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Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala and in the Americas, 2014:

Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer

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by LAPOP

Latin American Public Opinion Project
LAPOP
Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID, and other donors. It then sends the draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for the addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into other languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country and comparative reports. Country-specific analyses are carried out by local teams.

While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the *AmericasBarometer*, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden supported the project as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted as close in time as possible, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of the *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current graduate students located throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert individuals and institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
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Prologue: Background to the Study

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The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing and comparing citizens' experiences with democratic governance across individuals within countries, across sub-national regions and countries, and over time. This report presents one set of those assessments, focused around the latest year of data collection: 2014. This year marks a milestone for the project: LAPOP began the AmericasBarometer project in 2004 and we can today look back at a decade of change in public opinion within and across the Americas. The 2014 AmericasBarometer is the largest and most sophisticated survey of the Americas to date. When completed it will include 28 countries and over 50,000 interviews, the majority of which were collected using sophisticated computer software that adds yet another layer to LAPOP's meticulous quality control efforts. This prologue presents a brief background of the study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

While LAPOP has decades of experience researching public opinion, Vanderbilt University has housed and supported the research institute and the AmericasBarometer since 2004. LAPOP's foundations date to the 1970s, with the study of democratic values in Costa Rica by LAPOP founder Mitchell Seligson. LAPOP's studies of public opinion expanded as electoral democracies diffused across the region in the intervening decades and have continued to grow in number as these governments have taken new forms and today's administrations face new challenges. The AmericasBarometer measures democratic values, experiences, evaluations, and actions among citizens in the Americas and places these in a comparative context.

The AmericasBarometer project consists of a series of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults and containing a common core set of questions. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in eleven countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer is based on national surveys from 28 countries in the Americas. LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets, available free of charge for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation,

and a number of other supporters of the project, who are acknowledged in a separate section at the end of this prologue.

Our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens; NGOs; public officials and their governments; the international donor and development communities; and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics while also being accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2014 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction; sample design; data collection and processing; and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2014 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy; political tolerance; support for stable democracy; participation of civil society and social capital; the rule of law; evaluations of local governments and participation within them; crime victimization; corruption victimization; and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some previously-core items in the 2014 survey. To do so, we solicited input on a long list of questions we proposed for deletion from our partners across the region and, after complying with requests to restore some items, we settled on a reduced set of common modules to which we then added two types of questions: new common content and country-specific questions.

To develop new common content, we invited input from our partners across the Americas and then developed and led a series of three, multi-day questionnaire construction workshops in Miami, FL in the spring of 2013. Country team members, experts from academia, individuals from the international donor and development communities, faculty affiliates, and students attended and contributed to these workshops. Based on the discussions at these workshops we identified a series of modules that were piloted in pre-tests across the Americas. Some of these items received widespread support for inclusion from our partners and were refined and included as common content – such as a new set of questions related to state capacity and an extended module on crime and violence – while others were placed onto a menu of optional country-specific questions. At the same time, our country teams worked with us to identify new topics of relevance to their given countries and this process produced a new set of country-specific questions included within the AmericasBarometer. Questionnaires from the project can be found online at www.LapopSurveys.org, and at the conclusion of each country report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology as well as with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common "informed consent" form and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.

With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common sample design to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a minimum of approximately 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In most countries our practice is to use quotas at the household level to ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective. Detailed descriptions of the samples are available online and contained in the annexes of each country publication.

In 2013 LAPOP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the premier Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and one of the world's leading experts in survey methodology, Dr. Jim Lepkowski. Over the course of the year we worked with Dr. Lepkowski and his team of graduate students to review each previously developed sample design and to secure their input and advice on new designs.

Sample design typically relies on census information and maps. However, up-to-date information is not always available. To respond to this challenge, between 2013 and 2014, LAPOP developed a new software suite, which we call LASSO© (LAPOP Survey Sample Optimizer). This proprietary software allows us to estimate the number of dwellings in a given region using satellite images in the public domain, and then use a probabilistic method to locate sample segments (i.e., clusters) to draw a sample. While most of our sample designs are based on census data, we were able to successfully field test LASSO while working on the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and increase the sophistication of our approach. The 2014 AmericasBarometer represented our most expansive use of handheld electronic devices for data collection to date. At the core of this approach is our use of the "Adgys"© questionnaire app designed by our partners in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field reduces data entry errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track, on a daily basis, the progress of the survey, down to the location of interviews (which are monitored in real time but not recorded into the public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy) and the timing of the interviews. The team in Bolivia worked long hours to program the samples and questionnaires into the Adgys platform for the 18 countries in which we used this technology. In 2 other countries we continued our use of PDAs and a Windows Mobile-based software application supported by our hardworking partners at the University of Costa Rica.

Throughout the process of collecting the survey data, we worked in multiple ways to minimize error and maximize quality. We continued the process of pilot testing all questionnaires and training all interviewers in each country in accordance with the standards of LAPOP. In the process of collecting the data we monitored fieldwork in real time, when possible, and worked with local partners to replace (a small number of) low quality interviews while the study was in the field. For the few countries that still used paper questionnaires, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the electronic files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who then shipped those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing to ensure that the data transferred from the paper to the dataset was as close to error free as possible. In the case of some countries using electronic handheld devices for data entry in the field, a small subset of interviews were conducted with paper questionnaires due to security concerns; in these cases we followed a similar process by which the data were entered by the local team and audited for quality control by LAPOP at Vanderbilt. For all electronic databases, we checked the files for duplicates and consistency between the coding in the

questionnaire and the database. We also verified that the sample was implemented according to the design. In the few cases where we detected issues in the 2014 round, we worked with our local partners to resolve the problem, for example via the re-entry of a small set of paper questionnaires.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we have continued our practice of making reports based on survey data accessible and readable to the layperson. This means that our reports make use of easy-to-comprehend charts to the maximum extent that is possible. And, where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression analysis, we present results in standardized, easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2014 AmericasBarometer were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled data analyst, Carole Wilson, which allows them to create these graphs using Stata 12.0 or higher. The analyses presented in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design (i.e., stratified and clustered) and reporting on confidence intervals around estimates and statistical significance. Yet our approach to presenting these results is to make them as reader-friendly as possible. To that end we also include elsewhere in this report a note on how to interpret the data analyses.

We worked hard this round to turn around individual country results as quickly as possible. In a number of countries, this effort took the form of our newly developed "Rapid Response Report," based in a MS PowerPoint template, which provided a mechanism for country teams to organize and present key preliminary findings in a matter of weeks following the completion of fieldwork and data processing. A number of these rapid reports formed the basis of government and public presentations and, given the level of interest and engagement in these sessions, we hope to see use of our rapid reports increase in years to come.

As another mechanism intended to increase the speed with which country-specific findings are disseminated, we changed the format of our country studies this year. In the past we asked country team authors to wait for the processing of the entire multi-country dataset, an effort that takes many months due to variation in timing of fieldwork and the effort involved in carefully auditing, cleaning, labeling, and merging the many datasets. For this year we asked our country team authors to develop a minimum of three chapters that focus specifically on topics of relevance to their countries. When a given country report was commissioned by USAID, the content of these chapters was based on input from the mission officers in that country. In other countries it was based on the local team's or donor's priorities.

Once fieldwork and data processing was complete for a particular country, we sent the 2014 national study dataset and a time-series dataset containing all data for that country for each round of the AmericasBarometer to our country team who then used these datasets to prepare their contributions. The resulting chapters are rich in detail, providing comparisons and contrasts across time, across sub-regions within the country, and across individuals by sub-group. To complement these chapters, we assigned ourselves the task of using the comparative dataset, once it was ready for analysis, to develop a set of chapters on key topics related to crime and violence; democratic governance (including corruption and economic management); local participation; and democratic values. The writing of these chapters was divided between the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt and a set of scholars of public opinion and political behavior with expertise in the Latin American and Caribbean region and who have worked with LAPOP on such reports in the past. In contrast to the country-specific chapters, the objective of these chapters is to place topics and countries within the region in a comparative context.

This report that you have before you is one of a series of reports produced by LAPOP and our team to showcase key findings from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. It is the result of many drafts. Once a draft was completed and submitted to the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt, it was reviewed and returned to the authors for improvements. Revised studies were then submitted and reviewed again, and then returned to the country teams for final corrections and edits. In the case of country reports commissioned by USAID, we delivered the penultimate chapter drafts to USAID for their critiques. The country teams and LAPOP Central then worked to incorporate this feedback, and produced the final formatted version for print and online publication.

This report and the data on which it is based are the end products of a multi-year process involving the effort of and input by thousands of individuals across the Americas. We hope that our reports and data reach a broad range of individuals interested in and working on topics related to democracy, governance, and development. Given variation in preferences over the timeline for publishing and reporting on results from the 2014 AmericasBarometer, some printed reports contain only country-specific chapters, while others contain both country-specific and comparative chapters. All reports, and the data on which they are based, can be found available for free download on our website: www.LapopSurveys.org.

The AmericasBarometer is a region-wide effort. LAPOP is proud to have developed and coordinated with a network of excellent research institutions across the Americas. The following tables list the institutions that supported and participated in the data collection effort in each country.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica	Universidad de Costa Rica; CCP; Estado de la Nación	
El Salvador	FundaUngo	
Guatemala	Universidad Rafael Landívar, Tradición Jesuita en Guatemala	
Honduras	FOPRIDEH, Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras	Hagamos Democracia
Mexico	data, Opinión Publica y Mercados	ITAM, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Nicaragua	Red Nicaragüense por la Democracia y el Desarrollo Local	
Panama	CIDEM, Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas	

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina	UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA	
Bolivia	Ciudadanía Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública	EMBAJADA DE SUECIA
Brazil	VOX BRASIL	
Chile	Instituto de Ciencia Política	PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE
Colombia	Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales	observatorio de la democracia
Ecuador	UNIVERSIDAD SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO	PRIME CONSULTING
Paraguay	IRD Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	50 AÑOS IEP INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS PERUANOS	
Uruguay	CIFRA	Universidad Católica del Uruguay
Venezuela	ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN	THE UNIVERSITY of TENNESSEE KNOXVILLE

Caribbean		
Bahamas	PublicDomain Research & Strategy	
Belize	B&A Borge y Asociados	
Dominican Republic	Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.	intec Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo
Guyana	DP Development Policy and Management Consultants	
Haiti	Université d'Etat d'Haïti ueh	
Jamaica	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA	
Suriname	DataFruit Your one-stop shop for fieldwork.	
Trinidad & Tobago	THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	

Canada and United States	
Canada	THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY; MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES; PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America / Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

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Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central, and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by individual citizens across 28 countries in the Americas, who as survey respondents either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey, or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

Each stage of the project has involved countless hours of work by our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, and donors. We thank all these individuals for their commitment to high quality public opinion research. Let us also make some specific acknowledgments.

The AmericasBarometer project has been made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both of these institutions. At USAID Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite have consistently contributed constructive insights to the project and facilitated its use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt John Geer has been a tireless advocate of the project, which is fortunate to be housed within and benefit from a department that is brimming with talent. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, in other research units such as the Center for Latin American Studies, in the Office of Contract and Research Administration, and in the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected data collection efforts associated with the 2014 AmericasBarometer came from USAID, Vanderbilt, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden. We thank the individuals that we have worked with at each of these institutions for their important contributions.

We take special note of the LAPOP staff members who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Daniel Montalvo, Ana María Montoya, Diana Orcés (now at Oakland University), Georgina Pizzolitto, Mariana Rodríguez, Emily Saunders, and Carole Wilson. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and requirements. We thank Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Montevideo, Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marenco, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in our efforts to disseminate our studies to diverse audiences in clear and informative ways. In addition, we thank Dr. Mary Malone for her expert advice on our development of the comparative discussion and analyses regarding crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas within this report.

We take seriously the development of new research capacities and scholars in the field of public opinion research and we find LAPOP provides a highly effective mechanism for these efforts. Yet we in turn benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting the 2014 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes our undergraduate research assistants John Clinkscales, Christina Folds, and Maya Prakash. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations in the course of its development: Margarita

Corral, Alejandro Díaz-Domínguez, Brian Faughnan, Mason Moseley, Mariana Rodríguez, and Vivian Schwartz-Blum. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the project: Fred Batista, Gabriel Camargo, Kaitlen Cassell, Oscar Castorena, Mollie Cohen, Claire Evans, Adrienne Girone, Matthew Layton, Whitney Lopez-Hardin, Trevor Lyons, Arturo Maldonado, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Facundo Salles Kobilanski, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. We especially want thank those graduate students who worked alongside us as research assistants over the past two years on activities related to the development, implementation, auditing, analysis, and reporting of the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries, and affiliations are listed below.

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Liz and Mitch
Nashville, Tennessee
November, 2014

Introduction

The 2014 AmericasBarometer and this report mark an important milestone for the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP): we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us in first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas.

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: *citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago.* In Part I, we devote the first chapter to an assessment of citizens' experiences with, evaluations of, and reactions to issues of crime and insecurity in the region. We then proceed in the subsequent four chapters of Part I to address topics that are considered "core" to the AmericasBarometer project: citizens' assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key trends for the region, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues and crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of this report is to provide a comparative perspective – across time, across countries, and across individuals – on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Although this section of the report focuses in large part on the region as a whole, in all chapters of Part I, we highlight the position of Jamaica in graphs that make cross-country comparisons.

The first chapter demonstrates a number of ways in which the AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and over time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens, political pressures to adjust reports, and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information such as where the crime took place and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens' experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighborhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens' experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.

Chapter 1 of the report documents change over time with respect to citizens' perceptions of and experience with crime and violence in the region. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 3 adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity.

Interestingly, average overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010. As with just about any measure we examine in Part I, we find important differences within and across countries. Yet, *types* of crime experienced also vary across countries, which is another nuance examined in Chapter 1While crime victimization in general matters, it is important to keep in mind that the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary significantly according to the contexts in which they live.

One persistent theme in Part I is that perceptions of insecurity in the region matter independently from crime victimization. Perceptions of insecurity and assessments of violence by citizens of the Americas are fueled by personal experiences *and* by the diffusions of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer we added to our standard module questions asking about safety concerns in locations close to the home and daily routines (given that our data affirm, as noted in Chapter 1, that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives). Specifically, the new questions asked how worried individuals are about safety on public transportation and in schools. Slightly more than 1 out of every 3 individuals across the Americas, on average, reports either a high level of fear for the likelihood of a family member being assaulted on public transportation and/or a high level of concern for the safety of children in school.

Chapters 2 through 5 focus on the broader set of standard dimensions of democratic governance typically considered part of the core thematic focus of the AmericasBarometer project: the economy, corruption, local government, and democratic values and support. In our analyses of these topics we considered not only major developments and notable findings for the region as a whole and over time, but we also considered the relevance of crime and violence to these dimensions.

Chapter 2 focuses on economic trends in the region and notes divergence between objective indicators of household wealth and subjective perceptions of households' financial situations. Objectively, the 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in the region own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals, those who are less educated, individuals with darker skin tones, and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey. Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure.

Chapter 2 also looks beyond the personal finances of citizens of the Americas and details how they assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively than it was in recent waves of the survey. Citizen evaluations of the national economy across the region are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Citizen views of the national economy are also weighed down by the security situation in their country. Individuals who live in high crime areas across the Americas judge national economic performance more harshly.

Corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. Chapter 3 shows that 1 in 5 people in an average country was asked to pay a bribe in the past year. While several countries saw corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by corruption victimization levels

increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in most previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools, health clinics, and workplaces. Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe; while we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance for the region as a whole.

Given the frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes, it is not surprising that many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one bright spot in Chapter 3 is found in the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally be justified. This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So while the high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens of the Americas continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business.

It is typically the case that the level at which most citizens in the Americas interact with their government is local. In Chapter 4 we examine political participation in municipal government, evaluations of local services, and citizens' trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals in the Americas with the greatest and least satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase from 2012 in citizens' evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on local services. On average for the region as a whole, local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease from 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores for the region are in the middle of the scale.

With regard to trust in local governments the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds a more pessimistic pattern. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004. The factors that most strongly predict an individual's trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance.

Part I concludes with an assessment of the state of democratic legitimacy and democratic values in the Americas. Under this rubric, Chapter 5 considers support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures

of democratic legitimacy. Of special emphasis in this chapter is on the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this chapter permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy across the region with an eye to one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy's legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade for the region. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only somewhat. The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. But since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. Intriguingly, the ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time since our 2012 study. Among law-and-order institutions in the region – armed forces, national police, the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. Levels of trust in the armed forces and national police institutions appear most volatile where these institutions have recently played highly visible roles in maintaining public order. Individuals whose neighborhoods are increasingly insecure are losing trust in the police and courts. Law and order institutions in the region, it seems, must earn the public's trust by successfully providing the key public goods of safety and justice.

System support – the inherent value citizens place in the political system – fell in 2014. Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system's ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. Even within the two-year window between 2012 and 2014, several cases exhibit wide swings in support. The results of our analyses for the region as a whole suggest system support in the Americas reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system's ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens of the Americas are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. These contradictory results may signal a desire to insulate a high-performing system from those who denounce it. They nevertheless imply a Catch-22: improving governance may at once enhance the political system's legitimacy but lower political tolerance. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance).

Part II includes three chapters focused solely on Guatemala. The chapters analyze the results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer with respect to key issues of democratic governance: crime and insecurity, violence and tolerance in the family context, and the interaction between citizens and the State.

Chapter 1 includes several figures which compare Guatemala with other countries in the Americas with regards to issues of violence and insecurity. Given the relevance of crime and violence in Guatemala, Chapter 6 delves into various aspects related to these issues. The 2014 AmericasBarometer questionnaire includes several questions on victimization, but it also includes questions related to

insecurity and to changes in individuals' behavior as a result of crime. Insecurity and crime have become focal points in the day-to-day discourse, media coverage, and political debate in Guatemala. Among the main findings of this chapter are the following:

- In the 2014 survey, 17% of Guatemalans report having been victims of a crime within the preceding year. However, when the victimization of another household member is included alongside the victimization of the respondent (total victimization), the percentage rises to 27.2%.
- The percentage of crime victimization is significantly higher in urban areas, and in particular the Metropolitan area. In 2014, total crime victimization for urban and rural areas stood at 32.7% and 22%, respectively.
- 59.9% of Guatemalans report feeling secure in their neighborhood, while 40.4% indicate feeling insecure. There are important differences between urban and rural areas: 50% of those who live in urban areas feel insecure compared with the 42.4% reported for rural areas.
- Perceptions of insecurity increased in 2014 compared to previous years. In 2014, the average insecurity score (measured on a scale of 0-100) is 44.6 points.
- Approximately one-third of Guatemalans (31.1%) indicate that gangs affect their neighborhood. The rate of gang incidence decreases as the size of the location in which the respondent lives decreases. 53.6% of residents of the Metropolitan area report presence of gangs in their neighborhood, in comparison with 32.1% of people who live in small cities and 19.7% of those from rural areas.
- As a consequence of the insecurity, approximately one-third of Guatemalans have changed their behavior, including taking security measures at home, avoiding walking through certain dangerous areas, and restricting the locations at which they shop or engage in recreational activities.
- Perceptions of insecurity have an impact upon democratic values: as insecurity rises, the levels of satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system fall.
- Those respondents who indicate that someone in their household was a victim of crime within the preceding 12 months show significantly lower levels of support for the political system (44.3 points) in comparison to those who have not experienced victimization (50.0 points).
- Nearly half of respondents (48.5%) believe that the level of violence in their neighborhood is lower than it was 12 months prior. In contrast, 13.7% consider the level to be higher.
- 52.5% of respondents believe that it is important to increase the punishments for crime, whereas 23.8% believe that it is important to implement prevention measures. Even though the option of holding "both" viewpoints was not presented in the questionnaire, 23.3% of respondents gave this answer.

Chapter 6 analyzed in-depth the topic of violence in Guatemala, which in large part stems from common crime, organized crime, gangs, and narcotrafficking. Studies by LAPOP generally focus on the national level. This year for the first time, a different type of violence is addressed: violence at the family level. This is covered in Chapter 7.

Though it occurs within a domestic sphere, intrafamily violence has consequences that can have an impact at the national level. In fact, such violence has been mentioned as one of the factors that have driven women with young children to flee the country and emigrate to the United States or other countries. Domestic violence can also impact levels of poverty and can have repercussions on national-level violence by contributing to an environment in which Guatemalans become accustomed to resorting to violence as a means of solving problems.

Chapter 7 also analyzes the public opinion of Guatemalans with respect to two family-related issues of rising global relevance: same-sex marriage and abortion when the life of the mother is at risk.

The following are among the most important findings of the analysis of results of the 2014 survey:

- Merely 3% of Guatemalans would approve of a husband hitting his wife/partner because she did not efficiently perform the daily tasks around the house. 50.9% of respondents said that they would disapprove but understand. In all, this means that 53.9% of respondents would condone this form of violence against women.
- 10.2% of Guatemalans would approve of a husband hitting his wife/partner if she is unfaithful. 47.8% of respondents said that they would disapprove of the measure but nonetheless understand. In total, 58% of respondents would condone this form of violence.
- Guatemalans that live in rural areas are more likely to approve the use of violence against women in cases of infidelity. Whereas 39.4% of residents of the Metropolitan area would condone this form of violence, the percentage rises to 62.7% among those in the rural areas. In mid-to-small size cities, the percentage that approves of this form of violence is also high.
- Regardless of level of education, there are no statistically significant differences among men and women with respect to condoning physical violence against an unfaithful wife or partner.
- In comparison with other countries of the Americas, Guatemala is the state with the highest percentage of citizens that condone physical violence against an unfaithful wife or partner.
- Less than 5% of Guatemalans believe that physical punishment should always or very frequently be used against children who disobey their parents. Nonetheless, 40.5% consider that such punishment is sometimes necessary, while 27.3% believe that it is almost never necessary. Less than a third of respondents believe that physical punishment should never be used.
- As the size of the locale of residence of a respondent increases, support for the use of physical punishment against children decreases. In rural areas, the average approval rating for such forms of punishment is significantly higher than in the Metropolitan area.
- Around 15% of respondents report that their parents frequently resorted to physical punishment. 41.7% indicate that they suffered such forms of punishment only sometimes.
- In comparison with other countries of the Americas, Guatemala finds itself in a relatively high position with respect to condoning parental use of physical punishments against their children.
- There is a high correlation between approving of use of physical punishment against children and having experienced such forms of punishment during childhood.

- Guatemala is one of the countries of the Americas with the lowest levels of approval for same-sex marriage. The average approval score for Guatemala is 10.8 points on a scale of 0-100. This contrasts sharply with several countries of South America and Mexico, where approval reaches upwards of 40 points.
- As is the case in other countries, young Guatemalans (those 18-25 years old) demonstrate higher levels of support for same-sex marriage than those in older age cohorts.
- Married or partnered Guatemalans have significantly lower levels of support for same-sex marriage than other Guatemalans.
- Guatemalans who report higher levels of interest in politics also display higher levels of support for same-sex marriage.
- Although therapeutic abortion is legal in Guatemala, the country is among those with lowest levels of approval in cases when the life of the mother is at risk. 45.3% of Guatemalans approve of abortion in such cases, whereas in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico, or Argentina, approval reaches 60%.
- Approval of therapeutic abortion (in case of risk to the life of the mother) is higher among Guatemalans that live in the Metropolitan area than those who live in smaller cities or in the rural parts of the country.
- There is a linear relationship between education and approval of therapeutic abortion: Guatemalans with no education demonstrate lower levels of approval, but such levels rise in line with higher levels of education on the part of the respondent.

Chapter 8 discusses the relationship between Guatemalans and the State to which they belong. The type of relationship between a State and its citizens is one of the most important and debated topics in political science, economics, and other social sciences. This chapter covers two important issues. On one hand, it looks at respondents' opinions on what the proper role of the Guatemalan State should be with respect to social equality, as well as the extent to which respondents use and benefit from the social programs implemented by the Guatemalan government. On the other hand, the chapter also explores the levels of satisfaction with certain basic, state-provided services, as well as the level of trust that respondents have in certain government institutions at both the national and local levels.

The main findings of this chapter are the following:

- Approximately 60% of Guatemalans approve of the State playing a role in reducing inequality between the rich and the poor.
- Those who at the time of the survey considered the state of the national economy to be either the same or better than it had been 12 months prior were more likely to approve of State intervention to reduce social inequality.
- 17.3% of respondents report being beneficiaries of the transfer program Mi Bono Seguro. The majority of these beneficiaries reside in rural areas.
- 30.9% of Mi Bono Seguro beneficiaries have no education, while 20.8% have only primary education.

- Nearly one-half of the homes (47.3%) in which a respondent indicates having received Mi Bono Seguro are households of 4-7 people.
- The average perception that the State respects the private property of citizens is 52.9 points on the scale of 0-100 used in this study. In comparison, the average perception that the government improves security is 43.6 points.
- The average level of satisfaction with public services rests at an intermediate level on the scale of 0-100. More specifically, the highest level of satisfaction with public services is satisfaction with public schools (54.2 points), which is followed by satisfaction with the state of roads and highways in the country (49.3 points) and with public health services (46.9 points).
- The average level of satisfaction with the performance of police within the neighborhood of the respondent also sits at an intermediate level, with a score of 46.4 points on the scale of 0-100.
- Residents of the Metropolitan area are more satisfied with the state of roads and highways in the country than those who live in smaller cities or rural areas.
- There is a relationship between level of education and satisfaction with public services: respondents with no education report being more satisfied with health and education services in the country.
- In Guatemala, the perception that those who run the government are interested in what the average citizen thinks (external efficacy) only reaches an average score of 36.1 points on the 0-100 scale.
- In Guatemala, the degree to which respondents have an understanding of the most important political issues facing the country (internal efficacy) has an average score of 41.9 points on the 0-100 scale.
- Non-Indigenous Guatemalans display a higher internal efficacy average (45.1 points) than Guatemalans who self-identify as Indigenous (38.6 points).
- Citizens who report having a higher level of interest in politics also display a higher internal efficacy average.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically *not statistically significant*; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are *statistically significant* at the 95% confidence level. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will sometimes indicate the results of difference of means/proportion tests in footnotes or in the text.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2014 AmericasBarometer that only includes a subset of 25 countries, out of the 28 planned for inclusion in the 2014 survey. The data for these countries was available for analysis at the time of writing this report. In addition, these figures use a conservative estimate of the sampling error that assumes independent, rather than repeated, primary sampling units (PSUs) for data aggregated across time. At the time this report was written, LAPOP was in the process of updating the datasets in order to more precisely account for the complex sample design.

Part I:
Insecurity, Governance, and Civil Society in Guatemala and in the Americas

Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas

Nicole Hinton and Daniel Montalvo
with
Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

I. Introduction

The pervasiveness of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean raises serious concerns regarding the quality and stability of democracy in the region. Where regimes fail to adequately protect their citizens from violence and crime, not only are those citizens likely to become dissatisfied and less trusting of the institutions and public officials charged with providing security to citizens, but under some conditions they might also cast some blame on democracy itself for their perilous circumstances. Or, under conditions of rampant crime, they might become less committed to the key principles of the rule of law that allow democracy to thrive. Bailey (2009) warns against a vicious cycle in which countries find themselves in a "security trap," where inefficient state bureaucracies and rampant corruption weaken the ability of states to provide public security and maintain the rule of law, invoking distrust in the legitimacy of democracy that in turn weakens the state. Having a strong state that can effectively respond to and deter crime and violence is critical to the flourishing of democracy in any context. As Karstedt and LaFree (p.6, 2006) eloquently state, "The connection between democracy and criminal justice is so fundamental as to be self-evident: the rule of law guarantees due process, and the observation of human rights is an integral part of the emergence and institutionalization of democracy."

Scholars have provided consistent evidence that crime victimization and widespread insecurity can pose serious challenges to democracy in the Americas (Lipset 1994; Booth and Seligson 2009; Bateson 2010; Ceobanu, Wood et al. 2010; Malone 2010; Carreras 2013). According to the rich scholarship on the subject, there are at least three ways in which crime, violence, and threat can evoke reactions among the mass public that present a challenge to democratic quality and governance.[1] First, people concerned with insecurity can have increased authoritarian tendencies and preferences for centralization of power in executives who might then act with disregard for checks and balances (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). When individuals feel threatened or insecure they are more likely to tolerate, and even support, governments that restrict some core political rights and civil liberties.

A second threat to democratic quality and governance arises when citizens lose faith in the regime's ability to provide adequate public security, and instead support less democratic alternatives to enhance security. The most obvious example of this scenario involves individuals taking matters into their own hands to fight crime in extralegal ways, or transferring authority to groups that pursue vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga 2010). At the extreme, these groups include destabilizing and violent entities

[1] Such high rates of violent crime carry economic costs as well. High levels of violent crime can monopolize the resources of the state and siphon off funds from other vital public services. Rather than investing in public infrastructure and social services, democratic governments often find their resources dominated by rising levels of public insecurity. The World Bank noted that in addition to the pain and trauma crime brings to victims and their families, "crime and violence carry staggering economic costs" that consume approximately 8% of the region's GDP, taking into account the costs of law enforcement, citizen security and health care" (World Bank 2011, 5). On both political and economic fronts, current murder rates threaten sustainable community development. We thank Mary Malone for these insights and for additional advising over the content of Chapters 1-3 of this report.

such as para-military groups, hit men, and lynching mobs. Unfortunately, these groups are increasingly present in various locations throughout the Americas today and they may be gaining heightened support from dissatisfied citizens, a dynamic that has the potential to threaten the monopoly of the use of force that is supposed to belong to the state.

Lastly, crime and insecurity can be detrimental to democratic quality by directly undermining interpersonal trust, and hence the development of social capital. Since the classic work of Alexis de Tocqueville, through the innovative work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, to the multi-method research of Robert Putnam, scholars in various fields of the social sciences have devoted enormous effort to explain how the social fabric shapes democracy (Tocqueville 1835, Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993). The strength of such social fabric is threatened when security crises cause individuals to experience a drop in interpersonal trust (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) and those dynamics can fuel or be aggravated by additional erosion in trust in political institutions and state law enforcement (Corbacho et al. 2012).

What is the state of crime and violence in the Americas? Given the importance of this topic to democracy, this is an imperative question to answer. This chapter provides an assessment of the state of security in the Americas, drawing on secondary research and results from the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP's) AmericasBarometer regional survey, which provides an unprecedented collection of public opinion data from over 25 countries for the last decade, 2004 to 2014.[2] Some of the key points that we document in this chapter are the following:

- The Latin America and Caribbean region has the highest homicide rate compared to any other region on earth (23 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), per the latest data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
- Central America stands out as the most violent region on the planet; in 2012, it had an average of nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.[3]
- Issues related to crime and violence are consistently perceived as top concerns among citizens of the Americas. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, just about 1 out of every 3 citizens identifies security as the most important problem facing their country.
- On average across the region, 17% of respondents to the 2014 AmericasBarometer report being the victim of a crime, a rate that has stayed fairly constant since 2004.
- The 2014 AmericasBarometer documents important ways that rates of burglaries, the sale of illegal drugs, extortion, and murders vary across countries of the Americas.
- Urban residents, those who are more educated, and wealthier individuals are the most likely to report being victims of a crime in the Americas in 2014.

[2] The 2014 AmericasBarometer will include surveys in 28 countries in total, but this report focuses on analyses of 25 countries for which the data had been gathered and processed at the time of this writing. Given that not all years of the AmericasBarometer contain all 25 countries, we report in footnotes on robustness checks for comparisons across time to analyses that contain only the subset of countries consistently represented in a given time-series.

[3] In the most recent report UNODC (2013) notes that Southern Africa is tied with Central America in terms of highest number of average homicides for the region. The Central American region contains heterogeneity within it, with the homicide rates highest in the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the state of affairs in terms of the prevalence of crime and violence in the Americas, based on cross-national homicide indicators, as reported by UNODC. This section also discusses the advantages of using survey data to measure and analyze crime and insecurity. Section III examines data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer to provide an overview of how citizens of the Americas perceive crime and violence in their countries. This section examines the extent to which security tops the list of most important problems in the AmericasBarometer countries across time and space. In the fourth section, we take a deeper look at the 2014 AmericasBarometer data by examining the frequency and types of crime victimization most commonly experienced by individuals in the region. We also examine the demographic factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to crime.

II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas

Despite differences among the ways in which crime is defined and measured,[4] Latin America and the Caribbean is widely regarded as a region with notoriously high crime incidents. In this section, we examine how this region fares in comparison to the rest of the world in terms of homicide, robbery, and burglary rates,[5] some of the most commonly collected and referenced crime statistics by institutions such as the UNODC.[6] We then turn to a discussion of the usefulness of this type of official crime data in comparison to self-reporting of crime victimization using surveys like the AmericasBarometer.

Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries

In terms of homicide rates, UNODC ranks the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region as one of the deadliest places on earth. As Figure 1.1 shows, the LAC region had a higher homicide rate in 2012 than any other region represented in the UNODC study. The 2012 LAC average rate of 23.0 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is more than double the second highest regional mean, held by Sub-Saharan Africa[7] (11.2 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), five times the rate in South Asia (4.4) and East Asia and the Pacific (3.9), seven times larger than the rate in the U.S. and Canada (3.2) and the Middle East and North Africa (2.9), and about 10 times greater than the rate found in Europe and Central Asia (2.5).

[4] The most current conceptualizations of crime see it as part of the broader concept of citizen security, which is the personal condition of being free from violence and intentional dispossession. This condition includes not only victimization, but also perceptions of crime (Casas-Zamora 2013).

[5] Other dimensions and measurements of the concept of crime include, but are not limited to assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion and violent threats.

[6] Other key organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), and the World Health Organization (WHO) are also important sources for aggregate crime statistics. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as a good source particularly in Central America.

[7] In the most recent report UNODC (2013) provides sub-regional averages for Southern Africa (31), Middle Africa (18), and Western Africa (14), all of which are higher than the regional average for Africa and are more comparable to the Latin American and the Caribbean average.



Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012[8]

As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, differences in intentional homicide rates exist across sub-regions within Latin America and the Caribbean and over time. As depicted in the figure, the Central American sub-region has the highest murder rates within the LAC region, with nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.[9] Homicide rates in this sub-region have increased at a concerning pace in recent years, reaching a peak in 2011. Within Central America, the most violent country is Honduras, which according to the UNODC had an intentional homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. In sharp contrast, Costa Rica is the least violent with a rate of 8.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.[10]



Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time

[8] Rates are for 2012 or latest year available.
[9] The UNODC analysis includes Mexico as part of the Central American sub-region. The rate of this particular country in 2012 was 21.5 per 100,000 persons.
[10] Data on country rates are not presented here, but are available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/. Last accessed on October 24, 2014.

Trending in a way that is somewhat comparable to Central America, the Caribbean sub-region has also experienced an upward trend in homicide rates between 2000 and 2011 before dropping in 2012. Within this time period, the Caribbean's homicide rates increased from 12 to 21 per 100,000 inhabitants. The Caribbean country with the highest rate in 2012, per UNODC, is Jamaica (39.3) and the one with the lowest is Cuba (4.2).

South America, on the other hand, has seen a lower and more stable cross-time trend in homicides in recent years. On average in that region, homicide rates have not reached more than 21 per 100,000 inhabitants since 2002. In 2012 (the latest year for which these data are available), this sub-region experienced a mean murder rate of nearly 17 per 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, the homicide rate disparity in the South American sub-region is rather large. Among the most dangerous countries, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil have intentional homicide rates of 53.7, 30.8, and 25.2 (per 100,000), respectively, according to the UNODC. Among the least dangerous, we find countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, with murder rates of 3.1, 7.9, and 9.6, in that order.

We continue to see important differences across countries in the LAC region when we turn to other crime statistics available from the UNODC, such as aggregate rates of reported robberies and burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 1.3 displays rates for 2012 (the latest available) for most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica are the countries in which robberies are the most prevalent (975, 618, and 522 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively) and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Canada where they were the least (20, 68, 79, in that order). Interestingly, Guatemala ranks low on both robbery and burglary rates. Paraguay and El Salvador join Guatemala at the bottom of the chart for burglary rates. At the top of the burglary chart, we find both Canada and the United States (503 and 663 per 100,000 inhabitants) just below Barbados and Chile (690 and 679 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively).



Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012

A few points are worth noting regarding the data reported in Figure 1.3. First, although examining crime trends beyond homicides may be informative, the UNODC and others warn that comparisons across countries should be examined with caution as definitions and ways of recording incidents of robbery and burglary differ across state legal systems. Second, the ranking of countries like Guatemala and El Salvador at the bottom for rates of robberies and burglaries, while Argentina, Costa Rica, the

United States, and Canada are at the top may actually be a reflection of differences in the quality of crime reporting mechanisms, policing, or even trust in the system of law enforcement.[11] The reliability of such crime data is dependent on victims reporting incidents at all or accurately and the police recording the offense accordingly. Reported rates of crime other than homicides are shaped by trust in police (e.g., willingness to go to the police when there is a problem). Crime tends to be underreported in areas where trust in the police or institutions responsible for the rule of law is low (Skogan 1975).

Official crime statistics are also prone to errors in police, agency, and government recording processes (UNODC and UNECE 2010). To the degree that error rates in these processes are correlated with factors such as decentralization, corruption, economic development, etc. or with the levels of crime and violence themselves, these types of data may suffer important systematic biases. Even in terms of homicide rates, the variation in the definitions of crime, even among trusted institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and UNODC, and the consequent variation in the measurement of this phenomenon, can pose an important threat to the ability to make valid comparisons of levels of crime across time and space (Maxfield and Babbie 2010; Pepper, Petrie, and Sullivan 2010; Pepper and Petrie 2002).

Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics

Survey research provides an important alternative technique by which to measure not only perceptions of but also experiences with crime and violence. The use of survey data for measuring crime victimization has a number of advantages over official statistics. First, it produces data free of accidental or intentional omission or misrepresentation of crime by government officials. Second, public opinion surveys administered by non-governmental firms can alleviate some of the non-reporting bias associated with citizens' distrust in law enforcement (Levitt 1998; Tyler and Huo 2002). Third, survey research allows us to access a first-hand account of the situation suffered by the interviewee rather than the situation as interpreted or registered by law enforcement. Fourth, it allows for differentiation between perceptions of and experiences with crime and violence. Fifth, it allows us to standardize the wording of questions about crime incidents across countries so that we are assessing similar phenomena and thus making valid comparisons. Finally, it allows us to collect and assess a more nuanced database of crime victimization than those often provided by general statistics referenced in official reports (Piquero, Macintosh, and Hickman 2002).[12]

The AmericasBarometer survey, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, provides us with an extensive database on crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. It is the only multi-country comparative project in the hemisphere to collect data on all of North, Central, and South America, plus a number of Caribbean countries. The AmericasBarometer survey records first-hand accounts of the state of crime and violence in the region, and also incorporates a range of

[11] There is also a greater incentive to report property crimes (e.g., burglaries) in wealthier countries with better established insurance industries in which a police report is required to make a claim.

[12] An early example of the use of surveys to collect data on crime victimization is the effort by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) research consortium to conduct The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). The surveys collected six waves of cross-national individual level data in many European countries. However, Latin America was only been peripherally represented (Kennedy, 2014). ICVS data did also report Latin America to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world (Soares & Naritomi, 2010). However, because data from countries in this region were collected exclusively during the 1996/1997 wave and only in the cities of San Juan (Costa Rica), Panama City (Panama), Asunción (Paraguay), Buenos Aires (Argentina), La Paz (Bolivia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia), the portrayal of crime and violence of the region coming from this source is not only outdated but incomplete.

standardized crime and security survey measures (e.g., experiences and perceptions) that are comparable across time and space. Crime victimization data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer is particularly valuable because the project relies on large national samples of voting age adults in 28 countries across the Americas, with a survey instrument that included an extensive series of modules on the topics of crime, violence, and insecurity. The result is an unprecedented dataset in terms of its quality and scope.

Due to their advantages, crime victimization surveys are widely regarded as at least a complementary, and in some ways a superior, source of data in comparison to official aggregate crime statistics. That said, some scholars (e.g., Bergman 2006) maintain that although surveys can provide a better picture of crime *trends* they can say little about actual crime *rates.* According to Bergman (2006), even when crime is defined and measured in similar ways, cross-sectional survey data on victimization can suffer inaccuracies due to, among other reasons, variations in tendencies to under-report violence or over-report property theft within and across countries. The AmericasBarometer overcomes some potential problems in cross-national and cross-time comparisons by standardizing wording across its surveys. Further, each question in the survey is carefully considered and pre-tested within each country prior to inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, in order to ensure that the wording comports with local norms and is as likely as possible to elicit truthful answers. Be that as it may, Bergman's caveat that differences in motivations and inclinations to over- or under-report crime incidents may vary across countries in ways that warrant further consideration. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer asks multiple questions[13] not only about incidents of crime victimization but also about concerns surrounding violence and perceptions of insecurity in order to achieve as holistic an account of citizen security in the region as possible.

The remainder of this chapter presents a relatively brief overview of concerns about crime and crime victimization across the Americas. We note that the description and discussion only begin to scratch the surface of the extensive database on this topic available via the AmericasBarometer survey. While our analyses indicate important variation in rates of certain types of crime victimization incidents across the Americas, we do not focus here on the extent to which crime and insecurity are directly traceable to decentralized ordinary criminals or organized crime in particular. Organized crime is a notably pernicious problem in many Latin American countries given that, not only do criminal organizations engage in illegal activities, but they also seek to influence the state in order to attain certain political objectives (Bailey and Taylor 2009). The empirical evidence shows that organized crime puts the states' monopoly of the use of force at stake, since many governments have to constantly negotiate with criminal organizations in order to preserve an appearance of peace. In the Americas, criminal organizations vary widely in terms of size and scope. Those at the least organized end of the spectrum are domestic organizations arranged around fluid market transactions, such as small mafias, usurers, and extortionists. At the other end of the spectrum are transnational criminal organizations that engage in serious crimes or offenses across borders, such as drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, gang activity, and human trafficking (Manrique 2006, Bailey and Taylor 2009, Farah 2012). Our look at crime concerns and victimization in this chapter does not trace these perspectives and experiences back to these

[13] In addition, the AmericasBarometer crime victimization question has been developed to assist recall by providing a list of types of crimes; a follow-up question asking about what type of crime was experienced provides those using the AmericasBarometer dataset a second measure of victimization and, therefore, an additional means to assess and increase reliability of analyses of the data.

varying criminal elements in the LAC region, but we are cognizant that indeed this variation in the nature of crime syndicates and criminals is important for a comprehensive understanding of the region.[14]

III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas

As a first step to examining the 2014 AmericasBarometer data on crime, we take a look at what citizens of the Americas view as the most important problem within their country. Respondents in all countries are asked the following open-ended question:[15]

A4. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?

Responses to the question in the field are coded into one of approximately forty general categories, which are then recoded in our analysis into five general baskets: economy, security, basic services, politics, and other.[16] Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of responses for these five main categories, as provided by citizens across six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey project. Since 2004,[17] the economy and security rank as two principle concerns expressed on average by the public

[14] InSightCrime, a foundation that studies organized crime, lists 9 countries with the highest prevalence of organized crime in the region. In North America, Mexico is the largest and most sophisticated home for criminal organizations. Drug trafficking organizations, such as Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Familia Michoacana, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization and the Knights Templar dominate Mexico's criminal activities. In Central America, countries within the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) host some of the most violent crime organizations on earth. Particularly relevant organizations are Mendozas, Lorenzanas and Leones in Guatemala, MS13, Barrio 18, Cachiros and Valles in Honduras, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, Perrones and Texis Cartel in El Salvador. InSightCrime points to the problem of organized crime in Nicaragua, particularly the influence of drug traffickers on judicial rulings but compared to the countries in the Northern Triangle, this impact is on a completely different (smaller) magnitude. South America includes four countries on this list of countries with comparatively strong and prevalent criminal syndicates: Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. While Peru and Colombia are the world's two largest cocaine producers, Brazil and Venezuela are drug transit hubs with important money laundering centers and human trafficking activities. The most salient groups in Colombia are FARC and ELN; Shining Path in Peru; Cartel of the Suns and Bolivarian Liberation Forces in Venezuela; and Red Command and First Capital Command in Brazil.

[15] Though respondents may consider that many problems are worthy of mentioning, they are asked to state only one problem they think is the most important facing their country.

[16] Responses included in Economy: unemployment; problems with or crisis of economy; poverty; inflation or high prices; credit, lack of; lack of land to farm; external debt. Responses included in Security: crime; gangs; security (lack of); kidnappings; war against terrorism; terrorism; violence. Responses included in Basic Services: roads in poor condition; health services, lack of; education, lack of, poor quality; water, lack of; electricity, lack of; housing; malnutrition; transportation, problems of; human rights, violations of. Responses included in Politics: armed conflict; impunity; corruption; bad government; politicians. Responses included in Other: population explosion; discrimination; popular protests (strikes, road blockades); drug addiction; drug trafficking; forced displacement of persons; environment; migration; and "other" which comprises of less than 3% of responses.

[17] It is important to note that in 2004, we asked this question in 11 countries of the Americas only. These countries are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominincan Republic. In 2006, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, the United States and Canada were incorporated to this list. In 2008, the AmericasBarometer included Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Belize, and since 2010 we have included Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. These are the same 25 countries analyzed in this chapter. Figure 1.4 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

across the Americas.[18] The economy still leads as the most salient concern in 2014, with a regional average of 36% of respondents declaring that the economy is the most important problem in their country.[19] However, the economy as the most important problem has also experienced the biggest change across time: it decreased in public concern by approximately 25 percentage points from the first wave of the AmericasBarometer in 2004 to the most recent wave in 2014.



Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time

Security has consistently registered as the second most important problem in the Americas, as self-reported by citizens since 2004. Narrowing our focus to the two most recent years of the AmericasBarometer, 2012 and 2014, we see only minor changes over time in all five main categories. That said, we do see evidence that security concerns increased in recent years: in 2012, 30.1% cited an issue related to security as the most important problem and in 2014 that figure is 32.5%. In short, in 2014, on average across the Americas, essentially 1 out of 3 respondents report an issue related to crime, violence, or insecurity as the most important problem facing their country.

How much variation is there in concerns about security across countries in the Americas? To answer this question, we turn our attention to country-level data on the identification of security (crime and violence) as the most important problem. Figure 1.5 presents these data. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, in two countries, Trinidad & Tobago and El Salvador, 2 out of 3 citizens identify security as the most important problem facing their country. In Uruguay, this rate is 1 out of 2 citizens or 50% of the adult population. Security concerns are elevated in a number of other countries in the Americas as well, including Jamaica, Honduras, Peru, and Guatemala. In sharp contrast, few citizens in

[18] Using other survey data, Singer (2013) shows that the economy has consistently been cited as the most important problem in the hemisphere going back to the mid-1990s, although crime and security has increased in importance as the economy has strengthened and crime has gotten worse in many countries in recent years.

[19] As is standard LAPOP practice, in all analyses of regional averages in this chapter and this report more generally, we calculate regional means via a process that weights each country equally rather than proportional to population.

Haiti and Nicaragua identify security as the most important issue facing the country: in each case, fewer than 5% of individuals respond to the most important problem question with an issue related to security. In fact, though not shown here, we note that these two countries rank the highest in number of people surveyed stating economy as the most important problem in 2014.



Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014

Variation in concerns about security exists not only across countries in the Americas, but also across time. And, in fact, we also see cross-national variation in change across time: that is, the extent to which security concerns are increasing or decreasing in a country, on average, differs throughout the region. Map 1.1 shows how security as the most important problem has shifted from 2012 to 2014 across countries in the region by graphing the change in percentage that identify security as the most important problem. Guyana (shaded with the darkest color in Map 1.1) is a country in which we find the second largest increase in security being identified as the most important problem; yet, as Figure 1.5

demonstrates, it still ranks low in comparison to other countries in the Americas in the percentage of respondents that report security as the most important. Costa Ricans decreased in their tendency to identify security as the most important problem, when comparing 2012 to 2014, a shift that helps account for their fairly low ranking in Figure 1.5. On the other hand, Venezuela also experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents indicating security as the most important problem, but the country still ranks at about the regional mean for the Americas in 2014.[20]



Map 1.1. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country[21]

[20] It should be noted that this significant change in the percentage of Venezuelans that identifies security as the main problem is driven in large part by a significant increase in concerns over scarcity of basic products. Scarcity of food and basic necessities became a serious and salient problem in Venezuela in 2014. Thus, it may not be that security concerns diminished in Venezuela in 2014 so much as concerns about basic goods increased.

[21] Countries are categorized as having *decreased substantially* if the percentage of individuals reporting a security issue as the most important problem shifted downward between 10 and 40 percentage points between 2012 and 2014. They are

IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer

On average across the Americas, as described in the previous section, issues related to crime, violence, and security rank high on the minds of citizens across the Americas when they consider the most important problem facing their country. But, what types of experiences with crime victimizations, and at what rates, do citizens in the Americas report? In this section, using data collected for the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we first examine the frequency and types of crime victimization across the Americas, including analysis from new questions asked in 2014. Then we discuss the factors that may be associated with the likelihood of falling victim to crime and use the AmericasBarometer data to explore the individual-level characteristics of those most likely to report being victims of crime.

Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas

The AmericasBarometer has included several questions pertaining to crime victimization since 2004. One of these questions asks the individual whether he or she has been the victim of any type of crime over the past year. The specific wording is as follows:[22]

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]**
(88) DK **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]** (98) DA **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]**

Figure 1.6 displays reported crime victimization rates since 2004 for the Americas. That is, the figure shows the percentage of individuals, on average across the region, who answer that they were the victim of (at least one) crime over the past 12 months.[23] We see that crime victimization has hovered around 17% in most years except 2010, when there was a small spike in reported crime victimization. These findings suggest that the frequency of crime victimization has remained rather constant across time, on average for the region. In a separate analysis, not shown here, we find that the cross-time pattern of mostly stable rates shown in Figure 1.6 is fairly consistent for both the rural vs. urban populations of the Americas. That said, those who live in urban areas are more likely to report having been victimized by crime: on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 5 adults living in an urban area

categorized as *decreased modestly* if this downward shift is between 0 and 10 percentage points; *increased modestly* if the percentage of respondents selecting security shifted upward between 0 and 10; and *increased substantially* if that upward shift was over 10 percentage points.

[22] LAPOP has conducted a set of experiments in Belize and in the United States to assess whether the change in question wording results in a higher rate of response. The results are mixed, such that - for example - in a study conducted by LAPOP in Belize in 2008 in which the questions were placed into a split-sample design, there was no statistically distinguishable difference in responses to the original versus the modified question. On the other hand, in an online study conducted in the United States in 2013, LAPOP found that those who received the modified question wording were more likely to indicate having been the victim of a crime. Therefore, we can say that it is possible that some variation between crime victimization rates recorded by the AmericasBarometer pre-2009 compared to post-2009 are due to question wording differences; rates within the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 cannot be affected by question wording differences because not changes were introduced within those periods.

[23] Figure 1.6 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. Though when looking only at the 11 countries surveyed in 2004, we find the spike from 2008 to 2010 to be greater (a 5-point difference) and the trend after 2010 to decline at a slower rate. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

reports having been victimized by crime, while approximately just 1 out of 10 rural residents reports the same phenomenon (a statistically significant difference).[24]



Figure 1.6. Crime Victimization over Time

Figure 1.7 compares the percentage of citizens who have been victims of at least one crime in 2014, and documents important variation across countries. The top four spots in the chart are taken by South American countries: Peru (30.6%) is at the top, followed by Ecuador (27.5%), Argentina (24.4%), and Venezuela (24.4%). Three Caribbean countries rank at the bottom of the chart: Trinidad & Tobago (9.6%), Guyana (7.4%), and Jamaica (6.7%). The presence of Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago at the low end of Figure 1.7 is notable given that high percentages of individuals in these countries rate "security" as the most important problem facing their country in 2014 (see Figure 1.5).

[24] See also Figure 1.15.



Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine the number of times that victimized individuals have experienced crime in the last 12 months. For this purpose, the survey asks:

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?			
[fill in number] _____	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A

As we can see in Figure 1.8, in 2014, on average for the Americas, a majority of crime victims (55.7%) report being victimized one time. One in four crime victims reports being victimized two times. One in ten crime victims has been victimized three or more times in the past year, and very small percentages are found in the higher bins in the figure.



Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014

The AmericasBarometer not only records the levels of crime experienced by each of the survey respondents, but it also evaluates if other members of the respondent's household were victimized by any type of crime during the 12 months prior to the interview. To do so, between 2010 and 2014 the AmericasBarometer included the following question:

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

In Figure 1.9 we look at the region-wide levels of crime victimization within the household of the respondent since 2010.[25] We see a similar trend as we do with individual crime victimization; across time, levels of crime victimization within the household remain stable at about 17%, except for in 2010 when reports reach 19%. When examining crime victimization within the household in urban areas only, the trend remains the same though reports of crime victimization within the household are three percentage points higher than the general levels shown in the figure here.

[25] This question was not included in earlier rounds of the survey.



Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization within Household over Time

The AmericasBarometer also provides information on where the crime took place. Knowing the location of the crime can be useful in understanding differences in patterns of crime victimization within and across countries. Further, it may serve as information citizens can consider in taking precautionary measures to avoid crime, or may help local policy makers and law officers identify areas that need particular attention in order to increase citizen security. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included the following item, which was asked of those who indicated that they had been victim of a crime during the 12 months prior to the survey:

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**
(1) In your home
(2) In this neighborhood
(3) In this municipality/canton/parish
(4) In another municipality/canton/parish
(5) In another country
(88) DK
(98) DA
(99) N/A

Figure 1.10 shows the distribution of the location of crime victimization as reported by respondents across the Americas in 2014. We find a relatively equal distribution of respondents across categories. However, the most common locations where respondents report having been victimized are their homes (27%), in their neighborhood (26.8%), and in their municipality (26.9%). Victimization in other municipalities is less frequent (18.6%) and very few crime victims report the incident as having taken place outside of their country (0.6%).



Figure 1.10. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014

In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included an expanded series of survey items in order to obtain a sense of criminal activity within the neighborhood of the respondent. The new battery refers to the last 12 months, just as the crime victimization questions, and covers the following incidents: burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and murders. In the remainder of this section, we examine responses to these "VICBAR" questions:

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in that last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]

Figure 1.11 displays, by country, the percentage of respondents who answered yes to having experienced or heard of burglaries in their neighborhood. We see a great deal of variation across countries, from rates of affirmative responses of nearly 72% in Argentina, to 28% of respondents reporting such incidents in their neighborhood in Trinidad & Tobago. South American countries, like Argentina, Venezuela (69.9%), Brazil (69.6%), and Uruguay (69.2%), are grouped towards the top of those with the highest rates of burglaries, while Central American countries like Belize (37.6%), El Salvador (37.9%), Honduras (37.9%), Guatemala (41.0%), and Costa Rica (44.7%) are grouped somewhere in the middle of the figure. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, all of the Caribbean countries included in this report (Trinidad & Tobago, 28.2%; Guyana, 30.8%; Haiti, 32.9%;

and Jamaica, 34.7%) rank at the bottom in rates of witnessing or having heard about neighborhood burglaries.[26]



Figure 1.11. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014

Figure 1.12 examines the percentage of respondents across countries in 2014 that witnessed or heard of sales of illegal drugs in their neighborhood. Once again we see substantial cross-national variation in crime rates. More than half of the respondents of Brazil (64.6%), Costa Rica (58.2%), the Dominican Republic (56.1%), and Argentina (50.5%) report illegal drugs sales in their neighborhood in the 2014 AmericasBarometer study, whereas less than 10% of the respondents in Haiti make a similar report. Jamaica and Bolivia also show low rates, at 20.5% and 17.0%, respectively. When comparing the

[26] When examining only urban areas throughout the Americas, a similar ranking is found, but with increased percentage points per country across the board (about a 5-8 increase in percentage points per country).

two occurrences, sales of illegal drugs and burglaries, in the neighborhood of the respondent most countries have similar positioning within the region in each chart; but Costa Rica (58.2%), Chile (48%) and Trinidad & Tobago (44.7%) see substantial moves in placement toward the top of the chart in sales of illegal drugs, when comparing their ranking here to their ranking in the chart related to burglaries.[27]



Figure 1.12. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014

Next, Figure 1.13 displays the percentage of respondents across countries that report having witnessed or heard of extortion or blackmail within their neighborhood. The cross-national variation reveals a 25 point spread between the highest and lowest rate, which is so far the smallest variation and yet still substantial. On average, rates of reported extortion/blackmail in the neighborhood are among

[27] Trends in urban areas reflect the national trends, but with increased percentage points (about a 3-8 increase in percentage points per country).

the lowest percentages reported in the VICBAR series (that is, the series of reported criminal incidents in the neighborhood). We continue to see the Dominican Republic (24.4%) at the top of the charts for crime victimization within respondent's neighborhoods. However, overall we see a slightly different distribution of countries than we saw for burglaries and sales of illegal drugs. In second place is Haiti (24.2%), which has ranked lower on the two previous charts, comparatively. Guatemala (23.3%) and El Salvador (22.9%) are within the top five countries reporting extortion or blackmail, and again ranked much lower, comparatively, on the two previous measures. At the other end of the scale we find Uruguay, Guyana, and Nicaragua with a frequency of only 3.1%; 2.0%; and 1.4%, respectively.[28]



Figure 1.13. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014

[28] When examining urban areas only for reports of extortion or blackmail within the neighborhood, we find a similar country ranking with a few more percentage points reported per country.

Finally, Figure 1.14 examines the percentage of respondents that reported having known of a murder occurring in their neighborhood. We see Brazil (51.1%) at the top of the chart with the highest percentage, where over half of respondents report being aware of a murder in their neighborhood in the 12 months prior to the survey. Venezuela is in the second position with 42.7%, followed by the Dominican Republic, which we find at the top of all figures examining the VICBAR series – burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and now murders (33.9%). Costa Rica lies at the bottom of the chart (10.6%), just below Uruguay (11.9%) and Guyana (12%). The differences among those countries are not statistically significant.[29]



Figure 1.14. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014

[29] When examining urban areas only, the positioning of the countries remains, with less than a five percentage point increase per country.

Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?

Now that we have provided a broad picture of the frequency and nature of crime across the Americas as reported by the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we ask *who is most likely to report having been the victim of a crime?* Crime does not affect all population groups in the same way. Differences exist by place of residence, economic status, gender, age, and education.[30] In general terms, the scholarly literature suggests that crime is more often an urban phenomenon in Latin America. Living in large, urbanized cities makes citizens more likely to be victims of crime than residing in less populated and less developed areas (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Gomes and Paz 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Cotte Poveda 2012; Muggah 2012).

Increasing attention has also been given to the role of wealth in crime victimization; however, the relationship is less straightforward than between crime and urban settings. On the one hand, wealthier individuals can be more attractive to criminals and therefore wealth could be positively correlated with risk of crime victimization (Anderson 2009). On the other hand, wealth implies the motivation and capability to have more resources with which to protect one's person and/or property, which reduces the risk of becoming a victim of crime (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Barslund, Rand, Tarp, and Chiconela 2007; Gomes and Paz 2008; Justus and Kassouf 2013). Most recently, evidence indicates that wealth does indeed increase the probability of crime victimization, but the relationship is not linear, or non-monotonic. Once an individual has attained a certain level of wealth, the probability of falling victim to crime seems to diminish, likely because of the ability to guarantee self-protection (Justus and Kassouf 2013). This means that citizens belonging to the middle class may be more likely to be a victim of a crime than those that belong to the lowest or highest socioeconomic strata.

Scholars have also identified young adult males as those most susceptible to crime victimization (Beato, Peixoto, and Andrade 2004; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Muggah 2012). Those most vulnerable to violent crime in particular, are young male adults, especially those that are unemployed and have poor education. Victims of property crime, on the other hand, tend to also be young males, but are more likely to be those who have more education and frequently use public transportation (Bergman 2006).

Using the 2014 AmericasBarometer data, we first examine crime victims by location of their residence – whether an urban or rural location – and by their level of wealth.[31] The results in Figure 1.15 show that respondents living in urban locations are almost twice as likely to be victims of crime as respondents living in rural locations (20.2% vs. 11.8%), which is in line with conventional views and expectations. Also, as quintiles of wealth increase, the likelihood of reporting having been the victim of a crime increases. The results display a linear relationship rather than a tapering off effect or a diminishing return once wealth reaches a certain point. Thus, on average across the Americas, wealth is simply and positively related to reported crime victimization.

[30] Differences also emerge when considering whether victimization is violent or non-violent, or involves property; our analyses here focus on crime victimization in general.

[31] Wealth quintiles is a standard LAPOP variable created using the R-series questions about capital goods ownership to create a five-point index of quintiles of wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." AmericasBarometer Insights 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).



Figure 1.15. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014

To further examine what factors predict crime victimization in the Americas, Figure 1.16 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis intended to examine determinants of self-reported crime victimization within the Americas in 2014.[32] The figure displays the standardized regression coefficients as dots, with confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal lines. The figure shows that the most consequential factors associated with crime victimization are urban residence and education. Those living within an urban setting and having higher education levels are more likely to report being a victim of crime. Wealthy individuals are also more likely to report being a crime victim. On the other hand, women and those from higher age cohorts (the comparison category in the analysis is those of 36 to 45 years of age) are less likely to report being a victim of crime. We included a measure of respondent skin tone in the analysis, and see that it is not a significant factor in predicting crime victimization on average across the Americas. This result for skin tone and those that we report here for gender, education, and wealth are consistent with analyses of predictors of crime victimization using the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, as presented in our last report (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister2012), which gives us confidence in the robustness of these findings for the Latin American and Caribbean region.

[32] The analysis excludes the United States and Canada. Country fixed effects are included but not shown with Mexico as the base country. See corresponding table with the numerical results for the standardized coefficients in the Appendix.



Figure 1.16. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014

V. Conclusion

Issues related to crime, violence, and security are a serious challenge for democratic governance in the Americas. The AmericasBarometer has consistently recorded citizens' experiences with crime and violence in the region, and their concerns about these issues. In 2014, we expanded the study to include several new modules related to crime in order to allow even more detailed analysis of this topic. This chapter presents only a glimpse at this broader dataset, which we encourage those interested in the topic to explore in greater detail by accessing the survey data directly via LAPOP's website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Among the key findings in this chapter is the fact that concerns about crime as the most important problem have been steadily increasing over recent years in the Americas. And at the same time that regional average crime rates have remained fairly constant, significant variation exists across countries with respect to crime rates in general and with respect to reported incidents of particular types of crime in the neighborhood.

We concluded the chapter with an assessment of which individuals are more likely to report having been the victim of a crime in the Americas. We find that those living in urban settings, those with more years of education, and those with higher levels of wealth are more likely to report being the victim of a crime.

Appendix

Appendix 1.1. Determinants of Self-reported Crime Victimization, 2014 (Figure 1.16)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
66 years or older	-0.094*	(-5.09)
56-65 years	-0.069*	(-3.82)
46-55 years	-0.026	(-1.45)
26-35 years	0.004	-0.23
16-25 years	0.022	-1.18
Skin Tone	-0.033	(-1.75)
Wealth Quintiles	0.076*	-4.35
Years of Schooling	0.199*	-10.73
Woman	-0.071*	(-4.70)
Urban	0.212*	-10.61
Guatemala	-0.03	(-1.32)
El Salvador	-0.040*	(-1.98)
Honduras	-0.027	(-1.18)
Nicaragua	-0.050*	(-2.27)
Costa Rica	-0.135*	(-5.67)
Panama	-0.268*	(-8.69)
Colombia	-0.055*	(-2.74)
Ecuador	0.055*	-2.05
Bolivia	-0.024	(-0.92)
Peru	0.055*	(-3)
Paraguay	-0.125*	(-6.11)
Chile	-0.183*	(-6.84)
Uruguay	-0.014	(-0.70)
Brazil	-0.082*	(-3.93)
Venezuela	-0.016	(-0.87)
Argentina	-0.003	(-0.19)
Dominican Republic	0.004	(-0.17)
Haiti	-0.065*	(-2.89)
Jamaica	-0.253*	(-10.09)
Guyana	-0.225*	(-8.28)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.207*	(-8.87)
Belize	-0.073*	(-3.93)
Constant	-1.604*	(-85.00)
F	37.2	
Number of cases	38102	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

The last decade has seen dramatic economic improvements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Thanks to rising commodity prices, several countries enjoyed economic booms and, in turn, the region quickly recovered from the global economic slowdown. Improved education has narrowed skills gaps within the workforce (Kahhat 2010) and has boosted wages, particularly for low income workers (World Bank 2013). Many governments also launched ambitious social programs that helped provide more effective safety nets against poverty (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012). As a result, aggregate poverty rates in Latin America have fallen (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010).[1] Indeed, the number of people in Latin America living in extreme poverty (less than $2.50 a day) has dropped by 50% since 2000. In 2011, the number of people classified by the World Bank as middle class, measured as living on $10-50 a day, surpassed the number of people in Latin America classified as poor (Ferreira et al 2013). Inequality in the hemisphere remains high but has also decreased in recent years (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; Ferreira et al 2013).

These gains notwithstanding, the region's economies still face multiple challenges. Over 80 million people live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013) and 40% of Latin Americans live on a precarious $4-10 a day. The heralded growth of the middle class has been uneven—more pronounced in the Southern Cone than in the other places in the region. Moreover, as commodity prices have stabilized over the last two years, Latin America has seen its growth rates decrease. This development has led some observers to voice concerns over whether the region's economies are strong enough to continue raising people out of poverty.[2] Persistent inefficiencies in education systems and stubbornly large informal sectors in many countries hamper worker productivity.[3] So despite some recent signs of economic resilience, the quest for economic development continues across much of the Americas.

While these economic trends are important in and of themselves, a large literature links political participation and democratic attitudes to economic development and performance (e.g. Lipset 1959; Easton 1975; Carlin 2006; Bratton et al 2005; see discussion in Booth and Seligson 2009). Rising living standards and a growing middle class may ultimately be good for democracy if they result in growing demands for political inclusion (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet if democratic values have not become fully dispersed within the hemisphere, economic weakening may create discontent with democratic institutions and practices if citizens become convinced that democracy cannot fully deliver (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Booth and Seligson 2009). Moreover, high levels of poverty and inequality may create opportunities for leaders who promise to fix those problems if delegated sufficient political

[1] Data on poverty rates in the Caribbean are much more limited than are data on Latin America, thus while many reports speak of "Latin America and the Caribbean" in discussing the recent trends most of the data in them draws exclusively on Latin America. For a summary of some recent poverty data in the Caribbean, see Downes (2010).

[2] http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview; http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/27/inequality-latin-america-undp

[3] http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599782-instead-crises-past-mediocre-growth-big-riskunless-productivity-rises-life

authority to change the current status quo, perhaps at the cost of democratic checks and balances (Weyland 2013).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer provides a window into both the real improvements many citizens of the hemisphere experience as well as some lingering economic weaknesses. In particular, these data allow us to examine how the region's citizens view their current financial situation and the current state of the national economy. In doing so, we can see that while the average respondent is objectively better off than he or she was in the recent past, many people continue to report significant financial hardships. AmericasBarometer respondents also are tuned into the weakening macroeconomic situation; descriptions of the national economic situation are significantly lower in 2014 than they were in 2012 or 2010. In all of these trends, substantial differences in economic perceptions and household wealth within society reflect historic inequalities regarding access to education and the market that continue to shape patterns of inequality in the hemisphere.

II. Main Findings

In this chapter, we use the AmericasBarometer to track household access to basic services, ownership of common appliances, and other forms of household wealth along with subjective evaluations of whether one's income is sufficient to meet economic needs and subjective evaluations of recent economic trends. The main findings we documents are as follows:

- The regional average level of household wealth is increasing, in particular, ownership of many household appliances.
- Access to household services like running water and sewage has increased more slowly, but continues to increase in the hemisphere.
- When asked subjectively about their financial situations and whether their income is sufficient to meet their needs, many respondents report that they are struggling. In fact, the number of households that cannot make ends meet in an average country remains almost unchanged from previous waves of the survey.
- Evaluations of national economic trends are generally negative, although they vary substantially across countries in ways that reflect recent macroeconomic trends; respondents in countries whose economies are growing the most slowly tend to have the least positive views of the economy.

Yet we consistently find that both objective levels of wealth and subjective perceptions of household finances and the national economy differ within countries in ways that reflect structural inequalities within society as well as non-economic factors.

- Education is a particularly strong predictor of both objective household wealth and subjective reports of being financially secure.
- Individuals who live in urban areas, are married, are middle age, have lighter colored skin, and are male tend to report owning more household items.

- Household wealth is strongly correlated with reporting the ability to make ends meet, but even among the wealthiest quintile in the sample, 29% of respondents report that their income is not enough to make ends meet.
- Those who are poor, indigenous, and/or female tend to have the most negative views of the national economy.
- Individuals who live in high crime areas or who experienced corruption in the past year tend to be more negative about their country's economic trajectory.

III. The Evolution of Household Wealth

One way we can track Latin America's economic evolution is by looking at trends in household ownership of various consumer items. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents if they own the following:

R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	**DK** 88	**DA** 98	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? **[If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]**	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	88	98	
R6. Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R15. Computer	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R18. Internet	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	
R1. Television	(0) No **[Skip to R26]**			(1) Yes **[Continue]**	88	98	
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98	**99 INAP**

The list of household goods that the AmericasBarometer asks about has expanded over time, reflecting the advent of new technologies and the greater availability of other household items. The survey does not ask about the quality of the goods nor whether the respondent owns multiple versions of an appliance. Nevertheless, these measures allow us to break down some of the basic differences in household wealth in the hemisphere.

Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of households in 2014 that claim to have each item. As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere. According to these AmericasBarometer data, some household goods have become nearly ubiquitous in the Americas. For example, over 91% of households surveyed have a television. That number has grown slightly since

2006 (when it was 89%).[4] Of course this does not mean all homes are equal with regards to this one measure of wealth. Households will differ in the number and types of TV's they own. In fact, the 2014 AmericasBarometer added a question asking specifically about whether the respondent has a flat screen TV—less than 40% of respondents do. But at a basic level, access to television is high throughout the continent.



Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014[5]

Telephone access is also high throughout the Americas. Over 91% of individuals have either a cell phone or a landline phone in their home. Of the two types, cellular phones are far more common;

[4] In discussing trends in household wealth we focus on comparisons to 2006 because that was the year the AmericasBarometer expanded within South America and the Caribbean. If we restrict our attention to the countries in Central America and the Andes that were included in the 2004 wave and look at trends until the present day, the gains are even larger.

[5] This figure excludes the United States and Canada because several of the household wealth questions were not asked there.

roughly 89% of respondents have a cell phone while 36% have a landline phone. And while the share of houses with at least one television has remained relatively constant over the last 8 years of the AmericasBarometer survey, telephone penetration has increased markedly. In 2006 only 75% of households had access to a phone of any kind, with 63% of households having cell phones and 43% landlines. Thus in 8 years reported access to telephones in the household has increased by 16 percentage points and reported cell phone ownership has gone up by 26 percentage points.

In general, access to electronic appliances has been on a significant upward trend in recent years. Refrigerator ownership was fairly common in 2006 but increased 7.5 percentage points in the last eight years, such that nearly 82% of households in the average country report owning one. Ownership of washing machines and microwaves is more limited, but both have grown in recent years. Since 2006, the proportion of respondents in an average country who report owning a washing machine has increased by 16 percentage points and microwave ownership is now 14.6 percentage points higher. We observe a large increase – 21 percentage points since 2006 – in computer ownership. Concurrently, household access to the internet also grew by 28 percentage points since the AmericasBarometer first asked about it in 2008.

Other forms of household wealth changed more slowly. Though most homes in the Americas have access to indoor plumbing and an indoor bathroom, the percentage of homes that do not has only fallen 4 percentage points since 2006 in the average country. The average number of homes with an indoor bathroom has also only increased by 4 percentage points over the same period of time. These major gains in wealth are, perhaps, the most difficult to achieve. Not only are they expensive, they often require local governments and utilities to provide reliable forms of infrastructure, access, and services. Yet we might also consider that while a 4 percentage-point gain in access does not sound like much compared to the large increases in ownership of other goods and services, it does mean that in the past eight years the number of homes without access to indoor plumbing or an indoor bathroom have been reduced by 18 and 14 percent respectively. Car ownership also remains relatively rare; about 30% of respondents own at least one car, although that is an increase over the 24% that reported owning cars in 2006.

To summarize these overall trends, in Figure 2.2 we create a simple index of household ownership that keeps track of the number of goods households in an average country own.[6] We focus on the 12 items that were asked about in every survey since 2006 and count the number owned by each household.[7] For simplicity we weight each item equally and take the average number of owned items

[6] This index is a very simple index of wealth and differs from the one used elsewhere in the report that breaks wealth into quintiles. In most analyses in this report we use an index of household wealth that uses factor analysis to identify which goods distinguish the most well-off households from other households and which also incorporates differences in the kinds of wealth that are possible in urban and rural areas given differences in infrastructure (a well-to-do person in rural areas where electricity is scarce may own fewer electronic appliances, for example, than does a poor person living in an urban center). See Córdova, Abby. 2009. Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators. AmericasBarometer *Insight* Report 2008, no. 6. http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf**.** The index of household wealth used in the rest of the report breaks houses down into their quintiles by country but, by design, does not allow for comparisons across countries or within them over time in the number of goods that households actually own. Thus, here we look at a raw count of household goods.

[7] Television of any kind, a flat screen television, refrigerator, telephone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, a computer, and the internet.

across the sample. The data show household access to these basic services and appliances increased in every wave of the AmericasBarometer[8]



Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index

While household wealth has increased on average, large disparities continue to exist within the Americas. We explore differences within and across societies using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. In Figure 2.3 we model a slightly modified version of the household wealth index presented in Figure 2.2 that adds ownership of a flat screen TV and internet access (questions added to the AmericasBarometer battery since 2006) to the set of household goods and examine how they differ within societies. We control for country fixed effects to account for unmeasured differences across countries, thus the results in Figure 2.3 reflect average within-country differences in household wealth.[9]

[8] If we compare wealth within only those countries that are included in every survey since 2004, the same pattern of increasing wealth over time also occurs.

[9] As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. The coefficients are all standardized. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.1 at the end of the chapter.



Figure 2.3. Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014[10]

Average levels of household wealth vary significantly across socio-demographic groups. The largest correlate of household wealth is education. The more schooling an individual obtains, the more of these household items he or she tends to own. This pattern may exist for several reasons. It could be that as education levels continue to increase, opportunities to obtain household wealth also increase.[11] Yet inequalities with regards to access to education remain and these gaps in opportunities for children of different class and ethnic backgrounds and genders are likely to help further perpetuate inequalities in adulthood (Cruces et al. 2014).[12] It could also be that wealthy individuals are able to keep their children in school longer and that this correlation at the individual-level reflects differences in initial levels of wealth.

Other groups have systematically lower levels of wealth. Households in rural areas report having fewer household items than urban ones. Individuals with darker-toned skin tend to own fewer household goods than light-toned skinned individuals, even when holding the level of education and place of residence constant. Asset ownership varies with age in a non-linear way:[13] the youngest age category reports owning many of the household goods, perhaps due to a lack of family responsibilities, being early adopters of technology, or because many of them still live at home or receive support from their

[10] The analyses in this figure do not include the United States, Canada, or Uruguay because of missing values on some variables.

[11] In analyses not reported here we find that the average level of education among AmericasBarometer respondents has increased significantly since 2006, with the average respondent in 2014 reporting nearly half a year more schooling than did the average respondent in 2006, which reflects the expansion of education in recent decades (Cruces et al 2014) and the generational replacement as the younger, more educated generations come of age while the less educated generations drop out of the sample.

[12] In an analysis not reported here, we find that the largest correlates of respondents' educational attainment are their mother's education (which has by far the largest marginal effect-educated parents tend to have educated children), living in urban areas (rural areas tend to have lower average levels of education), gender (married women have lower average levels of education than do single women and single women have slightly lower levels of education than do single men although they are not significantly different than are married men), and age (younger respondents tend to be more educated).

[13] The reference category in the model is the 36-45 years-old category.

parents. Household wealth then drops as respondents enter their late 20s and early 30s but increases with age until dropping among the oldest groups.

Wealth also differs across genders, although this gap is affected by marital status. We break respondents up into those who live in a household as part of a couple (marriage, common-law marriage, or civil union) and those who do not (single, separated, divorced, or widowed). Individuals living as a couple tend to have more resources than do those who are not. In further analysis we found that parents of children who do not live with another person tend to have fewer resources than do single individuals without children (and this is equally true for men and women) while men and women who are part of a couple and have kids tend to have more possessions than couples who do not have children. Yet among both single individuals and couples, men are more likely to report higher ownership of goods than women. The survey does not allow us to isolate why married women are less likely to report the same levels of *household* wealth as married men, given that we would expect the two groups on average to report the same levels of wealth. One explanation is suggested by a study done in Malawi on reporting of household wealth, which posits that women may be less likely to report ownership of an item if it is predominantly used by her husband (Miller, Msiyaphazi Zulu, and Cotts Watkins 2001).

In summary, these results remind us that across the Americas, as a whole, certain groups – the uneducated, darker skinned individuals, single individuals (especially single parents), women, and individuals living in rural areas still experience real disadvantages in accumulating household wealth despite recent improvements in overall wealth levels.

IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet

Though the data in Figure 2.2 display a clear upward trend in the ownership of household goods, households do not necessarily feel financially secure. Many households obtained these goods by going into debt, which leaves them struggling to make payments.[14] Moreover, rising aspirations may leave individuals unsatisfied even as they are better off (Easterlin 2001; Graham 2005). Thus, we move beyond objective measures of wealth to subjective measures of personal financial situations. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents how well their income allows them to cover their financial needs.

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**
(1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
(2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
(3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
(4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
(88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA

The citizens of the Americas are split almost equally between those who think that they can make ends meet and those who report that they are struggling to do so (Figure 2.4). These differences break down along objective wealth lines. In Figure 2.5, we divide the sample by quintiles of household wealth (measured within each country), using the series of questions about household goods ownership following the approach by Córdova (2009). Over 29% of respondents in the lowest wealth category report they not only feel stretched but have a hard time making ends meet. This contrasts with less than

[14] See dos Santos (2013) or Soederberg (2014) for a review of evidence about the expansion of credit markets. Also http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/niveles-preocupantes-llega-deuda-de-hogares-colombianos-articulo-304173 and http://www.cps.fgv.br/cps/bd/DD/DD_Neri_Fgv_TextoFim3_PRINC.pdf

6% of those in the households with the most material benefits feeling they are in the same situation. Yet even in the highest wealth quintile, 3 out of every 10 individuals report that their income is not enough to comfortably meet their needs, and 53% of households in the median wealth quintile report that their income is not enough to meet their needs. Thus this question does not merely reflect income but also likely tracks the number of financial commitments households have taken on and the financial aspirations of different groups. At all levels of wealth across the Americas, on average, large numbers of individuals feel like they are financially stretched or worse.



Figure 2.4. Is The Household's Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014



Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014

If we look over time, the regional average across the hemisphere has hardly changed since 2006; outside of an increase in perceived security in 2012, the differences between years are fairly small (Figure 2.6). More importantly, the relative stability of respondents' perceptions of their household situations stands in contrast to the growth seen in the sheer number of material objects households have accumulated. While individuals in the Americas today own more things than ever before, they are feeling no more financially secure.

Levels of financial contentment at the household level vary across countries. Following LAPOP standard practices, answers to question Q10D are scored on a 0-100 scale, with high values representing greater ability to cover household expenses. In 2014 Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay have the highest level of individuals who feel like their income meets their needs, while Honduras and Haiti have the most individuals who report financial struggles (Figure 2.7). Since the question was asked in prior years, we can present a comparison between the 2014 results and those obtained in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In this analysis, we find that while Haiti had the lowest levels of subjective economic security in 2012, subjective household security in Honduras has fallen by more than 13 points on the 0-100 scale over the last 2 years as many more respondents report having difficulty making ends meet. Venezuela also saw the number of households who feel financially secure fall; the financial perceptions index is 11 points lower in 2014 than in 2012. Canada and Colombia, in contrast, were the only two countries that saw even a 2-point increase in subjective household finances over the past two years.



Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time



Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014

V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?

The citizens of the Americas offer mixed assessments of the national economy. In the AmericasBarometer survey respondents were asked how they perceived the recent performance of the national economy.

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?
(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

The most frequent response in 2014 was the economy was getting worse while relatively few respondents said the economy was getting better (Figure 2.8). This represents a sizable drop in economic assessments from the 2012 survey and, indeed, economic perceptions have not been this negative in the Americas since 2008 (Figure 2.9).



Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014



Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time

Citizen evaluations of the national economy vary substantially across countries (Map 2.1). To facilitate the interpretation of this question, we have recoded it on a 0-100 scale where high values represent a belief that the economy has gotten better. Respondents in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile have

the most positive views of their economy. Comparing these results for 2014 to those obtained from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we can report that each of these countries saw a fairly large increase in economic optimism; the economic assessment measure in Ecuador is eight points higher in 2014 than it was in 2012, while Bolivia and Chile each saw their economic perceptions score rise by more than 12 points. The other country where citizens view the economy much more positively in 2014 than two years ago is the Dominican Republic. In fact, economic assessments there changed from some of the most negative in 2012 to among the most positive in 2014. If we shift our attention to countries where respondents are the least positive in 2014, Venezuelans lead the region followed by Guatemalans, Argentines, and Mexicans. Venezuela also saw the largest drop in economic assessments (30 points) since the previous AmericasBarometer. For its part, Argentina saw a substantial drop of 26 points compared to two years ago. In total, 11 of the 25 countries in Map 2.1 have economic perception indexes that shrank by 10 points or more compared to 2012. Economic assessments are more negative than they were two years ago in 17 of the 25 countries.



Map 2.1. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014[15]

[15] The estimated economic perceptions score for each country in Map 2.1 is available in Appendix 2.2. For 2012 scores, see *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity (Seligson, Smith and Zechmeister 2012).*

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, widespread levels of economic pessimism are consistent with the weakening of many economies in the Americas. The IMF's April 2014 World Economic Outlook database projects that the average GDP growth for the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of the 2014 AmericasBarometer was 3.9% in 2013 and will be 3.3% in 2014, compared to the 4.3% growth rate the hemisphere averaged between 2010-2012. The IMF's projected inflation rate for the hemisphere in 2014 is 6.7%, an increase over the average inflation rates of 5.7 and 5.8 percent observed in 2012 and 2010 respectively. These estimates will be revised as more data become available, but they mirror the weakness that many AmericasBarometer respondents report.

Differences in economic opinions across countries often reflect differences in these macroeconomic indicators, although imperfectly. The Venezuelan economy, for example, is particularly weak, with the IMF forecasting a slight contraction in GDP for 2014 and inflation rates nearing 50% in 2014 (even after 1% growth in GDP and 40% inflation in 2013). Thus it is not surprising that Venezuelans hold the most negative views about the economy in the hemisphere in 2014. More generally, there is a positive association between the estimated GDP growth rate for the 12 months before the survey was conducted in each country and respondent's views of how their economy was doing compared to the previous year; a particularly high growth in Paraguay in 2013 as it recovered from a contracting economy in 2012 weakens the relationship somewhat (Figure 2.10).[16]



Figure 2.10. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014

Yet differences across countries cannot be fully explained by macroeconomic trends. Even if the cautious assessments of the economy in Paraguay likely reflect recent economic volatility, there are still some countries, like Guatemala, where respondents are particularly pessimistic given the state of the economy and others, such as Ecuador, where assessments of the economy seem more positive than one

[16] Following Singer (2013) we estimate the growth rate in the 12 months before each survey by taking the weighted average of the previous year's growth rate and the current one, weighting them according to the number of months in 2014 that had passed when the bulk of respondents in each country completed the survey.

might expect given recent economic trends and forecasts. Moreover, citizens within these countries do not necessarily agree on how well the economy is doing, a finding consistent with work showing citizen evaluations of the economy not only reflect economic factors but also their personal economic experiences (Duch et al. 2000) and other non-economic outcomes (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Duch and Kellstedt 2011).

In Figure 2.11 we model citizens' evaluations of the economy in 2014 as a function of the estimated GDP growth rate in the country, demographic factors, and non-economic factors like whether the respondent reports crimes in his or her neighborhood[17] and whether the respondent had to pay a bribe in the last 12 months.[18] Because the GDP growth variable is measured at the country level, this model is estimated using a hierarchical linear model.[19]

These data confirm a positive association between the estimated GDP growth and citizen evaluations of the economy. Yet they also confirm the notion that citizen assessments significantly differ along demographic lines. Wealthy and educate individuals tend to have more positive views of the national economy, perhaps because they are better positioned to capture the benefits of any eventual economic growth. Individuals who receive financial assistance from the government also hold positive assessments of the national economy. In contrast, women and individuals with darker skin tend to have more negative perceptions of how the national economy is performing. Previous waves of the AmericasBarometer showed women and darker skinned individuals experienced high levels of economic discrimination (Seligson et al. 2012) and the analysis presented previously in this chapter in Figure 2.3 remind us that these groups continue to face disadvantages in accumulating wealth. These structural disadvantages may be reflected in their negative views of the economy even after controlling for current levels of wealth. Yet other differences do not have as clear of an economic explanation. Young respondents, for example, tend to be more positive than older cohorts. Finally, despite higher levels of poverty in rural areas, rural residents tend to report that the national economy is doing better.

[17] Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1; this series asks if burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail had occurred in the respondent's neighborhood or not.

[18] See the discussion of this measure in Chapter 5; the measure is based on a series of questions to which respondents report being asked to provide a bribe (or not) to a government official, the police, a municipal government employee, in a court, to the military, in work, in a school, or in accessing public health care.

[19] As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.



Figure 2.11. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy,[20] 2014

The high levels of crime and corruption in the Americas also seem to be spilling over into respondent views of the national economy. Individuals who report that there have been crimes in their neighborhood are less likely to have a positive view of the economy. Bribery victims also tend to see the economy negatively. As poor governance affects citizens, it colors how they view the overall economic state of their country.

VI. Conclusion

Recent macroeconomic reports coming out of Latin America and the Caribbean have emphasized both the major improvements that have occurred in many countries and a risk of seeing these gains erased as economies slacken. The same mixed message emerges out of the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Household wealth continues to improve but many households struggle to meet basic needs. Large inequalities in access to these goods exist within societies, with historically excluded groups still lagging behind in their objective wealth. Finally, as the macroeconomic climate has worsened, and as many states struggle to fully combat crime and corruption, citizens have become pessimistic about their country's economic progress.

These data remind us of the challenges facing the hemisphere in furthering economic development. Room for improvement exists with regards to household access to sanitation and water. Education levels can continue to improve while darker skinned individuals, women, and rural residents need to be further incorporated into the economy. If the gains the Americas have achieved over the past decade are going to continue, new economic opportunities for traditionally underrepresented groups are necessary. Additionally, improvements in the rule of law and clean government may both prevent money

[20] The analyses in this figure do not include the United States or Canada because of missing values on some variables. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.3 at the end of the chapter.

from exiting the market and also increase consumer confidence, further stimulating economic development.

These economic fluctuations may very well have implications beyond the economy. In particular, a classic viewpoint suggests that wealth is often positively correlated with the deepening of democratic values. If so, then the overall trends in economic development in the hemisphere should have a stabilizing force. Yet the high levels of economic insecurity that remain potentially place a strain on democracies as impoverished individuals and those who cannot make ends meet look for political actors who might be able to alleviate their economic pain. Moreover, a weak economy may also bring with it doubts about the efficacy of political institutions, although a normative commitment to democratic values may insulate democratic institutions from instability when the economy deteriorates. We examine these relationships in Chapter 5. But, before turning to that analysis, in the next chapter we look at another area of policy concern in the Americas – fighting corruption.

Appendix

Appendix 2.1. Coefficients for Figure 2.3-the Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.175*	(-22.82)
Man in a Couple	0.035*	(5.57)
Woman in a Couple	-0.014*	(-2.25)
Woman Living Alone	-0.042*	(-7.43)
Level of Education	0.346*	(59.08)
Skin Tone	-0.134*	(-19.55)
16-25 Years	-0.003	(-0.49)
26-35 Years	-0.018*	(-3.18)
46-55 Years	0.008	(1.55)
56-65 Years	0.020*	(3.79)
66 Years or Older	0.004	(0.74)
Guatemala	-0.060*	(-6.21)
El Salvador	-0.083*	(-9.45)
Honduras	-0.034*	(-3.04)
Nicaragua	-0.142*	(-15.57)
Costa Rica	0.119*	(13.25)
Panama	0.033*	(3.29)
Colombia	-0.012	(-1.18)
Ecuador	-0.039*	(-3.12)
Bolivia	-0.130*	(-8.53)
Peru	-0.077*	(-9.08)
Paraguay	0.022*	(2.83)
Chile	0.076*	(8.88)
Brazil	0.093*	(10.67)
Venezuela	0.052*	(5.38)
Argentina	0.058*	(8.11)
Dominican Republic	-0.010	(-0.86)
Haiti	-0.162*	(-11.86)
Jamaica	0.024*	(2.39)
Guyana	0.017	(1.38)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.143*	(18.17)
Belize	0.010	(1.23)
Constant	-0.102*	(-11.69)
Number of observations	33769	
Population size	29411.22	
Design df	1912	
F(32, 1881)	413.07*	
R^2	0.3952	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics Based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Uruguay, the United States, and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Appendix 2.2. Estimated Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014. Empirical Basis for Map 2.1



Appendix 2.3. Coefficients for Figure 2.12-Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(Z Statistic)
GDP Growth Rate (Estimated)	0.178*	(2.19)
Rural	0.018*	(2.82)
Woman	-0.060*	(-10.48)
Wealth Quintile	0.041*	(6.65)
Level of Education	0.037*	(5.16)
Skin Tone	-0.015*	(-2.18)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.035*	(6.13)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	-0.031*	(-5.32)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	-0.023*	(-3.92)
16-25 Years	0.038*	(5.23)
26-35 Years	0.020*	(2.79)
46-55 Years	0.000	(-0.03)
56-65 Years	0.003	(0.43)
66 Years or Older	-0.008	(-1.30)
Constant	-0.094	(-0.50)
var(Country-Level)	0.104	
var(Individual-Level)	0.901	
Number of groups	23	
Wald $\chi^2(14)$	385.25*	
Hierarchical Linear Model with z-Statistics in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.

Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

While corruption trails crime and the economy as public priorities in the Americas (see Figure 1.4), it remains a major problem in the hemisphere. For example, a recent analysis looking at various indicators of government success in fighting corruption compiled by the World Bank[1] finds, on average, Latin America's governments are less successful at fighting corruption than their counterparts in Western Europe and North America and trail Eastern Europe in promoting clean government (Mungiu-Pippidi, Martinez, and Vaz Mondo 2013). Latin America has comparable levels of corruption with Asia and has less corruption, again on average, than Sub-Saharan Africa and the members of the former Soviet Union. Yet corruption levels vary substantially across the hemisphere, with some countries ranking among the cleanest in the world while in neighboring countries bribery is a part of many citizens' everyday lives.

The failure to prevent officials from misusing their power for personal gain can have deleterious economic and social consequences. Economists have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth (Ugur 2014) and wealth distribution (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).[2] Because corruption diverts funds from public programs' intended beneficiaries, it lowers the efficiency and quality of public services (Shleifer and Vichny 1993; Ehrlich and Lui 1999). The result may be higher death rates (Silverson and Johnson 2014). Of course corruption undermines the egalitarian administration of justice (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pharr 2000; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Morris 2008; Fried, Lagunes, and Venkataramani 2010). Some have further suggested that corruption erodes social capital by making its victims less trusting of their fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Eek 2009).

Corruption also generates political costs. It has been shown to reduce citizen engagement in politics (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Chong et al. 2011; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2013) and hamper support for democratic institutions and democracy more generally (Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011). Indeed, some scholars argue that political governance outcomes like corruption have a larger impact on democratic stability than economic outcomes (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001).

Thus in this chapter we document how respondents in the 2014 AmericasBarometer perceived and experienced corruption. We focus on two related but distinct dimensions: whether or not the respondent was asked to pay a bribe to obtain services and if they perceive public officials as corrupt. These complimentary dimensions capture two different facets of corruption: measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government can also track grand corruption, such as national scandals, with which respondents have no personal experience. Furthermore, citizens often have different tolerances when it comes to what kinds of activities undertaken by public officials they consider corrupt (Treisman 2007; Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). That is, these two types of questions provide windows into two different forms of governance failures, both of which can have negative consequences for democracy in the Americas.

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[1] The AmericasBarometer is one of the indicators used by the World Bank when generating its governance indicators. See www.govindicators.org/.

[2] Although Latin America may have a different pattern; see Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010).

Despite the differences in these indicators, the data confirm corruption in all of its forms is common across Latin America. Levels of perceived political corruption are high and have not significantly improved since the 2012 AmericasBarometer, though several countries have seen significant swings. Corruption victimization is also widespread among the population, although certain groups are more likely to be exposed than others. We conclude by considering whether respondents in the Americas are so accustomed to corruption that they have become acclimated to paying bribes. The one piece of good news is that the vast majority of 2014 AmericasBarometer respondents report that paying a bribe is never justifiable, even if they themselves had to pay a bribe in the last year. While this suggests the region's residents have not abandoned a commitment to clean governance, the failure of so many regimes to fully prevent corruption may have negative consequences for levels of political support for democracy and its institutions.

II. Main Findings

The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, with regards to key findings, we see the following patterns:

- In an average country in the hemisphere, roughly one in five AmericasBarometer respondents paid a bribe in the last year.
- Bribery victimization is reported at particularly high levels among citizens who have engaged with municipal governments, courts, and the police.
- Region-average bribe victimization levels are unchanged from 2012.
- Bribe victimization levels vary by country, with Haiti an extreme outlier.
- Most respondents think corruption is common among public officials, with average perceived corruption levels unchanged from previous years.
- While one in six AmericasBarometer survey respondents believe that paying a bribe can be justified in some circumstances, that number is much higher among those who paid a bribe during the year prior to the survey.
- Yet even among those who paid a bribe, the vast majority does not believe bribes are justifiable.

Second, we consider the factors that lead citizens to have different levels of exposure to corruption and perceptions of how common it is. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Bribery victimization is more common for men, in urban areas, in places where crime is common, and for the middle aged.
- Bribery victimization is generally more common for wealthy respondents but also among individuals who receive financial assistance from the government.
- Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, wealthy respondents, and educated respondents are more likely to believe that the government is corrupt.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

The AmericasBarometer surveys have employed over time a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, focusing specifically on bribery because this is the form that is most common for average citizens. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking direct questions such as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions). By asking about the variety of ways in which individuals interact with government, the data provide an extensive snapshot of the forms corruption can take.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	**No**	**Yes**	**DK**	**DA**
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] **EXC20**. In the last twelve months, did any **soldier or military officer** ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? **If the answer is No → mark 99** **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months?	99				

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
If the answer is No → mark 99 **If it is Yes→ ask the following:** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98

In Figure 3.1 we break down responses to these questions in two ways; the left figure displays the average percentage of respondents that reported being asked for at least one bribe in each setting to measure the overall scope of different types of corruption victimization.[3] Yet these numbers are affected by two factors: how frequently do interactions in each setting result in citizens being asked for a bribe and the frequency with which citizens have interactions in each of the settings the survey asks about. Since we also asked respondents about their interactions with different offices and institutions, we can also directly gauge the percentage of respondents whose interactions gave them the opportunity to be targeted for corruption subsequently paid a bribe. The right side of the figure thus looks at the number of people who were asked to pay a bribe in each setting as a percentage of the people who had relevant interactions. The questions about bribe requests from the police, soldiers, and government employees do not ask if respondents had any dealings with these officials and so the estimated percentages for these three categories are constant across the two parts of the figure.

The data in Figure 3.1 demonstrate the wide range of arenas where bribery occurs. For example, in the full population the most common corruption experiences occur with the police, as 10% of respondents reported a police officer asking them for a bribe in the past year. If we restrict our attention to individuals who actually had experiences with various public entities, however, we see they experience bribe requests in some settings at a significantly higher rate. For example, only 1.5% of the overall sample reported being asked for a bribe in court in the 12 months before the survey. Yet being required to present oneself in court is relatively rare – only 1 in 11 respondents had any dealings with courts in that period – but among those individuals who actually were in court, 14% were asked to pay a bribe. We see a similar pattern with corruption in the process of dealing with municipal government employees: while very few individuals had to process a document with the municipal government in the 12 months before the survey and thus only 2.9% of respondents reported being requested to pay a bribe, among those individuals who did try to process paperwork with the municipal government, 14.5% were asked for a bribe. Over 10% of individuals with children in school were asked for a bribe related to education while nearly 8% of respondents who accessed public health services were targeted. Although most interactions with public officials do not involve corruption, it is a fairly common element of citizen-state interaction in the Americas.

[3] As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers in each figure represent the percentages who were asked for a bribe in each setting in an average country in the hemisphere. The data in Figure 3.1 include the United States and Canada



Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014

As we consider the wide range of activities in which corruption plays a part, citizens of the Americas have multiple opportunities to be targeted for corruption and many people are being asked to pay bribes each year. From this battery of questions we can then build a summary index of whether or not a person was asked for a bribe in at least one of these settings.[4] In an average country, just under 1 in 5 AmericasBarometer respondents reported paying at least one bribe in the last 12 months (Figure

[4] The measure, labeled CORVIC in the dataset documentation, looks at the percentage of the total sample that was asked for a bribe and does not adjust for whether or not individuals had any contact with government or other relevant officials in the past year. While most of the questions in the module refer specifically to interactions with government officials or institutions, it is possible that some of the corruption reported in this overall measure, CORVIC, relates to bribe solicitation by individuals who are not public officials.

3.2).[5] This rate of corruption experiences is virtually unchanged from 2012 and is not significantly different from corruption levels in 2008 or 2006 (Figure 3.3).[6]



Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014

[5] The data in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 include the United States and Canada. If we exclude those two countries, the regional average level of corruption victimization increases slightly to 20.5% for 2014. 2004 has slightly higher corruption than 2006 does because the 2004 sample had fewer countries and includes countries where corruption victimization is more common. Yet if we look only at countries that have been in the sample since 2004, the same pattern of corruption declining over time and then increasing in 2012 occur. Corruption victimization levels increase somewhat, however, in the countries that were not part of the 2004 sample while they have decreased in the Central American and Andean countries that were the emphasis of the first AmericasBarometer survey.

[6] While 2004 saw significantly higher levels of corruption experiences that any other year in Figure 3.3, this is caused by the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey being limited to Mexico, Central America, and the Central Andes where corruption is slightly more common than in the rest of the hemisphere.



Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time

Yet these hemisphere averages mask large differences across countries (Figure 3.4). Haiti has the highest level of corruption victimization by a considerable margin; over two-thirds of Haitian respondents were asked to pay a bribe in the 12 months before being surveyed. Many of these corruption experiences in Haiti occur as citizens try to access social services; Haiti is actually right below the regional mean for police bribery requests but is an outlier for bribery occurring in schools, public health services, and work settings.[7] Bolivia has the second highest level of bribery victimization (30%). Yet this represents a significant drop from 2012 when nearly 45% of Bolivians were corruption victims.[8] Ecuador also saw a double-digit drop in corruption victimization from the 2012 poll, from nearly 41% to 26%. In contrast, Paraguay, Venezuela, Belize, and Panama all saw corruption victimization rates increase by seven percentage points or more since 2012. This moved Paraguay and Venezuela from around the hemispheric average to among the highest rates and moved Belize and Panama from comparatively low levels of corruption to around the regional average. The United States, Chile, Uruguay, and Canada have the lowest levels of corruption.

[7] For example, 49% of Haitian respondents, and 74% of respondents with students in school, paid a bribe in a school in the 12 months before the survey. If we look at health care, 33% of all respondents and 76% of those who said they visited a health care facility paid a bribe as part of that process.

[8] Corruption data from 2012 are not reported here but are available from Singer et. al (2012) or the LAPOP website.



Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014

To understand which individuals are most likely to be targeted for bribes, we model the summary variable of whether or not the respondents were asked for at least one bribe (the measure presented in Figure 3.2) with logistic regression. Just as in previous chapters, we focus on the demographic characteristics of the respondent and whether he or she lives in an urban or rural area. We also look at two features that might be related to respondents being in a position where corrupt interactions are likely to occur. First is whether or not the respondent received financial assistance from the government (excluding pensions or social security) to test if that interaction with the state places respondents at risk of being solicited for a bribe.[9] Second, we model whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood where a crime occurred to test if corruption victimization is more likely to occur in places where the rule of law

[9] Measured from the question WF1: "Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security? Yes or No"

is objectively weaker.[10] As we model these differences, we include country fixed effects to control for any unmeasured differences across countries, as such the estimated effects in the figure explain differences in likely corruption victimization within countries.[11]

The results of this model in Figure 3.5 show that groups differ significantly in their exposure to corruption.[12] In interpreting these differences, it is important to remember that while several surveys specifically ask about officials requesting bribes, the questions do not ask if the respondent played any role in initiating the bribe. The survey does not attempt to determine between these two scenarios because many people will lie if asked if they offered the bribe (Kray and Murrell 2013). Yet in considering why some groups experience corruption more often than others, we should not discount the possibility that group diversity reflects differences in the shares of individuals that are willing to offer a bribe as well as differences in which groups are targeted by officials. Differences across groups can also potentially reflect differences in the frequency with which groups interact with specific institutions or government officials.

For example, corruption experiences break down on gender lines. Men are more likely to report being asked for a bribe than women. Yet across the types of corruption measured by the survey, we find exceptions to this pattern: corruption victims in schools and healthcare are slightly more likely to be female than male.[13] This difference in corruption victimization patterns across settings does not occur because officials in education and health are particularly targeting women but rather because women were more likely to be users of these services. In fact, among users of these services, men and women are equally likely to be asked for bribes. Yet in the other forms of corruption we study men were more likely to pay bribes than women, even when we take into account differences in government and societal interactions across genders.

Within the Americas, solicitation of bribes is also more common among wealthy respondents. These individuals have the most to offer officials and thus are either frequently targeted for bribes, more frequently offer to pay bribes, or both. Educated individuals also are asked to pay more bribes. At the same time we see that individuals who receive welfare, who are overwhelmingly concentrated among poor individuals, are also significantly more likely to have been targeted for a bribe than non-welfare recipients. The implication may be that, in many parts of the Americas, the process of obtaining and maintaining welfare benefits involves corruption.

[10] Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1 that asked about burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail.

[11] The United States and Canada are excluded from this analysis because they are missing at least one of the questions used as controls.

[12] As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p<0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. Coefficients are standardized. The full set of coefficients is available in Appendix 3.1 at the end of the chapter.

[13] We do not present the results of this analysis here but they are available from the authors upon request.



Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014

Furthermore, people who live in high crime areas appear to be more likely targets for bribes. Further data analysis demonstrates that high-crime areas are, not surprisingly, highly correlated with being asked to pay bribes to policemen. Perhaps more surprising is that other forms of corruption are also correlated with respondents who live in high-crime neighborhoods. While we cannot state with any certainty whether high crime causes corruption, is caused by corruption, or both factors have common underlying causes, the breakdown of public security in parts of the Americas goes hand in hand with a broader weakness in the quality of governance. Finally, corruption victimization is more common in urban areas and is concentrated among respondents in the middle-age categories. There is no evidence that those with darker skin tones are more likely to be asked to pay bribes.

In summary, as we look across the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, the 2014 AmericasBarometer reminds us that while bribery may vary somewhat across groups and across countries, it is routine in many parts of the hemisphere.

IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?

Given the frequency with which respondents are asked to pay bribe, we might suspect many people in the hemisphere, even those who personally were not asked for a bribe, will believe that corruption is common. Moreover, the Americas are not immune to scandals involving high-level government officials (Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Thus it is instructive to look beyond personal experiences to see how citizens of the Americas perceive corruption generally.

The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents to consider the prevalence of corruption among public officials.[14] Specifically, respondents are asked:

[14] This question was not asked in Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read]
(1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Following standard LAPOP procedures, responses to this question (EXC7) are re-coded on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is "very uncommon" and 100 represents the perception that corruption is "very common."

The average citizen of the Americas is convinced that corruption is common among public officials, and just under 80% of respondents said that corruption was either very common or common among public officials, with respondents being equally split between the two categories (Figure 3.6). The average public evaluation of corruption in 2014 is unchanged from 2012 (Figure 3.7). In fact, over the years, the AmericasBarometer survey has found persistent agreement that corruption is common among government officials; in every wave since 2006 the combined percentage of respondents who think corruption is somewhat or very common is between 79.9 and 80.9 percent. While there is variation in the number of people who consider corruption to be very common compared to merely being common, the data consistently show few residents of the Americas believe that their government is uncorrupt.



Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014



Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time

Just as with corruption experiences, there is substantial variation across countries in how governments are perceived (see Figure 3.8). Respondents in Canada, Haiti, and Uruguay were the least likely to describe their government as corrupt in 2014. Yet even in these countries over 68% of respondents said that corruption was either common or very common. A number of countries have very high levels of perceived corruption, led by Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina.

It is worth highlighting that the countries where respondents report having frequently paid bribes (as tracked by Figure 3.4 above) are not necessarily the ones where governments are perceived as being corrupt in Figure 3.8. This difference is illustrated in Figure 3.9, which plots the average perceived levels of government corruption and the percentage of respondents who were asked at least once for a bribe in the 12 months before the survey. The largest difference is in Haiti; while Haiti has by far the highest rate of individual-level corruption victimization in the hemisphere, it has the second lowest level of perceived government corruption in the hemisphere. This may be because bribery in Haiti is frequently occurring in settings like the workplace, schools, or hospitals that many respondents do not necessarily connect to "the government" even if these tend to be public institutions. Yet Haiti is not the only exception and that difference is clear in the bottom figure of Figure 3.9 where we exclude Haiti (an outlier with regard to the level of corruption victimization) to make the differences within the rest of the sample clear. Perceived levels of government corruption in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras are also substantially lower than one would expect given the frequency of citizens reporting paying bribes in those countries. Colombia, Argentina, Guyana, and Jamaica, in contrast, all have levels of reported corruption victimization that are below the hemisphere average but rank in the top seven countries where citizens perceive that corruption is common among government officials. As we noted above, the discrepancy between perceived levels of corruption and reported corruption rates is a common pattern in corruption studies because measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government often also track grand corruption such as national scandals that respondents do not have personal experience with as well as different tolerances for what kinds of activities are considered corrupt.



Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014



Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014

Yet within countries, individuals who were asked to pay a bribe in the last year are more likely to say that corruption is common among government officials. Figure 3.10 is an ordered logistic analysis of corruption perceptions, with high values on the dependent variable representing the perception that corruption is very common. The model includes dummy variables for each country, so again the results should be read as explaining differences within countries not necessarily across them.[15]

[15] The coefficients are standardized-the full specification of the model is available in Appendix 3.2 at the end of the chapter.



Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Goverment Corruption, 2014

We see above that there is a weak correspondence at the country level between the bribery victimization and perceptions of government corruption. Yet if we look within countries, individuals who were targeted for bribery in the last year judge their public officials as more corrupt than their counterparts. Personal experiences with corruption, on average, spillover into broad evaluations of political corruption even if the two concepts do not perfectly coincide.

Of course one does not have to be directly affected by corruption to believe corruption is common. The other correlates of perceived government corruption are similar to those of corruption victimization. Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, and respondents who are comparatively wealthy, educated, and old are more likely to believe the government is corrupt even after controlling for these individuals' personal experiences with being asked to pay bribes. And although citizens who receive government assistance are more likely targets for bribery, they are *less* likely to believe the government is corrupt. Further analysis suggests this occurs because these individuals are more likely to support the government. Once we control for government approval, there is no significant association between receiving welfare benefits and corruption perceptions.

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?

So far our analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2014 survey suggests that levels of corruption victimization are high in the hemisphere and perceptions that the government is corrupt are widespread. In such circumstances, the worry is that citizens might begin to consider corruption a natural part of politics. Several recent studies have suggested individuals can see corruption as necessary to grease bureaucratic wheels, particularly when regulatory agencies are inefficient (Méon and Weill 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2011). There is also some evidence the negative effects of corruption on respondent well-being become attenuated in high corruption contexts as citizens adapt to their reality or begin to see it as one of the costs of doing business (Graham 2011). Thus the questions become whether citizens of the

Americas believe that bribery is an acceptable practice and, in particular, whether those who engage in it are more likely to justify it.

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about whether bribes can ever be justified.[16]

	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?	0	1	88	98

The percentage of people who think bribes can be justified – 16% (Figure 3.11) – is roughly the same as the number of people who were asked for bribes. The percentage is significantly higher, however, among those individuals who actually paid a bribe in the last year (Figure 3.12): almost 1 in 3 individuals who paid a bribe thought that paying a bribe could be justified compared to the 1 in 8 among those who did not pay a bribe.[17]

In analyses not presented here, we model which individuals were most likely to believe paying a bribe was justifiable. Corruption justification is more frequent among individuals who are younger, are male, and live in urban areas. It is more common among the wealthiest members of society. Individuals who reported that a crime occurred in their neighborhood are more likely to believe corruption could be justified as well. These differences exist regardless of whether or not the respondent was asked for a bribe and so they do not reflect differences in groups being targeted for bribery subsequently justifying that behavior. Yet if we compare bribery justification across those who were targeted for bribes and those who did not, an important pattern emerges: individuals who were targeted for a bribe and who get government assistance are more likely to find corruption justifiable than other bribery victims (Figure 3.13), which may imply that some see a connection between the bribe they paid and the benefits they receive and feel justified in their actions.[18] All of these data suggest that corruption can create an atmosphere where corruption is more likely to be tolerated (see also Carlin 2013).

[16] This question was not asked in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.
[17] Research on the 2012 AmericasBarometer comes to a similar conclusion (see Carlin 2013).
[18] In analysis not reported here, we model bribe justification as a function of the control variables in Figure 3.10 and interact corruption victimization and receiving government assistance and find that the two variables significantly modify their effect-the gap between corruption victims and non-victims is significantly ($p<0.05$) larger among those who got help from the government than among the general population.



Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014



Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014



Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014

Yet we should not overlook the fact that *most* individuals – over 68% – who had to pay a bribe in the last year still believe it is *never* justifiable to pay a bribe. In other words, most citizens in the Americas reject bribery despite its prevalence in society and politics even as they may be in a position where they feel compelled to pay a bribe. Thus many citizens of the Americas may be offended by the corruption that pervades their society and this, in turn, may lead to them have negative views of democratic institutions. Analyses in the chapters to follow will address this possibility.

VI. Conclusion

Corruption has pernicious economic, social, and political effects. Yet despite progress in reducing corruption in some countries, corruption remains widespread in many countries in the Americas. On average, 1 in 5 citizens reported paying a bribe in the last year, with those bribes being paid in many different settings. Perhaps more disconcertingly, at least 68% of respondents in every country in which the survey was conducted in 2014 think that corruption is somewhat or very common among government officials in their country. In most countries that percentage is higher. While most citizens do not believe bribery can ever be justified, many citizens do and this is particularly true for those who have been involved in corrupt exchanges.

Thus the AmericasBarometer survey reminds us that citizens are frequently experiencing corruption in their daily lives and perceive it to be widespread at the elite level. The relative consistency of aggregate bribery rates and corruption perceptions across waves of the survey serve as reminders of the severity of these problems in the hemisphere. What worries democrats in the region is that, if left unchecked, corruption could undermine support for democracy itself. To address this concern, Chapter

4 explores how corruption affects trust in local governments while Chapter 5 looks at how corruption (among other variables) affects attitudes towards the national political system.

Appendix

Appendix 3.1. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014 (Figure 3.5)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.097*	(-4.51)
Woman	-0.262*	(-16.57)
Level of Education	0.081*	(3.88)
Wealth Quintile	0.132*	(6.68)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.081*	(4.77)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.326*	(17.12)
Skin Tone	-0.040	(-1.80)
16-25 Years	-0.090*	(-4.47)
26-35 Years	0.006	(0.28)
46-55 Years	-0.037	(-2.02)
56-65 Years	-0.089*	(-4.54)
66 Years or Older	-0.189*	(-8.57)
Guatemala	-0.056*	(-2.46)
El Salvador	-0.254*	(-9.39)
Honduras	-0.041	(-1.59)
Nicaragua	-0.177*	(-7.73)
Costa Rica	-0.166*	(-5.94)
Panama	-0.102*	(-3.11)
Colombia	-0.223*	(-8.68)
Ecuador	-0.065*	(-2.04)
Bolivia	0.029	0.89)
Peru	-0.032	(-1.49)
Paraguay	0.005	(0.29)
Chile	-0.364*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	-0.307*	(-12.16)
Brazil	-0.203*	(-7.15)
Venezuela	-0.049*	(-2.03)
Argentina	-0.120*	(-5.27)
Dominican Republic	-0.082*	(-3.22)
Haiti	0.393*	(15.17)
Jamaica	-0.237*	(-10.32)
Guyana	-0.124*	(-4.80)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.225*	(-9.03)
Belize	-0.059*	(-3.46)
Constant	-1.448*	(-63.98)
Number of observations	29123	
Population size	25866.08	
Design df	1969	
F(34, 1936)	55.79*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are not included in the model because of missing observations on at least one variable.

Appendix 3.2. Factors Associated with Perceived Goverment Corruption, 2014 (Figure 3.10)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	0.076*	(5.00)
Rural	-0.083*	(-4.72)
Woman	-0.044*	(-3.51)
Level of Education	0.128*	(7.68)
Wealth Quintile	0.083*	(5.60)
Received Assistance From the Government	-0.034*	(-2.40)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.123*	(8.58)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.27)
16-25 Years	-0.103*	(-6.55)
26-35 Years	-0.003	(-0.17)
46-55 Years	0.007	(0.45)
56-65 Years	0.024	(1.51)
66 Years or Older	0.054*	(3.69)
Guatemala	-0.043*	(-1.99)
El Salvador	-0.070*	(-3.45)
Honduras	-0.082*	(-3.69)
Nicaragua	-0.094*	(-4.52)
Panama	-0.095*	(-4.67)
Colombia	0.082*	(3.35)
Ecuador	-0.175*	(-6.03)
Bolivia	-0.136*	(-4.38)
Peru	0.035	(1.79)
Paraguay	0.062*	(3.07)
Uruguay	-0.151*	(-7.92)
Venezuela	0.040	(1.93)
Argentina	0.028	(1.58)
Dominican Republic	0.052*	(2.10)
Haiti	-0.156*	(-6.50)
Jamaica	0.047*	(2.27)
Guyana	0.055*	(2.32)
Belize	0.005	(0.27)
Cut1	-3.212	(-74.48)
Cut2	-1.429	(-50.13)
Cut3	0.404	(15.59)
Number of Interviews	22124	
Population size	20675.9	
Design df	1354	
F(31, 1324)	32.32*	
Ordered Logit with Standard errors Adjusted for Survey design in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The model does not include Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, or Canada because these countries have missing observations on at least one variable in the model.

Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas

Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

When citizens interact with the state they do so far more frequently with representatives and officials of the local, rather than national or even regional, governments. For residents of the Americas, therefore, local government performance, responsiveness, and trustworthiness are central factors in the legitimacy of the political system. Furthermore, the performance of local services has crucial and material impacts on people's quality of life. Because of the recognition of the importance of local government, significant resources from international organizations and national governments have been used to further fiscal and political decentralization. This chapter examines a series of questions to assess citizens' view of their local government and its services and to measure community participation in the Americas. In particular, how often do they interact with their local government? How well do they evaluate those interactions? What are the trends over the past decade in evaluations of local government and services? Do national factors affect evaluations of local government?

While the local-level of government is often where citizens interact directly with the state, the power of local governments varies substantially within and across the countries of the hemisphere. In some places local authorities have significant resources, lawmaking prerogatives, and administrative power, while other local authorities have little political and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. A core premise motivating this chapter is that local government can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole, a point that is demonstrated in Chapter 5.

II. Main Findings of this Chapter

This chapter examines three key aspects of citizen engagement with local government vis-à-vis the AmericasBarometer survey. The first is participation in local government affairs and community activities. Key findings around these issues are:

- In 2014 citizen participation in local government meetings reached a new low, with only 1 in 10 having attended a meeting in the past 12 months.
- More citizens made demands of their local officials than any time since 2006.
- Those most satisfied and those least satisfied with local services were most likely to attend local government meetings (compared to those with middling levels of satisfaction).
- Citizens in formally federal countries were more likely to make demands on their local government.

A second aspect of the chapter is evaluations of local services:

- Satisfaction with local services in general, and several specific ones, remains fair with most respondents viewing service provision as "neither good, nor bad."
- Evaluations of public schools in the Americas declined somewhat between the 2012 and 2014 waves.
- Over the same period average evaluations of public health care increased (and evaluations of roads was unchanged).

The final section of the chapter looks at citizen trust in local governments:

- Region-average trust in local government reached a new low in 2014.
- Evaluations of local services are strongly correlated with trust in local government.
- Being a victim of corruption is negatively related to trust in local government.
- Perception of insecurity is also negatively related to trust in local government and is at its highest level since 2006.

The rest of the chapter focuses on three main aspects of local government and participation. First, we look at how and how often citizens in the Americas interact with their local governments and help improve their community. The section finishes with a focus on the individual factors related to when people make demands. We then turn to citizens' evaluations of local services (roads, schools, and health care) along with the individual-level factors related to citizen evaluations of these services. Finally, we look at levels of trust in municipalities over time and in select countries as well as its individual-level correlates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the patterns of interaction, support, and evaluations of the level of government most proximate to citizens.

III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). It has occurred simultaneously with the "third wave" of democratization in the hemisphere (Huntington 1991), fostering an environment of both strengthened local governments and widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level. However, there is significant variation in the success and extent of decentralization and subnational democratization (Benton 2012).

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of decentralization's influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study of Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest needs in education, sanitation, and agriculture (Faguet 2008). Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth (Akai and Sakata 2002). Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal decentralization in

government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators (Fisman and Gatti 2002).

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly (Bardhan 2002). Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005). Moreover, as Van Cott (2008) argues, the success of local democracy often depends on whether the decentralization process was a bottom-driven (as opposed to top-down), the presence of effective mayoral leadership, party cohesiveness, and a supportive civil society. Relatedly, Falleti (2010) forcefully argues that the nature and extent of decentralization in a particular Latin American country is due to the territorial and partisan interests of elites at the time reforms were implemented. In total, the extant literature is mixed at best with regard to the effectiveness and extent of decentralization in the region.

The performance of local government may not only be about the quality of service provision to citizens and political participation by residents, but also have the potential to affect trust in democratic institutions and support for democratic norms. Since many citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences may be central to shaping trust decisions and democratic attitudes. In this chapter and the next we look at these linkages because a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). Weitz-Shapiro (2008) also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole. According to her study, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Jones-West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. (Jones-West 2011) Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.

If local government performance and participation are central to democratic legitimacy, as we argue, then inclusion at the local-level of minorities and women is crucial for representation and the quality of democracy generally. A pivotal question in this realm is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests (Hirschmann 1970). Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation (Hayek 1945). If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups (Jones-West 2011).

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results (Pape 2007, 2008). Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies (Patterson 2002). West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government. The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found no relationship between gender and skin tone (a proxy for minority status), respectively, and which individuals made demands on local officials. However, the 2012 report did find significant linkages between trust in the local government and gender (positive) and darker skin tones (negative). In this chapter we explore if these are stable patterns or whether, instead, new or altered linkages have developed between local governments and women and minorities.

In the next section of the chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, when they make demands of their leaders, how they evaluate local political institutions, and if they participate in local community building. We focus on indicators of two types of direct participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*, and one indirect: *working to solve community problems*. We compare the extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2014 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). We also seek to understand the main determinants of the two types of governmental participation, with an emphasis on local government performance and racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services and trends in these evaluations. Finally, we examine trust in local government and seek to understand which citizens in the Americas trust their local governments to a greater or lesser extent.

We note that previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys, including the 2012 regional report, has examined in detail some of these phenomena, and that research stands as an additional resource for those interested in these topics (Montalvo 2009a; 2009b; 2010).

IV. Local Level Participation

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]** (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**

Local Meeting Attendance

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? Using all countries, Figure 4.1 shows levels of local participation in the Americas since 2004.[1] The first waves of the surveys were a high-water mark for participation in local government meetings. Since then, the rate of participation has remained fairly steady until 2014, with about 11% of people taking part in municipal meetings between the years 2008 and 2012. However, the most recent wave of the AmericasBarometer finds a new low point for public participation in local government. In the past two years there has been a significant one percentage-point drop in the local government meeting participation, a greater than 8% decline in the region-wide average for participation.[2]



Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014

Figure 4.2 uses the 2014 AmericasBarometer data to display, for each country, the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see wide variation in the rate of citizen participation in municipal meetings across countries. As in the 2012 survey, the highest participation rates in 2014 are found in Haiti and the United States. While Haiti still has the highest rates, it has declined substantially from 2012 (21.2% attendance rate), with previous high value likely linked to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated country following the massive earthquake in 2010. Again, Chile, Panama, and Argentina have some of the lowest participation rates. Participation rates are not directly tied to the level of decentralization in a country. While Panama and Chile are both unitary systems, and thus more likely to have weaker and less consequential local governments, Argentina has a strong and extensive federal system. Overall, some of Latin America's strongest federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) rate among the bottom third in terms of local-level participation. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that – per the 2014 AmericasBarometer – there is

[1] Following LAPOP conventions, all countries in the region are weighted equally, regardless of their population size.
[2] Figure 4.1, and all the over-time figures presented in the chapter (unless otherwise noted), would look roughly the same if we examine only the 22 countries that have been surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

no significant relationship between formal political federalism and the rate of municipal meeting attendance.



Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Demand Making on Local Government

While attending municipal meetings is a crucial way for citizens to engage their local governments, another important point of interaction is when citizens make demands of their local officials. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer allows us to examine both activities. How has local demand making changed over time? In Figure 4.3, unlike Figure 4.1, we find some potentially encouraging patterns. In 2014 citizen demand making on local government reaches its highest level since

2006. The optimistic view of this change is that citizens feel that asking their local government for changes is a potentially effective route to remedy problems. However, it is also possible to see this increase in a more negative light if increased demands are the result of local government having declining performance. As we will argue below, both interpretations appear to be accurate.



Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014

Figure 4.4 shows a significant difference in the percentage of citizens in each country who have made a request or demand to a person or agency in local government in the past year. As with local meeting attendance, the rate of demand making on local governments varies significantly across the region. With the aftermath of the Haitian 2010 earthquake fading, Haiti went from the top spot in 2012 (21.3%) to some of the lowest demand-making levels. The top three countries, and Ecuador, all saw substantial increases (+4-6 percentage points) in demand making. In most of the other countries in the Americas between 10 and 16% of respondents claimed to have made a demand on local government. Unlike with meeting attendance, the variance across countries in demand making in 2014 is correlated with political federalism.[3] Demand making is about one percentage point greater in federal than unitary countries.

[3] We follow Lijphart's (2012) approach and code as politically federal those countries whose constitutions specifically declare themselves federal and provide for strong, elected regional governments.



Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014

To understand which types of individuals are most likely to make demands of local government we look at key individual experiences, evaluations, and socio-demographic factors using logistic regression with country fixed effects. Figure 4.5 shows that older citizens, those with higher levels of educational attainment, those who live in rural areas, and women are more likely to make demands. So are, intriguingly, corruption victims and those who attend local government meetings. Of all the factors, attending local meetings is most strongly linked to demand making. A person who has attended a municipal meeting in the last year is 32% more likely to make a demand on municipal government, indicating that many individuals who ask things of their municipality do so via formal channels (see Figure 4.5 below).

Wealthier citizens are generally less likely to make demands. As we discuss below, both the most and least satisfied with services make more demands. Demand making generally increases with age until

people become elderly, at which point the likelihood of making a demand decreases, fitting a large literature on life cycles and political participation.



Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014[4]

In Figure 4.6 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand making on local government, on one hand, and attending local government meetings, corruption victimization, place of residence, and satisfaction with local services on the other hand. The bar chart in the top left in Figure 4.6 clearly shows that those who are active in local government, indicated by attending municipal meetings, are more likely to make demands of local government. Victims of corruptions are also more likely to make demands of local government; however, we are unable to tell if this is because they demand less corruption or if interaction with the state (by making demands) brings them into opportunities for corruption to occur. Both are possible, but the data cannot distinguish between the two potential processes (and both can be occurring simultaneously).

The bottom row (left side) shows respondents who reside in rural areas are more likely to make demands of their local government. Thus, social and/or geographic distance between the respondent and local government influence demand making.

The bottom right of Figure 4.6 shows a bimodal relationship between satisfaction with services and demand making. As Figure 4.5 shows, on average the more satisfied are less likely to make demands; however, we see in Figure 4.6 that this interpretation should be amended. Like the least satisfied with services, the most satisfied are also more likely to make demands. The bimodal relationship also is present in a multivariate analysis.

[4] For this regression analysis, like all others in the chapter, the United States and Canada are excluded from the sample. And tabular results for each of the regression analyses are in the chapter appendix.



Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014

Not all citizen participation at the local level is via the local government. To help improve their communities, some citizens work through community organizations instead of, or in addition to, governmental pathways. To get a more general grasp on the pattern of citizen engagement in their local communities the AmericasBarometer includes the following question designed to measure if and how often people work to improve their communities:

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?
(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month
(3) Once or twice a year (4) Never
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

Per LAPOP standards, we reverse and rescale the 1-4 responses from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning "never" and 100 meaning "once a week."

Finally, Figure 4.7 shows that the average amount of effort individuals put towards solving community problems has remained relatively static since the question was introduced in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. The stability of community-level involvement in problem-solving contrasts with the decline in municipal meeting attendance noted at the outset of this chapter.



Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014

V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

Like previous rounds, the 2014 AmericasBarometer included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question is as follows:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are…? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2014 round included three questions first introduced in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey:

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

Finally, the last question, which measures trust in local government, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means "not at all" and 7 means "a lot."

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Map 4.1[5] we examine citizens' average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been re-coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. With a few exceptions, the average citizen in most countries in the Americas is essentially neutral towards local government services, meaning that average scores cluster around the midpoint (50) on the scale. Brazil and Jamaica have the lowest levels of satisfaction with local government in the hemisphere while Canada has the highest. As with the 2012 survey, the appearance of Nicaragua and Ecuador at the same level as the U.S. indicates that while there may be a link between satisfaction with services and national wealth, it is not an ironclad one. The biggest shift of any country between the last two waves of the AmericasBarometer was Haiti's rise from the bottom of the list in 2012 (37.6 units or points on the 0-100 scale), up several places as respondents viewed services a bit more positively as the earthquake and its aftermath receded further into the past.

[5] A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix.



Map 4.1. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

How do the aggregate 2014 results compare to previous waves of the AmericasBarometer? Figure 4.8, which presents annual average evaluations on a 0-100 scale, shows that there is some reason for optimism with regard to local service provision. After waves with little change, 2014 had a significant increase in citizens' satisfaction with local services of just over 1.5 units (or points). However, middling ratings of service provision remain, and have always been, the norm in the region.



Figure 4.8. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014

In Figure 4.9 we further explore citizens' evaluations of their local government services. Since 2008, 4 out of 10 respondents see their local services as neither good nor bad. In general a few more people have a positive view of services than negative, with roughly 36% of respondents holding "Good" or "Very Good" views. In general, for the past six years (and likely longer) local governments have been neither highly effective at providing services nor completely failing citizens in service provision. The public sees services as generally middling in quality.



Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category

Not all local services are equally difficult to provide or equally valued by citizens; thus, respondents may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction in the Americas with the provision of services in three key areas: roads, schools, and health care.[6] Figure 4.10 shows satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2 (the wording of which was reported above in the text). Once again, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least satisfaction and 100 represents the most satisfaction. Across the region we find moderate levels of satisfaction with road infrastructure. Residents in several Caribbean and Central American countries hold particularly dim views of their road infrastructure. Levels of satisfaction with roads for most countries were stable between the 2012 and 2014 wave with the exception of Honduras. The continued political, economic, and security instability in the country may be taking its toll on service provision: Hondurans rate road infrastructure 10 units lower in 2014 than 2012.

[6] We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.



Figure 4.10. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Figure 4.11 examines satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2 (again rescaled 0-100). Similar to roads and public health, there are no clear patterns between national wealth and satisfaction with schools with the possible exception that wealthier countries have lower ratings. It is possible that with greater resources come greater expectations. Looking at a few key countries unearths some interesting results. For example, Chile is one of the wealthiest and most stable countries in the region but again has one the lowest levels of satisfaction with education. This low level of satisfaction with public schools may be linked with the now long-running university and high school student protests in Chile that began in 2006. Whether this dissatisfaction is the cause or consequence of the protests, we cannot say. We also want to point out Venezuela's decline. Compared to 2012, Venezuelans rated

schools 6.3 units lower in 2014, which may also be linked to the ongoing political and social instability in the country.



Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Finally, in Figure 4.12 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2 (rescaled 0-100). Though most countries average between 43 and 53 units, no country scores particularly high, and four countries are rated quite poorly: Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Haiti. Brazil, though has recently tagged as a rising global economic power (if faltering at the moment), receives significantly lower evaluations than nearly all other countries in the region for health services, roads, and education. Like public schools, evaluations of public health services has declined dramatically

in Venezuela (52.1 units in 2012 vs. 42.3 units in 2014) adding more evidence that the environment in Venezuela is taking its toll on public evaluations of government performance.

Additionally, as the graphs tend to indicate, citizens' evaluations of educational services are more closely correlated with their evaluations of health services (r = .44) than the quality of roads (r = .33) and health services is also more weakly correlated (r = .29) with roads than education. While all three are key indicators of local government performance, it appears that citizens may evaluate hard infrastructure, like roads, differently than the more complex services of the welfare state, such as health care and education.



Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Looking at aggregate comparisons for the three types of services between the 2012 and 2014 waves we see mixed results (Figure 4.13). With regard to public schools, respondents in the Americas in 2014 rated them slightly higher than they did in 2012; however, they evaluated public health services and road quality similarly across the two waves. Unlike the questions about general local services (Figure 4.10) that saw an uptick in evaluations, when asked about specific services stasis is the norm. Of the three specific service areas, respondents' evaluations of roads were the most closely linked to their general evaluation of local services, although it only at a modest level (r = .26).



Figure 4.13. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services

While question SGL1 asks people about their evaluations of general local services, the previous sets of figures suggest people may evaluate specific local services quite differently than the abstract idea of local services. To see how respondents may differ in their views of services when they are asked about them specifically or generally we create an additive scale from responses regarding the condition of roads, public schools, and public health care.[7] Figure 4.14 displays the average scores for this scale (0-100) across the countries in which the questions were asked. When compared to the general evaluations of services (SGL1), the results in several countries exhibit interesting contrasts. Chileans appear to be

[7] A principle component analysis of these three variables (SD2NEW, SD3NEW, SD6NEW) indicate that there is only one underlying dimension and it is different than SGL1. Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the three variables is a moderate .62.

quite happy with their local services in the abstract (57.5 units) but when asked about specific services they take a much dimmer view (48.7). Likewise, Colombians prefer their services in the abstract (53.9) more than specific ones (45.1). On the flipside, citizens of the Dominican Republic have a more dismal view of services in the abstract (46.6) than when asked about specific services (54.4). Overall, the bivariate correlation between SGL1 and the Local Services Evaluations Scale is r=.30. While there is somewhat of a disconnect between the specific questions about services and the general question, it is important to note that we were not able to ask about all relevant local services.



Figure 4.14. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014

To examine the individual factors and events that affect general evaluations of local services (SGL1) we use linear regression with country fixed effects. If we use the Local Services Evaluations

Scale instead of SGL1 the results are substantively identical to those presented below. Figure 4.15 shows people in the more marginalized positions in society rate their municipality services the lowest. Specifically, people with darker skin tone; poorer and lower educated residents; and those with higher levels of perceived insecurity all rate local services lower. Of particular note is the result for corruption victims. People who report having been asked for a bribe rate services significantly lower; this finding combined with results from the previous chapter showing high rates of corruption victimization among those who interact with local government indicates that this a widespread and substantively important result. One of the overall patterns in the results is that citizens who often have physically more difficult lives (poorer, rural, fear for physical security, darker skin tone) feel their local government's services are failing them.

We also find that people who have requested help of the municipality have more negative views of local services; however, if you are active in local government (by attending meetings), you are more likely to have a positive view of services. Thus, it is the nature of the interaction with local government that seems to matter with regard to views of local services. Finally, the national economy appears connected to evaluations of services: individuals who have positive perceptions of the national economy generally view local services in a more positive light. Whether it is local factors causing a positive national outlook or the reverse, we cannot say.



Figure 4.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014

Trust in Local Government

Like the previous waves of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 survey asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 4.16, we look at trust in local government since 2004. While it appears that 2004 was a high point, the peak is a function of a smaller number of countries included in that wave. If we restrict the sample to only those countries that had been included since 2006 the general trend for trust in local governments remained steady for six years before taking a significant decline in 2014. The public now has substantially less trust in their local government than ever before, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. This decline coincides with the highest level of perceived insecurity in the region since 2006.



Figure 4.16. Trust in Local Government over Time



Map 4.2. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

While the average level of trust in local government declined in the region, this decline was not uniform in the hemisphere. Map 4.2 presents average levels of trust in local government across the Americas on a 0-100 scale.[8] Compared to the 2012 wave most countries saw a slide in trust of local governments with Venezuela suffering the largest drop (from 59.4 to 50.2). Overall, the countries of the Southern Cone and North America appear to have the highest levels of trust in local governments although trust in local governments in Nicaragua is also high.

Comparing the results in Map 4.2 to those in Figure 4.8 there appears to be a linkage between trust in local government and satisfaction with local services across countries. For example, Chilean municipalities, which have moderate satisfaction with specific services, enjoy exceptionally high levels

[8] A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix

of trust. However, across the region the individual-level measures of trust and satisfaction with local services (SGL1) are correlated (*r* = .39).

Next we look at the factors that shape how much an individual trusts their local government. Using linear regression with country fixed effects, we test to see if interaction with local government and evaluations of local services predict levels of local political trust. Figure 4.17 indicates the most important factor shaping citizens' trust in local government is how they perceive the quality of municipal services.



Figure 4.17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014

Attending a municipal meeting also exhibits a positive relationship with trust in the local government, but its coefficient is only about 1/8th the size of the coefficient for evaluation of services. Overall, we see individuals who interact with their local government and rate the performance of the municipality more favorably express higher levels of trust in the institution.

Again we find a halo-effect between individuals' views of the national economy and trust in their local government. The more positive is one's view of the national economic outlook, the greater the level of trust in the local government. While economic outlook is positively correlated with trust in local government, individual-level factors associated with more advanced economies are not. People with higher levels of educational attainment and who live in urban areas are *less* trusting of their local governments. Also, similar to the determinants of who makes requests or demands of their local government, skin tone is not related to trust in local government.[9] People of darker skin tones, often minorities in the hemisphere (overall, though not necessarily in particular countries), appear to not view local governments any differently than others on average. If decentralization and local government reforms were designed to help enfranchise the traditionally disenfranchised (darker skin tone) these

[9] Excluding the Caribbean countries and Guyana has no effect on the skin tone result.

findings might be viewed as mixed. While people traditionally excluded from power have similar levels of trust in their local government can be seen as a success, if we consider the effect of satisfaction with local services the outcome is more mixed. As Figure 4.15 illustrates, the poorest in society tend to have the lowest evaluations of services—a crucial predictor of trust in local government. Women appear to display similar levels of trust in local government as men; thus, also bringing evidence that decentralization may have the ability to improve gender parity for government responsiveness.

Finally, we observe that negative perceptions of physical security and corruption victimization have negative correlations with trust in local government. The result for perception of insecurity is particularly interesting because it occurs at a time when citizens of the Americas have the highest average level of perceived insecurity since 2006. These results are unchanged if we use reported neighborhood crime instead of insecurity perceptions.

VI. Conclusion

In 2014 we see two diverging trends with regards to citizen interaction with local government in the Americas. On the one hand, after eight years of decline, we observe an uptick in the number of people making demands of their local officials. On the other hand, 2014 marked a significant drop in the number of people attending local government meetings after years of stable levels. A potentially positive explanation may be the expansion of e-government in the region with countries like Mexico investing heavily in online communication linkages for citizens. However, in light of an overall decline in institutional trust, discussed below, it is difficult to be overly sanguine about the effects of declining participation. Moreover, while the number of people making demands on their local government continues to rise, satisfaction with local government services remains lower among those who made a demand on local governments than among those who did not, which may imply that the quality of the interactions citizens are having with local governments as they make these requests is poor.

Although the overall trend in citizen participation in local government declined somewhat, there are significant differences between the countries in the region. Haiti continues to have the greatest level of participation, with 15% attending a town meeting, while only 4.9% of Argentines report having attended. A similar spread is observed for making demands on local government; yet, Haitians are near the bottom while some countries with low meeting attendance rates are at the top (Uruguay). While the aggregate relationship between meeting attendance and demand making is weak at the national level, there is a strong link between participating in meetings and making demands at the individual level: those who attended meetings were 32% more likely to make demands or requests of their local government.

Turning to local government performance, many people view municipal services as neither good nor bad. In the region as a whole, there is a slight increase in the average assessment of services after eight years of no change. In a few countries people give particularly low scores (e.g., Haiti, Brazil, Jamaica) or high scores (e.g., Panama and Canada), but in most countries the average citizen gives services a middling score near 50 out of 100. This finding holds if we break local services down to three specific areas (public health care, public school, and roads). In short, perceptions of local government are mediocre: local governments are not failing the average citizen but, at the same time, there is clearly room for improvement.

More discouraging is the new low in citizens' trust in local government observed in 2014. Again Haiti, Brazil, and Jamaica (along with Peru) have some of the lowest trust in local governments. When looking at what factors are linked to high institutional trust we see trust in local government is significantly associated with the perceived performance of the government (via services) and whether or not they directly take part in local government meetings. The fact that these evaluations and levels of participation have increased somewhat while trust has declined implies other factors must be at work. Figure 4.17 indicates that corruption, perceptions of insecurity, and perceived negative economic outlooks are likely drivers for the drop in trust.

Since the local level of government is often the only place citizens come in to direct contact with the state, it seems reasonable that to expect citizens' attitudes toward local government reflect, or are reflected in, their broader political attitudes and belief systems. We assess this in the next chapter by investigating how perceptions of local government performance predict support for democratic norms, the legitimacy of political institutions, and political tolerance.

Appendix

Appendix 4.1. Making Demands of Local Government (NP2)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	0.196*	-11.05
Perception of Insecurity	0.027	-1.5
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	-0.117*	-6.16
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.551*	-39.67
Perception of the National Economy	0.033	-1.75
66 years or older	0.02	-1.08
56-65 years	0.059*	-3.14
46-55 years	0.050*	-2.52
26-35 years	-0.043	-1.96
16-25 years	-0.179*	-7.42
Skin Tone	0.033	-1.52
Wealth Quintiles	-0.064*	-3.2
Years of Schooling	0.078*	-3.53
Women	0.068*	-3.99
Urban/Rural	0.127*	-5.89
Guatemala	-0.105*	-4.56
El Salvador	-0.073*	-3.32
Honduras	-0.073*	-3.24
Nicaragua	0.067*	-3.12
Costa Rica	-0.112*	-4.26
Panama	-0.123*	-4.56
Colombia	-0.059*	-2.71
Ecuador	-0.073*	-3.08
Bolivia	-0.174*	-4.79
Peru	0.002	-0.1
Paraguay	-0.053*	-2.46
Chile	0.03	-1.17
Uruguay	0.100*	-4.48
Brazil	-0.031	-1.35
Venezuela	-0.105*	-5.14
Argentina	-0.003	-0.15
Dominican Republic	-0.027	-1.21
Haiti	-0.215*	-9.69
Jamaica	-0.091*	-3.77
Guyana	-0.186*	-7.74
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.073	-1.91
Belize	-0.063*	-2.4
Constant	-1.966*	-87.78
F	60.11	
Number of cases	35412	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 4.2. Evaluation of Local Services SGL

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.034*	-5.36
Perception of Insecurity	-0.113*	-16.73
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.056*	-8.68
Requested Help from Municipal Office	-0.041*	-6.24
Perception of the National Economy	0.141*	-20.49
66 years or older	0	-0.02
56-65 years	-0.004	-0.64
46-55 years	0.001	-0.13
26-35 years	0.016*	-2.21
16-25 years	0.055*	-8.1
Skin Tone	-0.018*	-2.31
Wealth Quintiles	0.039*	-5.5
Years of Schooling	-0.016*	-2.09
Women	0.039*	-7.37
Urban/Rural	-0.034*	-3.8
Guatemala	0.01	-1.2
El Salvador	0.026*	-2.34
Honduras	0.025*	-2.73
Nicaragua	0.044*	-5.28
Costa Rica	0.009	-0.82
Panama	0.047*	-4.9
Colombia	0.009	-1.03
Ecuador	-0.005	-0.44
Bolivia	-0.008	-0.57
Peru	-0.026*	-3.05
Paraguay	0.009	-0.85
Chile	0.019	-1.91
Uruguay	-0.012	-1.17
Brazil	-0.073*	-6.78
Venezuela	-0.013	-1.36
Argentina	0.039*	-3.62
Dominican Republic	-0.049*	-3.75
Haiti	-0.026	-1.92
Jamaica	-0.093*	-8.95
Guyana	-0.046*	-4.45
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.016	-0.96
Belize	-0.005	-0.48
Constant	-0.002; -0.26	
F	47.69	
Number of cases	35412	
R-Squared	0.08	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 4.3. Trust in Local Government (B32)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.049*	-8.45
Perception of Insecurity	-0.086*	-14.6
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	0.361*	-57.08
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.043*	-7.96
Requested Help from Municipal Office	0.014*	-2.5
Perception of the National Economy	0.068*	-11.08
66 years or older	0.021*	-3.36
56-65 years	0.009	-1.41
46-55 years	0.000	-0.05
26-35 years	-0.014*	-2.16
16-25 years	0.004	-0.57
Skin Tone	0.004	-0.57
Wealth Quintiles	-0.009	-1.53
Years of Schooling	-0.040*	-5.93
Women	0.010*	-2
Urban/Rural	0.027*	-3.76
Guatemala	-0.060*	-6.87
El Salvador	-0.002	-0.18
Honduras	-0.009	-1.01
Nicaragua	-0.020*	-2.12
Costa Rica	-0.020*	-2.33
Panama	-0.088*	-8.98
Colombia	-0.068*	-7.24
Ecuador	-0.040*	-4.47
Bolivia	-0.062*	-5.29
Peru	-0.089*	-10.56
Paraguay	-0.003	-0.31
Chile	0.006	-0.57
Uruguay	-0.026*	-2.9
Brazil	-0.080*	-8.03
Venezuela	0.017	-1.62
Argentina	-0.048*	-4.54
Dominican Republic	-0.052*	-5.78
Haiti	-0.071*	-7.57
Jamaica	-0.092*	-11.32
Guyana	-0.040*	-4.13
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.133*	-9.93
Belize	-0.070*	-7.48
Constant	0.004; -0.51	
F	177.14	
Number of cases	35011	
R-Squared	0.2	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 4.4. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014



Appendix 4.5. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas



Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

Philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick since the times of Plato. One of the secrets of democracy's success is that it can generate and maintain legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if democratic values start to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas over the decade 2004-2014 and analyzes the factors that shape these orientations and values.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture and is key for democratic stability and quality (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Booth and Seligson 2009). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. In theory, political legitimacy or "system support" has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects represented by the political system and the political institutions themselves. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Prominent among the contextual explanations is the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy. Institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can further bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011). Other scholars, however, propose that the level of economic development influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (e.g. Lipset 1963; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). In particular, education is often shown to be strongly correlated with the development of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009, Carlin 2006, Carlin and Singer 2011). Thus support for the political system is often theorized to be stable in the short run because strong most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving.

However, this may not always be the case. Individual-level factors that change more frequently can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord the democratic system. In particular, a weakening economy, a rise in crime and insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine democratic legitimacy (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Booth and Seligson 2009; Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011). The 2012 AmericasBarometer Regional Report found how citizens in the Americas perceive or experience economic outcomes; the integrity of state officials; and the security situation influences how they evaluate the political system (Carlin et al. 2013).

To understand what makes political support unstable, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise the levels of support high enough so that in hard

times the regime can draw on these reserves of legitimacy to sustain itself. In such circumstances, the regime takes on inherent value and political support is robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long interrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus the reservoirs of political support in the region are likely to remain shallow and to ebb and flow with recent performance.

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree." Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955). At the macro level, more developed countries present higher levels of support for same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2013) and have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.

II. Main Findings

This chapter covers two main sets of themes. First, it documents the breadth of democratic attitudes in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for democracy as a form of government is fairly stable but has fallen slightly since 2012.
- Levels of trust in political and social institutions are generally falling, with the Catholic Church and the Army the most trusted, and political parties the least. Of all institutions, trust in elections suffered the greatest decline between 2012 and 2014.
- Among law-and-order institutions – armed forces, national police, and justice system – the justice system enjoys the least public trust and that trust declined the most since 2012.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, overall political system support dropped in 2014. Components tapping beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and rights protection deteriorated most. Several cases exhibit great volatility over time.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, political tolerance decreased in 2014 both overall and across each of its components. Major volatility is detected over time in several cases.
- Previously steady levels of attitudes conducive to democracy stability fell as attitudes that place democracy at risk rose dramatically.

Second, this chapter considers what factors lead citizens to have different attitudes toward the political system. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- System support in the Americas reflects the performance of and experiences with government at the national and local levels in broad policy areas such as neighborhood security, the economy, and corruption.
- Political tolerance is reduced among those who judge the president and local government as performing well. In short, those benefiting from the status quo are less likely to tolerate dissenting elements within society.
- Education and wealth have slight negative effects on system support, but strong positive effects on political tolerance. Compared to citizens aged 36-45, the younger and older cohorts are more supportive of the political system, and older cohorts are more politically tolerant. Women are more supportive of the political system than men but less politically tolerant.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III looks at stated support for "democracy" as the best form of government over time. Section IV examines trust in major political and social institutions in the region. Special attention is given to institutions responsible for establishing and upholding law and order. Section V's goal is to explore the attitudes theorized to foster stable democracy. Its first two subsections describe levels of (a) Support for the Political System and (b) Political Tolerance from 2004 to 2014 and within the region in 2014. Regression analyses probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold these two sets of attitudes. A third subsection derives attitudinal profiles from these two measures in order to gauge (c) Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability at the regional level since 2004 and cross-nationally in 2014. Section VI concludes with the main findings and a discussion of their potential implications.

III. Support for Democracy

As an entrée into a decade of gauging democratic legitimacy in the Americas, we analyze support for democracy in the abstract. This diffuse form of political legitimacy is a basic requirement for democratic consolidation. One way the AmericasBarometer measures abstract support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Winston Churchill[1] and inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler (1996). The "Churchillian" question uses a 7-point response scale, which has been rescaled, as is standard practice at LAPOP, to run from 0 ("strongly disagree") to 100 ("strongly agree"):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

While overall belief in democracy as the best system of government is reasonably high in the Americas, Figure 5.1 shows the 2014 regional average[2] is slightly lower than the 2012 level and its apex in 2008. The same pattern emerges among only those countries the AmericasBarometer has included

[1] Churchill actually referred to democracy as "the worst form of government except for all the others."
[2] As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere.

since 2006[3] and by sub-region.[4] Thus, support for democracy as a form of government in the Americas peaked in 2008, plateaued through 2012, but fell in 2014 to levels on par with those in the middle of the last decade.



Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time

IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Like previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 round asked about trust in a number of specific institutions. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," citizens responded to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

[3] Among the Latin American countries, only Argentina is excluded since it was first surveyed in 2008.
[4] Sub-regions refer to Mexico and Central America, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and the Caribbean. Only in the latter is the shape substantively different. Support for democracy peaked in 2004 and rebounded in 2012 and then fell all the more in 2014.

As per the LAPOP standard, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Results from the 2004-2014 AmericasBarometer reported in Figure 5.2 suggest levels of institutional trust form four distinct groupings. First, citizens of the Americas expressed the greatest levels of trust, on average, in the armed forces and the Catholic Church. The second most trusted set of institutions in the region includes the executive, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, elections, and national police forces. This set is followed by two major state organs: the justice system and the national legislature. Political parties stand alone as the least trusted institutions in the Americas.

Figure 5.2 also shows levels of trust in these social and political institutions over the decade 2004-2014. Trust has not increased in any of these institutions since 2012 and, in most cases, it has decreased.[5] The largest drop-off since 2012 is in trust in elections (4.7 units). This drop has occurred despite almost half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer holding a national election between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2014 fieldwork.[6] A drop in confidence in elections after elections have been held often reflects the disappointed opinions of supporters of the losing party (Anderson et al. 2005). Executive trust has also fallen on average since 2012 (4.1 units), although the variations across countries are substantial: it is bookended by a high of 71.1 in the Dominican Republic and a low of 36.5 in Venezuela. Trust in Evangelical/Protestant Churches fell substantially, as did trust in the Catholic Church, despite the naming of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013. Overall, this broad retreat in trust erases modest gains posted between 2008 and 2012 across all institutions.

[5] This conclusion holds within the sub-sample continuously studied since 2004, with one exception: average levels of trust in the armed forces increased significantly.

[6] Ecuador (February 2013, presidential/legislative), Trinidad & Tobago ((February 2013, presidential indirect), Venezuela (April 2013, presidential), Paraguay (April 2013, presidential), Argentina (October 2013, legislative), Chile (November 2013, presidential/legislative; December 2014, second-round presidential), Honduras (November 2013, presidential), Costa Rica (February 2014 first-round presidential; April 2014 second round), El Salvador (February 2014 first-round presidential; March 2014 second round), Colombia (March 2014, legislative; June 2014, presidential), Panama (May 2014).



Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014

Following on the thematic focus at the start of this report on the public opinion consequences of insecurity in the Americas, we now turn to the regional distribution of trust in three key law-and-order institutions: the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system. According to Figure 5.3, trust in the armed forces is generally high throughout the Americas. Ecuador leads in trust, trailed closely by Canada, the United States, and Guatemala. Only in Venezuela does it dip below 50 units.

High and stable regional levels of citizen trust in the armed forces mask massive over-time shifts within countries. For example, Venezuela reached its region-low levels after falling precipitously from 60 in 2012 to 42 units in 2014. And in Honduras, trust in the armed forces jumped from 52 in 2008 to 61 units in 2010, before plunging to 48 units in 2012 only to skyrocket to 64 units in 2014. These and other examples suggest the legitimacy of this key institution may correspond to the actual and potential role the military plays in politics.

If the armed forces are generally well trusted throughout the Americas, Figure 5.4 shows, by contrast, the national police are not. Average levels of trust in the national police sit below 40 units in over one third of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Canada and Chile top the region on this measure of institutional legitimacy, followed by Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Haiti. No country's average level of trust in the national police surpasses 70 units.

Within the increasingly unruly Central American corridor, trust in the national police has been volatile over the 2004-2014 decade. Spikes and/or drops of 8 units or more on the 0-100 scale occurred in all cases except Mexico and Nicaragua. Since 2012, however, there is no uniform trend. Public trust

in the national police fell greatly in Belize (-13.8 units), moderately in Panama (-5.1), and slightly in El Salvador (-3.2); it rebounded mightily in Honduras (+18.1 units) and somewhat in Guatemala (+3.2); in Mexico and Nicaragua it did not change. In Brazil, where from 2011 to 2014 the national police played a central role in the "pacification" of slums in preparation for the World Cup, trust in the national police has fallen more than 7 units since 2010.

A third Figure (5.5), displays levels of trust in the justice system across the Americas in 2014. Of the three institutions of law and order, the justice system is clearly the one respondents view as the least legitimate. No country scores over 60 units, and most have mediocre trust levels of 40-49 units. Below that, in the 30-40 unit range, are two types of the countries: those in which trust in the justice system is perennially low (Peru and Paraguay) and those in which trust levels have eroded dramatically of late (Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia).



Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

Looking across all three 2014 figures, average levels of trust in institutions of law and order are highly, but by no means perfectly, correlated.[7] Yet two patterns stand out. Canada, the United States, Ecuador, and Nicaragua consistently register among the region's highest levels of trust, while Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia reliably register some of the lowest levels.

Of thematic interest is the role of neighborhood insecurity in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. An index based on the four questions introduced in Chapter 1 about burglary, drug dealing, blackmail/extortion, and murder in a respondent's neighborhood is used to capture this concept.

[7] Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the Armed Forces: $r = 0.62$; Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.64$; Trust in the Armed Forces and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.56$.

Responses were recoded 1 ("yes" the form of neighborhood insecurity took place in the last 12 months) and 0 ("no" it did not) and combined into an additive index rescaled to 0-100.[8]

Figure 5.6 illustrates how neighborhood insecurity varies across the Americas in 2014. Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela stand out for their high levels of neighborhood insecurity. Most of the countries along the Andes-Central America-Mexico drugs supply chain fall within the next range, roughly equivalent to having one of these forms of neighborhood insecurity in the past year. Only Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana are significantly lower than this threshold. Overall, then, the regional distribution runs from an average of just over two forms of neighborhood insecurity (50 units) to an average of less than one (20 units).

Does the low trust in rule of law institutions across the Americas reflect neighborhood insecurity? Below are fixed-effects regression models of trust in the national police (Figure 5.7) and trust in the justice system (Figure 5.8). Included are socioeconomic and demographic variables, a measure of presidential approval, and factors related to the performance of and experiences with local and national government.[9] These analyses will help determine whether neighborhood security is partially responsible for the low levels of trust in these key security-related state institutions.

[8] These items are, respectively, VICBAR1, VICBAR3, VICBAR4, and VICBAR7. Polychoric principal components analysis suggests a single factor explains 65% of the variance among these variables, and a Cronbach's α coefficient of 0.64 suggests these variables form a fairly reliable scale.
[9] Full results available in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2. Models exclude the United States and Canada.



Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

A straightforward inference from Figure 5.7 is that the more insecure citizens' neighborhoods are, the less they trust the national police. This effect is on par with that of being asked to pay a bribe. An auxiliary analysis not reported suggests the adverse effects of neighborhood insecurity are potentially larger than those of crime victimization. Citizens who are satisfied with municipal services are more trustful of the national police, as are those who approve of the executive. Rural residents and those of middle age or older are more likely to trust the national police than urbanites and younger cohorts. Education slightly weakens police trust.

Figure 5.8 reports an analysis of the factors related to individual-level trust in the justice system in the Americas. Neighborhood insecurity appears to erode trust in the justice system as well. Again, rosy perceptions of the municipal government and the executive correlate positively with trust in the justice system, as does attending local government meetings. Not only are the more educated less trustworthy, so are wealthier respondents. Citizens who live in rural areas and who are in the youngest cohort trust the justice system more than urban dwellers and all other age cohorts.



Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

In sum, many institutions charged with upholding the law in the Americas lack citizen trust. Fairly high and stable regional levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police belie big changes within countries over time. Trust in the justice system is at critical levels in much of the Americas and has eroded quickly in some cases. The moderate correlation across these measures suggests that trust in one law and order institution does not necessarily translate into trust in the other two. Countries' rule of law outcomes, measured by the World Justice Project, are significantly correlated with trust in these institutions.[10] Publics across the Americas, it seems, do not blindly grant legitimacy to the core institutions tasked with upholding law and order. Rather, these institutions must earn the public's trust and support.

V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability

Stable democracies need citizens who grant their institutions legitimacy and who tolerate and respect the rights of dissenters. In other words, system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability or "consolidation." The ways in which tolerance and system support are expected to affect stable democracy, according to previous LAPOP studies, are summarized in Table 5.1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance,

[10] Order and Security correlates with trust in the armed forces (r = .34), the national police (r = .67), and the justice system (r = .50). Correlations between Criminal Justice and these three institutions are, respectively, r = .44, r = .69, and r = .45.

the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, Booth and Seligson used the 2008 AmericasBarometer to trace the serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). A prior step to analyzing these attitudes in combination is to first examine these two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) have proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring "system support" – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number. **B1**. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read***:* If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Responses to each question were based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("a lot"). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 5.9 compares levels of the system support index and its five components for countries included in the AmericasBarometer since 2006. On the whole, system support in the Americas in 2014 is down two units from readings in 2012 and 2010. Broken down into regions, however, one finds decreases on the order of three to four units in the Andes, Southern Cone, and Caribbean but an increase

of roughly three points in Mexico and Central America. On the other hand, significant declines across all regions in the beliefs that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that the political system respects citizens' basic rights combined to pull the index lower in 2014.[11] Considered in tandem with the low levels of trust in the justice system presented in Figure 5.5, the judiciary appears to pose a major hurdle to strong political support in the hemisphere.



Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014

How does support for the political system vary within the Americas today? Map 5.1 presents the levels of system support in the AmericasBarometer study in 2014. System support peaks in Costa Rica (62.3 units) and bottoms out in Brazil (37.6 units). Costa Rica and Canada sit atop the regional list on this legitimacy indicator while the United States hovers around the regional average (around 50 units). Encouragingly, citizens in the violent and politically volatile countries in Meso-America remain supportive of their political system.

[11] However, if the analysis is confined to the nine core countries continuously the AmericasBarometer surveyed 2004-2014, modest gains in the system support index and in all of its components, except the belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, are observed.



Map 5.1. System Support in the Americas, 2014

Because system support is supposed to tap the inherent value citizens place in democratic institutions it should be fairly stable over time. Radical shifts were nonetheless observed in several cases. Major gains were made, for example, in Honduras (+11.1 units), Panama (+9), Costa Rica (+6.4), and Ecuador (+6). Major losses, in turn, were recorded in Venezuela (-13.9 units), Belize (-12.2) Jamaica (-10.6), and Brazil (-7.8). A deeper look (not presented here) indicated that these swings do not correspond neatly with cross-time changes in economic perceptions.

What kinds of citizens are most supportive of their political systems? Fixed-effects regression is used to model system support as a function of, again, socio-economic and demographic variables, presidential approval, and local and national government performance and experience indicators.[12] As mentioned above, in long-standing democracies diffuse support for the political system is viewed as a

[12] Full results available in Appendix 5.3. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

deep-seated orientation that is relatively impervious to short-run changes in government performance. However in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, perceived performances of and experiences with both national and local government may still be crucial predictors of system support.

How well do neighborhood security and the rest of these variables correlate with system support in 2014? To focus on the America's newer democracies the United States and Canada are removed from this particular analysis. The results of the analysis, presented in Figure 5.10, indicate individuals who live in more insecure neighborhoods have lower system support. An analysis not shown for reasons of space indicate that when entered into the model separately, rather than as part of an index, each of these four variables has a statistically significant and negative relationship with system support. Rooting out insecurity can help cement this dimension of democratic legitimacy.

Other performance evaluations matter as well. At the level of national government, rosy evaluations of past economic performance and executive approval are strongly related to support for the broader political system. At the local level, satisfaction with municipal government services has similarly positive effects. System support also reflects individuals' interactions with the state. Whereas those who have been asked to pay a bribe are less supportive, those who have attended a meeting of the municipal government are more supportive.[13]



Figure 5.10. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

In addition, system support differs across demographic groups. Rural residents, the less wealthy, and women all support the political system more than their counterparts. Education has no discernible effect. The relationship between age and system support is non-linear: it is higher among the youngest and the two oldest cohorts than among those ages 36-45.

[13] When presidential approval is excluded, economic, municipal government evaluations, and municipal meeting attendance gain strength. Corruption victimization and neighborhood security do not change appreciably. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

These findings support three main conclusions. First, despite the expectation that system support is a deeply rooted orientation resistant to short-run performance fluctuations, in the Americas system support appears to shift with changes in neighborhood security, the state of the economy, and recent corruption experiences. Second, while system support is often viewed as a national-level concept, it appears in part based on the performance of local governments: how citizens view and interact with their municipalities shapes how they view their national political system. Thirdly, while cohort effects account for the differences in system support across age groups, the results run contrary to theories that link political legitimacy to rising levels of wealth, education, and urbanization (Lipset 1963, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance for those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items in the questionnaire:

D1. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: ***[Probe: To what degree?]***
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.[14]

Analyses by country (not shown) find levels of political tolerance are more than 4 units lower in countries with active high-profile dissident groups or actors.[15] Venezuela, where many candidates for national and sub-national offices are outwardly critical of the regime, rates among the most tolerant countries in the Americas. Where former dissidents are now sitting presidents tolerance is relatively high (Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil), middling (Nicaragua), and low (Bolivia). Countries with active dissident groups, such as Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru, exhibit middling levels of tolerance.

[14] The Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high ($\alpha = .85$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

[15] These include Colombia (FARC/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and ELN/Ejército de Liberación Nacional), Peru (Shining Path/Sendero Luminoso), Mexico (EPR/Ejército Popular Revolucionario and FAR-LP/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberación del Pueblo), and Paraguay (EPP/Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo).

How stable is political tolerance? While theoretically it should be quite stable, in actuality tolerance has changed drastically since 2012 in multiple countries. Gains in Venezuela (+7.6 units) and Honduras (+6.7) were overshadowed by huge losses in Panama (-19.8 units), Guatemala (-17.8), Guyana (-14.4), and Belize (-11.2). Most other publics became only somewhat less tolerant. Political tolerance is therefore no more or less stable than system support and, like many of the legitimacy measures analyzed here, has suffered a setback in the last two years.

To explore the evolution of political tolerance in the Americas, Figure 5.11 displays the regional means on political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Though relatively static from 2008 to 2012, regional levels of political tolerance declined in 2014. Tolerance of political dissidents' right to free expression and to compete for political office observed the largest decreases. A similar story emerges from an analysis (not shown) of the sub-sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2004.



Figure 5.11. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014

The geographical distribution of tolerance for political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Map 5.2, which maps countries by mean score range on the index from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in the United States and Canada (69.9 and 69.3 units on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Guatemala and Panama (29.5 and 32.1 units, respectively).



Map 5.2. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014



Figure 5.12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

What sorts of citizens on average are most politically tolerant in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean? A fixed-effects regression model analyzes political tolerance as a function of the same socio-economic and demographic variables, performance perceptions, and experiences with local and national government as in the analyses above.[16] The 2012 comparative report concluded that many of these predictors had opposing effects on system support and political tolerance (Carlin et al. 2013). Does this conclusion hold in 2014?

In many instances the answer is yes, according to Figure 5.12. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, is negatively associated with system support but positively associated with tolerating the political rights and civil liberties of people who are openly against the regime. Upon closer inspection, items tapping the presence of burglary and drug dealing appear to drive this relationship; blackmail/extortion and murder are not systematically related to political tolerance (analysis not shown).

But unlike system support, political tolerance does not consistently reflect evaluations of recent economic performance, corruption victimization, or participation in local government meetings.[17] And whereas strong performance by the national executive and local government services are positively correlated with system support, they are negatively correlated with political tolerance. These results are troubling insofar as they suggest that popular national executives and good local service provision can hinder the consolidation of democracy. Yet they resonate with findings from Latin America that election losers are particularly tolerant of political dissidents and continue to mobilize in support of their rights while political winners are likely to delegate additional authority to "their" executive.

Results from the socio-economic and demographic variables reveal more evidence that system support and political tolerance have distinct micro-foundations. A single (marginal) year of education

[16] Full results available in Appendix 5.4. Models exclude the United States and Canada.
[17] When presidential approval is excluded from the model, the same patterns hold with one exception: positive economic perceptions are negatively related to tolerance.

has the greatest effect on tolerance of any other variable considered. From a policy perspective, this suggests tolerance can be taught. In addition, wealthy, male, and darker-skinned respondents are more tolerant than poorer, female, and light-skinned ones. Place of residence has no systematic effect on tolerance. Age appears related to tolerance beyond a certain threshold. Those in the 36-45 age bracket are significantly less tolerant than the older cohorts in the model.

These results place democracy's champions in some awkward positions. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, appears to present a Catch-22: improving it may enhance the legitimacy of the political system but could simultaneously lower political tolerance. Satisfaction with incumbent governments presents another puzzle. Citizens who approve of the sitting executive and are happy with local services express relatively higher levels of system support but are, in turn, less tolerant of individuals who openly criticize the regime and question the value of democracy. Perhaps these contradictions signal a desire to insulate a system that delivers basic public goods and services from those who would destroy it. Yet somewhat paradoxically, strong democracy requires supporting the basic institutions undergirding the system *and* extending political and civil freedoms even to those who wish to undermine them. Reconciling these two sets of attitudes, then, is a major challenge for the development of the cultural foundations of democracy in the Americas (Singer n.d.). From a public policy standpoint the task is all the more daunting since neighborhood insecurity and citizen evaluations of incumbent governments appear to affect democracy's cultural foundations in different, and sometimes, contradictory ways.

Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the attitudes theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who scored above 50 (the midpoint) on both of the scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who scored below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold attitudes that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have attitudes that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.



Figure 5.13. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014

How prevalent are these attitudinal profiles in the Americas? Regional trends across the four profiles from 2004 to 2014 are reported in Figure 5.13. Alarmingly, *Stable Democracy* attitudes reach their lowest region-average levels of the decade in 2014, and *Authoritarian Stability* and *Democracy at Risk* profiles hit their decade highs. These trends are similar in a restricted sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2006 and even more pronounced in the nine core countries measured in each wave 2004-2014. But whereas *Democracy at Risk* is the modal profile in Figure 5.13, in the nine-country continuous sub-sample *Authoritarian Stability* is the most common profile. All of these results, but especially the latter, may sit uneasily with democracy's champions in the region. To see how these profiles are distributed across countries please reference Figure 5.14.



Figure 5.14. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014

Map 5.3 shows the percentage of citizens with the profile that favors *Stable Democracy* across the Americas in 2014. This snapshot identifies two clear outliers. At 56.8%, Canada boasts greater than 18% more citizens with stable democratic attitudes – high system support *and* high political tolerance – than any other country in the Americas. The next closest are Uruguay (38.5%) and the United States (37.1%). At 7.5%, Guatemala has statistically fewer citizens with attitudes favorable to stable democracy than any country except Panama, whose 95% confidence intervals overlap. Once again, we note dramatic declines from 2012 to 2014 in a handful of countries: Guyana (-28.0%), Jamaica (-20.6%), Guatemala (-17.2%), Belize (-16.7%), Colombia (-8.5%), and Brazil (-7.7%). Honduras and Haiti rebounded +9.6% and 5.4%, respectively, over the same period.



Map 5.3. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014

VI. Conclusion

The future of democracy in the Americas hinges on its legitimacy. When citizens broadly trust its local and national institutions, believe in its core principles, and value the system for its own sake, democracy is most stable and effective. But when legitimacy wanes, democracy's fate is less certain. Therefore it is important to track the evolution of legitimacy in the Americas, to compare it across countries, and, most crucially, to understand what drives legitimacy among citizens. To these ends, this chapter unpacked legitimacy into its constituent parts and sought to explain them with factors of high policy and theoretical relevance. As signaled by the first section of this volume, the 2014 report puts special emphasis on the role of insecurity and the institutions tasked with addressing it.

A straightforward message from this comparative analysis is that most indicators of democratic legitimacy on average fell across the Americas since their last reading in 2012. An investigation of the role of insecurity in democratic legitimacy, however, reveals a nuanced relationship. For example, support for democracy in the abstract and system support actually increased in the nine Latin American countries extending southward from Mexico to Bolivia, arguably the Americas' most violent and insecure sub-region. Yet individuals in insecure neighborhoods are less supportive of the political system but more politically tolerant. Taken together, these results suggest neighborhood insecurity may contribute to the mixture of attitudes amenable to *Unstable Democracy*: low system support, high tolerance. If so, insecurity could have a potentially destabilizing effect on democracy in the Americas.

Another inference that one can draw from this study is that institutions whose missions include establishing and maintaining security, law, and order in the Americas enjoy distinct levels of citizen trust. Long among the most trusted institutions in the region, the armed forces are far more trusted than the national police or, particularly, the justice system. Citizen orientations to the justice system generally appear to be souring. Beyond flagging trust, across the Americas the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial was far less firm in 2014 than at any time in the decade between 2004-2014. While regional average levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police are generally stable, in countries where these institutions have taken more prominent political roles over the past decade, citizen trust in them has shown volatility. This may suggest that the greater a political role these institutions of national and local security play, the more frequently citizens update their beliefs about their trustworthiness.

A final noteworthy conclusion is that, contrary to what might be considered classic theoretical expectations, levels of democratic legitimacy remain volatile in the Americas. The regression analyses imply this is likely due to links between individual indicators of democratic legitimacy and evaluations and experiences of government performance in the recent past. Brief analyses of specific cases here indicate democratic legitimacy is also reflective of the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. In addition to actual levels of democratic legitimacy, short-term volatility may have important implications for democracy as well. Monitoring democratic legitimacy over long time periods, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is crucial to knowing whether these are secular trends or merely a return to "normal".

To avoid an overly negative reading of the data, this chapter closes by noting that the association between government performance at the national and local levels and support for the political system and for democratic institutions can cut both ways. Although it finds, on average, downward trends in government performance in the Americas, other chapters also document public concern about weak performance in areas of heightened importance to citizens in many countries. Evaluations of the

economy have fallen despite evidence that wealth has risen. Personal security is becoming an increasingly important issue to citizens across the region despite the fact that crime victimization remains unchanged. Corruption victimization and perceptions of the corruption and crime situations remain at the relatively high levels documented in 2012 (Singer et al. 2012). Finally, while wealth levels in the region as a whole have improved, many countries continue to experience slowing economies, high levels of crime, and poor governance. If the region's political systems continue to fail in these respects, levels of democratic legitimacy could continue to tumble. Of course, frustrations with democratic institutions and their performance can either create space for actors to undermine those institutions or propel new modes of participation, such as reform movements, which can strengthen democratic institutions. Thus monitoring citizens' long-standing commitments to democratic principles and the norms of open political competition and tolerance is key to forecasting democracy's fate in the region.

Appendix

Appendix 5.1. Coefficients for Figure 5.7, Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.047*	(-6.24)
Sex	0.014*	(-2.54)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.031*	(-4.42)
Years of Schooling	-0.005	(-0.69)
Skin Tone	0.002	(-0.34)
16-25 years	-0.009	(-1.26)
26-35 years	-0.011	(-1.62)
46-55 years	0.021*	(-3.24)
56-65 years	0.022*	(-3.46)
66 years or older	0.042*	(-6.84)
Presidential Job Approval	0.199*	(-28.64)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.120*	(-19.79)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.007	(-1.28)
Corruption Victimization	-0.082*	(-13.34)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.043*	(-6.57)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.107*	(-15.58)
Guatemala	-0.038*	(-3.96)
El Salvador	0.017	(-1.80)
Honduras	-0.003	(-0.27)
Nicaragua	0.058*	(-5.96)
Costa Rica	0.047*	(-4.80)
Panama	0.046*	(-4.73)
Colombia	0.042*	(-4.36)
Ecuador	0.064*	(-6.70)
Bolivia	-0.082*	(-6.54)
Peru	-0.014	(-1.40)
Paraguay	-0.019*	(-2.07)
Chile	0.095*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	0.051*	(-5.17)
Brazil	0.041*	(-4.24)
Venezuela	0.019	(-1.90)
Argentina	0.033*	(-3.37)
Dominican Republic	-0.067*	(-6.58)
Haiti	0.082*	(-8.09)
Jamaica	-0.017	(-1.92)
Guyana	-0.047*	(-4.87)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.003	(-0.20)
Belize	-0.041*	(-3.95)
Constant	-0.007; (-1.04)	
F	135.06	
Number of cases	32152	
R-Squared	0.17	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 5.2. Coefficients for Figure 5.8, Factors Associated with Trust in Justice System in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.059*	(-8.49)
Sex	0.013*	(-2.31)
Years of Schooling	-0.022*	(-3.07)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.030*	(-4.73)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.70)
16-25 years	0.026*	(-3.74)
26-35 years	-0.001	(-0.09)
46-55 years	0.01	(-1.46)
56-65 years	-0.001	(-0.17)
66 years or older	0.011	(-1.72)
Presidential Job Approval	0.235*	(-31.81)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.111*	(-18.21)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.017*	(-2.86)
Corruption Victimization	-0.050*	(-7.85)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.046*	(-6.86)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.075*	(-11.27)
Guatemala	-0.022*	(-2.44)
El Salvador	-0.029*	(-3.48)
Honduras	-0.026*	(-3.02)
Nicaragua	0.018*	(-2.04)
Costa Rica	0.074*	(-9.18)
Panama	-0.004	(-0.43)
Colombia	-0.013	(-1.55)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.105*	(-8.89)
Peru	-0.068*	(-8.48)
Paraguay	-0.078*	(-8.91)
Chile	-0.071*	(-8.02)
Uruguay	0.008	(-0.85)
Brazil	-0.041*	(-4.71)
Venezuela	-0.004	(-0.43)
Argentina	0.006	(-0.76)
Dominican Republic	-0.079*	(-8.79)
Haiti	-0.041*	(-4.30)
Jamaica	-0.018*	(-2.20)
Guyana	-0.040*	(-5.09)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.006	(-0.48)
Belize	-0.038*	(-4.31)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	103.2	
Number of cases	31909	
R-Squared	0.13	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 5.3. Estimated System Support by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.1



Appendix 5.4. Coefficients for Figure 5.10, Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.054*	(7.26)
Sex	0.017*	(3.29)
Years of Schooling	-0.015*	(-2.14)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.014*	(-2.18)
Skin Tone	-0.002	(-0.31)
16-25 years	0.042*	(6.25)
26-35 years	0.003	(0.49)
46-55 years	0.012	(1.87)
56-65 years	0.020*	(3.11)
66 years or older	0.038*	(5.95)
Presidential Job Approval	0.315*	(43.58)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.110*	(17.62)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.013*	(2.43)
Corruption Victimization	-0.064*	(-10.56)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.076*	(11.90)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.066*	(-9.72)
Guatemala	-0.064*	(-6.93)
El Salvador	-0.055*	(-6.69)
Honduras	-0.063*	(-6.81)
Nicaragua	0.005	(0.55)
Costa Rica	0.099*	(11.16)
Panama	-0.052*	(-5.61)
Colombia	-0.048*	(-5.36)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.107*	(-8.93)
Peru	-0.082*	(-8.59)
Paraguay	-0.122*	(-13.23)
Chile	-0.070*	(-7.04)
Uruguay	-0.006	(-0.60)
Brazil	-0.149*	(-13.80)
Venezuela	-0.039*	(-3.61)
Argentina	0.021*	(2.41)
Dominican Republic	-0.098*	(-10.67)
Haiti	-0.134*	(-12.55)
Jamaica	-0.091*	(-11.60)
Guyana	-0.069*	(-7.71)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.019	(-1.29)
Belize	-0.054*	(-6.00)
Constant	0.011; (1.45)	
F	155.91	
Number of cases	31976	
R-Squared	0.23	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics
based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 5.5. Estimated Political Tolerance by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.2



Appendix 5.6. Coefficients for Figure 5.12, Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	-0.006	(-0.61)
Sex	-0.047*	(-8.75)
Years of Schooling	0.114*	(-15.05)
Wealth Quintiles	0.037*	(-5.21)
Skin Tone	0.022*	(-2.63)
16-25 years	0.009	(-1.28)
26-35 years	-0.012	(-1.63)
46-55 years	-0.013*	(-1.98)
56-65 years	-0.014*	(-2.06)
66 years or older	-0.016*	(-2.39)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.086*	(-10.97)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	-0.022*	(-3.31)
Attended Municipal Meeting	-0.007	(-1.08)
Corruption Victimization	-0.008	(-1.27)
Perception of National Economic Situation	-0.005	(-0.80)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	0.046*	(-6.10)
Guatemala	-0.113*	(-11.22)
El Salvador	-0.019	(-1.91)
Honduras	-0.009	(-0.84)
Nicaragua	0.026*	(-2.25)
Costa Rica	0.002	(-0.14)
Panama	-0.095*	(-9.21)
Colombia	-0.001	(-0.14)
Ecuador	-0.037*	(-2.99)
Bolivia	-0.053*	(-3.60)
Peru	-0.042*	(-3.69)
Paraguay	0.021	(-1.80)
Chile	0.050*	(-3.93)
Uruguay	0.090*	(-7.10)
Brazil	0.035*	(-2.99)
Venezuela	0.068*	(-5.10)
Argentina	0.040*	(-3.29)
Dominican Republic	0.041*	(-4.07)
Haiti	0.041*	(-4.03)
Jamaica	0.050*	(-3.80)
Guyana	0.040*	(-3.42)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.131*	(-6.71)
Belize	0.032*	(-2.65)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	55.94	
Number of cases	31853	
R-Squared	0.12	

Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design.
* p<0.05

Appendix 5.7. Estimated Stable Democracy Attitudes by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.3



Part II:
Violence at the National Level, Opinions about Family-related Issues, and the Relationship between Citizens and the State in Guatemala

Chapter 6. The Different Dimensions of Violence and Insecurity in Guatemala

Dinorah Azpuru

I. Introduction

Given the relevance of crime and violence in Guatemala, this chapter delves into various aspects related to these issues. The 2014 AmericasBarometer questionnaire includes several questions on victimization, but it also includes questions related to insecurity and to changes in individuals' behavior as a result of crime. Insecurity and crime have become focal points in the day-to-day discourse, media coverage, and political debate in Guatemala. Among the main findings of this chapter are the following:

- In the 2014 survey, 17% of Guatemalans report having been victims of a crime within the preceding year. However, when the victimization of another household member is included alongside the victimization of the respondent (total victimization), the percentage rises to 27.2%.
- The percentage of crime victimization is significantly higher in urban areas, and in particular the Metropolitan area. In 2014, total crime victimization for urban and rural areas stood at 32.7% and 22%, respectively.
- 59.9% of Guatemalans report feeling secure in their neighborhood, while 40.4% indicate feeling insecure. There are important differences between urban and rural areas: 50% of those who live in urban areas feel insecure compared with the 42.4% reported for rural areas.
- Perceptions of insecurity increased in 2014 compared to previous years. In 2014, the average insecurity score (measured on a scale of 0-100) is 44.6 points.
- Approximately one-third of Guatemalans (31.1%) indicate that gangs affect their neighborhood. The rate of gang incidence decreases as the size of the location in which the respondent lives decreases. 53.6% of residents of the Metropolitan area report presence of gangs in their neighborhood, in comparison with 32.1% of people who live in small cities and 19.7% of those from rural areas.
- As a consequence of the insecurity, approximately one-third of Guatemalans have changed their behavior, including taking security measures at home, avoiding walking through certain dangerous areas, and restricting the locations at which they shop or engage in recreational activities.
- Perceptions of insecurity have an impact upon democratic values: as insecurity rises, the levels of satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system fall.
- Those respondents who indicate that someone in their household was a victim of crime within the preceding 12 months show significantly lower levels of support for the political system (44.3 points) in comparison to those who have not experienced victimization (50.0 points).
- Nearly half of respondents (48.5%) believe that the level of violence in their neighborhood is lower than it was 12 months prior. In contrast, 13.7% consider the level to be higher.
- 52.5% of respondents believe that it is important to increase the punishments for crime, whereas 23.8% believe that it is important to implement prevention measures. Even though

the option of holding "both" viewpoints was not presented in the questionnaire, 23.3% of respondents gave this answer.

II. Background: The Extent of Violence

Aggregate data such as homicide rates provide one perspective on violence, but they do not reflect the daily reality of communities and neighborhoods affected by specific problems like extortion, threats, and the presence of gangs. Nonetheless, it is useful to take this type of data into account in order to have a framework of reference from which to establish comparisons against other countries.

In its 2014 Global Study on Homicide, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) indicated that the countries of the so-called "Northern Triangle" of Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras) are among those with the highest homicide rates in the world. Guatemala, in fact, was listed as the fifth most violent country, with a homicide rate greater than 40 per 100,000 people (Hernández 2014).[1] Other reports have indicated that violence in the Northern Triangle is even greater than that in states faced with internal armed conflicts (ACAPS 2014).

Discussion of the precise causes of the violence goes beyond the scope of this report, although it is important to mention that several studies have pointed to organized crime, drug traffic, and an increase in gang membership as factors contributing to the violence (Arnson and Olson 2011). It has also been noted that weak crime-prevention policies, inadequate enforcement of the law (impunity), and corruption within police forces and other institutions of the judicial system are also factors that influence the level of violence.

Homicide rates and other aggregate measures based on complaints made at public institutions possess certain limitations, given that not all victims report criminal acts committed against them. Additionally, such statistics fail to capture other dimensions of crime such as threats and insecurity. It is in this sense that surveys can help to provide a more integral and in-depth perspective about victimization.

III. Crime Victimization

In its 2014 region-wide questionnaire, the AmericasBarometer included a diverse set of questions related to crime victimization and insecurity. Some comparative data were presented in Part I of this report. Additionally, given the relevancy of the topic in Guatemala, there was also inclusion of certain specific questions that allow for a more in-depth assessment.

The central variable for measuring crime victimization in this survey is based on question VIC1EXT, which was already mentioned in Part I of this report. It is important to remember the phrasing and content of this question:

[1] With regards to the changes in the homicide rates, CABI (Central American Business Intelligence) has noted that in the case of Guatemala the figures used by UNODC in different years come from different sources, the, INACIF and the National Police, and for that reason they are not comparable. http://www.vox.com/2014/9/8/6083939/apsa-interesting-papers

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?

In the 2014 survey, 17% of Guatemalans report having been victims of a criminal act. In order to determine which factors are associated with crime victimization in Guatemala in 2014, logistic regression analysis is employed. The use of regression permits identification of the factors that are statistically associated with victimization, or what are known in the research lexicon as the independent variables. The regression model includes only sociodemographic variables, given that a relationship with other types of variables is unlikely in this case. The variables that are included in the regression can be seen in Figure 6.1, which also contains the results of the regression itself.[2] As it was explained earlier, a statistically significant relationship exists when a horizontal line separates from the vertical line. As can be seen in the figure, only two factors turn out to be associated with crime victimization in Guatemala in 2014: a respondent's place of residence and his or her level of education. Guatemalans who reside in major cities and who have higher levels of education are more likely to be victims.



Figure 6.1. **Variables Associated with Crime Victimization in 2014**

The majority of figures in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 show the bivariate relationship between the variable of interest (the dependent variable) and its predictors—the variables that as a result of the regression were identified as being statistically correlated with the variable of interest.

The following two figures show the predictors of crime victimization. Figure 6.2 shows in greater detail the differences in the level of victimization according to the size of the location of residence of a respondent. In the Metropolitan area, 25.5% of respondents report having been victimized. The percentage drops in accordance with a reduction in the size of the city in which a respondent lives. In

[2] See the table with the corresponding results in the Appendix.

rural areas, in fact, the percentage is reduced by half, with only 12.4% of respondents indicating that they have been victims of a crime.

It is worth remembering that Guatemala is the country in the Americas with the highest percentage of rural population. 51.2% of respondents in the 2014 survey reside in rural areas, thus inducing a lower overall level of victimization at the national level.



Figure 6.2. Crime Victimization and Location of Residence

Figure 6.3 shows how the levels of crime victimization have varied across rural and urban areas over the years. There has been a decrease in both, but the change is greater within urban areas. Whereas in 2010, 30.3% of urban respondents reported having been victims of a crime, the percentages for 2012 and 2014 drop to 28.5% and 21.9%, respectively. The drop between 2010 and 2012 is not statistically significant, but the difference between 2010 and 2014, as well as the difference between 2012 and 2014, is indeed significant.

With regards to changes in the year-by-year victimization rates of rural respondents, the only difference that is statistically significant is observed between 2010 and 2014, when victimization drops from 16.9% to 12.4%, respectively.

At any rate, the notable difference in victimization rates between urban and rural areas in Guatemala is observed in every iteration of the survey, and it is statistically significant in each case.



Figure 6.3. Crime Victimization by Year and Location of Residence

The relationship between victimization and education is shown in Figure 6.4. It is evident that as the level of education increases, respondents are more likely to have been victims, although it may also be the case that they are more open to sharing their experiences with the interviewer. Although only 11.1% of Guatemalans without any education report having been victims of a crime in 2014, nearly one-third of respondents with some university-level education report having been victimized. The percentage of victimization among respondents with some degree of secondary education is high as well, reaching nearly 20%.



Figure 6.4. Crime Victimization and Level of Education

In addition to the crime victimization experienced by respondents, it is important to have an idea about the impact that crime has upon a household. It is for this reason that the survey also asks about victimization at home. The specific question in this respect is the following:

> **VIC1HOGAR.** Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?

Upon adding together the direct victimization suffered by the respondent and that suffered by another individual in the household (VIC1EXT +VIC1HOGAR), a more comprehensive perspective is obtained. Figure 6.5 shows that total victimization has decreased over the years; the difference between 2010 and 2012 is not statistically significant, but the difference between 2010 and 2010, as well as the one between 2010 and 2014, is indeed statistically significant.[3]

[3] Generally, when the confidence intervals of the bars overlap this means that the difference between bars is not statistically significant. But in order to reach definite conclusions with regards to statistical significance in each case, this report also analyzes the p-value in the regression table, which can be found in the Appendix.



Figure 6.5. Household Crime Victimization by Year

It is once again important to note the difference between rural and urban parts of the country. Figure 6.6 shows a continuing statistically significant difference between both areas, with the urban area displaying a higher level of household victimization (32.7%). One can also see that in rural areas, household victimization is much higher than personal or direct victimization: although only 12.4% of rural respondents report having been victimized (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3), 22% of respondents indicate that either they or someone else in their household has been victimized, a full ten perentual points higher. The level of household victimization in urban areas also exceeds that of individual victimization, respectively standing at 32.7% and 21.9%.

In all, approximately one-third of homes in urban areas of Guatemala, as well as one-fifth of homes in rural areas, were in one way or another victims of a criminal act in the 12 months preceding the survey.[4]

[4] Since the survey was administered in March of 2104, it can be estimated that the reported victimization represents the year 2013 and the first quarter of 2014.



Figure 6.6. Household Crime Victimization, by Location of Residence

The final figure in this section is a map showing the distribution of household crime victimization across the four regions of the country that are included in the sample used for this study (see the Appendix for greater details regarding the sample). It is evident in map that the Metropolitan area has high levels of victimization in comparison to the other regions of the country. Accordingly, the Northwest and South of Guatemala have similar levels of victimization. The region with the lowest levels of crime victimization is the Northeast. The Metropolitan area experiences total victimization rates of 34.8%, while the Northwest and South have rates of 26.3% and 26.9%, respectively. In the Northeast, 18.3% of households were victimized.



Map 6.1. Household Crime Victimization, 2014

Finally, Table 1 indicates the type of victimization suffered by those respondents who report having suffered a criminal act. The highest percentage, 36.8%, report having suffered an armed robbery. This is followed by a third of respondents who report having been victims of unarmed robbery, albeit without assault or physical threats. Next 13.4% report having experienced an unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats. In total, 79.8% of victims report having gone through some kind of personal robbery. Another 5.9% report a burglary in their house. Less than 4% report having suffered extortion, property damage, or physical aggression without associated robbery. Finally, less than 1% of respondents report having suffered sexual assault or kidnapping. Here, it is important to keep in mind that sexual assault victims may not be willing to report this type of victimization.

Table 6.1. Types of Crime Victimization

Type of crime	Percentage
Armed robbery	36,8%
Unarmed robbery, no assault of physical threats	29,6%
Unarmed robbery, with assault and physical threats	13,4%
Home burglary	5,9%
Property damage	3,6%
Extortion	3,6%
Physical assault without robbery	3,2%
Other	3,2%
Rape or sexual assault	0,4%
Kiddnapping	0,4%
Total	*100%*

Source: Prepared by author with AmericasBarometer data, Guatemala 2014

IV. Insecurity and Fear of Crime

As was indicated in the above section, crime victimization is high in Guatemala, in particular in the urban areas of the country. Beyond the pernicious effects that crime victimization has upon victims and their relatives, such victimization also contributes towards a broader, nation-wide sense of insecurity. The questionnaire includes a question asking respondents how insecure they feel. The phrasing of the question is that used in victimization surveys around the world. Specifically, the question asks the following:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
(1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe

Figure 6.7 shows the distribution of responses to this question for Guatemala in 2014. Taking together the responses of people who indicated feeling either very secure or somewhat secure, 59.5% of Guatemalans can be seen as feeling safe in their neighborhood, whereas 40.4% feel unsafe.



Figure 6.7. Perception of Insecurity in Guatemala

As is the case with crime victimization, it is important to establish which are the factors or variables that influence why a person feels secure or insecure. Figure 6.8 shows the results of a linear regression model testing for this result.[5] Four variables turn out to be associated with the perception of insecurity: the area of residence, the respondent age, the awareness of the news, and whether a respondent has been a previous victim of crime. Once again, the size of the location where the respondent lives proves to be a relevant factor, as those who live in cities—particularly the Metropolitan area—are more likely to feel insecure in their neighborhoods. The relationship between age and insecurity is negative, since younger Guatemalans seem to feel more insecure. Finally, those Guatemalans who pay more attention to the news, and in particular those who have been victims of a crime, feel significantly more insecure than their cohorts. The details of these bivariate relationships are presented ahead.

[5] See the table with the corresponding results in the Appendix.



Figure 6.8. Variables Related to the Perception of Insecurity

Figure 6.9 shows in detail the way in which insecurity is related to the area of residence and to crime victimization. The left graph shows that as indicated, the perception of insecurity is higher in the Metropolitan area, which includes the Guatemala City, and in the larger cities of the country. In the scale of 0-100 used throughout this report, average insecurity in both areas was above 50 points. In contrast, average insecurity is lower in smaller cities and in particular in rural areas, where the level reaches 43.4 points. The perception of insecurity is high all around, but the levels are significantly lower in rural areas and in small cities than they are in the capital.

The graph on the right shows that on average, those who have been victims of a criminal act within the preceding 12 months are more likely to feel insecure. Whereas insecurity among Guatemalans who have not been victimized sits at 42.2 points, the score increases to 56.1 in cases of respondents who have been victimized.



Figure 6.9. Predictors of the Perception of Insecurity: Location of Residence and Crime Victimization

The other variables that are associated with the perception of insecurity are shown in Figure 6.10. These are respondent age and the level of attention that a respondent pays to the news. The figure on the left shows how those older than 55 tend to have a lower perception of insecurity compared to other age cohorts. Among these additional age categories, no major differences are observed. With respect to the level of attention paid to the news, it is evident that those who pay daily attention to the news have a higher perception of insecurity than those who never or only rarely follow the news, be it by radio, newspapers or internet.



Figure 6.10. Predictors of the Perception of Insecurity: Age and Attention to the News

Finally, with respect to the same question, Figure 6.11 compares results across years. The survey question at hand has been asked since 2004, which makes it possible to derive broader conclusions than was the case for crime victimization. The national average of perception of insecurity within the neighborhood rose in a statistically significant way from 2012 to 2014, shifting from 38.2 to 44.6 points, respectively, on the scale of 0-100. In fact, the average for 2014 was the second highest within the past decade; only in 2004 were higher levels of insecurity reported.



Figure 6.11. Perception of Insecurity, 2004-2014

The questionnaire for 2014 included, for the first time, questions related to fear of crime. The questions FEAR6e and FEAR6f are more specific than the preceding general question and read as follows:

	A lot	Somewhat	A little	Not at all
FEAR6e. And in general, how worried are you that someone in your family will be assaulted on public transportation? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all.	1	2	3	4
FEAR6f. And how worried are you about the safety of children in school? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all?	1	2	3	4

The distribution of responses among respondents who were presented with the transportation-related question can be observed in Figure 6.12. Given the relevance of this factor with regards to crime and insecurity, the differences between urban and rural areas are once again highlighted. As can be observed, the percentage of urban respondents that report feeling very worried about someone in their family becoming victim of a crime while on public transportation is higher than the corresponding percentage for rural respondents. In urban areas, 86.7% report feeling either somewhat or very worried, while the level for rural areas falls to 75.4%. Both percentages are rather high, but it is worth noting that 63.1% of urban Guatemalans report feeling very worried—a considerably high statistic for a service as basic as transportation.



Figure 6.12. Perception of Insecurity in Public Transportation

Concluding this section is Figure 6.13 showing the results for the question related to the security of children who attend school. Important differences once again manifest themselves between urban and rural respondents. Among urban respondents who have children in school, 80.6% indicate feeling somewhat or very worried, a statistic that sits at only 67.7% for rural respondents. In either case, both percentages are once again rather high and demonstrate that insecurity deeply affects Guatemalans, even at the school level, a place that should feel intuitively safe.[6]

[6] It is unclear if parents are worried about students during the time they are in school, or if they are also thinking about the outside of the school building, where they can run the risk of being assaulted.



Figure 6.13. Perception of insecurity of children in school

V. Presence of Gangs and Drug Traffic within the Community of the Respondent

Notwithstanding that crime stems from many multiple causes, as was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the presence of gangs or drug traffic have been identified as factors related to the levels of violence present in the countries of the so-called Northern Triangle. The issue of gangs has gained increased relevance in recent months and has been linked to the migration of unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle to other countries (Azpuru 2014). The 2014 questionnaire contains several questions related to these topics. The first of these is question AOJ21, which reads as follows:

AOJ21. I am going to mention some groups and I will ask you to tell me which of them represents the greatest threat to your security.
(1) People in your neighborhood or community
(2) Gangs
(3) Members of the Police or the Military
(4) Organized crime and narcotraffickers
(5) Relatives
(6) Common criminals

As can be seen in Figure 6.14, the majority of respondents (about 44.5%) consider common criminals (delincuentes) to be the greatest threat. But it is also worth nothing that nearly a third of respondents cite gangs as the greatest threat. The other categories identified by respondents, including organized crime and narcotrafficking, are mentioned by a relatively low percentage of the respondents. Finally, 9% of respondents indicate that none of the options presented represents a threat to their neighborhood.



Figure 6.14. Groups that Represent a Threat

Given the role of gangs as one of the groups that most threaten the security of certain neighborhoods, it is important to identify the extent of their presence. The specific question in the AmericasBarometer questionnaire is the following:

AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none?
(1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None

Figure 6.15 shows the results at the national level. When the categories of "very" and "somewhat" are taken together, nearly one-third of Guatemalans, or 31.1%, reported living in areas affected by the presence of gangs. This percentage is high, particularly taking into account the violent actions generated by gangs such as extortion and threats.



Figure 6.15. Gang Presence in the Neighborhood of the Respondent

The characteristics shared by individuals living in areas affected by gangs can be better understood through regression analysis. Figure 6.16 shows that there are four factors associated with the presence of gangs in the neighborhood.[7] On the one hand, indigenous Guatemalans are less likely to live in neighborhoods where there is presence of gangs. On the other hand, people that live in large cities, and particularly the Metropolitan area, have a higher likelihood of living in a neighborhood with presence of gangs.[8] Additionally, those who live in areas with presence of gangs experience higher levels of total crime victimization and are more likely to have the intention to migrate within the following three years. This is in line with a 2014 study by Hiskey, Malone, and Orcés who found that crime victimization in Central America within the past decade is related to the intention to migrate to other countries. Specifically, the authors note that those who have been victims of crime are more likely to consider migration as a viable option in order to escape their current situation[9].

Although the link between these four variables and the presence of gangs is not surprising, this analysis provides a statistical confirmation that this is indeed the case. The figures detailing the relationships between these variables are presented ahead.

[7] See the corresponding table in the Appendix.
[8] The non-indigenous category includes respondents who identified themselves as Ladinos as well as a small percentage of those who self-identified as 'other' (2.4%).
[9] Crime victimization is not the only factor related to a greater intention to emigrate. Other variables such as gender (male), age (younger respondents), corruption victimization, the assessment of the state of the national and the personal economy, receiving remittances and living in urban areas are also mentioned as predictors. In addition, the perception of insecurity has a marginal, but statistically significant effect. See Hiskey et. al http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO901en.pdf.



Figure 6.16. Factors Associated to Living in a Neighborhood with Presence of Gangs

The detail of the relationship between the presence of gangs and the location of the respondent's residence is shown in the left panel of Figure 6.17. The right panel shows information on the ethnic self-identification of the respondents. It is evident that the presence of gangs is much higher in urban areas, and particularly in the Metropolitan area, where over 50% of respondents answered in the affirmative. As the size of a respondent's location of residence decreases, the percentage of respondents indicating that gangs affect their neighborhood also decreases. This trend continues through to the rural areas of the country, where only one-fifth of respondents report presence of gangs.

With respect to respondents' ethnicity, 24.4% of those who self-identify as indigenous report that gangs are present in their neighborhood. The percentage rises to 37.9% among those Guatemalans who identify as Ladinos (not indigenous).[10]

[10] In the figure that shows the regression, the association between being Indigenous and living in a neighborhood with presence of gangs is not clear. This is due to the influence of other variables. However, in the table shown in the Appendix as well as in Figure 7.17, the difference between Indigenous and non-indigenous is clear.



Figure 6.17. Presence of Gangs in the Neighborhood by Location of Residence and Ethnic Self-identification

Figure 6.18 shows a clear relationship between presence of gangs and crime victimization of either the respondent or someone else in his or her household. Among those respondents reporting a high presence of gangs, the percentage of total victimization is 45.7%. Said percentage falls to 16.6% among respondents indicating that there is no presence of gangs in their neighborhood.[11]

[11] According to the information presented in Figure 7.18 it could be inferred that the crime suffered by the respondent or one of his/her relatives happened within their neighborhood, which is likely but not necessarily in all cases. The questionnaire includes a question about the place of victimization (VICAA), but there is no equivalent question that clarifies where his/her relative was victimized. For that reason this issue cannot be further discussed.



Figure 6.18. Household Crime Victimization and Presence of Gangs in the Neighborhood

A different perspective can be obtained from analyzing the responses to a series of questions related to perceptions about the degree of seriousness of certain problems within the neighborhood of a respondent. Table 6.2 contains a summary of the results. The most serious problems (at least those of which the respondents are aware) appear to be the first two listed in the table, respectively young people or children in the streets doing nothing or wandering around and young people participating in gangs. Approximately 40% of Guatemalans indicate that those two are either very serious or somewhat serious problems. At the other extreme, it stands out that the percentage of respondents in whose neighborhood these and other problems do not occur is very low—approximately 8% for each of the issues asked about in the survey.

Table 6.2. Seriousness of problems in the neighborhood

	Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not very serious	Noe serious	Not a problem
DISO7. Young people or children in the street doing nothing, wandering around here in your neighborhood	24,0%	21,4%	24,5%	22,3%	7,8%
DISO8. Young people or children living here in your neighborhood who are in gangs	21,2%	16,9%	25,4%	28,8%	7,8%
DISO10. Selling or trafficking of illegal drugs here in your neighborhood	12,3%	14,8%	21,1%	43,1%	8,1%
DIS018. Gangs fighting here in your neighborhood	10,6%	11,2%	25,5%	45,4%	7,3%
DISO14. Drug addicts in the streets here in your neighborhood	12,4%	17,9%	26,1%	37,1%	6,5%
DISO16. Assaults of people while they walk on the streets here in your neighborhood	14,6%	18,1%	30,7%	31,9%	4,8%
DISO17. Shootings here in your neighborhood	12,4%	16,4%	27,8%	37,9%	5,5%

Source: Prepared by author with information from the AmericasBaromenter (Guatemala 2014)

VI. Changes in Levels of Violence and of Criminality in the Community of the Respondent

This section addresses the issue of respondents' perceptions about changes to the atmosphere of violence within their community. One question directly related to the topic reads as follows:

PESE2. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighborhood is higher, about the same, or lower than 12 months ago?

Figure 6.19 presents the distribution of responses to this question. Nearly half of Guatemalans surveyed consider that the level of violence in their neighborhoods is lower than it was within the preceding year. At the other extreme, about 13.7% believe that violence has increased over the same period.



Figure 6.19. Perception of Changes in the Level of Violence

Four questions included in the 2014 questionnaire ask the respondent to indicate whether any of the following have occurred in his or her neighborhood during the last 12 months: theft or robbery, sale of drugs, extortions, and killings. As the results in Figure 6.20 indicate, robbery is the most frequent criminal act, with 41% of respondents indicating that it has taken place in their neighborhood in the last 12 months. Killings is the next most frequent crime, given that 29.9% of respondents indicate that at least one murder took place in their neighborhood within the previous year. Extortions come in at 23.3% of respondents, and just over a fifth of those surveyed indicate that the sale of drugs occurred over the preceding 12 months. However, it is important to keep in mind that unlike other forms of crime, it is less likely that respondents know or can corroborate the actual sale of drugs within their neighborhood.



Figure 6.20. Criminal Acts in the Neighborhood in the Past 12 Months

VII. The Effects of Crime and Insecurity upon Behavior

Previous sections discussed the degree to which crime, violence, and insecurity impact Guatemalans. This section examines the impact of these factors upon the behavior of citizens. A series of questions related to this topic was included in the 2014 version of the questionnaire for Guatemala. Respondents were asked to answer if over the previous 12 months they had changed any of their habits out of fear of becoming victims of crime:

	Yes	No	DK	DA
VIC40. Have you limited the places where you go to shop?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
VIC41. Have you limited the places where you go for recreation?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
VIC43. Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
VIC44. Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
VIC52n. Have you made changes to improve the security of your house?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
FEAR10. In order to protect yourself from crime, in the last 12 months, have you taken any measures such as avoiding walking through some areas in your neighborhood because they are dangerous?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)

The results for these questions are presented in the following graphs. Figure 6.21 shows the results for changes that are associated with the place of residence. The measure most commonly taken by respondents over the 12 months preceding the survey was to avoid walking through dangerous zones that were perceived as such. This was followed by moves taken to reinforce the security of the house. In both cases, more than 30% of respondents answer in the affirmative. 25.4% of respondents report having organized with neighbors, and 13.4% report having felt the need to change neighborhoods or move to a different community.



Figure 6.21. Changes in Behavior because of Violence (residence)

Figure 6.22 shows the results for changes associated with places where respondents go to for consumer or recreational activities. In both cases, as a result of fear of crime, more than one-fourth of the respondents report limiting the locations where they shop at or where they engage in recreational activities. The change was particularly notable with regards to limitations of shopping locations (31.5%).



Figure 6.22. Changes in Behavior because of Violence (places that are visited)

It is important to point out that in Figures 6.21 and 6.22, respondents were asked about changes that they had made as a consequence of crime and insecurity only within the last 12 months. Yet is plausible that other respondents had already taken changes in previous years, a reality that would not be captured by the questions at hand.

With respect to future changes in behavior as a result of crime and insecurity, Figure 6.16 shows that there is a correlation between living in a neighborhood in which there is gang presence and having the intention of migrating to another country within the next three years. Figure 6.23 shows the regression explaining more integrally which factors are associated with the intention of migrating. The dependent variable is the following question:

Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?			
(1) Yes	(2) No	(88) DK	(98) DA

The regression includes variables used by Hiskey et al. (2014), but it also includes additional variables not employed by said authors, including presence of gangs in the neighborhood. Additionally, for the particular case of Guatemala, it is always important to account for ethnic self-identification. Beyond these, additional variables were also included, such the respondent's marital status and whether he or she has any children. It is important to keep in mind that this question does not allow differentiation between those who would like to legally migrate to another country and those who would attempt to do so illegally.

Figure 6.23 shows the results of the regression. It can be seen that the age of the respondent, his/her socioeconomic level, and the size of the location of residence are sociodemographic factors influencing the decision to emigrate.[12] More specifically, being younger, being a part of an intermediate socioeconomic class, and living in cities of a larger size are predictors of the intention to emigrate. Beyond these three factors, not having children and receiving remittances are additional factors that are also predictors of the intention to emigrate.

With respect to the variables of interest in this chapter, there is a statistically significant relationship between intention to emigrate and diverse variables such as presence of gangs within a respondent's neighborhood and the perception of insecurity. The details of these relationships are shown further ahead.



Figure 6.23. Factors Associated with the Intention to Emigrate to Another Country

The following graphs show further detail about the relationship between the variables associated with violence and the intention of migrating. It is evident from Figure 6.24 that there is a nonlinear relationship between the perception of insecurity and the intention to emigrate. Respondents who feel more secure, as well as those who feel more insecure, are more likely to emigrate. The ones with the lowest likelihood of emigrating are those located in the middle categories: either somewhat secure or somewhat insecure. However, the only statistically significant difference is between those who feel very secure and those who feel somewhat secure or somewhat insecure. Once again it is worth noting that these results might stem from the fact that the migration question does not specify whether the respondent intends to migrate legally or illegally, nor does it ask about a specific country to where the respondent might have the intention of heading. Therefore, responses to the question may include people (particularly younger ones) that plan on studying or even moving entirely to another country.

[12] See table with corresponding results in the Appendix.



Figure 6.24. Intention to Emigrate and Perception of Insecurity

Finally, this section contains Figure 6.25 showing the relationship between intention to emigrate and presence of gangs in the neighborhood of the respondent. The intention to emigrate is higher among those respondents who report that there is a lot or some presence of gangs in their neighborhood. Yet it is interesting to note that the percentage is also high among those who indicate that gangs do not affect their neighborhood. In fact, there is not a statistically significant difference between these three categories. However, there are indeed significant differences between those who report little presence of gangs in their neighborhood and all other categories.[13] Once again, results here may stem from respondents that live in areas in which there is no presence of gangs yet who also share other motivations for emigrating, such as academic studies or economic reasons.

[13] This can be confirmed in the regression table in the Appendix.



Figure 6.25. Intention to Emigrate and Presence of Gangs in the Neighborhood

So as to further clarify the relationship between presence of gangs and the type of respondent that intends to emigrate, Figure 6.26 shows the relationship between those two variables in accordance with the level of education of the respondents. It can be seen that across every education category, those who live in neighborhoods or communities affected by gangs are more likely to emigrate. It is interesting to see that in comparison to the other education categories, those who possess some secondary education display higher levels of intention to emigrate.[14]

[14] Only some of the differences are statistically significant.



Figure 6.26. Intention to Emigrate by Education and Living in Neighborhood with Presence of Gangs

VIII. The impact of Victimization and Insecurity on the Political System

The impact that crime victimization and insecurity have upon the daily lives of Guatemalans is evident. The final section of this chapter measures the impact of both issues on the perceptions of the political system. The regressions presented in the following three figures show the predictors of satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy, and support for the political system.

Figure 6.27 shows how insecurity is associated with dissatisfaction with democracy.[15] Guatemalans that feel more insecure are less satisfied with democracy. The detail of this relationship is presented in Figure 6.30. Direct crime victimization or the victimization of someone else in the household do not have an impact upon the satisfaction with democracy, but it is important to note both that in rural areas and in smaller cities there is greater satisfaction with democracy and that citizens with lower levels of education are more likely to be satisfied. Additionally, those who have positive perceptions of the national economy also tend to feel more satisfied with democracy.

[15] See corresponding table with results in the Appendix.



Figure 6.27. Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy

Figure 6.28 shows a regression with the same independent variables used in the regression related to the satisfaction with democracy, but in this case, the dependent variable is the support for democracy. The corresponding question is included in Part I of this report.

The results of the regression show that neither the perception of insecurity nor the direct crime victimization experienced by the respondent affect the support for democracy. The only variable that proved to be statistically significant is the size of a respondent's location of residence: there is higher support for democracy in both the Metropolitan area and cities of a larger size.[16]

[16] See the corresponding table with results in the Appendix.



Figure 6.28. Predictors of Support for Democracy

Graph 6.29 presents a regression with the same model used in the two previous regressions, but in this case the dependent variable is support for the political system. The measurement of support for the political system was explained in Part I of this report. It can be observed that those who report that someone in their household has been a victim of a crime, as well as those who feel more insecure, are less likely to support the political system.[17] In addition, being a man and having a higher socioeconomic level are also important predictors of less support for the political system.

[17] The detail of these relationships can be found in the regression table in the Appendix.



Figure 6.29. Predictors of Support for the Political System

Figure 6.30 shows in greater detail the impact of insecurity on the satisfaction with democracy and the support for the political system. It is evident that those who feel more secure are more satisfied with the performance of democracy: the average satisfaction score is 55.9 among those who reported feeling very secure, and said difference from the other categories is statistically significant. The right panel shows that the average for support of the political system reaches 56.5 points among those who feel very secure—a score quite higher (and statistically significant) than in the other categories of insecurity.



Figure 6.30. Impact of Insecurity on the Satisfaction with Democracy and the Support for the Political System

The impact that the victimization of someone else in the household has upon a respondent's support for the political system can be observed in Figure 6.31. The average support for the political system is significantly lower among those Guatemalans who indicate that someone in their home has been the victim of a criminal act. More specifically, these numbers stand at 44.3 points for the respondents who report crime victimization in their household, versus 50.0 points for those who do not report having had a household member victimized.



Figure 6.31. Impact of Household Crime Victimization on the Support for the Political System

The last figure of this chapter, Figure 6.32, shows the breakdown of the answer to the following question:

AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: Implement preventive measures or Increase punishment of criminals?
(1) Implement preventive measures
(2) Increase punishment of criminals
(3) [Don't read] Both

The majority of respondents, 52.5%, believe that it is important to increase the degree of punishment for criminal acts, while approximately 23.8% of them believe that it is important to implement preventive measures. Although the option of "both" was not read to the respondent, 23.3% of respondents gave this as their answer.



Figure 6.32. Opinion on How to Reduce Criminality in the Country

IX. Conclusion

This chapter discusses the magnitude of crime in Guatemala, as well as the impact that crime and insecurity have on the daily lives of Guatemalans.

With respect to the magnitude of crime, nearly one third of Guatemalan homes were victimized by crime within the 12 months preceding the survey that was conducted in 2014. However, there are important differences between the rural and urban areas of the country. This is particularly the case for the Metropolitan area, which has a much higher incidence of victimization. The perception of insecurity is greater than actual crime victimization: almost 60% of respondents feel somewhat insecure. The difference between urban and rural areas once again manifests itself in the case of insecurity. On the other hand, it is well-attested to that gangs contribute to insecurity in Guatemala and the other countries of the Northern Triangle. A third of Guatemalans indicate that gangs affect their neighborhood, although once again, the actual rate of incidence is associated with the location in which the respondent resides.

In terms of impact, it is important to highlight that a substantial percentage of Guatemalans have changed their daily routines, activities, or behavior due to crime and insecurity: among other things, people have taken additional security measures at home, now avoid walking through certain dangerous areas, and have limited the places at which they shop or engage in recreational activities. Additionally, those respondents who feel the most insecure are more likely to have the intention of migrating to another country.

Beyond the impact of crime and insecurity on the personal lives of Guatemalans, it is also worrying to observe the effect that they have upon the political system. Those Guatemalans that have greater perceptions of insecurity feel less satisfied with democracy in the country, and they also show

lower levels of support for the political system. Furthermore, respondents whose close relatives have been victims of crime also demonstrate significantly lower levels of support for the political system as compared to those respondents that have not experienced the effects of victimization.

The analysis of the different dimensions of crime and insecurity in Guatemala presented in this chapter yields generally disheartening results. Nonetheless, there are two areas in which slightly more positive results are observed. For one, nearly 50% of respondents report that the level of violence in their neighborhood is lower than 12 months prior. Additionally, whereas one-half of respondents consider it important to increase punishments against criminals, the other half believe that it is important to either implement preventive measures against crime or to combine both punitive and preventive measures.

Comparative data with other countries are not presented in this chapter, given that these topics are addressed in the chapter concerning violence and insecurity in Part I of this report. That said, it is worth noting that in terms of crime victimization and perception of insecurity, Guatemala is an overall middle position among the countries of the Americas. As has been observed in previous reports on democratic culture, this is likely due to the fact that the incidence of crime and the corresponding perception of insecurity in Guatemala are much lower in the rural areas of the country, which in turn affects the national average. Given that Guatemala is one of the countries of the Americas with the highest percentage of rural population, the national averages for crime and insecurity are lower than in other countries with larger percentages of urban population.

Appendix

Appendix 6.1. Determinants of Crime Victimization, Guatemala 2014
(Regression Table Figure 6.1)

Crime Victimization (vic1extr)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.177363	.0978625	-1.81	0.075	-.3732561	.01853
Age	-.012325	.0802223	-0.15	0.878	-.1729074	.1482574
Education	.2522497	.0937051	2.69	0.009	.0646785	.4398209
Indigenous	.1471698	.0858087	1.72	0.092	-.024595	.3189346
Wealth	.0907605	.0829862	1.09	0.279	-.0753544	.2568754
Size of location of residence	.3307475	.0782831	4.23	0.000	.1740468	.4874481
Woman housewife	.0141029	.0976402	0.14	0.886	-.1813451	.2095509
Constant	-1.66866	.0869259	-19.20	0.000	-1.842661	-1.494659
F – 5.02 No. Cases – 1,461 R-Square						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 6.2. Determinants of Perception of Insecurity, Guatemala 2014
(Regression Table Figure 6.8)

Perception of Insecurity (aoj11r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	.0208905	.0310399	0.67	0.504	-.0412426	.0830235
Woman housewife	.0369113	.0363629	1.02	0.314	-.0358769	.1096996
Age	-.090246	.031475	-2.87	0.006	-.1532501	-.0272419
Indigenous	-.0059196	.0386765	-0.15	0.879	-.083339	.0714999
Education	-.0656331	.041878	-1.57	0.122	-.149461	.0181948
Wealth	.0328934	.0325026	1.01	0.316	-.0321676	.0979544
Size of location of residence	.1045082	.0401154	2.61	0.012	.0242084	.1848079
Married	-.02558	.0324671	-0.79	0.434	-.09057	.0394101
Has children	.0614291	.0374581	1.64	0.106	-.0135515	.1364097
Attention to news	.0527238	.0245653	2.15	0.036	.003551	.1018966
Crime victim	.1787796	.0278337	6.42	0.000	.1230644	.2344949
Constant	-3.93e-09	.0384539	-0.00	1.000	-.0769738	.0769738
F – 6.92 No. Cases – 1,436 R-Square - 0.0591						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 6.3. Determinants of Living in Neighborhood with Presence of Gangs, Guatemala 2014 (Regression Table Figure 6.16)

Presence of Gangs in Neighborhood (aoj17r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.010077	.0616258	-0.16	0.871	-.1334344	.1132805
Woman housewife	.0411747	.0672704	0.61	0.543	-.0934817	.175831
Age	.0958696	.0606934	1.58	0.120	-.0256214	.2173605
Indigenous	-.1607858	.0814756	-1.97	0.053	-.3238769	.0023053
Education	.0490447	.0856787	0.57	0.569	-.1224598	.2205492
Wealth	-.0996626	.0898294	-1.11	0.272	-.2794756	.0801504
Size of location of residence	.5577247	.0839507	6.64	0.000	.3896792	.7257703
Household crime victimization	.3711778	.0506522	7.33	0.000	.2697864	.4725692
Intention to emigrate	.1710688	.0549235	3.11	0.003	.0611274	.2810102
Constant	-.8944447	.0852787	-10.49	0.000	-1.065149	-.7237408
F – 12.88 No. Cases – 1,440						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 6.4. Determinants of Intention to Migrate to Another Country, Guatemala 2014 (Regression Table Figure 6.23)

Intention to emigrate to another country (q14r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf.Interval]	
Woman	-.1440335	.1180318	-1.22	0.227	-.3802999	.0922329
Woman housewife	-.141782	.1374222	-1.03	0.306	-.4168623	.1332983
Age	-.7321652	.0895136	-8.18	0.000	-.9113463	-.5529842
Indigenous	.1424466	.0905668	1.57	0.121	-.0388425	.3237357
Education	-.0537834	.1004657	-0.54	0.594	-.2548873	.1473205
Wealth	.2887337	.0865525	3.34	0.001	.1154801	.4619873
Married	.1303456	.1245782	1.05	0.300	-.1190247	.3797159
Has children	-.2589117	.106114	-2.44	0.018	-.4713219	-.0465014
Receives remittances	.1611641	.0699866	2.30	0.025	.0210707	.3012575
Size of location of residence	-.229494	.0799765	-2.87	0.006	-.3895844	-.0694037
Presence of gangs neighborhood	.2133533	.0731226	2.92	0.005	.0669824	.3597242
Perception of insecurity	-.1494984	.0732247	-2.04	0.046	-.2960736	-.0029232
Household crime victimization	.0729734	.0872148	0.84	0.406	-.1016059	.2475528
Victim of corruption	.1238648	.0719526	1.72	0.090	-.020164	.2678936
Perception of national economy	-.0011604	.0803845	-0.01	0.989	-.1620675	.1597467
Perception of personal economy	-.0535929	.0741397	-0.72	0.473	-.2019996	.0948139
Constant	-1.853178	.0933226	-19.86	0.000	-2.039983	-1.666372
F – 7.69 No. Cases – 1,405						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 6.5. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy, Guatemala 2014
(Regression Table Figure 6.27)

Satisfaction with democracy (pn4r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	.01582	.0355926	0.44	0.658	-.0554263	.0870663
Woman housewife	.0153271	.0390906	0.39	0.696	-.0629213	.0935755
Age	-.0533668	.0300982	-1.77	0.081	-.1136148	.0068812
Indigenous	-.0087623	.0307408	-0.29	0.777	-.0702966	.052772
Education	-.0845047	.0332041	-2.55	0.014	-.15097	-.0180395
Wealth	-.0327146	.0325161	-1.01	0.319	-.0978027	.0323735
Size location residence	-.0961302	.0349411	-2.75	0.008	-.1660724	-.026188
Perception of insecurity	-.1379246	.0321407	-4.29	0.000	-.2022613	-.0735879
Household crime victimization	-.0229291	.0213788	-1.07	0.288	-.0657234	.0198652
Crime victimization	.0507563	.0266856	1.90	0.062	-.0026608	.1041733
Perception national economy	.0947088	.0259036	3.66	0.001	.0428571	.1465605
Constant	7.64e-09	.0358669	0.00	1.000	-.0717955	.0717955

F – 7.89
No. Cases – 1,365
R-Square - 0.0537

Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design
* p<0.05

Appendix 6.6. Determinants of Support for Democracy, Guatemala 2014
(Regression Table Figure 6.28)

Support for Democracy (ing4r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.02218	.029279	-0.76	0.452	-.0807883	.0364283
Woman housewife	.0032205	.0327132	0.10	0.922	-.0622621	.068703
Age	.0382662	.0277432	1.38	0.173	-.0172679	.0938003
Indigenous	-.0269176	.0322183	-0.84	0.407	-.0914095	.0375742
Education	.0128111	.0362768	0.35	0.725	-.0598048	.0854271
Wealth	.0032434	.0357659	0.09	0.928	-.0683498	.0748366
Size of location of residence	.1187533	.041048	2.89	0.005	.0365869	.2009198
Perception of insecurity	-.0285561	.0317478	-0.90	0.372	-.0921062	.0349941
Household crime victimization	-.016466	.0262473	-0.63	0.533	-.0690057	.0360738
Crime victimization	-.0095277	.0342454	-0.28	0.782	-.0780774	.059022
Perception national economy	.0029298	.0308583	0.09	0.925	-.0588397	.0646994
Constant	5.93e-09	.0393966	0.00	1.000	-.0788609	.0788609

F – 2.39
No. Cases – 1,345
R-Square - 0.0197

Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design
* p<0.05

Appendix 6.7. Determinants of Support for the Political System, Guatemala 2014 (Regression Table Figure 6.29)

Support for the political system (PSA5r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	.0654396	.0336146	1.95	0.056	-.0018474	.1327266
Woman housewife	.0078358	.0385657	0.20	0.840	-.0693619	.0850335
Age	.0181702	.0295681	0.61	0.541	-.0410167	.0773571
Indigenous	-.0175747	.0339808	-0.52	0.607	-.0855947	.0504452
Education	.0276833	.0420506	0.66	0.513	-.0564902	.1118568
Wealth	-.1191115	.0361907	-3.29	0.002	-.191555	-.046668
Size of location of residence	-.0586594	.046353	-1.27	0.211	-.151445	.0341262
Perception of insecurity	-.0767933	.0383713	-2.00	0.050	-.1536018	.0000151
Household crime victimization	-.0841829	.0247	-3.41	0.001	-.1336255	-.0347404
Crime victimization	.0167457	.0202143	0.83	0.411	-.0237176	.057209
Perception of national economy	.0482933	.0263809	1.83	0.072	-.0045139	.1011004
Constant	-1.78e-08	.0367493	-0.00	1.000	-.0735618	.0735617
F – 3.82 No. Cases –1,373 R-Square - 0.0390						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Chapter 7. Violence and Tolerance in the Family Context

Dinorah Azpuru

I. Introduction

The previous chapter analyzed in-depth the topic of violence in Guatemala, which in large part stems from common crime, organized crime, gangs, and narcotrafficking. Studies by LAPOP generally focus on the national level. This year for the first time, however, violence at the family level is discussed.

Though it occurs within a domestic sphere, intrafamily violence has consequences that can create an impact at the national level. In fact, such violence has been mentioned as one of the factors that have driven women with young children to flee the country and emigrate to the United States or other countries. The problem has reached such magnitude that in August of 2014, the United States approved legislation allowing for domestic violence against Guatemalan women to qualify as a valid reason for granting asylum (Caldwell 2014).[1] Domestic violence can also impact levels of poverty and can have repercussions on national-level violence by contributing to an environment in which Guatemalans become accustomed to resorting to violence as a means of solving problems.

This chapter also analyzes the public opinion of Guatemalans with respect to two family-related issues of rising global relevance: same-sex marriage and abortion when the life of the mother is at risk.

The following are among the most important findings of the analysis of results of the 2014 survey:

- Merely 3% of Guatemalans would approve of a husband hitting his wife/partner because she did not efficiently perform the daily tasks around the house. 50.9% of respondents said that they would disapprove but understand. In all, this means that 53.9% of respondents would condone this form of violence against women.
- 10.2% of Guatemalans would approve of a husband hitting his wife/partner if she is unfaithful. 47.8% of respondents said that they would disapprove of the measure but nonetheless understand. In total, 58% of respondents would condone this form of violence.
- Guatemalans that live in rural areas are more likely to approve the use of violence against women in cases of infidelity. Whereas 39.4% of residents of the Metropolitan area would condone this form of violence, the percentage rises to 62.7% among those in the rural areas. In mid-to-small size cities, the percentage that approves of this form of violence is also high.
- Regardless of level of education, there are no statistically significant differences among men and women with respect to condoning physical violence against an unfaithful wife or partner.

[1] Nonetheless, it remains difficult for asylum to be granted in these cases. Esther Yu-Hsi Lee (2015) points out that as of January 2015, the great majority of asylum requests by Central American women with children who illegally crossed the U.S. border in the summer of 2014 had been denied. The rate of denial for women who did not have legal aid was 98.5% and it was slightly better for women who had legal aid, with 73.7%.

- In comparison with other countries of the Americas, Guatemala is the state with the highest percentage of citizens that condone physical violence against an unfaithful wife or partner.
- Less than 5% of Guatemalans believe that physical punishment should always or very frequently be used against children who disobey their parents. Nonetheless, 40.5% consider that such punishment is sometimes necessary, while 27.3% believe that it is almost never necessary. Less than a third of respondents believe that physical punishment should never be used.
- As the size of the locale of residence of a respondent increases, support for the use of physical punishment against children decreases. In rural areas, the average approval rating for such forms of punishment is significantly higher than in the Metropolitan area.
- Around 15% of respondents report that their parents frequently resorted to physical punishment. 41.7% indicate that they suffered such forms of punishment only sometimes.
- In comparison with other countries of the Americas, Guatemala finds itself in a relatively high position with respect to condoning parental use of physical punishments against their children.
- There is a high correlation between approving of use of physical punishment against children and having experienced such forms of punishment during childhood.
- Guatemala is one of the countries of the Americas with the lowest levels of approval for same-sex marriage. The average approval score for Guatemala is 10.8 points on a scale of 0-100. This contrasts sharply with several countries of South America and Mexico, where approval reaches upwards of 40 points.
- As is the case in other countries, young Guatemalans (those 18-25 years old) demonstrate higher levels of support for same-sex marriage than those in older age cohorts.
- Married or partnered Guatemalans have significantly lower levels of support for same-sex marriage than other Guatemalans.
- Guatemalans who report higher levels of interest in politics also display higher levels of support for same-sex marriage.
- Though therapeutic abortion is legal in Guatemala, the country is among those with lowest levels of approval in cases when the life of the mother is at risk. 45.3% of Guatemalans approve of abortion in such cases, whereas in countries such as Chile, Colombia, Mexico, or Argentina, approval reaches 60%.
- Approval of therapeutic abortion (in case of risk to the life of the mother) is higher among Guatemalans that live in the Metropolitan area than those who live in smaller cities or in the rural parts of the country.
- There is a linear relationship between education and approval of therapeutic abortion: Guatemalans with no education demonstrate lower levels of approval, but such levels rise in line with higher levels of education on the part of the respondent.

II. The Magnitude of Domestic Violence: Existing Information

Intrafamily violence has been a poorly analyzed topic in the past, but in recent years it has seen a sharp increase in relevance. In 2012, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) released an extensive report concerning violence against women in Latin America. The authors of the report (Bott, Guedes, Goodwin, and Adams) note that violence against women has been recognized as a health issue, a violation of human rights, and a barrier to economic development. They also point out that both the United Nations, in its Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, and the Inter-American system, by way of the 1994 Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, have made huge strides towards raising the relevance and visibility of the issue.

In the 2012 PAHO study, Bott and her colleagues analyze data gathered through surveys conducted between 2003 and 2009 in 12 countries throughout the Latin American region. Guatemala is one of the countries included in the report.[2] The survey covers a diverse series of topics related to intrafamily violence against women. With respect to physical violence, which is also the central topic of this section, the report notes that although there is widespread variation across countries, the percentages are high across the entire region. Table 7.1 shows the percentage of women that indicated having suffered physical violence at the hands of an intimate partner. The last column shows the percentage of the total that suffered acts of severe violence.[3]

Table 7.1. Physical Violence against Women in Latin America

Percentage of women (15-49 years of age) who reported physical violence from the spouse or partner

Country	*Suffered an act of physical violence at least once (total)*	*Suffered an act of severe physical violence*
Bolivia 2003	52.3 %	n/d
Colombia 2005	38.6%	19.4%
Peru 2007/8	38.6%	25.5%
Ecuador 2004	31.0%	21.3%
Nicaragua 2006/7	27.0%	21.3%
Guatemala 2008/9	**24.5%**	**17.7%**
El Salvador 2008	24.2%	17.6%
Paraguay 2008	17.9%	11.7%
Jamaica 2008/9	17.2%	13.3%
Dominican Republic 2007	16.1%	9.6%
Haiti 2005/6	13.4%	7.4%

Source: prepared by author with information from the report *Violencia contra la Mujer en América Latina* (Bott et al. 2012)

In the case of Guatemala, legislation has been enacted and institutions created so as to protect women.1996, saw passage of Decree 97-1996, or the Law to Prevent, Penalize, and Eradicate Intrafamilial Violence (Ley para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia intrafamiliar), which in its very first article reads:

[2] The information for Guatemala is based on a survey of reproductive health (ENSMI), conducted by the Centro de Estudios en Salud at the Universidad del Valle de Guatemala. The survey includes interviews with 16,819 women and took place between 2008 and 2009.

[3] Severe acts of violence are taken as punching, hitting with a blunt object, kicking, dragging, slapping, choking, burning, or otherwise threatening or hurting with a knife or a gun.

"Intrafamily violence constitutes a violation of Human Rights…[such violence] should be understood as any action, or omission thereof, that either directly or indirectly creates physical, sexual, psychological, or patrimonial pain or damage, as much in the public as the private spheres, to any person who is part of the family group, from relatives, partners or ex-partners, spouses or ex-spouses, or anyone with whom children have been procreated."

In line with said law, the Program on Prevention and Eradication of Intrafamily Violence (PROPEVI) was launched in 1999. The program is in charge of enacting the public policies, plans, and programs of the executive branch. Another law indirectly related with the topic of intrafamily violence is the Law Against Femicide and Other Forms of Violence Against Women (Decree 22-2008), which has as its objective to "Guarantee the life, liberty, integrity, dignity, protection, and equality of all women before the law and by the law, particularly when by consequence of gender, in relations of power or trust, in the public or private sphere, whosoever injure them, commit against them discriminatory practices of physical, psychological, or economic violence, or practices of contempt for their rights." Additionally, institutions like the Attorney General's Office and the Judiciary have established administrative units with the purpose of focusing on women that are affected by violence.

The regulations associated with Decree 97-1996 requires that the Guatemalan government receive, send, and register complaints of intrafamily violence, as well as maintain records of the same. Additionally, it is required that the public have access to the compiled statistics. In 2014, the National Statistical Institute (INE) published an integral report concerning family violence in 2013 (INE 2014). The report is based on the reports and complaints of violence before the aforementioned institutions. Table 7.2 shows that the number of registered cases of violence has increased over the years.

Table 7.2. Cases of intrafamily violence registered by the INE

Year	*Number of cases*
2004	8,231
2005	9,383
2006	9,401
2007	21,153
2008	23,721
2009	31,497
2010	32,017
2011	33,484
2012	36,107
2013	36,170

Source: Prepared by author with data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2013.

The report by the INE also contains information on different characteristics of the victims. Women constitute a large majority of victims, although some elderly men are also reported as victims. The bulk of victimized women are between 20 and 34 years old. The report also takes note of the ethnic self-identification of the victims: 56.4% identify as Ladino, 30.8% as belonging to some linguistic Maya community, and less than 1% as garífunas, xinkas, and other. The rest of victims do not identify with any of these ethnic groups.

With respect to education level, 79.9% of victims are illiterate, and with regards to occupation, the report indicates that 72.9% of victims neither are earners nor have income of their own. Among them, 69.8% are dedicated to performing tasks around the home (housewives), and 3.1% are either students or retired. Among victims that do receive pay or compensation for work (27.1%), about a third (30.8% of

them) perform domestic work, and a similar percentage are salespeople or service workers. It is interesting to note that 12.7% of salaried victims are professional women.

Another aspect of the INE report that is worth highlighting is that the individual most frequently identified as the aggressor (for the period from 2009 to 2013) in cases of violence is the spouse or partner, even though victims did suffer at the hands of other relatives or former spouses. According to reports by victims, the majority of male aggressors are between 20 and 39 years of age. With respect to education, nearly half of these male aggressors have some primary education, while nearly a third have some secondary education. Less than 3% has at least some university education.

Finally, it is important to clarify that the complaints received in the INE do not represent solely cases of physical violence. According to the report, 41.8% of complaints refer to a combination of psychological and physical violence. Physical violence per se only represents 11.4% of registered cases, while psychological violence itself represents nearly 30% of complaints. The remaining complaint cases represent a combination of other types of violence.

The preceding data present one dimension of violence against women in the family context, but it is evident that not all Guatemalan women who suffer domestic violence file a report with the authorities. Therefore, the data above do not accurately capture the magnitude of the problem. In addition, aggregate data do not allow for observation of additional characteristics of victims or their aggressors such as alcohol consumption, a factor that might potentially influence cases of domestic violence.

Another form of gathering information so as to gain a different perspective is by way of representative surveys. According to the aforementioned survey by the Pan American Health Organization, in 2008-2009, 24.5% of Guatemalan women indicated that they had suffered an act of physical violence committed by their husband or partner. Of these women, 17.7% reported having suffered acts of severe physical violence. In August of 2013, Guatemalan Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare announced that by way of the 2014 National Survey on Maternal and Infant Health (ENSMI), for the first the "impact that intrafamily violence has upon the health problems of citizens will be measured" (Prensa Libre 2013). The results of the survey, itself financed with funds from the United States and Sweden, are not yet available at the time of publication.[4]

Before moving on, it is also worth mentioning one 2011 conducted by the Universidad del Istmo, the "Study on Public Opinion Regarding Partner Mistreatment of Women." Said study covers only the Guatemalan administrative department of Quetzaltenango, including both urban and rural areas. The survey was administered to women who responded in the affirmative to four or more of the following questions:

a. Have you ever felt defenseless before your partner?
b. Are you entirely dependent on your partner?
c. Does your partner display a short-tempered character upon disagreeing with someone?
d. Do you believe that your partner does not appreciate himself?
e. Would you describe your partner as an envious person?
f. Do you only have friendships within your family?

[4] According to USAID's website, the data for Phase III of the project Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) would be gathered between March and September of 2014. See http://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/health%20and%20nutrition.

In this study, victimization was measured on a severity scale based on acts such as insults and threats, humiliation, punches, kicks, slaps, bites, shoving, stabbing, sexual aggression, prohibition to leave the household, withholding of money, or use of firearms. Beyond victimization, the survey included a series of independent variables such as victims' alcohol consumption habits, their levels of education, and other factors.

In summary, the victims identified in the 2011 study by the Universidad del Istmo have on average four years of formal education, while the aggressor has on average five years of education. The age and gender cohort with the highest proportion of victimization consists of women between 24 and 34 years of age. Additionally, close to 60% of mistreatment victims work at home and have little economic independence. These data coincide with the previously presented aggregate information gathered through complaints filed at government institutions.

The study also highlights both that alcohol consumption and drug use contribute to the severity of abuse against women and that rural areas tend to display greater levels of mistreatment of women. Finally, the study also determined that only 17% of victims actually reported abuse to the authorities.

III. Condoning the Use of Violence: Data from the AmericasBarometer

As opposed to the previous section dealing with the study by the Universidad del Istmo, this section presents the data gathered by the AmericasBarometer survey conducted in March of 2014. Given that the central objective of this study is to gain a deeper perspective on political culture overall, the questionnaire only included a limited number of questions concerning intrafamily violence. Respondents were not asked about direct victimization but rather about their opinions on the topic. In contrast to the surveys discussed in the preceding section, these questions were made to both male and female respondents. The first group of questions concerns violence against the wife, while the second deals with the physical punishment of children.

Given factors such as the complexity of the issue, the high probability of not garnering a response, and especially the fact that this survey does not focus on family-related issues, the survey did not ask explicitly about victimization from domestic violence. The two questions related to violence against the wife or partner are presented below.

Now I am going to read some situations in which some people think that it is justified that the husband hits his wife/partner and I will ask your opinion	**Would approve**	**Would not approve but understand**	**Would not approve or understand**
DVW1. His wife neglects the household chores. Would you approve of the husband hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	1	2	3
DVW2. His wife is unfaithful. Would you approve of the husband hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand? esposa es infiel. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	1	2	3

The results are presented in the following figures. Figure 7.1 shows that only 3% of respondents (men and women above 18 years of age) approve of a husband hitting his wife if she neglects to perform tasks around the house. Meanwhile, 50.9% give an ambiguous response: they would not approve but would understand. In all, 53.9% of Guatemalans appear willing to condone this type of violence against women. In contrast, 46.1% of respondents indicate that they would neither approve of nor understand a husband hitting his wife or partner for failing to perform household tasks.



Figure 7.1. Opinion about Violence against Wife for Neglect of Household Chores

Graph 7.2 shows the distribution of responses to a similar question, albeit one focused on marital infidelity. The results are perhaps even more worrying than those of the previous question. 10.2% of Guatemalans approve of hitting a wife in cases where she has been unfaithful. Additionally, 47.8% said they would disapprove but understand. Taken together, this means that 58% of Guatemalans demonstrate a favorable attitude towards physical violence against wives. On the other hand, 42% indicate that they would neither approve of nor understand said type of aggression.



Figure 7.2. Opinion about the Use of Violence against an Unfaithful Spouse

Regression analysis allows identification of the variables that influence approval or disapproval of aggression against women who have been unfaithful. Included in the regression model are basic respondent sociodemographic characteristics that may be potentially related to greater approval or disapproval of aggression: gender (and separately, whether a woman fulfills the role of a housewife), age, education, ethnic self-identification (Indigenous or Ladino), size of the locale in which a respondent resides, socioeconomic level, marital status (married or presence of a domestic partnership), and whether the respondent has children. Additionally, the level of religiosity and the respondent perceptions on his or her family's economic situation are also included.

It is important to clarify that the dependent variable, approval of physical violence against women in cases of infidelity, includes cases both in which respondents would approve of said actions (10.2%) and whether they would not approve but nonetheless understand (47.8%).

The results of the logistic regression for this question are presented in Figure 7.3.[5] According to the results, and as can be seen in the graph, the size of a respondent's locale of residence is associated with the level of approval given to use of violence against a wife. Additionally, the perceptions of a family's economic situation and the degree of religiosity (the importance of religion in the daily life of a respondent) are also variables associated with the approval or disapproval of aggression against wives in cases of infidelity. The precise nature of these relationships is explained further ahead.[6]

[5] See table with corresponding results in Appendix.

[6] A logistic regression using the approval of aggression against a wife if she doesn't take good care of the home as dependent variable was also estimated. As in the case of infidelity the size of the locale of residence and the religiosity of the respondent are predictors of this type of aggression; additionally, ethnic self-identification also turns out to be a predictor: respondents who self-identify as Indigenous are more likely to approve of this type of aggression. The economic situation is not a predictor in this case.



Figure 7.3. Factors Related to the Approval of Aggression against an Unfaithful Woman

Figure 7.4 shows that Guatemalans who live in rural areas and in small or medium cities are more likely to condone violence against a wife or partner who has been unfaithful. The percentage of acceptance among residents of medium-sized cities is extremely high at 73.5%, although it is also markedly elevated in small cities and in rural areas. In comparison, the percentage of residents of large cities who approve of such actions is 50%, with levels dropping to 39.4% for those living in the Metropolitan area. The difference between these latter two categories and all others is statistically significant.



Figure 7.4. Approval of Aggression against an Unfaithful Spouse and Location of Residence

The relationship between the approval of aggression against an unfaithful wife and the importance of religion in the life of a respondent is presented in Figure 7.5. It can be seen that respondents who cite religion as very important in their daily lives (and who overall represent more than 70% of respondents) display similar results as those who indicate that religion is weakly important or not important at all. The difference between these groups is not statistically significant, given that in all three cases, around 60% would approve of aggression. The only statistically significant difference with respect to religiosity arises between those who indicate that religion is very important and those who say that it is somewhat important. Here, those who indicate that religion is very important are more likely to condone physical aggression or violence against a wife who has been unfaithful.



Figure 7.5. Approval of Aggression against an Unfaithful Spouse and Importance of Religion

Finally, Graph 7.6 presents relationship between perceptions of a family's economic situation and the approval of aggression against an unfaithful wife. It is interesting to note that those respondents who consider their family's economic situation to be good (those who can afford to save) condone aggression against an unfaithful wife at similar rates as those who have less favorable economic outlooks. However, the only statistically significant difference arises between those who report a good economic situation and those respondents whose family income is insufficient and are faced with large difficulties. It is worth noting that only 2.35% of respondents reported finding themselves in a favorable economic situation, a level that reduces the extent to which these results can be generalized for this segment of the population. Finally, there is also a statistically significant difference between those who indicate that income is not enough and that they face difficulties, and those who report that they have just enough income and do not face large difficulties.



Figure 7.6. Approval of Aggression against an Unfaithful Spouse and Economic Situation

Curiously, the sex of a respondent does not influence approval of aggression against a wife who has been unfaithful. Figure 7.7 corroborates this finding: the differences between men and women are not statistically significant, regardless of level of education.



Figure 7.7. Approval of Aggression against an Unfaithful Spouse, Gender and Education

Next, the analysis focuses on a related but separate type of intrafamily violence: that directed against children. Different studies over the last couple of decades have shown the pernicious effects of resorting to physical punishment against children (ABC 2013). In the long term, such punishment can lead to aggressiveness as an adult, in addition to anxiety, depression, and other psychological problems (Durrant and Emson 2012). This is a reality that has gained recognition even at the international level; Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which entered into force in 1990,[7] requires countries to look out for children and to ensure that "no child shall be submitted to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment," while Article 19 of the same stipulates that states must take measures to "protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence." According to the Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children (2009), the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the body in charge of ensuring compliance with the articles of the Convention) has signaled that such compliance involves the banning and elimination of corporal punishment within the household[8].

Aggression towards children at home can have repercussions at the national level because it creates a vicious cycle in which those who have been physically reprimanded before may display violent tendencies as adults—not just towards their own children or spouses, but to all people in general.

[7] As of September 2014, only three members of the United Nations had not ratified the Convention. http://www.humanium.org/en/convention/signatory-states/

[8] The definition of corporal punishment used herein includes all punishment that involves physical force and has as its objective to cause any degree of pain or discomfort. In the majority of cases, children are hit with either the hand or an object such as a whip, stick, belt, or shoe. However, physical punishment may also include kicking, shaking or pushing, scratching, pinching, biting, pulling the hair or ears, or forcing a child to remain in uncomfortable positions.

Unfortunately, there is still a relative dearth of studies linking intrafamily violence to violence at the national level.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer questionnaire included for the first time questions related to the topic of aggression directed at children. The specific questions asked were the following:

VOL207n. Do you think that to correct a child who misbehaves it is necessary to hit or physically punish them? [Read options] (1) Always (2) Most often (3) Sometimes (4) Almost never (5) Never
VOL208n. When you were a child, your parents or guardians would hit or physically punish you in some way to correct your misbehavior? [Read options] (1) Always (2) Most often (3) Sometimes (4) Almost never (5) Never

The results for the first question (VOL207n) can be seen in Figure 7.8. On the positive side, the amount of respondents who believe that disobedient children should always or very frequently be physically punished is less than 5%. But it is also worrying to see that 40.5% of Guatemalans share the belief that such forms of punishment are sometimes necessary. 27.3% of respondents believe that physical punishment is almost never necessary, and only 27.3% rejects said aggression entirely.



Figure 7.8. Approval of Physical Punishment against Children

Figure 7.9 shows the results concerning victimization from physical punishment when the respondent was a child (question VOL208n). It can be noted that close to 15% of respondents indicate

that their parents either always or very frequently resorted to physical punishment in order to reprimand them. Meanwhile, 41.7% and 26% indicate that they sometimes or almost never experienced physical punishment, respectively. 16.8% of respondents state that physical punishment was never used against them.



Figure 7.9. Parents (of the respondent) used Physical Punishment

Regression analysis once again allows for identification of the factors that are most closely associated with approval of physical punishment as a way of reprimanding children. In addition to measuring whether there exists a relationship between having experienced physical punishment and using said punishment against one's own children, the regression also includes several important control factors. These are whether a respondent has any children, whether he or she is married or residing within a domestic partnership, and other standard sociodemographic variables. The regression also tests whether the importance of religion in the daily life of a respondent is also a relevant factor.

The results for this regression can be seen in Figure 7.10. There is an important correlation between a respondent having experienced physical punishment at the hands of a parent and that same respondent approving of physical punishment against children.[9] This will be looked at more in-depth ahead, but for now, it is also worth noting that the size of a respondent's locale of residents, as well as whether or not he or she has any children, are two additional factors that prove to be statistically related to levels of approval of physical punishment towards children.

[9] See table with corresponding results in the Appendix.



Figure 7.10. Factors Related to the Approval of Physical Punishment against Children

Graph 7.11 shows the enormous impact that having experienced punishment has upon later approval of the same. Respondents who indicate that their parents either always or very frequently used physical punishment are much more likely to accept the use of that type of punishment against their own children. The differences between all the categories shown in the figure are statistically significant. On a scale of 0-100, those who always or very frequently were subject to physical punishment come in at 54.1 points in terms of approving of such punishment overall. In contrast, those against whom physical punishment was never used only have an average acceptance level of 17.2 points.



Figure 7.11. Relationship between Approval of Physical Punishment against Children and Self-victimization

Figure 7.12 shows the relationship between approval of physical punishment and the size of the city, town, or area in which a respondent resides. It can be seen that the Metropolitan area displays the lowest levels of approval for physical punishment against children. And although the differences in percentages among all areas are small, they are nonetheless statistically significant.



Figure 7.12. Relationship between Approval of Physical Punishment against Children and Size of the Locale of Residence

Finally, it is evident from Figure 7.13 that those who have children are more likely to condone physical punishment as a way of reprimanding children. The average acceptance among those who are parents is of 42.2 points on a scale of 0-100, which compares to an average of 34.7 points among respondents who are not parents. The difference between the two categories is statistically significant.



Figure 7.13. Relationship between Approval of Physical Punishment against Children and Parenthood

The final graphs of this section compare the results obtained for Guatemala with those of several other countries in which questions of intrafamily violence were also included in the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey. Figure 7.14 shows the percentage of respondents that either approve or do not approve of but nonetheless understand the use of physical aggression against a wife/partner in case of infidelity. The 58% approval rate seen in Guatemala is much higher than that of respondents in other countries; the differences are statistically significant.



Figure 7.14. Approval of Physical Violence against an Unfaithful Wife in the Americas

Figure 7.15 shows the average rate of approval for the use of physical punishment against children in the countries of the Americas in which the 2014 AmericasBarometer posed this question. Guatemala's average of 40.5 points places the country in the mid-to-high range as compared to its other states; four countries get higher scores, while another seven have scores that are significantly lower than that of Guatemala.



Figure 7.15. Approval of Physical Punishment against Children in the Americas

IV. Opinions Concerning other Topics Related to the Family

The last section of this chapter examines briefly two additional topics that are related to the family and have recently become a part of the political debate in numerous countries around the world: same-sex marriage and therapeutic abortion, or those cases of abortion in which the life of the mother is at risk.

With respect to marriage between people of the same sex, despite the fact that the issue has remained a topic of widespread political and religious debate, within the last decade there have been major changes on the issue in numerous countries. Yet the changes are not uniform, and there is widespread variation internationally; on one hand, many countries (or their respective states or sub-jurisdictions) have extended the right to marry to couples of the same sex. On the other hand, certain

countries have also cracked down on freedom of expression and have enacted laws that are generally seen to be anti-gay.

Table 7.3 contains a list of countries where same-sex marriage is legal either at the national or regional level. The chart also contains a listing of countries that recognize marriages performed abroad and/or provide protections to same-sex couples in the form of civil unions.

Table 7.3. Status of Same-sex Marriage in the World

LEGAL AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL	YEAR	LEGAL AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL	YEAR	RECOGNIZTION OF CIVIL UNIONS AND REGISTRY OF UNIONS
Netherlands	2001	**Mexico**		**Germany**
Belgium	2003	Mexico City		**Andorra**
Spain	2005	Coahuila		**Australia**
Canada	2005			**Austria**
South Africa	2006	**United States***		**Colombia**
Norway	2009	Massachusetts	2004	**Croacia**
Sweden	2009	Connecticut	2008	**Ecuador**
Portugal	2010	Vermont	2009	**Slovenia**
Iceland	2010	Iowa	2009	**Estonia**
Argentina	2010	New Hampshire	2010	**Finland**
Denmark	2012	Washington D.C.	2010	**Hungary**
Brazil	2013	New York	2011	**Irlanda**
France	2013	Maine	2012	**Israel**
Uruguay	2013	Washington	2012	**Liechtenstein**
New Zeland	2013	Maryland	2013	**Mexico**
United Kingdom	2013	Rhode Island	2013	**Czech Republic**
(England, Wales, Scotland)		Minnesota	2013	**Switzerland**
Luxembourg	2014	Delaware	2013	
(formal vote in 2015)		Hawai	2013	
		New Jersey	2013	
		California	2013	
		New México	2013	
		Oregon	2014	
		Pennsylvania	2014	
		Illinois	2014	
		Indiana	2014	
		Oklahoma	2014	
		Utah	2014	
		Virginia	2014	
		Wisconsin	2014	
		Colorado	2014	
		North Carolina	2014	
		West Virginia	2014	
		Wyoming	2014	
		Alaska	2014	
		Arizona	2014	
		Nevada	2014	
		Florida	2014	
		Alabama	2015	

Source: Prepared by author from several sources

*As of February 24, 2015 same-sex marriage is legal in 37 states. Additionally in seven states restrictions have been lifted, but the cases are in process of appeal. The Supreme Court of the United States announced that in the summer of 2015 will make a decision that will determine if states can block same-sex marriage.

As can be seen in the table, the number of countries and jurisdictions that have legalized same-sex marriage has seen a sharp increase over the last three years (The Guardian 2014, CNN 2014).[10] Multiple surveys have shown that opinions on same-sex marriage have changed dramatically within the United States (Flores 2014, Bassets 2015). Public opinion analysts within the country believe that the change may be the most profound change seen in public opinion in recent decades (Kumar 2014). According to one study by the Public Religion Research Institute (2014), public opinion towards gay marriage is today more favorable than ever before.

Even though the shift towards more favorable opinions on same-sex marriage has occurred across all age groups, the largest support for gay marriage is seen among young Americans, regardless of their political affiliation. According to Gallup, in 2014, 78% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 approved of same-sex marriage. An August 2014 survey by McClatchy-Marist confirmed that public opinion on gay marriage is shifting dramatically among Americans, and it posited that the shift is due in large part to younger generations' higher levels of support and increased likelihood of personally knowing someone who is gay:

> "The sea change in attitudes is being propelled by two major forces, the poll found. First, people aged 18-29 overwhelmingly favor same-sex marriage. Second, the ranks of Americans who say they know someone who's gay has skyrocketed over the last decade and a half. And those who know someone who's gay are almost twice as likely to support same-sex marriage."

Acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage among young people is high independent of religion. For instance, an October 2014 survey by the Pew Research Center found that 85% of young Catholics believe that homosexuality should be accepted, while a full 75% support same-sex marriage. Among American Catholics in general, 57% are in favor of said marriages (Lipka 2014). Support for same-sex marriage is lower among young Evangelicals than young Catholics, but even here, the level of support has doubled in the last decade, surging from 20% in 2003 to 42% in 2014 (Dias 2015). At an even broader level, among Hispanic Catholics residing in the United States, acceptance reaches 56%.[11]

Analysts point out that the profound changes in public opinion have also effected changes in public policy across the United States. In turn, these changes in policies have also encouraged more individuals to be open about their own homosexuality (Pereda 2014).

Changes aside, homosexuality and same-sex marriage continue to be highly controversial issues, with many countries around the world not only prohibiting same-sex marriage but also punishing homosexuality outright. In fact, eighty-one countries, the majority in Asia and Africa, currently have anti-homosexuality laws in place (BBC 2014). One of the most notable of these cases was that of Uganda, where President Yoweri Museveni in February of 2014 signed into law a highly controversial measure punishing same-sex acts and relations with multiple years in prison. The country's Constitutional Court overturned the law following an international uproar and condemnation by multiple other countries, but the entire episode shows how as much in Uganda as in other developing economies, homosexuality remains a highly divisive issue that is often penalized by law. Even in countries with higher levels of development such as Russia, there remain high levels of homophobia and discrimination against persons of nontraditional sexual orientations.

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[10] In the Spanish media, the terms "same-sex marriage" and homosexual marriage" are generally used interchangeably, a reason why both terms are also used within this study (CCN Mexico, 2013).

[11] See http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/hispanic-support-same-sex-marriage-2003-n39331

With respect to Latin America, there is no state that currently penalizes same-sex relations, and in fact, several countries of the region have been pioneers on issues of LGBT rights such as same-sex marriage (see Table 7.3).[12] Gómez (2014) finds that there have been important changes in the region on social issues such as same-sex rights, abortion, and legalization of marijuana and suggests that Latin America is becoming more liberal. But this does not imply that homophobia is not present on the continent, and in order to counteract discrimination against people of nontraditional sexual orientations, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in June of 2014 passed a resolution titled "Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity".[13] The resolution was introduced by Brazil and cosponsored by Argentina, Uruguay, the United States, and Colombia. However, the measure failed to achieve unanimous consent, and although it was signed by all member countries, the document contains the objections and observations raised by 11 of the 34 OAS member states: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guatemala, Belize, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and Paraguay. Guatemala and Ecuador noted that "failure to legally recognize marriage among people of the same-sex did not constitute a discriminatory practice." (ABC Color 2014).[14]

In short, there is a large gulf worldwide between countries that approve of same-sex rights and those that actively repress homosexuality. Encarnación (2014) notes that in general, the level of wealth of a country, as well as its level of religiosity, are factors correlated with the global divisions on homosexuality: higher-income and secular countries are more likely to support same-sex rights, whereas the lower-income countries with higher levels of religiosity tend to repress homosexuality. Of note is also the observation that even though the correlation between political regime type and same-sex rights is not clear, LGBT rights are virtually nonexistent in authoritarian regimes (Encarnación 2014, 91).

Given the present-day relevance of same-sex rights and related issues, it is important to gauge Guatemalans' public opinions with respect to marriage between people of the same sex. Since 2010, the AmericasBarometer has included a question related to the topic. It reads:

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry?

Figure 7.16 shows the comparative results for the countries of the Americas in 2014. As can be seen, Guatemala is one of the countries with the lowest levels of support for same-sex marriage, scoring an average of 10.8 points on the scale of 0-100 points used in this report. Only four Caribbean countries fall below Guatemala: Belize, Guyana, Haiti, and Jamaica. Guatemala's average score contrasts sharply with that of countries such as Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, which are all above 40 points. Uruguay's score of 70.6 points is notable for being higher than even that of the United States.

[12] LGBT refers to Lesbians, Gays Bisexuals and Trans. In turn, trans includes transvestites, transexuals and trasgender).
[13] The resolution can be found in the website of the Organization of American States http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/AG-CG-doc_12-14_rev1.pdf
[14] When debate on the Resolution began during the OEA General Assembly held in Antigua Guatemala in 2013, Guatemalan President Otto Pérez Molina expressed his rejection of abortion and same-sex marriage to the media (Prensa Libre 2013).



Figure 7.16. Approval of same-sex marriage in the Americas

It is useful to analyze the case of Guatemala in greater detail. With respect to the 2014 survey, a frequency analysis shows that 74.4% of respondents strongly disapprove of same-sex marriage. The remaining 25% of respondents are divided equally across most of the remaining categories on the scale, yet only 3.9% of all respondents entirely approve of gay marriage. A regression analysis allows for identification of the factors that are associated with support of same-sex marriage. Beyond the sociodemographic variables that should be included as part of standard procedure (gender, age, education, socioeconomic level, place of residence, ethnic self-identification, civil status, and being head of household), the model also includes factors that have been suggested as potential explanatory variables for the topic, including a respondent's level of interest in politics, interpersonal trust, and the importance of religion in his or her life.

Figure 7.17 shows that two of the sociodemographic characteristics are associated with approval of same-sex marriage: the civil status and age of a respondent.[15] One additional related variable is the level of interest that the respondent has in politics. The details of these relationships are explored further ahead.



Figure 7.17. Factors Associated with the Support for Gay Marriage

Figure 7.18 shows the differences in support for gay marriage across different age cohorts. As can be seen, Guatemalans between 18 and 25 years of age have the highest average level of approval, with 14 points on the scale of 0-100. With the exception of those between 56 and 65 years of age, average approval falls as a respondent's age increases. There are statistically significant differences those who are 18-25 and their other age cohorts, with the exception of the 26-35 group. Regardless, the average level of acceptance among all categories is markedly low.

[15] See corresponding table with results in the Appendix.



Figure 7.18. Approval of Same-Sex Marriage by Age

Figure 7.19 shows the differences in opinion on same-sex marriage among respondents who are married or in a domestic partnership and those who are not (those who are single, divorced, or widowed). The average approval among those who are married or in a domestic partnership is 9.6 points (in the 0-100 scale), and it increases to an average of 13.3 points among respondents who are married. The difference between both groups is statistically significant.



Figure 7.19. Approval of Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Status

The relationship between approval of same-sex marriage and the level of interest that a respondent has in politics is shown in Figure 7.20. It is interesting to observe that those who report having higher interest in politics also display significantly higher levels of support for same-sex marriage (19.4 points on the scale of 0-100). A plausible explanation for this is that those who follow politics more closely are more aware of the international debate taking place on same-sex marriage and the changes that have been associated with it throughout the world. There is a statistically significant difference between those who report having a very high interest in politics and little or no interest. Likewise, those who report having some interest in politics differ in a statistically significant manner from those who have little interest in it.



Figure 7.20. Approval of Same-Sex Marriage and Interest in Politics

The discussion now turns to the second and final topic of this section, therapeutic abortion. An in-depth analysis of Guatemalans' opinions on therapeutic abortion—this is abortions performed in cases in which a mother's life is at risk—is beyond the scope of this report, therefore the issue is addressed only briefly. Abortion is an often taboo, very complex topic that includes a variety of potential exceptions and occurs under a variety of circumstances. As such, it can be said that the issue of abortion is more controversial than even same-sex marriage, particularly because it carries very deep religious connotations as well.

On a map showing the status of legislation concerning abortion in countries throughout the world (http://worldabortionlaws.com/map/), it can be seen that the majority of countries typically considered "developed" or high-income have in place some kind of legislation allowing abortion in all instances—with varying restrictions based on a certain gestation period. In practically all of these countries, abortion is also widely accepted in cases of incest, rape, risk to the life of the mother, or fetal malformation.

In contrast, there is large variation among middle and low-income countries, and this is precisely the case for Latin America as well. Only Uruguay, in which decriminalization of abortion occurred only

as recently as 2012, currently has nonrestrictive legislation in place.[16] Table 7.4 outlines the exceptions that currently exist in Latin America and the Caribbean. Only El Salvador and Nicaragua outlaw abortion under all circumstances, including saving the life of the mother.[17] Chile also prohibits abortion, but on January 31 of 2015, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet proposed a measure that decriminalizes voluntary abortion under three circumstances: risk to the life of the mother, fetal malformation, and rape; the proposed law must now be debated by the country's legislature. Another Latin American country where abortion was prohibited under all circumstances until recently is the Dominican Republic, which in December of 2014 legalized therapeutic abortion in the country.

Table 7.4. Legislation on Abortion in Latin America and some Caribbean Countries

Country	To protect the mother's life	Physical health	Mental health	Rape	Fetal malformation	Socioeconomic factors	By request
Argentina	Yes	Yes	No	Restricted	No	No	No
Belize	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No
Bolivia	Yes	Yes	--	Restricted	No	No	No
Brazil	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Chile (1)	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Colombia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Cuba	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ecuador	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
El Salvador	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Guatemala	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Haiti	Yes	--	No	No	No	No	No
Honduras	Restricted	No	No	No	--	No	No
Jamaica	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
México	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Varía	Varía
Nicaragua	No	--	No	No	No	No	No
Panama	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Paraguay	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Peru	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Dom. Rep.	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Trinidad T.	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Uruguay	Yes	Yes	Yes*	Yes*	No	Yes*	No
Venezuela	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No

Source: http://www.abortos.com/otras_aborto.htm
(1) In January 2016 the president of Chile presented a Project to Congress to decriminalize therapeutic abortion.
Yes - Legal.
No - Illegal
* - Legal only during the first quarter (exact date can vary).
# - Legal only during the first and second quarter (exact date can vary).
Restricted - Legal but subject to important restrictions.
Several – Varies by region.
--Information is not available or the legal norm is too ambiguous.

[16] According to El País (2013), "Uruguayan women are allowed to undergo an abortion up to 14 weeks after being victims of sexual assault, and at any point in the pregnancy in cases of risk to the life of the mother or fetal unviability. In order to seek out legal abortion, women must first undergo consultation with a Gynecologist, a psychiatrist, and a social worker, and they must then wait out a 5-day reflection period before proceeding with any action."
[17] Other than El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chile, only Malta and the Vatican prohibit abortion under any and all circumstances (2014).

In the case of Guatemala, the Penal Code of 1973 authorizes abortion if it is proved that the life of the mother is at risk. Chapter III, Article 137 of the Penal Code states:

> ARTICLE 137. Abortion is not punishable if performed by a physician, with the consent of the woman and a concurring diagnosis of at least one additional physician, and if it is performed without the intention of directly ending the life of the product of conception but only with the express goal of avoiding a risk, duly established, to the life of the mother, and after exhausting all other available medical and technological avenues.

Aside from the legislation already existing in each country, the 2012 and 2014 AmericasBarometer surveys included the following question:

W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger? (1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified

Figure 7.21 shows the comparative results for the Americas in 2014. Once again, Guatemala, with 45.3%, finds itself among the countries with the lowest rates of acceptance for abortion that is performed to save the life of the mother, regardless of the fact that therapeutic abortion is legal in the country. The differences that Guatemala has versus most other countries on the continent, with the exceptions of El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, and Guyana, are statistically significant,



Figure 7.21. Approval of Therapeutic Abortion in the Americas

Figure 7.22 shows the distribution of Guatemalans' opinions with respect to the question of abortion (defined therein as interruption of a pregnancy) in case of danger to the life of the mother. 45.3% of respondents indicate that abortion is acceptable under said circumstances, although a majority, 54.7%, said that it is not justifiable.



Figure 7.22. Approval of Therapeutic Abortion

A logistic regression model is used to determine factors that are associated with approval of abortion when the life of a mother is in danger. This is not a linear regression model as was used to test for approval of same-sex marriage but nonetheless employs the same dependent variables; that is to say, it tests for the same standard sociodemographic characteristics, interest in politics, and interpersonal trust. The results of the regression are shown in Figure 7.23. It can be seen that respondents who are housewives, who live in larger cities, and who have higher levels of education are more likely to approve of abortion in situations where a pregnancy endangers the life of the mother. There is also higher acceptance seen among those who have a higher degree of interest in politics. Furthermore, there is a relationship between the importance of religion in the daily life of a respondent and the level of approval he or she has for abortion meant to save the mother's life. The details of some of these relationships are provided ahead.



Figure 7.23. Factors Associated with the Approval of Therapeutic Abortion

Figure 7.24 shows the relationship between approval of therapeutic abortion and the size of the city, town, or area in which a respondent resides. Those who live in the Metropolitan area approve of abortion in cases when the mother's life is at risk at higher rates than those who live in rural areas, with levels of 54.9% and 42.1%, respectively. The difference between the two is statistically significant.



Figure 7.24. Approval of Therapeutic Abortion and Location of Residence

Figure 7.25 shows that there exists a clear linear relationship between a respondent's approval of therapeutic abortion and his or her level of education. As respondent education grows higher, the likelihood of approving of abortion in cases in which a mother's life is at risk also grows.



Figure 7.25. Approval of Therapeutic Abortion and Education

Figure 7.26 clarifies the relationship between the religiosity of a respondent and his or her approval of therapeutic abortion. As can be seen, the relationship is not linear but rather tail-heavy—those who either consider religion very important or not important at all are those who display highest levels of disapproval. In fact, the only difference that is statistically significant is seen between those who consider religion very important and those who view it as being somewhat important.



Figure 7.26. Approval of Therapeutic Abortion and Importance of Religion

Two factors that have not yet been discussed but have in other countries proven to be relevant when it comes to social issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion are ideology and the specific religion of a respondent. The last two figures of this chapter clarify how these two factors, despite not being included in the formal regressions, are associated with the topics covered above.

Figures 7.27 and 7.28 show, respectively, the relationship between ideology and approval of same-sex marriage and between ideology and approval of therapeutic abortion. With respect to marriage between people of the same sex, Guatemalan respondents that self-identify with the left of the political spectrum have a higher level of approval, although even theirs does not exceed 20 points on the 0-100 scale.



Figure 7.27. Approval of Same-Sex Marriage and Ideology

Graph 7.28 shows how for the case of therapeutic abortion, ideology does not appear to play an important determining role. The relationship between the two is irregular, and it only falls significantly among those who identify as being on the center-right of the political spectrum.



Figure 7.28. Approval of Therapeutic Abortion and Ideology

Graphs 7.29 and 7.30 compare the levels of support for each issue based on the religion of a respondent.[18] Guatemalans who do not practice any religion display the highest levels of support for both same-sex marriage and therapeutic abortion. Respondents who identify as Catholics follow: they are more open to abortion in cases when maternal health is at risk, as well as more supportive of same-sex marriage. On both issues, those who identify as non-evangelical Protestants demonstrate lower approval than the other groups.

With respect to the statistical validity of the results, it is important to note that on same-sex marriage, there are significant differences between Catholics and non-evangelical Protestants, as well as between Catholics and Evangelicals and Pentecostals. There are also significant differences between Guatemalans who do not practice any religion and those who identify as Protestant or Evangelicals However, there is no statistically significant difference between Catholics and those who do not practice any religion. The findings here coincide with those of Marcano (2013), who, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer, found similar patterns at the level of the entire American continent. The study measured attitudes towards homosexual individuals not only with respect to same-sex marriage, but also in terms of attitudes about LGBT persons serving in public roles and of opinions on having LGBT individuals as neighbors. At the level of the Americas, the vast majority of respondents, independent of religion, stated that it did not matter to them whether they had LGBT individuals as neighbors. However, with respect to the other two topics, Evangelicals were significantly less supportive, followed by Protestants and Catholics. Latin Americans who did not practice a religion were those with the highest levels of support for same-sex rights.

[18] Only 16 respondents indicated that they practiced an Oriental religion, a low enough number that responses for this category are not statistically reliable. Furthermore, not included in the graphs were the responses of those who self-identified with Judaism, traditional religions, or identified as Jehovah's Witnesses, given that in each of the cases the number of respondents was too low (less than 1% of the total) to derive any generalizable results. In terms of the remaining respondents, 49% identify as Catholic, 11% as non-Protestant Evangelist, 30% as Evangelist or Pentecostal, and 7% indicated that they do not practice any religion.



Figure 7.29. Approval of Same-Sex Marriage by Religion

In the case of therapeutic abortion, Catholics, Evangelicals and Pentecostals, and those who do not practice any religion all displayed similar results: between 45% and 47% of respondents accept abortion in instances when the life of the mother is at risk. However, there are statistically significant differences between all three cohorts and those who do identify as non-Evangelical Protestants, who one again display lower levels of acceptance in comparison with other groups.



Figure 7.30. Approval of Abortion in Case of Danger of Mother's Life, by Religion

V. Conclusion

This chapter analyzes public opinion about intrafamily violence; specifically, it looks at respondents' levels of approval for violence towards an unfaithful wife or partner and towards physical punishment against children. It also looks at the public opinion of Guatemalans with respect to same-sex marriage and therapeutic abortion (when the life of the mother is at risk.) The results for Guatemala are not encouraging.

With relation to the first issue, although only 10% of Guatemalans would approve of a husband hitting a wife or partner when she has been unfaithful, 47.8% of them indicate that they would disapprove but nonetheless understand. In all, 58% of respondents condone this type of violence against women. One of the most alarming aspects of this finding is that between men and women, regardless of level of education, there are no statistically significant differences in opinion regarding violence against an unfaithful wife. That is to say, women with no education as much as those with some higher education appear to condone marital violence at similar rates than men. In comparison to other countries of the Americas, Guatemala is the country with the highest percentage of approval for physical violence against an unfaithful spouse or partner.

With regards to physical violence against children, even though less than 5% of Guatemalans consider it necessary to always or very frequently reprimand their children through physical punishment, 40% and 27.3% are of the opinion, respectively, that such actions are sometimes or almost never necessary. Only less than one-third believe that physical punishment should never be used against children. As the size of the town, city, or area in which a respondent resides increases (from rural areas up through the Metropolitan area), the level of support for corporal punishment towards children drops. In other words, the Metropolitan area sees a significantly lower level of support for the use of physical punishment. In comparison with other countries of the Americas, Guatemala is in a mid-to-high position with respect to the use of corporal punishment against children.

Close to 15% of respondents report that their parents used physical punishment against them when they were children, and 47.1% indicate that they sometimes experienced such punishment. The statistical analysis that was performed finds a high correlation between approval of physical punishment against one's own children and having suffered through such punishment during childhood.

With respect to topics of current political global relevance, Guatemala is one of the countries of the Americas with the lowest levels of support for same-sex marriage. Guatemala's average score on a scale of 0-100 is 10.8 points, whereas Mexico and some countries of Latin America have scores surpassing 40 and even 50 points, respectively. As is the case in other countries, young Guatemalans (18-25 years of age) display levels of support for same-sex marriage higher than those seen among older citizens.

Finally, Guatemala is among the countries with the lowest levels of approval for therapeutic abortion, despite the fact that such abortion has been legal in the country since 1973. Only 43.5% of Guatemalans approve, whereas in countries such as Colombia, Mexico, and Argentina, approval reaches upwards of 60%. Approval of abortion in cases of risk to the life of the mother is greater among Guatemalans who live in the Metropolitan area and lower among those in the rural area. Guatemalans without any education display lower approval, although as education increases, rates of approval increase in turn.

Appendix

Appendix 7.1. Determinants of Approval of Violence against an Unfaithful Wife (Regression table Figure 7.3)

Approval of aggression against unfaithful wife (dvw2rdico)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.0040894	.0683245	-0.06	0.952	-.1408558	.1326769
Woman housewife	.0098522	.0871764	0.11	0.910	-.1646503	.1843547
Age	-.0392075	.0619263	-0.63	0.529	-.1631666	.0847515
Indigenous	.0562854	.0693599	0.81	0.420	-.0825535	.1951243
Education	-.0539146	.0902282	-0.60	0.552	-.234526	.1266968
Wealth	-.027065	.0713316	-0.38	0.706	-.1698507	.1157207
Size of place of residence	-.3552528	.0990847	-3.59	0.001	-.5535924	-.1569133
Married	.010234	.0798161	0.13	0.898	-.1495353	.1700034
Has children	-.0601141	.092853	-0.65	0.520	-.2459795	.1257513
Economic situation at home	.1935256	.0650962	2.97	0.004	.0632214	.3238299
Importance of religion	.1280901	.0664994	1.93	0.059	-.0050229	.2612032
Constant	.3463849	.1039695	3.33	0.002	.1382673	.5545025
F - 2.67 No. Cases 1,321						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 7.2. Determinants of Approval of Physical Punishment against Children (Regression Table Figure 7.10)

Approval of physical punishment against children (vol207nr)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.036573	.0335493	-1.09	0.280	-.1037292	.0305831
Woman housewife	.0369999	.0299141	1.24	0.221	-.0228796	.0968795
Age	-.053661	.0285611	-1.88	0.065	-.1108322	.0035102
Indigenous	-.0416948	.0287305	-1.45	0.152	-.0992051	.0158155
Education	-.04371	.0302364	-1.45	0.154	-.1042348	.0168148
Wealth	.004071	.0335386	0.12	0.904	-.0630638	.0712058
Size of place of residence	-.0734737	.0332191	-2.21	0.031	-.139969	-.0069783
Married	.0114989	.0341138	0.34	0.737	-.0567872	.0797851
Has children	.0707091	.0334765	2.11	0.039	.0036986	.1377196
Importance of religion	.0281259	.022036	1.28	0.207	-.015984	.0722358
Parents used physical punishment with respondent	.3847894	.0263635	14.60	0.000	.3320172	.4375617
Constant	-9.18e-09	.0328507	-0.00	1.000	-.0657578	.0657578
F – 30.03 No. Cases – 1,382 R-Square - 0.1691						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 7.3. Determinants de Approval of Same-Sex Marriage
(Regression Table Figure 7.17)

Approval of same-sex marriage (d6r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	.03194	.0370548	0.86	0.392	-.0422332	.1061133
Woman housewife	-.0051751	.0442456	-0.12	0.907	-.0937423	.0833922
Age	-.0615833	.0311553	-1.98	0.053	-.1239473	.0007807
Indigenous	-.0283274	.0300944	-0.94	0.350	-.0885679	.0319131
Education	.0593708	.0378976	1.57	0.123	-.0164895	.135231
Wealth	.0112567	.0346996	0.32	0.747	-.058202	.0807154
Size of place of residence	.0356597	.0411964	0.87	0.390	-.0468038	.1181231
Married	-.0726986	.0367244	-1.98	0.053	-.1462105	.0008132
Hijos	.0342497	.0428183	0.80	0.427	-.0514605	.1199599
Importance of religion	-.0189075	.0389532	-0.49	0.629	-.0968807	.0590658
Interpersonal trust	.0341941	.0254483	1.34	0.184	-.0167462	.0851345
Interest in politics	.0755999	.0323427	2.34	0.023	.0108589	.1403409
Constant	4.45e-09	.0367036	0.00	1.000	-.0734702	.0734702
F – 3.13 No. Cases - 1,411 R-Square - 0.0282						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 7.4. Determinants of Approval of Abortion when Mother's Life is at Risk
(Regression Table Figure 7.23)

Approval of Abortion when Mother's Life is at Risk (w14ar)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.0641475	.0755557	-0.85	0.399	-.2153887	.0870938
Woman housewife	.1693305	.0652531	2.59	0.012	.0387123	.2999488
Age	.068486	.0646292	1.06	0.294	-.0608834	.1978554
Indigenous	-.0186225	.0775173	-0.24	0.811	-.1737903	.1365453
Education	.1849117	.066098	2.80	0.007	.0526021	.3172214
Wealth	.0994282	.0767458	1.30	0.200	-.0541952	.2530515
Size of place of residence	.151066	.0778142	1.94	0.057	-.0046961	.306828
Married	.0359321	.0792693	0.45	0.652	-.1227427	.194607
Has children	-.009968	.0907053	-0.11	0.913	-.1915345	.1715985
Importance of religion	.1828621	.0700665	2.61	0.012	.0426088	.3231154
Interpersonal trust	-.0512444	.0661703	-0.77	0.442	-.1836986	.0812099
Interest in politics	.1309427	.0639496	2.05	0.045	.0029336	.2589517
Constant	-.1974809	.0844611	-2.34	0.023	-.3665481	-.0284137
F – 3.50 No. Cases – 1,352						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Chapter 8. Citizens and the State

Dinorah Azpuru

I. Introduction

This chapter discusses the relationship between Guatemalans and the State to which they belong. The type of relationship between a State and its citizens is one of the most important and debated topics in political science, economics, and other social sciences. This chapter covers two important issues. On one hand, it looks at respondents' opinions on what the proper role of the Guatemalan State should be with respect to social equality, as well as the extent to which respondents use and benefit from the social programs implemented by the Guatemalan government.[1] On the other hand, the chapter also explores the levels of satisfaction with certain basic, state-provided services, as well as the level of trust that respondents have in certain government institutions at both the national and local levels.

The main findings of this chapter are the following:

- Approximately 60% of Guatemalans approve of the State playing a role in reducing inequality between the rich and the poor.
- Those who at the time of the survey considered the state of the national economy to be either the same or better than it had been 12 months prior were more likely to approve of State intervention to reduce social inequality.
- 17.3% of respondents report being beneficiaries of the transfer program Mi Bono Seguro. The majority of these beneficiaries reside in rural areas.
- 30.9% of Mi Bono Seguro beneficiaries have no education, while 20.8% have only primary education.
- Nearly one-half of the homes (47.3%) in which a respondent indicates having received Mi Bono Seguro are households of 4-7 people.
- The average perception that the State respects the private property of citizens is 52.9 points on the scale of 0-100 used in this study. In comparison, the average perception that the government improves security is 43.6 points.
- The average level of satisfaction with public services rests at an intermediate level on the scale of 0-100. More specifically, the highest level of satisfaction with public services is satisfaction with public schools (54.2 points), which is followed by satisfaction with the state of roads and highways in the country (49.3 points) and with public health services (46.9 points).

[1] The terms government and state are frequently used synonymously. In the United States, references are often made to the role of the government, whereas in Latin Amerca people often speak of the role of the State. Even though the two terms are conceptually distinct, as State is a generally broader term than government, in this chapter both terms are employed.

- The average level of satisfaction with the performance of police within the neighborhood of the respondent also sits at an intermediate level, with a score of 46.4 points on the scale of 0-100.
- Residents of the Metropolitan area are more satisfied with the state of roads and highways in the country than those who live in smaller cities or rural areas.
- There is a relationship between level of education and satisfaction with public services: respondents with no education report being more satisfied with health and education services in the country.
- In Guatemala, the perception that those who run the government are interested in what the average citizen thinks (external efficacy) only reaches an average score of 36.1 points on the 0-100 scale.
- In Guatemala, the degree to which respondents have an understanding of the most important political issues facing the country (internal efficacy) has an average score of 41.9 points on the 0-100 scale.
- Non-Indigenous Guatemalans display a higher internal efficacy average (45.1 points) than Guatemalans who self-identify as Indigenous (38.6 points)
- Citizens who report having a higher level of interest in politics also display a higher internal efficacy average.

II. Essential and Nonessential Roles of the State and the Latin American Reality

Although there is a general consensus that every country requires a State structure that can provide basic services such as the security of citizens, there is disagreement as to what the full extent and type of involvement of a state should be. The appropriate role of the State is in fact one of the central issues around which major ideologies across the globe differ. The end of the Cold War at the start of the 1990s saw with it the virtual end of the far-left or communist model advocating complete control by the State of the production of goods and services. Today, as much within academic as popular discourse, the debate about the role of the State mostly revolves around the extent to which the State should meet certain essential and nonessential functions in a free-market, or capitalist, economy.

Orvis and Drogus (2014) divide the roles that can be met by a state within a capitalist economy into three categories: essential, beneficial, and politically motivated. Among the essential roles are the provision of internal and national security, respect for property and contract rights, and the creation and control of currency. Beneficial roles are those that while not essential are nonetheless important factors to the proper development of a free-market economy: development and maintenance of infrastructure, provision of health and education, and regulation of market imperfections (Orvis and Drogus 2014, 200). Whereas infrastructure (such as a highway system) is important for the transport of goods and people and the overall efficiency of multiple sectors of an economy, the collective impact of education and health is less clear—despite a majority of economists agreeing that a population with adequate levels of health and education can both become more productive and can generate less problems not just for the State but also for many companies and firms. The last type of State roles, politically generated roles, include on one hand the improvement of workplace conditions such as minimum wage protections and

sanitary requirements, but they also include the redistribution of national income through transfers and social programs that aim to promote social security and protect the elderly and other vulnerable groups.

It is the politically generated roles of a State, and particularly the issue of redistribution, that most often generate debate and political discussion between those who support an active State role in fighting inequality—itself often a byproduct of market distortions and imperfections—and those who advocate a lesser State role and argue that markets self-correct for societal inequity though the generation of employment opportunities

The redistributive role of the State is a relevant issue in any country, developed or not, but it takes upon especially important connotations within developing countries, and particularly those with high levels of socioeconomic inequality—which includes lack of access to opportunities. Given that Latin America is the most unequal region in the world (Burchardt 2012), redistributive functions are an issue of high importance, and they carry the potential to benefit countries not only in their entirely but also to raise previously excluded sectors of society. It is in this context that the United Nations Development Program (UNPD), in its 2014 Human Development Report, notes:

> "Universal provision of basic social services can raise social competencies and reduce structural vulnerability. It can be a powerful force for equalizing opportunities and outcomes. For instance, universal high-quality education can mitigate the gaps in education of children from rich and poor households. Intergenerational transmission of capabilities such as education within families can perpetuate the benefits in the long run. Universal policies also promote social solidarity by avoiding the disadvantages of targeting—social stigma for recipients and segmentation in the quality of services, as well as failure to reach many of the vulnerable" (UNPD 2014, 5).

Beyond basic social service programs such as health and universal education, in recent decades, many developing countries have sought to implement a variety of programs aimed at reducing inequality. One specific case is that of money transfer programs, often referred to as conditional cash transfers. These programs were discussed in greater detail in *The Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity* (Azpuru 2012).

Fiszbein (2014) notes that cash transfer programs have had positive effects on the reduction of extreme poverty. He also points out that the impact of such programs depends on two crucial factors: the total funding available for distribution in relation to the size of the poverty gap to be overcome, and the targeting of the resources and transfers themselves.[2] In his article, Fiszbein states that "For instance, with a social protection budget that equals the proportion of the poverty gap, Vietnam is four times as efficient at reducing poverty than Guatemala" (Fiszbein 2014).

It is worth remembering that Guatemala is a highly unequal country in which in 2011, according to the World Bank, 53.7% of citizens lived below the poverty line. The aforementioned 2014 version of the Human Development Report notes that overall poverty in Latin America was reduced between 2010 and 2012, and it highlights that Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica were able to reduce both poverty and

[2] "Firstly, there is the size of the available budget in relation to the size of the poverty gap that must be overcome. If the available budget is small in relation to the poverty gap, the effect of the impact of any programs will be limited. Secondly, how well focused these transfers are upon those who need them. If the transfers go to individuals and families who do not live in poverty, the effects of the actual programs will naturally be smaller. In other words, given a budget, a higher degree of resource targeting aimed at those citizens most in need will lead to a larger program impact" (Fiszbein, 2014).

vulnerability, which in turn induced an increase in the size of the middle class. Quite the opposite happened in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, where poverty increased by 6.8% and 0.7%, respectively. The size of the middle class in Guatemala also fell by 3.3%, while the reduction in the Dominican Republic was of 3.7% (Betim 2014).[3]

In contrast, according to data from the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), social spending in Guatemala in 2009 represented only 8.1% of GDP, a level of social investment below that of the majority of Latin American countries.

The preceding discussion provides context within which to analyze the opinions of Guatemalans with respect to the role of the state, to social programs, and to the overall provision of certain essential, beneficial, and politically generated services.

III. Guatemalans' Opinions on the Proper Role of the State

In past years, the AmericasBarometer Questionnaire included a series of questions related to the role of the State. Figure 8.1 shows the average responses to different questions from the 2012 iteration of the questionnaire. In overall terms, there is a high level of support in Guatemala for a robust and active State: on the scale of 0-100, the average scores for most categories is over 70 points, except having the State serve as the proprietor of important industries, for which the score is only 50.1 on the same scale.



Figure 8.1. Guatemalans' Opinions about the Role of the State in 2012

In contrast to previous years, the 2014 questionnaire only included the question related to the role of the State in reducing inequality. The specific question asked was the following:

[3] The only encouraging indicator for Guatemala is that it managed to reduce the proportion of its vulnerable population by 3.1% over the same period.

ROS4. The Guatemalan government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 8.2 shows the distribution of responses for 2014 using a scale of 1-7 points. It can be seen that most respondents lean towards an active intervention on the part of the State in order to reduce inequality.



Figure 8.2. Distribution of Opinions concerning the Role of the State in Reducing Social Inequality in 2014

Regression analysis allows identification of the factors most strongly associated with the belief that the State should intervene strongly in order to reduce inequality. The model includes various standard sociodemographic characteristics (gender, age, education, ethnic self-identification, place of residence, and level of income). Additionally, it includes variables such as level of religiosity, respondent perceptions of both national and personal economic situations, and ideological self-identification. Figure 8.3 shows that perceptions of the national economy turn out to be the only predictor that is statistically significant.[4] No sociodemographic factor, nor the religion or ideology of a respondent, has a statistically significant relationship with his or her thoughts on the proper role of the State in reducing inequality.

[4] The corresponding table can be found in the Appendix.



Figure 8.3. Factors related to the Belief that the State should Reduce Social Inequality

Figure 8.4 shows the association between preferences for an active State role in reducing inequality and the perception of the national economy. As can be seen, those who at the time of the survey considered the economy to be either the same or better than it had been 12 months prior are less likely to support intervention on the part of the State, with a score of 63.4 points on a scale of 0-100. On the other hand, Guatemalans who considered the economy to be worse off than one year before were more likely to support such kinds of intervention, with an average score of 67.6 points. The difference between both groups is statistically significant.



Figure 8.4. Approval of State Involvement at Reducing Inequality and Perception of the National Economy

It is also important to analyze how the results for Guatemala compare to those of other countries in the Americas on the same issue. Figure 8.5 shows that nearly all countries of the hemisphere that were included in the survey display high levels of support for an active state role in reducing inequality, with the notable exception of the United States. Guatemala has an average of 66.2 points on the scale of 0-100 used in this study. The majority of other countries display higher average scores than that of Guatemala.



Figure 8.5. Belief that the State should Intervene to Reduce Social Inequality in the Americas

IV. The Scope of Social Assistance Programs in Guatemala

State provision of education and health services at little to no cost has existed in Guatemala for quite some time, regardless of political regime type. However, soon after the start of the democratization process in the country, and in particular from the 1990s onward, social policy in the country has been institutionalized through the creation of multiple development funds (Ochaeta, Reyna y Sabetian 2013).[5]

[5] According to Ochaeta, Reyna, and Sabetian (2013), soon after the start of the most recent democratization of the country, a series of funds were established that aimed to promote social development in areas such as employment, education, health,

According to Sanabria, Coyoy y Urrutia (2014), such funds are predicated upon a neoliberal approach to development, accordingly "the intervention of the government must contribute to taking advantage of the economic opportunities provided by the market in favor of the por. Therefore the Social Funds, which emerged in the 1980s, sought with focalized actions to strengthen physical and human capital through investments in infrastructure and education in the areas where population in poverty and extreme poverty lived." (Sanabria et al. 2013, 149).[6]

Starting at the end of the 1990s, a series of social democratic governments seeking to address inequality through new approaches such as conditional cash transfer programs were elected into office throughout Latin America. Notable among these was the government of Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, which implemented a conditional cash transfer program known as Bolsa Família. The program has been in general recognized as being successful across multiple sectors and has since its implementation become the largest conditional cash transfer program in the world (Bunting 2010).

Cash transfer programs are relatively recent in Guatemala. The first such effort was undertaken during the administration of Álvaro Colom (2008-2012) with a program known as *Mi Familia Progresa*, which was accompanied by the programs *Bolsa Solidaria* and *Comedores Solidarios* (Lavarreda 2012). The current administration of Otto Pérez Molina, whose party is of a distinct ideology than Colom's (liberal versus social democratic respectively) left the programs in place upon coming to power in January of 2012, in largely because their popularity made complete repeal unfeasible. Nonetheless, the Pérez Molina administration made several changes to the programs. On one hand, the creation of the Ministry of Social Development ensured the programs' institutionalization. On the other, there were changes to the programs' names and coverage areas, in addition to adoption of a more technical distribution process. His government has also implemented additional programs to provide direct assistance to Guatemalans living in poverty (*Mi Bolsa Segura, Mi Comedor Seugro, Jóvenes Protagonistas, y Mi Beca Segura*), although the main conditional transfer programs is called *Mi Bono Seguro*. The website of the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) defines the program in the following way:

> "It [Bono Seguro] is a program aimed at reducing rural poverty and is focused primarily on households living in poverty and/or extreme poverty. It seeks to bring about conditions that would effectuate a break in the intergenerational poverty cycle by way of promoting the formation of human capital.…It also facilitates access to healthcare in children up to age fifteen, education in children ages six to fifteen, and care for pregnant and nursing women.
>
> It is structured as a conditional money transfer program that promotes not only demand for health and education services among recipient families, but also demand for early childhood development programs, enrollment, attendance, and time in school among children and adolescents between the ages of six and fifteen."[7]

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social security, and food safety. Such development funds included the *Fondo Nacional para la Paz* (Fonapaz), el *Fondo de Inversión Social* (FIS) y el *Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo* (Pronade), among others.

[6] Ochaeta et al. as Sanabria et al. argue that the funds stemmed from the ideology of the Washington Consensus, which advocates investment as a way of promoting economic growth, which in turn translates into the wellbeing of the overall population.

[7] Government information on the program can be found at http://www.mides.gob.gt/programas-sociales/mi-bono-seguro. The program consists of two components: a health transfer and an education transfer. The health transfer is given to families with children less than 6 years old (including any yet unborn children) conditional upon meeting certain medical controls, while

Among the criticisms that have been made about *Mi Bono Seguro* is the argument that the institutionalization of the program took too much time, negatively affecting recipient familiies. It is also argued that the actual reach of *Mi Bono Seguro* is smaller than that of its predecessor, that the program receives relatively few funds, and that the transfers do not actually reach the segments of the population that need them most (Paíz 2014). As was the case with the program implemented during the Colom administration, one of the primary critiques of *Mi Bono Seguro* concerns the politicization of the process of distributing the conditional cash transfers, during which funds can be manipulated to benefit the potential voters of the party in power (Ochaeta et al. 2013).

The AmericasBarometer questionnaire includes two questions related to social assistance on the part of the government:

WF1. Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security? (1) Yes (2) No
CCT1B. Now, talking specifically about *Mi Bono Seguro*, are you or someone in your house a beneficiary of this program? (1) Yes (2) No

Figure 8.6 shows the results for both questions. 17.3% of respondents in 2014 report that someone in their home receives benefits from the *Mi Bono Seguro* program. In contrast, only 8.2% of respondents report that their home receives assistance from the government. The difference likely stems from how the *Mi Bono Seguro* question is of a broader scope given that it involves additional members of the family (despite the fact that the program is designed to benefit entire households as opposed to specific individuals within them, regardless of the number of children in the home). Yet another alternative explanation is that people may not perceive *Mi Bono Seguro* to be government assistance.

the education transfer is given to families with children between 6 and 15, conditional upon the children maintaining a 90% school attendance rate (Ochaeta et al. 2013).



Figure 8.6. Respondents Who Receive Government Assistance

Once again, it proves useful to make use of a regression in order to identify which sociodemographic factors are associated with being a recipient; the dependent variable within the logistic regression used is the second question concerning *Mi Bono Seguro*. The model includes several standard sociodemographic factors as the independent variables. Figure 8.7 shows that the size of a respondent's location of residence as well as his or her age and education level, prove to be statistically significant predictors of who is more likely to be a beneficiary of a conditional transfer program. The precise details of these relationships are presented ahead.



Figure 8.7. Factors Associated with Being a Recipient of *Mi Bono Seguro*

Figure 8.8 makes clear that there are a higher number of *Mi Bono Seguro* beneficiaries in rural areas; although there are recipients in urban areas, the percentage is much lower. The differences between the rural area and cities of varying size are statistically significant.



Figure 8.8. Relationship Between Being a *Mi Bono Seguro* recipient and Size of Household

The relationship between being a *Mi Bono Seguro* beneficiary and education level is shown in Figure 8.9 The percentage of *Mi Bono Seguro* recipients is much higher among respondents with no

education (30.9%), and it moves inversely with level of education: as respondent level of education increases, his or her likelihood of being a *Mi Bono Seguro* recipient decreases. That said, it is also interesting to note that some respondents with higher education also reported that they were beneficiaries of the program. With the exception of the highest levels of education, the differences between all education categories are statistically significant.



Figure 8.9. Mi Bono Seguro Beneficiaries by Level of Education

Figure 8.10 shows the relationship between being a respondent's age and his or her being a recipient of *Mi Bono Seguro*. Given that among the recipients there are heads of household whose ages vary widely, it is unsurprising that no clear linear pattern emerges. Nonetheless, there is a statistically significant difference between the youngest group (18-24) and the group of 46-55 years of age.



Figure 8.10. Mi Bono Seguro Beneficiaries by Age

Beyond the correlations shown in the previous graphs, it is interesting to observe the relationship between being a recipient of Mi Bono Seguro and the number of people in a household; these data are provided in Table 8.1. One point that stands out is that the majority of recipient households (47.3%) are households of between four and seven people. Meanwhile, 30.4% of households enrolled in the Mi Bono Seguro program consist of between eight and eleven people.

Table 8.1. Size of *Mi Bono Seguro* Recipient Households

Number of people in household	Percentage of hosueholds that benefit from *Mi Bono Seguro*
1 to 3 people	13,1 %
4 to 7 people	47,3 %
8 to 11 people	30,4 %
More than 12 people	9,2 %
Total	**100 %**

Source: Prepared by author with data obtained from the 2014 AmericasBarometer

V. Citizen Assessment of the Performance of the Guatemalan State in Fulfilling its Role

As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, protecting property and contract rights and providing security to citizens are considered essential functions of the state in any free market economy. The 2014 AmericasBarometer questionnaire includes a series of questions that can provide insight into Guatemalans' evaluations of their state's success in fulfilling these roles.

With respect to property and contract rights, the following questions were included in the questionnaire:

Using the same 1 to 7 scale, where 1 is "Not at all" and 7 is "A lot," how likely is it that people in your neighborhood would be punished by authorities for…:
PR3A. Buying pirated DVDs. How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?
PR3B. And for obtaining electricity without paying (bypassing the meter). How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?
PR3C. And for occupying or invading a vacant lot. How likely is it that they would be punished by the authorities?
PR4. To what degree do you feel that the Guatemalan government respects the private property of its citizens? Please use the same scale from 1 is "not at all" to 7 is "a lot."

It is important to highlight that the first three questions refer to the neighborhood of the respondent. Figure 8.11 shows the average scores for these three on a scale of 0-100. As can be seen, the perception that the authorities punish those who purchase pirated DVDs is markedly below the perception that they go after those who obtain electricity without paying or those who move into unoccupied plots of land. In fact, there is no statistically significant relationship between the last two actions, although there is indeed one between these two and the pirating of DVDs.



Figure 8.11. Respondent Perceptions that the Authorities in their Neighborhood Punish Certain Actions

The distribution of responses to the last question concerning property rights is presented in Figure 8.12. The majority of Guatemalans share somewhat intermediate opinions with regards to how much the Guatemalan state protects private property; if the three leftmost bars are taken together, one sees that approximately 35% of Guatemalans lean towards negative perceptions of the government's performance on the issue. In contrast, 41% (the three rightmost bars on the graph) have positive perceptions.



Figure 8.12. Distribution of the Belief that the State Protects the Private Property of Citizens

Another of the essential roles of a state described at the beginning of this chapter is providing security to citizens. One of the questions on the 2014 questionnaire allows evaluation of Guatemalans' opinions regarding the Guatemalan's state success in meeting this role. The precise question asked is the following:

N11. To what extent would you say that the current administration improves citizen safety?

Figure 8.13 shows the distribution of responses, displaying the percentages obtained for each category. As was done with the previous figure, taking the three leftmost bars together yields a value of 48.4%, signifying that nearly half of respondents lean towards negative assessments of the government's performance in providing security to its citizens. Meanwhile, 25.2% of respondents are of an intermediate opinion, and only 26.2% of them fall in the positive side of the graph (the three rightmost bars).



Figure 8.13. Distribution of Citizens' Assessments of the State's Success in Improving Security

In order to compare evaluations of the state's performance in fulfilling its essential roles of protecting private property and providing security, it is necessary to obtain an average score. In numerical terms, the average score to the questions about the two essential functions of a state can be seen in Figure 8.14. The average score for the perception that the state respects the property rights of citizens is 52.9 points on the 0-100 scale used in this study, while the average for the perception that the government improves security is 43.6 points. The difference between both is statistically significant.



Figure 8.14. Comparison of the State's Performance in Fulfilling its Essential Roles

It is important to delve more in-depth into the issue of citizen security and the role of the state. Citizen security is normally associated with the police, although in reality, it is the entire justice system that is involved in providing said security, which ranges from prevention to the punishment of criminals. The following two questions provide a deeper perspective on this issue:

POLE2N. In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in your neighborhood?
AOJ12. If you were a victim of robbery or assault, how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None

Figure 8.15 shows the average response score for each question. Both of the variables at hand were recoded into the 0-100 scale in order to provide greater clarity. Level of satisfaction with the performance of police in the neighborhood of a respondent is 46.4 points, while the level of confidence in the justice system rests at 42.4 points. The difference between both is statistically significant. It is worth remembering that the perception that the government improves citizen security obtained a score of 43.6 points (Figure 8.14). In contrast, the performance of neighborhood police is the variable with a higher score, yet even it is below the 50-point threshold that in this study differentiates a positive from a negative result.



Figure 8.15. Comparison of Satisfaction with the Police and Trust in the Judicial System

The analysis now turns to the second group of functions of a state, those state roles considered as "beneficial." Among the beneficial roles of a state are infrastructure, health, and education. The 2014 AmericasBarometer questionnaire included three questions measuring citizen satisfaction on these issues. The comparative results by country are shown in Chapter 5 of this study. With regards to the questions themselves, their exact wording was as follows:

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools?
SD6NEW2. And the quality of medical and health services?

The highest average satisfaction is seen for the question about schools, which received 54.2 points on the 0-100 scale. This is followed by satisfaction with highways and with health services, which have scored of 49.3 and 46.9 points, respectively.

It is important to figure out what differentiates Guatemalans who feel satisfied from those who do not. This can be done through use of regression analysis. The following figures analyze the variables related to satisfaction with distinct types of services. Other than the standard sociodemographic characteristics, the regression includes additional factors that may affect satisfaction with services, such as perception of the state of the economy and interest in politics.

Figure 8.16 shows the variables related to satisfaction with the state of roads and highways in Guatemala.[8] Respondents who have better perceptions of the national economy are more likely to be satisfied with the state of highways. Among the sociodemographic factors, those who live in larger cities are also more satisfied with highways than those who live in rural areas, although this is unsurprising. It is also interesting to note that there is a relationship between level of income and level of satisfaction with roads and highways; those among the higher income quintiles (middle or upper middle) tend to be more satisfied.



Figure 8.16. Factors Related to Satisfaction with the State of Roads and Highways

Next, Figure 8.17 examines factors that are related with satisfaction of public schools.[9] Positive perceptions of the economy once again associated with higher satisfaction, although in this case, neither a respondent's location of residence nor his or her socioeconomic level proves to be a predictor. That said, there are nonetheless additional variables that do emerge as predictors of satisfaction with public schools, namely a respondent's years of schooling and his or her number of children. Those who have less education and who have fewer sons and daughters are more satisfied with the state of public schools.

[8] The corresponding table can be found in the Appendix.
[9] The corresponding table can be found in the Appendix.



Figure 8.17. Factores relacionados con la satisfacción con las escuelas públicas

Finally, the discussion turns to analysis of the determinants of satisfaction with public health services. The results are presented in Figure 8.18.[10] Once again, more positive perceptions of the national economy are associated with higher levels of satisfaction. Furthermore, the predictors of satisfaction with public health services are the same as for satisfaction with public schools: those who have fewer years of schooling and less children are more likely to be satisfied.

[10] The corresponding table can be found in the Appendix.



Figure 8.18. Factors Related to Satisfaction with Public Medical and Health Services

The following figures and charts provide more details about the predictors obtained from the previous three regressions. Figure 8.19 shows that as the size of a respondent's city increases, his or her satisfaction with roads and highways also increases. The same is observed for those who are in the highest income quintiles.



Figure 8.19. Predictors of Satisfaction with the State of Roads and Highways

Figure 8.20 provides a joint perspective on how education is related to satisfaction with both the health system and public schools. Respondents with lower levels of education show higher satisfaction with health and public education services. It is interesting to note that respondents with no education display the highest levels of satisfaction; this may stem from a dynamic where although parents did not attend school, their children probably do. Another interesting comparison can be found in Graph 8.20. The level of satisfaction with public education is higher than satisfaction with health services for all respective categories of a respondent's level of education.



Figure 8.20. Relationship Between Level of Education and Satisfaction with Public Services

VI. Citizens and Their Sense of Belonging

Citizens who feel as though they form a part of the state and its political system are also more likely to support the state. The final section of this chapter analyzes precisely this, the sense of belonging that citizens possess with respect to the state in general, as well as to the specific authorities that run it.

The following two questions of the AmericasBarometer allow insight into what in political science are referred to as internal and external efficacy. Respectively, these terms refer to whether citizens feel as though they understand the most important problems facing the nation and whether they feel that those who run the state are interested in what citizens think.

EFF1. Those who govern the country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 8.21 contains the results for both questions in terms of average scores. As has been the case throughout this study, the original 1-7 point scale has been recoded into a scale of 0-100 points in order to provide greater clarity. From the graph, one can see that the average score for external efficacy (the perception that those who govern the state are interested in what the average citizen thinks) reaches only 36.1 points. On the other hand, the internal efficacy score (how much citizens have an understanding of the political issues of the state) is higher at 41.9 points. Nonetheless, in both cases the average scores are low on the overall 0-100 scale employed in this study.



Figure 8.21. Internal and External Efficacy in the Citizen-State Relationship

As has been done in both this and previous chapters, a regression analysis is once again used in order to identify the predictors of internal efficacy—the degree to which a citizen believes that he or she understands what is happening in the country—considering that such efficacy is a better way to capture the dynamics of the relationship between citizens and the state. The linear regression includes sociodemographic factors, perceptions of the economy, respondent level of interest in politics, and the frequency with which a respondent pays attention to news of a political sort. Ideology is also employed as a control variable.

Figure 8.22 shows that, unsurprisingly, those who have higher interest in politics and those who pay more attention to news have higher perceptions of internal efficacy.[11] Of perhaps more interest is that those who identify further on the right of the political spectrum have higher perceptions of internal efficacy. Furthermore, respondents who self-identify as Indigenous report much lower comprehension of national affairs, regardless of their level of education.[12]

[11] The corresponding table can be found in the Appendix.
[12] Education is kept constant throughout the regression. The bivariate relationships between internal efficacy and ideology and internal efficacy and attention to the news are irregular, which is why they are not represented by specific graphs.



Figure 8.22. Factors Related to Internal Efficacy (Level of Understanding of National Affairs)

Figure 8.23 shows the difference between the degree of internal efficacy among Indigenous Guatemalans and those Guatemalans that identify as non-Indigenous, most of whom identify as Ladino. The average internal efficacy score among Indigenous Guatemalans is 38.6 points, but this rises to 45.1 points among non-Indigenous Guatemalans.



Figure 8.23. Internal Efficacy and Ethnic Self-Identification

Figure 8.24 shows the association between internal efficacy and interest in politics. It is evident that Guatemalans who report having a higher interest in politics feel that they can better understand the political issues facing the country. The differences among the different categories are statistically significant.



Figure 8.24. Internal Efficacy and Interest in Politics

Finally, Figure 8.25 shows the association between ideology and internal efficacy. Those who self-identify on the right of the political spectrum tend to feel that they have better comprehension of the political issues relevant to the country. There is a marked contrast between those who identify on the extreme right versus the extreme left.



Figure 8.25. Internal Efficacy and Ideology

VII. Conclusion

This chapter examines different topics related to the role of the State and the relationship between respondents and the Guatemalan State. On one hand, the chapter explores the degree to which Guatemalans approve that the State play an active role in the reduction of inequality between rich and poor. Approximately 60% of Guatemalans are in favor of the Guatemalan State assuming such a role.

The reach of conditional transfer programs in the country is also examined, and specifically that of the government program known as *Mi Bono Seguro*. 17.3% of respondents report having been beneficiaries of the program. Most these beneficiaries reside in rural areas, have little to no formal education, and live in households with a high number of people.

With respect to the state's performance in meeting the so-called essential roles of a State, the average level of perception that the state protects citizens' private property is 52.9 points on a scale of 0-100. In contrast, the score for the perception that the government improves security is 43.6 points.

The average level of satisfaction with public services sits at an intermediate level on the 0-100 scale that is used in this study. More specifically, the highest average score is seen in satisfaction with public schools, which is followed by satisfaction with the condition of roads and highways, and finally by satisfaction with public health services. The average satisfaction with the performance of police within the neighborhoods of respondents also rests at an intermediate level.

Finally, the relationship between citizens and the Guatemalan state is analyzed more in-depth. Specifically, the issue is looked at in terms of what political science refers to as perceptions of external and internal efficacy. The perception that those who govern the country are interested in what the average

citizen thinks (external efficacy) yields an average of 36.1 points on the 0-100 scale. In contrast, the degree to which respondents have an understanding of the most important political issues facing the country (internal efficacy) has a somewhat higher average of 41.9 points. Nonetheless, the fact that both scores fall below 50 points indicates that the relationship between citizens and the government is far from optimal.

Appendix

Appendix 8.1. Determinants of the Belief that the State Should Reduce Inequality (Regression table Figure 8.3)

Belief that the State Should Reduce Inequality (ros4r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.000647	.0282334	-0.02	0.982	-.0571622	.0558683
Age	-.0354593	.0356079	-1.00	0.323	-.1067362	.0358176
Indigenous	-.0189483	.0470955	-0.40	0.689	-.1132202	.0753236
Education	.0031966	.0349762	0.09	0.927	-.0668159	.073209
Wealth	.0471077	.0335342	1.40	0.165	-.0200182	.1142336
Size of place of residence	-.0446667	.0329058	-1.36	0.180	-.1105348	.0212015
Has children	.0117643	.0450969	0.26	0.795	-.078507	.1020356
Married	-.0175457	.0400522	-0.44	0.663	-.0977189	.0626275
Importance of religion	-.0510015	.0333184	-1.53	0.131	-.1176956	.0156925
Interest in politics	.0321198	.0266331	1.21	0.233	-.0211921	.0854318
Ideology	.038994	.0365765	1.07	0.291	-.0342218	.1122099
Perception of the national economy	-.0816466	.0332217	-2.46	0.017	-.1481471	-.0151462
Perception of family's economic situation	.023988	.0361067	0.66	0.509	-.0482874	.0962635
Constant	-8.19e-09	.0349538	-0.00	1.000	-.0699677	.0699677
F- 1.59 No. Cases – 1,112 R-Square – 0.0203						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 8.2. Determinants of Being a Beneficiary of the *Mi Bono Seguro* Program (Regression table Figure 8.6)

Beneficiary of *Mi Bono Seguro* (cct1br)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Size of location	-.5777669	.1115416	-5.18	0.000	-.8010418	-.3544921
Wealth	-.1756249	.1032945	-1.70	0.094	-.3823914	.0311416
Indigenous	-.0387916	.0873688	-0.44	0.659	-.2136792	.1360959
Woman	.0327121	.0617992	0.53	0.599	-.0909924	.1564167
Has children	.0700712	.1034445	0.68	0.501	-.1369955	.2771379
Married	-.0893412	.1088501	-0.82	0.415	-.3072283	.128546
Age	-.1869232	.0879099	-2.13	0.038	-.362894	-.0109524
Education	-.4398578	.1056026	-4.17	0.000	-.6512444	-.2284711
Constant	-1.758988	.0910207	-19.33	0.000	-1.941185	-1.57679
F- 10.92 No. Cases - 1,461						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 8.3. Determinants of Satisfaction with the State of Roads and Highways (Regression table Figure 8.16)

Satisfaction with roads and highways (sd2newr)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	.0309246	.0247077	1.25	0.216	-.0185334	.0803825
Age	.0695889	.0383874	1.81	0.075	-.0072519	.1464296
Indigenous	-.0388341	.0312648	-1.24	0.219	-.1014174	.0237492
Education	-.0308369	.0373407	-0.83	0.412	-.1055825	.0439087
Wealth	.068702	.0345717	1.99	0.052	-.0005007	.1379047
Size of place of residence	.1367138	.0413283	3.31	0.002	.0539863	.2194413
Has children	-.0143001	.033141	-0.43	0.668	-.080639	.0520387
Interest in politics	.0144928	.0245088	0.59	0.557	-.0345669	.0635525
Perception of the national economy	.0681679	.0275536	2.47	0.016	.0130134	.1233225
Constant	-4.30e-09	.0406599	-0.00	1.000	-.0813897	.0813897
F - 5.41 No. Cases - 1,429 R-Square - 0.0397						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 8.4. Determinants of Satisfaction with Public Education (Regression table Figure 8.17)

Satisfaction with Public Education (sd3newr)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.0177711	.023164	-0.77	0.446	-.0641388	.0285966
Age	.0134991	.035199	0.38	0.703	-.0569594	.0839576
Indigenous	-.0248808	.0372	-0.67	0.506	-.0993447	.0495832
Education	-.1043236	.0351332	-2.97	0.004	-.1746502	-.0339969
Wealth	.0182324	.0303701	0.60	0.551	-.0425599	.0790247
Size of place of residence	-.0230246	.0444545	-0.52	0.606	-.1120099	.0659608
Has children	-.0733079	.024284	-3.02	0.004	-.1219175	-.0246982
Interest in politics	-.0246587	.0278608	-0.89	0.380	-.0804282	.0311109
Perception of the national economy	.0708139	.0277106	2.56	0.013	.0153451	.1262827
Constant	3.36e-09	.0375345	0.00	1.000	-.0751335	.0751335
F - 2.59 No. Cases – 1,422 R-Square – 0.0174						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 8.5. Determinants of Satisfaction with Health Services (Regression table Figure 8.18)

Satisfaction with health services (sd6newr)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.0129561	.028249	-0.46	0.648	-.0695027	.0435904
Age	.0356993	.0304381	1.17	0.246	-.0252291	.0966277
Indigenous	-.0052835	.030863	-0.17	0.865	-.0670625	.0564954
Education	-.0969336	.0332678	-2.91	0.005	-.1635265	-.0303408
Wealth	-.0141343	.0304388	-0.46	0.644	-.0750642	.0467955
Size of place of residence	-.0147401	.0330827	-0.45	0.658	-.0809624	.0514822
Has children	-.0510023	.0278575	-1.83	0.072	-.1067651	.0047604
Interest in politics	.0087817	.0302761	0.29	0.773	-.0518224	.0693859
Perception of the national economy	.1160254	.0245129	4.73	0.000	.0669575	.1650933
Constant	1.92e-08	.0305975	0.00	1.000	-.0612475	.0612475
F- 3.97 No. Cases – 1,423 R-Square - 0.0252						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

Appendix 8.6. Determinants of Internal Efficacy (Regression table Figure 8.22)

Internal Efficacy (eff2r)	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Woman	-.0332828	.0257978	-1.29	0.202	-.0849228	.0183571
Age	.0388077	.0254777	1.52	0.133	-.0121914	.0898068
Indigenous	-.0816045	.0379902	-2.15	0.036	-.15765	-.0055589
Education	.0259251	.0322577	0.80	0.425	-.0386456	.0904959
Wealth	-.0201328	.0348552	-0.58	0.566	-.089903	.0496375
Size of place of residence	.0067235	.0323282	0.21	0.836	-.0579885	.0714355
Ideology	.1209977	.0297806	4.06	0.000	.0613854	.18061
Attention to news	.0763115	.0319539	2.39	0.020	.0123488	.1402742
Interest in politics	.1474835	.0299962	4.92	0.000	.0874396	.2075274
Perception of the national economy	.0099152	.0264332	0.38	0.709	-.0429967	.0628271
Constant	-7.11e-09	.0317742	-0.00	1.000	-.0636029	.0636029
F - 6.79 No. Cases - 1,154 R-Square = 0.0624						
Regression-standarized coefficients with t statistics based on standard errors adjusted by sample design * p<0.05						

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Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent

March, 2014

Dear Sir/Madam:

You have been randomly chosen to participate in a public opinion study. I come on behalf of Vanderbilt and Borge y Asociados. The project is financed by AID from the United States. The interview will last 45 minutes.

The main objective of the study is to get to know people's opinion on different aspects of the situation in Guatemala. The study will be carried out in a way that we will be able to better understand what people think across the country although we do not offer any specific benefit. We plan to hold a series of conference based on the results of what the people say. We will never reveal an individual opinion.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may skip questions without responding or end the interview at any time. The answers that you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous. You will not receive any payment for your participation but neither will you incur any expenses.

If you have questions regarding the study, you can call Borge y Asociados at 502-2261-3536 and speak with Paola De León or Jeanette Montiel. We will leave this letter with you in case you want to look it over. The IRB number of the study is 110627.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix B. Sample Design

Sample Design

This sample is prepared by ASIES for application in the year 2012 and following years. The most recent census data (Census 2002) is used, not the projections.

1. General Characteristics

a. Universe:

The universe for this study are all voting-age adults, 18 years or older, who live in the homes included in the census in urban and rural areas in different municipalities of Guatemala[1]. The sample excludes people in hospitals, jails, monasteries, and other similar institutions.

b. Regions:

This study uses the regions that were defined for the application of the first democratic culture surveys 1993. A slight difference is that the Suroriente and Suroccidente regions are combined in one general region called Sur. These regions were merged in order to comply with the requirement to have at least 200 interviews per region. It must be kept in mind that these regions are not those defined by the Ley Preliminar de Regionalización of 1985.

The regions used in this study are both the strata and the domains of study. These strata have been used in all past applications of the DIMS, CAMS and LAPOP projects and are identified by the variable ESTRATOPRI that has been previously used.

2. Sampling Units, Selection and Information

a. Sampling units. The primary sampling unit is the municipio (municipality) as reported in the Census of 2002[2]. The secondary sampling unit is the "sector censal" or census tract (that is identified by a number and name of the locality). The tertiary unit is the block (manzana) and the quaternary unit is the household.

b. The unit of selection is the household because it is permanent in the field and easy to identify.

c. The unit of information (respondent) is the selected adult to be interviewed according to the established quotas following LAPOP's sampling guidelines.

[1] Since the last census four new municipalities have been created: Unión Cantinil in Huehuetenango, Raxruhá y La Tinta in Alta Verapaz and Las Cruces in Petén. Residents of those municipalities are eligible for our simple given that the population that lives in those municipalities was already considered by the Census as part of another municipality.
[2] Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) had planned a Census for 2012 but it was postponed until 2013.

3. Sample Frame

The simple frame includes all the people living in the previously described universe. For that reason, all individuals in any ethnic or geographic group have the chance to be selected. For all sampling purposes, the listings of departments, municipalities, towns, as well as census tracts and maps created by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) during the last Census were used.

Guatemala is divided into 22 departments, which in turn are divided in municipios (municipalities). To date, Guatemala has 334 municipalities, although there were 331 at the time of the 2012 Census. Within each municipality, INE identifies different dwelling categories such as pueblo, villa, aldea, ciudad, paraje, etc.

Table 1
Distribution of the population 18 and over by Department, by gender, age and area of residence

	Urban			Rural			
Departments	Male	Female	Total Urban	Male	Female	Total Rural	Total
Guatemala	612,190	712,385	1,324,575	87,388	91,486	178,874	1,503,449
El Progreso	13,279	15,179	28,458	22,772	23,520	46,292	74,750
Sacatepéquez	55,752	59,841	115,593	9,511	9,777	19,288	134,881
Chimaltenango	54,891	60,564	115,455	49,358	53,410	102,768	218,223
Escuintla	70,105	74,560	144,665	73,439	68,743	142,182	286,847
Santa Rosa	27,486	30,152	57,638	48,700	49,077	97,777	155,415
Sololá	36,965	39,613	76,578	36,035	37,710	73,745	150,323
Totonicapán	26,256	33,179	59,435	44,637	55,585	100,222	159,657
Quetzaltenango[3]	85,389	101,589	186,978	59,828	69,052	128,880	315,858
Quetzaltenango Costa			*40,245*			*62,648*	*102,283*
Quetzaltenango Altiplano			*146,733*			*66,232*	*212,965*
Suchitepéquez	41,462	47,686	89,148	55,103	57,172	112,275	201,423
Retalhuleu	22,445	25,843	48,288	35,126	37,779	72,905	121,193
San Marcos[4]	43,215	48,932	92,147	136,590	146,280	282,870	375,017
San Marcos Costa			*22,381*			*56,415*	*78,796*
San Marcos Altiplano			*69,766*			*226,455*	*336,221*
Huehuetenango	46,026	53,942	99,968	136,766	152,479	289,245	389,213
Quiche	36,662	42,858	79,520	99,044	114,816	213,860	293,380
Baja Verapaz	14,213	16,533	30,746	33,584	37,922	71,506	102,252
Alta Verapaz	40,020	43,825	83,845	136,376	138,653	275,029	358,874
Petén	28,105	28,450	56,555	56,962	51,799	108,761	165,316
Izabal	24,262	27,207	51,469	52,889	53,160	106,049	157,518
Zacapa	21,069	24,296	45,365	30,576	31,349	61,925	107,290

[3] The departments of San Marcos and Quetzaltenango were divided to reflect in the distribution by regions two very different realities. Both departments have municipalities in the highlands and in the coastal areas. The municipalities of the coastal areas resemble those of Suchitepéquez and Escuintla more than those of the municipalities of the highlands (Altiplano). Quetzaltenango-Costa includes the municipalities of Colomba, Coatepeque, El Palmar, Flores Costa Cuca and Génova.
[4] In the department of San Marcos the coastal municipalities include La Reforma, El Quetzal, Nuevo Progreso, Catarina, Ocós, Ayutla, Catarina and Pajapita.

Chiquimula	20,081	25,556	45,637	51,454	55,263	106,717	152,354
Jalapa	18,212	22,586	40,798	36,007	38,791	74,798	115,596
Jutiapa	27,493	32,178	59,671	65,282	71,425	136,707	196,378
Total	1,365,578	1,566,954	2,932,532	1,357,427	1,445,248	2,802,675	5,735,207

Source: INE Population Census, 2002

4. Sampling Method

The sampling method takes into account the conditions established by LAPOP for national samples. Some of the main requirements are:

a. To obtain representative samples for the following domains of study:

   i. Size of municipalities (by population):
      - Less than 25,000 inhabitants
      - More than 25,000 and less than 100,000 inhabitants
      - More than 100,000 inhabitants

   ii. First stage strata:
      - Metropolitan region
      - Región Nororiental (Northeast region)
      - Región Suroriental (Southeast region)
      - Región Noroccidental (Northwest region)
      - Región Suroccidental (Southwest region)

   iii. Area:
      - Urban
      - Rural

b. Estimate the sampling errors for each of those strata.
c. Optimize the time used in data collection.
d. Optimize the resources to attain a balance between cost, size of the sample and precision of results.
e. Use the most recent and best quality sample frame available.
f. Administer a total of 24 interviews in each primary sampling unit.
g. A total of six interviews in each final segment.

5. Description of the Sampling Procedure

The sampling procedure follows a multi-stage process, as follows:

a. In the first stage municipalities were selected with probability proportional to population. In this case only the population over 18 years of age is included. Since each municipality includes exactly 24 interviews, 63 groups of 24 are distributed in all municipalities.
b. In the case of larger urban areas, if they get more than one unit they are not assigned to the municipality instead they are assigned to the neighborhood (barrio or colonia).

6. Stratification

Stratification is the process by which the population is divided in several subgroups. The purpose is to diminish the variance taking advantage of the fact that some groups have different variances. Additionally, stratification guarantees the inclusion of regions or interest groups. In a non-stratified sample, it is possible that some large groups (such as the capital) could be excluded because of chance.

The sampling is conducted separately within each stratum. For that reason, the strata used to report, also known as domains of study, have enough cases to allow for proper analysis. A requirement of LAPOP samples is that they should have a minimum of 200 cases in each stratum.

Table 2
Distribution of the sample by regional strata and size of the municipality

Population	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	124,907	326,393	1,052,149	**1,503,449**
Sur	1,095,546	569,975	0	**1,665,521**
Noroccidente	1,158,463	441,774	0	**1,781,923**
Nororiente	617,243	348,757	0	**966,000**
Total	**2,996,159**	**1,686,899**	**1,052,149**	**5,735,207**
% respondents	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	4%	19%	100%	**26%**
Sur	37%	34%	0%	**29%**
Noroccidente	39%	26%	0%	**31%**
Nororiente	21%	21%	0%	**17%**
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
Number of interviews	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	24	96	258	**378**
Sur	288	144	0	**432**
Noroccidente	306	126	0	**432**
Nororiente	168	96	0	**264**
Total	**786**	**462**	**258**	**1506**

7. Sample Selection

a. First stage: primary sampling units

The primary sampling units (PSUs) are assigned to each strata using probability proportional to the size of the population. The PSUs are the 334 municipalities in the country classified by size following LAPOP's guidelines.

All municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants are self-selected, which means that they are selected with a probability equal to one. In other words, they are necessarily included in the sample.

For the rest of municipalities in each stratum, the selection is done with probability proportional to population (over 18). In order to make this selection, the municipalities are ordered according to the code provided by the INE, a random start is chosen and a constant skip is used to choose the municipalities to be sampled. This procedure is not strictly random, since in a truly random selection a small community with population less than one skip could be chosen more than once. However, the equations that guide the calculation of the estimators for a sample obtained that way are essentially the same.

Table 3
Municipalities Selected by Region

Number of municipios	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	8	6	3	17
Sur	84	8	0	92
Noroccidente	137	16	0	153
Nororiente	63	9	0	72
Total	**292**	**39**	**3**	**334**
Interviews	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	24	96	258	**378**
Sur	288	144	0	**432**
Noroccidente	306	126	0	**432**
Nororiente	168	96	0	**264**
Total	**786**	**462**	**258**	**1506**
Selected municipalities	**Less than 25 K inhab.**	**Between 25 and 100 K inhab.**	**More than 100 K inhab.**	**Total**
Metropolitana	1	4	3	**8**
Sur	12	6	0	**18**
Noroccidente	13	5	0	**18**
Nororiente	7	4	0	**11**
Total	**33**	**19**	**3**	**55**

For the three large municipalities in Guatemala (Ciudad de Guatemala, Villa Nueva and Mixco) localities rather than municipalities are selected. In this case the localities are neighborhoods, which may be classed into different descriptions in the listing of INE such as “barrios, colonias, asentamientos, and lotificaciones”. Unlike the selection method used for other municipalities, in these cases only two segments are included in each locality, with only 12 interviews per neighborhood because many neighborhoods are too small to conduct 24 interviews without making proximity excessive.

Table 4
Primary sampling units in the larger municipalities

Municipios	**Inhab.**	**Percentage**	**Interviews**	**UPMs**
Guatemala	600,632	57.09	168	13
Mixco	248,815	23.65	48	5
Villa Nueva	202,702	19.27	48	4
Total	***1,052,149***	***100***	**264**	**22**

All in all, 77 PSUs are selected, out of which 55 are of 24 interviews and 22 of 12. Visits are made to thirty three small municipalities, seventeen medium size municipalities and three large ones. The result of this selection is shown in Table 8.

b. Second stage: secondary sampling units – census segments

In the second stage, after the stratification by urban and rural areas, the required census segments in each PSU are selected with a proportional probability to the population. The following table shows the distribution of the interviews and segments by area in each of the strata defined by region and by size of the municipality.

Table 5
Distribution of the sampling points by area and region
(Inhabitants 18 years or older)

	Interviews			Selected Census tracts		
Region	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Total**	**Urban**	**Rural**	**Total**
Metropolitana						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	12	12	24	2	2	4
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	66	30	96	11	5	16
Más de 100 000 habitantes	246	12	258	41	2	43
Total Metropolitana	**324**	**54**	**378**	**54**	**9**	**63**
Sur						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	92	196	288	15	33	48
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	72	72	144	12	12	24
Más de 100 000 habitantes						
Total Sur	**164**	**268**	**432**	**27**	**45**	**72**
Noroccidente						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	114	192	306	19	32	51
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	54	72	126	9	12	21
Más de 100 000 habitantes						
Total Noroccidente	**168**	**264**	**432**	**28**	**44**	**72**
Nororiente						
Menos de 25 000 habitantes	54	114	168	9	19	28
Entre 25 000 y 100 000 habitantes	24	72	96	4	12	16
Más de 100 000 habitantes						
Total Nororiente	**78**	**186**	**264**	**13**	**31**	**44**
Total País	**734**	**772**	**1506**	**122**	**129**	**251**

c. Third stage: tertiary sampling units – Manzanas (blocks) or groups of households

This stage is done on the maps of the census tracts. In each census tract a randomly selected block is selected as the final sampling point. Within each block, six people will be interviewed.

d. Fourth stage: quaternary sampling units – households

Beginning at a central point the interviewer will walk from a corner to identify the households to be included. In each household only one person who is a permanent resident can be interviewed. The respondent cannot be a temporary resident or the servant (empleada doméstica). Once an interview is fulfilled in a house, at least three houses must be left in between before selecting the next household. If it is not possible to complete the six interviews in that block, the next block in the same sector will be selected.

e. Fifth stage: final sampling units – Respondents

The last selection is done using the quotas presented below. In case there is more than one person who fulfills the quota, the person whose birthday was celebrated most recently will be selected.

Table 6
Gender and age quotas

Gender and age groups	18- 29	30- 45	More than 45	Total
Male	1	1	1	3
Female	1	1	1	3
Total	2	2	2	6

8. Confidence Levels and Sampling Error

As a general approximation, a sample from a large population with these characteristics has a maximum error of 2.5% with a 95% confidence level assuming a Bernoulli random variable with a parameter of p=0.50. This may be an underestimation of the true error, as design effects are likely to alter this measurement. However, it is not possible to provide more precise data before collecting the information.

This kind of sampling is known as a stratified multi-stage cluster sample. As the name implies, this is a sample that uses both clustering and stratification. Since some of the assignations are affected by the need to obtain six interviews by segment, there are some slight non-proportionalities. Non proportional assignation leads design effects larger than 1.00. Nonetheless, for reference purposes, the following table contains the errors for the required domains of study. These numbers are likely smaller than the actual values.

Table 7 Sample size and margin of error (95% confidence)		
Region	**Sample size**	**Sampling error (%)**
Metropolitana	378	5.10
Sur	432	4.81
Noroccidente	432	4.81
Noreste	264	6.33
Areas		
Urbana	734	3.73
Rural	772	3.55
Total Country	1506	2.50

9. Municipalities Selected by Region, Stratum and Size

Table 8 Selected Municipalities				
Region	**Size**	**INE Code**	**Department**	**Municipality**
Metropolitana	More than 100 000 inhab.	101	Guatemala	Guatemala
		108	Guatemala	Mixco
		115	Guatemala	Villa Nueva
	Less than 25 000 inhab.	107	Guatemala	San Pedro Ayampuc
	Between 25 000 and 100 000 inhab.	106	Guatemala	Chinautla
		110	Guatemala	San Juan Sacatepéquez
		116	Guatemala	Villa Canales
		117	Guatemala	Petapa
Noroccidente	Less than 25 000 inhab.	301	Sacatepéquez	Antigua Guatemala
		314	Sacatepéquez	Alotenango
		413	Chimaltenango	San Andrés Itzapa
		710	Sololá	Panajachel
		806	Totonicapán	Santa María Chiquimula
		911	Quetzaltenango	Concepción Chiquirichapa
		1204	San Marcos	Comitancillo
		1213	San Marcos	El Tumbador
		1304	Huehuetenango	Cuilco
		1311	Huehuetenango	La Libertad
		1319	Huehuetenango	Colotenango
		1404	Quiché	Zacualpa
		1413	Quiché	Nebaj
	Between 25 000 and 100 000 inhab.	401	Chimaltenango	Chimaltenango
		701	Sololá	Sololá
		901	Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango
		1301	Huehuetenango	Huehuetenango

		1401	Quiché	Santa Cruz del Quiché
Nororiente	Less than 25 000 inhab.	203	El Progreso	San Agustín Acasaguastlán
		1504	Baja Verapaz	Cubulco
		1606	Alta Verapaz	Tucurú
		1614	Alta Verapaz	Chahal
		1708	Petén	Dolores
		1803	Izabal	El Estor
		2004	Chiquimula	Jocotán
	Between 25 000 and 100 000 inhab.	1601	Alta Verapaz	Cobán
		1609	Alta Verapaz	San Pedro Carchá
		1705	Petén	La Libertad
		1805	Izabal	Los Amates
Sur	Less than 25 000 inhab.	504	Escuintla	Siquinalá
		509	Escuintla	San José
		602	Santa Rosa	Barberena
		609	Santa Rosa	Taxisco
		919	Quetzaltenango	El Palmar
		1006	Suchitepéquez	Santo Domingo Suchitepéquez
		1013	Suchitepéquez	Chicacao
		1104	Retalhuleu	San Martín Zapotitlán
		1212	San Marcos	Nuevo Progreso
		2102	Jalapa	San Pedro Pinula
		2202	Jutiapa	El Progreso
		2211	Jutiapa	Comapa
	Less than 25 000 inhab.	501	Escuintla	Escuintla
		502	Escuintla	Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa
		920	Quetzaltenango	Coatepeque
		1001	Suchitepéquez	Mazatenango
		2101	Jalapa	Jalapa
		2201	Jutiapa	Jutiapa

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Guatemala 2014, Versión # 15.2.5.1 IRB ***Approval: 110627***

USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE	B&A Borge y Asociados
Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina	VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

LAPOP: Guatemala, 2014

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PAIS. País: 01. México; **02. Guatemala**; 03. El Salvador; 04. Honduras; 05. Nicaragua 06. Costa Rica; 07. Panamá; 08. Colombia; 09. Ecuador; 10. Bolivia 11. Perú; 12. Paraguay; 13. Chile; 14. Uruguay; 15. Brasil 16. Venezuela; 17. Argentina; 21. Rep. Dom.; 22. Haití; 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana; 25. Trinidad & Tobago; 26. Belice; 40. Estados Unidos; 41. Canadá 27. Surinam; 28. Bahamas; 29. Barbados	**02**
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario **[asignado en la oficina]**	|__|__|__|__|__|
ESTRATOPRI: (201). Zona metropolitana (203) Noroccidente (205) Nororiente (206) Sur	|__|__|
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad **[población en edad de votar, según censo; modificar por cada país, usando número de estratos y rangos de poblaciones apropiados]**: (1) Grande(más de 100,000) (2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 - 100,000) (3) Pequeña (< 25,000)	|__|
UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"]: _____	|__|__|__|__|
PROV. Departamento:_____	**2**|__|__|
MUNICIPIO. Municipio:_____	**2**|__|__|
GUADISTRITO. Lugar poblado: _____	|__|__|
GUASEGMENTO. Segmento censal [código oficial del censo]: _____	|__|__|__|__|__|
GUASEC. Sector: _____	|__|__|__|__|
CLUSTER. [Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral]:_____ **[Cada cluster debe tener 6 entrevistas; clave-código asignada(o) por el supervisor de campo]**	|__|__|__|__|
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural **[Usar definición censal del país]**	|__|
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: (1) Capital Nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural	|__|
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español	|__|
Hora de inicio: _____:_____	|__|__|__|__|__|
FECHA. Fecha Día: ____ **Mes:**_____ Año: 2014	|__|__|__|__|__|

¿Vive usted en esta casa? **Sí→continúe** **No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista** **¿Es usted ciudadano guatemalteco o residente permanente de Guatemala?** **Sí→continúe** **No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista** **¿Cuántos años tiene? [Seguir solo si tiene por lo menos 18 años]** **Sí→continúe** **No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista**
ATENCION: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO Y OBTENER EL ASENTIMIENTO DEL ENTREVISTADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA.

Q1. Género **[ANOTAR, NO PREGUNTE]**: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	|__|
Q2Y. ¿En qué año nació?_____ año (8888) NS (9888) NR	|__|__|__|__|
LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho(a) está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo **in**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**			|___|___|
Agua, falta de	1 (19)	Impunidad	20 (61)
Caminos/vías en mal estado	2 (18)	Inflación, altos precios	21 (02)
Conflicto armado	3 (30)	Los políticos	22 (59)
Corrupción	4 (13)	Mal gobierno	23 (15)
Crédito, falta de	5 (09)	Medio ambiente	24 (10)
Delincuencia, crimen	6 (05)	Migración	25 (16)
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	7 (56)	Narcotráfico	26 (12)
Desempleo/falta de empleo	8 (03)	Pandillas	27 (14)
Desigualdad	9 (58)	Pobreza	28 (04)
Desnutrición	10 (23)	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	29 (06)
Desplazamiento forzado	11 (32)	Salud, falta de servicio	30 (22)
Deuda externa	12 (26)	Secuestro	31 (31)
Discriminación	13 (25)	Seguridad (falta de)	32 (27)
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	14 (11)	Terrorismo	33 (33)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	15 (01)	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	34 (07)
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	16 (21)	Transporte, problemas con el	35 (60)
Electricidad, falta de	17 (24)	Violencia	36 (57)
Explosión demográfica	18 (20)	Vivienda	37 (55)
Guerra contra el terrorismo	19 (17)	Otro	38 (70)
NS	88	NR	98

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica **del país** es mejor, igual o peor que hace **doce meses**? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que **su** situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace **doce meses**? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) No sabe (98) No responde	|__|__|

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o a una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	|__|__|
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) No responde	|__|__|
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.	|__|__|
CP4A. ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación a alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, municipalidad, concejal o alcalde auxiliar? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Una vez a la semana (2) Una o dos veces al mes (3) Una o dos veces al año (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir "una vez a la semana," "una o dos veces al mes," "una o dos veces al año," o "nunca" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	**Una o dos veces al mes**	**Una o dos veces al año**	**Nunca**	**NS**	**NR**	**INAP**	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98		|__|__|
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste…	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	|__|__|
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR								|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	**NS 88**	**NR 98**	
Izquierda									**Derecha**			

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los **últimos 12 meses** ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias…? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	|__|__|
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	|__|__|

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (88) NS**[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (98) NR **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**	|__|__|
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? **[Marcar el número]**_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencial sufrió? **[Leer alternativas]** (01) Robo sin arma **sin** agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma **con** agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión (11) **[No leer]** Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	|__|__|

VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencial del cual usted fue víctima? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o comunidad (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincuencial en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)	|__|__|

Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los **últimos doce meses** usted...

	Sí	**No**	**NS**	**NR**	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio o colonia por temor a la delincuencia? **[en zona rural utilizar "caserío" o "comunidad"]**	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
VIC44. En los últimos 12 meses**,** por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
VIC52n. ¿Ha tomado alguna medida de seguridad en su casa?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|
FEAR10. Para protegerse de la delincuencia, en los últimos 12 meses ha tomado alguna medida como evitar caminar por algunas zonas de su barrio porque puedan ser peligrosas?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	|__|__|

POLE2N. En general, usted está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a) o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con el desempeño de la policía en su barrio/colonia? **[Si responde que no hay policía en el barrio marcar "(4) Muy insatisfecho"]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) **In**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo **in**seguro(a) o muy **in**seguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PESE1. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en **su barrio** es **mayor, igual, o menor** que el de otras colonias o barrios en este municipio? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PESE2. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en **su barrio** es **mayor, igual, o menor** que el de hace 12 meses? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? **[Leer alternativas]** Confiaría… (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad? **[Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta]** (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas/maras (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) **[NO LEER]** Otros (8) **[NO LEER]** Ninguno (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes (3) **[No leer]** Ambas (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. ***[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente]***.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						**Mucho**	**No sabe**	**No responde**

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número. **B1**. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Guatemala garantizan un juicio justo? *(**Sondee:** Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)*	|__|__|
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Guatemala?	|__|__|
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político guatemalteco?	|__|__|
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político guatemalteco?	|__|__|
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político guatemalteco?	|__|__|
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	|__|__|
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Ejército?	|__|__|
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso?	|__|__|
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?	|__|__|
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	|__|__|
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?	|__|__|
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	|__|__|
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	|__|__|
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	|__|__|
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	|__|__|

Ahora, usando la misma escalera ***[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7*** **NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO**	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR**
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	|__|__|
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	|__|__|
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	|__|__|

NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	**Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR**
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el Ejército guatemalteco respeta los derechos humanos de los guatemaltecos hoy en día?	|__|__|
MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América?	|__|__|
MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que el Ejército de los Estados Unidos de América debería trabajar junto con el Ejército de Guatemala para mejorar la seguridad nacional?	|__|__|

Utilizando la misma escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es "nada" y 7 es "mucho", cuál es la probabilidad que tendría de ser castigado por las autoridades alguien que en su barrio haga las siguientes acciones:	**(88) NS (98) NR**
PR3A. Compre DVDs piratas, ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	|__|__|
PR3B. ¿Y si se conecta a la electricidad sin pagar? ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	|__|__|
PR3C. Y si alguien en su barrio invade un terreno desocupado, ¿qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	|__|__|
PR4. ¿Hasta qué punto siente usted que el Estado guatemalteco respeta la propiedad privada de sus ciudadanos? Seguimos con la misma escala de 1-nada a 7-mucho.	|__|__|

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Otto Pérez Molina es...?: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

SD2NEW2.Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a), o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted…**[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted…**[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

INFRAX. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) **[NO LEER]** No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el número 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo						**Muy de acuerdo**	**NS**	**NR**

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.
NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS4. El Estado guatemalteco debe implementar políticas **firmes** para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	|__|__|
MIL7. El Ejército debe participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en Guatemala. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	|__|__|

[RECOGER TARJETA "C"]

ENV1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: proteger el medio ambiente o promover el crecimiento económico? (1) Proteger el medio ambiente (2) Promover el crecimiento económico (3) **[No leer]** Ambas (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), **in**satisfecho(a) o muy **in**satisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Guatemala? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) **In**satisfecho(a) (4) Muy **in**satisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre? (1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 **NS**	98 **NR**
Desaprueba firmemente									**Aprueba firmemente**		

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|

E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	|__|__|
Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Guatemala. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos	**1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR**
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el **derecho de votar** de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: ***[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]***	|__|__|
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo **manifestaciones pacíficas** con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	|__|__|
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Guatemala. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan **postularse para cargos públicos**?	|__|__|
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión **para dar un discurso**?	|__|__|
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas **puedan postularse para cargos públicos**?	|__|__|
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	|__|__|

[Recoger tarjeta "D"]

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "C"]

Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo						**Muy de acuerdo**	**NS**	**NR**

Usted se considera que es:

PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestarse	|__|__|
PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable	|__|__|

[Recoger tarjeta "C"]

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	--	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado una mordida?	--	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Si la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? **Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99** **Sí la respuesta es Sí→ Preguntar:** En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	|__|__|

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: **[LEER]** (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Ahora voy a leerle una lista de situaciones que pueden o no ser problema en algunos barrios. Por favor dígame si las siguientes situaciones son un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no son un problema en **su barrio. [Repita después de cada pregunta "es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema" para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Muy serio	Algo serio	Poco serio	Nada serio	No es un problema	NS	NR	
DISO7. Jóvenes o niños en las calles sin hacer nada, que andan vagando en **su** barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO8. Jóvenes o niños que viven aquí en **su** barrio/colonia en pandillas o maras	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|

DISO10. Venta o tráfico de drogas ilegales aquí en **su** barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO18. Riñas o peleas de pandillas o maras aquí en **su** barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO14. Gente drogada en las calles de aquí, de **su** barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO16. Asaltos a las personas cuando caminan por la calle de aquí, de **su** barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|
DISO17. Balaceras aquí en **su** barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	|__|__|

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿cuáles de los siguientes actos de delincuencia han ocurrido en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia.	**Sí**	**No**	**Una vez a la semana**	**Una o dos veces al mes**	**Una o dos veces al año**	**NS**	**NR**	**INAP**	
VICBAR1. Han ocurrido robos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1 **[Continúe]**	2 **[Pasar a VICBAR3]**				88	98		|__|__|
						[Pasar a VICBAR3]			
VICBAR1F ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año?			1	2	3	88	98	99	|__|__|
VICBAR3. Han ocurrido ventas de drogas ilegales en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1	2				88	98		|__|__|
VICBAR4. Han ocurrido extorsiones en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1	2				88	98		|__|__|
VICBAR7. Han ocurrido asesinatos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1	2				88	98		|__|__|

	Muy preocupado	**Algo preocupado**	**Poco preocupado**	**Nada preocupado**	**NS**	**NR**	**INAP**	
FEAR6e. Y en general, ¿qué tan preocupado está usted de que alguien de su familia sea asaltado en el transporte público? ¿Diría que está muy preocupado, algo preocupado, poco preocupado o nada preocupado?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99 [No usa transporte público]	|__|__|
FEAR6f. ¿Y qué tan preocupado está usted acerca de la seguridad de los niños en la escuela? ¿Diría que está muy preocupado, algo preocupado, poco preocupado o nada preocupado?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99 [No tiene hijos/as o niños cercanos en escuela]	|__|__|

VB1. ¿Está empadronado para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
INF1. ¿Tiene usted documento personal de identificación (DPI)? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
VB2. ¿Votó usted en la primera vuelta de las últimas **elecciones presidenciales** de 2011? (1) Sí votó **[Siga]** (2) No votó **[Pasar a VB4NEW]** (88) NS **[Pasar a PV1]** (98) NR **[Pasar a PV1]**	|__|__|
VB3n. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, **[Pasar VB101]** (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto) **[Pasar VB101]** (201) CENTRO DE ACCION SOCIAL – CASA - Alejandro Giammattei **[Pasar a PV1]** (202) COMPROMISO RENOVACION Y ORDEN – CREO – Eduardo Suger **[Pasar a PV1]** (203) LIBERTAD DEMOCRATICA RENOVADA – LÍDER- Manuel Baldizón **[Pasar a PV1]** (204) PARTIDO ACCION DE DESARROLLO NACIONAL – ADN- Adela de Torrebiarte **[Pasar a PV1]** (205) PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL – PAN- Juan Guillermo Gutiérrez **[Pasar a PV1]** (206) PARTIDO PATRIOTA – PP - Otto Pérez Molina **[Pasar a PV1]** (207) PARTIDO UNIONISTA – PU- Patricia Escobar de Arzú **[Pasar a PV1]** (208) UNION DEL CAMBIO NACIONAL -UCN - Mario Estrada **[Pasar a PV1]** (209) VISION CON VALORES /ENCUENTRO POR GUATEMALA- EG-VIVA- Harold Caballeros **[Pasar a PV1]** (210) WINAQ/URNG/ANN - Frente Amplio - Rigoberta Menchú **[Pasar a PV1]** (277) Otro **[Pasar a PV1]** (88) NS **[Pasar a PV1]** (98) NR **[Pasar a PV1]** (99) INAP (No votó) **[Pasar a VB4NEW]**	|__|__|

VB4NEW. [SOLO PARA LOS QUE NO VOTARON. NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] ¿Por qué no votó en la primera vuelta de las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? **[Si dice "no voté porque no quería", preguntar por qué no quiso votar]** **[Una sola respuesta]** (1) Estaba confundido (2) No me gustaron los candidatos o la campaña (3) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (4) No creo en la democracia (5) Cuestiones burocráticas (registro, padrón) (6) Cuestiones de edad (muy joven, muy viejo) (7) No estaba en el distrito/estaba de viaje (8) No me interesa la política (77) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Sí votó) **[DESPUÉS DE ESTA PREGUNTA IR A PV1]**	|__|__|
VB101. [SOLO A LOS QUE RESPONDIERON "NINGUNO (BLANCO O NULO)" EN VB3n] ¿Por qué votó usted nulo o blanco en la primera vuelta de las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]** (1) Estaba confundido (2) Quería demostrar su descontento con todos los candidatos, no le gustó ninguno (3) No creo en la democracia, quería protestar contra el sistema político (4) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (5) No me interesa la política (6) Mi voto no marca la diferencia (7) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

Ahora vamos a hablar un poco de cosas que pueden pasar en las campañas electorales.	
PV1. Pensando en la campaña para las elecciones presidenciales de 2011, ¿recuerda usted haber presenciado o haber sabido de algún acto de violencia vinculado a la campaña? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Ahora le voy a leer una serie de eventos, y le voy a pedir que, para cada uno de ellos, me diga, si estos eventos sucedieron, durante la campaña electoral de 2011.

	Sí	No	NS	NR	
PV2a. Le atacaron o lastimaron a usted o a algún familiar por sus posiciones políticas	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2b. Algún candidato lo amenazó a usted o a algún familiar para que votara por él	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2c. Algún partido lo amenazó a usted o a algún familiar para que lo apoyara en la campaña	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2d. En su comunidad, hubo actividad de grupos violentos vinculados a los partidos políticos	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2e. Algún candidato de su comunidad fue atacado o lastimado durante la campaña	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2f. Algún candidato de su comunidad fue asesinado durante la campaña	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2g. Hubo linchamientos políticos en su comunidad	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2h. Hubo asesinatos políticos en su comunidad	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2i. Dirigentes partidarios amenazaron a los votantes en su comunidad	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2j. Dirigentes partidarios hicieron destrozos de propiedad en su comunidad	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
PV2k. Hubo represión policial en algún acto político en su comunidad	1	2	88	98	|__|__|

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pase a POL1]** (88) NS **[Pase a POL1]** (98) NR **[Pase a POL1]**	|__|__|
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? **[NO LEER LISTA]** (201) CENTRO DE ACCION SOCIAL - CASA (202) COMPROMISO RENOVACION Y ORDEN - CREO (203) LIBERTAD DEMOCRATICA RENOVADA - LIDER (204) PARTIDO ACCION DE DESARROLLO NACIONAL - ADN (205) PARTIDO DE AVANZADA NACIONAL - PAN (206) PARTIDO PATRIOTA - PP (207) PARTIDO UNIONISTA - PU (208) UNION DEL CAMBIO NACIONAL - UCN (209) VISION CON VALORES - VIVA (210) ENCUENTRO POR GUATEMALA- EG (211) WINAQ (212) UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL GUATEMALTECA - URNG (213) ANN (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? **[Leer opciones]** (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

PV3. Y pensando en las próximas elecciones de 2015, ¿piensa usted que los partidos y grupos políticos usarán la violencia: mucho, algo, poco o nada? **(1)** Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CLIEN1n. Pensando en las últimas elecciones nacionales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció un favor, regalo u otro beneficio **a alguna persona que usted conoce** para que lo apoye o vote por él? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CLIEN1na Y pensando en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2011, ¿alguien le ofreció **a usted** un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CHIPAR106. -¿Y pensando en la última campaña electoral, conoce usted a alguien de este sector que haya **recibido** un regalo o favor de un candidato? **[Notar que la pregunta ahora es sobre RECIBIR, no sobre que le hayan OFRECIDO]** (1) Sí **[Sigue]** (2) No **[Pasar a CHIPART108]** (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CHIPART107n. ¿Y recuerda qué tipo de regalo o favor recibió esa persona? **[No leer alternativas, marcar solo una respuesta]** (1) Alimentos (2) Mercadería (llaveros, stickers, gorros) (3) Camisetas de fútbol para el club (4) Bolsas para la feria (bolsos en general) (5) Trabajo (6) Dinero (7) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
CHIPART108. ¿Y usted cree que las personas que reciben regalos o favores se sienten obligados a votar por el candidato que se los dio? (1) Si (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PARCLIEN. ¿Conoce de primera mano o se ha enterado de personas que han accedido a un cargo público en la municipalidad, gobernación o gobierno central? **No → 99 (Inap)** **Sí → Preguntar:** ¿Cuál cree que fue la principal razón por la que consiguieron su empleo? **[leer alternativas]** **[Si conoce más de un caso, preguntar por el más reciente]** (1) Por sus méritos profesionales (2) Por motivos políticos (3) Por motivos personales, o (4) Por otros motivos (que no son por mérito o habilidades) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

[ENTREGAR TARJETA G] **FOR1n.** Ahora vamos a hablar sobre sus opiniones respecto de algunos países. ¿Cuál de los siguientes países es el que tiene **más influencia** en **América Latina**? **[Leer opciones]** (1) China, o sea, China continental y no Taiwán (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Brasil (6) Venezuela (7) México (10) España (11) **[No leer]** Otro país (12) **[No leer]** Ninguno (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	|__|__|
FOR4. Y **dentro de 10 años,** en su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países tendrá más influencia en **América Latina**? **[Leer opciones]** (1) China continental (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Brasil (6) Venezuela (7) México (10) España (11) **[No leer]** Otro país (12) **[No leer]** Ninguno (88) **[No leer]**NS (98) **[No leer]**NR	|__|__|
[RECOGER TARJETA "G". ENTREGAR TARJETA "H"] **FOR5.** En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro **de nuestro país**? **[Leer opciones]** (1) China continental (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Singapur (6) Rusia (7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil (11) Venezuela, o (12) México (13) **[No leer]** Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo (14) **[No leer]** Otro (88) NS (98) NR **[RECOGER TARJETA "H"]**	|__|__|
FOR6. Y pensando ahora **sólo en nuestro país,** ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en **nuestro país**? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucha **[Sigue]** (2) Algo **[Sigue]** (3) Poca **[Sigue]** (4) Nada **[Pasar a FOR6b]** (88) NS **[Pasar a FOR6b]** (98) NR **[Pasar a FOR6b]**	|__|__|
FOR7. En general, ¿la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa? (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) **[No leer]** Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) **[No leer]** No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|
FOR6b. Y pensando ahora **sólo en nuestro país,** ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene EEUU en **nuestro país**? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Mucha **[Sigue]** (2) Algo **[Sigue]** (3) Poca **[Sigue]** (4) Nada **[Pasar a MIL10A]** (88) NS **[Pasar a MIL10A]** (98) NR **[Pasar a MIL10A]**	|__|__|
FOR7b. ¿La influencia que Estados Unidos tiene en nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa? (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) **[No leer]** Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) **[No leer]** No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.							
	Muy confiable	**Algo confiable**	**Poco confiable**	**Nada confiable**	**No sabe/ no tiene opinión**	**NR**	
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|
MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	|__|__|

Ahora vamos a hacer unas preguntas sobre otro tema

VOL207n. ¿Usted cree que para corregir a un hijo que desobedece es necesario golpearlo o castigarlo físicamente? **[Leer opciones]** (1) Siempre (2) Muy frecuentemente (3) Algunas veces (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	**|__|__|**

Ahora vamos a hablar de su experiencia. Recuerde que si usted se siente incómodo o por otra razón prefiere no responder esta pregunta, solo dígamelo y seguiremos con la siguiente pregunta.

VOL208n. ¿Cuándo usted era niño, sus padres o sus tutores le pegaban o lo castigaban físicamente de alguna manera para corregir su mal comportamiento? **[Leer opciones]** (1)Siempre (2) Muy frecuentemente (3) Algunas veces (4) Casi nunca (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	**|__|__|**

Ahora le voy a leer algunas situaciones en las que algunas personas creen que está justificado que el esposo golpee a su esposa/pareja y le voy a pedir su opinión….	**Aprobaría**	**No aprobaría, pero lo entendería**	**No lo aprobaría, ni lo entendería**	**NS**	**NR**	
DVW1. La esposa descuida las labores del hogar. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	1	2	3	88	98	|__|__|
DVW2. La esposa es infiel. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	1	2	3	88	98	|__|__|

WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda regular en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el programa "Mi Bono Seguro"**,** ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, bachillerato/magisterio/secretariado, universitaria, maestría/doctorado) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1⁰	**2⁰**	**3⁰**	**4⁰**	**5⁰**	**6⁰**	**7⁰**	
Ninguno	0							
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6		
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo básico, tercero básico)	7	8	9					|__|__|
Bachillerato, Magisterio o Secretariado	10	11	12	13				
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Maestría o Doctorado	19	20	21	22+				
NS	88							
NR	98							

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su mamá? **[NO LEER OPCIONES]** (00) Ninguno (01) Primaria incompleta (02) Primaria completa (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa (07) Universitaria incompleta (08) Universitaria completa (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]** **[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]** (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]** (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]** (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (88) NS **[Pase a Q10NEW]** (98) NR **[Pase a Q10NEW]**	|__|__|
OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	|__|__|

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "F"]

Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? **[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]** (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 360 quetzales (02) Entre 360 y 600 quetzales (03) Entre 601 y 840 quetzales (04) Entre 841 y 1080 quetzales (05) Entre 1081 y 1320 quetzales (06) Entre 1321 y 1560 quetzales (07) Entre 1561 y 1800 quetzales (08) Entre 1801 y 2040 quetzales (09) Entre 2041 y 2280 quetzales (10) Entre 2281 y 2520 quetzales (11) Entre 2521 y 2870 quetzales (12) Entre 2871 y 3240 quetzales (13) Entre 3241 y 3780 quetzales (14) Entre 3781 y 4320 quetzales (15) Entre 4321 y 5400 quetzales (16) Más de 5400 quetzales (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)] **Q10G.** ¿Y cuánto dinero usted **personalmente** gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? **[Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]** (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 360 quetzales (02) Entre 360 y 600 quetzales (03) Entre 601 y 840 quetzales (04) Entre 841 y 1080 quetzales (05) Entre 1081 y 1320 quetzales (06) Entre 1321 y 1560 quetzales (07) Entre 1561 y 1800 quetzales (08) Entre 1801 y 2040 quetzales (09) Entre 2041 y 2280 quetzales (10) Entre 2281 y 2520 quetzales (11) Entre 2521 y 2870 quetzales (12) Entre 2871 y 3240 quetzales (13) Entre 3241 y 3780 quetzales (14) Entre 3781 y 4320 quetzales (15) Entre 4321 y 5400 quetzales (16) Más de 5400 quetzales (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)	|__|__|

[RECOGER TARJETA "F"]

Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	|__|__|
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: **[Leer opciones]** (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
Q11n. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento?_____ (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
Q12Bn. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? **[Contar todos los hijos del entrevistado, que vivan o no en el hogar]** _____ **(00 = Ninguno)** (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona ladina, indígena u otra? (2) Ladina (3) Indígena (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
[Preguntar a todos] **GUAETID2n.** ¿A qué grupo étnico (pueblo) pertenece? Por ejemplo, K'iche, Mam, Ixil u otro. **[No leer alternativas]** (01) Achí (02) Akateko (03) Awakateko (04) Ch'orti' (05) Chuj (06) Itza' (07) Ixil (08) Jakalteko (Popti') (09) Kaqchikel (10) K'iche' (11) Mam (12) Mopan (13) Poqomam (14) Poqomchi' (15) Q'anjob'al (16) Q'eqchi' (18) Sipakapense (19) Tektiteko (20) Tz'utujil (21) Uspanteko (22) Garífuna (26) Ninguno (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B"]

Ahora volveremos a usar la escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es "nada" y 7 es "mucho" **[1-7, NS 88, NR 98]**	
GUAETREP1a. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los indígenas están bien representados en el Congreso de la República?	|__|__|
GUAETREP1b. ¿Y hasta qué punto están los indígenas bien representados en los puestos de gobierno en general en Guatemala?	|__|__|

GUAETREP1c. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los indígenas están bien representados en los puestos de poder económico en Guatemala?	|__|__|
GUAETREP1d. ¿Y en los medios de comunicación? ¿Hasta qué punto los indígenas están bien representados allí?	|__|__|
GUAETREP2a. Y pensando ahora en las mujeres… ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que las mujeres están bien representadas en el Congreso de la República?	|__|__|
GUAETREP2b. ¿Y hasta qué punto están las mujeres bien representadas en los puestos de gobierno en general en Guatemala?	|__|__|
GUAETREP2c. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que las mujeres están bien representadas en los puestos de poder económico en Guatemala?	|__|__|
GUAETREP2d. ¿Y en los medios de comunicación? ¿Hasta qué punto las mujeres están bien representadas allí?	|__|__|

Y, por último, pensando en los garífunas. **GUAETREP3a.** ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los garífunas están bien representados en el Congreso de la República?	|__|__|
GUAETREP3b. ¿Y hasta qué punto están los garífunas bien representados en los puestos de gobierno en general en Guatemala?	|__|__|
GUAETREP3c. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los garífunas están bien representados en los puestos de poder económico en Guatemala?	|__|__|
GUAETREP3d. ¿Y en los medios de comunicación? ¿Hasta qué punto los garífunas están bien representados allí?	|__|__|

RECOGER TARJETA "B"

LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? **[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]** (201) Español (202) Mam (203) K'iche' (206) Kaqchiquel (207) Q'eqchi' (204) Otro (nativo) (205) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|
LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban **[Leer alternativas]**: *(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.*) (1) Sólo español (2) Español e idioma nativo (3) Sólo idioma nativo (4) Castellano - español e idioma extranjero (5) Solo idioma extranjero (88) NS (98) NR	|__|__|

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) **[No leer]** NS (98) **[No leer]** NR	|__|__|

GI0. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR					|__|__|
Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente…	**Correcto**	**Incorrecto**	**No sabe**	**No responde**	
GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? **[NO LEER**: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama**]**	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
GIX4. ¿En qué continente queda Nigeria? **[NO LEER**: África**]**	1	2	88	98	|__|__|
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Guatemala? **[NO LEER**: 4 años**]**	1	2	88	98	|__|__|

GI7. ¿Cuántos representantes/diputados tiene el Congreso de la República? **[ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]**	Número: _____	8888	9888	|__|__|__|__|

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R3. Refrigerador	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R4. Teléfono fijo(no celular)	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? **[Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]**	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	(88) NS	(98) NR
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R7. Horno microondas	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R15. Computadora	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R18. Servicio de Internet	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR
R1. Televisión	(0) No **[Pasa a R26]**			(1) Sí **[Sigue]**	(88) NS	(98) NR
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR (99) INAP
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de desagüe?	(0) No			(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

FORMATQ. Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico 1. Papel 2. Android **3.** Windows PDA	|___|

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____ (97) No se pudo clasificar **[Marcar (97) *únicamente,* si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]**	|___|___|
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	|__|__|__|
TI. Duración de la entrevista ***[minutos, ver página # 1]*** _____	
INTID.Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	|__|__|__|
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	|___|
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo.	|___|___|

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.
*Firma del entrevistador*_____ *Fecha* ____ /_____ /_____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios: _____
_____

[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta A (L1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Izquierda **Derecha**

Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Card D



Tarjeta G

Brasil

China Continental

España

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Venezuela

Tarjeta H

Brasil

China Continental

Corea del Sur

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Rusia

Singapur

Venezuela

Tarjeta F

(00) Ningún ingreso
(01) Menos de 360 quetzales
(02) Entre 360 y 600 quetzales
(03) Entre 601 y 840 quetzales
(04) Entre 841 y 1080 quetzales
(05) Entre 1081 y 1320 quetzales
(06) Entre 1321 y 1560 quetzales
(07) Entre 1561 y 1800 quetzales
(08) Entre 1801 y 2040 quetzales
(09) Entre 2041 y 2280 quetzales
(10) Entre 2281 y 2520 quetzales
(11) Entre 2521 y 2870 quetzales
(12) Entre 2871 y 3240 quetzales
(13) Entre 3241 y 3780 quetzales
(14) Entre 3781 y 4320 quetzales
(15) Entre 4321 y 5400 quetzales
(16) Más de 5400 quetzales

Paleta de Colores

[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, bachillerato/magisterio/secretariado, universitaria, maestría/doctorado) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1⁰	**2⁰**	**3⁰**	**4⁰**	**5⁰**	**6⁰**	**7⁰**
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria (Básicos: primero básico, segundo básico, tercero básico)	7	8	9				
Bachillerato, Magisterio o Secretariado	10	11	12	13			
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18+
Maestría o Doctorado	19	20	21	22+			
NS	88						
NR	98						

[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(88) NS (98) NR

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in research collaborations with LAPOP. LAPOP's efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. These studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behaviors related to democracy and quality of life. Over the course of the AmericasBarometer's duration, the project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, the University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The most recent surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in 2014 via face-to-face interviews in Latin American and Caribbean countries, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. The same surveys were conducted by internet to national samples in the United States and Canada. Interviews were conducted in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer includes surveys conducted in 28 countries across the Americas and more than 50,000 interviews. Common core modules and standardized techniques allow for comparison across individuals, between certain sub-national regions within countries, across countries, and over time.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project offers its AmericasBarometer country datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that LAPOP produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed via our "data repositories" and subscribing institutions in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate in the pursuit of excellence in academic and policy research and analysis throughout the Americas.

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