

SECOND REPORT:

GUATEMALAN VALUES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

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
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Executive Summary

This study describes the state of democratic values relevant to USAID strategic objectives in Guatemala and how those values did and did not change over the past two years. It is based on scientifically drawn, national household surveys of Guatemala completed in the Spring of 1993 and the Spring of 1995. The questionnaire was based on prior research in Central and South America, Western Europe and the United States. Although most interviews were completed in Spanish, some interviews were conducted in one of the four indigenous languages into which the questionnaire had been carefully translated.

Major Findings:

Central to the study are the concepts of system support, support for democratic liberties and the interrelationship between the two.

- System support is defined as the legitimacy accorded by the populace to the political system in general and to its component institutions. Taking the Guatemalan population as a whole, the study found no change in the level of system support. In both 1993 and 1995 the level was a 40 on a 100 point scale. However, by analyzing the data in terms of ethnicity, important differences were found. In 1993 the level of support from the Ladino population was significantly higher than support from the indigenous population. But by 1995, the level of system support from the indigenous population had increased significantly, which resulted in both Ladino and indigenous populations having the same levels of system support¹.
- Support for democratic liberties is the set of values that focuses on the acceptance of democracy within the context of a democratic order. Values related to a tolerance for political dissent are of particular importance. The study found that the level of political tolerance among the Guatemalan population as a whole had increased between 1993 and 1995. The level rose from a 44 to a 49 on a 100 point scale. Again there were differences among ethnic groups. In this case the level of tolerance for political dissent rose among the Ladinos, but did not change among the indigenous population.
- The relationship between these two variables - system support and support for democratic liberties (or political tolerance) - provides indicators of values supporting a stable or deepening democracy, an unstable democracy, oligarchic authoritarianism, and democratic breakdown. The study found no significant change in the level of support for stable democracy between 1993 and 1995; slightly less than 20 percent of the population reflected these values both years. There was, however, an overall increase in the proportion of Guatemalans with values supporting democracy in general (i.e., the combination of stable and unstable democracy); the percent of Guatemalans in this larger category rose from 50 to 55 between 1993 and 1995.

The surveys also gathered information on levels of community and political participation, attitudes toward and experiences with various governmental institutions, and approval of overthrowing the government by force.

¹ Because of sample size, the shift in support by the indigenous population was not enough to change the national level overall.

Among these findings are:

- The level of participation in community organizations such as schools, churches and community development organizations increased somewhat between 1993 and 1995 (from a level of 25 to 29 on a 100 point scale). There was no change in the level of participation in such occupational related groups as labor unions, cooperatives, or professional associations.
- Overall, there was little or no discernible change in the level of political participation. The percent of persons reporting they were registered to vote did not change; the percent reporting they voted in the last election declined;² and neither the percent who were members of political parties nor the percent who indicated they had worked in a political campaign changed significantly.
- There was change among the indigenous population. Indigenous levels of participation in political activities such as joining a political party, working actively in a political campaign, and trying to convince others how to vote, although still low, almost doubled from 1993 to 1995.
- There is a positive relationship between certain kinds of participation and support for the political system. It appears that it is participation in civil society organizations (i.e., organizations that have explicit political or policy interest), rather than primarily occupational or service oriented groups, that is the key.
- Public support for the forceful overthrow of an elected government declined. Although the level of approval in 1993 was not high (25 percent), there was a significant drop in the level of approval, to 17 percent of the population in 1995.

The study also identified a significant preference among the Guatemalan people for local-level government. Guatemalans are much more likely to contact local government officials for assistance, they believe they are treated better by such officials, and they believe that they are more likely to benefit from their contact with local rather than central government. As has been found in other countries in Central America, in Guatemala citizens satisfied with local government are more likely to be supportive of the national political system.

Major Conclusions

The good news is that there is reason for optimism. There has been movement in a positive direction with respect to democratic values. Between 1993 and 1995 the indigenous population became more supportive of the political system and the Ladino population became more tolerant of political dissent. The bad news is that there is still a very long way to go.

Programmatically, there are indications from the study that investments in the civil society sector would be beneficial to an effort at strengthening democracy in Guatemala. There are also indications that attention to local government improvement would produce values highly supportive of democracy as well.

The data presented in this study provide an indication that extensive donor efforts to improve governance, promote greater civic understanding, and change the behavior of public officials have borne fruit. At the same time the data underscore the distance that remains to be traveled to assure the possibilities for stable democracy in Guatemala.

² The reference point was the 1990 presidential election for respondents to the 1993 survey and the legislative elections of 1994 for those responding in 1995.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Guatemala has experienced a set of important political transformations in the past two and half years. An elected president (Jorge Serrano) attempted a coup designed to eliminate democratic government; the coup failed because of both international and domestic pressure. A president (Ramiro de León Carpio) chosen by Congress to replace Serrano finished out a term in office and presided over a peaceful transfer through a fair election to a president representing a different political orientation. The new president, Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen, although elected in a relatively low turnout runoff (around 37 percent of the electorate voted in the second round and around 47 percent in the first round), was able to point to a significant mandate--a Congress in which his party had a majority.

As important as these changes were at the national level, potentially more profound change has been taking place at the local level. The most significant element of this change is the development of political vehicles for the effective incorporation of the indigenous majority into the Guatemalan nation as a peaceful alternative to prolonged guerilla warfare.

But the question remains as to whether these positive changes can be institutionalized over time. An important part of that process of institutionalization is the development of an attitudinal framework that supports the process of democratization. The Democratic Indicators Monitoring System undertook a baseline survey in May 1993 to measure democratic values in Guatemala. This study reports on a second survey (undertaken in April of 1995) which permits an examination of any shifts in political attitudes relevant to democracy over the past two years.

In the balance of this chapter, we will present the most significant findings of the baseline (1993) study and present the methodological underpinnings for the findings contained in this report.

Highlights from the 1993 Study

The 1993 study described the current state of democratic values in Guatemala, values that are the building blocks of a stable political order and those values and attitudes necessary to assure that the existing political order is a democratic one.¹ The following is a summary of major findings from the survey conducted in 1993:

System Support is the legitimacy accorded by the populace to the political system in general and to its component institutions. It was measured using a six-item scale assessing public trust in courts, Congress, the Electoral Tribunal, public offices, the protection of human rights, and political parties. Overall, Guatemalans demonstrated only

¹ See Mitchell A. Seligson and Joel M. Jutkowitz, *Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic Development*, Arlington, Development Associates, 1994, pp111-119.

a modest level of support for their governmental system, an average of 40 on a 100 point scale. The ethnic background, wealth and education of the respondents were found to be the most important elements associated with system support. The lowest levels of support are found among those with the highest level of education and, consistent with this, among those with higher levels of wealth. The indigenous population, however, expressed lower system support than did the Ladino population, despite lower education and levels of wealth.

Support for Democratic Liberties are values that focus on the acceptance of democracy within the context of a stable democratic order. Guatemalans as a whole express low levels of support for democratic attitudes regarding the right to participate and the right to dissent. The strongest predictor of higher levels of support for democratic liberties was found to be education.

The **Interrelationship of System Support and Support for Democratic Liberties** provides an indicator of democratic stability. A table representing all the possible combinations of system support and high tolerance has four cells: high support and high tolerance, high support but low tolerance, low support but high tolerance, and low support and low tolerance. Indigenous peoples had twice as high a proportion of their responses as Ladinos in the high support and high tolerance (stable democracy) category, although no more than 10 percent of either group was in this category. The 1993 data indicate that Guatemala's democracy is set on a weak attitudinal base.

The level of **Perceived Political Violence** in Guatemala is high, and the data suggest that such violence is generally accepted. This is important because it represents a breakdown of democratic principles. Citizens have a negative view of the police, military, and the courts -- which are seen as agents of state violence and repression. Far too many Guatemalans also accept the notion of the use of force expressed in a coup as an appropriate means of effecting political change.

Conventional Political Participation includes voting, petitioning officials, and organizing at the community level. Guatemalans are comfortable with community participation, but are less active on a national level. An expansion of opportunities and skills to undertake participation on a different level was seen as needed.

Support for Military or Civilian Rule. Support for a military rule threatens the success of a democracy. On what turned out to be the eve of an attempted coup by President Serrano, Guatemalans were asked: "Do you think that sometimes there could be a sufficient reason for the military to take over the government by force, or do you think that there is never a sufficient reason for that." While the majority of the Guatemalans in the 1993 study did not support the idea of a coup, over one third of the population did think that conditions could justify a military takeover.

The Survey Sample and Questionnaire

The report on the 1993 survey fully describes the survey instrument used, the basis for its validity and reliability, and the national sample that was drawn.² The 1995 survey replicated the 1993 sample design and data collection procedures. The report on the 1993 survey explains the rationale of the sampling and the weighting technique. In brief, because both the 1993 and 1995 data underestimate the poor, uneducated population, the data were weighted to better emulate the national population. Logical choices for the weighting would be literacy and urban/rural variables, but these have been proven subjective, and therefore the objective criterion used was years of education. The education variable was used to weight the data, using census data to estimate the number of those who had less than 3 years of formal education and adjusting this number to allow for change over time.³

While the sample design and data collection procedures were the same in 1993 and 1995, some relatively minor changes were made to the questionnaire. Some items were dropped in 1995 based on analysis of the 1993 data. On the other hand, the 1995 instrument added several items to explore in more depth the reasons many Guatemalans do not vote. The 1995 instrument also included new questions regarding the extent of participation in political parties and civic committees, and an item on perceptions of the impact of private sector institutions on the country and its problems. Several new items pertaining to participation at the municipal level were added as well.

This study was designed as a series of successive cross sections, rather than a panel design (in which the same respondent would be interviewed for each wave), because the costs of using a panel study design were considered too high.⁴ However, the 1995 survey was conducted in the same communities, following the same selection protocols as in 1993. In both surveys interviews were conducted in 17 of Guatemala's 22 Departments plus Guatemala City. Thus, in brief, both surveys constitute a scientifically drawn probability sample of the Guatemalan population over 18 years of age, and direct comparisons can be made between similar groups of Guatemalans across the two surveys.

In Guatemala, there is perhaps no more socially relevant characteristic than ethnicity, but unfortunately, there are no universally accepted definitions of ethnic identity. Consequently, it is difficult to select the measure that most clearly distinguishes the Indian population from the non-Indian population. In the questionnaire we used several distinct methods: we determined the respondent's use of language (Spanish vs. Indian languages); we asked the respondents to self-identify (Indian vs. "ladino"); and, we noted if the respondent was

² Ibid, pp. 4-8.

³ See appendix one of Seligson and Jutkowitz, *op. cit* for greater details.

⁴ In Guatemala, a panel design would require a very large sample and suffer from high attrition because many individuals have no telephones and it is, therefore, very easy to lose track of respondents.

dressed in Indian or Western clothes. Throughout the report we have made clear which definition is being used.⁵

A significant concern in the conduct of this, or any other, public opinion survey is its timing. Although certainly not by design, the 1993 survey took place a week before the events that constituted the attempted coup by President Serrano and his subsequent removal from office and replacement by Ramiro de León Carpio. It is hard to imagine, given the survey instrument's focus on basic attitudes and values, that this timing affected the quality of the answers received. Indeed, comparisons between the 1993 survey and a 1992 survey of Central American political culture conducted by the University of Pittsburgh⁶ display a certain consistency of patterns that validates the fundamental nature of the attitudinal measures being used. The 1995 survey took place prior to the presidential electoral campaign at a time that also was not a period of intense political activity.

⁵ We systematically conducted separate analyses using each of the definitions and, for the most part, the general findings or conclusions are the same regardless of the measure used. Unless specifically indicated otherwise, we only report differences between the Ladino and indigenous populations when the direction of the findings are the same using at least two of the definitions and the difference using at least one is statistically significant.

⁶ University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project, March 1992.

Comparisons of the two datasets

To make comparisons across the two surveys, the demographic characteristics of the 1993 and 1995 samples need to be similar. As shown in exhibit 1.1, overall, the two samples are well matched. There are no statistically significant differences between the two samples in terms of language use, gender, education, urbanity and voter registration. There is a slight difference between the samples with regard to age (sig. <.05), but that should have no effect on the comparisons to be made between the two surveys.

Exhibit 1.1
Selected Characteristics of 1993 and 1995 National Samples

Comparison Variable	'93 Data	'95 Data
Number Interviewed		
unweighted	1197	1192
weighted	1199	1191
Mean age	39.9 years	41.2 years
Percent Spanish Speakers	97.9 %	96.2 %
Percent Male Respondents	49.1 %	49.2 %
Mean Education Level	4.5 years	4.7 years
Percent Urban Respondents	57.1 %	56.7 %
Percent Registered to Vote	76.9 %	76.6 %
Percent Indigenous Defined by:		
Dress	10.8%	11.3%
Ability to Speak Indigenous Language	24.5%	23.6%
Self- Identification	38.9%	42.7%

The chapters that follow present the findings of the 1995 survey and the relevant comparisons to the 1993 baseline. Chapter 2 covers system support and support for democratic liberties. Chapter 3 examines involvement in political participation at the community and national levels. Chapter 4 looks deeper at the issue of low voter turnout. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and implication of the study for donor programming.

Chapter 2: System Support, Political Tolerance and Stability: Changes from 1993 to 1995

The first report on the Guatemalan Democracy Study (1994) contains discussions on the extent of public support for the Guatemalan system of government and on the support for democratic liberties of the Guatemalan people. It also discusses an indicator of political stability that is the result of the interaction of these two variables. That report compares Guatemala to other Central American countries on the basis of data from the University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Study (1992). This chapter presents the results of the 1995 survey for these critical variables in comparison with the earlier 1993 survey.


A. System Support

The stability of a political system has long been thought to be directly linked to popular perceptions of that system's legitimacy. According to Lipset's classical work, systems that are legitimate survive even in the face of difficult times. Illegitimate systems, ones that do not have the support of the populace, can only endure over the long run through the use of repression. When repression no longer can be used effectively, or if opposition elements are willing to risk even extremely grave sanctions, illegitimate regimes will eventually fall. Authoritarian regimes survive on the basis of some combination of legitimacy and repression, while democracies tend to rely primarily on legitimacy alone.¹ To measure legitimacy of system support we have used a scale tested in Mexico, Costa Rica, and Peru, as well as in other comparative research.²

¹ This is not to say that democracies do not use coercion, but that its use is very limited.

² Until recently, efforts to measure legitimacy have tended to rely on the trust-in-government scale devised by the University of Michigan (Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government", *American Political Science Review* 68 (September 1974):951-972.). However, that scale depended too heavily on a measurement of dissatisfaction with the performance of incumbents rather than of generalized dissatisfaction with the system of government. The development of the political support scale has provided a much more powerful analytical tool for measuring legitimacy. (For a review of this evidence see Mitchell A. Seligson, "On the Measurement of Diffuse Support: Some evidence from Mexico," *Social Indicators Research* 12 (January 1983):1-24, and Edward N. Muller, Thomas O. Jukam and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Diffuse Political Support and Antisystem Political Behavior: A Comparative Analysis," *American Journal of Political Science* 26, May 1982: 240-264.) The scale has been shown to be reliable and valid. It is based upon a distinction made by Easton, relying upon Parsons, that defines legitimacy in terms of system support (diffuse support) rather than specific support (support for incumbents). For further discussion see: David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975):435-457; Talcott Parsons, "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action," in Young, ed. *Approaches to the Study of Politics*, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Elements of System Support: Exhibit 2.1 compares the results of the 1993 and the 1995 surveys on 10 distinct indicators that make up our scale of system support. As stated in the first report (pp. 15-16), we opted to convert items to a common 0-100 scale, with 0 always representing the low end of the continuum and 100 the high end. We believe this is less confusing for the reader than using a different scoring method for each set of items in the study, and when we make comparisons using multiple regression analysis the use of a single metric for all items allows us to compare the relative contribution of each item in the equation without having to resort to the complexity of using standard scores.³



Note: 1993=Pride in being Guatemalan, 1995=Pride in Guatemalan system of government.

Analyses of the data in exhibit 2.1 show a statistically significant change in 5 of the 10 indicators. However, the most dramatic change, in “pride”, is also misleading. In 1993 the question asked was about pride in being a Guatemalan, while in 1995 the question was about pride in the government of Guatemala. The phrasing was changed in 1995 to make

³ The arithmetic conversion of scales was performed by subtracting 1 from each item and then dividing by one less than the total number of points in the original scale and, finally, multiplying the result by 100. For example, a scale that ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 7 would first be reduced by subtracting 1 from each score, giving a range of 0-6. After dividing by 6, the lowest score would remain a 0, but the highest would be 1. Multiplying by 100 would make the maximum equivalent to 100. We followed this same procedure when we created summated scales that combined two or more items in the study.

the item parallel to items asked in surveys of other Central American pride in the countries.⁴ The results of the 1995 survey on the item asking about the government of Guatemala were similar to those obtained by the University of Pittsburgh study in 1992 for Guatemala; that is, around the middle point of the scale.⁵ This suggests that no substantial change in this dimension has occurred in the past three years.

The other statistically significant changes (<.005) in the system support indicators are:

- Confidence in the Human Rights Ombudsman declined (62 to 54; sig.<.001) -- Respondents were asked whether they had “much”, “little” or “no” confidence in the Procurador de los Derechos Humanos.
- Belief that Human Rights are Protected declined slightly (37 to 32; sig. <.001) -- Respondents were asked whether they believed the human rights of persons that live in Guatemala are “very well protected”, “more or less well protected” or “unprotected”. This change quite probably is due to more open and critical reporting of the human rights situation in Guatemala. It may also relate to the decline in confidence in the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman.
- Confidence in the Incumbent Government increased (42 to 52; sig.<.001) -- Respondents were asked whether they had “much”, “little” or “no” confidence in the current government. This may reflect a public perception that the government of Ramiro de León was proving more honest, reliable and open to the public than that of his two predecessors (Cerezo and Serrano).
- Confidence in political parties increased (19 to 23; sig. <.002) -- Respondents were asked whether they had “much”, “little” or “no” confidence in the political parties. The increase was significant for both indigenous and non-indigenous populations in our sample, but the increase for indigenous was 3 times that of non-indigenous (an increase of 9.9 versus 3.3 scale points).⁶ Quite probably the increase in the level of confidence is associated with the major changes in the Congress and Supreme Court that took place in 1994. The three parties that had been repeatedly accused of corruption (UCN, DC and MAS) lost control of Congress and the main parties became PAN and FRG, both of which strived to project an image of no corruption.

⁴ The 1995 wording was how the item was intended to be phrased in 1993.

⁵ Mitchell Seligson and Joel Jutkowitz. Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic Development. Development Associates. March 1994. p15.

⁶ As measured by style of dress (see further discussion below).

While the increase in public confidence in political parties is encouraging, in both segments of the samples in both survey years, the level of confidence is quite low. Indeed, for both 1993 and 1995, almost all of the system support items are in the negative range (below 50). The only exceptions for both years are the Electoral Tribunal and Human Rights Ombudsman, neither of which exceeded the mid point by very much.

Composite Measure of System Support: In order to analyze the single concept of system support, we first examined the relationship of each of the variables analyzed above to see if they relate to each other in a systematic way and therefore can formally be considered to form part of a single dimension called “system support.” We dropped four of the ten variables from our overall scale of system support on conceptual grounds: support for the current government, since it only measures incumbent support; confidence in the army, since that is not an institution associated with democratic governance; confidence in the Human Rights Ombudsman, since that is most likely a reflection of public views toward a specific individual; and pride, since the item was asked differently on the two surveys.

We found that we could form a reliable scale with the remaining six items: courts, legislature, election tribunal, public offices, political parties, and protection of human rights.⁷

We summed the six items into an overall scale that ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 100.⁸ The overall mean for the 1993 survey was 40.1 and, for 1995, it was 39.8. The difference between the two years is not statistically significant.

Demographic Characteristics: We also explored the relationship between system support and a series of socio-demographic variables: age, gender, education, wealth, geographic region, and ethnicity. As previously reported,⁹ for the 1993 data we found no significant relationship between support and age or gender, but we did find statistically significant (sig. <.01) relationships associated with education, wealth, ethnicity and geographic region. For 1995, there again was no relationship with **age**, but there was with **gender**; men were likely to be more supportive of the system than women.

In both years there was a small but statistically significant negative (sig. <.001) relationship between system support and **education**; in both cases the lowest level of support is found


⁷ The alpha reliability index for the six items was .78 for 1993 and also for 1995.

⁸ We summed each item, which ranged from 0 to 100, and then divided by 6.


⁹ Seligson & Jutkowitz, *op cit.* pp. 28-37.

among those with the most education. Since education and **wealth** are highly related, it is not surprising that there was also a negative relationship between wealth and system support.

The relationship between education and system support is graphically illustrated in exhibit 2.2 with respect to the courts. As the figure shows, for both years there is about a 10 point difference between the level of support from those with little or no education and those with at least some university level training.




Given the interest of international donors in promoting legal system reform, it may also be worth noting that the relationship between the courts and educational level is somewhat complex. In the 1995 survey, we added an item that asked respondents to indicate their level of trust in the Court of Constitutionality (*Corte de Constitucionalidad*). As shown in exhibit 2.3, there is a positive relationship between this aspect of the judiciary and education, at least up to the secondary school level. The Court rules on matters pertaining to the Guatemalan constitution and played an important role in stopping President Serrano's attempted coup d'état. It may be that the better educated Guatemalans had access to the media and understood the role of this court, whereas Guatemalans with little education did not understand the difference between the Court of Constitutionality and the rest of the judiciary.



As discussed in the first report, the survey contained three indicators of **ethnicity**: self-identification, language spoken, and style of dress. We have tended to use style of dress as the indicator of ethnicity in our analyses because often it most clearly differentiated between the indigenous and non-indigenous groups. Indigenous dress sharply marks the individual as unmistakably indigenous in terms of cultural identity and social class, whereas the meaning of self-identification and language use is much less clear, particularly for persons of mixed heritage or for indigenous persons living in urban areas or non-indigenous persons living in rural areas where most of their neighbors speak an indigenous language. However, relying on dress as the sole indicator of indigenous status results in an under representation of men in the indigenous sample. (On the basis of self-identification, about 50 percent of the indigenous sample is male and 50 percent is female, but in both of our samples only 18 percent of those who wore indigenous garb were men.) For this reason, we consistently indicate the basis for the reported ethnicity data and, in most cases, only report findings that are consistent across at least two indicators of ethnicity.¹⁰


¹⁰ We systematically conducted separate analyses using each of the definitions and, for the most part, the general findings or conclusions are the same regardless of the measure used. Unless specifically indicated otherwise we only report differences between the Ladino and indigenous populations when the direction of the findings are the same using at least two of the definitions and the difference using at least one is statistically significant.

In 1993, regardless of which of the three definitions is used, there was a statistically significant, negative relationship between indigenous status and system support. In 1995, regardless of definition, the relationship is not significant. This is because the level of support from the indigenous population increased substantially. As shown in exhibit 2.4, the level of system support for the indigenous population increased by almost 40 percent between 1993 and 1995, while the level of support from the Ladino population did not meaningfully change. In March 1995, as part of the peace talks between the Guatemalan government and leaders of the revolutionary movement, an agreement on the “Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Populations” was reached. This accord was welcomed by the major Mayan organizations as the beginning of an opening of the Guatemalan system and quite likely contributed to the increased level of indigenous support.




To provide greater reliability when making comparisons among indigenous groups, we augmented our national sample with interviews from an additional 200 indigenous persons. These respondents were from eight departments and selected on the basis of language spoken. Although efforts were made to insure the representivity of these additional interviewees, strictly speaking they do not constitute a probability sample of the indigenous population and, therefore, we have not assigned them national weights or combined them, for most purposes, with the national probability sample. Analyses using the augmented sample are clearly identified and, because they use a different base, comparisons of results with the weighted national sample must be carefully done.

Using the augmented sample, exhibit 2.5 shows the change in system support varied across the several ethnic groups. There were statistically significant changes from 1993 to 1995 among the Mam and K'iche' speakers. System support among the K'iche' increased by 12 scale points (sig. <.001), but fell among the Mam by 11 points (sig. <.03). The change among speakers of other indigenous languages and among those who spoke only Spanish was not statistically significant.



Region of the country was also found to be related to system support. The survey data were analyzed in terms of five regions: northeast, northwest, southeast, southwest, and the metropolitan area around Guatemala City. In both 1993 and 1995 there was a significant, positive relationship between residence in the Northeast and system support. In 1995 there was also a significantly negative relationship between support and residing in the metropolitan region. As shown in exhibit 2.6, the change between 1993 and 1995 for



the metropolitan region was negative but not statistically significant. There was, however, a significant decline in support in the southeast.

Treatment by Public Officials: Looking at the issue of system support from a slightly different perspective, we were interested in the relationship between support and the way Guatemalans reported they were treated by various types of government officials. For each of four types of officials respondents were asked whether in their encounters they were generally treated: very well, well, poorly, very poorly or in an acceptable manner (i.e. "regular").

From one point of view, there is not very much of a difference in the responses between 1993 and 1995. If the responses are treated as a scale ranging from "very poorly" to "very well" (with acceptable as the mid-point), analyses show no significant differences in the perception of treatment by police, courts or municipal government, but a small but statistically significant (.01) decline in the quality of treatment by public officials in general

(see exhibit 2.7). When these items are looked at in terms of ethnicity, there is a somewhat different pattern. For Ladinos, again the only significant change was a decline (sig. = .004) in treatment by public officials. However, among the indigenous population (defined by dress), there was no significant change in the perceived treatment by public officials, but there was a substantial improvement in the indigenous perception of how they were treated by officials at the municipal level.¹¹

¹¹ The mean score for treatment by municipal officials as perceived by the indigenous population increased from 51 to 61 from 1993 to 1995 (sig. = .005).

From a different point of view, there has been a systematic improvement in the public's perceptions of their treatment by government officials that may have some intriguing implications. As shown in exhibit 2.8, the proportion of Guatemalans, and especially indigenous Guatemalans (regardless of definition used), reporting they were treated badly or very badly declined considerably in each of the four categories. Interestingly, there was also a decline in the proportion indicating they were treated well or very well. Essentially, the movement was to the middle or acceptable ("regular") category.¹² Since most people are probably quite satisfied by simply "acceptable" treatment, it is more important for the percent of negative returns to decline than for the percent neutral and positive ratings to rise. From this perspective the change in perceived treatment, especially among the indigenous population, is quite consistent with our data on overall system support. It also may have implications for training and the setting of appropriate behavioral standards for public officials.

Exhibit 2.8
Percent of Guatemalans Reporting they were Treated Badly
or Very Badly by Governmental Staff

Type of Staff	Population Overall		Indigenous *	
	1993	1995	1993	1995
Most governmental employees	27	24	39	25
National Police	36	33	46	35
Judicial System/Courts	29	22	45	22
Local Government	18	13	31	16

* Defined by dress. The results are essentially the same, but somewhat less dramatic, using self-identification or language spoken as the definition of indigenous.

Political Violence: We also looked at the relationship between system support and perceptions of political violence and approval of coups. Violence has been a hallmark of Guatemalan history, and consistent with previous studies¹³ the 1993 survey found that 84 percent of the population believed that they lived in a country with much political violence.¹⁴

¹² The increase in the "regular" category was from 21% to 34% for government officials in general; 18% to 30% for the police; 19% to 34% for courts; and 16% to 27% for municipal officials.

¹³ University of Pittsburgh, 1992. *op. cit.*

¹⁴ Respondents were asked if they believed there was much, little, or no political violence.

The data from the 1995 survey shows slight improvement, down to 82 percent, but when responses are converted to a 100-point scale, the downward shift (from 91 to 89) is not statistically significant.

With respect to coups, we asked respondents a series of questions regarding their approval or disapproval of various types of political participation. Among them was a question regarding their approval of the forceful overthrow of an elected government. Although the level of approval in 1993 was not high (25 percent), there was a significant drop in the level of approval, to 17 percent of the population, in 1995.¹⁵ Here we may see a reflection of the adverse reactions from different groups in Guatemala to the Serrano *auto-golpe*, which could not secure popular support or even support from the elite which had traditionally favored *de facto* governments. As this level of approval declines, it may well be the case that the option of a coup, so characteristic of past Guatemalan politics, may no longer be viable.

Local Government: Local government is increasingly seen as a key institution in the effort to build democracy in Central America. Once an institution with little power and extremely limited financial resources, successful decentralization efforts throughout the region have given new life to municipal government.¹⁶ Perhaps because of this new importance of local government, but more probably because citizens are far more likely to have contact with their local government than the national government (legislators or executives), previous research has shown an important link between satisfaction with local government and system support at the national level. Two 1995 surveys, one in El Salvador and another in Nicaragua, have shown that citizens who are satisfied with local government are significantly more likely to express higher levels of system support than those who are dissatisfied with local government.¹⁷

In the 1995 Guatemala survey, a subset of the local government items was included. One of these measures was participation in local government. The survey found that nationwide, 13 percent of Guatemalans had participated in a meeting of their local government within the 12 months prior to the survey. This is a level identical with a 1994 survey

¹⁵ The significance was <.001, after converting the responses to a 100 point scale.

¹⁶ See Mark H. Bidus, Municipal Development and Democracy in Central America. Guatemala: USAID Regional Housing and Urban Development Office, August, 1995.

¹⁷ See Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Cordova M., El Salvador: Entre la guerra y la paz, Una cultura politica en transición. San Salvador: IDELA and FundaUngo, 1995, pp. 145 and Mitchell A. Seligson, Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions, 1991-1995. Also available in Spanish as, La Cultura Politica en Nicaragua: Transiciones, 1991-1995. USAID, Nicaragua, January, 1995. Pp. 113.


conducted in Guatemala (and the other countries of Central America).¹⁸ This places Guatemala second, behind El Salvador, but ahead of any of the other countries in terms of participation in local government.¹⁹

Participation in local government, however, has not been found to link to satisfaction with local government in El Salvador or Nicaragua. In Guatemala, there is in fact a significant but weak association ($r=.07$, $\text{sig}=.01$) between the two variables. This means that those who participate are only somewhat more likely to feel satisfied by the experience than are likely to feel dissatisfied. A second item measuring a more active form of participation, presenting petitions (i.e., demand-making), proved to have no significant relationship to satisfaction with local government, thus reinforcing the suggestion that participation does not necessarily lead to "satisfied customers."

¹⁸ Mitchell A. Seligson, "Central Americans View their Local Governments: A Six-Nation Study, 1994." Presented to the Regional Office for Central American Programs (ROCAP), Guatemala, October 5, 1994.

¹⁹ The fact that the percentage is the same for both surveys it strongly supports the validity of the survey methods being used in Guatemala, since the 1994 survey was conducted by a different polling organization (Gallup) and using a different sample design (but an identical questionnaire item).

While participation does not necessarily lead to satisfaction, and indeed might lead to frustration and dissatisfaction if demands go unmet, satisfaction with local government does connect directly to system support at the national level. This means that when local government manages to do things that make citizens feel content with the local governments, they tend to project that satisfaction on the political system more generally.²⁰ The following chart (exhibit 2.9) shows the relationship between satisfaction with local government services and our composite measure of system support. The statistically significant relationship ($p < .001$) reveals that those who say that local government services are "excellent" score over ten points higher (on a 1-100 scale) on system support, compared to those who say that satisfaction with local government is "terrible".



²⁰ One might suspect that the direction of causation goes in the other direction, that is, satisfaction with the system "causes" satisfaction with local government. In the studies of El Salvador and Nicaragua this issue of causal direction was examined and it was found (using two-stage least squares regression) that the direction was from local to national rather than the other way around. Such an analysis is complex, however, and not easily performed with the Guatemalan data set.

B. Support for Democratic Liberties

System support is a critical factor in ensuring political stability, but stable systems are not necessarily democratic ones. Stable democracies are, presumably, undergirded with not only high levels of system support but also high levels of support for democratic norms, especially for civil liberties and political tolerance.²¹

As discussed at some length in the first report,²² support for the right to participate and tolerance of disliked groups are central pillars of a democratic political culture. In Polyarchy,²³ Dahl argued that political cultures that support liberal, representative institutions are supported by two key mass attitudes: support for a system of widespread political participation and support for the right of minority dissent. In other words, a democratic culture is one that is both extensive and inclusive, with extensive cultures supporting democratic participation and inclusive cultures supporting civil liberties for unpopular groups.

Based on over a decade of prior research in Central America, we chose to measure extensive participation by three variables: support for participation in civic groups, political parties and protests. Because we expected near unanimity, and thus little or no variance among respondents, we did not ask about support for voting, which otherwise would have been included on our extensive participation scale.

One can support a wide variety of participatory forms and still be opposed to the right of unpopular groups to participate. For this reason, we believe that inclusive participation, rather than extensive, is the more stringent test of democratic commitment. Our measure of inclusive participation in the 1993 survey was divided into two batteries. The first was labeled “opposition to the suppression of democratic liberties.” It was comprised of three items that measured approval or disapproval of the government’s prohibiting marches and meetings of government critics, and censorship of the media. The second was composed of four items comprising a measure of the right to dissent and labeled “political tolerance”. Here we asked about extending to critics of the system of government the rights to vote, organize demonstrations, run for office, and speak out. The scale score results in 1993 for the items in the first battery were quite high (76, 82 and 84 points, respectively, out of a hundred),²⁴ and they were not included in the 1995 re-administration of the survey. Thus,

²¹ Seligson and Jutkowitz. op. cit. p38.


²² Ibid. pp. 38-41.

²³ Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Also see: Herbert McClosky and Alida Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983.

²⁴ Seligson and Jutkowitz. op cit. p. 45.

in this report the assessment of change in inclusive participation between 1993 and 1995 is based on the right to dissent--or the political tolerance battery of the original scale.

Extensive Participation: The level of support for conventional modes of political participation in 1993 and 1995 is compared in exhibit 2.10. Respondents were asked whether they approved, disapproved or were indifferent with respect to the public participating in legal demonstrations, working for a party or a candidate during an election campaign, and participating in community groups or associations in order to resolve community problems.



As the exhibit shows, the level of support with respect to each of these items in both of the surveys was on the positive end of the scale (i.e., above 50 on the scale 0-100). There was no change between 1993 and 1995 in the level of support for participation in election campaigns. There is, however, a statistically significant (sig., <.04) increase in approval of participation in legal demonstrations.


There is also a statistically significant (sig.<.02) reduction in the support for participation in community groups. The reduction, however, is entirely a product of the shift in attitudes of

Ladinos. Between 1993 and 1995, support among Ladinos dropped significantly (from 79 to 74; sig. <.01), while the level support among the indigenous population did not change. The survey does not provide an explanation for this shift, but changes in the political context may be a factor. For example, it may be associated with the increased presence and demands of Mayan organizations that began to emerge after the “Indigenous Rights” agreement was signed about a month prior to the survey in 1995.


Inclusive Participation - Political Tolerance or the Right to Dissent: Respondents to the items on the political tolerance scale were asked if they were willing to extend the crucial civil liberties of the right to vote, demonstrate, run for office and exercise free speech (by making speeches on the radio or television) to those who are critics of their system of government. These right-to-dissent items are a stringent test of democratic liberties, and not surprisingly the scores of respondents in Guatemala (as elsewhere in Central America) are lower here than on the extensive participation scale.

Exhibit 2.11 displays the results from both surveys for the four variables that comprise the political tolerance scale. As the exhibit shows, three of the four tolerance indicators changed significantly between 1993 and 1995. Support for the right of persons who are opposed to the government to run for public office and to vote increased considerably (sig. <.001), as did support for the right for free speech (sig. <.02). However, as was true for the level of system support, almost all of the measures of tolerance are in the negative range (below 50) of the scale, with only support for the right of dissidents to vote and to have free speech slightly exceeding the mid point of the scale in 1995.

To simplify the analysis of the support for the right to dissent, we created an index of political tolerance by combining the four variables discussed above and depicted in exhibit 2.11 and we determined that the combined scale was reliable (alpha = .84). We then summed each of the four variables in the index and divided by 4 so that the index had the same 0-100 range as it did in previous analyses.



The scores on the tolerance index for 1993 and 1995 are shown in exhibit 2.12. As the exhibit shows, the level of tolerance increased from 44 to 49, or 5 scale points (sig. <.01) over the two years time. This shift in tolerance, while clearly limited, still constitutes an important set of building blocks for an effort at promoting greater democracy in Guatemala. Speaking out and voting freely are powerful tools in shaping political discourse and political practice.



To understand more about the nature of political tolerance in Guatemala and possible reasons for its positive change over the past two years, we looked at the relationship between our measure of tolerance and the gender, age, education, wealth, ethnicity and region of the country in which the members of the samples reside. Looking first at these variables individually, the analyses show:

- **Gender:** There was no statistically significant difference between males and females in either 1993 or 1995, nor was there a statistically significant change in the level of tolerance between 1993 and 1995 for either group. (The level for males went from 47 to 51 and females from 42 to 47.)²⁵
- **Age:** There was no meaningful relationship between age and tolerance in either year of the survey.
- **Education:** There was a positive relationship between tolerance and level of education in both 1993 and 1995.²⁶
- **Wealth:** There was no meaningful relationship between wealth and tolerance. Although there was a small, statistically significant relationship between wealth and tolerance in both samples the relationships were in different directions and in neither case was it large enough to be meaningful ($r = .07$ in 1993 and $-.05$ in 1995).
- **Ethnicity:** In 1993 the level of tolerance among indigenous persons was significantly higher (sig. $<.001$) than non-indigenous in our sample, using any of 3 measures of ethnicity (dress, self identification, or language spoken). The average across the 3 measures was 53 for indigenous persons and 42 for others. Between 1993 and 1995 there was no significant change in the level of tolerance among indigenous persons, either as a group or for any of the specific language groups.²⁷ There was, however, a significant increase in the level of tolerance among non-indigenous persons (sig. $<.001$ for all 3 measures of ethnicity). And in 1995, there was no significant difference in the tolerance levels of the two groups (50 for indigenous persons and 49 for others).

²⁵ Whereas a change of 5 points is significant for the entire sample, it is not for the about 50 percent that is female (or male).

²⁶ Because the level of tolerance was essentially the same among all respondents below the university level in 1993, and the levels of persons with no education and those at the university level were about the same in 1995, the relationship between education and tolerance is better demonstrated by a graph (see exhibit 2.13) than statistically. The bivariate correlation between tolerance and education was $.14$ in 1993 ($p=.000$) and $.02$ in 1995 ($p=.566$).

²⁷ Kaqchikel, Mam, Q'eqchi', K'iche' or other; the assessment of change between 1993 and 1995 for these groups made use of the additional sample of 200 Indians for each survey.

- **Region of the country:**²⁸ In 1993 there were no significant differences among the tolerance scores for the 5 regions, but in 1995 the scores for respondents in the Northwest and Southeast were significantly higher than the rest (62 and 54 respectively). These two regions also increased significantly (sig. <.001) between 1993 and 1995. The change was the greatest in the Southeast, from an average score of 37 in 1993 to 54 in 1995. In the Northwest, the average, which was the highest among the regions in 1993, rose from 49 to 62 in 1995.

To get a sense of the relative strength of each of these six factors in explaining levels of tolerance we utilized multiple regression analysis. This technique allows us to compare the relative importance of the factors we have analyzed while controlling for (holding constant) all the others. Since the 1993 and 1995 samples were independent of one another (i.e., they do not contain the same individuals), we cannot directly address the possible reasons for the significant change in the tolerance scores. Rather, our analysis is focused on identifying the factors that predict the tolerance score for 1995, and comparing them to the predictors for 1993.

The regression analysis for the 1995 data found region of the country to be the strongest predictor of tolerance. Residence in the Northwest was the strongest predictor and residence in the Southeast was the second, with residents in both these regions scoring significantly higher than others on the tolerance scale. The other significant predictor was education, with each year of education increasing the level of tolerance by .7 points on our scale. Interestingly, the predictors of tolerance for 1993 are quite different than for 1995. On the earlier survey, education, ethnicity and age were the strongest predictors. In 1993, region of the country was relatively unimportant. It appears that during the intervening years, conditions changed for people living in the Northwest and Southeast that effected the level of tolerance of the people in these regions, regardless of their age, sex, ethnicity or level of education.

Politically, the most important finding in this analysis is that there is an increased tolerance among Ladinos. Thus, again, we can see a basis for some optimism about the existence of a greater, albeit only a slightly greater, possibility for building democracy in Guatemala.

²⁸ Respondents were categorized as residing in one of 5 regions: the metropolitan area of Guatemala City, the Northeast, the Northwest, the Southeast and the Southwest.

C. Interrelationship Between System Support and Democratic Norms

The theoretical basis for relating tolerance and system support was discussed at some length in the study's first report.²⁹ Essentially, when the complexity is reduced, system support can be either high or low and, likewise, tolerance can be either high or low.

A table representing all the possible combinations of system support and political tolerance has four cells:

- **High support and high tolerance** -- This combination is predicted to be the most politically stable case. High support is needed in noncoercive environments for the system to be stable, and tolerance is needed for the system to remain democratic. Systems with this combination of attitude are likely to experience a deepening of democracy.
- **High support but low tolerance** -- Systems with this combination are relatively stable (because of the high system support) but undemocratic. They are systems which tend toward oligarchic authoritarian rule in which democratic rights are restricted.
- **Low support but high tolerance** -- This combination is considered to be one of unstable democracy. This is not necessarily a situation of reduced civil liberties, since instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. In this situation, it is difficult to predict whether the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability, perhaps characterized by considerable violence.
- **Low support and low tolerance** -- This situation leads to democratic breakdown. Overtime, the current political system is likely to be replaced by one which is autocratic.

²⁹ Seligson and Jutkowitz. op.cit. pp. 54 -57.

The results of relating the two variables using 1993 and 1995 survey data are shown in exhibit 2.13.³⁰ As the exhibit shows, in 1995 stable democracy declined by an insignificant 1 percent, as did breakdown. This suggests that the increase in tolerance and declines in system support balanced one another.

Exhibit 2.13
Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Guatemala:
1993 and 1995
(Percent of Population in each cell)

Tolerance		
System Support	High	Low
High	Stable (deepening) Democracy	Authoritarian Oligarchy
1993	19.2	20.3
1995	18.0	17.1
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democratic Breakdown
1993	30.7	29.8
1995	37.2	27.7

³⁰ Given that there were differences between the two instruments, the scores for 1993 were recalculated for purposes of this comparison based on the 1995 instrument.

Overall, there was an increase between 1993 and 1995 in the respondents found in the two democracy cells (from 49.9 to 55.2). This increase suggests that there may be a growing receptivity to democracy among Guatemalans.

To gain some perspective, we can compare the Guatemala results to data collected from Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua in 1995 as part of the University of Pittsburgh's Central America Public Opinion Project.³¹ Exhibit 2.14 provides such comparisons. The data on the three Central American countries are based on surveys conducted only in the capital cities using questionnaires that are similar to, but not exactly the same as, the questionnaire we used in Guatemala. Thus, the comparisons must be made cautiously. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of the data for Guatemala and Nicaragua are strikingly similar and distinct from the other two countries. In both Guatemala and Nicaragua less than 20 percent of the sample are in the stable democracy category, while about 65 percent of their sample are in the unstable democracy or democratic breakdown categories. This contrasts most markedly with Costa Rica, which has almost half of its sample in the stable democracy category and another 41 percent in a category that, while not democratic, supports political stability.


Exhibit 2.14
Joint Distribution of System Support and Tolerance
in Selected Central American Countries (1995)*

	Stable Democracy	Unstable Democracy	Sum of Democracy	Authoritarian Oligarchy	Democratic Breakdown
Costa Rica	46%	8%	54%	41%	5%
El Salvador	26%	21%	47%	29%	24%
Guatemala	18%	37%	55%	17%	28%
Nicaragua	19%	35%	54%	16%	30%


* Data for Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua are from capital cities obtained as part of the University of Pittsburgh Central America Public Opinion Project, 1991-1995. Data for Guatemala are from the 1995 national household survey.

³¹ Seligson, Mitchell A. Political Culture in Nicaragua: Transitions 1991-1995. Management Systems International. Washington, DC December 1995. p. 27.

Exhibits 2.15 through 2.18 provide more detailed views of the relationship between tolerance and system support in Guatemala. Exhibit 2.15 shows the percent of Guatemalans by language group that fall into the stable democracy cell. As the exhibit shows, there was no significant change between 1993 and 1995 in the percent of Spanish speakers (i.e., non-indigenous persons), but there were increases for three of the indigenous groups, and declines for Q'eqchi' and the "other" language category.





The picture provided in exhibit 2.16 is essentially consistent with that in 2.15, but more positive. It displays the percent of Guatemalans, by language group, that fall into either the stable or the unstable democracy cells.³² By 1995, over half the population in each group were in one of the two democracy groups.



³² To calculate the percent of each group in the "unstable democracy" cell, an interested reader may subtract the percentages provided in exhibit 2.14 from those in 2.15.

Exhibits 2.17 and 2.18 provide similar information by region. Again there are noticeable differences and a pattern of both positive and negative change.





In sum, the overall advance provides a degree of optimism for the future of democracy in Guatemala that goes along with changes in political behavior reflected in increased political participation and the development of channels through civic associations for the increased involvement of the indigenous population. The chapter that follows examines one aspect of this political behavior: community and other forms of political participation.

Chapter 3: Involvement in Community and Political Life

Guatemala, like many Latin American countries, has seen a concentration of government administrative and financial resources at the national level. Historically, that national government has been dominated by a small segment of the population, usually based in the national capital. A recent and perhaps significant area of change in the Guatemalan polity has been the expansion of the effective nation. Those participating in politics now go beyond the confines of a small elite and beyond the limits of the national government. Thus, the local political arena appears to afford a significant opportunity for programming to strengthen democratic institutions. In looking at the entire political process, it is important to examine the participation of the Guatemalan public at both the local and national levels. In this chapter we examine a variety of avenues of participation open to individual Guatemalans. We also look at how participation may have changed between 1993 and 1995, and at the relationship of participation to levels of political tolerance and system support.

A. Participation in Community Groups

In the first study report we showed the overall pattern of participation in a variety of community groups for Guatemalans and the citizens of four other Central American countries (Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama).¹ Those results showed that Guatemala's levels of communal participation ranked quite high compared to its neighbors. It ranked first or second in the region in terms of the percent of persons who indicated they at least sometimes attended meetings of community development associations, church committees, school-related committees, civic clubs, professional group associations, unions, and cooperatives.¹

¹Seligson and Jutkowitz. *op. cit.* pp. 79-82.

²The cross country comparisons are based on data from the University of Pittsburgh's Central American Public Opinion Project, 1992. The differences among the five countries with respect to attendance at the various types of community meetings was statistically significant (sig. <.001).




Exhibit 3.1 compares the results of the 1993 and 1995 Guatemala surveys on citizen participation in these various types of organizations. As the exhibit suggests, there was a significant increase in participation in church and school related associations (sig.<.001 and <.002, respectively), but not with respect to the other types of groups.


A factor analysis of the seven types of local participation revealed two distinct factors: **communal participation** (church, school, community development association), and **occupation-related participation** (professional association, civic association, trade union and cooperative)¹. Thus, we formed two indexes, one called “communal participation” and the other called “occupation-related participation”.¹

Consistent with the results for the individual variables shown in exhibit 3.1, there was a small but statistically significant increase of 4 scale-score points (sig. <.001) in the level of communal participation between 1993 and 1995 (from 25 to 29 points out of 100), but no change in the level of occupation-related participation (a score of 7 both years).

³Seligson and Jutkowitz, *op. cit.* p.89 for a discussion of 1993 analyses. A factor analysis of the 1995 survey data produced similar results.


⁴The factor was largely defined by occupation-related participation, but it did also include civic associations.

To explore this type of participation further we looked into the relationship between communal participation and the socio-demographic characteristics of age, education, gender, ethnicity, wealth and the region in which respondents live. A regression analysis using the 1995 survey results indicated that communal participation was not at all related to ethnicity,¹ wealth or education. There was a small but statistically significant positive relationship between communal participation and age (sig.<.02).



There were also small but statistically significant differences in the level of communal participation among Guatemala's regions, with the highest level in the Northwest and the lowest in the Southwest region of the country. As exhibit 3.2 also shows, the level of communal participation in the metropolitan area, the Northwest and the Northeast were somewhat higher in 1995 than in 1993.

⁵Measured in terms of dress, self-identification, or language spoken.



The analyses of the 1993 data presented in the first report¹ showed a significant relationship between communal participation and church attendance. As exhibit 3.3 shows, the pattern for 1995 is basically the same as for 1993, except that the level of participation is slightly higher in 1995. This is not surprising, since in both surveys church groups were the most common type of community group in which people participate.

A regression analysis of the 1995 survey data to explore occupational related participation found gender, education, and geographic region to be significantly related to high levels of participation. Males and more highly educated persons were more likely to participate in occupationally related organizations than females and persons with less education. The levels of occupationally related participation were highest in the Northwest (12 points out of 100) and lowest in the Southwest (a score of 4).


B. Political Participation

Although there is a fairly high level of communal participation, participation in community groups is not the same as political participation. It is quite possible to be involved in

⁶Seligson and Jutkowitz. *op. cit.* p. 91.

church, school or work-related groups without any explicit involvement with the political process at either the local or national levels. The Guatemala surveys contained several indicators of the manner and extent to which the public was politically involved. Basically, these items range from the relatively passive stance of asking some level of the government for help, through the traditional modes of registration and voting, to working for a political party or candidate.

Contacting Public Officials: One of the most important and direct forms of political participation is contacting public officials, whether for communal or for personal gain. As shown in exhibit 3.4, the proportion of Guatemalans indicating they had approached a public official for assistance increased significantly from 1993 to 1995. As the exhibit shows, the increase is greatest in the contacts with the local mayors (sig. <.005). The increase is also statistically significant in contacts with legislators (sig. <.05).



It is also important to note that in both 1993 and 1995 we found that the mayor (*Alcalde Municipal*) was the official most commonly contacted, whereas a legislator was the least common. Supporting Tip O'Neill's famous dictum, "all politics is local," Guatemalans are three times as likely to contact their mayors as they are their legislators.

The 1995 survey included an item asking Guatemalans which of three types of officials (central government, legislators, or municipal government) responded best in helping to

resolve problems of their community. Exhibit 3.5 summarizes the responses for the population overall and by ethnic group, with indigenous people defined in three different ways. From all these perspectives the message is essentially the same: Municipal government is selected as most responsive twice as often as the national.

Exhibit 3.5
Percent Indicating Their Community's Problems
Were Helped Best By the Central Government,
their Legislators, their Local Government, or Were Not Helped
 (1995 Sample Only)
 (n= 1081)

Sample*	Central Government	Legislators	Municipal Government	Not Helped
Entire Country	22	2	50	26
Ethnicity:				
Western Dress	22	2	50	26
Indigenous Dress	18	2	56	24
Self Identity :				
Ladino	20	2	54	24
Indigenous	24	3	48	25
Language use:				
Spanish	21	2	51	27
Indigenous	26	3	48	23

*Note: The difference between indigenous and non-indigenous groups are not statistically significant, regardless of definition used.

More specifically, as the data in exhibit 3.5 show, for the population overall 50 percent of the respondents indicated that their municipal government helped best, while about a fifth indicated that none helped (19 percent) or that they were all about equal (7 percent). Another 22 percent indicated they were helped most by the central government and only 2 percent indicated that legislators responded best.

Looked at from the perspective of ethnicity the picture is basically the same. However, regardless of the ethnicity measure used for both the indigenous and non-indigenous respondents, local government is about twice as likely to be identified as being the most

helpful. It is also of note that about a quarter of the population indicated that none of the levels of government were useful at all.

To explore this area further, we combined the 3 contacting variables to create a composite measure similar to those previously discussed (i.e., with a scale score range of 0 - 100). We looked at changes in the composite measure between 1993 and 1995 and found a significant increase in 1995 (sig. <.005).

We then looked at changes from 1993 to 1995 in the composite with respect to gender, education, age, wealth, ethnicity and geographic region. We found statistically significant increases in the level of contacting officials among women (sig. <.01), residents of the Northeast (sig. <.02), and people who do not speak an indigenous language (sig. <.01). In each of these cases the increases were relatively small, from 2 to 6 points on a 100 point scale, and in none of these cases was the composite score above 16, indicating a low overall incidence of this form of political activity. A regression analysis using the 1995 data, and defining ethnicity in terms of language use, identified level of education and region as significant predictors (sig. < .01) of the level of contact. Higher scores are associated with higher levels of education and with residing in the Northwest.

Looking more closely at regional differences, we found that in both years the lowest levels were for the Metropolitan area (9 out of 100 in 1995) and the highest were for the Northwest (19 out of 100 for 1995). In exploring ethnicity a bit more fully we looked to see if there were meaningful differences between indigenous and non-indigenous people on any of the three variables making up the composite scale (see exhibit 3.4). We thought, for example, that perhaps there would be an increase in the level of contacting mayors by the indigenous population. There was not, however, and indeed the small but statistically significant increase is accounted for by the non-indigenous population.

We also looked at the relationship between participation in community groups and the level of contacting public officials for help. Here the relationships were strong. In both 1993 and 1995 there were significant correlations between requests to public officials and communal participation and participation in occupationally related groups. (Both were significant at <.001 both years.) While community participation is not the same as political participation, in this particular aspect of political participation, at least, those active in the community were also likely to be active in the political process.

Registration and Voting: For most North Americans the most widely accepted and understood indicator of democratic political participation is registration and voting in local and national elections. However, except for Costa Rica, prior to the 1980s competitive, free and fair elections were the exception rather than the rule in Central America. Thus, relatively little is known about the Central American voter and only recently has it been

possible to begin developing meaningful trend data within Central American countries or to make cross-country comparisons.

Guatemala began a formal transition to civilian rule in 1984 with the election of a Constituent Assembly. Since then it has had competitive presidential elections in 1985, 1990 and 1995, as well as two local elections, one plebiscite and one legislative election. As discussed at some length in the study's first report,¹ Guatemala's performance relative to its Central American neighbors with respect to voting has been relatively poor. Similarly, its turnout for the 1995 presidential and legislative elections was disappointingly low by regional standards, and the 1995 turnout (47 percent in the main election in November 1995 and 37 percent in the presidential run-off in January 1996) was not equal to that of the elections of 1990 (57 percent).

Because of the recent election performance and concerns about its implications for the future, we have chosen to devote a full chapter (Chapter Four) of this report to an exploration of voting and abstention in Guatemala, and we will not repeat that discussion here. However, it is important to note in this regard that what we can say on the topic of registration and voting is based on an analysis of survey data, not the actual number of registered voters or votes cast. Survey data of this kind almost always contain a portion of responses that reflect what respondents think they should have done, rather than what they actually did. For example, 45 percent of the respondents in our 1995 sample reported that they voted in the elections of 1994, whereas the proportion of the population that actually voted was 21 percent. Thus our analyses are most appropriately viewed as providing insight into the values and attitudes of Guatemalans, rather than their behavior.

The percent of persons reporting they were registered to vote did not change at all between 1993 and 1995 (76.5 and 76.6 percent of eligible adults, respectively). The percent of respondents who indicated they voted in the most recent preceding election declined substantially, from 59.2 to 45.2 percent of those who were eligible. Given various attempts during the period between the 1993 and 1995 surveys to increase voting by increasing the registration rates, the lack of change in the percent of those claiming to be registered is more surprising than the decline in the proportion claiming they voted. Indeed, the lower reported voter turnout in 1995 is quite likely a result of the timing of the surveys, with the question in 1993 tapping turnout for the 1990 presidential elections and the 1995 question obtaining information about the respondents' voting behavior in the local legislative elections of 1994, which may have been viewed as less important by many respondents.

Work in a Political Campaign: The form of participation demanding the highest level of commitment is actively participating in a political campaign. Less structured or demanding,

¹Seligson and Jutkowitz. *op. cit.* p.82-89.

but still an indicator of engagement and political commitment is trying to convince friends, neighbors or others to vote in a particular way. A third indicator of active engagement is avowed membership in a political party.

Exhibit 3.6
Percent of Public Who Worked in a Political Campaign

	1993	1995*
Percent registered in a party	8%	7%
Percent who worked in a campaign for a party or a candidate	7%	8%
Percent who at least sometimes tried to convince others how to vote	20%	22%
Percent who are party members, or worked in a campaign, or tried to convince others how to vote.	27%	29%
Percent of party members who: worked in a campaign	37%	31%
tried to convince others to vote	41%	39%

*Note: The survey was conducted in the Spring of 1995, about 6 months prior to the Presidential election.

Exhibit 3.6 shows the percentage of Guatemalans who indicated participation in one of the three forms of active political activity. Essentially there was no change between 1993 and 1995 in the percent of Guatemalans who indicated they were actively engaged in the political process, and in both years the overall percentage of actively involved persons was quite low. However, it is important to note that the survey in 1995 was taken in the Spring, about 6 months before the Presidential election. There were heavy registration drives in the months of June, July and August, and it is likely that as the election of 1995 drew nearer the percentage of persons actively involved increased.

After combining the three types of engagement into a single scale of 0 - 100 that can be related to the other composite measures of participation and to our measures of tolerance and system support,¹ we found there to be no significant difference between the levels of engagement in 1993 and 1995 with 10 out of a possible 100 being the level for both surveys.


⁸Alpha=.49 for 1993 and .52 for 1995.

We also looked at possible changes in the composite measure between 1993 and 1995 with respect to gender, age, education, wealth, ethnicity, geographic region, and our measures of communal and occupational participation. There were essentially no differences in the levels of engagement between 1993 and 1995 for males or for females, or for any of the five geographic regions. The relationship between engagement and education and wealth in both surveys was positive but not terribly strong. (Education was less than .2 and wealth less than .1 in both surveys.) The relationship with age was also positive but weak (.1) in 1993, and not significant in 1995.

There was, however, a significant change with respect to ethnicity. While there was no change in the level of political campaign work among the the non-indigenous population, there was an increase (sig. < .05) in the level for the indigenous population (defined in terms of indigenous dress). Their level of engagement almost doubled (from a score of 4.5 to a score of 8.0) over the two years. This relates to their concerted participation in the 1995 election which resulted in the election of a considerable number of indigenous mayors.

There was also a significant relationship in both surveys between political engagement and communal participation, in participation in occupationally related groups, and in asking assistance from political leaders. The strongest of these relationships (.2) was with participation in occupationally related groups from the 1995 survey.

Comités Civicos: As we showed in exhibit 3.6, membership in political parties is very low, less than 10 percent in either 1993 or 1995. In addition, as we showed in Chapter 2 (see exhibit 2.1) confidence in political parties is also very low, lower than any other political institution in Guatemala. In order to provide an alternative means of citizen organization, the current electoral code allows for the establishment of local "*comités civicos*" or civic committees that can organize for the purpose of supporting candidates for municipal office. In many respects these are alternatives to traditional political parties and in the most recent election, 22 of the 300 mayors elected in Guatemala were supported by these committees, including the mayor from the second largest city in the country, Quetzaltenango.



The 1995 questionnaire included an item asking whether respondents had attended meetings of *comités cívicos* frequently, a few times, or not at all. To investigate whether participation in these committees represents a movement in the direction of greater democratic stability in Guatemala or is linked to increased political alienation, we related the response to this item to our composite measure of system support. The data in the figure (exhibit 3.7) make quite clear that those who participate in this form of civil society organization are far more likely to express high levels of system support (in terms of our composite measure) than are those who participate in a more traditional political context (i.e. through political parties). We hasten to add, however, that we have only a very small number of participants in these civic committees (5 percent of the sample).

Looking to the future of Guatemalan politics, our data suggest civic committees may be an important vehicle for political participation and may provide an avenue for strengthening a significant component of democratic values. Local political groups such as the *comité cívico* may be an important transition vehicle for participation in political parties and in other ways integrating previously unfranchised, largely indigenous populations into the body politic.

C. Relationship of Community and Political Participation to Tolerance and System Support

To investigate the relationship between our various measures of participation and the measures of political stability -- i.e. political tolerance and system support -- discussed in Chapter 2, we began by conducting a series of regression analyses. Specifically, for each of the surveys we related the four composite measures of participation (communal participation, occupational participation, requests for political assistance, and work or engagement in a political campaign) plus various measures of socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, wealth, ethnicity,⁹ and geographic region) first to political tolerance and then to system support.¹⁰ In terms of the four participation variables, the results of the regressions on political tolerance were quite similar for both years. None of the four are significant predictors of tolerance in either year.

There were, however, significant relationships between types of community participation and system support. In 1993 the relationship was between system support and requesting assistance from political leaders (sig. < .01) and between support and communal participation (sig. < .03). The relationship between support and requesting assistance was also present in 1995, but not the relationship with communal participation. Instead, there was a significant, positive relationship between support and working in a political campaign (sig. < .02).

It is also of interest to note that there was not a significant relationship in either year between system support and participation in occupationally related groups. Apparently, involvement in unions, professional associations or cooperatives does not translate into system support or higher levels of tolerance for the political rights of others.

Stated simply, our data indicate that higher levels of system support are directly related to a greater degree of participation in the political process. This finding makes sense in so far as those who participate in politics are most likely to "believe" in the efficacy of the political process. It also has important programmatic implications, particularly for incorporating indigenous people into the democratic process. Strengthening avenues of effective political participation such as civic associations may be a means of "civic education" in relevant political values. This may in turn strengthen the democratic process.

⁹Separate analyses were run using alternate indicators of ethnicity: language spoken, dress, self-identification.

¹⁰There were 13 independent variables in each model.

Chapter 4: The Problem of Low Voter Turnout

The twentieth century has been witness to the greatest world-wide expansion of universal adult suffrage in history. Restrictions on the vote based on race, gender and property were common throughout much of the last century, even in well-established democracies such as the United States. In Central America, restrictions persisted through the first half of the twentieth century as well, even in countries with deep democratic traditions such as Costa Rica. Women became eligible to vote in that country only in 1949 and restrictions on leftist parties were lifted in 1962.¹ In the rest of Central America, the electoral tradition is far weaker, since for most of the countries authoritarian rule prevailed for much of the twentieth century. When elections were held, they were often fraudulent and the results often overturned by coups.

Guatemala's electoral tradition is especially thin. Only in the period from 1944 to 1954 were free and fair elections held, after which a series of military regimes came to power. Beginning in the 1980s and now into the 1990s, elections are once again being established as a normal way of determining who will fill the positions of power in the country. One would think that Guatemalans would be anxious to take advantage of the opportunity to vote in elections, but the results have been otherwise. Widespread electoral abstention has been the rule rather than the exception. In the 1994 plebiscite to decide reforms to the Constitution, only 16 percent of registered voters cast their ballots.

How can one interpret low voter turnout? This has been a problem that political scientists have attempted to explain for many years. Some argue that it is a vote of no confidence for the system, while others believe that it is a sign of voter apathy, while still others believe it is a sign of contentment with the political process. Empirical analyses have shown that all of these theses are true, to varying degrees, in varying countries and places. The low turnout rates in the U.S., for example, seem to have no relationship to widespread discontent among the electorate and seem instead to be more directly linked to the high level of mobility of the population and the difficulties involved in registration. Indeed, the "motor-voter" bill that is now law in the U.S. is designed to help reduce the magnitude of that problem.

In Guatemala, electoral traditions are so new and voting behavior studies so few that we have very little idea who votes and who does not, and if not, why not. This chapter is based on data from the 1993 and 1995 surveys and is intended to contribute to the growing body of knowledge on voter turnout in Guatemala. Since the surveys are among the very few that are of national scope and also include the major indigenous populations,

¹ Seligson, Mitchell A. 1987. "Costa Rica and Jamaica." In *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, ed. Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

we are reasonably confident that the results will give us some clear insight into the low turnout question.

A. Registration

The first issue to examine is the extent to which Guatemalans report they have registered to vote. As we noted in the context of Chapter 3, what we can say on the topic of registration and voting is based on an analysis of our survey data, not the actual number of registered voters or votes cast. Therefore, our analyses are reflections of Guatemalan attitudes with respect to these topics, rather than behavior. This is an important area to investigate because of the insight it provides on the extent to which Guatemalan's value the electoral process.

The 1993 and 1995 surveys both asked about registration. The questions about voting, however, differ in the two surveys, since respondents were asked about their participation in the immediately prior election. The 1993 survey asked about voting in the presidential election of November 1990, while the 1995 survey asked about voting in the legislative election of August 1994. Although this makes the two surveys somewhat non-parallel, since a different level of elections was the focus of each survey, it does provide the opportunity to examine responses pertaining to presidential elections versus legislative elections.


In 1990, official results show that 57 percent of the registered voters voted,² while in the 1994 elections, official results report 21 percent.³ The results from the survey are shown in exhibits 4.1 and 4.2, below.⁴

² Seligson, Mitchell, Annabelle Conroy, Ricardo Macías Córdova, Orlando Pérez, and Andrew Stein. 1995. "Who Votes in Central America? A Comparative Analysis." In *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited*, ed. John A. Booth. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

³ "Guatemala: Elecciones Generales 1995". Panorama CentroAmericano/Reporte Político Num. 108. Instituto del Centro Americano de Estudios Políticos. September 1995. p. 10.

⁴ There is a significant discrepancy between the proportion of persons in the 1995 sample who reported that they voted in 1994 and the proportion of the population who actually voted (45 versus 21 percent). Nevertheless, we have confidence in the analyses that follow because the correlates of reported voting from the 1993 sample (where the proportion voting is almost precisely that of the official count -- 59 versus 57 percent) are basically the same as those for 1995. Essentially, we assume the overestimate of voting from the 1995 data stems from socially desirable responses that are randomly distributed across the population.

Exhibit 4.1 emphasizes the distinctions between registration and voting.








Exhibit 4.2 transposes those same data so that one can more easily compare the 1993 sample with the 1995. Two conclusions emerge from exhibit 4.2. First, the percent of people reporting they were registered did not change at all between 1993 and 1995. Second, the decline in reported turnout between the 1990 and 1994 elections parallels the actual number of votes cast, and is likely a reflection of the universal pattern of a greater perceived importance and consequent higher voter turnout in presidential elections than in legislative or local elections.

Socio-economic and demographic factors frequently play a large role in determining who votes and who does not. While there are differences among countries, it is common to find that the better educated and wealthier are more likely to be voters, while the less well educated and poorer are more likely to be non-voters. In addition, females sometimes are less likely to vote than males, but typically these differences are small and diminishing. In Costa Rica, for example, gender plays virtually no role in voter turnout.

Guatemalan voting patterns follow international trends, but in some ways are more exaggerated. Exhibit 4.3 shows the impact of education on reported registration. Although the pattern differs somewhat for those with 4-6 years of education, for both the 1993 and 1995 samples, it is clear that education plays a major role in registration. For those with no education, registration falls below the national average, whereas for those with a college education, over 90 percent are registered to vote. Since 100 percent registration in a country in which voting is not obligatory (as it is in Costa Rica) is an unrealistic expectation, one could conclude that among the university educated in Guatemala registration is at or near its theoretical maximum level. On the other hand, among those with little education, approximately 20 percent more of the population could be registered than is currently the case.







Wealth and registration are also related, but according to our measure, not as closely as with education.⁵ Exhibit 4.4 shows that the poorest Guatemalans, those with an index of 1 or lower on the 8-point scale used for this measure, are less likely to register than those who score in the 2-4 range. Furthermore, those in the 5-8 range are even more likely to register to vote, although in 1993 the pattern is not entirely uniform as the index moves from 6 to 8.

⁵ The measure of wealth that we use in the survey is far from perfect, since there is no way of knowing precisely how wealthy a respondent really is. Survey respondents often are reluctant to be forthcoming about their wealth, an understandable reticence. The index of wealth utilized in the survey is a measure of appliances owned in the home of the respondent. These include: radios, TVs, refrigerators, washing machines, cars (tractors) and telephones.

Gender also plays a very important role in Guatemala insofar as voter registration is concerned. An examination of exhibit 4.5 shows that females are far less likely to report that they were registered to vote in both the 1993 and 1995 samples.




To place Guatemala in comparative perspective, we draw on the University of Pittsburgh 1991 Central America Public Opinion Project. In exhibit 4.6 the registration percentages of voting aged citizens is shown. The overall rate is not of central concern in this analysis since registration laws vary from country to country. For example, in El Salvador and Honduras registration and voting are compulsory. In Costa Rica the voter registration card is the same document as the national identification card (i.e., *cédula*) and without it one cannot transact any business, not even cash a check. For that reason, registration is virtually universal in Costa Rica. But of direct interest here is the gender gap in Central America. The bars on the chart are arranged by the proportion of females registered to vote. In each country there is a gap: for Panama and Honduras, it is trivial; in El Salvador and Nicaragua, it is wider; and in Guatemala the gap is the widest of all.⁶




⁶ Differences between these results (exhibit 4.6) and the Guatemala survey (i.e., exhibit 4.5) are because the Central American surveys were conducted in the national capitals rather than countrywide.

B. Voting

We now turn our attention to voting itself and examine the same set of socio-economic and demographic variables. Exhibit 4.7 shows the results for education and the vote. The patterns for both the 1990 presidential election and the 1994 legislative election are nearly identical. Once again, we see that voting levels were far lower in the legislative election than in the presidential election. Those with low levels of education consistently report they vote less than those with higher levels of education. Guatemalans with no education, as well as those with fewer than 4 years of education, vote below the national average. Once Guatemalans complete grade school, they are voting at or above the national average, while those with university educations report they vote far above the national average, approaching 80 percent in the presidential election. The magnitude of the gap between voting levels of Guatemalans with no education versus those with a university education is very great; for the legislative election, the university educated Guatemalans vote at almost two times the rate of those with no education.




On the whole, wealthier Guatemalans vote more than poor Guatemalans, but the relationship shifts abruptly among the wealthiest portion of the samples. Exhibit 4.8 shows the results of the analysis. Guatemalans in both the 1993 and 1995 samples who scored the lowest on the wealth index (0-1) voted below the national average, but so too do the most wealthy. Generally, voting increases with increased indications of wealth and reaches especially high levels, in both the 1993 and 1995 samples, in the range of 6-7 on the 8-point scale. The dramatic falloff among those with the greatest levels of wealth is troubling and difficult to explain. Further research should be conducted into this group of respondents to determine why they deviate from the national pattern. The wealthiest respondents in the 1995 survey voted at levels almost as low as the very poorest, but quite possibly for opposite reasons.⁷




⁷ The survey data do not provide an explanation, but it is plausible to argue that the least wealthy do not vote because they do not believe their votes will matter, while those with the greatest wealth believe they are immune from the vagaries of the electoral process.


Voting and gender exhibits the same pattern that was found for registration and gender, as is shown in exhibit 4.9. Guatemalan females are far less likely to vote than males. Indeed, in both surveys, while a majority of males voted, only a minority of females did.



We now turn to the complex question of voting and ethnicity. Perhaps one of Guatemala's most serious challenges is the divide that often separates the Ladino population from the indigenous population. In the 1993 survey, it was found that considerable differences existed on a variety of variables. Voting behavior parallels those findings. Exhibit 4.10 contrasts Ladino and indigenous voting rates for both samples. The ethnic classification utilized here is self-identification by the respondent. Ladinos voted at higher levels than indigenous in both the 1993 and 1995 samples.




A more precise clarification of ethnicity is perhaps obtainable by using language spoken. It will be recalled that the survey included speakers of the four major indigenous languages as well as monolingual Spanish speakers. For this analysis, focusing on ethnicity, we have departed from the national samples and included the additional 200 Indians interviewed to increase the sample size of each language group. The purpose was to provide greater reliability of the results when the focus of the study turned to ethnicity. In exhibit 4.11, the sample is divided by language spoken. In many cases, those who are categorized as speakers of an indigenous language also speak Spanish and/or another indigenous language.



Those categorized as Spanish speakers in exhibit 4.11 are monolingual Spanish speakers. Both elections produced similar results. Monolingual Spanish speakers were more likely to vote than those Guatemalans who speak an indigenous language. But there is an exception in both surveys; speakers of Mam are more likely to have voted in these elections than any other indigenous group and also more likely to have voted than monolingual Spanish speakers. This result suggests quite clearly that lumping all indigenous peoples in Guatemala into the same category can, at times, be misleading. That is to say, while it is generally true that the indigenous population is less likely to vote than Ladinos, that is not always the case. Moreover, the differences between indigenous and Ladinos is often very small, as a comparison of, for example, K'iche' speakers with monolingual Spanish speakers reveals.

C. Attitudes and Voting


We now move beyond socio-economic, demographic and ethnic factors related to the vote and turn our attention to attitudinal differences. There are many interesting attitudinal correlates of voting in Guatemala, but the most relevant for this study of democracy is the one which focuses on tolerance and system support. Exhibit 4.12 shows that there is a clear pattern of higher tolerance being linked to higher levels of voting. The only exception is in the high levels of voting in the 1993 sample for those at the lowest level of tolerance. Once again, this is an anomalous finding that requires further analysis, but the overall pattern is certainly of interest.



One might suspect that the above result is misleading, since tolerance is often correlated with education and as we have just shown, education and voting are linked. So, one might conclude that the relationship between tolerance and greater voting is spurious, coming as a result of the higher level of education among the more tolerant. In fact, this is not the case. When education is held constant, those with greater levels of tolerance vote more

We have also found that system support is associated with greater voting turnout. An analysis of the 1995 sample found system support to be a significant predictor of voting when tolerance, education and wealth are held constant. Indeed, although wealth was shown to relate to turnout, when tolerance, system support and education are considered, the impact of wealth becomes statistically insignificant. Put another way, those who

express higher support for the Guatemalan system of government are more tolerant of the rights of political minorities; and those who are more highly educated are among those Guatemalans who are more likely to have voted in the 1994 legislative elections.⁸




In addition to attitudinal factors that influence voting, other forms of political participation are positively associated with it. A new battery of items was added to the 1995 survey to measure participation in local government, since prior research has demonstrated important linkages between local government and national level democracy.⁹ Exhibit 4.13 shows that those Guatemalans who had participated in a municipal meeting (i.e., a meeting convened by the municipality) within a year of being interviewed were more likely to have voted in the 1994 election. Although the effect is noted for both males and females, it is greatest for females; only one-third of Guatemalan women who had not attended a municipal meeting voted in that election, compared to 58 percent voting for women who had attended such a meeting.

⁸ These results present the findings of a multiple regression analysis (OLS). The R square of the model is .05, F sig. < .001. System support, tolerance and education are each significant at .05 or better. The wealth index is not. Education and tolerance are the strongest predictors.


⁹ Seligson, Mitchell A., and Ricardo Córdova M. 1995. *El Salvador: De la Guerra a la Paz, una Cultura Política en Transición*. San Salvador: IDELA y FUNDAUNGO.

The linkage between local and national political participation also emerges when we examine the data from the perspective of ethnicity. Exhibit 4.14 shows the sample divided by the linguistic grouping discussed earlier. Several points can be noted. First, voting was higher among all groups, regardless of language spoken, if they had attended a municipal meeting. Second, the impact was greater for some language groups than others. Voting among Kaqchikel speakers reached the very high level of 89 percent among those who had attended a municipal meeting, compared to only 35 percent who had not. Third, while only among Mam speakers did a majority of non-attenders vote (51%), a majority voted among all linguistic groups who had attended a municipal meeting.




D. Reasons for Not Voting

We have seen important differences in the patterns of registration and voting among Guatemalans. To examine more closely the problem of low voter turnout we asked our respondents why they believe that many Guatemalans do not vote. The results are presented in exhibit 4.15. Overwhelmingly, the reason given for non-voting had to do with the low credibility of the elections. All other reasons paled by comparison. In other Central American countries, the major reason given for non-voting was the failure to register.



Finally, we asked our respondents in the 1995 survey what measures they thought should be taken to increase turnout. Overwhelmingly, as shown in exhibit 4.16, the Guatemalans called for better candidates for office. Apparently, many candidates are seen as either untrustworthy or are unknown. An additional measure suggested by a relatively large number of respondents is to increase the knowledge of the electorate about the candidates and the electoral process. About 10 percent of the respondents recommended improving voter access to the polls. Specifically, they urged having more voting places in the small, rural communities (*aldeas*) and helping voters obtain transportation. A small number of respondents, around 4 percent, suggested changes in the electoral process such as punishing persons who abstain from voting, reducing fraud, and changing the day of elections.



Low turnout, based on this analysis, is a function of a combination of factors: a failure to register which in turn precludes voting, linked to a lack of credibility of those seeking political office, and, therefore, a lack of faith in the electoral process. Those with greater education and wealth, with a greater sense of system support and tolerance of democratic liberties of others, and males who are Spanish speakers (Ladinos) are more likely to vote. By inference they also accord greater credibility to the electoral process.

The question remains, from a programmatic standpoint, of how to make the political process more credible, and more meaningful, particularly to those with lower socioeconomic status, to those with less education, and to women. Some suggestions based on insights gained from the two surveys will be offered in this report's final chapter, which follows.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Programmatic Implications

As the data have indicated, many attitudes relevant to democracy have shifted in a positive direction among the Guatemalans surveyed between 1993 and 1995. In and of itself, this shift represents a positive change which can contribute to the basis for a more democratic order in Guatemala, although not necessarily serving as a guarantor of increased democracy. Translating the growth in democratic values into increased democracy will result from a complex process of weaving changes in attitudes to changes in political behavior to shifts in the nature of political institutions. Increased democratic values are related to and can promote increased political participation in institutions that provide an opportunity to express those political values, thus resulting in an expansion of the democratic order.

In this chapter, we examine the major conclusions that have been drawn regarding values relevant to various areas of political behavior and political institutional development. We shall examine what these conclusions tell us about the areas where USAID and other donor programming may assist in fostering the continued growth of that democracy.

A. Shifts in Democratic Values

A good starting point for this analysis is the changes in values. One important element that heightens hope for the future of democracy in Guatemala is that an important part of the change in values that has taken place over the past several years is a shift in the degree to which Ladinos are willing to tolerate dissent. Historically, Guatemala's Ladinos limited access by the indigenous majority to effective political participation, a political behavior reflected in the variables that define tolerance of dissent. While the majority of Ladinos still do not show high levels of tolerance of dissent, Ladinos account for the bulk of the increase of such tolerance between 1993 and 1995. Indeed, between 1993 and 1995 there was more than a 15 percent increase in the level of tolerance among Ladinos (from 42 to 49 on a 100 point scale), and there is no longer a difference between indigenous people and Ladinos in this regard. This may provide the increased possibility for support of initiatives such as those recently undertaken by President Arzú to reach a basis for peace with the guerilla movement.

The second essential attitudinal dimension for a stable democracy is support for the political system. By this we do not mean support for the current government, but rather the more enduring underlying support for the structure and processes of democratic national governance. Between 1993 and 1995 there was positive change in Guatemala in this

respect as well. Viewed in terms of the total population, there was no significant change in the level of system support. However, when observed more closely in terms of the basic division of indigenous and Ladino ethnicity, the movement was a mirror image of that for tolerance of political dissent. That is, there was almost a 40 percent increase in the level of system support among the indigenous population (from 31 to 43 points on a 100 point scale), even though there was no appreciable change in the level of support among Ladinos.

The data from both surveys should make clear to donors the danger of treating Guatemalans as an undifferentiated whole. As market researchers have long known, different segments of large populations have different values and attitudes and behave in different ways. The survey data show clear differences between indigenous people and Ladino. There are also major differences in the response patterns among indigenous groups and among respondents from different regions of the country. From a social marketing point of view, the problem in 1993 among Ladinos was a need to raise their levels of tolerance for political dissent, and for indigenous groups it was to raise their support for the political system.

While our survey data do not say how or why these problems were addressed, they do show a positive change in both regards. Over the two years between the 1993 and 1995 surveys, the two major segments of Guatemalan society - Ladino and indigenous - moved toward one another in ways that bode well for lasting democracy.

Thus, there is a cause for some optimism. The good news is that there was positive change between the years 1993 and 1995. The bad news is that there is still a long way for both the indigenous and Ladino populations to go. In both years less than 20 percent of either group scored high on both the critical dimensions of support for the political system and tolerance for political dissent (the group characterized as supportive of stable democracy). There was essentially no change in the proportion of the overall population with the values most favorable to stable democracy from one survey to the next.

B. Shifts in Attitudes Toward Political Participation

While shifts in democratic values lay a foundation for greater democracy, shifts need to take place as well in political behavior. The study explored attitudes regarding behavior relevant to politics including voter turnout, contacting public officials, being active in community and occupational organizations and participating directly in political activities through political campaigns and organizations. Several conclusions drawn from these explorations are directly relevant to efforts at increasing the possibilities of democracy in Guatemala.

- **Provide Support to Civil Society Activities, Not to Community Groups in General**

The data relating attitudes and participation indicate a strong link between participating in politically oriented groups or activities at the local level and system support. Assuming that Guatemala's political system continues to seek to be more democratic, then efforts should be made to enhance opportunities and capacities for political participation. Such efforts should be expected to both increase system support and, through the enhancement of such values, strengthen the capacity of democratic institutions to broaden representation. Donor resources directed at supporting local, grassroots civil society organizations, or activities that support such organizations, particularly in areas where political participation has been weak, will serve to provide the populace with a form of education for democratic values as well as directly supporting activities that, per se, enhance the democratic process.

Conversely, the study does not reveal a clear relationship between most other forms of participation (for example, in occupational groups) and either the democratic values of political tolerance or of system support. Thus, donor investments in community-based organizations that are not involved in the political process are less likely to enhance democratic values or to make a direct contribution to expanding the political process than direct or indirect support for civil society organizations.

As the recent elections have indicated, investments in the political process need not take the form of support for traditional party organizations. The distinction the data point to is the importance of focusing on those local organizations with a political end.

- **Improve Voter Turnout by Increasing Voter Knowledge of Candidates**

A second set of findings regarding political attitudes relevant to political behavior revolves around the issue of low voter turnout. A portion of the problem of low voter turnout, as in the United States, is a technical problem. Failure to register means an inability to vote. But failure to register is often the result of a failure to accord credibility to the candidates and to the electoral process. Enhancing the credibility of the candidates and the process requires both long-term and short-term changes.

The data indicate that, long term, those with greater education and wealth are more likely to vote, as are those with higher levels of democratic values. This suggests that expansion of political and economic participation are likely to increase interest in voting.

In the shorter term, making the political process more credible will enhance participation. This means providing increased opportunities for effective and meaningful political participation as well as increased access to political participation to those groups who reject the system, but understand democratic values--for example, significant groups of indigenous peoples. The solution at this level, just as is the case with a broader form of political participation, may very well lie with donor support for groups and activities that promote active participation in the political process.

- **Work at the Local Level**

In Guatemala, as in Boston, for most people politics is local and encouraging participation in local politics provides important opportunities. Guatemalans are more likely to ask their mayor than their legislator or a central government official for help with a community or personal problem. They are more likely to feel well treated and less likely to feel mistreated in their encounters with local government personnel than public officials in general, or by the police or the courts. And be they indigenous or Ladino, they are overwhelmingly more likely to view their local government as the unit that has responded the best to community needs.

Thus, a potentially very important means of enhancing political participation is to build on events that have already taken place in the latest round of elections and strengthening political opportunities at the local level. Local politics may be more visible in its operations as well as in its impact. Encouraging democratic political processes and structures at the local level may offer alternatives to a traditional politics that has largely failed to effectively encourage widespread participation. Thus, donors may find this an appropriate arena for support aimed at generating both increased political participation and as a means of civic education for democratic values.

In conclusion, this analysis of the two surveys of democratic values in Guatemala suggests that positive change has occurred. This is consistent with some major behavioral indicators of change in the Guatemalan landscape, in the nearly three years since the first survey was done. There has been real progress towards resolving what has effectively been a 30-year long civil war. A Presidential election was held in which there was serious competition between the candidates and which resulted in a peaceful transition of government. Left wing oriented parties successfully campaigned for and elected delegates to the national legislature for the first time in many years and there was a major increase of indigenous political participation and success at the polls in municipal level elections. From the surveys, it is not possible to identify reasons for such change; they were not designed with that purpose in mind. Nor do the surveys resolve potentially endless arguments about the relative importance of concentrating donor programming on affecting political attitudes or on more tangible aspects of political reality such as governmental structures, the delivery of

public goods and services, or the behaviors of public officials as they interact with the public at large. Indeed, if anything, the data here reinforce the argument that effective programming to foster democracy should move at three levels. That is, efforts need to be made to improve the quality of public services, to affect public attitudes and beliefs, and to enhance political participation, both as an end in itself and as a means for changing beliefs. It is unlikely that a single approach will be enough. But these data from Guatemala provide some indication that the extensive donor efforts directed during the past several years on these levels are bearing fruit.

APPENDIX
SURVEY INSTRUMENT 1995

ENCUESTA DE CONOCIMIENTOS,
ACTITUDES Y PRACTICAS DE DEMOCRACIA

GUATEMALA, 1995

VERSIÓN DEFINITIVA

25/ENERO/95

Al Entrevistador:

LAS MAYÚSCULAS **EN NEGRITA** SON INSTRUCCIONES ESPECIFICAS AL ENCUESTADOR. NO DEBEN LEERSE EN VOZ ALTA ANTE EL ENTREVISTADO.

LAS MAYÚSCULAS SIMPLES, SON ALTERNATIVAS PARA CODIFICAR LA RESPUESTA DEL ENTREVISTADO; Y, A MENOS QUE APAREZCA **INSTRUCCIÓN** EN CONTRARIO, TAMPOCO DEBEN LEERSE AL ENTREVISTADO.

Las minúsculas **en negrita** son alternativas de respuesta que se deben leer al entrevistado.

Los textos en minúscula simple, corresponden a las preguntas que deben presentarse al entrevistado. Las palabras o frases subrayadas son puntos de énfasis que deben hacerse al presentar la pregunta.

Instrucciones Generales

1. Antes de dirigirse a la vivienda que le corresponde, **VERIFIQUE** que la hoja de respuestas esté total y correctamente llenada en los códigos de "NO.", "REG.", "U/R", "DEPTO.", "MPIO.", y "SECTOR CENSAL".

2. **IDENTIFIQUE** al informante: Que sea nacido en el país; que esté dentro de la **cuota por sexo** que le fue asignada; y que ha sido escogido conforme a las instrucciones que ha recibido para la selección dentro del hogar CENSAL.

3. **PRESÉNTESE:**

- *Vengo en nombre de ASIES (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales). Estamos haciendo una encuesta en todo el país, sobre aspectos muy importantes de la situación nacional, incluyendo los problemas que vivimos los guatemaltecos.*

Esta casa ha sido seleccionada por sorteo para hacer una entrevista. De modo que le agradezco que nos dedique unos minutos.

Estas encuestas, como usted sabe, son confidenciales y no le vamos a preguntar su nombre ni apellido. No hay respuestas correctas ni incorrectas, todas son importantes para nosotros. Por favor, contésteme las preguntas de acuerdo a lo que usted cree o piensa.

4. **ANOTE** en el primer renglón de la hoja de respuestas, el SEXO [Q1.](1 = HOMBRE, 2 = MUJER) y la EDAD [Q2.](años cumplidos) del informante, la HORA DE INICIO de la entrevista y el idioma en que se realiza la misma: [IDIOMA1.]1 = ESPAÑOL, 2 = MAM, 3 = Q'EQCHI', 4 = KAQCHIKEL, 5 = K'ICHE', 6 = OTRO.

5. **ANOTE SI ES ENTREVISTA DE PERSONA INDÍGENA ADICIONAL.**

01[A4A.]Para empezar: Como usted sabe, todas las comunidades tienen problemas, unos más grandes que otros.)Cuál cree usted que es el problema más serio que tienen los habitantes de [DIGA EL NOMBRE DEL LUGAR]? No me refiero al principal problema de todo el país, sino sólo de esta [DIGA CIUDAD, ALDEA, COMUNIDAD]

**ACEPTE SOLO UN PROBLEMA Y CODIFIQUELO
EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

01	COSTO DE LA VIDA/POBREZA	10	POCA UNIÓN/ORGANIZACIÓN
02	DESEMPLEO/POCO TRABAJO		11 GUERRA/TERRORISMO
03	BAJOS SALARIOS/INGRESOS		12 DELINCUENCIA COMÚN
04	POCA VENTA/MALA COSECHA	13	CONTAMINACIÓN AMBIENTAL
05	TIERRA ESCASA/CARA	14	TRANSPORTE/CAMINOS
06	EDUCACIÓN/ANALFABETISMO	15	OTRO [NO ESPECIFIQUE]
07	VIVIENDA ESCASA/CARA		
08	DESNUTRICIÓN/MALA SALUD		
09	FALTA DE AGUA/POTABLE	77	--->NO SABE
		88	--->NO RESPONDE

02[A4.]Ahora sí, hablando de todo el país,)cuál cree usted que es el problema más serio que tenemos en todo Guatemala?

**ACEPTE SOLO UN PROBLEMA Y CODIFIQUELO
EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

01	COSTO DE LA VIDA/POBREZA	09	GUERRA/TERRORISMO
02	DESEMPLEO/POCO TRABAJO		10 DELINCUENCIA COMÚN
03	BAJOS SALARIOS/INGRESOS		11 CONTAMINACIÓN AMBIENTAL
04	EDUCACIÓN/ANALFABETISMO	12	CORRUPCIÓN
05	VIVIENDA ESCASA/CARA		13 MAL GOBIERNO
06	DESNUTRICIÓN/SALUD	14	OTRO [NO ESPECIFIQUE]
07	TRANSPORTE/CAMINOS	77	--->NO SABE
08	POCA UNIÓN/ORGANIZACIÓN	88	--->NO RESPONDE

03[LS2.]Qué piensa de su situación económica en general?)Se siente **satisfecho o insatisfecho**?

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "SATISFECHO A MEDIAS"**

1	SATISFECHO
2	INSATISFECHO
3	SATISFECHO A MEDIAS
88	--->NO RESPONDE

04[LS1,]Qué piensa de su vivienda?)Se siente **satisfecho o insatisfecho?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "SATISFECHO A MEDIAS"**

1 SATISFECHO
2 INSATISFECHO
3 SATISFECHO A MEDIAS
88 --->NO RESPONDE

05[LS3.]En términos generales,)está usted satisfecho de su forma de vida actual?)Diría usted que se siente **satisfecho o insatisfecho?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "SATISFECHO A MEDIAS"**

1 SATISFECHO
2 INSATISFECHO
3 SATISFECHO A MEDIAS
88 --->NO RESPONDE

Ahora, le voy a mencionar varios tipos de organizaciones, para que usted me diga si asiste a reuniones de algunos de estos grupos, y si lo hace **frecuentemente, pocas veces o nunca:**

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		FREC.	POCAS V.	NUNCA	N/R
06	[CP6.]Comité o Asociación en la Iglesia?	1	2	3	88
07	[CP7.]Asociación de Padres en la Escuela?	1	2	3	88
08	[CP8.]Comité Pro-mejoramiento en la comunidad?	1	2	3	88
09	[CP9.]Asociación de personas que tienen la misma ocupación que usted?	1	2	3	88
10	[CP12.]Asociación o Club de Servicio (como Leones, Bomberos, etc.)	1	2	3	88
11	[CP10.]Sindicato de trabajadores o de campesinos?	1	2	3	88
12	[CP11.]Cooperativa?	1	2	3	88
12a	[] Partido político	1	2	3	88
12b	Comité Cívico	1	2	3	88

Para resolver problemas propios o de la comunidad, ¿ha pedido usted **muchas veces o pocas veces** la ayuda de...

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		MUCHAS	POCAS	NUNCA	N/R
13	[CP4.]...el Gobierno?	1	2	3	88
14	[CP3.]...el Alcalde Municipal?	1	2	3	88
15	[CP2.]...algún Diputado al Congreso?	1	2	3	88

Dígame si las siguientes instituciones ayudan **mucho, poco o nada**, para resolver los problemas más importantes del país:

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		MUCHO	POCO	NADA	N/R
16	[DD14.]El Gobierno	1	2	3	88
17	[DD15.]Las Iglesias de cualquier religión	1	2	3	88
18	[DD16.]Los militares	1	2	3	88
19	[DD18.]Los Jueces, los tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	88
20	[DD19.]Los sindicatos	1	2	3	88
21	[DD20.]La prensa, ya sea escrita, por radio, o por televisión	1	2	3	88
22	[DD21.]Los partidos políticos	1	2	3	88
23	[DD24.]Los diputados del Congreso	1	2	3	88
23a	Sector Privado	1	2	3	88

Ahora vamos a hablar de la municipalidad de este municipio.

23A NP1. ¿Ha tenido usted la oportunidad de asistir a una sesión o reunión convocada por la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?

1. Sí 2. No 77. No sabe/ no recuerda

23B NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o hecho alguna petición a funcionarios, regidores, concejales o síndicos o alguna oficina de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses?

1. Sí 2. No 77. No sabe/ no recuerda

23D SGL1. ¿Cree usted que los servicios que esta municipalidad está dando a los vecinos son excelentes, buenos, regulares, malos o pésimos?

1. excelente 2. bueno 3. regular 4. malo 5. pésimo 77. No sabe

SGL2. Eliminada.

23F LGL1. Para ayudar a resolver los problemas de esta comunidad, quién ha respondido mejor?)El Gobierno Central?)Los diputados? o)La municipalidad?

1. el gobierno central 2. los diputados 3. La municipalidad
4. ninguno 5. Todos igual 77. No sabe/no contesta [No leer # 4 o # 5]
-

24[VB1.]Está usted inscrito como ciudadano, en el Registro Electoral?

- 1 SI SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA
2 NO PASE A LA PREGUNTA 28
MARQUE EL 99 EN LAS PREGUNTAS 25 Y 27
88 --->NO RESPONDE IDEM
-

25[VB2.]Votó usted en las elecciones de diputados de agosto de 1994?

- 1 SI PASE A LA PREGUNTA 28
Y MARQUE 99 EN LA 27
2 NO SIGA A LA PREGUNTA 27
88 --->NO RESPONDE PASE A LA PREGUNTA 28
99 --->No APLICA Y MARQUE EL 99 EN LA PREGUNTA 27
-

27[VB2B.]Por qué no votó en las elecciones de agosto de 1994?

**ACEPTE SOLO UNA RAZÓN Y CODIFIQUELA
EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

- 1 NO CREE EN LAS ELECCIONES
2 POR LA VIOLENCIA/INSEGURIDAD
3 POR PROBLEMAS DE SALUD
4 POR PROBLEMAS DE TRANSPORTE
5 POR AUSENCIA DEL PAÍS
6 POR ATENDER EL TRABAJO
7 POR PROHIBICIÓN LEGAL
8 NO ESTABA INSCRITO
9 NO TENÍA LA EDAD
88 --->NO RESPONDE
99 --->No Aplica

28 [VB4.] En Guatemala muchos ciudadanos inscritos dejan de votar.) Por qué cree usted que ya no votan?

**ACEPTE SOLO UNA RAZÓN Y CODIFIQUELA
EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

- 1 NO CREEN EN LAS ELECCIONES
- 2 POR LA VIOLENCIA/INSEGURIDAD
- 3 POR PROBLEMAS DE SALUD
- 4 POR PROBLEMAS DE TRANSPORTE
- 5 POR ATENDER EL TRABAJO
- 6 POR FALTA DE EDUCACIÓN CÍVICA
- 77 --->NO SABE
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

Ahora voy a leer algunas razones que da la gente para no votar. Dígame si está de acuerdo o no en que...

28A La gente no vota porque cree que su voto no influye en la política
 1 muy de acuerdo 2 de acuerdo 3 mas o menos de acuerdo 4 en desacuerdo 5
 muy en desacuerdo
 77 NS 88 NR

28B Está usted de acuerdo en que la gente no vota porque los políticos son corruptos
 1 muy de acuerdo 2 de acuerdo 3 mas o menos de acuerdo 4 en desacuerdo 5
 muy en desacuerdo
 77 NS 88 NR

28C Está usted de acuerdo en que la gente no vota porque no entienden la política
 1 muy de acuerdo 2 de acuerdo 3 mas o menos de acuerdo 4 en desacuerdo 5
 muy en desacuerdo
 77 NS 88 NR

28D Y en que la gente no vota porque no tiene fe en el gobierno
 1 muy de acuerdo 2 de acuerdo 3 mas o menos de acuerdo 4 en desacuerdo 5
 muy en desacuerdo
 77 NS 88 NR

29 [VB1A.] Está usted inscrito en algún partido político? No me diga en cuál, sólo quiero saber si está inscrito o no en algún partido.

- 1 SI
- 2 NO
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

30[URG21B7.]Algunas personas dicen que vale la pena votar, otros dicen que no vale la pena.)Usted que opina?)**Vale la pena votar, o no vale la pena?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "DEPENDE/ALGUNAS VECES/..."**

- 1 VALE LA PENA
 - 2 NO VALE LA PENA
 - 3 DEPENDE/ALGUNAS VECES/...
 - 77 --->NO SABE
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
-

30A)Qué cree usted que se necesita hacer para que la gente vaya a votar? (NO LEER OPCIONES)

- 1.Poner más mesas o puestos de votaciones en las aldeas
 - 2. Que hayan candidatos conocidos en los pueblos
 - 3. Que puedan haber candidatos para diputados apoyados por Comités Cívicos
 - 5.Candidato de confianza
 - 6.Cambiar día de elección
 - 7.Tener interés en la elección
 - 8.Candidatos responsables
 - 9.Candidatos con demostrada capacidad
 - 10.Informar, motivar al electorado
 - 11.Candidatos con buena reputación
 - 12.Educación cívica para el pueblo
 - 13.Políticos nuevos
 - 14.Sancionar el abstencionismo
 - 15.Facilidades de transporte
 - 16.Evitar fraude
-

31[CCI1.]Algunos piensan que no vale la pena participar en política, porque de todos modos, la opinión de uno no cuenta en las decisiones del gobierno.)Cree usted **que vale la pena, o que no vale la pena** participar en política?

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "DEPENDE/ALGUNAS VECES/..."**

- 1 VALE LA PENA
 - 2 NO VALE LA PENA
 - 3 DEPENDE/ALGUNAS VECES/...
 - 77 NO SABE
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
-

32[CCI2.]Cómo cree usted que la mayoría de los empleados públicos lo atienden a usted?)**Muy bien..., bien..., mal... o muy mal?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "REGULAR"**

1 MUY BIEN
2 BIEN
3 MAL
4 MUY MAL
5 REGULAR
77 NO LE CONSTA
88 --->NO RESPONDE

33[CR80C3.]Cómo diría que en la Policía Nacional lo atienden a usted cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos?)**Muy bien..., bien..., mal... o muy mal?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "REGULAR"**

1 MUY BIEN
2 BIEN
3 MAL
4 MUY MAL
5 REGULAR
77 NO LE CONSTA
88 --->NO RESPONDE

34[CR80C4.]Cuando tiene qué tratar algún asunto en los Juzgados, por lo general,)cómo lo atienden a usted los jueces y los empleados?)Lo atienden **muy bien..., bien..., mal... o muy mal?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "REGULAR"**

1 MUY BIEN
2 BIEN
3 MAL
4 MUY MAL
5 REGULAR
77 NO LE CONSTA
88 --->NO RESPONDE

35[CCI3.]Y)cómo diría que en la Municipalidad, lo atienden a usted cuando tiene que tratar algún asunto con ellos?)**Muy bien..., bien..., mal... o muy mal?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "REGULAR"**

1 MUY BIEN
2 BIEN
3 MAL
4 MUY MAL
5 REGULAR
77 NO LE CONSTA
88 --->NO RESPONDE

36[URG21B10.]Cree usted que en nuestro país **hace falta un gobierno de mano dura**, o que los problemas pueden resolverse con **la participación de todos?**

1 MANO DURA
2 PARTICIPACIÓN
77 --->NO SABE
88 --->NO RESPONDE

Voy a mencionar varias organizaciones, para que usted me diga si éstas defienden el derecho a la vida. Dígame por favor si usted cree que el derecho a la vida, de los habitantes del país, lo respeta y lo defiende...

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		SI	ALGUNAS VECES	NO	N/S	N/ R
37	[DERHUM1.]...la policía?	1	2	3	77	88
38	[DERHUM2.]...el ejército?	1	2	3	77	88
39	[DERHUM3.]...los jueces?	1	2	3	77	88

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted **con toda libertad, con un poco de miedo, o con mucho miedo?**

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		CON LIBERTAD	POCO MIEDO	MUCHO MIEDO	N/R
40	[DERECHO1.]Participar en resolver problemas de su comunidad	1	2	3	88
41	[DERECHO2.]Votar en una elección nacional	1	2	3	88
42	[DERECHO3.]Participar en una manifestación pacífica	1	2	3	88
43	[DERECHO4.]Postularse para un cargo de elección popular	1	2	3	88

La gente a veces realiza actividades para lograr algún objetivo popular. ¿Dígame si usted aprueba o desaprueba que esta gente...

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA HOJA
DE RESPUESTAS**

		SI	NO	INDIFERENTE	N/R
44	[E5.]...participe en manifestaciones permitidas por la Ley?	1	2	3	88
45	...cierre una calle o carretera	1	2	3	88
46	[E14.]...invada casas desocupadas, o terrenos desocupados?	1	2	3	88
47	[E2.]...ocupe fábricas, oficinas o edificios?	1	2	3	88
48	[E3.]...trate de derrocar por la fuerza un gobierno que ha sido elegido por el pueblo?	1	2	3	88
49	[E8.]...participe en asociaciones o grupos para tratar de resolver problemas de la comunidad?	1	2	3	88
50	[E11.]...trabaje por un partido o un candidato durante la campaña electoral?	1	2	3	88

De las instituciones y personas que leeré a continuación, voy a pedirle que me diga si tiene mucha, poca o ninguna confianza en ellas.)Confía usted **mucho, poco o nada** en...

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE**

		MUCHO	POCO	NADA	N/R
51	[B1.] Los Tribunales de Justicia	1	2	3	88
52	[B13.] El Congreso de la República?	1	2	3	88
53	[B14.] El actual Gobierno?	1	2	3	88
54	[B15.] El Procurador de los Derechos Humanos?	1	2	3	88
55	[B11.] El Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	1	2	3	88
56	[B2.] Las oficinas públicas?	1	2	3	88
57	[B12.] El Ejército Nacional?	1	2	3	88
58	[B17.] Los Partidos Políticos?	1	2	3	88
58a	[] La Corte de Constitucionalidad	1	2	3	88

59 [B3.]) Cree usted que los derechos humanos de las personas que viven en nuestro país, están **muy bien protegidos, más o menos bien protegidos, o desprotegidos?**

- 1 MUY BIEN PROTEGIDOS
- 2 MAS O MENOS BIEN
- 3 DESPROTEGIDOS
- 77 --->NO SABE
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

60 [B4.]) Se siente usted muy orgulloso, poco orgulloso o nada orgulloso del **sistema** de gobierno de Guatemala?

- 1 MUY ORGULLOSO
- 2 POCO
- 3 NADA
- 4 NO SE CONSIDERA GUATEMALTECO
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

61[M1.] Cree usted que el Presidente De León Carpio está trabajando **muy bien...**, **bien...**, **mal... o muy mal?**

**TRATE DE LOGRAR UNA RESPUESTA DEFINIDA.
SOLO EN CASO EXTREMO, ANOTE LA RESPUESTA
AMBIGUA "REGULAR"**

1 MUY BIEN
2 BIEN
3 MAL
4 MUY MAL
5 REGULAR
77 --->NO SABE
88 --->NO RESPONDE

62[WC1.])Ha sufrido usted o algún miembro de su familia algún tipo de violencia política, como secuestros, asesinatos, bombas, o matanzas?

1 SI
2 NO
77 --->NO SABE
88 --->NO RESPONDE

63[WC2.] Algún miembro de su familia está desaparecido, o ha tenido que refugiarse o irse del país por causa de la violencia política?

1 SI
2 NO
77 --->NO SABE
88 --->NO RESPONDE

64[TR1.] Cree usted que en nuestro país hay **mucha**, hay **poca** o **no hay** violencia política?

1 MUCHA
2 POCA
3 NO HAY **PASE A LA PREGUNTA 69**
Y MARQUE EL 99 EN LAS PREGUNTAS 65, 66, 67 Y 68
77 --->NO SABE
88 --->NO RESPONDE

Voy a mencionarle algunas cosas que la gente dice que son causas de la violencia política. Dígame por favor si usted está **de acuerdo o en desacuerdo** en que esas podrían ser causas de violencia.

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		DESACUERDO	ACUERDO	N/R	N/A
65	【TR1C.】Las diferencias entre ricos y pobres	1	2	88	99
66	【TR5.】La mala distribución de la tierra	1	2	88	99
67	【TR .】Las diferencias entre indígenas y ladinos	1	2	88	99

68【TR6.】Algunas gentes dicen que para acabar con la violencia política, la única forma es usar también la violencia por parte de las autoridades.)Está usted **de acuerdo, poco de acuerdo o en desacuerdo** con eso?

- 1 DE ACUERDO
- 2 POCO DE ACUERDO
- 3 EN DESACUERDO
- 88 --->NO SABE/NO RESPONDE
- 99 --->NO APLICA

)Cree usted que las personas o instituciones que voy a mencionar, le dan a los indígenas igual, mejor o peor trato que a los ladinos?

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		MEJOR	IGUAL	PEOR	N/S N/R
69	[IND1] La Policía	1	2	3	88
70	[IND2] El Ejército	1	2	3	88
71	[IND3] Los Tribunales de Justicia	1	2	3	88
72	[IND4] Los maestros de las escuelas	1	2	3	88

73 [GI3.])Puede decirme cuántos diputados componen el Congreso de la República?

- 1 CORRECTO = **80**
2 INCORRECTO
77 --->NO SABE
88 --->NO RESPONDE

74 [GI2.])Puede decirme el nombre del actual Presidente de los Estados Unidos?

- 1 CORRECTO = **CLINTON**
2 INCORRECTO
77 --->NO SABE
88 --->NO RESPONDE

75 [GI1A.] Puede decirme el nombre del actual Vicepresidente de nuestro país?

- 1 CORRECTO = **HERBRUGER ASTURIAS, ARTURO**
 - 2 INCORRECTO
 - 77 --->NO SABE
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
-

76 [GI7.] Puede decirme el nombre del actual Presidente de El Salvador?

- 1 CORRECTO = **Calderón Sol**
 - 2 INCORRECTO
 - 77 --->NO SABE
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
-

77 [IT1] Cree usted que la mayoría de la gente es **confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable?**

- 1 CONFIABLE
 - 2 POCO CONFIABLE
 - 3 NADA CONFIABLE
 - 77 --->NO SABE
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
-

78 [IT2.] Cree usted que la mayoría de la gente **se preocupan sólo por sí mismos o tratan de ayudar al prójimo?**

- 1 SOLO POR SI MISMOS
 - 2 AYUDAN AL PRÓJIMO
 - 77 --->NO SABE
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
-

79 [IT3.] Cree usted que la mayoría de la gente, si tienen oportunidad, **tratarían de aprovecharse de usted, o cree que no se aprovecharían?**

- 1 LA MAYORÍA SE APROVECHARÍAN
 - 2 LA MAYORÍA NO SE APROVECHARÍAN
 - 77 --->NO SABE
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
-

80 [RFI51.] Algunas personas dicen que si nos acercáramos más a Dios, los problemas de nuestro país se resolverían solos.) Está usted **de acuerdo, poco de acuerdo o en desacuerdo** con eso?

- 1 DE ACUERDO
 - 2 POCO DE ACUERDO
 - 3 EN DESACUERDO
 - 88 --->NO SABE/NO RESPONDE
-

81[RFI3.] Dicen también que ninguna religión es mejor que otra, que todas son buenas.
) Está usted **de acuerdo, poco de acuerdo o en desacuerdo** con eso?

- 1 DE ACUERDO
- 2 POCO DE ACUERDO
- 3 EN DESACUERDO
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

82[RF32]) Cómo cree que se resuelven los problemas sociales más rápido: por **el esfuerzo de la comunidad**, o por **que cada persona lleve una vida totalmente correcta y moral?**

- 1 ESFUERZO COMUNITARIO
- 2 MORALIDAD DE CADA PERSONA
- 3 AMBAS COSAS A LA VEZ
- 77 --->NO SABE
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

83 Quitada

84 Quitada

85[PP2.] Alguna vez ha trabajado por algún partido o por algún candidato durante una campaña electoral?

- 1 SI
- 2 NO
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

86[PP1.] En tiempos de elecciones,) acostumbra usted aconsejar o tratar de convencer a otras personas por quién votar?) Esto lo hace usted **mucho, poco o nunca?**

- 1 MUCHO
- 2 POCO
- 3 NADA
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

87[JUST2.] Diría Ud. que los Tribunales de Justicia favorecen a la gente rica o poderosa?

- 1 SI
- 2 NO SIEMPRE
- 3 NO
- 77 --->NO SABE
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

88 [JUST3.] Diría Ud. que los Tribunales de Justicia trabajan rápido o despacio?

- 1 RÁPIDO
 2 DESPACIO
 77 --->NO SABE
 88 --->NO RESPONDE

Voy a leerle algunos de los problemas que tenemos en el país, para que me diga quién cree usted que puede solucionarlos mejor; si **un gobierno civil electo por el pueblo, o un gobierno militar impuesto por la fuerza:**

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 SI ES NECESARIO, Y ANOTANDO LAS RESPUESTAS
 CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
 HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		GOBIERNO ELECTO	GOBIERNO IMPUESTO	NINGUNO	N/S N/R
89	[DD1.]El desempleo	1	2	3	88
90	[DD2.]Los abusos contra trabajadores y campesinos	1	2	3	88
91	[DD4.]La violencia política	1	2	3	88
92	[DD5.]La pobreza	1	2	3	88
93	[DD6.]Las deudas que tenemos a otros países	1	2	3	88
94	[DD7.]La inmoralidad de la gente	1	2	3	88
95	[DD8.]La subida de los precios	1	2	3	88
96	[DD9.]La delincuencia común	1	2	3	88
97	[DD11.]La corrupción en el gobierno?	1	2	3	88

98 [BC15.] Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que los militares ocupen el gobierno por la fuerza, o cree que nunca hay suficiente razón para eso?

- 1 SI PODRÍA HABER RAZÓN
 2 NUNCA HABRÍA RAZÓN
 88 --->NO SABE/NO RESPONDE

Hay personas que siempre hablan mal, o están en contra, de lo que hace el gobierno, sea el gobierno actual, el pasado o el que viene. Dígame si está usted **de acuerdo o en desacuerdo** con que esas personas...

**VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA
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CON EL CÓDIGO CORRESPONDIENTE, EN LA
HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:**

		DE ACUERDO	DESACUERDO	N/R
99	[D1.]...voten?	1	2	88
100	[D2.]...participen en protestas o manifestaciones pacíficas?	1	2	88
101	[D3.]...se propongan para ser electos para cargos públicos (por ejemplo, diputados)	1	2	88
102	[D4.]...usen la radio o la televisión para sus expresiones?	1	2	88

103[URG21.] Cree usted que un gobierno electo por el pueblo es preferible que un gobierno impuesto por un golpe de Estado, o sea por la fuerza?

- 1 CREE QUE ES PREFERIBLE EL GOBIERNO ELECTO
- 2 CREE QUE ES PREFERIBLE EL GOBIERNO IMPUESTO
- 3 DA LO MISMO EL GOBIERNO ELECTO QUE EL GOBIERNO IMPUESTO
- 77 --->NO SABE
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

107[ACR1] En relación con la necesidad de hacer cambios de la forma en que está organizada nuestra sociedad, voy a plantearle tres opciones, para que me diga cuál le parece mejor:

- 1 Cambios radicales por una revolución
- 2 Reformas graduales
- 3 Debemos defenderla tal como está
- 77 --->NO SABE
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

Como últimas preguntas, le voy a pedir algunos datos personales:

108[Q1C.] Se considera usted indígena, o ladino?

- 1 INDÍGENA
- 2 LADINO
- 77 --->NO SABE
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

108a Voy a mencionarle varios grupos de personas y quisiera que me indicara con cuáles de ellos usted se siente mejor:

- 1 con los indígenas de su comunidad?
 - 2 con los ladinos de su comunidad?
 - 3 con los indígenas de otras partes del país?
 - 4 con los ladinos de otras partes del país?
- NO LEER ESTAS OPCIONES, SOLO ANOTAR SI LAS RESPUESTAS COINCIDEN**
- 5 con todos?
 - 6 con ninguno?
 - 77 no sabe?
 - 88 no responde?

109 [Q1B.] Habla usted algún idioma indígena?

**SI LA RESPUESTA ES QUE HABLA MAS DE UN IDIOMA INDÍGENA, ANOTE EL IDIOMA NATIVO
SI EL IDIOMA NATIVO ES EL ESPAÑOL, ANOTE EL IDIOMA INDÍGENA QUE MAS UTILIZA EN LA
ACTUALIDAD**

- 1 KAQCHIKEL
- 2 MAM
- 3 Q'EQCHI'
- 4 K'ICHE'
- 5 OTRO [NO ESPECIFIQUE]
- 6 NINGUNO
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

110[ED.]Cuál fue el último grado que aprobó usted en la escuela?

- 88 NO RECUERDA/NO RESPONDE **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 0 NO FUE A LA ESCUELA **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 1 1ero. DE PRIMARIA **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 2 2do. DE PRIMARIA **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 3 3ro. DE PRIMARIA **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 4 4to. DE PRIMARIA **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 5 5to. DE PRIMARIA **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 6 6to. DE PRIMARIA **SIGA A LA PROXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 7 1ro. BASICO . . . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 8 2do. BASICO . . . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 9 3ro. BASICO . . . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 10 4to. SECUNDARIA . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 11 5to. SECUNDARIA . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 12 6to. SECUNDARIA . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 13 UNIVERSIDAD INCOMPLETA . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 14 UNIVERSIDAD COMPLETA . . **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**
- 15 POS-GRADO **MARQUE 99 EN LA 111 Y PASE A LA PREGUNTA 112**

PARA LOS QUE TIENEN 6 AÑOS O MENOS, DE ESCOLARIDAD

111) Sabe usted leer y escribir?

- 1 SI
 - 2 NO
 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
 - 99 --->No aplica
-

112[Q3.] Cuál es su religión?

- 1 CATÓLICA **SIGA A LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA**
 - 2 CRISTIANA NO CATÓLICA **SIGA A LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA**
 - 3 OTRA NO CRISTIANA **SIGA A LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA**

 - 4 NINGUNA **PASE A LA PREGUNTA 115**
- MARQUE EL 99 EN LA PREGUNTA 113**
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE **PASE A LA PREGUNTA 115**
- MARQUE EL 99 EN LA PREGUNTA 113**
-

113[Q4.] Cada cuánto tiempo va usted a la iglesia?) **Va más de una vez por semana, una vez por semana, ó cada cuánto?**

- 1 DIARIAMENTE
 - 2 MAS DE UNA VEZ POR SEMANA
 - 3 SOLO UNA VEZ POR SEMANA
 - 4 DE VEZ EN CUANDO
 - 5 NUNCA

 - 88 --->NO RESPONDE
 - 99 --->No aplica
-

114 Quitada.

115[Q6.] Trabaja usted y recibe pago o ingresos en dinero por su trabajo?

- 1 SI **SIGA A LA PRÓXIMA PREGUNTA**
- 2 NO->ES AMA DE CASA **PASE A LA PREGUNTA 115-B**
Y ESCRIBA "99" EN LA CASILLAS "OCUP" Y 115-A
- 3 NO->ES ESTUDIANTE **IDEM**
- 4 NO->ESTA JUBILADO **IDEM**
- 5 NO->ESTA INCAPACITADO **IDEM**
- 6 NO->ESTA DESEMPLEADO **IDEM**
- 7 NO A SECAS, O CUALQUIER OTRA CAUSA **IDEM**
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE **IDEM**
-

OCUP)Cuál es la principal ocupación en la que usted obtiene sus ingresos?

ANOTE TEXTUALMENTE LA RESPUESTA EN LA CASILLA "OCUP"

NO RESPONDE ---> **ESCRIBA "88" EN LA CASILLA "OCUP"**

115A [Q8.] Cuánto gana, o recibe usted cada mes por su trabajo?

ANOTE LA RESPUESTA EN NUMEROS,
SIN DECIMALES.

SI LA RESPUESTA ES MENOR DE Q100, ESCRIBA "100"

NO RESPONDE ---> **ESCRIBA "88" EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS**

115B [Q9.] Entre todas las personas de este hogar, que trabajan, cuánto ganan o reciben por mes?

ANOTE LA RESPUESTA EN NUMEROS,
SIN DECIMALES.

SI LA RESPUESTA ES MENOR DE Q100, ESCRIBA "100"

NO SABE -----> **ESCRIBA "77" EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS**

NO RESPONDE ---> **ESCRIBA "88" EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS**

Finalmente, ¿podría decirme si en su casa tienen...

		MAS DE UNO	TIENE UNO	NO TIENE	N/R
116	[] Radio	1	2	3	88
117	[R1.] Televisor a color	1	2	3	88
118	[R2.] Televisor blanco y negro	1	2	3	88
119	[R3.] Refrigerador	1	2	3	88
120	[R6.] Lavadora	1	2	3	88
121	[R5.] Automóvil o tractor	1	2	3	88
122	[R4.] Teléfono	1	2	3	88
122a	[] Microonda	1	2	3	88
122b	[] Aspiradora	1	2	3	88
122c	[] Computadora	1	2	3	88
122d	[] Estereo	1	2	3	88

123 [R12.] Con qué cocinan (qué combustible se emplea para cocinar) en su casa?

- 1 LEÑA
- 2 CARBÓN
- 3 KEROSINA LIQUIDO
- 4 GAS PROPANO
- 5 ELECTRICIDAD
- 6 OTRO [NO ESPECIFIQUE]
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE

AGRADEZCA LA ENTREVISTA Y DESPÍDASE

=====

CONCLUIDA LA ENTREVISTA, ANOTE LO SIGUIENTE EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS:

124 [IDIOMA2.] La entrevista se realizó...

- 1 ...totalmente en español.
- 2 ...más en español que en lengua indígena.
- 3 ...mitad en español y mitad en lengua indígena.
- 4 ...más en lengua indígena que en español.
- 5 ...totalmente en lengua indígena.

125 [] Vestía el entrevistado traje indígena?

- 1 SI
- 2 NO

126 [R11.] Qué material pudo observar que predomina en las paredes de la casa?

- 1 CARTÓN/LAMINAS/OTRO SIMILAR
- 2 CAÑAS
- 3 BAJAREQUE
- 4 TABLAS
- 5 MADERA TRABAJADA
- 6 ADOBE
- 7 LADRILLO/BLOQUE/CONCRETO
- 8 OTRO **[NO ESPECIFIQUE]**

OBSERVE:) Tiene la vivienda...

**CODIFIQUE SU OBSERVACIÓN EN LA HOJA
DE RESPUESTAS**

		SI	NO	NO SE VIO
127	[R8.]...luz eléctrica?	1	2	3
128	[R9.]...agua entubada?	1	2	3

129 [R7.] Qué material pudo observar que predomina en el piso de la casa?

**CODIFIQUE SU OBSERVACIÓN EN LA HOJA
DE RESPUESTAS**

- 1 TIERRA
- 2 MADERA
- 3 CEMENTO
- 4 OTRO **[NO ESPECIFIQUE]**
- 5 NO SE VIO

130 [R10.] **OBSERVE:**) Qué clase de servicio sanitario tiene la casa?

**CODIFIQUE SU OBSERVACIÓN EN LA HOJA
DE RESPUESTAS**

- 1 NO TIENE
- 2 LETRINA
- 3 CUARTO(S) DE BAÑO
- 4 OTRO **[NO ESPECIFIQUE]**
- 5 NO SE VIO

131 [R13.]**OBSERVE:**)El local de habitación consiste en...

- 1 ...un solo cuarto?
- 2 ...más de un cuarto?
- 3 NO SE VIO

132CLASIFIQUE LA RESPUESTA DE LA CASILLA "OCUP", UBICANDOLA DENTRO DEL SIGUIENTE CÓDIGO:

- 1 EMPRESARIO GRANDE
- 2 EJECUTIVO DE EMPRESA
- 3 PROFESIONAL POR CUENTA PROPIA
- 4 MEDIANO O PEQUEÑO EMPRESARIO
- 5 EMPLEADO DE NIVEL PROFESIONAL
- 6 EMPLEADO DE NIVEL TÉCNICO
- 7 EMPLEADO DE NIVEL ASISTENTE
- 8 EDUCADOR UNIVERSITARIO
- 9 EDUCADOR DE NIVEL MEDIO
- 10 EDUCADOR DE PRIMARIA O PREPRIMARIA
- 11 OBRERO
- 12 TRABAJADOR AGRÍCOLA SIN TIERRA
- 13 DEPENDIENTE DE COMERCIO
- 14 OFICINISTA
- 15 PEQUEÑO AGRICULTOR (TIENE TIERRA)
- 16 OTRA _____ (ESPECIFICAR)
- 88 --->NO RESPONDE
- 99 --->No aplica

ANOTE LA HORA EN QUE TERMINO LA ENTREVISTA.

ANOTE LA DURACIÓN QUE TUVO LA ENTREVISTA.

PONGA LA FECHA Y FIRME LA DECLARACIÓN FINAL EN LA HOJA DE RESPUESTAS.