correlation between political tolerance (a core democratic value) and support for those who block roads in protest. With this in mind, we would certainly suggest that opponents of protests focus more on regulating them rather than precluding them entirely.

Our findings also suggest that effective anticorruption measures that reduce corruption victimization may have significant implications for attitudes about protests, and in interesting ways. On the one hand, the more a government is seen as effectively handling corruption (and other key issues, per footnote 10), the more individuals may be inclined to support the rights of those who block roads or protest in other ways. Yet, on the other hand, to the degree that the government's efforts succeed in decreasing corruption victimization levels,

[9] We also included political interest in a different version of this model (results not presented here). Political interest has a positive predicted effect on the approval for blocking roads as a form of protest.

[10] In fact, when we consider a similar measure from the survey, this one related to individuals' evaluations of how the government is handling crime (which is excluded from this current figure), we find it is also positively correlated with the dependent variable.

[11] In analyses not presented here, we also found that external political efficacy is positively correlated to support for those who block roads to protest, perhaps because people who see the government as responsive also think of protests as being a legitimately effective form of expression.

tolerance for such protests – all else equal – will decline. These counter-veiling influences suggest that successful efforts to reduce corruption, while having the potential to significantly and positively affect democratic governance in that realm, are unlikely to result in a strong increase, or a strong decrease, in support for the right of those who block roads in protest.

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Appendix

Complete regression outputs

VARIABLES	Figure 2	Figure 3
Presidential Approval		-9.483***
		(1.015)
Officials Corrupt		-1.253
		(0.788)
Government Performance: Corruption		4.156***
		(0.831)
Tolerance		27.42***
		(0.977)
Corruption Victim		3.445***
		(0.521)
Age	-11.53***	-11.35***
	(0.570)	(0.654)
Wealth	-0.562***	-2.149***
	(0.137)	(0.618)
Education	1.563*	-2.764**
	(0.940)	(1.096)
Female	-0.926***	0.289
	(0.309)	(0.357)
Urban	0.910*	1.183*
	(0.549)	(0.605)
Guatemala	-2.947*	2.078
	(1.515)	(1.419)
El Salvador	-5.617***	-2.019
	(1.262)	(1.278)
Honduras	2.416*	4.455***
	(1.286)	(1.293)
Nicaragua	5.192***	7.093***
	(1.367)	(1.387)
Costa Rica	5.992***	
	(1.447)	
Panama	4.294***	10.95***
	(1.451)	(1.402)
Colombia	15.87***	17.76***
	(1.501)	(1.533)
Ecuador	-4.676***	-0.210
	(1.391)	(1.426)
Bolivia	3.812***	7.022***
	(1.242)	(1.355)
Peru	1.643	3.944***
	(1.451)	(1.491)
Paraguay	26.19***	27.31***

	(1.570)	(1.737)
Chile	14.84***	
	(2.214)	
Uruguay	8.943***	8.233***
	(1.489)	(1.558)
Brazil	6.293***	
	(1.798)	
Venezuela	7.879***	5.041**
	(2.300)	(2.353)
Argentina	0.183	0.148
	(1.788)	(1.764)
Dominican Republic	12.96***	14.99***
	(1.568)	(1.629)
Haiti	8.103***	8.259***
	(1.549)	(1.666)
Jamaica	10.51***	9.792***
	(1.526)	(1.617)
Guyana	-1.312	-2.088
	(1.786)	(1.710)
Trinidad and Tobago	1.095	
	(1.550)	
Belize	13.45***	13.42***
	(1.696)	(1.678)
Suriname	5.155***	
	(1.325)	
Bahamas	9.680***	
	(1.294)	
Constant	30.95***	21.19***
	(1.247)	(1.509)
Observations	44,910	26,051
R-squared	0.061	0.124

Standard Errors in parentheses. ***p<.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
Note: For the country fixed effects in the model, the comparison (baseline) category is Mexico.

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2015

Number 122

The Latin American Voter

By
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Main Findings:

- *The Latin American Voter* has just been published by the University of Michigan Press
- The volume contains contributions by a set of 20 experts in various facets of voter choice
- Collectively, we find voters in the region tend toward selecting candidates based on social, demographic, economic cleavages; policy and left-right stances; partisan identifications; and evaluations of and experiences with government performance
- Yet, the tendency for citizens to decide to turn out to vote and select candidates based on factors other than charisma and clientelism is greater to the degree that the party system and behavior of elites within it combine to create electoral options that are substantively meaningful, clear, and coherent

About two-thirds of the electorate votes in a typical Latin American national election (Carlin and Love 2015). Since the 1970s, the region has witnessed more than three hundred presidential and legislative elections. While not all elections are flawless, these facts nonetheless speak to the diffusion and durability of democratic processes in the region. But what factors determine who turns out to vote and for which political option?

We offer a comprehensive answer to that question in a newly-released volume – *The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts* – published in August 2015 by the University of Michigan Press.



We find that the average Latin American voter is motivated to go to the polls and select officials on the basis of demographic group membership (class, religion, gender, and ethnicity); substantive political connections (partisanship, left-right stances, and policy preferences); and political outputs related to the economy, corruption, and crime. However, the extent to which these baseline propensities manifest in a given country at a given time depends critically on the nature of the substance (the specific cleavages, campaigns, and performance) and structure (e.g., party system fragmentation and polarization) that characterize the political environment.

In this *Insights* report we borrow liberally from our discussions in *The Latin American Voter* to highlight some of its key findings. The majority of the analyses in the volume are based on data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer project. The volume thus demonstrates the project's value for understanding the dynamics of elections in the Americas.

Sociodemographic Factors and the Latin American Voter

With respect to socioeconomic, demographic, and other descriptive factors, our results suggest the average Latin American voter is more likely to vote for a left-leaning candidate to the degree that the voter is:

- less wealthy
- someone less-inclined to attend church or to be religious
- male
- indigenous

Within the volume, our contributing authors look at class, religion, gender, and ethnicity in detail. Some of their conclusions include the following. First, class voting is more prevalent in Latin America today than in previous decades, an outcome that may be driven by the rise of the left in contemporary Latin America, making this cleavage salient (Mainwaring, Torcal, and Somma 2015). Second, Protestants are somewhat more likely to support a non-Catholic (i.e., Protestant or explicitly secular) candidate over a Catholic one (Boas and Smith 2015). Third, though indigenous and mestizos are, on average, more supportive of left-leaning

candidates than whites, this result is driven by a handful of cases in which ethnicity is particularly salient; in most cases ethnicity is not a major voting divide after controlling for class (Moreno 2015). Fourth, though female voters in Latin America exhibit a slight tendency to support conservative (right-leaning) candidates, this is less true among financially independent women; moreover, women voters also tend to support female presidential candidates (Morgan 2015). Fifth, religion and gender are more likely to emerge as salient cleavages in countries where parties offer distinct programmatic profiles.

The majority of The Latin American Voter*'s analyses are based on data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer.*

Policies, Ideology, Partisanship, and the Latin American Voter

Turning to factors related to policies, ideology, and partisanship, we find that on average across Latin America:

- Voters who select candidates on the right tend to prefer a small economic role for government, want tougher anticrime policies, disapprove of same-sex marriage, and trust the United States far more.
- Left-right identifications often predict voter choices.
- Partisans are more likely to support candidates from their own parties (Lupu 2015).

Thus, voting in the Latin American region does not revolve *only* around personalities and clientelism. In fact, while present to varying degrees across countries, clientelism tends to be an inefficient strategy for politicians in the region (Kitschelt and Altamirano 2015). At the same time, Latin American voters are more likely to select political candidates on the basis of policy and left-right stances to the degree that the party system is polarized enough to allow citizens to perceive clear differences between parties (Baker and Greene 2015; Zechmeister 2015).

Performance Factors and the Latin American Voter

While making vote decisions on the basis of policy and ideology requires a moderate level of sophistication, it is typically easier for voters to decide whether to support or reject the incumbent based on performance. With respect to evaluations and experiences, on average across the Latin American region:

- Support for the incumbent is higher among those who perceive that the national economy recently has strengthened.
- Individuals who perceive high levels of corruption in the government and corruption victims are less likely to support the incumbent.
- Support for the incumbent is lower among those who feel less safe in their neighborhood.

In other words, there is a tendency in Latin America – as in other democracies around the world – for voters to use the ballot to hold politicians accountable for outcomes on their watch. If voters perceive a weak economy (Gélineau and Singer 2015), widespread corruption among political officials (Manzetti and Rosas 2015), or high levels of insecurity (Pérez 2015), they are likely to vote against the president's party while they generally reward politicians for improvements in these areas.

The Importance of Context

Latin American party systems differ significantly from each other in ways that have important consequences for voter behavior. When we look at the region, on average, the evidence points to an electorate seeking out meaningful representation and accountability. *However*, its capacity to do so is significantly determined by the structure and content of the political environment. Thus, for example, even the most straightforward of assessments of the quality of life under the incumbent are more likely to become relevant factors in voters' decisions to the degree that the president's party has control over the policymaking process (and is therefore more clearly identified as responsible for output) and, in the case of the economy, parties stake out distinct stances on issues. Party system polarization is also associated with voters being more likely to link their demographic characteristics, issue positions, and left-right self-identification to their vote choice, with an increased likelihood of voters self-identifying with a political party, and with a higher likelihood to turnout in the first place.

The contributors to *The Latin American Voter* thus illustrate some of the ways in which the nature of the party system and the behavior of political elites can either facilitate or curtail voter decision-making on the basis of substantively important, programmatic factors. This matters, because it means that elites play a key role in enabling citizens' search for representation and accountability. To the degree that parties and politicians offer clear, coherent, and distinct programmatic options to citizens, voters are enabled in their search for representation and accountability, and personalities and vote buying tactics are less likely to hold sway.

Conclusion

Creating a coherent programmatic environment for political competition in Latin America is not an easy task for elites in much of the region. Authoritarian interruptions and high levels of electoral volatility steal away the time needed for programmatic party competition to take root and endure. Building, diffusing, and maintaining a programmatic agenda requires a high level of commitment, buoyed by the encouragement and support for all actors who have a stake in democracy in the region. *The Latin American Voter* makes the case that the public is frequently willing, and able, to do its part in pursuing representation and accountability, yet also constrained to the degree that party competition fails to create an electoral environment that is rich in issues and in clarity.

The Latin American Voter contains much more detailed analyses and discussions about the region as a whole and for specific countries than fit into this brief overview. For those interested in electoral behavior in the region, we encourage you to visit the press' website at: *https://www.press.umich.edu/8402589/latin_american_voter*.

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Number 123

Approval of Violence towards Women and Children in Guatemala

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Main Findings:

- Ranking highest in the region on tolerance for domestic violence, 58% of Guatemalans indicate that to some degree (either approving or "understanding") they condone a husband hitting an unfaithful wife
- There are no gender differences with regard to approving of or rejecting violence towards an unfaithful wife
- Less than 5% of Guatemalans believe that physical punishment should always or very frequently be used against children who disobey their parents. Nonetheless, 40.5% consider that such punishment is sometimes necessary, while 27.3% believe that it is almost never necessary
- Approximately 15% of Guatemalans report that their parents frequently resorted to physical punishment while 41.7% indicate that they suffered such forms of punishment sometimes

Domestic violence in Guatemala is a serious problem with consequences that reach far beyond the affected family. In fact, such violence has been mentioned as one of the factors that have driven women with young children to flee the country and emigrate to the United States or other countries.[1] Domestic violence also impacts levels of poverty and can have repercussions on national-level violence by contributing to an environment in which Guatemalans become accustomed to resorting to violence as a means of solving problems.

Figure 1. Percent Who Condone (Approve or Understand) Violence against an Unfaithful Wife, by Country, 2014



While the AmericasBarometer has asked about violence at the national level for many waves, the 2014 wave for the first time asked about violence at the family level in Guatemala. This *Insights* report focuses on the case of Guatemala and presents an assessment of answers to some of these probing and difficult questions.[2]

Intrafamily violence is a topic that has increased in salience in recent years. In 2012, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) released an extensive report concerning violence against women in Latin America. The authors of the report (Bott, Guedes, Goodwin, and Adams) note that violence against women has been recognized as a health issue, a violation of human rights, and a barrier to economic development. They point out that the United Nations, in its Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and the Inter-American system, by way of the 1994 Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, have significantly raised the visibility of the issue.

[1] Nonetheless, it remains difficult for asylum to be granted in these cases. Esther Yu-Hsi Lee (2015) points out that as of January 2015, the great majority of asylum requests by Central American women with children who illegally crossed the U.S. border in the summer of 2014 had been denied. The rate of denial for women who did not have legal aid was 98.5% and it was slightly better for women who had legal aid, 73.7%.

[2] This report is based on Chapter Seven of "The Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala," (eds) Dinorah Azpuru and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. Which can be found here: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala/AB2014_Guatemala_Country_Report_V4_Print_2_W_041515.pdf

Survey questions such as the ones asked in the 2014 AmericasBarometer are an important conduit through which to assess and raise awareness of societal approval of domestic violence. Given that this is such a prevalent issue in Guatemala, further study into the causes and pathways to prevention of domestic violence is necessary. Asking questions such as if a respondent was themselves the victim of abuse as a child can be helpful in understanding how violence can manifest in future generations.

Violence against Women

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included the following question, which asks about attitudes (but not direct victimization) on the subject of violence against women. The question poses a scenario and then asks for the individual's opinion.

DVW2. Now I am going to read some situations in which some people think that it is justified that the husband hits his wife/partner and I will ask your opinion…..His wife is unfaithful. Would you approve of the husband hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?[3]

Troublingly, 10.2% of Guatemalans explicitly approve of hitting a wife in cases where she has been unfaithful. Additionally, 47.8% said they would disapprove but understand. Taken together, this means that 58% of Guatemalans are, to some degree, willing to condone domestic violence under these circumstances. On the other hand, 42% indicate that they would neither approve of nor understand this type of aggression. As demonstrated in Figure 1, Guatemala leads the ranking in the region in tolerance for violence against an unfaithful wife.

Who Approves of Domestic Violence in the Case of Marital Infidelity?

Regression analysis allows identification of the variables that predict approval or disapproval of aggression against women who have been unfaithful. Included in the regression model are basic sociodemographic characteristics: gender (and separately, whether a woman fulfills the role of a housewife), age, education, ethnic self-identification (Indigenous or Ladino), size of the locale in which a respondent resides, socioeconomic level, marital status (married or presence of a domestic partnership), and whether the respondent has children. Additionally, the level of religiosity and the respondent's perceptions on his or her family's economic situation are included.[4]

[3] This question was asked of both men and women.

[4] Importance of religion: **Q5B**. "Could you please tell me how important religion is in your life?" [Read options] (1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important. Perception of economic situation: **Q10D**. "The salary that you receive and total household income: [Read the options} (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time. **Wealth**: The wealth measure is a five category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions; for more information see Córdova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf) Have children: **Q12**. Do you have children? How many? [Include all respondent's children] Married: **Q11n** "What is your marital status?" (1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law marriage (living together) (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (7) Civil Union. Size of place of residence: **TAMANO**. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area. Quintile of wealth: wealth measure is a five category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions; for more information see Córdova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf) Years of education: **ED**. "How many years of schooling have you completed?" Indigenous: **ETID**. Do you consider yourself ladino, indigenous, or other? (2) Ladina (3) Indigenous (7) Other Age: Age is divided by cohort with respondents grouped into the following categories: 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-65, and 65+. Housewife: **OCUP4A**. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently [Read options] (1) Working? [Continue] (2) Not working, but have a job? [Continue] (3) Actively looking for a job? [Go to PR1] (4) A student? [Go to PR1] (5) Taking care of the home? [Go to PR1] (6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work [Go to PR1] (7) Not working and not looking for a job? [Go to PR1] (88) DK [Go to PR1] (98) DA [Go to PR1] Female: The gender dummy variable takes the 1 value if the respondent is female.

The dependent variable, approval of physical violence against women in cases of infidelity, groups together cases in which respondents would approve of said actions (10.2%) and in which they would not approve but, nonetheless, understand (47.8%). The logistic regression analysis and the related discussion thus compares those who select either of these options in response to the question, to those who say they would neither approve nor understand.[5]

Figure 2. Approval of Violence against a Wife in the Case of Infidelity by Demographic Factors



Source:© Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.GUA14_0801

The results of the logistic regression for this question are presented in Figure 2. Of all the variables, only two — size of a respondent's locale of residence (coded so that higher values mean larger locales) and perception of the family's economic situation (coded so that higher values correspond to a better perception of the economic situation) — are clearly associated with the probability of approval (or not) to use of violence against a wife (in the case of infidelity).

Across levels of education, there are no statistically significant differences in opinion regarding violence against an unfaithful wife.

Guatemalans who live in rural areas and in small or medium cities are more likely to condone violence against a wife who has been unfaithful. When we examine this by simply looking at the raw data, the percentage of acceptance among residents of medium-sized cities is extremely high at 73.5%, although it is also markedly elevated in small cities and in rural areas. In comparison, the percentage of residents of large cities who approve of such actions is 50%, with levels dropping to 39.4% for those living in the metropolitan area. The difference between these latter two categories and all others is statistically significant.

There is also a statistically significant difference between those who indicate that income is not enough and that they face difficulties, and those who report that they have just enough income[6] are faced with large difficulties. It is worth noting that only 2.35% of respondents reported finding themselves in a favorable economic situation, a level that reduces the extent to which these results can be generalized for this segment of the population. For more information see Figure 7.6 in

[5] As is LAPOP standard, the coefficients in this analysis are standardized.

[6] When we look at the descriptive statistics of this particular variable, the only statistically significant difference arises between those who report a good economic situation and those respondents whose family income is insufficient and

and do not face large difficulties.[7] Those who perceive their economic situation as good, are more likely to condone violence against an unfaithful wife.

Something to note is the fact that there are no gender differences with regard to approving of or rejecting violence against an unfaithful wife. This might be surprising to those who would expect that women would have a less favorable view of this behavior given that they are the victims; however, in the case of Guatemala, women and men see this issue similarly.

Figure 3. Degrees of Approval of Violence against Children by Country, 2014



Violence against Children

Another form of domestic violence is aggression towards children at home. At the extreme, this type of aggression can have repercussions at the national level to the degree that it creates a vicious cycle in which those who have been physically reprimanded as children display violent tendencies as adults. That said, there is still a relative dearth of studies linking intra-family violence to violence at the national level.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer questionnaire included questions related to the topic of aggression directed at children. The specific questions asked were the following:

VOL207n. Do you think that to correct a child who misbehaves it is necessary to hit or physically punish them? [Read options] (1) Always (2) Most often (3) Sometimes (4) Almost never (5) Never

VOL208n. When you were a child, your parents or guardians would hit or physically punish you in some way to correct your misbehavior? [Read options] (1) Always (2) Most often (3) Sometimes (4) Almost never (5) Never

http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala/AB2014_Guatemala_Country_Report_V4_Print_2_W_041515.pdf.

[7] When we look at the raw data, the only statistically significant difference with respect to religiosity arises between those who indicate that religion is very important and those who say that it is somewhat important. Here, those who indicate that religion is very important are more likely to condone violence against a wife who has been unfaithful. For more information see Figure 7.5 in http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala/AB2014_Guatemala_Country_Report_V4_Print_2_W_041515.pdf.

Figure 3 displays mean degrees (on a 0 to 100 scale) of approval of using violence to punish children by country for 2014 (higher numbers indicate more approval).[8] As can be seen, Guatemala is among the top five most approving countries.

The percent of respondents who believe that disobedient children should always or very frequently be physically punished is less than 5%. But it is concerning to see that 40.5% of Guatemalans share the belief that such forms of punishment are sometimes necessary. However, 27.3% of respondents believe that physical punishment is almost never necessary, and 27.3% reject said aggression entirely.[9]

Regarding question VOL208n, close to 15% of respondents indicate that their parents either always or very frequently resorted to physical punishment in order to reprimand them. Meanwhile, 41.7% and 26% indicate that they sometimes or almost never experienced physical punishment, respectively. Only 16.8% of respondents state that physical punishment was never used against them.[10]

Figure 4. Approval of Violence against Children by Demographic Factors



Source:© Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.GUA14_0801

Who Approves of Violence against Children?

Regression analysis once again allows for identification of the factors that are most closely associated with approval of physical punishment as a way of reprimanding children. In addition to measuring whether a relationship between having experienced physical punishment and using said punishment against one's own children exists, the regression also includes several important control factors. These are whether a respondent has any children, whether he or she is married or residing within a domestic partnership, and other standard sociodemographic variables. The regression also tests whether the importance of religion in the daily life of a respondent is also a relevant factor.

The results for this OLS regression can be seen in Figure 4. There is a significant correlation between a respondent having experienced physical punishment at the hands of a parent and that same respondent approving of physical punishment against children. It is also worth noting that the size of a respondent's locale of residence, as well as whether or not he or she has

[8] The definition of corporal punishment used herein is the definition used by the Committee for the Rights of Children and includes all punishment that involves physical force and has as its objective to cause any degree of pain or discomfort. In the majority of cases, children are hit with either the hand or an object such as a whip, stick, belt, or shoe. However, physical punishment may also include kicking, shaking or pushing, scratching, pinching, biting, pulling the hair or ears, or forcing a child to remain in uncomfortable positions. For more information see http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/assets/pdfs/reports-technical/Legal-reform-handbook-2009-SP.pdf.

[9] For more information see Figure 7.8 in http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala/AB2014_Guatemala_Country_Report_V4_Print_2_W_041515.pdf.

[10] For more information see Figure 7.9 in http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala/AB2014_Guatemala_Country_Report_V4_Print_2_W_041515.pdf.

any children, are two additional factors that prove to be statistically related to levels of approval of physical punishment towards children.

Respondents who indicate that their parents either always or very frequently used physical punishment are much more likely to accept the use of that type of punishment against their own children. Those living in larger areas (cities) are less likely to accept this type of punishment.[11] Finally, those who have children are more likely to condone physical punishment as a way of reprimanding children. The average acceptance among those who are parents is of 42.2 points on a scale of 0-100, which compares to an average of 34.7 points among respondents who are not parents. The difference between the two categories is statistically significant.

Conclusion

Although only 10% of Guatemalans would explicitly approve of a husband hitting a wife when she has been unfaithful, 47.8% of them indicate that they would not approve but, nonetheless, understand. In all, this means that 58% of respondents condone – to some degree – this type of violence against women. In comparison to other countries of the Americas, Guatemala is the country with the highest percentage of approval of physical violence against an unfaithful wife.

For those who would believe that education can change domestic violence norms, it is important and alarming to note that (in analyses not presented here) the study finds that between men and women, regardless of level of education, there are no statistically significant differences in opinion regarding violence against an unfaithful wife. That is to say, women with no education as much as those with some higher education appear to condone marital violence at similar rates than men in Guatemala.[12]

With regard to physical violence against children, even though less than 5% of Guatemalans consider it necessary to always or very frequently reprimand their children through physical punishment, 40% are of the opinion that such actions are sometimes necessary. Only less than one-third believe that physical punishment should never be used against children. In comparison with other countries of the Americas, Guatemala is in a mid-to-high position with respect to the use of corporal punishment against children. As the size of the town, city, or area in which a respondent resides increases (from rural areas up through the metropolitan area), the level of support for corporal punishment towards children drops. The statistical analysis also finds a very high correlation between approval of physical punishment against one's own children and having experienced such punishment during childhood.

Reference

Bott, Sarah, Alessandra Guedes, Mary Goodwin, and Jennifer Adams Mendoza. 2012. Violence against Women in Latin America and the Caribbean: A comparative analysis of population-based data from 12 countries. Pan American Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Washington, D.C.

[11] In the raw data, the metropolitan area displays the lowest levels of approval for physical punishment against children. And although the differences in percentages among all areas are small, they are, nonetheless, statistically significant.

[12] For more information, please see Figure 7.7 in the Guatemala report: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/guatemala/AB2014_Guatemala_Country_Report_V4_Print_2_W_041515.pdf.

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Appendix

Determinants of Approval of Violence against an Unfaithful Wife

Approval of aggression against unfaithful wife (dvw2rdico)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.0040894	.0683245	-0.06	0.952	-.1408558	.1326769
Woman housewife	.0098522	.0871764	0.11	0.910	-.1646503	.1843547
Age	-.0392075	.0619263	-0.63	0.529	-.1631666	.0847515
Indigenous	.0562854	.0693599	0.81	0.420	-.0825535	.1951243
Education	-.0539146	.0902282	-0.60	0.552	-.234526	.1266968
Wealth	-.027065	.0713316	-0.38	0.706	-.1698507	.1157207
Size of place of residence	-.3552528	.0990847	-3.59	0.001	-.5535924	-.1569133
Married	.010234	.0798161	0.13	0.898	-.1495353	.1700034
Has children	-.0601141	.092853	-0.65	0.520	-.2459795	.1257513
Economic situation at home	.1935256	.0650962	2.97	0.004	.0632214	.3238299
Importance of religion	.1280901	.0664994	1.93	0.059	-.0050229	.2612032
Constant	.3463849	.1039695	3.33	0.002	.1382673	.5545025
F - 2.67 No. Cases 1,321						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Determinants of Approval of Physical Punishment against Children

Approval of physical punishment against children (vol207nr)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.036573	.0335493	-1.09	0.280	-.1037292	.0305831
Woman housewife	.0369999	.0299141	1.24	0.221	-.0228796	.0968795
Age	-.053661	.0285611	-1.88	0.065	-.1108322	.0035102
Indigenous	-.0416948	.0287305	-1.45	0.152	-.0992051	.0158155
Education	-.04371	.0302364	-1.45	0.154	-.1042348	.0168148
Wealth	.004071	.0335386	0.12	0.904	-.0630638	.0712058
Size of place of residence	-.0734737	.0332191	-2.21	0.031	-.139969	-.0069783
Married	.0114989	.0341138	0.34	0.737	-.0567872	.0797851
Has children	.0707091	.0334765	2.11	0.039	.0036986	.1377196
Importance of religion	.0281259	.022036	1.28	0.207	-.015984	.0722358
Parents used physical punishment with respondent	.3847894	.0263635	14.60	0.000	.3320172	.4375617
Constant	-9.18e-09	.0328507	-0.00	1.000	-.0657578	.0657578
F – 30.03 No. Cases – 1,382 R-Square - 0.1691						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

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Support for Homosexuals' Right to Run for Public Office in Jamaica

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Main Findings:

- Jamaica is second to last in the region on approval of the rights of homosexuals to run for public office
- 69.1 percent of respondents select the most extreme level of disapproval while only 5.3 percent respond that they "strongly approve"
- In Jamaica, support for the political rights of regime critics is much higher (41.6 degrees, on a 0-100 scale) than support for the political rights of homosexuals (16.0 degrees, on a 0-100 scale)
- Those who are more politically tolerant in general, women, and the more educated are more tolerant of the right of gay individuals to run for public office



Tolerance, understood as support for the political and social rights of others, rests on the principle of respect. *Social tolerance* is civility and inclusiveness in practice (Schatz, 2003a) and relates to respect for the personal choices and lifestyles of others even when those preferences vary from one's own and/or the majority. Conversely, intolerance implies a tendency towards social exclusion and support for discrimination. One group that has been the victim of social exclusion and discrimination in Jamaica is the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, & Transgender (LGBT) Community.

Over the years, the AmericasBarometer has collected data on the level of support for granting civil and political rights to homosexuals. In this *Insights* report[1] I assess one dimension of social tolerance in Jamaica, public support for the political rights of gay individuals. I do so by analyzing responses to the following question:

Figure 1. Average Degrees of Approval of Homosexual Rights of Running for Office, 2014



D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

It has been suggested that "in hugely interesting ways, states have come to see that their political power, their legitimacy, indeed their standing as global citizens, are now bound up with how they recognize and treat 'their' gay citizens" (Franke 2009, 4-5). This is an opportune moment to assess attitudes toward homosexuals in Jamaica as several countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region have been moving to offer equal rights to same-sex couples (Forgie 2011). Within the region, Jamaica has commonly been described as *intolerant* towards the political rights of homosexuals by international human rights groups and activists for homosexual rights (Strommen 2014).

Figure 1 affirms this general assessment: On a 0-100 measure of degrees of support for the rights of homosexuals to run for office, Jamaica ranks second to last in the (LAC) region.

[1] This report is based on Chapter 8 of the 2014 Jamaica report which can be found here: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/jamaica/AB2014_Jamaica_Country_Report_V3_W_061115.pdf

It is safe to say that no single cause is likely to explain attitudes toward gay individuals in Jamaica; rather, what we can do is to examine levels of tolerance or acceptance of the rights of homosexuals and the factors related to those attitudes.

Support for the Rights of Homosexuals to Run for Public Office

Figure 2 presents the distribution of responses on the original 1 to 10 scale to the AmericasBarometer question regarding the rights of homosexuals to run for public office in Jamaica. As suggested already by Figure 1, the overwhelming majority of Jamaicans are intensely opposed to allowing homosexuals this basic democratic right. Nearly seven out of ten (69.1 percent) select the most extreme level of disapproval, while only 5.3 percent say that they "strongly approve." Even if we combine the percentages on the approval side of the scale (6-10), that still only adds up to 11.1 percent of respondents approving of the right of homosexuals to run for public office to some degree.

Figure 2. Approval of Homosexuals' Right to Run for Public Office



Seven out of ten Jamaicans strongly disapprove of the right of homosexuals to run for public office. Only one in twenty strongly approves.

To put these low levels of approval in perspective, I compare tolerance towards the rights of gay individuals to run for office with tolerance towards the rights of regime critics to participate in politics. In the AmericasBarometer survey, respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which they support the rights of citizens who are critical of the regime to run for public office.[2] On a scale of 0-100, Jamaicans' level of support for regime critics' rights is 41.6 degrees as opposed to homosexuals' rights which is 16 degrees. The marked difference (25.6 degrees) in these levels of support illustrates a strong discriminatory tendency toward homosexuals with regards to their rights to freely participate in political processes.

Who Supports the Political Rights of Homosexuals in Jamaica?

With such a substantial segment of the population in favor of denying homosexuals the right to seek political office, it is useful to establish the categories in society that are more likely to be tolerant of this minority group. With this objective in mind, a linear regression

[2] **D3**. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

model composed of selected socio-demographic and other relevant factors is tested and the results are presented graphically in Figure 3.[3]

Figure 3. An Extended Model of Predicting Approval of Homosexuals' Right to Run for Public Office



It has been argued that the churches have contributed to the marginalization of homosexuals in Jamaica by openly characterizing the lifestyle as an affront to the teachings of the Bible and as otherwise immoral. It is therefore assumed that religiosity, measured here as the importance of religion in peoples' lives, would be a relevant factor.[4] Education[5] has also been cited as an important indicator of tolerance (Seligson and Morales, 2010). It is assumed here, nonetheless, that given the pervasiveness of the intolerance shown towards gays in Jamaica, in addition to education, an individual's exposure to what is happening elsewhere in the world or awareness of current affairs might be a factor. As a consequence, I control for "Attention to News," which is a measure of the frequency of "attention to the news whether by TV, radio, newspapers or the internet."[6] Level of community participation[7] may also be relevant and so the community participation index is added to the model.

It is assumed as well, that an individual's level of support for democracy[8] might influence the

[3] Political Tolerance is measured with an index combining the following four questions: **D1**. There are people who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]; **D2**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number; **D3**. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Jamaican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?; **D4**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches? **Urban**: Urban is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the respondent lives in an urban region, and 0 if the respondent lives in a rural area. Quintiles of **Wealth**: The wealth measure is a five category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions; for more information see Córdova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf) **Women:** The gender dummy variable takes the 1 value if the respondent is female. **Age**: Age is grouped into the following categories: 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-65, and 65+.

[4] Importance of Religion: **Q5B**. Could you please tell me how important is religion in your life? [Read options] (1) Very important (2) Rather important (3) Not very important (4) Not at all important.

[5] Education: **ED**. How many years of schooling have you completed? This variable is divided to combine "none" and "primary," and the two more categories are "secondary" and "post-secondary." For this variable, "secondary" is the baseline. (In Figure 5 "none" and "primary" are combined)

[6] **GI0**. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (recoded from 0-100 with higher scores indicating more attention to news)

[7] Community Participation is based on an index of three questions: "I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **CP6**. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them…; **CP7**. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them…; **CP8**. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them…"

[8] Support for Democracy: **ING4**. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than

level of tolerance, hence the inclusion of a variable capturing this value.

Figure 3 provides a graphical summary of the outcome of this OLS multivariate analysis. The results show that women and the more educated are more tolerant of the rights of gay individuals to run for political office than their counterparts; those who are more politically tolerant are also more supportive. Education is an interesting variable as there is a significant shift between primary and post-secondary levels. Those with post-secondary education are significantly more tolerant, and those with only a primary (or no) education are less tolerant. It seems that the threshold for tolerance for the rights of homosexuals to run for public office is at the post-secondary level when considering education.

Those who place a high level of importance on religion are less tolerant, as expected. In contrast, I do not find the hypothesized relationships for the attention to news and community participation measures, since neither of these indicators are statistically significant according to the model.

Conclusion

On the subject of social tolerance, defined as respect and accommodation for the personal choices and lifestyle preferences of others, the results point to a tendency for social (and by extension political) exclusion among Jamaicans when it comes to the LGBT community. With regard to attitudes in this realm, the overwhelming majority of Jamaicans indicate their strong opposition to the idea of affording homosexuals the basic democratic right of running for public office. When asked to express their approval or disapproval on 10-point scale, on which 1 represents "strongly disapprove" and 10 "strongly approve," 69.1 percent of respondents selected "1," the most extreme level of disapproval while only 5.3 percent responded "strongly approve." When the data on this 10-point scale is converted to a 0-100 point scale, it was found that average support among Jamaicans is just 16 degrees. It is noteworthy that this is a statistically significant decline of 5 points when compared to the 2012 LAPOP AmericasBarometer results on this same question.[9]

When we break this down further, we find that those who feel that religion is important in their lives and are less educated (meaning they do not hold a post-secondary degree) are less likely to be tolerant of homosexuals' rights to run for public office. Those with a post-secondary education level, women, and those who are more politically tolerant are more likely to be approving of these rights. It may be that the general diffusion of acceptance and rising levels of education will be key to enhancing tolerance in this realm.

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any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

[9] "The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity." http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2012/AB2012-comparative-Report-V7-Final-Cover-01.25.13.pdf

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Appendix: Predictors of Homosexuals Right to Run for Office, Jamaica 2014

	Coefficients	(t)
Age	-1.684	(-0.56)
Women	7.554*	(-4.34)
Primary	-5.363*	(-2.84)
Post-Secondary	12.891*	(-4.02)
Quintiles of Wealth	3.543	(-1.32)
Urban/Rural	-2.603	(-1.50)
Political Tolerance	13.588*	(-4.41)
Support for Democracy	1.577	(-0.5)
Community Participation	4.136	(-0.96)
Attention to News	2.616	(-0.7)
Importance of Religion	-7.445*	(-2.14)
Constant	8.084	(-1.38)
* p<0.05		
F 10.09 No. of cases 1313 R-Squared 0.08		

AmericasBarometer *Insights*: 2015

Number 125

Crime Diminishes Political Support and Democratic Attitudes in Honduras

By Orlando J. Pérez
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Main Findings:

- Crime victimization is associated with lower presidential approval, and with less support for the political system
- There is no association between political support and levels of insecurity in Honduras
- Both crime victims and non-victims, and those who feel insecure and secure, are just as likely to say that they support democracy as the best form of government
- However, victims of crime are more likely to say that a coup is justified in the case of high crime than non-victims

How does crime – directly through victimization and indirectly through insecurity – affect system support and democratic values in Honduras? Some authors suggest that fear of crime encourages citizens to demand punitive and repressive measures against alleged criminals (Sanjuán, 2003). Others assert that fear can generate support for authoritarianism (Corradi, 1992: 267). Concern about violent crime in Latin America seems to be so severe that people are "willing to sacrifice certain freedoms in order to feel more secure" (Tulchin and Ruthenberg 2006, 5). In a study of El Salvador, Pérez (2003) found that up to 55% of the population would support a military coup if there was high crime.

Figure 1. Crime Victimization, Honduras 2014



Crime Victim in the Last 12 Months

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v3.0 Honduras

Coinciding with recent waves of crime in Latin America, the last two decades have seen a rise of a new form of police repression called *mano dura* or "iron fist," (Seelke 2012) as well as relatively high levels of support for authoritarian measures among the citizenry. As Pérez explains:

> Crime undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime increases, pressure grows for a "strong" response by the government that, in many cases, results in highly repressive and undemocratic measures. (2003, 638)

Pérez (2011) also finds that not just crime victimization, but the *perception* of insecurity can be a significant determinant of opinions regarding institutions. Generally speaking, people who fear becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood are less willing to confer rights to the opposition; express less interpersonal trust; have less support for the idea that democracy is the best political system; and exhibit much less trust in political institutions.

How do these variables interact in the case of Honduras, as assessed recently via the 2014 AmericasBarometer? What consequences does crime in the country have for public opinion? This *Insights* report[1] assesses the extent to which crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity predict support for the president, the political system, and democratic values. It also examines the impact of crime victimization on support for authoritarian measures (specifically, support for coups).

Crime Victimization and Insecurity in Honduras

For decades, LAPOP has surveyed citizens regarding their experiences with crime and perceptions of insecurity. The 2014

[1] This report is based on Chapter Eight of "The Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras and in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer," (eds.) Orlando J. Pérez and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister which can be found here: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/honduras/AB2014_Honduras_Country_Report_English_V2_W_082515.pdf

AmericasBarometer survey included two of these standard questions:

VIC1EXT: Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?

AOJ11: Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

Figure 2. Model of Crime Victimization & Insecurity Predicting System Support



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v3.0 Honduras; System Support

As Figure 1 shows, in 2014, just over 18 percent of voting-age Hondurans reported having been the victim of at least one crime over the past year. Additionally (not shown graphically), on a 0-100 scale, insecurity in the country averaged 40 degrees.

Crime, Insecurity, and System Support

What are the implications of crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity on support for the political system in contemporary Honduras? Do crime victimization and neighborhood insecurity correspond to lower levels of system support? To answer these questions, I utilize multiple regression to predict system support. System support is measured using the average response to five questions measuring the extent to which citizens think the courts guarantee a fair trial; respect political institutions; believe basic rights are protected; feel proud of the system; and believe the political system should be supported.[2] Independent variables in the analysis are crime victimization and neighborhood insecurity. Control variables are included for sex, place of residence (urban/rural), age cohort, level of education, and quintiles of household wealth. All independent variables have been rescaled to range from zero to one to facilitate interpretation.[3]

[2] System support is calculated as the average of respondents' answers to the five questions: **B1** To what extent do you think the courts in Honduras guarantee a fair trial?; **B2** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Honduras?; **B3** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Honduras?; **B4** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Honduras?; and **B6** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Honduras? Original responses are on the scale of 1=Not at All to 7=A Lot; these are rescaled from 0 to 100.

[3] Urban is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the respondent lives in an urban region, and 0 if in a rural area. The sex dummy variable takes the 1 value if the respondent is female. The wealth measure is a five-category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions (for more information see Córdova 2009 http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf). Age is divided by cohort, with respondents grouped into the

Figure 2 shows the results of the regression analysis in graphical form.[4] Only two variables have a statistically significant relationship with system support: crime victimization and sex. Women have higher levels of system support than men, and those who have been victims of crime in the last year have significantly lower levels of system support than those who have not. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between perception of neighborhood insecurity and system support.

Direct experience with crime is inversely related to support for the political system. Security is one of the most important public goods and the State has the responsibility to provide the public with an acceptable level of order and security. When the State fails in this regard, it should not be surprising that the citizens' perception of the political system is affected.

Crime, Insecurity, and Presidential Support

Crime victimization is also correlated with disapproval of presidential performance. Figure 3 is the graphical representation of the results. Using the same independent variables as in the previous analysis, but with presidential approval[5] as the dependent variable, I find the same pattern of results: crime victims have significantly lower levels of presidential approval than those who were not victims, and women have higher levels than men. [6]

Figure 3. Model of Crime Victimization & Insecurity Predicting Presidential Support



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v3.0 Honduras; Presidential Support

Crime, Insecurity, and Democracy

In this section, I explore the extent to which crime victimization and perception of insecurity affect support for the abstract value of democracy. Although being a victim of a crime can cause public discontent with the functioning of the political system of Honduras and the support for the president, these experiences with crime may or may not lead to a more general loss of faith in the concept of democracy as a form of government.

To explore the impact of crime victimization and perception of insecurity on support for democracy in Honduras I utilize the AmericasBarometer question ING4 that seeks to establish the extent to which respondents

following categories: 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 56-65, and 65+. All independent variables are recoded on a scale of 0 to 1.

[4] See Appendix for full model results.

[5] **M1** Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Juan Orlando Hernández? Very Bad (0), Bad (25), Neither good nor bad (50), Good (75), Very Good (100).

[6] See Appendix for full model results.

support the concept that democracy, despite its problems, is the best political system.

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (Responses on a 7-point scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)

Figure 4 displays the results of a linear regression analysis including the control variables in the previous analyses, victimization by crime, and the perception of insecurity.[7] Neither of the variables of interest, crime victimization nor perception of insecurity, have a statistically significant effect on support for democracy. Only the age cohort measure is significant—older cohorts are more supportive of democracy than the younger cohort.

Figure 4. Model of Crime Victimization & Insecurity Predicting Support for Democracy



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v3.0 Honduras; Democracy

Crime, Insecurity, and Military Coups

Once again, in 2014 the AmericasBarometer included a series of questions that measure the circumstances in which respondents are willing to justify a military coup. One such question asks if the respondent believes a coup is justified in response to high crime. The question is worded as follows:

JC10. Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? [Read the options after each question]

- When there is a lot of crime.

What are the factors that support justification of a coup under conditions of high crime? Figure 5 displays a multiple regression model that analyzes this question.[8] In addition to the socio-demographic variables included as controls in the previous regressions, I add a variable measuring trust in the Armed Forces.[9]

The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 5. Three variables are statistically significant. Younger cohorts, those who trust the Armed Forces and victims of crime are more likely to believe a coup is justified in the case of high crime.

This finding is consistent with the literature that suggests crime may lead to support for authoritarian practices (Tulchin and Ruthenberg 2006; Pérez 2003).

[7] See Appendix for full model results.

[8] See Appendix for full model results.

[9] Question **B12:** To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces? Responses were originally placed on a 7-point scale ranging from "Not at All" (1) to "A Lot" (7), and are recoded here on a 0-1 scale.

Conclusion

This *Insights* report reveals strong evidence that crime impacts political attitudes in Honduras. This makes sense: the experience of being a crime victim represents a failure of the State to provide security to citizens and thus victims penalize the political system. Moreover, this effect is consistent with much of the literature that links crime to such attitudes. Specifically, I find that crime victimization has a strong inverse relationship with support for the Honduran political system and approval of its president. There is also a relationship between crime victimization and support for a coup in the case of high crime. In contrast, crime victimization does not appear to affect support for the value of democracy more generally. Those who are victims of crime are not more likely to disagree with the statement that democracy is the best form of government, despite its problems, than those who are not crime victims.

Interestingly, and running counter to scholarship that has looked at other countries and/or time periods, I do not find the same relationships between perceptions of insecurity and the political and democratic attitudes examined in this report that is present for victims of crime. Insecurity does not have a statistically significant effect in any of the analyses. This is noteworthy because, while the deleterious effects of crime on support for the political system, the president, and coups is worrisome, there are fewer self-reporting crime victims in Honduras (fewer than 20 percent of the sample) than there are those who report feeling somewhat or very insecure (approximately 35 percent of the sample).

Figure 5. Model of Crime Victimization & Insecurity Predicting Support for Coup



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v3.0 Honduras; Coup Justified

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Appendix

Model in Figure 2: System Support

	Coefficients	(t)
Urban	-1.16	(-0.83)
Age	0.48	-0.28
Woman	2.30*	-2.36
Level of Education	-0.56	(-0.21)
Wealth Quintiles	0.43	-0.27
Perception of Insecurity	1.04	-0.56
Victim of Crime	-9.52*	(-6.14)
Constant	53.29*	-32.4
F	8.79	
No. of cases	1507	
R-Squared	0.03	
*** p<0.05**		

Model in Figure 3: Presidential Job Approval

	Coefficients	(t)
Urban	1.26	-1.04
Age	1.02	-0.51
Woman	3.31*	-3.06
Level of Education	-4.86	(-1.72)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.73	(-0.47)
Perception of Insecurity	0.55	-0.29
Victim of Crime	-3.58*	(-2.41)
Constant	66.42*	-38.76
F	3.93	
No. of cases	1504	
R-Squared	0.02	
*** p<0.05**		

Model in Figure 4: Support for Democracy

	Coefficients	(t)
Urban	2.70	-1.22
Age	12.45*	-4.2
Woman	2.59	-1.78
Level of Education	6.57	-1.53
Wealth Quintiles	3.26	-1.15
Perception of Insecurity	-5.79	(-1.77)
Victim of Crime	-0.70	(-0.33)
Constant	56.01*	-17.07
F	3.54	
No. of cases	1469	
R-Squared	0.02	
*** p<0.05**		

Model in Figure 5: Coup is Justified when Crime is High

	Coefficients	(t)
Urban	1.79	-0.83
Age	-10.80*	(-2.14)
Woman	1.05	-0.41
Level of Education	-10.78	(-1.82)
Wealth Quintiles	-2.22	(-0.55)
Trust in Armed Forces	17.05*	-4.76
Perception of Insecurity	3.15	-0.77
Victim of Crime	5.17*	-2.08
Constant	26.65*	-5.34
F	3.46	
No. of cases	1420	
R-Squared	0.02	
Psuedo R-Squared		
*** p<0.05**		

AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – March 03, 2014

Venezuela's Escalating Protests, Violence, and Political Instability: The Legacy of Chávez

By Mariana Rodríguez and Jonathan Hiskey, Vanderbilt University

Over the last three weeks, Venezuela has found itself engulfed in protests against current President Nicolás Maduro's administration. While the student movement has spearheaded this uprising, many Venezuelans have taken to the streets to voice their grievances against the country's high levels of violent crime, high inflation rates, and the increasing scarcity of basic goods. As protests and violence continue, Hugo Chávez's hand-picked successor faces potentially destabilizing levels of political violence in an era in which protests in other parts of the world (e.g., Ukraine, the Middle East) recently have shown the power of the street. Almost a year after Hugo Chávez's death and Maduro's election, were such high levels of political unrest foreseeable? A brief look at what we refer to as Chávez's "political culture legacy" suggests that, in the absence of Chávez-like charismatic leadership and under the weight of the social and economic problems noted above, political instability was a likely outcome.[1]

To understand the nature of democratic attitudes under the Chávez regime and how they might help us understand the political instability in the country today, this *Topical Brief* analyzes survey data from the AmericasBarometer in Venezuela between 2007 and 2012.[2] As in previous AmericasBarometer studies, we examine two attitudinal dimensions essential to democratic stability: *political legitimacy* (or system support) and *political tolerance*.

Combining a society's level of support for the political system and its willingness to tolerate opposition to that system provides us a more general assessment of the type of political environment that such political attitudes are likely to engender (Seligson 2000; Booth and Seligson 2009; see also previous AmericasBarometer Reports). For example, in a country in which citizens express high levels of support for their political system and high levels of political tolerance, we can expect this political culture to be conducive to the emergence of a stable democratic system of government. Conversely, in a country where citizens neither support the political system nor tolerate those with different political views, the attitudinal landscape will likely not support a stable democracy but rather be more conducive to democratic breakdown.

[1] Prior issues in the *Insight*s series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[2] Funding for the 2012 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Vanderbilt University. This *Topical Brief* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

With this theoretical framework then, we can posit four possible political system outcomes as most likely to emerge from the combination of these two attitudinal dimensions: (1) *Stable democracy* (high system support, high political tolerance), (2) *Authoritarian stability* (high system support, low political tolerance), (3) *Unstable democracy* (low system support, high political tolerance), and (4) *Democracy at risk* (low system support, low political tolerance) (Seligson 2000; Booth and Seligson 2009). Working from this well-established theoretical framework, we examine the changes that took place in Venezuelan political culture during the Chávez era that can help us understand the ongoing political upheaval in Venezuela and what the future may hold for Venezuelan democracy.

Figure 1 displays the profiles of Venezuela's political culture from 2007 to 2012, capturing the evolution of the theorized political system outcomes based on the combination of citizens' levels of system support and tolerance through the second half of Chávez's 14 years in power. System support is measured using a standard index of system support questions often employed by AmericasBarometer studies that ask about respondents' perceptions of the legitimacy of key political institutions.[3] Similarly, political tolerance is measured using another standard index of AmericasBarometer studies that includes four items designed to capture the degree to which citizens are willing to allow critics of the political system to have the same political rights and freedoms as supporters of the system.[4]

Figure 1. Venezuela's political culture, 2007-2012



Both indices are converted to a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 signifies the lowest level of system support or political tolerance, and 100 the highest. Respondents are then divided by whether they score "high" (50 or above on levels of system support or political tolerance) or "low" (below 50) on each index. The distribution of respondents across the possible outcomes of the combination of these two attitudinal dimensions is then derived by calculating the percentage of Venezuelan respondents with attitudes conducive to stable democracy, authoritarian stability, unstable democracy, and democracy at risk.

Figure 1 shows that by the time Chávez began preparing for his fourth reelection in 2012, a fundamental shift in Venezuela's political culture had occurred. Whereas in 2007 over 40% of Venezuelans had expressed attitudes conducive to democratic stability, by 2012 the largest of the four categories was of those

[3] The system support items used are as follows: **B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? **B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? **B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)? **B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? **B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

[4] The items included in the political tolerance index are as follows: **D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? **D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? **D3**. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office? **D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?

supportive of authoritarian stability. That is, in 2012, the Venezuelan political system was dominated by the combination of high levels of system support and low levels of political tolerance, indicating that when Chávez died in early 2013, Venezuela had a political climate in which the regime was stable but democratic rule was threatened by a tendency to reject the political rights of critics of the political system.

Evidence of how powerful this Chávez-inspired political culture had become emerges in Figure 2, in which Venezuela ranks as one of the countries across the Americas most characterized by conditions of authoritarian stability in 2012. In that year, only El Salvador and Ecuador ranked higher than Venezuela in terms of the percentage of citizens falling into the "authoritarian stability" category.

This attitudinal profile of strong system support and intolerance in 2012 is not all that surprising considering it evolved in the context of an approaching presidential election in which the stakes were higher than in any other election since Chávez came to power in 1998. Not only did Chávez face his most competitive opponent to date in Henrique Capriles, but a widely publicized battle with cancer gave the president a sympathy element that further facilitated his ability to use his powerful personality and charisma as a means to link himself with the larger political system. By this time, support for Chávez translated strongly into support for the system. According to the 2012 AmericasBarometer, Venezuelan respondents that intended to vote for Chávez expressed an average system support score of 72 on a 0 to 100 scale (100 signifying the strongest support), while those intending to vote for another candidate or vote blank recorded an average system support score of 38 (See Appendix 1). Chávez and the electoral campaign of 2012 exploited this *Chavista* sentiment with the message that casting a vote for Chávez represented both a vote for the continuation of the Bolivarian Revolution project and a show of solidarity with Chávez himself.

Figure 2. Countries across the Americas with a political culture conducive to authoritarian stability in 2012



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Employing his trademark bellicose language against the opposition, Chávez led a campaign that depicted the 2012 elections as a zero-sum game in which the true will of the Venezuelan people and the future of the Bolivarian Revolution had to be defended at all costs from the oligarchic political elite of the past. For *Chavistas*, eagerness to stand by the president in the 2012 elections intensified in the face of a growing opposition movement that, under the skillful and charismatic leadership of Capriles, had overcome numerous unsuccessful attempts at becoming a credible electoral threat for Chávez. Framing its campaign as a fight for Venezuela, the opposition pitted their campaign against what they deemed a failed government by highlighting citizen discontent with Venezuela's increasingly poor economic performance, the country's rising violent crime rates, and growing government corruption.

Indeed, the combative political climate and polarization between *Chavistas* and opposition supporters that dominated Venezuelan politics during the Chávez regime was more palpable than ever in 2012. The consequence, as seen in Figure 3, was conditions in which system support, driven mainly by the *Chavista* majority, experienced a strong boost from previous years. Political tolerance, however, declined. Under these conditions Venezuela's political culture during the final days of Chávez displayed all the characteristics supportive of a stable, authoritarian regime.

Figure 3. Average Levels of System Support and Political Tolerance among Venezuelans, 2007-2012



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

The strength of this particular combination of attitudes in 2012, then, represents the Chávez political culture legacy. It is a legacy, however, that was intimately tied to the Chávez "cult of personality" he created. With Chávez's death, this legacy of authoritarian stability began to unravel. For even though his hand-picked successor survived one of the most contested elections in Venezuelan history, the recent protests and violence in Venezuela suggest that while political tolerance has declined, the high system support that was so strongly linked to the Chávez's personality is likely to have evaporated – moving the country out of the "authoritarian stability" category into what is arguably an even more troubling category: "democracy at risk." Of course, we will need to examine planned 2014 survey data to determine if indeed this is the case.

Chávez's Legacy and Current Turmoil in Venezuela

There are several lessons from the Venezuela Chávez left behind in 2013 that can help us understand what is going on in the country today. First, Maduro is clearly not Chávez – by all accounts he lacks Chávez's charisma, and, arguably, Chávez's political savvy. Second, the lid on hostile/intolerant conditions between *Chavistas* and opposition supporters that had been sustained by high levels of system support now seems to have cracked due to the apparent inefficiency and mismanagement of the Maduro administration (again, we will examine the 2014 survey data to determine whether we can find evidence of this posited evaporation of system support). Third, Chávez's institutional legacy of minority oppression now appears to have been activated by Maduro in an effort to maintain stability, and this has fanned the flames of protest against Maduro's government. All of these factors lead to the conclusion that the country's dominant political culture may well have moved from the "authoritarian stability" category in 2012 to the "democracy at risk" category in early 2014.

It does not take much of a leap of faith to infer that the performance of the Maduro administration has diminished the high levels of system support achieved by Chávez. Venezuela currently faces one of its worst economic crises, in which the Venezuelan currency has been officially devalued twice since Chávez began succumbing to cancer, and inflation rates now stand at over 55%. Venezuela is also experiencing a security crisis, recording one of the highest murder rates in the world in 2013 with more than 24,000

homicides (a rate of about 79 murders per 100,000 people) (AP 2013; Caselli 2014). Moreover, a growing dependency on imports and a shortage of dollars for currency exchange has resulted in punishing conditions of scarcity of basic foods and goods.

On the other hand, levels of political tolerance are also likely to have been affected under Maduro. Intolerance among Venezuelans may have increased as many *Chavistas* have assumed more defensive attitudes in the face of the diminished status of the Bolivarian Revolution in the hands of Maduro. Similarly, opposition leaders have seized on the failings of Maduro and become even more strident in their desires to regain some measure of influence in the Venezuelan political system. These desires have materialized as a call by opposition leaders (and a continued response from their supporters) to use street protests as a means to express their discontent with the performance of the Maduro administration. Yet, the true objective of these protests—whether they seek Maduro's resignation or a dialogue with the government to jointly seek solutions to the crises confronting Venezuela—remains unclear. And, despite calls from the opposition and the government for peaceful demonstrations, violent confrontations with the police and the Bolivarian National Guard have left more than a dozen dead, 150 injured, and even more detained (Ellsworth and Cawthorne 2014). To add to the instability, clashes between protesters and government security forces continue to garner international attention as widespread media censorship and government repression against protesters have increased.

Democratic stability will reemerge in Venezuela only when all citizens and public officials, including *Chavista* and opposition supporters alike, agree that political institutions are legitimate, while also expressing tolerance of the rights of those who may not share their political views. Considering Chávez's political culture legacy and the hostile climate between hardline *Chavistas* and angry opposition protesters that currently saturates political life in Venezuela, it seems that a long and difficult road toward societal reconciliation and the regaining of democratic institutional legitimacy lies ahead for Venezuela.

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Full results of the 2012 AmericasBarometer - survey and the AmericasBarometer 2012 comparative study can be consulted on-line at www.LapopSurveys.org. The full data set is available for on-line analysis or download (in SPSS and Stata formats) at no cost.

Appendix

Appendix 1. Average System Support by Vote Intention, Venezuela 2012



AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – November 17, 2014

President Disbands the Legislature amid Declining Citizen Evaluations in Guyana

By J. Daniel Montalvo, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, and Mitchell A. Seligson (Vanderbilt University)

Facing a vote of no-confidence from the opposition in the National Assembly, Guyana's President Donald Ramotar applied a little-known constitutional provision on November 10, to temporarily disband the Guyanese legislature, the *New York Times* reported. President Ramotar, who has held office since the re-election of the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in November 2011, claimed that he had no choice but to resort to this constitutional tool in order to protect the economy from what he called "political gamesmanship." *Time Magazine* on-line reports that Mr. Ramotar accused the opposition of intending to "end the life of the 10th parliament with immediate effect, dashing all hopes for urgent attention to issues relating to economic growth, social services and, the holding of local government elections…" However, members of the opposition in the legislature, "who have a one seat majority," accused the President of acting in a way that is detrimental to the Guyanese democratic political system.

In this *Topical Brief*[1], we document that these developments in Guyana occur at a time of a decline in citizens' rates of approval of the President's job performance, a deterioration of the perception of the national economic situation, and a decrease of trust in the parliament. Our measures of public opinion come from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer survey of Guyana, 2006-2014[2]. Even though citizen ratings of these institutions and the political system as a whole have been relatively stable over time (around 50 out of 100 possible points), our data reveal that the political outlook for the Guyanese regime suffered a moderate but general reversal in legitimacy levels in 2014.

Figure 1. Presidential Approval Decreased in 2014



[1] Funding for the 2014 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and Vanderbilt University. This *Topical Brief* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development, or any other supporting agency.

[2] Prior issues in the *Insight*s series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

Figure 2. Over Half of the Guyanese Population Reports the Economy Has Worsened in 2014



Each year of survey, we ask respondents the following question: "Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President [Name]? Very good (100); Good (75); Neither good nor bad (fair) (50); Bad (25); Very bad (0)" (M1, recoded). Figure 1 documents that mean values on this presidential job approval measure increased after 2006 and then held constant until 2012. In 2014, however, the average decreased around 6 points on the 0-100 scale, in comparison to the previous survey year.

What explains this decline? At the theoretical level, some of it could be due to the normal popularity erosion that most newly-elected presidents face after the "honeymoon effect" has worn off. The 2012 survey in Guyana took place only two months after Mr. Ramotar had been appointed. Nonetheless, this decrease could also be due to more structural factors, such as popular perception of economic performance, citizens sensing that the government may not be able to successfully negotiate agreements with opposition members in the parliament, or a broader public perception of a government inability to satisfy citizen demands.

Looking at the objective data, however, we find that Guyana is a middle-income country,[3] whose economy seems to be faring well: national GDP grew at an average rate of 5.1% percent over the last three years and its inflation rate was, on average, 3.2% (CIA Factbook). However, citizen perceptions tell us a radically different story. When asked "Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?" (SOCT2), 57% of respondents reported that the economy worsened in 2014. As Figure 2 illustrates, this percentage almost *tripled* since 2012, with these negative evaluations reaching by far their highest level in 2014 compared to recent years.

Are these depressed economic evaluations the result of a recent shock in the real economy or a product of politics? Even though we are unable to provide a more nuanced answer in this short report, we can note that trust in the parliament has also decreased more than 13 points on a 0-100 scale between 2012 and 2104. Figure 3 shows the results of the question: "To what extent do you trust the Parliament? Not at all (0), A lot (100) (B13, recoded). Thus, we find that the current political upheaval in Guyana goes hand-in-hand with broad and increasing citizen dissatisfaction with Guyanese political institutions and what they are delivering.

Figure 3. Trust in the Guyanese Parliament Experienced a Sharp Increase in 2012 Followed by a Rapid Decline in 2014



What will the future bring? In the 2010-2014 AmericasBarometer surveys of Guyana we also asked about citizen support for the shuttering

[3] Guyana's 2013 GDP per capita (PPP) is $8,500, according to the CIA's World Factbook.

of the legislature by the president in times of crisis.[4] Across all years, fewer than 9% of Guyanese respondents expressed that such a maneuver would be justifiable. Thus, we conclude by noting that there is little reason to believe that the Guyanese public is likely to take recent events as a palliative to their brewing dissatisfaction.

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"President of Guyana Disbands Parliament," *Time,* November 11, 2014.

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[4] JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Parliament and govern without Parliament?

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The 2014 AmericasBarometer dataset will be available on December 1, 2014. Full results of the AmericasBarometer surveys in Guyana and the additional 27 countries surveyed in the region can be consulted on-line at www.LapopSurveys.org. The full data sets are available for on-line analysis or download (in SPSS and Stata formats) at no cost.

AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – December 11, 2014

Frente Amplio to Govern Uruguay for the Third Time with the Challenge of Sustaining Economic Growth and Combating Insecurity

By María Fernanda Boidi

Tabaré Vázquez, the presidential candidate of *Frente Amplio,* was elected President of Uruguay on Sunday, November 30. Vázquez defeated Luis Lacalle Pou from the *Partido Nacional* with 53.6% to 41% of the votes.[1] *Frente Amplio* received a relative majority of the votes in the presidential and legislative elections held on October 26, 2014; it got close to, but did not reach the benchmark of 50% of the vote, thus a run-off was necessary according to the electoral law. *Frente Amplio* will continue to hold the majority of the seats in the two legislative chambers.

The new government's term will begin on March 1, 2015. This will be the seventh presidential term after the return to democracy, the third consecutive term for the *Frente Amplio*, and the second term for Tabaré Vázquez, a medical doctor who was the first left-wing mayor of Montevideo (1990-1995) and the first left-wing president (2005-2010) in the history of the country. Vazquez leads a country that is growing economically – although at a slower pace than in the recent past[2] - with a citizenry that approves of the current economic performance but is highly concerned about insecurity.

Figure 1. Evaluation of the National Economy



Using data from the 2014 Uruguay national survey[3] from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer, this Topical Brief[4] describes Uruguayans' views of the national and their personal economy, which are currently at their peak relative to the governing left-wing party's past record. It also examines Uruguayans' concerns about, and

[1] Data from the preliminary vote count, Corte Electoral.

[2] See World Bank Indicators: http://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG

[3] The Uruguay national survey was carried out in March and April 2014. Funding for the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer came mainly from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Topical Brief* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

[4] Prior issues in the *Topical Brief* and *Insight*s series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

recent experiences with insecurity, one of the country's biggest challenges in recent times.

Uruguayans assess the current economic situation between moderate and positive. Asked "How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?," 44.9% answered "neither good nor bad." The second most-mentioned response was "good," with 33.6%. Positive views ("good" and "very good") added together represent 37.5% of the responses; this is more than twice the figure for the negative views ("bad" and "very bad"), which add up to 17.7% (Figure 1).

Figure 2. Evaluation of Personal Economic Situation



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.UR14_1_W

A similar pattern of responses emerges with respect to a question about the respondents' personal economic situation. When asked "How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?," the neutral answer is mentioned by 49% of respondents; the gap between positive views (38.8% "good" and 1.5% "very good") and negative views ("bad" 8.6% and "very bad" 2%) is even greater: positive views outweigh negative views by 29.7 percentage points (Figure 2).

Given the recent economic performance in the country and citizens' perceptions of that performance, the economy is no longer the most important problem for Uruguayans. In fact, by the 2010 AmericasBarometer concerns about safety had surpassed concerns about the economy in Uruguay (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Most Serious Problem, Uruguay 2007-2014



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2007-2014; v.GM14_0912

Uruguay successfully weathered the world economic crisis of 2008, unemployment rates remain low, and citizens perceive that the economy is doing relatively well; all these reasons help to explain why the economy is not the major concern for Uruguayans. In 2014, only one fifth of respondents (20.5%) indicated that a problem of an economic nature is the most serious problem faced by the country, in contrast to 2007, when more than 6 out of 10 respondents (62.9%) expressed an economic issue as their primary concern. The rising concern over security – the most serious problem according to essentially half of respondents in 2012 and 2014 – is likely explained by both experiences and perceptions regarding personal safety.

As for perceptions, the AmericasBarometer data show that 2014 is one of the years in which Uruguayans have felt the most insecure, approximately equaling the levels recorded at the beginning of the series in 2007 and 2008: 45.8 points on average in the 0-100 scale (Figure 4). In this scale, 0 means "very safe" and 100 means "very unsafe." Uruguay ranks between Argentina (46.2) and Colombia (45.3), well below Venezuela (63.2) - the most insecure country according to its citizens' perceptions -

but also far from the safest country (Canada, with a score of 22 points on the insecurity measure).[5]

Figure 4. Perception of Insecurity, Uruguay 2007-2014



The AmericasBarometer also measures direct experience with crime. In 2014, more than 1 out of 4 Uruguayans reported having been a direct victim of a crime within the previous 12 months. This figure is identical to that of 2012 and the value has remained stable since the beginning of the series (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Crime Victimization, Uruguay 2007-2014



[5] Perception of insecurity is measured with the following question: Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **un**safe? To facilitate the analysis, responses are scaled in a 0-100 rank, where 0 means "very safe" and 100 means "very unsafe."

Personal experiences are amplified by what individuals have seen directly or heard of in their neighborhoods. According to what respondents report in the AmericasBarometer, burglaries and drug sales are widespread phenomena: 69.2% indicate that burglaries had happened in their neighborhoods during the previous 12 months, and 47.1% report that drug sales had occurred in the area during the same time period. A non-trivial 11.9% reports being aware of murders having occurred in the neighborhood during the last year. Extortions – a problem common in many countries covered by the AmericasBarometer - do not seem to be a significant issue in Uruguay (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Awareness of Crime in Neighborhood, Uruguay 2014



The economy has been an asset for the most recent governments in Uruguay, but citizen safety is still problematic according to the data. Upcoming AmericasBarometer *Insights* series reports focused on Uruguay will address this topic in more detail. It seems clear that, according to what citizens reported in the most recent AmericasBarometer survey, this is a topic that deserves attention and will require immediate efforts to rectify. Citizen safety will surely be one of the biggest challenges for the government that will take office in March 2015.

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The 2014 AmericasBarometer is available online. Full results of the AmericasBarometer surveys in Uruguay and the additional 27 countries surveyed in the region can be consulted on-line at www.LapopSurveys.org. The country data sets are available for on-line analysis or download (in SPSS and Stata formats) at no cost.

AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – February 9, 2015

Those with Darker Skin Report Slower Police Response

By Mollie J. Cohen, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, and Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University

From riots in Ferguson, Missouri to street protests in New York to the Twitter hashtag, #blacklivesmatter, and more, race relations and policing have captured national attention in the United States. Many voices are discussing the fact that African Americans trust the police less and give poorer evaluations of various aspects of police performance, compared to white North Americans (e.g., Brown and Coulter 1983, Van Ryzin et al. 2004, Newport 2014). What about the rest of the Americas? As Edward Telles and colleagues have convincingly demonstrated in the new book *Pigmentocracies* (2014), skin tone is associated with unequal opportunity and discrimination across the Americas. In this *Topical Brief*,[1] we report on perceptions of police responsiveness in the Latin America and Caribbean region, with a particular focus on its relationship to skin tone.[2]

Figure 1. Perceived Police Response Time, Regional Averages



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; Draft0912

The 2014 AmericasBarometer[3] asked thousands of individuals in national surveys across the Americas the following question:

INFRAX: Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon?

[1] Prior issues of the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which this report is based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[2] In measuring police performance, studies from the United States have frequently used citizen perceptions of police response times as predictors of citizen confidence in the police. We note that citizen perceptions of police performance do not always align perfectly with "objective" (official) measures of police performance (see Brown and Coulter 1983), though further research on this is warranted.

[3] Funding for the 2014 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Brief* is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

(1)Less than 10 minutes
(2)Between 10 and 30 minutes
(3)More than 30 minutes and up to an hour
(4)More than an hour and up to three hours
(5)More than three hours
(6)There are no police/they would never arrive[4]

Figure 1 displays the regional average results for this question based on survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean.[5] Striking is the fact that only 10 percent of respondents, on average across the region, indicate that the police would arrive in "less than 10 minutes." ***More than 3 out of every 5 individuals believe that the police would take more than thirty minutes to arrive, if they would get there at all.***

Perceptions of police response time in Latin America and the Caribbean closely correspond with respondents' views of police performance. Figure 2 compares reported *diss*atisfaction with police performance[6] and respondents' beliefs about police response time.

As the figure shows, those who believe that the police would take more time to arrive to the scene of the crime (or not arrive at all) report greater dissatisfaction with the police.[7]

Figure 2. Longer Perceived Police Responsiveness is Associated with Greater Dissatisfaction with the Police



Police Responsiveness and Skin Tone

What predicts beliefs about response time? The scholarly literature (focused mainly on the U.S. case) suggests a number of individual characteristics that predict evaluations of the police, including demographic features and socioeconomic factors, such as age, education, income, and place of residence (urban/rural). For example, younger people frequently report less trust in the police, as do individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Brown and Benedict 2002). We also expect that those who reside in urban communities are likely to evaluate police response times as faster than those in rural communities for two reasons. First, urban areas should be more easily accessible for the police because of better roads and, second, urban neighborhoods are more likely to house a local police precinct while rural residents might have to wait for the police from the county or state.

But what if there is a relationship between respondents' skin tone and reported police

[4] This option (6) was not read out loud, but interviewers were instructed to record if the respondent offered it. Respondents could also offer that they "don't know" or simply choose not to answer; these individuals (fewer than 4 percent of those surveyed) are not included.

[5] The 2014 AmericasBarometer is based on 28 countries, including the U.S. and Canada, which are not included in this report. At the time of writing, data for Suriname, the Bahamas, and Barbados was not available for analysis. Therefore, the LAC region represented in this report constitutes 23 countries.

[6] **POLE2N**: In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighborhood? [If respondent says there is no police, mark 4 "Very dissatisfied"] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied. For this report, this variable has been rescaled from 0 to 100.

[7] Of those who report that the police would never come, 74.88 percent report that they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with police performance, while only 18.8 percent of those who report that the police would arrive in less than ten minutes report the same levels of dissatisfaction.

response time, independent of urban/rural residence and socio-economic status? We next examine the possibility that, even when controlling for individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics, darker skin tone relates to slower perceived police response times.

We assess the relevance of skin tone as a predictor of perceived police response time by constructing a multivariate model in which we include respondents' place of residence (urban vs. rural), gender, education, wealth,[8] age, and skin tone. To capture skin tone, we use a measure based on the interviewer's coding of the respondent's facial skin tone on an eleven-point scale, with higher values indicating a darker complexion. The analysis controls for country fixed effects, which enables us to rule out the impact of a variety of nation-specific factors, such as national wealth and development that might be associated with skin tone. The results of the OLS analysis are depicted in Figure 3.[9]

The dependent variable, perceived police response, has been rescaled from 0 to 100 with lower values indicating slower response times. Dots indicate non-standardized regression coefficients; if these are located to the left of the vertical line, the relationship is estimated to be negative and the reverse if the dot is to the right of the vertical line.[10] In other words,

Figure 3. Determinants of Longer Perceived Police Response Times



Source: © AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; Draft0912

positive coefficients mean the independent variable is predicting longer response times, and the reverse for negative coefficients. The horizontal lines indicate confidence intervals, indicating we can be 95% confident that a result is statistically distinguishable from 0 if the lines do not cross the vertical line at 0.

As expected, perceived response times in urban areas are quicker than they are for rural areas. Women report longer response times. This could be because they perceive that the police will not take their reports as seriously; further investigation of this finding is warranted, since it may reveal systematic patterns of discrimination against women. Age[11] predicts perceptions of police response time, but not in the expected direction: in contrast to research

[8] Wealth is measured based on an assessment of respondents' household possessions. See http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf for more details on this measure.

[9] Multinomial logistic regression as well as ordered probit analysis yielded results that are substantively similar to those reported here. We report OLS coefficients because they are more readily interpretable (see also the appendix). All independent variables are scaled from 0 to 1, while the dependent variable is the 6-point response set recoded to a 0 to 100 scale.

[10] This *Topical Brief* breaks with past LAPOP reports by presenting non-standardized coefficients. Each independent variable (represented on the Y-axis) can be interpreted in terms of the predicted impact a one-unit change has on the dependent variable (on the horizontal axis). All independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1; coefficients in Figure 3 should be interpreted as the maximum effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable (perceived response time).

[11] Age is measured in cohorts. The first category includes those 18-25 years old, while the second category includes 26-35 year olds. The third category (the baseline for this analysis) captures 36-45 year olds, while the last three groups include 46-55 year olds, 56-65 year olds, and those 65 years of age or older.

on the U.S. case, in the Latin America and Caribbean region it is the youngest and oldest citizens who tend to rate police response time the fastest. More educated respondents, as well as wealthier respondents, report faster response times, perhaps because they tend to live in neighborhoods with better infrastructure than poorer respondents. We did not control for neighborhood infrastructure, but we did control for rural/urban residence.

We draw attention here to the finding for skin tone: ***individuals with darker skin across the Americas believe that it would take significantly longer for the police to respond to a call reporting a burglary than do lighter skinned respondents.*** The positive, significant effect that we find for skin tone comes even after controlling for other core factors that are associated with skin tone in the Americas as well as differences in the characteristics of the nations of the hemisphere.[12]

Skin tone matters in the Americas, not only in outcomes associated with socioeconomic status, but also with respect to the way that respondents perceive they are treated by the state. While current dialogue in the U.S. is focused on race relations and policing in U.S. cities, we highlight here the fact that – across the Latin America and Caribbean region, on average – those with darker skin tones tend to perceive the police to be less responsive than those with lighter skin tones.[13]

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[12] Calculating the difference in perceived response time in minutes for those with lighter or darker skin is complex because of the way the dependent variable was coded in the questionnaire. However, the results shown here suggest, and multinomial and ordinal logistic regression analyses further confirm, that those with darker skin are more likely to respond that the police will take more time than lighter skinned respondents.

[13] These results are not statistically significant in all countries. The effect of skin tone on perceived police response time is significant at the 90 percent confidence threshold in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Chile, Bolivia, Panama, Honduras, and Uruguay, and is marginally significant ($p<.15$) in Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela, Haiti, and Guyana. In Uruguay and Guyana, the estimated effect runs counter to expectations, with darker skinned individuals reporting *lower* wait times than lighter skinned individuals. In the 11 other countries where at least marginally statistically significant relationships were found, the effect is as described in this report, with those with darker skin reporting longer wait times.

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Full results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer and previous rounds can be consulted on-line at www.LapopSurveys.org. The full data set is available for on-line analysis or download (in SPSS and Stata formats) at no cost.

Appendix: Full OLS Regression Output

VARIABLES	Police Response Time (0-100)
65+	-2.958***
	(0.653)
56-65 years old	-0.695
	(0.566)
46-55 years old	-0.170
	(0.497)
26-35 years old	-1.385***
	(0.426)
16-25 years old	-2.412***
	(0.429)
Skin Tone	4.067***
	(1.167)
Quintiles of wealth	-4.995***
	(0.583)
Education	-2.102**
	(0.877)
Female	1.195***
	(0.270)
Urban	-4.538***
	(0.641)
Guatemala	5.357***
	(1.725)
El Salvador	-2.039
	(1.570)
Honduras	10.04***
	(1.814)
Nicaragua	13.55***
	(1.656)
Costa Rica	-9.466***
	(1.603)
Panama	-8.437***
	(1.888)
Colombia	-2.476
	(1.797)
Ecuador	-12.40***
	(1.807)
Bolivia	11.56***
	(2.056)
Peru	8.355***
	(2.114)
Paraguay	-6.143***
	(1.697)
Chile	-4.636**
	(1.890)
Uruguay	-15.91***
	(1.578)
Brazil	4.088**
	(1.716)
Venezuela	20.19***
	(2.103)
Argentina	-13.34***
	(2.063)
Dominican Republic	8.651***
	(1.771)
Haiti	12.15***
	(2.309)
Jamaica	-2.308
	(1.788)
Guyana	10.91***
	(1.859)
Trinidad & Tobago	-4.068**
	(1.733)
Belize	7.023***
	(2.133)
Constant	48.76***
	(1.647)
Observations	36,819
R-squared	0.133

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – February 16, 2015

Response to Argentine Prosecutor's Death Highlights Polarization and Mistrust of Institutions

By Mason Moseley, University of Pennsylvania

On January 18, 2015, only hours before presenting his case against current Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in a special parliamentary hearing, federal prosecutor Alberto Nisman was found dead in his Puerto Madero apartment from a single gunshot wound to the head. Nisman had been investigating the devastating 1994 terrorist attack on a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires (the *Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina* - AMIA) for ten years, and alleged that the current government had attempted to cover up Iran's involvement in the attack in exchange for improved terms of trade. It was even revealed that he had sought arrest warrants for President Kirchner and her Minister of Foreign Affairs, Héctor Timerman, in the days before coming forth with his charges.[1] While investigators have yet to make a definitive determination regarding the nature of Nisman's death, a poll reported by *The Economist* showed that over seventy percent of *porteños* (residents of Buenos Aires) believe Nisman was murdered (*The Economist* 2015).

Figure 1. Increased Polarization in Approval of Argentina's President, 2008-2014



[1] For more details on the Nisman case, see *La Nación* for local coverage in Spanish (www.lanacion.com.ar/la-muerte-de-alberto-nisman-t53089) or the *New York Times* for coverage in English (www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/world/whodunit-in-obsessed-nation-question-becomes-who-didnt.html).

Argentines have responded to Nisman's death with incredulity, anger, and resignation, as many believe it signals another blow to the democratic institutions of a country long stricken by institutional weakness and high levels of corruption (Levitsky and Murillo 2005). Setting aside the considerable personal tragedy of the situation, the country's response highlights two important trends in Argentine public opinion: 1) the deepening of political polarization between pro- and anti-*Kirchneristas* and 2) widespread mistrust of formal political institutions, and belief that the political system is fundamentally corrupt. In this *Topical Brief*, I assess public opinion on these two dimensions using data from the AmericasBarometer.[2,3]

Since her election in 2007, President Kirchner has increasingly become a lightning rod for Argentine public opinion. More brash in her public persona than her husband and predecessor, Néstor Kirchner, and more uncompromising in her pursuit of political goals, Cristina Kirchner has won many devout followers and detractors alike. Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which these divisions have grown between 2008 and 2014.[4] In this six-year period, the percentage of respondents who answered that the president was doing either a "Very bad" or "Very good" job more than tripled, and the portion of individuals who maintained neutral views of Kirchner fell from nearly fifty percent to less than one in three. Put simply, Argentines' views of the president have moved towards the poles since her tenure began.

When newspapers began reporting Nisman's death, both Argentina's fragmented opposition and the government moved swiftly to shape the narrative surrounding the tragedy. Kirchner's opponents, including the country's largest media conglomerate and newspaper, *Clarín*, sought to implicate the government in the death of a responsible civil servant who possessed damning evidence that could destroy Kirchner. Conversely, the President herself first lamented Nisman's apparent "suicide," and then only days later pivoted and suggested Nisman was merely a pawn in a larger conspiracy to discredit her government. Many in Argentina have interpreted the news through these

[2] Prior issues of the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which this report is based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[3] Funding for the 2014 round mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Brief* is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

[4] Figure 1 is drawn from the following question: **M1**. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad. Figure 1 displays the percentage of respondents who responded either "Very good" or "Very bad" from 2008 to 2014.

partisan lenses, further underlining the growing reality that the country is deeply polarized.

The second important trend highlighted by the response to Nisman's death is Argentines' lack of faith in the country's formal political institutions and processes. Argentina has typically ranked low even by Latin American standards in terms of system support (LAPOP 2008-2014), and this crisis has highlighted citizens' distrust of many of the key institutional actors involved in the AMIA case, and now in the investigation of Nisman's death. Trust in the judicial system, executive, national legislature, and political parties fell between 2012 and 2014, and will likely continue to plummet with the current scandal (though LAPOP's time series does not extend to this point). Trust in the executive in particular experienced a precipitous fall between 2012 and 2014, dropping by nearly twenty points on a 100-point scale to a score of 41.8, which places Argentina in the bottom half of this category regionally (Figure 2).[5] In general, Argentines seem reluctant to place their faith in any institutional actor, making it all the more difficult for many to interpret the events of recent weeks and believe justice for the victims is imminent.

Figure 2. Trust in the Executive in the Americas, 2014



By regional standards, Argentina ranks close to the top in public perceptions of corruption (LAPOP 2014; Figure 3).[6] The absence of a commonly held trusted authority that individuals believe could objectively investigate both Nisman's allegations against the government and the circumstances surrounding his death has likely left many Argentines doubting they will ever know the truth of the events surrounding Nisman's death.

[5] Trust in the executive is measured with the following question: **B21A**. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister? Respondents answered using a 1-7 scale, which was then rescaled from 0 to 100.

[6] Figure 3 plots perceptions of corruption according to responses to the following question: **EXC7**. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? For this report, this variable has been rescaled from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating a belief that corruption is more common.

Figure 3. Perceptions of Corruption in the Americas, 2014



Thousands plan to attend a mass demonstration on February 18 (dubbed #18F on Twitter) organized by federal prosecutors in Nisman's memory, reinforcing the country's continued reliance on protest demonstrations as a form of democratic representation in the absence of trusted formal institutions (Moseley 2014).

As others have noted, much remains to be determined in both the investigation of Nisman's death and his allegations against the government (e.g. Zraick 2015), but the consequences appear serious regardless. If prosecutors find that Nisman committed suicide, it represents yet another setback in the investigation of the deadliest terrorist attack in Argentine history, which has gone unsolved for more than twenty years. The public's response to his death also further underscores the depth of political divisions in Argentina, and the profound mistrust of democratic institutions that have yet to show marked improvement – and have from some perspectives, deteriorated – in more than thirty years of democratic governance.

If Nisman was murdered, the implications are clearly worse, revealing either the complicity of domestic actors in the killing of a public servant, or the state's inability to protect a man whom many suspected, including the prosecutor himself, was in danger (*La Nación* 2015). Not to mention that if Nisman's allegations against the government are corroborated, it would reveal unprecedented corruption at the very highest levels of Argentine democracy, and a government willing to barter justice for the families of the eighty-five AMIA victims in exchange for political and economic gain. Prosecutor Gerardo Pollicita issued formal charges against the president on February 13, and an investigation into Nisman's claims is pending.

With the presidential election approaching in October, and Kirchner constitutionally prohibited from seeking a third term, 2015 promises to be a pivotal year in determining the future of Argentina's democracy.

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AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – March 2, 2015

Amid Low Evaluations of Maduro's Performance, Tolerance of Regime Critics Grows in Venezuela

By Mariana Rodríguez with Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Vanderbilt University

Nearly one year after the arrest of opposition leader and outspoken regime critic, Leopoldo López, on charges of inciting violence during an extensive series of protests in February 2014, another leading opposition figure, Antonio Ledezma, a close ally of López and mayor of Caracas, has been arrested by the Venezuelan government on conspiracy charges in an alleged coup plot against President Maduro.

In a context marked by presidential approval ratings lower than any other head of state in the Latin America and Caribbean region (See Figure 1)[1] and looming legislative elections, concerns are mounting over repressive measures by Maduro's administration to silence regime critics. In this *Topical Brief*,[2] we assess public opinion on presidential approval and support for the political rights of

Figure 1. Average Presidential Approval, 2014



[1] Figure 1 shows means (not percents) on a 0-100 scale based on the following question: **M1**. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of the President/Prime Minister? (100) Very good (75) Good (50) Neither good nor bad (25) Bad (0) Very bad.

[2] Prior issues of the *Insights* series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php.

regime dissidents in Venezuela using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer.[3]

Maduro's dismal presidential approval ratings[4] reflect public discontent with the severe political, social, and economic problems facing Venezuela, including inflation rates reaching an estimated 68% and rising (Romero and Gupta 2015), widespread scarcity of basic goods, and the second highest homicide rate in the world (Medina 2015). This problem-plagued climate has fueled a growing call by opposition leaders and activists for citizens to voice their grievances and demand change from the government.

Within this context, the embattled President Maduro's administration has taken a stern stance toward government dissidents. Violent clashes between government security forces and street demonstrators during last year's wave of protests left over 40 people dead, hundreds injured, and thousands arrested (Silva and Chinea 2014). In addition to Ledezma's recent arrest, 33 out of 50 opposition mayors across Venezuela face legal charges related to their involvement in the February 2014 protests (Romero and Gupta 2015). Other prominent opposition leaders and activists have been accused of conspiracy, coup plotting, and other machinations. In the case of Maria Corina Machado, these accusations resulted in the removal of her seat at the National Assembly (e.g., Schaefer Muñoz and Minaya 2015).

Figure 2. Average Political Tolerance, 2014



What levels of public support exist for government efforts to silence regime critics in Venezuela? Very little, according to data from the LAPOP AmericasBarometer. In fact, ***Venezuelans rank as the most supportive of regime critics' political rights*** in comparison with citizens of other Latin American and Caribbean countries, as seen in Figure 2. The *Political Tolerance*

[3] Funding for the March 2014 Venezuela data collection came from Vanderbilt, the University of Tennessee, and the Tinker Foundation. Funding for the rest of the 2014 AmericasBarometer mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt. This *Brief* is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of USAID or any other supporting agency.

[4] *The Economist* (2015) reports current approval ratings for President Maduro at below 20%.

measure is an index of support for the right of regime critics to protest, vote, exercise freedom of expression, and run for public office.[5]

Moreover, ***levels of political tolerance have increased***. Figure 3 displays average support for each act within the tolerance index and compares averages across 2012 and 2014. As can be observed, Venezuelans have grown more tolerant since 2012 on every dimension. In 2014, a year in which Venezuelan politics fell into a crisis marked by widespread protests against the government and by political violence, citizens expressed more support for the right of dissenters to peacefully demonstrate and voice their opinions, vote, and run for public office.

These data suggest that ***strident moves against opposition leaders, to the extent that they appear to be moves designed to silence regime critics, may further undermine President Maduro's popularity.***

Figure 3. Average Political Tolerance by Dimension, Venezuela 2014



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2012-2014; v.VEN14ts_0724

As one would expect, there is a strong negative relationship between presidential approval and support for the rights of regime critics to exercise civil liberties in Venezuela. Figure 4 shows that political tolerance is highest for those who give the most negative evaluations of President Maduro's work in office (71.9 units, or degrees, of tolerance on the 0-100 scale), while it is lowest among those who rate his job performance as "very good" (41 units). This sharp difference – representing a gap that spans 1/3 of the 100-point scale, from 71.9 to 41, is illustrative of the high levels of polarization in Venezuelan public opinion. It is relevant to point out the degree of this polarization: while 54% of respondents evaluate President Maduro's job performance as "bad" or "very bad,"

[5] The political tolerance index, scaled 0 (least tolerant) to 100 (most tolerant), is based on the following questions: **D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? **D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? **D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office? **D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches? The index has a Cronbach's alpha score of .90.

only 19% think he is doing a "good" or "very good" job.

Overall, these results suggest that to the extent that President Maduro's popularity continues to fall, so too will support for actions perceived as attacks on the right of his opponents to participate in politics. Given the platform that the impending legislative elections and continued protest calls by opposition leadership provide for critics to voice their discontent with the *Chavista* regime, President Maduro appears to be in a bind: maneuvers to silence regime opponents may be aimed at maintaining political power, but these tactics are unpopular, and likely increasingly so.

Figure 4. Average Tolerance by Presidential Job Performance Evaluations, Venezuela 2014



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AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – March 23, 2015

Amid Brazil's Protests, a Troubling Surge in Support for Military Intervention

By Guilherme Russo, Vanderbilt University

Over the past weeks, Brazil has witnessed two of its largest political mobilizations in decades. On March 13, 2015, social movements and labor unions organized demonstrations of support for President Dilma Rousseff in a number of cities around the country. Two days later, opponents of the administration staged a massive protest in the streets of São Paulo to vent their discontent (Magalhaes and Jelmayer 2015).[1] Reports on the size of the demonstration by opponents in São Paulo ranged from two hundred thousand to one million people. By either measure, it was the largest political mobilization since the 1984 "Direct (Elections) Now!" movement (G1a 2015).[2] In marches throughout the country, demonstrators have demanded Rousseff's impeachment or resignation as her government faces an economic crisis and another large corruption scandal involving, among others, the president's political party, the Worker's Party (The Economist 2015). A number of protesters have

Figure 1. Percent who believe a Military Coup is Justifiable under High Corruption in the Americas, 2014



[1] For more details on the protests, see *Folha de São Paulo* for local coverage in Portuguese (http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/especial/2015/protestos-15-de-marco/) or the *New York Times* for coverage: (http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/15/world/americas/ap-lt-brazil-protests.html).

[2] The Diretas Já [Direct (Elections) Now] movement emerged during military rule in Brazil and demanded a return to direct elections (see, e.g., http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/19/world/direct-vote-demanded-for-brazil.html).

declared their dissatisfaction not only with the standing president, but also with the way democracy is working in the country. At the extreme, some have called for the military to take power (Watts 2015).

In this *Topical Brief*,[3] I assess public opinion with respect to military intervention in Brazil.[4] The analyses presented here show that ***the percentage of the Brazilian public who find it justifiable for the military to intervene under conditions of high corruption is high in comparison to other countries, and has increased significantly in the last two years***. Further, results show that acceptance of military intervention is found among those who disapprove *and* those who approve of Rousseff's government.

The presumably small but vocal group of protesters calling for military intervention claims that democratic institutions are ineffective and controlled by a corrupt government, and that only a return to a military rule could reestablish order (G1b 2015). Although citizens with this opinion appear to be a minority among those dissatisfied with the current administration, their appeal to return to rule by the armed forces has engendered heated debate with those in favor of impeachment (Bergamim Jr. and Campanha 2015).

In light of these events and discussions, it is illuminating to assess the degree to which such calls for a military intervention might resonate with the mass public. As a standard question, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents if a military coup-d'état would be justified under conditions of "a lot of corruption" in their country.[5] Figure 1 presents the percent of individuals who agree that a military intervention is justifiable under high corruption in each country surveyed by LAPOP in 2014.[6] Brazil ranks near the top, with the sixth highest percentage of respondents (47.6%) agreeing that a military take-over is justifiable. This level of acceptance stands in stark contrast to other Southern Cone countries with recent histories of military regimes (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are all in the bottom four in the figure).

[3] Prior issues of the *Insights* Series can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which this report is based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php.

[4] For this purpose, I look at the following question: **JC13**. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? When there is a lot of corruption. A military take-over of the state would be justified (1) or would not be justified (2).

[5] The Brazil AmericasBarometer national survey was conducted from March 21st to April 27th, 2014.

[6] Funding for the 2014 AmericasBarometer mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Important sources of support were also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Brief* is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

Moreover, the rate of acceptance of a military intervention under high corruption in Brazil has increased significantly in the last two years. As Figure 2 shows, the percentage of respondents who think a military intervention would be justified under high corruption slightly decreased after 2008 (though the change was not statistically significant), but then significantly increased by more than ten percentage points between 2012 and 2014. ***In 2014, 47.6%, or nearly one out of every two adults in Brazil, report that they would find a military coup to be justified under conditions of high corruption.***

Figure 2. Percent Who believe a Military Coup is Justifiable under High Corruption in Brazil, 2007-2014



Interestingly, acceptance of a military intervention does not come only from those who disapprove the current government. Although those who perceive Rousseff's administration as "Very Bad" or "Bad" are more likely to approve of a military intervention, Figure 3[7] shows that 45.6% of those who find her government to be "Very Good" or "Good" also approve of a military take-over in times of high corruption. Therefore, the high percentage of approval for a military intervention in times of corruption presented here cannot be interpreted as a direct manifestation of support for the armed forces to oust President Rousseff. Rather, ***we see widespread tolerance for undemocratic measures to combat corruption in politics.***

Figure 3. Percent who believe a Military Coup is Justifiable under High Corruption by Level of Approval of Brazil's President, 2014



Whether these expressions of support would manifest themselves in active support in the case of a military intervention is a question that one can

[7] Aside from **JC13**, Figure 3 draws on question **M1**. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Dilma Roussef? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad.

hope remains untested. What is known is that since the 2013 demonstrations through the present day, Brazilians have been increasingly determined to manifest their political opinions in street demonstrations.[8] As the country just completed the 30th anniversary of its most recent democratic transition,[9] Brazil still stands as a political system that permits citizens to enjoy their freedoms of organization and expression, even accommodating the freedom to call for a military intervention.

On Wednesday (March 18), President Rousseff responded to the protests by presenting a package of initiatives to combat corruption (Folha de São Paulo). If these measures will have any impact on the public's perceptions of her government is yet to be seen. Since her tight reelection in October of last year, President Rousseff has not enjoyed a "honeymoon period" with the public. Instead, this past week her approval rate reached a new low with only 13% of the public evaluating her administration as "Great" or "Good" (Datafolha 2015). Although a military intervention seems far from likely, and an impeachment process would require direct evidence against her, President Rousseff would be well-advised to redouble efforts to combat corruption and economic stagnation, or challenges to her government may continue to escalate while the public's commitments to democratic values may continue to deteriorate.

[8] Per the AmericasBarometer, the percent of respondents who reported participating in a demonstration or protest march increased significantly in Brazil from 4.68% in 2012 to 7.74% in 2014. The question employed was **PROT3**: In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?

[9] On March 15, 1985 José Sarney was inaugurated as the first civilian president after twenty-one years of military rule.

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AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – March 25, 2015

Uruguayans are Skeptical as the Country Becomes the First to Regulate the Marijuana Market

By María Fernanda Boidi, Insights Research and Consulting; Rosario Queirolo, Universidad Católica del Uruguay; José Miguel Cruz, Latin American and Carribean Center - FIU

In December 2013, the Uruguayan Congress approved Law 19.172, effectively making the Uruguayan state the first in the world to control and regulate all activities related to the marijuana market, from growing to distributing and selling cannabis and all its byproducts. The unprecedented policy decision put the small Latin American country in the spotlight. On one hand, the law has been praised for its liberal and creative approach to drug policy, which together with other pro-civil liberties policies such as equal marriage and abortion, granted Uruguay the title of "Country of the Year" by *The Economist*.[1] On the other hand, the new law's measures violate treaties that comprise the International Drug Control Regime (IDCR).

However, unlike other liberal policies such as the legalization of same-sex marriage, which is widely supported by the Uruguayan population (Boidi 2013), or abortion rights, which are conditionally supported by the public (Boidi and Corral 2013), the regulation of the marijuana market is opposed by a majority of the Uruguayan public. This *Topical Brief*[2] assesses the state of public opinion toward the regulation of a legal marijuana market in Uruguay.

Figure 1. Support for Marijuana Regulation in Uruguay



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; LAPOP UY vMay2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer[3] survey asked Uruguayans to what extent they agree with the measure captured in this statement: "Since a few weeks ago, the marijuana market in Uruguay is no longer penalized and it is regulated by the government."[4] Figure 1 shows

[1] "Earth's got talent," December 21, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21591872-resilient-ireland-booming-south-sudan-tumultuous-turkey-our-country-year-earths-got

[2] The LAPOP *Insights* series (with *Topical Briefs*) can be found at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php. The data on which they are based can be found at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/survey-data.php

[3] Funding for the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer mainly came from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and Vanderbilt University. This *Topical Brief* report is solely produced by LAPOP and the opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or any other supporting agency.

[4] The law passed in December 2013, and data collection took place in March 2014. In addition to the options offered in the question it was possible to give the following responses "neither agree nor disagree" (5.2%), and "agree with non-penalization but disagree with regulation,"

the majority of the population rejects the new measure: 33.6% indicate they disagree a lot with the measure, and an additional 26.3% indicate they simply disagree. Adding these two categories together, ***almost six out of ten Uruguayans (59.9%) disagree with the new marijuana policy.*** On the other hand, only 9.7% fully support the measure, and an additional 23.8% agree with it. Adding the two categories expressing positive attitudes toward the measure together, just one in three persons (33.6%) supports the new marijuana law.

Beyond approval for the law itself, views about the use of marijuana are rather negative among Uruguayans. The AmericasBarometer survey asked respondents to what extent they agreed with a series of statements about marijuana, including the following: "Consuming marijuana is harmful to health;" "Marijuana is a gateway drug;" and "Marijuana users are a threat to society." Respondents expressed their agreement with each of the statements using numbers from a scale ranging from 1 "Not at All" to 7 "A Lot." To facilitate the analysis and simplify interpretation, the original responses were recoded onto a 0-100 scale that maintains the same substantive meaning of responses, but for which 0 represents that the respondent does not agree "at all" with the statement, and a score of 100 means that the respondent agrees "a lot."

The numbers displayed in Figure 2 reflect the average of responses given by the Uruguayan survey respondents, which constitute an estimate of the average degrees of acceptance (on the 0-100 scale) of each statement among the Uruguayan public. The grey areas around the dot represent the confidence interval for the estimate.

Average agreement with the statement that marijuana is harmful to health is 71.8 degrees on the 0-100 scale. Considering the fact that the midpoint of the scale is situated at 50, then it is

"doesn´t know", and "doesn´t answer," which added together sum 1.5%

Figure 2. Public Beliefs about Marijuana



Figure 3. Rates of Approval of the Market by Belief that Marijuana is a Gateway Drug



easy to see that with an average of over 70, ***Uruguayans tend toward agreeing strongly with the general idea that marijuana is harmful to health.*** Similarly, respondents tend to believe that marijuana is a gateway drug, an idea that was salient in the meager public debate that preceded the approval of the law (an average of 71.7 degrees of agreement with the statement). On the contrary, Uruguayans tend not to believe that marijuana users are a threat to society, with the score on that measure averaging 48.5, a value that falls below the midpoint of the scale.

Beliefs about and experiences with marijuana are closely related to rates of approval of the new law. One of these beliefs is that marijuana is a "gateway drug;" Figure 3 shows that, among those who do *not* believe marijuana is a gateway drug, 72% approve of the law. At the other end, only 13% of those who agree "a lot" with the idea that marijuana is a gateway drug support the law.[5]

The AmericasBarometer survey in Uruguay also asked about the respondent's own experiences with marijuana. Analyzing this question allows us to see how familiarity with marijuana is associated with support for the new law. As shown in Figure 4, a quarter (25.7%) of those who have never tried marijuana support the law, while 62.7% of those who have tried it at least once in their lifetime approve of it. Similarly, 22.2% of the Uruguayans who do not know anyone who uses marijuana approve of the law, while approval more than doubles among those who do know someone who uses it (46.4%).

Nonetheless, ***the most powerful variables associated with support for marijuana are not related to marijuana itself: they are political.*** Figure 5 clearly shows that approval of the marijuana law is strongly predicted by an individual's ideological stance, with those self-identified on the "left" holding more positive attitudes towards the law than those who place themselves on the "right." Further, approval of the law is strongly related to approval of José Mujica´s government, which held the Executive at the time of the 2014 AmericasBarometer data collection.

Now, with Tabaré Vázquez taking office as President, a puzzling question about the future of public support for the marijuana law is presented. Unlike President Mujica, who was

Figure 4. Approval of the New Marijuana Law by Individual Experiences



Figure 5. Approval of the New Marijuana Law by Political Orientations



the critical proponent and advocate for this law, President Vázquez has milder views towards it and has publicly expressed his concern about some aspects of the law (though he has stated his commitment to continue its implementation).[6] In the coming months, it might be possible to see the link between presidential approval and support for government regulation of the marijuana market unravel. But, at the same time, as implementation of the law advances, new considerations might come to citizens´ minds in

[5] In this and all subsequent figures the measure of approval adds together those who "strongly agree" and those who simple "agree" with the new marijuana regulation law. This and all the other bivariate relationships discussed in this document achieve statistical significance in a regression analysis (not shown here, but available upon request from the authors).

[6] "Tabaré Vázquez admitió que es 'increíble' que las farmacias vendan marihuana en Uruguay," October 16, 2014. Accessed March 23, 2015. http://www.infobae.com/2014/10/16/1602164-tabare-vazquez-admitio-que-es-increible-que-las-farmacias-vendan-marihuana-uruguay

ways that reshape their support for the law and their attitudes toward marijuana use more generally.

As a pioneer in the realm of a regulated legal market for marijuana, Uruguay stands as a critical case for understanding not only how such a law is implemented but, also, how the process of putting that law into action affects public attitudes on issues of marijuana cultivation, sales, and use.

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The 2014 AmericasBarometer is available online. Full results of the AmericasBarometer surveys in Uruguay and the additional 27 countries surveyed in the region can be consulted on-line at www.LapopSurveys.org. The country data sets are available for on-line analysis or download (in SPSS and Stata formats) at no cost.

AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – June 2, 2015

Same-Sex Marriage Resonates Most Strongly with Young People in the Americas

By Arturo Maldonado, Vanderbilt University

In April of 2015, Ecuador and Chile approved civil union laws for same-sex couples. In recent years, same-sex marriages have been recognized in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina.[1] Conversely, other countries in the Americas have demonstrated opposition to the idea of civil unions or marriages for same-sex couples. For example, this year the Peruvian Congress finally voted against a civil union law[2] and in 2013, the Colombian Senate selected not to approve gay marriage[3] (see also the discussion in Lodola and Corral 2010).

The May 22 referendum in Ireland on same-sex marriage raised the salience in the media of public opinion as a key input into the legislative process.[4] The most recent round of the LAPOP *AmericasBarometer* once again allows insight into levels of and variation in public support for same-sex marriage across and within countries of the Americas.

Figure 1. Average (0-100) Degree of Support for Same-sex Marriage, 2014



Figure 1 shows average levels of public support for same-sex marriage across the Americas on a 0-100 scale, on which higher values mean more degrees of support.[5] Countries are color-coded so that green indicates countries in which gay marriage is legal; blue indicates countries that

[1] http://www.freedomtomarry.org/landscape/entry/c/international.

[2] On September 12th, 2013, Congressman Carlos Bruce, the first Peruvian lawmaker who has announced he is gay, presented a draft bill about civil union, but after a debate in the Congress, legislators did not pass it.

[3] According to www.freedomtomarry.org, the Colombian court ruled that the Congress must pass gay marriage before June 2013, but the Colombian Senate did not approve it. As a consequence, same-sex couples are able to register their unions in court as civil unions.

[4] 62.1% voted yes on the proposal for the marriage equality bill in Ireland. See: http://www.referendum.ie.

[5] D6: "How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?"

allow civil unions; purple indicates countries where gay marriage or unions are recognized in some regions of the country; and red indicates countries that do not recognize same-sex marriages or unions at all.

Figure 1 reveals ***higher public support for same-sex couples' right to marry is found in those countries that have enacted legislation allowing same-sex marriages and/or unions.*** This conclusion is consistent with Boidi (2013), who shows that Uruguay's approval of gay marriage in 2013 aligned with liberal views on this issue among that country's public in 2012. Comparatively high support continues to be found in Uruguay, and in most other countries with similar laws. The exception is Ecuador, which has approved civil unions despite low public support for this type of legislation.

In a number of countries where laws have been passed in favor of same-sex unions and marriages, public opinion tends to be polarized on the issue. Boidi (2013) shows that preferences in Uruguay in 2012 were polarized, with most people reporting they either "strongly dissaprove" or "strongly approve." The data for the 2014 round of the *AmericasBarometer* demonstrate that this tendency continues in Uruguay and is present in some other countries as well. To illustrate this and some of the differences found within and across countries in the region, Figure 2 presents the distribution of responses to the *AmericasBarometer* same-sex marriage question in four countries: Uruguay and Argentina, where gay marriage has beeen approved, and Bolivia and Peru, where gay marriage or civil unions have not been passed.

Uruguay is the country where most people "strongly approve" of same-sex couples' right to marry in 2014 (52.7%), yet still a sizeable percent (17.1) "strongly disapprove." In Argentina, 23.3% respond "strongly

Figure 2. Distribution of Support for Same-sex Marriage in Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru, 2014



dissaprove" and 33.7% "strongly approve."[6] Public opinion tilts in another way in two countries that have passed same-sex union legislation and have less polarization of opinion: in Ecuador and Colombia (not shown here), 62.5% and 40.8% respond "strongly dissaprove" and just 5.8% and 14.6% "strongly approve," respectively.

In countries where laws in favor of gay rights have not been passed, there is little evidence of polarization in opinion. For example, Bolivia and Peru have high proportions of people who strongly disapprove of same-sex marriage (45.6% and 36.1%, respectively), and small percentages of people who strongly approve same-sex marriage (4.1% and 4.3%, respectively).[7]

What explains these differences in public support for this measure *within* countries? In previous research on this question, Lodola and Corral (2010) find that younger, more educated, wealthier, urban residents, and those who place themselves on the left are more likely to support gay marriage rights. Boidi (2013) arrives at similar conclusions in her analyses of the case of Uruguay.

Lodola and Corral (2010) and Marcano (2013) emphasize the role of religion in opposing to gay rights. They find that Catholics and Evangelicals are less likely to support the idea of same-sex marriage.

When assessing the issue across ten Latin American countries[8] using data recently collected as part of the 2014 *AmericasBarometer*,[9] I find that women,[10] the more educated,[11] wealthier,[12] and younger people tend to be more likely to support same-sex marriage in most countries, independently of whether their countries have approved or not approved a civil union or marriage law. Along the same line, Catholics,[13] Evangelicals, and Protestants[14] tend to be less likely to support gay marriage than non-Catholics and non-Evangelicals and Protestants, respectively, independently of whether their countries have passed or not passed a law in favor of same-sex civil unions or marriages. Of these variables, age is one of the factors to most consistently predict individuals' support for same-sex marriage. This variable is negative and statistically significant in all ten countries investigated in detail for this report: that is, ***older people are less likely to support gay marriage.***

[6] Chile and Brazil also exhibit polarized distributions, not shown here. In these countries, 31.2% and 35% respond "strongly disapprove", respectively; and 23.2% and 24.5% respond "strongly approve", respectively.

[7] In Paraguay and Venezuela, not shown here, 66% and 45% respond "strongly disapprove", respectively; and 12% and 11.2% respond "strongly approve", respectively.

[8] I ran an OLS regression with the pooled AmericasBarometer 2014 data set and then separate analyses for each of ten countries (see footnote 7). In each regression the dependent variable is support for same-sex couples' right to marry (recoded on a 0-100 scale) and female, education, wealth, age, left-right self-placement, Catholic, and Evangelical/Protestant are the independent variables, along with country dummies in the pooled analysis. For the pooled analysis, I find that women, education, and quintiles of wealth are positive and statistically significant predictors of same-sex couples' right to marry. Age, Left-right self-placement, Catholic, and Evangelical/Protestant are negative and statistically significant predictors. Results available upon request.

[9] For this report, I focus in detail on Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and Paraguay. I ran an OLS regression for each of these countries and report in the footnotes that follow on these results.

[10] I find that being female is a statistically significant and positive indicator in Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay.

[11] Education is a positive and statistically significant predicator in Ecuador, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

[12] The quintiles of wealth measure is positive and statistically significant in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela.

[13] The Catholic measure is negative and statistically significant in Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

[14] The Evangelical and Protestant measures are negative and statistically significant in all countries.

Figure 3. Average (0-100) Degree of Support for Same-sex Marriage by Age Cohorts in Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru, 2014



Figure 3 shows four examples of the relationship between age and support for the right of same-sex couples to marry. This figure shows that countries where a gay marriage law has beeen approved display higher degrees of support in general, but also an opinion divide between younger and older people. For example, in Uruguay the difference between those 18 to 25 years old and those older than 66 years old is 28 degrees of support on a 0-100 scale. This difference is also 28 degrees in Argentina (as shown in the figure), and 30 degrees in Brazil and 35 degrees in Chile (not shown for brevity). Countries that have not passed such a law display lower degrees of support, yet still display an age-based opinion divide. As Figure 3 shows, in Bolivia and Peru, the difference between those 18 to 25 years old and those older than 66 years old is 15 and 14 degrees, respectively; in Paraguay and Venezuela, average opinions across the youngest and oldest cohort vary by 15 and 24 degrees, respectively.[15]

Taken as a whole, the 2014 *AmericasBarometer* results reveal that legislators in the Americas tend to be in line with people's preferences in their countries, in that pro-union/marriage legislation tends to be found in countries with more support among the mass public for extending such rights to gay individuals (see also Boidi 2013). The interesting exception is Ecuador, where President Correa has approved a civil union law despite a low support for this idea. Further, the results indicate that countries

[15] In general, the countries examined in this report exhibit a monotonic decline with age, except in Argentina and Uruguay, where young citizens seem to have similar higher degrees of support for same-sex couples' right to marry. In Uruguay, respondents between 18 and 45 years old report similar degrees of support. In Argentina, citizens between 18 and 35 years old also report similar degrees of support for same-sex couples' right to marry.

where there are gay marriage laws tend to have a fair degree of polarization in preferences.

They also inform us that there are significant demographic factors undergirding support for gay marriage in the Americas. Age is one of the most relevant of these factors. In countries across the region, young people tend to exhibit higher degrees of support for gay marriage compared to older people.

The relevance of age to public opinion on gay marriage is not limited to the Americas. In fact, news reports indicate that younger people were the principal supporters of the recent referendum on gay marriage in Ireland.[16] Thus, no matter the region, it seems that activists in favor of LGTB rights in countries where a gay marriage or civil union law has not been passed are likely to find that their arguments resonate most strongly with young people. We can further conclude from these public opinion tendencies that support for gay marriage is likely to increase, rather than decrease, over time, to the extent that the next cohorts of young people express views that align more with their slightly older peers than with members of the senior generation.

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Full results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer and previous rounds can be consulted on-line at www.LapopSurveys.org. The full data set is available for on-line analysis or download (in SPSS and Stata formats) at no cost.

[16]See: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/05/gay-marriage-ireland-118254.html#.VWzb1FnBzGc

AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – July 7, 2015

Amid a Steady Decline in the Percentage of Self-Reported Catholics, Pope Francis Visits Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay

By Daniel Montalvo and Emily Saunders, Vanderbilt University

Pope Francis is the first Pope from the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region in the approximately 2000 year history of the Catholic Church. He is seen as a transformative figure, commenting on controversial issues such as homosexuality and the role of women in the church.[1] This week, the Pope will make his second Papal visit to the LAC region, stopping in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay, the first time he has visited any of these respective countries since his election to the office. The Pope's itinerary, released last week,[2] reveals that his trip will be a mix of administrative, sacramental, and service oriented activities. With the immediate excitement expressed by the public over this trip and the residual excitement of having a Pope from the region, this *Topical Brief* looks at the trends of Catholicism in the region, with an emphasis on Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay.

Figure 1. Percent Catholic across the LAC Region, 2014



[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pope-francis-talks-about-gay-clergy-role-of-women-on-flight-from-brazil-to-vatican/2013/07/29/0af5df0a-f857-11e2-b018-5b8251f0c56e_story.html

[2] http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/1502005.htm

As seen in Figure 1, there is a massive range across the region with regard to the percentage of Catholics in each country in 2014. Paraguay has the most people identifying as Catholic with 84.7% whereas Jamaica has the least with 3.1%. In addition to Paraguay, the Pope will visit Ecuador with 74.1% of respondents identifying as Catholic and Bolivia with 70.7%. In a region that has been widely hailed as a Catholic stronghold for decades, percentages in the low 70's in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia could be surprising.

Between 2006 and 2014 the AmericasBarometer survey asked interviewees in a number of countries, including the three the Pope will visit this week:

Q3C. What is your religion, if any?

The original response categories included Catholic, Non-Evangelical Protestant, Non-Christian Eastern Religions (such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism, etc.), No Religion, Evangelical or Pentecostal,[3] Mormons, Traditional religions (such as Candomble, Rastafari, Voodoo, etc.), Jewish, Agnostic or Atheist, Jehovah Witness and Other. For the purpose of this study, we collapse all of the non-Catholics into a single category.

[3] Even though several of these categories are denominations of Protestantism, LAPOP separates them due to their salience in LAC.

Figures 2 through 4 show the cross-time results of this question in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay. ***Each country sees at least a slight decline in the percentage of Catholics.*** We find the steepest decline in Bolivia. Between 2008 and 2014, the percentage of self-reported Catholics dropped 11 percentage points, from 82% to 71%.

In Ecuador, the percentage of self-reported Catholics dropped 8.5 percent points between 2006 and 2014, from 82.5% to 74%.

Figure 2. Percent Catholic Ecuador, 2006-2014



The most Catholic country among the three (and in the region as a whole), Paraguay, has seen the lowest decline. From 2008 (the year with the highest percentage of self-reported Catholics in the series) to 2014, only 4% less of the Paraguayan population reported being non-Catholic. The percentage of

Catholics dropped from 88.7% in 2008 to 84.6% in 2014.

Figure 3. Percent Catholic Bolivia, 2006-2014



Figure 4. Percent Catholic Paraguay, 2006-2014



What are the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of self-identified Catholics in these 3 countries? To answer this question, we ran 3 separate logistic models, with 2014 data from the AmericasBarometer. Results are shown in the Appendix.

In Bolivia, age, education, and quintiles of wealth are positively associated with the likelihood that an individual reports being Catholic, as opposed to holding any other religious identification (or none at all). Holding all other factors constant, older individuals, those with more years of completed education and individuals with higher levels of material wealth are more likely to be Catholic. There are no statistical differences in terms of gender or the level of urbanization of the place or residence (urban/rural).

In Paraguay and Ecuador, the statistical analyses suggest that those living in urban areas and older individuals are more likely to self-report as Catholics (compared to providing any other response to the religious identification question). We find no differences in terms of gender, education or material wealth.

In sum, the second time that Pope Francis will visit South America in his role as Pope coincides with a steady decline in the percentage of Catholics in the region. However, according to the 2014 AmericasBarometer data, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay (the three countries that Pope Francis will visit) remain overwhelmingly Catholic, with at least 7 out 10 individuals identifying with this religion. That

being said, while 7 out of 10 is certainly more than most countries in the region, there has still been at least a slight decline over the years in those identifying as Catholic. It will be interesting to see in the coming years if those numbers level off or even rise given Pope Francis' affiliation with and increased attention to the region.

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Appendix

Table 1. The socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of self-identified Catholics

	Paraguay	Ecuador	Bolivia
Woman	.1213856	-.1810905	-.0736024
	(.1378511)	(.1342794)	(.1175331)
Wealth	.0030098	-.025198	.1117604**
	(.0740188)	(.0513116)	(.047157)
Urban	.460792**	.3698816**	.2703117
	(.2013259)	(.1723025)	(.1877897)
Age	.138901**	1463035***	.1718778***
	(.0614227)	(.040641)	(.0333113)
Education	.0195139	-.031838	.0393362***
	(.0249226)	(.0222452)	(.0125454)
Constant	.4257535	.6794328	-.6577836
	(.4239396)	(.4150422)	(.357128)

Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1

AmericasBarometer: Topical Brief – November 10, 2015

Low Support for Homosexuals' Political Rights is Commonplace in the Caribbean

By Daniel Montalvo and Emily Saunders

The *New York Times* recently published an OpEd highlighting "the many voices of queer individuals in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean who have been assaulted, forced into pretending to be heterosexual or cisgender, or even murdered" (Bellot, 2015). Outside the Caribbean, several countries in the Americas have legalized same-sex marriage or passed civil union laws. While public support for gay rights is far from universal even in these countries, tolerance for LGBTQ rights is particularly low in the Caribbean.[1] As reported in a previous *Topical Brief*, tolerance for gay marriage in the Caribbean countries is quite low (with all surveyed Caribbean countries registering below 23 degrees on a 0-100 tolerance scale from 0-100).[2]

This *Topical Brief* examines levels of approval of homosexuals' political rights in six Caribbean countries: the Dominican Republic, Barbados, Trinidad & Tobago, the Bahamas,

Figure 1. Average Degrees of Approval of Homosexuals' Political Rights, 2014



[1] http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB021en.pdf
[2] http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/ITB021en.pdf

Jamaica, and Haiti. In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked:

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?



Figure 2. Percent Disapproving versus Approving of Homosexuals' Political Rights in the Caribbean, 2014

This question is useful because it moves us away from looking only at tolerance toward gay marriage, a dimension commonly examined when scholars and journalists consider this topic, to one that is critical to the full exercise of democratic citizenship – the ability to participate as a candidate in public elections. As shown in Figure 1, the Dominican Republic has the highest level of approval (on a 0-100 scale) and yet averages only 34.5 degrees, and Haiti registers the lowest with a mean approval of 10.5 degrees.

In combining the six Caribbean countries in Figure 2, we find that ***53.8% of those surveyed "strongly disapprove" of homosexuals running for public office, and only 7.3% "strongly approve,"*** when given the question on the original 1-10 scale.[3] Even if we combine 7-10 assuming that these answers denote *some* form of approval, only 15.1% of the survey respondents chose one of these answers. These low numbers indicate that the vast majority of the population of the surveyed Caribbean countries disapprove of homosexuals' political rights.

When we break down the answers to this question by common sociodemographic features, we find some interesting results. As can be seen in Figure 3, ***the wealthy, those living in urban areas, women, and the more educated are more approving of homosexuals' political rights than their counterparts***. Regarding quintiles of wealth,[4] we find that there is a 12.2

[3] These numbers reflect the average percent for the six countries presented here.

[4] Wealth: The wealth measure is a five category variable that is generated using a series of items about household possessions;

Figure 3. Average Degrees of Approval of Homosexuals' Political Rights by Wealth, Place of Residence, Gender, and Level of Education in the Caribbean, 2014



Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.GM v3.0

degree difference between the poorest and wealthiest in our survey, a difference that is statistically significant. Those living in urban areas register 7.6 degrees higher on the approval scale than those living in rural areas. Likewise, women also register higher degrees of approval (25.2 degrees) than do men (20.4 degrees). There is also a significant difference when considering the education levels of the respondents; those with a post-secondary education score 33.8 degrees as opposed to those with no education (17.9 degrees) a significant difference of 15.9 degrees.

While progress has been made on the issue of gay marriage in much of the LAC region, there is work to be done to achieve equality for all. In this report we extend beyond looking at support for marital rights to another dimension of gay rights – participation in politics – and we find that in the Caribbean region in particular, the public tends against the realization of such political rights. That being said, some are more approving than others; in brief, the wealthy, those living in urban areas, women, and the more educated are

for more information see Córdova 2009 (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf).

more approving of homosexuals' political rights.

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