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Political Culture of Democracy in Honduras and in the Americas, 2014:

Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer

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AmericasBarometer by LAPOP
Barómetro de las Américas

Latin American Public Opinion Project
LAPOP
Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

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This study was performed with support from the Program in Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

January 2015

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID, and other donors. It then sends the draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for the addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into other languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country and comparative reports. Country-specific analyses are carried out by local teams.

While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the *AmericasBarometer*, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden supported the project as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted as close in time as possible, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of the *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current graduate students located throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert individuals and institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

Prologue: Background to the Study

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and

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The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing and comparing citizens' experiences with democratic governance across individuals within countries, across sub-national regions and countries, and over time. This report presents one set of those assessments, focused around the latest year of data collection: 2014. This year marks a milestone for the project: LAPOP began the AmericasBarometer project in 2004 and we can today look back at a decade of change in public opinion within and across the Americas. The 2014 AmericasBarometer is the largest and most sophisticated survey of the Americas to date. When completed it will include 28 countries and over 50,000 interviews, the majority of which were collected using sophisticated computer software that adds yet another layer to LAPOP's meticulous quality control efforts. This prologue presents a brief background of the study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

While LAPOP has decades of experience researching public opinion, Vanderbilt University has housed and supported the research institute and the AmericasBarometer since 2004. LAPOP's foundations date to the 1970s, with the study of democratic values in Costa Rica by LAPOP founder Mitchell Seligson. LAPOP's studies of public opinion expanded as electoral democracies diffused across the region in the intervening decades and have continued to grow in number as these governments have taken new forms and today's administrations face new challenges. The AmericasBarometer measures democratic values, experiences, evaluations, and actions among citizens in the Americas and places these in a comparative context.

The AmericasBarometer project consists of a series of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults and containing a common core set of questions. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in eleven countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer is based on national surveys from 28 countries in the Americas. LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets, available free of charge for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation,

and a number of other supporters of the project, who are acknowledged in a separate section at the end of this prologue.

Our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens; NGOs; public officials and their governments; the international donor and development communities; and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics while also being accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2014 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction; sample design; data collection and processing; and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2014 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy; political tolerance; support for stable democracy; participation of civil society and social capital; the rule of law; evaluations of local governments and participation within them; crime victimization; corruption victimization; and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some previously-core items in the 2014 survey. To do so, we solicited input on a long list of questions we proposed for deletion from our partners across the region and, after complying with requests to restore some items, we settled on a reduced set of common modules to which we then added two types of questions: new common content and country-specific questions.

To develop new common content, we invited input from our partners across the Americas and then developed and led a series of three, multi-day questionnaire construction workshops in Miami, FL in the spring of 2013. Country team members, experts from academia, individuals from the international donor and development communities, faculty affiliates, and students attended and contributed to these workshops. Based on the discussions at these workshops we identified a series of modules that were piloted in pre-tests across the Americas. Some of these items received widespread support for inclusion from our partners and were refined and included as common content – such as a new set of questions related to state capacity and an extended module on crime and violence – while others were placed onto a menu of optional country-specific questions. At the same time, our country teams worked with us to identify new topics of relevance to their given countries and this process produced a new set of country-specific questions included within the AmericasBarometer. Questionnaires from the project can be found online at www.LapopSurveys.org, and at the conclusion of each country report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology as well as with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common "informed consent" form and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common sample design to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a minimum of approximately 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In most countries our practice is to use quotas at the household level to ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective. Detailed descriptions of the samples are available online and contained in the annexes of each country publication.

In 2013 LAPOP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the premier Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and one of the world's leading experts in survey methodology, Dr. Jim Lepkowski. Over the course of the year we worked with Dr. Lepkowski and his team of graduate students to review each previously developed sample design and to secure their input and advice on new designs.

Sample design typically relies on census information and maps. However, up-to-date information is not always available. To respond to this challenge, between 2013 and 2014, LAPOP developed a new software suite, which we call LASSO© (LAPOP Survey Sample Optimizer). This proprietary software allows us to estimate the number of dwellings in a given region using satellite images in the public domain, and then use a probabilistic method to locate sample segments (i.e., clusters) to draw a sample. While most of our sample designs are based on census data, we were able to successfully field test LASSO while working on the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and increase the sophistication of our approach. The 2014 AmericasBarometer represented our most expansive use of handheld electronic devices for data collection to date. At the core of this approach is our use of the "Adgys"© questionnaire app designed by our partners in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field reduces data entry errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track, on a daily basis, the progress of the survey, down to the location of interviews (which are monitored in real time but not recorded into the public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy) and the timing of the interviews. The team in Bolivia worked long hours to program the samples and questionnaires into the Adgys platform for the 18 countries in which we used this technology. In 2 other countries we continued our use of PDAs and a Windows Mobile-based software application supported by our hardworking partners at the University of Costa Rica.

Throughout the process of collecting the survey data, we worked in multiple ways to minimize error and maximize quality. We continued the process of pilot testing all questionnaires and training all interviewers in each country in accordance with the standards of LAPOP. In the process of collecting the data we monitored fieldwork in real time, when possible, and worked with local partners to replace (a small number of) low quality interviews while the study was in the field. For the few countries that still used paper questionnaires, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the electronic files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who then shipped those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing to ensure that the data transferred from the paper to the dataset was as close to error free as possible. In the case of some countries using electronic handheld devices for data entry in the field, a small subset of interviews were conducted with paper questionnaires due to security concerns; in these cases we followed a similar process by which the data were entered by the local team and audited for quality control by LAPOP at Vanderbilt. For all electronic databases, we checked the files for duplicates and consistency

between the coding in the questionnaire and the database. We also verified that the sample was implemented according to the design. In the few cases where we detected issues in the 2014 round, we worked with our local partners to resolve the problem, for example via the re-entry of a small set of paper questionnaires.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we have continued our practice of making reports based on survey data accessible and readable to the layperson. This means that our reports make use of easy-to-comprehend charts to the maximum extent that is possible. And, where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression analysis, we present results in standardized, easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2014 AmericasBarometer were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled data analyst, Carole Wilson, which allows them to create these graphs using Stata 12.0 or higher. The analyses presented in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design (i.e., stratified and clustered) and reporting on confidence intervals around estimates and statistical significance. Yet our approach to presenting these results is to make them as reader-friendly as possible. To that end we also include elsewhere in this report a note on how to interpret the data analyses.

We worked hard this round to turn around individual country results as quickly as possible. In a number of countries, this effort took the form of our newly developed "Rapid Response Report," based in a MS PowerPoint template, which provided a mechanism for country teams to organize and present key preliminary findings in a matter of weeks following the completion of fieldwork and data processing. A number of these rapid reports formed the basis of government and public presentations and, given the level of interest and engagement in these sessions, we hope to see use of our rapid reports increase in years to come.

As another mechanism intended to increase the speed with which country-specific findings are disseminated, we changed the format of our country studies this year. In the past we asked country team authors to wait for the processing of the entire multi-country dataset, an effort that takes many months due to variation in timing of fieldwork and the effort involved in carefully auditing, cleaning, labeling, and merging the many datasets. For this year we asked our country team authors to develop a minimum of three chapters that focus specifically on topics of relevance to their countries. When a given country report was commissioned by USAID, the content of these chapters was based on input from the mission officers in that country. In other countries it was based on the local team's or donor's priorities.

Once fieldwork and data processing was complete for a particular country, we sent the 2014 national study dataset and a time-series dataset containing all data for that country for each round of the AmericasBarometer to our country team who then used these datasets to prepare their contributions. The resulting chapters are rich in detail, providing comparisons and contrasts across time, across sub-regions within the country, and across individuals by sub-group. To complement these chapters, we assigned ourselves the task of using the comparative dataset, once it was ready for analysis, to develop a set of chapters on key topics related to crime and violence; democratic governance (including corruption and economic management); local participation; and democratic values. The writing of these chapters was divided between the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt and a set of scholars of public opinion and political behavior with expertise in the Latin American and Caribbean region and who have worked with LAPOP on such reports in the past. In contrast to the country-

specific chapters, the objective of these chapters is to place topics and countries within the region in a comparative context.

This report that you have before you is one of a series of reports produced by LAPOP and our team to showcase key findings from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. It is the result of many drafts. Once a draft was completed and submitted to the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt, it was reviewed and returned to the authors for improvements. Revised studies were then submitted and reviewed again, and then returned to the country teams for final corrections and edits. In the case of country reports commissioned by USAID, we delivered the penultimate chapter drafts to USAID for their critiques. The country teams and LAPOP Central then worked to incorporate this feedback, and produced the final formatted version for print and online publication.

This report and the data on which it is based are the end products of a multi-year process involving the effort of and input by thousands of individuals across the Americas. We hope that our reports and data reach a broad range of individuals interested in and working on topics related to democracy, governance, and development. Given variation in preferences over the timeline for publishing and reporting on results from the 2014 AmericasBarometer, some printed reports contain only country-specific chapters, while others contain both country-specific and comparative chapters. All reports, and the data on which they are based, can be found available for free download on our website: www.LapopSurveys.org.

The AmericasBarometer is a region-wide effort. LAPOP is proud to have developed and coordinated with a network of excellent research institutions across the Americas. The following tables list the institutions that supported and participated in the data collection effort in each country.

Country	Institutions
Mexico and Central America	
Costa Rica	Universidad de Costa Rica; CCP; Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible
El Salvador	FUNDAUNGO
Guatemala	Universidad Rafael Landívar, Tradición Jesuita en Guatemala
Honduras	FOPRIDEH, Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras; Hagamos Democracia
Mexico	data, Opinión Publica y Mercados; ITAM, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Nicaragua	Red Nicaragüense por la Democracia y el Desarrollo Local
Panama	CIDEM, Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	
Bolivia	Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	VOX BRASIL	
Chile	Instituto de Ciencia Política	Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	Universidad San Francisco de Quito	PRIME CONSULTING
Paraguay	IRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	50 AÑOS IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos	
Uruguay	CIFRA	Universidad Católica del Uruguay
Venezuela	ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN	THE UNIVERSITY of TENNESSEE KNOXVILLE

Caribbean	
Bahamas	PublicDomain Research & Strategy
Belize	B&A Borge y Asociados
Dominican Republic	Gallup República Dominicana, S.A. / intec Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo
Guyana	DPMCG Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	Université d'Etat d'Haïti / ueh
Jamaica	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname	DataFruit Your one-stop shop for fieldwork.
Trinidad & Tobago	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Canada and United States	
Canada	THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY; MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES; PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America / Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central, and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by individual citizens across 28 countries in the Americas, who as survey respondents either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey, or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

Each stage of the project has involved countless hours of work by our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, and donors. We thank all these individuals for their commitment to high quality public opinion research. Let us also make some specific acknowledgments.

The AmericasBarometer project has been made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both of these institutions. At USAID Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite have consistently contributed constructive insights to the project and facilitated its use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt John Geer has been a tireless advocate of the project, which is fortunate to be housed within and benefit from a department that is brimming with talent. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, in other research units such as the Center for Latin American Studies, in the Office of Contract and Research Administration, and in the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected data collection efforts associated with the 2014 AmericasBarometer came from USAID, Vanderbilt, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden. We thank the individuals that we have worked with at each of these institutions for their important contributions.

We take special note of the LAPOP staff members who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Daniel Montalvo, Ana María Montoya, Diana Orcés (now at Oakland University), Georgina Pizzolitto, Mariana Rodríguez, Emily Saunders, and Carole Wilson. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and requirements. We thank Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Montevideo, Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marenco, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in our efforts to disseminate our studies to diverse audiences in clear and informative ways. In addition, we thank Dr. Mary Malone for her expert advice on our development of the comparative discussion and analyses regarding crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas within this report.

We take seriously the development of new research capacities and scholars in the field of public opinion research and we find LAPOP provides a highly effective mechanism for these efforts. Yet we in turn benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting

the 2014 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes our undergraduate research assistants John Clinkscales, Christina Folds, and Maya Prakash. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations in the course of its development: Margarita Corral, Alejandro Díaz-Domínguez, Brian Faughnan, Mason Moseley, Mariana Rodríguez, and Vivian Schwartz-Blum. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the project: Fred Batista, Gabriel Camargo, Kaitlen Cassell, Oscar Castorena, Mollie Cohen, Claire Evans, Adrienne Girone, Matthew Layton, Whitney Lopez-Hardin, Trevor Lyons, Arturo Maldonado, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Facundo Salles Kobilanski, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. We especially want thank those graduate students who worked alongside us as research assistants over the past two years on activities related to the development, implementation, auditing, analysis, and reporting of the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries, and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	●Dr. Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados, Mexico ●Dr. Vidal Romero, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Mexico
Costa Rica	●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Subdirector of the project Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica ●Ronald Alfaro, Doctoral Candidate, University of Pittsburgh and Senior Researcher of the Project Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica
El Salvador	●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Assistant Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO, El Salvador
Guatemala	●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA
Honduras	●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Millersville University, Millersville, USA
Nicaragua	●Dr. Ken Coleman, Research Faculty, University of Michigan, USA ●Mr. Eduardo Marenco, LAPOP Consultant, Managua, Nicaragua
Costa Rica	●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica ●Ronald Alfaro, PhD candidate, University of Pittsburgh and Senior Research Staff, Estado de la Nación, Costa Rica
Panama	●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Associate Dean, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Millersville University, Millersville, PA, USA
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Argentina	●Dr. Germán Lodola, Professor, Department of Political Science, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Argentina
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Country	Researchers
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Paraguay	●Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, LAPOP Consultant, Montevideo, Uruguay
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Uruguay	●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, LAPOP Consultant, Montevideo, Uruguay ●Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Associate Professor of Political Science, Universidad Católica del Uruguay
Venezuela	●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA ●Dr. Mariana Rodríguez, Program Coordinator, LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
Caribbean Group	
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Dominican Republic	●Dr. Jana Morgan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants, Guyana
Haiti	●Dr. Francois Gélineau, Professor and Research Chair in Democracy and Legislative Institutions, Laval University, Quebec, Canada. ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA ●Roody Reserve, PhD student in Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Jamaica	●Balford Lewis, Research Fellow, Centre for Leadership and Governance, UWI, Mona, Jamaica ●Anthony A. Harriott, Professor of Political Sociology, Director of the Institute of Criminal Justice and Security, and the Head of Department of Government at the Mona Campus, UWI, Jamaica
Suriname	●Dr. Jennifer Goede, Executive Director, DataFruit, Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago	●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago ●Dr. Mark Kirton, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies. St. Augustine, Trinidad & Tobago
North America Group	
Canada	●Nat Stone, Manager, POR Knowledge Management and Practices at Public Works and Government Services Canada and Professor (part-time) at Algonquin College, School of Business, Ottawa, Canada ●Dr. Keith Neuman, Executive Director of the Environics Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
United States	●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Founder and Senior Advisor to LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Research Professor, Spanish and Portuguese Department, Vanderbilt University, USA

We thank all of these people and institutions for their wonderful support.

Liz and Mitch
Nashville, Tennessee
November, 2014

Introduction

The 2014 AmericasBarometer and this report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us in first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas.

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: *citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago.* In Part I, we devote the first chapter to an assessment of citizens' experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity in the region. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters of Part I to address topics that are considered "core" to the AmericasBarometer project: citizens' assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends for the region, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues and crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective – across time, across countries, and across individuals – on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Although this section of the report focuses in large part on the region as a whole, in all chapters of Part I, we highlight the position of Honduras in graphs that make cross-country comparisons.

The first chapter demonstrates a number of ways in which the AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and over time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens, political pressures to adjust reports, and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information such as where the crime took place and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens' experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighborhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens' experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.

Chapter 1 of the report documents change over time with respect to citizens' perceptions of and experience with crime and violence in the region. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 3 adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity.

Interestingly, average overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010. As with just about any measure we examine in Part I, we find important differences within and across countries. Yet, *types* of crime experienced also vary across countries, which is another nuance examined in Chapter 1. While crime victimization in general matters, it is important to keep in mind that the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary significantly according to the contexts in which they live.

One persistent theme in Part I is that perceptions of insecurity in the region matter independently from crime victimization. Perceptions of insecurity and assessments of violence by citizens of the Americas are fueled by personal experiences *and* by the diffusions of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer we added to our standard module questions asking about safety concerns in locations close to the home and daily routines (given that our data affirm, as noted in Chapter 1, that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives). Specifically, the new questions asked how worried individuals are about safety on public transportation and in schools. Slightly more than 1 out of every 3 individuals across the Americas, on average, reports either a high level of fear for the likelihood of a family member being assaulted on public transportation and/or a high level of concern for the safety of children in school.

Chapters 2 through 5 focus on the broader set of standard dimensions of democratic governance typically considered part of the core thematic focus of the AmericasBarometer project: the economy, corruption, local government, and democratic values and support. In our analyses of these topics we considered not only major developments and notable findings for the region as a whole and over time, but we also considered the relevance of crime and violence to these dimensions.

Chapter 2 focuses on economic trends in the region and notes divergence between objective indicators of household wealth and subjective perceptions of households' financial situations. Objectively, the 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in the region own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals, those who are less educated, individuals with darker skin tones, and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey. Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure.

Chapter 2 also looks beyond the personal finances of citizens of the Americas and details how they assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively than it was in recent waves of the survey. Citizen evaluations of the national economy across the region are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Citizen views of the national economy are also weighed down by the security situation in their country. Individuals who live in high crime areas across the Americas judge national economic performance more harshly.

Corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. Chapter 3 shows that 1 in 5 people in an average country was asked to pay a bribe in the past year. While several countries saw

corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by corruption victimization levels increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in most previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools, health clinics, and workplaces. Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe; while we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance for the region as a whole.

Given the frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes, it is not surprising that many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one bright spot in Chapter 3 is found in the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally be justified. This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So while the high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens of the Americas continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business.

It is typically the case that the level at which most citizens in the Americas interact with their government is local. In Chapter 4 we examine political participation in municipal government, evaluations of local services, and citizens' trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals in the Americas with the greatest and least satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase from 2012 in citizens' evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on local services. On average for the region as a whole, local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease from 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores for the region are in the middle of the scale.

With regard to trust in local governments the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds a more pessimistic pattern. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004. The factors that most strongly predict an individual's trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance.

Part I concludes with an assessment of the state of democratic legitimacy and democratic values in the Americas. Under this rubric, Chapter 5 considers support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the

attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures of democratic legitimacy. Of special emphasis in this chapter is on the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this chapter permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy across the region with an eye to one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy's legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade for the region. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only somewhat. The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. But since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. Intriguingly, the ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time since our 2012 study. Among law-and-order institutions in the region – armed forces, national police, the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. Levels of trust in the armed forces and national police institutions appear most volatile where these institutions have recently played highly visible roles in maintaining public order. Individuals whose neighborhoods are increasingly insecure are losing trust in the police and courts. Law and order institutions in the region, it seems, must earn the public's trust by successfully providing the key public goods of safety and justice.

System support – the inherent value citizens place in the political system – fell in 2014. Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system's ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. Even within the two-year window between 2012 and 2014, several cases exhibit wide swings in support. The results of our analyses for the region as a whole suggest system support in the Americas reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system's ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens of the Americas are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. These contradictory results may signal a desire to insulate a high-performing system from those who denounce it. They nevertheless imply a Catch-22: improving governance may at once enhance the political system's legitimacy but lower political tolerance. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance).

Part II of this report includes three chapters that focus only on Honduras, and analyze results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer for issues that are fundamental for democratic governance: local government, crime and insecurity, and support for democracy. Chapter 6 examines local government in Honduras. Among Honduran respondents, 10% report having attended a municipal meeting. The levels of participation in municipal meetings decreased since 2012, and remain lower than those observed in

2006. In 2014, 12.8% of Hondurans report having submitted a petition to local governments. The percentage of Honduras that requested help from municipal offices increased between 2012 and 2014. Of those that requested help from the municipality, 67.5% say that their issue was not resolved. Those with less economic resources, who reside in rural areas, and who have attended a municipal meeting are the types of respondents who tend to submit more petitions to local governments. In general, evaluations of local governments are relatively positive. Evaluations of local governments have remained stable since 2004. The majority of Hondurans think that water and sewage, as well as garbage collection services have not changed in the last two years. Finally, despite the relatively high levels of trust that local governments receive, Hondurans express the need for giving the central government more responsibility and funding when it comes to health services and education.

Chapter 7 examines crime and perceptions of insecurity in Honduras. The level of crime victimization has remained stable between 2012 and 2014. Problems related to security are identified as the most important for the country. The results of the AmericasBarometer indicate that despite the high levels of crime, 66.4% of Hondurans feel "somewhat" or "very safe" in their neighborhoods. Nevertheless, perceptions of insecurity have significantly increased in 2014. The factors that have the largest impact on perceptions of insecurity are interpersonal trust (an important factor also for levels of social capital) and crime victimization, or the direct experience with crime. Crime victims express levels of insecurity 13 degrees higher than those that have not been victimized.

The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that the levels of crime victimization in Honduras increased significantly between 2004 and 2006, but then decreased in 2008. Since the 2008 survey, the levels of crime victimization have increased slightly in 2010 and significantly in 2012. Respondents' level of education, age, and size of location of residence are the factors that determine the levels of crime victimization in Honduras.

At the same time, the majority of Hondurans express satisfaction with the performance of the police in their neighborhoods. Direct experiences with the police tend to increase the perception of satisfaction with this institution. The more frequent the patrolling done by the police in the neighborhood is, the greater the level of satisfaction with their performance. The population of Tegucigalpa perceives the police as responding much faster to a robbery than residents of San Pedro Sula.

Chapter 8 examines the impact of crime and insecurity on democratic values and support for the political system. In Honduras, crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity are not statistically significant factors in determining support for democracy. Crime victimization, however, significantly reduces support for the political system. The data also show that 30% of Hondurans would support a military coup if the level of crime is high. This percentage has decreased significantly since 2008. However, crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity are not significant predictors of support for a military coup in Honduras. Political tolerance or the decision to vote for a presidential candidate of either the opposition or the incumbent administration in the next elections also does not significantly influence the level of support for a military coup. Lastly, crime victimization is a significant factor in determining the level of approval for the job of the current president. Citizens that have been victims of a crime express less approval for the performance of President Hernández.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically *not statistically significant*; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are *statistically significant* at the 95% confidence level. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will sometimes indicate the results of difference of means/proportion tests in footnotes or in the text.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2014 AmericasBarometer that only includes a subset of 25 countries, out of the 28 planned for inclusion in the 2014 survey. The data for these countries was available for analysis at the time of writing this report. In addition, these figures use a conservative estimate of the sampling error that assumes independent, rather than repeated, primary sampling units (PSUs) for data aggregated across time. At the time this report was written, LAPOP was in the process of updating the datasets in order to more precisely account for the complex sample design.

Part I:
Insecurity, Governance, and Civil Society in Honduras and in the Americas

Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas

Nicole Hinton and Daniel Montalvo
with
Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

I. Introduction

The pervasiveness of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean raises serious concerns regarding the quality and stability of democracy in the region. Where regimes fail to adequately protect their citizens from violence and crime, not only are those citizens likely to become dissatisfied and less trusting of the institutions and public officials charged with providing security to citizens, but under some conditions they might also cast some blame on democracy itself for their perilous circumstances. Or, under conditions of rampant crime, they might become less committed to the key principles of the rule of law that allow democracy to thrive. Bailey (2009) warns against a vicious cycle in which countries find themselves in a "security trap," where inefficient state bureaucracies and rampant corruption weaken the ability of states to provide public security and maintain the rule of law, invoking distrust in the legitimacy of democracy that in turn weakens the state. Having a strong state that can effectively respond to and deter crime and violence is critical to the flourishing of democracy in any context. As Karstedt and LaFree (p.6, 2006) eloquently state, "The connection between democracy and criminal justice is so fundamental as to be self-evident: the rule of law guarantees due process, and the observation of human rights is an integral part of the emergence and institutionalization of democracy."

Scholars have provided consistent evidence that crime victimization and widespread insecurity can pose serious challenges to democracy in the Americas (Lipset 1994; Booth and Seligson 2009; Bateson 2010; Ceobanu, Wood et al. 2010; Malone 2010; Carreras 2013). According to the rich scholarship on the subject, there are at least three ways in which crime, violence, and threat can evoke reactions among the mass public that present a challenge to democratic quality and governance.[1] First, people concerned with insecurity can have increased authoritarian tendencies and preferences for centralization of power in executives who might then act with disregard for checks and balances (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). When individuals feel threatened or insecure they are more likely to tolerate, and even support, governments that restrict some core political rights and civil liberties.

A second threat to democratic quality and governance arises when citizens lose faith in the regime's ability to provide adequate public security, and instead support less democratic alternatives to enhance security. The most obvious example of this scenario involves individuals taking matters into their own hands to fight crime in extralegal ways, or transferring authority to groups that pursue

[1] Such high rates of violent crime carry economic costs as well. High levels of violent crime can monopolize the resources of the state and siphon off funds from other vital public services. Rather than investing in public infrastructure and social services, democratic governments often find their resources dominated by rising levels of public insecurity. The World Bank noted that in addition to the pain and trauma crime brings to victims and their families, "crime and violence carry staggering economic costs" that consume approximately 8% of the region's GDP, taking into account the costs of law enforcement, citizen security and health care" (World Bank 2011, 5). On both political and economic fronts, current murder rates threaten sustainable community development. We thank Mary Malone for these insights and for additional advising over the content of Chapters 1-3 of this report.

vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga 2010). At the extreme, these groups include destabilizing and violent entities such as para-military groups, hit men, and lynching mobs. Unfortunately, these groups are increasingly present in various locations throughout the Americas today and they may be gaining heightened support from dissatisfied citizens, a dynamic that has the potential to threaten the monopoly of the use of force that is supposed to belong to the state.

Lastly, crime and insecurity can be detrimental to democratic quality by directly undermining interpersonal trust, and hence the development of social capital. Since the classic work of Alexis de Tocqueville, through the innovative work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, to the multi-method research of Robert Putnam, scholars in various fields of the social sciences have devoted enormous effort to explain how the social fabric shapes democracy (Tocqueville 1835, Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993). The strength of such social fabric is threatened when security crises cause individuals to experience a drop in interpersonal trust (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) and those dynamics can fuel or be aggravated by additional erosion in trust in political institutions and state law enforcement (Corbacho et al. 2012).

What is the state of crime and violence in the Americas? Given the importance of this topic to democracy, this is an imperative question to answer. This chapter provides an assessment of the state of security in the Americas, drawing on secondary research and results from the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP's) AmericasBarometer regional survey, which provides an unprecedented collection of public opinion data from over 25 countries for the last decade, 2004 to 2014.[2] Some of the key points that we document in this chapter are the following:

- The Latin America and Caribbean region has the highest homicide rate compared to any other region on earth (23 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), per the latest data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
- Central America stands out as the most violent region on the planet; in 2012, it had an average of nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.[3]
- Issues related to crime and violence are consistently perceived as top concerns among citizens of the Americas. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, just about 1 out of every 3 citizens identifies security as the most important problem facing their country.
- On average across the region, 17% of respondents to the 2014 AmericasBarometer report being the victim of a crime, a rate that has stayed fairly constant since 2004.
- The 2014 AmericasBarometer documents important ways that rates of burglaries, the sale of illegal drugs, extortion, and murders vary across countries of the Americas.
- Urban residents, those who are more educated, and wealthier individuals are the most likely to report being victims of a crime in the Americas in 2014.

[2] The 2014 AmericasBarometer will include surveys in 28 countries in total, but this report focuses on analyses of 25 countries for which the data had been gathered and processed at the time of this writing. Given that not all years of the AmericasBarometer contain all 25 countries, we report in footnotes on robustness checks for comparisons across time to analyses that contain only the subset of countries consistently represented in a given time-series.

[3] In the most recent report UNODC (2013) notes that Southern Africa is tied with Central America in terms of highest number of average homicides for the region. The Central American region contains heterogeneity within it, with the homicide rates highest in the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the state of affairs in terms of the prevalence of crime and violence in the Americas, based on cross-national homicide indicators, as reported by UNODC. This section also discusses the advantages of using survey data to measure and analyze crime and insecurity. Section III examines data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer to provide an overview of how citizens of the Americas perceive crime and violence in their countries. This section examines the extent to which security tops the list of most important problems in the AmericasBarometer countries across time and space. In the fourth section, we take a deeper look at the 2014 AmericasBarometer data by examining the frequency and types of crime victimization most commonly experienced by individuals in the region. We also examine the demographic factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to crime.

II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas

Despite differences among the ways in which crime is defined and measured,[4] Latin America and the Caribbean is widely regarded as a region with notoriously high crime incidents. In this section, we examine how this region fares in comparison to the rest of the world in terms of homicide, robbery, and burglary rates,[5] some of the most commonly collected and referenced crime statistics by institutions such as the UNODC.[6] We then turn to a discussion of the usefulness of this type of official crime data in comparison to self-reporting of crime victimization using surveys like the AmericasBarometer.

Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries

In terms of homicide rates, UNODC ranks the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region as one of the deadliest places on earth. As Figure 1.1 shows, the LAC region had a higher homicide rate in 2012 than any other region represented in the UNODC study. The 2012 LAC average rate of 23.0 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is more than double the second highest regional mean, held by Sub-Saharan Africa[7] (11.2 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), five times the rate in South Asia (4.4) and East Asia and the Pacific (3.9), seven times larger than the rate in the U.S. and Canada (3.2) and the Middle East and North Africa (2.9), and about 10 times greater than the rate found in Europe and Central Asia (2.5).

[4] The most current conceptualizations of crime see it as part of the broader concept of citizen security, which is the personal condition of being free from violence and intentional dispossession. This condition includes not only victimization, but also perceptions of crime (Casas-Zamora 2013).

[5] Other dimensions and measurements of the concept of crime include, but are not limited to assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion and violent threats.

[6] Other key organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), and the World Health Organization (WHO) are also important sources for aggregate crime statistics. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as a good source particularly in Central America.

[7] In the most recent report UNODC (2013) provides sub-regional averages for Southern Africa (31), Middle Africa (18), and Western Africa (14), all of which are higher than the regional average for Africa and are more comparable to the Latin American and the Caribbean average.



Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012[8]

As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, differences in intentional homicide rates exist across sub-regions within Latin America and the Caribbean and over time. As depicted in the figure, the Central American sub-region has the highest murder rates within the LAC region, with nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.[9] Homicide rates in this sub-region have increased at a concerning pace in recent years, reaching a peak in 2011. Within Central America, the most violent country is Honduras, which according to the UNODC had an intentional homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. In sharp contrast, Costa Rica is the least violent with a rate of 8.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.[10]



Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time

[8] Rates are for 2012 or latest year available.
[9] The UNODC analysis includes Mexico as part of the Central American sub-region. The rate of this particular country in 2012 was 21.5 per 100,000 persons.
[10] Data on country rates are not presented here, but are available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/. Last accessed on October 24, 2014.

Trending in a way that is somewhat comparable to Central America, the Caribbean sub-region has also experienced an upward trend in homicide rates between 2000 and 2011 before dropping in 2012. Within this time period, the Caribbean's homicide rates increased from 12 to 21 per 100,000 inhabitants. The Caribbean country with the highest rate in 2012, per UNODC, is Jamaica (39.3) and the one with the lowest is Cuba (4.2).

South America, on the other hand, has seen a lower and more stable cross-time trend in homicides in recent years. On average in that region, homicide rates have not reached more than 21 per 100,000 inhabitants since 2002. In 2012 (the latest year for which these data are available), this sub-region experienced a mean murder rate of nearly 17 per 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, the homicide rate disparity in the South American sub-region is rather large. Among the most dangerous countries, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil have intentional homicide rates of 53.7, 30.8, and 25.2 (per 100,000), respectively, according to the UNODC. Among the least dangerous, we find countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, with murder rates of 3.1, 7.9, and 9.6, in that order.

We continue to see important differences across countries in the LAC region when we turn to other crime statistics available from the UNODC, such as aggregate rates of reported robberies and burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 1.3 displays rates for 2012 (the latest available) for most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica are the countries in which robberies are the most prevalent (975, 618, and 522 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively) and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Canada where they were the least (20, 68, 79, in that order). Interestingly, Guatemala ranks low on both robbery and burglary rates. Paraguay and El Salvador join Guatemala at the bottom of the chart for burglary rates. At the top of the burglary chart, we find both Canada and the United States (503 and 663 per 100,000 inhabitants) just below Barbados and Chile (690 and 679 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively).

Robbery, Number of Police-Recorded Offences (rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



All rates are from 2012 except for the following countries: Bahamas and Belize (2011), Nicaragua (2010), Peru and Guatemala (2009), Argentina (2008), and Ecuador (2006).
Robbery is defined by the UNODC as "the theft of property from a person; overcoming resistance by force or threat of force. The category includes muggings (bag-snatching) and theft with violence; but excludes pick pocketing and extortion."

Burglary Breaking and Entering, Number of Police-Recorded Offences (rate per 100,000 inhabitants)



All rates are from 2012 except for the following countries: Bahamas and Belize (2011), Peru and Guatemala (2009), Paraguay (2008), and Ecuador (2006).
Burglary is defined by the UNODC as "gaining unauthorized access to a part of a building/dwelling or other premises; including by use of force; with the intent to steal goods (breaking and entering). "Burglary" should include; where possible; theft from a house; apartment or other dwelling place; factory; shop or office; from a military establishment; or by using false keys. It should exclude theft from a car; from a container; from a vending machine; from a parking meter and from fenced meadow/ compound."

Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012

A few points are worth noting regarding the data reported in Figure 1.3. First, although examining crime trends beyond homicides may be informative, the UNODC and others warn that comparisons across countries should be examined with caution as definitions and ways of recording

incidents of robbery and burglary differ across state legal systems. Second, the ranking of countries like Guatemala and El Salvador at the bottom for rates of robberies and burglaries, while Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, and Canada are at the top may actually be a reflection of differences in the quality of crime reporting mechanisms, policing, or even trust in the system of law enforcement.[11] The reliability of such crime data is dependent on victims reporting incidents at all or accurately and the police recording the offense accordingly. Reported rates of crime other than homicides are shaped by trust in police (e.g., willingness to go to the police when there is a problem). Crime tends to be underreported in areas where trust in the police or institutions responsible for the rule of law is low (Skogan 1975).

Official crime statistics are also prone to errors in police, agency, and government recording processes (UNODC and UNECE 2010). To the degree that error rates in these processes are correlated with factors such as decentralization, corruption, economic development, etc. or with the levels of crime and violence themselves, these types of data may suffer important systematic biases. Even in terms of homicide rates, the variation in the definitions of crime, even among trusted institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and UNODC, and the consequent variation in the measurement of this phenomenon, can pose an important threat to the ability to make valid comparisons of levels of crime across time and space (Maxfield and Babbie 2010; Pepper, Petrie, and Sullivan 2010; Pepper and Petrie 2002).

Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics

Survey research provides an important alternative technique by which to measure not only perceptions of but also experiences with crime and violence. The use of survey data for measuring crime victimization has a number of advantages over official statistics. First, it produces data free of accidental or intentional omission or misrepresentation of crime by government officials. Second, public opinion surveys administered by non-governmental firms can alleviate some of the non-reporting bias associated with citizens' distrust in law enforcement (Levitt 1998; Tyler and Huo 2002). Third, survey research allows us to access a first-hand account of the situation suffered by the interviewee rather than the situation as interpreted or registered by law enforcement. Fourth, it allows for differentiation between perceptions of and experiences with crime and violence. Fifth, it allows us to standardize the wording of questions about crime incidents across countries so that we are assessing similar phenomena and thus making valid comparisons. Finally, it allows us to collect and assess a more nuanced database of crime victimization than those often provided by general statistics referenced in official reports (Piquero, Macintosh, and Hickman 2002).[12]

The AmericasBarometer survey, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, provides us with an extensive database on crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. It is the

[11] There is also a greater incentive to report property crimes (e.g., burglaries) in wealthier countries with better established insurance industries in which a police report is required to make a claim.

[12] An early example of the use of surveys to collect data on crime victimization is the effort by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) research consortium to conduct The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). The surveys collected six waves of cross-national individual level data in many European countries. However, Latin America was only been peripherally represented (Kennedy, 2014). ICVS data did also report Latin America to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world (Soares & Naritomi, 2010). However, because data from countries in this region were collected exclusively during the 1996/1997 wave and only in the cities of San Juan (Costa Rica), Panama City (Panama), Asunción (Paraguay), Buenos Aires (Argentina), La Paz (Bolivia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia), the portrayal of crime and violence of the region coming from this source is not only outdated but incomplete.

only multi-country comparative project in the hemisphere to collect data on all of North, Central, and South America, plus a number of Caribbean countries. The AmericasBarometer survey records first-hand accounts of the state of crime and violence in the region, and also incorporates a range of standardized crime and security survey measures (e.g., experiences and perceptions) that are comparable across time and space. Crime victimization data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer is particularly valuable because the project relies on large national samples of voting age adults in 28 countries across the Americas, with a survey instrument that included an extensive series of modules on the topics of crime, violence, and insecurity. The result is an unprecedented dataset in terms of its quality and scope.

Due to their advantages, crime victimization surveys are widely regarded as at least a complementary, and in some ways a superior, source of data in comparison to official aggregate crime statistics. That said, some scholars (e.g., Bergman 2006) maintain that although surveys can provide a better picture of crime *trends* they can say little about actual crime *rates.* According to Bergman (2006), even when crime is defined and measured in similar ways, cross-sectional survey data on victimization can suffer inaccuracies due to, among other reasons, variations in tendencies to under-report violence or over-report property theft within and across countries. The AmericasBarometer overcomes some potential problems in cross-national and cross-time comparisons by standardizing wording across its surveys. Further, each question in the survey is carefully considered and pre-tested within each country prior to inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, in order to ensure that the wording comports with local norms and is as likely as possible to elicit truthful answers. Be that as it may, Bergman's caveat that differences in motivations and inclinations to over- or under-report crime incidents may vary across countries in ways that warrant further consideration. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer asks multiple questions[13] not only about incidents of crime victimization but also about concerns surrounding violence and perceptions of insecurity in order to achieve as holistic an account of citizen security in the region as possible.

The remainder of this chapter presents a relatively brief overview of concerns about crime and crime victimization across the Americas. We note that the description and discussion only begin to scratch the surface of the extensive database on this topic available via the AmericasBarometer survey. While our analyses indicate important variation in rates of certain types of crime victimization incidents across the Americas, we do not focus here on the extent to which crime and insecurity are directly traceable to decentralized ordinary criminals or organized crime in particular. Organized crime is a notably pernicious problem in many Latin American countries given that, not only do criminal organizations engage in illegal activities, but they also seek to influence the state in order to attain certain political objectives (Bailey and Taylor 2009). The empirical evidence shows that organized crime puts the states' monopoly of the use of force at stake, since many governments have to constantly negotiate with criminal organizations in order to preserve an appearance of peace. In the Americas, criminal organizations vary widely in terms of size and scope. Those at the least organized end of the spectrum are domestic organizations arranged around fluid market transactions, such as small mafias, usurers, and extortionists. At the other end of the spectrum are transnational criminal organizations that engage in serious crimes or offenses across borders, such as drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, gang activity, and human trafficking (Manrique 2006, Bailey and

[13] In addition, the AmericasBarometer crime victimization question has been developed to assist recall by providing a list of types of crimes; a follow-up question asking about what type of crime was experienced provides those using the AmericasBarometer dataset a second measure of victimization and, therefore, an additional means to assess and increase reliability of analyses of the data.

Taylor 2009, Farah 2012). Our look at crime concerns and victimization in this chapter does not trace these perspectives and experiences back to these varying criminal elements in the LAC region, but we are cognizant that indeed this variation in the nature of crime syndicates and criminals is important for a comprehensive understanding of the region.[14]

III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas

As a first step to examining the 2014 AmericasBarometer data on crime, we take a look at what citizens of the Americas view as the most important problem within their country. Respondents in all countries are asked the following open-ended question:[15]

> **A4**. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?

Responses to the question in the field are coded into one of approximately forty general categories, which are then recoded in our analysis into five general baskets: economy, security, basic services, politics, and other.[16] Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of responses for these five main categories, as provided by citizens across six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey project. Since 2004,[17] the economy and security rank as two principle concerns expressed on average by the public

[14] InSightCrime, a foundation that studies organized crime, lists 9 countries with the highest prevalence of organized crime in the region. In North America, Mexico is the largest and most sophisticated home for criminal organizations. Drug trafficking organizations, such as Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Familia Michoacana, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization and the Knights Templar dominate Mexico's criminal activities. In Central America, countries within the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) host some of the most violent crime organizations on earth. Particularly relevant organizations are Mendozas, Lorenzanas and Leones in Guatemala, MS13, Barrio 18, Cachiros and Valles in Honduras, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, Perrones and Texis Cartel in El Salvador. InSightCrime points to the problem of organized crime in Nicaragua, particularly the influence of drug traffickers on judicial rulings but compared to the countries in the Northern Triangle, this impact is on a completely different (smaller) magnitude. South America includes four countries on this list of countries with comparatively strong and prevalent criminal syndicates: Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. While Peru and Colombia are the world's two largest cocaine producers, Brazil and Venezuela are drug transit hubs with important money laundering centers and human trafficking activities. The most salient groups in Colombia are FARC and ELN; Shining Path in Peru; Cartel of the Suns and Bolivarian Liberation Forces in Venezuela; and Red Command and First Capital Command in Brazil.

[15] Though respondents may consider that many problems are worthy of mentioning, they are asked to state only one problem they think is the most important facing their country.

[16] Responses included in Economy: unemployment; problems with or crisis of economy; poverty; inflation or high prices; credit, lack of; lack of land to farm; external debt. Responses included in Security: crime; gangs; security (lack of); kidnappings; war against terrorism; terrorism; violence. Responses included in Basic Services: roads in poor condition; health services, lack of; education, lack of, poor quality; water, lack of; electricity, lack of; housing; malnutrition; transportation, problems of; human rights, violations of. Responses included in Politics: armed conflict; impunity; corruption; bad government; politicians. Responses included in Other: population explosion; discrimination; popular protests (strikes, road blockades); drug addiction; drug trafficking; forced displacement of persons; environment; migration; and "other" which comprises of less than 3% of responses.

[17] It is important to note that in 2004, we asked this question in 11 countries of the Americas only. These countries are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominincan Republic. In 2006, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, the United States and Canada were incorporated to this list. In 2008, the AmericasBarometer included Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Belize, and since 2010 we have included Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. These are the same 25 countries analyzed in this chapter. Figure 1.4 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

across the Americas.[18] The economy still leads as the most salient concern in 2014, with a regional average of 36% of respondents declaring that the economy is the most important problem in their country.[19] However, the economy as the most important problem has also experienced the biggest change across time: it decreased in public concern by approximately 25 percentage points from the first wave of the AmericasBarometer in 2004 to the most recent wave in 2014.



Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time

Security has consistently registered as the second most important problem in the Americas, as self-reported by citizens since 2004. Narrowing our focus to the two most recent years of the AmericasBarometer, 2012 and 2014, we see only minor changes over time in all five main categories. That said, we do see evidence that security concerns increased in recent years: in 2012, 30.1% cited an issue related to security as the most important problem and in 2014 that figure is 32.5%. In short, in 2014, on average across the Americas, essentially 1 out of 3 respondents report an issue related to crime, violence, or insecurity as the most important problem facing their country.

How much variation is there in concerns about security across countries in the Americas? To answer this question, we turn our attention to country-level data on the identification of security (crime and violence) as the most important problem. Figure 1.5 presents these data. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, in two countries, Trinidad & Tobago and El Salvador, 2 out of 3 citizens identify security as the most important problem facing their country. In Uruguay, this rate is 1 out of 2 citizens or 50% of the adult population. Security concerns are elevated in a number of other countries in the Americas as well, including Jamaica, Honduras, Peru, and Guatemala. In sharp contrast, few citizens in

[18] Using other survey data, Singer (2013) shows that the economy has consistently been cited as the most important problem in the hemisphere going back to the mid-1990s, although crime and security has increased in importance as the economy has strengthened and crime has gotten worse in many countries in recent years.

[19] As is standard LAPOP practice, in all analyses of regional averages in this chapter and this report more generally, we calculate regional means via a process that weights each country equally rather than proportional to population.

Haiti and Nicaragua identify security as the most important issue facing the country: in each case, fewer than 5% of individuals respond to the most important problem question with an issue related to security. In fact, though not shown here, we note that these two countries rank the highest in number of people surveyed stating economy as the most important problem in 2014.



Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014

Variation in concerns about security exists not only across countries in the Americas, but also across time. And, in fact, we also see cross-national variation in change across time: that is, the extent to which security concerns are increasing or decreasing in a country, on average, differs throughout the region. Map 1.1 shows how security as the most important problem has shifted from 2012 to 2014 across countries in the region by graphing the change in percentage that identify security as the most important problem. Guyana (shaded with the darkest color in Map 1.1) is a country in which we find the second largest increase in security being identified as the most important problem; yet, as Figure

1.5 demonstrates, it still ranks low in comparison to other countries in the Americas in the percentage of respondents that report security as the most important. Costa Ricans decreased in their tendency to identify security as the most important problem, when comparing 2012 to 2014, a shift that helps account for their fairly low ranking in Figure 1.5. On the other hand, Venezuela also experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents indicating security as the most important problem, but the country still ranks at about the regional mean for the Americas in 2014.[20]



Map 1.1. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country[21]

[20] It should be noted that this significant change in the percentage of Venezuelans that identifies security as the main problem is driven in large part by a significant increase in concerns over scarcity of basic products. Scarcity of food and basic necessities became a serious and salient problem in Venezuela in 2014. Thus, it may not be that security concerns diminished in Venezuela in 2014 so much as concerns about basic goods increased.

[21] Countries are categorized as having *decreased substantially* if the percentage of individuals reporting a security issue as the most important problem shifted downward between 10 and 40 percentage points between 2012 and 2014. They are

IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer

On average across the Americas, as described in the previous section, issues related to crime, violence, and security rank high on the minds of citizens across the Americas when they consider the most important problem facing their country. But, what types of experiences with crime victimizations, and at what rates, do citizens in the Americas report? In this section, using data collected for the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we first examine the frequency and types of crime victimization across the Americas, including analysis from new questions asked in 2014. Then we discuss the factors that may be associated with the likelihood of falling victim to crime and use the AmericasBarometer data to explore the individual-level characteristics of those most likely to report being victims of crime.

Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas

The AmericasBarometer has included several questions pertaining to crime victimization since 2004. One of these questions asks the individual whether he or she has been the victim of any type of crime over the past year. The specific wording is as follows:[22]

> **VIC1EXT**. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
> (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]**
> (88) DK **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]** (98) DA **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]**

Figure 1.6 displays reported crime victimization rates since 2004 for the Americas. That is, the figure shows the percentage of individuals, on average across the region, who answer that they were the victim of (at least one) crime over the past 12 months.[23] We see that crime victimization has hovered around 17% in most years except 2010, when there was a small spike in reported crime victimization. These findings suggest that the frequency of crime victimization has remained rather constant across time, on average for the region. In a separate analysis, not shown here, we find that the cross-time pattern of mostly stable rates shown in Figure 1.6 is fairly consistent for both the rural vs. urban populations of the Americas. That said, those who live in urban areas are more likely to report having been victimized by crime: on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 5

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categorized as *decreased modestly* if this downward shift is between 0 and 10 percentage points; *increased modestly* if the percentage of respondents selecting security shifted upward between 0 and 10; and *increased substantially* if that upward shift was over 10 percentage points.

[22] LAPOP has conducted a set of experiments in Belize and in the United States to assess whether the change in question wording results in a higher rate of response. The results are mixed, such that - for example - in a study conducted by LAPOP in Belize in 2008 in which the questions were placed into a split-sample design, there was no statistically distinguishable difference in responses to the original versus the modified question. On the other hand, in an online study conducted in the United States in 2013, LAPOP found that those who received the modified question wording were more likely to indicate having been the victim of a crime. Therefore, we can say that it is possible that some variation between crime victimization rates recorded by the AmericasBarometer pre-2009 compared to post-2009 are due to question wording differences; rates within the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 cannot be affected by question wording differences because not changes were introduced within those periods.

[23] Figure 1.6 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. Though when looking only at the 11 countries surveyed in 2004, we find the spike from 2008 to 2010 to be greater (a 5-point difference) and the trend after 2010 to decline at a slower rate. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

adults living in an urban area reports having been victimized by crime, while approximately just 1 out of 10 rural residents reports the same phenomenon (a statistically significant difference).[24]



Figure 1.6. Crime Victimization over Time

Figure 1.7 compares the percentage of citizens who have been victims of at least one crime in 2014, and documents important variation across countries. The top four spots in the chart are taken by South American countries: Peru (30.6%) is at the top, followed by Ecuador (27.5%), Argentina (24.4%), and Venezuela (24.4%). Three Caribbean countries rank at the bottom of the chart: Trinidad & Tobago (9.6%), Guyana (7.4%), and Jamaica (6.7%). The presence of Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago at the low end of Figure 1.7 is notable given that high percentages of individuals in these countries rate "security" as the most important problem facing their country in 2014 (see Figure 1.5).

[24] See also Figure 1.15.



Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine the number of times that victimized individuals have experienced crime in the last 12 months. For this purpose, the survey asks:

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?
[fill in number] _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

As we can see in Figure 1.8, in 2014, on average for the Americas, a majority of crime victims (55.7%) report being victimized one time. One in four crime victims reports being victimized two times. One in ten crime victims has been victimized three or more times in the past year, and very small percentages are found in the higher bins in the figure.



Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014

The AmericasBarometer not only records the levels of crime experienced by each of the survey respondents, but it also evaluates if other members of the respondent's household were victimized by any type of crime during the 12 months prior to the interview. To do so, between 2010 and 2014 the AmericasBarometer included the following question:

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

In Figure 1.9 we look at the region-wide levels of crime victimization within the household of the respondent since 2010.[25] We see a similar trend as we do with individual crime victimization; across time, levels of crime victimization within the household remain stable at about 17%, except for in 2010 when reports reach 19%. When examining crime victimization within the household in urban areas only, the trend remains the same though reports of crime victimization within the household are three percentage points higher than the general levels shown in the figure here.

[25] This question was not included in earlier rounds of the survey.



Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization within Household over Time

The AmericasBarometer also provides information on where the crime took place. Knowing the location of the crime can be useful in understanding differences in patterns of crime victimization within and across countries. Further, it may serve as information citizens can consider in taking precautionary measures to avoid crime, or may help local policy makers and law officers identify areas that need particular attention in order to increase citizen security. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included the following item, which was asked of those who indicated that they had been victim of a crime during the 12 months prior to the survey:

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**
(1) In your home
(2) In this neighborhood
(3) In this municipality/canton/parish
(4) In another municipality/canton/parish
(5) In another country
(88) DK
(98) DA
(99) N/A

Figure 1.10 shows the distribution of the location of crime victimization as reported by respondents across the Americas in 2014. We find a relatively equal distribution of respondents across categories. However, the most common locations where respondents report having been victimized are their homes (27%), in their neighborhood (26.8%), and in their municipality (26.9%). Victimization in other municipalities is less frequent (18.6%) and very few crime victims report the incident as having taken place outside of their country (0.6%).



Figure 1.10. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014

In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included an expanded series of survey items in order to obtain a sense of criminal activity within the neighborhood of the respondent. The new battery refers to the last 12 months, just as the crime victimization questions, and covers the following incidents: burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and murders. In the remainder of this section, we examine responses to these "VICBAR" questions:

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in that last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]

Figure 1.11 displays, by country, the percentage of respondents who answered yes to having experienced or heard of burglaries in their neighborhood. We see a great deal of variation across countries, from rates of affirmative responses of nearly 72% in Argentina, to 28% of respondents reporting such incidents in their neighborhood in Trinidad & Tobago. South American countries, like Argentina, Venezuela (69.9%), Brazil (69.6%), and Uruguay (69.2%), are grouped towards the top of those with the highest rates of burglaries, while Central American countries like Belize (37.6%), El Salvador (37.9%), Honduras (37.9%), Guatemala (41.0%), and Costa Rica (44.7%) are grouped somewhere in the middle of the figure. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, all of the Caribbean countries included in this report (Trinidad & Tobago, 28.2%; Guyana, 30.8%; Haiti, 32.9%;

and Jamaica, 34.7%) rank at the bottom in rates of witnessing or having heard about neighborhood burglaries.[26]



Figure 1.11. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014

Figure 1.12 examines the percentage of respondents across countries in 2014 that witnessed or heard of sales of illegal drugs in their neighborhood. Once again we see substantial cross-national variation in crime rates. More than half of the respondents of Brazil (64.6%), Costa Rica (58.2%), the Dominican Republic (56.1%), and Argentina (50.5%) report illegal drugs sales in their neighborhood in the 2014 AmericasBarometer study, whereas less than 10% of the respondents in Haiti make a similar report. Jamaica and Bolivia also show low rates, at 20.5% and 17.0%, respectively. When

[26] When examining only urban areas throughout the Americas, a similar ranking is found, but with increased percentage points per country across the board (about a 5-8 increase in percentage points per country).

comparing the two occurrences, sales of illegal drugs and burglaries, in the neighborhood of the respondent most countries have similar positioning within the region in each chart; but Costa Rica (58.2%), Chile (48%) and Trinidad & Tobago (44.7%) see substantial moves in placement toward the top of the chart in sales of illegal drugs, when comparing their ranking here to their ranking in the chart related to burglaries.[27]



Figure 1.12. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014

Next, Figure 1.13 displays the percentage of respondents across countries that report having witnessed or heard of extortion or blackmail within their neighborhood. The cross-national variation reveals a 25 point spread between the highest and lowest rate, which is so far the smallest variation and

[27] Trends in urban areas reflect the national trends, but with increased percentage points (about a 3-8 increase in percentage points per country).

yet still substantial. On average, rates of reported extortion/blackmail in the neighborhood are among the lowest percentages reported in the VICBAR series (that is, the series of reported criminal incidents in the neighborhood). We continue to see the Dominican Republic (24.4%) at the top of the charts for crime victimization within respondent's neighborhoods. However, overall we see a slightly different distribution of countries than we saw for burglaries and sales of illegal drugs. In second place is Haiti (24.2%), which has ranked lower on the two previous charts, comparatively. Guatemala (23.3%) and El Salvador (22.9%) are within the top five countries reporting extortion or blackmail, and again ranked much lower, comparatively, on the two previous measures. At the other end of the scale we find Uruguay, Guyana, and Nicaragua with a frequency of only 3.1%; 2.0%; and 1.4%, respectively.[28]



Figure 1.13. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014

[28] When examining urban areas only for reports of extortion or blackmail within the neighborhood, we find a similar country ranking with a few more percentage points reported per country.

Finally, Figure 1.14 examines the percentage of respondents that reported having known of a murder occurring in their neighborhood. We see Brazil (51.1%) at the top of the chart with the highest percentage, where over half of respondents report being aware of a murder in their neighborhood in the 12 months prior to the survey. Venezuela is in the second position with 42.7%, followed by the Dominican Republic, which we find at the top of all figures examining the VICBAR series – burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and now murders (33.9%). Costa Rica lies at the bottom of the chart (10.6%), just below Uruguay (11.9%) and Guyana (12%). The differences among those countries are not statistically significant.[29]



Figure 1.14. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014

[29] When examining urban areas only, the positioning of the countries remains, with less than a five percentage point increase per country.

Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?

Now that we have provided a broad picture of the frequency and nature of crime across the Americas as reported by the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we ask *who is most likely to report having been the victim of a crime?* Crime does not affect all population groups in the same way. Differences exist by place of residence, economic status, gender, age, and education.[30] In general terms, the scholarly literature suggests that crime is more often an urban phenomenon in Latin America. Living in large, urbanized cities makes citizens more likely to be victims of crime than residing in less populated and less developed areas (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Gomes and Paz 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Cotte Poveda 2012; Muggah 2012).

Increasing attention has also been given to the role of wealth in crime victimization; however, the relationship is less straightforward than between crime and urban settings. On the one hand, wealthier individuals can be more attractive to criminals and therefore wealth could be positively correlated with risk of crime victimization (Anderson 2009). On the other hand, wealth implies the motivation and capability to have more resources with which to protect one's person and/or property, which reduces the risk of becoming a victim of crime (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Barslund, Rand, Tarp, and Chiconela 2007; Gomes and Paz 2008; Justus and Kassouf 2013). Most recently, evidence indicates that wealth does indeed increase the probability of crime victimization, but the relationship is not linear, or non-monotonic. Once an individual has attained a certain level of wealth, the probability of falling victim to crime seems to diminish, likely because of the ability to guarantee self-protection (Justus and Kassouf 2013). This means that citizens belonging to the middle class may be more likely to be a victim of a crime than those that belong to the lowest or highest socioeconomic strata.

Scholars have also identified young adult males as those most susceptible to crime victimization (Beato, Peixoto, and Andrade 2004; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Muggah 2012). Those most vulnerable to violent crime in particular, are young male adults, especially those that are unemployed and have poor education. Victims of property crime, on the other hand, tend to also be young males, but are more likely to be those who have more education and frequently use public transportation (Bergman 2006).

Using the 2014 AmericasBarometer data, we first examine crime victims by location of their residence – whether an urban or rural location – and by their level of wealth.[31] The results in Figure 1.15 show that respondents living in urban locations are almost twice as likely to be victims of crime as respondents living in rural locations (20.2% vs. 11.8%), which is in line with conventional views and expectations. Also, as quintiles of wealth increase, the likelihood of reporting having been the victim of a crime increases. The results display a linear relationship rather than a tapering off effect or a diminishing return once wealth reaches a certain point. Thus, on average across the Americas, wealth is simply and positively related to reported crime victimization.

[30] Differences also emerge when considering whether victimization is violent or non-violent, or involves property; our analyses here focus on crime victimization in general.

[31] Wealth quintiles is a standard LAPOP variable created using the R-series questions about capital goods ownership to create a five-point index of quintiles of wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." AmericasBarometer Insights 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).



Figure 1.15. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014

To further examine what factors predict crime victimization in the Americas, Figure 1.16 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis intended to examine determinants of self-reported crime victimization within the Americas in 2014.[32] The figure displays the standardized regression coefficients as dots, with confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal lines. The figure shows that the most consequential factors associated with crime victimization are urban residence and education. Those living within an urban setting and having higher education levels are more likely to report being a victim of crime. Wealthy individuals are also more likely to report being a crime victim. On the other hand, women and those from higher age cohorts (the comparison category in the analysis is those of 36 to 45 years of age) are less likely to report being a victim of crime. We included a measure of respondent skin tone in the analysis, and see that it is not a significant factor in predicting crime victimization on average across the Americas. This result for skin tone and those that we report here for gender, education, and wealth are consistent with analyses of predictors of crime victimization using the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, as presented in our last report (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister2012), which gives us confidence in the robustness of these findings for the Latin American and Caribbean region.

[32] The analysis excludes the United States and Canada. Country fixed effects are included but not shown with Mexico as the base country. See corresponding table with the numerical results for the standardized coefficients in the Appendix.



Figure 1.16. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014

V. Conclusion

Issues related to crime, violence, and security are a serious challenge for democratic governance in the Americas. The AmericasBarometer has consistently recorded citizens' experiences with crime and violence in the region, and their concerns about these issues. In 2014, we expanded the study to include several new modules related to crime in order to allow even more detailed analysis of this topic. This chapter presents only a glimpse at this broader dataset, which we encourage those interested in the topic to explore in greater detail by accessing the survey data directly via LAPOP's website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Among the key findings in this chapter is the fact that concerns about crime as the most important problem have been steadily increasing over recent years in the Americas. And at the same time that regional average crime rates have remained fairly constant, significant variation exists across countries with respect to crime rates in general and with respect to reported incidents of particular types of crime in the neighborhood.

We concluded the chapter with an assessment of which individuals are more likely to report having been the victim of a crime in the Americas. We find that those living in urban settings, those with more years of education, and those with higher levels of wealth are more likely to report being the victim of a crime.

Appendix

Appendix 1.1. Determinants of Self-reported Crime Victimization, 2014 (Figure 1.16)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
66 years or older	-0.094*	(-5.09)
56-65 years	-0.069*	(-3.82)
46-55 years	-0.026	(-1.45)
26-35 years	0.004	-0.23
16-25 years	0.022	-1.18
Skin Tone	-0.033	(-1.75)
Wealth Quintiles	0.076*	-4.35
Years of Schooling	0.199*	-10.73
Woman	-0.071*	(-4.70)
Urban	0.212*	-10.61
Guatemala	-0.03	(-1.32)
El Salvador	-0.040*	(-1.98)
Honduras	-0.027	(-1.18)
Nicaragua	-0.050*	(-2.27)
Costa Rica	-0.135*	(-5.67)
Panama	-0.268*	(-8.69)
Colombia	-0.055*	(-2.74)
Ecuador	0.055*	-2.05
Bolivia	-0.024	(-0.92)
Peru	0.055*	(-3)
Paraguay	-0.125*	(-6.11)
Chile	-0.183*	(-6.84)
Uruguay	-0.014	(-0.70)
Brazil	-0.082*	(-3.93)
Venezuela	-0.016	(-0.87)
Argentina	-0.003	(-0.19)
Dominican Republic	0.004	(-0.17)
Haiti	-0.065*	(-2.89)
Jamaica	-0.253*	(-10.09)
Guyana	-0.225*	(-8.28)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.207*	(-8.87)
Belize	-0.073*	(-3.93)
Constant	-1.604*	(-85.00)
F	37.2	
Number of cases	38102	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

The last decade has seen dramatic economic improvements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Thanks to rising commodity prices, several countries enjoyed economic booms and, in turn, the region quickly recovered from the global economic slowdown. Improved education has narrowed skills gaps within the workforce (Kahhat 2010) and has boosted wages, particularly for low income workers (World Bank 2013). Many governments also launched ambitious social programs that helped provide more effective safety nets against poverty (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012). As a result, aggregate poverty rates in Latin America have fallen (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010).[1] Indeed, the number of people in Latin America living in extreme poverty (less than $2.50 a day) has dropped by 50% since 2000. In 2011, the number of people classified by the World Bank as middle class, measured as living on $10-50 a day, surpassed the number of people in Latin America classified as poor (Ferreira et al 2013). Inequality in the hemisphere remains high but has also decreased in recent years (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; Ferreira et al 2013).

These gains notwithstanding, the region's economies still face multiple challenges. Over 80 million people live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013) and 40% of Latin Americans live on a precarious $4-10 a day. The heralded growth of the middle class has been uneven—more pronounced in the Southern Cone than in the other places in the region. Moreover, as commodity prices have stabilized over the last two years, Latin America has seen its growth rates decrease. This development has led some observers to voice concerns over whether the region's economies are strong enough to continue raising people out of poverty.[2] Persistent inefficiencies in education systems and stubbornly large informal sectors in many countries hamper worker productivity.[3] So despite some recent signs of economic resilience, the quest for economic development continues across much of the Americas.

While these economic trends are important in and of themselves, a large literature links political participation and democratic attitudes to economic development and performance (e.g. Lipset 1959; Easton 1975; Carlin 2006; Bratton et al 2005; see discussion in Booth and Seligson 2009). Rising living standards and a growing middle class may ultimately be good for democracy if they result in growing demands for political inclusion (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet if democratic values have not become fully dispersed within the hemisphere, economic weakening may create discontent with democratic institutions and practices if citizens become convinced that democracy cannot fully deliver (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Booth and Seligson 2009). Moreover, high levels of poverty and inequality may create opportunities for leaders who promise to fix those problems if

[1] Data on poverty rates in the Caribbean are much more limited than are data on Latin America, thus while many reports speak of "Latin America and the Caribbean" in discussing the recent trends most of the data in them draws exclusively on Latin America. For a summary of some recent poverty data in the Caribbean, see Downes (2010).

[2] http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview; http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/27/inequality-latin-america-undp

[3] http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599782-instead-crises-past-mediocre-growth-big-riskunless-productivity-rises-life

delegated sufficient political authority to change the current status quo, perhaps at the cost of democratic checks and balances (Weyland 2013).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer provides a window into both the real improvements many citizens of the hemisphere experience as well as some lingering economic weaknesses. In particular, these data allow us to examine how the region's citizens view their current financial situation and the current state of the national economy. In doing so, we can see that while the average respondent is objectively better off than he or she was in the recent past, many people continue to report significant financial hardships. AmericasBarometer respondents also are tuned into the weakening macroeconomic situation; descriptions of the national economic situation are significantly lower in 2014 than they were in 2012 or 2010. In all of these trends, substantial differences in economic perceptions and household wealth within society reflect historic inequalities regarding access to education and the market that continue to shape patterns of inequality in the hemisphere.

II. Main Findings

In this chapter, we use the AmericasBarometer to track household access to basic services, ownership of common appliances, and other forms of household wealth along with subjective evaluations of whether one's income is sufficient to meet economic needs and subjective evaluations of recent economic trends. The main findings we documents are as follows:

- The regional average level of household wealth is increasing, in particular, ownership of many household appliances.
- Access to household services like running water and sewage has increased more slowly, but continues to increase in the hemisphere.
- When asked subjectively about their financial situations and whether their income is sufficient to meet their needs, many respondents report that they are struggling. In fact, the number of households that cannot make ends meet in an average country remains almost unchanged from previous waves of the survey.
- Evaluations of national economic trends are generally negative, although they vary substantially across countries in ways that reflect recent macroeconomic trends; respondents in countries whose economies are growing the most slowly tend to have the least positive views of the economy.

Yet we consistently find that both objective levels of wealth and subjective perceptions of household finances and the national economy differ within countries in ways that reflect structural inequalities within society as well as non-economic factors.

- Education is a particularly strong predictor of both objective household wealth and subjective reports of being financially secure.
- Individuals who live in urban areas, are married, are middle age, have lighter colored skin, and are male tend to report owning more household items.

- Household wealth is strongly correlated with reporting the ability to make ends meet, but even among the wealthiest quintile in the sample, 29% of respondents report that their income is not enough to make ends meet.
- Those who are poor, indigenous, and/or female tend to have the most negative views of the national economy.
- Individuals who live in high crime areas or who experienced corruption in the past year tend to be more negative about their country's economic trajectory.

III. The Evolution of Household Wealth

One way we can track Latin America's economic evolution is by looking at trends in household ownership of various consumer items. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents if they own the following:

R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	**DK** 88	**DA** 98	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? **[If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]**	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	88	98	
R6. Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R15. Computer	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R18. Internet	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R1. Television	(0) No **[Skip to R26]**			(1) Yes **[Continue]**	88	98	
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	**99 INAP**

The list of household goods that the AmericasBarometer asks about has expanded over time, reflecting the advent of new technologies and the greater availability of other household items. The survey does not ask about the quality of the goods nor whether the respondent owns multiple versions of an appliance. Nevertheless, these measures allow us to break down some of the basic differences in household wealth in the hemisphere.

Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of households in 2014 that claim to have each item. As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere. According to these AmericasBarometer data, some household goods have become nearly ubiquitous in the Americas. For example, over 91% of households surveyed have a television. That number has grown

slightly since 2006 (when it was 89%).[4] Of course this does not mean all homes are equal with regards to this one measure of wealth. Households will differ in the number and types of TV's they own. In fact, the 2014 AmericasBarometer added a question asking specifically about whether the respondent has a flat screen TV—less than 40% of respondents do. But at a basic level, access to television is high throughout the continent.



Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014[5]

[4] In discussing trends in household wealth we focus on comparisons to 2006 because that was the year the AmericasBarometer expanded within South America and the Caribbean. If we restrict our attention to the countries in Central America and the Andes that were included in the 2004 wave and look at trends until the present day, the gains are even larger.

[5] This figure excludes the United States and Canada because several of the household wealth questions were not asked there.

Telephone access is also high throughout the Americas. Over 91% of individuals have either a cell phone or a landline phone in their home. Of the two types, cellular phones are far more common; roughly 89% of respondents have a cell phone while 36% have a landline phone. And while the share of houses with at least one television has remained relatively constant over the last 8 years of the AmericasBarometer survey, telephone penetration has increased markedly. In 2006 only 75% of households had access to a phone of any kind, with 63% of households having cell phones and 43% landlines. Thus in 8 years reported access to telephones in the household has increased by 16 percentage points and reported cell phone ownership has gone up by 26 percentage points.

In general, access to electronic appliances has been on a significant upward trend in recent years. Refrigerator ownership was fairly common in 2006 but increased 7.5 percentage points in the last eight years, such that nearly 82% of households in the average country report owning one. Ownership of washing machines and microwaves is more limited, but both have grown in recent years. Since 2006, the proportion of respondents in an average country who report owning a washing machine has increased by 16 percentage points and microwave ownership is now 14.6 percentage points higher. We observe a large increase – 21 percentage points since 2006 – in computer ownership. Concurrently, household access to the internet also grew by 28 percentage points since the AmericasBarometer first asked about it in 2008.

Other forms of household wealth changed more slowly. Though most homes in the Americas have access to indoor plumbing and an indoor bathroom, the percentage of homes that do not has only fallen 4 percentage points since 2006 in the average country. The average number of homes with an indoor bathroom has also only increased by 4 percentage points over the same period of time. These major gains in wealth are, perhaps, the most difficult to achieve. Not only are they expensive, they often require local governments and utilities to provide reliable forms of infrastructure, access, and services. Yet we might also consider that while a 4 percentage-point gain in access does not sound like much compared to the large increases in ownership of other goods and services, it does mean that in the past eight years the number of homes without access to indoor plumbing or an indoor bathroom have been reduced by 18 and 14 percent respectively. Car ownership also remains relatively rare; about 30% of respondents own at least one car, although that is an increase over the 24% that reported owning cars in 2006.

To summarize these overall trends, in Figure 2.2 we create a simple index of household ownership that keeps track of the number of goods households in an average country own.[6] We focus on the 12 items that were asked about in every survey since 2006 and count the number owned by each household.[7] For simplicity we weight each item equally and take the average number of owned items

[6] This index is a very simple index of wealth and differs from the one used elsewhere in the report that breaks wealth into quintiles. In most analyses in this report we use an index of household wealth that uses factor analysis to identify which goods distinguish the most well-off households from other households and which also incorporates differences in the kinds of wealth that are possible in urban and rural areas given differences in infrastructure (a well-to-do person in rural areas where electricity is scarce may own fewer electronic appliances, for example, than does a poor person living in an urban center). See Córdova, Abby. 2009. Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators. *AmericasBarometer Insight* Report 2008, no. 6. http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf**.** The index of household wealth used in the rest of the report breaks houses down into their quintiles by country but, by design, does not allow for comparisons across countries or within them over time in the number of goods that households actually own. Thus, here we look at a raw count of household goods.

[7] Television of any kind, a flat screen television, refrigerator, telephone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, a computer, and the internet.

across the sample. The data show household access to these basic services and appliances increased in every wave of the AmericasBarometer.[8]



Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index

While household wealth has increased on average, large disparities continue to exist within the Americas. We explore differences within and across societies using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. In Figure 2.3 we model a slightly modified version of the household wealth index presented in Figure 2.2 that adds ownership of a flat screen TV and internet access (questions added to the AmericasBarometer battery since 2006) to the set of household goods and examine how they differ within societies. We control for country fixed effects to account for unmeasured differences across countries, thus the results in Figure 2.3 reflect average within-country differences in household wealth.[9]

[8] If we compare wealth within only those countries that are included in every survey since 2004, the same pattern of increasing wealth over time also occurs.

[9] As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. The coefficients are all standardized. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.1 at the end of the chapter.



Figure 2.3. Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014[10]

Average levels of household wealth vary significantly across socio-demographic groups. The largest correlate of household wealth is education. The more schooling an individual obtains, the more of these household items he or she tends to own. This pattern may exist for several reasons. It could be that as education levels continue to increase, opportunities to obtain household wealth also increase.[11] Yet inequalities with regards to access to education remain and these gaps in opportunities for children of different class and ethnic backgrounds and genders are likely to help further perpetuate inequalities in adulthood (Cruces et al. 2014).[12] It could also be that wealthy individuals are able to keep their children in school longer and that this correlation at the individual-level reflects differences in initial levels of wealth.

Other groups have systematically lower levels of wealth. Households in rural areas report having fewer household items than urban ones. Individuals with darker-toned skin tend to own fewer household goods than light-toned skinned individuals, even when holding the level of education and place of residence constant. Asset ownership varies with age in a non-linear way:[13] the youngest age category reports owning many of the household goods, perhaps due to a lack of family responsibilities, being early adopters of technology, or because many of them still live at home or receive support from

[10] The analyses in this figure do not include the United States, Canada, or Uruguay because of missing values on some variables.

[11] In analyses not reported here we find that the average level of education among AmericasBarometer respondents has increased significantly since 2006, with the average respondent in 2014 reporting nearly half a year more schooling than did the average respondent in 2006, which reflects the expansion of education in recent decades (Cruces et al 2014) and the generational replacement as the younger, more educated generations come of age while the less educated generations drop out of the sample.

[12] In an analysis not reported here, we find that the largest correlates of respondents' educational attainment are their mother's education (which has by far the largest marginal effect-educated parents tend to have educated children), living in urban areas (rural areas tend to have lower average levels of education), gender (married women have lower average levels of education than do single women and single women have slightly lower levels of education than do single men although they are not significantly different than are married men), and age (younger respondents tend to be more educated).

[13] The reference category in the model is the 36-45 years-old category.

their parents. Household wealth then drops as respondents enter their late 20s and early 30s but increases with age until dropping among the oldest groups.

Wealth also differs across genders, although this gap is affected by marital status. We break respondents up into those who live in a household as part of a couple (marriage, common-law marriage, or civil union) and those who do not (single, separated, divorced, or widowed). Individuals living as a couple tend to have more resources than do those who are not. In further analysis we found that parents of children who do not live with another person tend to have fewer resources than do single individuals without children (and this is equally true for men and women) while men and women who are part of a couple and have kids tend to have more possessions than couples who do not have children. Yet among both single individuals and couples, men are more likely to report higher ownership of goods than women. The survey does not allow us to isolate why married women are less likely to report the same levels of *household* wealth as married men, given that we would expect the two groups on average to report the same levels of wealth. One explanation is suggested by a study done in Malawi on reporting of household wealth, which posits that women may be less likely to report ownership of an item if it is predominantly used by her husband (Miller, Msiyaphazi Zulu, and Cotts Watkins 2001).

In summary, these results remind us that across the Americas, as a whole, certain groups – the uneducated, darker skinned individuals, single individuals (especially single parents), women, and individuals living in rural areas still experience real disadvantages in accumulating household wealth despite recent improvements in overall wealth levels.

IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet

Though the data in Figure 2.2 display a clear upward trend in the ownership of household goods, households do not necessarily feel financially secure. Many households obtained these goods by going into debt, which leaves them struggling to make payments.[14] Moreover, rising aspirations may leave individuals unsatisfied even as they are better off (Easterlin 2001; Graham 2005). Thus, we move beyond objective measures of wealth to subjective measures of personal financial situations. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents how well their income allows them to cover their financial needs.

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**
(1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
(2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
(3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
(4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
(88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA

The citizens of the Americas are split almost equally between those who think that they can make ends meet and those who report that they are struggling to do so (Figure 2.4). These differences break down along objective wealth lines. In Figure 2.5, we divide the sample by quintiles of household wealth (measured within each country), using the series of questions about household goods ownership

[14] See dos Santos (2013) or Soederberg (2014) for a review of evidence about the expansion of credit markets. Also http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/niveles-preocupantes-llega-deuda-de-hogares-colombianos-articulo-304173 and http://www.cps.fgv.br/cps/bd/DD/DD_Neri_Fgv_TextoFim3_PRINC.pdf

following the approach by Córdova (2009). Over 29% of respondents in the lowest wealth category report they not only feel stretched but have a hard time making ends meet. This contrasts with less than 6% of those in the households with the most material benefits feeling they are in the same situation. Yet even in the highest wealth quintile, 3 out of every 10 individuals report that their income is not enough to comfortably meet their needs, and 53% of households in the median wealth quintile report that their income is not enough to meet their needs. Thus this question does not merely reflect income but also likely tracks the number of financial commitments households have taken on and the financial aspirations of different groups. At all levels of wealth across the Americas, on average, large numbers of individuals feel like they are financially stretched or worse.



Figure 2.4. Is The Household's Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014



Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014

If we look over time, the regional average across the hemisphere has hardly changed since 2006; outside of an increase in perceived security in 2012, the differences between years are fairly small (Figure 2.6). More importantly, the relative stability of respondents' perceptions of their household situations stands in contrast to the growth seen in the sheer number of material objects households have accumulated. While individuals in the Americas today own more things than ever before, they are feeling no more financially secure.

Levels of financial contentment at the household level vary across countries. Following LAPOP standard practices, answers to question Q10D are scored on a 0-100 scale, with high values representing greater ability to cover household expenses. In 2014 Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay have the highest level of individuals who feel like their income meets their needs, while Honduras and Haiti have the most individuals who report financial struggles (Figure 2.7). Since the question was asked in prior years, we can present a comparison between the 2014 results and those obtained in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In this analysis, we find that while Haiti had the lowest levels of subjective economic security in 2012, subjective household security in Honduras has fallen by more than 13 points on the 0-100 scale over the last 2 years as many more respondents report having difficulty making ends meet. Venezuela also saw the number of households who feel financially secure fall; the financial perceptions index is 11 points lower in 2014 than in 2012. Canada and Colombia, in contrast, were the only two countries that saw even a 2-point increase in subjective household finances over the past two years.



Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time



Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014

V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?

The citizens of the Americas offer mixed assessments of the national economy. In the AmericasBarometer survey respondents were asked how they perceived the recent performance of the national economy.

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

The most frequent response in 2014 was the economy was getting worse while relatively few respondents said the economy was getting better (Figure 2.8). This represents a sizable drop in economic assessments from the 2012 survey and, indeed, economic perceptions have not been this negative in the Americas since 2008 (Figure 2.9).



Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014



Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time

Citizen evaluations of the national economy vary substantially across countries (Map 2.1). To facilitate the interpretation of this question, we have recoded it on a 0-100 scale where high values represent a belief that the economy has gotten better. Respondents in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile have

the most positive views of their economy. Comparing these results for 2014 to those obtained from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we can report that each of these countries saw a fairly large increase in economic optimism; the economic assessment measure in Ecuador is eight points higher in 2014 than it was in 2012, while Bolivia and Chile each saw their economic perceptions score rise by more than 12 points. The other country where citizens view the economy much more positively in 2014 than two years ago is the Dominican Republic. In fact, economic assessments there changed from some of the most negative in 2012 to among the most positive in 2014. If we shift our attention to countries where respondents are the least positive in 2014, Venezuelans lead the region followed by Guatemalans, Argentines, and Mexicans. Venezuela also saw the largest drop in economic assessments (30 points) since the previous AmericasBarometer. For its part, Argentina saw a substantial drop of 26 points compared to two years ago. In total, 11 of the 25 countries in Map 2.1 have economic perception indexes that shrank by 10 points or more compared to 2012. Economic assessments are more negative than they were two years ago in 17 of the 25 countries.



Map 2.1. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014[15]

[15] The estimated economic perceptions score for each country in Map 2.1 is available in Appendix 2.2. For 2012 scores, see *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity (Seligson, Smith and Zechmeister 2012).*

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, widespread levels of economic pessimism are consistent with the weakening of many economies in the Americas. The IMF's April 2014 World Economic Outlook database projects that the average GDP growth for the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of the 2014 AmericasBarometer was 3.9% in 2013 and will be 3.3% in 2014, compared to the 4.3% growth rate the hemisphere averaged between 2010-2012. The IMF's projected inflation rate for the hemisphere in 2014 is 6.7%, an increase over the average inflation rates of 5.7 and 5.8 percent observed in 2012 and 2010 respectively. These estimates will be revised as more data become available, but they mirror the weakness that many AmericasBarometer respondents report.

Differences in economic opinions across countries often reflect differences in these macroeconomic indicators, although imperfectly. The Venezuelan economy, for example, is particularly weak, with the IMF forecasting a slight contraction in GDP for 2014 and inflation rates nearing 50% in 2014 (even after 1% growth in GDP and 40% inflation in 2013). Thus it is not surprising that Venezuelans hold the most negative views about the economy in the hemisphere in 2014. More generally, there is a positive association between the estimated GDP growth rate for the 12 months before the survey was conducted in each country and respondent's views of how their economy was doing compared to the previous year; a particularly high growth in Paraguay in 2013 as it recovered from a contracting economy in 2012 weakens the relationship somewhat (Figure 2.10).[16]



Figure 2.10. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014

Yet differences across countries cannot be fully explained by macroeconomic trends. Even if the cautious assessments of the economy in Paraguay likely reflect recent economic volatility, there are still some countries, like Guatemala, where respondents are particularly pessimistic given the state of

[16] Following Singer (2013) we estimate the growth rate in the 12 months before each survey by taking the weighted average of the previous year's growth rate and the current one, weighting them according to the number of months in 2014 that had passed when the bulk of respondents in each country completed the survey.

the economy and others, such as Ecuador, where assessments of the economy seem more positive than one might expect given recent economic trends and forecasts. Moreover, citizens within these countries do not necessarily agree on how well the economy is doing, a finding consistent with work showing citizen evaluations of the economy not only reflect economic factors but also their personal economic experiences (Duch et al. 2000) and other non-economic outcomes (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Duch and Kellstedt 2011).

In Figure 2.11 we model citizens' evaluations of the economy in 2014 as a function of the estimated GDP growth rate in the country, demographic factors, and non-economic factors like whether the respondent reports crimes in his or her neighborhood[17] and whether the respondent had to pay a bribe in the last 12 months.[18] Because the GDP growth variable is measured at the country level, this model is estimated using a hierarchical linear model.[19]

These data confirm a positive association between the estimated GDP growth and citizen evaluations of the economy. Yet they also confirm the notion that citizen assessments significantly differ along demographic lines. Wealthy and educate individuals tend to have more positive views of the national economy, perhaps because they are better positioned to capture the benefits of any eventual economic growth. Individuals who receive financial assistance from the government also hold positive assessments of the national economy. In contrast, women and individuals with darker skin tend to have more negative perceptions of how the national economy is performing. Previous waves of the AmericasBarometer showed women and darker skinned individuals experienced high levels of economic discrimination (Seligson et al. 2012) and the analysis presented previously in this chapter in Figure 2.3 remind us that these groups continue to face disadvantages in accumulating wealth. These structural disadvantages may be reflected in their negative views of the economy even after controlling for current levels of wealth. Yet other differences do not have as clear of an economic explanation. Young respondents, for example, tend to be more positive than older cohorts. Finally, despite higher levels of poverty in rural areas, rural residents tend to report that the national economy is doing better.

[17] Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1; this series asks if burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail had occurred in the respondent's neighborhood or not.

[18] See the discussion of this measure in Chapter 5; the measure is based on a series of questions to which respondents report being asked to provide a bribe (or not) to a government official, the police, a municipal government employee, in a court, to the military, in work, in a school, or in accessing public health care.

[19] As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.



Figure 2.11. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy,[20] 2014

The high levels of crime and corruption in the Americas also seem to be spilling over into respondent views of the national economy. Individuals who report that there have been crimes in their neighborhood are less likely to have a positive view of the economy. Bribery victims also tend to see the economy negatively. As poor governance affects citizens, it colors how they view the overall economic state of their country.

VI. Conclusion

Recent macroeconomic reports coming out of Latin America and the Caribbean have emphasized both the major improvements that have occurred in many countries and a risk of seeing these gains erased as economies slacken. The same mixed message emerges out of the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Household wealth continues to improve but many households struggle to meet basic needs. Large inequalities in access to these goods exist within societies, with historically excluded groups still lagging behind in their objective wealth. Finally, as the macroeconomic climate has worsened, and as many states struggle to fully combat crime and corruption, citizens have become pessimistic about their country's economic progress.

These data remind us of the challenges facing the hemisphere in furthering economic development. Room for improvement exists with regards to household access to sanitation and water. Education levels can continue to improve while darker skinned individuals, women, and rural residents need to be further incorporated into the economy. If the gains the Americas have achieved over the past decade are going to continue, new economic opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups are necessary. Additionally, improvements in the rule of law and clean government may both

[20] The analyses in this figure do not include the United States or Canada because of missing values on some variables. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.3 at the end of the chapter.

prevent money from exiting the market and also increase consumer confidence, further stimulating economic development.

These economic fluctuations may very well have implications beyond the economy. In particular, a classic viewpoint suggests that wealth is often positively correlated with the deepening of democratic values. If so, then the overall trends in economic development in the hemisphere should have a stabilizing force. Yet the high levels of economic insecurity that remain potentially place a strain on democracies as impoverished individuals and those who cannot make ends meet look for political actors who might be able to alleviate their economic pain. Moreover, a weak economy may also bring with it doubts about the efficacy of political institutions, although a normative commitment to democratic values may insulate democratic institutions from instability when the economy deteriorates. We examine these relationships in Chapter 5. But, before turning to that analysis, in the next chapter we look at another area of policy concern in the Americas – fighting corruption.

Appendix

Appendix 2.1. Coefficients for Figure 2.3-the Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.175*	(-22.82)
Man in a Couple	0.035*	(5.57)
Woman in a Couple	-0.014*	(-2.25)
Woman Living Alone	-0.042*	(-7.43)
Level of Education	0.346*	(59.08)
Skin Tone	-0.134*	(-19.55)
16-25 Years	-0.003	(-0.49)
26-35 Years	-0.018*	(-3.18)
46-55 Years	0.008	(1.55)
56-65 Years	0.020*	(3.79)
66 Years or Older	0.004	(0.74)
Guatemala	-0.060*	(-6.21)
El Salvador	-0.083*	(-9.45)
Honduras	-0.034*	(-3.04)
Nicaragua	-0.142*	(-15.57)
Costa Rica	0.119*	(13.25)
Panama	0.033*	(3.29)
Colombia	-0.012	(-1.18)
Ecuador	-0.039*	(-3.12)
Bolivia	-0.130*	(-8.53)
Peru	-0.077*	(-9.08)
Paraguay	0.022*	(2.83)
Chile	0.076*	(8.88)
Brazil	0.093*	(10.67)
Venezuela	0.052*	(5.38)
Argentina	0.058*	(8.11)
Dominican Republic	-0.010	(-0.86)
Haiti	-0.162*	(-11.86)
Jamaica	0.024*	(2.39)
Guyana	0.017	(1.38)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.143*	(18.17)
Belize	0.010	(1.23)
Constant	-0.102*	(-11.69)
Number of observations	33769	
Population size	29411.22	
Design df	1912	
F(32, 1881)	413.07*	
R^2	0.3952	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics Based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Uruguay, the United States, and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Appendix 2.2. Estimated Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014. Empirical Basis for Map 2.1



Appendix 2.3. Coefficients for Figure 2.12-Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(Z Statistic)
GDP Growth Rate (Estimated)	0.178*	(2.19)
Rural	0.018*	(2.82)
Woman	-0.060*	(-10.48)
Wealth Quintile	0.041*	(6.65)
Level of Education	0.037*	(5.16)
Skin Tone	-0.015*	(-2.18)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.035*	(6.13)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	-0.031*	(-5.32)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	-0.023*	(-3.92)
16-25 Years	0.038*	(5.23)
26-35 Years	0.020*	(2.79)
46-55 Years	0.000	(-0.03)
56-65 Years	0.003	(0.43)
66 Years or Older	-0.008	(-1.30)
Constant	-0.094	(-0.50)
var(Country-Level)	0.104	
var(Individual-Level)	0.901	
Number of groups	23	
Wald $\chi^2(14)$	385.25*	
Hierarchical Linear Model with z-Statistics in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

While corruption trails crime and the economy as public priorities in the Americas (see Figure 1.4), it remains a major problem in the hemisphere. For example, a recent analysis looking at various indicators of government success in fighting corruption compiled by the World Bank[1] finds, on average, Latin America's governments are less successful at fighting corruption than their counterparts in Western Europe and North America and trail Eastern Europe in promoting clean government (Mungiu-Pippidi, Martinez, and Vaz Mondo 2013). Latin America has comparable levels of corruption with Asia and has less corruption, again on average, than Sub-Saharan Africa and the members of the former Soviet Union. Yet corruption levels vary substantially across the hemisphere, with some countries ranking among the cleanest in the world while in neighboring countries bribery is a part of many citizens' everyday lives.

The failure to prevent officials from misusing their power for personal gain can have deleterious economic and social consequences. Economists have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth (Ugur 2014) and wealth distribution (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).[2] Because corruption diverts funds from public programs' intended beneficiaries, it lowers the efficiency and quality of public services (Shleifer and Vichny 1993; Ehrlich and Lui 1999). The result may be higher death rates (Silverson and Johnson 2014). Of course corruption undermines the egalitarian administration of justice (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pharr 2000; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Morris 2008; Fried, Lagunes, and Venkataramani 2010). Some have further suggested that corruption erodes social capital by making its victims less trusting of their fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Eek 2009).

Corruption also generates political costs. It has been shown to reduce citizen engagement in politics (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Chong et al. 2011; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2013) and hamper support for democratic institutions and democracy more generally (Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011). Indeed, some scholars argue that political governance outcomes like corruption have a larger impact on democratic stability than economic outcomes (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001).

Thus in this chapter we document how respondents in the 2014 AmericasBarometer perceived and experienced corruption. We focus on two related but distinct dimensions: whether or not the respondent was asked to pay a bribe to obtain services and if they perceive public officials as corrupt. These complimentary dimensions capture two different facets of corruption: measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government can also track grand corruption, such as national scandals, with which respondents have no personal experience. Furthermore, citizens often have different tolerances when it comes to what kinds of activities undertaken by public officials they consider corrupt (Treisman 2007;

[1] The AmericasBarometer is one of the indicators used by the World Bank when generating its governance indicators. See www.govindicators.org/.
[2] Although Latin America may have a different pattern; see Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010).

Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). That is, these two types of questions provide windows into two different forms of governance failures, both of which can have negative consequences for democracy in the Americas.

Despite the differences in these indicators, the data confirm corruption in all of its forms is common across Latin America. Levels of perceived political corruption are high and have not significantly improved since the 2012 AmericasBarometer, though several countries have seen significant swings. Corruption victimization is also widespread among the population, although certain groups are more likely to be exposed than others. We conclude by considering whether respondents in the Americas are so accustomed to corruption that they have become acclimated to paying bribes. The one piece of good news is that the vast majority of 2014 AmericasBarometer respondents report that paying a bribe is never justifiable, even if they themselves had to pay a bribe in the last year. While this suggests the region's residents have not abandoned a commitment to clean governance, the failure of so many regimes to fully prevent corruption may have negative consequences for levels of political support for democracy and its institutions.

II. Main Findings

The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, with regards to key findings, we see the following patterns:

- In an average country in the hemisphere, roughly one in five AmericasBarometer respondents paid a bribe in the last year.
- Bribery victimization is reported at particularly high levels among citizens who have engaged with municipal governments, courts, and the police.
- Region-average bribe victimization levels are unchanged from 2012.
- Bribe victimization levels vary by country, with Haiti an extreme outlier.
- Most respondents think corruption is common among public officials, with average perceived corruption levels unchanged from previous years.
- While one in six AmericasBarometer survey respondents believe that paying a bribe can be justified in some circumstances, that number is much higher among those who paid a bribe during the year prior to the survey.
- Yet even among those who paid a bribe, the vast majority does not believe bribes are justifiable.

Second, we consider the factors that lead citizens to have different levels of exposure to corruption and perceptions of how common it is. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Bribery victimization is more common for men, in urban areas, in places where crime is common, and for the middle aged.

- Bribery victimization is generally more common for wealthy respondents but also among individuals who receive financial assistance from the government.
- Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, wealthy respondents, and educated respondents are more likely to believe that the government is corrupt.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

The AmericasBarometer surveys have employed over time a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, focusing specifically on bribery because this is the form that is most common for average citizens. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking direct questions such as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions). By asking about the variety of ways in which individuals interact with government, the data provide an extensive snapshot of the forms corruption can take.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	**No**	**Yes**	**DK**	**DA**
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] **EXC20**. In the last twelve months, did any **soldier or military officer** ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

In Figure 3.1 we break down responses to these questions in two ways; the left figure displays the average percentage of respondents that reported being asked for at least one bribe in each setting to measure the overall scope of different types of corruption victimization.[3] Yet these numbers are affected by two factors: how frequently do interactions in each setting result in citizens being asked for a bribe and the frequency with which citizens have interactions in each of the settings the survey asks about. Since we also asked respondents about their interactions with different offices and institutions, we can also directly gauge the percentage of respondents whose interactions gave them the opportunity to be targeted for corruption subsequently paid a bribe. The right side of the figure thus looks at the number of people who were asked to pay a bribe in each setting as a percentage of the people who had relevant interactions. The questions about bribe requests from the police, soldiers, and government employees do not ask if respondents had any dealings with these officials and so the estimated percentages for these three categories are constant across the two parts of the figure.

The data in Figure 3.1 demonstrate the wide range of arenas where bribery occurs. For example, in the full population the most common corruption experiences occur with the police, as 10% of respondents reported a police officer asking them for a bribe in the past year. If we restrict our attention to individuals who actually had experiences with various public entities, however, we see they experience bribe requests in some settings at a significantly higher rate. For example, only 1.5% of the overall sample reported being asked for a bribe in court in the 12 months before the survey. Yet being required to present oneself in court is relatively rare – only 1 in 11 respondents had any dealings with courts in that period – but among those individuals who actually were in court, 14% were asked to pay a bribe. We see a similar pattern with corruption in the process of dealing with municipal government employees: while very few individuals had to process a document with the municipal government in the 12 months before the survey and thus only 2.9% of respondents reported being requested to pay a bribe, among those individuals who did try to process paperwork with the municipal government, 14.5% were asked for a bribe. Over 10% of individuals with children in school were asked for a bribe related to education while nearly 8% of respondents who accessed public health services were targeted. Although most interactions with public officials do not involve corruption, it is a fairly common element of citizen-state interaction in the Americas.

[3] As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers in each figure represent the percentages who were asked for a bribe in each setting in an average country in the hemisphere. The data in Figure 3.1 include the United States and Canada



Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014

As we consider the wide range of activities in which corruption plays a part, citizens of the Americas have multiple opportunities to be targeted for corruption and many people are being asked to pay bribes each year. From this battery of questions we can then build a summary index of whether or not a person was asked for a bribe in at least one of these settings.[4] In an average country, just under 1 in 5 AmericasBarometer respondents reported paying at least one bribe in the last 12 months (Figure

[4] The measure, labeled CORVIC in the dataset documentation, looks at the percentage of the total sample that was asked for a bribe and does not adjust for whether or not individuals had any contact with government or other relevant officials in the past year. While most of the questions in the module refer specifically to interactions with government officials or institutions, it is possible that some of the corruption reported in this overall measure, CORVIC, relates to bribe solicitation by individuals who are not public officials.

3.2).[5] This rate of corruption experiences is virtually unchanged from 2012 and is not significantly different from corruption levels in 2008 or 2006 (Figure 3.3).[6]



Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014

[5] The data in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 include the United States and Canada. If we exclude those two countries, the regional average level of corruption victimization increases slightly to 20.5% for 2014. 2004 has slightly higher corruption than 2006 does because the 2004 sample had fewer countries and includes countries where corruption victimization is more common. Yet if we look only at countries that have been in the sample since 2004, the same pattern of corruption declining over time and then increasing in 2012 occur. Corruption victimization levels increase somewhat, however, in the countries that were not part of the 2004 sample while they have decreased in the Central American and Andean countries that were the emphasis of the first AmericasBarometer survey.

[6] While 2004 saw significantly higher levels of corruption experiences that any other year in Figure 3.3, this is caused by the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey being limited to Mexico, Central America, and the Central Andes where corruption is slightly more common than in the rest of the hemisphere.



Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time

Yet these hemisphere averages mask large differences across countries (Figure 3.4). Haiti has the highest level of corruption victimization by a considerable margin; over two-thirds of Haitian respondents were asked to pay a bribe in the 12 months before being surveyed. Many of these corruption experiences in Haiti occur as citizens try to access social services; Haiti is actually right below the regional mean for police bribery requests but is an outlier for bribery occurring in schools, public health services, and work settings.[7] Bolivia has the second highest level of bribery victimization (30%). Yet this represents a significant drop from 2012 when nearly 45% of Bolivians were corruption victims.[8] Ecuador also saw a double-digit drop in corruption victimization from the 2012 poll, from nearly 41% to 26%. In contrast, Paraguay, Venezuela, Belize, and Panama all saw corruption victimization rates increase by seven percentage points or more since 2012. This moved Paraguay and Venezuela from around the hemispheric average to among the highest rates and moved Belize and Panama from comparatively low levels of corruption to around the regional average. The United States, Chile, Uruguay, and Canada have the lowest levels of corruption.

[7] For example, 49% of Haitian respondents, and 74% of respondents with students in school, paid a bribe in a school in the 12 months before the survey. If we look at health care, 33% of all respondents and 76% of those who said they visited a health care facility paid a bribe as part of that process.

[8] Corruption data from 2012 are not reported here but are available from Singer et. al (2012) or the LAPOP website.



Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014

To understand which individuals are most likely to be targeted for bribes, we model the summary variable of whether or not the respondents were asked for at least one bribe (the measure presented in Figure 3.2) with logistic regression. Just as in previous chapters, we focus on the demographic characteristics of the respondent and whether he or she lives in an urban or rural area. We also look at two features that might be related to respondents being in a position where corrupt interactions are likely to occur. First is whether or not the respondent received financial assistance from the government (excluding pensions or social security) to test if that interaction with the state places respondents at risk of being solicited for a bribe.[9] Second, we model whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood where a crime occurred to test if corruption victimization is more likely to

[9] Measured from the question WF1: "Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security? Yes or No"

occur in places where the rule of law is objectively weaker.[10] As we model these differences, we include country fixed effects to control for any unmeasured differences across countries, as such the estimated effects in the figure explain differences in likely corruption victimization within countries.[11]

The results of this model in Figure 3.5 show that groups differ significantly in their exposure to corruption.[12] In interpreting these differences, it is important to remember that while several surveys specifically ask about officials requesting bribes, the questions do not ask if the respondent played any role in initiating the bribe. The survey does not attempt to determine between these two scenarios because many people will lie if asked if they offered the bribe (Kray and Murrell 2013). Yet in considering why some groups experience corruption more often than others, we should not discount the possibility that group diversity reflects differences in the shares of individuals that are willing to offer a bribe as well as differences in which groups are targeted by officials. Differences across groups can also potentially reflect differences in the frequency with which groups interact with specific institutions or government officials.

For example, corruption experiences break down on gender lines. Men are more likely to report being asked for a bribe than women. Yet across the types of corruption measured by the survey, we find exceptions to this pattern: corruption victims in schools and healthcare are slightly more likely to be female than male.[13] This difference in corruption victimization patterns across settings does not occur because officials in education and health are particularly targeting women but rather because women were more likely to be users of these services. In fact, among users of these services, men and women are equally likely to be asked for bribes. Yet in the other forms of corruption we study men were more likely to pay bribes than women, even when we take into account differences in government and societal interactions across genders.

Within the Americas, solicitation of bribes is also more common among wealthy respondents. These individuals have the most to offer officials and thus are either frequently targeted for bribes, more frequently offer to pay bribes, or both. Educated individuals also are asked to pay more bribes. At the same time we see that individuals who receive welfare, who are overwhelmingly concentrated among poor individuals, are also significantly more likely to have been targeted for a bribe than non-welfare recipients. The implication may be that, in many parts of the Americas, the process of obtaining and maintaining welfare benefits involves corruption.

[10] Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1 that asked about burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail.

[11] The United States and Canada are excluded from this analysis because they are missing at least one of the questions used as controls.

[12] As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. Coefficients are standardized. The full set of coefficients is available in Appendix 3.1 at the end of the chapter.

[13] We do not present the results of this analysis here but they are available from the authors upon request.



Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014

Furthermore, people who live in high crime areas appear to be more likely targets for bribes. Further data analysis demonstrates that high-crime areas are, not surprisingly, highly correlated with being asked to pay bribes to policemen. Perhaps more surprising is that other forms of corruption are also correlated with respondents who live in high-crime neighborhoods. While we cannot state with any certainty whether high crime causes corruption, is caused by corruption, or both factors have common underlying causes, the breakdown of public security in parts of the Americas goes hand in hand with a broader weakness in the quality of governance. Finally, corruption victimization is more common in urban areas and is concentrated among respondents in the middle-age categories. There is no evidence that those with darker skin tones are more likely to be asked to pay bribes.

In summary, as we look across the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, the 2014 AmericasBarometer reminds us that while bribery may vary somewhat across groups and across countries, it is routine in many parts of the hemisphere.

IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?

Given the frequency with which respondents are asked to pay bribe, we might suspect many people in the hemisphere, even those who personally were not asked for a bribe, will believe that corruption is common. Moreover, the Americas are not immune to scandals involving high-level government officials (Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Thus it is instructive to look beyond personal experiences to see how citizens of the Americas perceive corruption generally.

The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents to consider the prevalence of corruption among public officials.[14] Specifically, respondents are asked:

[14] This question was not asked in Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read]
(1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Following standard LAPOP procedures, responses to this question (EXC7) are re-coded on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is "very uncommon" and 100 represents the perception that corruption is "very common."

The average citizen of the Americas is convinced that corruption is common among public officials, and just under 80% of respondents said that corruption was either very common or common among public officials, with respondents being equally split between the two categories (Figure 3.6). The average public evaluation of corruption in 2014 is unchanged from 2012 (Figure 3.7). In fact, over the years, the AmericasBarometer survey has found persistent agreement that corruption is common among government officials; in every wave since 2006 the combined percentage of respondents who think corruption is somewhat or very common is between 79.9 and 80.9 percent. While there is variation in the number of people who consider corruption to be very common compared to merely being common, the data consistently show few residents of the Americas believe that their government is uncorrupt.



Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014



Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time

Just as with corruption experiences, there is substantial variation across countries in how governments are perceived (see Figure 3.8). Respondents in Canada, Haiti, and Uruguay were the least likely to describe their government as corrupt in 2014. Yet even in these countries over 68% of respondents said that corruption was either common or very common. A number of countries have very high levels of perceived corruption, led by Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina.

It is worth highlighting that the countries where respondents report having frequently paid bribes (as tracked by Figure 3.4 above) are not necessarily the ones where governments are perceived as being corrupt in Figure 3.8. This difference is illustrated in Figure 3.9, which plots the average perceived levels of government corruption and the percentage of respondents who were asked at least once for a bribe in the 12 months before the survey. The largest difference is in Haiti; while Haiti has by far the highest rate of individual-level corruption victimization in the hemisphere, it has the second lowest level of perceived government corruption in the hemisphere. This may be because bribery in Haiti is frequently occurring in settings like the workplace, schools, or hospitals that many respondents do not necessarily connect to "the government" even if these tend to be public institutions. Yet Haiti is not the only exception and that difference is clear in the bottom figure of Figure 3.9 where we exclude Haiti (an outlier with regard to the level of corruption victimization) to make the differences within the rest of the sample clear. Perceived levels of government corruption in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras are also substantially lower than one would expect given the frequency of citizens reporting paying bribes in those countries. Colombia, Argentina, Guyana, and Jamaica, in contrast, all have levels of reported corruption victimization that are below the hemisphere average but rank in the top seven countries where citizens perceive that corruption is common among government officials. As we noted above, the discrepancy between perceived levels of corruption and reported corruption rates is a common pattern in corruption studies because measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government often also track grand corruption such as national scandals that respondents do not have personal experience with as well as different tolerances for what kinds of activities are considered corrupt.



Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014



Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014

Yet within countries, individuals who were asked to pay a bribe in the last year are more likely to say that corruption is common among government officials. Figure 3.10 is an ordered logistic analysis of corruption perceptions, with high values on the dependent variable representing the perception that corruption is very common. The model includes dummy variables for each country, so

again the results should be read as explaining differences within countries not necessarily across them.[15]



Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Goverment Corruption, 2014

We see above that there is a weak correspondence at the country level between the bribery victimization and perceptions of government corruption. Yet if we look within countries, individuals who were targeted for bribery in the last year judge their public officials as more corrupt than their counterparts. Personal experiences with corruption, on average, spillover into broad evaluations of political corruption even if the two concepts do not perfectly coincide.

Of course one does not have to be directly affected by corruption to believe corruption is common. The other correlates of perceived government corruption are similar to those of corruption victimization. Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, and respondents who are comparatively wealthy, educated, and old are more likely to believe the government is corrupt even after controlling for these individuals' personal experiences with being asked to pay bribes. And although citizens who receive government assistance are more likely targets for bribery, they are *less* likely to believe the government is corrupt. Further analysis suggests this occurs because these individuals are more likely to support the government. Once we control for government approval, there is no significant association between receiving welfare benefits and corruption perceptions.

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?

So far our analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2014 survey suggests that levels of corruption victimization are high in the hemisphere and perceptions that the government is corrupt are

[15] The coefficients are standardized-the full specification of the model is available in Appendix 3.2 at the end of the chapter.

widespread. In such circumstances, the worry is that citizens might begin to consider corruption a natural part of politics. Several recent studies have suggested individuals can see corruption as necessary to grease bureaucratic wheels, particularly when regulatory agencies are inefficient (Méon and Weill 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2011). There is also some evidence the negative effects of corruption on respondent well-being become attenuated in high corruption contexts as citizens adapt to their reality or begin to see it as one of the costs of doing business (Graham 2011). Thus the questions become whether citizens of the Americas believe that bribery is an acceptable practice and, in particular, whether those who engage in it are more likely to justify it.

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about whether bribes can ever be justified.[16]

	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?	0	1	88	98

The percentage of people who think bribes can be justified – 16% (Figure 3.11) – is roughly the same as the number of people who were asked for bribes. The percentage is significantly higher, however, among those individuals who actually paid a bribe in the last year (Figure 3.12): almost 1 in 3 individuals who paid a bribe thought that paying a bribe could be justified compared to the 1 in 8 among those who did not pay a bribe.[17]

In analyses not presented here, we model which individuals were most likely to believe paying a bribe was justifiable. Corruption justification is more frequent among individuals who are younger, are male, and live in urban areas. It is more common among the wealthiest members of society. Individuals who reported that a crime occurred in their neighborhood are more likely to believe corruption could be justified as well. These differences exist regardless of whether or not the respondent was asked for a bribe and so they do not reflect differences in groups being targeted for bribery subsequently justifying that behavior. Yet if we compare bribery justification across those who were targeted for bribes and those who did not, an important pattern emerges: individuals who were targeted for a bribe and who get government assistance are more likely to find corruption justifiable than other bribery victims (Figure 3.13), which may imply that some see a connection between the bribe they paid and the benefits they receive and feel justified in their actions.[18] All of these data suggest that corruption can create an atmosphere where corruption is more likely to be tolerated (see also Carlin 2013).

[16] This question was not asked in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.
[17] Research on the 2012 AmericasBarometer comes to a similar conclusion (see Carlin 2013).
[18] In analysis not reported here, we model bribe justification as a function of the control variables in Figure 3.10 and interact corruption victimization and receiving government assistance and find that the two variables significantly modify their effect-the gap between corruption victims and non-victims is significantly ($p<0.05$) larger among those who got help from the government than among the general population.



Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014



Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014



Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014

Yet we should not overlook the fact that *most* individuals – over 68% – who had to pay a bribe in the last year still believe it is *never* justifiable to pay a bribe. In other words, most citizens in the Americas reject bribery despite its prevalence in society and politics even as they may be in a position where they feel compelled to pay a bribe. Thus many citizens of the Americas may be offended by the corruption that pervades their society and this, in turn, may lead to them have negative views of democratic institutions. Analyses in the chapters to follow will address this possibility.

VI. Conclusion

Corruption has pernicious economic, social, and political effects. Yet despite progress in reducing corruption in some countries, corruption remains widespread in many countries in the Americas. On average, 1 in 5 citizens reported paying a bribe in the last year, with those bribes being paid in many different settings. Perhaps more disconcertingly, at least 68% of respondents in every country in which the survey was conducted in 2014 think that corruption is somewhat or very common among government officials in their country. In most countries that percentage is higher. While most citizens do not believe bribery can ever be justified, many citizens do and this is particularly true for those who have been involved in corrupt exchanges.

Thus the AmericasBarometer survey reminds us that citizens are frequently experiencing corruption in their daily lives and perceive it to be widespread at the elite level. The relative consistency of aggregate bribery rates and corruption perceptions across waves of the survey serve as reminders of the severity of these problems in the hemisphere. What worries democrats in the region is that, if left unchecked, corruption could undermine support for democracy itself. To address this

concern, Chapter 4 explores how corruption affects trust in local governments while Chapter 5 looks at how corruption (among other variables) affects attitudes towards the national political system.

Appendix

Appendix 3.1. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014
(Figure 3.5)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.097*	(-4.51)
Woman	-0.262*	(-16.57)
Level of Education	0.081*	(3.88)
Wealth Quintile	0.132*	(6.68)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.081*	(4.77)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.326*	(17.12)
Skin Tone	-0.040	(-1.80)
16-25 Years	-0.090*	(-4.47)
26-35 Years	0.006	(0.28)
46-55 Years	-0.037	(-2.02)
56-65 Years	-0.089*	(-4.54)
66 Years or Older	-0.189*	(-8.57)
Guatemala	-0.056*	(-2.46)
El Salvador	-0.254*	(-9.39)
Honduras	-0.041	(-1.59)
Nicaragua	-0.177*	(-7.73)
Costa Rica	-0.166*	(-5.94)
Panama	-0.102*	(-3.11)
Colombia	-0.223*	(-8.68)
Ecuador	-0.065*	(-2.04)
Bolivia	0.029	0.89)
Peru	-0.032	(-1.49)
Paraguay	0.005	(0.29)
Chile	-0.364*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	-0.307*	(-12.16)
Brazil	-0.203*	(-7.15)
Venezuela	-0.049*	(-2.03)
Argentina	-0.120*	(-5.27)
Dominican Republic	-0.082*	(-3.22)
Haiti	0.393*	(15.17)
Jamaica	-0.237*	(-10.32)
Guyana	-0.124*	(-4.80)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.225*	(-9.03)
Belize	-0.059*	(-3.46)
Constant	-1.448*	(-63.98)
Number of observations	29123	
Population size	25866.08	
Design df	1969	
F(34, 1936)	55.79*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are not included in the model because of missing observations on at least one variable.

Appendix 3.2. Factors Associated with Perceived Goverment Corruption, 2014 (Figure 3.10)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	0.076*	(5.00)
Rural	-0.083*	(-4.72)
Woman	-0.044*	(-3.51)
Level of Education	0.128*	(7.68)
Wealth Quintile	0.083*	(5.60)
Received Assistance From the Government	-0.034*	(-2.40)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.123*	(8.58)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.27)
16-25 Years	-0.103*	(-6.55)
26-35 Years	-0.003	(-0.17)
46-55 Years	0.007	(0.45)
56-65 Years	0.024	(1.51)
66 Years or Older	0.054*	(3.69)
Guatemala	-0.043*	(-1.99)
El Salvador	-0.070*	(-3.45)
Honduras	-0.082*	(-3.69)
Nicaragua	-0.094*	(-4.52)
Panama	-0.095*	(-4.67)
Colombia	0.082*	(3.35)
Ecuador	-0.175*	(-6.03)
Bolivia	-0.136*	(-4.38)
Peru	0.035	(1.79)
Paraguay	0.062*	(3.07)
Uruguay	-0.151*	(-7.92)
Venezuela	0.040	(1.93)
Argentina	0.028	(1.58)
Dominican Republic	0.052*	(2.10)
Haiti	-0.156*	(-6.50)
Jamaica	0.047*	(2.27)
Guyana	0.055*	(2.32)
Belize	0.005	(0.27)
Cut1	-3.212	(-74.48)
Cut2	-1.429	(-50.13)
Cut3	0.404	(15.59)
Number of Interviews	22124	
Population size	20675.9	
Design df	1354	
F(31, 1324)	32.32*	
Ordered Logit with Standard errors Adjusted for Survey design in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The model does not include Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, or Canada because these countries have missing observations on at least one variable in the model.

Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas

Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

When citizens interact with the state they do so far more frequently with representatives and officials of the local, rather than national or even regional, governments. For residents of the Americas, therefore, local government performance, responsiveness, and trustworthiness are central factors in the legitimacy of the political system. Furthermore, the performance of local services has crucial and material impacts on people's quality of life. Because of the recognition of the importance of local government, significant resources from international organizations and national governments have been used to further fiscal and political decentralization. This chapter examines a series of questions to assess citizens' view of their local government and its services and to measure community participation in the Americas. In particular, how often do they interact with their local government? How well do they evaluate those interactions? What are the trends over the past decade in evaluations of local government and services? Do national factors affect evaluations of local government?

While the local-level of government is often where citizens interact directly with the state, the power of local governments varies substantially within and across the countries of the hemisphere. In some places local authorities have significant resources, lawmaking prerogatives, and administrative power, while other local authorities have little political and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. A core premise motivating this chapter is that local government can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole, a point that is demonstrated in Chapter 5.

II. Main Findings of this Chapter

This chapter examines three key aspects of citizen engagement with local government vis-à-vis the AmericasBarometer survey. The first is participation in local government affairs and community activities. Key findings around these issues are:

- In 2014 citizen participation in local government meetings reached a new low, with only 1 in 10 having attended a meeting in the past 12 months.
- More citizens made demands of their local officials than any time since 2006.
- Those most satisfied and those least satisfied with local services were most likely to attend local government meetings (compared to those with middling levels of satisfaction).
- Citizens in formally federal countries were more likely to make demands on their local government.

A second aspect of the chapter is evaluations of local services:

- Satisfaction with local services in general, and several specific ones, remains fair with most respondents viewing service provision as "neither good, nor bad."
- Evaluations of public schools in the Americas declined somewhat between the 2012 and 2014 waves.
- Over the same period average evaluations of public health care increased (and evaluations of roads was unchanged).

The final section of the chapter looks at citizen trust in local governments:

- Region-average trust in local government reached a new low in 2014.
- Evaluations of local services are strongly correlated with trust in local government.
- Being a victim of corruption is negatively related to trust in local government.
- Perception of insecurity is also negatively related to trust in local government and is at its highest level since 2006.

The rest of the chapter focuses on three main aspects of local government and participation. First, we look at how and how often citizens in the Americas interact with their local governments and help improve their community. The section finishes with a focus on the individual factors related to when people make demands. We then turn to citizens' evaluations of local services (roads, schools, and health care) along with the individual-level factors related to citizen evaluations of these services. Finally, we look at levels of trust in municipalities over time and in select countries as well as its individual-level correlates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the patterns of interaction, support, and evaluations of the level of government most proximate to citizens.

III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). It has occurred simultaneously with the "third wave" of democratization in the hemisphere (Huntington 1991), fostering an environment of both strengthened local governments and widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level. However, there is significant variation in the success and extent of decentralization and subnational democratization (Benton 2012).

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of decentralization's influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study of Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest needs in education, sanitation, and agriculture (Faguet 2008). Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth (Akai and Sakata 2002). Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal decentralization in

government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators (Fisman and Gatti 2002).

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly (Bardhan 2002). Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005). Moreover, as Van Cott (2008) argues, the success of local democracy often depends on whether the decentralization process was a bottom-driven (as opposed to top-down), the presence of effective mayoral leadership, party cohesiveness, and a supportive civil society. Relatedly, Falleti (2010) forcefully argues that the nature and extent of decentralization in a particular Latin American country is due to the territorial and partisan interests of elites at the time reforms were implemented. In total, the extant literature is mixed at best with regard to the effectiveness and extent of decentralization in the region.

The performance of local government may not only be about the quality of service provision to citizens and political participation by residents, but also have the potential to affect trust in democratic institutions and support for democratic norms. Since many citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences may be central to shaping trust decisions and democratic attitudes. In this chapter and the next we look at these linkages because a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). Weitz-Shapiro (2008) also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole. According to her study, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Jones-West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. (Jones-West 2011) Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.

If local government performance and participation are central to democratic legitimacy, as we argue, then inclusion at the local-level of minorities and women is crucial for representation and the quality of democracy generally. A pivotal question in this realm is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests (Hirschmann 1970). Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation (Hayek 1945). If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups (Jones-West 2011).

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results (Pape 2007, 2008). Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies (Patterson 2002). West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government. The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found no relationship between gender and skin tone (a proxy for minority status), respectively, and which individuals made demands on local officials. However, the 2012 report did find significant linkages between trust in the local government and gender (positive) and darker skin tones (negative). In this chapter we explore if these are stable patterns or whether, instead, new or altered linkages have developed between local governments and women and minorities.

In the next section of the chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, when they make demands of their leaders, how they evaluate local political institutions, and if they participate in local community building. We focus on indicators of two types of direct participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*, and one indirect: *working to solve community problems*. We compare the extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2014 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). We also seek to understand the main determinants of the two types of governmental participation, with an emphasis on local government performance and racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services and trends in these evaluations. Finally, we examine trust in local government and seek to understand which citizens in the Americas trust their local governments to a greater or lesser extent.

We note that previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys, including the 2012 regional report, has examined in detail some of these phenomena, and that research stands as an additional resource for those interested in these topics (Montalvo 2009a; 2009b; 2010).

IV. Local Level Participation

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**

Local Meeting Attendance

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? Using all countries, Figure 4.1 shows levels of local participation in the Americas since 2004.[1] The first waves of the surveys were a high-water mark for participation in local government meetings. Since then, the rate of participation has remained fairly steady until 2014, with about 11% of people taking part in municipal meetings between the years 2008 and 2012. However, the most recent wave of the AmericasBarometer finds a new low point for public participation in local government. In the past two years there has been a significant one percentage-point drop in the local government meeting participation, a greater than 8% decline in the region-wide average for participation.[2]



Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014

Figure 4.2 uses the 2014 AmericasBarometer data to display, for each country, the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see wide variation in the rate of citizen participation in municipal meetings across countries. As in the 2012 survey, the highest participation rates in 2014 are found in Haiti and the United States. While Haiti still has the highest rates, it has declined substantially from 2012 (21.2% attendance rate), with previous high value likely linked to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated country following the massive earthquake in 2010. Again, Chile, Panama, and Argentina have some of the lowest participation rates. Participation rates are not directly tied to the level of decentralization in a country. While Panama and Chile are both unitary systems, and thus more likely to have weaker and less consequential local governments, Argentina has a strong and extensive federal system. Overall, some of Latin America's strongest federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) rate among the bottom third in terms of local-level participation. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that – per the

[1] Following LAPOP conventions, all countries in the region are weighted equally, regardless of their population size.
[2] Figure 4.1, and all the over-time figures presented in the chapter (unless otherwise noted), would look roughly the same if we examine only the 22 countries that have been surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

2014 AmericasBarometer – there is no significant relationship between formal political federalism and the rate of municipal meeting attendance.



Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Demand Making on Local Government

While attending municipal meetings is a crucial way for citizens to engage their local governments, another important point of interaction is when citizens make demands of their local officials. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer allows us to examine both activities. How has local demand making changed over time? In Figure 4.3, unlike Figure 4.1, we find some potentially encouraging patterns. In 2014 citizen demand making on local government reaches its highest level

since 2006. The optimistic view of this change is that citizens feel that asking their local government for changes is a potentially effective route to remedy problems. However, it is also possible to see this increase in a more negative light if increased demands are the result of local government having declining performance. As we will argue below, both interpretations appear to be accurate.



Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014

Figure 4.4 shows a significant difference in the percentage of citizens in each country who have made a request or demand to a person or agency in local government in the past year. As with local meeting attendance, the rate of demand making on local governments varies significantly across the region. With the aftermath of the Haitian 2010 earthquake fading, Haiti went from the top spot in 2012 (21.3%) to some of the lowest demand-making levels. The top three countries, and Ecuador, all saw substantial increases (+4-6 percentage points) in demand making. In most of the other countries in the Americas between 10 and 16% of respondents claimed to have made a demand on local government. Unlike with meeting attendance, the variance across countries in demand making in 2014 is correlated with political federalism.[3] Demand making is about one percentage point greater in federal than unitary countries.

[3] We follow Lijphart's (2012) approach and code as politically federal those countries whose constitutions specifically declare themselves federal and provide for strong, elected regional governments.



Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014

To understand which types of individuals are most likely to make demands of local government we look at key individual experiences, evaluations, and socio-demographic factors using logistic regression with country fixed effects. Figure 4.5 shows that older citizens, those with higher levels of educational attainment, those who live in rural areas, and women are more likely to make demands. So are, intriguingly, corruption victims and those who attend local government meetings. Of all the factors, attending local meetings is most strongly linked to demand making. A person who has attended a municipal meeting in the last year is 32% more likely to make a demand on municipal government, indicating that many individuals who ask things of their municipality do so via formal channels (see Figure 4.5 below).

Wealthier citizens are generally less likely to make demands. As we discuss below, both the most and least satisfied with services make more demands. Demand making generally increases with

age until people become elderly, at which point the likelihood of making a demand decreases, fitting a large literature on life cycles and political participation.



Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014[4]

In Figure 4.6 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand making on local government, on one hand, and attending local government meetings, corruption victimization, place of residence, and satisfaction with local services on the other hand. The bar chart in the top left in Figure 4.6 clearly shows that those who are active in local government, indicated by attending municipal meetings, are more likely to make demands of local government. Victims of corruptions are also more likely to make demands of local government; however, we are unable to tell if this is because they demand less corruption or if interaction with the state (by making demands) brings them into opportunities for corruption to occur. Both are possible, but the data cannot distinguish between the two potential processes (and both can be occurring simultaneously).

The bottom row (left side) shows respondents who reside in rural areas are more likely to make demands of their local government. Thus, social and/or geographic distance between the respondent and local government influence demand making.

The bottom right of Figure 4.6 shows a bimodal relationship between satisfaction with services and demand making. As Figure 4.5 shows, on average the more satisfied are less likely to make demands; however, we see in Figure 4.6 that this interpretation should be amended. Like the least satisfied with services, the most satisfied are also more likely to make demands. The bimodal relationship also is present in a multivariate analysis.

[4] For this regression analysis, like all others in the chapter, the United States and Canada are excluded from the sample. And tabular results for each of the regression analyses are in the chapter appendix.



Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014

Not all citizen participation at the local level is via the local government. To help improve their communities, some citizens work through community organizations instead of, or in addition to, governmental pathways. To get a more general grasp on the pattern of citizen engagement in their local communities the AmericasBarometer includes the following question designed to measure if and how often people work to improve their communities:

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month
(3) Once or twice a year (4) Never
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

Per LAPOP standards, we reverse and rescale the 1-4 responses from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning "never" and 100 meaning "once a week."

Finally, Figure 4.7 shows that the average amount of effort individuals put towards solving community problems has remained relatively static since the question was introduced in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. The stability of community-level involvement in problem-solving contrasts with the decline in municipal meeting attendance noted at the outset of this chapter.



Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014

V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

Like previous rounds, the 2014 AmericasBarometer included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question is as follows:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2014 round included three questions first introduced in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey:

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

Finally, the last question, which measures trust in local government, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot."

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Map 4.1[5] we examine citizens' average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been re-coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. With a few exceptions, the average citizen in most countries in the Americas is essentially neutral towards local government services, meaning that average scores cluster around the midpoint (50) on the scale. Brazil and Jamaica have the lowest levels of satisfaction with local government in the hemisphere while Canada has the highest. As with the 2012 survey, the appearance of Nicaragua and Ecuador at the same level as the U.S. indicates that while there may be a link between satisfaction with services and national wealth, it is not an ironclad one. The biggest shift of any country between the last two waves of the AmericasBarometer was Haiti's rise from the bottom of the list in 2012 (37.6 units or points on the 0-100 scale), up several places as respondents viewed services a bit more positively as the earthquake and its aftermath receded further into the past.

[5] A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix.



Map 4.1. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

How do the aggregate 2014 results compare to previous waves of the AmericasBarometer? Figure 4.8, which presents annual average evaluations on a 0-100 scale, shows that there is some reason for optimism with regard to local service provision. After waves with little change, 2014 had a significant increase in citizens' satisfaction with local services of just over 1.5 units (or points). However, middling ratings of service provision remain, and have always been, the norm in the region.



Figure 4.8. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014

In Figure 4.9 we further explore citizens' evaluations of their local government services. Since 2008, 4 out of 10 respondents see their local services as neither good nor bad. In general a few more people have a positive view of services than negative, with roughly 36% of respondents holding "Good" or "Very Good" views. In general, for the past six years (and likely longer) local governments have been neither highly effective at providing services nor completely failing citizens in service provision. The public sees services as generally middling in quality.



Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category

Not all local services are equally difficult to provide or equally valued by citizens; thus, respondents may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction in the Americas with the provision of services in three key areas: roads, schools, and health care.[6] Figure 4.10 shows satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2 (the wording of which was reported above in the text). Once again, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least satisfaction and 100 represents the most satisfaction. Across the region we find moderate levels of satisfaction with road infrastructure. Residents in several Caribbean and Central American countries hold particularly dim views of their road infrastructure. Levels of satisfaction with roads for most countries were stable between the 2012 and 2014 wave with the exception of Honduras. The continued political, economic, and security instability in the country may be taking its toll on service provision: Hondurans rate road infrastructure 10 units lower in 2014 than 2012.

[6] We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.



Figure 4.10. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Figure 4.11 examines satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2 (again rescaled 0-100). Similar to roads and public health, there are no clear patterns between national wealth and satisfaction with schools with the possible exception that wealthier countries have lower ratings. It is possible that with greater resources come greater expectations. Looking at a few key countries unearths some interesting results. For example, Chile is one of the wealthiest and most stable countries in the region but again has one the lowest levels of satisfaction with education. This low level of satisfaction with public schools may be linked with the now long-running university and high school student protests in Chile that began in 2006. Whether this dissatisfaction is the cause or consequence of the protests, we cannot say. We also want to point out Venezuela's decline. Compared to 2012,

Venezuelans rated schools 6.3 units lower in 2014, which may also be linked to the ongoing political and social instability in the country.



Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Finally, in Figure 4.12 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2 (rescaled 0-100). Though most countries average between 43 and 53 units, no country scores particularly high, and four countries are rated quite poorly: Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Haiti. Brazil, though has recently tagged as a rising global economic power (if faltering at the moment), receives significantly lower evaluations than nearly all other countries in the region for health services, roads, and education. Like public schools, evaluations of public health services has

declined dramatically in Venezuela (52.1 units in 2012 vs. 42.3 units in 2014) adding more evidence that the environment in Venezuela is taking its toll on public evaluations of government performance.

Additionally, as the graphs tend to indicate, citizens' evaluations of educational services are more closely correlated with their evaluations of health services (r = .44) than the quality of roads (r = .33) and health services is also more weakly correlated (r = .29) with roads than education. While all three are key indicators of local government performance, it appears that citizens may evaluate hard infrastructure, like roads, differently than the more complex services of the welfare state, such as health care and education.



Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Looking at aggregate comparisons for the three types of services between the 2012 and 2014 waves we see mixed results (Figure 4.13). With regard to public schools, respondents in the Americas in 2014 rated them slightly higher than they did in 2012; however, they evaluated public health services and road quality similarly across the two waves. Unlike the questions about general local services (Figure 4.10) that saw an uptick in evaluations, when asked about specific services stasis is the norm. Of the three specific service areas, respondents' evaluations of roads were the most closely linked to their general evaluation of local services, although it only at a modest level (r = .26).



Figure 4.13. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services

While question SGL1 asks people about their evaluations of general local services, the previous sets of figures suggest people may evaluate specific local services quite differently than the abstract idea of local services. To see how respondents may differ in their views of services when they are asked about them specifically or generally we create an additive scale from responses regarding the condition of roads, public schools, and public health care.[7] Figure 4.14 displays the average scores for this scale (0-100) across the countries in which the questions were asked. When compared to the general evaluations of services (SGL1), the results in several countries exhibit interesting contrasts.

[7] A principle component analysis of these three variables (SD2NEW, SD3NEW, SD6NEW) indicate that there is only one underlying dimension and it is different than SGL1. Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the three variables is a moderate .62.

Chileans appear to be quite happy with their local services in the abstract (57.5 units) but when asked about specific services they take a much dimmer view (48.7). Likewise, Colombians prefer their services in the abstract (53.9) more than specific ones (45.1). On the flipside, citizens of the Dominican Republic have a more dismal view of services in the abstract (46.6) than when asked about specific services (54.4). Overall, the bivariate correlation between SGL1 and the Local Services Evaluations Scale is r=.30. While there is somewhat of a disconnect between the specific questions about services and the general question, it is important to note that we were not able to ask about all relevant local services.



Figure 4.14. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014

To examine the individual factors and events that affect general evaluations of local services (SGL1) we use linear regression with country fixed effects. If we use the Local Services Evaluations Scale instead of SGL1 the results are substantively identical to those presented below. Figure 4.15 shows people in the more marginalized positions in society rate their municipality services the lowest. Specifically, people with darker skin tone; poorer and lower educated residents; and those with higher levels of perceived insecurity all rate local services lower. Of particular note is the result for corruption victims. People who report having been asked for a bribe rate services significantly lower; this finding combined with results from the previous chapter showing high rates of corruption victimization among those who interact with local government indicates that this a widespread and substantively important result. One of the overall patterns in the results is that citizens who often have physically more difficult lives (poorer, rural, fear for physical security, darker skin tone) feel their local government's services are failing them.

We also find that people who have requested help of the municipality have more negative views of local services; however, if you are active in local government (by attending meetings), you are more likely to have a positive view of services. Thus, it is the nature of the interaction with local government that seems to matter with regard to views of local services. Finally, the national economy appears connected to evaluations of services: individuals who have positive perceptions of the national economy generally view local services in a more positive light. Whether it is local factors causing a positive national outlook or the reverse, we cannot say.



Figure 4.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014

Trust in Local Government

Like the previous waves of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 survey asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 4.16, we look at trust in local government since 2004. While it appears that 2004 was a high point, the peak is a function of a smaller number of countries included in that wave. If we restrict the sample to only those countries that had been included since 2006 the general trend for trust in local governments remained steady for six years before taking a significant decline in 2014. The public now has substantially less trust in their local government than ever before, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. This decline coincides with the highest level of perceived insecurity in the region since 2006.



Figure 4.16. Trust in Local Government over Time



Map 4.2. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

While the average level of trust in local government declined in the region, this decline was not uniform in the hemisphere. Map 4.2 presents average levels of trust in local government across the Americas on a 0-100 scale.[8] Compared to the 2012 wave most countries saw a slide in trust of local governments with Venezuela suffering the largest drop (from 59.4 to 50.2). Overall, the countries of the Southern Cone and North America appear to have the highest levels of trust in local governments although trust in local governments in Nicaragua is also high.

Comparing the results in Map 4.2 to those in Figure 4.8 there appears to be a linkage between trust in local government and satisfaction with local services across countries. For example, Chilean municipalities, which have moderate satisfaction with specific services, enjoy exceptionally high

[8] A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix

levels of trust. However, across the region the individual-level measures of trust and satisfaction with local services (SGL1) are correlated (r = .39).

Next we look at the factors that shape how much an individual trusts their local government. Using linear regression with country fixed effects, we test to see if interaction with local government and evaluations of local services predict levels of local political trust. Figure 4.17 indicates the most important factor shaping citizens' trust in local government is how they perceive the quality of municipal services.



Figure 4.17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014

Attending a municipal meeting also exhibits a positive relationship with trust in the local government, but its coefficient is only about 1/8th the size of the coefficient for evaluation of services. Overall, we see individuals who interact with their local government and rate the performance of the municipality more favorably express higher levels of trust in the institution.

Again we find a halo-effect between individuals' views of the national economy and trust in their local government. The more positive is one's view of the national economic outlook, the greater the level of trust in the local government. While economic outlook is positively correlated with trust in local government, individual-level factors associated with more advanced economies are not. People with higher levels of educational attainment and who live in urban areas are *less* trusting of their local governments. Also, similar to the determinants of who makes requests or demands of their local government, skin tone is not related to trust in local government.[9] People of darker skin tones, often minorities in the hemisphere (overall, though not necessarily in particular countries), appear to not view local governments any differently than others on average. If decentralization and local government reforms were designed to help enfranchise the traditionally disenfranchised (darker skin

[9] Excluding the Caribbean countries and Guyana has no effect on the skin tone result.

tone) these findings might be viewed as mixed. While people traditionally excluded from power have similar levels of trust in their local government can be seen as a success, if we consider the effect of satisfaction with local services the outcome is more mixed. As Figure 4.15 illustrates, the poorest in society tend to have the lowest evaluations of services—a crucial predictor of trust in local government. Women appear to display similar levels of trust in local government as men; thus, also bringing evidence that decentralization may have the ability to improve gender parity for government responsiveness.

Finally, we observe that negative perceptions of physical security and corruption victimization have negative correlations with trust in local government. The result for perception of insecurity is particularly interesting because it occurs at a time when citizens of the Americas have the highest average level of perceived insecurity since 2006. These results are unchanged if we use reported neighborhood crime instead of insecurity perceptions.

VI. Conclusion

In 2014 we see two diverging trends with regards to citizen interaction with local government in the Americas. On the one hand, after eight years of decline, we observe an uptick in the number of people making demands of their local officials. On the other hand, 2014 marked a significant drop in the number of people attending local government meetings after years of stable levels. A potentially positive explanation may be the expansion of e-government in the region with countries like Mexico investing heavily in online communication linkages for citizens. However, in light of an overall decline in institutional trust, discussed below, it is difficult to be overly sanguine about the effects of declining participation. Moreover, while the number of people making demands on their local government continues to rise, satisfaction with local government services remains lower among those who made a demand on local governments than among those who did not, which may imply that the quality of the interactions citizens are having with local governments as they make these requests is poor.

Although the overall trend in citizen participation in local government declined somewhat, there are significant differences between the countries in the region. Haiti continues to have the greatest level of participation, with 15% attending a town meeting, while only 4.9% of Argentines report having attended. A similar spread is observed for making demands on local government; yet, Haitians are near the bottom while some countries with low meeting attendance rates are at the top (Uruguay). While the aggregate relationship between meeting attendance and demand making is weak at the national level, there is a strong link between participating in meetings and making demands at the individual level: those who attended meetings were 32% more likely to make demands or requests of their local government.

Turning to local government performance, many people view municipal services as neither good nor bad. In the region as a whole, there is a slight increase in the average assessment of services after eight years of no change. In a few countries people give particularly low scores (e.g., Haiti, Brazil, Jamaica) or high scores (e.g., Panama and Canada), but in most countries the average citizen gives services a middling score near 50 out of 100. This finding holds if we break local services down to three specific areas (public health care, public school, and roads). In short, perceptions of local

government are mediocre: local governments are not failing the average citizen but, at the same time, there is clearly room for improvement.

More discouraging is the new low in citizens' trust in local government observed in 2014. Again Haiti, Brazil, and Jamaica (along with Peru) have some of the lowest trust in local governments. When looking at what factors are linked to high institutional trust we see trust in local government is significantly associated with the perceived performance of the government (via services) and whether or not they directly take part in local government meetings. The fact that these evaluations and levels of participation have increased somewhat while trust has declined implies other factors must be at work. Figure 4.17 indicates that corruption, perceptions of insecurity, and perceived negative economic outlooks are likely drivers for the drop in trust.

Since the local level of government is often the only place citizens come in to direct contact with the state, it seems reasonable that to expect citizens' attitudes toward local government reflect, or are reflected in, their broader political attitudes and belief systems. We assess this in the next chapter by investigating how perceptions of local government performance predict support for democratic norms, the legitimacy of political institutions, and political tolerance.

Appendix

Appendix 4.1. Making Demands of Local Government (NP2)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	0.196*	-11.05
Perception of Insecurity	0.027	-1.5
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	-0.117*	-6.16
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.551*	-39.67
Perception of the National Economy	0.033	-1.75
66 years or older	0.02	-1.08
56-65 years	0.059*	-3.14
46-55 years	0.050*	-2.52
26-35 years	-0.043	-1.96
16-25 years	-0.179*	-7.42
Skin Tone	0.033	-1.52
Wealth Quintiles	-0.064*	-3.2
Years of Schooling	0.078*	-3.53
Women	0.068*	-3.99
Urban/Rural	0.127*	-5.89
Guatemala	-0.105*	-4.56
El Salvador	-0.073*	-3.32
Honduras	-0.073*	-3.24
Nicaragua	0.067*	-3.12
Costa Rica	-0.112*	-4.26
Panama	-0.123*	-4.56
Colombia	-0.059*	-2.71
Ecuador	-0.073*	-3.08
Bolivia	-0.174*	-4.79
Peru	0.002	-0.1
Paraguay	-0.053*	-2.46
Chile	0.03	-1.17
Uruguay	0.100*	-4.48
Brazil	-0.031	-1.35
Venezuela	-0.105*	-5.14
Argentina	-0.003	-0.15
Dominican Republic	-0.027	-1.21
Haiti	-0.215*	-9.69
Jamaica	-0.091*	-3.77
Guyana	-0.186*	-7.74
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.073	-1.91
Belize	-0.063*	-2.4
Constant	-1.966*	-87.78
F	60.11	
Number of cases	35412	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* $p<0.05$

Appendix 4.2. Evaluation of Local Services SGL

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.034*	-5.36
Perception of Insecurity	-0.113*	-16.73
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.056*	-8.68
Requested Help from Municipal Office	-0.041*	-6.24
Perception of the National Economy	0.141*	-20.49
66 years or older	0	-0.02
56-65 years	-0.004	-0.64
46-55 years	0.001	-0.13
26-35 years	0.016*	-2.21
16-25 years	0.055*	-8.1
Skin Tone	-0.018*	-2.31
Wealth Quintiles	0.039*	-5.5
Years of Schooling	-0.016*	-2.09
Women	0.039*	-7.37
Urban/Rural	-0.034*	-3.8
Guatemala	0.01	-1.2
El Salvador	0.026*	-2.34
Honduras	0.025*	-2.73
Nicaragua	0.044*	-5.28
Costa Rica	0.009	-0.82
Panama	0.047*	-4.9
Colombia	0.009	-1.03
Ecuador	-0.005	-0.44
Bolivia	-0.008	-0.57
Peru	-0.026*	-3.05
Paraguay	0.009	-0.85
Chile	0.019	-1.91
Uruguay	-0.012	-1.17
Brazil	-0.073*	-6.78
Venezuela	-0.013	-1.36
Argentina	0.039*	-3.62
Dominican Republic	-0.049*	-3.75
Haiti	-0.026	-1.92
Jamaica	-0.093*	-8.95
Guyana	-0.046*	-4.45
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.016	-0.96
Belize	-0.005	-0.48
Constant	-0.002; -0.26	
F	47.69	
Number of cases	35412	
R-Squared	0.08	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 4.3. Trust in Local Government (B32)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.049*	-8.45
Perception of Insecurity	-0.086*	-14.6
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	0.361*	-57.08
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.043*	-7.96
Requested Help from Municipal Office	0.014*	-2.5
Perception of the National Economy	0.068*	-11.08
66 years or older	0.021*	-3.36
56-65 years	0.009	-1.41
46-55 years	0.000	-0.05
26-35 years	-0.014*	-2.16
16-25 years	0.004	-0.57
Skin Tone	0.004	-0.57
Wealth Quintiles	-0.009	-1.53
Years of Schooling	-0.040*	-5.93
Women	0.010*	-2
Urban/Rural	0.027*	-3.76
Guatemala	-0.060*	-6.87
El Salvador	-0.002	-0.18
Honduras	-0.009	-1.01
Nicaragua	-0.020*	-2.12
Costa Rica	-0.020*	-2.33
Panama	-0.088*	-8.98
Colombia	-0.068*	-7.24
Ecuador	-0.040*	-4.47
Bolivia	-0.062*	-5.29
Peru	-0.089*	-10.56
Paraguay	-0.003	-0.31
Chile	0.006	-0.57
Uruguay	-0.026*	-2.9
Brazil	-0.080*	-8.03
Venezuela	0.017	-1.62
Argentina	-0.048*	-4.54
Dominican Republic	-0.052*	-5.78
Haiti	-0.071*	-7.57
Jamaica	-0.092*	-11.32
Guyana	-0.040*	-4.13
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.133*	-9.93
Belize	-0.070*	-7.48
Constant	0.004; -0.51	
F	177.14	
Number of cases	35011	
R-Squared	0.2	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* $p<0.05$

Appendix 4.4. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014



Appendix 4.5. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas



Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

Philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick since the times of Plato. One of the secrets of democracy's success is that it can generate and maintain legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if democratic values start to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas over the decade 2004-2014 and analyzes the factors that shape these orientations and values.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture and is key for democratic stability and quality (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Booth and Seligson 2009). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. In theory, political legitimacy or "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects represented by the political system and the political institutions themselves. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Prominent among the contextual explanations is the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy. Institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can further bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011). Other scholars, however, propose that the level of economic development influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (e.g. Lipset 1963; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). In particular, education is often shown to be strongly correlated with the development of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009, Carlin 2006, Carlin and Singer 2011). Thus support for the political system is often theorized to be stable in the short run because strong most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving.

However, this may not always be the case. Individual-level factors that change more frequently can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord the democratic system. In particular, a weakening economy, a rise in crime and insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine democratic legitimacy (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Booth and Seligson 2009; Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011). The 2012 AmericasBarometer Regional Report found how citizens in the Americas perceive or experience economic outcomes; the integrity of state officials; and the security situation influences how they evaluate the political system (Carlin et al. 2013).

To understand what makes political support unstable, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise the levels of support high enough so that in

hard times the regime can draw on these reserves of legitimacy to sustain itself. In such circumstances, the regime takes on inherent value and political support is robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long interrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus the reservoirs of political support in the region are likely to remain shallow and to ebb and flow with recent performance.

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree." Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955). At the macro level, more developed countries present higher levels of support for same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2013) and have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.

II. Main Findings

This chapter covers two main sets of themes. First, it documents the breadth of democratic attitudes in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for democracy as a form of government is fairly stable but has fallen slightly since 2012.
- Levels of trust in political and social institutions are generally falling, with the Catholic Church and the Army the most trusted, and political parties the least. Of all institutions, trust in elections suffered the greatest decline between 2012 and 2014.
- Among law-and-order institutions – armed forces, national police, and justice system – the justice system enjoys the least public trust and that trust declined the most since 2012.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, overall political system support dropped in 2014. Components tapping beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and rights protection deteriorated most. Several cases exhibit great volatility over time.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, political tolerance decreased in 2014 both overall and across each of its components. Major volatility is detected over time in several cases.
- Previously steady levels of attitudes conducive to democracy stability fell as attitudes that place democracy at risk rose dramatically.

Second, this chapter considers what factors lead citizens to have different attitudes toward the political system. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- System support in the Americas reflects the performance of and experiences with government at the national and local levels in broad policy areas such as neighborhood security, the economy, and corruption.
- Political tolerance is reduced among those who judge the president and local government as performing well. In short, those benefiting from the status quo are less likely to tolerate dissenting elements within society.
- Education and wealth have slight negative effects on system support, but strong positive effects on political tolerance. Compared to citizens aged 36-45, the younger and older cohorts are more supportive of the political system, and older cohorts are more politically tolerant. Women are more supportive of the political system than men but less politically tolerant.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III looks at stated support for "democracy" as the best form of government over time. Section IV examines trust in major political and social institutions in the region. Special attention is given to institutions responsible for establishing and upholding law and order. Section V's goal is to explore the attitudes theorized to foster stable democracy. Its first two subsections describe levels of (a) Support for the Political System and (b) Political Tolerance from 2004 to 2014 and within the region in 2014. Regression analyses probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold these two sets of attitudes. A third subsection derives attitudinal profiles from these two measures in order to gauge (c) Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability at the regional level since 2004 and cross-nationally in 2014. Section VI concludes with the main findings and a discussion of their potential implications.

III. Support for Democracy

As an entrée into a decade of gauging democratic legitimacy in the Americas, we analyze support for democracy in the abstract. This diffuse form of political legitimacy is a basic requirement for democratic consolidation. One way the AmericasBarometer measures abstract support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Winston Churchill[1] and inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler (1996). The "Churchillian" question uses a 7-point response scale, which has been rescaled, as is standard practice at LAPOP, to run from 0 ("strongly disagree") to 100 ("strongly agree"):

> **ING4.** Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

While overall belief in democracy as the best system of government is reasonably high in the Americas, Figure 5.1 shows the 2014 regional average[2] is slightly lower than the 2012 level and its apex in 2008. The same pattern emerges among only those countries the AmericasBarometer has included since 2006[3] and by sub-region.[4] Thus, support for democracy as a form of government in the

[1] Churchill actually referred to democracy as "the worst form of government except for all the others."
[2] As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere.
[3] Among the Latin American countries, only Argentina is excluded since it was first surveyed in 2008.

Americas peaked in 2008, plateaued through 2012, but fell in 2014 to levels on par with those in the middle of the last decade.



Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time

IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Like previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 round asked about trust in a number of specific institutions. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," citizens responded to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

[4] Sub-regions refer to Mexico and Central America, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and the Caribbean. Only in the latter is the shape substantively different. Support for democracy peaked in 2004 and rebounded in 2012 and then fell all the more in 2014.

As per the LAPOP standard, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Results from the 2004-2014 AmericasBarometer reported in Figure 5.2 suggest levels of institutional trust form four distinct groupings. First, citizens of the Americas expressed the greatest levels of trust, on average, in the armed forces and the Catholic Church. The second most trusted set of institutions in the region includes the executive, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, elections, and national police forces. This set is followed by two major state organs: the justice system and the national legislature. Political parties stand alone as the least trusted institutions in the Americas.

Figure 5.2 also shows levels of trust in these social and political institutions over the decade 2004-2014. Trust has not increased in any of these institutions since 2012 and, in most cases, it has decreased.[5] The largest drop-off since 2012 is in trust in elections (4.7 units). This drop has occurred despite almost half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer holding a national election between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2014 fieldwork.[6] A drop in confidence in elections after elections have been held often reflects the disappointed opinions of supporters of the losing party (Anderson et al. 2005). Executive trust has also fallen on average since 2012 (4.1 units), although the variations across countries are substantial: it is bookended by a high of 71.1 in the Dominican Republic and a low of 36.5 in Venezuela. Trust in Evangelical/Protestant Churches fell substantially, as did trust in the Catholic Church, despite the naming of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013. Overall, this broad retreat in trust erases modest gains posted between 2008 and 2012 across all institutions.

[5] This conclusion holds within the sub-sample continuously studied since 2004, with one exception: average levels of trust in the armed forces increased significantly.

[6] Ecuador (February 2013, presidential/legislative), Trinidad & Tobago ((February 2013, presidential indirect), Venezuela (April 2013, presidential), Paraguay (April 2013, presidential), Argentina (October 2013, legislative), Chile (November 2013, presidential/legislative; December 2014, second-round presidential), Honduras (November 2013, presidential), Costa Rica (February 2014 first-round presidential; April 2014 second round), El Salvador (February 2014 first-round presidential; March 2014 second round), Colombia (March 2014, legislative; June 2014, presidential), Panama (May 2014).



Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014

Following on the thematic focus at the start of this report on the public opinion consequences of insecurity in the Americas, we now turn to the regional distribution of trust in three key law-and-order institutions: the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system. According to Figure 5.3, trust in the armed forces is generally high throughout the Americas. Ecuador leads in trust, trailed closely by Canada, the United States, and Guatemala. Only in Venezuela does it dip below 50 units.

High and stable regional levels of citizen trust in the armed forces mask massive over-time shifts within countries. For example, Venezuela reached its region-low levels after falling precipitously from 60 in 2012 to 42 units in 2014. And in Honduras, trust in the armed forces jumped from 52 in 2008 to 61 units in 2010, before plunging to 48 units in 2012 only to skyrocket to 64 units in 2014. These and other examples suggest the legitimacy of this key institution may correspond to the actual and potential role the military plays in politics.

If the armed forces are generally well trusted throughout the Americas, Figure 5.4 shows, by contrast, the national police are not. Average levels of trust in the national police sit below 40 units in over one third of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Canada and Chile top the region on this measure of institutional legitimacy, followed by Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Haiti. No country's average level of trust in the national police surpasses 70 units.

Within the increasingly unruly Central American corridor, trust in the national police has been volatile over the 2004-2014 decade. Spikes and/or drops of 8 units or more on the 0-100 scale occurred in all cases except Mexico and Nicaragua. Since 2012, however, there is no uniform trend. Public trust

in the national police fell greatly in Belize (-13.8 units), moderately in Panama (-5.1), and slightly in El Salvador (-3.2); it rebounded mightily in Honduras (+18.1 units) and somewhat in Guatemala (+3.2); in Mexico and Nicaragua it did not change. In Brazil, where from 2011 to 2014 the national police played a central role in the "pacification" of slums in preparation for the World Cup, trust in the national police has fallen more than 7 units since 2010.

A third Figure (5.5), displays levels of trust in the justice system across the Americas in 2014. Of the three institutions of law and order, the justice system is clearly the one respondents view as the least legitimate. No country scores over 60 units, and most have mediocre trust levels of 40-49 units. Below that, in the 30-40 unit range, are two types of the countries: those in which trust in the justice system is perennially low (Peru and Paraguay) and those in which trust levels have eroded dramatically of late (Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia).



Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

Looking across all three 2014 figures, average levels of trust in institutions of law and order are highly, but by no means perfectly, correlated.[7] Yet two patterns stand out. Canada, the United States, Ecuador, and Nicaragua consistently register among the region's highest levels of trust, while Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia reliably register some of the lowest levels.

Of thematic interest is the role of neighborhood insecurity in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. An index based on the four questions introduced in Chapter 1 about burglary, drug dealing, blackmail/extortion, and murder in a respondent's neighborhood is used to capture this

[7] Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the Armed Forces: $r = 0.62$; Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.64$; Trust in the Armed Forces and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.56$.

concept. Responses were recoded 1 ("yes" the form of neighborhood insecurity took place in the last 12 months) and 0 ("no" it did not) and combined into an additive index rescaled to 0-100.[8]

Figure 5.6 illustrates how neighborhood insecurity varies across the Americas in 2014. Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela stand out for their high levels of neighborhood insecurity. Most of the countries along the Andes-Central America-Mexico drugs supply chain fall within the next range, roughly equivalent to having one of these forms of neighborhood insecurity in the past year. Only Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana are significantly lower than this threshold. Overall, then, the regional distribution runs from an average of just over two forms of neighborhood insecurity (50 units) to an average of less than one (20 units).

Does the low trust in rule of law institutions across the Americas reflect neighborhood insecurity? Below are fixed-effects regression models of trust in the national police (Figure 5.7) and trust in the justice system (Figure 5.8). Included are socioeconomic and demographic variables, a measure of presidential approval, and factors related to the performance of and experiences with local and national government.[9] These analyses will help determine whether neighborhood security is partially responsible for the low levels of trust in these key security-related state institutions.

[8] These items are, respectively, VICBAR1, VICBAR3, VICBAR4, and VICBAR7. Polychoric principal components analysis suggests a single factor explains 65% of the variance among these variables, and a Cronbach's α coefficient of 0.64 suggests these variables form a fairly reliable scale.
[9] Full results available in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2. Models exclude the United States and Canada.



Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

A straightforward inference from Figure 5.7 is that the more insecure citizens' neighborhoods are, the less they trust the national police. This effect is on par with that of being asked to pay a bribe. An auxiliary analysis not reported suggests the adverse effects of neighborhood insecurity are potentially larger than those of crime victimization. Citizens who are satisfied with municipal services are more trustful of the national police, as are those who approve of the executive. Rural residents and those of middle age or older are more likely to trust the national police than urbanites and younger cohorts. Education slightly weakens police trust.

Figure 5.8 reports an analysis of the factors related to individual-level trust in the justice system in the Americas. Neighborhood insecurity appears to erode trust in the justice system as well. Again, rosy perceptions of the municipal government and the executive correlate positively with trust in the justice system, as does attending local government meetings. Not only are the more educated less trustworthy, so are wealthier respondents. Citizens who live in rural areas and who are in the youngest cohort trust the justice system more than urban dwellers and all other age cohorts.



Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

In sum, many institutions charged with upholding the law in the Americas lack citizen trust. Fairly high and stable regional levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police belie big changes within countries over time. Trust in the justice system is at critical levels in much of the Americas and has eroded quickly in some cases. The moderate correlation across these measures suggests that trust in one law and order institution does not necessarily translate into trust in the other two. Countries' rule of law outcomes, measured by the World Justice Project, are significantly correlated with trust in these institutions.[10] Publics across the Americas, it seems, do not blindly grant legitimacy to the core institutions tasked with upholding law and order. Rather, these institutions must earn the public's trust and support.

V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability

Stable democracies need citizens who grant their institutions legitimacy and who tolerate and respect the rights of dissenters. In other words, system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability or "consolidation." The ways in which tolerance and system support are expected to affect stable democracy, according to previous LAPOP studies, are summarized in Table 5.1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the society has high system support but

[10] Order and Security correlates with trust in the armed forces (r = .34), the national police (r = .67), and the justice system (r = .50). Correlations between Criminal Justice and these three institutions are, respectively, r = .44, r = .69, and r = .45.

low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, Booth and Seligson used the 2008 AmericasBarometer to trace the serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). A prior step to analyzing these attitudes in combination is to first examine these two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) have proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring "system support" – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. **B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read***:* If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Responses to each question were based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("a lot"). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 5.9 compares levels of the system support index and its five components for countries included in the AmericasBarometer since 2006. On the whole, system support in the Americas in 2014 is down two units from readings in 2012 and 2010. Broken down into regions, however, one finds decreases on the order of three to four units in the Andes, Southern Cone, and Caribbean but an

increase of roughly three points in Mexico and Central America. On the other hand, significant declines across all regions in the beliefs that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that the political system respects citizens' basic rights combined to pull the index lower in 2014.[11] Considered in tandem with the low levels of trust in the justice system presented in Figure 5.5, the judiciary appears to pose a major hurdle to strong political support in the hemisphere.



Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014

How does support for the political system vary within the Americas today? Map 5.1 presents the levels of system support in the AmericasBarometer study in 2014. System support peaks in Costa Rica (62.3 units) and bottoms out in Brazil (37.6 units). Costa Rica and Canada sit atop the regional list on this legitimacy indicator while the United States hovers around the regional average (around 50 units). Encouragingly, citizens in the violent and politically volatile countries in Meso-America remain supportive of their political system.

[11] However, if the analysis is confined to the nine core countries continuously the AmericasBarometer surveyed 2004-2014, modest gains in the system support index and in all of its components, except the belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, are observed.



Map 5.1. System Support in the Americas, 2014

Because system support is supposed to tap the inherent value citizens place in democratic institutions it should be fairly stable over time. Radical shifts were nonetheless observed in several cases. Major gains were made, for example, in Honduras (+11.1 units), Panama (+9), Costa Rica (+6.4), and Ecuador (+6). Major losses, in turn, were recorded in Venezuela (-13.9 units), Belize (-12.2) Jamaica (-10.6), and Brazil (-7.8). A deeper look (not presented here) indicated that these swings do not correspond neatly with cross-time changes in economic perceptions.

What kinds of citizens are most supportive of their political systems? Fixed-effects regression is used to model system support as a function of, again, socio-economic and demographic variables, presidential approval, and local and national government performance and experience indicators.[12] As mentioned above, in long-standing democracies diffuse support for the political system is viewed as a

[12] Full results available in Appendix 5.3. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

deep-seated orientation that is relatively impervious to short-run changes in government performance. However in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, perceived performances of and experiences with both national and local government may still be crucial predictors of system support.

How well do neighborhood security and the rest of these variables correlate with system support in 2014? To focus on the America's newer democracies the United States and Canada are removed from this particular analysis. The results of the analysis, presented in Figure 5.10, indicate individuals who live in more insecure neighborhoods have lower system support. An analysis not shown for reasons of space indicate that when entered into the model separately, rather than as part of an index, each of these four variables has a statistically significant and negative relationship with system support. Rooting out insecurity can help cement this dimension of democratic legitimacy.

Other performance evaluations matter as well. At the level of national government, rosy evaluations of past economic performance and executive approval are strongly related to support for the broader political system. At the local level, satisfaction with municipal government services has similarly positive effects. System support also reflects individuals' interactions with the state. Whereas those who have been asked to pay a bribe are less supportive, those who have attended a meeting of the municipal government are more supportive.[13]



Figure 5.10. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

In addition, system support differs across demographic groups. Rural residents, the less wealthy, and women all support the political system more than their counterparts. Education has no discernible effect. The relationship between age and system support is non-linear: it is higher among the youngest and the two oldest cohorts than among those ages 36-45.

[13] When presidential approval is excluded, economic, municipal government evaluations, and municipal meeting attendance gain strength. Corruption victimization and neighborhood security do not change appreciably. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

These findings support three main conclusions. First, despite the expectation that system support is a deeply rooted orientation resistant to short-run performance fluctuations, in the Americas system support appears to shift with changes in neighborhood security, the state of the economy, and recent corruption experiences. Second, while system support is often viewed as a national-level concept, it appears in part based on the performance of local governments: how citizens view and interact with their municipalities shapes how they view their national political system. Thirdly, while cohort effects account for the differences in system support across age groups, the results run contrary to theories that link political legitimacy to rising levels of wealth, education, and urbanization (Lipset 1963, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance for those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items in the questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.[14]

Analyses by country (not shown) find levels of political tolerance are more than 4 units lower in countries with active high-profile dissident groups or actors.[15] Venezuela, where many candidates for national and sub-national offices are outwardly critical of the regime, rates among the most tolerant countries in the Americas. Where former dissidents are now sitting presidents tolerance is relatively high (Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil), middling (Nicaragua), and low (Bolivia). Countries with active dissident groups, such as Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru, exhibit middling levels of tolerance.

[14] The Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high ($\alpha = .85$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

[15] These include Colombia (FARC/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and ELN/Ejército de Liberación Nacional), Peru (Shining Path/Sendero Luminoso), Mexico (EPR/Ejército Popular Revolucionario and FAR-LP/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberación del Pueblo), and Paraguay (EPP/Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo).

How stable is political tolerance? While theoretically it should be quite stable, in actuality tolerance has changed drastically since 2012 in multiple countries. Gains in Venezuela (+7.6 units) and Honduras (+6.7) were overshadowed by huge losses in Panama (-19.8 units), Guatemala (-17.8), Guyana (-14.4), and Belize (-11.2). Most other publics became only somewhat less tolerant. Political tolerance is therefore no more or less stable than system support and, like many of the legitimacy measures analyzed here, has suffered a setback in the last two years.

To explore the evolution of political tolerance in the Americas, Figure 5.11 displays the regional means on political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Though relatively static from 2008 to 2012, regional levels of political tolerance declined in 2014. Tolerance of political dissidents' right to free expression and to compete for political office observed the largest decreases. A similar story emerges from an analysis (not shown) of the sub-sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2004.



Figure 5.11. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014

The geographical distribution of tolerance for political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Map 5.2, which maps countries by mean score range on the index from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in the United States and Canada (69.9 and 69.3 units on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Guatemala and Panama (29.5 and 32.1 units, respectively).



Map 5.2. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

What sorts of citizens on average are most politically tolerant in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean? A fixed-effects regression model analyzes political tolerance as a function of the same socio-economic and demographic variables, performance perceptions, and experiences with local and national government as in the analyses above.[16] The 2012 comparative report concluded that many of these predictors had opposing effects on system support and political tolerance (Carlin et al. 2013). Does this conclusion hold in 2014?

In many instances the answer is yes, according to Figure 5.12. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, is negatively associated with system support but positively associated with tolerating the political rights and civil liberties of people who are openly against the regime. Upon closer inspection, items tapping the presence of burglary and drug dealing appear to drive this relationship; blackmail/extortion and murder are not systematically related to political tolerance (analysis not shown).

But unlike system support, political tolerance does not consistently reflect evaluations of recent economic performance, corruption victimization, or participation in local government meetings.[17] And whereas strong performance by the national executive and local government services are positively correlated with system support, they are negatively correlated with political tolerance. These results are troubling insofar as they suggest that popular national executives and good local service provision can hinder the consolidation of democracy. Yet they resonate with findings from Latin America that election losers are particularly tolerant of political dissidents and continue to mobilize in support of their rights while political winners are likely to delegate additional authority to "their" executive.

[16] Full results available in Appendix 5.4. Models exclude the United States and Canada.
[17] When presidential approval is excluded from the model, the same patterns hold with one exception: positive economic perceptions are negatively related to tolerance.

Results from the socio-economic and demographic variables reveal more evidence that system support and political tolerance have distinct micro-foundations. A single (marginal) year of education has the greatest effect on tolerance of any other variable considered. From a policy perspective, this suggests tolerance can be taught. In addition, wealthy, male, and darker-skinned respondents are more tolerant than poorer, female, and light-skinned ones. Place of residence has no systematic effect on tolerance. Age appears related to tolerance beyond a certain threshold. Those in the 36-45 age bracket are significantly less tolerant than the older cohorts in the model.

These results place democracy's champions in some awkward positions. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, appears to present a Catch-22: improving it may enhance the legitimacy of the political system but could simultaneously lower political tolerance. Satisfaction with incumbent governments presents another puzzle. Citizens who approve of the sitting executive and are happy with local services express relatively higher levels of system support but are, in turn, less tolerant of individuals who openly criticize the regime and question the value of democracy. Perhaps these contradictions signal a desire to insulate a system that delivers basic public goods and services from those who would destroy it. Yet somewhat paradoxically, strong democracy requires supporting the basic institutions undergirding the system *and* extending political and civil freedoms even to those who wish to undermine them. Reconciling these two sets of attitudes, then, is a major challenge for the development of the cultural foundations of democracy in the Americas (Singer n.d.). From a public policy standpoint the task is all the more daunting since neighborhood insecurity and citizen evaluations of incumbent governments appear to affect democracy's cultural foundations in different, and sometimes, contradictory ways.

Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the attitudes theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who scored above 50 (the midpoint) on both of the scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who scored below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold attitudes that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have attitudes that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.



Figure 5.13. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014

How prevalent are these attitudinal profiles in the Americas? Regional trends across the four profiles from 2004 to 2014 are reported in Figure 5.13. Alarmingly, *Stable Democracy* attitudes reach their lowest region-average levels of the decade in 2014, and *Authoritarian Stability* and *Democracy at Risk* profiles hit their decade highs. These trends are similar in a restricted sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2006 and even more pronounced in the nine core countries measured in each wave 2004-2014. But whereas *Democracy at Risk* is the modal profile in Figure 5.13, in the nine-country continuous sub-sample *Authoritarian Stability* is the most common profile. All of these results, but especially the latter, may sit uneasily with democracy's champions in the region. To see how these profiles are distributed across countries please reference Figure 5.14.



Figure 5.14. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014

Map 5.3 shows the percentage of citizens with the profile that favors *Stable Democracy* across the Americas in 2014. This snapshot identifies two clear outliers. At 56.8%, Canada boasts greater than 18% more citizens with stable democratic attitudes – high system support *and* high political tolerance – than any other country in the Americas. The next closest are Uruguay (38.5%) and the United States (37.1%). At 7.5%, Guatemala has statistically fewer citizens with attitudes favorable to stable democracy than any country except Panama, whose 95% confidence intervals overlap. Once again, we note dramatic declines from 2012 to 2014 in a handful of countries: Guyana (-28.0%), Jamaica (-20.6%), Guatemala (-17.2%), Belize (-16.7%), Colombia (-8.5%), and Brazil (-7.7%). Honduras and Haiti rebounded +9.6% and 5.4%, respectively, over the same period.



Map 5.3. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014

VI. Conclusion

The future of democracy in the Americas hinges on its legitimacy. When citizens broadly trust its local and national institutions, believe in its core principles, and value the system for its own sake, democracy is most stable and effective. But when legitimacy wanes, democracy's fate is less certain. Therefore it is important to track the evolution of legitimacy in the Americas, to compare it across countries, and, most crucially, to understand what drives legitimacy among citizens. To these ends, this chapter unpacked legitimacy into its constituent parts and sought to explain them with factors of high policy and theoretical relevance. As signaled by the first section of this volume, the 2014 report puts special emphasis on the role of insecurity and the institutions tasked with addressing it.

A straightforward message from this comparative analysis is that most indicators of democratic legitimacy on average fell across the Americas since their last reading in 2012. An investigation of the role of insecurity in democratic legitimacy, however, reveals a nuanced relationship. For example, support for democracy in the abstract and system support actually increased in the nine Latin American countries extending southward from Mexico to Bolivia, arguably the Americas' most violent and insecure sub-region. Yet individuals in insecure neighborhoods are less supportive of the political system but more politically tolerant. Taken together, these results suggest neighborhood insecurity may contribute to the mixture of attitudes amenable to *Unstable Democracy*: low system support, high tolerance. If so, insecurity could have a potentially destabilizing effect on democracy in the Americas.

Another inference that one can draw from this study is that institutions whose missions include establishing and maintaining security, law, and order in the Americas enjoy distinct levels of citizen trust. Long among the most trusted institutions in the region, the armed forces are far more trusted than the national police or, particularly, the justice system. Citizen orientations to the justice system generally appear to be souring. Beyond flagging trust, across the Americas the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial was far less firm in 2014 than at any time in the decade between 2004-2014. While regional average levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police are generally stable, in countries where these institutions have taken more prominent political roles over the past decade, citizen trust in them has shown volatility. This may suggest that the greater a political role these institutions of national and local security play, the more frequently citizens update their beliefs about their trustworthiness.

A final noteworthy conclusion is that, contrary to what might be considered classic theoretical expectations, levels of democratic legitimacy remain volatile in the Americas. The regression analyses imply this is likely due to links between individual indicators of democratic legitimacy and evaluations and experiences of government performance in the recent past. Brief analyses of specific cases here indicate democratic legitimacy is also reflective of the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. In addition to actual levels of democratic legitimacy, short-term volatility may have important implications for democracy as well. Monitoring democratic legitimacy over long time periods, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is crucial to knowing whether these are secular trends or merely a return to "normal".

To avoid an overly negative reading of the data, this chapter closes by noting that the association between government performance at the national and local levels and support for the political system and for democratic institutions can cut both ways. Although it finds, on average, downward trends in government performance in the Americas, other chapters also document public

concern about weak performance in areas of heightened importance to citizens in many countries. Evaluations of the economy have fallen despite evidence that wealth has risen. Personal security is becoming an increasingly important issue to citizens across the region despite the fact that crime victimization remains unchanged. Corruption victimization and perceptions of the corruption and crime situations remain at the relatively high levels documented in 2012 (Singer et al. 2012). Finally, while wealth levels in the region as a whole have improved, many countries continue to experience slowing economies, high levels of crime, and poor governance. If the region's political systems continue to fail in these respects, levels of democratic legitimacy could continue to tumble. Of course, frustrations with democratic institutions and their performance can either create space for actors to undermine those institutions or propel new modes of participation, such as reform movements, which can strengthen democratic institutions. Thus monitoring citizens' long-standing commitments to democratic principles and the norms of open political competition and tolerance is key to forecasting democracy's fate in the region.

Appendix

Appendix 5.1. Coefficients for Figure 5.7, Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.047*	(-6.24)
Sex	0.014*	(-2.54)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.031*	(-4.42)
Years of Schooling	-0.005	(-0.69)
Skin Tone	0.002	(-0.34)
16-25 years	-0.009	(-1.26)
26-35 years	-0.011	(-1.62)
46-55 years	0.021*	(-3.24)
56-65 years	0.022*	(-3.46)
66 years or older	0.042*	(-6.84)
Presidential Job Approval	0.199*	(-28.64)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.120*	(-19.79)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.007	(-1.28)
Corruption Victimization	-0.082*	(-13.34)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.043*	(-6.57)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.107*	(-15.58)
Guatemala	-0.038*	(-3.96)
El Salvador	0.017	(-1.80)
Honduras	-0.003	(-0.27)
Nicaragua	0.058*	(-5.96)
Costa Rica	0.047*	(-4.80)
Panama	0.046*	(-4.73)
Colombia	0.042*	(-4.36)
Ecuador	0.064*	(-6.70)
Bolivia	-0.082*	(-6.54)
Peru	-0.014	(-1.40)
Paraguay	-0.019*	(-2.07)
Chile	0.095*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	0.051*	(-5.17)
Brazil	0.041*	(-4.24)
Venezuela	0.019	(-1.90)
Argentina	0.033*	(-3.37)
Dominican Republic	-0.067*	(-6.58)
Haiti	0.082*	(-8.09)
Jamaica	-0.017	(-1.92)
Guyana	-0.047*	(-4.87)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.003	(-0.20)
Belize	-0.041*	(-3.95)
Constant	-0.007; (-1.04)	
F	135.06	
Number of cases	32152	
R-Squared	0.17	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 5.2. Coefficients for Figure 5.8, Factors Associated with Trust in Justice System in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.059*	(-8.49)
Sex	0.013*	(-2.31)
Years of Schooling	-0.022*	(-3.07)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.030*	(-4.73)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.70)
16-25 years	0.026*	(-3.74)
26-35 years	-0.001	(-0.09)
46-55 years	0.01	(-1.46)
56-65 years	-0.001	(-0.17)
66 years or older	0.011	(-1.72)
Presidential Job Approval	0.235*	(-31.81)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.111*	(-18.21)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.017*	(-2.86)
Corruption Victimization	-0.050*	(-7.85)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.046*	(-6.86)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.075*	(-11.27)
Guatemala	-0.022*	(-2.44)
El Salvador	-0.029*	(-3.48)
Honduras	-0.026*	(-3.02)
Nicaragua	0.018*	(-2.04)
Costa Rica	0.074*	(-9.18)
Panama	-0.004	(-0.43)
Colombia	-0.013	(-1.55)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.105*	(-8.89)
Peru	-0.068*	(-8.48)
Paraguay	-0.078*	(-8.91)
Chile	-0.071*	(-8.02)
Uruguay	0.008	(-0.85)
Brazil	-0.041*	(-4.71)
Venezuela	-0.004	(-0.43)
Argentina	0.006	(-0.76)
Dominican Republic	-0.079*	(-8.79)
Haiti	-0.041*	(-4.30)
Jamaica	-0.018*	(-2.20)
Guyana	-0.040*	(-5.09)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.006	(-0.48)
Belize	-0.038*	(-4.31)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	103.2	
Number of cases	31909	
R-Squared	0.13	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* $p<0.05$

Appendix 5.3. Estimated System Support by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.1



Appendix 5.4. Coefficients for Figure 5.10, Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.054*	(7.26)
Sex	0.017*	(3.29)
Years of Schooling	-0.015*	(-2.14)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.014*	(-2.18)
Skin Tone	-0.002	(-0.31)
16-25 years	0.042*	(6.25)
26-35 years	0.003	(0.49)
46-55 years	0.012	(1.87)
56-65 years	0.020*	(3.11)
66 years or older	0.038*	(5.95)
Presidential Job Approval	0.315*	(43.58)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.110*	(17.62)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.013*	(2.43)
Corruption Victimization	-0.064*	(-10.56)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.076*	(11.90)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.066*	(-9.72)
Guatemala	-0.064*	(-6.93)
El Salvador	-0.055*	(-6.69)
Honduras	-0.063*	(-6.81)
Nicaragua	0.005	(0.55)
Costa Rica	0.099*	(11.16)
Panama	-0.052*	(-5.61)
Colombia	-0.048*	(-5.36)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.107*	(-8.93)
Peru	-0.082*	(-8.59)
Paraguay	-0.122*	(-13.23)
Chile	-0.070*	(-7.04)
Uruguay	-0.006	(-0.60)
Brazil	-0.149*	(-13.80)
Venezuela	-0.039*	(-3.61)
Argentina	0.021*	(2.41)
Dominican Republic	-0.098*	(-10.67)
Haiti	-0.134*	(-12.55)
Jamaica	-0.091*	(-11.60)
Guyana	-0.069*	(-7.71)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.019	(-1.29)
Belize	-0.054*	(-6.00)
Constant	0.011; (1.45)	
F	155.91	
Number of cases	31976	
R-Squared	0.23	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* $p<0.05$

Appendix 5.5. Estimated Political Tolerance by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.2



Appendix 5.6. Coefficients for Figure 5.12, Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	-0.006	(-0.61)
Sex	-0.047*	(-8.75)
Years of Schooling	0.114*	(-15.05)
Wealth Quintiles	0.037*	(-5.21)
Skin Tone	0.022*	(-2.63)
16-25 years	0.009	(-1.28)
26-35 years	-0.012	(-1.63)
46-55 years	-0.013*	(-1.98)
56-65 years	-0.014*	(-2.06)
66 years or older	-0.016*	(-2.39)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.086*	(-10.97)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	-0.022*	(-3.31)
Attended Municipal Meeting	-0.007	(-1.08)
Corruption Victimization	-0.008	(-1.27)
Perception of National Economic Situation	-0.005	(-0.80)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	0.046*	(-6.10)
Guatemala	-0.113*	(-11.22)
El Salvador	-0.019	(-1.91)
Honduras	-0.009	(-0.84)
Nicaragua	0.026*	(-2.25)
Costa Rica	0.002	(-0.14)
Panama	-0.095*	(-9.21)
Colombia	-0.001	(-0.14)
Ecuador	-0.037*	(-2.99)
Bolivia	-0.053*	(-3.60)
Peru	-0.042*	(-3.69)
Paraguay	0.021	(-1.80)
Chile	0.050*	(-3.93)
Uruguay	0.090*	(-7.10)
Brazil	0.035*	(-2.99)
Venezuela	0.068*	(-5.10)
Argentina	0.040*	(-3.29)
Dominican Republic	0.041*	(-4.07)
Haiti	0.041*	(-4.03)
Jamaica	0.050*	(-3.80)
Guyana	0.040*	(-3.42)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.131*	(-6.71)
Belize	0.032*	(-2.65)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	55.94	
Number of cases	31853	
R-Squared	0.12	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 5.7. Estimated Stable Democracy Attitudes by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.3



Part II:
Local Government, Insecurity and Democracy in Honduras

Chapter 6. Local Government

Orlando J. Pérez

I. Introduction

Historically, a feature of a majority of Latin American societies has been the centralization of power in the central government, perhaps a result of centuries of presidential governments (Nickson 1995). However, the decentralization of power, including finances, can help achieve greater citizen participation in local government affairs and thus, greater transparency and accountability of local government or municipalities (Oates 1972; Seabright 1996; Tabellini 2000; Carrión 2007; Kyriacou et al 2009). However, there is considerable debate about the extent, form, and ideal conditions for decentralization, as well as the possible negative consequences of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000; Barr 2001; O 'Neill 2003, 2004; Falleti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Hijas and Harper 2007). Some have argued that decentralization fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism, and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Others, however, have shown a combination of both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003).

Today, a majority of Latin American countries, with support from international development agencies, continue to enthusiastically push the political reforms necessary to increase decentralization (Rondinelli et al 1983). This process has occurred in parallel to "the third wave" of democratization in the hemisphere (Huntington 1991). The citizens of Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced a strengthening of their local governments but also saw the adoption of democratic procedures for political representation at the local level. Has decentralization and the proliferation of local governments met their objectives of improving the relationship between citizens and the state apparatus? What is the effect of this change on the relationship between the individual and the state in relation to the legitimacy of political institutions? What are the factors that could affect levels of citizen participation in local government? To answer these questions, this chapter examines two of the most representative forms of local political participation: public participation in municipal meetings or, open sessions, and the submission of petitions to the municipality. It also seeks to know the main determinants of both types of involvement, with particular attention to the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizen participation in local politics. Finally, it assesses the extent to which the citizens of Honduras are satisfied with their local governments, focusing on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and support for the political system. Additionally, the relationship between the evaluation of the services provided by the municipality and support for the political system is studied. This chapter demonstrates the link between the performance of local governments and the national political system.

Prior studies utilizing the results of the AmericasBarometer surveys have examined this phenomenon in detail. For example, Montalvo (2009a) showed that the determinants of requests made to municipal governments not only included individual-level factors, such as education and age, but also the decentralization of government spending. Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and requests by their citizens. In another study, Montalvo (2009b) found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively correlated with satisfaction with municipal services, which shows that perceptions of poor performance at this level are likely due to these problems. Finally, Montalvo (2010) also showed that satisfaction with municipal services,

participation in community activities, and interpersonal trust are among the main determinants of trust in local government.

Despite the ongoing debate, previous reports of the AmericasBarometer have shown that participation of citizens in matters of local government seems to promote greater trust in local government and greater satisfaction with the services it provides. Moreover, it was also found that those who have more confidence in and are more satisfied with local government are also more likely to exhibit political attitudes considered more conducive to a democratic system of government.

Citizens who participate in and positively evaluate their local government (aspects that are not necessarily positively correlated with each other) may more strongly believe that democracy is the best system. Previous investigations by the AmericasBarometer in several countries have shown that those who participate in local governments are more likely to approve the right of participation and may also more strongly believe in the right of inclusion of all citizens (i.e. minorities rights) (Seligson 1999). There is evidence that trust in local government carries over into the belief of legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003).

There is debate about the effects of decentralization. Some authors defend the notion that local politics generally produce positive results for governance and democracy. How does the performance of local government affect attitudes towards the political system in general? Because some citizens relate to the government only locally, they may only form their impressions about democracy from these experiences. Therefore, a considerable proportion of citizens may use their interactions with the local level of government as the base from which they formulate their views on democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) showed that decentralization can increase system support; however, using the performance of local governments as the base from which to evaluate the overall system can be problematic when local institutions do not work well. Weitz-Shapiro (2008) found that Argentines take into account their evaluations of local governments when evaluating democracy in general. Using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer, West (2011) found that citizens who have more interaction with their local governments, and are more satisfied with them, are more likely to have democratic values. Moreover, this relationship is seen more among minorities. Therefore, local politics can be vital for democratization.

II. Participation at the Local Level

The 2014 AmericasBarometer includes a series of question that evaluate citizens' commitment to the local political system:

Now we are going to talk about your municipality….
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or petition? (1) Yes (0) No (88) Doesn't know (98) NR (99) N/A

Municipal Meeting Attendance

Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of Hondurans who report having attended a town meeting last year; 10% of Honduran respondents report that they have attended town hall meetings.



Figure 6.1. Municipal Meeting Participation in Honduras, 2014

How has citizen participation in municipal meetings changed in recent years? Figure 6.2 shows the levels of local participation since 2004. The levels of participation in municipal meetings have declined since 2006, increasing slightly in 2012, only to decline again in 2014. Since 2006, only about 1 in 10 Hondurans participate in municipal meetings.



Figure 6.2. Participation in Municipal Meetings Over Time in Honduras, 2004-2014

Submission of Petitions to Local Governments

The 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to not only examine who attends municipal meetings but also who submits petitions to their local governments. Figure 6.3 analyzes the responses of question NP2 and presents the percentage of citizens who have submitted applications or petitions to an official of a local government in the last year. In 2014, 12.8% of Hondurans reported have requested something from the municipality.



Figure 6.3. Presentation of Petitions to Local Governments in Honduras, 2014

How has the practice of submitting petitions to local governments changed over time? Figure 6.4 examines the percentage of citizens making requests since 2004. The percentage of Hondurans who requested help from the municipality doubled between 2010 and 2014.



Figure 6.4. Presentation of Petitions over Time to Local Governments in Honduras, 2014

Finally, the AmericasBarometer asked respondents if their petitions and requests were resolved. Note that this question was asked only to citizens who reported having made a complaint to or

petitioned their local government. These responses can provide important feedback about the quality of municipal services, at least from the point of view of the citizens. Figure 6.5 presents the responses to the question MUNI10 in Honduras. Of people who sought help from the municipality, 67.5% say it did not solve the problem, 32.5% said that it did solve the problem. The reduced number of persons for whom the local government resolved their problem points to a local system with little capacity to address the problems in their communities.



Figure 6.5. Results of the Petitions Made to Local Governments in Honduras, 2014

What are the determinants of soliciting assistance from the local governments? Figure 6.6 presents the results of a logistic regression model performed to understand the factors that may affect making petitions to local governments in Honduras.[1] In this, and the other regression figures in this report, all variables have been standardized. As with all this report's regression graphics, the coefficients that measure the effect of each variable is indicated by dots, with the confidence intervals being horizontal lines that extend to the right and left of each item. If the confidence interval does not cross the centerline at point 0.0, then the variable has a statistically significant effect (at a level of $p < 0.05$). The coefficient whose confidence interval falls completely on the right side of the zero line indicates a positive net effect on the dependent variable. Furthermore, a coefficient whose confidence interval falls to the left side of the zero line indicates a statistically significant negative net effect. The most important factors are attending municipal meetings, wealth, and size of location of residence.[2] People with lower incomes; those who live in smaller cities or rural areas; and those who have attended meetings make more petitions to local governments.

[1] See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.

[2] Size of location is measured (1) National Capital, (2) Large City, (3) Medium City, (4) Small City and (5) Rural Area. Therefore, the variable increases while the size of the place decreases.



Figure 6.6. Determinants of Presenting Petitions to Local Governments in Honduras, 2014

In Figure 6.7, we can see more detailed bivariate relationships between petitions made to local governments and the significant variables included in the logistic regression analysis. People who attended municipal meetings make requests at a level of 18 percentage points higher than those who never attend local meetings. Petitions to the municipality decrease by 10 percentage points between those with the lowest levels of wealth and those with the highest levels wealth. People living in small cities, medium cities, or rural areas seek more assistance from the local government in comparison to citizens living in large cities or the nation's capital. The positive relationship indicates that while the variable increases the size of the location decreases.



Figure 6.7. Factors Associated with the Presentation of Petitions to Local Governments in Honduras, 2014

III. Satisfaction and Confidence in Local Governments

The AmericasBarometer also asked respondents several questions regarding citizen satisfaction with and trust in their local governments. The first question below appears in previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? [Read options]
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA

The 2014 round of surveys in Honduras asks three questions to determine the level of satisfaction with various services that are traditionally provided by the national government and supported by local governments.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dis**satisfied, or very **dis**satisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? Are you… [Read alternatives]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? Are you…[Read alternatives]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

The last question, which has been used in previous rounds, evaluates trust in local governments. Citizens respond to the question on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 being "none" and 7 "a lot."

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

Figure 6.8 presents the average levels of citizen satisfaction with the services of local governments in Honduras, as derived from answers to the question SGL1. As can be seen by the graph below, 43.3% report that the services are "regular." 17.7% say that the services are “bad” or “very bad,” and 38.9% think that the services are “good” or “very good.” The overall assessment of local governments is relatively positive.



Figure 6.8. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Honduras, 2014

How has the satisfaction with local government services changed in recent years? In Figure 6.9, one can see the trends in satisfaction since 2004 (changing SGL1 to a scale of 0-100, where 0 is the worst evaluation and 100 is the best). Evaluations of local governments have been stable since 2004. There was a decrease in 2008, but it recovered in 2010, with no statistically significant differences between 2010 and 2012. The data for 2014 show a slight increase in satisfaction with municipal services.



Figure 6.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services Over Time in Honduras, 2004-2014

Satisfaction with Health Services, Education and Roads

It is possible that citizens may evaluate the provision of some services more positively than others. The following three graphs show the levels of satisfaction with the conditions of roads, schools and health services in Honduras.[3] Figure 6.10 shows the distribution of responses to the three questions. Both health services and schools receive the highest levels of satisfaction. Over 60% of Hondurans interviewed express some degree of satisfaction with health services and public education. However, over 60% express some level of dissatisfaction with roads.

[3] In the case of Honduras, these services are principally the responsibility of the national government.



Figure 6.10. Satisfaction with Health Services, Schools and Roads in Honduras, 2014

For the 2014 survey, the AmericasBarometer asked for a retrospective evaluation of other services also provided by the municipality. Here are the questions:

Now I am going to ask about certain municipal services. I am going to ask about each one of those and you say if they have improved, stayed the same or have gotten worse in the last two years. **[After each service, ask: Has improved, Has stayed the same, Has gotten worse]**						
HONMUN32. Trash Collection	(1) Has improved	(2) Has stayed the same	(3) Has gotten worse	**[Do not read]** (4) Service not offered	(88) DK	(98) DA
HONMUN33. Management of Markets	(1) Has improved	(2) Has stayed the same	(3) Has gotten worse	**[Do not read]** (4) Service not offered	(88) DK	(98) DA
HONMUN36. Water and Sewage	(1) Has improved	(2) Has stayed the same	(3) Has gotten worse	**[Do not read]** (4) Service not offered	(88) DK	(98) DA

Figure 6.11 presents the results of these questions. One can see that garbage collection is the service that improved the most over the past two years; 31.3% think that garbage collection has improved over this time frame. In relation to the management of markets, only 16.5% think there has been improvement, while 61.7% say they have remained the same. Water and sewer service has improved according to 25% of respondents, but 54.5% think that it has stayed the same.



Figure 6.11. Evaluation of Services Provided by the Municipality in Honduras, 2014

The following graphs show the distribution of opinion on garbage collection, water and sewage and market management by primary stratum. In Figure 6.12, we see that 61.9% of respondents in the North C and East B regions state that garbage collection has improved in the last two years. The South is where the most negative opinions are expressed, with 31.8% of respondents reporting that garbage collection services have deteriorated. In the capital (Central A region), 58% think that this service has remained the same, and 32.7% believe that it has improved.



Figure 6.12. Evaluation of Garbage Collection by Region in Honduras, 2014

Figure 6.13 shows the results for water and sewer service by region. Again, the North C and East B regions have the highest percentage of respondents expressing the opinion that service has improved over the last two years. In region Central A, 60% think the water and sewer service has remained the same. The East A region is where citizens express more negative views, with 29.5% saying that the water and sewer service has worsened over the past two years.



Figure 6.13. Evaluation of Water and Sewer Services by Region in Honduras, 2014

In the case of management of markets, Figure 6.14 shows that the regions North C and East B express the highest percentage of citizens who think that service has improved, at 40%. The North A region (Province of Cortez and the City of San Pedro Sula) contains the highest percentage who think that this service has deteriorated over the last two years (34.2%).



Figure 6.14. Evaluation of the Management of Markets by Region in Honduras, 2014

Confidence in Local Governments

In the AmericasBarometer, citizens were not only asked if they were satisfied with their local governments and the services they provide, but also if they trust their governments. The answers to this question can provide a perspective on certain abstract attitudes towards local governments that come from long ago. Figure 6.15 displays the average levels of trust in local government since 2004 (B32 was changed to a scale of 0-100, where 0 represents the lowest level of trust and 100 the highest). Local governments in Honduras receive a level of trust of 53.7 points on the scale of 0-100. This represents a significant increase from 2012.



Figure 6.15. Trust in Local Government in Honduras, 2004-2014

What factors influence levels of trust in local government? To answer this question, linear regression analysis was used. The results are found in Figure 6.16.[4] People with less wealth, who are older; reside in rural areas; attended a town meeting; and are more satisfied with the services provided by the municipality tend to have more confidence in local government.



Figure 6.16. Determinants of Trust in Local Governments in Honduras, 2014

[4] See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.

Figure 6.17 shows the bivariate relationship between the most significant factors and the level of trust in local government. It can be observed that people who live in small towns or rural areas express 10 points more trust than those residing in the capital or large cities. People who think that the services provided by the municipality are very good express 48 points more trust than the respondents for whom the services are very bad. In turn, people with fewer resources are more trusting, as well as those who are older. Finally, attendance at municipal meetings increases trust by 10 points on the scale of 0-100.



Figure 6.17. Factors Associated with Levels of Trust in Local Governments in Honduras, 2014

IV. Impact of Satisfaction on Local Services and Political System Support

As argued earlier in this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government, except at the local level. Therefore, perceptions of local governments can significantly impact attitudes toward the political system in general. Figure 6.18 presents a linear regression model

to determine whether satisfaction with local services is associated with political system support[5] in Honduras, while controlling for other factors that can affect system support.[6]

The President's job approval and evaluation of services provided by local governments are statistically significant factors in explaining changes in political system support. The results indicate that the greater the satisfaction a citizen has with the performance of the President or with local government services, the greater the support for the political system.



Figure 6.18. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of Support for the Political System in Honduras, 2014

Figure 6.19 presents the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and support for the political system. It is observed that people who perceive local services as "good" or "very good" express levels of support almost twice as high for the political system than those who think otherwise. Therefore, it can be said that the perception of local services has a significant impact on support for the political system in general. This result shows the significant effect of the local situation on the evaluation of the national system.

[5] Political system support is measured with an index formed by the following questions: B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Honduras guarantee a fair trial? B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Honduras? B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Honduras? B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Honduras? B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Honduras? All variables are recoded from 0-100, where 0 = the weakest attitude and 100 = the strongest.

[6] See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.



Figure 6.19. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Honduras, 2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer survey asked the opinions of Hondurans about the responsibilities and resources between the municipal and national governments.

HONMUN30. In your opinion, who should be responsible for providing health services to the people of this community, the central government or the municipality? (1) Central government (2) Municipality (88) DK (98) DA
HONMUNI31. ¿Who should be responsible for providing education to the people of this community? **[Read the options]** (1) Central government (2) Municipality (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 6.20 shows that Hondurans, despite expressing relatively high levels of trust and satisfaction in their local governments, prefer that the central government be in charge health services and education.



Figure 6.20. Who Should be Responsible for Health Services and Education?, Honduras 2014

V. Conclusion

This chapter examines the evaluations of local governments. Decentralization has been a subject of interest to academics and politicians seeking to deepen political participation and the democratization of public institutions. It is observed that 10% of Honduran respondents have attended town hall meetings. The levels of participation in municipal meetings declined from 2012 to 2014, still remaining below those seen in 2006. 12.8% of Hondurans have requested something from the municipality during the last year. The percentage of Hondurans who requested help from the municipality increased between 2012 and 2014, although the level is lower than that observed at the beginning of the AmericasBarometer in 2004. Opinions about the ability of local governments to respond to requests from citizens are usually negative. A large majority, 67.5%, of those who sought help from the municipality report that it did not solve the problem. People with lower incomes, who live in rural areas, and who have attended municipal meetings are more likely to make demands on local governments.

Hondurans express a level of satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality of 55.3 points on a scale of 0-100. The overall evaluation of the local governments is relatively positive and has been stable since 2004. The results presented on specific municipal services represent a relatively high level of satisfaction, with the exception of roads or streets. Most Hondurans think that water and sewer services and garbage collection have not changed in the last two years. The President's job approval and evaluation of services provided by local governments are statistically significant factors in explaining changes in support for the political system. The more satisfied a citizen is with the work

done by the President or the services provided by local governments, the greater the level of support the citizen has for the political system. Finally, despite relatively high levels of trust received by local governments, Hondurans believe that more responsibility and money should be given to the central government.

Appendix

Appendix 6.1. Factors Associated with the Submission of Petitions to Local Governments in Honduras, 2014
(Figure 6.6)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	0.102	(1.32)
Age	0.109	(1.36)
Female	0.097	(1.25)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.373*	(-4.61)
Size of Location	0.218*	(2.10)
Trust in Local Government	0.052	(0.55)
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	-0.031	(-0.32)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.322*	(5.29)
Constant	-2.002*	(-23.14)
F	8.43	
Number of cases	1435	
Regression-Coefficients standardized statistics *t* based on standard errors adjusted for sampling design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.2. Determinants of Trust in Local Governments in Honduras, 2014
(Figure 6.16)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.024	(-0.84)
Age	0.065*	(2.49)
Female	-0.021	(-0.80)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.072*	(-2.65)
Size of Location	0.088*	(2.91)
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	0.335*	(12.96)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.062*	(2.45)
Requested Help from Municipal Office	0.015	(0.57)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	28.20	
Number of cases	1435	
R-Squared	0.15	
Regression-Coefficients standardized statistics *t* based on standard errors adjusted for sampling design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.3. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Determinant of Support for the Political System in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 6.18)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.020	(-0.86)
Age	0.026	(1.22)
Female	0.034	(-0.09)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.003	(2.07)
Size of Location	0.010	(2.39)
Personal Economic Situation	0.066*	(0.40)
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	0.104*	(8.78)
Presidential Job Approval	0.257*	(21.18)
Constant	-0.000	(0.27)
F	25.05	
Number of cases	1434	
R-Squared	0.10	
Regression-Coefficients standardized statistics t based on standard errors adjusted for sampling design * p<0.05		

Chapter 7. Crime and Insecurity

Orlando J. Pérez

I. Introduction

Crime and insecurity have emerged as critical issues in Latin America and other developing countries. Studies have shown that citizens see crime as one of the most pressing problems facing the nation (Quann and Hung 2002). Moreover, crime has important political consequences. Some research links crime to the weakening of democratic values (Beirne 1997; Newman and Pridemore 2000; Pérez 2003, 2011; Prillaman 2003; Bateson 2012). Furthermore, the failure of security and judicial institutions to maintain order and protect the lives and property of citizens has been linked to decreases in government credibility (Wilkinson 1986) and crises of representation in parts of Latin America (Mainwaring et al. 2006).

Honduras ranks among the world's most violent countries. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the homicide rate per 100,000 habitants has increased from 50.9 in 1999 to 90.4 in 2012, with the world average being just ten in 100,000. Honduras nearly doubles the homicide rate of the second highest country, Venezuela, whose rate is just over 50 per 100,000 inhabitants[1]. This chapter analyzes the factors that determine levels of crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. Additionally, it analyzes the work of the Honduran National Police.

The literature presents a number of causes for crime involving multiple factors that are dynamic and interrelated. Here we can mention economic conditions (such as unemployment and wage levels); social conditions (such as social origin, poverty, and educational level); demographic conditions (such as conditions at birth, age, and sex); drug abuse; culture of violence; availability of weapons; transnational networks, among others. Cea et al. (2006) include an extensive literature review of the causes of crime. Among the economic factors considered by most scholars are the economic growth (total or per capita), inequality, and unemployment. Corman and Mocan (2000) find a relationship between increased poverty rates and increased rates of killings and injuries (assaults). Fajnzylber et al. (1998) find that economic growth has a negative and significant relationship to rate of robberies, but not for the homicide rate. Fajnzylber et al. (1998, 1999, 2000) find a positive relationship between inequality in the distribution of income and higher levels of crime, also finding that inequality is a sensitive variable in relation to policies by the state. The same positive relationship was found in Lederman et al. (2000). Ehrlich (1973), using the percentage of families below half the average income, found a positive and significant relationship with property crimes, but a lesser relationship with crimes against persons. Nunez et al. (2003), using the ratio of cash income between the richest quintile and the poorest quintile, find a positive relationship with the category of crimes associated with drug use. Studies on unemployment and crime have produced mixed results. Fuentes (2006) finds that reducing unemployment would have minimal impact on reducing the growing trend of crime. Ehrlich (1973) did not find a relationship between unemployment and crime for young people less than 24 years of age, but did find a relationship to the 35-39 years of age group. According to Fleisher

[1] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "UNODC Homicide Statistics." <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html>

(1963), by contrast, crime is significantly negatively correlated with crime regardless of age group. Nunez et al. (2003) find a positive and significant relationship between unemployment and crime.

In the literature, age and gender are the two demographic indicators most considered related to crime. Most crimes tend to be committed by young men, thus a higher proportion of this group, in relation to the total population, tends to increase criminal activity. Grogger (1998) argues that age is related to crime through wages, meaning that since youth receive lower wages, committing a crime can be a way to earn more income. Rodríguez (2003) finds a significant positive relationship and Fuentes (2006) finds a negative relationship between the proportion of people older than 35 years of age and crime.

Another demographic factor is race, explaining this relationship by the existence of discrimination and low incomes for certain sectors of the population. This problem is particularly marked in the United States where it is recognized that the "non-white" population (including immigrant minorities and blacks) face segregation in labor markets (Cornwell and Trumbull 1994; Ehrlich 1973).

Cea et al. (2006, 13) argue that "the highest levels of crime and violence occur in degraded urban environments," indicating that not all urban areas generate crime. In general, urban areas have a population with higher incomes, in comparison to rural areas. However, the higher income inequality and greater population density found in urban areas may encourage crime for economic reasons.

The existence of illicit activities, such as sales, production, or consumption of drugs, is also related to the development of other criminal activities (Fajnzylber et al 1998, 1999, 2000). All three studies find a significant positive relationship between crime and drug production.

Finally, lack of social capital defined as "the set of rules, networks and organizations built on relationships of trust and reciprocity that contribute to social cohesion, development and well-being of society, as well as the ability of its members to act and meet their needs in a coordinated form for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1993), may also have an effect on crime and violence. Social capital reduces the costs of social transactions which increase the likelihood of peaceful conflict resolution. Furthermore, communities with increased social ties possess better tools for the development of collective action.

This chapter discusses levels of victimization by crime and perceptions of insecurity in Honduras from the results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Also, it looks at the changes observed over time. Finally, the chapter discusses the perceptions of the work of the Honduran National Police.

II. Perception of Insecurity

The AmericasBarometer measures citizens' levels of perceived insecurity by asking:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe
(4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 7.1 shows the 2014 results of this question. Here we can see that the feelings of security prevail, 66.4% of Hondurans feel somewhat or very safe in their neighborhood. One in three, however, express some level of insecurity.



Figure 7.1. Perception of Neighborhood Insecurity in Honduras, 2014

Figure 7.2 presents the results of this question over time. Following the practice of the AmericasBarometer, responses were recoded on a scale of 0-100, where higher values mean greater perceived insecurity. The level of uncertainty increases significantly in 2014, but still does not reach the levels of 2008. In relative terms, the trend over time is a greater perception of safety despite the high level of crime in the country. One reason for this phenomenon is that we are measuring the national average, where areas of relatively low levels of crime are included. Additionally, the question is directed to the neighborhood or community of the respondent and possibly, with the exception of some neighborhoods with high levels of insecurity, most citizens know their community and by having lived there for several years, they have likely come to feel relatively safe within their own neighborhoods. Finally, even if crime is high, only a minority of citizens are directly affected by it on a daily basis, so it is not surprising that many still express feelings of security despite the crime statistics.



Figure 7.2. Perception of Insecurity in Honduras, 2004-2014

Map 7.1 shows the distribution of insecurity by region. The regions with the greatest sense of insecurity are North A (Cortes) and Central A (Francisco Morazán). Intermediate levels of insecurity include the regions North B (Atlántida, Colon and Yoro) and Central B (Comayagua and La Paz). As will be seen later, the North A and Central A regions have the highest levels of crime victimization and contain the country's largest urban areas, Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula.



Map 7.1. Perception of Insecurity by Region, 2014

The increase in perception of insecurity may be related to the fact that security issues are identified as the most important problem for the country. Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of the most important problems for the country since 2004. In 2014, problems related to security are identified by the highest percentage of respondents. In fact, the 2014 survey results show the highest percentage of Hondurans (47.9%) identifying public safety as the most important problem facing the country since the AmericasBarometer's first survey in Honduras in 2004.



Figure 7.3. The Most Important Problem Facing Honduras, 2004-2014

What are the determinants of the perception of insecurity? To answer this question, Figure 7.4 shows the results of a linear regression analysis with demographic and other variables that could have an impact on levels of insecurity. The variables included are those that measure interpersonal trust; crime victimization; and the perception of thefts; drug sales; extortions; and killings in their neighborhood in the last year.[2] The results indicate that the variable with greatest weight is interpersonal trust. People who express greater trust in their neighbors tend to perceive lower levels of insecurity. Interpersonal trust is an important indicator of social capital, which is civic organization and community participation. The analysis indicates that the variable measuring if neighbors organized as a result of crime is not significant. This may be due to the small number (only 11.4%) that said they have organized due to fear of crime.

Regression analysis shows that people who say that there have been robberies and murders in their neighborhood express greater feelings of insecurity. Those who have been victims of crime also express higher levels of insecurity. None of the demographic variables are statistically significant. These results indicate that direct experiences with crime are decisive factors in determining feelings of insecurity.

[2] See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.



Figure 7.4. Determinants of the Perception of Insecurity in Honduras, 2014

Figure 7.5 presents the results of the relationship between the perception of insecurity and factors found to be significant. It is observed that high levels of interpersonal trust reduce feelings of insecurity by half. Victims of crime express levels of insecurity 13 points higher than those who have not been victimized. Respondents who say that there have been robberies or murders in their neighborhood feel higher levels of insecurity.



Figure 7.5. Relationship between Significant Factors and Perception of Insecurity in Honduras, 2014

III. Victimization by Crime

How is the *perception* of insecurity compared with the citizens' *experiences* with insecurity? Since 2010, the AmericasBarometer has asked a series of questions to measure crime victimization:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options] (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality/canton/parish (4) In another municipality/canton/parish (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Figure 7.6 combines the responses to the questions VIC1EXT y VIC1HOGAR for 2014.



Figure 7.6. Personal Victimization by Crime and Victimization of another Person in the Home in Honduras, 2014

It is observed that 18.3% of respondents say they have been victims of crime and 21.3% say that someone in their household has been victimized by crime. It is important to note, however, that the survey was administered only to voting age adults; therefore, it is possible that the victimization of minors is not always reported because family members may not be aware of what happened. Also, remember that respondents self-identify as victims of crime. In some contexts, certain criminal acts (especially those that are almost exclusively perpetrated against marginalized groups) may have been normalized and therefore are not reported with the same frequency with which they occur.

Figure 7.7 shows the distribution of victimization (VIC1EXE) by region.



Figure 7.7. Crime Victimization by Region in Honduras, 2014

The region with the highest percentage of crime victims is North C and East B.[3] These regions are followed by North A (Cortes). Regions North C, East B, and North B report percentages of victimization higher than the 18.3% national average.

Figure 7.8 shows the locations where most of the crimes committed in Honduras occur according to the answers of respondents across the country; 18.1% say they have been victims in a municipality different from where they live. Whereas, 25.2% were victimized in the neighborhood or community in which they live and 40.8% in the municipality where they reside. Only 15.5% were victimized by crime in their home.

[3] It is important to note that for regions East B and North C, the reduced number of interviewees reduces the confidence that can be attributed to the results in these regions.



Figure 7.8. Location of Respondents' Most Recent Crime Victimization

Finally, it might be interesting to know how personal experiences with crime have changed over time. Figure 7.9 shows the trends in self-reported victimization in Honduras between 2004 and 2014. It should be noted, however, that there was a change in the formulation of the questions measuring crime victimization in 2010. Between 2004 and 2008, LAPOP used question VIC1, which asked: Have you been the victim of a crime in the past 12 months? In 2010 and 2012, this question was replaced by VIC1EXT, which gives more details regarding acts of crime that could have occurred. This change was made in order to increase the validity of the responses.



Figure 7.9. Victimization by Crime Over Time in Honduras, 2004-2014

Levels of crime victimization increased significantly between 2004 and 2006, followed by a decrease in 2008. Since the 2008 survey, victimization levels increased slightly in 2010 and significantly in 2012. The level of victimization has remained stable between 2012 and 2014. Although part of the increase seen between 2010 and 2014 can be attributed to the change in question used to measure this variable, given the increasing levels of violence in Honduras, the increase in victimization also reflects the general increase in crime in the country.

Who are More Likely to be Victims of Crime?

Figure 7.10 illustrates the results of the logistic regression model that evaluates who are more likely to be victims of crime in Honduras.[4] The size of the place of residence and level of education are the most significant factors.

[4] See the table of corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.



Figure 7.10. Determinants of Personal Victimization by Crime in Honduras, 2014

To better understand the effect of each independent variable on crime victimization in Honduras, Figure 7.11 shows the bivariate relationships between each of the independent variables found to be significant in the logistic regression and crime victimization in Honduras. Crime victimization increases significantly as the level of education increases, the size of the respondent's location of residence increases,[5] and with decreasing age. Young people with secondary or higher levels of education who live in large and medium cities reported being victims of crime with higher frequency.

[5] Size of place measures (1) National Capital, (2) Large City, (3) Medium City, (4) Small City y (5) Rural Area. As the variable increases, the size decreases.



Figure 7.11. Sociodemographic Factors and Crime Victimization in the Home in Honduras, 2014

Crime can affect citizens' various daily activities. The AmericasBarometer asked the extent to which Hondurans change several life activities in response to crime. In general, most respondents report not having to change their daily activities, although at least one-third of the population reports having limited where they go to shop and for entertainment (see Figure 7.12).



Figure 7.12. Change in Behavior for Fear of Crime in Honduras, 2014

IV. Evaluation of the Performance of the National Police

The National Police is the institution responsible for fighting crime. Unfortunately, the institution has been questioned in recent years. The National Police of Honduras is under the direction of the Ministry of Security but were under the control of the armed forces until 1996. As part of a series of constitutional reforms, a single police force under civilian leadership was instituted: the National Police of Honduras (PNH), which remains as the only force after the enactment of its organic law in 1998.

The capacity and integrity of the National Police of Honduras has been questioned by national and international studies. Various reports have accused the police of involvement in bribes; passing information to criminal groups; allowing uncontrolled passage of drug shipments; and directing criminal operations.[6] In recent years, the government has attempted several reforms of the National Police, including a purge; the creation of special units, such as the Intelligence Troop and Special Response Security Group (Tigres), an elite force composed of certified police and military personnel; as well as the increased use of the military in joint patrols with the National Police. These reforms have had mixed results.

[6] See: http://www.elheraldo.hn/csp/mediapool/sites/ElHeraldo/Pais/story.csp?cid=568791&sid=299&fid=214; http://www.salanegra.elfaro.net/es/201203/cronicas/7982/.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer includes various questions about the evaluation of the performance of the National Police. For example:

POLE2N. In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighborhood?
[If respondent says there is no police, mark 4 "Very dissatisfied"]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA



Figure 7.13. Satisfaction with Police Performance in the Neighborhood in Honduras, 2014

Figure 7.13 indicates that most Hondurans express satisfaction with the work of the police in their neighborhood or community; 52% say they are "satisfied" and 6.6% are "very satisfied" with the work done by the police in their neighborhood.

However, in relation to other institutions, the National Police receive low levels of trust. In Figure 7.14,[7] one can see that the police receive less trust than the Armed Forces, the President, and the Municipality.

[7] These results represent the variables of the B series (Institutional Trust). The scale is 0 – 100, where 0 = No confidence and 100 = A lot of confidence.



Figure 7.14. Institutional Trust in Honduras, 2014

The AmericasBarometer asked about actions that the police take inside the neighborhood or community:

ICO2. How often do the police patrol your neighborhood? **[Read the options]**
(1) Several times per day
(2) At least once a day
(3) Several times per week
(4) Several times per month
(5) Rarely
(6) Never
(88) DK (98) DA

Figure 7.15 shows the results. Here, we see that 34% say the police "never" or "rarely" patrol their neighborhood and 6.8% say they patrol several times per month. 41.5% say the police patrol their neighborhood "at least once a day" or "several times a day."



Figure 7.15. Frequency of National Police Patrolling in the Neighborhood in Honduras, 2014

The police patrol is mostly concentrated in large cities (over 100,000 habitants) and the nation's capital (see Figure 7.16). In rural areas 43.9% of residents say that the police rarely, if ever, patrol their neighborhood or community. Of citizens living in the nation's capital, 59.4% say the police patrol their neighborhood several times a day or at least once a day. Obviously, the police concentrate their activities in urban areas where the largest number of police units are deployed and where the crime rate is higher.



Figure 7.16. Frequency of National Police Patrolling in the Neighborhood by Size of Place of Residence in Honduras, 2014

What factors determine satisfaction with the National Police? To answer this question, linear regression analysis is conducted, including demographic factors and perceptions of the police. Figure 7.17 shows the results. It is noted that three factors are statistically significant: the level of police patrols in their neighborhood or community; trust in the police; and perception of insecurity. It was found that the higher the frequency of police patrols, the higher the level of satisfaction with their work. People who express greater levels of trust also express satisfaction with police performance and those who feel greater levels of insecurity express less satisfaction.



Figure 7.17. Determinants of Satisfaction with the Performance of the National Police of Honduras, 2014

The relationship between the significant factors and satisfaction with police work can be best seen in Figure 7.18. It is observed that when the frequency of patrols increases in the neighborhood or community, satisfaction also increases. Those who trust in the police also expressed greater satisfaction, while people with greater feelings of insecurity express less satisfaction. These results indicate that the opinions about direct experiences with the police increase the positive perception of the institution. This result has components that support the idea of community policing and increased police presence in neighborhoods and communities.



Figure 7.18. Relation between Significant Factors and Satisfaction with the National Police of Honduras, 2014

Another way to evaluate the work of the National Police is asking about the average response time to a criminal act. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer asked Hondurans:

INFRAX. Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? [READ ALTERNATIVES]
(1) Less than 10 minutes
(2) Between 10 and 30 minutes
(3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour
(4) More than an hour and up to three hours
(5) More than three hours
(6) [DON'T READ] There are no police/they would never arrive
(88) DK
(98) DA



Figure 7.19. Police Response Time in Honduras, 2014

Figure 7.19 shows that the time parameter that receives the highest response rate is "10 to 30 minutes," with 24.4%. One in every five respondents, or 21.5%, say that there are no police or that they never come, and 13.6% say that the police would take over three hours to respond to a robbery in the home. Figure 7.20 shows the distribution of these responses by size of location of residence. In the nation's capital, the perception is that the police would respond much faster than in rural areas or other cities; 44.5% of citizens in the capital said that police would respond in less than 30 minutes. In other large cities, including San Pedro Sula, police respond less quickly. A quarter of the population in big cities says that there are no police or that they would never respond to a robbery in the home.



Figure 7.20. Police Response Time by Size of Place of Residence in Honduras, 2014

Figure 7.21 shows the difference in response times by the police between San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa. The population of Tegucigalpa perceives that the police would respond much faster than the residents of San Pedro Sula. In Tegucigalpa, 35.7% say that the police would respond in 10 to 30 minutes. In San Pedro Sula, only 21.4% of residents say that the police would respond in the same time frame. In San Pedro Sula, 26.4% say that there are no police or that they would never respond to a robbery in the home.



Figure 7.21. Police Response Time in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, 2014

V. Conclusion

This chapter analyzes the determinants of crime and insecurity in Honduras. The country is among the most violent in the world with a rate of 90.4 homicides per 100,000 habitants, nearly 10 times higher than the world average. The results of the AmericasBarometer indicate that despite the crime levels, 66.4% of Hondurans feel somewhat or very safe in their neighborhood or community. One in three, however, express high levels of insecurity. The level of insecurity has increased significantly in 2014, but still does not reach the levels of 2008. The trend over time is a greater perception of *safety* despite the high level of crime in the country.

Security issues are identified as the most important for the country. In 2014, security issues replace political problems as the country's most important problem. Obviously, for Hondurans, although many feel safe in the neighborhood where they live, violence remains a topic of much concern.

The factors that have the greatest impact on levels of insecurity are interpersonal trust (an important factor in levels of social capital) and victimization of, or direct experience with crime. Interpersonal trust has the greatest impact on levels of insecurity. Citizens who express greater trust in their neighbors tend to express lower feelings of insecurity. Interpersonal trust facilitates civic or community organization and allows for a greater level of collaboration among neighborhood residents. The possibility of organizing obviously increases the sense of security. Additionally, the act of trusting more in one's neighbors can psychologically affect feelings of safety. On the other hand, crime victims

express levels of insecurity 13 points higher than those who have not been victimized. Respondents who say that there have been robberies or murders in their neighborhoods report higher levels of insecurity.

The results presented in this chapter show that levels of crime victimization increased significantly between 2004 and 2006, but decreased in 2008. Since 2008, the levels of victimization have increased, slightly in 2010 and significantly in 2012. The levels of victimization remained stable between 2012 and 2014. Level of education, age, and the size of location of residence of the respondents are the factors that determine the levels of crime victimization. Young people with a secondary level of education or higher and who live in large and medium-size cities report being victims of crime more often.

Finally, the chapter evaluates the work of the National Police of Honduras, one of the most questioned institutions in recent years. Most Hondurans express satisfaction with the police work in the neighborhood or community where they reside. Opinions on direct experiences with the police tend to increase the perception of satisfaction with the institution. The more frequent the police patrols in the neighborhood, the higher the level of satisfaction with their work. The population of Tegucigalpa perceives that the police would respond much faster to a home robbery than the residents of San Pedro Sula.

Appendix

Appendix 7.1. Determinants of the Perception of Insecurity, 2014 (Figure 7.4)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.017	(-0.54)
Age	0.030	(1.03)
Female	0.038	(1.47)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.023	(-0.89)
Size of Location	-0.055	(-1.73)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.241*	(-8.47)
Organized in Neighborhood for Security	0.045	(1.66)
Crime Victimization	0.094*	(3.42)
Robberies in the Neighborhood	0.097*	(3.02)
Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood	0.039	(1.22)
Extortion in the Neighborhood	0.024	(0.59)
Murders in the Neighborhood	0.083*	(2.45)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
F	17.14	
Number of cases	1176	
R-Squared	0.15	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 7.2. Determinants of Personal Victimization by Crime in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 7.10)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	0.248*	(3.20)
Age	-0.195*	(-2.08)
Female	0.017	(0.24)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.109	(1.24)
Size of Location	-0.228*	(-2.66)
Skin Tone	0.063	(1.11)
Constant	-1.590*	(-19.20)
F	8.11	
Number of cases	1516	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 7.3. Determinants of Satisfaction with the Work of the National Police of Honduras, 2014 (Figure 7.17)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.067*	(-2.06)
Age	0.010	(0.36)
Female	0.003	(0.14)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.002	(0.07)
Size of Location	-0.022	(-0.68)
Trust in National Police	0.167*	(6.10)
Crime Victimization	-0.059*	(-2.29)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.133*	(-4.56)
Robberies in the Neighborhood	-0.032	(-1.10)
Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood	-0.055	(-1.73)
Extortion in the Neighborhood	0.013	(0.45)
Murders in the Neighborhood	-0.014	(-0.47)
Police Patrols your Neighborhood	0.468*	(14.62)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	37.82	
Number of cases	1171	
R-Squared	0.31	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * $p<0.05$		

Chapter 8. Crime and Democratic Values

Orlando Pérez

I. Introduction

What are the effects of levels of crime victimization and the perception of insecurity on democratic values in Honduras? Some authors suggest that the fear of crime encourages citizens to demand punitive and repressive measures against alleged criminals (Sanjuan, 2003). Fear can generate support for authoritarianism (Corradi, 1992: 267). Concern about violent crime in Latin America seems to be so severe that people are "willing to sacrifice certain freedoms in order to feel more secure" (Tulchin and Ruthenberg 2006, 5). In El Salvador, Perez (2003) finds that up to 55% of the population would support a military coup if there was high crime. In Africa, for example, the fear of crime has been associated with a decline of democracy (Kuenzi 2006).

Coinciding with recent waves of crime in Latin America, the last two decades have seen a rise of a new form of police repression called *mano dura*, as well as relatively high levels of support for authoritarian measures. As Pérez (2003, 638) explains:

> *Crime undermines support for democratic regimes. As crime increases, pressure grows for a "strong" response by the government that, in many cases, results in highly repressive and undemocratic measures.*

Using the 2008 AmericasBarometer, Perez (2011) found that respondents who were victims of crime were significantly less likely to express confidence in state institutions. Moreover, the perception of insecurity is a more significant factor than being a victim of crime. People who fear becoming victims of crime in their neighborhood are less willing to confer rights to the opposition; express less interpersonal trust; have less support for the idea that democracy is the best political system; and exhibit much less trust in political institutions.

In general, studies have found that victims of crime have lower levels of interpersonal trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Victims of crime have been found to be personally alienated (Cárdia 2002; Elias 1986; Marks and Goldsmith 2006; Melossi and Selmini 2000; Skogan 1990), and unhappy (Powdthavee 2005). On the other hand, several studies have found that victims of crime develop attitudes and behaviors that contribute to greater political participation. For example, Bellows and Miguel (2009), Blattman (2009) and Voors et al. (2012) found that people who suffered violence in civil war showed higher rates of voting, community leadership and civic participation. Other studies found that people living in war-devastated communities express higher levels of social capital, altruism and political participation (Bellows and Miguel 2006; Gilligan, Pasquale, Samii 2011; Kage 2011).

This chapter analyzes the relationship between crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity and democratic values. It also analyzes the impact of victimization and insecurity on the citizens' electoral decisions. Additionally, the chapter examines the impact of crime victimization on support for authoritarian measures.

II. Crime, Insecurity and Democracy

What is the impact of crime victimization on support for democracy in Honduras? The AmericasBarometer uses a question that seeks to establish the extent to which respondents support the concept that democracy, despite its problems, is the best political system.[1]

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

To answer the question, a linear regression analysis was conducted, including demographic factors, victimization by crime and the perception of insecurity. Figure 8.1 shows that crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity are not statistically significant in determining support for democracy.[2]



Figure 8.1. Impact of Victimization by Crime and Insecurity on Support for Democracy in Honduras, 2014

III. Support for the Political System

What are the effects of victimization by crime and insecurity on support for the political system? Figure 8.2 shows the impact of experiences with crime and perceptions of insecurity on

[1] The national average for this index is 65.8 on a scale of 0-100.
[2] See the table of corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.

system support.[3] The results indicate that the level of education, victimization by corruption and perceptions of insecurity, and corruption are not significant determinants of system support.



Figure 8.2. Impact of Victimization by Crime and Insecurity on Support for the Political System in Honduras, 2014

The results indicate that crime victimization is a significant determinant of political system support. The perception of insecurity is not a significant determinant. Direct experience with crime significantly reduces support for the political system. Security is one of the most important public goods and the State has the responsibility to provide the public with an acceptable level of order and security. When the State fails in this regard, it should not be surprising that the citizens' perception of the political system is affected.

[3]See the corresponding table of results in the Appendix of this chapter. System support is calculated as the average of the respondents' answers to the five questions: B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Honduras guarantee a fair trial?; B2 To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Honduras?; B3 To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Honduras?; B4 To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Honduras?; and B6: To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Honduras?. The variable related to these questions is recoded on a scale from 0 to 100.



Figure 8.3. Victimization by Crime and Support for the Political System in Honduras, 2014

Figure 8.3 digs deeper into the effects of independent variables on system support and presents bivariate relationships between system support and experience with crime. It is observed that people who have been victims of crime express less support for the political system of Honduras. However, recalling the results in Figure 8.1, the same cannot be said for the way in which crime victimization abstractly affects citizen support for democracy. That is to say, although being a victim of a crime can cause public discontent with the functioning of the political system of Honduras, experiences with crime do not necessarily lead to Hondurans losing faith in the concept of democracy as a form of government.

IV. Support for Military Coups

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions that measure the circumstances in which respondents are willing to justify a military coup.

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances?[Read the options after each question]:				
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA



Figure 8.4. Coup Justified When There is A Lot of Crime in Honduras, 2014

When there is a lot of crime, 30.7% of citizens would justify a coup. Figure 8.5 shows the evolution of the question JC10 since 2004. Support for a coup has declined significantly since 2008, and in 2014, Hondurans express the lowest levels since the beginning of the AmericasBarometer. One of the reasons for this significant reduction since 2008 is the political crisis of 2009 and its aftermath.



Figure 8.5. A Coup Justified When There is A Lot of Crime, Honduras 2004-2014

What are the factors that support justification of a coup? A scale of support for a coup was developed by combining and recoding questions JC10 and JC13, where "0" signifies complete

rejection of coups no matter what the condition and "100" reflects support for a coup under the two conditions proposed in the questions. Linear regression analysis is used, including demographic variables, crime victimization, and perceptions of insecurity (see Figure 8.6).[4] Crime victimization and insecurity are not significant factors. Confidence in the Armed Forces and age are factors that significantly influence the levels of justification of a coup. The older the respondent, the lesser the support for a coup, while greater confidence in the Armed Forces increases support for a coup.



Figure 8.6. Determinants of Justification of a Coup in Honduras, 2014

V. Political Tolerance

Political tolerance is a fundamental pillar to the survival of democracy. According to previous studies by LAPOP, political tolerance is defined as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree" (Seligson 2000, 2). Gibson noted the harmful effects of intolerance on the quality of a democracy. The intolerance of both citizens and elites is associated with supporting policies that seek to limit individual freedoms and the perceived lack of freedom among those who are the targets (Gibson 1988; 2008; 1998; 1995).

The AmericasBarometer uses a series of five questions to measure political tolerance:

[4] See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Honduran form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Honduran form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all indices used by the AmericasBarometer, an average is calculated from the responses of each respondent to the four questions above. The outcome variable is then recoded on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 represents "very little tolerance" and 100 represents "very high tolerance."

How do crime and perception of insecurity affect political tolerance? Figure 8.7 presents the results of a linear regression analysis where one can observe that insecurity and victimization are not significant factors.[5] Education and gender are the most important factors. Men and people with higher levels of education express higher levels of political tolerance.



Figure 8.7. Political Tolerance and Victimization by Crime and Insecurity in Honduras, 2014

VI. Political Participation

Crime can affect election results in two ways, influencing the decision to participate in the polls or in supporting a candidate. Crime may pose tangible and intangible costs that reduce the likelihood of individuals to participate, but it can also provide benefits relating to social solidarity and concrete

[5] See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.

practices associated with helping to resolve some of the causes of crime. Victims of crime may see active political participation as a way to mitigate the negative effects of victimization. Similarly, while it is expected that victims of crime express lower levels of political efficacy, particularly external efficacy, as the offense constitutes a failure of the State, one can also see that victims express high levels of effectiveness related to the motivation that can come from personal tragedy. Moreover, in situations where the crime is a major national problem, people affected by this phenomenon may have higher levels of internal efficacy as they feel more "connected" to a major national problem. Logistic regression models evaluating data from the AmericasBarometer which, due to space considerations, is not shown here indicates that victims of crime are associated with higher levels of internal efficacy. However, as expected, crime victims present with lower levels of external efficacy.

A number of studies have examined the extent to which crime can affect voters' preferences on candidate platforms. The results tend to support the idea that conservative candidates (ideologically right) are more likely to be helped by a campaign that emphasizes fighting crime (Estrada 2004; Mayer and Tiberj 2004; Hamai and Ellis 2006). That is, the campaigns that focus on “heavy handed” policies tend to be of more help to candidates on the right, in comparison to the left. The literature shows that crime is important to the extent that people believe it is a major problem (Garland 2001; Godoy 2006). In fact, crime seems to be a determining factor in the preferences of voters, even in cases where crime rates are low (Cullen et al 1985; Beckett 1997; Davey 1999). In such circumstances, the behavior of the media and the rhetoric of political leaders may increase the effects of crime (Romer et al. 2006). Media coverage may reveal the magnitude of the problem and pressure politicians to respond forcefully (Kaniss 1991; Vermeer 2002). As a result, candidates try to express support for tough policies to combat crime and maintain law and order. The rhetoric often results in candidates accusing each other of being weak on crime (see Krause 2009; Holland 2013). When it comes to combating crime, the results indicate that voters tend to favor politicians on the right rather than those on the left (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). Weyland (2000) found that in Peru, President Alberto Fujimori's popularity rose significantly in response to the perception of the fight against crime. In the context of Central America, which includes the most violent sub-regions of Latin America, there are several cases of presidential candidates who have used the issue of crime and tough rhetoric to gain political support.

What effects might crime and insecurity have on electoral decisions? Since presidential elections took place before the survey was carried out, the impact of experiences with victimization and perceptions of insecurity that occur after the respondent has decided to vote cannot be measured. However, the AmericasBarometer asks about future electoral decisions:

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read options]**
(1) Wouldn’t vote
(2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party
(3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration
(4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote
(88) DK (98) DA

The results of this question can be seen in Figure 8.8; 35.9% say they would vote for a candidate or party other than the current president and 33.3% say they would vote for a candidate or the party of the current president; 25.3% say they would not vote.



Figure 8.8. Future Vote for President in Honduras, 2014

How do crime and insecurity affect the decision for whom to vote? To answer this question the VB20 variable is recoded as a dichotomy that separates those who would support the current government and those who would support the opposition. Those who do not vote or leave their vote blank are removed from the analysis because it is difficult to know their electoral motivations. Figure 8.9 presents the results of a logistic regression where one can see that crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity are not significant factors. Gender, education, and where the respondent lives are significant. Women, people with less education, and those who live in rural areas would support the candidate or party of the current president.



Figure 8.9. Future Vote for President and Crime and Insecurity in Honduras, 2014

VII. Support for the President's Performance

Finally, the impact of crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity on the evaluation of the president's performance is analyzed. The AmericasBarometer includes a question that attempts to measure the perception of the work of the current president.

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Juan Orlando Hernández? **[Read the options]**
(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 8.10, the evolution of this measure is observed since 2004. It is seen that the evaluation increases significantly between 2012 and 2014, however, it has varied widely since 2008.



Figure 8.10. Approval of the Performance of the Current President in Honduras, 2004-2014

The question is, to what extent does crime affect support for the president? Figure 8.11 presents the results of a linear regression where one can observe that crime victimization is a significant factor. People who report being victims of a criminal act express less support for the performance of the current president. In addition, women express more support than men.



Figure 8.11. Determinants of Approval of the President's Performance in Honduras, 2014

Figure 8.12 presents the bivariate relationship between crime victimization and approval of the president. Although victims and non-victims express a high level of support, people who were not victimized by criminal act express greater approval.



Figure 8.12. Approval of the President and Victimization by Crime in Honduras, 2014

VIII. Conclusion

This chapter examines the relationship between crime, insecurity, and democratic values, including support for democracy, political tolerance, support for the political system, participation, and support for the president. The results presented here indicate that crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity are not statistically significant factors in determining support for democracy. Victims of crime, however, express less support for the political system than those who have not been victims of crime. The experience of being a crime victim represents a failure of the State to provide security to citizens and thus victims penalize the political system.

The percentage of Hondurans who would support a coup by the military in conditions of high crime is 30%, a number that has declined significantly since 2008. It is thought that this decline is partly due to the experience of the 2009 political crisis. Crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity are not significant factors in support of a coup. Neither are they for political tolerance or the decision to vote for a candidate of the opposition vs. a candidate from the current administration in the next election. Finally, crime victimization is a significant factor in determining approval of the current president's performance.

Appendix

Appendix 8.1. Impact of Victimization by Crime and Insecurity on Support for Democracy in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 8.1)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	0.040	(1.20)
Age	0.117*	(4.22)
Female	0.045	(1.85)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.032	(0.95)
Size of Location	-0.086*	(-2.35)
Crime Victimization	-0.010	(-0.38)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.064	(-1.94)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	4.25	
Number of cases	1467	
R-Squared	0.03	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 8.2. Impact of Victimization by Crime and Insecurity on Support for the Political System in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 8.2)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.018	(-0.57)
Age	0.002	(0.09)
Female	0.062*	(2.51)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.021	(0.78)
Size of Location	0.009	(0.27)
Crime Victimization	-0.163*	(-5.77)
Perception of Insecurity	0.000	(0.00)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	7.88	
Number of cases	1505	
R-Squared	0.03	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 8.3. Determinants of Justification of a Coup in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 8.6)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.055	(-1.75)
Age	-0.098*	(-3.46)
Female	0.016	(0.61)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.021	(-0.64)
Size of Location	0.001	(0.04)
Trust in Armed Forces	0.143*	(5.55)
Support for Democracy	-0.020	(-0.80)
Crime Victimization	0.037	(1.45)
Perception of Insecurity	0.023	(0.83)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
F	4.56	
Number of cases	1424	
R-Squared	0.03	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 8.4. Political Tolerance and Victimization by Crime and Insecurity in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 8.7)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	0.129*	(4.25)
Age	-0.034	(-1.22)
Female	-0.052*	(-2.65)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.020	(0.67)
Size of Location	-0.056	(-1.50)
Crime Victimization	0.022	(0.65)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.026	(-0.76)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
F	10.62	
Number of cases	1507	
R-Squared	0.04	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 8.5. Future Vote for President and Crime and Insecurity in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 8.9)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.182*	(-2.17)
Age	0.089	(1.26)
Female	0.238*	(3.63)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.139	(-1.76)
Urban/Rural	0.187*	(2.13)
Crime Victimization	-0.017	(-0.22)
Perception of Insecurity	0.063	(0.81)
Constant	-0.068	(-0.78)
F	6.86	
Number of cases	940	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 8.6. Determinants of Approval of the President's Performance in Honduras, 2014 (Figure 8.11)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Level of Education	-0.054	(-1.68)
Age	0.018	(0.65)
Female	0.078*	(3.06)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.012	(-0.46)
Urban/Rural	-0.029	(-1.00)
Crime Victimization	-0.064*	(-2.34)
Perception of Insecurity	0.007	(0.26)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	3.96	
Number of cases	1502	
R-Squared	0.02	
Regression Coefficients standardized with t statistic based on standardized errors adjusted for sample design. * p<0.05		

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Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

Marzo, 2014

Estimado señor o señora:

Usted ha sido elegido/a al azar para participar en un estudio de opinión pública. Vengo por encargo de la Universidad de Vanderbilt y la empresa Le Vote. El proyecto está financiado por la AID de los Estados Unidos. La entrevista durará unos 45 minutos.

El objetivo principal del estudio es conocer la opinión de las personas acerca de diferentes aspectos de la situación de Honduras. El estudio se lleva a cabo de manera que podamos comprender mejor lo que la gente piensa acerca de su país, aunque no podemos ofrecer ningún beneficio específico. Planificamos realizar una serie de conferencias basadas en los resultados de lo que dice la gente. Nunca revelaremos su opinión individual.

Su participación en el estudio es voluntaria. Usted puede dejar preguntas sin responder o terminar la entrevista en cualquier momento. Las respuestas que usted proporcione serán completamente confidenciales y anónimas. Usted no recibirá pago alguno por su participación, pero ésta tampoco le ocasionará gastos.

Si tiene preguntas respecto al estudio, puede comunicarse con la empresa Le Vote al teléfono 2271-0045 con el Señor Ricardo Romero o al correo: levote@yahoo.com. Dejaremos esta carta con usted, en caso usted desee revisarla. El número IRB del estudio es 110627.

¿Desea Participar?

Appendix B. Sample Design

Sample Design for the 2014 AmericasBarometer Survey in Honduras

I. Universe, Population, Unit of Observation

Universe: The survey provides national of adults of voting age concentrated in the nine standard principal regions of the country: region Norte A, Norte B, Norte C, Oriental A, Oriental B, Sur, Central A, Central B, Occidental. In the past, these were the strata (ESTRATOPRI) for Honduras and they will continue to be in 2012. The universe is composed of adults (18 years and older) who live in the urban and rural areas of the 298 municipalities registered in the 2001 Honduran census.[1]

Population: The survey is designed to gather information from a nationally representative sample of population of voting-age adults. Only non-institutionalized adults are eligible to participate. Therefore, the sample excludes people in in-patient psychiatric facilities, hospitals, police academies, military quarters and those in the country's prisons.

Unit of Observation: The study includes subject regarding not only the individual, but also to other members of the household. That is, the statistical unite of observation is that household. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, some respondents live in dwellings that can be shared with other households. For this reason, it is more convenient to consider that dwelling as the final unit of analysis. Additionally, the household is an easily identifiable unit in the filed with relative permanency over time, a characteristic that allows us to consider it as the final unit of selection.

II. Sample Frame

The sample covers 100% of the eligible population in Honduras. This means that each eligible person in the country has an equal and known opportunity of being included in the survey sample. This also implies that no particular ethnic group or geographic areas will be excluded from the sample framework.

The sample design uses as the sampling frame the list of municipalities, localities, census segments, and maps of Honduras from the 2001 census implemented by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (INE – National Institute of Statistics).

Honduras is divided into 18 departments and subdivided into 298 municipalities. Inside each municipality, the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* created census segments, and within those, the constituent dwellings.

Per the 2001 data, Honduras has a total of 3,093,262 voting-age adults. Of these, 56% live in urban areas and the other 44% live in areas that are categorized as rural. Table 1 shows the distribution of the 18 years and older population by department and urban and rural areas.

[1] *Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Honduras.*

Table 1. Distribution of 18 and Older Population by Departments, and Urban and Rural Areas

Region	Department	Urban	Rural	Total
Central A	Francisco Morazán	299,626	88,006	387,632
Central B	Comayagua	86,973	86,173	173,146
Central B	La Paz	16,942	40,888	57,830
Norte A	Cortes	516,154	152,056	668,210
Norte B	Atlántida	135,406	50,673	186,079
Norte B	Colon	64,307	53,914	118,221
Norte B	Yoro	206,034	136,974	343,008
Norte C	Islas de la Bahía	4,397	7,624	12,021
Occidental	Copan	63,989	99,167	163,156
Occidental	Intibuca	13,949	40,228	54,177
Occidental	Lempira	7,010	82,335	89,345
Occidental	Ocotepeque	10,265	41,528	51,793
Occidental	Santa Bárbara	78,742	122,840	201,582
Oriental A	El Paraíso	57,901	87,665	145,566
Oriental A	Olancho	61,760	90,787	152,547
Oriental B	Gracias a Dios	4,596	13,080	17,676
Sur	Choluteca	68,720	111,828	180,548
Sur	Valle	40,368	50,357	90,725
	General Total	**1,737,139**	**1,356,123**	**3,093,262**

III. Sampling Method

The sampling method chosen takes into consideration a series of elements pre-established by LAPOP. The following requirements for the design of the sample were determined by LAPOP Central beforehand:

(a) Obtain representative samples for the following study strata:

Size of the Municipalities

1. Municipalities with over 100,000 inhabitants
2. Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants
3. Municipalities with fewer than 25,000 inhabitants

Strata for the First Stage

1. Central A
2. Central B
3. Norte A
4. Norte B
5. Norte C
6. Occidental

7. Oriental A
8. Oriental B
9. Sur

Strata for the second stage:

1. Urban Area
2. Rural Area

(b) Calculate the sampling errors corresponding to these strata.
(c) Minimize travel time in survey operations.
(d) Optimal allocation that would allow a reasonable set of trade-offs between budget, sample size, and level of precision of the results.
(e) Use the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available.
(f) Expectation of between 24 and 32 interviews by Primary sampling unit (PSU) or municipality, allowing a multi-level analysis.
(g) Final sampling unit of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas.

On the basis of these requirements, the method that is used in Honduras corresponds to a **stratified multi-stage cluster sampling**. The sample will be stratified based on three factors:

1) Size of the Municipalities
2) Region: region Central A, Central B, Norte A, Norte B, Norte C, Occidental, Oriental A, Oriental B and Sur
3) Level of Urbanization: Urban/Rural Areas

The stratified sampling ensures a greater reliability in our sample by reducing the variance of the estimates. Stratification improves the quality of estimates, with the sole condition that the whole sample unit belongs to only one stratum, and the strata in combination cover the total population. Stratification also enables us to ensure the inclusion in the sample of the most important geographic regions in the country and sample dispersion.

The survey design for Honduras follows a multi-stage process as shown in the table 2 below:

1) The first stage, which corresponds to the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs), involves the selection of municipalities within each of the strata defined above with probability proportional to the voting age adult population (PPS) of the country. Each PSU consists of 24 interviews.

Table 2. Multi-Stage Stratified Cluster Sampling

Strata	Size of Municipalities, Regions, Level of Urbanization
Primary Sampling Unit (PSU)	Municipalities
Secondary Sampling Unit (SSU)	Census segments or Enumeration areas
Tertiary Sampling Unit (TSU)	Blocks or Manzanas
Quaternary Unit (EU)	Household
Final Unit	Respondent

2) The second stage of the sample design consists of the selection of census segments or enumeration areas within each PSU using PPS.
3) In the third stage blocks or "manzanas" within the census segments are selected.
4) In the fourth stage, clusters of households are randomly selected within each PSU. A total of 6 interviews are to be carried out in each sampling point in both rural and urban areas. Sampling points represent clusters of interviews, and the clusters are kept relatively small in order not to increase the "design effect" of the sample, but are also designed to reduce transportation costs by allowing some concentration in a given geographic point.
5) Finally, in the fifth stage of the sample design, a quota sample by gender and age is employed for selecting *a single respondent in each household*. The objective of the quota sample is to ensure that the distribution of individuals by sex and age in the survey matches the country's official population statistics or those reported by the Census Bureau. Fully random selection within the household would have required extensive recalls, thus dramatically increasing costs with no assurances that a correct balance by gender and age would be thus achieved.

IV. Stratification

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided into subgroups. Sampling is then conducted separately in each subgroup. Stratification allows subgroups of interest to be included in the sample whereas in a non-stratified sample some may have been left out due to the random nature of the selection process. In an extreme case, samples that are not stratified can, by chance, exclude the nation's capital or largest city. Stratification helps us increase the precision of the sample. It reduces the sampling error. In a stratified sample, the sampling error depends on population variance *within* strata and not *between* them.

Since sampling is conducted separately in each stratum, it is desirable and important to ensure that there are a sufficient number of people in each subgroup to allow meaningful analysis.

Note: To ensure that the sample is representative at the strata level, each strata consist of at least 200 interviews.

The Honduras sample is stratified by population size of the municipalities, regions (region Central A, Central B, Norte A, Norte B, Norte C, Occidental, Oriental A, Oriental B and Sur) and level of urbanization (urban, rural). Table 3 displays the distribution of the interviews within each region by level of urbanization size of the municipalities for Honduras. A total of 852 interviews were conducted in urban areas and 660 in rural areas. It must be remembered that Honduras has an urban/rural distribution of 56-44 according to the census. Our sample design reflects this distribution.

Table 3. Distribution of the Sample by Region and Size of Municipalities

Population	Less than 25,000 inhabitants	Between 25,000 y 100,000 inhabitants	More than 100.000 inhabitants	Total
Central A	113,246		274,386	387,632
Central B	155,880	75,096		230,976
Norte A	83,786	275,241	309,183	668,210
Norte B	216,255	290,931	140,122	647,308
Norte C	12,021			12,021
Occidental	533,083	26,970		560,053
Oriental A	176,642	121,471		298,113
Oriental B	17,676			17,676
Sur	174,505	96,768		271,273
Total	**1,483,094**	**886,477**	**723,691**	**3,093,262**

% de respondents	Less than 25,000 inhabitants	Between 25,000 y 100,000 inhabitants	More than 100.000 inhabitants	Total
Central A	8%	0%	38%	13%
Central B	11%	8%	0%	7%
Norte A	6%	31%	43%	22%
Norte B	15%	33%	19%	21%
Norte C	1%	0%	0%	0%
Occidental	36%	3%	0%	18%
Oriental A	12%	14%	0%	10%
Oriental B	1%	0%	0%	1%
Sur	12%	11%	0%	9%
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
Total	**48%**	**29%**	**23%**	**100%**

Number of Interviews	Less than 25,000 inhabitants	Between 25,000 y 100,000 inhabitants	More than 100.000 inhabitants	Total
Central A	48	0	144	192
Central B	72	50	0	123
Norte A	24	120	192	336
Norte B	119	99	120	338
Norte C	24	0	0	24
Occidental	239	48	0	287
Oriental A	72	49	0	120
Oriental B	24	0	0	24
Sur	72	48	0	120
Total	**694**	**414**	**456**	**1564**

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Honduras 2014, Versión # 15.2.3.1 IRB ***Approval: 110627***

LAPOP: Honduras, 2014

PAIS. País:					
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. **Honduras**	05. Nicaragua	**04**
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam	28. Bahamas	29. Barbados			

IDNUM. Número de cuestionario **[asignado en la oficina]**	|__|__|__|__|
ESTRATOPRI: (401) Central A (Francisco Morazán) (402) Central B (Comayagua /La Paz) (403) Norte A (Cortés) (404) Norte B (Yoro/Atlántida/Colón) (405) Norte C (Islas de la Bahía) (406) Occidental (Ocotepeque/Copán/Santa Bárbara/ Lempira/ Intibucá) (407) Oriental A (Olancho y El Paraíso) (408) Oriental B (Gracias a Dios) (409) Sur (Choluteca y Valle)	|__|__|
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad **[población en edad de votar, según censo]**: (1) Grande(más de 100,000) (2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 - 100,000) (3) Pequeña (< 25,000)	|__|
UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"]: _____	|__|__|__|__|
PROV. Departamento:_____	4|__|__|
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____	4|__|__|
HONDISTRITO. Distrito: _____	|__|__|
HONSEGMENTO. **Segmento censal [código oficial del censo]:** _____	|__|__|__|__|
HONSEC. Sector: _____	|__|__|__|__|
CLUSTER. [Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral]: _____ **[Cada cluster debe tener 6 entrevistas; clave-código asignada(o) por el supervisor de campo]**	|__|__|__|__|
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural **[Usar definición censal del país]**	|__|
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital Nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural	|__|
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	|__|
Hora de inicio: _____:_____	|__|__|__|__|

FECHA. Fecha Día: ____ **Mes:**_____ Año: 2014	|__|__|__|__|
¿Vive usted en esta casa? **Sí→continúe** **No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista** **¿Es usted ciudadano hondureño o residente permanente de Honduras?** **Sí→continúe** **No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista** **¿Cuántos años tiene? [Seguir solo si tiene por lo menos 18 años]** **Sí→continúe** **No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista**	
ATENCION: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO Y OBTENER EL ASENTIMIENTO DEL ENTREVISTADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA.	

Q1. Género **[ANOTAR, NO PREGUNTE]**: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	|__|
Q2Y. ¿En qué año nació?_____ año (8888) NS (9888) NR	|__|__|__|__|
LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho(a) está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo **in**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**			|__|__|
Agua, falta de	1 (19)	Impunidad	20 (61)
Caminos/vías en mal estado	2 (18)	Inflación, altos precios	21 (02)
Conflicto armado	3 (30)	Los políticos	22 (59)
Corrupción	4 (13)	Mal gobierno	23 (15)
Crédito, falta de	5 (09)	Medio ambiente	24 (10)
Delincuencia, crimen	6 (05)	Migración	25 (16)
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	7 (56)	Narcotráfico	26 (12)
Desempleo/falta de empleo	8 (03)	Pandillas	27 (14)
Desigualdad	9 (58)	Pobreza	28 (04)
Desnutrición	10 (23)	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	29 (06)
Desplazamiento forzado	11 (32)	Salud, falta de servicio	30 (22)
Deuda externa	12 (26)	Secuestro	31 (31)
Discriminación	13 (25)	Seguridad (falta de)	32 (27)
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	14 (11)	Terrorismo	33 (33)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	15 (01)	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	34 (07)
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	16 (21)	Transporte, problemas con el	35 (60)
Electricidad, falta de	17 (24)	Violencia	36 (57)
Explosión demográfica	18 (20)	Vivienda	37 (55)
Guerra contra el terrorismo	19 (17)	Otro	38 (70)
NS	88	NR	98

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace **doce meses**? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace **doce meses**? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) No sabe (98) No responde	|__|__|

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	|__|__|
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a SGL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a SGL1]** (98) No responde **[Pase a SGL1]**	|__|__|
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
HONMUN30. En su opinión, ¿quién debería ser el responsable de proveer (dar) los servicios de salud para la gente de esta comunidad, el gobierno central o la municipalidad? (1) El gobierno central (2) La municipalidad (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
HONMUNI31. ¿Y quién debería ser el responsable de proveer (dar) educación para la gente de esta comunidad? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) El gobierno central (2) La municipalidad (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Ahora le voy a preguntar sobre ciertos servicios municipales. Le voy a pedir que para cada uno de ellos me diga si ha mejorado, ha seguido igual o ha empeorado en los últimos dos años. **[Luego de cada servicio, pregunte: ha mejorado, ha seguido igual, o ha empeorado]**

HONMUN32. Recolección de basura	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	**[NO LEER]** (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
HONMUN33. Administración de los mercados	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	**[NO LEER]** (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
HONMUN36. Agua y alcantarillado	(1) Ha mejorado	(2) Ha seguido igual	(3) Ha empeorado	**[NO LEER]** (4) No se presta el servicio	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|

HONMUN37. ¿La alcaldía del municipio en donde usted vive informa a los ciudadanos sobre la forma en que invierte los recursos de la municipalidad? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a CP4A]** (88) NS **[Pase a CP4A]** (98) NR **[Pase a CP4A]**	|__|__|

Dígame por favor, ¿de cuáles de las siguientes maneras esta municipalidad suele informar a los ciudadanos sobre su gestión y la utilización de recursos?

HONMUN38. Mediante cabildos abiertos	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	|__|__|
HONMUN39. Sesiones abiertas de la corporación	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	|__|__|
HONMUN40. Publicación en algún medio de prensa o radio	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	|__|__|
HONMUN41. Reunión con el alcalde municipal o delegado municipal	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	|__|__|
HONMUN42. Rótulo fijo o murales	(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	|__|__|

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. **CP4A.** ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación a alguna autoridad local como el alcalde o municipalidad? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Una vez a la semana (2) Una o dos veces al mes (3) Una o dos veces al año (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	**Una o dos veces al mes**	**Una o dos veces al año**	**Nunca**	**NS**	**NR**	**INAP**	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	|__|__|
HONCP22. ¿Reuniones de grupos de seguridad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
HONCP21A. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de vecinos o patronato? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CPSS1. Durante los últimos dos años, ¿usted ha participado como jugador junto a otras personas en la práctica de algún deporte? **[Leer alternativas]**	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98	|__|__|
Izquierda									**Derecha**			

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los **últimos 12 meses** ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado **[Siga]** (2) No ha participado **[Pase a JC10]** (88) NS **[Pase a JC10]** (98) NR **[Pase a JC10]**	|__|__|
PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los **últimos 12 meses**? _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
PROT7. Y ¿en los últimos doce meses, ha participado en el bloqueo de alguna calle o espacio público como forma de protesta? (1) Sí, ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	|__|__|
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	|__|__|

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso Nacional y gobierne sin Congreso Nacional?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (88) NS **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**	|__|__|
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? **[Marcar el número]**_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? **[Leer alternativas]** (01) Robo sin arma **sin** agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma **con** agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión o chantaje (11) **[No leer]** Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	|__|__|
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)	|__|__|

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los **últimos doce meses** usted...

	Sí	**No**	**NS**	**NR**	**INAP**	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		|__|__|
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		|__|__|
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? **[en zona rural utilizar "caserío" o "comunidad"]**	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		|__|__|
VIC45. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo por temor a la delincuencia? **[Si no trabaja marque 99]**	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	|__|__|

ICO2. ¿Qué tan seguido la policía nacional patrulla su barrio/colonia? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Varias veces por día (2) Por lo menos una vez por día (3) Algunas veces por semana (4) Algunas veces por mes (5) Rara vez (6) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

POLE2N. En general, ¿usted está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a) o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con el desempeño de la policía en su barrio o colonia? **[Si responde que no hay policía en el barrio marcar "(4) Muy insatisfecho"]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) **In**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo **in**seguro(a) o muy **in**seguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PESE1. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en **su barrio o colonia** es **mayor, igual, o menor** que el de otras colonias o barrios en este municipio? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PESE2. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en **su barrio o colonia** es **mayor, igual, o menor** que el de hace 12 meses? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría… (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes (3) **[No leer]** Ambas (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. ***[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]***.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						**Mucho**	**No sabe**	**No responde**

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. **B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Honduras garantizan un juicio justo? *(**Sondee:** Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*	|__|__|
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Honduras?	|__|__|
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político hondureño?	|__|__|
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político hondureño?	|__|__|
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político hondureño?	|__|__|
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	|__|__|
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	|__|__|
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	|__|__|
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	|__|__|
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	|__|__|
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	|__|__|
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?	|__|__|
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	|__|__|
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	|__|__|
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	|__|__|

B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	|__|__|
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	|__|__|
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Central?	|__|__|
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ministerio Público?	|__|__|
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Tribunal Superior de Cuentas?	|__|__|
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción?	|__|__|
HONB51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Comisionado de los Derechos Humanos?	|__|__|
VENB11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en que el voto es secreto en Honduras?	|__|__|
VENHONB51. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en que los resultados oficiales de la pasada elección presidencial reflejan los votos emitidos?	|__|__|
VENHONVB10. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo con que hayan participado observadores internacionales en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales?	|__|__|

Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta, **NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO**	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR**
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿hasta qué punto los partidos políticos hondureños representan bien a sus votantes?	|__|__|
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted?	|__|__|

Ahora, usando la misma escalera ***[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7*** **NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO**	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR**
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	|__|__|
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	|__|__|
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	|__|__|

NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR**
MIL1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas hondureñas están bien entrenadas y organizadas?	|__|__|
MIL2. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras han hecho un buen trabajo cuando han ayudado a enfrentar desastres naturales?	|__|__|
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas hondureñas respetan los derechos humanos de los hondureños hoy en día?	|__|__|
MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América?	|__|__|
MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América deberían trabajar junto con las Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras para mejorar la seguridad nacional?	|__|__|

Utilizando la misma escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es “nada” y 7 es “mucho”, cuál es la probabilidad que tendría de ser castigado por las autoridades alguien que en su barrio haga las siguientes acciones..:	**(88) NS (98) NR**
PR3A. Compre DVDs/discos piratas. ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	|__|__|
PR3B. ¿Y si se conecta a la electricidad sin pagar (pegues clandestinos)? ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	|__|__|
PR3C. Y si alguien en su barrio invade un terreno desocupado, ¿qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	|__|__|
PR3D. ¿Y, por construir o remodelar una vivienda sin licencia o permiso? ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	|__|__|
PR3E. Y usando la misma escala, ¿si alguien en su barrio fuera a construir o remodelar una casa, qué tan probable sería que a esa persona le pidieran pagar una mordida?	|__|__|
PR4. ¿Hasta qué punto siente usted que el Estado hondureño respeta la propiedad privada de sus ciudadanos? Seguimos con la misma escala de 1-nada a 7-mucho.	|__|__|

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

Ahora voy a hacerle algunas preguntas sobre la transparencia gubernamental. Por transparencia, queremos decir, el permitir a la ciudadanía y los medios, acceso a la información que permita fiscalizar las instituciones públicas. ¿Cree usted Que las siguientes instituciones son muy transparentes, algo transparentes, poco transparentes o nada transparentes? **[Repetir después de cada pregunta "muy transparente, algo transparente, poco transparente o nada transparente]**

	Muy transparente	Algo transparente	Poco transparente	Nada transparente	NS	NR	
HONQT1. ¿La Presidencia de la República?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT2. ¿El Congreso Nacional?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT3. ¿La Contraloría General de la República?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT4. ¿Las empresas estatales? (ENEE, SANAA, HONDUTEL etc.)	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT5. ¿La policía?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT6. ¿El ejército (las fuerzas armadas)?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT7. ¿El Ministerio Público?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT8. ¿Consejo Nacional Anticorrupción?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT9. ¿El gobierno municipal?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT10. ¿El Tribunal Superior de Cuentas?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT11. ¿El Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
HONQT12. ¿El Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Juan Orlando Hernández es...?: **[Leer alternativas]** |__|__|
(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR

M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los diputados del Congreso hondureño están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? |__|__|
(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal
(5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR

HONM3. Hablando de la Corte Suprema y pensando en todos los magistrados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los magistrados de la Corte están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? |__|__|
(1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal
(5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98) NR

SD2NEW2.Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a), o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? |__|__|
(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a)
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR

SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted…**[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted…**[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

INFRAX. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) **[NO LEER]** No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

COER1. Cuando hace las compras en un comercio o pulpería de su barrio, y aunque usted no lo pida, ¿le dan factura: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Siempre (2) algunas veces (3) casi nunca o (4) nunca? **[NO LEER]** (99) No hago compras en el comercio o pulpería de mi barrio (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo					**Muy de acuerdo**		**NS**	**NR**

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

ROS1. El Estado hondureño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
ROS4. El Estado hondureño debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
MIL7. Las Fuerzas Armadas deben participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en Honduras. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	|__|__|

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

ENV1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: proteger el medio ambiente o promover el crecimiento económico? (1) Proteger el medio ambiente (2) Promover el crecimiento económico (3) **[No leer]** Ambas (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
DST1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: tener viviendas de construcción más segura o evitar el aumento de costos? (1) Viviendas de construcción más segura (2) Evitar aumento de costos (3) **[NO LEER]** Ambos (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a) o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Honduras? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) **In**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre? (1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 **NS**	98 **NR**
Desaprueba firmemente									**Aprueba firmemente**		

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Honduras. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: ***[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]***	|__|__|
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	|__|__|
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Honduras. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?	|__|__|
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?	|__|__|
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?	|__|__|

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	|__|__|

[Recoger tarjeta "D"]

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo						**Muy de acuerdo**	**NS**	**NR**

Usted se considera que es:

PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestarse	|__|__|
PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable	|__|__|

[Recoger tarjeta "C"]

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

HONJC17. ¿Cree usted que se justifica que la Corte Suprema de Justicia remueva o quite al presidente de la República si éste desobedece las cortes o las leyes?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	**No**	**Sí**	**NS**	**NR**	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	--	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	88	98	|__|__|

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida?		0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: **[LEER]** (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR						|__|__|

Ahora voy a leerle una lista de situaciones que pueden o no ser problema en algunos barrios. Por favor dígame si las siguientes situaciones son un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no son un problema en **su barrio o colonia. [Repita después cada pregunta "es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Muy serio	Algo serio	Poco serio	Nada serio	No es un problema	NS	NR	
DISO7. Jóvenes o niños en las calles sin hacer nada, que andan vagando en **su** barrio o colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO8. Jóvenes o niños que viven **aquí** en **su** barrio o colonia en pandillas o maras	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO10. Venta o tráfico de drogas ilegales **aquí** en **su** barrio o colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO18. Riñas o peleas de pandillas o maras **aquí** en **su** barrio o colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO14. Gente drogada en las calles de **aquí de su** barrio o colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|

	Muy serio	Algo serio	Poco serio	Nada serio	No es un problema	NS	NR	
DISO16. Asaltos a las personas cuando caminan por la calle de **aquí, de su** barrio o colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO17. Balaceras **aquí** en **su** barrio o colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿cuáles de los siguientes actos de delincuencia han ocurrido en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia.	Sí	No	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	NS	NR	INAP	
VICBAR1. ¿Han ocurrido robos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1 **[Continúe]**	2 **[Pasar a VICBAR3]**				88	98		
						[Pasar a VICBAR3]			
VICBAR1F ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año?			1	2	3	88	98	99	
VICBAR3. ¿Han ocurrido ventas de drogas ilegales en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1	2				88	98		
VICBAR4. ¿Han ocurrido extorsiones o cobro de impuesto de guerra en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1	2				88	98		
VICBAR7. Han ocurrido asesinatos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1	2				88	98		

	Sí	No	NS	NR	
FEAR10. Para protegerse de la delincuencia, en los últimos 12 meses ha tomado alguna medida como evitar caminar por algunas zonas de su barrio porque puedan ser peligrosas?	1	0	88	98	|__|__|
VIC44. En los últimos 12 meses, por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	1	0	88	98	|__|__|

	Muy preocupado	Algo preocupado	Poco preocupado	Nada preocupado	NS	NR	INAP	
FEAR6f. ¿Y qué tan preocupado está usted acerca de la seguridad de los niños en la escuela? ¿Diría que está muy preocupado, algo preocupado, poco preocupado o nada preocupado?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99 [No tiene hijos/as o niños cercanos en escuela]	|__|__|

VB1. ¿Tiene tarjeta de identidad? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas **elecciones presidenciales** de 2013? (1) Sí votó **[Siga]** (2) No votó **[Pasar a VB4NEW]** (88) NS **[Pasar a VB10]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VB10]**	|__|__|
VB3n. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2013? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco) **[Pasar VB101]** (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto) **[Pasar VB101]** (401) Juan Orlando Hernández (Partido Nacional) **[Pasar a VB10]** (402) Xiomara Castro de Zelaya (Libertad y Refundación) **[Pasar a VB10]** (403) Mauricio Villeda (Partido Liberal) **[Pasar a VB10]** (404) Salvador Nasralla (Partido Anticorrupción) **[Pasar a VB10]** (405) Romeo Vásquez Velásquez (Alianza Patriótica) **[Pasar a VB10]** (406) Orle Solís (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) **[Pasar a VB10]** (407) Jorge Aguilar Paredes (Partido Innovación y Unidad) **[Pasar a VB10]** (408) Andrés Pavón (Unificación Democrática) **[Pasar a VB10]** (477) Otro **[Pasar a VB10]** (88) NS **[Pasar a VB10]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VB10]** (99) INAP (No votó) **[Pasar a VB4NEW]**	|__|__|

VB4NEW. [SOLO PARA LOS QUE NO VOTARON. NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] **[Si dice "no voté porque no quería", preguntar por qué no quiso votar]** ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? **[Una sola respuesta]** (1) Estaba confundido (2) No me gustaron los candidatos o la campaña (3) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (4) No creo en la democracia (5) Cuestiones burocráticas (registro, padrón) (6) Cuestiones de edad (muy joven, muy viejo) (7) No estaba en el distrito/estaba de viaje (8) No me interesa la política (77) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Sí votó) **[DESPUÉS DE ESTA PREGUNTA IR A VB10]**	|__|__|

VB101. [SOLO A LOS QUE RESPONDIERON "NINGUNO (BLANCO O NULO)" EN VB3n] ¿Por qué votó usted nulo o blanco en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Estaba confundido (2) Quería demostrar su descontento con todos los candidatos, no le gustó ninguno (3) No creo en la democracia, quería protestar contra el sistema político (4) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (5) No me interesa la política (6) Mi voto no marca la diferencia (7) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a POL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a POL1]** (98) NR **[Pase a POL1]**	|__|__|
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (401) Partido Nacional (PNH) (402) Partido Liberal (PLH) (403) Partido Demócrata Cristiano de Honduras (PDCH) (404) Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU) (405) Unificación Democrática (UD) (406) Partido Libertad y refundación (LIBRE) (407) Partido Anti Corrupción (PAC) (408) Alianza Patriótica Hondureña (APH) (409) Frente Amplio Político en Resistencia (FAPER) (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones]** (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CLIEN1n. Pensando en las últimas elecciones nacionales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció un favor, regalo u otro beneficio **a alguna persona que usted conoce** para que lo apoye o vote por él? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CLIEN1na. Y pensando en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2013, ¿alguien le ofreció **a usted** un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTREGAR TARJETA G] **FOR1n.** Ahora vamos a hablar sobre sus opiniones respecto de algunos países. ¿Cuál de los siguientes países es el que tiene **más influencia** en **América Latina**? **[Leer opciones]** (1) China, o sea, China continental y no Taiwán (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Brasil (6) Venezuela (7) México (10) España (11) **[No leer]** Otro país (12) **[No leer]** Ninguno (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	
FOR4. Y **dentro de 10 años,** en su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países tendrá más influencia en **América Latina**? **[Leer opciones]** (1) China continental (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Brasil (6) Venezuela (7) México (10) España (11) **[No leer]** Otro país (12) **[No leer]** Ninguno (88) **[No leer]**NS (98) **[No leer]**NR	
[RECOGER TARJETA "G". ENTREGAR TARJETA "H"] **FOR5.** En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro **de nuestro país**? **[Leer opciones]** (1) China continental (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Singapur (6) Rusia (7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil (11) Venezuela, o (12) México (13) **[No leer]** Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo (14) **[No leer]** Otro (88) NS (98) NR **[RECOGER TARJETA "H"]**	
FOR6. Y pensando ahora **sólo en nuestro país,** ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en **nuestro país**? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucha **[Sigue]** (2) Algo **[Sigue]** (3) Poca **[Sigue]** (4) Nada **[Pasar a FOR6b]** (88) NS **[Pasar a FOR6b]** (98) NR **[Pasar a FOR6b]**	
FOR7. En general, ¿la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa? (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) **[No leer]** Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) **[No leer]** No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
FOR6b. Y pensando ahora **sólo en nuestro país,** ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene EEUU en **nuestro país**? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucha **[Sigue]** (2) Algo **[Sigue]** (3) Poca **[Sigue]** (4) Nada **[Pasar a MIL10A]** (88) NS **[Pasar a MIL10A]** (98) NR **[Pasar a MIL10A]**	
FOR7b. ¿La influencia que Estados Unidos tiene en nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa? 1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) **[No leer]** Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) **[No leer]** No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|

WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda regular/periódica en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa Bono 10,000**,** ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1^0	2^0	3^0	4^0	5^0	6^0	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	|__|__|
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15				
No sabe	88						
No responde	98						

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? **[NO LEER OPCIONES]** (00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]** **[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]** (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]** (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]** (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (4) Es estudiante?**[Pase a Q10NEW]** (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar?**[Pase a Q10NEW]** (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (88) NS **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q10NEW]**	|__|__|
OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]

Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? **[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]** (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de L. 2.050 (02) Entre L. 2.050 – L. 2.900 (03) Entre L 2.901– L. 3.450 (04) Entre L. 3.451 - L. 4.000 (05) Entre L. 4.000 – L. 4.550 (06) Entre L. 4.551 – L. 5.100 (07) Entre L. 5.101 – L. 5.650 (08) Entre L. 5.651 – L. 6.450 (09) Entre L. 6.451 – L. 7.400 (10) Entre L. 7.401 – L. 8.200 (11) Entre L. 8.201 - L. 9.200 (12) Entre L. 9.201 – L.10.450 (13) Entre L. 10.451 – L. 11.500 (14) Entre L. 11.501 – L. 12.900 (15) Entre L. 12.901 – L. 16.450 (16) Más de L. 16.450 (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)] **Q10G.** ¿Y cuánto dinero usted **personalmente** gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? **[Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]** (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de L. 2.050 (02) Entre L. 2.050 – L. 2.900 (03) Entre L 2.901– L. 3.450 (04) Entre L. 3.451 - L. 4.000 (05) Entre L. 4.000 – L. 4.550 (06) Entre L. 4.551 – L. 5.100 (07) Entre L. 5.101 – L. 5.650 (08) Entre L. 5.651 – L. 6.450 (09) Entre L. 6.451 – L. 7.400 (10) Entre L. 7.401 – L. 8.200 (11) Entre L. 8.201 - L. 9.200 (12) Entre L. 9.201 – L.10.450 (13) Entre L. 10.451 – L. 11.500 (14) Entre L. 11.501 – L. 12.900 (15) Entre L. 12.901 – L. 16.450 (16) Más de L. 16.450 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)	|__|__|

[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer opciones]** (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR	
Q11n. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento?_____ (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12Bn. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR	

Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? **[Contar todos los hijos del entrevistado, que vivan o no en el hogar]** _____ **(00 = ninguno)** (88) NS (98) NR	
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? **[Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-hondureña, codificar como (4) Negra]** (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza o trigueña (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]** (401) Castellano/Español (402) Lenca (403) Garífuna (406) Misquito (407) Xicaque (408) Paya (404) Otro (nativo) (405) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR	

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	

GI0. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente…	**Correcto**	**Incorrecto**	**No sabe**	**No responde**	
GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? **[NO LEER**: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama**]**	1	2	88	98	
GIX4. ¿En qué continente queda Nigeria? **[NO LEER**: África**]**	1	2	88	98	
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Honduras? **[NO LEER**: 4 años**]**	1	2	88	98	

GI7. ¿Cuántos diputados tiene el **Congreso Nacional**? **[ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]**	Número: _____	8888	9888	|__|__|__|__|

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R3. Refrigerador (nevera)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? **[Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]**	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	(88) NS	(98) NR
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R7. Horno microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R15. Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R18. Servicio de Internet	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R1. Televisor	(0) No **[Pasa a R26]**			(1) Sí **[Sigue]**	(88) NS	(98) NR
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR (99) INAP
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de saneamiento/desagüe/drenaje/alcantarillado?	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR

INF3A. ¿Está usted conectado en su casa o en su barrio a la red pública de agua? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

FORMATQ. Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico 1. Papel **2.** Android **3.** Windows PDA	|___|

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar **[Marcar (97) *únicamente,* si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]**	|___|___|
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	|__|__|__|
TI. Duración de la entrevista ***[minutos, ver página # 1]*** _____	|___|___|___|___|
INTID.Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	|__|__|__|
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	|___|
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo.	|___|___|

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
*Firma del entrevistador*_____ *Fecha* ____ /_____ /_____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios: _____
_____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta A (L1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Izquierda **Derecha**

Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D



Tarjeta G

Brasil

China continental

España

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Venezuela

Tarjeta H

Brasil

China continental

Corea del Sur

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Rusia

Singapur

Venezuela

Tarjeta F

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de L. 2.050
(02) Entre L. 2.050 – L. 2.900
(03) Entre L 2.901– L. 3.450
(04) Entre L. 3.451 - L. 4.000
(05) Entre L. 4.000 – L. 4.550
(06) Entre L. 4.551 – L. 5.100
(07) Entre L. 5.101 – L. 5.650
(08) Entre L. 5.651 – L. 6.450
(09) Entre L. 6.451 – L. 7.400
(10) Entre L. 7.401 – L. 8.200
(11) Entre L. 8.201 - L. 9.200
(12) Entre L. 9.201 – L.10.450
(13) Entre L. 10.451 – L. 11.500
(14) Entre L. 11.501 – L. 12.900
(15) Entre L. 12.901 – L. 16.450
(16) Más de L. 16.450

Paleta de Colores

[[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1^0	**2^0**	**3^0**	**4^0**	**5^0**	**6^0**	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15				
No sabe	88						
No responde	98						

[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(88) NS (98) NR

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in research collaborations with LAPOP. LAPOP's efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. These studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behaviors related to democracy and quality of life. Over the course of the AmericasBarometer's duration, the project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, the University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The most recent surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in 2014 via face-to-face interviews in Latin American and Caribbean countries, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. The same surveys were conducted by internet to national samples in the United States and Canada. Interviews were conducted in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer includes surveys conducted in 28 countries across the Americas and more than 50,000 interviews. Common core modules and standardized techniques allow for comparison across individuals, between certain sub-national regions within countries, across countries, and over time.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project offers its AmericasBarometer country datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that LAPOP produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed via our "data repositories" and subscribing institutions in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate in the pursuit of excellence in academic and policy research and analysis throughout the Americas.

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ISBN 978-1-939186-22-5
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9 781939 186225