

The Political Culture of Democracy in Guyana, 2009: The Impact of Governance

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While its primary goal is giving citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys with pen and paper. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), surveyors are now entering the replies directly to Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer*’s biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) helped fund the survey research in Central America and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) funded surveys in Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. Vanderbilt’s Center for the Americas and Notre Dame University funded the survey in Uruguay. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides insight into where the country stands relative to regional trends on major democracy indicators. The second section shows how these indicators are affected by governance. Finally the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

Elizabeth Gewurz Ramirez
AmericasBarometer Grant Manager at USAID



Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project
Vanderbilt University

This study serves as the latest contribution of the **AmericasBarometer** series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the AmericasBarometer website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the funding for the realization of this study.

We embarked on the 2008 **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided a generous grant to LAPOP to bring together the leading scholars in the field in May, 2006, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into what has become the “UNDP Democracy Support Index.” The scholars who attended that meeting prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

For the current round, two meetings of the teams took place. The first, in July 2007 was used to plan the general theoretical framework for the 2008 round of surveys. The second, which took place in December of the same year in San Salvador, El Salvador, was attended by all the research teams of all participating countries in the 2008 round. Officials from the USAID’s Office of Democracy were also present for this meeting, as well as members of the LAPOP team from Vanderbilt. With the experiences from the 2004 and 2006 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon a common questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy,

political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society y social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors. In some cases, we have found surprising similarities between countries while in others we have found sharp contrasts.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of the effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layman reader, meaning that there would be heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agreed that those graphs would always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs were indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=3,000), and Canada (N=2,000).

account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting² in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed the certifying test. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

A concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified, after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps; the first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses as entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this did not occur in any case during the 2008 round of the **AmericasBarometer**. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2008 round is the expansion of the use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) to collect data in five of the countries. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2008 round of surveys. We found this method of recording the survey responses extremely

² All AmericasBarometer samples are auto-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador.

efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys.

The fieldwork for the surveys was carried out only after the questionnaires were pretested extensively in each country. This began with tests between Vanderbilt students in the fall of 2007, followed by more extensive tests with the Nashville population. After making the appropriate changes and polishing the questionnaire, LAPOP team members were then sent to Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua and Venezuela to conduct more tests. The suggestions from each country were transmitted to LAPOP and the necessary changes and revisions were made. In December, the questionnaire, having been revised many times, was tested by each country team. In many countries more than 20 revised versions of the questionnaire were created. Version 18 was used as the standard for the final questionnaire. The result was a highly polished instrument, with common questions but with appropriate customization of vocabulary for country-specific needs. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In the end, we had versions in ten different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.lapopsurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyse their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by Mitchell Seligson, the scientific coordinator of the project. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing, and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 35,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Mexico and Central America Group		
Mexico		
Guatemala		
El Salvador		
Honduras		
Nicaragua		
Costa Rica		
Panama		

Andean/Southern cone Group		
Colombia		
Ecuador		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Bolivia		
Paraguay		
Chile		
Uruguay		
Brazil		
Venezuela		

Caribbean Group		
Dominican Republic	 	
Guyana		
Haiti		
Jamaica		THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Canada and United States		
Canada		
United States		

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Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pablo Parás García, President, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados • Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala • Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director, FundaUngo, El Salvador • Prof. Miguel Cruz, Researcher, IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Researcher and Senior Analyst, Study Director, Market Strategies, Inc. • Dr. José René Argueta, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Luis Rosero, Director of Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), and Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica. • Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Estado de la Nación Project
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor of Political Science, Central Michigan University
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Mitchell A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

Country	Researchers
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
Colombia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes
Ecuador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University • Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University • Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University • Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University • Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Julio Carrión, Associate Professor, University of Delaware in the United States, and Research at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. • Patricia Zárate Ardelá, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University • Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública • Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública • Vivian Schwarz-Blum, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública • Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay
Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Uruguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Professor of Political Science, Universidad de Montevideo
Brazil	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Lucio Renno, Professor in the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas, University of Brasilia
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • María Fernanda Boidi, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University • Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR and University of Illinois • Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University

Country	Researchers
Caribbean Group	
Republica Dominicana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Jana Morgan Kelly, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee • Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and director of surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies • Balford Lewis, Professor of Research Methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona.

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 35,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2008

Executive Summary

The present study represents the second round of AmericasBarometer Surveys undertaken by the Latin American Public Opinion Project in Guyana. The first, conducted in 2006, utilized responses from a total of 1,555 Guyanese citizens of voting age, who were not institutionalized and consented to anonymous interviews, to obtain a nationally representative sample of the country's population. Although only the second round conducted in Guyana, the Latin American Public Opinion Project has been systematically measuring citizens' values and attitudes in the region for decades. Initially LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). However, since then, the project has expanded to conducting bi-annual nationally representative surveys in over twenty countries. In the 2008-09 round, over 40,000 people were interviewed throughout the Americas. Housed at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, LAPOP is directed by founder Professor Mitchell A. Seligson and supported by an International Advisory Board made up of scholars and leaders of international democracy assistance organizations as well as a scientific support team and a large group of graduate student researchers.

From the 2006 round, LAPOP was able to arrive at a number of conclusions concerning democratic attitudes, values and behaviours of the Guyanese population. For example, we found that while the political culture in Guyana is clearly based on a democratic process, democratic institutions within the country are still maturing. The second round of surveys has allowed the LAPOP team to make comparison across time. In order to understand how attitudes and values have changed during the three years between 2006 and 2009, throughout this report, the reader will find comparisons between the two surveys at the national level.

In March and April of 2009, LAPOP, with the collaboration of local researchers, completed interviews for the second round of the AmericasBarometer Survey in the Co-operative Republic of Guyana. Like the 2006 survey, a nationally representative sample was drawn in the current survey. However, the 2009 sample is larger and is able to more precisely represent the regions in the country. Specifically, in this current round of surveys, by further refining the stratification of the sample and increasing the sample size by about 1,000 respondents, we were able to obtain representative samples of regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10. Given the relatively small populations of regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 in the Guyanese hinterland, these regions were combined in a single region. In total, 2,514 interviews were conducted throughout the country in the 2009 round of the AmericasBarometer Survey in Guyana. The sampling by region has the distinct advantage that it now allows researchers to come to conclusions at the sub-national (regional) level, in addition to the national level as was done in 2006. Throughout this report, results from such regional analyses are presented.

The present study is divided into three distinct sections. The first section is comprised of both the preface and chapter one. The preface of this study briefly outlines the political and economic contexts in Guyana while also going into more detail concerning the sample design.

Chapter one, through the use of cross-national comparisons of the 24 participating countries in the 2008/9 AmericasBarometer Survey, including Canada and the United States, proposes a theoretical framework for the analysis of the current round of survey data, focusing primarily on the impact of governance throughout the hemisphere. This chapter also presents the working hypothesis utilized throughout the 2008/9 LAPOP series that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately lead to consolidated democracies*. For the current study, the LAPOP team defines the dependent variable, support for stable democracy as central elements or dependent variables that could that could reasonably be affected by the quality of governance. Borrowing from such canonical works as Lipset's *The Political Man*, Dahl's *Polyarchy* and most notably Norris' *Critical Citizens*, the concept of support for stable democracy encapsulates (i) support for the right of participation and citizen inclusion; (ii) political legitimacy, or the belief that the current political institutions are the best for the system; (iii) interpersonal trust; and (iv) support for the idea that democracy *per se* is the best form of government (also known as the Churchillian version of democracy). The 2009 round of the AmericasBarometer survey finds that for a majority of the essential components of a stable democracy, Guyanese are in the intermediate range when compared with the other 23 countries included in the current survey round. For example, when asked whether given democracies problems it is still better than any other form of government, the average score in Guyana is 69.2 on the 0-100 scale. This places Guyana in the intermediate-low range, 16 positions below the highest country. In contrast, Canadians with an average score of 87.2, are at the top end. In the area of belief in the right of public contestation, Guyana scores an average of 71.7 on the 0-100 scale. This places the country in the intermediate-high range, below eight other countries in the region: Paraguay, Nicaragua, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, United States, Belize and Costa Rica. In regards to tolerance, the LAPOP data finds Guyana scoring relatively high compared to the other countries in the region. Based on an index created by LAPOP, we find that on a scale of 0-100, the average tolerance score is 58.1 in Guyana, preceded only by Canada, Argentina, United States, Belize and Paraguay. While just over the mid-point mark, the average Guyanese score for political legitimacy of core regime institutions of 52 points places the country in the high range in comparison with the other countries included in the study, preceded only by Belize whose average was about 56. Finally, Guyana scored in the intermediate range concerning interpersonal trust, with an average score of 60.1 points on the 0-100 scale, 10 positions from the top. The chapters that follow in part II of this study more fully develop the theory articulated in chapter I of this study, focusing in large measure on issues of governance and the impact of governance on democratic stability.

Chapter two, examines the role of both public perceptions on the presence of corruption as well as corruption victimization on support for stable democracy. The results in this chapter suggest that corruption victimization remains relatively high in Guyana compared to other countries in the region. Similarly, corruption appears to have increased in sectors such as the police in 2009, when compared to 2006, whereas it has decreased within the work place, health, and educational sectors during the same period. Furthermore, corruption victimization seems to be most pronounced in Regions 3 and 4 in comparison to Region 2. Afro-Guyanese have a lower probability of being victims of corruption compared to mixed Guyanese. These data also suggest that corruption victimization has an impact on support for the legitimacy of core political institutions, while also finding that the perception of corruption has a positive impact on the right

of public contestation. These results suggest that discontented citizens agree with the idea of making demands on the government for a change, especially with regards to corruption.

Chapter three examines the relationship between crime and its support on stable democracy. This chapter distinguishes between *perceptions* of crime and *actual* crime victimization. The results found here indicate that crime victimization varies by region and has a negative impact on interpersonal trust, suggesting that those Guyanese who have been victims by any act of delinquency may lose confidence in others. In addition, the fear of crime has a negative effect on support for the idea of democracy, interpersonal trust, and the belief of legitimacy of core political institutions. When people feel that they are unsafe, there is a higher probability that they turn these feelings against others and the political system itself, increasing their disbelief in the legitimacy of their political institutions, such as the police and the judiciary. Furthermore, the fear of crime appears to be most pronounced among females, the young, and those who live in larger cities.

Chapter four examines the impact of local government evaluations and participation on support for stable democracy. In terms of perception of local government performance, the Guyanese view it as roughly equal to the performance of both regional and national governments. On the 0-100 scale, average support for local government performance is 48.9 points, statistically indistinguishable from the other two levels of government. However, delving deeper into this issue and examining it at the regional level, we find that sparsely populated Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 hold higher levels of satisfaction in regards to local government performance than more urban regions such as 10 and.

In terms of participation in local government, Guyana falls in an intermediate position in comparison with the other countries included in the survey. Eleven percent of the Guyanese population attended a municipal meeting in the past year. There is, however, significant variation between regions, with 25% of citizens in Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 attending such a meeting while only 6% of Guyanese in Region 4 did so. Likewise, 12.5% of the population made a demand on their municipal government in the past year.

This chapter finds a significant relationship between satisfaction with local services and both belief in political legitimacy of core institutions and interpersonal trust as well as core democratic values as articulated in chapter one. As expected, both relationships are positive leading us to conclude that those who hold lower satisfaction with local government services also tend to have lower levels of belief in institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust.

Chapter five turns to perceptions of economic performance by the government and how these perceptions impact support for stable democracy in Guyana. In 2009, over 56% of the Guyanese population identified the economy as being the main problem of the country; this is up from 40% in 2006. However, in order to understand how the Guyanese perceive the economic performance of the national government, the Latin American Public Opinion Project constructed an index combining questions asking respondents to rate their government's performance on fighting poverty and combating unemployment. In comparative perspective, Guyana ranks in the intermediate range of the other countries included in the 2008/09 survey round with an average

response of 45.4 points on a 0-100 scale. While the Guyanese population may be more concerned with the economy today than in 2006, according to the data obtained from the current round, their assessment of the national government's economic performance is higher in 2009 than it was in 2006¹ suggesting that, as whole, the citizens of Guyana do not blame their own national government for the economic difficulties.

This chapter also analyzes the relationship between perceptions of government economic performance and specific support for democracy. This type of democratic support, in contrast to diffuse support for democracy, addresses one's support for the *current* government and not necessarily for the democratic system. To measure specific support for democracy, this chapter utilizes the question asking respondents to rate the performance of the government of Guyana. As expected, a significant positive relationship resulted from the analysis with those who hold higher perceptions of government economic performance also possessing higher satisfaction with the work of the current government. In addition to one's perception of government economic performance, we also find that perception of one's personal economic situation, the national economic situation, living in a rural area and a small city and age all have positive effects on one's specific support for democracy.

Finally, chapter five examines the relationship of perception of economic performance of the government on support for stable democracy. Of the essential components articulated in chapter one, we find that several have significant relationships with one's perception of economic performance by the government. This analysis finds that perception of government economic performance is negatively related to support for contestation. Perceived legitimacy toward democratic institutions and interpersonal trust both hold positive relationships with perceptions of government economic performance.

Chapter six addresses the topic of legitimacy of the political system as well as citizens' perceptions about democracy and political institutions in Guyana. The citizens of Guyana express rather high levels of attitudes favourable toward stable democracy compared to other countries in the Americas. Around 35.7% of Guyanese express high levels of system support and political tolerance, and this percentage has increased with respect to 2006. Within Guyana we observe some differences across regions regarding attitudes favourable towards stable democracy. Region 2 has the highest percentage of people holding high levels of both system support and political tolerance, whereas Region 4 has the lowest levels. Regarding the determinants of support for stable democracy, we find that it depends above all upon citizens' perceptions of government economic performance, that is to say the extent to which the current government is fighting poverty and unemployment. In this chapter we also examine the levels of confidence in the main public institutions. In this regard, citizens show intermediate levels of trust in their institutions, with averages around 50 points on a 0-100 scale. The Church and the Guyana Defence Force are the institutions that reach the highest levels of confidence while the Mayor's Office, the Guyana Police Force and political parties are the most distrusted institutions. A third aspect analyzed in this chapter was confidence in the justice system. Again, Guyanese express intermediate levels of

¹ In 2009, the average score for the "econperf" index was 45.4 points on the 0-100 scale, this is up from 34.6 points in 2006.

trust. We find that this confidence depends on satisfaction with the current president, ethnic self-identification (Indians and Amerindians trust more than Blacks and Mixed), region (Region 2 has the highest levels whereas Region 4 has the lowest levels), and perceptions of and experiences with corruption. These perceptions and personal experiences have a negative impact on one's confidence in the justice system. Finally, we note that despite the fact that a majority of Guyanese citizens, 67.6%, consider democracy as the preferable form of government, only half are satisfied or very satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Guyana.

In **Chapter seven** we analyse voting behaviour and party identification in Guyana. First, we look at how many people have already registered to be included in the voters list in order to be eligible to vote in the next general elections of 2011. We observe that 81.6% of Guyanese report being registered to vote, with few notable differences among regions in the country. Statistical analyses show that people in urban areas and wealthy citizens are more likely to be registered as well as Indians. Regarding electoral behaviour, around 70% of respondents report having voted in the last elections of 2006. Region 5 appears to be region with the highest levels in both registered voters and electoral turnout. We also find that men and young people report being less likely to vote in the 2006 elections. Furthermore, we also observe a strong correlation between vote choice and ethnic self-identification. Finally, in the third section of this chapter, we analyse party identification in Guyana, which reveals that the country displays the lowest levels of party identification in the Americas. Only 12.2% of citizens identify with a political party, most of them identifying with either the PPP or the PNC in similar percentages.

The final chapter of the report is part of the third section, *Beyond Governance*, which examines democratic issues outside of the realm of governance. **Chapter eight** analyses, in-depth, one of the five components of stable democracy laid out in chapter one, interpersonal trust. Attempting to understand the role of interpersonal trust in a democratic society, this chapter takes advantage of the comparative nature of the 2008/09 round of the AmericasBarometer survey and examines the issue not only cross-nationally, but also across time between 2006 and 2009 in Guyana. First, it is discovered that Guyana falls in the intermediate range of interpersonal trust compared with the 23 other countries included in the series. With an average score of 60.1 points on the 0-100 scale, Guyana ranks 11 places from the top country, which is occupied by Canada with an average score of 79.6.

Over time, the differences between 2006 and 2009 are statistically indistinguishable. However, we do find that in regard to region, Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 and Region 5 have significantly higher levels of interpersonal trust than do those living in Region 10 and Region 4.

Chapter eight also examines the determinants of interpersonal trust, finding that, in the case of Guyana, crime victimization, being female and being of mixed race all have significant negative relationships with levels of interpersonal trust, while age, wealth, and living in small cities and rural areas (compared to the nation's capital) all hold significant positive relationships with interpersonal trust.

The second part of chapter eight examines issues of civic participation and levels of such types of participation in Guyana. Utilizing LAPOP's "CP" series, this section analyses individually participation in solving community problems, participation in meetings of religious groups, participation in meetings of parents associations, participation in meetings of a committee for community improvements, participation in meetings of professional associations, participation in meetings of labour unions, participation in meetings of political parties and participation in meetings of women's' associations or groups, all within the last twelve months.

In terms of civic participation in comparative perspective, Guyana consistently ranks toward the top or intermediate high range in comparison with the other countries included in the survey. The only two areas of civic participation where Guyana falls to the intermediate low range is in participation in committees for community improvement where Guyana, with 25.3% of the population having participated, places it in the 16th position from the top and in labour union participation where Guyana finds itself seventh from the bottom, with 5.5% of Guyanese participating in the past year.

Regionally speaking, Guyanese living in the stratum of Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 consistently show more civic participation than those of other regions. The only two areas of civic participation where Guyanese of this particular region did not participate more than residents in any other region were participation in labour unions (where residents of Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 actually participated the least) and in participation in meetings of political parties, where this particular stratum fell in the middle of the other regions being analysed.

Interestingly, across *all* types of civic participation included in this study, in Guyana we found a decrease in participation over the previous round. The only category, however, where this decrease in participation was statistically insignificant was in regards to participation in meetings of professional associations. Participation in meetings of religious groups, for example, decreased by almost 20 percentage points between 2006 and 2009 while participation in parent associations decreased by almost nine percent. Participation in labour union meetings decreased by almost 10% between 2006 and 2009 while participation in political party meetings decreased by about 5 percentage points between the same time period.

Chapter eight also examined which Guyanese are more likely to engage in certain types of civic participation. Employing statistical models for a number of types of participation, we discovered that sex, age, wealth, area size and region were all consistently significant predictors of civic participation, however, not always in the same direction. For example, compared to men, women are more likely to participate in activities such as religious meetings and parent association meetings while men are more likely to participate in meetings of committees for community improvement, professional associations and labour unions. As regards to age, we find that older Guyanese are more likely to participate in religious meetings and meetings of professional associations while younger Guyanese participate more heavily in meetings of parent associations. Wealth is a significant positive predictor in participation in religious meetings and an insignificant predictor in all other types of civic participation.

Compared with the metropolitan area of the national capital (Georgetown), this chapter finds that those living in rural areas are significantly *less* likely to participate in religious meetings; those living in rural areas are significantly *more* likely to participate in labour union meetings; and those living in both small cities and rural areas are more likely to participate in political party meetings compared to those Guyanese living in the nation's capital

Citizens in Region 4 are less likely to participate in meetings of religious organizations than are Guyanese living in any other region of the country; Guyanese in Region 2 are significantly *less* likely to participate in parent association meetings compared to Guyanese living in Region 4 while those living in Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 are significantly more likely to participate in meetings of committees for community improvement than those Guyanese living in Region 4. Citizens in Region 10 are more likely to participate in professional association meetings than Guyanese living in Region 4 while Guyanese in Region 10 are *less* likely to participate in political party meetings than are citizens in Region 4. Finally, we notice that women in Region 6 and Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 are statistically more likely to participate in women groups and associations than women in Region 4.

Details of all of the information presented above are contained in the full report.

PART ONE:
THEORY AND
CROSS-NATIONAL
COMPARISONS

Context of Democratic Development in Guyana, Method and Description of Data.

Political Context

The political situation in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana has been, since at least 1957, marred by racial tensions and identity politics. It was in that year that the People's Progressive Party (PPP) split along racial lines with most Indo-Guyanese supporting it while the majority of Guyana's black population began supporting the newly formed People's National Congress (PNC). Indeed, as will be demonstrated at many places in this volume, these divisions concerning race and party identification are still present in Guyana.

Below, Figure i-1 presents Guyana's Freedom House score on Democracy since 1972 as compared with Latin American averages.⁴ Given that in Freedom House's measure the "freer" a society is in terms of both civil and political rights, the lower the score, for ease of interpretation, we have inverted the scale so that higher scores signify a more democratic society. As can be seen from the figure, for much of the 1990s, following the election placing the PPP as the majority party in the country, Guyana was classified as a "free" society, routinely scoring above the Latin American average. It should be noted that in 1992 the PNC lost control of the government for the first time since its election in 1964. During this time period the PNC led Guyana amid "credible and persistent allegations of electoral irregularities, including vote rigging and list padding."⁵

⁴ In order to calculate average Freedom House score for the Latin American Region, the sum for each year was taken from the following countries and divided by the total number of countries (32): Grenada Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominical, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Uruguay, Venezuela. Country scores were not included in the analysis until they achieved independence.

⁵ Electoral Assistance Bureau. 2007. EAB Final Report: General and Regional Elections, 28th August 2006, Co-Operative Republic of Guyana.
http://www.gecom.org.gy/pdf/Electoral%20Assistance%20Bureau%20Final_Report%202006%20elections.pdf.
Accessed 06 June 2009. Page 11.




Figure i-1. Freedom House Scores in Guyana and Latin America, 1972-2008

Between the years 1993 and 2004, Guyana's combined Freedom House score of political and civil liberties exceeded the average of the Latin American region. Indeed, for these 11 years Guyana was classified as a "free" society. However, as can be seen in Figure i-1, Guyana's ranking declined somewhat in 2005, dropping from a score of 10 to 8 on the Freedom House inverted index, and also reducing its classification from "free" to "partly free." According to the annual report released for that year by Freedom House, this change in classification was attributed to "...the government's failure to fully investigate the emergence of anticrime death squads and the growing influence of the illegal narcotics trade on the country's political system."⁶ The following year, Guyana's ranking increased by one point on the combined scale, enough to elevate it back to being considered a "free" society, however, since 2005, Guyana's Freedom House score has again fallen below that of the regional average.

Economic Context

Since achieving independence from Great Britain in 1966, Guyana's economic performance can at best be described as inconsistent. Following a short period of economic growth between 1970 and 1975, Guyana's accumulated growth of GDP between 1976 and 1990 was -32.8% according to the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. This economic inconsistency has persisted into more recent years; Figure i.2, shown below,

⁶ Freedom House. 2006. "Freedom in the World- Guyana (2006)."

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2006&country=6975>. Accessed 05 June 2009.

presents average GDP growth for Guyana compared with averages for the entire Latin American region.




Figure i-2. Economic Growth in Guyana and Latin America 1972-2008

As is apparent from the figure above, as in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean more generally, Guyana has experienced considerable ebbs and flows in economic growth. Since 1990, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana has witnessed five year of negative economic growth, 1990, 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2005 while the average for Latin America has fallen into negative territory only once, in 2002. Following Guyana's negative growth rate in 2005, the country saw a significant improvement in economic performance the following year (2006) with 5% GDP growth during that year as well as in 2007. In 2008 however, economic growth declined to just 3%.

As one of the Western Hemisphere's poorest countries with a per capita income of about one-fifth of the average in South America,⁷ Guyana faces formidable economic challenges. In 2007, following the most recent general and regional elections in the country, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) attributed the current economic climate to a considerable external debt estimated to be roughly \$1.2 billion U.S. dollars which, according to the EAB has had direct effects in "hamper[ing] efforts aimed at restoring the nation's dilapidated physical and social infrastructures."⁸ Additionally, the report cites the European Market's decision to reduce (and eventually eliminate) preferential price regimes for Guyanese sugar as also contributing to its most recent economic woes. Finally, an inadequate education system as well as high levels of migration are also seen as impeding both short and long-term development in the country.

⁷ Electoral Assistance Bureau, page 12. See note 2.

⁸ Ibid.

Sample Design

In order to systematically assess democratic attitudes, behaviours, and values among the Guyanese population, the Latin American Public Opinion Project in March and April of 2009 interviewed a total of 2,514 Guyanese who were of voting age, not institutionalized and who consented to participate anonymously in the study. This most current round of surveys in Guyana complements the first AmericasBarometer Survey conducted in Guyana in 2006, allowing us to begin carrying out analyses of the values, behaviours and attitudes of the Guyanese population across time. In both years, the questionnaire was pretested and interviewers and supervisors were trained by Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr. The full questionnaire is contained in the appendix of this report.

Population

The distribution of the sample was based on the 2002 census data carried out by the Bureau of Statistics. According to the 2002 census data, Guyana has a total of 751,223 inhabitants. Twenty eight percent (28%) of the population was living in municipalities that constitute what is categorized as the urban area in this study and the remaining seventy-two percent (72%) live in rural and hinterland areas administered by Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDCs), Amerindian Village Councils (AVCs) and Community Development Councils (CDCs). The country is divided into 10 administrative regions as shown in the map below.



Figure i-3. Map of Guyana Showing the Administrative Regions

Table i-1 shows the distribution of the population 20 years old and over by region and urban and rural areas. The census bureau did not release information on the 18 and over population, hence the team had little option but to use the 20 and over age group, making the reasonable assumption that the distribution of the 18 and 19 year olds does not vary from the 20 and over population.

Table i-1. Distribution of Population 20 Years and Over By Region

Region	Population total	%	Urban area	%	Rural area	%
Region 1 (Barima/Waini)	9,845	2.40%	-	0.00%	9,845	2.40%
Region 2 (Pomeroon/Supenaam)	25,568	6.20%	7,131	1.70%	18,437	4.50%
Region 3 (West Demerara/Essequibo Island)	58,215	14.20%	-	0.00%	58,215	14.20%
Region 4 (Demerara/Mahaica)	176,812	43.00%	80,874	19.70%	95,938	23.40%
Region 5 (Mahaica/West Berbice)	28,620	7.00%	-	0.00%	28,620	7.00%
Region 6 (East Berbice/Corentyne)	68,972	16.80%	18,523	4.50%	50,449	12.30%
Region 7 (Cuyuni/Mazaruni)	8,483	2.10%	-	0.00%	8,483	2.10%
Region 8 (Siparuni/Potaro)	5,028	1.20%	-	0.00%	5,028	1.20%
Region 9 (Upper Takutu/UpperEssequibo)	8,375	2.00%	-	0.00%	8,375	2.00%
Region 10 (Upper Demerara/Berbice)	20,948	5.10%	15,587	3.80%	5,361	1.30%
Total	410,866	100%	122,115	29.70%	288,751	70.30%

Source: Guyana Census (2002)

Sampling Method

The sample was designed by Dominique Zéphyr from the LAPOP central office. The goal was to have a sample that represents the entire adult population of Guyana. It is a random stratified sample representative at the national, urban and rural, and regional levels. The stratification ensures the inclusion and representation of the most important geographic regions in the country. Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 (Barima-Waini, Cuyani-Mazaruni, Potaro-Siparuni and Upper Takutu-Upper Essequibo), because of their relatively small populations, were combined into a single group while each of the other regions (Regions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10: Pomeroon-Supenamm, Essequibo Islands-West Demerara, Demerara-Mahica, Mahaica-Berbice, East Berbice-Corentyne and Upper Demerar-Berbice) are in their own strata. The sample was further sub-stratified into urban and rural areas. The proposed size of the sample for each stratum (by urban and rural areas) is shown in the Table i-2.

Table i-2. Sample Size: Number of Interviews in Urban and Rural Areas by each Stratum

Stratum	Stratum Name	Population total	Total Number of Interviews	% Urban population	Number of Interviews in Urban Area	% Rural population	Number of Interviews in Rural Area
I	Region 2	25,568	312	27.9%	96	72.1%	216
II	Region 3	58,215	300	-	0	100.0%	300
III	Region 4	176,812	666	45.7%	336	54.3%	330
IV	Region 5	28,620	300	-	0	100.0%	300
V	Region 6	68,972	306	26.9%	96	73.1%	210
VI	Region 10	20,948	330	74.4%	240	25.6%	90
VII	Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	31,731	300	-	0	100.0%	300
Total	Country total	410,866	2514	29.7%	768	70.3%	1746

In order to draw the sample, we followed a multistage procedure. We first selected the municipalities and Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDC) according to their population size, followed by the selection of sectors (imply economic sectors – agri, health, education, etc) and villages, and in the last stage enumeration districts (EDs) and households were chosen. For the selection of units in each stage, we implemented the Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) method.

In order to minimize travel time and costs, a fixed number of interviews was carried out in each sampling point within each stratum. Thus, the Guyana sample follows a clustered sample design. A total of 10 to 12 and 8 interviews were conducted in each sampling point in rural and urban areas, correspondingly. In total, as shown in Table i-3, the sample is composed of 267 sampling points: 171 urban and 96 rural.

Table i-3. Distribution of Sampling Points across Strata

Stratum	Stratum Name	Number of interviews			Sampling points		
		Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
I	Region 2	96	216	312	12	18	30
II	Region 3	-	300	300	-	30	30
III	Region 4	336	330	666	42	33	75
IV	Region 5	-	300	300	-	30	30
V	Region 6	96	210	306	12	21	33
VI	Region 10	240	90	330	30	9	39
VII	Regions 1, 7, 8, and 9	-	300	300	-	30	30
Total	Country total	768	1746	2514	96	171	267

The margin of error anticipated for the national sample is $\pm 2.0\%$, assuming a Simple Random Sample (SRS) design, and a 50-50% distribution for a dichotomous variable (a maximum possible variation) and a 95% confidence level ($z=1.96$).

The sample is not self-weighted. Different sampling fractions were used in each stratum. Consequently, different sample weights were calculated for each stratum. Since the sample is stratified, clustered, and weighted, in the analysis of the data we took into account the complex sample design to accurately estimate the precision (standard errors) of the results presented in this study.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics of the 2008 Sample




Figure i-4. Sample Distribution by Geographic Area

In addition to stratifying by region, the 2009 AmericasBarometer Survey also accounts for the urban vs. rural geographic dispersion in the population. We have therefore also stratified for geographic zone, dividing the sample into rural and urban populations, Figure i-4 presents both the 2006 and 2009 sample distributions by geographic area. As can be seen in the above figure, about 67% of the 2009 sample came from rural areas of the country while almost 33% lived in urban zones. This compares to 70% from rural areas and 30% from urban areas of Guyana during the 2006 round.




Figure i -5. Sample Distribution by Sex

Focusing now on gender, both the 2006 and 2009 surveys, Figure i-4, shown above presents the distribution of the sample by sex after applying the appropriate weights. As can be seen, for the current round in Guyana 50% of the sample consists of male respondents while the other 50% is comprised of female respondents. Additionally, Figure i-5 displays the sample distribution from the 2006 round by sex, which is directly comparable to 2009. The differences are minor and not statistically significant.




Figure i -6. Sample Distribution by Age

Figure i-6 displays the sample distribution according to age range for both the 2006 and 2009 rounds in Guyana. The age distribution between the two rounds appear relatively similar, although we notice a slight decrease in the proportion of respondents falling into the 26-35 year old age range and a slight increase in those respondents reporting their age as being 66 years old or older.




Figure i-7. Sample Distribution by Education Level

In terms of the sample distribution by education, Figure i-7, illustrated below, shows that compared with the 2006 sample, in 2009 the AmericasBarometer Survey has an increased proportion of respondents reporting only a primary education while seeing a decrease in terms of both higher educated respondents and those with secondary educations, although for the latter the decrease was only about 2 percentage points. In 2006 those with only primary education made up roughly 24% of the sample while in 2009 they represented almost 33%. Those with secondary education accounted for about 58% of the sample in 2006 while in 2009 their representation decreased to just over 56% of the total sample. Finally those Guyanese who reported having had completed higher education accounted for about 17% of the total sample in 2006 while in 2009 just under 11%.




Figure i-8. Sample Distribution by Ethnic Self-Identification

Finally, and of particular import in the case of Guyana is the ethnic distribution of the 2009 sample. This study will show that tensions exist between the two dominant ethnic groups in the country, those of Afro-Guyanese or black descent and those of Indo-Guyanese or Indian descent. After applying the appropriate weights, we see, in Figure i.8 the sample distributions for both 2006 and 2009 according to ethnic self-identification. As can be seen above, in both rounds Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese make up a majority of respondents in the sample. For 2006 the combined proportion of these two ethnicities is just over 67% while 7% of the sample is comprised of those self identifying as indigenous or Amerindian and the remaining 25% as being of mixed race. In 2009 however, we see that roughly 70% of the sample self-identifies as being either Black or Indian, about 9% identify as Amerindian and the remaining 21% as mixed race. It is worth pointing out that the ethnic distribution of the 2009 AmericasBarometer sample in Guyana compares relatively well with the official ethnic breakdown of the country as reported by the Guyanese government. In their 2007 post-election report, the Electoral Assistance Bureau estimated the proportion of Guyanese of Indian descent being 43.5% of the population, those of African descent accounting for roughly 30% of the total population; indigenous citizens make up 9% while mixed race and those of other ethnicities account for about 17% of the total population.

Chapter I. Building Support for Stable Democracy⁹

Theoretical Framework

Democratic stability is a goal sought by many governments world-wide, yet it has been an elusive goal for many countries. Paralyzing strikes, protests and even regime breakdowns via executive or military coups have been commonplace in the post World War II world (Huntington 1968; Linz and Stepan 1978; Przeworski, *et al.* 1996; Przeworski, *et al.* 2000). How can the chances for stable democracy be increased? That is the central question that lies at the heart of every democracy and governance program, including those carried out by USAID. There are many accounts in the field of historical sociology providing very long-term explanations of stability and breakdown, such as the classic work by Barrington Moore, Jr. (Moore Jr. 1966), studies of state breakdown (Skocpol 1979) and the recent work of Boix (2003), Gerring (Gerring, *et al.* 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Yet, when policy makers sit down to determine how in the relatively short-term they can best help to consolidate democracy and avoid instability, multi-century explanations are often not immediately helpful.

The best advice, of course, for achieving democratic stability for countries that have made the transition from dictatorship to democracy is for a country to “get rich,” at least that is what the best long-run empirical investigations show (Przeworski, *et al.* 2000).¹⁰ Yet, generating national wealth is a major challenge in itself, and is not a process that can take place overnight. Can governments, and international and bi-lateral agencies interested in promoting democratic stability do anything to enhance the chances of democratic consolidation? Based on the macro-level analysis of USAID’s DG programs since 1990, it is now clear that the answer is an unequivocal “yes.” Such programs clearly result (on average) in increased democracy (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson 2007; Azpuru, *et al.* 2008; Seligson, Finkel and Pérez-Liñán forthcoming). Yet, such macro-level studies fail to tell us which DG programs produce a positive impact in specific countries and in specific ways. To obtain that kind of information, there is really no substitute for country-level analysis, so that the specific conditions for each country can be observed and understood. For research such as this, the AmericasBarometer survey data, the focus of this study, is ideal.

⁹ This chapter was written by Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby Córdova and Dominique Zéphyr.

¹⁰ This same research is largely agnostic on the question as to what causes the transition from dictatorship to democracy in the first place. The research by Przeworski argues that wealth does not produce the transition, but once a country becomes democratic, breakdown is far less likely as national wealth increases.

Beyond the advice to “get rich,” increasingly, attention is being placed on good governance as the way to help the consolidation and deepening of stable democracy. This is not a new finding, as the classic work of Seymour Martin Lipset suggested it over a half century ago. Lipset argued that democracies consolidate as a result of a process by which governments resolve problems that plague political systems (Lipset 1961). Lipset therefore placed the *performance* of regimes as a central factor in the consolidation and stability of democracy. Today, we increasingly refer to “performance” using the modern terminology of “governance” (in Spanish, often rendered as *gobernabilidad*, or more accurately, *gobernanza*¹¹).¹² Good governance may well be essential for the democracies to be able to consolidate and to remain stable, and at the same time, studies have shown that a reciprocal process may be at work; democracy may help produce better governance (Hayen and Bratton 1992; Pritchett and Kaufmann 1998; Treisman 2000a).

Democracy has become “the only game in town,” in the majority of countries throughout the world (see the Freedom House web site), yet it is also the case that survey evidence from many countries show deep dissatisfaction with the way that democracy is working, and in some countries, as Freedom House and other recent studies have found, democracy is backsliding (Seligson 2005). Thus, increasingly we face the problem of citizens believing in democracy, but questioning its ability to deliver on its promises.

Working hypothesis

Based on the research reported above, we have developed a working hypothesis for the 2008 version of the LAPOP series of “Political Culture of Democracy” series: citizen perception of governance matters. That is, we wish to test the thesis that *citizen perception of a high quality of governance increases citizen support for stable democracy and will ultimately help lead to consolidated democracies*.¹³ Alternatively, when citizens gauge that their governments are not performing well, are not “delivering the goods,” so to speak, they lose faith in democracy and

¹¹ Note that there are problems with the translation into Spanish of the word “governance.” We have decided to use the term “gobernabilidad” even though we recognize that it differs in meaning from the English term “governance.” Frequently, in Spanish, people refer to “gobernabilidad,” which implies the ability to be governed, which is not what is in question in the LAPOP studies. Rather, we are interested in the *quality* or *performance* of government as perceived and experienced by citizens of the Americas. However, if we use the term, “desempeño del gobierno” we are focusing more attention on the incumbent government than we wish to do. Another alternative is “desempeño gubernamental,” but this phrasing seems too bogged down. Thus, we have decided to retain the common term, “gobernabilidad” in the Spanish language reports, as the one most easily and widely understood, and will use “governance” in the English language versions.

¹² According to the World Bank (Kaufmann 2006 82): “We define *governance* as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes: the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored, and replaced (the political dimension); the government’s capacity to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies (the economic dimension); and the respect of citizens and the state for the country’s institutions (the institutional respect dimension).”

¹³ We emphasize *support* for stable democracy; recognizing that many other factors, including international conflicts, ultimately affect the stability of any regime.

thus open the door to backsliding and even alternative systems of rule, including the increasingly popular “electoral dictatorships” (Schedler 2006). The quintessential case is that of Russia, where serious failures of governance are thought to have given rise to the current system, in which liberal democratic institutions have been largely neutered. In this study, we are focusing on a single year (2008) or on a narrow range of years for which AmericasBarometer data exist for some countries, and thus cannot test the ultimate causal link between citizen support for stable democracy and consolidated democracy itself. Yet, it is difficult to imagine a counterfactual that a positive perception of good governance would lead to democratic breakdown, and we cannot think of any instance where research has made such a perverse link. Moreover, in public opinion research that has looked at the longer-term view, evidence has been presented showing a strong link between citizen attitudes and democracy (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).¹⁴ Therefore, demonstrating that *governance matters*, and more particularly what forms of governance matters for what aspects of citizen support for stable democracy, would be an important breakthrough in research that has not been attempted before.

To carry out this test, we use the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey data to develop a series of measures of perception/experience with governance, and a series of measures of citizen support for stable democracy. *We do not expect that all forms of good governance will have a significant and positive impact on all dimensions of support for stable democracy.* Indeed, we strongly suspect that “all good things do not go together,” and only some governance issues are linked to some democracy dimensions. By looking carefully at key components of governance and dimensions of democracy, we should be able to provide the most useful policy-relevant advice by answering the questions: what works, for what, and where?

There have been many attempts to measure the quality of governance, the best known of which is the World Bank Institute “Worldwide Governance Indicators” directed by Daniel Kaufmann. The increasing importance of those items in the development community is difficult to overstate. Indeed, beginning with the 2006 round of World Bank indicators, the LAPOP AmericasBarometer data results have been incorporated within them. Yet, that data series provides only a single number for each of six dimensions of governance for each country and does not allow for sub national analysis. This is a severe limitation when democracy practitioners want to determine how to target their programs in a particular country. Moreover, the World Bank measures do not measure governance directly, but are largely composed of a series of surveys of expert opinion on the *perception* of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007a). Expert opinion is almost always provided by non-nationals and therefore may be influenced by many factors, including stereotyping, ideological preferences (e.g., preference for free market economies over socialist economies) (Bollen and Jackman 1986; Bollen and Paxton 2000) as well as the interests that the experts may have in making a given country’s governance look better or worse than it actually is.¹⁵ The AmericasBarometer data

¹⁴ Note that the particular series of questions used in the studies mentioned only partially overlap with those proposed here. Critics of the Inglehart approach have questioned those variables (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) or the direction of the causal arrows (Muller and Seligson 1994).

¹⁵ For an extended discussion and debate on these limitations see (Seligson 2002c; Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2007b; Kurtz and Schrank 2007).

allows us to measure the quality of governance *as perceived and experienced by the citizens of the Americas themselves*, not filtered through the lens of foreign “experts.” Such an approach, while not perfect, is ideal for our interests in looking at democracy, since democratic regimes depend, in the final analysis, on the consent and support of the governed. Moreover, it is the values and experiences of citizens that democracy and governance programs can be expected to influence, and therefore the direct linkage to democracy programs should be in evidence.

There is increasing contemporary evidence that the citizen perception of and experience with quality of governance has an important impact on citizen attitudes toward democracy. In the extensive analysis carried out by the AfroBarometer (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007), citizen perception of the quality of governance was shown to influence citizen attitudes toward democracy. Especially important in Africa, for example, has been the ability of the government to provide personal security (Bratton and Chang 2006). In newly democratizing states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, there is evidence that governments that are perceived as performing poorly undermine democratic values (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). Evidence has also shown that the ability of Costa Rica to become an early leader of democracy in Latin America was directly linked to successful governance (Seligson and Muller 1987).

Based on that evidence, this study examines the impact of *citizen perception of and experience with* governance (both “good” and “bad”) on the extent to which citizens in the Americas support, or fail to support, key aspects of stable democratic rule. In prior studies by LAPOP, each chapter was treated as a stand-alone examination of different aspects of democracy. In this study, in contrast, we develop in Part I, a unifying theme, which we then deploy in Part II of the study. In Part I we make the case that no one aspect of democratic political culture, by itself, is sufficient to build a solid foundation for democratic stability. In publications, we have taken a partial approach to this question, typically emphasizing the predictive value of the combination of political tolerance and political legitimacy (i.e., diffuse support). In this report, we expand on that approach, focusing on what LAPOP believes to be four central elements, or four central dependent variables that reasonably could be affected by the quality of governance. In this effort we are guided in part by the approach taken by Pippa Norris in her pioneering work (Norris 1999):

- 1) *Belief in democracy as the best possible system.* Belief in the Churchillian concept of democracy, namely that democracy, despite all its flaws, is better than any other system;
- 2) *Belief in the core values on which democracy depends.* Belief in the two key dimensions that defined democracy for Robert Dahl (1971), contestation and inclusiveness.
- 3) *Belief in the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy:* the executive, the legislature, the justice system, and political parties.
- 4) *Belief that others can be trusted.* Interpersonal trust is a key component of social capital.

Extensive research suggests that there are four main sets of beliefs that are essential for democracies to be able to consolidate and remain stable, and we define each of those in turn¹⁶:

Support for the Idea of Democracy per se

Citizens need to believe that democracy is better than alternative forms of government. If citizens do not believe this, then they can seek alternatives. We measure this belief with a question that was developed by Mishler and Rose (Rose, *et al.* 1998; Rose and Shin 2001). The item is often called the “Churchillean concept of democracy,” as it comes from Winston Churchill’s famous speech made before the House of Commons in 1947 (as quoted in Mishler and Rose 1999 81) “Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

In the Americas Barometer, we tap this concept with the following item:

ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.

The results for the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I-1. The reader should note carefully the “confidence interval” “I” symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close enough to each other in magnitude so that the “I” symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries.¹⁷ At the high end, three quarters of those surveyed in Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic agreed with the Churchilllean notion of democracy. Indeed, even in the countries with the lowest level of agreement (Honduras, Guatemala and Paraguay) three-fifths of the population agreed with this notion. *In no country of the Americas do majorities disagree with Churchill’s famous dictum.*

¹⁶ We acknowledge that there may be others, and that some scholars may use different questions to tap these dimensions, but most researchers who work with survey data would likely accept these four as being very important for democratic stability.

¹⁷ Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost). The sample design used in this study is explained in detail in the appendix of this study.




Figure I-1. Support for Democracy in Comparative Perspective

We cannot limit our analysis to this single measure, however, since we are not confident that all who profess support for “democracy” actually mean political democracy the way we understand it, and the way Robert Dahl (1971) and others have framed it. Indeed, in the 2006 AmericasBarometer it was found that there is significant variation in the meaning of democracy among respondents and countries (see www.AmericasBarometer.org to download these studies). As a result, it is important to have a broader notion of democracy, and thus three additional dimensions are added, as discussed below.

Support for Core Values on which Democracy Depends

In Robert Dahl’s classic work on democracy (1971), the core values of democracy include the belief in a system that assures citizen rights of 1) *Contestation* and 2) *Inclusiveness*. An recent extensive analysis of all of the major data bases (Freedom House, Polity, Vanhanen, Banks, etc.) that attempt to measure democracy has concluded that they all can be reduced to these two

dimensions (Coppedge, Alvarez and Maldonado forthcoming). In this study, they are measured with a series of items from the AmericasBarometer as follows:

- A. Support for the **Right of Public Contestation (contest)** which is measured as belief in a system of widespread political participation (Seligson and Booth 1993 779). In prior studies by LAPOP the following three items have been found to form a reliable scale.¹⁸

E5. Of people participating in legal demonstration. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 for this scale are shown in the Figure I-2 below. Once again, *majorities in every country support these critical rights*. Even among the countries with the lowest support, the average score on a 0-100 scale is well into the positive range indicating strong majoritarian support for the citizen's right to contestation. In eight countries, this support exceeds an average score of 75 on the 0-100 scale, with no real difference among these countries.

¹⁸ Cronbach alpha coefficients are almost always above .7.




Figure I-2. Support for the Right of Public Contestation in Comparative Perspective

B. Support for Right of Citizen Inclusiveness (support for minority rights, or opposition rights). Democracies can survive only when those in power can lose power. That is, as Przeworski (Przeworski 1991) has stated, “democracy involves the institutionalization of uncertainty.” In effect, this means that political, ethnic and other minorities must enjoy a wide range of civil liberties, for if they do not, such minorities can never become majorities. Consider a country that regularly holds elections, but in those elections opposition groups are barred from running for office, or even making speeches or demonstrating. In that country, there is no chance that those in power could lose power, and therefore this would be a case in which uncertainty is absent. The long reign of the PRI in Mexico meant for most political scientists that Mexico was not a democracy. In order to more fully understand citizen democratic attitudes as Dahl defined them, it is important to know the extent to which citizens tolerate the rights of opposition. The LAPOP scale, used for many years, includes the following four items measuring political tolerance:

D1. There are people who speak negatively of the (national) form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ?
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views?
D3. Still thinking of those who speak poorly of the (national) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I-3. These results, based on the same 0-100 index used throughout this study, show far less support for this key democratic value than the prior two dimensions. Only five countries are above 60, and eight countries are lower than 50, a score which indicates that the mean of the population falls on the intolerant end of the continuum.

It is important to note that the series developed here, like all efforts to measure tolerance, depend in part upon one's position pro/con on the opposition. Consider Paraguay, which has a high score on the political tolerance series. But the survey was taken prior to the recent election in that country, in which the opposition, for the first time in history, captured the presidency. When a different item that measures tolerance toward homosexuals (D5) is used, then Paraguay falls to the country 6th lowest in tolerance.




Figure I-3. Tolerance in Comparative Perspective

Belief in the Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions

Citizens need to believe that democracy is a better political system than are alternatives, and also believe in its core values (dimensions I and II above). In addition, however, countries with a stable democracy will have citizens who believe that the political institutions that effectuate democracy are legitimate. Without trust in institutions, especially liberal democratic ones, citizens have no reason (other than via coercion) to respect and obey the decrees, laws and judicial decisions that emerge from these core institutions. Detailed theoretical and empirical defense of the importance of legitimacy can be found in (Easton 1975; Lipset 1981; Gilley 2006; Booth and Seligson forthcoming; Gilley forthcoming). To measure belief in the political legitimacy of core regime institutions, we use an index¹⁹ based on five items from the AmericasBarometer survey:

¹⁹ This series forms a very reliable scale, with Cronbach Alpha coefficients above .7 in almost all countries.

B14. To what extent do you trust the national government?
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

The results from the AmericasBarometer survey, 2008 are as shown in Figure I-4. These results, once again, show that even though the people of the Americas believe in democracy, many are reluctant to trust its core institutions. In the analysis of this data, it was found that in a number of countries the results were strongly influenced by respondent perception of the incumbent administration. For example, in countries where a president was found to be extremely popular (e.g. Colombia), that popularity spilled over into a positive evaluation of these key institutions. Confounding the problem is that the series includes an item (B14) that measures support for the administration itself, and thus is highly influenced by the popularity of that administration.

There are two basic choices in correcting for the impact of presidential popularity on support for institutions. One would have been to remove item B14 from the series, but then the scale would not represent one of the institutional pillars of the system. The second alternative, controlling the scale by the impact of citizen evaluation of that administration (questionnaire item M1), is the one that was decided upon. Thus, the results in Figure I.4 reflect the legitimacy of the institutions of key political institutions, net of the effect of chief executive performance.

The results show that citizen perception of these key institutions is more often than not on the negative side. Indeed, only Mexico, Guyana, and Belize, just barely have a score above 50 on the 0-100 basis. These results are consistent with the frequently written about “crisis of legitimacy” in Western democracies (Abramson and Finifter 1981; Nye 1997; Hardin 1999; Holmberg 1999; Norris 1999; Otake 2000; Pharr and Putnam 2000a; Dalton 2004; Hetherington 2005; Cleary and Stokes 2006). The sharp contrast between Paraguay’s high level of tolerance for opposition and its extremely low levels of institutional legitimacy highlight the importance of including multiple dimensions of analysis in this study of the impact of governance.




Figure I-4. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

The impact of excluding the measuring trust in the chief executive on this scale is shown in Figure I-5. The average scores remain in the negative end of the continuum, but the ranking of nations shifts somewhat. The U.S. which at the time of the survey had an administration that suffered from very low presidential approval, increases in the rankings with the question on the administration is dropped from the series. Ecuador and Paraguay, however, remain at the bottom.




Figure I-5. Political Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions in Comparative Perspective (absent trust in national government and controlled for approval of chief executive performance)

Social Capital

Just as trust in institutions is important for democracy, so is trust in individuals. Abundant research has found that democracy is more likely to endure in countries that have high levels of social capital, defined in terms of interpersonal trust (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993; Helliwell and Putnam 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). At the same time, interpersonal trust has been found to be associated with factors that relate to the quality of governance in a country, such as the extent of crime and corruption (Herreros and Criado 2008) and performance of local and national governments (Putnam 1993; Lederman, Loayza and Menendez 2002; Seligson 2002b; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; You 2006). These findings relate directly to many of the governance variables we analyze in this report. We use the classic interpersonal trust item:

IT1. Now, talking about the people from around here, would you say that the people are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, little trustworthy or not at all trustworthy.

The results from the AmericasBarometer 2008 are shown in Figure I-6. On the familiar 0-100 scale, all but two countries are in the positive end of the continuum. One, Canada, is the true standout, with trust that averages nearly 80, while the next highest country, Costa Rica, has a level of only 68.1.




Figure I-6. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

Conclusion

This chapter has proposed a framework for the analysis of the 2008 AmericasBarometer data set. It has suggested that support for democracy may be a function of citizen perception of and experience with governance. Attitudes supportive of a democratic regime are not defined here by a single dimension, but four separate dimensions, each of which has been seen by prior research as playing an important role. In the chapters that follow, empirical tests will be made to determine to what extent governance perception and experience influences support for these four dimensions.

PART TWO: GOVERNANCE

Chapter II. Corruption and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical Framework²⁰

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in most regions of the developing world, corruption has surfaced as one of the leading policy issues on the international political agenda as well as in the national agendas of many countries (Schedler, Diamond and Plattner 1999). Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was widespread during the long period of authoritarian rule in Latin America. However, since the media were widely censored and those who reported on corruption placed themselves at serious risk of retribution, the topic was not widely discussed. With the emergence of democracy in almost every country in the region, however, reporting and discussion of corruption has become widespread.

For a number of years, economists took note of the adverse impact on growth and unequal distribution that corruption causes. Corruption diverts public funds into private hands, and often results in less efficient, lower quality performance of public services. It also affects private business and civil society organizations as well. More recently, corruption has been shown to have an adverse effect on democracy, eroding public confidence in the legitimacy of the public sector. There is growing understanding of the corrosive effects of corruption on economic development and how it undermines the consolidation of democratic governance (Doig and McIvor 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Camp, Coleman and Davis 2000; Doig and Theobald 2000; Pharr 2000b; Seligson 2002a; Seligson 2006).

In June, 1997, the Organization of American States approved the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, and in December of that year, the OECD and representatives from emerging democracies signed the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In November 1998 the Council of Europe including Central and Eastern European countries adopted the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Then, in February, 1999, the Global Coalition for Africa adopted “Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries.”

The situation today stands in sharp contrast with that of just a few years ago when corrupt practices drew little attention from the governments of Western democracies, and multinational corporations from many industrialized countries viewed bribes as the norm in the conduct of

²⁰ This theoretical section was prepared by Diana Orcés.

international business. Within this general context, grand and petty corruption flourished in many developing nations.

It is widely understood, as noted in a recent U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) handbook, that specific national anti-corruption strategies must be tailored to fit “the nature of the corruption problem as well as the opportunities and constraints for addressing it.” This same handbook recommends a series of initiatives to address official corruption based on the institutional premise that “corruption arises where public officials have wide authority, little accountability, and perverse incentives.”²¹ Thus, effective initiatives should rely upon “strengthening transparency, oversight, and sanction (to improve accountability); and redesigning terms of employment in public service (to improve incentives).” Institutional reforms should be complemented with societal reforms to “change attitudes and mobilize political will for sustained anti-corruption interventions.”

How Might Corruption Affect Support for Stable Democracy?

Although the empirical relationship between corruption and democracy has only recently begun to be explored, there is already strong evidence that victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country. The first study was carried out by Mitchell Seligson using LAPOP data on only four countries in the region, while additional research showed that the patterns held more broadly (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). A larger, soon to be published study of legitimacy consistently shows that corruption victimization erodes several dimensions of citizen belief in the legitimacy of their political system (Booth and Seligson forthcoming).

In order to effectively deal with the problem of corruption, it is important to be able to measure its nature and magnitude. Is corruption greater in some areas than others? If we do not know this for a fact, then we cannot really say much about variations, its causes or consequences. We have, of course, the frequently cited and often used Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index; however, this index does not purport to get at the *facts* of corruption, but only the *perceptions* of it.²² And while we can hope that in this case perception is linked to reality, as it clearly is in so many other areas, the evidence is so far lacking.

Corruption victimization could influence democracy in other ways. Victims of corruption, for instance, could be less accepting in the belief of the Churchillian notion of democracy. On the other hand, it is far less likely to impact support for public contestation or inclusiveness. It may, however, erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow man/woman.

²¹ USAID. 1999. A Handbook on Fighting Corruption. Washington, DC: Center for Democracy and Governance (www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/usaaid/indexpg.html) February.

²² The TI index is based mainly on perceptions of corruption by non-nationals (i.e., expert evaluations by international businessmen and women. In most cases, at least one survey of national public opinion is used.

The Measurement of Corruption

The AmericasBarometer has developed a series of items to measure corruption victimization. These items were first tested in Nicaragua in 1996 (Seligson 1997; Seligson 1999c) and have been refined and improved in many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture and to avoid ambiguity, we define corrupt practices by asking such questions as: “Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the level of local government, in the public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can determine where corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we can construct overall scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have faced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of crime victimization, we assume that it makes a difference if one has a single experience or multiple experiences with corruption.

The full series of corruption victimization items by the AmericasBarometer, which allows for making comparisons across countries, is as follows:

	N/A Did not have contact	No	Yes
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...			
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe during the past year?		(0)	(1)
EXC6. During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		(0)	(1)
EXC11. During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality or NDC? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	(9)	(0)	(1)
EXC13. Are you currently employed? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: At your workplace, have you had to pay a bribe in the last year?	(9)	(0)	(1)
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?	(9)	(0)	(1)
EXC15. Have you used any public health services during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?	(9)	(0)	(1)

	N/A Did not have contact	No	Yes
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes → ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past year?	(9)	(0)	(1)

This chapter has two objectives: first, to present levels of corruption in Guyana by contrasting measures of victimization with measures of the perception of corruption; and secondly, to determine the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy.

The first part of this chapter analyzes corruption in Guyana measured by citizens' experience with corruption, namely, where are bribes most commonly demanded and how frequently they are demanded. Next, it examines the changes in the index of corruption victimization in Guyana compared to previous years, followed by a comparison of the levels of corruption victimization in Guyana with all of the other countries included in the AmericasBarometer 2008/09 survey by LAPOP. We then analyse corruption victimization by region and explore who in Guyana are most likely to become victims of corruption. Finally, we conclude the first section of this chapter by determining the effects of corruption victimization on citizens' support for stable democracy.

The second part of this chapter follows the same procedure as described above, but here we focus on another variable that measures corruption— the perception of corruption— in order to gain a better understanding of the effects of corruption on stable democracy.

Corruption in Guyana

In this section we explore places and occasions in which citizens of Guyana are more likely to be asked to pay a bribe and how frequently such bribes are demanded. To determine the answer to place and occasion, we analyze the various components of the corruption victimization index created by LAPOP. Similarly, to have a better idea of the frequency of demands for bribes, we examine the *total* index of corruption victimization, allowing us to know if respondents were victims of corruption during the last year as well as how many times they were asked to pay a bribe.

Where are bribes more common?

Figure II-1 shows citizens' experience with corruption in various public and private entities in Guyana for the years of 2006 and 2009. First, we note that corruption victimization has significantly decreased during this period primarily at work places, and the health and education sectors, declining from 16.7 to 2.5 percent, 13.6 to 2.7 percent, and from 13.2 to 3.6 percent, respectively. However, the data also show that corruption victimization by the police in Guyana has increased from 11.8 to 17.6 percent. In addition, we notice that citizens who carry out

transactions at town councils, public entities, and the courts were victimized by corruption more in 2009 compared to 2006; nonetheless, these differences are not statistically significant. Thus, there are at least two ways in which we can interpret these findings. The first is that while corruption seems to have decreased in 2009 in certain sectors, it also seems to have increased in other sectors compared to 2006. Secondly, corruption by the police has worsened, eroding citizens' trust in this institution. Hence, programs aimed at improving the effectiveness of institutions, while presumably having been effective in reducing corruption in some sectors, still need to target other sectors, namely, the police and town councils where the highest corruption victimization is registered.




Figure II-1. Modes of Corruption Victimization in Guyana

How frequently are bribes demanded?

To measure corruption we take into account its various dimensions as well as where it occurs, its pervasiveness, and its severity. To do this, LAPOP created a total index of corruption victimization which shows the percentage of people being victimized by corruption and the number of times that they were asked to pay a bribe. Figure II-2 shows the percentage of people who were victims of corruption in 2009, taking into account the number of times that payment of a bribe was demanded during the last year.

We observe in Figure II-2 that approximately 14 percent of citizens of Guyana have experienced at least one type of corruption victimization. Similarly, almost 9 percent of Guyanese citizens have been victimized by corruption in two or more ways. These results indicate that even though the majority (77.6%) have not had any experience with corruption in the 12 months prior to the survey, nearly one fourth of the population has been victimized, making the reduction of corruption victimization an important policy objective. We continue with the analysis of corruption victimization by year.




Figure II-2. Total Number of Modes of Corruption Victimization

Corruption Victimization in Guyana: 2006 and 2009

Figure II-3 shows the change in the level of corruption victimization in Guyana from 2006, when the previous round of the AmericasBarometer survey took place, to 2009. We notice in Figure II-3 that about 22.4 percent of Guyana's population has been victimized by corruption in the 2009 survey, a few percentage points lower than in 2006. The decrease in the levels of corruption victimization (from 25 to 22%), however, is not statistically significant (that is, the two percentages fall within a range in which there is no real difference between them), suggesting that the same levels remain in Guyana in 2009. We continue with the comparison of the levels of corruption victimization across the Americas in order to see how severe the problem of corruption in Guyana is in relation to other countries included in the AmericasBarometer 2008, a region widely known for its high levels of corruption, comparable to those found in Africa (Freedom House 2008).




Figure II-3. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Year

Corruption in Guyana in comparative perspective

The 2006 AmericasBarometer study showed a higher level of corruption in Guyana compared to other countries in the region. For example, more than 25% of the population in Guyana reported having been victimized by corruption in 2006.²³ Similarly, Guyana ranked very high in 2006 and 2009 in corruption compared to other countries in this study, according to the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International. This index ranges from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and ten representing low levels of perceived corruption. Specifically, Guyana ranked 126 out of 180 countries surveyed in 2009 with a score of 2.6, surpassed in Latin America and the Caribbean only by Haiti, Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Honduras in the perception of corruption. In addition, these data indicate that Guyana has levels of corruption similar to those of African countries, such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda.²⁴

The AmericasBarometer survey allows us to measure and study corruption from the experiences and opinions of citizens. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, in addition to measuring corruption by using a question about perception, LAPOP has also developed a measure concerning victimization, described above, which allows us to have a more realistic view of how corruption affects the daily lives of citizens. The index of corruption victimization by LAPOP was created using the questions EXC1 to EXC16 (shown in the previous section) and takes a value of 1 if the respondent affirms having been a victim of corruption at least one time

²³ See previous studies on Guyana in the official LAPOP webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org

²⁴ See www.transparency.org (page visited on May 6th, 2009).

during the last year. The results by the AmericasBarometer 2008 show that corruption is fairly high in Guyana.




Figure II-4. Corruption Victimization in Comparative Perspective

Figure II-4 shows that Guyana compared to other countries included in the AmericasBarometer has a relatively high percentage of its population being victimized by corruption (22.4%), exceeded only by 7 countries (Jamaica, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Mexico, Bolivia and Haiti) out of the 24 in the sample. At the other extreme, Colombia, Panama, the United States, and Uruguay are the countries in the region with the lowest corruption victimization, indicating percentages lower than 10.²⁵ Therefore, these results coincide with those registered by the Index of Corruption Perception by Transparency International, in which Guyana presents high levels of perception of corruption. However, in contrast to perception of

²⁵ Some of these questions that were asked in Guyana were not asked in Canada and for this reason; Canada is not shown in the Figure.

corruption, Figure II-4 shows citizens' actual experience with it, which certainly is a more direct measure of the levels of corruption within a country. Next, we show how corruption varies by regions in Guyana.

Corruption in Guyana by Regions

Figure II-5 indicates the differences in levels of corruption victimization by region. Specifically, more than 25 percent of Guyanese who live in regions 3 and 4 have been victims of corruption in contrast to only 10.3 percent of the Guyanese who live in regions 1, 7, 8, and 9 as illustrated in Figure II-5. By the same token, a lower percentage of corruption victimization is registered in regions 2 and 5 with 12.5 and 14.3 percent, respectively.





Figure II-5. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Region

Who is More Likely to Become a Victim of Corruption?

In this section we examine the characteristics of citizens of Guyana with a higher probability of becoming victims of corruption. In the previous LAPOP study, it was found that men, those who live in urban areas, younger and wealthier citizens are more likely to be asked to pay a bribe.²⁶ Through the application of a multivariate logistic statistical model, we determine who has a higher probability of being victimized by corruption in Guyana. The dependent variable is the index of corruption victimization by LAPOP, which takes a value of 1 if the respondent mentioned having experienced corruption and 0 if the respondent did not. In this model, we include the following independent variables: ethnicity, education, sex, wealth (measured by

²⁶ For a detailed treatment of corruption across the Americas and the specific case of Guyana, see www.lapopsurveys.org

capital goods ownership), urban/rural area, number of children, and region. The results are shown in Figure II-6.27



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 5
Figure II-6. Predictors of Corruption Victimization in Guyana

Figure II-6 illustrates the effects of individual level characteristics on the probability of being asked for a bribe.²⁸ Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each variable on experience with corruption victimization is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the “0” line a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot that do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant. The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients. For instance, we observe in Figure II-6 that individuals who are wealthier and who live in regions 3 and 4 are more likely to be asked to pay bribes. On the other hand, females and older individuals are less likely to become victims of corruption. We will continue with the examination of each of the variables that have an impact on corruption victimization in Guyana.

²⁷ The Appendix at the end of this chapter shows full results for the multivariate logistic regression.

²⁸ While Region 5, Indian and male are not displayed in the figure, they are accounted for. Being dummy variables, these three categories are referred to as “reference categories” meaning that all other categories of that variable are compared in relation to the reference.




Figure II-7. Percentage of Corruption Victimization by Age, Wealth, Sex and Ethnic Self-identification

Figure II-7 shows that more than 50 percent of Guyanese who were victimized by corruption in the past year are between the ages of 26 and 45 years old. On the other hand, only around 21.2 and 22.4 percent of Guyanese between 16 and 25 years old and individuals older than fifty years old respectively, were victims of corruption. In addition, Figure II-7 demonstrates that corruption victimization is higher among the wealthy. All these findings corroborate with those of previous studies carried out by LAPOP.

The results of the analysis also show that women are significantly less likely to have been victims of corruption compared to men. Figure II-7 shows that 28.4 percent of men were victims of corruption in the last year, compared with 16.4 percent of women were victims during the same period. Female respondents may be housewives on a fixed allowance, thus, opening the possibility that they refuse to pay bribes because it would reduce their “income” that must go toward meeting their household food needs. It may also reflect the fact that women are less likely to be the ones paying the bills or having other public transactions and as a result are less likely to be exposed to instances of corruption victimization (Seligson 2007). However, one should interpret these findings with caution as more women have been entering the workforce in recent years.

Additionally, Figure II-7 illustrates the impact of ethnicity on corruption victimization. It is noteworthy that none of the ethnicity variables became significant in the regression. However,

once the reference group is changed to mixed, we observe statistical significant results. As it is well documented that ethnicity plays an important role in the lives of the Guyanese, we decided to illustrate the impact of ethnicity on corruption victimization. For instance, mixed individuals reveal a significantly higher percentage of corruption victimization (28, 6%) during the last year compared to 23.6, 19.9, and 11.1 percent of Indo, Afro, and Amerindo Guyanese, respectively, who were victimized by corruption during the same period.

The Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for Stable Democracy

In order to assess the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy, we apply a multivariate regression model for each of the components of support for stable democracy included in this study. In other words, we estimated a multivariate statistical model to determine the impact of corruption victimization on support for the idea of democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions, and interpersonal trust.²⁹ There is strong evidence that victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions of their country (Seligson 2002b; Seligson 2006). Corruption victimization could also influence democracy in other ways. For instance, victims' belief in the Churchillian notion of democracy could diminish. Similarly, corruption may erode social capital, making victims of corruption less trusting in their fellow citizens. However, it is less likely that corruption victimization has an effect on support for public contestation or inclusiveness.

²⁹ The Appendix at the end of this chapter shows full results for each of the multivariate regressions employed in this section.




Figure II-8. The Impact of Corruption Victimization on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions

In the current section of this chapter we find that corruption victimization has a significant statistical impact only on the legitimacy of core political institutions as shown in Figure II-8. More specifically, Guyanese who have had multiple experiences with corruption during the last year show lower support for their political institutions.³⁰ It is noteworthy that the results of the multivariate regression reveal a statistically significant negative effect of corruption victimization at the accepted level of $p < 0.05$.

Perception of Corruption

The second section of this chapter analyzes corruption in Guyana measured by citizens' perception of corruption. First, it examines the changes in the perception of corruption from 2006 to 2009, followed by a comparison of the levels of perception of corruption in Guyana with the rest of the countries included in the AmericasBarometer 2008 survey by LAPOP. Next, we continue with the analysis of the perception of corruption by region and we explore which Guyanese tend to perceive higher levels of corruption. Finally, we conclude this chapter by determining the impact of the perception of corruption on citizens' support for a stable

³⁰ A more complete display and discussion of the items that make up the index of Support for the Legitimacy of Core Regime Institutions is found in Chapter I of this study.

democracy. The AmericasBarometer 2008 employed the following question to measure citizens' perception of corruption:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is **[Read]** (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon?

Perception of Corruption in Guyana: 2006 and 2009




Figure II-9. Changes in Perception of Corruption in Guyana by Year

Figure II-9 shows that there has been a decline in the levels of the perception of corruption in Guyana during the past three years, dropping from 78.1 to 72.2 points on a scale from 0 to 100. However, these levels remain high compared to other countries in the sample, as observed in the following section.

Figure II-10 shows that Guyanese citizens, compared to citizens in other countries included in the sample perceive high levels of corruption (72.2). Countries in the region that reveal higher levels of corruption perception and are statistically different from Guyana are Ecuador, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, Argentina, and Jamaica, ranging anywhere from 76.6 to 85.6 average points on a scale from 0 to 100. The country showing the lowest perception of corruption in the sample is Haiti with an average even lower than Canada of 50.4 points.

In short, when we compare these results with those of corruption victimization, we conclude that both measures of corruption indicate that corruption in Guyana is a problem and needs to be addressed if the country is to make measurable socio-economic progress in the short to medium term. We continue with a comparison of the perception of corruption in Guyana by regions.




Figure II-10. Perception of Corruption in Comparative Perspective

Figure II-11 shows that perceptions of corruption do not vary significantly across regions. The only difference observed is between Regions 10 and 2, where perception of corruption is much higher in Region 10 with 78 points on a scale from 0 to 100 compared to 62.1 points. The rest of the regions in Guyana reveal similar levels of the perception of corruption.

Strong evidence indicates that high levels of corruption lead to deficiencies in the delivery of public services and undermine the overall effectiveness of the systems of governance and rule

of law (Seligson 2006). Thus, it is important that public policy be designed to fight corruption, especially in countries where corruption is far more common as in the specific case of Guyana.




Figure II-11. Average of Perception of Corruption by Region

The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for Stable Democracy

In this section we focus on the analysis of the impact of the perception of corruption on support for stable democracy. More specifically, we apply various multivariate regressions for each of the components of support for stable democracy included in this study: support for the idea of democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions, and interpersonal trust, as we did in the previous section with corruption victimization.³¹

³¹ The Appendix at the end of this chapter shows full results for each of the multivariate regressions employed in this section.




Figure II-12. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on the Political Legitimacy of Institutions

We find that perception of corruption has a significant statistical impact on the legitimacy of core political institutions and support for the right of public contestation. Figure II-12 indicates that as Guyanese perceived levels of corruption among public officials increase, their support for the legitimacy of core political institutions diminishes.³² It is worth noting that the results of the multivariate regression reveal a statistically significant negative effect of perception of corruption at the accepted levels of $p < 0.05$. These results echo those shown in the previous section in which higher levels of corruption victimization have a negative effect on the support for the legitimacy of core political institutions as well. This suggests that corruption in Guyana, measured by both experience and perception, has a detrimental effect on how the Guyanese view their political institutions.

An interesting finding, however, is that citizens' perception of high levels of corruption among public officials translates into higher support for the right of public contestation; that is to say, these individuals reveal higher support for citizens' participation in legal activities to protest and to solve problems. These results make sense as Guyanese who perceive high levels of corruption also support people's right to make demands to the government, perhaps as a way to solve the problem of corruption in the country.

³² A more extensive display and discussion of the items that make up the indices of Support for the Legitimacy of Core Political and Support for the Right of Public Contestation is found in Chapter I of this study.




Figure II-13. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for the Right of Public Contestation

Figure II-13 shows that Guyanese who perceive higher levels of corruption among public officials also tend to display higher support for the right for public contestation with levels of this support ranging anywhere from 66 to 76 points on a scale from 0 to 100. Still, we notice a slight decrease in this support. These results reveal a statistically significant positive effect of perception of corruption at the accepted levels of $p < 0.05$.

Conclusion

The analysis of the data from the AmericasBarometer survey by LAPOP in 2009 confirms that corruption remains relatively high in Guyana compared to other countries in the region. In addition, even though we register a decrease in the levels of corruption victimization from 2006 to 2009 in Guyana, these differences are statistically insignificant. The only significant decrease during this period is citizens' perception of corruption (i.e., from 78 to 72 points). Additionally, we find that despite various instances of corruption—be they in the private or public sectors—having decreased in 2009 compared to 2006 (e.g., the work place, health or educational sectors), corruption has increased remarkably in other sectors such as the police. Thus, anti-corruption programs in Guyana must also target these areas given that high levels of corruption may erode citizens' trust in the related institutions.

Furthermore, the statistical analyses of the determinants of corruption victimization in Guyana in 2009 indicate that individuals who are younger, male, and wealthy have a higher probability of becoming victims of corruption. By the same token, Guyanese who live in certain

regions of the country, such as regions 3 and 4 in comparison to region 2 are more likely to be victims of corruption.

Finally, to determine the impact of corruption on support for stable democracy, the results in this chapter suggest that corruption, measured by victimization and perception, has a negative impact on support for the legitimacy of core political institutions, rendering support to the idea that corruption erodes institutional legitimacy (Seligson 2002). Moreover, we find that citizens' perception of corruption translates into higher support for the right of public contestation, perhaps as a direct response to the high levels of corruption in the country, suggesting that people may be more supportive of making demands to the government for change. In short, we conclude that corruption has a negative impact on the prospects of democratic stability in Guyana because it negatively affects citizens' support for institutional legitimacy. Without this support, democracy may be at risk.

APPENDIX CHAPTER II.

Appendix II-1. Predictors of Corruption Victimization

Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Regions 1,7,8,9 ^a	-0.073	(-0.69)
Region 10	0.175	(1.74)
Region 6	0.122	(1.65)
Region 4	0.402*	(3.64)
Region 3	0.286*	(3.70)
Region 2	-0.035	(-0.43)
Rural	0.067	(0.87)
Mixed ^a	0.077	(0.98)
Amerindian	-0.061	(-0.64)
Black	-0.140	(-1.77)
Female	-0.382*	(-6.52)
Age	-0.263*	(-4.27)
Number of Children	0.126	(1.99)
Education	0.043	(0.70)
Wealth	0.181*	(2.31)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.077	(1.19)
Constant	-1.505*	(-24.17)
F = 11.33		
Number of Obs. = 2364		
p<0.05		
a Reference groups: Region 5 and Indian		

Appendix II-2. The Impact of Corruption Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy

	Support for Democracy		Support for the Right Public Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Interpersonal Trust	
Independent Variables	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.
Number of Ways Victimized in Past Year by Corruption	0.034	(1.26)	0.510	(0.61)	0.561	(0.92)	-4.345*	(0.79)	-2.118	(1.13)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.078*	(0.04)	-0.016	(0.02)	-0.083*	(0.03)				
Political Interest	-0.008	(0.02)	0.046*	(0.02)	0.046*	(0.02)	0.076*	(0.02)		
Education	0.241	(0.22)	0.302	(0.19)	0.214	(0.19)	-0.739*	(0.21)	0.036	(0.20)
Female	-2.265	(1.44)	-2.208*	(0.91)	-2.421*	(1.03)	-0.099	(1.00)	-1.853	(1.03)
Age	0.370	(0.21)	0.169	(0.17)	0.288	(0.18)	-0.619*	(0.19)	0.214	(0.19)
Age squared	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.006*	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)
Wealth	0.161	(0.40)	0.291	(0.31)	0.748*	(0.37)	0.109	(0.30)	0.153	(0.32)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.422	(0.82)	-0.832*	(0.39)	-1.207*	(0.58)	3.266*	(0.62)	1.889*	(0.58)
size of city/town	-0.400	(0.69)	-1.830*	(0.49)	-1.605*	(0.74)	4.033*	(0.50)	2.094*	(0.57)
Constant	59.061*	(6.79)	72.187*	(4.76)	60.633*	(7.19)	47.278*	(5.30)	41.396*	(5.01)
R-Squared	0.009		0.046		0.047		0.133		0.033	
N. of cases	2103		2308		2260		2297		2323	
* p<0.05										

Appendix II-3. The Impact of the Perception of Corruption on Support for a Stable Democracy

	Support for Democracy		Support for the Right Public Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Interpersonal Trust	
Independent Variables	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.
Perception of Corruption	0.019	(0.03)	0.050*	(0.02)	0.073*	(0.02)	-0.132*	(0.02)	-0.002	(0.03)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.073*	(0.03)	-0.019	(0.02)	-0.081*	(0.02)				
Political Interest	-0.014	(0.03)	0.043*	(0.02)	0.037	(0.02)	0.078*	(0.02)		
Education	0.275	(0.22)	0.294	(0.20)	0.160	(0.19)	-0.642*	(0.21)	-0.004	(0.20)
Female	-2.017	(1.44)	-2.166*	(0.94)	-2.271*	(0.99)	0.598	(1.07)	-1.230	(1.00)
Age	0.245	(0.20)	0.061	(0.17)	0.202	(0.18)	-0.671*	(0.19)	0.089	(0.18)
Age squared	-0.003	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)
Wealth	0.162	(0.40)	0.200	(0.31)	0.594	(0.37)	0.064	(0.31)	0.069	(0.33)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	-0.382	(0.79)	-0.670	(0.41)	-1.093	(0.58)	3.290*	(0.64)	1.870*	(0.61)
size of city/town	-0.397	(0.69)	-1.704*	(0.49)	-1.406	(0.77)	3.984*	(0.50)	2.203*	(0.59)
Constant	60.320*	(6.76)	70.639*	(5.17)	57.234*	(7.62)	54.498*	(5.84)	43.257*	(5.48)
R-Squared	0.008		0.050		0.050		0.143		0.031	
N. of Cases	2050		2233		2190		2226		2232	
* p<0.05										

Chapter III. Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

Theoretical Framework

Crime is a serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. The least violent of the countries in Latin America have officially reported murder rates that are double the U.S. rate, which itself is more than double the rate in Canada, while many countries in the region have rates that are ten and even more than twenty times the U.S. rates. The contrast with European and Japanese murder rates, which hover around 1-2 per 100,000, is even starker.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to measure crime with accuracy. The most extensive report to date on crime in the Americas with a focus on the Caribbean (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 4), states:

In general, crime data are extremely problematic, and the Caribbean region provides an excellent case study of just how deceptive they can be. The best source of information on crime comes from household surveys, such as the standardized crime surveys conducted under the aegis of the International Crime Victims Surveys (ICVS). Unfortunately, only one country in the Caribbean has participated in the ICVS: Barbados. Information from other survey sources can be interesting, but rarely approaches the degree of precision needed for sound analysis of the crime situation.

The UN/World Bank report also states that official crime figures that are gathered and published by governments are based on police data, which in turn are based on cases that the public report to police. As prior LAPOP studies have shown, among respondents who say they have been victimized by crime, half or more, depending on the country; do not report the crime to the authorities. Moreover, the UN/World Bank study indicates that the official data may actually show higher crime rates in countries where crime is lower, and lower crime rates in countries in which the true crime rate is higher. This is so because “Making comparisons across jurisdictions is even more complicated, because the precise rate of under-reporting varies between countries, and countries where the criminal justice system enjoys a good deal of public confidence tend to have higher rates of reporting. On the other hand... it is precisely in the most crime ridden-areas that reporting rates are the lowest” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 5). The problem is not resolved by using other official statistics, such as reports from the ministry of health, since their records often

times only cover public hospitals, and, moreover, deal only with violent crimes that require hospitalization or end in death. Moreover, underreporting of certain crimes, such as rape and family violence, make it difficult to know what to make of reports of these types of crime.

A further problem with crime data is the variation in what is and is not considered to be crime. One noteworthy example of this situation occurs in Guatemala, where people who die in automobile accidents have been counted among homicides; in most other countries this is not the case. In the U.S. since vehicular deaths far exceed deaths by murder, the homicide rate would skyrocket if those who died in car accidents were to be included. Furthermore, in some countries attempted murder is included in the murder rates.

The result is major confusion among sources as to the real rates of crime and violence. The UN/World Bank report cited above makes the following statement: “According to WHO data Jamaica has one of the lowest rates of intentional violence in the world. According to the police statistics, however, the homicide rate was 56 per 100,000 residents in 2005—one of the highest rates in the world...” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007 8).

In the present study, we rely upon household survey data, which, as noted above by the UN/World Bank study, is the most reliable type of data with which to measure crime. Even so, survey data confront serious limitations for several reasons. First, murder victims obviously cannot be interviewed, and hence direct reporting on the most violent form of crime is impossible with surveys. Second, the use of family member reports of murder or crime is well known to lead to inflated crime statistics in part because it is often no more than hearsay data given that the definition of “family” varies from one individual to another (from immediate to extended), and because there is double counting as extended family members in a given sample cluster all report on the same crime. Third, the efficacy of emergency medicine (EMS) in a given location can determine if an assault ends up in a homicide or an injury. In places where EMS systems are highly advanced, shooting and other assault victims can be saved, whereas in areas where such services are limited, death rates from such injuries are high. Thus, more developed regions seem to have lower homicide rates than they would, absent high quality EMS, while less developed regions likely have higher homicide rates than they would if they had better EMS.

A final complicating factor in using national estimates of crime is the variation of concentration or dispersion of crime. In the 1970s in the U.S., for example, urban crime levels rose sharply because of gangs and drugs. Suburban and rural U.S. did not suffer the increases found in many large cities. The *national average*, however, was heavily influenced by the weight of urban areas in the national population, and as the country urbanized, city crime became increasingly more influential in determining national crime statistics. In LAPOP surveys of Latin America, the same phenomenon has emerged in a number of countries. In El Salvador, for example, crime rates reported in our surveys of San Salvador are sharply higher than in the rest of the country. The same phenomenon is also observed regarding corruption; in nearly all countries, reported corruption rates are higher in urban as opposed to rural areas.

For all these reasons, LAPOP has decided to focus considerable resources for its next round of surveys in attempting to develop a more accurate means of measuring crime. Future studies will report on those results. In the 2008 round, the focus is on the impact of crime, not its comparative magnitude. In a number of countries, whatever the inaccuracy of crime reporting, those who report being victims of crime or who express fear of crime, have significantly different attitudes toward democracy from those who have not been victims or who express little fear.

It is said that there are no victimless crimes; thus, we tend to consider the impact on the individual victims or their immediate families. Economists see wider impacts and point toward lost productivity and lost state revenue, while sociologists focus on the impact of crime on the “social fabric.” Political scientists, however, have written far less about crime, and when they do, they often focus on issues narrowly related to the criminal justice system itself. Those perspectives arise from studying crime in wealthy, advanced industrial societies, where, even at the peak of a crime wave, levels of violent crime do not come close to those found in many Latin American countries. At the height of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the United States in the 1980s, murder rates did not exceed 10 per 100,000, whereas in Honduras the officially reported rate has been four times this rate for a number of years; moreover, in some regions such as the area around the industrial city of San Pedro Sula, rates of over 100 per 100,000 have become the norm (Leyva 2001).

Homicide rates usually are considered to be the most reliable indicator of crime, since few murders go unreported.³³ According to an extensive study by the World Bank of homicide rates for 1970-1994, the world average was 6.8 per 100,000 (Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Loayza 1998). The homicide rate in Latin America is estimated at 30 murders per 100,000 per year, whereas it stands at about 5.5 in the United States and about 2.0 in the United Kingdom, Spain, and Switzerland. The Pan American Health Organization, which reports a lower average for Latin America as a whole of 20 per 100,000 people,³⁴ says that “violence is one of the main causes of death in the Hemisphere. . . . In some countries, violence is the main cause of death and in others it is the leading cause of injuries and disability.”³⁵ In the region there are 140,000 reported homicides each year.³⁶ According to this and other indicators, violence in Latin America is five times higher than in most other places in the world (Gaviria and Pagés 1999). Moreover,

³³In South Africa, however, during apartheid, this was not the case among the nonwhite population, where murders were frequently overlooked.

³⁴According to the United Nations Global Report on Crime, health statistics as a basis for measuring homicide significantly under-report the total homicide level. Health statistics data are based on the classification of deaths made by physicians rather than by the police. According to the UN comparison, health-based homicide rates average about half those of Interpol or UN statistics. See United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice*, ed. Graeme Newman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 12-13.

³⁵Pan American Health Organization press release, July 17, 1997 (www.paho.org/english/DPI/rl970717.htm).

³⁶Nevertheless, not all of the countries in this region face the same magnitude and type of violence. In the nineties, Colombia, faced with epidemic problems of drug trafficking and guerrilla violence, had one of the highest homicide rates anywhere – around 90 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, Chile, despite a history of political conflict, displayed homicide rates no greater than 5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. See Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS), “Actitudes y normas culturales sobre la violencia en ciudades seleccionadas de la región de las Américas. Proyecto ACTIVA” (Washington, D.C.: Division of Health and Human Development, 1996; mimeographed).

according to Gaviria and Pagés, homicide rates are not only consistently higher in Latin America, but also the gap with the rest of the world is growing larger. Consistent with the above data, using 1970-1994 data from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, Fajnzylber et al. found that Latin America and the Caribbean have the highest homicide rates, followed by sub-Saharan African countries.³⁷

In the Latin American context of extremely high crime, political scientists and policy makers alike need to ask whether crime, and the associated fear of crime, is a threat to the durability of democracy in Latin America (Seligson and Azpuru 2001). Some social scientists have begun to pay attention to the issue of crime as a political problem. Michael Shifter asserts that, partially because of more open political systems, the problems of crime, drugs, and corruption are beginning to find a place on the political agenda of the Latin American region (Shifter and Jawahar 2005). In spite of the successes of democracy in the region in achieving relative economic stability, in sharply reducing political violence, and in expanding the arena for political participation and civil liberties, Shifter argues that democracy has not been capable of dealing effectively with other problems that citizens care a great deal about, especially crime. In short, crime is seen as an outcome of a serious failure of governance in the region. To explore this question, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey data.

The main objective of this chapter is to examine the levels of crime victimization and perception of insecurity in Guyana in order to determine their impact on support for a stable democracy.

How Might Crime Victimization Affect Support for Stable Democracy?

It is easy to see how crime victimization and fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if its citizens are subject to crime or fear crime. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens, thus eroding social capital if they have been victims or fear crime. Fear of crime could make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation. Finally, crime victimization and the fear of crime could drive citizens to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police, but also the judiciary. What is less clear is whether it is crime itself or the fear of crime that carries the most import. Even in countries with high murder rates, the chance of an individual being murdered or even the victim of a serious crime is still quite low. Therefore, the impact of victimization might not be as great as fear of crime, which is a feeling that can be held by a far greater portion of the population than the number of victims themselves. Citizens hear about crime from their neighbours, read about it in

³⁷The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that were included in this calculation are Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bahamas, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Barbados, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, Suriname, Honduras, Antigua, Dominica, Belize, Panama, Guyana, Cuba, and El Salvador.

the newspapers, and are often inundated with often macabre images of crime on TV. In the sections below, we examine the impact of crime on our five dimensions of support for stable democracy.

How do we measure crime?

The first section of this chapter concentrates on the analysis of the following variable:

VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No

This chapter begins with an examination of the changes in crime victimization in Guyana during the last three years, followed by a comparative analysis of most of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the U.S. and Canada, in order to assess Guyana's ranking on crime victimization in relation to the other countries in the sample. Next, we continue with the analysis of crime victimization by region and explore who in Guyana have a higher probability of becoming victims of crime. Finally, this section concludes with a statistical analysis of the impact of crime on support for stable democracy. The same procedure is applied to the perception of crime in the second section of this chapter.

Crime Victimization in Guyana

Crime Victimization in Guyana, 2006 and 2009

We observe in Figure III-1 that crime victimization in Guyana has decreased from 11 to 8.7 percent over the past three years. Yet these differences are not statistically significant. In short, while there does seem to be some decline in crime victimization, the drop is not large enough for us to be completely confident that crime has actually declined in Guyana.




Figure III-1. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime in Guyana: 2006 and 2009

Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective

The prior LAPOP study found that Guyana has relatively low levels of crime victimization in comparison to other countries in the region.³⁸ Likewise, Figure III-2 shows that in Guyana in 2009, crime victimization remains low with 8.7% of its population being victimized, slightly higher but not significantly different, statistically speaking, than that of Panama (8.4%) and Jamaica (8.3%).

³⁸ For more information about crime in the Americas, see www.lapopsurveys.org




Figure III-2. Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective

These relatively low levels of crime victimization in Guyana may indicate that efforts to reduce crime have taken effect following the escalation of serious crimes in 2002, according to the LAPOP report of Guyana 2007 (Seligson 2007). This same report argues that the levels of crime are accompanied by slow and often insufficient follow up by the Police Force as many cases go un-reported, in particular those related to petty crime and domestic violence. Some of the results reported here may seem inconsistent with the conventional image of countries having high crime rates vs. those that have lower rates. One explanation for these somewhat unexpected results is that in countries where violence is more prevalent, such as in Colombia, where higher levels of homicide are much more common, citizens in these countries may report fewer crimes related to robbery, thefts, minor assaults, etc, as these types of offenses may not be perceived as worthy of reporting, given the high homicide rate. The AmericasBarometer survey does not record homicides since we are interviewing living persons. Likewise, citizens in countries where homicides are far less common (e.g., Argentina), individuals may be more prone to report any

type of crime, even minor ones, explaining the higher percentage of reported crime victimization in that country. LAPOP continues to study this issue of crime victimization and how it is reported by respondents.

Crime Victimization by Region




Figure III-3. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime by Region in Guyana

Crime victimization varies sharply by region in Guyana. For instance, we notice in Figure III-3 that Guyanese who live in Regions 3 and 4 are by far more likely to be victims of crime with 10.7 and 13.4 percent of its population being victimized, respectively. On the other hand, individuals who live in Regions 2, 5, and 6 are significantly less likely to become victims of crime with only 3 to 4 percent of its population reporting having had an experience with some type of crime. The seemingly high level in Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9 may be largely due to the “Bartica massacre” in Region 7 in February 2008.

In order to have a better understanding of the impact of crime on democracy in Guyana, we first examine those Guyanese citizens who are more likely to become victims of crime and then analyze the impact of crime victimization on each of the components of stable democracy: support for the idea of democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions, and interpersonal trust.

Who are those more likely to become victims of crime?

To determine who is more likely to become a victim of crime, we estimate a multivariate statistical model, more specifically, a logistic regression in which the dependent variable is crime victimization. In this case the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the person responds affirmatively to having been a victim of crime during the last year, and a 0, if the individual did not have any experience with it. In this model we incorporate the following independent variables: education, sex, age, wealth (measured by the LAPOP index of household capital goods ownership), urban/rural area, and region.

According to the Freedom House Report (2008), racial polarization has eroded law enforcement in Guyana. This has resulted in perceptions about who is a victim, perpetrator and protector, based on ethnicity. For instance, many citizens who identify themselves as Indians claim to have been victimized by Afro-Guyanese criminals and at the same time, they claim not to have been protected by the police force which is predominantly staffed by Afro-Guyanese. By the same token, many Afro-Guyanese claim that the police are manipulated by the government, which is seen as being dominated by Indo-Guyanese. This hostility between Afro- and Indo-Guyanese has been a long standing concern in Guyana, as evidenced by the Racial Hostility Bill amended in September 2002, which increased the penalties for race-based crimes (Freedom House 2008). According to the LAPOP survey, the racial make up in Guyana is as follows: citizens who identify themselves as Indian represent 38 percent of the sample as a whole, whereas Blacks, mixed, and Amerindians represent 32, 21, and 9 percent, respectively. Figure III-4 below presents the ethnic makeup of the 2009 AmericasBarometer Survey in graphic form. To be able to capture this self-defined ethnic diversity our analysis includes a variable (technically, a “dummy variable”) for each category of ethnic self-identification registered in the 2009 Guyana survey by LAPOP. The results for the multivariate logistic regression model are shown in Figure III-5.³⁹

³⁹ Full results of the logistic regression model are found in Table 1 in the Appendix.





Figure III-4. Distribution of 2009 AmericasBarometer Guyanese Sample by Ethnic Self-Identification



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 5

Figure III-5. Probability of Being Victimized by Crime in Guyana

Figure III-5 illustrates the effects of individual level characteristics on the probability of being victimized by crime.⁴⁰ Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each variable on crime victimization shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left of the “0” line a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, they are shown by confidence interval lines stretching to the left and right of each dot that do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the effects are statistically insignificant. The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients.

We observe in Figure III-5 that contrary to our expectations, none of the variables for self-defined ethnicity are statistically significant. In fact, crime victimization varies significantly only by region and urban/rural area. Individuals who live in Regions 3 and 4 are more likely to become victims of crime compared to those who live in Region 5. On the other hand, those who live in rural areas are less likely to become victims of crime. These results make sense as it is well known that larger cities and more urbanized areas experience by far more instances of crime, as illustrated in Figure III- 6. Specifically, Figure III-6 shows that more than 10 percent of Guyanese who live in urban areas are victimized by crime compared to less than 8 percent of Guyanese who live in rural areas. The remaining variables did not reach statistical significance.




Figure III-6. Percentage of Population Victimized by Crime by Urban/Rural Area

⁴⁰ While Region 5, Indian and male are not displayed in the figure, they are accounted for. Being dummy variables, these three categories are referred to as “reference categories” meaning that all other categories of that variable are compared in relation to the reference.

The Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy

In this section of the chapter we focus on the analysis of the impact of crime victimization on support for stable democracy. To accomplish this objective, we estimate various statistical models for each of the components of support for stable democracy. Specifically, we are able to determine the impact of crime on support for democracy, support for the right of public contestation, political tolerance, belief in the legitimacy of political institutions, and interpersonal trust.⁴¹

The Impact of Crime Victimization

Our analysis finds that the only significant impact that crime victimization has on support for stable democracy is on interpersonal trust. None of the other components of support for stable democracy analyzed in this study indicate that crime significantly influences support for democracy. We conclude, therefore, that the impact of crime victimization on support for stable democracy in the Guyanese case is not as acute as previously thought and that there may be other variables that have a greater impact such as corruption, which is analyzed in the previous chapter. We now illustrate the relationship between interpersonal trust and crime victimization.




Figure III-7. The Impact of Crime Victimization on Interpersonal Trust

⁴¹ To see the full results of the statistical regressions, see Table 3 and 4 in the Appendix of this chapter.

Figure III-7 reveals that citizens of Guyana who have experienced crime show lower levels of interpersonal trust than those who have not been victimized, showing an average of 54.4 points compared to 60.7 points on a scale from 0 to 100. These results suggest that when someone is a victim of crime, this individual will lose confidence in others, and since interpersonal trust has long been shown to be an important element in stable democracy, crime does have a negative impact on democracy. We continue with the analysis of another measure of crime: perception of insecurity to determine if beyond crime itself, if the fear of crime has an important impact on democracy.

Perception of Insecurity in Guyana

This section of the current chapter examines the changes in the fear of crime in Guyana over the past three years, followed by a comparative analysis of how Guyana ranks in the perception of crime related to other countries included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey by LAPOP. Next, we continue with the analysis of fear of crime by region while exploring who in Guyana tend to perceive higher levels of insecurity. Finally, this chapter concludes with a statistical analysis of the impact of fear of crime on support for stable democracy.

How do we measure perception of insecurity?

The following variable measures the perception of insecurity.

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and, thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?

Perception of Insecurity in Guyana, 2006 and 2009

Figure III-8 shows that the average fear of crime or perception of insecurity in Guyana has decreased from 40.7 to 36.2 points on a scale from 0 to 100, making these differences statistically significant. These results suggest that efforts to address crime in Guyana have impacted citizen perception of insecurity.




Figure III-8. Average Perception of Insecurity in Guyana: 2006 and 2009

Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective

As we observed in the previous section, Figure III-9 shows that Guyana is also located among the countries with the lowest levels of perception of insecurity with an average of 36.2 points on a scale from 0 to 100, only a few points higher and statistically different from Jamaica, the United States, and Canada. Specifically, Jamaica shows an average perception of 31.3 points, while Canada and the United States have an average of 20.8 and 23.3 points, respectively. These results make sense as, for example in Jamaica, the country that shows the lowest crime victimization in the sample (8.3%), we would have expected low levels of fear of crime as well, which is indeed the case.




Figure III-9. Perception of Insecurity in Comparative Perspective

Perception of Insecurity by Region

Figure III-10 shows that the perception of insecurity also varies by region. These differences are not as sharp, however as those found for corruption victimization. Specifically, the majority of the regions have an average level of perceived insecurity of more than 35 points on a scale from 0 to a 100. Region 2 reveals the highest levels of fear of crime with 39.7 points compared to Region 5, showing the lowest levels of perceptions of insecurity (28.4 points).





Figure III-10. Average of Perception of Insecurity by Region

Who are those who tend to perceive more insecurity?

Now, we continue with the analysis of those Guyanese who express higher levels of fear of crime or perception of insecurity. Since the dependent variable is continuous, the statistical model employed in this section of this chapter is a multivariate linear regression model, taking higher values when the perception of insecurity of the Guyanese increases. In this model we include the same independent variables incorporated in the previous model related to crime victimization (e.g., education, sex, age, wealth, ethnicity, urban/rural area, and region). The results of this model are shown in Figure III-11.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 5
Figure III-11. Guyanese Citizens Who Tend to Perceive More Insecurity

Specifically, we note in Figure III-11 that older individuals and those who live in rural areas have a lower tendency to perceive insecurity compared to younger individuals and those who live in urban areas, when we observe that their confidence intervals stretching to the left do not overlap the vertical “0” line, demonstrating a statistically significant negative effect. In contrast, females and those who live in Regions 2 and 6 show a higher perception of insecurity, illustrated by their confidence intervals stretching to the right and not overlapping the vertical “0” line. The rest of the variables do not yield statistically significant results. In the following section we explore these relationships.⁴²

Figure III-12 illustrates more clearly the relationships between sex, age and the perception of insecurity. Males show an average of fear of crime of 34.6 points on the 0 to 100 scale, while females show an average of 37.8 points on the same scale, a relatively high figure. Similarly, the older the individual, the less they tend to perceive insecurity. There is a minor increase of perception of insecurity among individuals between ages 46-56, but these levels fall among individuals over age 56. We attribute this finding to the fact that younger people are more likely to be “out on the streets,” especially at night, increasing their perceived chances of becoming victims of crimes and thus increasing their perceived levels of insecurity.

⁴² To see the full results of this multivariate linear regression model, refer to Table 2 in the Appendix.




Figure III-12. Average Perception of Insecurity by Sex and Age




Figure III-13. Average Perception of Insecurity by Urban and Rural Areas

In the same fashion, Figure III-13 reveals the average perception of insecurity by rural vs. urban areas. Guyanese who live in rural areas show an average fear of crime (33.9 points) significantly lower than those who live in urban areas (40.9 points). As we expected, perceived

insecurity is much higher in urban areas: the bigger the city the more elevated the fear of crime. Clearly, these results echo the usual high levels of crime that occur in urbanized areas.

The Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for a Stable Democracy

It is not difficult to see how fear of crime might have an impact on citizen support for democracy. Belief in democracy as the best system could decline if citizens consistently perceive high levels of insecurity, making them more likely to lose faith in their political institutions, especially the police and the judiciary. Citizens might also become less tolerant of others and/or lose faith in their fellow citizens. Finally, the perception of insecurity could also make citizens less willing to support the right to public contestation.

In this section of this chapter we find that the perception of insecurity seems to have a greater impact on support for a stable democracy than actual experience with crime does. Fear of crime has a statistically negative effect on support for democracy, interpersonal trust, and the belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions. An important reason for this difference is that crime victims in any given year are a small minority of the population, whereas fear can be pervasive and affect many.




Figure III-14. The Impact of the Perception of Insecurity on Support for Democracy and Interpersonal Trust

We observe in Figure III-14 that the relationships between perception of insecurity and support for the idea of democracy and interpersonal trust are negative. In the specific case of support for democracy, as people feel more insecure, they express lower levels of support for the idea of democracy. In particular, going from feeling very safe to very unsafe diminishes support for the idea of democracy by around 6 points on a scale from 0 to 100. Similarly, we note in Figure III-14 that the same happens for interpersonal trust. Guyanese who feel very unsafe show significantly lower levels of interpersonal trust than those who feel very safe. These results are not surprising since people who feel that they are in constant danger may turn those feelings against others and the political system itself. Indeed, we also find that those who feel unsafe express low levels of belief in the legitimacy of core political institutions, as illustrated in Figure III-15. Consequently, the AmericasBarometer survey results show that the *fear* of crime may be a more acute problem in Guyana than *actual* crime victimization.




Figure III-15. The Impact of Perception of Insecurity on Support for the Legitimacy of Political Institutions

Even in countries with high murder rates, the chance of an individual being murdered or victimized by a serious crime in any given year is generally not high. In this study, we have demonstrated that the impact of crime victimization may not be as great as the perception of insecurity, which is a feeling that can be held by a far greater portion of the population than the victims themselves. For instance, 8.7% of the Guyanese population was victimized by crime, whereas the perception of insecurity among the Guyanese reached an average of 36.2 on the 0 to 100 scale. As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, citizens hear about crime from their neighbours, read about it in the newspapers, and are often flooded by gruesome images of crime

on the TV. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that individual feelings of insecurity can be high in spite of not having had direct experiences with crime.

Conclusion

The statistical analysis of the determinants of crime victimization in Guyana in 2009 shows that crime victimization varies primarily by region and area. Similarly, those who live in urban areas are by far more likely to be victimized by crime than those who live in rural areas. Another interesting finding is that crime victimization has a negative impact on only one component of support for stable democracy: interpersonal trust, suggesting that Guyanese who have been victims by any act of delinquency may lose confidence in others.

This study also points to the detrimental effects that fear of crime have on support for stable democracy, namely, support for the idea of democracy, interpersonal trust, and the belief of the legitimacy of core political institutions. When people feel that they are unsafe, it is more likely that they will turn those feelings against others and the political system, diminishing their belief in the legitimacy of political institutions, such as the police and the judiciary. In addition, females, younger individuals, and those who live in bigger cities tend to perceive more insecurity.

APPENDIX CHAPTER III.

Appendix III-1. Predictors of Crime Victimization

Probability of Being Victimized by Corruption		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.358	(1.65)
Region 10	0.246	(1.37)
Region 6	0.061	(0.36)
Region 4	0.462*	(2.12)
Region 3	0.511*	(2.88)
Region 2	0.026	(0.14)
Rural	-0.181*	(-2.06)
Mixed	0.094	(1.09)
Amerindian	-0.012	(-0.11)
Black	-0.001	(-0.01)
Wealth	0.037	(0.31)
Age	-0.030	(-0.37)
Female	-0.158	(-1.82)
Education	0.037	(0.43)
Constant	-2.595*	(-25.04)
F = 3.03		
Number of Obs. = 2483		
P<0.05		
a Reference groups: Region 5 and Indian		

Appendix III-2. Predictors of Perception of Insecurity

Predictors of Perception of Insecurity		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	t
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.044	(0.99)
Region 10	0.024	(0.57)
Region 6	0.078*	(2.04)
Region 4	0.085	(1.74)
Region 3	0.052	(1.27)
Region 2	0.092*	(2.25)
Rural	-0.097*	(-2.75)
Mixed	0.050	(1.86)
Amerindian	0.012	(0.33)
Black	0.035	(1.15)
Wealth	-0.042	(-1.59)
Age	-0.095*	(-4.08)
Female	0.050*	(2.24)
Education	-0.028	(-0.92)
Constant	0.002	(0.06)
R-Squared = 0.030		
Number of Obs. = 2481		
P<0.05		
a Reference groups: Region 5 and Indian		

Appendix III-3. The Impact of Crime Victimization on Support for a Stable Democracy

	Support for Democracy		Support for the Right of Public Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Interpersonal Trust	
Independent Variables	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.
Crime Victimization	0.041	(0.02)	0.007	(0.02)	0.035	(0.02)	-0.033	(0.02)	-0.052*	(0.02)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.088*	(0.03)	-0.017	(0.02)	-0.083*	(0.03)				
Political Interest	-0.003	(0.02)	0.047*	(0.02)	0.046*	(0.02)	0.072*	(0.02)		
Education	0.249	(0.22)	0.306	(0.19)	0.235	(0.20)	-0.775*	(0.22)	0.037	(0.19)
Female	-1.685	(1.43)	-2.319*	(0.91)	-2.409*	(1.01)	0.592	(1.03)	-1.588	(0.95)
Age	0.379	(0.21)	0.180	(0.16)	0.305	(0.18)	-0.685*	(0.19)	0.190	(0.18)
Age Squared	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	0.062	(0.41)	0.293	(0.31)	0.719*	(0.36)	-0.002	(0.30)	0.088	(0.31)
Perception of Family Economic Situation		(0.80)	-0.816*	(0.40)	-1.206*	(0.58)	3.163*	(0.63)	1.852*	(0.59)
size of city/town	-0.574	(0.69)	-1.839*	(0.49)	-1.584*	(0.74)	4.098*	(0.50)	2.081*	(0.57)
Constant	56.800*	(6.80)	72.143*	(4.77)	60.024*	(7.25)	47.626*	(5.36)	41.738*	(5.04)
R-Squared	0.011		0.046		0.048		0.120		0.033	
N of Cases	2198		2304		2256		2293		2319	
* p<0.05										

Appendix III-4. The Impact of the Perception of Insecurity on Support for a Stable Democracy

	Support for Democracy		Support for the Right of Public Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Interpersonal Trust	
Independent Variables	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err.	Coef.	Std.Err..
Perception of Insecurity	-0.069*	(0.02)	-0.029	(0.02)	0.001	(0.02)	-0.040*	(0.02)	-0.207*	(0.02)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.080*	(0.03)	-0.021	(0.02)	-0.085*	(0.03)				
Political Interest	0.003	(0.02)	0.050*	(0.02)	0.046*	(0.02)	0.075*	(0.02)		
Education	0.207	(0.22)	0.288	(0.19)	0.211	(0.19)	-0.794*	(0.21)	-0.036	(0.20)
Female	-1.597	(1.43)	-2.279*	(0.91)	-2.505*	(1.00)	0.851	(1.03)	-0.870	(0.89)
Age	0.382	(0.21)	0.161	(0.16)	0.300	(0.18)	-0.681*	(0.19)	0.208	(0.17)
Age Squared	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)
Wealth	0.030	(0.41)	0.270	(0.31)	0.765*	(0.35)	-0.005	(0.30)	0.055	(0.31)
Perception of Family Economic Situation		(0.82)	-0.850*	(0.39)	-1.262*	(0.58)	3.028*	(0.64)	1.375*	(0.53)
size of city/town	-0.666	(0.70)	-1.873*	(0.49)	-1.585*	(0.74)	4.034*	(0.48)	1.658*	(0.48)
Constant	60.928*	(6.88)	74.328*	(4.74)	60.634*	(7.09)	49.365*	(5.44)	52.459*	(4.74)
R-Squared	0.015		0.047		0.047		0.120		0.092	
N of cases	2198		2304		2256		2293		2319	
* p<0.05										

Chapter IV. The Impact of Local Government Performance on the Support for Stable Democracy⁴³

Theoretical framework

What role, if any, does local level politics and participation play in the democratization process? Conventional wisdom, drawing heavily on the U.S. experience, places citizen activity in local civil society organizations and local government at the center of the process. World-wide, few citizens have contact with any level of government above that of their local authorities; in contrast, it is not at all uncommon for citizens to have direct, personal and sometimes frequent contact with their local elected officials. In this chapter, we examine the impact on support for stable democracy of citizen participation in local government.

For those who live at a distance from their nation's capital, which is, of course most citizens in the Americas (with the exception of perhaps of Uruguay), access to their national legislators, cabinet officers require trips of considerable time and expense. Local officials, in contrast, are readily accessible. The U.S. experience suggests that citizens shape their views of government based on what they see and experience first hand; the classic comment that "all politics is local" emerges directly from that experience. The U.S. has over 10,000 local governments, with many of them controlling and determining key resources related to the provision of public services, beginning with the public school system, but also including the police, local courts, hospitals, roads, sanitation, water and a wide variety of other key services that powerfully determine the quality of life that many citizens experience.

In contrast, most of Spanish/Portuguese speaking Latin America has a long history of governmental centralization, and as a result, historically local governments have been starved for funding and politically largely ignored. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, most local governments in the region suffered from a severe scarcity of income, as well as authority to deal with local problems (Nickson 1995). It is not surprising, therefore, that the quality of local services has been poor. Citizen contact with their states, therefore, has traditionally been with local governments that have little power and highly constricted resources. If citizens of the region express concerns about the legitimacy of their governments, and have doubts about democracy in general, the problem may begin with their experiences with local government.

⁴³ This chapter was written by Lawrence Lachmansingh with support from Winston Cramer.

Development agencies and many countries in the region have drawn this same conclusion and have been pressing, in the past decade, to decentralize the state and to provide more power and control at the local level, as well as to promote civil society organizations at the grass roots. There is, however, considerable debate over the definition and impact of decentralization in Latin America (Treisman 2000b; Barr 2001; O'Neill 2003; Selee 2004; Falletti 2005; O'Neill 2005; Daughters and Harper 2007). One of the presumed most important advantages of consists in bringing the government closer to the people (Aghón, Albuquerque and Cortés 2001; Finot 2001; Bardhan 2002; Carrión 2007).⁴⁴

Is decentralization and expanding the resources and power of local government a good idea? Several scholars argue in favor of decentralization, stating that it boosts local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources, generates accountability by bringing the government closer to the people, and strengthens social capital by fostering civic engagement and interpersonal trust (Aghón, *et al.* 2001; Barr 2001; Bardhan 2002). Nonetheless, detractors of decentralization assure that it fosters sub-national authoritarianism, augments regionalism due to an increase in the competition for resources and stimulates local patronage (Treisman 2000b; Treisman and Cai 2005; Treisman 2006). Other studies have shown both positive and negative results (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Seligson, López-Cáliz and Alcázar forthcoming). What do the citizens of Latin America think about decentralization and how does that influence their views on democracy? Responses to those questions are analyzed in this chapter.

How Might Local Government Attitudes and Behaviors Affect Citizen Support for Stable Democracy?

Citizens who participate in and who trust their local governments may well have a higher belief that democracy is the best system. Prior research in various AmericasBarometer countries has shown that those who participate in local government are also likely to be more approving of public contestation and might also have a stronger approval of the right of inclusive participation (i.e., the rights of minorities) (Seligson 1999b). On the other hand, in some countries participants in local government might favor participation of those who are part of their culture/ethnic group, and oppose the participation of “outsiders.” There is strong evidence that trust in local government spills over into belief in the legitimacy of national institutions (Seligson and Córdova Macías 1995; Córdova and Seligson 2001; Córdova Macías and Seligson 2003; Booth and Seligson forthcoming). Finally, a positive view of local government, along with participation in local government, could build social capital. In the pages below, we examine the impact of the evaluation of and participation in local government on support for stable democracy.

⁴⁴ There are actually three common types of state decentralization at the national level; namely, fiscal, political and administrative (Bunce 2000; Cai and Treisman 2002).

Historical Background

The genesis of local government in Guyana lies in the post-emancipation era of British Guiana when Ordinance 2 of 1837 created the Mayor and Town Council of Georgetown as an adaptation of the English Municipal Corporation Act of 1835. Generally, local government in colonial times saw the transplanting of British models to the Commonwealth Caribbean colonies.

At the end of the apprenticeship period in 1838, the freed slaves pooled their resources and purchased abandoned coffee and sugar plantations. Plantation Northbrook, later renamed Victoria, was the first such purchase (Young 1955). This initial purchase started what is referred to in Guyana as the village movement, which some identify as the birth of local government in British Guiana (Alexander 1991). Other collective purchases include Buxton on the East Coast of Demerara, Danielstown on the Essequibo Coast and Litchfield on the West Coast of Berbice.

These communal villages were an attempt by the ex-slaves to pursue a path of self-reliance and self-management. The former they achieved by cultivating the land to provide food and the latter through the development of a committee of management comprising a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer and no less than 7 committee members (Mangar 2002). These were the acknowledged village leaders whose authority flowed with the mutual agreement of the villagers. In addition to the collective purchases, there were also individual ones, such as Queenstown on the Essequibo Coast. By 1850, 25 communal villages were established and 7000 persons owned land in proprietary villages (Smith 2000). In its initial stages, the village administration was concerned with the maintenance of roads, bridges, dams as well as sea defence, and drainage and irrigation works. This often proved challenging because of the limited resources received through self-taxation, as well as resistance from the plantocracy who saw the village movement as counter to their interests.

The 1892 Village Ordinance was yet another significant milestone in local government history in British Guiana and perhaps the first evidence of local government decentralization. This Ordinance led to improved functioning of village councils and improvement in public works, particularly streets and drainage, thanks to new revenue sources flowing from property tax and a streamlined system of oversight by the Board of Health. The first conference of village Chairmen occurred in 1902. Five years later, local governments were established throughout the country and a Local Government Board appointed by central government (Mangar 2002).

A more comprehensive system of local government emerged in 1970 through the Municipal and District Councils Act 28:01 and the Local Authorities Act 28:02, which divided the coastland of the country into district, village and country district councils with the District Commissioner as the form of decentralized Central Government authority (Young 1955). Regional Ministers and Regional Development Authorities eventually replaced the District Commissioner system with the introduction of the Regional Development Authorities Act 1977. These became the immediate forerunners of the current Regional system.

The current local government system has its basis in the 1980 Constitution and its institutional and operational framework is prescribed in the Local Democratic Organs Act 12 of 1980. This Act provides for the division of the country into 10 administrative regions and a six-tier system: region, sub-region, district, community, neighborhood and people's cooperative unit. However, only two levels – region and neighborhood are operational. At the regional level, the Regional Democratic Council (RDC) is responsible for management and administration and carries out delegated functions of central government and provides oversight and assistance to the 65 Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDCs), 6 municipalities, Amerindian village councils and community development councils, save for the city of Georgetown and the town of New Amsterdam - which enjoy relative autonomy. This system of local government seeks to give effect to Article 71 of the Constitution of Guyana, which states, "Local government is a vital aspect of democracy and shall be organized so as to involve as many people as possible in the task of managing and developing the communities in which they live."

RDC elections are held at the same time as national elections: statutorily due every five years. The NDC and municipal elections are statutorily due every three years but these have not been held since 1994 and prior to this, in 1974. Because of this protracted delay in holding local government elections, almost all NDCs and Municipalities have hemorrhaged significant numbers of elected members. With performance diminishing, at least a dozen NDCs and one municipality were sufficiently defunct by 2009 to require the appointment of Interim Management Committees, pending the local government elections.

While RDCs have been functioning and are renewed regularly through elections and receive annual budgetary allocations, local government organs in Guyana generally suffer from inadequate human and financial resources to carry out their roles and responsibilities effectively. Even the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development does not have its full complement of professional staff. Recognising the need for substantial reform to the local government system, the constitutional reform process (1999-2001) saw several agreements being reached and approved, including increased roles, responsibilities and independence for local governments. In anticipation of these agreements being implemented, several national and international initiatives were implemented over the past decade to build the capacity of local government in Guyana. These initiatives yielded less than optimum results due in large part to the lack of implementation of the constitutional agreements and to the subsequent delays in holding local government elections.

A bipartisan Task Force on Local Government Reform, with membership from the PPP/C and the main opposition party, the PNCR, was established at the recommendation of the 2001 Constitution Reform Commission to undertake the task of implementing the provisions of Local Government Reform legislation. Some of the Terms of Reference for the Task Force were:

1. Generally, to ensure the conclusion of the Constitutional reform process and give effect to the new constitutional provisions regarding local democracy.
2. Specifically monitor and address the deficiencies within the local government system. The mandate of this task force included: to develop a local government electoral system that combines constituency and proportionality elements; to develop objective criteria for transferring

funds from central government to local government; to establish a local government commission with dispute resolution and other powers, and; to review the local government Act accordingly.

The Task Force achieved considerable progress in pursuing its mandate but, after eight years, was unable to conclude all of its tasks, at which time the Government moved the local government reform process into the National Assembly. In May and June of 2009, the Government tabled bills in the Assembly intended to address the reforms identified during the constitutional reform process relating to local government, including the holding local government elections before the end of 2009.

Trust in Local Government

Local Government is an integral part of democratic and development processes, since it provides tangible opportunities for citizens to be involved in the management of their communities. The trust of citizens in local government is thus a key measure of a democracy's health. The AmericasBarometer includes a very general question on such trust, in the same series of items (the "B series") in which trust in all other branches of government is measured. The item reads as follows:

B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor's office of your city or town/ NDC chairman's office?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all				A lot			Doesn't know

Trust in Local Government vs. Trust in the National Government and in the Regional Government

Notwithstanding the challenges faced in the functioning of local government in Guyana, respondents are generally disposed to trusting their local government systems at levels comparable to the trust levels for Regional and National Governments. As indicated in Figure IV-1 below, local government is trusted at 48.9 average points, which is three points lower than the national government and just 1.1 point behind the regional government.⁴⁵ However, given the 95% confidence intervals,⁴⁶ there is no statistically significant difference between the trust levels of citizens across national, regional and local governments.

⁴⁵ **Note about average points** - Valid responses to this variable have been recoded into a 0 to 100 scale, where 100 represent the highest level of trust in the local government. All the other dependent variables in this chapter have also been recoded into a 0 to 100 scale to facilitate their interpretation.

⁴⁶ **Note about confidence Intervals**- The reader should note carefully the "confidence interval" "I" symbols on each bar. Whenever two or more bars are close, enough to each other in magnitude so that the "I" symbols overlap, there is no statistically significant difference among those countries. Note that these confidence intervals take into account the complex nature of the sample designs used in these studies, each of which were stratified by region (to increase the precision of the samples) and clustered by neighborhood (to reduce cost).




Figure IV-1. Comparison between Trust in Local Government, Trust in National Government and Trust in Regional Democratic Council

Trust in Local Government Over time

Local government has experienced no significant change in the level of trust from Guyanese in the 2009 LAPOP survey. Since the previous survey in 2006, the level of trust has declined by 1.3 points, as illustrated in figure V-2. However, given the confidence intervals there is no statistically significant change in trust levels over the intervening period.




Figure IV-2. Trust in Local Government by Year

Trust in Local Government in Comparative Perspective

On a comparative scale depicting the level of trust of citizens in local government (Figure IV-3) across countries included in the AmericasBarometer LAPOP survey, Guyana ranks just about mid-way of the participating countries. It is positioned eleventh from the top and thirteenth from the bottom with 48.9 average points. Leading the region with 63.7 points is the Dominican Republic while Haiti with 38.3 points occupies the lowest position. Guyana's trust level is comparable to those of other English-speaking Caribbean members that are included in the survey, Belize and Jamaica, which demonstrated trust levels in local government at 47.2 and 43.4 average points respectively.




Figure IV-3. Trust in the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Trust in the Local Governments by Regions

The Hinterland Regions of Guyana (Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9), with 64.2 average points, are more inclined than any other region to trust their local governments (Figure IV-4). The more rural regions, 2 and 6, follow with 57.1 and 54.7 average points respectively. The remaining four regions then fall well below 50 with regions 10 and 4 - which have the largest population of any region - obtaining the lowest trust ratings with 42.8 and 45 average points respectively. It would seem that trust levels in the more rural regions of Guyana. The following sections delve deeper into the characteristics of trust in local government.





Figure IV-4. Trust in Local Government by Regions

Determinants of Trust in Local Government

Variations in the characteristics of respondents can produce significant impacts upon the overall opinion of citizens. Regression analysis is used in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP to assess the relative influences on national opinions by examining these characteristics or predictors.⁴⁷

In assessing the predictors of trust in local government, it was found that persons from the hinterland regions (1, 7, 8 and 9) and Region 2 express higher levels of trust in local government. Higher education levels, urban residents, age and those who self-identify as Black are the significant factors producing lower levels of trust in local government, as shown in Figure IV-5.

⁴⁷ **Note on regression analysis** - In the regression charts, we standardize all variables and indicate the zero mean as a red line. Each predictor that does not intersect with that line is a significant predictor ($p < 0.05$). Notice that any coefficient to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect of that variable on the dependent variable. In contrast, any coefficient to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure IV-5. Predictors of Trust in the Local Government

In further examining the levels of trust in local authorities according to age, ethnic self-identification, area and education, we find some sharp difference across these demographics as seen in Figure IV-6. In terms of age, responses from the age ranges 18-25 and 66+ indicate higher levels of trust in local authorities with levels of 52.2 and 54.7 average points respectively. Responses from the remaining four age ranges are less inclined to trust local authorities, falling between 45.1 and 48.2 average points. In respect of ethnicity, Amerindians are by far the most trusting group with 62.3 average points, possibly because most of these communities are dominated by one tribe and communal living is a way of life of most hinterland communities. The trust levels for Indo-Guyanese is 52 while Guyanese of Mixed and Black ethnicities are the least trusting of local governments, reflecting levels of 46.3 and 44 average points respectively. Another predictor of trust levels is education. Here, the more educated a respondent the less likely they are to trust local governments. Respondents with a primary education demonstrate a trust level of 52.4 while respondents with higher education only trust at a level of 41.7 average points. The final predictor of trust is area of residence, or simply area, and the finding confirms the suggestion made earlier that levels of trust decrease the more urban the region: respondents from urban areas lag behind their rural counterparts by almost 10 average points (42.5 vs. 52.1). This finding has particular application to the national capital, Guyana's main urban area, and the functioning of the City Council.




Figure IV-6. Trust in the Local Government by Education Level, Age, Area and Ethnic Self-identification

Participation in Local Government Meetings

Trust in local government reflects, in part, the degree of involvement by citizens in the work of local government. One means of involvement is participation in local government meetings. In order to determine levels of such participation, respondents were asked the following question:

NP1. Have you attended a city/town/NDC council meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor or NDC chairman in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember

Participation in Local Government Meetings Over time

The data suggests that there has been a decrease of 3% in attendance at local government meetings since 2006 (Figure IV-7), from 14% to 11%. The finding does not indicate frequency of attendance, being limited to some or no attendance “in the past 12 months.” However, when one considers the 95% confidence intervals, which overlap between 2006 and 2009, there is no statistically significant difference in the two findings.




Figure IV-7. Percentage Who Attended a Local Government Meeting by Year

Participation in Local Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective

Of the countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, Guyana's ranks 11th (at 11%) in citizens' attendance at local government meetings. Guyana is thus positioned in the upper half of the ranking, along with the two other English-speaking Caribbean countries - Belize (2nd ranked with 16% participation level) and Jamaica (7th ranked with 13.8%). The Dominican Republic tops the group with 16.8% while Panama, with 3.5%, demonstrates the lowest level of participation (Figure IV-8).




Figure IV-8. Participation in Local Government Meetings in Comparative Perspective

Participation in Local Government Meetings by Regions

Participation of citizens in local government meetings by region (Figure IV-9) highlights again the importance of this form of government in the hinterland regions (1, 7, 8 and 9). 25% of the respondents from the hinterland regions attend local government meetings, well ahead of the 2nd highest region, Region 6, which demonstrated a 15.5% participation level. In stark contrast, region 4 exhibits the lowest participation level – 6%. The following discussion examines the predictors that influence the levels of participation in local government meetings.





Figure IV-9. Participation in Local Government Meetings by Regions

Determinants of Participation in Local Government Meetings

Examining the determinants of participation levels in local government meetings using linear regression shows that being a crime victim, and resident in Regions 6, 10 and the hinterland regions (1,7,8 and 9) are characteristics of persons more likely to participate in meetings (Figure.IV.10) while females and urban residents tend to participate less in such meetings.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure IV-10. Predictors of Participation in Local Government Meetings

When participation in local government meetings is viewed through the lens of *gender* (Figure IV.11), male respondents exercise a positive effect on the overall participation percentage with a participation level of 12.8%, although the confidence intervals do overlap, suggesting that the difference is statistically insignificant. Yet we already know from the multivariate analysis that gender differences are significant in Guyana. In addition, attendance at meetings may demonstrate a gender-based effect depending on the purpose and focus of the meeting. In terms of *area*, respondents from rural areas are more than twice as likely to attend (13.6%) local government meetings over their urban counterparts (5.5%). This finding is consistent with the diminished levels of trust in local governments found in urban areas. It may also reflect the urban phenomenon (not limited to Guyana by any means) of increased individualism and the subsequent reduction in interest for activities of a communal nature.




Figure IV-11. Participation at the Local Government meetings by Sex and Area

Demand-Making to the Local Government

Another contributor to the trust that citizens have in local government is the extent to which they feel they can call upon the local authorities to help meet the needs of citizens. To assess the level to which citizens are making demands of local governments, respondents were asked as follows:

NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councillor of the city/town/NDC within the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember

Demand-Making at the Local Government Over Time

The percentage of persons making requests to the local government declined slightly, from 13.9% in 2006 to 12.5% in the 2009 dataset (Figure IV-12). However, this difference is statistically insignificant given the 95% confidence interval.




Figure IV-12. Demand-Making at the Local Government by Year

Demand-Making at the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Despite the moderate decline in requests made to local government in the 2009 dataset, Guyana's overall standing in comparison to the 23 countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP is at number 9, just behind Jamaica with 13%. Interestingly, the third English-speaking Caribbean country in the comparison, Belize, lags third from the bottom with a 7.9% demand-making level. This is despite Belize demonstrating one of the highest levels of participation in local government meetings in the region. Panama has the lowest demand level with 7.3% (see Figure IV-13).




Figure IV-13. Demand-Making to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Demand-Making at the Local Government by Regions

Figure IV-14 illustrates the level of demand making to local government by region. Region 2 has the highest demand making levels (20.8%), followed by the hinterland regions with 17.2%. At the other end of the scale, Region 4 demonstrates the lowest level of demand-making on local government - 8.2%. Another region with strong urban characteristics, region 10, lags with region 4 at the bottom of the regional comparison with a 10% demand-making level. The following discussion examines the determinants of demand-making in Guyana.





Figure IV-14. Demand-Making at Local Government by Regions

Determinants of Demand-Making at the Local Government

Victims of a crime and residents in Regions 2, 3, 5 and 6 and the hinterland regions (Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9) are more engaged in demand-making to local government. The only variable which serves as a statistically significant negative predictor of demand-making at the local government is being female, in other words, in the case of Guyana, females are significantly less likely to make a demand of the local government than their male counterparts (Figure IV-15).



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure IV-15. Predictors of Demand-Making at Local Government

Respondents that were victims of any type of criminal acts in the past year (19.2%) are likely to seek assistance from the local government organs, in contrast, to those who were not (11.9%) as demonstrated in Figure IV-16.




Figure IV-16. Demand-Making at Local Government by Victimization

Utilizing the age and gender demographics to examine demand-making trends, as shown in Figure IV-17, reveal that demand-making increases with age, peaking at 16.3% with the 46-55 age group and then declines as age increases. This corresponds with the increased responsibilities that come with property ownership, family needs, and other drivers of demand for local government services as one grows older. In terms of *gender*, males made more requests than females of local governments by a significant degree – 15.7% vs. 9.3%, consistent with other LAPOP 2009 findings on civic participation in meetings of community improvement committees.




Figure IV-17. Demand-Making at Local Government by Sex and Age

Satisfaction with Local Government Services

A key result indicator in the functioning of local governments is the level of satisfaction with services received by citizens and taxpayers. The quality of that service is intrinsically linked to local government design and implementation issues, such as has been the focus of the Joint Task Force and which now occupies the attention of the National Assembly. To assess this indicator, respondents were asked the following question:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the city/town/ NDC is providing are...? [Read options]

- (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor (5) Very poor
(8) Doesn't know

Satisfaction with Local Government Services in 2009

Overall, a total of 28.8% of respondents considered that the quality of local government services provided by local governments is either good or very good (Figure IV-18), while 40.6% felt the opposite, that services were either poor or very poor. A significant proportion of

respondents (30.5%) held a neutral view, being of the opinion that the services provided are neither good nor poor (fair).




Figure IV-18. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services

Satisfaction with Local Government Services Over Time

Citizens were slightly more satisfied with their local government services in 2006 (48.5%) than in 2009 (44.7%), a decrease of 3.8% as reflected in Figure IV-19. The following discussion compares Guyana to the other countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP and then examines in greater detail the drivers behind popular opinion on local government services.




Figure IV-19. Satisfaction with Local Government Services by Year

Satisfaction with Local Government Services in Comparative Perspective

Brazil leads the countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP for level of satisfaction with local government services, with 58.2% (Figure IV-20). Indeed, the majority of countries are above 50%. Strikingly, Guyana and its three sister CARICOM countries convincingly occupy the bottom four positions with satisfaction levels ranging from 44.7 % (Guyana) to 37% (Jamaica). Despite these poor satisfaction levels, citizens of these four CARICOM countries do not exhibit a particularly high level of demand-making on local governments (see Figure IV-13), with Haiti and Belize being among the bottom five demand-making countries.




Figure IV-20. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services

Satisfaction with Services Provided by Municipalities or NDCs

The majority of Guyanese are supposed to benefit from the work of two local government bodies, Neighbourhood Democratic Councils (NDCs) and Municipalities. When one delves into the satisfaction levels of respondents resident in either NDC- or municipality-governed areas, it becomes apparent that municipalities are particularly stricken with a lack of confidence in their performance. Only 36.1 % of respondents in municipal areas expressed satisfaction with the local government services they received while for respondents resident in NDC areas, the satisfaction percentage was a full 13 percentage points higher – 49.1% (Figure IV-21).

This finding confirms the earlier suggestion that the City Council in the national capital faces particular challenges, although other municipalities are by no means exempted. That demand-making in regions 4 and 10, where the two largest municipalities in Guyana are located,

is the lowest in the country (see Figure IV-14) suggests a lack of confidence by citizens in the ability of municipalities to respond to citizens' needs, and thus they demand less. The LAPOP 2009 survey also found that citizens in regions 4 and 10 had the lowest level of interpersonal trust, a phenomena more marked in the national capital, and they consistently lagged in terms of civic participation measures (see chapter on Interpersonal trust and Civic Participation). These findings suggest a particular need to address the local governance and civic participation challenges in regions 4 and 10, within the general needs that exist nationally.




Figure IV-21. Satisfaction with Municipalities and NDCs Services

Satisfaction with Local Services Provided by NDCs by Regions

Measuring satisfaction with local services offered by the NDCs (Figure IV-22), by region, shows that Region 6 is most satisfied at 54.8 percent followed by the hinterland regions and Region 2 at 52.6 and 51.7 percent respectively. Region 10 brings up the rear with a level well below all others: 30.7%. It should be noted that there are only 5 NDCs in the regions characterised in the survey as being hinterland⁴⁸ (regions 1, 7, 8 and 9) and region 10. The findings for these regions are based on a small number of NDCs and thus the negative findings could be a function of one or two NDCs that have been less responsive than others. The following discussion examines in greater detail the predictors of satisfaction with local government services.

⁴⁸ Region 1 has two NDCs, while regions 7, 9 and 10 have one each. Region 8 does not have any NDCs.





Figure IV-22. Satisfaction with NDCs Services by Regions

Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The correlation between the satisfaction with local government services and trust in these entities is very high, as seen in Figure IV-23. Urban residents are significantly dissatisfied with the services they receive, and this is the only negative predictor in this regression analysis.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure IV-23. Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Figure IV-24 illustrates the relationship between persons who are generally satisfied with local government services and trust in local government levels (see earlier discussion, starting on page 5). The correlations between *trust* and *satisfaction* are clearly positive: as one increases so does the other.




Figure IV-24. Impact of the Trust in the Local Government on Satisfaction with the Local Government Services

The significant difference in satisfaction levels between citizens in urban and rural areas (36.1 vs 49.1%), indicated in Figure IV-25, continues the trend of urban weakness in the area of local government. However, this is not to say that the rural levels are cause for much comfort: even if 49.1% represented the national level of satisfaction, Guyana would still fall in the lower half of the AmericasBarometer countries, although well ahead of sister CARICOM countries.

There is therefore cause for concern regarding the performance levels of local government in Guyana, particularly in urban areas, and these confirm the urgency to undertake measures that assure improved performance. Were an improvement in satisfaction levels to be achieved, it may very likely result in an increased level of trust in local government.




Figure IV-25. Satisfaction with the Local Government Services by Area

Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities

Decentralization of responsibilities to local government is integral to the achievement of mandates, efficiencies, effectiveness and the development of communities, within the context of national policy objectives. Decentralization, however, is fundamentally about which level of government ought to possess more power, or less. Citizens are likely to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of central, regional and local governments and to support, or not, the decentralization of responsibilities based on an assessment of the capacity to assure local services. The following questions sought to gauge public support for the decentralization of responsibilities.

LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given **more responsibilities?** [Read options]

- (1) Much more to the central government
- (2) Somewhat more to the central government
- (3) The same amount to the central government and the city/town/ NDC
- (4) Some more to the city/town/ NDC
- (5) Much more to the city/town/ NDC
- (8) DK/DA

Now, let's talk about the allocation of responsibilities and resources to Regional Democratic Councils (RDC)

LGL2C. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given **more responsibilities?** [Read options]

- (1) Much more to the central government
- (2) Somewhat more to the central government
- (3) The same amount to the central government and the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
- (4) Some more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
- (5) Much more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
- (8) DK/DA

Citizens Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Regional Democratic Council and Local Government

When citizens were questioned about the extent to which responsibilities should be decentralised to RDCs and local government, citizens leaned significantly towards either the retention of the status quo or an increase in responsibilities for central government (Figure IV-26). Specifically, when given the choice between central and local governments, 68% of respondents preferred that responsibilities remain the same or that more responsibilities be given to central government. Only 32% of respondents felt that more responsibilities should be given to local governments. When asked about responsibility levels for RDCs, the numbers were similar: 70.5% in favour of more or the same levels of central government responsibilities and only 29.5% in favour of more RDC responsibilities.




Figure IV-26. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Regional Democratic Council and Local Government

Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Guyana, with an average score of 45.8 points on our 0-100 scale, ranks fifth from the bottom among countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, above the Dominican Republic, Panama, Haiti and Honduras, in terms of support for the decentralisation of responsibilities to local government (Figure IV-27). Nine countries have levels above 50 with Bolivia topping the scale significantly at 61 average-points.




Figure IV-27. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities by Regions

In assessing the support of citizens in the ten administrative regions for the decentralization of responsibilities, it was found that support levels are fairly consistent across the

regions (Figure IV-28). Region 3 (51.7 points) has the highest support levels, followed by regions 10, 5, 6 and 4, with ranges from 49.4 to 44 points. Region 2 has the lowest support levels of the ten regions, at 39.7 points. A more in-depth discussion of the determinants of support for decentralisation follows below.





Figure IV-28. Support for Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government by Region

Determinants of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government

In determining the factors that influence support for the decentralisation of responsibilities to the local government, it was found that support levels are higher for citizens in Regions 10 and 3, and for those who are older and who have higher levels of education, as shown in Appendix IV-5. There are no significant negative predictors in determining levels of support.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure IV-29. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government

In dissecting the support for decentralization (Figure IV-30) according to *education* level, it was found that the more educated the respondent, the more they supported decentralisation of responsibilities to local governments. Individuals who have acquired a higher level of education are more inclined to support decentralization (49.5 points) than those with primary education levels (43.9 points). In terms of *age*, support for decentralisation of responsibilities to local government rises steadily as one grows older, with the 18-25 age range supporting decentralisation with 43.3 points and those aged 66+ supporting at 53.4 points.




Figure IV-30. Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government by Education Level and Age

Support for the decentralization of Economic Resources

The management of money in the pursuit of governmental mandates is a key consideration, and one that is under consideration in the local government reform process within the National Assembly. The 2009 LAPOP survey asked citizens the following questions to gauge public opinion as to how decentralized the management of money or economic resources ought to be.

LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? **[Read options]**

- (1) Much more the central government
- (2) Some more the central government
- (3) The same amount the central government and the city/town/ NDC
- (4) Some more the city/town/ NDC
- (5) Much more the city/town/NDC
- (8) DK/DA

LGL2D. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? **[Read options]**

- (1) Much more the central government
- (2) Some more the central government
- (3) The same amount the central government and the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
- (4) Some more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
- (5) Much more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)
- (8) DK/DA

Citizens Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Regional Democratic Council and Local Government

When citizens were questioned about the level of decentralisation of economic resources that should occur, citizens leaned again significantly towards either the retention of the status quo or an increase in money for central government (Figure IV-31). Specifically, 70.7% of respondents preferred that the status quo be retained or that central government should manage more money. Only 29.4% of respondents felt that local governments should manage more money.⁴⁹ For RDCs, the numbers were starker: 73.2% of respondents favoured more or the same levels of money for central government and only 26.7% in favour of RDCs managing more money.

These findings, together with the earlier discussion on the decentralization of responsibilities, are relevant to the policy discussions that have been taking place on these subjects at the national political level, as elected representatives seek to give meaning to the constitutional reforms of 2001. The 2009 survey confirms a lack of citizen confidence in the ability of regional and local governments to manage additional responsibilities, including increased fiscal responsibilities, and a preference for the status quo and the perceived strengths of the central government. The effort to develop legislation that provides for greater levels of decentralization and responsibility would likely benefit from support for public confidence-building measures, including the capacity building of local and regional governments.




Figure IV-31. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Regional Democratic Council and Local Government

⁴⁹ Percentages do not total 100% due to rounding errors.

Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Among countries included in the AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, public support for the decentralization of economic resources is led by Costa Rica with a level of 61.1 average points (Figure IV-32). Guyana, with 43.1, is fifth from the bottom. Honduras has the lowest level of support (35.8 average points). With the notable exception of Jamaica (8th with 50.7), the two other CARICOM countries also demonstrate relatively low levels of support for the management of more money at the local government levels, with Belize and Haiti demonstrating levels of 44.5 and 37.4 average points respectively.




Figure IV-32. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government in Comparative Perspective

Support for Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government by Regions

Region 3 with 49.6 average points leads local support for the decentralization of economic resources to the local government, followed by region 5 and the hinterland regions with 46.9 and 45.4 average points respectively (Figure IV.33). Citizens in regions 2 and 6 are the least supportive of the decentralization of economic resources, with support levels falling to 36 and 39.6 points respectively. A discussion on the predictors of support for increased management of money by local government follows.





Figure IV-33. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources by Region

Determinants of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources

Support for the decentralization of the economic resources to the local government is positively affected by the predictors of higher education, self-identification as Black, age and Region 3 (Figure IV-34). In this regression analysis there are no statistically significant negative predictors.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure IV-34. Predictors of support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government

Analysis of support for the decentralization of economic resources by education level and self-identified ethnicity (Figure IV.35) indicates that citizens with a higher *educational level* are much more inclined to support decentralization to local governments (48.6 points) than those with only a primary education (41.8 points), consistent with the earlier finding on the general decentralization of responsibilities. In terms of *ethnicity*, respondents who identified themselves as Black (45.7 points) led the other ethnic groups in supporting the decentralization of economic resources. Persons who self-identified as Indian demonstrated the lowest level of support among ethnic groups, at a level of 40.6 points. This statistically significant difference in viewpoint between Blacks and Indians as to whether more money should be managed by local governments likely reflects the correlation between ethnicity and party voted for, but that analysis would take us beyond the focus of this chapter. However, it is noticeable that not only is the spread across this difference in opinion relatively small (5.1 points) but that the level of support is low, regardless of ethnic group, in comparison to the other countries included in the AmericasBarometer.




Figure IV-35. Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources to the Local Government by Education Level and Ethnic Self-identification

The impact of satisfaction with local services (sgl1r) on support for stable democracy

A regression analysis was created (see Appendix IV-7) to establish the relationship between the impact of satisfaction with local services on support for a stable democracy, using independent variables such as satisfaction with local government services, satisfaction with the performance of the current President, education, gender and age.

Relationship between Belief in the Political Legitimacy and Satisfaction with Local Services

The line chart shown in Figure IV-36 illustrates that the more Guyanese are satisfied with local government services, the more they are disposed to supporting the political legitimacy of core democratic institutions. Similarly, as the level of dissatisfaction rises, the level of support for the legitimacy of core institutions falls. Thus, for democracy to be deepened and consolidated through the according of legitimacy to core democratic institutions by citizens, it is imperative that satisfaction levels with the services received from local governments be increased.




Figure IV-36. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Political Legitimacy

Relationship between Interpersonal Trust and Satisfaction with Local Services

A final line chart, again based on the regression analysis contained in Appendix IV-7, was created to assess the relationship between interpersonal trust and satisfaction with local services. As seen in Figure IV-37, there is a strong positive correlation between interpersonal trust and satisfaction with local services: the more satisfied citizens are with local government services, the more they will tend to trust others in the society. These findings highlight the role that democratic institutions can play in creating greater cohesion within the Guyanese society.




Figure IV-37. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Interpersonal Trust

Conclusion

In the 2009 LAPOP survey, Guyanese demonstrated a similar level of trust in the three levels of government – central, regional and local. This puts Guyana into a relatively high category within the Latin American and Caribbean region, where trust levels in local government ranked 11th of 23 countries surveyed and the best among four participating CARICOM countries.

When one examines how local government is viewed by citizens in Guyana it is evident that hinterland areas possess the highest levels of both trust in local government and participation in local government meetings, exceeding the top performers in the AmericasBarometer countries. The hinterland regions also demonstrated the second highest levels of demand-making to local governments in Guyana, and satisfaction with the services of their local governments.

Despite the positive influence of the hinterland opinion, Guyanese in general are considerably dissatisfied with the local government services they receive. Guyanese in urban areas hold even lower levels of trust and satisfaction in the services of their local governments, and particularly of municipalities. There is much to suggest that Guyanese could learn from the experiences of their fellow-citizens in the hinterland regions, with a view to improving democratic and developmental results such as increased participation and satisfaction with services.

Citizens of the other CARICOM countries in the AmericasBarometer survey are significantly dissatisfied with the services of their local governments. Specifically, the participating CARICOM countries occupy the bottom four positions in the regional comparison, suggesting that there may be a commonality of causes and effects within CARICOM countries. There may thus be value in exploring for common solutions across the sub-region.

The general lack of trust, satisfaction, demand-making and participation has contributed to a situation where Guyanese are very cautious in contemplating the decentralization of responsibilities, including the management of more money, by local governments. Despite their misgivings about local governments, however, Blacks are slightly more inclined than other ethnic groups to support increased decentralization.

Finally, the findings suggest worrisome trends in terms of the health of Guyana's democracy, particularly as relate to institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust. These two crucial elements of democratic stability are eroded as levels of citizen satisfaction with the services they receive from local governments decrease. When the citizens perceive little benefit, they will be less inclined to invest themselves or their resources. In this way, the democratic dividends of healthy social relations and human development remain unrealized, threatening the viability of democracy itself.

The efforts of elected representatives at the national level to address the challenges facing local government are thus highly relevant and of critical importance at this time.

APPENDIX CHAPTER IV.

Appendix IV-1. Predictors of Trust in the Local Government

Predictors of Trust in the Local Government		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	t
Black	-0.082*	(-2.36)
Amerindian	0.033	(0.82)
Mixed	-0.053	(-1.75)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.133*	(2.90)
Region 10	0.001	(0.04)
Region 6	0.069	(1.76)
Region 5	-0.053	(-1.29)
Region 3	-0.054	(-1.10)
Region 2	0.095*	(2.88)
Urban	-0.117*	(-2.83)
Wealth	0.052	(1.78)
Age	-0.053*	(-2.22)
Female	-0.020	(-1.07)
Education	-0.077*	(-2.35)
Crime Victimization	-0.039	(-1.48)
Constant	0.005	(0.16)
R-Squared = 0.073		
Number of Obs. = 2256		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-2. Predictors of Participation in Local Government Meetings

Predictors of Participation in Local Government Meetings		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.084	(0.80)
Amerindian	0.161	(1.84)
Mixed	-0.046	(-0.60)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.305*	(3.33)
Region 10	0.296*	(2.39)
Region 6	0.328*	(3.13)
Region 5	0.080	(0.79)
Region 3	0.186	(1.92)
Region 2	0.183	(1.98)
Urban	-0.337*	(-2.34)
Married or common law	0.061	(0.85)
Number of Children	0.109	(1.11)
Wealth	-0.132	(-1.39)
Age	0.107	(1.26)
Female	-0.190*	(-2.79)
Education	0.077	(0.92)
Crime Victimization	0.154*	(2.34)
Constant	-2.184*	(-22.72)
F = 4.82		
Number of Obs. = 2448		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-3. Predictors of Demand-Making at the Local Government

Predictors of Demand-Making at the Local Government		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.012	(0.14)
Amerindian	0.127	(1.62)
Mixed	-0.013	(-0.20)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.217*	(2.48)
Region 10	0.073	(0.62)
Region 6	0.266*	(3.30)
Region 5	0.168*	(2.26)
Region 3	0.236*	(3.25)
Region 2	0.375*	(6.21)
Urban	-0.066	(-0.74)
Married or common law	0.076	(1.10)
Number of Children	0.089	(0.96)
Wealth	0.059	(0.79)
Age	0.182*	(1.99)
Female	-0.296*	(-3.88)
Education	0.131	(1.40)
Crime Victimization	0.167*	(2.68)
Constant	-1.977*	(-25.80)
F = 4.43		
Number of Obs. = 2452		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-4. Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

Predictors of Satisfaction with Local Government Services		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.009	(0.10)
Amerindian	-0.014	(-0.11)
Mixed	0.056	(0.68)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.137	(0.94)
Region 10	-0.009	(-0.10)
Region 6	0.081	(1.06)
Region 5	-0.012	(-0.10)
Region 3	0.067	(0.71)
Region 2	0.237*	(2.03)
Urban	-0.314*	(-3.11)
Wealth	0.031	(0.32)
Age	-0.023	(-0.29)
Female	0.135	(1.73)
Education	0.060	(0.65)
Crime Victimization	0.001	(0.02)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.846*	(10.19)
Constant	2.091*	(20.47)
F = 8.05		
Number of Obs. = 2144		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-5. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government

Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Responsibilities to the Local Government		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	t
Black	0.027	(0.93)
Amerindian	0.028	(0.87)
Mixed	0.019	(0.55)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.054	(1.02)
Region 10	0.057*	(2.35)
Region 6	0.034	(1.52)
Region 5	0.058	(1.82)
Region 3	0.092*	(4.01)
Region 2	-0.017	(-0.61)
Urban	-0.034	(-1.13)
Wealth	0.054	(1.57)
Age	0.087*	(3.33)
Female	-0.030	(-1.46)
Education	0.077*	(2.43)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.036	(1.38)
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	-0.049	(-1.74)
Constant	-0.002	(-0.07)
R-Squared = 0.030		
Number of Obs. = 2080		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-6. Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources

Predictors of Support for the Decentralization of Economic Resources		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	t
Black	0.085*	(3.28)
Amerindian	0.028	(0.73)
Mixed	0.045	(1.74)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.060	(1.20)
Region 10	-0.026	(-0.79)
Region 6	-0.021	(-0.74)
Region 5	0.051	(1.57)
Region 3	0.086*	(4.94)
Region 2	-0.036	(-1.37)
Urban	-0.038	(-1.10)
Wealth	0.046	(1.32)
Age	0.058*	(2.06)
Female	-0.042	(-1.82)
Education	0.046*	(2.05)
Attended a Municipal Meeting	0.028	(1.15)
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	-0.002	(-0.07)
Constant	0.009	(0.31)
R-Squared = 0.030		
Number of Obs. = 2054		
* p<0.05		

Appendix IV-7. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy

Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on Support for Stable Democracy										
Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for the Right Public Contestation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy of Core Institutions		Interpersonal Trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	-0.029	(0.03)	0.002	(0.02)	-0.005	(0.03)	0.198*	(0.02)	0.081*	(0.02)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.095*	(0.04)	-0.020	(0.02)	-0.083*	(0.03)				
Political Interest	-0.015	(0.03)	0.050*	(0.02)	0.055*	(0.02)	0.063*	(0.02)		
Education	0.223	(0.24)	0.370	(0.20)	0.211	(0.21)	-0.621*	(0.20)	0.050	(0.20)
Female	-2.156	(1.47)	-2.218*	(0.95)	-2.630*	(1.06)	-0.296	(1.11)	-1.811*	(0.91)
Age	0.367	(0.22)	0.051	(0.17)	0.210	(0.19)	-0.678*	(0.20)	0.136	(0.19)
q2sq	-0.004	(0.00)	0.001	(0.00)	-0.002	(0.00)	0.007*	(0.00)	0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	-0.047	(0.40)	0.302	(0.32)	0.625	(0.36)	0.319	(0.29)	0.304	(0.34)
Perception of Family Economic Situation	0.189	(0.75)	-0.922*	(0.43)	-1.156	(0.59)	2.298*	(0.65)	1.482*	(0.63)
Size of city/town	-0.604	(0.74)	-1.595*	(0.48)	-1.865*	(0.82)	3.917*	(0.51)	2.046*	(0.59)
Constant	60.016*	(6.72)	73.210*	(4.80)	64.655*	(7.48)	38.678*	(5.44)	38.348*	(5.11)
R-cuadrado	0.011		0.043		0.052		0.180		0.040	
N of Cases	1952		2132		2092		2123		2142	
* p<0.05										

Chapter V. Impact of Citizen Perception of Government Economic Performance on Support for Stable Democracy⁵⁰

Theoretical Framework

The final chapter in Part II of this study deals with the issue of the impact of perception of government performance on support for stable democracy. It has become common place in the field of democratic governance, especially when speaking about election outcomes, to comment: “It’s the economy, stupid.” That is, when incumbent candidates lose office, it is often attributed to current economic performance. Citizens directly associate the performance of the economy with those who are in control of the national government. In Latin America where, as has been shown in the preceding chapters, citizens often have negative experiences with specific aspects of governance (such as crime and corruption), they also have often been disappointed by the performance of the economy in two key ways: reducing poverty and unemployment. This chapter, then, looks at citizen perceptions of the success/failure of the government to deal with these two critical economic challenges and their impact on support for stable democracy.

While economic conditions have long been thought to have played a role in support for democracy, it was not until the mid 1970s and early 1980s that researchers began to take note. During this time, largely in the developed world, especially the United States, survey research began to see a considerable drop in public support for both political leaders and institutions. While much of this drop was originally attributed to national controversies and scandals such as the unpopular Vietnam War or Watergate, scholars began to notice that public opinion was not rising and falling according to these events. Rather, it seemed, macro and micro economic conditions were falling more in line with the ebbs and flows of public opinion. As perceptions of economic conditions improved, so too did opinions of political leaders, institutions and overall support for the system.

Measuring system support can most clearly be traced back to David Easton’s (1965) three tier categorization of political support, articulated as political community, the regime, and

⁵⁰ This chapter was written by Brian Faughnan.

political authorities, which Easton (1975) later consolidated into two forms of system support, diffuse and specific. Diffuse support according to Muller, Jukam and Seligson (1982) can be defined “as a feeling that the system can be counted on to provide equitable outcomes, or it can take the form of legitimacy, defined as a person’s conviction that the system conforms to his/her moral or ethical principles about what is right in the political sphere” (Muller et al. 1982, 241) while specific support involves evaluations of the current incumbents within the political system.

Despite the fact that early research focuses on the effects of economic performance on political or system support in the developed world, there was generally no distinction made between Easton’s three tiers and diffuse and specific support. However, in 1987 Lipset and Schneider found that in the United States, negative economic outlooks and perceptions affected “peoples’ feelings about their leaders and institutions” (Lipset and Schneider 1987, 2) and that “the confidence level varies with the state of the economy, economic improvements should increase faith in institutions” (ibid, 5). In other words, poor economic conditions in the United States affected specific support to a large extent with little or no effect on diffuse support.

More recently, however, the effects of the perceptions of economic conditions on support for stable democracy in the developed world have been placed in doubt, especially aggregate-level economic performance which, according to Dalton, “offers limited systematic empirical evidence demonstrating that poor macroeconomic performance is driving down aggregate levels of political support across the advanced industrial democracies” (2004, 113). He does continue to write that while aggregate level economic indicators may not affect system support, individual level analyses of a society’s economic conditions are perhaps a better gauge of support of the system within that society. Kornberg and Clarke (1992) also note that the political community should remain rather unaffected by short-term economic perceptions, but that political authorities are not as fortunate. In his 2004 study of advanced industrial democracies, Dalton observes a moderate correlation with a person’s financial satisfaction and support for the incumbent (specific support). He goes on to find that across eight US presidential administrations, citizens who are more optimistic about their personal economic situations also tend to be more trusting of government. However, according to Dalton, “perceptions of the national economy are more closely linked to trust in government, and the relationship with their personal financial condition is weaker.” In other words, while citizens are more likely to hold the government responsible for the state of the national economy, they are “less likely to generalize from their own financial circumstances to their evaluations of government overall” (Dalton 2004, 118). Nevertheless, Dalton’s conclusions on the subject of economic performance and support for the system are cautious ones and that “the link between economic performance and political support appears tenuous” (ibid, 127) within the OECD nations.

Turning now toward a government’s economic performance and support for stable democracy within the region of Latin America, Power and Jamison (2005) include as a proximate cause for the low levels of political trust in Latin America economic conditions which according to them have been “fragmentary and inconsistent.” In accordance with previous literature, the authors’ preliminary conclusion is that a country’s “level of economic development is less important than economic performance” (Power and Jamison 2005, 58). However, they caution

that these results should not be interpreted as being conclusive and that more research is needed. Furthermore, Schwarz-Blum (2008) finds that, contrary to the conclusions of Dalton and others who study advanced industrial democracies, in Latin America, one's individual assessment of both the national as well as their individual economic conditions does play a role in their support for the political system, and that citizens who evaluate more highly both the national as well as their personal economic situations will be more likely to support the political system than those citizens who hold lower perceptions. Given the inconclusive results from the previous research conducted on the subject, this chapter, using AmericasBarometer survey data, will examine the impact of economic performance on trust in institutions and other important dimensions of support for stable democracy as outlined in chapter I of this study.

How Might Perception of Government Economic Performance Affect Support for Stable Democracy?

Citizens who believe that their governments are performing well in terms of economic growth may have a stronger belief that democracy is the best system. It is less likely, however, that this perception would affect their core democratic values (extensive and inclusive contestation). On the other hand, we would expect a strong association between perceptions of economic performance and the legitimacy of the core institutions of the regime. Finally, it may be that citizens who see the system as performing poorly over time may have a more negative sense of social capital, but we anticipate that the relationship will be particularly strong. In the pages below we test these hypotheses with the AmericasBarometer data.

Government Economic Performance

Like many citizens of the Western Hemisphere, the citizens of Guyana tend, more than any other category, to rate the economy as the main problem of the country. As can be observed in Figure V-1, in 2009, 56.2% of respondents identified the economy as the main problem facing the country today. The next highest category is security concerns, accounting for 13.1% of respondents followed by politics (12.3%), other (11.3%) and basic services (7.1%). Comparing these results to those of 2006, it quickly becomes clear that the economy has become much more of a perceived problem in the three years between the two survey rounds. While in 2006 a plurality of respondents labelled the economy as being the main problem facing the country, at just over 40% of respondents, this is 10 percentage points from a majority. Likewise, a significantly higher proportion (27% vs. 13%) of Guyanese labelled security as their main concern in 2006 than 2009, while all other categories remained comparable in terms of respondents labelling them as the primary problem.

Fully understanding the reasons for the significant shifts between 2006 and 2009 in terms of the economy being the number one problem in the country goes beyond the scope of this chapter. However, there are a number of plausible explanations that deserve at least brief mention. First, and perhaps most likely, is that of the 24 AmericasBarometer surveys

administered by LAPOP in 2008/09, the Guyana survey was the only one that took place following the collapse of the U.S. financial sector and the resulting global economic troubles. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the significant increase in the economy as the primary concern is a response to the events of the second half of 2008.

Second, between 2006 and 2009, a 14% decrease was observed between those who saw security as the major concern for the country. Given that the other possible categories, politics, basic services, and other remained relatively stable between the two rounds, it could also be hypothesized that citizens are feeling safer and more secure in 2009 than they were in 2006. The analysis of this issue is developed more in-depth in other chapters in this volume.




Figure V-1. Economy as the Main Problem of the Country

Whatever the reasoning, however, the data are clear that in 2009, over 50% of the Guyanese population viewed the economy as the primary problem facing their country. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents holding this view increased almost 16 percentage points since the last AmericasBarometer was conducted in the country in 2006. To understand how these attitudes might affect democracy and democratic stability, we must dig deeper into the AmericasBarometer data. This chapter will first examine how Guyanese feel about the economic performance of their government, including comparisons across the hemisphere, time, and regions within the country. It will then examine the role of economic outlooks (both national and personal) on specific support for the government. Finally, before concluding, the chapter will

examine the impact of perception of government economic performance on democratic stability in Guyana.

Measuring Perception of Government Economic Performance

In order to measure citizens' perceptions of their government's handling of the economy, the Latin American Public Opinion Project has created a new index (**econperf**). This index is a product of two items in the 2008/09 survey conducted in 23 countries throughout the Americas;⁵¹ both items ask respondents to rate their respective government's performance on economic issues. The first item (N1) asks respondents how well they believe their current government fights poverty. The second question included in the index (N12) asks respondents to rate their government's performance on combating unemployment. Below the exact wording for each question is included.

N1. To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty?

N12. To what extent would you say the current government combats unemployment?

⁵¹ The total number of countries included in the 2008/09 Round of the AmericasBarometer Survey was 24; however, the applicable questions for this chapter were not included in the Canadian questionnaire, therefore 23 countries will be used for this specific analysis.

Perceptions of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective




Figure V-2. Perception of Government Economic Performance in Comparative Perspective

Citizen perception of government economic performance varies greatly throughout the Americas. The results of the economic performance index, in a comparative perspective, can be seen in Figure V-2. The average score for the 23 countries is 41.3 on the 0 to 100 scale where 0 signifies that citizens believe the economic performance of their government is poor while 100 signifies satisfaction with the government's economic performance. However, as can be seen from the figure above, a significant disparity exists between the countries. For example, five countries, Chile, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Uruguay, have scores which exceed the mid-point of 50 on the 0-100 scale. Uruguay is the country which has the highest average score

for citizen perceptions of government economic performance at 54.6. Alternatively, a separate group of countries falls at or below the thirty point mark in their average perception of government economic performance, and one of those countries, Paraguay, has an average score which is almost 14 points below the next closest country, Haiti.

As can be seen from the figure above, in relation to the other countries included in the 2008/09 AmericasBarometer survey, Guyana's average score of 45.4 slightly exceeds the region average of 41.3. Of the 23 countries, Guyana is 10 places from the top, and has a score which is statistically indistinguishable (as demonstrated by the confidence interval bars) from Venezuela, Belize, Ecuador, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic.

To better understand the case of Guyana, however, we must move away from the hemispheric comparison and look more in-depth at the country level data. The first question we will seek to answer is how the data concerning citizens' perceptions of government economic performance differs between the two rounds of surveys (2006 and 2009) that have been conducted by LAPOP in Guyana. The section below addresses this issue.

Perceptions of Government Economic Performance over Time




Figure V-3. Perception of Government Economic Performance in 2006 and 2009

Interestingly, as the proportion of Guyanese who view the economy as the main problem facing the country increased between 2006 and 2009 (as seen in Figure V-1), the average score of perceptions of government economic performance also increased. As can be seen in Figure V-3 above, in 2006, the average score for the index was 34.6, while in 2009 it increased to 45.4, an

increase of almost 11 points. If we follow the hypothesis laid out in the beginning of the chapter, namely, that when rating the economy as the country's most pressing problem, interviewees were responding in large part to the global economic crisis. We could, therefore surmise from the results of Figure V-3 that the Guyanese, in large part, do not blame the incumbent government for the current economic situation.

Perceptions of Government Economic Performance by Region




Figure V-4. Perception of Government Economic Performance by Region, 2009

As in the previous two figures, Figure V-4, shown above, employs the index of perceptions of government economic performance as the dependent variable, examining it in relationship to the ten regions in Guyana. Region 4 is shown to register the lowest average in citizen perception of government economic performance with an average score of 39.7 while Region 2 displays the highest perception in government economic performance with an average score of 60.3. In addition to Region 2, we also find that the Guyanese from Region 3 also tend to have relatively high evaluations of government economic performance with an average score exceeding the mid-point; statistically, the respondents Regions 2 and 3 hold roughly the same views concerning their government's performance on economic matters. Beyond these two regions, however, we find lower evaluations of government economic performance, with averagees failing to reach 50 points on the 0-100 scale. Regions 4 and 10 are especially low, each of which averages less than 40 points.

While examining the results of citizen perceptions of government economic performance in the aggregate assists us in understanding and coming to macro-level conclusions, in order to truly understand the data in the AmericasBarometer surveys, we must dig deeper and examine them at the individual level. The remaining pages of this chapter will do just that. Basing our theoretical argument on the research of Easton (1975), Lipset and Schneider (1987) and Dalton (2004), the independent variables of interest will include what political scientists call both sociotropic and isotropic economic perceptions. In other words, we are interested in understanding how individuals' perception of the national economic situation as well as their perception on their own personal economic situation influences how they perceive the government's economic performance.

To measure the sociotropic and isotropic economic situations, the analyses below employ two items from the AmericasBarometer core questionnaire. Shown below, SOCT1 asks respondents how they would describe the country's economic situation, while IDIO1 asks respondents to rate their own economic situation.

SOCT1. How would you describe the economic situation of **the country**? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad?


(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know

While the relationship between individuals' evaluation of national and personal economic situations and their assessment of government economic performance is by no means immune from the ever-present threat of endogeneity, we contend that it is reasonable to assume that the causal arrows flow from the previously stated independent variables to determine perceptions of government economic performance. It is not unrealistic to presume that in evaluating the economic performance of their government, citizens first evaluate their own personal economic situation as well as the current health of their national economy.

In addition to the two independent variables mentioned above, the quantitative analyses in this chapter will also employ a number of control variables to hold those effects constant. Included as controls will be the size of the city or town in which the respondents live, their wealth (as measured by household possessions), age, sex, and the education level of the respondents. Furthermore, regions are also included as control variables in the regression models below. It should be noted that in order to preserve the readability of the figures, not all control are depicted; however, for those interested, all variables included in the regressions, along with their coefficients, standard errors, and t-values are included in tabular form in the appendix of this chapter.

Determinants of Perception of Government Economic Performance in Guyana

Figure V-5 presents the results of the multivariate regression predicting perceptions of government economic performance. Variables which cross the red vertical line do not carry any statistical significance (at the .05 level) while those whose horizontal lines (representing the confidence intervals) fall to the right of the 0 mark have a significant, positive impact on the dependent variable, and those to the left of the red line have a significant, negative impact on predicting perceptions of government economic performance. The dots in the centre of the line represent the expected impact.



The reference group is: Metropolitan Area
Figure V-5. Determinants of Perceptions of Government Economic Performance

As can be seen from Figure V-5,⁵² the two variables of interest, individual perception of the national economic situation and one's own economic situation are both statistically and substantively significant in the expected direction. We find that as people's attitudes become more positive towards their personal and national economic situations, their perceptions of the

⁵² While urban area and male are not displayed in the figure, they are accounted for. Being dummy variables, these two categories are referred to as "reference categories" meaning that all other categories of that variable are compared in relation to the reference. Additionally, in the table in the appendix, for the region variables Region 4 is omitted from the table as is the Indian variable for race. These two categories are also reference categories for their respective variables.

government's economic performance increase. The linear relationships of these two variables are depicted in Figures V-6 and V-7, showing that in the case of citizens' perception of their personal economic situation, as their evaluation increases so to does their perception of the government's handling of the economy.

More interestingly, however, is Figure V-7 which shows a positive linear relationship between one's evaluation of the national economic situation and perceptions of government economic performance between the ratings of "very bad" to "good" on the evaluation of the national economy (we notice an insignificant decrease in the perceptions of government economic performance by those who rate the sociotropic economic situation as "very good").

Figure V-5 shows that compared to those living in Georgetown, the capital city, Guyanese who live in rural areas are statistically more likely to hold positive perceptions regarding governmental economic performance. Likewise, age shows a significant, negative relationship, meaning that younger Guyanese tend to hold more pessimistic perceptions of government economic performance. The final significant variable in the regression predicting government economic performance is education, which impacts the dependent variable negatively; those with less education hold more favourable perceptions of government economic performance.




Figure V-6. Impact of the Perception of Personal Economic Situation on Perceptions of Government Economic Performance, 2009




Figure V-7. Impact of the Perception of the National Economic Situation on Perceptions of Government Economic Performance, 2009

From the regression results presented above, the data from Guyana support the research of both Dalton and Schwarz-Blum. In the former, Dalton contends that, in developed countries, citizens use their evaluations of the national economic situation to evaluate government economic performance. As can be seen above, the most significant variable, statistically as well as substantively significant, is one's perception of the national economic situation. However, Schwarz-Blum contends that while in developed countries, personal economic situations may not impact one's evaluation of governmental economic performance, in Latin America, this is not case. Guyana supports this claim: we find that although citizens' evaluation of the national economy is a *stronger* predictor of their perception of government economic performance, evaluations of their personal economic situation is also a statistically and substantively significant predictor of the dependent variable.

The previous analysis examined perceptions of government economic performance as a dependent variable finding that both personal and national economic evaluations are significant predictors in the case of Guyana. The remaining pages of this chapter, will examine the impact of these variables on support for both specific and diffuse democracy, or, how individuals view the current government (specific) and the impact these variables have on democratic stability (diffuse).

Perceptions of the Economic Situation and Its Impact on Specific Support in Guyana

Figure V-1 above showed that a majority of Guyanese rate the economy as being the primary concern facing the country. Furthermore, this chapter has demonstrated significant variation in attitudes concerning how people view the economic performance of the Guyanese national government. Given that we have already examined the determinants of perceptions of economic performance in Guyana, the remaining pages of this chapter attempt to explain attitudes toward democracy. As was articulated in the theoretical framework of this chapter, David Easton theorized over 30 years ago that democratic support could be sub-classified into both specific and diffuse support; specific support referring to one's support for the current democratic government and leaders of the society and diffuse support referring to one's support of democratic institutions, regardless of the current leadership.

This section examines the impact that perceptions of government economic performance has on specific support for democracy. To measure this concept, we utilize question M1 from the 2009 AmericasBarometer Survey in Guyana which asks the following:

M1. Speaking in general of the current government, how would you rate the job performance of President Jagdeo? **[Read the options]**
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/DR




Figure V-8. Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President, 2009

The two pie charts in Figure V-8 depict the assessments of the work of the current president given by respondents in both 2006 and 2009. As can be observed, in 2009 the ratings for President Jagdeo increased in both the “very good” and “very bad” categories, while the proportion of Guyanese responding “neither good nor bad” decreased. In the most recent survey, 14% of respondents rated their satisfaction with the current president as “very good” while almost 30% rated their satisfaction as “good”. The middle response, “neither good nor bad” decreased by more than 12 percentage points between the two surveys with only 38% of respondents rating the president that way. Finally, about 12% rated their satisfaction with the president as “bad” and 6.7% as “very bad”.

In order to facilitate the analysis of this variable, the Latin American Public Opinion Project has converted it into a scale from 0-100 where 0 signifies the least satisfaction with the performance of the current president, while 100 represents the most satisfied.




Figure V-9. Average Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President by Region, 2009

On the 0-100 scale, the average satisfaction with the performance of the current president is 58.4. Figure V-9 shows how that support is dispersed by region in Guyana. Region 2 has the highest satisfaction with the job of the president. Statistically speaking, we can only conclude that the population of Region 2, on average, is more satisfied with the president’s performance than are the citizens of Regions 4 and 10, which hold the lowest opinion of presidential performance.

Of note are the racial tensions represented in this variable. Below, Figure V-10 stratifies the satisfaction variable (M1) by race, showing that the levels of satisfaction expressed by respondents who identified with each race. The differences are statistically different.




Figure V-10. Average Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President by Ethnicity, 2009

It is commonplace in surveys to find that ethnic identities matter in rating job performance of elected officials. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the self-identifying Indian population of Guyana is the most strongly satisfied with the current president's job performance. The Amerindian population, with a level of 62.8 is the next most satisfied group, while those of mixed race rate the performance of the current president at over the 50 point threshold. Persons who identify themselves as Black rate the work of the current president below the mid-point at 45.2 points.

To understand the impact of perceptions of economic performance on specific support for democracy, a multivariate regression is estimated below with perceptions of government economic performance serving as an independent or explanatory variable.




Figure V-11. Determinants of the Approval of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009

Figure V-11 above, depicts the predictors for specific support of democracy in Guyana, (i.e., approval of the current president). In addition to a number of control variables, all the economic perception variables result in statistically and substantively significant relationships with the dependent variable. Not surprisingly, and consistent with the well-established literature in political science on topics such as retrospective voting and candidate evaluation, in Guyana we find that citizens use evaluations of current economic conditions, both personal and national, to evaluate political leaders, in this case, the Guyanese president. Specifically, of the variables included in the multivariate model predicting specific support for democracy, age, size of city or town of the respondent, perception of one's personal economic situation, perception of the national economic situation, and, our variable of interest, perception of government economic performance, all have positive impacts on specific support for democracy.

In Figure V-12, the strong, positive relationship between perception of government economic performance and specific support for democracy is depicted. As one's perception of the economic performance of the Guyanese government increases, we would also expect, on average, an increase in satisfaction with the work of the current president. Indeed, for those who hold the highest perception of government economic performance, we would expect an average score of 80 for the specific support measure, while those with the lowest levels on the independent variable would have an average score close to 40 points on the 0-100 scale.




Figure V-12. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on the Approval of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009

Shown below in Figures V-13 and V-14 are the linear relationships of isotropic and sociotropic economic perceptions and approval of the current president, Bharrat Jagdeo. In both charts, we see a clear linear relationship between the two variables. We can confidently conclude that perceptions of economic situations serve as strong predictors in determining a person's specific support for democracy; as economic perceptions improve, so too does support for the current leader of Guyana.




Figure V-13. Impact of the Perception of One's Personal Economic Situation on the Approval of the Current President (Specific Support), 2009




Figure V-14. Impact of the Perception of the National Economic Situation on the Approval for the Current President (Specific Support), 2009

In sum, this section of this chapter has examined the impact of economic perceptions on specific support for democracy, or their support for the current democratic government. To measure this, the study employs the question regarding presidential performance. This item, M1, asks respondents to rate their satisfaction with the current president. In addition to the size of the city or town of the respondent, in the case of Guyana, we also find that individuals' current attitude toward not only the national economic situation but also their own personal economic situation are significant variables for predicting specific support for democracy: as positive economic perceptions increase, so too does support for the current president. Finally, we also find that as one's perception of government economic performance increases, specific support is also likely to increase.

The next section examines another facet of democratic support for democracy—diffuse support. To do so, this chapter uses the AmericasBarometer survey in Guyana to understand the impact of perceptions of government economic performance on democratic stability, finding that in a number of different aspects of democratic stability this variable has significant explanatory power.

Impact of Perception of Government Economic Performance on Democratic Stability in Guyana

To analyze support for democratic stability in Guyana, this analysis will continue to utilize the index measuring government economic performance. Specifically, this part of the current chapter seeks to understand, what impact if any, perception of government performance has on support for democratic stability. As democracy and democratic stability are multi-faceted concepts, to adequately measure them we are required to utilize multi-faceted techniques. Therefore, LAPOP has identified five key aspects of democratic stability and measures each of the five in the most recent round of the Guyanese survey. The five aspects of democratic stability are (1) support for democracy, (2) support for the right of participation, (3) political tolerance, (4) legitimacy of political institutions, and (5) interpersonal trust. To understand how perceptions of government economic performance affects support for a stable democracy in Guyana, each dimension is modelled separately using multivariate regression techniques. The charts below depict only the significant linear relationships between perceptions of government economic performance and the respective aspects of democratic stability; however, included in the appendix of this chapter are regression tables which present the results for all five regression models including all co-variates.




Figure V-15. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on the Support for Participation, 2009

Figure V-15 above depicts the significant relationship between perception of government economic performance and support for the right of participation. The results shown above, although not perfectly linear, suggest that support for the right of participation depends in large measure on how economic performance of the government is perceived. In the first quartile, those who perceive government economic performance in the most negative terms have the highest regard for the right of participation. Moving from the first to the second quartile in perceptions of government economic performance, we notice a sharp decrease in support for the right of protest. While there is a slight increase between those who fall in the second and third quartile, a noticeable jump in support for the right to participate occurs between the third and fourth quartiles, but the difference is not significant.

As is the case throughout the Americas, in Guyana we find a significant positive correlation between trust in the national government and the perception of government economic performance.⁵³ Although it goes beyond the purview of this chapter to systematically test this relationship, the high correlation between the two variables in the case of Guyana leads us to conclude that higher levels of support for the right to participate, given their negative perceptions of government economic performance, is ultimately a product of lack of citizen confidence in the central government of Guyana. Those who have low levels of trust in the central government also

⁵³ Throughout the 23 countries included in this analysis, the correlation between trust in the national government and perception of government economic performance is 0.58 (sig.<0.001). In Guyana the correlation between the two variables is 0.57 (sig.<0.001),

express the most negative opinions regarding government economic performance and are more likely to support the right of participation and opposition.




Figure V-16. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on Tolerance, 2009

A second aspect of stable democracy of which perception of government economic performance is a significant predictor is tolerance. Figure V-16 shows a negative linear relationship between the two variables. Citizens whose perceptions regarding government economic performance are the most negative tend to also have the highest levels of political tolerance. In this graph, like the previous ones, we find that those whose perceptions of government economic performance are the most negative show the highest rates of political tolerance as measured by an index created by LAPOP while those with the most faith in government economic performance score the lowest on the same measure.




Figure V-17. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on the Legitimacy of Political Institutions, 2009

A further aspect of democratic stability with which perceptions of democratic economic performance have a significant relationship is shown above in Figure V-17. In this case, support for the government's economic performance correlates with higher levels of legitimacy of political institutions. As can be seen from the clear linear relationship between the two variables, Guyanese whose perceptions of government economic performance are most negative also tend to have the weakest belief in the legitimacy of political institutions. Alternatively, those with the highest perceptions of government economic performance also express the highest levels of belief in the legitimacy of the country's political institutions.

It is legitimacy in political institutions which is most closely associated with David Easton's definition of diffuse support for democracy (1975). The figure above supports our hypothesis that individuals' perception of the government's economic performance greatly impacts their diffuse support for democracy in a positive direction. It is the diffuse support of democracy which most preoccupies democratization scholars, given that, unlike specific support for democracy, diffuse support goes beyond support for the current government or leaders and addresses support for the government system within the society.




Figure V-18. Impact of the Perception of Government Economic Performance on Interpersonal Trust, 2009

The final aspect of a stable democracy with which perceptions of government economic performance has a significant relationship is that of interpersonal trust. Figure V-18 presents this relationship and shows that as citizens' positive perception of government economic performance increases, so to does their level of interpersonal trust. Specifically, we see an average difference of about 10 points in interpersonal trust between those with the lowest perceptions of government economic performance and those with the highest levels of the dependent variable.

In Guyana, the only aspect of democratic stability with which perceptions of government economic performance do not have a significant relationship is the measure used for support for democracy. This variable was measured using what has become known as the "Churchillian question," asking respondents to what point do they agree or disagree (on a 0-7 scale) that "Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government;" In the 2009 Guyana sample, almost 70% of respondents answered that question with a 5 or above.

Conclusions

The current chapter analyzes the extent to which individuals' perception of current economic conditions and government economic performance has an impact on various aspects of democratic support in Guyana. Although we primarily employed data gathered from the 2009 AmericasBarometer Survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project conducted in Guyana,

the opening sections of the chapter enlisted a number of comparisons to place the data into a temporal context. First, it was demonstrated that since 2006 Guyanese have become more concerned with the economy, with over half labelling it as the primary concern facing the country in the most recent round of surveys (2009). Furthermore, while the Guyanese have grown more preoccupied with the current state of the economy, average perceptions of government economic performance have actually increased by over 10 points since the previous round, placing Guyana over the regional average of 41.3.

Concerning perceptions of economic conditions and their support for democracy, the current chapter estimated several multivariate models to reflect the multifaceted nature of the concept. First, in Guyana we find a significant relationship between perceptions of government economic performance and specific support for democracy. As has been demonstrated in advanced industrial democracies, and also in Guyana, citizens employ economic perceptions to evaluate their political leaders. Other variables such as age and size of city or town were also found to be significant predictors.

Perception of government economic performance is also found to be a significant explanatory variable for many aspects of democratic stability, although not in consistent directions. Regarding support for the right of participation it was shown that in Guyana, those with the lowest perceptions of government economic performance are the most supportive while those in the second quartile are the least supportive. A negative linear relationship exists between perceptions of government economic performance and political tolerance; on average, those with the most positive perceptions exhibit lower levels of tolerance. Finally, in what most closely resembles Easton's definition of diffuse support for democracy, perception of government economic performance has a positive, significant relationship on the legitimacy of political institutions, while a positive relationship also exists between the key independent variable and interpersonal trust.

In short, economic perceptions do matter. In this chapter we have demonstrated that in Guyana perception of government economic stability is a strong predictor not only for specific and diffuse support of democracy among the citizenry but also for democratic stability more broadly. While in the latter concept, support for democratic stability, the relationship is not consistent among all five spheres of the concept, it is clear that this variable is essential to democratic support in the broadest sense of the term.

APPENDIX CHAPTER V.

Appendix V-1. The Most Serious Problem Facing the Country (A4) Recoded by Category

Economy	Security	Basic Services	Politics	Other
Lack of Credit (09)	Delinquency, Crime, Violence (05)	Water, Lack of (19)	Armed Conflict (30)	Inequality (58)
Unemployment/Lack of Jobs (03)	Gangs (14)	Roads in poor condition (18)	Corruption (13)	Forced Displacement (32)
Economy, problems with, crisis of (01)	Kidnapping (31)	Education, lack of, poor quality (21)	Human rights, violations of (56)	Discrimination (25)
Inflation, high prices (02)	Security (Lack of) (27)	Electricity, lack of (24)	Politicians (59)	Drug addiction (11)
Poverty (04)	War on Terror (17)	Health Services, lack of (22)	Bad Government (15)	Population explosion (20)
Land to Farm, Lack of (07)	Terrorism (33)	Transportation, problems with (60)		Environment (10)
External Debt (26)	Violence (57)	Housing (55)		Migration (16)
		Malnutrition (23)		Narco-trafficking (12)
				Popular protest (Strikes, street closings, work stoppages, etc.) (06)
				Narcoterrorism (65)
				Other (70)

Appendix V-2. Predictors of Perception of Government Economic Performance

Perception of Government Economic Performance		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.102*	(4.44)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.188*	(8.49)
Small City	0.100	(1.93)
Rural Area	0.187*	(3.65)
Household wealth	0.047	(1.73)
Age	-0.058*	(-2.84)
Female	0.004	(0.28)
Education	-0.099*	(-4.57)
Region 2	0.169*	(4.99)
Region 3	0.072*	(2.14)
Region 4	0.078	(1.52)
Region 6	0.029	(0.86)
Region 10	0.071	(1.66)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.012	(0.21)
Mixed	-0.169*	(-5.00)
Amerindian	-0.076*	(-2.43)
Black	-0.294*	(-9.12)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.01)
R-Squared = 0.264		
Number of Obs. = 2416		
* p<0.05		

Appendix V-3. Predictors of Satisfactions with the Performance of the Current President (Specific Support)

Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Education Level	0.014	(0.61)
Female	-0.026	(-1.79)
Age	0.045*	(2.54)
Wealth	-0.014	(-0.55)
Small City	0.092*	(2.61)
Rural Area	0.091*	(2.39)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.221*	(9.59)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.083*	(3.42)
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.336*	(16.51)
Region 2	0.076*	(2.08)
Region 3	0.095*	(2.32)
Region 4	0.111*	(2.34)
Region 6	0.071*	(2.00)
Region 10	0.050	(1.29)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.075	(1.68)
Mixed	-0.136*	(-5.57)
Amerindian	-0.065	(-1.95)
Black	-0.210*	(-8.51)
Constant	-0.006	(-0.28)
R-Squared = 0.386		
Number of Obs. = 2390		
* p<0.05		

Appendix V-4. The Impact of Government Economic Performance on Support for a Stable Democracy

Independent Variables	Support for Democracy		Support for Participation		Political Tolerance		Legitimacy toward Political Institutions		Interpersonal Trust	
	Coef.	St. Err.	Coef.	St. Err.	Coef.	St. Err.	Coef.	St. Err.	Coef.	St. Err.
Economic Performance	0.020	(0.03)	-0.040*	(0.02)	-0.066*	(0.03)	0.540*	(0.02)	0.120*	(0.03)
Satisfaction w/ Performance of President	0.054	(0.04)	0.027	(0.03)	-0.020	(0.03)				
Political Interest	-0.010	(0.02)	0.039	(0.02)	0.034	(0.02)	0.063	(0.02)		
Education	0.310	(0.24)	0.219	(0.19)	0.086	(0.20)	-0.005	(0.15)	0.169	(0.20)
Female	-2.016	(1.40)	-2.064*	(0.91)	-2.195*	(1.05)	-0.028	(0.86)	-1.221	(1.00)
Age	0.357	(0.21)	0.192	(0.16)	0.299	(0.19)	-0.512*	(0.13)	0.188	(0.18)
Age Squared	-0.004	(0.00)	-0.001	(0.00)	-0.003	(0.00)	0.006*	(0.00)	-0.000	(0.00)
Wealth	0.398	(0.41)	0.405	(0.33)	0.801*	(0.33)	-0.107	(0.26)	0.358	(0.34)
Perception of Family Economy	-0.379	(0.84)	-0.512	(0.41)	-0.795	(0.57)	0.471	(0.45)	1.376*	(0.59)
Small City	-4.188	(4.39)	-9.942*	(2.88)	-9.839*	(4.51)	0.681	(2.23)	7.287	(3.94)
Rural Area	-7.094	(3.78)	-10.448*	(2.32)	-8.161*	(3.17)	3.812*	(1.54)	7.164*	(2.46)
Region 2	0.240	(3.75)	0.274	(2.83)	0.381	(2.38)	0.524	(1.54)	-5.305	(2.82)
Region 3	7.960*	(3.94)	5.837*	(2.82)	0.936	(2.03)	0.166	(1.73)	-6.525*	(3.23)
Region 4	-3.108	(4.26)	-2.711	(2.92)	-3.076	(2.24)	-2.171	(1.40)	-3.884	(2.49)
Region 6	-0.547	(4.26)	2.123	(2.95)	2.961	(1.92)	1.195	(1.84)	-6.711*	(3.08)
Region 10	0.108	(4.69)	7.919*	(3.24)	1.642	(2.99)	3.760	(2.13)	-8.252*	(3.80)
Regions 1,7,8,9	8.022	(4.64)	1.532	(3.16)	-1.656	(2.76)	1.952	1.88	3.389	(3.47)
Mixed	-4.097	(2.09)	2.408	(1.29)	2.815	(1.58)	-3.036*	(1.26)	-1.821	(1.72)
Amerindian	-2.729	(3.31)	1.160	(2.60)	1.317	(2.15)	2.118	(2.16)	-0.604	(2.62)
Black	-0.985	(2.10)	4.400*	(1.39)	6.085*	(1.77)	4.442*	(1.20)	1.451	(1.63)
Constant	62.892*	(8.54)	69.116*	(5.23)	58.742*	(7.08)	34.627*	(4.00)	41.132*	(5.49)
R-squared	0.029		0.074		0.066		0.477		0.055	
N of cases	2084		2280		2235		2275		2289	
* p<0.05										

Chapter VI. Deepening our Understanding of Political legitimacy⁵⁴

Theoretical Framework

The legitimacy of the political system has long been viewed as a crucial element in democratic stability.⁵⁵ New research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005) for many aspects of democratic rule (Booth and Seligson 2005; Gilley 2006; Gibson 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Gilley forthcoming). In the preceding chapter, we have examined political legitimacy as an important element of democratic stability, but our focus has been narrow, as we were simultaneously examining several other key elements in the stability equation. In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. Second, we examine a much broader range of political institutions than are used in that approach or in the approach used in the previous chapters of this volume.

The Legitimacy/Tolerance Equation

In prior studies of the AmericasBarometer survey, political legitimacy, defined in terms of “system support” along with tolerance for political opposition has been used in combination to create a kind of early warning signal that could be useful in identifying democracies in the region which may be especially fragile. The theory is that both attitudes are needed for long-term democratic stability. Citizens must *both* believe in the legitimacy of their political institutions *and* be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. In such a system, there can be majority rule accompanying minority rights, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). The framework shown in Table VI- 1 represents all of the theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided between high and low.

⁵⁴ This chapter was written by Margarita Corral

⁵⁵ Dictatorships, of course, may seek to be popular and have the support of broad sectors of the population, but when they fail at that, they have the ultimate recourse to coercion. In democracies, governments that attempt to resort to coercion usually quickly fall.

System Support

Before analyzing political legitimacy and political tolerance as a whole, we will first examine both components separately in Guyana. We will focus on how these two elements have changed between 2006 and 2009, while also examining the position of the country compared to other countries in the Americas, and then we will consider the levels of system support and political tolerance by regions.

As we pointed out before, a democratic political system cannot survive for long without the support of its citizens. Part of this support comes from the belief that the components of the political system, political institutions, and politicians are trustworthy. In order to analyze support for the political system, the Latin American Public Opinion Project developed an index composed of five questions, the “System Support Index”, which has been considered a valid measure to capture the level of support and confidence that citizens give to their political system.

The items used for creating the “system support” index are the following:

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

These variables are measured on a seven-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 “a lot”. However, in order to better interpret the results and to facilitate the comparison across questions and survey waves, these responses were recalibrated to a 0-100 scale. An average close to zero indicates low levels of support for the political system whereas an average close to 100 represents high levels of system support.

Figure VI-1 depicts the average level for each of the five components of the System Support Index in Guyana for 2009. In general terms, the average score for all the components falls above 50 points on a 0-100 scale, which we interpret as indicating moderate levels of support. The element with the highest average is respect for the political institutions of the country, which reaches 60.2 points on the 0-100 scale. The lowest level of support, with a score of 50.3 points, is the belief that the system protects citizens’ basic rights. Between these two measures we observe support for the political system (56.5), belief that courts in Guyana guarantee a fair trial (55.5) and pride in being Guyanese (51.6).

The confidence intervals in Figure VI-1 show that there are statistically significant differences between support for the political institutions, the belief in fair trials, and the belief that basic rights are well protected by the Guyanese political system.




Figure VI-1. Average of the components of the System Support Index, 2009

In order to gain a deeper understanding of system support in Guyana, we take into account the evolution of such support over time. Figure VI-2 shows the average scores of this index in 2009 compared to 2006. As we can observe, there has been a slight increase between the years. The average for the system support index was 52.7 in 2006 while in 2009 it reached 54.8 points on the 0-100 scale. However, the differences between 2006 and 2009 are not statistically significant.




Figure VI-2. System Support Index in Guyana, 2006-2009

Thus far, we could say that Guyana displays intermediate levels of system support which have increased slightly over time. However, to have a broader scope for these results, we should consider the levels of system support in other countries in the Americas. Figure VI-3 shows levels of system support in comparative perspective. When making a regional comparison, we observe that Guyana holds a high-intermediate position scoring 54.8 points on the 0-100 scale. Seven countries are above Guyana, with Canadians expressing the highest levels of system support. At the other extreme, with scores below 45 points we find Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Haiti, and Paraguay.




Figure VI-3. System Support Index in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Returning now to the analysis of system support in Guyana, we now examine variation in levels of system support by region. Figure VI-4 displays these levels stratified by the seven regions under consideration in this study on the political culture of Guyanese citizens.




Figure VI-4. System Support in Guyana by regions, 2009

All the regions, except for one (Region 4), have citizens who on average score on the positive end of the continuum, that is, higher than 50 on the 0-100 scale. However, the average for Region 4 is slightly below 50 points (49.5) and the differences among the majority of the regions are not statistically significant. The region with the highest level of system support is Region 2, the only region that displays statistically significant differences from the rest of the country. In short, we could say that levels of system support are quite similar across the country except for Region 2 where the average score exceeds 65 points on our scale, and Region 4, which is lower than all the others.

Political Tolerance

As discussed above, along with system support, political tolerance is the other element needed for long-term democratic stability. In general terms, political tolerance refers to the degree to which citizens are willing to accept the rights of minorities or those with whom they may disagree. As Seligson and Córdova (1993) point out, the continuation of democracy may be jeopardized if “disliked groups” or minorities are denied the right to participate and express themselves freely. In order to have a stable democracy over the long term, minority rights must be guaranteed, and citizens must support their system.

The political tolerance index is a scale based on the following four LAPOP items:

- D1.** There are people who always say bad things of the Guyanese form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such **people's right to vote**?
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views?
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things of the Guyanese form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

These variables were measured on a ten-point scale, where 1 means “strongly disapprove” and 10 “strongly approve.” However, as is done elsewhere in this study, the variables are re-coded on a 0-100 scale with scores closer to zero indicating low levels of political tolerance and those closer to 100 representing higher levels.




Figure VI-5. Average of the components of the Political Tolerance Index, 2009

Figure VI-5 shows the average level for each of the four components of the Political Tolerance Index in Guyana for 2009. In general terms, the average score for all the components rises above 50 points on a 0-100 scale, displaying intermediate averages of political tolerance which range from 51 to 65.7 points. The component with the highest average is approval of the right to conduct peaceful demonstrations by people who always speak negatively about the Guyanese form of government. Support for the right to protest reaches 65.7 points. At the other

extreme we find support for the right for those people to run for office, with a score of 51 points on our 0-100 scale. Support for the right to vote and the right of free speech fall in between, with average scores of 61.9 and 53.5 points respectively.

The confidence intervals in Figure VI-5 show that there are statistically significant differences between approval of protests and right to vote and the two other components of the political tolerance index (right of free speech and right to run for office).




Figure VI-6. Political Tolerance Index in Guyana, 2006-2009

Figure VI-6 shows the average scores of political tolerance in 2009 compared to 2006. When we look at the temporal evolution of this index, we observe a decline of six points during the last three years. The average level of political tolerance in Guyana in 2006 was 64.3, which drops to 54.8 in 2009. Furthermore, the difference between 2006 and 2009 is statistically significant. Unlike what we observed regarding levels of system support in Guyana, levels of political tolerance are decreasing which could impact support for stable democracy, although levels have not fallen below the mid-point of the scale.

When we compare regions within Guyana, we observe similar levels across those regions, with averages above 50 points on our 0-100 scale. Figure VI-7 displays the average for the seven regions under consideration. Individuals from Regions 1,7,8,9 occupy the lowest position of political tolerance with an average score of 52 points. At the other extreme, with a score of 60.4, is Region 10 with the highest level of political tolerance. The remaining regions are in intermediate positions with no statistically significant differences among them. The only statistically significant difference in the levels of political tolerance is between Region 10 and Regions 1,7,8,9.




Figure VI-7. Political Tolerance in Guyana by regions, 2009

The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

In this section we analyze the interaction between System Support and Political Tolerance, and how this relationship functions in the case of Guyana.

Table VI.1. Theoretical Relationship between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities

System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown

From a theoretical point of view, we propose to analyze the relationship between support for the political system and tolerance. To do so it is necessary to transform both variables from continuous to dichotomous, “high” and “low.”⁵⁶ It is important to analyze the four possible combinations between system support and tolerance that appear in Table VI-1. Political systems populated largely by citizens who express high system support and high tolerance would be

⁵⁶ Each of these scales ranges from 0 to 100, with 50 as the mid-point.

predicted to be the most stable. This prediction is based on the logic that high support is needed in non-coercive environments for the system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would appear to be the eventual inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic unless minority rights are assured. While assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under these conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support, and that have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights are likely to enjoy stable democracy (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, the system should remain stable (because of the high support), but democratic rule may ultimately be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward authoritarian (oligarchic) rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low system support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the table and are directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when values tend to converge toward political tolerance. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict whether instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the direction of the eventual outcome. One cannot, of course, on the basis of public opinion data alone, predict a breakdown, since so many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support/opposition of international players, are crucial to this process. But systems in which the general public supports neither the basic institutions of the nation nor the rights of minorities, are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is permitted. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption made is that over the long run, attitudes of both elites and the general public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, such incongruence may have eventually helped to bring about the overthrow of the Somoza government. But the Nicaraguan case was one in which the extant system was authoritarian and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993; Booth and Seligson 1994).

Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana

We now turn to the analysis of Guyana, first to determine the percentage of Guyanese citizens who would be classified within each cell. Table VI-2 shows the distribution of such results for 2006 and 2009 so that we can compare the evolution during the last three years. In this sense, results for 2009 are hopeful, given the improvement in support for stable democracy, however slight. The percentage of citizens who placed into the category of stable democracy increased from 31.5% in 2006 to 35.7 in 2009. The two intermediate cells, authoritarian stability and unstable democracy also experienced change. The percentage for authoritarian stability increased from 21% to 24% whereas the percentage for unstable democracy dropped from 32% in 2006 to 26.3% in 2009. Finally, the democracy at risk cell shows an almost constant pattern, given that in 2006 15.5% of respondents were in that category, similar to the 14% in 2009. Therefore, the category with the highest percentage of respondents in Guyana is stable democracy, that is to say, the percentage of the population expressing both high system support and high levels of political tolerance, and this cell has increased between 2006 and 2009.

Table VI.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Tolerance in Guyana, 2009

System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance			
	High		Low	
High	Stable Democracy		Authoritarian Stability	
	2006	2009	2006	2009
	31.5%	35.7%	21%	24.0%
Low	Unstable Democracy		Democracy at Risk	
	2006	2009	2006	2009
	32%	26.3%	15.5%	14.0%

This same positive pattern can be observed in Figure VI-8, which shows the percentage of the population with attitudes favourable towards stable democracy in 2006 and 2009. In 2006 31.4% of Guyanese displayed high levels of both system support and political tolerance, whereas this percentage increased to 35.7% in 2009. However, the differences between these two years are not statistically significant.




Figure VI-8. Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana, 2006 and 2009

In order to have a broader perspective of the percentage of citizens who hold attitudes favourable to stable democracy in Guyana, we compare the situation with the other countries included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. As we can see in Figure VI-9, Guyana displays one the highest percentages of citizens with attitudes favourable towards stable democracy. Only five countries appear above Guyana, with Canada being the country with the highest percentage (61.8%), followed by Costa Rica, Belize and the United States. At the other extreme we find countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Haiti, and Paraguay where percentages fail to reach 20% of the population. The most worrisome case is Paraguay where fewer than 10% of citizens hold high levels of both system support and political tolerance.




Figure VI-9. Support for Stable Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2009

Returning our focus to Guyana, we observe differences among the regions in the country. As we can see in Figure VI-10 a majority of the regions average roughly 30% of the population as being classified as possessing attitudes amenable toward stable democracy. The highest percentages are reached in Regions 10 and 2, with levels of 44.9% and 53.9%, respectively. Alternatively, the region with the lowest percentage is Region 4. However, the only differences that are statistically significant are those between Region 2 and Region 4. In short, aside from one region, the rest of the country displays similar or higher percentages of citizens with attitudes favourable toward stable democracy than when we analyze the country as a whole.




Figure VI-10. Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana by regions, 2009


Predictors of Support for Stable Democracy in Guyana

A more in-depth analysis of the attitudes that are favourable to stable democracy requires an understanding of the factors that help to explain such attitudes. In this sense, Figure VI-11 (and its respective table in the Appendix) shows the results from the logistic regression that was conducted in order to determine those variables that have an impact on the levels of both system support and political tolerance⁵⁷.

The logistic regression model includes the following independent variables: dummy variables for region (Region 4 being the category of reference), ethnic identification (Indians as the baseline), education, gender, age, wealth, rural or urban residence, crime victimization, corruption victimization, perception of government economic performance,⁵⁸ and interpersonal trust.

⁵⁷ To carry out this analysis we use a new dependent variable, called “bar2x2”, which was generated from the data. This variable reflects the percentage of respondents who express both high system support and high political tolerance averages.

⁵⁸ The perception of the Government Economic Performance is an Index constructed from two items that asked respondents to what extent they think that the current administration fights poverty and unemployment.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure VI-11. Predictors of Attitudes Favourable towards Stable Democracy, 2009

Figure VI-11 shows the effects of these individual level variables on the probability of expressing attitudes favourable toward stable democracy. The impact of each variable is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left, a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, the confidence interval lines to the left and right of each dot do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they overlap the vertical line, the impact is not statistically significant. We observe in Figure VI-11 that the only variable with a significant impact is the perception of government economic performance. In short, people who believe that the current government is fighting poverty and unemployment are more likely to express high levels of system support and political tolerance, holding the remaining variables constant.

Furthermore, there are statistically significant effects for some regions.⁵⁹ Citizens of Regions 10 and 2 tend to express higher levels of attitudes favourable towards stable democracy compared to citizens of Region 4. These effects can be seen graphically in Figure VI-10.

Figure VI-11 presents the relationship between attitudes favourable toward stable democracy and the resulting significant variable of perception of government economic performance. The line demonstrates a positive relationship between both variables. As the perception that the government is fighting poverty and unemployment increases, levels of system support and political tolerance increase as well.

⁵⁹ While Region 4, Indian and male are not displayed in the figure, they are accounted for. Being dummy variables, these three categories are referred to as “reference categories” meaning that all other categories of that variable are compared in relation to the reference.




Figure VI-12. Support for Stable Democracy according to Perceptions of Government Economic Performance, 2009

Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

Utilizing various survey waves of the AmericasBarometer, we are able to examine the evolution of trust in a wide series of democratic institutions. Although in Chapter I we explored some of the temporal variations of some institutions (those forming the institutional legitimacy index, i.e., national government, justice system, Supreme Court of Justice, Congress and political parties), in this section we present a general comparison of the legitimacy of a wider range of political institutions in Guyana. We measure “trust” in each of the key institutions using a 1-7 scale where 1 means “not at all” and 7 “a lot”. This scale is recoded into the same 0-100 scale used throughout this study.

Figure VI-13 illustrates the levels of trust expressed by Guyanese citizens in the main institutions of the political system. Although the Church is not a political institution, it was included as an anchoring parameter for the measurement of trust in public institutions. In this sense, the Church, in generic terms, receives the greatest average of trust among Guyanese, with 86 points on the 0-100 scale. Furthermore, it is the only institution along with the Guyana Defence Force that displays statistically significant differences with the remaining institutions.




Figure VI-13. Legitimacy of Institutions in Guyana, 2009

A majority of the institutions receive an intermediate level of legitimacy, with levels around 50 points. In this group of institutions we find the Supreme Court, the President, the Attorney General, the Parliament, the National Government, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Integrity Commission, the Guyana Elections Commission and the Regional Democratic Council. These institutions score between 50 and 57.4 points, without any statistically significant differences among them. At the bottom we find the Mayor's Office or the NDC Chairman's Office, the Guyana Police Force, and political parties, with average scores between 46 and 48.9 points on the 0-100 scale.

Beyond the comparison among institutions, it is important to observe whether or not changes have occurred over time. In this sense, Figure VI-14 shows the average of trust in different public institutions in Guyana for 2006 and 2009. In general terms we observe few changes for the majority of institutions between the two survey waves. The largest differences are seen in the Guyana Defence Force and in the Integrity Commission. They are the only institutions that exhibit statistically significant differences in both years. In the case of the Guyana Defence Force, there has been a decrease of 7 points, from 69.2 in 2006 to 62.6 in 2009. In contrast, in the case of the Integrity Commission, the change shows an increase in its legitimacy among Guyanese citizens, from 46.3 to 51.5. For the rest of institutions we do not find statistically significant differences between 2006 and 2009. Trust has decreased slightly or remains at essentially the same levels for the majority of the institutions under consideration: the Parliament, the Regional Democratic Council, the Mayor's Office or the NDC Chairman's

Office, the Guyana Police Force, and political parties. On the other hand, we see slight increases in the confidence in the Church, in the Supreme Court, the National Government and the Guyana Elections Commission.




Figure VI-14. Legitimacy of Institutions in Guyana, 2006-2009

The Justice System

Every democracy needs the “rule of law” to assure citizen exercise of political rights and civil liberties and to provide the accountability mechanisms which both limit the abuses of the state and guarantee the equality of all citizens (O’Donnell 2004). Furthermore, this justice system must be perceived as accessible and efficient by the citizenry in order to generate the necessary levels of commitment with the political system (O’Donnell 1994).

Given the importance of the justice system, it is necessary to analyze Guyanese citizens’ opinions of their system more in depth. This section will focus on the legitimacy of the justice system in general terms, first comparing levels of trust between 2006 and 2009 and then Guyana’s position among other countries in the Americas. We also look at levels of trust in the justice system considering the different regions within the country. Finally, we will present the determinants of the levels of confidence in the justice system among Guyanese citizens.

In order to analyze levels of trust in the Guyanese justice system, we take into account the responses to the following question in the 2009 questionnaire:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?

The responses were given on a seven-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 “a lot.” However, as is done throughout this report, the scale is recalibrated to a 0-100 scale. An average close to zero indicates low levels of trust in the justice system while an average close to 100 represents high levels of trust.

Figure VI-15 depicts the levels of trust in the judicial system for 2006 and 2009. Results indicate stable levels of confidence between both years. Averages are almost identical: 51.7 for 2006 and 51.9 for 2009. Therefore, Guyanese show intermediate levels of trust close to the midpoint on the 0-100 scale.




Figure VI-15. Legitimacy of the Justice System in Guyana, 2006 and 2009

Further, we seek to determine trust levels that Guyanese show in their judicial system compared to other countries in the AmericasBarometer sample. We see in Figure VI-16 that Guyana ranks sixth in terms of confidence in the justice system, sharing similar averages with older democracies such as Costa Rica, Uruguay, and the United States. Canada is the only country in the sample that reaches 60 points on the 0-100 scale. At the other extreme, the countries with the lowest levels of trust are Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Paraguay.




Figure VI-16. Legitimacy of the Justice System in comparative perspective

When we compare regions within Guyana, we find differences among them regarding levels of trust in the judicial system. Figure VI-17 shows averages for the seven regions we consider in this study. We see averages that range from 45.8 points in Region 4 to 62.1 in Region 2. The remaining regions score between 50 and 60 points on our 0-100 scale, with no statistically significant differences among them. The only statistically significant differences in the levels of trust in the justice system are between Region 2 and Region 4, and Region 10 and Region 2.





Figure VI-17. Legitimacy of the Justice System in Guyana by regions, 2009

Finally, when we analyze the legitimacy of the justice system in Guyana, it is also important to understand the reasons why some citizens express higher levels of trust in the justice system than others. In order to find the determinants of these levels of confidence, we ran a multivariate regression taking into account the classic socio-demographic characteristics along with opinions concerning the performance of the current president, the perception of corruption, and crime and corruption victimization as independent variables. Figure VI-18 and Table 2 in the Appendix show the results of this regression. As we noticed in Figure VI-17 living in some regions makes a difference in one's trust in the justice system; holding constant all other variables, people in Regions 2, 3 and 10 express higher levels of trust in the justice system compared to those living in Region 4. Ethnic self-identification, living in a rural or urban area, satisfaction with the performance of the current president, and experiences with and perceptions of corruption are statistically significant predictors of confidence in the justice system. The relationship between these significant variables and trust in the justice system are presented in Figure VI-19.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure VI-18. Predictors of Trust in the Justice System, 2009

As we observe in Figure VI-19 people who have higher levels of satisfaction with the current president also express higher levels of trust in the justice system. Those who rate the performance of the current president as poor have an average score of 29.3 in their trust of the justice system whereas those who believe that he is doing a very good job score 69.2 on the trust measure. Moreover, citizens who have been victims of corruption show less confidence in the justice system, an average of 53.7 points compared to the 45.9 by those who have not been victimized. Furthermore, we find that ethnic self-identification has a statistically significant impact as well. Those who self-identify as Indians and Amerindians have higher levels of trust in the justice system than Black and Mixed citizens. Finally, we see that Guyanese living in rural areas are more trusting of the justice system than people living in urban areas, 56 points versus 43.4.




Figure VI-19. Determinants of Trust in the Justice System, 2009

Other Opinions about Democracy

The last section of this chapter addresses two other general aspects of democracy. Specifically, we analyze citizen preferences for democracy as a form of government and also their satisfaction with the way democracy works in Guyana. These two topics are analyzed first for the entire country and then by region.

Figure VI-20 displays the distribution of the responses given by Guyanese citizens when they were asked what kind of government they preferred. As we can observe, three response options were possible: democracy is preferable, for people like me it does not matter, and an

authoritarian government may be preferable. We see that 67.6% of respondents said that democracy is their preferred form of government. For 15.95% of Guyanese citizens an authoritarian government may be preferable under some circumstances, whereas for 16.5% the form of government does not matter.




Figure VI-20. Preference for Democracy in Guyana, 2009

When we look at these preferences by region, we observe that the percentage of people who prefer democracy over other forms of government vary across regions. Figure VI-21 displays the percentage of people who prefer democracy throughout the seven regions we consider in this study. We observe percentages that range from 57.2% in Region 3 to 83.9% in Region 10. These are the only two regions that show statistically significant differences. The rest of regions achieve percentages between 61.4% (Region 5) and 71.8% (Region 6), and do not show statistically significant differences among them.




Figure VI-21. Preference for Democracy by Regions, 2009

Finally, we could expect that although citizens prefer democracy in general terms, as we see in Guyana, albeit they may not be satisfied with its performance. Furthermore, citizens with strong democratic values may prefer democracy even if it is not working as well as they would like. Figure VI-22 displays the level of satisfaction with democracy in Guyana. In this regard we observe that about half of the population is satisfied (45.1%) or very satisfied (5.6%) with the way democracy works in the country. The other half holds negative views, 38.8% are dissatisfied and 10.5% are very dissatisfied.




Figure VI-22. Satisfaction with Democracy in Guyana, 2009

When we examine levels of satisfaction with democracy by region we notice differences across the country. Figure VI-23 displays the averages for each of the seven regions considered in this study. In this sense, three regions (Region 10, 4, and 5) find themselves in the lowest position with average scores below 50 points. It is noteworthy that Region 10 displays the highest percentage of people preferring democracy while also being the Region holding the lowest level of satisfaction with democracy. At the other extreme, with a score close to 60 we find Region 2. This region shows statistically significant differences with regions 10 and 4 as does Region 3




Figure VI-23. Satisfaction with Democracy by Region, 2009

Conclusions

In this chapter we have addressed the relationship between system support and political tolerance, two basic elements for any stable democracy. First, we examined each of these aspects separately and then combined them into our Index of Political Stability. We discovered that Guyana displays similar levels of system support and political tolerance, with averages close to 50 points on our 0-100 scale. However, tendencies for both measures have varied during the last three years. While system support increased slightly, political stability declined between 2006 and 2009.

When we observe the percentage of citizens who express high levels of system support and high levels of political tolerance, Guyana ranks rather high compared to other countries in the Americas, sharing percentages similar to older democracies such as Uruguay and the United States. This percentage increased slightly from 2006 to 2009, from 31.4% to 35.7%. Within Guyana we also noticed differences across regions regarding attitudes favourable towards stable democracy. Region 2 is the region with the highest percentage of people holding high levels of both system support and political tolerance. At the other extreme, we find Region 4. Regarding the determinants of support for stable democracy, we found that such support depends above all upon citizens' perceptions of government economic performance, that is to say, the extent to which the current government is fighting poverty and unemployment.

Apart from the analysis of stable democracy in Guyana, this chapter also examined the levels of trust in the primary public institutions of the country. In general terms, Guyanese

citizens have intermediate levels of confidence in their institutions, with averages close to 50 points on a 0-100 scale. The institutions that inspire the highest levels of trust are the Church and the Guyana Defence Force, with averages above 60 points. At the other extreme, the Mayor's Office, the Guyana Police Force, and political parties are the most distrusted institutions among the citizenry. Regarding the evolution of trust between 2006 and 2009, levels of confidence remain essentially identical; the only significant variations occur with regard to the Defence Force, which has decreased, and the Integrity Commission, which has increased.

A third aspect analyzed in this chapter was the legitimacy of the justice system. As is the case for the other aspects, Guyanese express intermediate levels of trust in the justice system, levels that remain constant if we compare 2006 to 2009. In comparative perspective, Guyana ranks among the countries with the highest levels of trust in the Americas. We also found that levels of confidence in the justice system depend on the satisfaction with the current president, on the ethnic self-identification (Indians and Amerindians trust the system more than Blacks and Mixed), on the region (Region 2 displays the highest levels whereas Region 4 has the lowest levels), and on perceptions of and experiences with corruption. These perceptions and personal experiences have a negative impact on one's confidence in the justice system.

Finally, we observed that despite the fact that a majority of Guyanese citizens, 67.6%, consider democracy as the preferable form of government, only half are satisfied or very satisfied with the way democracy is functioning in Guyana.

APPENDIX CHAPTER VI.

Appendix VI-1. Determinants of Support for Stable Democracy

Support for Stable Democracy		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Region 2	0.225*	(2.94)
Region 3	0.027	(0.44)
Region 5	0.041	(0.71)
Region 6	0.017	(0.26)
Region 10	0.280*	(4.15)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.113	(1.58)
Mixed	-0.035	(-0.67)
Amerindian	-0.075	(-0.99)
Black	-0.099	(-1.89)
Education	-0.038	(-0.60)
Female	-0.018	(-0.35)
Age	-0.083	(-1.66)
Wealth	0.075	(1.19)
Urban / rural	0.111	(1.35)
Crime Victimization	0.061	(1.14)
Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption	-0.007	(-0.14)
Perception of Government Economic Performance	0.529*	(9.06)
Interpersonal Trust	0.082	(1.48)
Constant	-0.510*	(-8.86)
F = 8.31		
Number of Obs. = 2277		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VI-2. Determinant of Trust in the Justice System

Trust in the Justice System		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	t
Region 2	0.067*	(3.71)
Region 3	0.055*	(2.28)
Region 5	0.034	(1.26)
Region 6	0.008	(0.32)
Region 10	0.087*	(3.74)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.052	(1.79)
Mixed	-0.065*	(-2.39)
Amerindian	0.005	(0.15)
Black	-0.071*	(-2.51)
Urban / rural	0.077*	(2.85)
Education	0.020	(0.76)
Female	0.014	(0.69)
Age	-0.037	(-1.58)
Wealth	0.009	(0.34)
Crime Victimization	-0.025	(-0.99)
Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption	-0.087*	(-3.47)
Perception of Corruption	-0.093*	(-4.61)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.294*	(11.01)
Constant	0.011	(0.60)
R-Squared = 0.176		
Number of Obs. = 2272		
* p<0.05		

Chapter VII. Voting Behavior and Political Parties⁶⁰

Theoretical Framework

This chapter addresses issues of voting behaviour in Guyana as well as the attachments Guyanese citizens have developed with political parties. The first section examines a key prerequisite to voting, namely registration. We will analyse to what extent citizens appear on voter lists that will allow them to vote in the next general elections. We will then look at levels of electoral participation in the most recent elections of 2006, in general and by region, comparing them to the rest of countries in the Americas. Next we will explore the factors that explain electoral turnout in Guyana. In the third section, we focus on one of the principal elements that characterize Guyanese politics—the relationship between ethnicity and voting preferences. The last section examines party identification, looking at its temporal evolution, the distribution across regions, and its strength among Guyanese citizens.

Electoral Participation in Guyana

Electoral participation is one of the most important and common forms of political participation in every democracy. Aside from being the mechanism to select public officials, it is a way to express citizen belief in the legitimacy of the political system. In Guyana, there have been four general elections since 1992 when the first free elections took place. Since 1992, the People's Progressive Party (PPP) has been in power, following twenty-eight years of rule by the People's National Congress (PNC). In this section, we will examine the levels and determinants of registering to vote, after which we will look at the primary individual level factors that explain electoral participation in the elections of 2006.

Registering to Vote

In Guyana, one of the requisites to exercise the right to vote is appearing on the Official List of Electors, which is maintained by the Elections Commission (GECOM). In order to vote in the next general elections, Guyanese 18 and older must appear on this new list of voters. Therefore, it is important to know the percentage of Guyanese who are thus far registered to vote.

⁶⁰ This chapter was written by Margarita Corral.

The AmericasBarometer survey directly asks respondents if they are registered to vote. The question is formulated as follows:

VB1. Did you register for the new voters list? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK

Results for this question can be found in Figure VII-1. As is shown below, 81.6% of voting age Guyanese report being registered for the new voters list while the remaining 18.4% have not yet registered.




Figure VII-1. Registration for the new voters list in Guyana, 2009

Apart from these general percentages, it is also important to know if there are differences among regions within Guyana regarding the levels of voter registration. Figure VII-2 depicts the results taking into account the seven areas we consider in this report. We see that there are no statistically significant differences among regions; percentages of registered Guyanese range from 76.9% in Regions 1,7,8,9 to 88% in Region 5.





Figure VII-2. Registration for the new voters list by region, 2009

A more in-depth analysis of the process of registering to vote deserves an understanding of the factors that help to explain this most common form of political behaviour. Here we are interested in learning whether or not socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Guyanese citizens have an impact on the likelihood of registering to vote. Figure VII-2 (and Table I in the Appendix) presents the results from the logistic regression that was modelled in order to determine the variables that influence registering for the new voters list. The logistic regression model includes the following independent variables: dummy variables for region (Region 4 being the reference category), ethnic identification (Indians serving as the baseline), education, gender, age, wealth, and rural or urban residence.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure VII-3. Determinants of registration for the new voters list

Figure VII-3 shows the effects of these individual level variables on the probability of having registered for the new voters list. The impact of each variable is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical “0” line indicates a positive effect, and if to the left, a negative effect. If the effects are statistically significant, the confidence interval lines to the left and right of each dot do not overlap the vertical “0” line (at .05 or better). If they do overlap, the impact is not statistically significant. We observe in Figure VII-3 that there are three variables with a significant impact: personal wealth, living in rural or urban areas, and ethnic self-identification. People with higher levels of personal wealth are more likely to have registered for the new voters list than those with lower levels of wealth. People living in urban areas are more likely to register than people living in rural areas. And, compared to Indians, Amerindians and Mixed-race citizens are less likely to be registered on the new voters list.⁶¹

⁶¹ While Region 4, Indian and male are not displayed in the figure, they are accounted for. Being dummy variables, these three categories are referred to as “reference categories” meaning that all other categories of that variable are compared in relation to the reference.

Turnout in the 2006 General Elections

In 2006, the fourth general election under democratic rule was held in Guyana. This election kept Bharrat Jagdeo, the People's Progressive Party/Civic's leader (PPP/C), in power. In this section we analyse the electoral behaviour in that election, specifically voter turnout. We will compare percentages of participation within the country and with the rest of the countries included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer wave. We also seek to determine who voted and which variables influenced turnout.

In order to examine electoral participation in the 2006 elections we asked the following question:

VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections of 2006?

- (1) Voted **[Continue]**
- (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB50]**
- (8) DK **[Go to VB50]**

Seventy-one and eight-tenths percent of voting age Guyanese responded to having voted in the last general elections of 2006. Of course respondent recall of 2006 is blurred by the three year-gap since the election was held; however, this statistic is comparable to the 68.8% turnout rate as reported by the Electoral Assistance Bureau of Guyana.⁶² Figure VII-4 places Guyana in a low-intermediate position in comparison to other countries in the Americas. It displays similar levels of turnout to the United States, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Panama, all with percentages close to 71%.

⁶² Electoral Assistance Bureau. 2007. EAB Final Report: General and Regional Elections, 28th August 2006, Co-Operative Republic of Guyana.
http://www.gecom.org.gy/pdf/Electoral%20Assistance%20Bureau%20Final_Report%202006%20elections.pdf
 Accessed 06 June 2009.




Figure VII-4. Electoral turnout in comparative perspective

Figure VII-5 shows electoral turnout in Guyana by region. We observe that percentages of turnout for the majority of regions are quite similar, about 70%. The highest percentage is reached in Region 5 with levels of 80.7%. This region is the only one that displays statistically significant differences with other areas (Region 10, Region 4 and Regions 1, 7, 8, 9). At the other extreme, the region with the lowest percentage is Region 10, reporting 68.5% voter turnout.





Figure VII-5. Electoral Turnout by Region

When we analyse electoral participation, it is important to understand the reasons why some citizens participate in elections and others do not. In order to have an understanding of this issue, we estimate a logistic regression, taking into account the main socioeconomic and demographic variables. Figure VII-6 (and Table VII-2 in the Appendix) displays graphically the results of this analysis. The independent variables considered are dummy variables for region (Region 4 being the reference category), ethnic identification (Indians as the baseline), education, gender, age, wealth, and rural or urban residence.

As we saw in Figure VII-5, some regions, specifically Regions 5 and 6 display higher levels of voter turnout. The regression results also show how Amerindians compared to Indians were less likely to participate in the 2006 election.



The reference groups are: Indian and Region 4
Figure VII-6. Predictors of Turnout in Guyana

However, the two variables with the largest impact are gender and age. The relationship between these two variables and turnout is shown in Figure VII-7. Here we see that young citizens, between 18 and 25 years old, display statistically significantly lower levels of participation than the other cohorts. People who vote in higher proportions are between 36 and 45 years old and between 56 and 65. This is a typical pattern, with younger people less interested in voting and the oldest having more difficulty getting to the polls. Regarding gender, we observe that Guyanese females were more likely to vote in 2006 than men. The difference is statistically significant: turnout was 75.1% for women whereas in the case of men that percentage drops to 68.6%. This is a very unusual finding since most countries have a higher turnout among men than women.




Figure VII-7. Determinants of Turnout in Guyana

Ethnic Groups and Voting Preferences in 2006 Elections

One of the primary characteristics of Guyanese democracy is political competition based on ethnicity. The 2009 survey offers an ideal opportunity in which to test this relationship. Figure VII-8 shows voting preferences by ethnic group. We observe that 68.7% of Indians voted for the PPP/C while only 3.7% of Blacks voted for that party. Alternatively, the PNC is the preferred political party of Black citizens; 75.1% of Blacks voted for this party, whereas only 1.7% of Indians voted for the PNC. Therefore, it appears that the two main ethnic groups in Guyana have very different party preferences. Finally, the AFC gathers votes from all ethnic groups, mainly from Mixed-race citizens (39.6%) and the Black population (31.7%).




Figure VII-8. Ethnic group and voting preferences in the 2006 Elections

Identification with Political Parties in Guyana

Apart from electoral behaviour, we also analyse party identification in Guyana. Political parties are key institutions in any democratic system; they perform essential functions for the stability and consolidation of liberal democracies. Among these crucial functions are aggregating interests, channelling citizens' demands, and selecting candidates for public office (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In this sense, it is important to have political systems in which citizens develop affective ties or attachments to political parties that help to build stable and institutionalized party systems.

In order to understand levels of party identification in Guyana, the 2009 AmericasBarometer survey asked Guyanese the following question:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes **[Continue]**

(2) No **[Go to POL1]**

(8) DK **[Go to POL1]**

Figure VII-9 shows the responses to this question comparing them to the results from the 2006 survey. We observe that party identification has dropped significantly during the last three years. While in 2006 19.4% of respondents identified with a political party, this percentage falls to 12.2% in 2009.




Figure VII-9. Levels of Party Identification in Guyana, 2009

In order to determine whether a percentage of 12.2% identifying with a political party is high or low, we compare Guyana with other countries in the Americas. Figure VII-10 reveals that Guyana is the country with the lowest percentage of party identification in our sample. Except for Guatemala, the difference between Guyana and the other countries is statistically significant. The country with the highest levels of party identification is the Dominican Republic, with 70.3% of its population identifying with a political party, followed by Paraguay, Jamaica and Uruguay. In general terms we can say that levels of party identification in the Americas is quite low, with percentages below 50% in the majority of countries.




Figure VII-10. Party Identification in Comparative Perspective, 2008

Going back to the analysis of party identification in Guyana, we now turn to levels of party identification by region. Figure VII-11 displays these levels stratified by the seven regions under consideration in this study on the political culture of Guyanese citizens. As we can see, all the regions, except for two (Region 2 and Region 10), present percentages between 11.6% and 15.1%; the region with the highest levels of party identification is Region 3. However, the only statistically significant difference is found between Region 6 and Region 2. In short, we can conclude that levels of party identification remain low across the country with slight variation among regions.




Figure VII-11. Party Identification by Region in Guyana, 2009

Aside from levels of party identification, we are interested in determining the distribution of such identification. That is to say, which political parties have larger levels of identification among citizens? Figure VII-12 shows that the PPP/C and the PNCR/1G have similar levels of citizens identifying with them, 48.2% and 47.5%, respectively, which articulates the leading position of these two parties in the Guyanese party system. Alternatively, only 5.9% of Guyanese who identify with a political party identify with the Alliance for Change (AFC).




Figure VII-12. Distribution of Party Identification by Political Party, 2009

Given this distribution of party identification, it would be interesting to analyse identification patterns across regions. For the purpose of this study, we have considered only the two main political parties in Guyana. Figure VII-13 shows the percentage of people identifying with the PPP/C by region. We observe that identification with this party occurs mainly in Regions 1,7,8,9 and Region 2, where about 80% of those who identify with a political party do so with the PPP/C. At the other extreme, with percentages of approximately 30% we find Regions 4 and 10. The remaining regions place in intermediate positions, with percentages between 51.5%-63.6%, with no statistically significant differences among them. The two regions with the highest percentages display statistically significant differences with the two regions in the lowest positions.




Figure VII-13. Identification with the PPP/C by region, 2009

Not only is it interesting to determine the levels of party identification but also the strength of such identification. When respondents said they identified with a political party and which political party they identified with, they were then asked about the strength of that identification. Figure VII-14 shows levels of strength for the PPP/C. Here we see that a majority of those identifying with this party hold a strong (43.1%) or very strong (13.8%) identification. Only 6.1% say they hold a very weak identification with the party.




Figure VII-14. Identification Strength with the PPP/C

Regarding the PNCR/IG we also observe that their supporters are concentrated in specific regions. As we can see in Figure VII-15, in Region 4, 61.3% of Guyanese who identify with a political party identify with the PNCR/IG. In Region 5 that percentage drops to 48.5%. Alternatively, the region with the lowest percentage is Regions 1,7,8,9, with 11.1%. However, the only differences that are statistically significant are those between Region 4 and Regions 1,7,8,9, and Region 4 and Region 2.




Figure VII-15. Identification with the PNCR/IG by Region, 2009

Finally, we observe the identification strength of Guyanese who identify with the PNC/IR. From Figure VII-16 we see that 33.6% of this group consider their identification with that party as strong, and 7.8% as very strong. A large proportion, 28.7%, consider their identification neither strong nor weak while almost a third of respondents report having weak or very weak identification with the PNC/IR.




Figure VII-16. Identification Strength with the PNC/IR

Conclusions

In this chapter we have analysed questions related to voting behaviour and party identification in Guyana. First, we examined how many people have already registered to appear on the new voters list in order to be eligible to vote in local government elections and the 2011 national elections. We saw that 81.6% of Guyanese report being registered for the new list, without many differences among regions in the country. Statistical analyses demonstrated that people in urban areas and wealthy citizens are more likely to be registered. Furthermore, Amerindian and Mixed-race citizens are registered at lower levels than Indians.

We then looked at levels of electoral participation in the previous election of 2006. About 70% of respondents reported having voted in the last election, displaying similar levels across regions and similar levels to the majority of countries in the Americas. Region 5 was the region with the highest levels in both registered voters and electoral turnout. When determining the factors that explain electoral turnout, we found that men and young people were less likely to

vote in the 2006 elections, as well as Amerindians compared to Indians. We also observed a strong correlation between voting choice and ethnic self-identification.

Finally, in the third section of this chapter, we focused on the analysis of party identification in Guyana. In this sense, the country displays the lowest levels of party identification in the Americas. Only 12.2% of citizens identify with a political party, most of them identifying with either the PPP or the PNC in similar percentages. The main differences occur among regions. Despite these low levels of party identification, parties have strong supporters among those identifying with them.

APPENDIX CHAPTER VII.

Appendix VII-1. Predictors of Registration for the New Voters List

Registered for the new voter list		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Region 2	0.040	(0.46)
Region 3	0.092	(1.28)
Region 5	0.122	(1.55)
Region 6	-0.055	(-0.86)
Region 10	0.018	(0.22)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.113	(0.98)
Mixed	-0.152*	(-2.24)
Amerindian	-0.228*	(-2.68)
Black	-0.061	(-0.89)
Education	0.066	(0.90)
Wealth	0.249*	(3.18)
Urban / rural	0.199*	(2.32)
Female	0.058	(0.94)
Age	0.135	(1.96)
Constant	1.545*	(22.80)
F = 3.73		
Number of Obs. = 2474		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VII-2. Predictors of Electoral Turnout in 2006

Electoral Turnout		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Region 2	0.121	(1.70)
Region 3	-0.047	(-0.70)
Region 5	0.155*	(2.29)
Region 6	0.107*	(2.24)
Region 10	0.053	(0.69)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.131	(1.66)
Mixed	-0.110	(-1.75)
Amerindian	-0.239*	(-2.98)
Black	-0.106	(-1.40)
Education	0.072	(0.98)
Wealth	-0.016	(-0.21)
Urban / rural	0.104	(1.48)
Female	0.195*	(3.42)
Age	0.868*	(11.24)
Constant	1.134*	(18.21)
F = 14.14		
Number of Obs. = 2480		
* p<0.05		

PART THREE:
BEYOND
GOVERNANCE

Chapter VIII. Interpersonal Trust and Civic Participation⁶³

Theoretical framework

Since the publication of Alexis de Tocqueville's observations on American democracy in 1835, a strong and vibrant civil society has not just been seen as an expendable component of stable democracy, but as an essential characteristic of it. In the almost two centuries since the original release of *Democracy in America*, scholars have been attempting to understand just how civil society contributes to the consolidation of democratic governance within a polity. Originally, for example, it was presumed that the act of participating in civil organizations and associations increased levels of trust among citizens within a society, however, that assumption has recently been challenged as scholars have begun to posit that a baseline level of interpersonal or societal trust must exist within a society before citizens will be willing to associate with their compatriots. Furthermore, scholars such as Uslaner (2000; 2002) contend that while citizens may become more trusting through their participation in civic organizations, that trust is better defined as 'particularized' to certain segments of the population and not 'generalized' throughout the entire society.

Robert Putnam famously argues that through participation in civic organizations such as religious groups, parent-teacher associations (PTAs) and even bowling leagues, mass publics begin to build a social capital which increases trust and efficiency throughout society (Putnam 1993; 2000). In his seminal work on democracy in Italy, Putnam argues that a primary difference between the more efficient, less corrupt and more developed north and the less developed southern regions of Italy is their civic participation and the resulting lack of interpersonal trust. Banfield also noted this lack of trust in his ethnographic study of a rural southern Italian village, concluding that an "amoral familism" hampers the development of "Montegrano" (Banfield 1958). One aspect of this hypothesis goes in direct opposition to Newton's definition of social trust as being "the actor's belief that, at worst, others will not knowingly or willingly do him harm, and at best, that they will act in his interests" (Newton 2001, 202). A key component to "amoral familism" according to Banfield is that "no one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so (Banfield 1958, 83-84). Clearly, at the very least, in the case of Italy, civic participation seems to play a pivotal role in the functioning and efficiency of democratic institutions.

Even in the most advanced democratic societies, civic participation and the creation and maintenance of a strong civil society are of utmost concern to democratic scholars. Putnam

⁶³ This chapter was written by Lawrence Lachmansingh.

(2000), for example, contends that due in large part to the advancement of technology (especially the television) since the 1950s, Americans participation in civic organizations continues to decline, putting at risk the foundations of democratic governance that have in large part been taken for granted by the American public. As Putnam explains, it is not so much that Americans are no longer bowling; it is that they are now opting to bowl *alone* instead of participating in leagues. Social trust, argues Putnam, is dependent on a participatory citizenry and without it; the quality of democracy will begin to decline.

Recently however, scholars have begun to question the fundamental assumptions concerning our understanding of participation in civic organizations and interpersonal or societal trust. Uslaner and Brown (2005), for example, contend that it is not participation which leads to trust, but is in fact the other way around, “the causal relationship” they argue “runs from trust to participation” (Uslaner and Brown 2005, 868). Scholars have also begun to note the impact of structural variables such as inequality on interpersonal trust and civic participation. In the same work, Uslaner and Brown find that while inequality does not have a substantive effect on communal participation in the United States (volunteering, giving to charity), it does have a pronounced effect on political participation (voting, signing petitions, and working for a political party), with those less well off participating less. Furthermore, using multi-level statistical methodologies to examine inequality, social trust and civic participation in Latin America, Córdova (2008) argues that “civic participation by itself is unlikely to foster democracy unless it forms part of a broader agenda that included policies that facilitate the conditions for the construction of generalized social trust, such as economic policies designed to promote equality” (Córdova 2008, 149). While the causal relationship has not been conclusively determined, it has become essentially unanimous among scholars that both interpersonal trust and civic participation are key components to a well-functioning, liberal democracy.

Recognizing the importance of these two variables, interpersonal trust and civic participation, the current chapter explores individual level variables which cause a person to both trust and participate more in a variety of organizations. The first part of the chapter will examine levels of interpersonal trust (IT1) in Guyana, comparing those levels to years past and throughout the several regions of the country. We will then, through the use of regression analysis, examine the primary predictors of interpersonal trust at the individual level.

Following our analysis of interpersonal trust, we will then proceed to examine civic participation within the country. Using the “CP series” from the 2009 Americas Barometer Survey administered in Guyana, our analysis will examine each organization included in the questionnaire, including participating in meetings of religious organizations (CP6), parent associations (CP7), committees for community improvement (CP8), professional associations (CP9), labour unions (CP10), political parties (CP13) and finally women’s groups and associations (CP20). For each organization, we will examine levels of participation in Guyana in comparison with the 22 other countries included in the Americas Barometer Survey, the difference in participation across time (2006 and 2009) and regions.⁶⁴ Furthermore, where appropriate and when the data permits, we will examine participation in organizations with those

⁶⁴ Given data constraints, some analyses may be lacking from certain types of organizations.

of differing race. Finally, we will investigate the individual level variables that influence people's participation in each type of organization.

Next, we will look at the relationship between participation in civic organizations and demand-making on different governmental institutions including parliament (CP2), local authorities (CP4A) and ministries or state agencies (CP4). The final section will then examine the relationship between participation in public demonstrations or protests (PROT2) and participation in civic organizations.

Historical Background

In a country as ethnically diverse as Guyana, which boasts of six races, building interpersonal trust is a major consideration in the pursuit of sustainable development. The dominant political ideology, which formed in the pre-Independence period, proposed that development challenges posed by ethnic, geographic, class and other divisions could be overcome by political independence and the embracing of inclusive policies. Indeed, the newly independent Guyana of 1966 declared its national motto as “One People, One Nation, One Destiny.”

Civil society has contributed significantly towards the achievement of the “One People” notion over the decades by reflecting the diversity of needs and interests that exists across the country. Hundreds of groups at the local and national levels are currently addressing developmental issues and seeking to make a positive difference in the quality of life of citizens. These groups are reinforced by hundreds more in the extensive Guyanese diaspora, who typically maintain Guyana-focused agendas. By pursuing public goods such as worker's rights, humanitarian relief, education, health, economic development, environmental protection, security and HIV/AIDS prevention, for example, these groups are increasingly seeking ways of working across divisions in a manner that promotes social cohesion and capital.

Guyana's civil society is typified, as elsewhere, by mass-based organisations (MBOs), such as religious groups and labour unions, and a growing Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) sector. These have co-existed along with political parties, as demonstrated by the extent of cooperation – or lack thereof – with partisan agendas, which unfortunately since their inception are still perceived to mirror ethnic divisions. Thus, while civil society world-wide has been a potent force for contributing to increased levels of interpersonal trust, it can also contribute to distrust.

While MBOs have existed for decades and have developed norms for functioning that permit sustainability, they are beset by much of the same challenges that face the more newly formed NGOs: an outdated legal infrastructure, limited resources, poor governance and tendencies toward authoritarianism. Despite these obstacles, many groups are demonstrating a capacity for healthy organisational performance, are achieving results and meaningful impact. There are numerous examples of successful NGOs. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain at

all levels to better equip civil society to build interpersonal trust.

In recent years, civil society has benefitted from a national recognition that trust-building remains a key challenge in the pursuit of nation-building. With an eye to deepening Guyana's democracy, constitutional reforms in 2001 established Article 13, which states:

“The principal objective of the political system of the State is to establish an inclusionary democracy by providing increasing opportunities for the participation of citizens, and their organizations, in the management and decision-making processes of the State, with particular emphasis on those areas of decision-making that directly affect their well-being.”

Specific roles for civil society were to be assured in part through membership in five rights-based constitutional commissions to address issues of ethnic relations, children, Indigenous Peoples, women and gender, and human rights. Unfortunately, the establishment of these Commissions has been significantly delayed – with only the Ethnic Relations Commission being operational.

In addition to the slow implementation of the agreed constitutional reforms, the post-2001 period was characterised by political and social tensions that further threatened the levels of interpersonal trust, particularly across members of Guyana's different communities. Civil society responded through the ‘Social Partners’ (the Private Sector Commission, the Trades Union Congress and the Guyana Bar Association) and promoted a process of dialogue between the main political parties. These and subsequent processes yielded additional political agreements and eventually saw a reduction in tensions.

Generally, however, civil society's participation in decision-making processes in the areas of governance and peace – key sectors for building and demonstrating interpersonal trust - have yielded limited successes. Among the collaborative efforts that civil society has recently pursued are the Forum for Effectiveness and Solidarity (FES), the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) and the Peacebuilders Network. Broader processes such as the National Development Strategy, Multi-stakeholder Fora and the Poverty Reduction Strategy also enjoyed considerable civil society support.

The reasons for these limited successes have been outlined earlier. The net effect is that stakeholder confidence, particularly of political parties, in the abilities and motivations of civil society, is low. The capacity of civil society to occupy a more prominent position in trust-building, whether at the local or national level, is thus constrained.

The following analysis suggests the extent of both the will and capacity within civil society to participate in the development process. It may also contribute towards an improved understanding of how critically needed capacity can be identified and strengthened.

Interpersonal Trust

The key measure of interpersonal trust in the AmericasBarometer survey is one that has been used many times before, and was also included in the 2006 LAPOP survey in Guyana. It reads as follows:

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
(1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK/DR

We will examine the responses to this item by recoding them in the traditional LAPOP format, namely to convert to a 0-100 scale, with 0 equal to untrustworthy and 100 equal to very trustworthy.

As already shown in Chapter I, but repeated here because of its relevance, Guyana scored just above the middle in the AmericasBarometer series of countries. The average score for Guyana was 60.1 in 2008, just about the same as Guamatela (60.2) and Jamaica (60.3), but far below Canada (79.6), and yet sharply above Haiti (40.8).




Figure VIII-1. Interpersonal Trust in Comparative Perspective

Interpersonal Trust Over time




Figure VIII-2. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Year

Figure VIII-2 shows that levels of interpersonal trust between the period of 2006 and 2009 in Guyana have only changed by 0.2 average points in a 0-100 scale. This statistically insignificant change suggests that the major causes of trust and distrust within communities remained the same over the period in question or that the changes that did occur effectively balanced each other out. Further analysis in this chapter will investigate the determinants of trust levels in Guyana.

Interpersonal Trust by Regions





Figure VIII-3. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Regions

Figure VIII-3, characterizing interpersonal trust by region, indicates that those citizens likely to have higher levels of interpersonal trust reside in region 5 (66.3 points) and the hinterland regions – 1, 7, 8 & 9 (65.9 points). While the most populated region, Region 4, and Region 10 have the lowest levels of interpersonal trust (58.5 points and 57.5 points respectively), it is noticeable that when the 95% Confidence Interval is considered there is no significant difference between trust levels in the vast majority of the citizens (regions 2, 3, 4, 6 and 10).

Determinants of Interpersonal Trust



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-4. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust

Having examined regional comparisons, we now turn to the predictors of interpersonal trust in Guyana (Figure VIII-4).⁶⁵ This linear regression shows that a significant negative effect upon levels of trust is driven by respondents being either female, of mixed ethnicity or the victim of a crime in the past year. It is not surprising that females and victims of crime would tend to be less trusting, as females are all too often the victims of various forms of abuse, and, crime victims, of course, are likely to become suspicious of their fellow citizens. The discussion around Figure V.4 delves deeper into this question. The regression results also show that those who are older, wealthier, and who reside in a small city or rural area have significantly higher levels of interpersonal trust than younger, poorer and more urban citizens. It is striking that ethnic self identification so important a factor in Guyana, has no significant impact on interpersonal trust once these demographic and socio-economic factors are taken into consideration, with the minor exception of slightly lower trust among those who self-identify as “mixed.” More discussion on these predictors follows Figure V.5 below.

⁶⁵ In the regression charts, we standardize all variables and indicate the zero mean as a red line. Each predictor that does not intersect with that line is a significant predictor ($p < 0.05$). Notice that any coefficient to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect of that variable on the dependent variable. In contrast, any coefficient to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.




Figure VIII-5. Average Levels of Interpersonal Trust by Crime Victimization

Crime victimization has a significantly negative impact on interpersonal trust in Guyana. As illustrated in Figure VIII-5, those who have been a victim of a crime within the past year have an almost 6-points lower level of interpersonal trust than those who had not been victimized. Crime victimization has the effect of reducing citizen’s trust in each other likely due to the human phenomenon of “once bitten, twice shy.”




Figure VIII-6. Interpersonal Trust by Sex, Age, Wealth and Size of City/Town

Figure VIII-6 graphically displays the significant predictors that positively affect interpersonal trust in Guyana: age, sex, wealth and the size city/town. In terms of *gender*, men demonstrate a 2 average-points higher level of trust than women. When it comes to *age*, there is higher interpersonal trust among those older than the youngest cohort of 18-25, which can be as a result of adult maturation and increased community involvement as well as an increased acceptance of and comfort with the status quo. These levels remain relatively high for older citizens. Younger citizens between the ages of 18-25, however, have the lowest level of interpersonal trust. This may result from those in this age group being more concerned with personal development issues than with community related issues. It may also reflect an idealistic frustration with the status quo, as higher standards and expectations are not realised in the real world.

The *size of the city*⁶⁶ lived in is a significant predictor of interpersonal trust, with levels being markedly higher in rural areas (62.1 points) and small cities (59.2 points), when compared with the national capital. Persons in the national capital are only likely to have a 53.8 points degree of interpersonal trust. This can be as a result of the lower level of community participation that tends to prevail in urban areas, as confirmed in Figure V.7 below. Other urban

⁶⁶ For the 2009 survey, three categories of size were used: **National Capital** (Georgetown), **small city** (all the other municipalities) and **rural areas** (all other areas).

phenomenon, such as a perception of increased levels of crime and political competition, particularly of the rancorous kind, may also contribute to lower levels of trust.

Finally, in terms of *wealth*, the wealthiest Guyanese have the highest levels of interpersonal trust (63 points). Major differences in trust-levels are not demonstrated among less well-off Guyanese, the lowest level being 57.8 points.

Civic Participation

Participation in Solving Community Problems

The extent to which citizens participate in solving community problems can be a tangible indicator of a democracy's health, particularly as relates to the confidence of citizens that such involvement can make a difference in their lives. At the same time, it may also indicate a view on the state of local institutions and their capacity (or lack thereof) as relates to addressing community issues. Deeper analysis into the views of citizens on local government is covered in a separate chapter.

To assess the level of citizen participation in solving community problems, the following question was asked:

CP5. Now, changing the subject...Over the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighbourhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never.	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4)	DK (8)
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


Figure VIII-7. Participation in Solving Community Problems in Comparative Perspective

Figure VIII-7 shows that across the countries included in the AmericasBarometer survey by LAPOP, Guyana ranks highly (7th, with 37.8%) as it relates to participation in solving community problems. Paraguay and Haiti, at 65.6 and 56.4% respectively, convincingly occupy the top two positions while Chile and Nicaragua, with 24.5 and 25.4% respectively, placing them at the bottom of the graph. It is interesting to note that in a region dominated by Spanish-speaking countries, only two of the top seven countries are Spanish-speaking. While it may be tempting to view a higher ranking as a positive from the perspective of participation, it may also be that the *necessity* for participation, warranted by a preponderance of community problems (including weak local government), is what drives the higher level of participation or forces people to take matters into their own hands.




Figure VIII-8. Participation in Solving Community Problems by Region

Among the regions in Guyana, the highest percentage of participation in solving community problems (51%) occurs in the cluster of regions, 1, 7, 8 and 9, as shown in Figure VIII-8 above. These regions are comprised of mainly indigenous communities that are traditionally organized along communal lines. The statistics drawn from the survey also suggests that the community councils and other community bodies in the hinterland are active and provide citizens with the vehicles for organizing and directing local energies.

However there is a noticeable decrease in participation among the other regions, with Region 4 – the most populous region - recording the lowest level (33.5%). This is reflective of the coastal response to community issues, which is magnified in the capital, where communities are less cohesive and local authorities are in a state of considerable disarray. This latter issue will be covered in a separate chapter on local governance. Suffice it to note at this stage that needed local government reforms remain outstanding, with local elections now being 12 years overdue.

Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups

Religion plays an important role in the fabric of Guyanese society, where the vast majority of citizens profess belief in a higher being. According to the AmericasBarometer survey, various Christian groups comprise the largest segment of the population (about 64%), about 21% are Hindus, 7.5% Muslim, with only 4% declaring no religion. A scattering of other groupings (Bahai, Rastafarian, etc.) make up the remainder. The 2009 survey sought to elicit the

extent to which citizens participated in meetings of religious organizations by asking the following question:

CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK/DR
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)




Figure VIII-9. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Year

According to the 2009 data, there has been a sharp drop of almost 20% in the level of participation in religious meetings since 2006. As will be seen in the analysis of subsequent types of civic participation, there has been an across-the-board decrease in participation between the LAPOP surveys of 2006 and 2009.




Figure VIII-10. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups in Comparative Perspective

At 62.2%, Guyana is ranked 8th for the level of participation in meetings of any religious group among the countries included in the AmericasBarometer survey by LAPOP, with Uruguay demonstrating the lowest level of participation. Guyana lies within a cluster of 11 countries that share a similar level of participation, from 63.2% (Bolivia) to 58.8% (Colombia). Interestingly, the four CARICOM countries in the AmericasBarometer survey are found within the top eight countries for participation in religious meetings, with Haiti and Jamaica topping the ratings.





Figure VIII-11. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Regions

Determinants of Participation in Religious Meetings

In exploring the regions in Guyana as a determinant of participation in religious meetings it can be seen according to Figure VIII-11 that levels are greatest (74.9%) in the hinterland regions (regions 1, 7, 8, and 9). As argued earlier, the higher degree of community interaction in the hinterland translates into benefits for civic participation. By contrast, and again holding true in this case, Region 4 (lowest, with 56.1%) and the other coastal regions demonstrate markedly lower levels of participation in religious meetings. It is interesting to note that Region 6 defied the coastal trend and exhibited the second highest level of participation in religious meetings – 69.5%.



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-12. Predictors of Participation in Religious Meetings

Figure VIII-12 above illustrates the predictors of participation in religious meetings in Guyana. From the regression analysis we find that racial self-identification once again does not define Guyanese. Participation levels are higher outside region 4, particularly in the hinterland regions, as already noted. Moreover, we found that women, older people, and wealthier people participate more. However, rural areas demonstrate a negative relationship on levels of participation in religious meetings.




Figure VIII-13. Participation in Meetings of Religious Groups by Sex, Age, Wealth and Size of City or Town

Not surprisingly, and as reflected in Figure VIII-13 above, when it comes to *gender*, females attend religious meetings at higher levels than males. What is perhaps surprising is that the difference in levels is only 7%. Indeed, when we examine another variable in the survey (Q5a), which asks directly about the frequency of participation in religious services (since many of those who attend such services also attend meetings of their church group before/after such services), we find that whereas 23% of males attend such services once a week, 35% of females do so. In contrast, whereas 13% of males never attend, only 5% of females never attend. Finally, while 15% of males attend more than once a week, 23% of females do.

In terms of *age*, participation in religious meetings rises noticeably with the 36-45 age group, at 66.5%, and generally increases the older one becomes. While younger citizens tend to participate less, the decrease is not particularly dramatic: the lowest level of participation is only 56.6% (age 26-35). In terms of *wealth*, the more wealthy citizens (>\$120K/month household income) exhibit the highest degree of participation at 68%. Yet, that participation is not very different from that of the less well-off citizens. Indeed, the remaining Guyanese (<\$120K/month household income) participate in religious meetings at levels above 59%. Finally, in terms of *size of city/town*, being a resident of a small city (municipalities other than Georgetown) also has a positive effect on participation in meetings of religious groups. These residents participate at a level of 67.8%.

Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations

In most countries, including Guyana, local schools play an important role in civic society. Schools offer parents multiple opportunities to meet with other parents, teachers and administrators. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer includes a question on frequency of attendance at parents' associations. The wording is as follows (CP7), along with the special item we added for Guyana, given the importance of race in this country (CP7A).

CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) [Go to CP8]	(8) [Go to CP8]
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CP7A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option] ...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/D R (8)	N/A (9)
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Once again we find a significant decrease in participation levels in the 2009 dataset when compared with 2006. In this instance, and as depicted in Figure VIII-14 below, citizens reduced their participation levels in Parent Associations by over 9%, from 54.9% to 46%. There are no apparent reasons for this general decrease. From all accounts the situation as pertains to parents, children and the circumstances surrounding parent associations in Guyana have remained the same between 2006 and 2009.




Figure VIII-14. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations by Year




Figure VIII-15. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations in Comparative Perspective

Despite this decline, within the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey countries, Guyana exhibits the eighth highest level of participation in parents associations, placing immediately behind the other English-speaking Caribbean countries in the survey – Jamaica and Belize. Haiti leads the group with the highest level of participation in parent associations (65.5%), followed immediately by another poor country, Bolivia (53.3%). This phenomenon may reflect the increased compulsion citizens feel to participate when institutional performance is weak (see parallel discussions on civic participation in local issues and trust in local government).

Interestingly, the countries with the lowest levels of participation in parent associations are two more developed countries, Canada (24.7%) and the United States (23.6%), but this is at least in part a function of the much lower family size in those countries, which is also the case in countries like Argentina and Uruguay, where birth rates are low.




Figure VIII-16. Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations by Region

Consistent with earlier findings, the hinterland regions (1, 7, 8, 9) demonstrate the highest level of participation in parent associations to a significant degree – 66.3%. Regions 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 follow in a cluster that ranges from 42.4% to 47.3%, as shown in Figure VIII-16 above. The remaining region, Region 2, demonstrates the lowest level of participation in parent associations, 38.3%, but that difference is not significant when compared to all other regions except the hinterland regions. The analyses in this chapter suggest that the higher levels of participation in school-related meetings in Region 1, 7, 8, and 9 vs. all other regions is, at least in

part, due to the much higher number of children that hinterland parents have. The mean number of children in these regions is 3.6 vs. 2.4 for the nation as a whole. Indeed, in region 1,7,8,9 only 18% of the respondents report having no children, vs. the national average of 27%. In Region 2, where participation in schools is the lowest, 31% of respondents had no children, the highest of any region. Other factors include that the hinterland communities are nucleated and relatively isolated. There are few forms of ‘social’ activity. Thus, involvement in activities in the community is generally high.





Figure VIII-17. Race of Other Participants at Parent Association Meetings

To further explore participation in parent association meetings Figure VIII-17 looks at the ethnicity of those who attended such meetings, from the perspective of the respondent. About half of the other attendees at parent association meetings are of the same race for 30% of the respondents. In 31.5% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 38.5% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a different race. In the majority of cases, Guyanese are engaging with each other as parents across the racial divide, thus reflecting – and contributing to – levels of interpersonal trust. We will see below that this figure is much lower in other kinds of associations and therefore the school seems to be a particularly good venue for Guyanese to meet and mix.

It is useful to note that when it comes to geographic coverage, the model for schools is similar to that for local government. School areas, like NDCs, comprise a collection of local areas that are almost by definition multi-ethnic. The pursuit of a common agenda through a model that insists upon multi-ethnicity may offer an opportunity for addressing development issues and deepening levels of interpersonal trust.

Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-18. Predictors of Participation in Parent Association Meetings

Further characteristics were used to determine the attendance at parent association meetings (Figure VIII-18). From those characteristics it can be seen that having children and being female are among the strongest factors. This makes sense, since, as already noted, having children provides a motivation for attending school-related meetings. As is traditional among females over generations of civilization, women are generally more interested in their children's education than males. This was confirmed in most of the AmericasBarometer surveys. Age is a strong negative determinant of participation in school activities, since both younger and older individuals are less likely to have children in school. Residents in region 2 participate less in part because they have fewer children in school, but also because of some unknown factor that requires further exploration since the regression results reported above already take into account the number of children (as well as age and other factors). On the other hand, married or common law, Amerindian and Black are those characteristics that have a positive impact on levels of attendance at these meetings in Guyana, net of other factors. We shall explore some of these characteristics in the following charts.




Figure VIII-19. Participation in Parent Association Meetings by Sex

Not surprisingly, we found that women were significantly more likely to participate in parent association meetings than men, by a margin of 18.9% (Figure VIII-19). Some might be impressed that as many as 36.6% of males attend such meetings, given perceptions of the role of males in Guyanese families. From a gender equality perspective, it would be useful to examine the levels over time of male participation.




Figure VIII-20. Participation in Parent Association Meetings by Age and Marital Status

The age breakdown for attendance at parent association meetings shows a harmonic rise and fall in attendance, with levels rising as one grows older to a peak of 66.8% for those aged 36-45 and then subsequently tapering off. Attendance by the over 45 age ranges may be indicative of the parenting function assumed by grandparents in the Guyana context.

Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvement

Throughout the Americas, citizens participate actively in community improvement associations and organizations. In the 2009 survey we asked the following two questions:

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK/DR
CP8. And meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) [Go to CP9]	(8) [Go to CP9]

CP8A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option] ...	All of the same race as yours	Mostly of the same race as yours	About half the same race as yours	Mostly of a different race than yours	All of a different race than yours	DK/DR	N/A (9)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(8)	




Figure VIII-21. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements by Year

Figure VIII-21 compares participation in meetings of a committee for community improvements in 2006 and 2009. The data shows that there has been a decline in 2009 of almost 10%. The decline is consistent with other declines in civic participation noted between 2006 and 2009. We strongly suspect that one explanation is that there may have been a heightened focus on community improvements in 2006 as a result of the national elections that were held in August of that year, some months prior to the survey. More likely, however, given the other data generated in 2009, is that the state of disrepair of local governments has generally discouraged the participation of citizens in community affairs. Other community organizations, such as Community Development Committees and NGOs, may also not be gaining the confidence of citizens enough to inspire participation.

Thus, while a higher number of Guyanese help solve problems in their communities (37.8%, Figure VIII-22) they appear to perform this service without formalising the engagement through meetings, as shown in the next chart. Perhaps much of the problem solving is also being done at an individual level.




Figure VIII-22. Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements in Comparative Perspective

A comparative perspective of participation in meetings of a committee for community improvements, Figure VIII-22, shows the highest level of participation is found in Canada (50%) while the lowest level occurs in Uruguay (13.3%). Guyana is located just eight places above Uruguay. There is a noticeably consistent and gradual decrease in participation levels across the top nine countries, who are followed by a clustering of seven countries ranging in levels from 27.6% (Mexico) to 25.3% (Guyana). Thereafter the participation levels trend downwards, ending with Uruguay.




Figure VIII-23. Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvements by Region

Consistent with other forms of participation, the highest participation levels (55.6%) in meetings of committees for community improvements are found in the hinterland regions (Regions 1, 7, 8 and 9), after which participation levels decrease dramatically. The hinterland communities are generally considered to be more cohesive and community-based in their approach to community issues. They also have the highest number of children and thus benefit more from the increased benefits seen earlier in parent association participation levels. That the hinterland registers such a dramatically higher level of participation in meetings of committees for community improvement than the rest of the country strongly suggests that these committees benefit from a higher degree of legitimacy and public confidence. We have already seen (Chapter IV), that Amerindians and hinterland regions exhibit the highest levels of trust in local governments, suggesting that the structures for participation in community development bodies are generating relatively high levels of legitimacy and public confidence.

The region recording the lowest participation level is region 5 (19.1%), with regions 4 and 3 (20.1% each) at the low end of Figure VIII-23 above. That the majority of the population resides in these three regions suggests that either opportunities for participation or confidence in existing mechanisms is lacking. Suffice it to say that significant room for increased participation in the area of community improvement exists, representing a development opportunity through the use of a currently under-utilized resource – the People.





Figure VIII-24. Race of Other Participants at Committee for Community Improvement Meetings

For community improvement meetings, Figure VIII-24 displays the ethnicity of those who attended such meetings, from the perspective of the respondent. About half of the other attendees at Community Improvement Meetings are of the same race for 23.4% of the respondents. In 48.1% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 28.5% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a different race. Thus, while there is some ethnic mixing occurring in community improvement meetings, 76.6% of the attendees were either all or mostly of one race. This likely reflects the racial consolidation that occurred at the village levels during the early 1960s.

Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Committees for Community Improvement

We now turn to a systematic analysis of the factors that determine participation in community development organizations.



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-25. Predictors of Participation in Committee for Community Improvement Meetings

Among the characteristics of persons that attend the committee meetings for community participation (Figure VIII-25), females are much less active than males. The positive predictors of participation are education, being married or in a common law relationship, as opposed to being single, residing in region 10, regions 1,7,8,9 and self-identifying as Amerindian. It has already been noted that the hinterland areas, where Amerindians are concentrated, exhibit a dramatically higher level of civic participation in Guyana as a result of more cohesive community structures and relations. A more detailed discussion on the other predictors occurs around the following Figure.




Figure VIII-26. Participation in Committee for Community Improvement Meetings by Education Level, Sex and Marital Status

Figure VIII-26 examines four key predictors in assessing participation in community development committees. *Education* contributes positively to levels of participation, with persons possessing higher education demonstrating the highest levels of participation (29.1%). *Gender* plays a significant role as well, with males participating at significantly higher levels than females (29% vs 21.6%). This likely reflects the social and cultural norms that males are more involved outside the home and particularly in infrastructural-type works, such as are likely to be the subject of community improvement efforts. But it may also reflect “machismo” norms that limit women to “the kitchen” and the school, but not the “important” activities at the community level. *Ethnicity*, as discussed earlier, sees Amerindians being far and away the most active participants in community improvement meetings, with a participation percentage of 55.4. Interestingly, the other major ethnic groupings (Indian, Mixed and Black) are all at about the same low level, approximating to 22%. Finally, *Marital Status* identified as persons in a marriage or common-law relationship are much more likely to be involved in community improvement meetings than those who are single, divorced or widowed (30% vs. 19.9%).

We included a catch-all question on participating in several types of associations that depend on one’s profession. The item read as follows, along with its follow-up question on diversity.

CP9. And meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4) [Go to CP10]	DK/DR (8) [Go to CP10]
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CP9A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option]...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/DR (8)	N/A (9)
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


Figure VIII-27. Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations by Year

Meetings of professional associations also saw a drop in participation over the 2006-2009 period, with levels of participation falling from 20% to 15.9% (Figure VIII-27). This decline corresponds with reductions in all other spheres of civic participation assessed thus far in this analysis. The comparative data show that even with these reduced levels, Guyana scores relatively well.




Figure VIII-28. Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations in Comparative Perspective

On the face of it, a level of 15.9% participation level seems to be a low and unsatisfactory performance. However, when compared with other countries within the LAPOP survey, Guyana actually compares well at #6 (Figure VIII-28). Canada is far and away the best performer in this category, at 42.7%, while a cluster of four countries follow at some distance with levels ranging from 25.1% to 22%.




Figure VIII-29. Participation in Meetings of Associations of Professionals by Region

The picture that arises when one examines the participation of professionals in associations is similar to that established with other forms of civic participation: hinterland communities lead the way (31%), while the majority who live on the coast lag significantly behind (Figure VIII-29). Regions 4, 6 and 3 demonstrate levels of participation of only 11.7, 12.7 and 14.4% respectively. Interestingly, the more rural regions are noticeably better in comparison. Professionals in regions 10, 5 and 2 engage each other at levels of 20, 23.4 and 25.7% respectively.





Figure VIII-30. Race of Other Participants at Professional Association Meetings

For professional association meetings, respondents were asked to describe the ethnic makeup of attendees. About half of the other attendees at professional association meetings were of the same race for 30.3% of the respondents. In 43.4% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 26.3% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a different race.

Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Professional Associations

We next explore the characteristics of those who participate in professional associations.



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-31. Predictors of Participation in Professional Association Meetings

The linear regression chart Figure VIII-31 identifies the predictors of participation in professional association meetings as education, female, age, and regions 2 and 10. Of these, all exercise a positive influence on levels of participation with the exception of female, which will be discussed further in the following paragraph.




Figure VIII-32. Participation in Professional Association Meetings by Education Level and Sex

Figure VIII-32 shows sex and education level as these relate to participants at professional association meetings. In terms of *education*, 25.9% of those who possess higher education attend meetings of professional associations as compared with those with primary (16.3%) or secondary (14%) education. With regard to *gender*, males are much more likely to participate in professional associations than females (20.1% vs. 11.7%), suggesting that more needs to be done to encourage female participation in professional associations.

Participation in Labour Union Meetings

The question we asked about labor union participation is as follows:

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK/DR
CP10. And meetings of a labour union? Do you attend them...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(8)




Figure VIII-33. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union by Year

As indicated in Figure VIII-33 there has been a sharp decline in participation levels for meetings of labour unions over the 2006-9 period. In 2006, 14.5% of respondents indicated that they attended union meetings at least once per year. By 2009, the corresponding percentage had declined to 5.5%. Again, civic participation levels in 2009 are consistently and significantly down from their 2006 levels.




Figure VIII-34. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union in comparative perspective

As shown in Figure VIII-34 Guyana is ranked seventh from the bottom, with 5.5%, of the LAPOP survey countries. The highest level of participation in labour union meetings is found in Bolivia, with 21.1%, after which levels drop of dramatically: the second highest level of participation is 12.4% (Brazil) followed by Peru (11.1%). All other countries in the AmericasBarometer survey are in single digits. Guyana's two sister English-speaking countries in the survey, Jamaica and Belize, also demonstrate low levels of participation – 6.4 and 9.4% respectively.





Figure VIII-35. Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union by Region

In a deviation from the picture thus far across regions in Guyana, as shown by figure VIII-35, the highest participation is in region 3 with 9.2% while the lowest level was recorded in the hinterland regions, at 2%. This latter observation reflects the relative absence of labour unions in hinterland regions, while the relatively higher levels in Regions 3 and 6 may be attributed to sugar workers and the agricultural workers unions.

Determinants of Participation in Labor Union Meetings

We next examine the factors that relate to levels of participation in labour union meetings.



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-36. Predictors of Participation in Labour Union Meetings

The regression model in Figure VIII-36 above shows those characteristics that impact labour union participation in Guyana as being female, employed, living in a rural area and self-identified as Black. While females tend to participate less in labour union meetings, persons who are employed, resident in a rural area and self-identify as Black are inclined to participate more.




Figure VIII-37. Participation in Labour Union Meetings by Sex, Employment Status and Size of City or Town

Figure VIII-37 explores sex and size of town as characteristics of participation in labour union meetings. In terms of *gender*, males participate in labour unions meetings at a level of 8.1% while females account for only a 2.9% participation level. In terms of *size of city/town*, participation is greater in small cities and rural areas at levels of 6.5 and 6.4% respectively. The national capital is well below these levels, at 2.4%. The geographic disparities will be of particular interest to individual unions, since it speaks to their appeal, and indicates – in tandem with earlier findings in this report – some of the challenges unions must address if participation levels in their meetings are to increase.

Participation in Meetings of Political Parties

The final civil society organization included in the AmericasBarometer is participation in meetings of political parties. The questions we asked are as follows:

CP13. Meetings of a political party or political movement? Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4) [Go to CP20]	DK/DR (8) [Go to CP20]
--	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	------------------------------	------------------------------

CP13A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option]...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/D R (8)	N/A (9)
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


Figure VIII-38. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party by Year

While there has been a decrease in the participation levels at meetings of political parties in 2009 (16.4%), when compared with 2006 (21.6%), this is readily explained by 2006 being an election year. The following sections describe in greater detail the 2009 findings.




Figure VIII-39. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party in Comparative Perspective

When compared to other LAPOP survey countries, as in Figure VIII-39 above, Guyana falls in the mid-range in terms of participation in political party meetings. Citizens of the Dominican Republic exhibit the highest level of political party participation, at 35.2%. Interestingly, the DR is followed in the ranking, at some distance, by Guyana's two sister English-speaking Caribbean countries, Belize and Jamaica, with 24.4 and 23.8% respectively. Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile trail the other countries with participation levels in single-digits, with Chile being the lowest at 2.8%.




Figure VIII-40. Participation in Meetings of a Political Party by Region

Figure VIII-40 shows the participation levels in political meetings across the ten regions of Guyana. Regions 2, 3 and 6, traditional PPP/C strongholds, demonstrate the highest levels of participation in political party meetings with 23.1, 22.7 and 20.1% respectively. In contrast, and further to the suggestion made in relation to Figure VIII-38 above, traditional PNC strongholds occupy the lower end of the comparison with region 10 showing the lowest levels of participation – 10.3%. The hinterland regions fall exactly in the middle of the ranking at a level of 18.7%.





Figure VIII-41. Race of Other Participants at Meetings of a Political Party

For political party meetings, respondents were asked to describe the ethnic makeup of attendees (Figure VIII-41). About half of the other attendees at political party meetings were of the same race for 27.5% of the respondents. In 48.2% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 24.3% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a different race. As with community meetings, the majority of respondents (72.7%) reported attending political party meetings at which the attendees were all or mostly of one race.

Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Political Parties

The characteristics of those who are more likely to participate in political party meetings are shown in the following chart.



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-42. Predictors of Participation in Political Party Meetings

Figure VIII-42 shows that political interest, living in a small city (municipalities other than Georgetown), living in a rural area, and self-identifying as Amerindian or Black are factors that significantly and positively influence participation at political meetings in Guyana. Region 10 is the only significant predictor that has a negative relationship with participation.




Figure VIII-43. Participation in Political Party Meetings by Political Interest

Figure VIII-43 looks at political interest as a characteristic of participation at political party meetings. Not surprisingly, the data show that political interest is a strong positive predictor of participation in political meetings. 35.6% of the respondents who were interested in politics “a lot” attended political party meetings while 26.5% of those who had little or no interest in politics attended meetings of political parties.




Figure VIII-44. Participation in Political Party Meetings by Size of City or Town

Figure VIII-44 shows that the national capital, a PNCR stronghold, witnessed the lowest level of participation in meetings at 9.1%. By contrast, rural areas and small cities exercised a positive influence on the overall participation levels, with 16.5 and 18.8% respectively of respondents from those areas attending political party meetings.

Participation in Meetings of Women's Groups

A question was asked only of women regarding their participation in women's groups. The items read as follows:

CP20. [Women only] Associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4) [Go to LS6]	DK/DR (8) [Go to LS6]
--	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	-----------------------------	-----------------------------

CP20A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option]...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/DR (8)	N/A (9)
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


Figure VIII-45. Participation in Meetings of Associations or Groups of Women in Comparative Perspective

As shown in Figure VIII-45 above, Guyana ranked 6th with 18.6% among the LAPOP countries, in terms of level of attendance at meetings of women's groups. Here, women would have attended such meetings at least once per year. Haiti is the regional leader with 25.5% followed by Guatemala (24%). El Salvador and Colombia bring up the rear with 7.6 and 7.2% respectively. The two other English-speaking Caribbean countries, Jamaica and Belize, demonstrate levels of participation comparable to Guyana's, at 21.3 and 13.9% respectively.




Figure VIII-46. Participation in Meetings of Associations or Groups of Women by Region

Figure VIII-46 returns us to the pattern that had existed before we assessed more sensitive civic participation mechanisms, such as labour unions and political parties. When it comes to participation in meetings of associations or groups of women, the hinterland regions (Regions 1, 7, 8 & 9) are well ahead of the rest of the country with a 39.6% participation rate. Regions 2, 3 and 6 follow the hinterland regions at some distance with levels approximating 22%. Regions 4, 5 and 10 bring up the rear with participation levels of 13, 15.3 and 17.6% respectively.





Figure VIII-47. Race of Other Participants at Meetings of Associations or Groups of Women

For meetings of women's associations or groups, respondents were asked to describe the ethnic makeup of attendees. About half of the other attendees at such meetings were of the same race for 22% of the respondents, as can be seen in Figure VIII-47. In 45.3% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of the same race as the respondent while in 32.7% of the cases, the other attendees were either all or mostly of a different race. Thus, meetings of women's groups are attended by persons mostly or entirely of one race at a level of 78%.

Determinants of Participation in Meetings of Women's Associations or Groups

The characteristics of those who are more likely to participate in women's association or group meetings are shown in the following figure:



The reference groups are: Indian, Region 4, and Metropolitan Area
Figure VIII-48. Predictors of Participation in Women's Group or Association Meetings

Figure VIII-48 shows that of the predictors of higher levels of participation in meetings of women's groups or associations include: greater political interest, and living in region 6 and the hinterland (regions 1, 7, 8 & 9).




Figure VIII-49. Participation in Women's Group or Association Meetings by Political Interest

Women who indicated that their interest in politics as “a lot” have a very high degree of participation in meetings of women’s groups and associations (36.9%). Given that such persons also attend political party meetings to a high degree, it might be the case that a significant amount of the work to organize women’s groups and associations is being done by or through political parties. It also may be that women who have high political interest are “joiners,” and involve themselves in these organizations.

Demand-Making, Protest and Civic Participation

The survey included a separate battery of items measuring activities beyond mere participation in civic groups. These items measured a more direct and active type of participation. The first item in this series is reproduced below:

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...?	Yes	No	DK/DR
CP2. A member of Parliament	(1)	(2)	(8)
CP4A. A local authority (e.g., a mayor/ municipality or town councillor/Neighbourhood Democratic Council)	(1)	(2)	(8)
CP4. Any ministry, public institution or state agency	(1)	(2)	(8)

Demand-Making according to civic participation

In the survey all respondents were asked the above question with a view to identifying the extent to which they had approached someone in authority for help in resolving problems. Responses are grouped according to the type of civic organization for which the respondent had indicated he/she had attended at least one meeting in the past year.




Figure VIII-50. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Demand-making on Members of Parliament

Figure VIII-50 shows the percentage of the population that requested help and cooperation from Members of Parliament (MPs), by level of participation in civic organizations. The percentage of respondents who said they asked a Member of Parliament for help, of those who participated in a particular civic organization, is higher for those who attended meetings of that civic organization than for those who did not.




Figure VIII-51. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Demand-making on Local Authorities

Figure VIII-51 examines demand-making on local authorities. Again we see a strong relationship between those who both make requests of local authorities and attend meetings of religious groups. We find that 17.9% of those who participated in religious groups made a demand on local authorities whereas only 12.6% of those who do not participate in such religious organizations made a demand. Furthermore, participation in each of the other civic groups is also positively correlated with demand-making.




Figure VIII-52. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Demand-making on a Ministry or State Agency

The emerging picture for demand-making remains quite similar when one considers requests for help made to a ministry or state agency (Figure VIII-52). Once again we find that those who participate in civil society organizations are far more likely to make demands.

Protest activity according to civic participation

At times, citizens protest in favor or against a government action. We asked respondents about their participation in such protests in the year prior to the survey.

PROT2. In the past year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it sometimes, almost never or never?

(1)
Sometimes

(2)
Almost
never

(3)
Never

(8)
DK

(9)
N/A




Figure VIII-53. Levels of Participation in Civic Organizations by Participation in Public Demonstration or Protest

The survey found that community improvement organisations, political parties and unions were the only civic organisations with a significant impact on protest behavior (Figure VIII-53). For example, only 7.5% of those who did not participate in community improvement organizations participated in protests while 16.3% of those who did participate in such organisations protested during the previous year. Participants in religious organizations with 9.4% had the lowest level of participation in a public demonstration or protest while those participating in political parties had the highest (22.9%).

Conclusion

Interpersonal trust is a tangible indicator of the state of a democracy. Guyana demonstrates a moderate level of interpersonal trust in comparison with other countries in the survey, ranking 11th out of 23 countries surveyed. Despite the hypothesis that ethnic differences in Guyana are a threat to interpersonal trust, the 2009 survey confirms that ethnicity is not a significant determinant of interpersonal trust, with only Guyanese of mixed ethnicity demonstrating slightly lower trust levels.

The involvement of citizens in pursuing issues of concern to them is a key objective in Guyana's Constitution. Guyana compares well with the other AmericasBarometer countries – ranking 7th – when it comes to civic participation. Such participation, which is driven in significant measure by the extent of interpersonal trust, is noticeably higher in the hinterland regions of Guyana. For all forms of civic participation, with the exception of political parties and trade unions, citizens from the hinterland participate at much higher levels than other citizens. On the other hand, the most populous region - Region 4 – is ranked last or second-to-last for participation levels when it comes to solving community problems, and participating in meetings of religious groups, community improvement committees, professional associations, and labour unions.

At the same time, however, participation levels across all forms of civic participation have decreased since the previous survey in 2006. Some of these decreases have been quite dramatic, from 14.5% to 5.5% for unions and from 81.4% to 62.2% for religious groups, for example. That the 2006 survey occurred in an election year and close to the Christmas season may explain some of the overall decreases but not why the decrease is across-the-board.

The extent of ethnic mixing in the various forms of civic associations was examined and found generally to be of a low level. Generally, respondents indicated that regardless of the type of association they participated in, their fellow-participants were either mostly or entirely of one race at levels ranging between 69.7 and 78%.

When it comes to the more active forms of civic participation - demand-making and protesting - the 2009 survey found that citizens were much more likely to participate if they were members of a civic association, and particularly if they were a member of a political party, union or community improvement committee. Religious groups, on the other hand, exercise the least effect on the levels of demand-making and protest.

APPENDIX CHAPTER VIII.

Appendix VIII-1. Predictors of Interpersonal Trust

Interpersonal Trust		
Independent Variables	Coefficient.	t
Black	-0.035	(-1.34)
Amerindian	-0.029	(-0.90)
Mixed	-0.056*	(-2.10)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.081	(1.97)
Region 10	-0.056	(-1.21)
Region 6	-0.048	(-1.38)
Region 5	0.042	(1.24)
Region 3	-0.047	(-1.36)
Region 2	-0.007	(-0.21)
Rural Area	0.158*	(3.26)
Small City	0.123*	(2.20)
Wealth	0.059*	(2.26)
Age	0.085*	(3.52)
Female	-0.045*	(-2.33)
Education	0.023	(0.85)
Crime Victimization	-0.060*	(-3.06)
Constant	-0.005	(-0.17)
R-Squared = 0.041		
Number of Obs. = 2416		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VIII-2. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group

Participation in Meetings of any Religious Group		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	-0.012	(-0.17)
Amerindian	0.129	(1.61)
Mixed	-0.087	(-1.28)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.351*	(3.86)
Region 10	0.262*	(2.85)
Region 6	0.282*	(3.98)
Region 5	0.194*	(2.32)
Region 3	0.146*	(2.16)
Region 2	0.240*	(2.92)
Rural Area	-0.223*	(-2.66)
Small City	-0.220	(-1.78)
Married or common law	0.008	(0.14)
Number of Children	0.018	(0.23)
Wealth	0.152*	(2.31)
Age	0.171*	(2.61)
Female	0.155*	(3.20)
Education	0.093	(1.50)
Interpersonal Trust	0.022	(0.46)
Constant	0.609*	(11.15)
F = 4.10		
Number of Obs. = 2401		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VIII-3. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of Parent Associations

Participation in Meetings of a Parent Associations		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.146*	(2.42)
Amerindian	0.183*	(2.18)
Mixed	0.099	(1.55)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.096	(1.03)
Region 10	-0.104	(-1.61)
Region 6	0.014	(0.31)
Region 5	0.007	(0.11)
Region 3	-0.010	(-0.20)
Region 2	-0.169*	(-3.38)
Rural Area	0.059	(0.70)
Small City	0.041	(0.47)
Married or common law	0.508*	(9.54)
Number of Children	0.437*	(6.28)
Wealth	-0.035	(-0.48)
Age	-0.391*	(-5.85)
Female	0.406*	(7.91)
Education	0.098	(1.47)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.082	(-1.85)
Constant	-0.132*	(-2.72)
F = 11.86		
Number of Obs. = 2394		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VIII-4. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements

Participation in Meetings of a Committee for Community Improvements		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.102	(1.21)
Amerindian	0.360*	(4.88)
Mixed	0.044	(0.56)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.254*	(2.24)
Region 10	0.241*	(2.03)
Region 6	0.100	(1.07)
Region 5	-0.115	(-1.36)
Region 3	-0.105	(-1.19)
Region 2	0.134	(1.49)
Rural Area	0.286	(1.69)
Small City	0.018	(0.11)
Married or common law	0.227*	(3.82)
Number of Children	-0.052	(-0.79)
Wealth	0.030	(0.47)
Age	0.096	(1.51)
Female	-0.207*	(-3.67)
Education	0.168*	(2.23)
Interpersonal Trust	0.010	(0.21)
Constant	-1.015*	(-14.70)
F = 5.05		
Number of Obs. = 2377		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VIII-5. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Professional Association

Participation in Meetings of a Professional Association		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	-0.117	(-1.38)
Amerindian	0.165	(1.98)
Mixed	-0.130	(-1.48)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.270	(1.91)
Region 10	0.377*	(2.62)
Region 6	0.026	(0.21)
Region 5	0.205	(1.90)
Region 3	-0.043	(-0.33)
Region 2	0.287*	(2.29)
Rural Area	0.262	(1.50)
Small City	-0.202	(-1.16)
Wealth	0.097	(1.08)
Age	0.122*	(2.26)
Female	-0.356*	(-5.79)
Education	0.250*	(3.65)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.089	(-1.60)
Constant	-1.613*	(-19.02)
F = 7.13		
Number of Obs. = 2379		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VIII-6. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union

Participation in Meetings of a Labour Union		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.243*	(2.28)
Amerindian	-0.223	(-1.15)
Mixed	0.055	(0.56)
Regions 1,7,8,9	-0.186	(-0.96)
Region 10	-0.114	(-0.75)
Region 6	0.036	(0.32)
Region 5	-0.080	(-0.86)
Region 3	0.095	(0.77)
Region 2	-0.006	(-0.06)
Rural Area	0.541*	(3.05)
Small City	0.388*	(2.02)
Employed	0.604*	(3.69)
Wealth	0.185	(1.76)
Age	-0.166	(-1.72)
Female	-0.355*	(-2.85)
Education	0.071	(0.59)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.078	(-0.80)
Constant	-3.314*	(-22.02)
F = 2.75		
Number of Obs. = 2382		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VIII-7. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Political Party


Participation in Meetings of a Political Party		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.191*	(2.35)
Amerindian	0.209*	(2.36)
Mixed	-0.026	(-0.30)
Regions 1,7,8,9	-0.115	(-1.00)
Region 10	-0.287*	(-2.67)
Region 6	-0.030	(-0.32)
Region 5	-0.173*	(-2.05)
Region 3	0.080	(1.10)
Region 2	0.049	(0.56)
Rural Area	0.438*	(3.64)
Small City	0.361*	(2.74)
Wealth	-0.066	(-0.90)
Age	0.103	(1.53)
Female	0.004	(0.06)
Education	-0.082	(-1.13)
Interpersonal Trust	-0.099	(-1.63)
Political Interest	0.566*	(8.81)
Constant	-1.816*	(-26.48)
F = 6.70		
Number of Obs. = 2389		
* p<0.05		

Appendix VIII-8. Predictors of Participation in Meetings of a Political Party

Participation in Meetings of Associations or groups of Women		
Independent Variables	Coefficients	(t)
Black	0.178	(1.43)
Amerindian	0.211	(1.91)
Mixed	0.193	(1.60)
Regions 1,7,8,9	0.434*	(3.27)
Region 10	0.187	(1.43)
Region 6	0.242*	(2.44)
Region 5	0.113	(1.24)
Region 3	0.230	(1.79)
Region 2	0.205	(1.89)
Rural Area	0.141	(0.85)
Small City	-0.051	(-0.29)
Married or common law	0.072	(0.74)
Number of Children	0.070	(0.57)
Wealth	0.103	(0.94)
Age	0.000	(0.00)
Education	0.091	(0.86)
Interpersonal Trust	0.094	(0.97)
Political Interest	0.339*	(3.56)
Constant	-1.476*	(-15.63)
F = 2.05		
Num of Obs. = 1185		
* p<0.05		

Appendixes

Appendix I: The IRB “informed consent” document



Dear Sir/Madam:

You are being asked to participate in a public opinion study funded by Vanderbilt University. I come on behalf of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to ask to participate in this survey that will take 30 to 40 minutes to complete.

The goal of the study is for us to learn of the opinions of people about different aspects of the local and national situation.

This survey is completely voluntary. Your answers will be kept confidential. We will not ask for your name and nobody will ever be able to learn how you responded. You can leave any questions unanswered, and you may stop the interviews at any time.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact Lawrence Lachmansingh whose phone number is 226-8430.

We are leaving this sheet with you in case you want to refer to it.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix II: The Questionnaire

Guyana 2009 v20 Version #18Q V10 IRB Approval: 060187

	
	 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Political Culture of Democracy: Guyana, 2009

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Country: 1. Mexico 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panama 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Peru 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brazil 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. Dominican Republic 22. Haiti 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 26. Belize 40. Canada 41. United States	COUNTRY	24
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]	IDNUM	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
ESTRATOPRI: (2401) Region 2 (2404) Region 5 (2407) Regions 1, 7,8,9 (2402) Region 3 (2405) Region 6 (2403) Region 4 (2406) Region 10	ESTRATOPRI	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
UPM	UPM	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Regions: (1) Region 1 (6) Region 6 (2) Region 2 (7) Region 7 (3) Region 3 (8) Region 8 (4) Region 4 (9) Region 9 (5) Region 5 (10) Region 10	PROV	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
MUNICIPALITY (Urban Areas): (206) Anna Regina (619) New Amsterdam (416) Georgetown (1002) Linden (417) Suburbs of Georgetown (8888) Rural areas (618) Rose Hall (617) Corriverton	MUNICIPALITY	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
NDC (Rural Areas): _____ (8888)Urban Areas	GUYNDC	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

SECTOR OR VILLAGES	SEC	<input type="text"/>
Enumeration districts	GUYSEGMENTO	<input type="text"/>
[CLUSTER]:	CLUSTER	
UR (1) Urban (2) Rural	UR	
TAMANO: Size of City/Town (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area	TAMANO	
Questionnaire language: (1) English	IDIOMAQ	
Start time: ____:____		-----
Date Day: ____ Month: ____ Year: 2009	FECHA	<input type="text"/>
NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.		

Q1. Sex (note down; do not ask):	(1) Male	(2) Female	Q1	
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LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are...? (1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR	LS3	
---	------------	--

A4 [COA4]. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?
[DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]

A4

☐ ☐

Water, lack of	19	Inflation, high prices	02
Roads in poor condition	18	Politicians	59
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15
Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack of	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime, violence	05	Drug trafficking	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Popular protests (strikes, road blocks, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Malnutrition	23	Health services, lack of	22
Forced displacement of persons	32	Kidnappings	31
External debt	26	Security (lack of)	27
Discrimination	25	Terrorism	33
Drug addiction	11	Land to farm, lack of	07
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Transportation, problems of	60
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Violence	57
Electricity, lack of	24	Housing	55
Population explosion	20	Other	70
War against terrorism	17	Doesn't know	88

SOCT1. How would you describe the economic situation of **the country**? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
 (8) Doesn't know

SOCT1

SOCT2. Do you think that the current economic situation of **the country** is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?
 (1) Better **[Continue]** (2) Same **[go to IDIO1]** (3) Worse
[go to SOCT2B]
 (8) Doesn't know **[Go to IDIO1]**

SOCT2

SOCT2A. Would you say that the current economic situation of **the country** is slightly better, somewhat better, or much better than it was 12 months ago?
 (1) Slightly better (2) Somewhat better (3) Much better (8) Doesn't know
 (9) N/A ("Worse", same or DK to SOCT2)
[After this question go to IDIO1]

SOCT2A

SOCT2B. Would you say that the current economic situation of **the country** is slightly worse, somewhat worse, or much worse than it was 12 months ago?
 (1) Slightly worse (2) Somewhat worse (3) Much worse (8) Doesn't know
 (9) N/A ("better" same or "DK" to SOCT2)

SOCT2B

IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) Doesn't know	IDIO1	
IDIO2. How do you think that your current economic situation is compared to 12 months ago? Is it better, same, or worse (1) Better [Continue] (2) Same [Go to CR1] (3) Worse [Go to IDIO2B] (8) Doesn't know [Go to CR1]	IDIO2	
IDIO2A. Would you say that your current economic situation is slightly better, somewhat better, or much better than it was 12 months ago? (1) Slightly better (2) Somewhat better (3) Much better (8) Doesn't know (9) N/A ("worse", same or DK to IDIO2) [After this question go to CR1]	IDIO2A	
IDIO2B. Would you say that your current economic situation is slightly worse, somewhat worse, or much worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Slightly worse (2) Somewhat worse (3) Much worse (8) Doesn't know (9) N/A ("better" or DK to IDIO2)	IDIO2B	

Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have:					
CR1. Independence or Respect for elders	(1) Independence	(2) Respect for elders	(8) DK	CR1	
CR2. Curiosity or Good manners	(1) Curiosity	(2) Good manners	(8) DK	CR2	
CR3. Obedience or Self-reliance	(1) Obedience	(2) Self-reliance	(8) DK	CR3	
CR4. Being considerate or Well-behaved	(1) Considerate	(2) Well-Behaved	(8) DK	CR4	

Now we have some questions about how you feel about different groups [Read Options] .						
GRIDEN1. How close do you feel to other Guyanese people?	Very close (1)	Close (2)	Somewhat close (3)	Not close (4)	DK/DR 8	GRIDEN1
GRIDEN2. How close do you feel to Black people?	Very close (1)	Close (2)	Somewhat close (3)	Not close (4)	DK/DR 8	GRIDEN2
GRIDEN3. How close do you feel to Indian people?	Very close (1)	Close (2)	Somewhat close (3)	Not close (4)	DK/DR 8	GRIDEN3
GRIDEN4. How close do you feel to Mixed people?	Very close (1)	Close (2)	Somewhat close (3)	Not close (4)	DK/DR 8	GRIDEN4

GRIDEN5. How close do you feel to Amerindian people?	Very close (1)	Close (2)	Somewhat close (3)	Not close (4)	DK/DR 8	GRIDEN5
RSTEREO1. Thinking about racial groups in Guyana other than your own, would you say that trustworthiness describes people in those groups extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all?	Extremely well (1)	Quite well (2)	Not too well (3)	Not well at all (4)	DK/DR 8	RSTEREO1
RSTEREO2. Thinking about racial groups in Guyana other than your own, would you say that intelligent describes people in those groups extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all?	Extremely well (1)	Quite well (2)	Not too well (3)	Not well at all (4)	DK/DR 8	RSTEREO2
RSTEREO3. Thinking about racial groups in Guyana other than your own, would you say that hardworking describes people in those groups extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all?	Extremely well (1)	Quite well (2)	Not too well (3)	Not well at all (4)	DK/DR 8	RSTEREO3

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.						
In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...?	Yes	No	DK/DR			
CP2. A member of Parliament	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP2		
CP4A. A local authority (e.g., a mayor/municipality or town councillor/Neighbourhood Democratic Council)	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4A		
CP4. Any ministry, public institution or state agency	(1)	(2)	(8)	CP4		
Now let's talk about your local government...						
NP1. Have you attended a city/town/NDC council meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor or NDC chairman in the past 12 months?					NP1	
(1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember						

<p>NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councillor of the city/town/NDC within the past 12 months?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No (8) Doesn't know/Doesn't remember</p>	NP2	
<p>SGL1. Would you say that the services the city/town/ NDC is providing are...? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor poor (fair) (4) Poor</p> <p>(5) Very poor (8) Doesn't know</p>	SGL1	
<p>LGL2A. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given more responsibilities? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Much more to the central government</p> <p>(2) Somewhat more to the central government</p> <p>(3) The same amount to the central government and the city/town/ NDC</p> <p>(4) Some more to the city/town/ NDC</p> <p>(5) Much more to the city/town/ NDC</p> <p>(8) DK/DA</p>	LGL2A	
<p>LGL2B. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Much more the central government</p> <p>(2) Some more the central government</p> <p>(3) The same amount the central government and the city/town/ NDC</p> <p>(4) Some more the city/town/ NDC</p> <p>(5) Much more the city/town/NDC</p> <p>(8) DK/DA</p>	LGL2B	
<p>Now, let's talk about the allocation of responsibilities and resources to Regional Democratic Councils (RDC)</p> <p>LGL2C. Taking into account the current public services in the country, who should be given more responsibilities? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Much more to the central government</p> <p>(2) Somewhat more to the central government</p> <p>(3) The same amount to the central government and the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)</p> <p>(4) Some more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)</p> <p>(5) Much more to the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)</p> <p>(8) DK/DA</p>	LGL2C	
<p>LGL2D. And taking into account the available economic resources in the country, who should manage more money? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Much more the central government</p> <p>(2) Some more the central government</p> <p>(3) The same amount the central government and the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)</p> <p>(4) Some more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)</p> <p>(5) Much more the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)</p> <p>(8) DK/DA</p>	LGL2D	

CP5. Now, changing the subject...Over the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighbourhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never.	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4)	DK (8)	CP5	
--	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------	-----------	------------	--

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat for each question “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year” or “never” to help the respondent]**

CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4)	DK/DR (8)	CP6	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) [Go to CP8]	(8) [Go to CP8]	CP7	

CP7A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option] ...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/D R (8)	N/A (9)	CP7A	
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CP8. And meetings of a committee or association for community improvement? Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4) [Go to CP9]	DK/DR (8) [Go to CP9]	CP8	
---	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	-----------------------------	-----------------------------	------------	--

CP8A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option] ...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/DR (8)	N/A (9)	CP8A	
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CP9. And meetings of an association of professionals, traders or farmers? Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4) [Go to CP10]	DK/DR (8) [Go to CP10]	CP9	
--	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	------------	--

CP9A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option] ...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/DR (8)	N/A (9)	CP9A	
---	--------------------------------------	---	--	--	---	--------------	------------	-------------	--

CP10. And meetings of a labour union? Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4)	DK/DR (8)	CP10	
--	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	--------------	--------------	-------------	--

CP13. Meetings of a political party or political movement? Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4) [Go to CP20]	DK/DR (8) [Go to CP20]	CP13	
---	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------	--

CP13A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option] ...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/DR (8)	N/A (9)	CP13A	
--	--------------------------------------	---	--	--	---	--------------	------------	--------------	--

CP20. [Women only] Associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	Once a week (1)	Once or twice a month (2)	Once or twice a year (3)	Never (4) [Go to LS6]	DK/DR (8) [Go to LS6]	CP20	
---	--------------------	------------------------------	-----------------------------	------------------------------------	------------------------------------	-------------	--

CP20A. In general, would you say that the people who attend those meetings with you are [read each option] ...	All of the same race as yours (1)	Mostly of the same race as yours (2)	About half the same race as yours (3)	Mostly of a different race than yours (4)	All of a different race than yours (5)	DK/DR (8)	N/A (9)	CP20A	
--	--------------------------------------	---	--	--	---	--------------	------------	--------------	--

[Use card #0]

LS6. Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel about it? Which step comes closest to the way you feel?											LS6	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	
Worst possible life						Best possible life					DK	

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago?	LS6A	
---	-------------	--

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Worst possible life						Best possible life				DK	

[COLLECT CARD #0]

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this community are generally very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? [Read options] (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) not very trustworthy (4) untrustworthy (8) DK/DR	IT1	
--	-----	--

IT1B. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? (1) Most people can be trusted (2) One can't be too careful in dealing with people (8) DK/DR	IT1B	
--	------	--

SHOW CARD # 1

L1. (Left-Right Scale) Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right, where 1 means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those who sympathize more with the left and those who sympathize more with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position.

										L1
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Left					Right					DK/DR

Collect Card # 1

PROT2. In the past year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? Did you do it sometimes, almost never or never?	(1) Sometimes	(2) Almost never	(3) Never	(8) DK	(9) N/A	PROT2	
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Now let's change the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances a military take-over would be justified. In your opinion would a military coup be justified in the following circumstances?

[Read the options after each question]:

JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over would be justified	(2) A military take-over would not be justified	(8) DK	JC1	
--	---	---	--------	-----	--

JC4. When there are a lot of social protests.	(1) A military take-over would be justified	(2) A military take-over would not be justified	(8) DK	JC4	
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over would be justified	(2) A military take-over would not be justified	(8) DK	JC10	
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over would be justified	(2) A military take-over would not be justified	(8) DK	JC13	

JC15. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for the President to shut down the Parliament or do you think there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes, there can be sufficient grounds	(2) No, there can never be sufficient grounds	(8)DK	JC15	
JC16. Do you think that sometimes there can be sufficient grounds for the President to dissolve the Supreme Court (High Court) or do you think that there can never be sufficient grounds to do so?	(1) Yes, there can be sufficient grounds	(2) No, there can never be sufficient grounds	(8)DK	JC16	

VIC1. Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No [Skip to AOJ8] (8) DK/DR [Skip to AOJ8]	VIC1	
VIC2. What kind of crime were you the victim of? [Read the options] (1) Robbery without physical aggression or threat (2) Robbery with physical aggression or threat (3) Physical aggression without robbery (4) Rape or sexual assault (5) Kidnapping (6) Damage to property (7) Home burglary (8) Other (88) DK (99) N/A (was not a victim)	VIC2	
AOJ1. Did you report the crime to any institution? (1) Yes [Skip to AOJ8] (2) Did not report [Continue] (8) DK/DR [Skip to AOJ8] (9) N/A (not a victim) [Skip to AOJ8]	AOJ1	

<p>AOJ1B. Why did you not report the crime? [Do not read options]</p> <p>(1) Does not work (2) It is dangerous and afraid of retaliation (3) Did not have any proof (4) It was not that serious (5) Did not know where to report (7) Little confidence in the Police (6) Other reason (8) DK/DR (9) N/A</p>	<p>AOJ1B</p>
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<p>AOJ8. In order to apprehend criminals do you think that the authorities should always respect the law or that occasionally they can operate at the margin of the law?</p> <p>(1) They should always respect the law (2) Can operate at the margin of the law occasionally (8)DK/DR</p>	<p>AOJ8</p>
<p>AOJ11. Speaking of the neighbourhood where you live and, thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?</p> <p>(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>AOJ11</p>

<p>AOJ11A. And speaking of the country in general, how much do you think that the level of crime that we have now represents a threat to our future well-being? [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) Very much (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>AOJ11A</p>
<p>AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>AOJ12</p>
<p>AOJ12a. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the police would apprehend the guilty? [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>AOJ12a</p>

<p>AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think?</p> <p>(1) Police protect or (2) Police involved in crime (3) [Don't Read] Some of them protect and others are involved in crime (8) DK/DR</p>	<p>AOJ18</p>
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[Give card "A" to the respondent]

Now we will use a card. This card has a 7 point scale; each point indicates a score that goes from 1, meaning NOT AT ALL, to 7, meaning A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in the contrary, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Not at all				A lot			Doesn't know

Note down a number 1-7, or 8 for

those who don't know

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Guyana guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two).	B1
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Guyana?	B2
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Guyana?	B3
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Guyana?	B4
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Guyana?	B6
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?	B10A
B11. To what extent do you trust the Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM)?	B11
B12. To what extent do you trust the Guyana Defence Force?	B12
B13. To what extent do you trust the Parliament?	B13
B14. To what extent do you trust the National Government?	B14
GUYB15. To what extent do you trust the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)?	GUY B15
B18. To what extent do you trust the Guyana Police Force?	B18
B20. To what extent do you trust the Church?	B20
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?	B21
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?	B21A
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court (High Court)?	B31
B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor's office of your city or town/ NDC chairman's office?	B32
B33. To what extent do you trust the Regional Democratic Council (RDC)?	B33
B43. To what extent are you proud of being a Guyanese?	B43
B16. To what extent do you trust the Attorney General?	B16
B46 [b45]. To what extent do you trust the Integrity Commission?	B46
B47. To what extent do you trust elections?	B47
B48. To what extent do you believe that free trade agreement will help to improve the economy?	B48

Now, using the same scale, (<i>continue with card A: 1-7 point scale</i>)	Note down 1-7, 8 = DK		
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A Lot			
N1. To what extent would you say the current government fights poverty?		N1	
N3. To what extent would you say the current government promotes and protects democratic principles?		N3	
N9. To what extent would you say the current government combats government corruption?		N9	
N11. To what extent would you say the current government improves the security of citizens?		N11	
N12. To what extent would you say the current government combats unemployment?		N12	

[Take back card A]

M1. Speaking in general of the current government, how would you rate the job performance of President Jagdeo? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (8) DK/DR		M1	
M2. Now speaking of the Parliament. Thinking of those members of the Parliament as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the Members of the Parliament are performing their jobs very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (8) DK/DR		M2	

[Give card B]: Now we will use a similar card, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score. I am going to read various statements and I would like you to tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements.

Write a number 1-7, or 8 for those who don’t know

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Strongly disagree Strongly agree							Doesn't know

Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements, again using card B: POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP101
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POP102. When the Parliament obstructs the work of our government, our presidents should govern without the Parliament. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP102	
POP103. When the Supreme Court [High Court] obstructs the work of our government, it should be ignored by our presidents. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP103	
POP106. Our presidents must follow the will of the people because what the people want is always right. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP106	
POP107. The people should govern directly and not through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP107	
POP109. In today's world there is a battle between good and evil, and people must choose between one of the two. How much do you agree or disagree that such a battle between good and evil exists? (8) DK/DR	POP109	
POP110. Once the people decide what is right, we must prevent a minority from opposing them. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP110	
POP112. The largest obstacle to progress in our country is the ruling class (or oligarchy) taking advantage of the people. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP112	
POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the interests of the country. How much do you agree or disagree? (8) DK/DR	POP113	

EFF1. Those who govern this country are really interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree?	EFF1	
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree?	EFF2	
[Don't take back Card B]		

those who don't know		Write a number 1-7, or 8 for
ING4. Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	ING4	
PN2. Despite our differences, we Guyanese have many things that unite us as a country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	PN2	
DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	DEM23	

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you **agree** or **disagree** with the following statements. We will continue using the same scale from 1 to 7.

ROS1. The government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		ROS1	
ROS2. The government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		ROS2	
ROS3. The government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		ROS3	
ROS4. The government should implement strong policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		ROS4	
ROS5. The government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		ROS5	
ROS6. The government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for health care. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?		ROS6	

[Take back Card "B"]

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the form of democracy in Guyana? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (8) DK/DR		PN4	
PN5. In your opinion, is Guyana very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic? (1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic (4) Not at all democratic (8) DK/DR		PN5	

[Give the respondent card "C"]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point scale, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove					Strongly approve					Doesn't know

	1-10, 88	
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	E5	
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?	E8	
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	E11	
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	E15	
E14. Of people squatting on private property or land. How much do you approve or disapprove?	E14	
E2. Of people taking control over factories, offices and other buildings as a form of protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?	E2	
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	E3	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	E16	

The following questions are to find out your opinion about the different ideas of people who live in Guyana. Please continue using the 10 point scale [card C].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Strongly disapprove							Strongly approve			Doesn't know

	1-10, 88	
D1. There are people who always say bad things of the Guyanese form of government, not just the government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]	D1	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	D2	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things of the Guyanese form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	D3	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?	D4	
D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?	D5	

[COLLECT CARD “C”]

Now changing the subject...

<p>DEM2. With which of the following statements do you agree with the most:</p> <p>(1) For most people it doesn't matter whether a regime is democratic or non-democratic.</p> <p>(2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government</p> <p>(3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.</p> <p>(8) DK/DR</p>	DEM2	
<p>DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government that rules with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?</p> <p>(1) Iron fist (2) Participation for all (8) DK/DR</p>	DEM11	
<p>AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader that does not have to be elected. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? [Read]</p> <p>(1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected</p> <p>(2) Electoral democracy is the best</p> <p>(8) DK/DR</p>	AUT1	
<p>AUT2. With which of the following statements do you agree the most: [Read choices]</p> <p>(1) As citizens we should be more active in questioning our leaders or</p> <p>(2) As citizens we should show more respect for the authority of our leaders</p> <p>(8) DK/DR</p>	AUT2	
<p>PP1. During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (8) DK/DR</p>	PP1	
<p>PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of 2006?</p> <p>(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (8) DK/DR</p>	PP2	

Now, I would like for you to tell me if you consider the following actions as:
(1) Corrupt and should be punished; (2) Corrupt but justified under the circumstances; or (3) not corrupt.

DC10. A mother of several children needs to obtain a birth certificate for one of them. In order not to be wasting time waiting, she pays to an official of the registrar's office G\$1000. Do you think that what the woman did is [Read the options, and if answer "the municipal official has to be punished," Ask: and the mother?] : (1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justified (3) Not corrupt (8) DK	DC10	
DC13. An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think that what the politician did is [Read the options] (1) Corrupt and should be punished (2) Corrupt but justified (3) Not corrupt (8) DK	DC13	

	N/A Did not have contact	No	Yes	DK/DR		
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...						
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe during the past year?		(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC2	
EXC6. During the past year did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC6	
EXC11. During the past year did you have any official dealings in the municipality or NDC? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: During the past year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	(9)	(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC11	
EXC13. Are you currently employed? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: At your workplace, have you had to pay a bribe in the last year?	(9)	(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC13	
EXC14. During the past year, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → note down 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts within the past year?	(9)	(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC14	

	N/A Did not have contact	No	Yes	DK/DR	
EXC15. Have you used any public health services during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to receive attention in a hospital or a clinic during the past year, did you have to pay a bribe?	(9)	(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC15
EXC16. Have you had a child in school during the past year? If the answer is No → mark 9 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school during the past year?	(9)	(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC16
EXC17. Did anyone ask you for a bribe to avoid having the electricity cut off?		(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC17
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		(0)	(1)	(8)	EXC18

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (8) DK/DR	EXC7	
COMUNETID. How would you describe most of the people here in the community where you are living? Would you say that they are mainly white, mixed, Amerindian, Black , Indian, Chinese, or Portuguese? (1) White (2) Mixed (3) Amerindian (4) Black or Afro-Guyanese (5) Indo-Guyanese (6) Chinese (7) Other (8) Portuguese (88) DK	COMUNETID	
COMCON1. How much of a problem do you think that racial differences are for Guyana? Would you say that it is a serious problem, a moderate problem, or not a problem at all? (1) Serious (2) Moderate (3) Not at all (8) DK	COMCON1	
COMCON2. How much of a problem do you think that racial differences are for your community? Would you say that it is a serious problem, a moderate problem, or not a problem at all? (1) Serious (2) Moderate (3) Not at all. (8). DK	COMCON2	

COMCON3. Would it bother you to live in a neighbourhood with people from another racial group? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK.	COMCON3	
COMCON4. Would you allow a child of yours to marry someone of another racial group? (1) Yes (2) No. (8) DK	COMCON4	
COMCON5. Do you attend a church or other religious service in which people from a racial group different from yours also attend? (1) Yes (2) No. (8) DK (9) INAP [does not attend church or services]		

Now changing the subject, have you ever felt discriminated or treated unfairly because of your physical appearance or the way you talk in the following places:		
DIS2. In government offices (courts, ministries, city halls, NDC offices) (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR	DIS2	
DIS4. In social events or meetings (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR	DIS4	
DIS5. In public places (such as on the street, market) (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR	DIS5	
Now we want to know how much information about politics and the country is known by the people...		
GI1. What is the name of the current president of the United States? [Don't read, Barack Obama] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer	GI1	
GI2. What is the name of the Speaker of the Parliament in Guyana? [Don't read, Hari Narayen (Ralph) Ramkarran] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer	GI2	
GI3. How many regions does Guyana have? [Don't read, 10] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer	GI3	
GI4. How long is the government's term of office in Guyana? [Don't read, 5 years] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer	GI4	
GI5. What is the name of the current president of Brazil? [Don't read, Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, also accept "Lula" or "Lui"] (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do not Know (9) No Answer	GI5	

VB1. Did you register for the new voters list? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK	VB1	
VB2. Did you vote in the last general elections of 2006? (1) Voted [Continue] (2) Did not vote [Go to VB50] (8) DK [Go to VB50]	VB2	

<p>VB3. Who did you vote for in the last general elections of 2006? [DON'T READ THE LIST]</p> <p>(0) None (Blank ballot or spoiled or null ballot)</p> <p>(2401) Bharrat Jagdeo, People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/C)</p> <p>(2402) Robert Corbin, People's National Congress /One Guyana (PNCR/1G)</p> <p>(2403) Raphael Trotman, Alliance for Change (AFC)</p> <p>(2404) Paul Hardy, Guyana Action Party/ Rise Organise And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR)</p> <p>(2405) Manzoor Nadir, The United Force (TUF)</p> <p>(2406) Chandra Narine Sharma, Justice For All Party (JFAP)</p> <p>(77) Other</p> <p>(88) DK/DR</p> <p>(99) N/A (Did not vote)</p>	VB3	
<p>VB50. [Ask to everyone] In general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?</p> <p>(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (8) DK/DR</p>	VB50	
<p>VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?</p> <p>(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (8) DK [Go to POL1]</p>	VB10	
<p>VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [Don't read the list]</p> <p>(2401) People's Progressive Party Civic (PPP/C)</p> <p>(2402) People's National Congress /One Guyana (PNCR/1G)</p> <p>(2403) Alliance for Change (AFC)</p> <p>(2404) Guyana Action Party/ Rise Organise And Rebuild (GAP/ROAR)</p> <p>(2405) The United Force (TUF)</p> <p>(2406) Justice For All Party (JFAP)</p> <p>(2407) GNC</p> <p>(2408) LD</p> <p>(2409) PRP</p> <p>(2410) National Democratic Front (NDF)</p> <p>(77) Other</p> <p>(88) DK/DR [Skip to POL1]</p> <p>(99) NA [Skip to POL1]</p>	VB11	
<p>VB12. Would you say that your identification with that party [the party mentioned in VB11] is very weak, weak, not weak or strong, strong, very strong?</p> <p>(1) Very weak (2) Weak (3) Not weak, or strong (4) Strong</p> <p>(5) Very strong (8) DK/DR (9) N/A</p>	VB12	
<p>POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?</p> <p>(1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (8) DK/DR</p>	POL1	
<p>POL2. How often do you discuss politics with other people? [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month</p> <p>(4) Rarely (5) Never (8) DK/DR</p>	POL2	

[Use card #2]

The following section contains pairs of words. On a scale of zero to ten, please tell us which word best describes you. For example, the number zero means “relaxed” the number ten means “tense,” the number five that is exactly in the middle means neither relaxed nor tense. On this scale, what number best describes you? You can use any number from zero to ten.	0-10, 88 DK		
PER1. Then, if 0 is relaxed and 10 is tense, what number best describes you?		PER1	
PER2. Next, 0 is outgoing, and 10 is shy, what number best describes you?		PER2	
PER3. Next, 0 is hard-working, and 10 is lazy, what number best describes you?		PER3	
PER4. Next, 0 is imaginative, and 10 is unimaginative, what number best describes you?		PER4	
PER5. Next, 0 is introverted, and 10 is extroverted, what number best describes you?		PER5	
PER6. Next, 0 is nervous, and 10 is calm, what number best describes you?		PER6	
PER7. Next, If 0 is sympathetic, and 10 unsympathetic, what number best describes you?		PER7	
PER8. Next, 0 is not an intellectual, and 10 is an intellectual, what number best describes you?		PER8	
PER9. Next, 0 is unkind, and 10 is kind, what number best describes you?		PER9	
PER10. Next, 0 is irresponsible, and 10 is responsible, what number best describes you?		PER10	

[Collect Card #2]

Now, I am going to ask you a few questions for statistical purposes.									
ED. What was the highest level of education that you have reached?									
_____ (primary, secondary, “A” level, university/tertiary) What was the last grade/year that you completed _____ = _____ total number of years [Use the table below for the code]									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
None	0								ED
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6			
Secondary/Vocational	7	8	9	10	11				
“A” level	12	13							
University/Tertiary	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+		
Doesn't know/Doesn't respond	88								

ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mixed, Amerindian, Black, Indian, Chinese, or Portuguese? (1) White (2) Mixed (3) Amerindian (4) Black or Afro-Guyanese (5) Indo-Guyanese (6) Chinese (7) Other (8) Portuguese (88) DK	ETID	
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LINK1. Do you think what happens generally to the (Race of Respondent based on respondent self-report in ETID) in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?	(1)Yes [Continue]	(2)No[Go to q2]	(8)DK/DR [Go to q2]	LINK1	
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LINK2. Will it affect you a lot, some, or not very much?	(1) A lot	(2) Some	(3) Not very much	(8) DK/DR	9 N/A	LINK2	
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Q2. How old are you? _____ years	Q2	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
GUYQ3. What is your religion/denomination? [Do not read options] (1) Anglican (2) Methodist (3) Pentecostal (4) Roman Catholic (5) Jehovah Witness (6) Seventh Day Adventist (7) Bahai (10) Muslim (11) Hindu (12) Rastafarian (13) Other Christians (14) None (15) Other religions (88) DK/DR	Q3	

Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? [Read options] (1) More than once per week (2) Once per week (3) Once a month (4) Once or twice a year (5) Never (8) DK/DR	Q5A	
[Show the list of ranges on Card D] Q10. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? (00) No income (01) Less than 10,000 (02) 10,001- 20,000 (03) 20,001-40,000 (04) 40,001-60,000 (05) 60,001-90,000 (06) 90,001-120,000 (07) 120,001-150,000 (08) 150,001-200,000 (09) 200,001-250,000 (10) Above 250,000 (88) DK/DR [COLLECT CARD D]	Q10	
Q10A. Does your family receive remittances from abroad? (1) Yes (2) No [Go to Q10C] (8) DK/NA [Go to Q10C]	Q10A	
Q10A1. [Only for those who receive remittances] How do you generally use the remittances from abroad? [Don't Read] (1) Consumption (food, clothing) (2) Housing (construction, repair) (3) Education (4) Community (schools repairs, reconstruction of churches/temples, community parties) (5) Health care (6) Savings/Investment (7) Other (8) DK/DR (9) N/A	Q10A1	
Q10B. [Only for those who receive remittances] To what extent does the income of this household depend on remittances from abroad? [Read Options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) Nothing (8) DK/NA (9) N/A	Q10B	

<p>Q10C. [Ask to everybody] Do you have close relatives who use to live in this household and are now living abroad? [If answer “Yes”, Ask where]</p> <p>[Don’t Read]</p> <p>(1) Yes, in the United States only</p> <p>(2) Yes, in the United States and in other countries</p> <p>(3) Yes, in other countries (not in the United States)</p> <p>(4) No [Skip to Q14]</p> <p>(8) DK/NA [Skip to Q14]</p>	Q10C	
<p>Q16. [Only for those who answered Yes to Q10C] How often do you communicate with them? [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Every day</p> <p>(2) Once or twice a week</p> <p>(3) Once or twice a month</p> <p>(4) Rarely</p> <p>(5) Never</p> <p>(8) DK/DR</p> <p>(9) N/A</p>	Q16	
<p>Q14. [Ask to everyone] Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR</p>	Q14	
<p>Q10D. [Ask to everyone] The salary that you receive and total family income : [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) Is good enough for you, you can save from it</p> <p>(2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems</p> <p>(3) Is not enough for you, you are stretched</p> <p>(4) Is not enough for you, you are having a hard time</p> <p>(8) [Don’t read] DK/DR</p>	Q10D	
<p>Q 10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Increased? [Go to Q11]</p> <p>(2) Remained the same? [Go to Q11]</p> <p>Decreased? [Go to Q10F] (8) DK/DR[Go to Q11]</p>	Q10E	
<p>Q10F. What was the main reason why the income of your household decreased in the past two years? [Do not read options]</p> <p>(1) Reduction in hours of work</p> <p>(2) A member of the household lost his or her job</p> <p>(3) Reduction in sales/Business not good</p> <p>(4) A family business went into bankruptcy</p> <p>(5) Remittances from abroad decreased or stopped</p> <p>(6) A member of the household who received income was sick or died</p> <p>(7) Natural disaster /lost of crop</p> <p>(8)Other</p>	Q10F	

(88) Doesn't know		
(99) N/A ("increased", "remained the same" or DK in 10E)		
Q11. What is your marital status? [Don't read options] (1) Single (2) Married (3) Common law (4) Divorced (5) Separated (6) Widowed (8) DK/DR	Q11	
Q12. How many children do you have? _____ (00 = none → Skip to LENG1) (88) DK	Q12	
Q12A. [If has children] How many children live with you at the present time? _____ (00) = none, (99) N/A (doesn't have children).	Q12A	

LENG1. What language have you spoken at home since childhood? (2401) English (2402) Indigenous or Amerindian language (2403) Chinese (2405) Other foreign (88) DK	LENG1	
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WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read options] (1) Everyday or almost everyday (2) At least once a week (3) At least once a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (8) DK/DR [Don't read]	WWW1	
---	-------------	--

We would like to ask your opinion regarding some incidents that could occur here in Guyana.		
HC1. [Only for those with Typeinf2 =1] In one incident, a Black man is stabbed by two Indian men following an argument. Suppose the two attackers plead guilty. Of the possible sentences that I will read to you, which do you believe would be most appropriate to administer to the two attackers? [Read Options] (1) The death penalty (2) Life imprisonment (3) 30 years (4) 15 years (5) 5 years (6) No punishment [Do not read] (8) DK/DR		

HC1EXP. [Only for those with Typeinf2 =2] In one incident, an Indian man is stabbed by two Black men following an argument.

Suppose the two attackers plead guilty. Of the possible sentences that I will read to you, which do you believe would be most appropriate to administer to the two attackers? **[Read Options]**

- (1) The death penalty
- (2) Life imprisonment
- (3) 30 years
- (4) 15 years
- (5) 5 years
- (6) No punishment **[Do not read]**
- (8) DK/DR

HC2. Now suppose that the attackers are set free since there was not enough evidence to prosecute or convict them. In this case, to what extent would you approve or **disapprove** of people taking the law into their own hands and punishing in the attackers? Would you say that you.... **[Read options]**

- (1) Approve
- (2) Somewhat approve
- (3) Somewhat disapprove
- (4) Disapprove
- (8) DK/DR

TREATMENTB.

PV1. [Only for those with Typeinf3 =1] In another incident, a Black man is fatally shot by the police. The police allege that he opened fire when presented with a warrant to search his house. Witnesses in his neighbourhood claim he was shot dead while posing no threat.

Who are you more likely to believe in this case – the police, who claim the man opened fire, or the neighbourhood witnesses, who claim the man posed no threat?" **[Do not Read Options]**

- (1) Police
- (2) Neighbourhood Witnesses
- (3) Neither
- (88) DK/DR

PV1EXP. [Only for those with Typeinf3 =1] In another incident, an Indian man is fatally shot by the police. The police allege that he opened fire when presented with a warrant to search his house. Witnesses in his neighbourhood claim he was shot dead while posing no threat.

Who are you more likely to believe in this case – the police, who claim the man opened fire, or the neighbourhood witnesses, who claim the man posed no threat?" **[Do not Read Options]**

- (1) Police
- (2) Neighbourhood Witnesses
- (3) Neither
- (88) DK/DR

PV2. Suppose some citizens plan to organize a public demonstration in front of the police station. To what extent would you approve or disapprove of such a protest over this issue? **[Read Options]**

- (1) Approve
- (2) Somewhat approve
- (3) Somewhat disapprove
- (4) Disapprove
- (8) DK/DR

PV3. Suppose some citizens do organize a public demonstration in front of the police station. If asked, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this issue? **[Read Options]**

- (1) Not at all likely **[skip to PV5]** (2) Somewhat likely (3) Likely
(4) Very likely (8) DK/DR **[skip to PV5]**

PV4. Suppose there is a risk that some, but not all, participants in the demonstration could turn violent. Knowing this, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this issue? **[Read Options]**

- (1) Not at all likely (2) Somewhat likely (3) Likely (4) Very likely
(8) DK/DR (9) N/A

PV5. [Only for those with Typeinf4 =1] Now suppose a bipartisan panel comprised of equal numbers of both PPP and PNC members conducted a thorough investigation of this incident. They conclude that the police action was justified and call for the police to be freed. To what extent would you support or oppose the prosecution of the police involved in this case? **[Read Options]**

- (1) Strongly support
(2) Support
(3) Somewhat support
(4) Neither support nor oppose
(5) Somewhat oppose
(6) Oppose
(7) Strongly oppose
(8) DK/DR

PV5EXP. [Only for those with Typeinf4 =2] Now suppose a bipartisan panel comprised of equal numbers of both PPP and PNC members conducted a thorough investigation of this incident. They conclude that the police action was not justified and call for the police to be prosecuted. To what extent would you support or oppose the prosecution of the police involved in this case? **[Read Options]**

- (1) Strongly support
(2) Support
(3) Somewhat support
(4) Neither support nor oppose
(5) Somewhat oppose
(6) Oppose
(7) Strongly oppose
(8) DK/DR

TREATMENTD.

POLV1. [Only for those with Typeinf5 =1] Now please consider a different incident. Suppose that in the next election in a town that has in the past supported the PPP, a PNC candidate who has made efforts to reach out to all citizens in the town wins. Some citizens claim that there were electoral irregularities, while international observers report no irregularities.

To what extent would you believe the claims of irregularities? **[Read Options]**

- (1) Strongly believe
- (2) Believe
- (3) Somewhat believe
- (4) Not sure whether to believe or disbelieve
- (5) Somewhat disbelieve
- (6) Disbelieve
- (7) Strongly disbelieve
- (8) DK/DR

POLV1EXP. [Only for those with Typeinf5 =1] Now please consider a different incident. Suppose that in the next election in a town that has in the past supported the PNC, a PPP candidate who has made efforts to reach out to all citizens in the town wins. Some citizens claim that there were electoral irregularities, while international observers report no irregularities.

To what extent would you believe the claims of irregularities? **[Read Options]**

- (1) Strongly believe
- (2) Believe
- (3) Somewhat believe
- (4) Not sure whether to believe or disbelieve
- (5) Somewhat disbelieve
- (6) Disbelieve
- (7) Strongly disbelieve
- (8) DK/DR

POLV2. Suppose some citizens plan to organize a public demonstration to protest the election outcome. To what extent would you approve or disapprove of a protest over this issue? **[Read Options]**

- | | | |
|----------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| (1) Approve | (2) Somewhat approve | (3) Somewhat disapprove |
| (4) Disapprove | (8) DK/DR | |

POLV3. Suppose some citizens do organize a public demonstration to protest the election outcome. If asked, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this issue? **[Read Options]**

- | | | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------|-----------------|
| (1) Not at all likely | [SKIP TO R1] | (2) Somewhat likely | (3) Likely | (4) Very likely |
| (8) DK/DR | [SKIP TO R1] | | | |

POLV4. Suppose there is a risk that some, but not all, participants in the demonstration could turn violent. Knowing this, how likely would you be to participate in a public demonstration on this issue? **[Read Options]**

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|------------|
| (1) Not at all likely | (2) Somewhat likely | (3) Likely |
| (4) Very likely | (8) DK/DR | (9) N/A |

We would now like to ask you about your interest in programs that could be carried out in Guyana to increase tolerance and understanding between racial groups.

ACTION1. How interested would you be in attending an event at which speakers from different racial groups talked about their experiences in Guyana?

- (1) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (3) Not very interested
(4) Not interested (8) DK/DR

ACTION2. How interested would you be in attending such an event if it were hosted by a religious organization?

- (1) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (3) Not very interested
(4) Not interested (8) DK/DR

ACTION3. How interested would you be in attending such an event if it were hosted jointly by both the PPP and the PNC?

- (1) Very interested (2) Somewhat interested (3) Not very interested
(4) Not interested (8) DK/DR

ACTION4. How interested would you be in attending such an event if it were hosted by a group from your neighbourhood?

- (1) Very interested
(2) Somewhat interested
(3) Not very interested
(4) Not interested
(8) DK/DR

To end, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: *(read out all items)*

R1. Television	(0) No	(1) Yes	R1
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	R3
R4. Conventional or landline telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	R4
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	R4A
R5. Vehicle	(0) No (1) One (2) Two (3) Three or more		R5
R6. Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	R6
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	R7
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	R8
R12. Potable water Indoors	(0) No	(1) Yes	R12
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	R14
R15. Computer	(0) No	(1) Yes	R15
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No	(1) Yes	R16
R17. Stereo	(0) No	(1) Yes	R17
R18. High Speed Cable Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes	R18

<p>OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently...[Read the options]</p> <p>(1) Working? [Continue]</p> <p>(2) Not working, but have a job? [Continue]</p> <p>(3) Actively looking for a job? [Go to MIG1]</p> <p>(4) A student? [Go to MIG1]</p> <p>(5) Taking care of the home? [Go to MIG1]</p> <p>(6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disable to work [Go to MIG1]</p> <p>(7) Notworking and not looking for a job? [Go to MIG1]</p> <p>(8) DK/DR</p>	<p>OCUP4A</p>	
<p>OCUP1. What is your main occupation or type of work? [Probe: what is your job about?] [Don't read the options]</p> <p>(1) Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor, physician, engineer, architect, accountant, engineer, etc.)</p> <p>(2) Manager</p> <p>(3) Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school teacher, artist, athlete, etc.)</p> <p>(4) Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician, etc.)</p> <p>(5) Government official (member of government legislative, executive or judicial branches, or other government employee)</p> <p>(6) Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service representative, etc.)</p> <p>(7) Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.)</p> <p>(8) Food vendor</p> <p>(9) Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, taxi driver, etc.)</p> <p>(10) Farmer</p> <p>(11) Farmhand (works for others, does not own land)</p> <p>(12) Artisan</p> <p>(13) Domestic servant</p> <p>(14) Servant</p> <p>(15) Member of the armed forces or of the civil services (police, fire-fighters, etc.)</p> <p>(88) DK</p> <p>(99) N/A</p>	<p>OCUP1</p>	<p> _ _ </p>
<p>OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise?</p> <p>(2) A salaried employee in the private sector?</p> <p>(3) Owner or partner in a business</p> <p>(4) Self-employed</p>	<p>OCUP1A</p>	

(5) Unpaid worker (8) DK/DR (9) N/A		
OCUP1C. Do you have health insurance through your business or employer? (1) Yes (2) No (8) DK/DR (9) N/A	OCUP1C	

MIG1. During your childhood, where did you mainly live? In the countryside? In a town? Or in a city?: (1) In the countryside, a rural area (2) In a town (3) In a city (8) DK/DR	MIG1	
MIG2. Where were you living 5 years ago? [Read options] (1) In the same town/city or NDC [Go to TI] (2) In another town/city or NDC in the country [Continue] (3) In another country [Go to TI] (8) DK/DR [Go to TI]	MIG2	
MIG3. The place where you lived 5 years ago was: [Read options] (1) A NDC or town/city smaller than this one (2) A NDC or town/city larger than this one (3) A NDC or town/city like this one (8) DK (9) NA (did not migrate)	MIG3	

Time interview ended _____ : _____	TI	____ ____ ____
TI. Duration of interview [minutes, see page # 1] _____		

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Interviewer ID number _____	IID	
Interviewer self-identification of his/her own ethnicity Do you consider yourself White, Mixed, Amerindian, Black, Indian, Chinese, or Portuguese? (1) White (2) Mixed (3) Amerindian (4) Black or Afro-Guyanese (5) Indo-Guyanese (6) Chinese (7) Otro (8) Portuguese (88) DK	IETID	

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

A4 [COA4]. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?

[DO NOT READ OUT THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]

Water, lack of	19	Inflation, high prices	02
Roads in poor condition	18	Politicians	59
Armed conflict	30	Bad government	15

Interviewer's signature _____ *Date* ____ / ____ / ____

Field supervisor's signature _____

Comments: _____

Signature of the person who entered the data _____

Signature of the person who verified the data _____

Corruption	13	Environment	10
Credit, lack of	09	Migration	16
Delinquency, crime, violence	05	Drug trafficking	12
Human rights, violations of	56	Gangs	14
Unemployment	03	Poverty	04
Inequality	58	Popular protests (strikes, road blocks, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Malnutrition	23	Health services, lack of	22
Forced displacement of persons	32	Kidnappings	31
External debt	26	Security (lack of)	27
Discrimination	25	Terrorism	33
Drug addiction	11	Land to farm, lack of	07
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Transportation, problems of	60
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Violence	57
Electricity, lack of	24	Housing	55
Population explosion	20	Other	70
War against terrorism	17	Doesn't know	88


Card for Interviewer

Card for Interviewer

OCUP1. What is your main occupation or type of work? [**Probe: what is your job about?] [Don't read the options]**

- (1) Professional, intellectual or scientist (lawyer, university professor, physician, engineer, architect, accountant, engineer, etc.)
- (2) Manager
- (3) Technical or mid-level professional (computer technician, school teacher, artist, athlete, etc.)
- (4) Skilled worker (machine operator, mechanic, carpenter, electrician, etc.)
- (5) Government official (member of government legislative, executive or judicial branches, or other government employee)
- (6) Office worker (secretary, receptionist, cashier, customer service representative, etc.)
- (7) Businessperson (entrepreneurs, salespeople, etc.)
- (8) Food vendor
- (9) Employee in the service sector (hotel worker, restaurant employee, taxi driver, etc.)
- (10) Farmer
- (11) Farmhand (works for others, does not own land)
- (12) Artisan
- (13) Domestic servant
- (14) Servant
- (15) Member of the armed forces or of the civil services (police, fire-fighters, etc.)
- (88) DK
- (99) N/A

Card #0



Card # 1

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Left					Right				

Card “A”

A lot	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Not at all	1


Card “B”

Strongly agree	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
Strongly disagree	1

Card “C”

<i>Strongly approve</i>	10
	9
	8
	7
	6
	5
	4
	3
	2
<i>Strongly disapprove</i>	1

Card # 2



Card “D”

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than 10,000
- (02) 10,001- 20,000
- (03) 20,001-40,000
- (04) 40,001-60,000
- (05) 60,001-90,000
- (06) 90,001-120,000
- (07) 120,001-150,000
- (08) 150,001-200,000
- (09) 200,001-250,000
- (10) Above 250,000

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