

Insights Series #146

Representation in the Americas: Perceptions of External Efficacy in the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer

Kaitlen J. Cassell

March 9, 2021

Key Findings:

- External political efficacy is a measure of political representation that can provide important insights into the health of the relationship between political elites and their constituents
- Countries that experienced recent elections tend to have more efficacious individuals, while countries that are experiencing economic or political hard times tend to have less efficacious individuals
- While education and wealth are negatively associated with external efficacy, urban residence, and age positively impact the belief that politicians are interested in the public's concerns
- Presidential approval and support for the political system have a strong, positive association with external efficacy
- Respondents who are more engaged with their communities report higher levels of external efficacy



Liberal democracy rests on the promise that elected representatives will provide meaningful representation for their constituents. If citizens are content with the quality of representation, they are more likely to support elected officials and more likely to participate in politics.¹ Conversely, perceptions of poor representation may lead citizens to support candidates who promise to make drastic changes to the status quo.² One measure of representation is commonly referred to as *external political efficacy*, which considers the extent to which individuals feel that elected representatives listen to what they have to say.

This *Insights* report uses data from the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer round to investigate variation in levels of external efficacy across countries and individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The key takeaways of this analysis are that there is significant variation across countries; levels of efficacy are higher in countries that have recently held elections; education and wealth are both inversely correlated with external efficacy; and, those who see the political system as more legitimate and who participate more in their communities have higher levels of efficacy.

External Efficacy Varies Across Countries

In the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer, 31,050 individuals were asked the following question:


EFF1: Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Respondents answered on a 1-7 scale where 1 indicates “Strongly Disagree” and 7 indicates “Strongly Agree.” Figure 1 represents the percentages of respondents in each country who answered a 5, 6, or 7 on the 7-point scale. Across the region, only one country, Mexico, is above 50%. Across the region, there is a 27-percentage point difference between the most efficacious country, Mexico (51.0%), and the least: the United States (23.9%). While a slim majority of Mexicans feel that leaders listen to them, less than a quarter of Americans feel the same. Unsurprisingly, countries

that are experiencing political or economic “hard times” (Honduras, Chile, Panama, and the United States) fall towards the bottom of the scale.³ In contrast, countries with elections near the 2018/19 AmericasBarometer fielding (Mexico and Colombia, and to a lesser extent, Paraguay and Brazil) seem to get an efficacy boost, perhaps because their preferred candidate was recently elected, generating a sense of “election euphoria.”⁴

Interestingly, Nicaragua and Bolivia appear toward the top of the list (as the third and fourth most efficacious countries, respectively). The 2016 re-election of President Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua was marred by claims of fraud. Given the diminished accountability Ortega faced, it is intriguing that citizens in Nicaragua are comparatively high in levels of external efficacy. Similarly, in 2019, Bolivia experienced a “coupvolution” (a combination of a coup and a revolution), in which the forced resignation of former President Evo Morales was orchestrated in part by uprisings (the “revolution”) and in part by the military (the “coup”).⁵ The finding for Bolivia could be in part attributed to when fieldwork was conducted, which was obviously well before Morales’ resignation. Nicaragua is less clear; more attention should be given to this outlier in future research.

While Figure 1 places attention on national levels of external efficacy, what predicts this political attitude among individuals? The next sections consider this question.



95 % Confidence Interval (with Design-Effects)

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP

Figure 1: Percentage of Respondents Reporting High Levels of External Efficacy⁶

Increased Education Weakens the Belief that Politicians Care about the Public

As a preliminary step, I evaluate individual-level characteristics that may affect external efficacy, including education, gender, wealth quintile, age, and whether an individual lives in an urban or rural area.^{7,8} Of these predictors, previous research has singled out education as having a powerful impact on external efficacy. Agerberg (2019) and Rasmussen and Nørgaard (2008) find positive relationships between higher education and individuals' likelihood to report greater levels of external efficacy. In particular, Rasmussen and Nørgaard (2008) find that this effect persists even when personal dispositions are accounted for (unlike internal efficacy, which looks at individuals' belief that they are capable of understanding politics).

I also expect age to exert a positive influence on external efficacy. Previous research has shown that older individuals, many of whom lived through non-democratic regimes, to be more positive towards political institutions. Cassell, Booth, and Seligson (2018), for example, show that older individuals are less supportive of a hypothetical coup than younger individuals. Meanwhile, Castorena and Graves (2019) show that older people tend to be more supportive of democracy, as well.

In terms of individuals' relative wealth, measured using wealth quintiles, I do not have a strong expectation and consider this relationship to be exploratory.

I do not anticipate finding a significant difference between genders for external efficacy. While women and men in the region differ in areas such as authoritarianism and support for coups,⁹ it is not clear that external efficacy should have the same effect given that it is not related to governing style or crime. Using 2018/19 LAPOP data, Castorena and Graves (2019) find a slight difference between men and women when examining support for democracy (with 59.4% of men and 56% of women expressing support). The authors reveal a slightly wider difference upon

examination of satisfaction with democracy (42.3% of men expressing satisfaction with democracy compared to 36.9% of women). If anything, these findings indicate that men may feel more efficacious than women.

Finally, concerning urban versus rural dwellings, I expect that urbanites will be more efficacious because politicians often cater more to urban populations than rural ones since there are more potential voters in urban settings.

To evaluate the relationship between these five predictors and external efficacy, I utilize an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model.¹⁰ Figure 2 presents the results of this analysis, which utilizes but does not present country fixed effects to account for country-by-country differences. In the figure, the black dots represent the estimated effect size for each of the independent variables (predictors) when regressed on external efficacy. The purple bars on either side of the dot represent 95% confidence intervals. If the estimate and error bars fall on either side of the red line, the predictor has a statistically significant effect. More precisely, if the estimates are completely to the left of the red line, they have a significant negative relationship with external efficacy, while estimates wholly to the right positively predict external efficacy. Another way to see whether a variable is statistically significant is whether the black circle is filled in (representing a significant finding), or open (representing a finding that is not significant). The numbers for each point estimate represent minimum-to-maximum changes; that is, going from the lowest value of a variable to the highest.




Figure 2: Maximal Effects of Demographic and Socioeconomic Predictors on External Efficacy

Figure 2 demonstrates that higher levels of education are negatively associated with external efficacy in this sample. The magnitude of the effect of education on external efficacy is worth highlighting, as it is the largest in the model. The results indicate that going from having no formal education to having post-secondary education represents an 11.6 percentage point shift (out of 100). This finding is contrary to previous studies, including an *Insights* report conducted on external efficacy in 2014, which found no relationship between education and efficacy (Lee et al. 2015). One reason for this divergence is that the aforementioned studies were not conducted with a Latin American and Caribbean sample—Agerberg (2019) evaluated 31 democracies, primarily in Europe, while Rasmussen and Nørgaard (2008) conduct their research on Danish and Americans via MTurk. Another non-rival explanation is that more educated respondents are more critical because they follow politics more closely and have higher expectations of their representatives. More educated individuals are also more likely to have higher rates of exposure to international

politics, thereby having comparisons to pit against their own country's representation. Further research is needed comparing the LAC region to other Western nations.

As predicted, wealthier individuals are less likely to be efficacious: going from the lowest to highest wealth quintile translates to a 1.9 percentage point decrease in efficacy. Though statistically significant, this finding is only marginally substantively significant in that the magnitude is relatively small. In line with expectations, older individuals are more likely to be efficacious. However, the effect size is relatively small given that respondents' ages range from 16 to 99 (and the results demonstrate minimum to maximum shifts). Furthermore, urban individuals are more efficacious than rural dwellers by 3.4 percentage points. Meanwhile, the finding for being a woman is statistically insignificant, indicating that women are not more or less likely to report high levels of efficacy compared to men.

In sum, of the demographic and socioeconomic predictors evaluated, education appears to be the most impactful finding, with a strong negative impact on external efficacy. However, Figure 2 also demonstrates that less wealthy individuals, those living in urban areas, and older individuals are more efficacious on average in this sample.

Positive Citizen Evaluations of the Political System are Fundamental for External Efficacy

Though demographic and socioeconomic factors help us understand the influences on external efficacy, other attitudes and behaviors are also critical in fleshing out this concept. Based on extant literature, I assess the impact of seven variables, which I group into three overarching categories: 1) political legitimacy, 2) economic evaluations, and 3) online and offline participation.

The first group, political legitimacy, is composed of two predictors: pres-

idential approval and system support. From a theoretical perspective, political legitimacy is generally thought to contain two related concepts: specific support, which refers to evaluations of the specific individuals occupying political office, and diffuse support, which refers to attributes of the system as a whole, such as trust in institutions.¹¹ Presidential approval is used here as a measure of specific support.¹² Given the nature of the external efficacy question, individuals are likely to think first and foremost of the most visible politician in a country: the president. Diffuse support is measured using LAPOP's system support variable, which is an additive index of five variables measuring trust in institutions.¹³ Scholars have consistently shown that system support has important effects on things such as support for coups,¹⁴ political participation and activism,¹⁵ and even regime stability.¹⁶ Furthermore, Castorena and Morton (2019) find a statistically significant association between system support and external efficacy.¹⁷ I anticipate that higher support for the president (specific) and higher system support (diffuse) will lead individuals to report higher levels of external efficacy.

The second group, economic evaluations, includes two predictors: evaluations of one's personal economy and evaluations of the national economy.¹⁸ Scholars have consistently demonstrated the penetrating effects of the economy on political attitudes and behavior, including political evaluations such as external efficacy.¹⁹ In line with this robust literature, I expect that as individuals' economic perceptions improve, so will their reported external efficacy.

The last group, online and offline participation, includes three variables: community participation, high social media use, and low social media use (where the latter two variables are compared to individuals who do not use social media at all).²⁰ For community participation (offline participation), Anderson (2010) finds that a "sense of community" (measured using survey items about perceptions of one's community) among respondents in the United States engenders greater efficacy. More broadly, Finkel (1985, 1987) demonstrates electoral and campaign participation lead to higher external efficacy, while Rhodes-Purdy (2017) shows that individuals with more participatory opportunities are more likely to support the

regime and have higher external efficacy.

In terms of online participation, Kenski and Stroud (2006) conclude that higher internet use leads to greater levels of external efficacy. More relevant for the times, Lupu, Zechmeister, and Ramírez Bustamante (2019) demonstrate that social media use (a particular form of internet use) impacts a number of theoretically similar outcomes in the Latin American region, including support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, and political tolerance. The authors conclude that “high social media users are more tolerant, and more supportive of democracy as a system of government than are low social media users or non-users” (62), although the reverse is true for satisfaction with government. Meanwhile, Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl, and Ardévol-Abreu (2017) find that increased news exposure decreases external efficacy. Thus, the expected direction of social media use is not entirely clear: extant literature suggests online activity could either increase or decrease external efficacy.

Figure 3 incorporates these predictors into the same model in Figure 2, which is again estimated using OLS Regression. Note that the socioeconomic and demographic indicators and country dummy variables from the previous model are included but not presented. The interpretation remains the same as Figure 2 the effect sizes below represent minimum to maximum shifts, with solid black dots representing statistically significant findings and hollow dots representing insignificant associations.




Figure 3: Maximal Effects of Attitudinal and Behavioral Predictors on External Efficacy

Figure 3 demonstrates that political legitimacy, namely presidential approval and system support, is positive and statistically significant in the model. Individuals who approve of the president more strongly (specific support) and report high levels of system support (diffuse support) are more likely to feel that politicians listen to people like them. The magnitude of the effect for system support is by far the largest in the model: the shift from individuals reporting no system support to individuals reporting the highest levels of system support is 46.8 percentage points. Meanwhile, going from the lowest to highest presidential approval is associated with a 17.3 percentage point shift, which is also comparatively strong compared to other predictors.

The economic variables indicate mixed results. On the one hand, the perception of one's own economic situation does not have a statistically significant effect. On the other, a minimum to maximum shift in perceptions of the national economy is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in external efficacy. This finding may not be entirely surprising

given that the focus of external efficacy is more national in scope.

The third group of predictors, participation, reveal a positive association for community participation but no significant association for social media use (when compared to individuals who do not use social media at all). The finding for community participation suggests that the more individuals participate in their community, the more likely they are to feel efficacious. The insignificant finding for social media use is not entirely surprising given that scholarship is relatively new and how and what social media use impacts are still being uncovered.

Implications for Representative Democracy

External efficacy is an important indicator of the health and quality of a democracy. If respondents do not feel that their leaders listen to them, at best, they vote them out of office in the next election. However, the antipathy between voters and their representatives can have downstream consequences, from negative evaluations of democracy to supporting candidates that may propose radical changes to the status quo.

This analysis has demonstrated that individuals' demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds have a small but nonetheless significant impact on external efficacy. In particular, one's level of education has a strong, negative association with external efficacy, a result that is contrary to what previous studies of other world regions have found. In addition, individuals in lower wealth quintiles, those living in urban areas, and older respondents are more likely to report that political representatives listen to what they think. Meanwhile, gender does not have a significant effect.

When the scope of the analysis is broadened to include political attitudes and behaviors, different manifestations of political legitimacy, both diffuse and specific, stand out as the strongest predictors of efficacious attitudes. Individuals who think that the president is performing their job well and those that have high system support are much more likely to dis-

play high levels of external efficacy. This relationship is likely reciprocal: the more people perceive politicians to care about their needs, the more likely they are to support the political system and to believe that they are being represented. In other words, perceived good governance fosters trust in representative democracy. Economic predictors reveal mixed effects: while evaluations of the national economy exert a positive influence, evaluations of one's personal economy are not distinguishable from 0. This outcome is not entirely surprising, as the above-hypothesized relationship between citizens and their representatives, in this particular instance, is predominantly political. Finally, while community participation significantly affects efficacy attitudes, social media usage does not, indicating that at least for this particular attitude, offline participation is more impactful than online participation in this sample.

In a global climate that is increasingly critical of democratic institutions²¹ in general and political leaders in particular, external efficacy is an important signal about not only the relationship between individuals and their representatives but the health of democracy more broadly. This report shows that levels of external efficacy vary significantly around a low mean in the Latin American region and are predicted by a number of individual characteristics, attitudes, and behavioral inclinations. Democracy has been in decline both worldwide and within the LAC region.²² With this decline in mind, renewed attention on citizens and their elected representatives is essential to understanding how to strengthen or, in some cases, repair this relationship. This report suggests that strong institutions and an effective president are critical to bolstering democracy in the LAC region.

Notes

1. Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl, and Ardévol-Abreu (2017) find that individuals who exhibit “government efficacy” are more likely to participate politically. While government efficacy and external efficacy are different concepts, there is strong conceptual overlap.

2. Castanho Silva (2018).
3. A country is considered to be experiencing “hard times” based on extensive news coverage of significant political or economic events. For example, Chile experienced widespread political protests in the capital; similarly, the U.S. experienced mass protests over racial justice as well as escalating tensions between political parties under the presidency of Donald Trump. Hondurans also protested in mass, calling for the removal of President Orlando Hernandez, while Panamanians did the same in response to constitutional reforms.
4. Castorena and Graves (2019).
5. Fisher (2019).
6. This graph shows the percentage of respondents in each country that selected a 5, 6, or 7 in response to the efficacy category.
7. **Gender** is measured with the following variable: Q1. Sex [Record but DO NOT ask]: (1) Male (2) Female. **Education** is measured with the variable edr, which is created from responses to the survey item: ED. How many years of schooling have you completed? Responses are then sorted into the following four categories: none, primary, secondary, and post-secondary. **Age** is measured with the variable Q2. How old are you? (in years). **Urban** uses the country’s census definition to classify the respondents’ dwelling as either (1) Urban or (2) Rural. **Wealth** is measured by the variable quintal, which divides respondents into five quintiles using questions about possessions present in the respondent’s household. Respondents are asked whether their households own the following types of items: refrigerator, washing machine, microwave oven, landline telephone, cell phone, cars, motorcycle, potable water, connection to the sewage system, indoor bathroom, computer, internet, TV, and flat panel TV.
8. The United States and Canada are excluded in these and further statistical analyses to allow for LAC regional inferences to be made, as well as due to the online format of the survey in these countries.
9. Cassell, Booth, and Seligson (2018); Castorena and Graves (2019).
10. The dependent variable, external efficacy, is coded dichotomously, where 0 represents respondents in each country who selected a 1, 2, 3, or 4 and 1 represents respondents who selected 5, 6, or 7 in response to the efficacy category.

11. Easton (1976); note that Easton associates diffuse support with political legitimacy rather than specific support.
12. **Presidential approval** is measured using the variable M1: Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President [NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT] 1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad.
13. **System support** is an additive index of the five standard LAPOP items: B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.) B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)? B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? Each of these questions is asked on a 1-7 scale (ranging from "not at all" to "a lot," which is then rescaled to run from 0-100, where 0 represents extremely low system support, and 100 the highest degree of system support. See Booth and Seligson (2009); Booth and Seligson (2005); and Seligson (2000) for additional information on system support.
14. Cassell, Booth, and Seligson (2018).
15. Booth and Seligson (2005).
16. Booth and Seligson (2009).
17. Note that the relationship was in the opposite direction as the one examined here: the authors found that external efficacy positively predicted higher levels of system support.
18. Evaluation of ones' **personal economy** is measured with the variable IDIO2: Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse. Evaluation of the **national economy** is measured with the variable SOCT2: Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse.
19. See, e.g., Downs (1957); Fiorina (1981); G lineau (2007); and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2008).

20. **Community participation** is an index created from attendance of meetings of religious organizations (CP6), parents associations (CP7), community associations (CP8) measuring average frequency of attendance; ranges from 0 “Never attends meetings of any organization” to 1 “Attends meetings of all organizations at least once a week”. **High and low social media use** (as well as no social media use, the reference category) are based on individuals’ usage for 3 social media platforms: Twitter, Facebook, and Whatsapp. According to Lupu, Zechmeister, and Ramírez Bustamante (2019, 64) “For each platform, we identify users with a combination of two sets of survey questions. First, we identify users as those who respond positively to the questions, SMEDIA1/SMEDIA4/SMEDIA7. Do you have a Facebook/Twitter/WhatsApp account? Then, we recode as non-users those who respond “never” to the follow-up questions, SMEDIA2/SMEDIA5/SMEDIA8. How often do you see content on Facebook/Twitter/WhatsApp?”.
21. Puddington (2016).
22. Freedom House (2019).

References

- Agerberg, Mattias. 2019. “The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption, and Politics.” *Political Behavior* 41 (2): 369–399.
- Anderson, Mary. 2010. “Community Psychology, Political Efficacy, and Trust.” *Political Psychology* 31 (1): 59–84.
- Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2005. “Political Legitimacy and Participation in Costa Rica: Evidence of Arena Shopping.” *Political Research Quarterly* 58 (4): 537–550. <http://prq.sagepub.com/content/58/4/537.short>.
- . 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cassell, Kaitlen, John Booth, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2018. “Support for Coups in the Americas: Mass Norms and Democratization.” *Journal of Latin American Politics and Society* 60 (4): 1–25.

- Castanho Silva, Bruno. 2018. "Populist Success: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis." In *The Ideational Approach to Populism*: edited by Kirk Hawkins, Ryan Carlin, Levente Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 279–292. London: Routledge.
- Castorena, Oscar, and Sarah L. Graves. 2019. "Support for Electoral Democracy." In *Pulse of Democracy*, edited by Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, 8–25. Nashville, TN: LAPOP.
- Castorena, Oscar, and Brielle Morton. 2019. "Democratic Legitimacy." In *Pulse of Democracy*, edited by Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, 30–47. Nashville, TN: LAPOP.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Easton, David. 1976. "Theoretical Approaches to Political Support." *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, no. 9 (3): 431–448. http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0008423900044309.
- Finkel, Steven E. 1985. "Reciprocal Effects of Participation and Political Efficacy: A Panel Analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (4): 891–913.
- . 1987. "The Effects of Participation on Political Efficacy and Political Support: Evidence from a West German Panel." *The Journal of Politics* 29 (4): 441–464.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fisher, Max. 2019. "Bolivia Crisis Shows the Blurry Line Between Coup and Uprising." *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/world/americas/bolivia-evo-morales-coup.html>.
- Freedom House. 2019. "Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat." <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/hungary>.
- Gélineau, François. 2007. "Presidents, Political Context, and Economic Accountability: Evidence from Latin America." *Political Research Quarterly* 60 (3): 415–428.

- Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Trevor Diehl, and Alberto Ardévol-Abreu. 2017. "Internal, External, and Government Political Efficacy: Effects on News Use, Discussion, and Political Participation." *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 61 (3): 574–596.
- Kenski, Kate, and Natalie Jomini Stroud. 2006. "Connections Between Internet Use and Political Efficacy, Knowledge, and Participation." *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* 50 (2): 173–192.
- Lee, Hannury, Ginny Randall, Jackdon Vaught, Mollie J. Cohen, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2015. "Low Levels of External Efficacy Can be Improved by Government Efforts to Deliver Better Outcomes." *Insights Series*, no. 115, <https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO915en.pdf>.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier. 2008. "The Economic Vote in Transitional Democracies." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 18 (3): 303–323.
- Lupu, Noam, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, and Mariana V. Ramírez Bustamante. 2019. "Social Media and Political Attitudes." In *Pulse of Democracy*, edited by Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, 52–65. Nashville, TN: LAPOP.
- Puddington, Arch. 2016. "Freedom in the World 2016: Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure." Edited by Freedom House. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/anxious-dictators-wavering-democracies-global-freedom-under-pressure>.
- Rasmussen, Stig Hebbelstrup Rye, and Ashbjørn Sonne Nørgaard. 2008. "When and Why Does Education Matter? Motivation and Resource Effects in Political Efficacy." *European Journal of Political Research* 57:24–46.
- Rhodes-Purdy, Matthew. 2017. "Beyond the Balance Sheet: Performance, Participation, and Regime Support in Latin America." *Comparative Politics* 49 (2): 252–272.

Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America." *Estudios interdisciplinarios de America Latina y el Caribe* 11 (2): 5-29.



Kaitlen Cassell earned her Ph.D. in Political Science from Vanderbilt University in 2020. Her research focuses on issues of political behavior, governance, and representation in Latin America and Europe, with a specific emphasis on elite communication strategies and individual responses to these strategies. Her work has appeared in *Political Communication* and *Latin American Politics and Society* (with co-authors Mitch Seligson and John Booth). She currently works in survey research as a Research Manager for YouGov of America. Her work is available at <http://www.kaitlencassell.com>.

This report was edited by Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Dr. Mariana Rodríguez. This report was translated by Dr. Juan Camilo Plata, Dr. J. Daniel Montalvo, and Rubí Arana. This report was audited by Valerie Schweizer. Formatting, production, copy editing, graphics, and report distribution were handled by Rubí Arana and Laura Sellers. Our data and reports are available for free download on the project website. Please follow us on Twitter or Facebook to stay in touch.

As a charter member of the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Transparency Initiative, LAPOP is committed to routine disclosure of our data collection and reporting processes. More information about the AmericasBarometer sample designs can be found at vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.

This *Insights* report is made possible by the support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. The contents of this *Insights* report are the sole responsibility of its author and LAPOP and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID, the United States Government or any other supporting organization. LAPOP's AmericasBarometer surveys are supported predominantly by USAID and Vanderbilt University. The 2018/19 round also had support from the IADB, the UNDP, the Open Society Foundations, and academic partners and researchers across the Americas.

vanderbilt.edu/lapop
@lapop_barometro
@LatinAmericanPublicOpinionProject
lapop@vanderbilt.edu
+1-615-322-4033



230 Appleton Place, PMB 505, Suite 304, Nashville, TN 37203, USA