Political Culture of Democracy in Haiti and in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer Executive Summary

François Gélineau, Ph.D.
Université Laval

Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D.
LAPOP Director and Series Editor
Vanderbilt University
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Executive Summary

By:

François Gélineau, Ph.D.
Université Laval

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Introduction

The 2014 AmericasBarometer and this report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us in first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas. During this period, the AmericasBarometer has expanded to include 28 countries in the region and more than 50,000 respondents. LAPOP has carried out the AmericasBarometer in Haiti since 2006. The 2014 survey was conducted by Borge y Asociados in February and March and 1,512 people were interviewed.

This report summarizes the main findings of the 2014 round of surveys. We present findings about experiences with crime and insecurity in the region, focusing particularly on the results for Haiti on these subjects. Key findings related to citizens’ evaluations of the economy, their perceptions of and experience with corruption, their interaction with and evaluations of local government, and their support for democracy and democratic attitudes are also reported. We identify prominent regional patterns, as well as the evolution and sources of change along these dimensions. We also present the main findings for Haiti on issues pertaining to the extent to which material conditions, infrastructures, and government services have improved since the earthquake hit the island in 2010; as well as on Haitians’ democratic values, their party attachments, ideology, opinions on short term political issues, government performance, and incumbent support.

1. Crime and Insecurity in the Americas

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago (see Figure 1). The AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and over time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens, political pressures to adjust reports, and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information such as where the crime took place and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens’ experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighbourhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens’ experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.
The data document change over time with respect to citizens’ perceptions of and experience with crime and violence in the region. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas, approximately one out of every three adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity.

As shown in Figure 2, Haiti is among the countries where security seems not to be a priority. Haiti is among the countries in the region where the concern for security is lowest in 2014 with 4.5% of respondents who report security as the most important problem facing the country. In fact, the main concern of Haitians in 2014 is clearly the economy, with 63.1% of respondents mentioning economic problems such as unemployment, poverty and inflation as the main challenge facing the country.
Interestingly, overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010 (see Figure 3). In 2014, the rate of victimization by crime in Haiti is slightly lower than the regional average. In fact, Haiti experienced a significant decrease from 20% in 2012 to 15.7% in 2014 in the proportion of respondents who report being victims of crime. As with just about any measure we examine in this report, we find important differences within and across countries. For example, the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary across countries. Our data also affirm that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives.
The 2014 indicate that perceptions of insecurity in the region matter independently from crime victimization. Perceptions of insecurity and assessments of violence by citizens of the Americas are fueled by personal experiences and by the diffusions of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. Our data confirm that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives.

2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas

The 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in the Americas own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals, those who are less educated, individuals with darker skin tones, and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey.

Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure. This discrepancy is particularly apparent in Haiti, which has the lowest average (27.2) among the countries of the region in perceptions of the economic situation of the household on a scale of 0 to 100 (see Figure 5).
Figure 4. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles in the Americas, 2014

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.GM14_0912

Figure 5. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.GM14_0912
Beyond citizens’ personal finances, the 2014 AmericasBarometer asks respondents to assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively in the region than it was in 2010 and 2012. However, Haitians continue to report an average economic evaluation below the regional average on a scale from 0 to 100. Citizen evaluations of the national economy across the region are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Citizen views of the national economy are also weighed down by the security situation in their country. Individuals who live in high crime areas across the Americas judge national economic performance more harshly.

![Figure 6. Average Perceptions of the National Economic Situation, overtime Regional Perspective and by Country for 2014](image)

3. Corruption in the Americas

Corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. The 2014 data show that 1 in 5 people in an average country were asked to pay a bribe in the past year (Figure 7). With a rate of 69.2%, Haiti exhibits the highest rate of corruption victimization in 2014 (see Figure 7).

While several countries saw corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by corruption victimization levels increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in most previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools and health service providers.
Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe. While we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance for the region as a whole.

Figure 7. Corruption Victimization, overtime Regional Perspective and by Country for 2014

Despite the low frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes in Jamaica, many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one positive findings is the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally be justified. This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So while the high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens of the Americas continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business. Nevertheless, Haiti remains the country with the largest proportion of respondents (43%) believes that it is justified to pay a bribe in 2014.
Figure 8. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe is Justified at Times, Regional Perspective 2014

4. Performance and Local Government in the Americas

Typically, most citizens in the Americas interact with their government at the local level. The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about their political participation in municipal government and trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals in the Americas with the greatest and least satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase from 2012 in citizens’ evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on local services. On average for the region as a whole, local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease from 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores for the region are in the middle of the scale.
With regard to trust in local governments the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds an overall pattern of decline in the region. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004, and Haiti is among the countries with the lowest level of trust on a scale from 0 to 100 (see Figure 9). The factors that most strongly predict an individual’s trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance.

5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas

In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures of democratic legitimacy, such as support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. We particular pay attention to the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this approach permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy across the region with an eye to one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy’s legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as a form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade for the region. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only
somewhat in terms of average trust on a 0 to 100 scale (see Figure 10). The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. The average level of trust of Haitians in respect to the legislature is 41.5, while trust in the parties is only 32.2 on a scale from 0 to 100.

According to regional results, since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. The ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church. For Haiti, the average trust in this religious institution is 59.9, higher than the regional average. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time between our 2012 study and the 2014 survey. In Jamaica, the average level of trust in elections is 47.4.

Among law-and-order institutions in the region – armed forces, national police, and the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. In Haiti, average level of trust in the police is 46.9, and trust in the justice system is 43.7 on a scale from 0 to 100.

System support – the inherent value citizens’ place in the political system – fell in 2014. Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system’s ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. In Haiti the average level of support for the political system is 42.3 on a scale from 0 to 100. The results of our analyses for the region as a whole suggest system support in the Americas reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system’s ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy,
corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens of the Americas are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. In Haiti the average level of political tolerance is 50% in 2014. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance) (see Figure 11). While 22.5% of Haitians have attitudes that support democratic stability, 27.6% display attitudes conducive to authoritarian stability, 21.6% favouring unstable democracy, and 28.3% democracy at risk.

6. Haitians and Human Development

The earthquake that hit the island on January 12, 2010 left the country in an unprecedented state of destruction. Millions of Haitians found themselves without a home and without access to basic public services such as water and electricity. Houses were brought to the ground, depriving Haitians of a roof and sanitary facilities. The 2010 earthquake was preceded by a few years during which tropical storms had already caused important physical damages to the land. Five years after earthquake, one wonders to what extent Haitians have access to basic services such as water supply or electricity has been reestablished.

Even before the earthquake, the country was already in need of major assistance in order to improve its precarious economic situation. In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, donor countries rallied around Haiti to offer support in rebuilding the country. Yet, over 79,000 people still live in one of the temporary camps set up in the days/weeks following January 12, 2010. Needless to say, the rebuilding efforts did not have the immediate effect some were expecting.
Economic development and human development are not only required to insure the basic dignity of citizens, they are central to democracy. This theme is central to the endeavor of the AmericasBarometer. This chapter aims to evaluate the extent to which material conditions, infrastructures, and government services have improved since the earthquake hit the island in 2010.

A first look at Figure 12 suggests that Haitians are more deprived of material goods than other citizens of the Americas. Just like everyone in the region, a vast majority of Haitians report owning a phone (80.5%) – compared to 91.9% for the entire region. Yet, only about half of them own a television (compared to 91.8% in the region), about 1 in 4 owns a refrigerator (compared to 81.7% in the region), 1 in 5 owns a TV (compared to 91.8% in the region), and less than 10% of Haitians own a computer (compared to 42.2%), a car (compared to 30.2%), a microwave (compared to 42.9%), or a washing machine (compared to 58.0%).

Findings in the way of economic wellbeing of Haitians reveal that since 2010, material conditions of Haitians have undoubtedly improved, but have not fully recovered to the levels observed
in 2006. In 2014, 39.4% of Haitians were in the lower quintile of wealth, compared to 45% in 2010 and 24.7% in 2006.

Despite the fact that the average level of household wealth is found to be increasing over time, respondents are overwhelmingly pessimistic with regard to their personal finances and with the national economic trend. As illustrated by Figure 14, the earthquake has contributed to worsening the economic wellbeing of Haitians. The percentage of Haitians in the inferior quintile more than doubled from 2008 to 2010. In 2012 and 2014, the number of Haitians in the lower quintile was reduced, but not quite to levels observed before the earthquake.

![Figure 13. Average Wealth Over Time in Haiti, 2006-2014](source)

In Chapter 2, we saw that just about half of the respondents in the region report having enough income to meet their needs, or even save from it. Using a 0-100 scale, citizens of the Americas have consistently ranked just below the half-point of the scale since 2006. As Figure 14 shows, the same cannot be said of Haitians. The perception of their household finances has ranked below the regional average consistently. It started the 2006-2014 period at just below 40 points, and dropped almost constantly ever since; with a small upward bump in 2010. That upward bump can probably be explained by the state of catastrophe in which the earthquake left the country. Respondents may simply relativize their own financial situation with that of so many who lost so much during the natural disaster.
In 2014, only 9.0% of Haitians report receiving governmental assistance, only a few percentage points below the regional mean. However, as most post-earthquake relief efforts were handled by non-governmental organization (foreign or local), the figure could actually reflect the reality of the source of Haitians economic assistance.

While the 2014 AmericasBarometer did not include specific questions about reconstruction, many of the items found in the core questionnaire can shed light on these questions. Figure 15 illustrates the presence of indoor plumbing and indoor bathrooms for the 2006-2014 period. The 2006-2010 period displays a devastating trend on access to these basic services. While in 2006 about 30% of the respondents claimed to have both indoor plumbing and bathrooms, this percentage dropped continuously in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, about 20% of the respondents claimed to have access to indoor plumbing and 15% had indoor bathrooms. Access to both dropped to levels below 10% the year of the 2010 earthquake. Since 2010, access to these services has undoubtedly improved. Access to indoor plumbing increased from a little over 5% in 2010 to about 10% in 2012, and almost 25% in 2014. The proportion of respondents claiming to have indoor bathrooms in their house went from under 10% in 2010 to about 12% in 2012, and around 20% in 2014.
Despite this rather encouraging trend, the situation remains critical. In the 2014 questionnaire, respondents were also asked whether their home was connected to the sewage system. Figure 16 shows that the situation is overwhelmingly precarious with respect to sanitary facilities. In Haiti, access to the sewage system is clearly a luxury as only 2% of the respondents can enjoy it. The vast majority of homes in Haiti are not connected to the sewage system.
Further analysis of this reality suggests that access to basic sanitary infrastructure is highly dependent on the socioeconomic status of the respondents. Figure 17 offers strong evidence of the gap that exists across socioeconomic class. While almost 60% of the wealthier quintile of the respondents claims to have a bathroom in their home, only about 6% of the remaining respondents (which represent 80% of the population) can say the same. Not surprisingly, the more educated are also more likely to have indoor bathrooms. Another interesting fact is that households with indoor bathrooms are mostly located in larger cities, especially in the national capital. Of course, this might have to do with the fact that sewage systems are more present in larger urban agglomerations.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included three items aimed at measuring the level of satisfaction with the condition of the road system, public schools, and health services. These questions were also asked in 2012. Figure 18 suggests that satisfaction with health services remained fairly stable between 2012 and 2014. It also indicates that respondents are less satisfied with public schools, but equally so in 2012 and 2014. However, the level of satisfaction with the road systems seemed to have declined between 2012 and 2014. Satisfaction with government services, such as road infrastructure, public healthcare, and public schools, has remained fairly stable in comparison with 2012. In 2014, 34.0% of Haitians are satisfied with roads, 36.4% with public schools, and 45.1 with public health services.
Satisfaction with local governments has improved, even exceeding levels observed before the earthquake. As shown in Figure 19, between 2006 and 2014 the level of satisfaction shifted from about 37 to about 47 on a 0-100 scale.
Figure 19. Satisfaction with Services of Local Government

Not living in fear of being burglarized or attacked is another public good that is determinant in human development. In the left quadrant of Figure 20, we observe a long-term improvement, yet limited, in the perception of neighborhood security. Between 2006 and 2014, the average position on the 0-100 scale declined from about 50 to about 40. The year 2010 marked a low-point, probably because the consequences of the January earthquake brought other concerns to the forefront.

Figure 20 also indicates that feelings of insecurity are more often observed in Port-au-Prince (right quadrant). Although the average feeling of insecurity by region is within the margins of error, the fact that the confidence interval is much smaller in the capital city strongly suggest that insecurity is more consistently a source of concern there than anywhere else.
Figure 20. Perceptions of Neighborhood Insecurity in Haiti

Despite high levels of preoccupation with crimes and insecurity, most respondents (58.8%) find that insecurity is lower in their own neighborhood than elsewhere, as shown in Figure 21. They also tend to think that insecurity is lower (57.3%), relative to one year ago (right quadrant). Gangs are often presumed to bear the responsibility for insecurity, at least in part.

Figure 21. Perceptions of Neighborhood Insecurity Relative to Other Neighborhoods and to the Previous Year, Haiti 2014
As displayed in Figure 22, in 2014, about 1 out of 4 Haitians believe that his/her neighborhood is affected by gangs (upper left quadrant). In 2012, it was almost 1 out of 3. As for the differences by region in perceptions of gang presence in the neighborhood, residents of Port-au-Prince report the largest concern with 37.58% of the respondents claiming that gangs disturb peace in their neighborhood (upper right quadrant). Yet, an overall majority of respondent still feels safe enough to walk in their neighborhood, even in Port-au-Prince, where 37.1% of respondents claim to avoid walking in the streets of their neighborhood.

![Source: AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2010-2014; v.HT14ts_0929](image)

Figure 22. Perceptions of Gangs in the Neighborhood in Haiti, 2010-2014

Figure 23 further explores crime victimization in Haiti. Since 2006, crime victimization has hovered between 14 and 17%, with a high point at over 19% in 2010 and 2012. If we break down the variable by regions, and take the margins of error into consideration, we observe that crime victimization rates are fairly homogenous across the country. However, the areas of Part-au-Prince and the North do display higher rates of crime victimization than the south.
As was the case in 2012, those respondents that report having been victims of crime indicate that the crime occurred overwhelmingly in their municipality in 2014 (Figure 24). The major difference is the 8.3 percentage point increase in crime occurring in the home between 2012 and 2014.

Figure 23. Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2010-2014

Figure 24. Location of Crime Victimization in Haiti, 2012-2014
To further assess the factors associated with crime victimization in Haiti, Figure 25 suggests that the only two factors that clearly affect crime victimization are household wealth (measured in quintiles) and age. The figure indicates that people with more wealth are more prone to be victimized by crime. Haitians in the wealthier 60% (quintiles 2, 3, and 5) have a higher likelihood of reporting having been a victim of crime in comparison to those belonging to the poorest quintile. As for age, the figure suggests that older citizens (56 and older) are less likely to be victims of crime than those between 36 and 45 years of age.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a battery of questions documenting perceptions of corruption and victimization by corruption. In evaluating corruption, victimization by corruption remains high in Haiti and perceptions of corruption continue to be surprisingly low (Figure 26). In 2014, Haiti ranks next to last in perceptions of corruption, just before Canada, but ranks first in victimization, surpassing Bolivia by almost 40%.

While the rate of interviewees reporting to have been asked to pay a bribe hovered around 50% between 2006 and 2010, it showed a steep increase in 2012. The 2014 level remains unchanged from 2012, with over two thirds of Haitians being victimized by corruption. What is more, 74.6% of those victimized by corruption in 2014 have had to pay a bribe once (45.1%) or twice (29.5%).
When we dig further into the public services for which Haitians are being asked to pay a bribe in Figure 27, we find that healthcare and public schools are the most frequent sources of corruption, both in 2012 and 2014. Interestingly, at 7.3%, Haitians are rarely asked to pay a bribe by a police officer. While police corruption happens less frequently in Haiti, it comes first in the region in terms of overall rates of corruption victimization.

The Haitian results differ from the regional analysis in several ways. First, it appears that living in a rural or urban area, being a woman, or having reported the incidence of a crime in their neighborhood makes no difference in Haiti when we try to explain variations in victimization by corruption. In the region as a whole, it was found that females and those living in rural areas were less likely to report having been asked to pay a bribe in the past.
We also found that in the Americas as a whole, crime in the neighborhood was associated with greater likelihood of victimization by corruption. For the region, we also found that victims of corruption were mostly middle-aged citizens. In Haiti, however, the age divide seems to be between two groups: those below 36, and the others; older citizens being more prone to be victimized by corruption (Figure 28).
As illustrated by Figure 29, perceptions have not fluctuated a lot over the past eight years. Interestingly, these responses have not followed the same trend as victimization by corruption (Figure 26), which increased abruptly in 2012. While perception of corruption increases very slightly with victimization, the average perception of corruption is the same whether respondents received governmental assistance or reported crime in their neighborhood. While Haiti ranks next to last in the region in terms of perception of public corruption, it clearly leads the region as far as victimization by corruption is concerned.
Figure 30 presents the simple bivariate relationships between perception of corruption and corruption victimization, government assistance, and crime in neighborhood for the 2014 wave. While perception of corruption increases very slightly with victimization, the average perception of corruption is the same whether respondents received governmental assistance or reported crime in their neighborhood.

![Graph showing correlations between corruption perception, victimization, assistance, and crime.]

Figure 30. Corruption Victimization, Governmental Assistance, and Crime, 2014

Figure 31 presents the results of a multivariate regression analysis in which we predict perception of corruption. The results of the regression analysis for Haiti are in some ways similar to the results for the whole region. Just like citizens of other countries of the region, Haitians who have been asked to pay a bribe in the past, those who reached higher levels of education, as well as older Haitians are more likely to perceive higher levels of corruption in government. However, the similarities stop there. Unlike in the rest of the region, perception of corruption in Haiti does not vary along wealth, sex, or urban/rural location.
A striking pattern emerges when we compare Haitians to citizens of other countries in the region on the issue of corruption in 2014 (Figure 32). While Haiti ranks next to last in the region in terms of perception of public corruption, it clearly leads the region as far as victimization by corruption is concerned. There thus seems to be a wide gap between how Haitians perceive and experience corruption, at least when compared to the other countries in the region. It is as if Haitians had come to consider corruption as part of the normal course of public service delivery.
This possible internalization of corruption among Haitians is further illustrated by Figure 33. Compared to other citizens of the Americas, Haitians are more than twice as likely to believe that paying a bribe is sometimes justified. Just like other citizens of the Americas, however, Haitians who were victimized by corruption are more likely to think paying a bribe can be justified at times. The number of Haitians who were asked to pay a bribe that justify corruption is over 35 percentage points higher (54.4%) than those who did not experience corruption (17.4%).

Even though some improvement has been observed with regards to different dimensions of human development in Haiti, much remains to be done. Overall, material wealth has moved beyond the 2010 low-point, but has not yet regained the pre-earthquake levels. Access to in-home sanitary facilities has increased, but access to sewage systems remains extremely low. Crime continues to be an issue, especially in Port-au-Prince, but Haitians have begun to feel safer at home. Corruption might be the only dimension for which no improvement has been observed over the recent period. On the contrary, things have continued to deteriorate on this front.

For democracy to flourish in Haiti, many more efforts at increasing the material well-being of its citizens must be deployed. These have to include access to basic sanitary infrastructure, roads, and other public services. Efforts also have to target crime and corruption. Haitians have a right live in a safe environment, and they have a right to access public services, such as education and basic healthcare, without having to pay a bribe.
Democratic rule is often associated with a political culture in which citizens that share a number of attitudes and behaviors conducive to democratic governance. Several authors in the social sciences have exposed how important certain shared beliefs and values are fundamental to the functioning of democracies (Almond and Verba 1963; Booth and Seligson 2009; Putnam 1994, 2001). In Chapter 5, we identify two of those that are central to democracy: political tolerance and system support. While political tolerance refers to the respect for the political rights of others, notwithstanding the political position they adopt, system support has to do with the overall respect individuals have for political institutions, i.e., legitimacy. In contexts in which citizens display high levels of tolerance and high level of system support, we can expect stable democracies. On the contrary, where citizens have low tolerance and low support, democracy can be said to be at risk. By extrapolating from the results presented in Chapter 6, one can conclude that Haitians ought to display low levels of system support and low levels of tolerance. Yet, catastrophic events such as the earthquake that hit the island on January 12, 2010 can have surprising consequences. With such a level of destruction and disorganization of the state, Haitians had to find ways to provide for themselves. These last resort behaviors may as well have had the effect of making Haitians work together in order to improve their living conditions.

This chapter explores the democratic values of Haitians, with a specific focus on political tolerance and system support. It also looks at how Haitians get involved in their community and in the political life of the country. The main findings of the chapter can be summarized as follows:
As explained in Chapter 5, the AmericasBarometer uses an index based on four questions measuring how much respondents support the right to vote, to protest, to run for public office, and to make public speeches for citizens who object to the political system. From a peak in 2006, political tolerance declined rapidly until 2010, the year the country was hit by the devastating earthquake (Figure 34). It improved thereafter to 50.0 on a 0-100 scale to catch up with the regional average in 2014.

On the one hand, Haitians seem more tolerant of critics having the right to vote and to peacefully demonstrate (Figure 35). The right to demonstrate seems especially important for Haitians. On the other hand, they are less tolerant of regime critics running for office or making speeches.
Another dimension of tolerance is openness to people who are different from the mainstream. When compared to the region as a whole, Haitians appear to be quite socially conservative. In both dimensions, they rank at the very bottom of the region in their acceptance of homosexuals. Even though Figure 36 shows that Haitians are comparatively not very supportive of homosexuals running for office (left quadrant) or of gay marriage (right quadrant), Figure 37 shows that these attitudes seem to be slowly changing. There is a slight and steady increase in both dimensions, with a clearer trend in upward support for homosexuals being permitted to run for office.
Figure 36. Attitudes towards Homosexuals in the Americas, 2014

Figure 37. Attitudes towards Homosexuals in Haiti, 2010-2014
Figure 38 shows that tolerance for these more extreme forms of protest have increased since 2010. At the same time, one has to recognize that support for these forms of protest remain fairly limited, with values lingering within the lower third of the 100-point scale.

In democratic regimes, trust is another central attitude to ensure political stability. When compared to the rest of the region, Haiti ranks at the bottom in terms of the interpersonal trust scale that is recoded from 0 to 100 (Figure 39).
Similarly, the earthquake may have influenced the evolution of interpersonal trust (Figure 49). The year 2010 also marks a low point in trust over the past decade. Yet, as the living conditions improved thereafter, the levels of trust have risen to higher levels than before the natural disaster at 47.98 on a 0-100 scale, compared to a regional average of about 61.
Figure 41 reports the levels of trust in political institutions among Haitians for the 2006-2014 period. One general observation emerges of the graph: overall trust in political institutions is fairly low among Haitians across all survey years. Yet, Haitians are not much different from other citizens in the Americas. The levels of trust reported in Figure 41 are fairly similar to the regional mean (including Haiti). One noticeable trend involves the substantial increase in the level of trust Haitians have for the executive, particularly after the earthquake.

Figure 41. Trust in Political Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014
In 2014, Haitians seem more trusting of the president (65.4) than the prime minister (51.2), the national legislature (42.6), their local government (38.7), political parties (36.8%), or the kaseks (35.5). Haitians are also quite suspicious of elections and of the national electoral institutions, with an average position of about 29.8 and 31.4, respectively on a 0-100 scale. Trust in judicial institutions is overall fairly low amongst Haitians. Haitians seem to be suspicious of institutions, including political institutions such as political parties, the national legislature, the executive, the prime minister, the local government, the kaseks, and elections more broadly. Trust in judicial institutions is overall fairly low amongst Haitians. As illustrated by Figure 42, Haitians have been consistently distrustful of their judicial system and, even more so, of the Supreme Court. Somewhat surprisingly, Haitians are very trusting of their National Police. All in all, Haitians are among those who have the highest level of trust in their National Police across the Americas. While Haitians seem to be suspicious of governmental institutions, they exhibit higher levels of trust in non-political institutions.

Figure 42. Trust in Judicial Institutions, Haiti 2006-2014

Figure 43 reports the levels of trust for the Catholic Church, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, the media and the U.S. Military. Aside from the media, the levels of trust for the other three institutions included in the graph are above the 50-point mark on the 0-100 scale for the 2006-2014 period.
System Support can be described as “a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized.” From the left-side graph of Figure 44, it is clear that Haiti ranks among those countries of the continent with low levels of system support. If a majority of citizens display high system support as well as high levels of tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the opposite, where citizens lack tolerance and have low levels of system support, democracy is said to be at risk. The percentage of Haitians that display both high levels of tolerance and system support declined in 2010 to 3.7%, but increased to levels comparable to those observed before the earthquake in 2012 and 2014.
Figure 44. System Support in Haiti, 2006-2014

Figure 45 compares the different countries of the region in terms of the percentage of citizens who lack system support and have low levels of tolerance. With such a high number of people in that category, Haiti ranks fourth in the region, among the countries in which democracy can be said to be at risk.
Yet, if we look at the evolution of these attitudes over the past decade, we clearly see that democratic political culture among Haitians has improved and stabilized. Figure 46 displays the distribution of Haitian respondents from 2006 to 2014 along the four different attitudinal profiles that can be created by combining attitudes regarding system support and political tolerance. The results for Haiti clearly show that democratic attitudes deteriorated steadily between 2006 and 2010, reaching a point at which 61.6% of Haitian lacked system support and had low levels of tolerance. Not surprisingly, the electoral cycle of 2010-2011 was particularly tense. Yet, since then, the situation has largely improved. Between 2012 and 2014 the percentage of Haitians holding attitudes that can place democracy at risk dropped to 40%. The proportion of Haitians with attitudes conducive to stable democracy (high system support, high political tolerance) has increased from a low 10.7% in 2012 to 16.1% in 2014.
Despite the recent decrease in the percentage of Haitians with attitudes that could place democracy at risk, other measures of democratic attitudes offer evidence of the fragile state of Haitian democracy.

Figure 47 suggests that these political attitudes deteriorated until 2010, and improved thereafter. This is true for pride of living under the Haitian political system and for the believed necessity to support the political system. That being said, the overall level of agreement with these dimensions remains low, at around 40 points on a 0-100 scale in 2014. Appreciations of the political parties’ capacity to represent voters and to listen to voters are not too encouraging either, with values in the mid- to low-30s on the same 0-100 scale in 2014.
In Haiti, support for democracy is generally lower than in the region as a whole. Interestingly, the trend regarding support for democracy in Haiti seems to follow the nature of the electoral cycle. As Figure 48 illustrates, support is high after election years. Between elections, support for democracy is consistently lower. In sum, in the aftermath of elections support for democracy is at about 70 on the 0-100 scale, and in the mid-60s between elections.
Figure 48. Support for Democracy in Haiti, 2006-2014

Figure 49 presents the percentage of Haitian respondents who responded that democracy is preferable to any other form of government (left-hand side) and those who responded that authoritarian government is sometimes justified (right-hand side). The percentage of respondents who prefer democracy over another form of government starts low in 2008, reaches a high point in 2010, and declines thereafter. Support for dictatorship under certain circumstances follows the inverse relationship. Overall, support for democracy over another form of government remains high throughout the 2008-2014 period in Haiti, with no less than 69% of the respondents preferring that option. However, there is some variation over time. With such results in 2014, Haiti ranks third in the Americas (see Figure 50), after Paraguay and Peru, as far as the percentage of respondents who support non-democratic forms of government is concerned.
Figure 49. Preference for Democracy over Authoritarianism in Haiti, 2006-2014

Figure 50. Preference for Democracy over Authoritarianism in the Americas, 2014

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2006-2014; v.HTI14ts_0929

Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP, 2014; v.GM14_0912
According to the analyses presented in the previous pages, Haitians have a low level of tolerance towards dissention, they lack confidence in their institutions, and they are less attached to the principle of democracy than many of the citizens from other countries in the region. Yet, it is possible that despite these attitudes, Haitians are active citizens, getting involved in their community and playing their part in a democratic society. As discussed earlier, Haitians have ranked consistently high in the Americas with regards to their attendance in municipal meetings. Figure 51 displays that Haitians are consistently more active in different community organizations than the citizens of the other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. This is especially true of their participation in religious organizations. One interesting observation is that Haitians have been very active in their community in the years that followed the earthquake.

![Figure 51. Components of Community Participation in Comparative Perspective, 2006-2014](image)

While in 2008 Haitians displayed participation rates below the level observed in other countries of the region, participation levels found surpassed regional rates in 2010 and 2012, and then returned to slightly below the regional average in 2014. Nevertheless, when asked if they contributed to resolving a community problem, Haitians consistently ranked above the regional average. (Figure 52)
A combination of all four forms of community participation and community engagement into a single index (Figure 53) shows that after 2010, Haitians generally became more likely than citizens of the other countries of the region to engage in their community.
Interestingly, Haitians are more likely to take part in meetings organized by religious organizations than their peers from other countries of the Americas. That being said, religious meetings are the most common type of community participation in both Haiti and elsewhere in the region. After participation in religious meetings, participation rates in other types of community organizations ranks as follows: attendance to meetings of parent associations, community improvement associations, political parties, and women’s organizations (Figure 54).

![Figure 54. Types of Community Participation in the Americas, 2014](image)

In both 2010 and 2012, Haitians were almost twice as many respondents reported having participated in a protest than citizens of the other countries of the region. However, their protest participation rates diminished to the regional average in 2014 (Figure 55). If Haitians protests, it is mostly because they are dissatisfied with economic considerations. Politics, education, public services, the environment, human rights, and security lag far behind (Figure 56).
Figure 55. Participated in a Protest in Haiti, 2010-2014

Figure 56. Reasons for Protesting Haiti, 2010 and 2014
Beyond participating in protests, the AmericasBarometer includes further questions regarding conventional forms of political participation. Figure 57 reports the percentage of respondents who answered that they would vote if elections were held in the coming days, and Haiti ranks among the countries in which citizens display the lowest intention to vote during a future election.

In addition to asking respondents about their behavior given hypothetical elections, the AmericasBarometer also ask them if they voted in the previous presidential election. The upper-left quadrant graph in Figure 58 suggests that intentions to vote are fairly stable over time, while the graph in the upper-right quadrant suggests the closer the survey is to the previous election, the higher the reported voting turnout. This is why we can observe peaks in 2006 and 2012. Finally, the graph reports the intention to vote for those who reported having voted in the last election for 2012 and 2014 only. Almost 82% of Haitians who reported voting in the last election claim they would vote again if elections were held in the near future.
Figure 58. Intentions to Vote and Reported Vote in Haiti, 2006-2014

Figure 59 presents the result of a regression analysis in which we predict intentions to vote. The results suggest that perceptions of the economy, corruption victimization, presidential approval, and more education are all significantly associated with voter turnout among Haitians.
Since Haiti adopted its 1987 political constitution, the country has had seven presidential elections. While the 1987 election was cancelled, the 1988 process was boycotted by most. Only five elections have completed their course (1990, 1995, 2000, 2006, and 2010), and only twice has the president managed to complete his term. Although this brief account of aborted elections and unfinished electoral mandates draws a somewhat poor picture of Haitian politics, it helps contextualize the results presented in this chapter.

8. Haitian Voters in Action

Every election since the adoption of the 1987 Haitian Constitution has been a theater for political turmoil. The outcome of each electoral process has been questioned by the losers. On every occasion, the process has been marked by protesters taking on the streets. Many elections have been resolved by para-constitutional arrangements. Elections in Haiti are a complicated affair. In light of what we learned in the previous chapters regarding the state of human development (Chapter 6) and the democratic culture (Chapter 7) in Haiti, this is not surprising. Nevertheless, in Haiti, electoral processes do complete their course, especially the most recent ones. How are citizens behaving in elections? To what extent are Haitians driven by the same motivations as citizens of other countries when deciding for whom to vote? Beyond standard demographic and socioeconomic variables, most models of vote choice rely on two additional sets of variables to explain how voters make their decision. The first has to do with ideology and party attachment. The second relates to issues such as short-term considerations related to governmental performance.

The current chapter explores how party attachment, ideology, and short-term issues affect incumbent support in Haiti. The main findings of the chapters are as follows.

Overall, Haitians tend to place themselves more to the left of the continuum (4.0 on a 0-10 scale in 2014) than citizens of other countries of the Americas (5.8 in 2014), especially so in the most recent waves of the AmericasBarometer.
The fact that Haitians are more willing to self-position on the left-right axis is nothing new. As Figure 61 indicates, Haitians have outnumbered citizens of the other countries in answering that question every year since 2008. Also, as is the case for citizens of the other countries of the Americas, since 2008, the number of Haitians accepting to self-position on the left-right axis has been consistently increasing.
Figure 61. Percentage of Haitians who self-identify on the left-right axis, 2008-2014

Figure 62. Position on the left-right axis, Haiti 2014
While the mean position on the left-right axis has leaned toward the left since 2010, Figure 63 suggests this has not always been the case. Before the earthquake, the left-right distribution was more centered, with an average position on the 1-10 scale located at around 5.

Another dimension of ideology and partisanship measured by the AmericasBarometer is respondents’ attachment to political parties. As illustrated by Figure 64, Haiti does not stand out as an outlier with regard to party identification in the Americas. With 34.3% of Haitians claiming that they identify with a political party, the country is very close to the regional rate of identification (34.05%).
Most Haitians who identify with a party rally with the political formation of the sitting president (59.2% in 2014).
In the absence of a strong presidential figure, Haitians are less numerous to rally behind any political party.

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Figure 65. Party Identification in Haiti, 2006–2014

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Figure 66. Evolution of Party Identification in Haiti, 2006–2014
The AmericasBarometer regularly asks respondents to identify the most important problem facing their country. Figure 67 plots the responses over time for Haiti. Since 2008, around 70% of Haitians have identified the economy as their number one concern, leaving little space for other issues.

Contrary to the trend followed by other countries of the region, in recent years, Haitians are more satisfied with the economy. In 2014, 15.7% of them feel the economy has gotten better, compared to 4.4% in 2010 and 1.6% in 2008.
Now, whether these issue concerns translate into support for the government depends on how individuals assess the efforts deployed by the authorities to address the issues. This applies to the economy, but also to other issues such as corruption or crime. Figure 69 shows how these assessments have evolved between 2006 and 2014 in Haiti. On the governmental efforts to fight crime or corruption, Haitians have become more satisfied in the recent past, at 47.27 on a 0-100 scale, compared to 25.21 in 2002. On how governments manage the economy, Haitians are more critical, at 37.49 on a 0-100 scale in 2014.

Although the AmericasBarometer is not an electoral study, it contains many questions allowing us to document the electoral behavior of its respondents. Two key variables are of interest here: presidential approval and vote intention. Figure 70 reports the percentage of Haitians who rate the job performance of the president as “good” or “very good” for each survey since 2006.
As Figure 72 illustrates, the rate of vote intention for the incumbent has declined by almost 5 percentage points, while support for opposition has increase by about the same amount. Yet, these are very small differences. What is more, over two thirds of Haitians who would cast a vote indicate they would support the incumbent president.
In order to identify the correlates of incumbent support, we run a regression analysis in which we predict vote intention for the incumbent president using demographic and socio-economic variables and ideology, as well as perceptions of how the governments combats corruption, improves security, and how the government handles the national economy.

Figure 73 reports the results of the regression analysis. The variable that has the most impact on incumbent support is identification with the party of the president. Haitians who have a positive appreciation of the economy have a higher probability of supporting the government candidate in elections. Incumbent support among Haitian is mostly defined by party identification, but also by short-term consideration such as perceptions of the economy.
In the end, the current chapter provided evidence that Haitians mostly rely on short-term considerations in order to guide their voting decision. Such a behavior is consistent with the absence of a stable party system. Yet, political parties are important for democracy to take roots. This is widely recognized. Almost every new Haitian president since 1987 has been elected on the basis of a newly created political formation. Strengthening the Haitian party system should be a priority in the coming years.
The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in research collaborations with LAPOP. LAPOP’s efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. These studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behaviors related to democracy and quality of life. Over the course of the AmericasBarometer’s duration, the project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, the University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The most recent surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in 2014 via face-to-face interviews in Latin American and Caribbean countries, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. The same surveys were conducted by Internet to national samples in the United States and Canada. Interviews were conducted in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer includes surveys conducted in 28 countries across the Americas and more than 50,000 interviews. Common core modules and standardized techniques allow for comparison across individuals, between certain sub-national regions within countries, across countries, and over time.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project offers its AmericasBarometer country datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that LAPOP produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed via our “data repositories” and subscribing institutions in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate in the pursuit of excellence in academic and policy research and analysis throughout the Americas.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Tabarre 41
Route de Tabarre
Port-au-Prince, Haiti
Telephone: (509) 2229-8000
Fax: (509) 2229-8066