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IN THE NEW CENTURY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The most consistent effort to evaluate the development of democratic values in Guatemala at the national level has been the series of surveys carried out within the framework of the Democratic Indicators Monitoring System (DIMS) studies, sponsored by USAID/Guatemala every other year since 1993. This National Report contains the results of the fifth DIMS study, based on the national survey of September of 2001, as well as a comparison with the results of previous DIMS surveys and a comparison with other countries where similar studies have been conducted.

An explanation of the changes introduced in the study in 2001 as well as a description of methodological aspects is contained in the introduction of this fifth report. Chapter II of this report contains a brief assessment of the democratization process in Guatemala as well as a recount of some major issues that may have shaped public opinion in Guatemala in the period between the last two DIMS Reports. The remaining chapters present the analysis of the results grouped into different areas for better understanding.

Legitimacy of Democracy

- In terms of the support for the political community, Guatemalans are highly proud of their nationality. However, there was a decline in pride in 2001 in comparison with 1999, a difference that is statistically significant.

- With regards to the legitimacy of democratic principles, there was a statistically significant increase in the preference for democracy in 2001 in comparison with 1999. Guatemalans who reside in urban areas, who participate in more social groups, who have more political information, who have lower education and who are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in the country are likely to always prefer democracy. In a comparative analysis, Guatemala is one of the countries with a lower preference for democracy. However, the percentage of Guatemalans who directly chose authoritarianism as an option is relatively low and similar to that of other countries in the Latin American region.

- In terms of lingering authoritarian values, about half of the population has since 1993 shown preference for a stronghand government instead of a government that promotes participation in order to solve the country’s problems. However, there was a decrease in the preference for stronghand between 1999 and 2001. Guatemalans with less formal education, those who voted for the FRG in the 1999 elections, those who have less political information, those who prefer order and those who believe that a warrant is not necessary to enter a suspect’s home are more likely to prefer a stronghand government to resolve the problems of Guatemala. In the same line of thought, the support for an eventual coup
d’état has been relatively high in Guatemala since 1993 and it remained that way in 2001.

- In terms of the support for the performance of the democratic regime, in 2001 one fourth of Guatemalans (25%) felt very satisfied or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Women and Guatemalans with higher socioeconomic income tend to be less satisfied. In addition, those who feel more satisfied with the performance of the President and the performance of their local government, have a higher satisfaction with democracy.

On the one hand we find two very positive findings in this area: a higher number of Guatemalans prefer democracy and a higher number reject a stronghand government in 2001. Also on the positive side, we see that a high percentage of Guatemalans continue feeling proud of their nationality and that a high number support the right to a warrant and reject illegal actions such as invasion of private property or blocking roads. However, we also find some discouraging results: a large number of Guatemalans continue to believe that a coup d’etat could eventually be justified and also a large number consider that it is better to have order in society even at the expense of some liberties. In addition, we find that there is not an overwhelming support for basic democratic rights such as the belief that the rights of a suspect should never be violated. Also, we find relatively low support for democratic actions such as participating in solving community problems, participating in demonstrations and participating in political campaigns. Finally, only a quarter of Guatemalans feel satisfied with the way democracy is working in the country in 2001.

Support for the Political System and Political Institutions

- In terms of the support for the political system (index of respect for political institutions, pride to live under Guatemala’s political system, belief that the courts guarantee a free trial, belief that basic human rights are protected by the political system and support for the political system), Guatemala is below the 50-point reference line, which is considered as the dividing line for high/low support. Guatemalans display lower system support than Salvadorans in all items.

- In terms of extended system support, the average support for five-key democratic institutions (the courts, Congress, the Electoral Tribunal, public offices and political parties) is low. The Electoral Tribunal is the institution that obtains higher trust, with an average of 46 points. The political parties, by contrast, have the lowest level of support (29 average points). In addition none of a series of public institutions also evaluated in 2001 (the municipality, the army, the Ombudsman, the Public Ministry, the National Police, the Constitutional Court, public offices and the current government) obtains high support from citizens. However, the municipality is the
institution that obtains higher support, with an average of 48 points. This support has been declining steadily; with the latest survey it has fallen for the first time to the negative range of the scale. Other institutions like Congress and the political parties, which had experienced an increase of citizens’ support in 1999, also experienced a decline of trust in 2001.

- Overall, Guatemalans who are more satisfied with their economic situation, those who are more satisfied with the services provided by their local government, those who perceive that the corruption in the government is not extended, those who evaluate in a positive way the performance of President Alfonso Portillo, those who are more satisfied with the way democracy is working and those who prefer a participatory government (rather than a government that uses a strong hand to resolve the country’s problems), are more likely to support the Guatemalan system of government.

- Guatemalans have low tolerance for the right of others to vote, to demonstrate, to run for office and to speak freely. In all items Guatemalans obtained lower scores than Salvadorans. In fact, Guatemala’s index of political tolerance (constructed with the four individual items mentioned before) is the lowest in the region, at least among the countries that have been included in these types of studies. Guatemalans who live in rural areas, who are poorer and who are less satisfied with democracy are less likely to be tolerant.

- In the model that puts together system support and tolerance, a high percentage of Guatemalans (44%) in 2001 fall in the category of democratic breakdown, a highly troublesome finding. By contrast, only one fifth (18%) of Guatemalans fall in the cell of those who favor a stable democracy. Guatemala situates itself in the middle of a range of countries in Latin America where similar studies have also been conducted in recent years. Nevertheless, if Guatemala is compared only with other Central American countries the results are not encouraging: in 1999, 38% of Salvadorans fell in the stable democracy cell, whereas in 1999, 32% of Nicaraguans fell in that cell.

In conclusion, we find that Guatemalans have very low levels of system support (measured by the core items and also by the support for institutions). In addition, they have low levels of tolerance; in fact, the tolerance index for Guatemala is the lowest among the countries of Latin America where similar studies have been conducted. Given those results, it is not surprising that over 40% of Guatemalans fall in the cell of democratic breakdown, whereas only 18% fall in the cell of democratic stability. The decrease of support for the courts, Congress, the municipalities and the political parties between 1999 and 2001 is also noticeable.
Support for Local and National Authorities

- The contact between citizens and their local government is fundamental in any democracy. In this survey, several questions tap on this relationship between citizens and their municipality. The frequency with which the respondents have attended meetings at their municipality in the past 12 months has remained basically unchanged throughout the years. Only around 13% of Guatemalans reported having attended meetings at their local municipality in 2001.

- In 2001, an additional 5% of Guatemalans made demands to their municipality (vis-à-vis 1999). Guatemalans who have a higher level of education and those who participate in more social groups, are more likely to have presented requests to their municipality in the previous 12 months.

- There has been a steady increase in the percentage of citizens who feel that the municipality does not keep them well informed or not informed at all, a difference that is statistically significant. In 2001, only one-third of the respondents (32%) consider that the municipality keeps them somewhat informed or very well informed.

- A decline in the satisfaction with the services provided by their own municipality to the community was found in 2001 both in rural and urban areas. Half of the respondents rated the services provided by their municipality as regular. One third of the respondents (30%) rated them as good or excellent and one fifth (20%) considered them bad or very bad. The percentage of Salvadorans who think that the services provided by their local government are excellent or good is greater (42%) than in Guatemala (30%).

- There is a difference in the average satisfaction with individual services provided by the municipality between Indigenous and Ladino Guatemalans. Ladino Guatemalans have an average satisfaction of 44 points, while Indigenous Guatemalans feel less satisfied with an average of 39 points.

- About a third of the citizens think that the municipal authorities serve economic interests, another third think that they serve the political group to whom they belong, and only 15% think that the municipal government serves the interests of citizens.

- A cross-time look at the perception of Guatemalans about who has helped most or responded better to solve the problems of the community (where the respondent lives) shows that there have been changes over time. The most dramatic change is the tremendous increase in the percentage of citizens who in 2001 answered that none of the institutions has been
helpful. In addition, in 1999 around 22% of the respondents chose the central government as an option, whereas in 2001 only 11% chose it.

- Congress in Guatemala has obtained low levels of support throughout the years. There was a slight recovery in 1999, but by 2001 the trend of decline continued (the average support obtained by Congress was of 33 points in 2001). Guatemalans who have been victims of crime, who perceive that corruption in the government is widespread and who have a higher income are likely to have less support for Congress.

- With regards to the rating of the performance of the President, current President Portillo in September of 2001 and ex President Serrano in April of 1993 obtain the most negative evaluations from the population about their performance, whereas ex Presidents De León and Arzú obtain the most positive results.

- In 2001, there was a dramatic and statistically significant increase in the percentage of citizens who believe that corruption is widespread (from 53% in 1999 to 68% in 2001).

In conclusion, we find that between 1999 and 2001, there was a general decline in the support for both local and national authorities. With regards to the municipal government, the only positive trend was a higher number of demands made to the municipalities. In contrast, there was a decrease in citizens’ participation in municipal meetings, in the perception that the municipal government keeps citizens well informed and in the satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality. In terms of other institutions and authorities, it is notable to see that in 2001 many citizens believe that none of the State institutions has been helpful in solving community problems. Overall, Congress, the President, and even the municipal government suffered a decrease of citizens’ support. This may be related to the dramatic increase that occurred in the perception that corruption in the government is widespread.

**Perceptions of the Justice System**

- In 2001, there was a reduction of trust in the courts in comparison with other years both in urban and rural areas. The belief that courts don’t guarantee a free trial turns out to be a significant predictor not only for the trust in the courts themselves, but also for the trust in the Ombudsman, the Public Ministry, the National Police and the Constitutional Court.

- Since 1997, about a quarter (a little over 25%) of Guatemalans have reported being victims of crime (either themselves or someone in their family). However, the percentage of Guatemalans who have been directly or indirectly victims of crime is much higher in the Metropolitan area than in the rest of the country in all years. In 2001, 43% of the respondents
living in the Metropolitan area reported being victims of crime (directly or indirectly), whereas in other regions, only 25% or less reported so.

- Around 26% of the respondents reported feeling very unsafe or somewhat unsafe in 2001. Once again we find that the region where the respondent lives makes a big difference: those living in the Metropolitan area feel much more insecure (over 40%) than those who live in other regions of Guatemala.

- The average support for human rights is rather low: when respondents were asked if it is important that the authorities respect human rights, about 50% of the respondents said that human rights have helped to protect criminals, whereas only 50% think that human rights are important for everybody.

- Only a little over half of the population rejects the idea of self-justice actions. One third of Guatemalans openly agree with self-justice, whereas the remaining 13% consider that self-justice is sometimes justified.

In conclusion, the justice system is still very fragile. We find that none of the justice institutions obtains more than 43 average points of citizens’ support. On the other hand, we find that Guatemalans, especially those who live in the Metropolitan area, continue to be exposed to high levels of crime victimization and feel insecure. We have found that these two variables negatively influence the democratic values of Guatemalans. In addition, it is worrisome to see that 50% of the respondents consider that human rights have benefited criminals and that 43% accept the idea of actions of self-justice. On the positive side, a large percentage of Guatemalans believe that family violence is a very serious problem in the country; this awareness may be instrumental in actions to combat this phenomenon.

**Political and Social Participation**

- The percentage of citizens who indicated that they were registered to vote (empadronados) has remained without much change throughout the years. In 2001, around 75% of the respondents said they were registered.

- Out of those respondents who indicated being registered to vote, 83% indicated that that they voted in the 1999 elections. In this survey, as in most public opinion surveys, the reported voting figures are higher than the actual turnout. The difference between the reported vote in the DIMS survey and the actual vote can be related to two reasons: embarrassment or fear to say that they did not vote or problems in the electoral registry.

- By September of 2001, there was still a high percentage (almost 65% of the potential registered voters) of citizens who either said that they will not
vote for any of the parties or that they don’t know yet for which party to vote.

• In 2001 there was a noteworthy decrease in the importance given to the act of voting in Guatemala.

• In 2001 there was a decline in all freedoms evaluated in this study in comparison with 1999 and even in comparison, in most cases, with previous years. Consistently, women reported feeling less free to vote in a national election, to participate in demonstrations, to participate in solving community activities and to run for office. The difference in all cases is statistically significant. On the other hand, although Indigenous Guatemalans have a lower perception of freedom, the difference with Ladino Guatemalans is not statistically significant.

• As to the obstacles for the participation of women in political life in Guatemala, about 15% of the respondents said that there are few opportunities for them to participate. Twelve percent of the respondents said that it was because of the rejection of men. Another 10% asserted that there is not enough credibility for their abilities and another 10% said that they are not prepared to participate. The opinion was similar regardless of the gender of the respondent.

• In 2001 respondents were asked which group would represent them better if talks with the government were to take place. The churches, the media and the popular groups were chosen by most citizens with 36%, 19% and 13% respectively. Only 4% chose political parties as an option.

• In 2001 there was a general decrease in the participation in social organizations in Guatemala except for the participation in church-related groups. All other groups (including parent-school groups, unions, cooperatives, community associations, professional associations, political parties and civic committees) had a decline in terms of citizens’ participation.

• In terms of interpersonal trust, Guatemalans are more distrustful than Bolivians and much more than Salvadorans. While 61% of Salvadorans and 49% of Bolivians think that most people are very reliable or somewhat reliable, only 24% of Guatemalans think so. This low level of interpersonal trust can negatively influence the efforts of dialogue between sectors in the country.

In conclusion, the period between September of 1999 and September of 2001 was not positive in terms of the political and social participation of Guatemalans. There was an increase in the participation in church groups, but there was a decrease in the participation in other types of organizations. In
addition, although the church and the media continue to have a relatively high level of trust from the population, political parties continue to have little trust and low participation in Guatemala. Furthermore, the positive trend that was taking place towards the belief that it is worth to vote reverted in 2001. One of the most worrisome findings is the statistically significant decline that occurred in 2001 in regards to the perception of freedom to vote in a national election, to participate in public demonstrations, to run for public office and to participate in solving community problems.

Perceptions of the Peace Process

- Between 1999 and 2001, there was an important increase in the number of those who consider the Peace Accords to be very good. Overall, in 2001 around 94% of Guatemalans (who gave an answer) considered the Peace Accords as good or very good. Seven percent did not answer the question. In addition, a majority of Guatemalans (94% of those who gave an opinion) believe that the government should pay more attention to the implementation of the Peace Accords.

- The DIMS 2001 survey asked which is the most important issue for Guatemala, one that we should all pay attention to? Both in rural and urban areas, public security was mentioned as the most important issue, although the percentage of response for that option was higher in urban areas. The reduction of poverty was the second issue in both areas. The fulfillment of the Peace Accords was chosen by 11% of the respondents in the rural areas and 7% in the urban areas.

- Almost half of the respondents in 2001 said that they expected the Peace Accords to end violence or to end the war.

- In regards to the relevance of issues related to the Peace Accords, the educational reform is the one that had a higher average response (72 points), followed by promoting citizens’ participation to solve community problems (67). Improvements for indigenous rights and the issues of justice and reparation to the victims of the armed conflict are next with 65 and 64 average points respectively, followed closely by the increase of government expenditures in health, education and housing (average of 63). The army and the tax reforms have the same level of importance for respondents (score of 56). Lastly, the electoral reform gets an average of 51.

- One third of the respondents indicated that there have been changes in their community since the beginning of the peace-building period. A majority of the perceived changes are related to improvements in the environment of violence that existed during the armed conflict.
• A high percentage of Guatemalans (72%) think that the victims of political violence should seek justice.

• Respondents were asked if they would be willing to pay more taxes if the resources were used in a better way for social programs (such as health, education, etc.). About one half of the respondents (52%) said that they were not willing to pay more taxes, but around a 44% said they would. The question did not ask about paying taxes to this or any particular government. Guatemalans who have more education and who pay more attention to the news are more willing to pay more taxes if these are used properly for social programs. Those who live in urban areas and those with higher income are also more willing to pay.

In conclusion, the findings in this section are rather positive. Guatemalans seem to have a favorable opinion about the Peace Accords (term which seems to be largely understood as an equivalent to the peace-building process) and believe that the government should pay more attention to the implementation of the commitments contained in the accords. The results of this survey challenge the generalized perception that Guatemalans are indifferent to peace issues. The findings do corroborate, however, that there is little knowledge about the content of the Peace Accords. It must also be highlighted that there seems to exist more awareness about the peace-building process and its importance in the rural areas of Guatemala. This finding is probably due to the fact that the rural areas were the ones that suffered most from the war.

**Conclusion**

As a way of general conclusion we can say that the balance of the findings in the DIMS 2001 study is on the negative side. Between the previous DIMS study of September 1999 and the fifth DIMS study of September 2001, we find a general decline in trust for democratic institutions, a higher support for an eventual coup d'etat, a weaker support for democratic principles and a general deterioration in the image of local and national authorities; this last finding may be related to the dramatic increase in the perception that corruption in the government is widespread.

Nevertheless, there are also some positive findings in the cross-time analysis. On the one hand, we find that a higher number of Guatemalans prefer democracy in 2001 and that a higher number reject a stronghand government to solve the country’s problems. A high percentage of Guatemalans continue to feel proud of their nationality; there is also high support the right to a warrant. In addition, there is a more positive opinion about the Peace Accords than in 1999.

Finally, the cross-time analysis also shows that the justice system is still very fragile. Guatemalans, especially those who live in the Metropolitan area, continue to be exposed to high levels of crime victimization and feelings of
insecurity. In addition, there continues to be a relatively high percentage of Guatemalans who accept the idea of self-justice actions. In terms of political and social participation, there was a decrease in the participation of Guatemalans in social organizations, a finding which in the analysis appears to be related to the statistically significant decline that occurred in 2001 in the perception of freedom Guatemalans have. In addition, the positive trend that was taking place towards the belief that it is worth to vote reverted in 2001.

Beyond the cross-time analysis, a very low percentage of Guatemalans is satisfied with the way democracy is working in their country in 2001. Guatemalans have very low levels of system support and low levels of tolerance, and overall, they show relatively low support for democratic actions and for human rights issues. On the positive side, most Guatemalans reject illegal actions such as invasion of private property or blocking roads but support legal actions such as participating in community groups, political campaigns and political demonstrations.

Some of the most positive findings of 2001 are related to the peace-building process: Guatemalans believe that the government should pay more attention to the implementation of the commitments contained in the accords. The results of this survey challenge the generalized perception that Guatemalans are indifferent to peace issues.

The confrontational political ambiance that has prevailed in Guatemala in the past two years seems to have had an influence on the democratic values of Guatemalans. Overall, the performance of the current government authorities (in particular the accusations of corruption) seems to have affected the trust in all democratic institutions. In addition to that, neither the formal nor the non-formal educational programs and projects seem to have emphasized issues related to the democratic education of citizens at all levels.

In consequence, in order to revert the negative trends that appeared in 2001, there is an urgent need of dialogue between the different social sectors and in particular between the government and civil society. The actions that the government takes in order to curtail corruption and the efforts it makes to provide more security, efficient social services and ensure that democratic freedoms are preserved, are also fundamental for the construction of stronger democratic values in Guatemala. Moreover, the efforts that national and international, governmental and non-governmental and bilateral and multilateral institutions and organizations make to reinforce democratic education in Guatemala seem to be indispensable.
POSSIBLE AREAS OF INTERVENTION

The findings derived from the analysis of the DIMS 2001 survey on democratic values of Guatemalans suggest some important areas that may be possible to impact through well-targeted programs. Among the primary areas of consideration for policy-makers, civil society and donors are the following:

Social Participation

• An important determinant for the preference of democracy is social participation: those who participate in more social groups show a higher preference for democracy. This is not a surprising finding, and it stresses the importance of promoting social participation. This can take the form of supporting, in diverse ways, grass-root community organizations, intersectoral groups of dialogue where national problems are debated, and educational campaigns that promote participation.

• In 2001, respondents were asked which group would represent them better if talks with the government were to take place. The possible options were read to the respondents. It must be highlighted that popular groups obtain a relatively high percentage of adherence. This finding may have programmatic implications as to the importance of promoting these types of social organizations, stressing however the difference in the role that these groups ought to play in a democracy vis-à-vis political parties.

• There was a decline in the participation in community development groups in 2001. This may be related to the greater fear of participation in solving community problems in that year. These findings should be taken into account for programs of cooperation that seek to strengthen participation.

Civic Education

• Guatemalans with a higher level of education (in some cases high school and in others university) show weaker democratic values in several areas. For example, they have a lower level of preference for democracy, show less support for the basic principles of democracy, have less support for democratic institutions, have lower support for human rights issues, and have a less favorable opinion of the Peace Accords (although it is still very favorable). On the positive side, those with university education are more likely to prefer a participatory government instead of a government that uses strong-hand to solve the problems of the country.

The explanations for the findings related to education are not evident; the weakness in certain democratic values of Guatemalans with high school or university education may be related to the fact that the respondents
with a higher education are in more contact with the media and, therefore, tend to be more aware of political issues and problems, but also more critical. The weakness in democratic values of more educated Guatemalans may also be related to other factors: the more educated tend to live in urban areas where insecurity is much higher; or they were raised in the period of the armed conflict when political positions were highly polarized.

One of the most plausible explanations is that educational programs are inadequate; the official school programs do not stress democratic or civic education at any level. In fact, in the official programs of the Ministry of Education, only the class called “Estudios Sociales” (social studies) covers areas related to the political history and the political development of Guatemala. This class, however, also includes contents such as geography and world history, and therefore, there is in general a very weak coverage of Guatemalan issues. It is optional for the teacher or a school (private or public) to include contents related to democratic education. The Peace Accords specifically called for the improvement of democratic education programs but little has been done to date.

In view of the above, the promotion of programs of democratic education in urban areas and among high school and university students is a possible area of intervention for national and international cooperation programs.

In addition, since there seems to be more support among Guatemalans with higher education for democratic values related to the protection of their own rights ---not so much of the rights of others-- it is important to take into account the direction and content of the formal and non-formal educational programs that are supported: They should not only stress the rights of citizens but also the obligations of democratic citizens (respect for the law, respect for the opinion of others who may think differently, respect for democratic institutions and procedures, etc.).

- In some areas of analysis, Guatemalans who live in rural areas and who are poorer have weaker democratic values than urban and more educated Guatemalans. For instance, they are less likely to be tolerant. This stresses the importance of also carrying out programs of civic education in rural areas and in particular among the population that has lower income.

- Having 44% of the population in the democratic breakdown cell in 2001 makes Guatemala more vulnerable to a democratic breakdown. The possibilities of democratic stability in the long-term would be better preserved if Guatemalans were more tolerant and showed more support for their political system. Therefore, any efforts to carry out programs of democratic education are indispensable for democratic stability in the
long-range for Guatemala. Those programs should stress the importance of differentiating between the support for elected authorities and the support for democracy as a system of government.

- One third of Guatemalans openly agree with self-justice actions, and an additional 13% consider that self-justice is sometimes justified. This is a definite area of possible intervention for governmental, non-governmental and international cooperation programs. They should stress the respect for human life in their educational programs.

- Guatemalans display very low levels of interpersonal trust. Although it is difficult to build trust in a society, this can be helped through educational programs. This may be another line for intervention of national and international programs in Guatemala.

**Responsive Local Government**

- Those who feel better informed by their local government have a higher level of trust in their municipality and are more satisfied with the performance of democracy. This is an important finding that can have programmatic implications: It is important to stress local government communication with its constituents.

- Those who, in September of 2001, feel fairly satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of the services provided by their local government also have a higher degree of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Guatemala. By contrast, those who rate the municipal services with a lower score reported not feeling satisfied with the way democracy is working. This accentuates the importance of programs that help to improve local governments in the country.

- Respondents who attend municipal meetings more often and those who are better informed by the municipality are likely to be more satisfied with the services provided by their local government. This should come as no surprise, and it stresses the importance of keeping citizens well informed about the activities of the municipality and promoting their participation in meetings held by the local authorities when possible.

- There is an association between the belief in the value of voting, the place of residence of the respondent, and the satisfaction with municipal services. Those who live in the rural areas and, in particular those who have a high opinion about the work of their local government are the ones who most believe in voting. It is worth it to note that in the analysis, the lack of satisfaction with the performance of the current President, the perception of corruption, or the lack of trust in institutions, did not turn out to be significant predictors of believing in voting. It would appear as if the
performance of the local government is more important when it comes to assess the relevance of voting for individuals. This finding has obvious programmatic implications and stresses the importance of supporting local governments.

**Improved Judicial Services**

- The belief that courts guarantee a free trial increases the support for all of the institutions that form part of the justice system in Guatemala; by contrast those who believe that the courts don’t guarantee a free trial show much lower support for all justice institutions. This stresses the importance of improving the quality of the services provided by the courts, which is a possible area of intervention of national and international cooperation programs.

**Citizen Security Programs**

- Higher levels of crime victimization and the feelings of insecurity were found to be related to weaker democratic values. Respondents were asked whether the population should participate in “Juntas de Vecinos” (neighborhood crime watch groups) or something similar that would help to protect the community against crime. About 87% of the respondents gave a positive answer and only 8% said that the population should not participate. Another 5% did not answer the question. This could be considered as a possible area of intervention for community cooperation programs. However these programs should be free of any military intervention.

**Voter Mobilization and Education**

- In 2001, there was a sharp and statistically significant decline in the percentage of Guatemalans who believe that voting is worth it. The decline is marked in both males and females although females seem to be even more disenchanted. The promotion of voting and its importance is a possible area of intervention for national and international aid programs that have the goal of strengthening democracy in Guatemala.

- Among the predictors that repeatedly appear as explanations of a lower perception of freedom, gender is the more constant. Consistently, women feel less free than men to run for office, to demonstrate or to participate in community problem-solving activities. This is a finding that should prompt further programmatic research and the development of programs oriented to overcome this problem. The support for organizations that protect and promote the rights of women is one possible line of intervention.
Political Party Renewal

- In other parts of the world, and in spite of the generalized decline of trust in political parties in many countries, political parties continue to be the liaison of society with the decision-making process. The discussion of why this has not happened in Guatemala goes beyond the purpose of this report. Suffice it to say it is not only a responsibility of the parties themselves (although they have many weaknesses), but it is also the responsibility of many social groups that have sought to occupy spaces that would correspond to a political party in any consolidated democracy. This may also have programmatic implications: programs seeking the consolidation of democracy in Guatemala should differentiate the role that should be played by social organizations and the specific role that has to be played by political actors in a democracy. Therefore these programs should help both types of organizations in a different way.

- Even those respondents who belong to political parties do not seem to consider them as the best channel to communicate with the government. This might be related to the lack of knowledge ---of party leaders and members--- about the role that a political party should play in a democratic society. An orientation about the purposes, functions and roles of political parties in a democracy both to members and non-members of political parties is another possible and important area of intervention since the Electoral Law of Guatemala is not clear on this respect.

Building Understanding of Peace Accords

- Many Guatemalans don’t know the Peace Accords although there seems to be overwhelming support for the peace-building process. It is important to provide more information on this subject. Guatemalans could use more readily available and understandable information about the Peace Accords and their implications for Guatemala.

The publications that contain the whole set of Peace Accords are not accessible nor comprehensible for the average Guatemalan, even for those with a high school or university education. Therefore, a possible area of intervention is the publication and dissemination of adequate materials about the accords that can raise interest and reach, not only those with low levels of education, but also those with higher levels of education. In addition, educational programs related to peace should not limit themselves to stress the commitments contained in the accords. It is also important for citizens to be aware of the advantages and benefits of living in a peaceful society and of using peaceful mechanisms of conflict-resolution at the individual and community level.
CHAPTER I

GENERAL ASPECTS

The 2001 DIMS Survey

Two events marked the last part of the 20th Century in Guatemala. In 1985, after decades of authoritarian rule, the country began a process of democratization; and in 1996 a comprehensive set of Peace Accords put an end to almost 36 years of a harsh internal conflict that left tens of thousands of casualties and deep psychological scars among wide sectors of the population. As never before, both the democratization process and the peace process have laid the foundations for important changes in Guatemala that may bring political stability to a country where authoritarianism, polarization and intolerance have been common.

The consolidation of peace and democracy must be seen as processes that will not happen overnight in any country, especially in a society like Guatemala with a long history of political conflict and authoritarian rule. That consolidation requires many things. Among them there should be a development of a political culture among the population, that supports and enhances the chances of constructing a long-lasting peace and democracy instead of favoring violence and authoritarianism.

The most consistent effort to evaluate the development of democratic values in Guatemala at the national level has been the series of surveys carried out within the framework of the Democratic Indicators Monitoring System (DIMS) studies sponsored by USAID/Guatemala.

USAID/Guatemala pioneered a survey of democratic values in Guatemala in 1993 with the technical and academic expertise of three institutions: Development Associates, Inc., based in Washington D.C.; the University of Pittsburgh, based in Pennsylvania; and the Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES), based in Guatemala. Thereafter, the survey has been carried out every other year (1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001) with the objective of assessing timeline trends and new issues that could have emerged with regards to the consolidation of a democratic culture in Guatemala. This National Report contains the results of the fifth DIMS study, based on the national survey of September of 2001.

The theoretical foundation of these studies is the extensive academic research on democratic culture conducted in the United States and Europe in the second half of the 20th Century. The sample, the questionnaire, and the analysis developed in Guatemala for the 1993 survey have been the baseline of the studies that followed. In each year, an inclusive report stating the main findings
of the survey has been published in Spanish and disseminated widely to the Guatemalan public.

Although the same basic framework has been maintained throughout the years, some changes have been introduced in every occasion according to the political context of Guatemala and the new trends in academic research of political culture in the world. In that line of thought, some important changes have been introduced to the fifth DIMS Survey of Political Values of Guatemalans:

- The original sample that was drawn and designed in the early 90s, was enlarged in 2001 in order to have a more representative perspective of the national population. Therefore, in addition to the baseline sample of 1,200 cases that has been used in previous occasions (which allows cross-time analysis), new cases were added for a total national sample of 1,670 cases. Additional samples of 500 cases each were drawn for the departments of Quetzaltenango and Quiché, for department-specific reports that will be published separately.

- The scale of measurement of key variables such as system support, tolerance, interpersonal trust and others, was modified in 2001 in order to match the format of the questions used in other studies of democratic values in Latin America. Therefore, this fifth report contains a good deal of comparative analysis with other countries, which is complemented by new variables included in the DIMS 2001 such as satisfaction with democracy. This comparative work can provide an important parameter to determine the relative degree of advancement of democratic values of Guatemalans. For this purpose, we benefited from the exchange with the University of Pittsburgh’s Latin America Public Opinion project.

- The scale of measurement or the format were not changed in many of the questions which also allows for longitudinal analysis of the data. In fact, this fifth report also emphasizes the cross-time analysis of questions that have not been analyzed in previous reports, such as the perception of freedom that Guatemalans have.

- Even though inferential statistics were used in the previous reports, the emphasis was placed on bivariate analysis. The 2001 report incorporates multivariate analysis in all chapters in a more consistent way.

- A series of questions related to the peace-building process were included in the 2001 questionnaire, in order to have a perspective on the perceptions that Guatemalans have about the Peace Accords at the time of their fifth anniversary.
Methodology and Sample Design

This survey, as the previous DIMS studies, seeks to present an assessment of democratic values in Guatemala. It was designed to represent the democratic values of all citizens in Guatemala. Different from many electoral surveys where the samples often underrepresent the poor or isolated rural citizen who frequently does not vote, this survey attempts to have a wider coverage.

This task is particularly challenging in a country like Guatemala because of the multilingual nature of the population. In order not to exclude the opinions of individuals who may be monolingual, the DIMS studies have always prepared versions of the questionnaire in five Mayan languages: Kiche, K’ekchi, Mam, Kaqchikel and Ixil. It has also been necessary to include bilingual interviewers for each of those languages on the survey team.

In the design of the sample, we have taken into account the factors of population size, multiethnic composition of the population and distribution. As discussed earlier, the 2001 sample was enlarged to 1,670 cases, but the 1,200 baseline sample that had been used in the previous four DIMS surveys was maintained in order to make cross-time analysis.

The 2001 sample, technically speaking, has a sampling error of ± 2.5%. This means that if we drew repeated samples of this size in Guatemala, 95% of them would reflect the views of the population with no greater inaccuracy than ± 2.5%. Even if other factors can reduce the accuracy of the results, including non-response, errors in selecting the respondent, misunderstanding of the question, etc., this confidence interval is considered very good.

The ASIES survey team that carried out the interviews has ample experience and is professionally trained. In addition, many are bilingual (Mayan language-Spanish). The 2001 national survey was carried out on September 20th-25th. The collection of specific data for the departments of Quiché and Quetzaltenango took place between September 29th and October 4, 2001.

The distribution of the sample by department can be seen in Table I.1. It must be noted that the sample does not cover all of the departments of Guatemala. This is because the design was based on dividing Guatemala into four main geographic regions and the metropolitan area.
Table I.1  
Distribution of Sample by Department  
DIMS 2001  
Unweighted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENT</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (including metropolitan area)</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escuintla</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiché</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alta Verapaz</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marcos</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quetzaltenango</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimaltenango</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huehuetenango</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suchitepequez</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jutiapa</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiquimula</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zacapa</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solola</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Peten</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izabal</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalapa</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baja Verapaz</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Progreso</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1670 CASES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be noted that the size of the sample does not allow for the analysis of results per individual department. The confidence interval at the department level are too large and therefore the analysis would not be accurate. The smallest unit that we can make estimates about is the region.¹ In Table I.2. we can see the distribution of the sample by region.

¹ In order to make estimations about individual departments we would need a much larger sample which, for budget reasons, was not possible on this occasion.
Table I.2
Distribution of the Sample
By Region
DIMS 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>DEPARTMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala (metropolitan area)</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>Chimaltenango Escuintla Suchitepequez Part of Quetzaltenango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>El Progreso Chiquimula Jutiapa Jalapa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>Solola San Marcos Huehuetenango Quiche Part of Quetzaltenango</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>Baja Verapaz Alta Verapaz El Peten Zacapa Izabal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of the Data

For the analysis of the data, several databases were used. In the first place, for cross-time analysis, we used a database comprised of the 1,200 baseline sample of 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001. For the more specific analysis of results in 2001, we used a database that contains the enlarged sample of 1,670 cases. Both the 1,200 cases database and the 1,670 database were weighted to better emulate the national population.

In addition, for cross-country comparative analysis we used the databases that contain the results of similar surveys of democratic values conducted in El Salvador and Bolivia. These were made available through an exchange with the University of Pittsburgh’s Latin American Public Opinion Project. Also for cross-country analysis, we used, in certain cases, the database from the Latinobarometer of 1997, also provided by the University of Pittsburgh. Comparative analyses with countries out of the Western Hemisphere were also
carried out. For this purpose we used printed data in diverse academic books and journals.

This report contains both descriptive and inferential statistical analyses in order to better comprehend not only the distribution of the responses, but the reasons or explanations that lay behind the results. For this purpose, it was necessary to recode many of the variables used for the analysis. The scale used for many questions ranges from 0 to 100 to make the results more comprehensible.

**Characteristics of the Sample**

We will now discuss the main characteristics of the national sample of the 1,670 cases for 2001. This sample reflects the basic socio-economic and socio-demographic traits that exist in Guatemala. The distribution of the sample can be seen in Table I.3 below.
### Table I.3
Characteristics of the Sample
DIMS 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th># OF CASES*</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30 years</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 years</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 years</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 years</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and up</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity (by self-identification)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladino</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6 (primary)</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 (middle high)</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-12 (high school)</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Marital status</td>
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<td>432</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>904</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Unido”</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/separated</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>
## SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>NUMBER OF CASES</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wealth</strong> (by number of goods at home: radio, television, refrigerator, washer, vehicle, telephone, microwave, vacuum cleaner, computer)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Income** (household income per month) | | |
| Less than Q500 | 270 | 16.2 |
| Q501 to Q1000  | 423 | 25.3 |
| Q1001 to Q3000 | 436 | 26.1 |
| Q3001 to Q6000 | 117 | 7.0  |
| Q6001 to Q9000 | 31  | 1.9  |
| Q9001 to Q12,000 | 12 | .7   |
| Q12,001 to Q15,000 | 6 | .3 |
| Q15,001 to Q18,000 | 1 | .1 |
| More than Q18,001 | 5 | .3 |
| No answer | 369 | 22.1 |
| Total    | 1670 | 100.0 |

*Except for residence, all the rest of the information are weighted cases.*
CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT:
PEACE AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN GUATEMALA

An Overall Assessment

The detailed analysis of the advancements and shortcomings of democratization in Guatemala goes beyond the scope of this report. However, we will present some general ideas that can help to better understand the development of Guatemalans’ democratic values in recent years.

The United Nations indicates that democracy is a set of procedural rules decided by the parties for managing conflict within society, but stresses that the consolidation of democracy requires much more than rules. It also stresses that democratization becomes harder in post-conflict societies like Guatemala, for instance.

In effect, a transition from war to peace involves multiple issues not present in the move from authoritarianism to democracy. Among those factors are the demobilization and reintegration of combatants from both sides of the conflict, the needs of special populations such as refugees and the displaced, the reconstruction of often devastated economies, and the existence of weak democratic institutions (if they existed at all before the conflict) and of often weaker civil societies. The consolidation of democracy is often hampered by lingering problems from the past like the decimation of political and social leadership by political violence, the polarization and resentment generated by the war and the lack of dialogue and negotiation not only between the contending parties of the conflict but between diverse social groups.

As has happened in Central America, new challenges often surface after procedural democracy is established, as it has happened in Central America. Among those problems are the corruption by the civilian elected authorities, low voting turnouts, inefficient state institutions, stagnant economic performance and rampant levels of common crime. On the other hand, in post-conflict societies, there is usually extensive presence from international actors who, in one way or another, get involved in the process of establishing peace and the construction or reconstruction of democracy. These are only some of the areas which differentiate a “normal case” of democratization from a case of democratization in a post-conflict situation.

Krishna Kumar, who has evaluated several post-conflict societies, asserts that in them democratization is a long-term process beset with ups and downs, progress and breakdowns. He stresses that democratization and reconciliation processes are invariably intertwined. In fact, reconciliation can be viewed as an integral part of democratization over the long-time horizon. Reconciliation in post-conflict societies does not imply the absence of conflict. Instead, it is the transformation of violent conflicts into non-violent ones; it means that it takes a universal commitment to capture political power through ballots and not bullets.4

In a post-conflict society, the analysis of democratization should take into account at least five areas: institution-building, the establishment of the rule of law, political participation (beyond elections), political culture (democratic rather than authoritarian values) and specific post-conflict tasks.5

Scholars who have dealt with problems of construction or reconstruction of democracy in post-conflict societies recognize that institution-building is one of the key and most urgent tasks, noting, however, that the difficulties encountered may be much greater than in the cases of normal democratization because of the legacy of the war. In the case of Guatemala, although the State had not collapsed either before or during the conflict, it was institutionally weak. The task was facilitated because the peace negotiations had, as a departing point, the basic framework of the political Constitution that had been drawn in the mid-80s and that was recognized overall by the armed opposition. More than the construction or reconstruction of democratic institutions, the challenge was to redefine and redesign many State institutions that had been taken over, or at least, strongly influenced by the Armed Forces in the framework of the counterinsurgency period.6

But beyond the civilian control of State institutions, Guatemala faced the challenge of modernizing the whole State apparatus, in particular, those government agencies that provide social services for the population. The Guatemalan Peace Accords have specific provisions for the modernization and decentralization of the State apparatus, many of which have not been complied to, according to reports of national and international organizations. Overall, State institutions in Guatemala have low levels of legitimacy among citizens, as it has been observed in all DIMS reports since 1993. One of the major weaknesses and

5 For a more complete assessment of each one of these areas see Azpuru, Dinorah “Evaluando la Democratizacion y la Paz en Guatemala” en *Revista ASIES* 3-2001 (Guatemala, ASIES, 2001). This framework of analysis was developed by D. Azpuru.
hindrances for strengthening democracy is the political party system, which is considered highly volatile and unstable.\footnote{See Informe sobre el Estado de la Region, chapter 7, “El Desafío del Fortalecimiento de los Estados de Derecho y la Representación Política,” United Nations Development Program.}

In any case, in terms of institution-building, there have been important advancements \textit{vis-á-vis} the authoritarian period. These changes began in 1985 with the initial democratic opening and the new constitution, but many changes were deepened during the peace negotiations period (1991-1996) and, in particular, during the post-conflict period (from 1997 to the present). Institutions such as the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Court of Constitutionality have been at the forefront, sustaining the democratic regime.

In regards to the second grand area of analysis, the \textit{Rule of Law} there has been some progress but it is worrisome to note that the judicial system is one of the weakest institutions. There have been efforts to improve it, but in practice the recommendations from the Justice Commission derived from the Peace Accords have not been thoroughly implemented. In addition, the efforts of the judicial authorities are shadowed by deep-rooted corruption in lower ranks, by impunity, threats to judges and attorneys and the lack of economic resources. It is clear that it is difficult to establish the rule of law in societies where the judiciary remains weak and inefficient. In Guatemala, another worrisome problem has been the lynching of alleged criminals by mobs, especially in former conflict areas.

The shortcomings of the justice system together with the lack of efficiency of law-enforcement institutions such as the National Police, are felt by the population that faces rampant levels of common crime, especially since the post-conflict period started. Guatemala has one of the highest homicide rates of Latin America and some of the highest rates of crime victimization. Previous DIMS reports have shown that crime has been reported as one of the most serious problems by Guatemalans. It comes in only behind economic-based problems such as unemployment or the high cost of living.

In the third area of analysis, \textit{political participation}, the data from previous DIMS studies shows that Guatemalans feel more free to participate today that eight years ago. However the advancement is still relative, since the perception of freedom is lower among women, indigenous and rural respondents. One of the shortcomings in participation has to do with low electoral turnout rates; but it must be noted that there are major problems in the registration system and therefore the real turnout rates are not known with exactitude. The voting behavior of Guatemalans also presents other shortcomings such as the tendency to favor hard-line candidates or candidates that use demagogy in their political campaigns.
Beyond conventional political participation through the polls, there are other areas of political participation that have problems. One such area is the high fragmentation of civil society, that has little capability to articulate interests and that lacks connections to the political parties that can intermediate their demands. In addition, social organizations are not encompassing enough to include rural citizens, and many are urban-based entities with an authoritarian leadership themselves. The mechanisms for the participation of common citizens that do not belong to social organizations are weak, and therefore participation during inter-electoral periods tends to be low.

The fourth area of analysis of the democratization process in Guatemala is that of political culture. Scholars have long argued that the existence of democratic values in any society is fundamental for the stability of democracy in the long-run. This and all the previous DIMS reports present a comprehensive picture of the standing of democratic values of Guatemalans. To this respect, there remain serious weaknesses, although there has been some progress. Overall one of the greatest advancements is a higher preference for democracy instead of dictatorship. Nevertheless, there exist pockets of authoritarianism; many individuals and groups are accustomed to decades of authoritarian (military) rule and to strong-hand governments rather than participatory ones.

The last area of analysis is that of post-conflict tasks. These are tasks related to immediate actions to be taken after a peace agreement is signed. In Guatemala, there was a general advancement in areas like the repatriation of refugees and the demobilization and reincorporation of excombatants both from the army and the guerrilla. In fact, the first phase of the so-called operational peace accords has been considered relatively successful by local and international observers. The second phase however, has had serious problems of implementation.8

To finish this general overview of the process of democratization, in Table II.1, we can see some quantitative indicators of democratization that are used by international organizations and academics to measure advancements or setbacks in this area. A comparison is made with El Salvador, as it will be made throughout this report. The comparison is relevant because El Salvador is also a post-conflict society, with similar historical roots and a legacy of harsh authoritarianism, although both countries have important differences, such as their ethnic composition.

8 For an evaluation of the programs of reintegration of former guerillas in Guatemala see ASIES, Union Europea and Cruz Roja Española, El Programa de Incorporación para los Ex-combatientes, 1997-2001 (Guatemala: Artgrafic de Guatemala, 2001).
### Table II.1
A Comparison of Indicators of Democratization in Guatemala and El Salvador 1980-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY/ YEAR</th>
<th>EL SALVADOR</th>
<th>GUATEMALA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>COUNTRY/YEAR</strong></td>
<td>8(PF)</td>
<td>6(PF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** table prepared by D. Azpuru

*The scale of the Freedom House Rating goes from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). In 1978 and 1988 the freedom rating is the sum of rights and liberties. In 2000 it is the combined average of both. The 2000 categories are as follows 1.0 to 2.5 = free. 3.0 to 5 = partially free. 5.5 to 7 = not free.

**The coding for the Polity IV dataset goes from +10 (full democracy) to −10 (full autocracy). The measurement includes: competitiveness of political participation, openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive.

***The Fitzgibbons-Johnson index is a ranking of the 20 Latin American countries made by specialists, usually from Western countries. 1 is the most democratic country whereas 20 is the least democratic. The measurement includes: free elections, free party organizations, independence of the judiciary, civilian supremacy over the military.

The data for the exact year was not always available. When it is not the year of the heading, the year of the data is in parentheses.

We can see in Table II.1 that both countries have shown improvements in their processes of democratization, even if it is measured by the standards of procedural democracy. The most remarkable changes have occurred in El Salvador, which became in 2000 a free country by the Freedom House rating. In a similar way, it came closer to the +10 mark of full democracy by the Polity IV dataset and moreover, it passed from position 16 to position 10 (more democratic) in two decades by the Fitzgibbons-Johnson Index.

There have also been improvements in Guatemala, although not as notable as those of El Salvador. Both in the Freedom House rating and the Polity IV dataset, Guatemala shows progress of its level of democratization. In the Fitzgibbons-Johnson Index, however, it still remained by the year 2000 in the position 19 out of 20 Latin American countries, which is questionable if one considers that Peru (under the autocratic rule of Alberto Fujimori) was better ranked (in position 18). Overall, these results show that the process of democratization in Guatemala has brought improvements vis-à-vis the authoritarian period.
From the DIMS 1999 to the DIMS 2001

The two-year period between the DIMS survey of September 1999 and the DIMS survey of September 2001 began with an electoral process in which, as it has been the case since the democratic opening in 1985, an opposition party won the elections. The period corresponded almost entirely with the first two years in office of the new elected government of the *Frente Republicano Guatemalteco* (FRG).

We will highlight some aspects about the political context in that period that may be useful for understanding some of the answers given by the respondents in the DIMS 2001. In view of the type of analysis, we stay away from specific cases or issues. Basically we can say that these two years were characterized by:

--The lack of dialogue between the government and organized social sectors was one of the most notable manifestations of the two-year period in spite of announcements made by the government that it would open up dialogue with society. The period was also marked by constant clashes between the new administration that took office in January of 2000 and the written media.

--The disagreements were specially marked between the private sector and the government. The tax package that was approved by Congress in mid-2001 brought about protests and social unrest. It also showed the existing division between organized social sectors.

--The formation of diverse social coalitions to make proposals to the government in the second semester of 2001 (like *Grupo Barómetro*, *Foro Guatemala* and *Foro para la Reconciliación*) showed that civil society is using democratic mechanisms and seeking consensus among opposing viewpoints. In fact, traditionally opposed sectors were able to sit together and establish dialogue in these groups.

--In general, there existed freedom of expression for the written media; the government was constantly subject of criticism in the opinion editorials and there were, especially in 2001, numerous accusations of corruption in the government, including Congress. Some opinion editorialists even called for the resignation of the President. However, there were some accusations of intimidation to journalists.

--The government was formed in a plural way and included two prominent Mayan academics and some former guerrilla members. Nevertheless, on several occasions the unusual blend of individuals of opposing ideological backgrounds that formed the new government sent unclear signals to the population as to who was making certain major decisions and which was
the direction of public policies. The media often talked about irreconcilable splits within the government.

--The high levels of common crime continued. The security environment was further affected when 78 dangerous convicts escaped from a high security prison. In addition, lynchings in the country continued throughout the two-year period. The gravity of the problem became evident when a Judge was lynched and killed by a mob in March 2001.

--Diverse human rights groups throughout the two-year period and MINUGUA in its Human Rights Report of September 2001 highlighted the deterioration of the situation of human rights in Guatemala. Although it recognized that violations are not a State policy as it was in the counterinsurgency period, MINUGUA pointed out the increase in violations of human rights and acts of “social cleaning” against criminals (limpieza social). In the positive side, there was an unprecedented sentence in the case of the murder of Bishop Juan Gerardi. However, many involved in the trial (as prosecutors or witnesses) were threatened, and some had to leave the country.

--The deceleration of the peace-building process was manifest in spite of a new schedule proposed by the government in late 2000 (and officially launched in April of 2001). There were, in fact, some clear setbacks, such as the increase in the budget of the army and the maintenance of the Estado Mayor Presidencial. On the positive side, MINUGUA’s mandate was extended and peace-related institutions (the State institutions formed as a result of the Peace Accords) kept on working. In addition, the current government prompted the recognition of the responsibility of the State of Guatemala in the violations of human rights during the armed conflict at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights from the Organization of American States. The relatives of the victims of the massacre of “Dos Erres” in Peten were granted an economic compensation from the State.

--The formation of several new political groups that seek to become political parties gave the impression that an early electoral campaign was taking place. At the same time, several prominent businessmen announced their intention to participate in politics. Although the increased participation in politics is positive, the division of the emerging leadership into several political groups contributes to the continued fragmentation and instability of the Guatemalan political party system.

--The presence of the left as a political force was scarcely felt in local politics in the past two years due, to a great extent, to the divisions within the left, including the URNG.
--On the side of the economy, there existed macroeconomic stability. Guatemala kept a low external debt, low inflation and relative stability in interest rates. However, there was a low rate of economic growth. In fact in the two-year period Guatemala had the lowest economic growth since the beginning of the democratization process in 1985. The rates were 3.3% in 2000 and 1.5% in 2001. The government highlighted the international variables that affected the economy in that period, such as the drop in coffee prices.

--On the side of social problems, the high levels of poverty that exist in the country became dramatically obvious when famine struck some communities in eastern Guatemala. The government argued that poverty is not a responsibility of this administration but a structural problem. The FRG highlighted the increase of the minimum salary and the reform to the labor laws as social achievements of the government.

Although it is difficult to recount in this report all the events that may have shaped public opinion in the past two years, the overall impression is that the political ambiance that prevailed in the period between the 1999 DIMS survey and the 2001 DIMS survey ---in particular the lack of dialogue between the government and social sectors--- was not helpful for the consolidation of democratic values among Guatemalans.

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CHAPTER III

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY
AND LINGERING AUTHORITARIAN VALUES

Theory and Methodology

Earlier studies in political science considered that political culture was not a relevant variable in the resulting regime-type; moreover, if political culture was at all considered as an influential factor in the determination of regime-type, it was mostly in terms of the importance of the elites' political culture. However, when the so-called “third wave of democratization” began, in the mid 1980s, the opinion of the masses about the type of regime that governs them has become more and more important. Theory and reality have proved that the opinions and subsequent actions of the masses can play an important role in the political development of any country.

Thus, the existence of popular support for democracy (also understood as the legitimacy of democracy) can enhance the possibilities of deepening democracy itself, and, by contrast, the support for authoritarian options among the masses can undermine the efforts to achieve democratic consolidation. Throughout this report, as it has been the case in the previous DIMS reports, there is an important underlying assumption: democracy is still the best system of government yet known to mankind.

Legitimacy can be defined as the attribute of the State that implies the existence, in a majority of the population, of a degree of consensus that ensures obedience without recurring to force. A prominent Spanish political scientist, Juan Linz, says that legitimacy is the belief among any given population that in spite of its imperfections and shortcomings, the existent political institutions are better than others that may be established. It should be clear that we are not referring to the elected authorities (or imposed authorities in an authoritarian regime) that may be in charge of institutions at a given time; we are referring, instead, to the permanent institutions that sustain a regime, regardless of the authorities that may be temporarily in charge of them.

However, legitimacy is closely related to the issues of efficacy and effectiveness of the elected authorities. Thus, ineffectiveness weakens the authority of the State and its legitimacy. Political scientist Larry Diamond asserts that the legitimacy of political institutions is closely associated to the performance of those institutions in addressing the problems that concern the citizens (i.e. they have to be responsive to their preferences).

10 Bobbio, N. & Matteuci, N. Diccionario de Política, Vol. 1 (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Madrid, 1985)
The legitimacy of democratic institutions, although essential, is not enough to sustain democracy over time. Several years ago, prominent political scientist David Easton, asserted that there are three levels of legitimacy: the support for the political community, the support for the democratic regime and the support for the incumbent authorities. The legitimacy or support of the political community implies the belief that the territorial borders of a given State are acceptable and valid. The second level of legitimacy, that of the regime, implies the approval of society towards the political rules necessary for running the political system and it entails the support for the current structure of power. For instance, it implies the approval and support for a democratic regime. Finally, the legitimacy of government is more specific and it refers to the support for the authorities that conduct public affairs at any given point in time; in a democracy, it is the support for the elected authorities. As can be seen, there are important differences in the different levels of legitimacy.

More recently, a group of American scholars led by Pippa Norris, proposed a further subdivision to the three levels of legitimacy advanced by Easton. This scheme maintains the legitimacy of the political community on one extreme (diffuse support) and the level of legitimacy of the authorities at the other extreme (specific support). However, the second level of legitimacy, that of the democratic regime, is divided in three levels: the support for the principles of the regime, the evaluation of the performance of the regime and the support for the institutions of the regime. Table III.1 presents the comparison between the new subdivisions proposed by Norris and the old scheme proposed by Easton.

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Table III.1
Levels of Legitimacy in a Democratic System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVELS OF LEGITIMACY OR SOCIAL SUPPORT</th>
<th>EASTON</th>
<th>NORRIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIFFUSE SUPPORT</td>
<td>• 1.- Support for the political community</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(pride in being citizen of a given country)</td>
<td>• 2.- Support for the principles of the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for the political regime</td>
<td>• 3.- Support for the performance of the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIC SUPPORT</td>
<td>• 5.- Support for the political actors or authorities</td>
<td>• 4.- Support for the system and support for the institutions of the regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(trust in the political actors, evaluation of the performance of the incumbent authorities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: prepared by D. Azpuru

We will take a look at the five levels of legitimacy in Guatemala. In this chapter, we will examine the support for the political community (level 1), the support for the principles of the regime (level 2) and the support for the performance of the regime (level 3). In Chapter IV we will examine the support for the political system and for democratic institutions (level 4), and in Chapter V we will examine the support for the political actors and the incumbent authorities (level 5). It must be noted that political tolerance, which is a democratic principle that belongs to the second level of legitimacy will be examined in Chapter IV to maintain the theoretical framework used in previous DIMS reports.

Although legitimacy seems to be a difficult thing to measure empirically, there are previous studies in other countries that can provide the theoretical basis to formulate the questions that attempt to tap into the public’s sense of
legitimacy at the different levels. Furthermore, empirical studies in other countries have used questions that are also being used in this study. In any case, the attempts to measure legitimacy in an empirical way are more accurate than subjective personal interpretations often made about the legitimacy of democracy or democratic institutions in Guatemala.

**Support for the Political Community**

This first level of legitimacy, which is considered as a diffuse support (because it is more abstract), is probably the most difficult to measure empirically. It refers to the basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and a general willingness to cooperate together politically.\(^{14}\)

To measure this dimension in Guatemala, we use one basic question that has been used extensively in other countries:\(^{15}\)

- How proud are you to be (Guatemalan)?
  - Very proud, somewhat proud, not proud at all

The results can be seen in Figure III.1. Since this question was also asked in 1999, we can see the comparison between both years, by gender of the respondent. As it can be seen, Guatemalans are highly proud of their nationality, regardless of gender, and the difference between men and women is not statistically significant. However, we can observe a decline in pride in 2001 in comparison with 1999, a difference that is statistically significant. It is difficult to determine why Guatemalans are less proud of their nationality in 2001, but it may be that the signing of the Peace Accords had influenced a more positive feeling that has been declining as the years go by. In any case, the results show that, overall, the respondents tend to feel very proud of being Guatemalans.

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\(^{14}\) See Norris, op. cit., p. 10. She refers to the assertion by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan that agreement about the boundaries of the political community is an essential precondition for the foundation of any stable nation-state.

\(^{15}\) It has been used for instance in the World Values Survey. There is another question used as an alternative in the World Values Survey, which asks the respondents: “Of course we all hope there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” This question would not be applicable in Guatemala, given that citizens would probably think of the 36-year internal conflict that ended in 1996. Guatemala has not been involved in any major war against another country in recent history.
These results are especially interesting given the multiethnic composition of Guatemalan society. Figure III.2, which is based only on the survey of 2001, shows that the levels of pride in being a Guatemalan remain high regardless of ethnicity although it declines slightly among the indigenous population. A statistical test allows us to establish that the difference between Ladinos and Indigenous Guatemalans is statistically significant.
Comparative results for this question can be found in the book published by Norris. However, the question in the World Values Survey had four possible answers instead of three. In any case, we can compare the percentages of those who answered “very proud” or “quite proud” in other countries with the percentage who answered “very proud” in Guatemala in 2001. The results are seen in Table III.2.
Table III.2
Percentage of citizens who feel very proud of their nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% FEEL VERY PROUD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>86**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>mid-1990s</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Values Survey (in Norris) and DIMS 2001 for Guatemala
**The question is the same but in Guatemala in 2001, it had 3 possible answers, whereas it had 4 possible answers in the other countries. This table shows only the percentages of those who answered very proud in Guatemala and very proud or quite proud in the other countries.

In terms of the percentage of citizens who feel proud of their nationality, Guatemala seems to be in the middle of the range. Although there are countries like the United States where pride is widely spread, some Latin American countries resemble Guatemala. Moreover, countries like Estonia that, until recently, were part of another country (the Soviet Union), have lower levels of pride than Guatemala. We don’t have data available for countries like Bosnia, Sri Lanka or some African states where ethnic subdivisions and ethnic conflict is deeply ingrained, but there the levels of national pride can be expected to be rather low.

Support for the Principles of the Regime

We now move on to the analysis of the second level of legitimacy, that related to the legitimacy of regime principles. In this case we will be looking at democratic principles. There can be two dimensions: the more general one related to the belief that democracy is the best possible form of government and the more specific dimension related to the belief in the basic principles of a democratic regime. Those basic principles include values such as freedom, participation, tolerance, respect for legal-institutional rights and the rule of law. The 2001 DIMS survey included several items that could help us evaluate the support for democratic principles in Guatemala.

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16 Norris op. cit. p.11
Support for the Idea of Democracy

In terms of the first dimension, the general agreement with the idea that democracy is the best way of government, there is a basic question that has been included in questionnaires around the world like the Latinobarometer, the Eurobarometer and the World Values Survey:

Which of the following opinions about different forms of government is closest to your own?

1. In any case, democracy is the best form of government
2. In certain cases, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one
3. For someone like me, it doesn’t make any difference whether we have a democratic regime or not
4. Do not know

In the DIMS study, this question was asked for the first time in 1999. In Figure III.3 we can see the comparative results between 1999 and 2001. We can observe that there was a statistically significant increase in the preference for democracy in 2001 in comparison with 1999 (going up from 48% to 57%). We can also see that there is a high percentage of non-response to this question; however, the percentage of those who did not know decreased in 2001. There wasn’t much variation in the percentage of those who were indifferent or those who considered that an authoritarian government is sometimes preferable. About one-fifth of the respondents were indifferent to the type of regime both in 1999 and 2001, and about one-tenth showed preference for a dictatorship. These results show a positive trend towards a higher level of support for the idea that democracy is the best type of government.
A multivariate analysis of the results (see statistical annex) for 2001 allows us to see which variables have an explanatory power associated to the preference for democracy. The regression analysis\(^\text{17}\) showed that the determinants of preference for democracy in 2001 are place of residence, education, the index of political information, the index of participation in groups and satisfaction with democracy. Thus, those who reside in urban areas, who have less formal education, who have more political information, who participate in more social groups, and who are more satisfied with the way democracy is working in the country are likely to always prefer democracy.

An interesting finding is that those who have more education tend to have a lower level of preference for democracy.\(^\text{18}\) The low preference for democracy is especially marked among respondents with a high school education, in particular in rural areas. However, both in rural and urban areas, those who have some university education (graduates or just students) also show overall low levels of support for the idea of democracy. The explanation for this finding is not

\(^{17}\) Logistic and not linear regression was not used because the dependent variable was transformed in a dichotomous variable with those preferring democracy in one category and those preferring authoritarianism or indifference in another.

\(^{18}\) The results and the direction of the predictors were confirmed with a compare means procedure.
evident; it may be related to the fact that the respondents with higher education are in more contact with the media and therefore tend to be more critical. Nevertheless, it is a worrisome finding that should be further studied and taken into account in the programs of civic education with high school and university students. These programs should stress the importance of differentiating between the support for elected authorities and the support for democracy in general.

The following graph shows the differences in the preference for democracy. It uses two socio-demographic variables that are significant in the equation ---education and residence. It can be seen in Figure III.4 that at all levels of education, those residing in urban areas have a higher preference for democracy. We can also see that those of higher education (10 or more years of schooling) show less preference for democracy in both urban and rural areas.

Figure III.4
Preference for Democracy:
By Education and Residence
DIMS 2001
In Figure III.5, we can observe another determinant of the preference for democracy: Those who participate in more social groups show a higher preference for democracy. We can clearly see that those who participate in four or more groups are more likely to prefer democracy. This is not a surprising finding and stresses the importance of promoting social participation.

![Preference for Democracy by participation in groups](image)

**Figure III.5**
Preference for Democracy: By Participation in Groups
DIMS 2001

Finally, in Figure III.6 we can see the relationship between preference for democracy and satisfaction with democracy. Those who, at the time of the survey in September of 2001, were more satisfied with the way democracy was working in Guatemala had a higher preference for democracy. Recent theory in political science has made a difference in the support or preference for an ideal democracy and the actual satisfaction with the way democracy works in a given society. In Western democracies, citizens tend to have a high level of preference for democracy regardless of their satisfaction with the way in which it actually works. In Guatemala, however, there still seems to be a strong link between the performance of democracy and the preference for democracy as an ideal in people’s minds.
We now move to a comparative perspective between the levels of preference for democracy in Guatemala and other parts of the world. In the Latinobarometer, an urban survey of democratic values in Latin America, Guatemalans have usually obtained lower scores than other Latin Americans in terms of their preference for democracy. Table III.3 shows detail of the percentages obtained in different parts of the world in regards to this question:  

---

Table III.3
Democratic Legitimacy in the World (By Preference for Democracy)
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>PREFER DEMOCRACY</th>
<th>AUTHORITARIANISM</th>
<th>NO DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1985****</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1988**</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995**</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1985****</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1980****</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985****</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990****</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995****</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1988**</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995**</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1992*</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000*****</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999******</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1988**</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995**</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong></td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999***</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001***</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1988**</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1995**</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1997******</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Prepared by D. Azpuru
*Eurobarometer, Information found in Montero, Gunther and Torcal
**Latinobarometer, Information found in Montero, Gunther and Torcal
***Democratic Indicators Monitoring System (DIMIS), Guatemala
****Banco de Datos CIS, Information found in Montero, Gunther and Torcal
*****Latin America Public Opinion Project, University of Pittsburgh
******Latinobarometer database, 1997
As can be observed, Guatemala falls in the lower end of the table in terms of the preference for democracy. Furthermore, if it had not been for the increase shown in the preference for democracy in 2001, Guatemala would be almost at the bottom of the list, only above Paraguay. In evaluating these results, it must be taken into account that different from most countries in Table III.2, Guatemala is a post-conflict society that just came out of an internal struggle that left behind a legacy of polarization and hatred. On a more positive note, the percentage of Guatemalans who directly chose authoritarianism as an option is relatively low and similar to that of other countries in the Latin American region. Guatemala, however, has a larger number of citizens who either are indifferent to the regime type or who do not know what to answer.

It is interesting to compare the situation of Guatemala with that of Spain and Portugal in the early 80s when those countries were beginning a process of democratization. At the time, a large number of citizens in Spain and Portugal did not answer the question. By contrast, by the mid-90s, the percentage of Portuguese and Spanish citizens who chose democracy had dramatically increased. This increase in the support for democracy has probably a lot to do with the positive performance of democracy in those two European countries. In Latin America, although economic and social conditions are more difficult and although there is less accountability of authorities, the trend seemed to be positive over time. However, recent political events in some countries (i.e. Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina) like coup d'etat attempts, social turmoil and corruption by the elected authorities may turn the tide in the negative direction.

Support for Basic Democratic Principles

We now shift our attention to the legitimacy of other democratic principles in Guatemala. These are more tangible and not as general as the support for the idea of democracy that was analyzed before. First, we will analyze citizens' support for principles related to the right to a due process, something fundamental in any democracy. Respondents were asked the following questions:

- **To fight against crime, with what opinion do you agree more?**
  - Crime must be stopped even if some rights are violated
  - The suspect’s rights should never be violated

- **Does the police need a warrant when serious criminal activity is suspected?**
  - One should always wait until a judge issues a warrant
  - The police may enter a house without the need of a warrant

- **What do you think is preferable?**
  - To limit liberties to have order
  - To have full liberty even at the expense of some disorder

---

The average support for these three basic democratic principles in Guatemala can be seen in Figure III.7. The figure shows that the highest support in Guatemala is for the right to a warrant before entering a suspect’s home. However, we can observe a decrease of support for this right between 1999 and 2001, a difference statistically significant. The other two democratic principles seem to have less support among Guatemalans. Thus, a mean of 56 was obtained both in 1999 and 2001 for the belief that a suspect’s rights should always be respected. We can also see that only a third of Guatemalans prefer liberty to order whereas the majority consider that it is preferable to limit some liberties to have order in society. The preference for liberty (instead of order) decreased slightly in 2001 in comparison with 1999, but the difference is statistically non-significant.

![Support for Basic Democratic Rights](figure.png)

**Figure III.7**
Support for Basic Democratic Rights
DIMS 1999 and 2001

Through a series of logistic regression equations using the 2001 database, we determined which are the variables associated to the support for basic principles of democracy. In Table III.4, we can see the mean support for the different principles that were just enumerated and the independent variables that turned out to be significant predictors. The model used in all the three equations was the same, but as we can see, the predictors are different in each
case. However, some, like education and approval of self-justice actions, appear as predictors more often.  

Table III.4  
Predictors of Support for Basic Democratic Principles  
Averages (DIMS 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE</th>
<th>PREDICTORS OF SUPPORT</th>
<th>AVERAGE SUPPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The rights of the accused should never be violated | -Ethnicity  
• Indigenous  
• Ladino  
-Education  
• None  
• 1-6  
• 7-9  
• 10-12  
• University  
-Approval of self-justice  
• Yes  
• No  
-Rating of President’s performance  
• Very bad  
• Bad  
• Regular  
• Good  
• Very good | 60  
54  
51  
56  
59  
64  
55  
44  
66  
52  
57  
56  
63  
65 |
| A warrant is always necessary to enter a suspect’s home | -Education  
• None  
• 1-6  
• 7-9  
• 10-12  
• University  
-Approval of self-justice  
• Yes  
• No | 81  
73  
74  
67  
65  
67  
77 |
| It is preferable to have liberties even if it causes some disorder | -Gender  
• Male  
• Female  
-Feeling of security  
• Very unsafe  
• Unsafe  
• Safe  
• Very safe  
-Political tolerance  
• High  
• Low  
-Approval of self-justice  
• Yes  
• No | 34  
28  
27  
28  
31  
34  
36  
28  
23  
36 |

21 These results were confirmed through a compare means procedure.
As we can see in Table III.4, Indigenous Guatemalans are more likely to believe that rights should never be violated. This may be related to the fact that their rights have been violated by society to a greater extent than Ladino Guatemalans. We again see that education is an explanatory variable, but not necessarily in the positive direction. Those who have no education and those who have a university education are less likely to support this basic principle of democracy. In terms of non socio-demographic variables, those who believe that self-justice is acceptable (always or sometimes), not surprisingly, have less support for this right. Finally, those who consider that President Portillo is doing a good or very good job are more likely to believe that rights should never be violated.

As to who believes that a warrant is always necessary to enter a suspect’s home, only two variables turned out to be significant ---education and approval of self-justice. Surprisingly, those who have less education are more likely to approve of this right; whereas, those who have a university education are less prone to support it. At the same time, not surprisingly, those who approve in actions of self-justice are less likely to support this democratic principle.

In terms of the preference for order over liberty, we see that the predictors are different. Gender plays a role in this case: women are more likely to prefer order rather than liberty than do men. Those Guatemalans who feel unsafe or very unsafe in their neighborhoods are also more likely to prefer order. In addition, those who are less tolerant are more likely to prefer order. Once again, the support for self-justice turned out to be significant and those who accept the actions of self-justice are inclined to prefer order. The average support for liberty is lower than for the other two principles here assessed.

Overall, one of the most unexpected findings is that those with higher education have less support for the basic principles of democracy, especially those with a university education. It may not be so surprising if we consider that in previous DIMS studies, those with more education have shown to have less support for democratic institutions. The explanations of why that happens are difficult to grasp. It may be related to other variables such as the fact that the more educated tend to live in urban areas where insecurity is much higher, or that they are in more contact with a media highly critical of the system, or that they were raised in the period of the armed conflict when political positions were highly polarized.

The lower support for democratic principles among people with higher levels of education may also derive from an inadequate education curriculum. The education system does not stress democratic or civic education at any level. In fact, in the official programs of the Ministry of Education, only the class called “Estudios Sociales” (social studies) covers areas related to the political history and the political development of Guatemala. This class, however, also includes contents such as geography and world history, and therefore, there is a very
weak coverage of Guatemalan issues. It is optional for the teacher or a school (private or public) to include contents related to democratic education. The Peace Accords specifically called for the improvement in the programs of democratic education, but little has been done to date. In view of this, the promotion of programs of democratic education is a possible area of intervention of national and international cooperation programs.

In Figure III.8, we observe that the preference for liberty is very low among all categories of education. However, the belief that rights should never be violated in order to combat crime tends to be lower among those with a university education. Moreover, those with 10 years or more of education have a lower belief in the need for a warrant.

![Support for Democratic Principles By Education](image)

**Figure III.8**
Support for Democratic Principles By Education
DIMS 2001

Always related to the analysis of support for the principles of democracy is the support that Guatemalans have toward a series of actions that are common in a democratic regime. In the first set, we will examine those which can be called positive actions and afterwards those which can be considered negative actions since they are not legal in the Guatemalan legislation. The respondents were asked the following questions:
There are some actions in which people may participate in order to attain their political and popular objectives. Tell me how much would you approve or disapprove for people to participate in these actions (1 means total disapproval and 10 means total approval)?

- Participate in legal demonstrations?
- Participate in groups or associations that try to solve community problems?
- Work for a party or candidate during an electoral campaign?
- Close or block a road?
- Invade private property?
- Participate in a group that seeks to violently overthrow an elected government?

In Figure III.9, we can see the levels of approval for positive actions: participating in legal demonstrations, participating in groups to solve community problems and working for a party or candidate during an electoral campaign. Overall these are basic actions that should be allowed in every democracy and are therefore linked to the support for democratic principles. It can be observed that the participation in groups that solve community problems is supported by a majority of the respondents although the average is relatively low towards an action/right that should be key in any democracy. The right to participate in demonstrations obtains less approval, and the right to participate in a political campaign is not widely supported. The last finding is somewhat worrisome, given that participating in a campaign should be a widely accepted action in a democratic regime.
We now examine the support for actions that are considered as illegal by Guatemalan legislation although some of them have been relatively common in Guatemala since the democratic opening in the mid-80s: blocking streets or roads, invading private property and participating in groups that attempt to violently overthrow an elected government. In Figure III.10, we can see that there is relatively low support for the negative actions described. The invasion of private property obtains the lowest degree of approval. The participation in blocking roads or the participation in coup d’état attempts obtain both a low average of around 20. It must be noted, however, that the participation in coups d’état is much more negative to a democracy and should be bluntly rejected by any democratic citizen. This latter finding relates to another section of analysis of this chapter: the support for authoritarian options or principles.
Support for Authoritarian Principles

Authoritarianism is not a new social phenomenon, and the study of authoritarian regimes in Latin America has been abundant. However, most of those studies addressed the issue from a state-centric perspective: the characterization of the authoritarian regimes, the consequences of authoritarian governments and the demise of authoritarian regimes. On the contrary, social research on mass authoritarianism is more scarce. The main contributions date back to the work of famous psychologist Adorno, who published the results of his research in 1950. For many years, the experimental research on authoritarianism in the United States was based upon the work of Adorno, and, more specifically, the F-Scale derived from that study. Most of these studies leaned on the psychological analysis of authoritarianism and therefore used variables related to personality traits. According to some scholars, these studies had excessive preoccupation with individual differences in explaining prejudice, which was considered to be a

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22 Some of the most outstanding works on this subject were carried out by Guillermo O’Donnell, Juan Linz, Philippe Schmitter and others.
23 Adorno T.W., Else-Frenkel, B., Levinson D., & Sanford, N. The Authoritarian Personality, 1950 (Harper & Brothers, New York)
fundamental trait of authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{24} The emergence of social psychology allowed for more emphasis on situational determinants of behavior. Experimental research continued to be the dominant method, but some survey research was also conducted. In the decade of the 1980s, Robert Altemeyer again approached the issue of authoritarianism at the mass level. Most of his studies were conducted in developed countries using experimental research rather than public opinion surveys.\textsuperscript{25} In Latin America the study of mass authoritarianism has been even more scarce, although some quantitative research has been conducted in recent years.\textsuperscript{26}

In a society like Guatemala, with a long history of authoritarian governments and a very short experience with democracy, the study of authoritarian values of citizens becomes crucial. There may exist in the country a large pool of citizens with authoritarian tendencies. In the following figures, we will examine whether or not this is the case.

One of the items related to authoritarian values that has been included since the beginning of the DIMS studies in 1993 is whether Guatemalans think that the problems of the country can be solved with the participation of all or whether it is necessary to have a strong-hand government. It is believed that a democratic citizen should choose the participation option instead of the strong-hand option. This issue is discussed in-depth in Chapter VI of the 1999 DIMS report.

The cross-time results are in Figure III.11. As it can be seen, except for 1999, about half of the population has shown preference for a strong-hand (or strong-fisted) government through the years. The highest support for a strong-hand government was in 1999 (about 62\% of the respondents) when the fourth DIMS field study was conducted. This response was probably related to the fact that in the political campaign, one of the parties ---namely the FRG--- had a discourse related to the need of strong-hand. The leader of that party, General Efrain Rios Montt, has in fact always tried to portray that image. By September of 2001, however, the trend went back to what it used to be in previous years. This may be due to the fact that citizens realized that not many changes took place

\textsuperscript{25} See for instance Altemeyer, Robert. \textit{The Authoritarian Spector}, 1996 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA). It must also be noted that in the U.S, the studies on political authoritarianism have been confounded with the study of liberalism and conservatism, given that the central definition of authoritarianism subsumed conservatism. However, Altemeyer has argued that to say that all authoritarians are conservative is not the same as saying that all conservatives are authoritarians. Neither of these statements is the same as saying that conservatives and authoritarians share some of the same defining characteristics. Knight, Kathleean. "Liberalism and Conservatism" in \textit{Measures of Political Attitudes} edited by J. Robinson, P. Shaver and L. Wrightsman, 1999 (Academic Press, San Diego, CA)
(for instance in the fight against corruption or crime) in spite of having strong-hand government.

![Preference for Stronghand Government](image)

**Figure III.11**
Preference for Stronghand Government
DIMS 1993-2001

It is still worrisome to see that about half of Guatemalans believe in the need for a strong-hand government instead of a participatory one. A multivariate analysis of the 2001 DIMS database allows us to identify the variables that relate to that support for strong-hand government. The predictor variables that are statistically significant in explaining the support for strong-hand are education, party vote in the 1999 elections, the index of political information, the preference for liberty instead of order, the belief that a warrant is necessary to enter a suspect’s home, the satisfaction with democracy, and crime victimization.

More specifically, those with less formal education, those who voted for the FRG in the 1999 elections, those who have less political information, those who prefer order and those who believe that a warrant is not necessary to enter a suspect’s home, are more likely to prefer a strong-hand government to resolve the problems of Guatemala. In addition, those who are more satisfied with the way democracy was working in 2001 and those who have not been victims of crime also tend to prefer strong-hand.
The last two findings may seem contradictory, but there may be plausible explanations. On the one hand, those who are satisfied with the FRG government (which has continued trying to portray a strong-hand image) may relate this factor to their satisfaction with the way democracy is functioning and are therefore more likely to support a strong-hand government. On the other hand, those who have been victims of crime in the past 12 months may believe that the current government ---allegedly a stronghand government--- was not able to protect them from crime and may, therefore, look for another option (i.e., a participatory government).

The following figures show in detail some of the above-mentioned findings. We can clearly see in Figure III.12 that respondents with less education have a greater tendency to prefer a strong-hand government. In this case, those with university education are likely to prefer a participatory government. This was the only socio-demographic variable that turned out to be a predictor of support for strong-hand government.

This finding may seem inconsistent with the findings from previous pages, that showed that a higher education seemed to have a negative impact in the preference for the idea of democracy or the support for democratic principles. Although it is difficult to give a tangible explanation, we can share some thoughts. Maybe those with a higher education prefer a government that gives participation rather than a government that acts with a stronghand because they are interested in having their own right to participate safeguarded. However, when it comes to the rights of others (e.g. crime suspects), Guatemalans with more education may have a different opinion. Again, this contradiction may stem from an educational system that does little to inculcate democratic values and that when it does, stresses the personal rights of citizens but not the rights of others or the obligations of citizens in a democracy.
In Figure III.13, we observe the relationship between the vote for the FRG in 1999 and the preference for strong-hand. We see that those who voted for the FRG have a statistically significant higher preference for a strong-hand government. The above finding should not be surprising, given that the party that won the elections in 1999 had a political discourse that portrayed a strong-hand stance.
Finally, in Figure III.14, we see the relationship between the preference for strong-hand and two of the democratic principles analyzed earlier in this chapter. We can see that those who prefer a strong-hand tend to have a lower support for democratic principles; finding that is not surprising.
An item that more clearly (than the preference for strong-hand) implies the existence of authoritarian tendencies is the belief that a coup d’etat may be sometimes necessary. This is precisely the antithesis of democracy and a political phenomenon very common to Guatemala’s political history up to 1985, when the democratic opening began. After that year, there have been attempts of coups d’etat, but they have been unsuccessful, and democracy has prevailed.

Related to this issue the DIMS surveys have always asked the respondents if they think that there can ever be reason for the military to take power through a coup d’etat or if there is never enough reason for that. In Figure III.15 we can see how much support does the possibility of a coup d’etat has obtained in Guatemala since 1993. As it can be seen, the mean support for an eventual coup d’etat is relatively high and almost at the 50-point reference line for all years, except 1999 when it declined. The increase in the acceptance of a coup d’etat between 1999 and 2001 (year in which the average support for a coup is the highest ever) is troublesome, and it may be related to the ambiance of polarization and lack of dialogue that existed in Guatemala in 2001 between the government and diverse sectors of society.
A multivariate analysis showed that the only predictor of support for an eventual coup d’état is a higher trust in the army. None of the socio-demographic or contextual variables proved to be significant predictors in the different models that were used.

Finally, we will show some comparative results with the legitimacy of democratic principles in Bolivia and El Salvador. The comparison with these two countries is relevant because on the one hand, Bolivia has a high percentage of indigenous population and on the other hand, because El Salvador is a post-conflict society. In addition, they are both societies where authoritarian governments have been the rule rather than the exception throughout their political history. In Table III.5 we see some of those comparative results, using questions that had exactly the same format and measurement scale in all three countries.
Table III.5
The Legitimacy of Democratic Principles
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION</th>
<th>GUATEMALA 2001</th>
<th>BOLIVIA 2000</th>
<th>EL SALVADOR 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should the police wait for a warrant before entering a suspect’s home?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Don’t wait</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wait for the warrant</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Don’t know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you think is better?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• To have order in society even if some freedoms are restricted</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Respect all rights even if that causes some disorder</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Don’t know</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can the problems of the country be solved in a better way?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With a strong-hand government</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With the participation of all</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: For Guatemala, DIMS 2001 database; for Bolivia and El Salvador databases from the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, Bolivia 2000, El Salvador 1999

Although Guatemala obtains a slightly better result with regards to the right for a warrant, in the other two aspects, a much higher percentage of Guatemalans favors the less democratic alternatives.

In addition, in Figure III.16 we can see the differences in preference for a strong-hand government.
The latter part of this chapter deals with the third level of legitimacy of democracy, that of the support for the performance of the regime. According to diverse academics it is another dimension that differs from the support for democracy as an ideal. Some scholars stress the value of separating support for democracy as an ideal form of government from citizens’ evaluations of the contemporary performance of their particular political regime however much it may meet or stray from democratic norms. In western democracies, for instance, the support for the idea of democracy tends to be high in spite of the fact that the satisfaction with the way in which democracy works is usually lower.

To measure the support for the performance of the democratic regime, respondents are asked how satisfied they are with the way democracy is working in their country, giving them four options for reply. In Guatemala, this question was asked for the first time in the 2001 DIMS study.

---

The distribution of results can be seen in the Figure III.7. It shows that one fourth of Guatemalans (25%) feel “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with the way democracy works in their country. Around 50% feel “not very satisfied” and a quarter (another 25%) feel “not satisfied”.

![Pie chart showing satisfaction with democracy among Guatemalans.](image)

**Figure III.17**
**Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works in Guatemala**
**DIMS 2001**

The only way to establish the meaning of these results is by comparing them with results of other countries. The question used in the DIMS 2001 to measure satisfaction with democracy has the same format and scale (four options of response) as the question that has been asked in regional democratic values surveys around the world, namely the Eurobarometer, the Latinobarometer and the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer. The exact same question has also been included in the studies conducted by the University of Pittsburgh in several Latin American countries as part of the Latin American Public Opinion Project.28 In Table III.6, we see the comparison of the

---

28 As part of the collaboration with the University of Pittsburgh, the databases from the El Salvador 1999 and the Bolivia 2000 studies were used in this report.
percentage of citizens who chose the options of very satisfied or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in each country.  

Table III.6  
Satisfaction with Democratic Performance around the World  
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% VERY OR FAIRLY SATISFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Europe*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Europe**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  
*Eurobarometer  
**Central and Eastern Eurobarometer

Most of the information for this table was found in Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, op. cit.
We will now compare the results shown above with the results from the Latin American region. We must note that the data from the Latinobarometro refers to urban areas in Latin America.

### Table III.7
Satisfaction with Democratic Performance in Latin America
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>% VERY OR FAIRLY SATISFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000****</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1999****</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001*****</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1997***</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
***Latinobarometer database, 1997
****University of Pittsburgh’s Latin America Public Opinion Project databases
*****DIMS 2001

Guatemala positions itself in the middle of the table in the Latinobarometer of 1997, but note that most Central American countries obtain better results in that survey with regards to this question. Guatemalans show much less satisfaction in 2001 with only 25% of the population feeling very or fairly satisfied with the way in which democracy works. This change may derive from the differences in the samples, given that the DIMS sample is nation-wide whereas the Latinobarometer is only urban. However, the result may also be influenced by a true disappointment with the way democracy was working in 2001. We must recall that 1997 was a positive year for the country. A Peace Accord between the URNG and the government had just been reached, there was a lot of international support for that peace process, and there were probably high expectations with regards to the future of democracy in Guatemala. By contrast,
2001 was a year in which dialogue and consensus, two basic traits of democracy, were, for the most part absent from the political panorama.

We now examine which are the main predictors of satisfaction with democracy. The linear regression analysis shows that there is a significant relationship between satisfaction with the performance of democracy and age, gender, wealth, the feeling of security, the level of political information of the respondent, the preference for democracy, the preference for a strong-hand government, the satisfaction with municipal services, and the evaluation of the performance of the current President. The equation is shown in the statistical annex.

A compare means procedure confirms the direction of the relationship. Age does not show a clear pattern and the satisfaction with democracy varies in an uneven way. In the case of gender, however, things are clearer: men tend to be more satisfied with the performance of democracy than women. In terms of wealth, those with a lower socio-economic level tend to feel more satisfied with the performance of democracy. The latter results can be seen in Figure III.18:
In Figure III.19 we can see that those who feel more secure are likely to be more satisfied with the way democracy is working while those Guatemalans who feel less secure\textsuperscript{30} tend to be less satisfied. This confirms the importance of contextual variables as explanations of certain political variables.

![Figure III.19](image)

Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy and Feeling of Security

DIMS 2001

Not all the determinants of satisfaction with democracy will be shown graphically. However, It is worth mentioning that those who have a higher level of political information (i.e. know more about political leaders) tend to be less satisfied with democracy. It is important to also point out the relationship between two important variables dealt with earlier in this chapter (the preference for democracy and the preference for a strong-hand government) and the satisfaction with the performance of democracy. The association can be seen in Figure III.20. As it can be observed, those who think that democracy is always preferable tended to feel more satisfied with the performance of democracy in 2001. We can also see that those who prefer the country’s problems to be

\textsuperscript{30} The feeling of security was measured through a question that asked the respondent how safe did he or she felt in his/her neighborhood.
solved with a strong-hand rather than with the participation of all, were likely to feel more satisfied with the way democracy was working in Guatemala in 2001.

Finally, linked to the issues that will be discussed in Chapter V when we address the legitimacy of the local and the national government, we can see in Figure III.21 that the satisfaction with the performance of democracy is directly related to a positive evaluation of the President and to a positive evaluation of the services provided by the local government. As we can clearly see, those who in September of 2001, had a more positive evaluation of the performance of President Alfonso Portillo also felt more satisfied with the way democracy was working at the time of the survey. In a similar way, it is clear that those who felt fairly satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of the services provided by their local government also had a higher degree of satisfaction with the performance of democracy in Guatemala. By contrast, those who had a very low image of the performance of the President and those who rated the municipal services with a lower score reported not feeling satisfied with the way democracy is working. These findings accentuate the importance of efficient local governments in the country.
Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy
And Evaluation of President’s Performance and of Municipal Services

DIMS 2001

Both variables sig. < .001

Figure III.21
Satisfaction with the Performance of Democracy,
Evaluation of President’s Performance
and of the Quality of Municipal Services
DIMS 2001
CHAPTER IV
SYSTEM SUPPORT AND TOLERANCE

Theory and Methodology

This chapter deals with the fourth level of support for democracy discussed in Table III.1 (Chapter III): the support for the system and the support for democratic institutions.\(^{31}\) A central focus of all previous DIMS studies since 1993 has been the evaluation of two key democratic indicators—system support and political tolerance. According to the theoretical model that guides the discussion in this chapter,\(^{32}\) a democracy is more likely to be stable over time in a society where the legitimacy of democratic institutions and tolerance for minority rights are strong. The diverse possible combinations of high-low system support and high-low tolerance, are shown in Table IV.1.

Table IV.1
Theoretical Relationship Between
System Support and Political Tolerance
In Democratic Societies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYSTEM SUPPORT</th>
<th>TOLERANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Stable Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unstable Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{31}\) Because of the framework used in previous DIMS Reports, the analysis of tolerance, which would have corresponded in Chapter III (among the analysis of democratic principles), will be made here.

\(^{32}\) This framework was presented first in Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Cordova Macias, *Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador* (San Salvador: IDELA, 1993). For a more recent discussion see Mitchell A. Seligson, “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability: Political Culture in Central America”, *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe*, 11, No. 2 (2000). The theory that sustains this discussion has also been discussed in previous DIMS studies.
The most important cells are those called “stable democracy” and “democratic breakdown.” The cell stable democracy represents a situation in which a large number of citizens in any given democratic polity show high levels of tolerance for minority rights and high support for their democratic institutions; there, democracy is more likely to endure over time. By contrast, in a polity where citizens display low levels of political tolerance and low support for democratic institutions, a democratic breakdown is more likely. Clearly, there are many other factors, both local and international, that may influence a democratic breakdown, but it has been acknowledged by several prominent academics that a strong set of democratic values among a population may decisively help to sustain a democracy, particularly in difficult times when it is under stress.³³

The cell called “authoritarian stability” represents those societies where system support is high but tolerance is low. Here, stability is a likely outcome because the institutions of the regime have popular support; but because there is low support for minority rights, those systems may move toward an authoritarian rule with restrictions on democratic rights. Finally, the cell called “unstable democracy” represents those polities where there is high tolerance but low system support. These polities may move in a positive direction if the support for minority rights can be translated into more civil liberties; however, they may also undergo periods of political violence because of the instability.

The measurement of system support and political tolerance used in this report is backed by the theoretical approach discussed before. As a result of a long-term research project at the University of Pittsburgh, two scales for measuring system support and for tolerance were developed. The scales, based originally on studies carried out in developed democracies, have also been used in Central America and other Latin American countries in recent years.³⁴

The scale of legitimacy or system support is called “Political Support/Alienation” (PSA) and is based upon five core items measured on a 1-7 point scale (in which 1 means not at all and 7 means a great deal):

- To what extent do you believe that the courts in Guatemala guarantee a fair trial?
- To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Guatemala?
- To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Guatemalan political system?
- To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Guatemala?

³³ For a discussion of conditions that may lead to a democratic breakdown, see Linz, Juan & Stepan, Alfred, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 1978 (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD). Among the academics that acknowledge the importance of system support and tolerance are Robert Dahl, Larry Diamond and Seymour Martin Lipset.

³⁴ In addition to the Guatemala DIMS studies carried out every other year since 1993, similar studies have been conducted in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay and more recently Ecuador. All of the studies have been part of the University of Pittsburgh’s Latin America Public Opinion Project. Most of those studies have been supported by USAID and some have been supported by the Interamerican Development Bank and other international organizations.
To what extent do you feel that one ought to support the political system of Guatemala?

The core items just discussed were not used in the previous DIMS studies in Guatemala; however they were incorporated into the questionnaire for the 2001 study in order to have the possibility to compare the results of Guatemala with those of other countries.

There is another dimension for the measurement of system support (also understood as legitimacy) known as the extended system support series. It taps into citizens’ support towards specific democratic institutions by asking them how much trust they have in those institutions. The five basic democratic institutions are the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Congress, the courts, public offices and political parties. It assumes that citizens with strong democratic values should differentiate between the support for institutions and the support for the incumbents. In other words, institutions are permanent and should count on citizens’ support in order for democracy to sustain. However, elected authorities are temporary, and their poor performance should not lead citizens to withdraw support from the institutions themselves.

The support for these five basic institutions as well as other political institutions is also evaluated in the DIMS 2001. Another substantial change that was introduced in the Guatemala DIMS 2001 was a new 1-7 point scale for the measurement of extended system support. Previously, a 3-point scale was used, giving the respondent fewer options and limiting the comparison with other countries. Nevertheless, the question was duplicated using both the old and the new measurement scaled in the case of four institutions: the courts, congress, political parties, and the municipalities in order to be able to carry out cross-time analysis.

The measurement of political tolerance in the DIMS 2001 was made, as it has been in previous occasions, using the following four items.

There are people who only say bad things about the governments of Guatemala, not only the current government, but the system of Guatemalan government. How strongly (on the scale of 1-10) would you approve or disapprove the right of these people to:

- Vote
- Participate in peaceful demonstrations
- Run for public office
- Use the radio or the television to express themselves

It must be noted that in the DIMS 2001, the scale of measurement for tolerance in Guatemala was also changed to a 10-point scale. In the previous DIMS, a 2-point scale was used, which again limited the respondent’s options and did not allow for comparative analysis with other countries of the region.

The changes introduced in the measurement scale of system support and tolerance in Guatemala in 2001 limit the possibilities to carry out cross-time comparisons with the previous DIMS studies, however, those changes allow for cross-country comparisons. This comparison is important because it places
Guatemalans in a larger context of countries that are also in a process of democratizing, especially those in Central America.

**System Support in Guatemala**

We now proceed to see the results of system support for Guatemala in three different dimensions: the results obtained in the larger sample of 1,670 respondents in 2001; those results in a comparative perspective with other countries; and in the case of four items, a cross-time comparison within Guatemala. In all cases, as it has been usual in the previous DIMS reports, the items were recoded in a 0-100 scale in order to have a better understanding of the results.

As it was explained in Chapter III, the support for the system represents another level of legitimacy of the regime. More specifically it represents the support that citizens may have for permanent democratic institutions and the political system.

Although the previous DIMS studies in Guatemala did not include the core items used to construct the PSA scale, they were added to the questionnaire in 2001. The results of the individual items are shown in Figure IV.1.
As can be observed, the average support is below 50 points in all of the core items. This is considered the dividing line or reference line for high and low support. The following table shows the comparative results with two other Latin American countries Bolivia and El Salvador.\(^{35}\)

### Table IV.2
Comparative Averages of System Support
Core Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE/COUNTRY</th>
<th>GUATEMALA 2001</th>
<th>EL SALVADOR 1999</th>
<th>BOLIVIA 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do courts guarantee a free trial?</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should institutions be respected?</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are basic human rights protected?</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you feel proud of the political system?</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should the political institutions be supported?</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV.2 shows that Guatemalans display lower system support than Salvadorans in all items. The comparison with El Salvador is particularly useful given that both Central American countries are post-conflict societies that are trying to consolidate democracy after decades of authoritarian rule.

In the comparison with Bolivia, both Guatemalans and Bolivians obtain an average of 39 in the variable related to the protection of human rights (which is rather low). Guatemalans have a better opinion than Bolivians about the courts guaranteeing a free trial. In the three remaining items (pride of the political system, belief that institutions should be respected, and belief that the institutions should be supported), Guatemalans obtain a lower average than Bolivians.

We now analyze the index of legitimacy, which is the PSA scale that attempts to tap in on the level of citizens’ support for their system of government. The scale is formed by the five core items mentioned before. Guatemala obtains an average of 43 points on this scale. The result, which is below the 50-point line, can be better understood through a comparison with results of other countries in Latin America in recent years, as shown in Figure IV.2.

\(^{35}\) The results for El Salvador were obtained from M. Seligson, J. Cruz and R. Cordova Macias, *Auditoria de la Democracia, El Salvador 1999* (Iuodop, University of Pittsburgh and FundaUngo, El Salvador, Imprenta Criterio, 2000) and from Mitchell A. Seligson, *La cultura política de la democracia en Bolivia: 2000*. In both cases, the same questions and the same scales were used and therefore the comparison is possible.
We now move on to the analysis of another dimension of system support: the extended system support series that looks at the support of citizens towards specific democratic institutions by asking them how much trust they have in them. In Figure IV.3, we can see the support obtained by five basic democratic institutions in Guatemala in 2001. As indicated before, a new scale that ranges from 1 to 7 was used in contrast to the previous DIMS, which only gave the respondent 3 options. As can be observed, the average support for all five democratic institutions is also on the lower half of the 0-100 range used throughout this chapter.
By contrast, the same institutions obtained higher support in neighboring El Salvador in 1999:

- Trust in the Electoral Tribunal = 55
- Trust in the Supreme Court = 52
- Trust in Congress = 48
- Trust in political parties = 36

We will now take a look at the support given by Guatemalans in 2001 to a whole range of political institutions. The results are shown in Figure IV.4. As can be seen, most institutions have little trust from the population, and they all fall under the dividing 50-point line.\(^{36}\)

---

\(^{36}\) One of the concerns in using the core items questions and the new scales in both system support and tolerance, was that there could be little understanding of them in Guatemala and that the number of non-responses would be high. However, the percentage of non-response was low overall. Only in some cases did it come up to 14% of the sample, which in any case does not represent a large percentage of the total population.
The 2001 questionnaire included four items of extended system support using the old 3-point measurement scale: Congress, the courts, political parties, and the respondent’s municipality. This allows for cross-time comparisons within Guatemala. The results are shown in Figure IV.5. It must be noted that the item related to trust in the respondent’s own municipality was not used in 1993 nor in 1995. In 1997, 1999 and 2001, the municipality is the institution that obtains higher trust from citizens. However, this support has been declining steadily, and, as noted above, in 2001 it falls for the first time to the negative range of the scale (below 50 points). The decline in support for the respondent’s own municipality may be related to factors like the relatively frequent claims of corruption in many local governments or the lack of efficiency in delivering services to the population. We will come back to this issue in Chapter V.

In Figure IV.5, we can also see that other institutions like congress and the political parties, which had experienced an increase of citizens’ support back in 1999, also experienced a decline of trust in 2001. This is probably also related to the accusations of corruption in congress that have been frequent in the media these past two years.
Explanatory Variables for System Support

What are the factors that influence a higher or lower support for the political system in Guatemala? Are the socio-demographic traits of respondents the variables that account for more or less system support, or are there other explanations? Through a multivariate analysis using the index of system support (based upon the 5 core items) as a dependent variable, we find that there are several variables related to system support that turn out to be statistically significant: economic satisfaction, satisfaction with municipal services, the evaluation of the performance of the President, the perception of the level of corruption in the government, the satisfaction with the way democracy works in Guatemala, and the preference for stronghand government. The equation is shown in the statistical annex.

Thus, those Guatemalans who are more satisfied with their economic situation, those who are more satisfied with the services provided by their local government, those who perceive that the corruption in the government is not extended, those who positively evaluate the performance of President Alfonso Portillo, those who are more satisfied with the way democracy is working, and
those who prefer a participatory government (rather than a government that uses a strong-hand to resolve the country’s problems) are more likely to support the Guatemalan system of government. In the following figures, we can graphically see the relationship between system support and some of the aforementioned explanatory variables. In the equation, none of the socio-demographic variables turned out to be significant predictors of system support.

In Figure IV.6 we see the link between economic satisfaction, education, and support for the political system in Guatemala. We observe that, regardless of the level of education of the respondents, those who are more satisfied with their economic situation tend to be more supportive of the political system. This should come as no surprise, given the association that has been found in diverse studies between economic development and the prospects for democracy. Note that education is not a significant predictor of system support but that economic satisfaction is statistically significant.

![System Support, Education and Economic Satisfaction](image-url)
In Figure IV.7, we see the influence of the performance of the current President and gender in the support for the system. Those who hold a favorable image of the performance of the President are more likely to grant legitimacy (support) to the political system. This finding is not a positive one since citizens should differentiate between a good or poor performance of the incumbent authorities from a more permanent support for their political system. Note that in this case, both men and women are equally more likely to support the system if they have a positive evaluation of the performance of the President. Although in most cases, men seem to be more supportive of the system; the difference with women is not statistically significant.

![System Support](image)

**Figure IV.7**
**System Support, Gender and Evaluation of President’s Performance**
**DIMS 2001**

Finally, in Figure IV.8, we see the relationship between satisfaction with local government services and general system support. We can observe the importance of local government, which is many times underestimated. It can be seen that those who consider that municipal services are good or excellent tend to have a higher average of system support; by contrast those who rate the services provided as bad or very bad have lower support for the system. The multivariate analysis showed that residence (urban or rural) is not associated to higher of lower system support.
Political Tolerance in Guatemala

Tolerance is a basic principle of democracy, and the prospects for the consolidation of democracy are enhanced by the existence of citizens who are tolerant to the political ideas of others, especially the minorities. In this section, through the analysis of tolerance in Guatemala, we go back to analyzing the support for democratic principles (covered partially by Chapter III). As it was mentioned earlier, the questions related to political tolerance were kept in the same format of the previous DIMS studies; however, there was a modification in the measuring scales: In 2001 a 10-point scale was used in order to make the results from Guatemala comparable to those of other countries (instead of the 2-point scale used before). The results for tolerance in each of the four individual items used in this study to measure tolerance are shown in Figure IV.9:
As in the case of system support, the results are also on the lower half of the 100-point range scale. In other words, Guatemalans show low tolerance for the right of others to vote, to demonstrate, to run for office, and to speak freely. Again, the comparison with other Latin American countries can be useful to put Guatemala’s results into better perspective.

Table IV.3
Comparative Political Tolerance Averages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE/COUNTRY</th>
<th>GUATEMALA 2001</th>
<th>EL SALVADOR 1999</th>
<th>BOLIVIA 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for voting</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for demonstrations</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for running for office</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for free speech</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
For Guatemala DIMS 2001;
For other countries data from the University of Pittsburgh’s Latin American Public Opinion Project.
We can see once again that Salvadorans in 1999 had higher levels of political tolerance than Guatemalans in 2001. In a similar way, the average for each individual item used to measure tolerance was higher in Bolivia in 2000 than in Guatemala in 2001.

By combining the four items of political tolerance, we can construct an index of political tolerance. In Figure IV.10, we can see the results for the index of system support (constructed with the 5 core items) and the index of political tolerance (constructed with the 4 items mentioned before) in Guatemala. Both indexes are under the 50-point dividing line and can therefore be considered negative indexes.

Once again, using information from the University of Pittsburgh’s Latin America Public Opinion Project, we can see in Figure IV.11 that Guatemala’s index of political tolerance is the lowest in the region, at least among the countries that have been included in these types of studies:
The scale of measurement of tolerance was modified in the DIMS 2001 and consequently the results from previous DIMS vary from the results of the DIMS 2001. Even if a cross-time comparison is not possible given the use of a new scale of measurement, we must recall that tolerance has remained low in Guatemala over the years. The index of political tolerance using the old measurement scale were the following:

1993 = 44
1995 = 49
1997 = 54
1999 = 52
We now move to the multivariate analysis to try to find out which are the predictors that help explain political tolerance in Guatemala. The regression equation shows that the only explanatory variables for political tolerance are place of residence, wealth, and satisfaction with democracy. Thus, those who live in rural areas, those Guatemalans who are poorer, and those who are less satisfied with democracy are less likely to be tolerant. This stresses the importance of carrying out programs of civic education in rural areas and, in particular, among the population that has lower income.

Figure IV.12 shows that those who have a higher socio-economic level tend to have a higher level of tolerance.

![Figure IV.12](image)

Figure IV.13 shows some interesting findings. In the case of Ladino Guatemalans, those living in rural areas display a slightly higher level of tolerance. In the case of Indigenous Guatemalans however, those who reside in urban areas tend to be more tolerant. We must recall that the difference between rural and urban areas is statistically significant whereas the difference between Ladinos and Indigenous it not significant.
Political Tolerance
By Residence and Ethnic Self-Identification

DIMS 2001

Residence sig. <.005. Ethnicity not sig.

Empirical Relationship Between System Support and Tolerance in Guatemala

As it has been stated in all previous DIMS reports as well as in all the studies of democratic values conducted under the University of Pittsburgh’s project, the final goal in the measurement of system support and tolerance is to put them together in a model that helps evaluate the overall attitudes that favor a stable democracy in any given country.

We can see the final results for Guatemala 2001 in Table IV.4. It is very important to note once again that different from the model presented in previous DIMS reports, the measurement scales varied in 2001 both in the case of tolerance and in the case of system support; moreover, the items used to measure system support are no longer the extended series of support for institutions, but the five core items. Therefore, the numbers in Table IV.4 cannot be compared to those of previous years.
Table IV.4
Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support
Guatemala, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYSTEM SUPPORT</th>
<th>TOLERANCE</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Stable Democracy</td>
<td>Authoritarian Stability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unstable Democracy</td>
<td>Democratic Breakdown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16 %</td>
<td>44 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be observed, a high percentage of Guatemalans (44%) fall in the category of democratic breakdown, which is a highly troublesome finding.\textsuperscript{37} It is hard to predict what the consequences of this result may be. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in addition to the opinion of the masses, there are many other factors that may influence an actual democratic breakdown. Some possible intervening variables are the role and positioning of local elites, the role of the military, and international conditions --including support, indifference or opposition from international actors.

In the attempted coup d'etat (\textit{autogolpe}) staged by Jorge Serrano in May of 1993, the masses did not play a fundamental role in the return to democracy, whereas the actions taken by the Guatemalan elites (including leaders from different social organizations united in the \textit{Instancia Nacional de Consenso}), the military, and the international community were crucial.

Overall, maybe because of the long history of political repression in Guatemala, the masses have not played a relevant role in the major political events that have occurred in the country. Even social movements like the Revolution of October 1944 were largely urban-based. However, the discontent of the masses anywhere in the world may have unpredictable consequences. We can at least say that having 44% of the population in the democratic breakdown cell in 2001 makes Guatemala more vulnerable to a democratic breakdown. Ergo, the possibilities of democratic stability in the long-term would be better preserved if Guatemalans were more tolerant and showed more support for their political system. Therefore, any efforts to carry out programs of democratic education are indispensable for democratic stability in the long-range in Guatemala.

\textsuperscript{37} In the 1999 survey and using the old measuring system, 20% of Guatemalans fell in the democratic breakdown cell and 28% in the stable democracy cell. However, the comparison across time should not be made, given that both the questions used to build the index of system support and the scales of measurement for both system support and tolerance are different.
In 2001, almost one fifth (18%) of Guatemalans fell in the cell of those who favor a stable democracy. The importance of this finding can be better observed in a comparison with studies conducted in other countries of the Latin American region, which have used the same measurement scales and questions. In Figure IV.14 we can look at the percentage of citizens who fall in the cell of stable democracy in several countries of the region:

Although Guatemala falls in the middle of the figure shown above, the results are somewhat discouraging in comparison with the results obtained in recent years (especially in 1999) by El Salvador and Nicaragua, two neighboring countries that are also post-conflict societies. We cannot determine whether there has been an actual decline of tolerance and system support within Guatemala in comparison with previous years, because the scales and questions used to measure them were different in 2001. However, given the polarization and erosion of political institutions that has occurred in the country in recent times, in particular in the months prior to the 2001 survey, it is likely that a large decline may have actually taken place.
CHAPTER V
FROM LOCAL TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Theory and Methodology

In Table III.1 (Chapter III), there is a detailed recount of the different levels of legitimacy that may exist in a society. The more diffuse levels of legitimacy (the legitimacy of the political community, the legitimacy of the principles of the regime, and the legitimacy of the performance of the regime) were discussed in Chapter III. In Chapter IV a detailed analysis of the support for the political system and the political institutions was made. In this fifth chapter we will examine the most specific level of legitimacy: the support that Guatemalans have for their authorities, starting at the local level and moving up to the national level.

As it was seen in the two previous chapters, the legitimacy of the regime as well as the legitimacy of political institutions is closely associated to the performance of the authorities, especially the municipality of the respondent and the President.

Over the years, a series of questions related to the performance of local and national governments have been included in the DIMS studies. These can allow us to have an overall perspective of the perceptions of Guatemalans about their elected authorities and the political actors (namely the political parties). Some new questions were included in 2001 and should allow for a more in-depth analysis. The comparison with other countries is not as relevant in this chapter, and in fact, there are only a few items that can be found in the exact format in databases from other countries. However, when possible, a comparative perspective will also be presented.

Support for Local Government

In the fourth DIMS Report, published in February of 2000, we could see a tendency towards the decrease of confidence in the local government over the years. However, the municipality continued to be one of the institutions that had a better image among Guatemalans. In Chapter IV of this report we observed that the declining trend continued in 2001. In this chapter we will go more in-depth into the analysis of Guatemalans’ perceptions about their local authorities.

We will first take a look at several aspects related to the relationship between the municipality and citizens. In Figure V.1, we can observe the frequency with which the respondents have attended meetings at their municipality. We can see that the percentage of those who have attended has remained basically unchanged throughout the years. Only around 13% of Guatemalans reported having attended meetings at their local municipality.
In Figure V.2, we can see the cross-time results for another aspect: whether citizens have requested help from their municipality in the past 12 months. Here we find an improvement, which is statistically significant. By 2001, an additional 5% of Guatemalans had made demands to their municipality. Compare this with the previous years when the trend had remained unchanged.
Have you made demands to your municipality in the past 12 months?

DIMS 1995-2001

DIF. sig. < .005

We will now explore whether there has been a change in the cross-time trend in aspects related to how well the local government communicates with citizens about its activities. From the data, we can see that there has been a steady increase in the percentage of citizens who feel that the municipality does not keep them well-informed or not informed at all, a difference that is statistically significant. Overall, only one-third of the respondents (32%) in 2001 considered that the municipality keeps them somewhat informed or very well informed. In Figure V.3, we can see those results.
We will now examine which are the determinants of the relationship between citizens and their local government. In other words, we will, through a series of multivariate analysis, try to establish which independent variables explain the results we just discussed, taking into account the answers given by the respondents in 2001.

In the first place, through a logistic regression analysis, we find that the variables that are related to the attendance to meetings in the municipality are the participation in groups, the support for the system, and the vote in 1999. More explicitly, those who participate in more social groups, those who have a higher level of support for the political system, and those who voted in 1999 are more likely to attend the local government meetings. In Figure V.4, we can see the differences that exist between those who indicated that they voted in the 1999 elections and those who didn’t vote: Those who voted tend to attend municipal meetings more than those who didn’t. The difference is statistically significant.
As to who requested help or presented demands to the local government, the only predictors that turned out to be significant are education and, again, the participation in social groups. Thus, those who have a higher level of education and those who participate in more social groups are more likely to have presented requests to their municipality in the previous 12 months. The importance of education can be more clearly seen in Figure V.5.
In neither of the above cases was the respondent’s residence (urban or rural) a significant predictor. Although there are differences, they are not statistically significant. However, in the third variable here examined -- whether the municipality gives information to citizens -- residence is a significant predictor. The level of participation in social groups also turned out to be an important determinant in this case, as it was in the case of attendance to municipal meetings and of requests for help from the municipality. Accordingly, those who reside in urban areas and Guatemalans who participate more in social groups feel better informed by the local government than those who reside in rural areas and who don’t participate (or only participate in few) in organizations.

Furthermore, those who feel better informed by their local government have a higher level of trust in their municipality and are more satisfied with the performance of democracy. This is so in urban and rural areas, although in rural areas, the relationship between satisfaction with democracy and the information provided by the local government is not as clear. The latter findings can be seen in Figure V.6.
Does the Municipality Keep you Informed?

By Residence and Satisfaction with Democracy

DIMS 2001

Satisfaction with the way democracy is working in Guatemala

Both variables sig. <.005

In Figure V.7, we can see that the differences between Ladino Guatemalans and Indigenous Guatemalans are not statistically significant in the items related to the attendance to municipal meetings and the requests made to the municipality. In fact, the percentage of Ladinos and Indigenous Guatemalans that attended municipal meetings is exactly the same; in the other case, a slightly higher percentage of Indigenous Guatemalans made demands to their municipality, although the difference is not statistically significant.
However, in the case of information received from the municipal government, there is a statistically significant difference between Indigenous and Ladino Guatemalans. The results can be observed in Figure V.8. The pattern is not straightforward, and, whereas more indigenous feel they are not informed at all, a higher percentage of Indigenous Guatemalans feel they are very well informed vis-à-vis the Landon.
There are some further findings about the municipal government that are worth examining. In the first place, it is important to analyze the perception that citizens may have about the services provided by their local government. Respondents were asked to rate the services that the municipality was providing to the community. In Figure V.9, we observe the differences in the average satisfaction with municipal services by residence and by year. The difference between years is statistically significant, whereas the residence of the respondents is not significant.

The year 1997 was the peak year of satisfaction with municipal governments, in both rural and urban areas. The average satisfaction appears to be similar for all other years. However, a decline in the satisfaction can be observed between 1999 and 2001 in rural as well as urban areas. This question was not asked in 1993.
We will now examine the results of 2001 in more detail. In Figure V.10, we can see the distribution of the respondent’s opinion with respect to the services provided by their local government in 2001. We can observe that half of the respondents in 2001 rated the services provided by their municipality as regular. One third of the respondents (30%) rated them as good or excellent, and one fifth (20%) considered them bad or very bad.
In Figure V.11, we see the division by the country’s region. We can observe that in all regions, there is a similar level of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government, although in the metropolitan area and in the southwest there is less discontent (a higher percentage rated the services as good or excellent).
A multivariate analysis allows us to find out that socio-demographic variables don’t make a difference in the satisfaction with municipal services; in fact, the only predictors are trust in the municipality, the attendance to municipal meetings, and the provision of information by the local government. In Figure V.12 we can observe that those who attend municipal meetings more often and those who are better informed by the municipality, are likely to be more satisfied with the services provided by their local government. This should come as no surprise, and it stresses the importance of keeping citizens well informed about the activities of the municipality and promoting their participation in meetings held by the local authorities when possible.
The satisfaction with municipal services can have two dimensions. The one we just analyzed before refers to the services provided by the local government to the community. The other dimension is the services that it may provide to individual citizens. In the DIMS 2001, a question asking the respondent how satisfied he/she was of the requests, or “trámites” he/she made at his municipality was included.

Forty-two percent of the respondents had not made any “trámites” at their local government office (probably in recent times, since all Guatemalans must go to their municipality to obtain an ID card or “cédula de vecindad” when they turn 18). Out of the remaining 58%, in Figure V.13 we see that there is a difference in the average satisfaction with those services between Ladinos and Indigenous Guatemalans with the latter feeling less satisfied. The difference is statistically significant.
Finally, with regards to the municipality, respondents were asked the following question:

- *To whom does the municipal government respond/serve?*
  - To his political party (or civic committee)
  - To citizens
  - To economic interests

The distribution of answers can be seen in Figure V.14. It is not clear what the concept of “economic interests” means for the respondents of this survey, but about a third of the citizens think that the municipal authorities serve those interests; another third think that they serve the political group to whom they belong; and only 15% think that the municipal government serves the interests of citizens.
Finally in this section, we will make some comparative analysis with two Latin American countries: El Salvador and Bolivia. Those countries are part of the University of Pittsburgh’s Latin America Public Opinion Project and have included several questions in their surveys similar to those included in the DIMS surveys. Table V.1 shows the results.
**Table V.1**
Perceptions about Municipal Government
In Comparative Perspective
Valid Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How do you rate the services that the municipality is providing?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Excellent</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Good</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regular (average)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Bad</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Very bad</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you requested help from your municipality in the past year?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you attended meetings at your municipality?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A: not available

*Sources: For Guatemala, DIMS 2001 database; for Bolivia and El Salvador databases from the University of Pittsburgh Latin American Public Opinion Project, Bolivia 2000, El Salvador 1999*

Overall, El Salvador’s local governments seem to be closer to citizens, in view of the fact that a higher percentage considers the services provided by the municipality as excellent or good and a higher percentage has requested help from their local authorities. Guatemala and Bolivia seem to have similar results.

In Figure V.15, we can see more clearly that in terms of satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality, El Salvador gets a better rating. In the graph we can see the differences in the percentage of citizens who think that the services provided by their local government are excellent or good.
Perceptions about the Current Government

We now approach the analysis of the perceptions that Guatemalans have about their national authorities. In Chapter, IV we made a detailed analysis of the legitimacy of political institutions in Guatemala in 2001. Among other findings, we saw that the municipality and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal are the institutions that have more support from the population. At the other extreme, the current government, congress, and the political parties obtained the lowest support (see Figure IV.4).

In this section we will go more in-depth into the analysis of aspects related to the public perceptions about the current government and congress. The analysis about the perceptions of the political parties and of the system of justice will be dealt with in the following two chapters. This particular analysis taps into the most specific level of legitimacy, as was previously explained in Table III.1.
It is common that the support for the incumbent authorities suffer the greatest erosion of legitimacy, in comparison with more diffuse levels of support. In fact, the legitimacy of the authorities may vary enormously in relatively short periods of time, and is subject to the influence of the performance of the incumbent authorities as well to other external factors such as the economy, personal safety and other contextual issues. For the same reasons, the specific legitimacy of the authorities may vary considerably from country to country, so it is risky to make a comparative analysis.

We will first take a cross-time look at Guatemalans’ perceptions about who has helped most or responded better to solve the problems of the community (where the respondent lives). There are several noticeable changes that can be seen in Figure V.16. Probably the most dramatic one is the tremendous increase of the percentage of citizens who, in 2001, answered that none of the institutions has been helpful. Over one third of the respondents in 2001 chose that option. Another perceptible change is the decrease in the number of citizens who considered that the central government had been useful. Whereas in 1999 around 22% of the respondents chose the central government as an option, in 2001 only 11% chose it.

Accordingly with some of the findings shown in the previous section where we noted that the perceptions of citizens about their local government were becoming less favorable, in this figure we can also confirm that finding. The municipality is still by far the institution that, according to citizens, has been most useful in solving community problems, but there has been a constant decline since the peak year, in 1997. In regards to the deputies from congress, the proportion has remained without much change, those being the ones that the population considers less helpful in solving their problems. The option “all the same” that was included in the question was excluded from the graph because the percentage of citizens that chose it is minimal.
From the analysis of the opinions about deputies, we move on to the analysis of congress, which should be one of the most important institutions in any democracy. However, in Guatemala it has obtained low levels of support throughout the years. Although there was a slight recovery in 1999, by 2001 the trend of decline continued. In Figure V.17, we can see the results more clearly.
The low level of support for congress is probably associated with the image of the deputies and that of political parties, the least trusted institution in Guatemala. A multivariate analysis allows us to find the determinants of trust for congress: victimization of crime, the perception of corruption in the government, and wealth. Thus, those who have been victims of crime, who perceive that corruption in the government is widespread, and who have a higher income, are less likely to support congress.

This brings us to the analysis of an important issue: citizens’ perception about the extent of corruption in the government. This a factor that has repeatedly proven to undermine support for institutions everywhere. In Figure V.18, we see the distribution of answers to the question “how extended is government corruption?” This question was asked for the first time in the study carried out in September of 1999, and the results from that year refer to the government of Alvaro Arzú. In 2001 the results refer to the administration of Alfonso Portillo. We can notice that the percentage of those who believed that corruption is not a widespread phenomenon remained the same between 1999 and 2001. However, there was a dramatic and statistically significant increase in the percentage of citizens who believe that corruption is widespread.
Another cross-time variable that can be analyzed with the DIMS datasets is the one related to the most specific level of support, the support for the elected president. In Figure V.19, we can see the comparison of the ratings of the performance of the presidents that were democratically elected between 1993 and 2001. Respondents were asked to indicate their evaluation about the work that the President was doing at the time of the survey.\textsuperscript{38}

The results for 1993 refer to the administration of Jorge Serrano (survey of April 1993), for 1995 to the government of Ramiro de Leon (survey of January of 1995), for 1997 and 1999 to the administration of Alvaro Arzu (surveys of April 1997 and September 1999). The results for 2001 correspond to the government administration of incumbent President, Alfonso Portillo (survey of September 2001). In Figure V.19, it can be seen that current President Portillo, in September of 2001, and ex-President Serrano, in April of 1993, obtain the most negative results, whereas ex-Presidents De León and Arzú (in his last year in office) obtain the most positive results. It is noticeable that the decrease of support for the President in 2001 occurs at the middle of his term of office.

\textsuperscript{38} The original question has five options of response: very good, good, regular, bad or very bad. For purposes of intelligibility the five options have been recoded into three.
It is important to see whether the trend shown above is influenced by the residence of the respondents. In Figure V.20, we can see that the trend remains similar, regardless of whether the respondents live in urban or rural areas of Guatemala. Ex-President Serrano had a better image in the rural areas, ex-President De León had a relatively good image in both urban and rural areas, ex-President Arzú had a more positive image in the rural areas by 1997. By 1999 things had turned around, and his image in urban areas was more positive. Although the incumbent President Portillo obtains a little higher support in the rural areas in 2001, only one third of the citizens in both rural and urban areas consider that he is doing a good job.
In Figure V.21, we can see the difference in the rating of the presidents according to ethnic self-identification and year. We observe that the ethnic self-identification of the respondent did not make much of a difference in the opinion of ex-Presidents Serrano and De León, but that it made a difference in the opinion of ex-President Arzú in 1999 and, especially, in the opinion of President Portillo in 2001. In the last two cases, Indigenous Guatemalans gave them a lower rating than Ladino Guatemalans.
We now move more in-depth into the analysis of the survey of 2001, which contains some new items that were not included in the previous DIMS questionnaires. This study does not pretend to evaluate corruption *per se* or the rating that the citizens may give the president just for the sake of it or to benefit anyone in particular. The main concern is the impact that high levels of corruption and a poor performance of this or other presidents or government administrations may have in the consolidation of democratic values among Guatemalans.

The multivariate analysis allows us to find out which are the predictors of some of the variables examined above. We find that the predictors for the perception of corruption are wealth, the feeling of security, and the preference for a strong-hand government. Accordingly, those who have a higher level of income, those who feel unsafe, and those who prefer a participatory government instead of strong-hand are more likely to perceive that corruption is widely widespread in the government. It may seem strange to find that the feeling of security is a predictor of the level of corruption; however, in the previous DIMS report of 2000, we saw that the feeling of insecurity can influence citizens' democratic values in a variety of ways.
The predictors for the evaluation of the performance of the President are diverse. Among the socio-demographic factors, the ethnic self-identification is the only significant variable: those Guatemalans who self-identified themselves as indigenous give the President a lower rating than those who identified themselves as Ladinos. Among the contextual variables, economic satisfaction, the perception of corruption in the government, and the feeling of security are significant determinants. Thus, those who are less satisfied with their economic situation (regardless of wealth), those who perceive that corruption is extended in the government, and those who feel more unsafe are prone to give President Portillo a lower rating. In addition, party vote and the satisfaction with democracy are also significant predictors. Those who voted for the FRG are more likely to have a better image of the performance of the president. Finally, those who are more unsatisfied with the president’s performance have a low satisfaction with democracy. The linear regression equation is shown in the statistical annex.

In Figure V.22, we can see that those who voted for the FRG give President Portillo a better rating. However, the ethnicity of the respondent plays a role and those who self-identified as indigenous give him a lower score, even if they voted for the FRG in the 1999 elections. It must be noted, however, that this does not mean that all of those who voted for the FRG have a good image of the president’s work since even the rating of those who voted for that party is overall very low, especially in comparison with the rating given to former presidents in recent years.
In Figure V.23 we can see that those who feel more insecure in terms of personal safety give a lower rating to the performance of the president. We can also see that those who perceive that the President is not doing a good job are also likely to be less satisfied with democracy. The potential danger of this last finding can be worrisome in a society like Guatemala where democratic values are still fragile.
In Figures V.24 and V.25, we can see that there is a relationship between the attention that a citizen pays to the news and his/her perception of corruption in the government and the rating he/she gives the President. An index called political attentiveness, which measures the frequency with which the respondent listens, watches, and reads news in the media was constructed for this analysis. It must be noted that in the multivariate analysis, this variable did not turn out to be a significant predictor either of the president’s performance or the perception of corruption in the government; however, in a bivariate analysis, the index of political attentiveness resulted as statistically significant.

In Figure V.24, we can see that those that have a higher average of political attentiveness (they pay more attention to news in the media) have a higher perception of corruption in the government.
In Figure V.25, we can see that those that have a higher average of political attentiveness (they pay more attention to news in the media) give President Portillo a lower rating.
Political Attentiveness and Rating of President's Performance

DIMS 2001

Figure V.25
Political Attentiveness and Rating of President’s Performance
DIMS 2001
CHAPTER VI

A FRAGILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Introduction

It has been recognized in recent years that one of the most important weaknesses in Latin American consolidating democracies is the lack of an efficient rule of law.\textsuperscript{40} Guatemala is no exception, and diverse studies have stressed the shortcomings of the justice system.

There are three particular problems in the justice system that directly affect the population: the impunity derived from the lack of efficiency of the system of administration of justice, the absence of an efficient and accountable police corps that can provide security to the population against common crime and the lingering corruption that still exists in the law enforcing agencies as well as in those that convey justice.\textsuperscript{41}

Although the authorities that run the diverse institutions that form the justice system in Guatemala are not elected directly by the population, their performance becomes key for the strengthening of democracy. The lack of confidence in those institutions is in fact closely related to the lack of support for the whole political system.

We must note that this chapter (and the two that follow) is not directly related to the theoretical framework presented at the beginning of Chapter III. In this chapter we will go more in-depth into the analysis of the perceptions of Guatemalans about the justice system. We will examine the opinion that citizens have about the services provided by the different justice institutions, the levels of crime victimization, their perception of personal security, and furthermore, we will briefly analyze the opinions of Guatemalans about lynchings of alleged criminals, which has become one of the most worrisome phenomena of recent years.

\textsuperscript{40} See for instance Patricio Aylwin, speech at the Organization of American States, reproduced in \textit{Journal of Democracy}, 9.3 (1988). He asserts that the lack of efficiency of the Judiciary in Latin America is one of the greatest challenges for democracy.

Perceptions about the Institutions that Provide Justice

The first aspect that should be examined is how much citizens’ support (measured by trust from the population) do the institutions that form part of the justice system have. In Chapter IV we already saw that the mean support for the courts of justice (*tribunales de justicia*) has been decreasing over the years in a small but statistically significant way.

In Figure VI.1, we can see the average support that the courts have obtained over the years both in rural and urban areas. There are some things worth noticing in this graph. On the one hand, we can observe that the support has remained lower in the urban areas year after year. On the other hand, we can see that in 2001 there was a reduction of trust in the courts in comparison with other years. In fact, by 2001 the difference in the level of support for the courts in rural and urban areas is smaller than it was in 1993. This suggests that the erosion of trust in this institution has been more perceptible in rural areas.

**Figure VI.1**
Support for the Courts of Justice
By Year and Residence
DIMS 1993-2001
We will now examine the support obtained by other institutions that form part of the justice system. Since the scale to measure trust in institutions was changed in the DIMS 2001, we cannot have cross-time results to compare previous years. In Figure IV.4 (Chapter IV) we saw that the average support for other justice institutions is as follows:

- Ombudsman = 43 points
- Public Ministry = 43 points
- National Police = 42 points
- Constitutional Court = 40 points

A multivariate analysis helps us determine which ones are the variables that explain why an institution has a higher or lower support from the population. In the following table, we detail the predictors of trust for the institutions that are part of the justice system.

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42 As it was mentioned, the question about support was duplicated in the DIMS 2001, using both the 3-point measuring scale and the 10-point scale for the courts, political parties, the municipality and congress. That is why we can have cross-time results for these institutions.

43 The explanation of the direction in which the predictors are related to the dependent variable was confirmed through a comparison of means procedure.
In Table VI.1, we also show the percentage of people who did not answer the question about trust in each institution. As expected, the Constitutional Court is the less known, with 15% of non-response.

It is important to note that several predictors appear repeatedly as explanations of trust in the justice institutions. Thus the belief that courts don’t guarantee a free trial turns out to be a significant predictor for all five institutions. The satisfaction with democracy is a predictor in four out of five cases. The participation in groups, the belief that human rights are important and the
preference for stronghand government appear as predictors on three occasions. All the other variables appear only once as explanations of trust in the particular institutions. It must be said that the same set of independent variables was used in the different models, in order to determine the predictors. It must also be noted that all the socio-demographic variables were included in the equations, but in most cases they turned out to be statistically not significant.

In the following three figures, we can see more clearly the importance of some of the predictors that appear time after time as explanations of support for the justice institutions. It can be seen in Figure VI.2 that the belief that courts guarantee a free trial increases the support for all of the institutions that form part of the justice system in Guatemala; by contrast, those who believe that the courts don’t guarantee a free trial show much lower support for the justice institutions. This stresses the importance of improving the quality of the services provided by the courts, which is a possible area of intervention of national and international cooperation programs.
In Figure VI.3, below we can observe that those who believe that human rights protect criminals (*delincuentes*) have a lower support for the justice system. By contrast, those who believe that human rights are an important subject for all, show a higher support.

![Support for Justice Institutions and Belief in Importance of Human Rights](image)

Figure VI.3
Support for Justice Institutions and Belief in Importance of Human Rights
DIMS 2001

Finally, we can notice in Figure VI.4 that those who believe that the problems of Guatemala can be solved with a strong-hand government have a lower support for the institutions of the justice system. By contrast, those who believe that the problems can be solved with the participation of citizens have a higher support for institutions.
Another dimension in the relationship between citizens and the justice system, which is different to trust, is the level of citizens’ satisfaction with the services provided by the institutions. The average satisfaction with some of the institutions can be seen in Figure VI.5. It must be noted that the results shown in the graph only refer to those respondents who indicated that they had used the services of those institutions. In the case of the courts, 60% of the respondents had not used the services; in the case of the Police, 49% had not used the services; and in the case of the Public Ministry, 66% had never used the services provided by that institution. As it can be seen, the differences in the level of satisfaction of the respondents are not great, the police being the one that has apparently provided better services. In any case, the average level of satisfaction is relatively low. In all cases, only about one third of the users were satisfied.
We now approach the analysis of support for justice institutions from a comparative perspective. In Figure VI.6, we can see a contrast in the average support for some justice institutions in Guatemala and in El Salvador. We can see that aside from the Ombudsman, which seems to have more support in Guatemala, Salvadorans seem to have a higher level of trust in their institutions, including the consideration that courts guarantee a free trial and that human rights are protected by the political system.\footnote{It must be noted that in El Salvador, instead of Public Ministry the question asked for trust in the Attorney General, which is an alternative name used also in Guatemala. In the case of trust in the courts, the El Salvador questionnaire asked for trust in the Supreme Court instead of the courts of justice.}
Source: For Guatemala DIMS 2001
For El Salvador University of Pittsburgh Latin America Public Opinion Project database

Figure VI.6
Comparative Trust in Justice Institutions
Averages

Victimization and Fear of Crime among Guatemalans

As it is widely discussed in Chapter V of the DIMS 1999 Report, crime\(^{45}\) has become one of the most acute problems for the post-conflict societies of Central America, and Guatemala has been no exception. The economic implications of the high levels of crime are evident; furthermore, it has been established that crime also has a political impact.\(^{46}\) In other chapters in this same report, we have seen how the victimization and fear of crime have an impact on the trust in political institutions and even in the authoritarian values of citizens. Crime affects not only the lives of those who have been direct victims, but also of those who live with fear of being victims. Thus, the feeling of insecurity that a person may experience can also have an impact on his/her political values and attitudes.

\(^{45}\) As it was discussed in the DIMS 2000 Report, crime in Latin America refers to what is commonly known as “delincuencia común” (common crime).

In the DIMS 2001, both the levels of crime victimization and the fear of crime (or feeling of security) of the respondents were evaluated. In Figure VI.7, we take a look at a cross-time comparison of the percentage of Guatemalans who reported that *they or a relative had been victims of crime (robbery, assaults or aggressions) within the past year*. The question was not asked in 1993 nor in 1995 and we therefore don’t have cross-time data for those years. However, since 1997 we can see that about a quarter (a little over 25%) of Guatemalans have reported being victims of a crime (either themselves or someone in their family).

In Figure VI.8 we can see that the region of the country is very important when it comes to the victimization of crime. We can observe that the percentage of Guatemalans who have been directly or indirectly (through their relatives) victims of a crime is much higher in the metropolitan area than in the rest of the country in all years, especially in 1999.
We will explore a little further who were victims of crime in 2001. Statistical procedures like cross-tabulations and comparison of means allow us to determine the direction and significance of the socio-demographic variables that may be associated to crime victimization. In Figure VI.9, we can see that both the residence and the wealth of the victim are significant when it comes to being victims of crime. Accordingly, those who live in urban areas and those who have more wealth are more likely to be victims.

We notice however, that at higher levels of income (more goods at home), those with a higher socioeconomic level in the rural areas seem to be more prone to be victims than the wealthier Guatemalans living in urban areas. This may be related to the security measures that may be available in urban areas and not in rural areas (like private security, secluded townhouses or condominiums, etc.). It is also noticeable that at the lower levels of income, victimization is very high in urban areas. This in turn may be related to the existence of youth gangs or “maras” in poorer urban areas.
As discussed before, the region where the respondent lives is another socio-demographic variable associated to crime victimization, and the year 2001 was no exception. This means that there was a significant difference in terms of crime in the diverse regions of Guatemala in 2001: Those living in the metropolitan area reported much higher rates of victimization.

In Figure VI.10, we can observe the differences by region in 2001, divided also by ethnic self-identification. In the overall analysis, ethnicity is not a significant predictor of crime victimization, which means that both groups are, in general, similarly impacted by crime. However when it comes to the analysis by region, we can see that Indigenous Guatemalans reported a higher crime victimization in several regions of the country, including the metropolitan area. This last finding may be associated with other socioeconomic and sociodemographic variables.

We recall the departments included in each region in this study: the metropolitan area includes the Department of Guatemala. The Northwest includes Solola, San Marcos, Huehuetenango, Quiche and part of Quetzaltenango. The Southwest includes the departments of Chimaltenango, Escuintla, Suchitepequez and part of Quetzaltenango. The Southest includes El Progreso, Chiquimula, Jalapa and Jutiapa. The Northeast includes Baja Verapaz, Alta Verapaz, El Peten, Zacapa and Izabal. Some departments were not included in the sample.
In the 2001 survey we wanted to know what percentage of the population had been victims in a direct way, not through their relatives as measured by the previous question. The respondents were asked *what kind of aggression did you suffer if you were the direct victim of crime?* Table VI.2 shows the results. We can see that in urban areas, around 81% of the respondents reported not being direct victims of crime. This compares with 90% of non-victims in rural areas.
Table VI.2
Type of Victimization of Crime
By Those Who Reported Being Direct Victims
DIMS 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF CRIME</th>
<th>VALID PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URBAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery without physical aggression</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery with physical aggression</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical aggression without robbery</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape or sexual abuse</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to property</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a direct victim</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We must note, however, that many times crimes ---especially those like rape--- are not reported by the respondents because of fear or embarrassment. Therefore, these results must be seen as a mere approximation which may vary from other statistics about homicide rates and other crime victimization surveys that use different methodologies.

The respondents who were victims in a direct way were asked whether they went to the authorities to report the crime. Out of total 13% of the respondents who said they were victims, 7% said they reported the crime to the authorities.

In Figures VI.11 and VI.12 we can see the opinion of that 7% who reported the crime, as to the quality of the services given by the authorities and whether they obtained positive results from them. From Figure VI.11, it appears as if a large percentage (60%) of those who went to the authorities to report a crime were treated well. However, around 40% of the crime victims felt that the authorities did not treat them well.
In Figure VI.12, we see that when it comes to the results obtained, things are the other way around, and over 60% of the respondents indicated that they did not obtain good results.
Also related to the issue of crime, respondents were asked whether the population should participate in “Junta de Vecinos” (neighborhood crime watch groups) or something similar in order to protect the community against crime. About 87% of the respondents gave a positive answer, and only 8% said that the population should not participate. Another 5% did not answer the question. This could be considered as a possible area of intervention for programs of cooperation with communities. However, there should be no involvement from the army to avoid the unconstructive experience of the Civil Defense Patrols.

As it was explained earlier in this chapter, not only the victimization of crime has an impact on the political values of citizens, but also the fear of being victim of a crime. In previous chapters, we have found a statistical association between fear of crime and several political variables. In order to measure fear of crime (or feeling of security if seen from a positive perspective), in the DIMS 1999, respondents were asked whether or not they were afraid to walk in their neighborhood at night. In 2001 the question was modified and respondents were asked whether they felt very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe in the neighborhood or community where they live. We must note that this is only one way of trying to learn whether an individual lives under the fear of
crime. A more insightful study would be necessary in order to get a more certain perspective on this issue, but that goes beyond the scope of this report.

Overall, around 26% of the respondents reported feeling very unsafe or somewhat unsafe, while 74% felt safe or somewhat safe. However, again we find that the region where the respondent lives makes a big difference. In Figure VI.13, we see that those living in the metropolitan area feel more insecure than those who live in other regions of Guatemala.

The multivariate analysis shows that residence and crime victimization are the only significant predictors of the feeling or perception of security. This can be seen in the linear regression equation in the statistical annex. The bivariate analysis showed that education and region are also variables that account for the differences in the perception of security.

In Figure VI.14, we can see that those with a university education (finished or not) have a lower average perception of security than those with lower levels of education. This may explain, in part, some findings of earlier chapters that
show that university students or graduates tend to have lower support for democratic principles, like respecting the rights of the accused.

Finally with regards to this issue, in Figure VI.15 we can see that those who reside in rural areas feel more secure. The difference with those residing in urban areas is statistically significant. In the graph we can also see that women in urban areas feel more insecure than men, whereas in the rural areas, they have a similar perception of security.
We will now look at some comparative figures with neighboring El Salvador. The exact same question about perception of security, with the same options of response, was asked in El Salvador in 1999. We must recall that Guatemala and El Salvador have both been hit by rampant crime in the postwar period and that both underwent a renovation of the security forces with the creation of a new National Civilian Police.

In Table VI.3, we can see that overall, Salvadorans have a lower feeling of security than Guatemalans. The explanations may vary and the result may be influenced by the coverage of the media, the alternative systems of security that may exist (like the private police companies), or the type of crime that occurs in each society.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{48} We cannot make an exact comparison of the levels of victimization of crime in both countries since in El Salvador the question asks directly for personal crime victimization and in Guatemala it asks about the respondent and his/her family. However, if we compare the results from the question in Guatemala that asks about the type of crime that the respondent suffered if he/she was a direct victim, we can make some comparisons. In El Salvador, 12% of the respondents said that they were direct victims of crime in 1999. In Guatemala, 13% said so in 2001. Therefore, the overall figures of crime victimization are very similar.
Table VI.3
Comparative Feeling of Security in Guatemala and El Salvador
By Gender
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEELING OF SECURITY</th>
<th>GUATEMALA</th>
<th>EL SALVADOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very safe</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat safe</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat unsafe</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very unsafe</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: For Guatemala DIMS 2001
For El Salvador, Latin American Public Opinion Project from the University of Pittsburgh,
El Salvador, 1999

Finally, with respect to crime issues, in the DIMS 2001 survey, Guatemalans were asked whether they believed that human rights are an important subject for all or whether they have served to benefit criminals. In Figure VI.16, we can see the results by education and ethnic self-identification of the respondents. We observe that, overall, the average support for human rights is rather low in most cases. In addition, the average support for human rights is, in general terms, lower among the Ladino Guatemalans than among the Indigenous Guatemalans except at the level of those with university education. It is also important to note that those with no formal education tend to give more support to human rights issues. These findings are important because, once again, they show that Guatemalans with a high school education tend to have weaker democratic values, especially in Ladino areas. This may have programmatic implications, in particular for those programs whose goal is to promote human rights education.
Closely related to the issue of human rights is that of the lynching of alleged criminals. Although lynchings are not carried out by state agents or institutions, they have been recognized as a flagrant violation of human rights. In the next section, we will examine in more detail the opinion of Guatemalans about issues of self-justice.

Perceptions about Self-Justice

Lynchings of alleged criminals have become one of the most difficult problems of the justice system in post-conflict Guatemala. Not only have they become more frequent, but they have also extended, on a couple of occasions, to the lynching of individuals who are not alleged criminals. The most relevant cases in recent years were the lynching and death of a Japanese tourist in Huehuetenango and of a judge (Juez de Paz) in Alta Verapaz.

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49 Lynchings are, however, only one manifestation of violence in post-conflict Guatemala. The violent death of policemen, violent kidnappings that end in the death of the victim, robberies, and many other types of crime are also frequent. The analysis of other types of violence goes beyond the scope of this report.
There have been different explanations of why lynchings occur; one of the most often discussed is that they are the legacy from the armed conflict since the majority of cases of mob-lynchings have taken place in departments that are former conflict areas. There are, however other explanations; some assert that the phenomenon has historical roots. Others believe it is because state institutions fail to provide security to the population. Still others take a cultural approach to explain why lynchings happen (the ethnicity variable).  

In this chapter we don’t attempt to make a thorough analysis of this complex phenomenon of social violence. Instead, we attempt to present some public opinion data that can help to enlighten the analysis of the issues of self-justice. A question related to this issue was for the first time included in the DIMS 1999 study. To measure the level of support for self-justice, Guatemalans were asked the following question:

In several communities, alleged criminals have been lynched. Some people say that when the authorities don’t respond, people should seek justice themselves, others say that people should never recur to self-justice. With what opinion do you agree more?

- Agree with self-justice
- Only in some occasions should people use self-justice
- Self-justice should never take place

The use of the words self-justice could be linked to other types of violence; however, since the question mentions lynchings, we can assume that people link the question to the issue of lynchings.

In Figure VI.17, we can see the responses given to this question, both in 1999 and in 2001. There has not been much change in the opinion about self-justice between 1999 and 2001. In both years, only a little over half of the population rejects the idea of self-justice, which is a worrisome finding. In fact, one third of Guatemalans openly agree with self-justice, whereas the remaining 13% consider that self-justice is sometimes justified. This is a definite area of possible intervention for governmental, non-governmental and international cooperation programs. These programs should stress the respect for human life.

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We will now analyze the results for 2001. Respondents in 2001 were also asked *why they thought that lynchings occurred*. The distribution of the responses can be seen in Table VI.4. It must be noted that this was an open question. The answers were grouped according to the type of response. It must also be noted that the different responses may be interrelated. In any case, we present the whole distribution of answers in order to have a more specific perspective on the issue.
We will now examine which variables are related to the support for self-justice in 2001, using a multivariate statistical procedure. The linear regression equation shows that the predictors of support for lynchings are: place of residence, ethnic self-identification, trust in the courts and in the national police, extended support for the system, and support for democratic principles. Thus, those who live in rural areas, who are indigenous, who have little trust in the courts and in the national police, who have little trust in government institutions, and who don’t support democratic principles are more likely to approve actions of self-justice. The equation is shown in the statistical annex.

Figure VI.18 shows the distribution of the opinion about self-justice by region and ethnic self-identification. In order to make it more clear, the two negative answers (agreement with self-justice and belief that self-justice is sometimes justified) were recoded into one option. We can see that Indigenous Guatemalans tend to have more support for self-justice actions in three regions, except in the northeast and the southwest. We can also see that the Ladinos living in the metropolitan area are the ones who least support actions of self-justice, whereas the Ladinos living in the southwest region are the ones that most support those actions.

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In Figure VI.19, we can see the differences in the support for self-justice actions by the respondent’s place of residence and education. We can observe that those with no formal education have higher levels of support for self-justice actions, especially in rural areas. By contrast, in urban areas, those with a middle-school education seem to be more likely to support those actions. We can also see a declining trend in the support for self-justice as the respondents’ level of education increases, especially in urban areas. Thus, those with a university education are the ones that show less support for self-justice actions. The decline also occurs in rural areas, but university level respondents in rural areas have higher levels of support for self-justice actions than their colleagues living in urban areas.
In Figure VI.20, we can see the link between the support for self-justice and lower levels of trust in the courts and in the national police. It must be noted that several other institutions were tested in the regression equation, but none of them resulted significantly associated to the support for self-justice. We can see that those with higher trust in the courts and the police have lower approval of lynchings.
Finally, in Figures VI.21 and VI.22, we see that those who are inclined to non-democratic principles (i.e. who display authoritarian values) like believing that it is not necessary to wait for a warrant to enter a suspect’s home, accepting that human rights can be violated in order to combat crime, preferring order over liberty, or preferring stronghand over participation are more likely to support actions of self-justice. We can clearly see that those who answered “yes” to the possibility of actions of self-justice (includes those who always or sometimes approve actions of self-justice) have lower support for the three democratic principles shown in Figure VI.21.
In a similar way, in Figure VI.22 we can notice that those who approve actions of self-justice have a much higher preference for a stronghand government to resolve the problems of Guatemala instead of preferring a government that promotes participation.
Violence within the Family

One last aspect of this chapter about the justice system is a brief examination of another level of violence ---violence within the family. Respondents were asked whether they consider family violence in general to be a serious problem. They had a range of six options which to choose from.

It must be noted that they were not asked about violence “in their own family”, but about their perception of family violence in the country. In Figure VI.23, we can see that a high percentage of Guatemalans consider family violence to be a very serious problem.
Family violence is considered a serious problem regardless of gender, age, residence, or ethnic self-identification of the respondent. In Table VI.5, shows the percentages of those who think that it is a very serious problem.
**Table VI.5**  
Perception of Family Violence  
By Sociodemographic Characteristics  
DIMS 2001  
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC TRAITS</th>
<th>FAMILY VIOLENCE IS A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladino</td>
<td>39 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>37 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 +</td>
<td>41 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

Theory and Methodology

It has been recognized that the participation of citizens and a strong civil society are key elements for the creation of democratic societies and the achievement of sustainable human development.\(^5^3\) In fact, one of the components of most modern definitions of democracy is precisely that of citizens’ participation in the decision-making process. Prominent political scientist Robert Dahl enumerates the minimal conditions of a democratic system, which he calls a polyarchy: (1) elected authorities; (2) free elections; (3) freedom of expression; (4) alternative information available; (5) associational autonomy; and (6) inclusive citizenship. To fulfill the last three conditions, he stresses the importance of effective participation by its citizens.\(^5^4\)

Dahl emphasizes that independent associations or groups are a source of civic education and enlightenment. Political activity, he asserts, should not cease between elections: legislators can be influenced, causes be advanced, policies promoted, appointments sought. Therefore, associations, in particular political associations, are necessary and desirable in any democracy.

The importance of participation goes beyond mere political participation. In recent years, one of the most important findings in Political Science has been the relationship found between democratic development and the so-called “social capital.” Robert Putnam\(^5^5\) and others have shown that in societies with greater social capital, democratic development reaches higher levels, and democratic stability is more feasible. Social capital is formed by three basic elements: interpersonal trust, the degree of citizens’ participation in a wide range of organizations, and the belief that social changes should happen gradually.

At a more specific level, the participation of citizens has become the vital element of many development programs and, in fact, success and the durability of results are often associated with the degree of citizens’ participation in specific projects.

In this chapter we will examine issues related to the political and social participation of Guatemalans. As in previous chapters, we will take a look at cross-time results and emphasize the analysis of the occurrences of 2001

\(^5^4\) See Dahl, Robert On Democracy (Yale University Press, New Haven, Yale University, 1999) and Dahl, Robert Polyarchy and Opposition (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1971)

through bivariate and multivariate analysis. Finally, whenever data from other countries on this subject is available, we will make comparisons with other countries of the Latin American region.\textsuperscript{56}

**Political Participation of Guatemalans**

In this section we will examine aspects of what is considered conventional political participation ---the participation of citizens in elections, in political parties and in civic committees.\textsuperscript{57} We will also examine other issues related to other non-conventional forms of political participation, such as the participation in demonstrations and in associations that seek to find the solution to community problems.

To begin, we look at the participation in elections. It is known that Guatemala is one of the countries of the hemisphere with the lowest levels of participation in elections. In fact, many consider that one of the main weaknesses of the democratic process that began in Guatemala in 1985 is the low rate of participation in the elections.

There are multiple reasons that explain the lack of sufficient participation; these relate not only to the apathy of citizens to go to the polls but to other individual and institutional factors that limit participation. Among them are the location of the electoral boots only in the municipal townships, the fact that voting has not been residential, an outdated electoral registry (padrón electoral) and others.\textsuperscript{58}

We must note however that the baseline turnout figures that are officially employed may be deceiving. Researchers Boneo and Torres-Rivas suggest that at least a 25% of those that appear in the electoral registry in Guatemala correspond to people who have died, have migrated to other countries, or have an incomplete or incorrect registration.\textsuperscript{59}

We observe in Figure VII.1 that the percentage of citizens who indicated that they were registered to vote (empadronados) has remained without much change throughout the years. About one quarter of the population reported not

\textsuperscript{56} This chapter, as the previous one and the one that follows, is not directly related to the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter III.

\textsuperscript{57} We must note that “civic committees” are a legal figure used only in Guatemala, not in other parts of the world.

\textsuperscript{58} See Boneo, Horacio y Torres-Rivas, Edelberto. ¿Por qué no votan los guatemaltecos? Estudio de participación y abstención electoral, International IDEA, Tribunal Supremo Electoral and United Nations Development Program (Guatemala, F&G Editores, 2000). We can add that the non-approval of the reforms to the Electoral and Political Parties Law suggested by the Commission of Electoral Reform derived from the Peace Accords has been another negative element. The changes made by the Electoral Reform Commission in Congress and approved by the Legislature drift away from the original purpose of the reforms.

\textsuperscript{59} op. cit., p. 55
being registered. We must recall, however, that some Guatemalans may consider themselves registered but have not picked up their electoral document (boleta de empadronamiento), which is a second step in the registration process that many stop short of doing.

To find out which socio-demographic factors determine voting registration in 2001, we used a logistic regression procedure. The results are shown in the statistical annex. We can see that age, gender and education are significant predictors of electoral registration. In Figure VII.2, we can observe, in more detail that those who are younger and who are females tend to have a lower level of registration. In fact, after 40 years of age, male respondents reported an identical level of registration.
In a similar way, in Figure VII.3 we see that those with lower educational levels are more likely not to be registered than those who have more years of schooling, especially those who have attended the university (even if they did not finish their studies).
The 24% of respondents who indicated in 2001 that they were not registered to vote were asked to state the reasons. In Table VII.1 we can see the frequency of the responses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of time</td>
<td>40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another reason</td>
<td>17 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is not important</td>
<td>15 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t know how to do it</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The procedure is too difficult</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The electoral office is too far away</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doesn’t have money for the “tramite”</td>
<td>4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has not finished the registration procedure</td>
<td>3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(second step)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table VII.1**
Reasons for Not Being Registered to Vote *(empadronado)*
DIMS 2001
Percentages
The 75% of the respondents who indicated that they were registered to vote were asked a series of questions related to their voting behavior. Respondents were asked whether they voted in the 1999 Presidential elections. Eighty-three percent of those interviewed (and registered to vote) answered positively to this question and another 17% indicated that they did not vote. Although it was not clearly stated, the question made reference to the first round of elections, which is usually the one that gets a higher turnout. We must remember that in the 1999 elections for the first time in many years, the turnout rate was higher than 50%. It was the 11th electoral process held since the democratic opening in 1984, including the election of the Constituent Assembly. The final turnout reported by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal for the first round of elections was of 54% (53.6) of the registered voters.60

In this survey, as in most public opinion surveys, the reported total voting figures are higher than the actual turnout. In Guatemala, it is hard to tell if the difference between the reported vote in the DIMS survey and the actual vote derives from those who out of embarrassment or fear report having voted even if they did not or if it derives from the problems in the electoral registry, in which as indicated above, many of the supposedly registered voters should not be in there.61

The multivariate analysis shows that several socio-demographic characteristics account for the differences in reported voting turnout. The equation is shown in the statistical annex. We find that age, ethnicity and education turn out to be significant predictors of voting turnout. The ethnic self-identification is an interesting case: Those who are indigenous reported higher rates of voting, which seems to contradict the general perception that they have lower voting rates. In fact, the electoral registry does not differentiate between Indigenous and Ladino Guatemalans, and therefore, it is difficult to have first-hand information about voting behavior according to ethnicity. However, other studies like that of Boneo and Torres-Rivas have used Census data by municipality and have concluded that the differences in voting behavior between the Indigenous and Ladino population are not relevant.62

In Figure VII.4 we can see the differences in voting behavior in 1999 by age and residence of the respondents. We can observe that younger

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61 We must also recall that voting is non-compulsory in Guatemala since the Constitution of 1985. However, it used to be compulsory and this may still lead some people to report voting out of fear of fines or other penalty.

Guatemalans reported lower rates of voting, a difference that is statistically significant. The differences by place of residence are not statistically significant although we can see that urban areas have, in general, higher voting turnout rates.

In Figure VII.5, we can see that, as in the case of electoral registration, those with higher education reported higher turnout rates.
Regardless of whether they voted or not in the past elections, all of the respondents were asked *why they think that people don’t vote*. Almost half of those interviewed said that people don’t vote because they don’t believe in elections, and another 5% said that people do not vote because they don’t believe in democracy. Another 18% said that people who don’t vote are disappointed of government administrations. All together, 69% of the respondents associated the low turnout with dissatisfaction with democracy. One tenth of the respondents did not know how to answer the question. The remaining 21% attributed the low turnout to lack of civic education (4%), to the lack of relevance of elections for people’s lives (3%), to violence or insecurity (2%), to transportation problems (2%), or to personal problems such as health, having to work, or being out of the country (3%). A remaining 7% mentioned other reasons.

As part of the analysis of electoral behavior, it is important to find out information about party vote (i.e. the party for which the responded voted in the election preceding the survey). This is a key explanatory variable in most public opinion studies around the world. Respondents in the DIMS 2001 who answered that they voted in 1999 were asked *for which party did they vote in 1999*.
In addition, the survey also asked all the respondents if the elections were held tomorrow, for what party would you vote?

There are only five parties that obtain more than 1% of the total reported vote in 1999 according to this survey. Those, the parties that obtained at least 1% in the actual 1999 elections and those that have at least 1% vote intention by 2001 are the only parties included in the table below. The comparison with the actual results can be seen in Table VII.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>VOTE IN 1999 REPORTED IN DIMS 2001 (VALID PERCENT)</th>
<th>ACTUAL VOTE IN THE 1ST. ROUND NOV. 1999 (VALID VOTES)</th>
<th>VOTE INTENTION IN DIMS 2001 (VALID PERCENT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANN (DIA-URNG)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URNG</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DIA</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDNG*</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLN*</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLP</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCG**</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another party</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null or blank vote</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>35.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>866 cases</td>
<td>2'191,512 votes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| None                | n/a                                              | n/a                                                  | 22                                              |
| I will not vote     | n/a                                              | n/a                                                  | 7                                               |
| Don’t know yet      | n/a                                              | n/a                                                  | 35.6                                            |
| TOTALS              | 100 %                                           | 1670 cases                                           |                                                 |

Sources: DIMS 2001 survey for first and last columns. Information from the Electoral Tribunal for middle column.

*These parties disappeared because they did not reach a minimum of 4% of the vote and will not participate again in 2001.
**The DCG did not present a presidential candidate in 1999.

One of the things that can be observed in Table VII.2 is that (as it has been usual in Guatemala in the past 15 years of democratic rule), there is very little party stability. The results of Table VII.2 confirm that we cannot speak about voters’ identification with one party, like in other countries with more institutionalized party systems. We must note that by September of 2001, there was still a high percentage (over 60% of the potential registered voters) of
citizens who either said that they will not vote for any of the parties or that they don’t know yet for which party to vote. Therefore, these results should not be taken as a definite forecast since we are still many months away from the elections of 2003. These results can be useful, however, to evaluate the image of the governing party at the middle of its term and also as an outlook of other potential parties in the elections to come.

Given the apparent disillusionment of many citizens with the political parties (by the high number of citizens responding that they won’t vote or that they will vote null or blank or will not vote for any party as shown in Table VII.2), it is important to assess the opinion of Guatemalans about voting in general, which is by far one of the most important instruments in any democracy. Respondents in the DIMS 2001 survey (as well as in previous DIMS) were asked whether or not they consider it worth voting.

The answers can be seen in Figure VII.6. As it can be seen, the disillusionment with politics seems to go beyond the political parties, and it extends to the act of voting per se. In 2001 there was a noteworthy decrease in the importance given to the act of voting in Guatemala. Whereas the trend was going up in a positive direction between 1993 and 1999, by 2001 there was a sharp and statistically significant decline in those who believe that it is worth voting. The decline is marked in both males and females, although females seem to be even more disenchanted. The promotion of voting and its importance is a possible area of intervention for national and international aid programs that have the goal of strengthening democracy in Guatemala.
In view of the above results, it is important to try to explain the reasons for that decline. A multivariate analysis of the 2001 data shows that the predictors of believing in the importance of voting are place of residence, the evaluation of the government’s attention to the Peace Accords, the satisfaction with municipal services, the belief that a warrant is necessary to enter a suspect’s home, and the perception of freedom to participate in solving community problems and vote in a national election.

Consequently, those who tend to believe that it is worth voting (this is the least disappointed) are those respondents who live in rural areas, who believe that the government is paying enough attention to the Peace Accords, who are satisfied with municipal services, who believe that a warrant is necessary to enter a suspect’s home, and who feel free to participate in solving community problems and free to vote in a national election.

In Figure VII.7, we can see the association between believing in the value of voting, the residence of the respondent, and the satisfaction with municipal services. Those who live in the rural areas, and in particular those who have a high opinion about the work of their local government believe more in the importance of voting. In the analysis, neither the satisfaction with the performance of the current President, the perception of corruption nor the trust in
institutions are statistically significant predictors. The performance of the local government seems to be more important when it comes to assessing the relevance of voting for individuals. This finding has obvious programmatic implications and stresses the importance of supporting local governments.

In Figure VII.8, we can see another link with the value given to voting. We observe that those who are Ladinos (except for the last bar) and who feel more free to participate in solving community problems are more likely to believe that it is worth voting. By contrast, those who feel very afraid to participate (especially among Indigenous Guatemalans) have a low opinion of voting. The regression analysis also shows that those who feel free to vote are more likely to have a positive opinion about voting. This latter finding is not shown on a chart.
In view of the close association between the perception of freedom and the importance given to voting, we will examine in more detail a set of questions which asked the respondents how free they feel to carry out several activities. These are normal and necessary activities in any democracy. It is evident that a restriction of those democratic freedoms hinders participation.

Since this question was asked since the beginning of the DIMS studies, it is possible to conduct a cross-time analysis. We will therefore examine whether there has been a change over time in terms of Guatemalans feeling free to vote in a national election, free to run for an elected post, free to participate in solving community problems, and free to participate in a peaceful demonstration. The first two are clearly political rights without which democracy cannot work. The other two are rights that are also fundamental to any democracy, especially in terms of promoting citizens’ participation. Respondents were given three options of response: feel free, feel somewhat afraid, and feel very afraid.

In the following table, we can see the average feeling of freedom reported by the respondents in every year.
Table VII.3
Average Democratic Freedoms By Year
DIMS 1993-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Do you feel free to participate in solving community problems?</th>
<th>Do you feel free to vote in a national election?</th>
<th>Do you feel free to participate in a demonstration?</th>
<th>Do you feel free to run for political office?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>77.71</td>
<td>86.54</td>
<td>58.28</td>
<td>52.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>73.84</td>
<td>84.96</td>
<td>53.69</td>
<td>45.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>78.04</td>
<td>90.48</td>
<td>67.13</td>
<td>61.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>79.39</td>
<td>89.73</td>
<td>65.87</td>
<td>61.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>76.34</td>
<td>87.50</td>
<td>54.93</td>
<td>54.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall average</td>
<td>77.04</td>
<td>87.82</td>
<td>59.87</td>
<td>54.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We should highlight at least three relevant things from Table VII.3. First, year after year the right that has been less perceived by Guatemalans is the freedom to run for political office. This obtained the lowest averages in almost every year, except for 2001, when the fear to participate in demonstrations was equally low.

That brings us to another relevant aspect from Table VII.3: In 2001 there was a decline in all freedoms in comparison with 1999 and, in most cases, even in comparison with previous years. In fact, the positive trend that was taking place in 1997 and 1999 reverted in 2001. The differences between years are statistically significant. This is certainly a worrisome finding. The right that suffered the greatest decline in 2001 was the freedom to participate in peaceful demonstrations, and the one that suffered less decline was the freedom to vote. This relates to the final aspect that must be noted in the table above: The perception of freedom to vote is the one that consistently obtains the highest levels. This means that it is one of the rights that has advanced most in Guatemala in the democratic period. The peak was in 1997, and thereafter, there has been a slight decline. However it can be said that a large majority of Guatemalans feel free to vote.

We will next examine the above findings in more detail. We will show four figures, divided by residence, to examine whether there exists a difference in the perception of freedom in the rural and urban areas. We will first take a look at the general averages by year.

In Figure VII.9, we can see the average answers to the question relating to how free do people feel to vote in a national election. As mentioned before, the overall levels of freedom to vote are high in both rural and urban areas, although there has been a decline since 1999.
In the next figure, we analyze the perception of freedom to run for an elected post. We can see here a sharp difference with the freedom to vote. In other words, Guatemalans may feel fairly free to vote, but they are certainly more afraid of running for office. The highest average ever reported was 63 in 1997. However, this freedom had a sharp decline in 2001 in both rural and urban areas.
We now analyze other political rights which are fundamental in a democracy. First we see the trend in the perception of freedom to demonstrate. We can notice in Figure VII.11 the critical difference between 1999 and 2001 in rural and urban areas. In the DIMS survey of September 2001, Guatemalans definitely felt less free to demonstrate in comparison with the same month in 1999. This increased level of fear to participate in demonstrations is obviously harmful for democratic participation.
Finally, we see in Figure VII.12 the perception of freedom to participate in solving community problems. We can observe that there was a slight increase of this freedom in 1999 and again a decrease in 2001. Overall, however, this freedom fares much better than the freedom to demonstrate and the freedom to run for office.
To finish with this analysis of perception of freedoms, we will examine a little more in-depth the determinants of the above mentioned variables. In Table VII.4, we see the predictors for each of the referenced freedoms. Since there was an overall decline of all freedoms in 2001, we will conduct a multivariate analysis using only the database for that year, trying to find out which Guatemalans felt less free and why.
Table VII.4
Predictors of Perceptions of Freedom
DIMS 1993-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREEDOM</th>
<th>PREDICTORS</th>
<th>DIRECTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to vote</td>
<td>- Residence</td>
<td>Rural less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wealth</td>
<td>Poorer less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fear of ethnic conflict</td>
<td>More fear less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Importance of human rights</td>
<td>HR important less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to run for office</td>
<td>- Age</td>
<td>Middle-age more free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Gender</td>
<td>Women less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wealth</td>
<td>Poorer less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Feeling of security</td>
<td>Unsafe less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fear of ethnic conflict</td>
<td>Uneven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Index of participation</td>
<td>Less participation less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- President’s performance</td>
<td>Bad rating less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preference for democracy</td>
<td>Prefer author. less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preference for order</td>
<td>Prefer liberty less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to demonstrate</td>
<td>- Gender</td>
<td>Women less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Support for lynchings</td>
<td>Reject self-justice less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preference for democracy</td>
<td>Prefer author. less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Importance of human rights</td>
<td>HR not imp. less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to participate in</td>
<td>- Gender</td>
<td>Women less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>community problem-solving</td>
<td>- Education</td>
<td>Less educated less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Feeling of security</td>
<td>Unsafe less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Government corruption</td>
<td>Belief corruption is not extended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Fear of ethnic conflict</td>
<td>less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>More fear less free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>Less satisfied less free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some of the predictors shown above come as no surprise. For instance, it is common sense that those who participate in more social organizations and those who have a good image of the work that the current president is doing, feel more free to participate in some democratic activities.

However, there are other predictors that are worth noting. A predictor that is recurrent is the feeling of security: Those who feel safer also feel more free to participate in a wider variety of democratic activities such as the above. By contrast those who fear crime (who feel insecure) and also those who fear an ethnic conflict in Guatemala in the future feel less free.

We can see that among the predictors that repeatedly appear as explanations of a lower perception of freedom, gender is the more constant. Consistently, women feel less free than men to run for office, to demonstrate, and to participate in community problem-solving activities. This is a finding that should also prompt further programmatic research and development of programs oriented to overcoming this problem.

We examine now an index of political freedom that was constructed using the four mentioned freedoms. The reliability analysis of this index is relatively high (alpha=.688). In a regression equation using the index of freedom as a dependent variable and a series of independent variables, we find again that
gender is the only sociodemographic predictor (i.e. women feel less free). Ethnic self-identification does not appear as a statistically significant variable related to the perception of freedom. Other variables that also turned out to be significant in the equation are the index of participation in groups (those who participate in more groups feel more free), the feeling of security (those who feel secure feel more free), political attentiveness (those who more frequently read, watch or listen to the news feel less free), and rating of the president’s performance (those give a lower rating to the president feel less free). The equation is shown in the statistical annex of this report.

In Figure VII.13, we can see the relationship between the overall perception of freedom with gender and feelings of security. We observe that those respondents who feel safer in terms of their personal security have a greater perception of democratic freedom, a difference that is especially notable in men. Overall, we can see that women have consistently a lower perception of freedom, regardless of whether or not they feel personally secure from crime.

![Perception of Freedom (Index of Freedom)
By Gender and Feeling of Security
DIMS 2001](image-url)
This latter comment brings us to the analysis of another item contained in the DIMS 2001 questionnaire. Respondents were asked what the obstacles for the participation of women are in political life in Guatemala. Around 15% of the respondents said that there are few opportunities for them to participate. Around 12% of the respondents said that it was because of the rejection of men. Another 10% asserted that there is not enough credibility about their abilities, and another 10% said that they are not prepared to participate. The remaining respondents said that there are limited spaces for women or that they have to take care of the house. Around 25% of the respondents did not know how to answer the question. We can see the distribution of responses by gender in Table VII.5. It must be noted that the differences between men and women are not statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBSTACLE</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Few opportunities/limited spaces available for them</td>
<td>21 %</td>
<td>21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little credibility in her own capacities</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>11 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of men</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are not prepared</td>
<td>10 %</td>
<td>10 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They must take care of home</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11 %</td>
<td>14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>27 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We now move on to the analysis of other variables that connect us with the next section of this chapter specifically related to the participation in social organizations. In 2001, respondents were asked which group would represent them better if talks with the government were to take place. The possible options were read to the respondents.

In Figure VII.14, we can see the distribution of the answers. It must be highlighted that popular groups obtain a relatively high percentage of adherence, which is a finding that may have programmatic implications as to the importance of promoting these type of social organizations.
As it can be seen, political parties are at the bottom of the list. This is a contradiction to the essence of a political party whose role it is to be the link of civil society with the so-called political society (i.e. with the government). The president of the section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association, Evelyne Huber points out:

“Political parties should be the major organizers of political interests and channels for the attainment and exercise of power.”

In other parts of the world, and in spite of the generalized decline of trust in political parties in many countries, the political parties continue to be the liaison of society with the decision-making process. The discussion of why this has not happened in Guatemala goes beyond the purpose of this report. Suffice it to say it is not only a responsibility of the parties themselves, but also the responsibility of many social groups that have sought to occupy spaces that would correspond to a political party in any consolidated democracy. This may also have programmatic implications. Programs seeking the consolidation of democracy in

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Guatemala should differentiate the role that in a democracy should be played by social organizations and the specific role that has to be played by political actors. Therefore those programs should help each type of organization in accordance to its role.

The low levels of trust in political parties in Guatemala can be better understood when we see a comparison with the level of trust in political parties in neighboring El Salvador. Figure VII.15 shows that both men and women have lower levels of trust in the parties in Guatemala than in El Salvador.

There are, however, citizens who do participate in political parties, and in fact, in 2001 many new groups seeking to become political parties were made public (the name in the Guatemalan legislation is comites pro-formación de partido político). Respondents in the DIMS surveys have been asked if they were registered in a political party.

In Figure VII.16, we can see that there has not been much variation in the percentage of citizens who said that they belonged to a political party: It has been only between 10% and 12% of the population year after year, including 11% in 2001. This would mean that even those who belong to political parties do
not consider them as the best channel to communicate with the government (since only 4% of the respondents chose the parties as an option in the previous question). This might be related to the lack of knowledge among party leaders and among the members of parties about the role that a party is supposed to play in a democratic society. In fact, many Guatemalans seem to consider that parties are only electoral mechanisms whose only purpose is to present candidates in elections.\textsuperscript{64} An orientation about the purposes, functions, and roles of political parties in a democracy both to members and non-members of political parties, is another possible area of intervention since the Electoral Law of Guatemala is not clear to this respect.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure VII.16}
\caption{Figure VII.16}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{64} For a more detailed analysis of the role of the political parties, see the different Memorias del Seminario sobre el Rol de los Partidos Politicos, organized and published by ASIES since 1984.
Social Participation

In the last section of this chapter we will examine the degree of participation in organizations of diverse types in Guatemala. We must recall that according to prominent political scientists like Ronald Inglehart and Robert Putnam, the participation in groups is very important for democracy, whether the organizations are or not of political nature. It is believed that a citizen who participates in groups interacts with others and becomes more tolerant to different ideas; in addition, he/she gets used to group decision-making procedures, which are fundamental to a democracy. In previous chapters of this report we have seen the importance of participation as an explanatory variable for a more democratic citizen.

Throughout the years, the DIMS questionnaires have asked the respondents if they participate and with what frequency they participate in meetings of a variety of groups, some of which can be considered as occupational groups (related to the profession or work of the individual) and others that are more social or community oriented in nature. The surveys have also included questions about participation in more political oriented groups, such as political parties and civic committees.

In Figure VII.17, we can see the level of participation in the politically-oriented groups. It must be recalled that in order to participate in the meetings of these groups, individuals don’t necessarily have to be registered in the party or committee. That is why this information is different from the one presented in Figure VII.16. We must further note that belonging (being registered) into a group does not necessarily imply that one attends the meetings of that organization.

The percentage of participation shown in the following figures refers to those who indicated that they participate often or sometimes in meetings of these groups. We can see that there was a decline in the level of participation in politically-oriented groups from 1999 to 2001; this is reasonable since 1999 was an electoral year. By 2001 we are back to the levels of participation of 1995, the first year in which these questions were asked.
Next, in Figure VII.18 we can observe the level of participation in socially-oriented organizations. The cross-time results show that there has been a percentage increase in the participation in church groups *vis-à-vis* 1999. However, the participation in school groups and in community development groups has decreased in the same period.

In fact, for school-related groups, 2001 is the year with the lowest participation. This is worrisome since the Peace Accords emphasized the importance of the involvement of parents in the educational process. The decline of participation in community development groups is also troublesome, and it may be related to the lower perception of freedom to participate that occurred in 2001. These findings should be taken into account in programs of cooperation that seek to strengthen participation.
It must be noted that in 2001, the DIMS questionnaire asked, for the first time, the level of participation in popular groups. Around 9% of the respondents indicated that they participate often or sometimes in such groups. This level of participation in popular groups is similar to the participation in unions and cooperatives in 2001.

Finally, we take a look at the participation in occupation-related groups. The cross-time results are shown in Figure VII.19. We can see that in 2001 there was an important decrease in the participation in professional groups and cooperatives and to a lesser extent in unions. Once again, 2001 marks the year with the lowest level of participation in cooperatives and one of the lowest in the levels of participation in professional groups, which had considerably increased in 1999.
A multivariate analysis, using the index of participation (that sums the participation in different types of organizations) in 2001, showed that residence, age, gender, ethnic self-identification, and education are significant predictors. A compare means procedure allows us to see the direction of a higher or lower index of participation. Thus, we find that there was lower participation among those living in urban areas, the younger and the older Guatemalans, females, Ladinos, and those with lower levels of education. In addition, we can see that those who don’t have a definite preference for democracy were also less likely to participate.

Finally, we constructed an index of freedom\textsuperscript{65} with the four types of freedoms measured in the questionnaire. In the regression equation the index of freedom is a significant predictor of participation. In other words, those who feel more free are more likely to participate. By contrast, those who feel less free tend to participate less. This may be one of the reasons why participation declined in 2001 since, as we saw before, Guatemalans in 2001 felt less free than in 1999.

\textsuperscript{65} The reliability analysis showed that this scale is reliable, with an alpha of .6883.
Interpersonal Trust

As it was explained at the beginning of this chapter, one important component of social capital is the interpersonal trust that may exist in a society. People who trust others are more likely to believe in democracy and to support participation. In Table VII.6 we can see a comparison of the levels of trust in Guatemala in 2001 in comparison with El Salvador and Bolivia.66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>GUATEMALA 2001</th>
<th>EL SALVADOR 1999</th>
<th>BOLIVIA 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How reliable do you think people are?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Very reliable</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Somewhat reliable</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not very reliable</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not reliable at all</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do people worry only about themselves or do they try to help others?
| | | |
| Only themselves | 74 | 72 | 75 |
| Try to help others | 26 | 28 | 25 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Source: For Guatemala DIMS 2001
For El Salvador and Bolivia, University of Pittsburgh’s Latin America Public Opinion Project databases.

Although in the second question the three countries obtain similar results, in the first question it is evident that Guatemalans are more distrustful than Bolivians and much more than Salvadorans. Whereas 61% of Salvadorans and 49% of Bolivians think that most people are very reliable or somewhat reliable, only 24% of Guatemalans think so. This is a troublesome finding that probably helps explain why it is so hard in Guatemala to establish dialogue between sectors. The analysis of why Guatemalans are so distrustful goes beyond the scope of this report. It may be due to the influence of 36 long and harsh years of armed conflict, to decades of authoritarian governments or even to historical or structural reasons.

66 There were questions in the exact format and scale in all three questionnaires.
In any case, what the multivariate analysis allows us to see is the characteristics of those who are more wary of others. Through a linear regression, we see that Guatemalans who live in urban areas are more distrustful. Other socio-demographic traits do not have a significant impact in the difference between trust and mistrust in others. However, other contextual variables are significant predictors. We see that those who prefer a stronghand government and who feel unsafe in their neighborhood are more distrustful. We also find an association between the performance of government and the lack of trust in others: Those who perceive that the government is not doing a good job and who consider corruption to be relatively extended have lower levels of trust. Yet once more, we find that the incumbent authorities play a fundamental role in the consolidation of democratic values, and consequently, a poor performance negatively affects democratic values. This may not be the case in societies where citizens have strong democratic values, but in societies like Guatemala, where democratic values are still consolidating a poor government performance is likely to have negative effects.

Figure VII.20 shows more clearly that those who live in rural areas are more likely to trust others, regardless of the ethnic self-identification of the respondent. By contrast, citizens of urban areas are likely to be more distrustful of others. The place of residence is a statistically significant explanatory variable of trust whereas ethnic self-identification is not. In fact, Indigenous and Ladino Guatemalans have exactly the same overall level of interpersonal trust: 39 average points.
Finally, in Figure VII.21 we see that those who have a preference for a strong-hand government to resolve the problems of the country, instead of preferring participation of all, are more likely to be mistrustful.
Although it is difficult to build trust in a society, this may be helped through educational programs and this may be a line of intervention of national and international programs in Guatemala. These findings suggest that the emphasis of educational programs should not be placed only in rural, but also in urban areas.
CHAPTER VIII
FIVE YEARS AFTER:
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS

Introduction

This last chapter is the most important ones because it is the most specific to Guatemalan reality. Different from previous chapters, the emphasis is not put on democratic values or attitudes, the legitimacy of political institutions, or the participation of citizens, but on the perceptions that Guatemalans have about their peace-building process. December of 2001 marked the fifth-year anniversary of the signing of the comprehensive Peace Accords that put an end to 36 years of the internal-armed conflict. In spite of problems and setbacks, the peace-building process that began at the end of 1996 has sustained over time.

The peace-building process in Guatemala can be assessed from two different (and often clashing) perspectives: an overall assessment that emphasizes the less tangible achievements that the peace-building process has brought about, and, on the other hand, a detailed assessment of compliance with the provisions contained in the Peace Accords. In general terms, both approaches are useful to assess the peace-building process in Guatemala, and both perspectives should complement the other.

Although the scope and detail of the Guatemalan accords should facilitate the assessment of peace-building from the second perspective --in comparison to other post-conflict societies where the agreements are not so comprehensive-- that same extensiveness of the accords can make the evaluation a very complex, and often, disheartening task. In addition, away from the issues of demobilization, reinsertion, and reconciliation, the assessment of the consolidation of peace begins to intermingle so closely to the assessment of the consolidation of democracy that it is hard to differentiate one from the other.

The assessment of the second perspective, which implies an evaluation of the compliance with more than 200 commitments contained in the Peace Accords, goes well beyond the scope of this report. The efforts made by MINUGUA and other national and international organizations are focused precisely on the observance of the provisions of the Peace Accords. We can say that overall, beyond the so-called operative peace commitments, all of the other commitments have only been partially achieved, and there remain many weaknesses; we can even assert that there have been setbacks in some areas.67

The assessment from the first perspective, that of the more intangible changes that may have occurred in Guatemala as a result of the signature of the Peace Accords is hardly ever made. In this chapter, we will discuss some general ideas from that perspective.\textsuperscript{68} We must note that we start out with the conception that Guatemala is still undergoing a peace-building process that because of its nature, was meant to be a long-term process.

However, the main focus of the chapter is on the analysis of the perceptions that Guatemalans have about the peace-building process. In the 2001 DIMS survey, a series of questions related to the peace process were included in the questionnaire. With the exception of one question, all the others were not asked in the previous DIMS, and consequently, this chapter will not emphasize cross-time analysis. In a similar way, the questions related to the peace-building process are so specific to Guatemalan reality that no cross-country comparison will be made.

**Peace-Building Theory and the Guatemalan Peace-Building Process**

In view of the different nature of peace-building processes (and peace agreements) around the globe, it is hard to find indicators that can help us to tell whether a peace-building process is heading in the right direction in a post-conflict society. In other words, there seem to be few universal quantitative parameters by which to measure whether “peace” is advancing or consolidating.

The clearest indicator of a successful peace settlement in a country that has suffered a civil war is that the armed confrontation between the contending actors has not resumed. A minimum of two years of non-armed confrontation is often taken as proof that peace may be succeeding. While it is impossible to assure that peace is irreversible, five years without armed confrontation often is a stronger indicator of success.\textsuperscript{69}

Some scholars like Doyle and Sambanis go a little further and make a difference between lenient peace-building success (which implies an end to the war and to residual lower-level violence and uncontested sovereignty) and strict peace-building success (which, in addition to the absence of war, implies a minimum standard of democratization).\textsuperscript{70}

Beyond those factors, it is difficult to find cross-country comparative indicators of the progress, success, or consolidation of peace in any given post-conflict


society. A good deal of the post-conflict literature deals with the factors that help to sustain peace; some are related to the traits of the conflict, such as the number of casualties of the civil war, the number of factions involved, and the type of war (whether it is an identity civil war or a political/economic war); others have to do with the post-war characteristics such as the method of termination of the conflict (military victory or negotiated settlement), the scope of power sharing stated in the peace agreements, the role of international actors in the negotiations and the post-conflict periods, and even some traits of the post-war country (e.g. the level of development and the ethnic heterogeneity of the population). Yet, how to measure the consolidation of peace is not evident. Clearly, in societies where a peace agreement has been signed, the compliance with the provisions in that particular treaty can help with assessing the success of peace. However, peace settlements can vary enormously in scope and substance and sometimes peace accords do not encompass the deep changes that have to occur in a society in order to consolidate peace in the long-run.

There are, nevertheless, some areas which are generally common to most peace-building processes that can be used as indicators of advancement: the effective demobilization and disarmament of the contending actors, the demining of former conflict areas, the reintegration of ex-combatants to a normal life within society, and the return and restoration of a displaced civilian population (including refugees in other countries).

Thereafter, we start dealing with more intangible indicators of the success of peace such as psychosocial healing, justice, and reconciliation. Other variables, which are difficult to quantify or measure, are the creation or reconstruction of harmonic social relations based upon consensus instead of violence, the acknowledgment by the contending parties and other sectors of society of the need to use peaceful means to solve social conflict, the participation of citizens in the decision-making process, the inclusion of previously excluded groups of society in the political and economic life of the country, the monitoring and observance of human rights, the improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of existing government institutions and even the implementation of structural reforms. These factors are often cited as indicators of the progress of peace.

As mentioned before, beyond the mere process of reconciliation, it is difficult to separate the assessment of peace from the assessment of democratization, given that most peace settlements include, in one way or another, elements for the democratization of society.

In light of the above discussion, how can we measure the progress of peace-building in Guatemala? As stated before, one of the few quantifiable cross-country indicators that can be used is the duration of peace as absence of armed confrontation. In fact, peace in Guatemala has reached the 5-year

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71 See K. Kumar, *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War*, op. cit
threshold; the final Peace Accord was signed in December of 1996, but in practice, an effective cease-fire had been reached in March of that year. In terms of the standards or parameters by which peace (as absence of war) is measured internationally, Guatemala has so far been a relatively successful case. In fact, Doyle and Sambanis consider Guatemala a case of strict peace-building success. They assert that the conflict that ended in the mid 90s is a successful case of strict peace-building because a level of democratization has been achieved in addition to the successful end to the war and to residual lower-level violence and uncontested sovereignty.

In addition, it has been recognized that in general terms, the first phase of the operative agreements (which cover most of the areas usually common to all peace-building processes: demobilization and disarmament of the contending actors, the reintegration of ex-combatants, and the return and relocation of displaced civilian population, including refugees in other countries) had a successful outcome. The demobilization and disarmament of the combatants from the URNG was carried out as accorded; there were few cases of political violence aimed at demobilized combatants, and the ex-guerrillas as a group (and individually) have had the possibility to participate in local politics through the new ex-guerrilla party. In fact, several of the former commanders of the URNG are now members of Congress.

However, the process of socio-economic reinsertion has been incomplete. Most of the problems have been related to the lack of sufficient funding for productive projects and the lack of follow-up. A survey of ex-combatants carried out in the year 2000 revealed concerns over the lack of stable jobs, adequate housing, and sufficient economic resources to sustain a family. These problems are common to the majority of the Guatemalan population but appear to have been more acute for ex-combatants. As to the army’s demobilization, it has been a slow process, but concrete things, like the elimination of the Mobile Military Police and the Civil Defense Patrols were achieved. Nevertheless, there have been complaints by human rights groups that accuse former civil patrolmen of violent acts in their communities.

Beyond the operative commitments, the implementation of the commitments contained in the other Peace Accords in Guatemala has been a slow process, beset with ups and downs, especially under the current government. The diverse reports published by MINUGUA and other international organizations are often disheartening. Nevertheless, the slow compliance and even the setbacks in the implementation of the Peace Accords should not overshadow the achievements of the peace-building process. On the whole, it can be said that in spite of many problems, Guatemala has come a long way from its authoritarian past and that the peace-building period has brought about many tangible but also some intangible changes. Two of the less quantifiable but nonetheless appreciable changes are on the one hand the termination of armed hostilities and on the other hand, the political opening that has occurred in recent years.
Public Support for Peace in Guatemala

It is often asserted that Guatemalans do not identify with the Peace Accords, and after the Consulta Popular of 1999, some even dared to say that Guatemalans were opposed to them. However, in the DIMS 1999 Report and in other academic publications, it has been shown that the failure of the Consulta Popular did not mean a rejection of the Peace Accords by the population.

Overall, there has been very few quantifiable efforts to measure the adherence of Guatemalans, not only to the Peace Accords, but to the peace-building process in general. We will attempt to provide some data that can enlighten the analysis from this perspective.

First of all, we must note that the only question related to the Peace Accords that was included in the 1999 DIMS questionnaire and in the DIMS 2001 survey was one related to the opinion of Guatemalans about the Peace Accords. The specific question was the following: *Do you think that the Peace Accords are very good, somewhat good or not good?*

In Figure VIII.1, we can see the comparison of the percentage of responses in 1999 and in 2001 to that question; we must note that the question itself may have had some flaws, but it is the only item available for cross-time comparison. The results lead us to believe that when answering the question, respondents were thinking about the peace-building process in general and not necessarily about the Peace Accords, which in reality are not known in detail by the population. In fact the accords are so complex that only a few specialized agencies and individuals would know them in detail.

As we can see between 1999 and 2001, there was an important increase in the number of those who consider the accords to be very good. The difference is statistically significant. There was also a slight increase in the percentage of Guatemalans who consider that the accords are not good. The valid percentages are shown on the graph. It is important to note that in 1999, 6% of the respondents did not answer the question, and in 2001, 7% did not answer it. The results are rather positive. Overall, 94% of those who responded to the question said that the accords were somewhat good (41%) or very good (53%).
Through a multivariate analysis of the 2001 database, we can determine the predictors or explanatory variables that account for the opinion of the Peace Accords. The regression equation is shown in the statistical annex. Different types of independent variables were included in the model: political values variables (such as preference for authoritarian options, tolerance, etc.); sociodemographic variables (age, gender, etc.), and contextual variables (variables that exist in the context of the respondent that may influence his opinion such as crime victimization and fear of crime).

The political values variables associated to the opinion about the Peace Accords are the preference for democracy (those who prefer democracy have a better opinion of the accords), the preference for a stronghand government or participation to solve the country’s problems (those who prefer a stronghand have a lower opinion of the accords), the idea that a warrant is or is not necessary to enter a suspect’s home (those who think a warrant is necessary have a higher opinion), the level of tolerance (those who are tolerant have a better opinion) and the level of support for democratic institutions (those who support institutions have a better opinion).
In terms of the contextual variables, the only predictor of opinion about the Peace Accords is the victimization of political violence (those who were not victims have a higher opinion). Finally, in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, the determinants of the opinion about the Peace Accords are age and education (the older and the less educated Guatemalans have a better opinion of the accords). Once again, we find that education is correlated with less favorable opinions about democracy and peace. This may relate to the critical stance that university students or graduates may have, or, as stated in previous chapters, it may relate to weaknesses and problems in the education system, especially with regards to the democratic development of citizens. It may also relate to the lack of sufficient materials about the Peace Accords that are comprehensive and understandable for persons with middle and higher education. The publications that contain the whole accords are not accessible nor attractive to this kind of public. Therefore one of the efforts of programs that seek to promote peace should stress the edition of other kinds of materials.

Table VIII.1 shows a comparison of the average support for the Peace Accords according to the socio-demographic traits of the respondents. Although only education and age are statistically significant, it is important to note the differences that may exist between men and women, Indigenous and Ladino Guatemalans, urban and rural areas, and wealthier and poorer Guatemalans.
In the following figures, we illustrate some of the differences more clearly. In Figure VIII.2, we see that those who have a high school or university education (even if not complete) have a lower average opinion of the Peace Accords. By contrast, those with no education have the highest opinion. However, we must note that there is a favorable opinion about the Peace Accords at all levels, including the highest levels of education.
In Figure VIII.3, we see the differences in opinion divided by age and residency. We can see that those who live in urban areas have a lower opinion, regardless of age. However, in rural areas, those who are older tend to have a better opinion than younger Guatemalans. The lower support for the accords in urban areas may be related to the greater fear of crime in the postwar period.
In the next two figures, we see the association between preference for democratic options (instead of more authoritarian ones) and the opinion of the accords. Thus in Figure VIII.4, we can see that those who prefer democracy, rather than an eventual authoritarian government (or who are indifferent) are more likely to have a higher opinion of the Peace Accords. The difference is statistically significant.
Finally, we see in Figure VIII.5 that those who favor a strong-hand government to solve Guatemala’s problems are less likely to have a good opinion of the accords, in comparison with those who believe that problems can be solved with participation. The difference is also statistically significant.
We now move on to the analysis of a related subject. Is peace an important subject for Guatemalans? In other words, is it a “top-of-mind” issue or not. Respondents in the DIMS 2001 survey were asked which is the most important issue for Guatemala, one that we should all pay attention to? The choices were read to the respondents. The frequency of the problem mentioned first is shown on Table VIII.2 below, which is divided by the respondent’s residency. We can see that the percentages vary in the rural and urban areas, although there are overall similarities. For instance, in both areas, public security was mentioned as the most important issue; however, the percentage of response for that option was higher in urban areas. The reduction of poverty was the second issue in both rural and urban areas, and the percentages were almost identical.

In regards to the Peace Accords, we can see that this issue was mentioned more frequently in rural areas (11%) vis-à-vis 7% in the urban areas. This may have a programmatic implication that relates to some findings previously seen in this same chapter: There is a need to raise more awareness about the Peace Accords in urban areas. However, it must be noted that all
issues, including that of public security, are in one way or another included in the accords, something the respondents may have been unaware of.

Table VIII.2
Most Important Issue for Guatemala
DIMS 2001
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE</th>
<th>RURAL</th>
<th>URBAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public security</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of poverty</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic recuperation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of justice</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulfillment of the Peace Accords</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax collection</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of them</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of them</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More specifically, respondents were asked whether the government should pay more attention to the implementation of the Peace Accords or whether that is not important for the future of Guatemala. In Figure VIII.6 we can clearly see that a majority of Guatemalans (94% of those who gave an opinion) believe that the government should pay more attention to the accords. By contrast, only 2% think that the government is paying enough attention, 3% of the respondents think that the government should not pay more attention to them, and 1% think that the accords are not important at all.
We can say that overall there seems to be overwhelming support for the implementation of the Peace Accords. It must be noted that only 10% of those interviewed did not answer the question. In addition, it is important to analyze the respondents who do not support the accords (the ones who answered that the government should not pay more attention to them or that they are not important). Taking into account the predictors of opinion of the accords analyzed before, in Figure VIII.7 we present the lack of support for the accords by education. We observe that, again, those with a university education (even if not completed) are less likely to support the implementation of the accords, although the percentages of those who reject the accords is minimal and the difference in this case is not statistically significant.
Knowledge and Expectations About the Peace Accords

In this section, we will explore aspects related to the knowledge and expectations that Guatemalans have about the Peace Accords and the peace-building process in general.

In the DIMS 2001 survey, respondents were asked if you know the peace accords, which do you consider the most important one? This question was asked to find out whether or not the respondents knew the accords and if so, which is the accord they know most about. It must be noted that 51% of the respondents did not know the accords. Another 17% did not answer the question. Given the complexity of the Guatemalan Peace Accords these results are not surprising.

In total, only 32% of those interviewed gave an answer to this question. The distribution of responses among those who indicated knowing the accords is shown in Table VIII.3.
Table VIII.3
Importance of Individual Peace Accords
DIMS 2001
Percentages
(only 32% who reported knowing the accords)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACCORD</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Population</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-Economic Aspects</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of them are important</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other accords</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Power and Role of the Army</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Clarification Commission</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional and Electoral Reforms</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of them is important</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Figure VIII.8 we can see the degree of importance given to each accord by ethnic self-identification. Note that the percentages that appear in Figure VIII.8 are valid percentages out of the total number of responses (including those who said they did not know the accords). In addition, in the graph, only the four accords that were considered most important are shown.

The Indigenous Rights Accord has more importance for the indigenous population, although many Ladinos also consider it to be the most significant one. For Indigenous Guatemalans, the Socioeconomic Accord and the Human Rights Accord are also important. For Ladino Guatemalans, the most important accord is Human Rights, followed by the Socioeconomic Accord.
All of the respondents were asked what *did they expect from the Peace Accords*. Table III.4 shows the distribution of responses to this open question. We can see that almost half of the respondents said that they expected the end of violence or the end of the war. In that sense, the peace-building process has fulfilled those particular expectations, since the armed conflict has not resumed. Violence has had other manifestations, such as crime, but that is a problem that also exists in other societies that have not had an armed conflict.
Table VIII.4
Expectations from the Peace Accords
DIMS 2001
Percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPECTATION</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No more violence/end of the war</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other things</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More employment</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not expect anything special</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More social programs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of the Army</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The five expectations mentioned most often by the respondents are shown in Figure VIII.9, divided by place of residence. We can see that the expectations in both rural and urban areas are very similar. Overall, the hope that violence could be reduced and that the war would end were the expectations most often specified by Guatemalans.
We will now assess the importance given by respondents, not to each individual accord, but to general issues covered in the diverse accords. All of the respondents (regardless of whether they reported knowing or not knowing the accords) were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 (where 1 is not important at all and 10 is very important) the relevance of certain issues contained in the accords. Note that in this case they were not asked to rank the issues, but to give an estimation of how important they considered each issue. The average that each issue obtained is seen in Figure VIII.10. It must be noted that the non-response in this case was relatively high with about one-fifth of the respondents (20%) answering that they did not know in each case.

We can see that the educational reform is the one that had a higher average of response (72 points) followed by promoting citizens’ participation to solve community problems (67 points). The improvements in the respect to indigenous rights and the issues of justice and reparation to the victims of the armed conflict are next with a 65 and 64 average points respectively, followed closely by the increase to government expenditures in health, education and housing (average of 63 points). The army and tax reforms have the same level
of importance for respondents (56 points), and lastly, the electoral reform gets an average score of 51.

What is probably most surprising about these results is the importance given by the respondents in this study to the participation of citizens' in decision-making about their communities, which obtained a higher level of importance than issues like the increase in social expenditures. Another interesting result is the relatively high level of importance given to the issues of justice and reparation to victims. In the last part of this chapter, we will go a little more in-depth into the analysis of justice and reconciliation issues.

Respondents were asked whether or not there have been changes in their community since the signature of the Peace Accords five years ago. In Figure VIII.11, we can see the distribution of the answers.
One third of the respondents indicated that there have been changes since the beginning of the peace-building period. In Figure VIII.12, we can see the difference by ethnic self-identification, a difference that is statistically significant. As it can be observed, a higher percentage of Indigenous Guatemalans perceive that some changes have occurred. There is also a statistically significant difference between urban and rural areas: Around 28% of the respondents in urban areas reported that there have been changes whereas 35% of the residents in rural areas reported changes.
Have there been changes in your community as a result of the Peace Accords?

By Ethnic Self-Identification, DIMS 2001

Another question was asked to those who believed that changes have taken place: *Which is the main change that has occurred?* We must note that it was an open question and that people were not induced to answer about positive or negative changes. The responses can be seen in Table VIII.5.
Table VIII.5
Changes Occurred as a Result of the Peace Accords
DIMS 2001
Percentages
(only those who reported that there have been changes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGES OCCURRED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence-related changes:</td>
<td>69 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is no more war</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is no violence</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is no persecution</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• People don’t run away</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Families are returning</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fear has diminished</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The army has left</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic changes:</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More roads</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Community improvements</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic improvements</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other changes:</td>
<td>19 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More participation and community organization</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other non-specified changes</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can’t tell exactly</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can see that a majority of the perceived changes have to do with improvements related to the violence existent during the armed conflict. Once again, this is one intangible change that is not usually taken into account when the evaluations of the Peace Accords are made.
From Justice to Reconciliation

In this section we will analyze some issues related to justice and reconciliation. First we will take a look at the victimization of political violence during the armed conflict.

Respondents were asked whether they or someone in their family had been victims of political violence during the armed conflict. Around 87% of those interviewed had not been victims and 13% had. The percentages are similar to those obtained in previous DIMS. We ran a logistic regression equation (see statistical annex) to find out what explanatory variables account for the victimization of political violence. The equation is shown in the statistical annex.

The only socio-demographic variables that are significant predictors of political victimization are residence (respondents in rural areas are more likely to have been victims) and ethnic self-identification (Indigenous Guatemalan are more likely to have been victims), findings that are not surprising.

Earlier in this chapter we saw that justice and reparation to victims of the armed conflict seem to be relatively important issues for Guatemalans. In Figure VIII.13 we analyze whether or not the victimization of political violence makes a difference in the opinion about this subject. We can see that, in fact, those who were direct or indirect victims of political violence during the armed conflict have higher support for issues of justice and reparation, in both urban and in rural areas.
Importance of Justice and Reparation Issues
By Residence and Victimization of Political Violence

Another related question included in the DIMS 2001 questionnaire asked all of the respondents whether or not the relatives of the victims should seek justice. As it can be observed in Figure VIII.14, a large percentage thinks that justice should be sought. We must note, however, that one-fifth of the respondents did not know or did not want to answer this question.
Opinion about Peace-Related Institutions

We will examine Guatemalans’ opinions about a series of institutions that were created as a result of the signature of the Peace Accords, with the exception of the Development Councils, which were created by the Constitution of 1985.

The respondents were asked how much these institutions help solve the most important problems of Guatemala. They were asked to rate each institution on a scale that goes from 1 (does not help at all) to 10 (helps very much). Before we examine the average obtained by each institution, it must be noted that many respondents did not know the institution about which they were being asked. The percentage of non-response for each institution can be seen in Table VIII.6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>% DON'T KNOW INSTITUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RURAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUGUA</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPAZ</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMISION DE ACOMPAÑAMIENTO</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSEJOS DE DESARROLLO</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTIERRA</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FON TIERRA</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSORIA DE LA MUJER</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MESAS DE CONCERTACION</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the next two figures, we can see the average opinion of the above institutions. First we see in Figure VIII.15 the opinion that citizens have of MINUGUA, SEPAZ, the Comisión de Acompañamiento and the Consejos de Desarrollo.
In Figure VIII.16 we can see the average opinion about the helpfulness of CONTIERRA, FONTIERRA, the Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena and the Mesas de Concertación.
We can see that those who know the institutions listed above have an opinion that ranges between 30 and 40 points for most of them. The Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena appears as the peace-related institution that Guatemalans find most helpful for solving the country’s problems, at least among the institutions included in this analysis. In comparison, the Mesas de Concertación appear as the least helpful. We don’t have data available to compare these institutions with other state or private institutions. In any case, it must be taken into account that most are fairly new institutions, and in the light of that consideration, the overall results seem somewhat positive.

**Sustainability of Peace**

One of the greatest concerns of the international community that has closely followed and supported the implementation of the Peace Accords in Guatemala is related to the financial sustainability of peace. The lack of dialogue with the FRG government prompted, in 2001, a rejection from diverse organized sectors to a tax increase, one of the central commitments contained in the Peace Accords.
In the DIMS 2001, a question was asked related to this subject. Respondents were asked if they would be willing to pay more taxes if the resources were used in a better way for social programs (such as health, education, etc.). Note that the question did not ask about the willingness to pay more taxes to the current government but that it was a general question.

About one half of the respondents (52%) said that they were not willing to pay more taxes, but around a 44% said that they would. The remaining 4% did not answer the question. The multivariate analysis showed that the determinants of willingness to pay more taxes are the education of the respondent, the index of political attentiveness (how often the respondent listens, reads or watches news), and the perception of government corruption. Hence, those who have more education and who pay more attention to the news (controlled by education) are more willing to pay more taxes if these are used properly for social programs.

In Figure VIII.17, we can see that respondents who are in contact with the news are more willing to pay taxes, because, most likely, they are more aware of the high levels of poverty in Guatemala.
In Figure VIII.18, we can observe that those with higher levels of education are more willing to pay more taxes. This is a positive finding that contrasts with previous findings that showed that respondents with higher levels of education were less likely to have favorable opinions about peace and democracy in Guatemala.

![Willingness to Pay More Taxes](image)

Finally, using bivariate statistical procedures, we find that the place of residence and wealth are also significantly associated with the willingness to pay more taxes. In Figure VIII.19, we see that there is more willingness to pay taxes in urban areas and among those with higher income.
Willingness to Pay More Taxes
If Properly Used for Social Programs

DIMS 2001

Dif. sig. <.005

Wealth (by # of goods at home)

Figure VIII.19
Willingness to Pay More Taxes
If Used Properly for Social Programs
By Wealth