GUATEMALAN VALUES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

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Executive Summary

Study Design

This study describes the current state of democratic values in Guatemala, both those values that are the building blocks of a stable political order and those values and attitudes necessary to assure that the existing political order is a democratic one. The study, using a survey, seeks to determine the level of legitimization of democratic practice in Guatemala, and, beyond that, to determine trends in that process of legitimization.

The questionnaire designed for this study is based upon prior research in Central America, South America, the United States and Western Europe that has attempted to tap mass attitudes toward democracy. It focuses on key elements of a democratic political culture: support for a democratic system of government, support for democratic liberties, tolerance of dissent and acceptance of widespread political participation. The universe of the study is all Guatemalans 18 years of age and older located in both urban and rural areas throughout the country. Thus this is the first national study of political culture ever undertaken in Guatemala. The 1993 survey took place in May of 1993, just before the auto-golpe of then President Serrano. A follow-on survey is scheduled for 1995.

To place the data in an appropriate comparative context, the 1993 Guatemala Democratic Norms survey is compared with a set of surveys undertaken in the capital cities of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama in 1992 referred to as the University of Pittsburgh Survey, 1992. (That survey also covered San Pedro Sula in Honduras.)

Findings

We have examined the results of the two sets of national surveys, the University of Pittsburgh Survey, 1992 and the 1993 Guatemala Democratic Norms survey. We have used the former survey to provide a basis for cross-national comparisons in order to better understand the results of the latter survey.

System Support

The first important set of attitudes are those regarding system support, defined as the legitimacy accorded by respondents to the political system in general and to its component institutions. Attitudes covered under this rubric include the overall acceptance and support of the system of government, and of political institutions, such as the legislature, the courts, the military and the principal agents for the protection of citizens' rights. System support is the attitudinal underpinning of a stable political order, one able to manage conflict within the confines of its political institutions.
With regard to system support, Guatemala sat in the middle for most elements of system support when compared with other countries in Central America (1992 survey). Highest system support on an institution-by-institution basis was expressed for the human rights ombudsman, the lowest for congress and the political parties (1993 Survey). At a conceptual level, respondents expressed an almost universal patriotic pride as Guatemalans, but felt that their political system did not defend human rights.

Overall, Guatemalans demonstrate only a modest level of support for their system of government. The most important elements associated with system support are ethnic background, wealth and education of the respondents. K’iche’ speakers are the least likely to support the political system. The poorest and the most educated segments of the population are also likely to be the least supportive of the political system.

Support for Democratic Liberties

System support, that is to say, support for a stable political order, does not guarantee democracy. Loyalty to the system may very well serve to bind individuals to an authoritarian order as well as it can bind individuals to the support of a democratic order. Therefore, we looked at an additional set of values that focus on the acceptance of democracy within the context of a stable political order. Support for democracy can be couched in terms of belief in a system of widespread political participation (extensive political cultures) and/or support for the right of minority dissent (inclusive political cultures). Both elements are necessary for a full-fledged democratic order, one that assures the maximum liberty to participate in the making of rational and effective choices, and one that tolerates a full range of democratic dissent.

Guatemalans as a whole demonstrate low levels of support in comparison to elsewhere in Central America for democratic attitudes regarding both the right to participate and the right to dissent. They are more concerned about their individual range of political action than the rights of other Guatemalans. Indigenous peoples express higher support for democratic liberties than do ladinos, above all with respect to the right to dissent. K’iche’, among indigenous peoples, are more likely to express support for democratic liberties than other groups, according to data from the 1993 national sample. Looking at the data from a special sample of indigenous peoples, we found that both Mam and K’iche’ score higher on their support of democratic liberties than do other indigenous groups.

Education was the strongest predictor of higher levels of support of democratic liberties, suggesting that education may serve as a route for the formation of such beliefs.
The Interrelationship of System Support and Democratic Norms

The prospect for democratic development is a function of the relationship between support of the overall political system and the support for democratic participation and democratic liberties. We have examined each set of attitudes separately. Combining these attitudes by means of a typology, we can identify four different regime types: stable democracies, unstable democracies, oligarchic regimes and democratic breakdown regimes. This typology begins with the assumption that regimes being analyzed are all at least formally democratic, having, at a minimum, competitive regular elections with widespread political participation. As its history context demonstrates, Guatemala is a recent arrival to the category of a formal democratic order (the last eight years).

Using this typology, in comparative perspective (based on the 1992 survey), Guatemala is the Central American country with the lowest proportion of its citizens supporting stable democracy. Guatemala is the Central American country with the highest proportion of its citizens whose attitudes support "democratic breakdown". Guatemala is the country with the fewest individuals who support democracy overall (are in either the stable or unstable democracy cells).

In terms of a national sample (based on the 1993 data), the most important difference in the distribution of overall attitudes toward democracy is according to ethnicity. Indigenous peoples have twice as high a proportion of their respondents in the stable democratic cell as do ladinos. (K'iche' are to be found in the unstable democratic cell because of their low level of system support.) The largest concentration of Guatemalans are in the democratic breakdown cell, with the exception of the K'iche'.

One of the implications of this analysis is that Guatemala's democracy is set on an extremely weak attitudinal base. The events in May, 1993, suggest that mobilization in support of democracy is possible under certain circumstances. However, it is clear that the attitudinal base needs to be strengthened to make such crises less likely in the future.

Political Violence In Guatemala

Violent solutions to political disagreements represent the breakdown of democratic principles. Democracy, in essence, is a system to contain political violence and direct dispute resolution toward peaceful channels, within the context of the freedom to express and tolerate dissident viewpoints. Violence has been a hallmark of Guatemalan history. Repression has been a tool of authoritarian regimes throughout Guatemala's political history. Violence also has been a tool for political change. The future of Guatemalan democracy must include the ability to limit and control violence and to open up the possibility of peaceful expression of alternative viewpoints.
The vast majority of Guatemalans surveyed believe that they live in a society with a high level of political violence (1992 study). The three most commonly cited causes of political violence are inequality of land distribution, followed by the gap between rich and poor and lastly by the differences between indigenous peoples and ladinos. The greater one believes in the ability of the police, the Army and the courts to defend the right to life in Guatemala, the greater support for the system one has, but the lower the support for democratic liberties. Stated in other terms, faith in the police, the Army and the courts goes with support for the political system. A lack of faith in these institutions goes with support for basic democratic liberties. (These institutions are seen largely as agents of repression and not as agents to protect citizens’ rights.). Surprisingly high levels of Guatemalans (from 13-22 percent) support violent political measures, such as land seizures, building takeovers and coups. The greatest support level is for coups (22 percent). A large majority of those interviewed opposed the use of state violence as a means to stop political violence.

The conclusions reached regarding these data suggest two broad areas of concern. One area relates to the means of preserving public order. Reflecting historical patterns, the police, the military and the courts, which in a democracy represent forces of order that can assure the peaceful resolution of conflict, are viewed as agents of state violence and repression. The other area of concern is the degree to which Guatemalans accept the notion of the use of force, and above all the maximum force expressed in a coup, as appropriate means of effecting political change.

**Conventional Political Participation**

The forms of political participation most closely associated with stable democracy are such activities as voting, petitioning officials either informally or formally and organizing at the community level or through interest groups to promote a specific set of policies.

The Guatemalans in our study, whether they are in urban or rural areas, are most comfortable with participating at the community level. Formally, the current Constitution encourages that sort of participation. What may be needed is an expansion of the opportunities and the skills to undertake such participation.

**Support for Military or Civilian Rule**

We have examined the role of state violence in preserving an existing political order. We have also examined the overall possibilities for the maintenance or breakdown of the Guatemalan democratic order. Finally, we need to turn to the option, always present in Guatemalan history, between military and civilian control of the political order.

While the majority of the Guatemalans in our study do not support the idea of a coup, a significant proportion (over one third) do in fact support a military takeover. This represents a constant danger to the existing democratic order.
Summary

Using the 1992 survey to compare Guatemala City with the other Central American capital cities and the 1993 survey to probe a national sample of Guatemalans, we have described the key values that shape the vision that Guatemalans have of their political order and the possibility for its development as a democracy. We have noted that Guatemalans start out with an important handicap—the absence of the long tradition of democratic practice.

The results of this analysis are that Guatemalans demonstrate only a modest level of support for their system of government in comparison to other Central Americans. They demonstrate a low level of support for attitudes regarding both the right to participate and the right to dissent, basic liberties associated with a full-blown democratic order. Guatemalans, when compared with other Central Americans, are the least likely of all Central Americans to support a democratic political order. In short, the future of democracy in Guatemala rests on very weak attitudinal supports.

The brightest ray of hope in the data comes from two observations. Education is the best predictor of higher levels of support for democratic liberties. The groups that historically have benefited the least from the political system, the indigenous population, most notably the K’iche and the Mam, demonstrate considerable support for democratic liberties, for the right of all Guatemalans to participate and to enjoy the right of dissent.

Political development literature suggests that the expansion of access to the educational process may be a powerful tool for strengthening the democratic order. Clearly, our data support this notion.

Support for grassroots participation in Guatemala, particularly among indigenous peoples, is likely to expand support for democratic liberties. Thus, it is likely to expand the possibilities for democratic development. This will be more likely to be the case if expansion of such liberties goes hand in hand with access to and participation in local and national government, Then Guatemala may move closer to broad-based attitudinal support for democracy.
I. Introduction

Recent political events in Guatemala, the May, 1993 coup and the public reaction that restored democracy within a very short time, suggest the role that public opinion can play in maintaining a democratic order. As those events emphasized, an effective and sustainable democratic order needs to draw its strength from a significant portion of the population. Citizens need to be participant within the national society to the extent that they are aware of the existence of a nation-state, of the institutions of democratic government and of the need to tolerate dissent and to act within the democratic process willingly. Thus, a critical component of democratic development is the presence of an appropriate set of democratic values and attitudes.

This study describes the current state of democratic values in Guatemala, both those values that are the building blocks of a stable political order and those values and attitudes necessary to assure that the existing political order is a democratic one. In this introductory chapter, we shall describe the background to the study's development and the broad outline of the methodology used. We will also treat issues related to the reliability and validity of the data collected. Finally, we will explore the historical context of the study, examining in broad outline the march of relevant aspects of Guatemalan political development. Chapters II-VII describe the results of the analysis of the survey data collected, placing them in an appropriate comparative perspective. Chapter VIII contains the conclusions that can be drawn from the data.

Background

Guatemala over the past several years, like virtually all countries in Latin America, has been undergoing a process of political transformation moving toward popular sovereignty and responsible governance. In some countries, such as Chile, which emerged from a military dictatorship in 1990, the process has proceeded at a rapid pace, building on a past in which democratic rule had earlier established itself as an acceptable, even desirable, form of government. In effect, that return to democracy could build on the ample opportunity that existed for the development of what we might call a democratic political culture prior to the onset of authoritarian rule.

In Guatemala the democratic tradition is far thinner than it is in Chile. Prior to the present period, Guatemala enjoyed only a relatively brief period, from 1944-1954, of free and fair elections and responsive government. Hence, public experience with and memory of democracy is very limited. One cannot expect that democratic values, which have taken decades or even centuries to evolve in other countries, could be established full-blown in Guatemala after only a very few years of elected, civilian rule. Moreover, in Guatemala several military men have been elected to office and have proceeded to institute brutal, dictatorial regimes. Therefore, in the popular mind there is room for considerable confusion between democratic governments and elected governments.
Guatemala’s problems in establishing democracy are further complicated by deep racial cleavages that have long divided the country. Only in Guatemala among all the countries in Central America is fully one-third of the population composed of indigenous peoples, substantial proportions of whom reside in and around the nation’s capital and major urban centers.

Since the early days of contact between European and indigenous populations, Indian communities have been subject to continual repression, sometimes terminating in outright massacres. Many ladinos, in turn, believe that the indigenous population is not loyal to nor supportive of the dominant culture. Both indigenous peoples and ladinos are distrustful of each other.

A further difficulty limiting democratic political culture is related directly to the indigenous population itself. The basic elements of democracy, such as majority rule and minority rights, may be missing or limited among many of the Mayan populations. Indeed, although the anthropological evidence is incomplete and contradictory, there are numerous indications of authoritarian political practices among the indigenous populations of Guatemala. In short, winning the allegiance of this population to any political system, let alone a democratic one constructed by the ladino population, presents a major challenge.

But the problems are not limited to the above-mentioned factors. In the country as a whole, economic issues are likely to be far more important than questions of style of governance. Faced with overwhelming poverty, high infant mortality, high levels of illiteracy and other indicators of a bleak economic and social situation, any regime, irrespective of form, that can deliver to the population improvements in economic welfare is likely to win the support of that population.

Finally, one cannot ignore the military and the economic elites. Military men no doubt view civilian governments with much suspicion, fearing that their own privileged position in society could be threatened. Indeed, there is the added concern that civilian governments could seek to punish those in the military who have been accused of human rights violations. Economic elites fear an erosion of their own position, knowing that in terms of votes alone, they stand very little chance of resisting challenges to their economic privileges.

In Guatemala, then, it is not obvious that large sectors of the population, neither rich nor poor, Ladino or Indian, would hold any deep-seated allegiance to democratic norms. Yet, it is a reality that popular, free and fair elections are now regularly being held and that when called to support a democratic government during the recent coup attempt, a broad cross section of Guatemalans expressed themselves in favor of democracy.
The question at this juncture is to determine the level of legitimization of democratic practice in Guatemala, and, beyond that, to determine trends in that process of legitimization.

Prior Research

A major handicap in the study of support for a democratic political culture in Guatemala is the scarcity of baseline data. In fact, a rapid review of the literature reveals only a very limited set of instances in which any attempts were made prior to the past few years to do any serious public opinion research, particularly research that touched the opinions of those outside the capital city.¹

Normally, one could expect to consult public opinion survey data to see how attitudes have shifted over the years. But social science in Guatemala has, for three reasons, not developed that data base. First, social scientists there have long been a target of persecution by the military. Countless social scientists have been killed, while others have fled the country and now live in exile in Costa Rica, the United States, Mexico and elsewhere. Second, public opinion research involves asking questions, and asking questions for many years in Guatemala was a dangerous undertaking. As a result, social science tended toward the theoretical, since obtaining empirical data simply was too dangerous. Third, the social science community as a whole associated survey research with U.S.-style social science, an enterprise that was rejected because of a generally misplaced belief that a covert relationship existed between North American academics and the U.S. intelligence community.

The establishment of elected government has meant a rapid expansion in public opinion polling. The first studies were conducted in connection with the elections themselves. These studies made little or no attempt to measure underlying attitudes. There are other, more serious, surveys being conducted in Guatemala. Several studies focus on nutrition, demography, ethnolinguistics, etc. The only extensive study of democratic political culture of which we are aware is the one conducted by the University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project in March, 1992.

Hence, in a real sense, we are starting with an almost blank slate. The Pittsburgh project is useful for establishing the reliability of key questionnaire items and some parameters for urban areas but does not provide a solid basis upon which to draw national

¹One early example was a survey on attitudes toward political participation in San Antonio Sacatepéquez and Cobán in the early 1950s. This survey noted, as expected, important differences between ladinos and indigenous peoples regarding both knowledge and attitudes concerning politics. See, Kalman H. Silvert, The Conflict Society. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1961, pp.35-46.
conclusions because of its geographic and linguistic limitations. Thus, this project will establish needed baseline data that can be used to monitor the evolution of a civic culture of democracy in Guatemala.

How quickly might we expect that culture to change? There is no easy answer. Previous research has shown that much depends on national political developments. We know, for example, that values in Italy and Germany evolved rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s, as Ronald Inglehart has shown in his volume, *Culture Shift.* Seligson has shown, using data from Costa Rica, that once established, the legitimacy of a system does not rapidly erode and is quite resistant to failures in performance, such as those brought on by economic crises.

But we also know that the values that have developed in Guatemala have evolved over the centuries. It will require significant changes in the performance of the system in terms of respect for human rights and civil liberties, along with important improvements in the quality of life of the poor, for those changes to substantially affect attitudes. The establishment of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, along with 23 regional offices, is an important step in this direction. The growing sense of openness in the media is another. But it is not at all clear that these changes are being perceived in rural (especially indigenous) areas; indeed, it is not at all clear that conditions have improved in these areas. Therefore, a key element in the design of this study is to assure a national sample that adequately represents rural and, especially, indigenous populations. This requirement is reflected in the sample design as well as in items included in the instrument.

The Need for a National Sample

To meet the need to represent the full range of opinions and attitudes within Guatemala, nothing short of a national sample that reflects the views of all Guatemalans, rich and poor, urban and rural, Indian and Ladino, male and female, will do. A concern with a truly national sample is important because it fulfills a need and because it represents an important innovation in survey research within the country. It may be the case that there has never been a national sample of public opinion in Guatemala. The great majority of surveys in Guatemala are marketing surveys. Since rural Guatemalans earn little and consume less, they are not a high priority for marketing firms. Election studies similarly designed to test the "voter market" exclude many rural areas since voter turnout in those areas is often substantially lower than in urban areas. From the point of view of candidates who use the polls to guide their election strategies, the widely dispersed rural populations

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are too difficult to reach. Therefore, the cost involved in inclusion of rural Guatemala in all types of marketing studies is seen as not being justified by the benefits.

A further complexity that limits sample frames in Guatemala is that of the variety of languages spoken. According to the National Bilingual Education Program of the Ministry of Education, there are between 20 and 30 indigenous languages spoken in Guatemala, including two non-Mayan languages. Some 11 of the Mayan languages have distinct dialect variants.\(^4\) Studies have, of course, been conducted among the populations of many, if not all, of these languages, but the task of conducting a study that would incorporate them all has been daunting. In fact, those surveys that claim to be national in scope merely use a single survey instrument prepared in Spanish and claim to use bilingual interviewers who do on-the-spot translations.\(^5\) Since studies have shown that monolingual speakers of Mayan languages are far more likely to be female than male, these studies systematically exclude Indian females.

The concentration of large portions of the population into a relatively small number of indigenous languages, coupled with widespread bilingualism among these populations presents the opportunity for a reasonable compromise between a "perfect" but enormously expensive sample and a study that would exclude monolingual natives altogether.

The great bulk of the native population speak one of only four languages. The early 1980 figures show that of the 2.9 million Mayan language speakers, 2.3 million, or 79 percent are concentrated in these four languages: K'iche', 930,000; Mam, 644,000; Kaqchikel, 405,000; and Q'eqchi', 361,000.

A clear division point emerges after these four languages are taken into consideration, because the next most popular language, Q'anjob'al, is spoken only by 112,000 natives, and from there on down, the numbers drop rapidly. Hence, from the point of view of cost-effectiveness, it makes sense to attempt to include the speakers of the four major languages, knowing that even the next most popular language is spoken by only 1 percent of the population and that all remaining Mayan languages together comprise some 8 percent of the population.

Excluding these minority languages does not mean that 8 percent of the population is being excluded from the sample. In fact, a large proportion of speakers of all Mayan


\(^5\)Based on a conversation with the director of one major international polling organization.
languages are to at least some extent bilingual. For example, among the four major languages, only one, Q'eqchi', has a large proportion of entirely monolingual speakers. The bilingual education project found that 49.6 percent of the Q'eqchi' speakers it surveyed were monolingual. However, this is a gross overestimate of the total monolingualism among Q'eqchi' speakers because its data are based upon the location of bilingual schools, none of which were located in county seats (cabeceras cantonales). The schools were all located in villages (aldeas). Bilingualism is extremely common among those in urban and semi-urban environments in Guatemala. Hence, a survey of all Q'eqchi' speakers would unquestionably produce a far higher proportion of bilingual speakers, although there are no data that would allow us to establish precise figures.

The other three major Mayan languages were found to have no more than 13 percent monolingual speakers. Again, these data are based on village studies, and, therefore, the bilingual proportion of the total Mayan language population is much higher. Furthermore, the rapid spread of radio and television throughout Guatemala, coupled with the continued decline of the relative size of the Indian population, has, no doubt, further accelerated the process of bilingualism in recent years.

It is safe to speculate that monolingualism among the speakers of the minority languages could be no higher than it is among the Q'eqchi' (i.e., less than half of all speakers) and probably is a lot lower. The speakers of these minority languages live in relatively small and compact regions according to the linguistic maps prepared by the Bilingual Education program and may well have greater contact with Spanish speakers. For example, the speakers of Xinka, Poqomam, Chorti', Itza and Mopan are completely surrounded by speakers of Spanish and must, no doubt, deal with Spanish speakers on a regular basis. Hence, at most, the exclusion of these minority languages may result in the exclusion of some 4 percent of the population. The actual percentages will emerge from the sample-design procedures described below.

To summarize, cost-benefit analysis suggests that the preparation of the questionnaire in Spanish plus the four major Mayan languages enumerated above would allow the sample to include not less than 96 percent of the population and, in all likelihood, closer to 98 or 99 percent. This was the procedure followed in the development of the study's instruments. Other issues related to sample design and related considerations, including the weighting of the sample, are presented in appendices to this report.

**Questionnaire Design**

The questionnaire designed for this study is based upon prior research in Central America, South America, the United States and Western Europe that has attempted to tap mass attitudes toward democracy. The immediate antecedent of this study was a comprehensive examination of attitudes in each of the five Central American countries plus Panama, stimulated by the onset of democracy in these countries. The study, referred to
as the University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project, received support from the Mellon Foundation, the Tinker Foundation and the North-South Center. The project was conducted in collaboration with research institutes and universities throughout Central America as well as colleagues in several U.S. universities.

The Guatemalan component of this six-country survey was conducted in March, 1992, with the field work the responsibility of Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES). That survey was urban in nature since resource limitations prevented it from being extended to rural areas in which Mayan language translations would have been needed. The total sample size was 904.

Initial analysis of the Guatemalan data confirmed that, at least insofar as urban populations are concerned, the questionnaire utilized was largely successful. However, it also became clear that a number of items needed refinement and some were best dropped. In addition, with the involvement of graduate students at the University of Pittsburgh, new items (some used in Uruguay) were included to get a better measure of respondent support for democratic versus authoritarian rule. Finally, USAID's PARTICIPA project in Chile had also developed a questionnaire that included some items that appeared to be good measures of attitudes toward the judiciary, an institution of considerable interest to USAID/Guatemala.6

The instrument used in this survey was refined during April and May, 1992, with the collaboration of University of Pittsburgh graduate students. Development Associates in collaboration with ASIES set up a series of focus groups of native speakers of the four major Mayan languages that translated and tested the viability of the questionnaire in those four languages. The experiment resulted in the development of four indigenous language instruments. A copy of the Spanish language version of the instrument is included as an appendix.

Data Reliability

A major concern in all self-report data is the reliability of the data. Reliability refers to the degree that the data represent a consistent and accurate picture of the responses of those interviewed to the questions asked. The reliability of this survey was enhanced by a series of procedures: training of interviewers and their supervisors, and careful supervision of interviewers in the field assured that agreed upon procedures were followed; reviewing all responses to check for internal consistency; and comparing response patterns for appropriate subsamples (Spanish speaking urban residents) to similar responses in the March, 1992, University of Pittsburgh/ASIES survey to check for consistency over time.

A significant concern in the conduct of this survey or any other public opinion survey is its timing. Although certainly not by design, the survey took place a week before the period of the events that constituted the auto-golpe by President Serrano, his subsequent removal from office and replacement by Ramiro de León Carpio. However, it is hard to imagine that, given the survey instrument's focus on basic attitudes and values, this timing will affect the quality of most of the answers received. In point of fact, comparisons between the 1993 and the 1992 survey display a certain consistency of patterns that suggests the fundamental nature of the attitudinal measures being used.

A key question that we shall return to in the conclusion, a question of significant interest in the design of development programs, is how and through what means the values and attitudes presented can be altered.

**Historical Antecedents of Guatemalan Democracy**

To understand the current Guatemalan political culture, we need to remember that Guatemala lacks a democratic tradition.

The seeds of democratic change in Guatemala can be found in the so-called "October Revolution" in 1944. That revolution resulted in the emergence of a democratically oriented government, legitimated by a majority of those who were politically participant in the effective Guatemalan nation [i.e. the majority of ladinos located in Guatemala City and other major urban areas and those in control of rural areas (the land owning families)]. This period of democratic development lasted from 1944-1954, through the presidencies of Juan José Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz. This brief experiment with a formal, democratic order ended with a coup in 1954.

The ease with which the coup succeeded in destroying a democratically elected order was ample evidence of the weakness of the Guatemalan commitment to democracy. It was also a demonstration of the limited extent of the effective nation, the body politic, of Guatemala—only a very small proportion of the total population was politically involved in support for the Arbenz government or support for the counter-revolution. The rest were essentially silent because they were ladinos located in rural areas who had little real participation in politics or were indigenous peoples who were not, at the same time, included with the body politic or saw themselves as part of the Guatemalan nation. The expansion of the effective nation as evident by the political culture of present day Guatemalans is an important contribution to the probability of democracy in Guatemala, a discussion we shall return to in the conclusions.

**Recent Political Development**

After almost thirty years of authoritarian government, formal electoral democracy returned to the Guatemalan political scene in the mid-1980s. Elections were held in
December, 1985 which resulted in the election of the Christian Democrat, Vinicio Cerezo. The assumption of power of a civilian did not resolve the problems of democratic development in Guatemala. Previous military governments had left behind a legacy of a society divided, fearful, and without a tradition of democratic practice which would have facilitated an opening toward democracy. Those governments had been unwilling to reform the rigid social and economic structure of the country, a social and economic structure marked by a high level of inequality.

Although formal control had been passed to a civilian government, the military still retained a great deal of maneuvering room with respect to the civilian government. However, the opening toward democracy generated expectations in the populace with respect to the end of repression, violations of human rights and restoration of social tranquility. In addition, there was a hope that the arrival of a civilian government would bring an end to corruption, and the beginning of an economic resurgence which would result in a broad based improvement of living standards.

The Cerezo administration (1986-1991) faced various attacks aimed at destabilizing the government and various attempted coup d’etats. Many political commentators felt that the greatest achievement of the government was its ability to survive until the end of its term. Nevertheless, the government suffered a considerable erosion of support in the last years of the presidential term. Critical decisions were postponed because of their political cost. The result was a lack of concrete achievements. At the end of the presidential term, the government was widely viewed as corrupt and inefficient in its management of public spending.

On a more positive note, Cerezo was credited with fostering a foreign policy in Central America that contributed to the resolution of conflicts in the region. To this can be added the achievement of passing the mandate of government onto another democratically elected administration in January of 1991, that of Jorge Serrano.

The new government came to power with certain limitations. The government's political party was weak, without much in the way of popular support and without a clearly defined political program. Congress was dominated by opposition parties. In its favor, the government was received with a far lower level of expectations than had been the case with the previous administration.

The first year of Serrano's government was characterized by relative stability, in part a result of the breathing space associated with a new administration. Various accommodations had to be made. Serrano was obliged to share power with a Congress dominated by the opposition. The resultant process of negotiation often reflected narrow party interests rather than a broad concern for national goals. In positive terms, the government was able to achieve a stabilization of the national economy although at the cost of a deterioration of the living standards of a large portion of the population. Thus, the
government also faced demands of groups seeking to redress the structural imbalances in the system, demands it did not meet. In addition, the government was incapable of ending the continuing violations of human rights, although some positive changes took place.

Towards the end of 1991, the president's political problems began to increase. Serrano was not able to hold on to the coalition that had won him victory in the second round of the presidential election. He began to be accused by a portion of the media of being excessively authoritarian in his actions. He failed to reach an understanding with the labor unions about a "Social Pact". The government made little headway, despite its promises, in combating corruption and punishing ex-officials involved in corruption. Rumors of corruption began to surface.

Things worsened in 1992. Serrano became more autocratic, more hostile to and more in conflict with the press. Accusations of corruption increased. A climate of political tension existed between the president and various groups intent on reducing corruption, increasing political accountability and supporting the dialogue with the guerrillas which had reached a stalemate. In addition, during the course of the year, controversies arose over the actions and decisions of both the Court of Constitutionality and the Public Ministry as well as a result of alliances formed between the President and the Congress.

In general terms, positions hardened, both those of the president and the Army, as was evident in the aggressive attitudes of the military and the president towards their critics. These included fights both with the Human Rights Ombudsman and ex-officials of government.

**The Political Environment of the Study**

Confrontations continued in 1993. By May, 1993, the country showed signs of being ungovernable, viewed from the perspective of the questionable legitimacy of its institutions, and the loss of political support for the government. It was evident that the process of democratization was not on track. The wear and tear on figures of authority was affecting the democratic institutions themselves,. Popular discontent was growing. During the first two weeks of May, tensions intensified.

Rooted in student dissent, the situation deteriorated. Showing opposition to open dialogue, the government responded to the protests by marshalling forces, including the army, to the streets.

Going beyond the weaknesses and mistakes of the Serrano Government, it is important to point out that other elements in Guatemalan society were also contributing to the deterioration of the democratic process. The public witnessed the politicization of the Public Ministry, the politicization of the election of the Supreme Court in the Congress and the continued violation of human rights. That caused all three branches of government, the
executive, legislative and the judiciary, to be accused of acting outside the bounds of their legitimate authority.

Besides what was happening to the three powers of the State, the country's political parties were also suffering damage. It was obvious that their function as intermediaries between social needs and the government had broken down. It was also true that their actions in Congress contributed to the deterioration of their public image.

The factionalization of Guatemalan society probably allowed Serrano more leeway in his actions. The prevailing sectarianism in Guatemala, as evidenced above all by a tangible lack of desire for dialogue and negotiation contributed to the lack of governability. That lack of governability was, at the time this study was conducted, probably the most significant characteristic of the Guatemalan political environment.

The Coup and the Return to Democracy

On May 25, 1993, President Serrano Elias announced to the country his decision to temporarily suspend various articles of the Constitution of the Republic, dissolve Congress and the Supreme Court, replace the members of the Court of Constitutionality, the Attorney General of the Nation and suspend various constitutional guarantees. As a result of this auto-coup, Guatemala between May 25 and June 5 went through one of the most important political phenomena in its history. Jorge Serrano and his Vice President, Gustavo Espina, were removed from their offices thanks to an outcry of public opinion focussed in the capital, that made possible the election of Ramiro de Leon Carpio, then Human Rights Ombudsman, as the new president.

The institutional crisis of May-June 1993 and the public reaction to the "auto-golpe" was visible evidence of a shift, at least in the capital, of popular support for the democratic order. Across a broad spectrum of economic and political interests, important groups and prominent individuals demonstrated their rejection of the seizure of power by Serrano and his supporters. The result was the return of power to democratic institutions. The events of this period underscored the respect that existed for organizations such as the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the Supreme Electoral Tribune as well as the relatively low level of respect for many of the political parties and the Congress. The role played by the Army demonstrated that it could no longer be considered a single bloc. While early on, the armed forces showed support for the auto-golpe, fissures within the upper ranks of the military limited the role that it could play in determining the outcome.
In Conclusion

Historically, except for two brief periods, 1944-1954 and 1984 to the present, Guatemala's political history has been one of personalistic, militaristic authoritarianism. In the period from 1954 until 1984, the military dominated politics. Repression was the tool used to control dissent and manage the political order. Change resulted from a use of force. The past eight years of democratic development have been a process of moving slowly toward the construction of democratic institutions and a democratic consensus. Human rights violations remain a concern, but at the very least there is an institutional presence to express that concern. A variety of political parties exist, as does a Congress that serves as a forum of expression for those parties. However, the party structure and the Congress are weak, with a reputation for corruption. The one critical test of democratic commitment in the past eight years, the reaction to the auto-golpe of May, 1993, demonstrates that at least at the level of the historically active political arena, the capital city, there is a strong sentiment and a willingness to defend the existing democratic order, however imperfect.

It is the task of this study to relate these historical manifestations to the underlying attitudes and orientations of a national sample of Guatemalans with a view towards better understanding the terms of democratic development in Guatemala. The balance of this work attempts to do just that.

As indicated above, the following chapters present the results of the survey and the conclusions that can be drawn from the data we have gathered.
II. System Support

The Logic of the Comparisons

There are three central goals of this analysis of public opinion data in Guatemala. First, we want to examine the levels of support for democracy for the country as a whole. Second, we want to compare important subsets of the population (Indian versus ladino, women versus men, young versus old, etc.). Third, we want to detect changes in attitudes, both for the nation as a whole and for relevant subgroups. The third goal will form the basis for the second (and possible subsequent) studies. As previously noted, a follow-up study is planned for 1995, at which time comparisons will be made with the 1993 data.

The second goal will comprise the bulk of the analysis of this report, as we attempt to compare and contrast a variety of key subgroups of the Guatemalan population.

The first goal, that of examining the levels of support for democracy for Guatemala as a whole, requires further explanation. In order to make some statement about the level of democracy, it is necessary to compare Guatemala against some standard. We could use the United States as that standard, but we think that would be inappropriate. After all, Guatemala is a small, poor, nation inside the Latin American political tradition that has only recently inaugurated democracy whereas the U.S. is a large, rich, nation within a distinct Anglo-Saxon political tradition with one of the longest democratic heritages of any nation. It may well be that ultimately Guatemalan views and North American views will converge on a common point, but it is equally likely that the distinctiveness of Guatemala’s own traditions and history will result in permanent differences between the two countries over the long term.¹

We feel that a much more appropriate standard for comparison are the other Spanish speaking countries of Central America: Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. While important differences in the details of their history and cultural background cannot be ignored,² there is far more that binds these countries together than

¹José Medina Echavarría commented on the nature of liberalism in Latin America in the late 19th and 20th centuries by pointing to the historical differences between the Latin (French and Spanish) emphasis on the rights of the individual, especially of the aristocracy, and the Anglo-Saxon concerns that focused on increasing participation by all classes in the democratic process. This was an important difference in the character of democratic development in Latin America that only recently has began to work itself out. See, Jose Medina Echavarría, Consideraciones Sociologios sobre el desarrollo economico. Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1964; "Aspectos Sociales del desarrollo economico." Santiago: Editorial Universitario, 1973; Discurso sobre politico y planeacion. Siglo XXI: Mexico, 1972.

²Héctor Pérez-Brignoli, A Brief History of Central America. Berkeley: University of
there is that sets them apart. The availability of a data set in which identical questions were asked to over 4,000 urban residents in these countries in 1991-92 allows us to make these comparisons. The data come from the University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project.³ The project received support from several sources.⁴

The 1993 study of public opinion in Guatemala, hereafter known as the 1993 Guatemalan democracy study, had to differ in a variety of ways from the prior survey work. Specifically, the language of the questionnaire had to be simplified and the response formats reduced in complexity. Two factors required those changes. First, the Guatemalan sample was the first other than the Costa Rican that was to be national in nature. As a result significant numbers of rural and poorly educated respondents were to be included in the sample. Second, the presence of significant numbers of bilingual Indians in the Guatemalan sample added a complexity to the project that encouraged us to simplify the questionnaire as much as possible.

³The sample sizes varied for each country (Guatemala, 904; El Salvador, 910; Honduras, 566; Nicaragua, 704; Costa Rica, 597; Panama, 500). These differences partly reflect the different sizes of the populations studied but are mainly the product of differences in the resources available to the study team in each country. Country sample designs were of area probability design. In each country, the most recent population census data were used to stratify the urban areas into lower, middle and upper socioeconomic status (SES). The sample size assigned to each stratum was based upon these SES estimates. Within each stratum, census maps were used to select, at random, an appropriate number of political subdivisions (e.g., districts) and, within each subdivision, the census maps were used to select an appropriate number of segments from which to draw the interviews.

⁴That project, conceived in 1989, was designed to tap the opinion of Central Americans on a variety of issues. The study received funding support from the Andrew Mellon Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, Inc., the Howard Heinz Endowment, the University of Pittsburgh Central Research Small Grant Fund and the Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos (IDELA). The collaborating institutions in Central America were: Guatemala--Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales (ASIES); El Salvador--Centro de Investigación y Acción Social (CINAS) and the Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos (IDELA); Honduras--Centro de Estudio y Promoción del Desarrollo (CEPROD) and the Centro de Documentación de Honduras (CEDOH); Nicaragua--Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) and the Escuela de Sociología, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA); Costa Rica--Universidad de Costa Rica; Panamá--Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos "Justo Arosemena" (CELA). Collaborating doctoral students in political science at the University of Pittsburgh were Ricardo Córdova (El Salvador), Annabelle Conroy (Honduras), Orlando Pérez (Panama) and Andrew Stein (Nicaragua).
The major change in the questionnaire for those items that were repeated from the University of Pittsburgh study of 1991-92 was elimination of seven- and ten-point response scales and their replacement with three- and four-point response formats. For example, if the original item requested that the respondent give his/her opinion with reference to a scale that ranged from a low of one, indicating strong disagreement to a high of ten indicating strong agreement, the revised items used in the 1993 Guatemalan democracy study, might have had the respondent select from four options, labeled "strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree."5

In light of these changes in the 1993 survey, we decided to make all comparative references to the other Central American countries by using the 1992 Guatemalan survey, which did use wording and coding identical to the other five countries included in the study. Since the six-nation study was urban, limited in most cases to the capital city of the nation, we limit our comparisons to the Guatemala City portion of the sample and compare it to the other capital cities of Central America. Only in the case of Honduras, in which Tegucigalpa is considered the political capital and San Pedro Sula the economic capital, did we compare more than one city in a nation with Guatemala City.

The task of comparison, then, becomes a two-stage process. First, we will compare the opinions of the residents of Guatemala City to the other capital cities of Central America. We then compare various subsets of the Guatemalan population, using Guatemala City as the point of comparison. In that way, should we detect higher or lower values on any given variable than we found in Guatemala City, we will also know how these values compare to the other countries in the region.

**The Scoring Methodology**

The original data set utilized a number of different measuring devices to tap respondent opinion. In some cases a 7-point scale was utilized, in others 10 points were used and in still others, 4- and 5-point scales. Part of the reason for this variation had to do with the nature of question being asked, while part had to do with comparability with similar items asked in prior studies of opinion in Central America.

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5It is possible to adjust the coding formats of one or the other survey to make them *numerically* equivalent, but doing so does not make them qualitatively equivalent. For example, we found that using the seven-point format on the item "To what degree are you proud of the Guatemalan system of government" produced responses that averaged around 4, or the middle-point on the scale. When we changed the format in the 1993 survey to read "Do you feel very proud, somewhat proud or not at all proud of being Guatemalan" 85 percent said "very proud." Of course, in this case, we changed both the coding format of the item as well as the content (substituting pride in the government for pride in being a Guatemalan).
We felt it was important not to confuse the reader with a different scoring method for each set of items in the study. Moreover, when comparisons are made using multiple regression analysis, the use of a single metric for all items allows us to compare the relative contribution of each item to the equation both within Guatemala and among the six countries in the region without having to resort to the complexity of standard scores. As a result, we opted to convert all items to a common 0-100 scale, with 0 always representing the low end of the continuum and 100 the high end.6 We followed this same procedure when we created summated scales that combined two or more items in the study.

System Support in Comparative Perspective

In Guatemala, we are concerned with the promotion of a system that is both democratic and stable. System stability has long been thought to be directly linked to popular perceptions of the legitimacy of the system. Illegitimate systems, ones that do not have the support of the populace, can only endure over the long haul through the use of repression. When repression no longer can be used effectively, or if opposition elements are willing to risk even extremely grave sanctions, illegitimate regimes will eventually fall. Hence, the failure of the Tiananmen Square protestors to bring about changes in the Chinese system can be attributed to either of two causes: (1) the level of coercion that state was willing to apply exceeded the willingness of the protestors and their supporters to bear it, or (2) system legitimacy was greater among the mass public than it appeared from observing the protestors alone. In contrast, the rapid demise of the communist governments of Eastern Europe suggest rather strongly that once repressive forces are weakened (in this case by the removal of the threat of Soviet intervention on behalf of those governments), illegitimate regimes will quickly crumble.

But what of democratic systems? Since almost all of Latin America is today democratic (in structure at least), we want to know what forces have, in the past, been responsible for their downfall? In most cases, military coups have been the main actors responsible. Certainly, this has been the case in the vast majority of democratic breakdowns in Latin America. Democratic systems provide a wide variety of mechanisms for the popular expression of discontent and numerous obstacles to the widespread use of official repression. Hence, even when citizens are discontented with government performance, they tend to wait until the next election to seek a change in incumbents. But there are some instances in which popular sentiment seems to have been at least partly responsible for democratic breakdowns. The best known case is the demise of the Weimar Republic, where the voters made their choice. In Latin America, it would be easy

6The arithmetic conversion of scales was performed by subtracting 1 from each item and then dividing by one less than the total number of points in the original scale and, finally, multiplying the result by 100. For example, a scale that ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 7 would first be reduced by subtracting 1 from each score, giving a range of 0-6. After dividing by 6, the lowest score would remain a 0, but the highest would be 1. Multiplying by 100 would make the maximum equivalent to 100.
to suggest that the Fujimori "auto-golpe," which extinguished democratic rule in Peru in 1992, emerged out of a popular revulsion over the inability of the democratic system to deal effectively with Sendero Luminoso terrorism. According to several reports, President Alberto K. Fujimori remains among the most popular heads of state in all of Latin America. Similarly, the repeated attempts to overthrow the elected government of Venezuela have been supported, according to the polls, by the vast majority of its citizens. But in Guatemala, the effort in 1993 to overthrow democracy via an "auto-golpe" resulted in the complete failure of the attempt. Our survey of democratic norms was conducted on the eve of that failed effort.

Hence, while authoritarian regimes survive on the basis of some combination of legitimacy and repression, democracies tend to rely primarily on legitimacy alone. According to Lipset's classical work, systems that are legitimate survive even in the face of difficult times. By the mid 1980s, Guatemala and the other five countries were regularly holding free and fair elections. The survival of these democracies, each of which are facing very difficult economic times, depends upon continued popular support. One need only think of the ballot box ouster in 1990 of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua to see how critical such support can be. In that case, the inability of the system to cope effectively with the severe economic crises and the protracted Contra war caused voters to turn against the system.

Until recently, efforts to measure legitimacy have been hampered by reliance on the trust-in-government scale devised by the University of Michigan. That scale, it has turned out, depended too heavily on a measurement of dissatisfaction with the performance of incumbents rather than of generalized dissatisfaction with the system of government. The

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8 This is not to say that democracies do not use coercion but that its use is very limited.

9 Participation by leftist parties was highly restricted in El Salvador up until the peace accords implemented in 1992-93. In Guatemala, participation has been constrained historically by extra-legal means.

10 See Vanessa Castro and Gary Prevost, The 1990 Elections in Nicaragua and their Aftermath. Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992. Since the ouster of the Sandinistas involved a dramatic shift in the entire system of government, from socialist to capitalist, from Soviet/Cuba alignment to realignment with the U.S., it is appropriate to think of this election as having changed the system rather than merely the personnel of government.

development of the political-support alienation scale--- now tested in studies of Germany, Israel, the United States, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru and elsewhere---has provided a much more powerful analytical tool for measuring legitimacy.\textsuperscript{12} The scale has been shown to be reliable and valid. It is based upon a distinction made by Easton, relying upon Parsons. That defines legitimacy in terms of system support (diffuse support) vs. specific support (support for incumbents).\textsuperscript{13}

**General System Support**

Relying on the 1992 six-nation survey, we begin this exploration of comparative levels of system support by looking first at the most general of all of the items in the series: pride. Respondents were asked, "To what extent do you feel proud to live under the political system of Guatemala?" (or the other countries of the region). Figure II-1 shows the results. As we can see, with the major exception of Costa Rica, levels of pride in Central America are nearly identical. Only Costa Rica, with the longest democratic tradition and the highest standard of living of any of the countries in Central America, stands out from the other countries, with a statistically significant (< .001) difference. Guatemala does not appear much different from the remainder of her neighbors.


The second general item in this series on system support asked, “To what extent should one support the Guatemalan system of government?” As is seen in Figure II-2, a pattern very similar to that developed on the pride item emerges; once again Costa Rica stands out from the other countries, with citizen expressing much higher (sig. < .001) levels of pride than in the other countries. Guatemala's levels of support among its capital city residents is statistically indistinguishable from the samples from Honduras, El Salvador and Panama. Only Nicaraguans express a bit more support that do the other nations.
The third general measure of system support is given by the responses to the question, "To what extent do you have respect for the political institutions of Guatemala?" In contrast to the "pride" and "support" items, this measure shows statistically significant differences among the countries (sig. < .001). As shown in Figure II-3, Costa Rica still leads the other countries in the region, but this time Nicaragua is not far behind. Somewhat surprisingly, Hondurans have the lowest level of respect for their political institutions. Guatemala City residents appear, once again, to be neither particularly high nor particularly low in this system support measure.
The fourth and final general indicator of system support pertains to protection of basic rights: "To what extent do you think that the basic rights of citizens are well protected by the Guatemalan political system." Interviewers reported that many respondents interpreted that question as referring to human rights, a concept very much in mind when the question was formulated. When the question was asked again in Guatemala in 1993, we changed its wording so that it referred directly to human rights, in contrast to "basic rights" in the 1992 six-nation study. Figure II-4 contains the results of the 1992 study. Once again Guatemala is found in the middle of the pack, with Costa Rica at the high end and Honduras, once again surprisingly, at the low end. These findings for Honduras are troubling and reflect a picture different from that given in many media accounts of the country. But since this report focuses on Guatemala, we will leave it to others to examine the implications for these findings for Honduras.
Support for Specific Institutions

We now move on to examine a series of specific institutions that are crucial for the functioning of any democracy: the courts, the legislature and the Electoral Tribunal. We start with the courts, which throughout Central America have the lowest support rating of any of those three institutions, the six-country average being 42 on our scale of 0-100. The comparative results are shown in Figure II-5. The question posed to 4,000 Central American respondents was: "To what degree do the courts in country (e.g. Guatemala) guarantee a fair trial?" It is in El Salvador, not surprisingly, where the courts have the lowest level of support. The 12 years of civil war in that country and the inability of the court system to prosecute the most horrendous violation of human rights apparently has had its impact on citizen confidence in the judiciary. Panama, too, with the Noriega dictatorship fresh in its mind, has citizens with little confidence in the judiciary. In Guatemala, the courts have a somewhat higher standing among the public, with the strongest support found in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Honduras, which had done so poorly in other respects, apparently has a court system that is more widely trusted by its citizens than are some of its other institutions.
The legislatures of Central America have long been subservient to the executive branch. During the long years of dictatorial rule, legislatures either did not function at all or were virtually powerless. Nonetheless, they have a somewhat higher rating than do the courts, with an average of 46 on our scale of 0-100. (Excluded from the rating we did not ask this question was Costa Rica, for which comparable data were not collected). As can be seen in Figure II-6, the legislature of Nicaragua has the highest level of support, followed by El Salvador and Panama. At the bottom of the list, tying for last, are Guatemala and Honduras. The differences between Nicaragua and El Salvador, on the one hand, and the other countries on the other, are statistically significant (< .001).
The final democratic institution to be examined is that of the electoral tribunal. Throughout Central America, elections are supervised by such tribunals, although the specific responsibilities of each tribunal varies from country to country. In every case, they are the primary institutions charged with the responsibility of insuring the integrity of voting and the vote count, and hence play a key role in the democratic process. The question asked was: "To what degree do you trust the Supreme Electoral Tribunal?" For Central America as a whole, trust in this body was higher than it was for any other institution studied. This question was not asked in Costa Rica. As is shown in Figure II-7 below, confidence in the tribunal in Guatemala is higher than it is for any country except Nicaragua, although the gap between Guatemala and Nicaragua is quite large.

![Trust in the Legislature: Six-Nation Comparison](image)

Source: University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project, 1992

Figure II-6
Support for the Military

The role of the military in politics seems to be receding throughout Central America. However, as recent participation in uprisings in both Guatemala and Nicaragua have shown, as an institution, the military still plays a critical role. To measure support for the military as an institution, this question was asked: "To what extent do you have trust in the Armed Forces?" Costa Rica has no army, and we did not ask this question there. The results are presented in Figure II-8. Hondurans have very low trust in their military, whereas Guatemalans, Salvadorans and Nicaraguans have significantly more trust.
Levels of System Support Within Guatemala

Having examined eight distinct indicators of system support in comparative perspective, we now turn to a comparison of various subsets of the Guatemalan population. To do this, we need to utilize the 1993 Guatemalan democracy study since it is the only national probability sample of the entire Guatemalan population.

The overall picture is presented in Figure II-9. There is a clear hierarchy of support for the different institutions in Guatemala. The greatest support is found on the "pride" item, but it should be noted that this item is different from the one utilized in the other Central American countries or the one used in the 1992 Guatemalan survey. In this application of the survey, we were asking not about pride in the political system but pride in "being Guatemalan." In many ways, it is a measure of nationalism, and it is clear from the overwhelmingly positive responses, that Guatemalans are quite proud of their country. Support for the political system, not surprisingly, is lower. Even so, one component of that
system, the Human Rights Ombudsman, stands out as having the highest level of support of any of the remaining items in the study. It is of considerable note, of course, that within days of the administration of this questionnaire, the Human Rights Ombudsman, Ramiro de León Carpio, was selected by the Congress of Guatemala to assume the presidential sash after the failed "auto golpe" of President Jorge Serrano on May 25, 1993.

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal, courts and public offices have a surprisingly high level of support. Lower support was expressed for the Army, the Congress and respect for human rights. At the very bottom, however, were the political parties, with support at extremely low levels. These attitudes may well reflect both an appraisal of the political situation and a political preference. The Guatemalan government's lack of respect for human rights has been well documented. Thus, it is not surprising that few consider basic rights protected. Support for both the Electoral Tribunal and the Human Rights Ombudsman may represent the opposite direction—a hope that these two institutions and their leaders (now the two top executives of the country) may increase basic rights.

Low levels of support for the Congress and political parties may also go hand in hand—reflecting the weakness of both institutions and the high level of personalism associated with Guatemalan politics. It is worth noting that three institutions that came into being as a result of the 1985 Constitution were central in restoring democracy after the Serrano coup. They are the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Human Rights Ombudsman. All have a reputation for being impartial and above partisan politics.
It would be possible to continue to conduct this examination on a variable-by-variable basis, commenting on, for example, support for the legislature vs. support for the courts. We believe, however, that it would be more appropriate at this point in the analysis to concern ourselves with the overall concept of system support so as not to lose sight of the "forest because of the trees" in the analysis.

In order to analyze the single concept of system support, we first examined the relationship of each of the variables analyzed above to see if they relate to each other in a systematic way and therefore can be formally considered to form part of a single dimension called "system support." Since our focus is on democratic institutions, we exclude from this list of variables the one question on support for the Army. The item measuring "support for the political system" was excluded from the 1993 survey. That left us with six items. We found, however, that the item measuring pride, which was reworded for the 1993 administration to focus on pride of being a Guatemalan rather than pride in the political system, did not provide sufficient discrimination among the respondents to be included here.14 In the 1993 administration of the scale, we added a new item, "trust in the political

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14 When we included the "pride" item, in which most respondents said that they were
parties." We found that we could form a reliable scale with these six items: courts, Congress, Electoral Tribunal, public offices, human rights and political parties. We summed these six items into an overall scale that ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 100. The overall mean for the entire sample was 40 on this scale.

System Support, Age and Gender

We first explore the relationship between system support and two basic demographic variables, age and gender. There are numerous theories in the social sciences that suggest that these two variables can be very important in determining attitudes. In Guatemala, however, system support is not a function of either. We did find that males had a somewhat higher level of system support than females (41 vs. 39), but the difference was not statistically significant. Age showed no significant linear relationship to system support.

System Support and Education

Education has been viewed as a central mechanism for the socialization of populations in democratic norms. Less is known about the relationship between education and system support, but expectations are that increased education should be associated with higher system support. Such a relationship is found in Panama and Costa Rica. In Guatemala, however, the reverse is the case: those with lower education have higher system support (sig. < .001). As can be seen in Figure II-10, system support peaks among those with one to three years of education, and then declines steadily thereafter. The lowest level of support is found among those with the highest level of education.

"very proud," reliability dropped to .75. For that reason, and the limited variance, we excluded the item from the scale.

15 This item is the equivalent of "public institutions" analyzed above in the Central America data set. In order to make the object of the question more concrete for less well educated Guatemalans, we changed the wording to "public offices."

16 The Alpha reliability index for the six items was .78.

17 We summed each item, which ranged from 0 to 100 and then divided by 6.
Residents of Guatemala City are, as a group, more highly educated than residents of other areas of Guatemala. It is not surprising, therefore, that support for the system of government in Guatemala is lowest in Guatemala City. Highest system support is found in the Northeastern region of the country. Figure II-11 shows the relationship between education, system support and geographic region of Guatemala.
Wealth and System Support

Since we have found that education is negatively associated with support for the system in Guatemala, and since education and wealth are generally positively associated with each other, we can hypothesize that wealth should also be negatively associated with system support. That is, we should find that wealthier Guatemalans are less supportive of their system of government than poorer Guatemalans.

In this study, we have measured wealth in two ways. First, we used the conventional format of requesting the respondent to disclose monthly income and total household income. We have found in our previous work in Central America that such a measure normally does not work very well, perhaps because respondents are reluctant to tell interviewers about their income or because many Central Americans work in agriculture and their crop sales and home consumption are not easily translated into monthly cash income. A further problem is that students and housewives often earn little or no income, and, therefore, we have a considerable amount of missing data on this item. We nonetheless correlated the income data with system support and, not surprisingly, did not find a statistically significant relationship.

We have been more successful using an index based upon the presence of key appliances in the home, as well as the condition of the home. We constructed an index...
based upon the presence of the following appliances in the home: radio, TV, refrigerator, washing machine, car or tractor, telephone. We found that this index of wealth was significantly correlated (r = .17, sig. < .001) with system support. Figure II-12 shows the association between wealth, as measured by ownership of these appliances, and system support. Among the poorest 6.7 percent of the population, those who have none of these appliances, system support is the highest, whereas among the 1.7 percent of the sample who own all of the appliances, support is the lowest.

**Wealth and System Support**
(as measured by appliances in the home)

![Graph showing the association between wealth and system support](image)

**Source:** Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

The index was created by assigning a score of 1 to any respondent whose home had the appliance, and a score of zero to those whose homes did not. The scores were then added. The questionnaire distinguished between black and white and color TV. We combined the two types of TVs, scoring 0 for no TV, 1 for a black-and-white, 2 for a color and 3 for both. The overall scale was not especially reliable (Alpha = .56). Factor analysis of the items demonstrated, however, that there were two dimensions in the scale, the first comprising radio and TV, and the second comprising washing machine, car or tractor and telephone. Refrigerator had distributed loadings, but loaded more heavily on the second factor. We found that both factors were associated with system support, although the second was more closely associated than the first. To avoid adding this complexity to the analysis, we decided to maintain a single appliance index.
Ethnicity and System Support

In Guatemala, there is perhaps no more socially relevant characteristic than ethnicity. It is the one country in Central America with a large concentration of indigenous population. Unfortunately, there are no universally accepted definitions of ethnic identity in Guatemala. Consequently, it is difficult to select the measure that most clearly distinguishes the Indian population from the non-Indian population. In the questionnaire we used several distinct methods. We determined the respondent's use of language (Spanish vs. Indian languages). We asked the respondents to self-identify (Indian vs. "ladino"). We noted the language in which the interview was conducted, and, finally, we noted if the respondent was dressed in Indian or Western clothes. A clear pattern emerged in the analysis: the indigenous population expressed lower system support than did the ladino population, despite lower education (characteristic of Indians in Guatemala) being associated with higher system support. Respondents in our sample who dressed in indigenous clothing averaged 2.8 years of formal schooling compared to 4.8 years for those in Western dress.

The analysis of the linkage between ethnicity and system support is complex, and we need to take it one step at a time so as to avoid misleading generalizations.

We first examined the question of self-identification. In our sample, 36 percent identified as Indian, 56 percent as ladino and 8 percent did not specify an identification. We found that those who identified as Indians expressed a somewhat lower level of system support than did the ladino population, but the difference was not dramatic.

We then examined the question of Indian versus Western dress. In our sample, 11 percent of the respondents wore Indian garb. Among those who did, we found a sharply lower level of system support, statistically significant at < .001. We present these results in Figure II-13.
Indian dress sharply marks the individual as unmistakably Indian. But we know that it is far more common to see women dressed in Indian clothing than men. In fact, in our sample, of those who wore Indian garb, only 18 percent were men. Therefore, we can assume that there are many men in the sample who were Indian by any definition but who did not dress in Indian clothes. We also found that even though males in Indian garb were somewhat more supportive of the system than females in garb (index of 34 versus 30), both Indian males and females expressed lower system support.

We then examined system support by the individual indigenous languages spoken by our sample of Guatemalans to determine variation among the groups. For the sample as a whole, 25 percent of the respondents spoke an indigenous language, although most of those were bilingual in Spanish. We examined levels of system support for each of the languages in our study. This analysis reveals sharp differences in the levels of system support among the various Indian language groups (Figure II-14). Only Kiche speakers stand out as having dramatically lower support. Indeed, the other Indian language groups show support that does not significantly vary from that expressed by the monolingual Spanish speakers. It should be noted, however, that the Kiche speakers constituted the
largest group of Indian language speakers in our sample. According to the National Bilingual Education Project, this is the largest group of Indians in Guatemala, comprising some 930,000 people.19

![Language Spoken and System Support](image)

**Source:** Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure II-14

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Other Items Related to System Support

Thus far, our exploration of system support within Guatemala has utilized the combined six-item index of support. Our study did include some additional items related to system support that were not included in the six-item scale. The item measuring support for the Armed Forces was excluded because of its negative correlation, among certain segments of the population, with support for other components of the political system. That is, some people who are negative about the Army are positive about the courts, legislature, etc., and, therefore, the inclusion of this item would have lowered the overall reliability of the system support scale. A second excluded item was support for the Human Rights Ombudsman. We did not include this item in our overall system support scale because it was the only one directly associated with an individual rather than an institution.

An examination of system support and ethnicity in Guatemala on these two items (see Figure III-15) reveals interesting contrasts. First, and not at all surprisingly, for each group, including the monolingual Spanish speakers, the Army receives far less support than does the Human Rights Ombudsman. Second, among all of the Indian groups except the Kaqchikel, support for the Army is significantly lower than it is among the monolingual Spanish speaking population of Guatemala. Third, the Kiche speakers express the lowest support for the Army of any group. Finally, even among the Kiche, whose support is quite low compared to other groups on the general support index, support for the Human Rights Ombudsman is dramatically higher than for the Army and only somewhat lower than among the monolingual Spanish speakers.
We can probe into the ethnicity question a bit further, although the size of our sample makes generalizations from this exploration rather risky. We would like to know if the low support expressed by the Kiche speakers is a generalized phenomenon or one confined to certain geographic areas of Guatemala. In Figure II-16, we examine the Kiche speakers in the departments in which our survey found concentrations of these individuals, and contrast their system support scores to monolingual Spanish speakers in the same departments. We do not attempt to control here for factors such as education or wealth but focus exclusively on ethnicity (as defined by language). We can draw two conclusions from this figure. First, although system support among Kiche speakers varies from department to department, it is lower in every department than the national average of monolingual Spanish speakers. Therefore, we can conclude that the low support is a characteristic associated with ethnicity and is not an artifact of geography. Notwithstanding that conclusion, system support among Kiche speakers is particularly low in the Departments of Quiché and Totonicapán. Second, in each department (except the composite "other" group), Kiche speakers have lower system support scores than monolingual Spanish speakers. The difference is not significant in Guatemala City, but our sample of Kiché speakers there is very small (N=6). The sample of monolingual Spanish speakers in Totonicapán is so small (N=2) that we should not draw any conclusions from those findings. Yet, in Quiché and Quetzaltenango, the pattern is clear and the samples sufficiently large for us to conclude that ethnicity is directly associated with lower system support.
Summing Up: Predictors of System Support in Guatemala

We have examined a number of factors that influence system support in Guatemala. But our analysis thus far has not compared the relative strength of each factor in explaining levels of support. To do this, we need to utilize multiple regression analysis. We will not burden the reader with the complexities of that analysis but only point out that the technique allows us to compare the relative importance of each of the factors we have analyzed while controlling for (holding constant) all of the others.

Our analysis finds that the single most important factor in predicting system support is ethnicity, followed by wealth and trailed by education. Each one of these factors is statistically significant (<.01). The multiple R = .24. The beta weights are: Indian = .16; Wealth = -.14; Education = -.10. The overall significance of the equation (F test) < .001.

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The multiple R = .24. The beta weights are: Indian = .16; Wealth = -.14; Education = -.10. The overall significance of the equation (F test) < .001.
Holding constant for ethnicity and education, the wealthiest Guatemalans express system support of 15 points below the poorest Guatemalans. When ethnicity and wealth are held constant, college educated Guatemalans are 10 points below in system support than are Guatemalans with no education.

In the next chapter, we will move from a discussion of system support to a discussion of a critical underpinning for democracy--attitudinal support for democratic liberties.
III. Support for Democratic Liberties

System support is a critical factor in ensuring political stability. Nations whose citizens support their system of government are likely to remain stable for many years. Stable systems, however, are not necessarily democratic ones, as we well know from observing histories of dictatorships throughout Latin America and the world. Stable democracies are ones that, presumably, are undergirded with not only high levels of system support but also high levels of support for democratic norms, especially support for civil liberties and political tolerance. In this chapter, we examine support for democratic liberties in Guatemala, first in comparative perspective and then within certain key groups of the Guatemalan population. Once again, we will make use data from the University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project (1992) for the cross-national comparisons and from the 1993 Guatemala democratic study for the intranational exploration.

Measurement of Democratic Political Culture

We build our study on a long tradition of empirical research that has two principal, highly influential strands, which may be labeled "the civic culture tradition" and the "tolerance tradition." In the civic culture tradition, almost all comparative empirical studies of democracy begin from The Civic Culture. Active (but not extreme) political participation is the vital distinguishing feature of the civic culture, which is differentiated from "parochial" and "subject" cultures largely by greater citizen participation.


2. Almond and Verba, op. cit, p.31-32. Also important was a sense of civic competence, and degree of national pride. Numerous critiques of the Civic Culture have noted that while the emphasis on participation was valid, the addition of national pride and civic competence confused things. Some national political cultures exhibit high national pride but not democratic orientations. Civic competence has been shown to be problematical as a component of democratic political culture because of the confusion between citizen expectations and citizen orientations (Enrique A. Baloyra, 1979. "Criticism, Cynicism, and political Evaluation: A Venezuelan Example." American Political Science Review, Vol. 73 (December): 987-1002). Thus what remains of the notion of civic culture, qua democratic culture, is support and encouragement for political participation. The key tests of participatory political culture thus involve, at a minimum, support for the right to organize civic groups, work for political parties, protest and, of course, vote.
The political tolerance tradition has its roots in studies by Stouffer (1955) and McClosky (1964)³ of U.S. respondents' willingness to extend civil rights to proponents of unpopular causes. In the context of 1950s and 1960s, tolerance toward communists was a central issue of national concern; thus, these studies focused on the rights of communists. Replications of these studies later reported increased tolerance⁴ but the increases were seen as illusory because by the late 1970s antipathy toward other disliked groups had supplanted that toward communists. Later methodological refinements honed tolerance measures by centering on groups the respondents themselves disliked (i.e., one's "least-liked group").⁵ Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus argue that tolerance is a critical element in democratic political culture because intolerant attitudes eventually can produce intolerant behavior that may victimize the targets of intolerance.⁶

In sum, support for the right to participate and tolerance of disliked groups are central pillars of democratic political culture. In Polyarchy, Dahl⁷ argued that two key mass attitudes underlie a political culture that supports liberal, representative institutions: support for a system of widespread political participation and support for the right of minority dissent. In other terms, a democratic political culture is one that is both extensive and inclusive. Extensive cultures support democratic participation, while inclusive cultures support civil liberties for unpopular groups.

Central to the argument of linking political culture to political democracy is that culture change usually occurs gradually. For example, Inglehart⁸ assumes that


⁵. One well known part of the tolerance tradition (Prothro and Grigg 1960, Budge 1970) focused on communists, but the core of the argument involved inconsistency between support for general procedural norms of democracy and specific applications of those norms to unpopular groups.

⁶. The comparative work, including the cases of Israel and New Zealand, is contained in John L. Sullivan, James Pierson and George E. Marcus, Political Tolerance and American Democracy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982.


"autonomous and reasonably enduring cross-cultural differences exist and that they can have important political consequences." His data from over 200 national surveys in Western Europe lead him to conclude that the differences among political cultures are "remarkably stable." We sought measures of democratic political culture that not only encompassed the extensive (widespread) participation and inclusive (tolerance of dissenters) participation dimensions as defined by Dahl, and had been shown to be stable, even under conditions that produce major variation in more transitory opinions, such as support for a given candidate or policy.

We selected a set of ten items measuring democratic attitudes that had been tested in the United States, Mexico and, most extensively, in Costa Rica. Repeated administration of those items in Costa Rican surveys conducted in 1978, 1980, 1983 and 1985 showed that despite a major economic crisis in the early 1980s, democratic norms varied little.9 This is not to say, of course, that the response patterns could not change, especially under such revolutionary conditions as existed in Nicaragua, but these items do seem to meet the test of measuring an "enduring cultural trait" as specified by Inglehart.10

Extensive participation is measured by three variables: support for participation in civic groups, political parties and protests. We did not ask about support for voting since we expected near unanimity in its favor and, therefore, little or no variance. We believe, however, that inclusive participation is the more stringent test of commitment to democratic norms; one can support a wide variety of participatory forms and still be opposed to the right to participate for unpopular groups. Thus we employed seven questions divided into two batteries. The first comprises three items that measure opposition to the suppression of democratic liberties—approval or disapproval of the government’s prohibiting protest marches, meetings of government critics and censorship of the media.11 The second is composed of four items comprising a measure of the right to dissent, in which we asked


10. Imsel.hart, op. cit, 1988: 1209

11. The list could have been expanded by including, as did Sullivan for example, questions on the rights of dissenters to teach in public schools or, as did Stouffer, questions on book banning. But the strong associations among the items we did use found in our prior surveys in Costa Rica suggested that we would gain little additional understanding of democratic culture by adding additional items. More important, these items have little salience where teachers are appointed by national ministries and school libraries are almost nonexistent.
about extending to critics of the government the right to vote, organize demonstrations, run
for office and speak out.

Comparative Perspectives

Extensive Participation

Figure III-1 compares levels of support for conventional modes of political
participation: legal demonstrations, communal problem solving, and election campaigns.  Although the average scores for all nations are in the positive end of the continuum (i.e., 50
or higher on the scale of 0-100), in comparative perspective Guatemalans do not appear
very supportive of these forms of participation.  In two of the three forms of participation--
communal problem solving and election campaigns--they give the lowest levels of support
of any country in Central America.  On the question of support for legal demonstrations,
they are slightly above El Salvador, the lowest of the six countries, but substantially lower than Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Inclusive Participation: Opposition to the Suppression of Democratic Liberties}

We move on now to a more stringent test of support for democracy. Here we ask the respondents if they would approve or disapprove of the government taking action to restrict civil liberties. The data are shown in Figure III-2. In this set of variables, the differences among the countries are not as great. Only El Salvador stands out as having relatively low support on these democratic norms, but even in El Salvador's case, all of the averages are in the positive, (i.e., democratic) end of the continuum. Noteworthy is that Guatemalans are especially supportive of these democratic liberties, scoring above all other nations in the opposition to the prohibition of demonstrations.

\textsuperscript{12} Note that the Costa Rican data set included only one of the variables. As a result, for this series, a 1987 national probability sample, also conducted by the University of Pittsburgh group, was utilized. The subset of the metropolitan area of the capital city included 304 cases and is the basis on which the means are built in the figure.
Inclusive Participation: The Right to Dissent

We consider the right-to-dissent items the most stringent test of democratic liberties. In these items, we are asking respondents if they are willing to extend the crucial civil liberties of the right to vote, demonstrate, run for office and exercise free speech (by making a speech on radio or TV) to those who are critics of their system of government. Not surprisingly, approval of these liberties by our respondents in Central America was, on average, lower than it was for the other, "easier" tests of support for democratic norms.

The comparative results are presented in Figure III-3. As can be seen, in each of the four items, Guatemalans scored lower than did the citizens of any other nation in Central America. On the right-to-demonstrate item, the differences were the smallest, with Guatemalans scoring 48 and Salvadorans, the next lowest country, scoring 50. On no item in this series did the average score of the Guatemalans move into the positive range (50 or over), and on the final two items, the right to run for office and the right to free speech, we
observe the lowest score for any item for any nation that we have examined thus far. Clearly, Guatemalans have little tolerance for the right to dissent.

On the whole, then, this comparison of Guatemala with the rest of Central America has demonstrated that, overall, Guatemalans scored lowest. We now turn our attention to exploring differences in support for democratic norms within the Guatemalan population.

Levels of Support for Democratic Liberties Within Guatemala

The overall picture of support for democratic liberties in Guatemala for the country as a whole is presented in Figure III-4. We have grouped the ten items into the three major areas described above: extensive participation, opposition to suppression of democratic liberties, and support for the right to dissent. We can make several observations about these results. First, as we found in our comparative survey, in Guatemala support for extensive participation is lower than is support for opposition to the suppression of civil liberties. In most countries, support for civic participation in communal groups, election campaigns and legal demonstrations is higher than is opposition to the suppression of democratic liberties (OSDL). Second, support for participation in election campaigns is
surprisingly low. Third, for each of the right-to-dissent items, the average score for Guatemalans as a whole is in the negative end of continuum, whereas OSDL and extensive participation are firmly in the positive end. Quite clearly, the majority of the Guatemalans in our sample are more concerned about the protection of their own liberties than about the rights of other Guatemalans to express their dissent. This reflects an historical reality marked by extreme repression of dissent by central authorities (including the military), use of death squads and other direct force as tools of control. This finding also underscores the need for an effort to foster a broader definition of democracy among Guatemalans.
An Index of Support for Democratic Liberties

In order to simplify the analysis of the internal factors that relate to lower or higher support for democratic liberties, we have created a single index combining all ten variables on the three separate sets of measures analyzed above and depicted in Figure III-4. We determined that the combined scale was reliable (Alpha = .75), and formed three distinct factors corresponding to each of the three main dimensions.\textsuperscript{13} We summed each of the ten variables in the index and divided by 10 so that the index had the same 0-100 range as it did in all of our previous analyses. In the discussion below, we use this combined index of democratic liberties.

Gender, Age and Democratic Liberties

We did not find significant differences in system support that differentiated men from women. In support for democratic liberties, however, we do find some significant (.05), albeit small, differences. As illustrated in Figure III-5, males have somewhat higher overall support for democratic liberties than females. One might jump to the conclusion that the greater support for democratic liberties among males is a function of their higher level of education. In fact, as will be shown in the multiple regression analysis below, gender remains a determinant of support for democratic liberties even when controlled for education.

\textsuperscript{13}A varimax rotation factor analysis produced loadings of .66 or higher on each of the variables that loaded on its factor, with no evidence of distributed loadings.
Turning to age as a predictor of democratic liberties, we find that there is no relationship. This parallels our results for system support.

**Education and Support for Democratic Liberties**

In most studies of support for democratic liberties, especially those that focus on political tolerance, education is found to be an important determinant (Muller, Seligson and Turan, 1987). More highly educated individuals come to appreciate the value of free expression. We find that this is also the case in Guatemala as is shown in Figure III-6. The lowest levels of support for democratic liberties are found among Guatemala’s illiterate population, the highest, among the college educated (sig. < .001). The important increase seems to occur sometime in high school.
Unlike our examination of system support, there were no major differences among the regions in Guatemala, as is shown in Figure III-7. The differences among the regions are fairly small (although significant at .01) but not clearly associated with the overall level of education in that area.

Figure III-6

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993
Wealth and Support for Democratic Liberties

Wealth has a significant but unusual relationship to support for democratic liberties. We found that both family income ($r = .14$, sig. $< .001$) and wealth measured by appliances ($r = .08$, sig. $= .01$) in the home had a significant, positive correlation with support for democratic liberties. As shown in Figure III-8, however, the pattern is reversed among the wealthiest Guatemalans. Indeed, among that group support for civil liberties is lower than it is for any other level of wealth in the study. This finding suggests quite strongly that two factors are at work here. First, increased economic means tends to increase one’s support for democratic liberties. Beyond a certain level, however, support for such freedoms drops off dramatically, perhaps as a result of fears among the very wealthy that they might be the target of social unrest should civil liberties be widely exercised in Guatemala. We will find, however, that wealth proves to be a far weaker predictor of democratic liberties than does education.
Ethnicity and Support for Democratic Liberties

It will be recalled that we found that system support was lower among the Indians than among the ladino population in Guatemala. An examination of support for democratic liberties reveals some very interesting results. First, we note that when we define Indians by their dress, we find that they express higher support for democratic liberties than do those in Western dress (66 versus 62), but the difference is rather small for the overall scale of democratic liberties (Figure III-9). An examination of one component of the scale, right to dissent, shows systematic and statistically significant differences in the four items that comprise this scale, our most stringent test of support for democracy. The other components of the scale produce inconsistent results, with those with Indian dress

\[ \text{Figure III-8} \]

Source: Democratic Norms Survey, 1993

14The differences are significant at .01 or better on all but the first item, right to vote, in which the difference while substantively notable, is not statistically significant.
sometimes expressing higher support for democratic liberties than those in Western dress, and vice versa.

A clearer pattern for the overall scale of support for democratic liberties emerges when we examine the population by the language they speak. Figure III-10 shows that monolingual Spanish speakers are, as a group, noticeably lower in their support for democratic liberties than are Mam-and Kiche-speaking (mono-lingual or bilingual) populations. The remaining Indian groups do not distinguish themselves from the monolingual Spanish speakers.

We find these results particularly fascinating because they show that ethnicity appears to be more powerful than education in explaining how some Guatemalans think about democratic liberties. Upon investigation, however, we find that this explanation holds only for the Kiche speaking Indians. The average education for the monolingual Spanish speakers in the sample is 4.7 years, compared to the bilingual Kiche speakers, whose education averaged 3.0 years. The bilingual Mam group, for whom we have a full set of
responses on all support-for-democracy questions is quite small (N=20) and averages 5.7, obviously unrepresentative of Indians in general. But once we dismiss the results of the Mam speakers, we are still left with important finding that the Kiche Indians, despite their low level of education, are more supportive of democratic norms and less supportive of the political system than are the monolingual Spanish speakers.

The distinctiveness of Kiche speakers becomes more obvious when we focus exclusively on the right-to-dissent item, the most stringent test of support for democratic norms. As we see in Figure III-11, the Kiche score is notably (and statistically significantly) higher than any other ethnic group in Guatemala on three of the four variables. The Spanish speakers, the extreme right-hand bar in each grouping in Figure III-11, score lower than do any of the Indian groups except the K'ekchi on three of the four variables.
Combining our knowledge of system support with our understanding of support for democratic liberties, one pattern has begun to emerge: Indians, especially the Kiche, are less supportive of the political system than other Guatemalans while at the same time being more supportive of democratic liberties, especially the right to dissent. Apparently, discontent is expressed in part by the felt need to have increased freedom of expression. A second, and perhaps far more important, finding emerges from this analysis: in direct contrast to many ladino images of Indians, who are held as being authoritarian in nature and, therefore, partially responsible for Guatemala’s long authoritarian political tradition, Guatemalan Indians appear to value the key civil liberties that underlie stable democracy more than Guatemalan ladinos.

We now take a look at all of the variables that we have examined thus far to see what impact they each have when the other variables are held constant. It is especially important to do so in this chapter since we have discovered that both wealth and education are related to support for democratic liberties, and, as we know, wealth and education are
normally correlated with each other.\textsuperscript{15} That is to say, people of higher education normally earn more, and we need to know whether education and/or wealth each make an independent contribution to predicting support for democratic liberties or whether the relationship of either one of these variables is merely spurious.

We ran a multiple regression analysis to predict support for the ten-item support for democratic liberties index. We found that education was the strongest predictor, with each year of education increasing support for democratic liberties by 1.2 points on our scale when all other factors are held constant. Gender was the second most important factor predicting support for democracy, with women 4 points lower than men when all other factors are held constant. Finally, ethnicity, defined in terms of wearing Indian garb, produced a 7 point increase in support for democratic liberties, again with all other variables held constant. When we separate out the Kiche Indians from the others, the impact on support for civil liberties is even greater. In this equation, being a Kiche Indian increases support for democratic liberties by 10 points, with other Indian groups having no significant impact in the equation. In this equation, gender also drops to insignificance. Wealth, which earlier had proven to be a predictor of support for democratic liberties, was found, as suspected, to have been a spurious variable, making no significant impact when education is included in either model. But we need to recall that wealth has a non-linear relationship with tolerance.

In the next chapter, we will relate attitudes toward system support and attitudes toward democratic norms to provide a fuller picture of the way Guatemalans view the possibilities for stable democracy.

\textsuperscript{15}Indeed, in our sample the correlation between family income and education of the respondent is .41.
IV. The Interrelationship of System Support and Democratic Norms

We have now studied levels of system support and levels of support for democratic norms. Now we would like to go beyond those numbers and to see whether we can predict the impact of those attitudes on democratic stability in Guatemala. We want to do this from two perspectives. First, we want to compare Guatemala to the other countries in Central America. Second, we want to examine the position of some of the critical subgroups we have already identified in the previous two chapters. But first, we briefly explain the relationship between the two sets of attitudes.

Theoretical Considerations

Theoretical Background

Much of the research on the impact of culture on democracy has two serious limitations. First, the research ignores the question of system stability and focuses exclusively on its content. That is, those who argue for a cultural explanation of democracy often forget that it is of little interest to determine that a particular culture or combination of attitudes favorably predisposes a political system to democracy if the system is so unstable that it breaks down. ¹ An extreme case would be a society populated entirely by anarchists, in which each individual would be willing to grant to all others any and all freedoms. If they had their way, anarchists would dissolve government and leave the territory without a functioning political system. Under such extreme circumstances, issues of democracy become moot since rule by the many (democracy) becomes rule by the individual (anarchy). While few such extreme cases can be found to some measure in the real world, the breakdown of the state in Somalia and the emergence of ubiquitous clan warfare is a case that brings home the importance of system stability and the potential irrelevance of democracy (or any other form of governance). We have other illustrations, the most significant of which are the breakup of the Soviet Union and the question of political authority in Russia and the newly independent states.

It is not surprising, therefore, that one of few exceptions to the neglect of the stability question in studies of political culture was a recent survey conducted by Finifter in the waning days of the Soviet Union, a nation whose stability was very much in question as the

survey was being conducted and has now ceased to exist. Unfortunately, the prevailing trend in studies of nations that are democratizing is to focus on democracy to the exclusion of stability. In this chapter, we hope to remedy that deficiency by focusing directly on system support, a variable long thought to impact directly on system stability. As Dahl has recently said, "No satisfactory explanation of why polyarchy exists in some countries and not in others can ignore the pivotal role of beliefs.... countries vary a great deal in the extent to which activists (and others) believe in the legitimacy of polyarchy."

A second significant shortcoming of much of the political culture research is that it tends to focus on variables far removed from the core values of democracy. One 1990 survey of the political culture of a city in the former Soviet Union explicitly recognized the importance of such core values, especially political tolerance, but then proceeded to measure political efficacy, political trust and other variables not directly measuring democracy.

Theoretical Interrelationship of System Support and Tolerance

How do system support and tolerance relate, and what impact is there on democratic stability of the different combinations of these two variables? When complexity is reduced to the simple, dichotomous case, support can be either high or low and, likewise, tolerance can be either high or low. The following chart represents, for this dichotomous situation, all theoretically possible combinations of system support and tolerance.

Let us review each cell, one by one. As reflected in Table IV-1, systems populated by individuals who have high system support and high political tolerance are those we would predict would be most stable. This prediction is based on the simple logic that high support is needed in noncoercive environments for the system to be stable, and tolerance

\[ \text{Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science Review 86 (December 1992):857-874.} \]


\[ \text{Hahn, "Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture," pp 406-407. In contrast, the Gibson, Duch and Tedin study cited above does directly measure political tolerance.} \]

\[ \text{This framework was first presented in Mitchell A. Seligson and Ricardo Córdova Macías, Perspectivas para una democracia estable en El Salvador (San Salvador: IDELA, 1993).} \]
is needed for the system to remain democratic. Systems with this combination of attitude are likely to experience a deepening of democracy.

Table IV-1
Theoretical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Institutionally Democratic Polities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System support</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Stable (deepening) Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unstable Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When system support remains high but tolerance is low, the system should remain stable (because of the high support) but democratic rule ultimately might be placed in jeopardy. Such systems would tend to move toward oligarchical rule in which democratic rights would be restricted.

Low support is the situation characterized by the lower two cells in the chart and should be directly linked to unstable situations. Instability, however, does not necessarily translate into the ultimate reduction of civil liberties, since instability could serve to force the system to deepen its democracy, especially when the values tend toward political tolerance. One could easily interpret the instability associated with the Martin Luther King years in the United States as ones that led directly to the deepening of democracy in that country. Hence, in the situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will result in greater democratization or a protracted period of instability characterized perhaps by considerable violence. On the other hand, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown seems to be the obvious eventual outcome. Presumably, over time, the system that would replace it would be autocratic.
It is important to keep in mind two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, note that the relationships discussed here apply only to systems that are already institutionally democratic. That is, they are systems in which competitive, regular elections are held and widespread participation is allowed. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of an authoritarian regime and its replacement by a democracy. Second, the assumption being made is that over the long run, attitudes of the mass public make a difference in regime type. Attitudes and system type may remain incongruent for many years. Indeed, as Seligson and Booth have shown for the case of Nicaragua, that is what may well have occurred. But the Nicaraguan case we studied was one in which the extant system was authoritarian (i.e., Somoza's Nicaragua) and repression had long been used to maintain an authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of the citizens.\(^6\)

It is now time to put together the two variables that have been the focus of our discussion by examining the joint distribution of the two variables. To do this, both variables are dichotomized into "high" and "low."\(^7\) The results for Costa Rica alone, our paradigmatic case of democratic stability in Central America, are presented in Table IV-2 below, with all six countries being presented in Table IV-3.

**Table IV-2.**  
**Empirical Relationship Between Tolerance and System Support in Costa Rica**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System support</th>
<th>Tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Stable (deepening) Democracy 52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Unstable Democracy 3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


\(^7\)Since both variables ranged from 0 to 100, dichotomization was done by dividing the scale at 50. Doing so approximately divides the entire Central American sample into 50% high and 50% low for both support and tolerance.
An examination of Table IV-2 makes it very clear why, from the perspective of the political culture literature, Costa Rica has been so stable. All but 7 percent of the urban population are in the "high" support zone. Moreover, the cell with the largest proportion of respondents, the majority of the entire sample, are those in the stable democracy cell. Yet, over two-fifths of the respondents are in the oligarchy, or restricted democracy cell based on their low levels of tolerance. Before commenting on these findings further, we should compare the Costa Rican case to the other five countries in the region. This is done in Table IV-3.

Our focus is on Guatemala in comparative perspective. The results are disturbing. Compared with other Central American nations, Guatemala has the lowest proportion of its citizens in the "stable democracy" cell, the highest proportion of its citizens in the "democratic breakdown" cell and the lowest percentage of its citizens in either the stable or unstable democracy cells (see shaded center column in Table IV-3). Clearly, the values that support democracy in Guatemala are lowest among all the countries in Central America, creating the opportunity for anti democratic attempts, such as the auto-golpe of 1993. However, as indicated by the events of May, 1993, there is a critical mass of Guatemalans that at least for the moment are willing to commit to democracy. But the issue clearly hangs in the balance between the two poles.

We should comment briefly on the other countries in the region. The Costa Rican case stands apart from the others, with its high proportion of citizens in the stable democracy cell. In sharp contrast, less than one-quarter of urban Salvadorans possess the combination of attitudes needed to sustain stable democracy. More troubling for El Salvador is that next to Guatemala, it has the largest proportion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Stable Democracy</th>
<th>Unstable Democracy</th>
<th>Sum of Democracy Cells</th>
<th>Oligarchy</th>
<th>Democratic Breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Percents do not always total 100 owing to rounding._

_Source: University of Pittsburgh Central America Public Opinion Project_
of any of the six countries in the breakdown cell. Further, the largest concentration of its population are found in the oligarchy cell. Of the six countries, Guatemala and El Salvador would seem to have the darkest possibilities for maintenance of stable democracy. These findings coincide with most expert opinion on Central America, which has long viewed the decades of guerrilla warfare and ethnic violence in Guatemala and the problems of overpopulation and land distribution in El Salvador as significant barriers to stable democracy. El Salvador's situation seems especially complex, given that the population is almost evenly divided among the four cells. This may produce extreme fragmentation as the country attempts to reconstruct itself after the decade of civil war.

Honduras and Panama have somewhat similar profiles. The great bulk of their populations are concentrated in the two democracy cells, with Panama having a slightly larger proportion in the stable democracy cell, and Honduras a larger proportion in the unstable democracy cell. Neither country is likely to end up with an oligarchical system, but the low levels of system support in Honduras may drive it toward breakdown or toward further democratization.

Nicaragua is unique among these six cases. The largest proportion of its population is found in the stable democracy cell, yet this amounts to only somewhat more than one-third of the citizens. Like Costa Rica, its second largest concentration is in the oligarchy cell. Comparatively low proportions of the population are in the unstable cells (unstable democracy and democratic breakdown). This distribution may well reflect that Nicaraguans have had their revolution and are now seeking stability, democratic or otherwise.

These projections have been made on the basis of the theoretical impact of the relationship between system support and political tolerance. There is no way of knowing at this juncture whether these predictions will be fulfilled. Obviously, numerous factors will influence the long-term deepening, erosion or stagnation of democracy in each Central American country. Moreover, the impact of public preferences on regime type remains an area of much speculation. Nonetheless, it is possible to attempt to answer a relevant but more restricted question with these data, namely, what is the relationship between the four regime preference categories outlined in this chapter and political behavior, democratic or otherwise, in each country? It seems reasonable to hypothesize that those who support stable democracy should be more supportive of conventional democratic participation and less supportive of violent political participation. Similarly, those whose attitudes favor oligarchy or democratic breakdown could be expected to be less supportive of democratic participation. Yet because those who fall into the oligarchy or breakdown cells are also low in their levels of tolerance, they may also have low support for violent political participation. The unstable democracy cell is the greatest puzzle, since this cell is populated by individuals with low system support and high levels of tolerance and would, therefore,
presumably be supportive of both democratic and undemocratic means to achieve their political objectives.

An examination of Figures IV-1 through IV-3 reveals quite clearly the implications for democracy of the typology developed in this paper. Figure IV-1 shows that although approval of participation in legal demonstrations is quite high in all countries, it is highest among those who are in the stable or unstable democracy cells. This is precisely what the theory would predict. Far less approval is shown in each of the six countries among those who fall into the oligarchy or breakdown cells.

A similar pattern is found when we examine approval of participation in election campaigns (Figure IV-2). In each country for which there are data (the question was not asked in Costa Rica), the two democracy cells show higher approval of this form of democratic participation. Also for every case, the lowest approval is found among those in the democratic breakdown cell.

---

8The actual question read: To what extent (on a ten-point scale) do you approve or disapprove of people participating in a demonstration that has been legally permitted.

9The actual question was: To what extent do you approve or disapprove (on a ten-point scale) people working in election campaigns for a political party or candidate?
Finally, what of support for violent political participation, the willingness of citizens to approve the use of force to achieve their objectives? Figure IV-3 shows the results. There are two patterns of note there. First, the unstable democracy cell stands out as being far more willing to approve violent behavior for political purposes. This is not surprising given their low system support and high tolerance. Even in Costa Rica, the small proportion of respondents who are in the unstable democracy cell are far more willing than any of their compatriots to support such violence. The second pattern that emerges is that levels of support for such actions is higher in both Honduras and Nicaragua than it is in the other countries. Neither El Salvador nor Guatemala, countries that were shown as having dim prospects for democracy, exhibit significant support for violent actions. Perhaps the exceptionally high levels of violence in the recent past in both of those countries has discouraged individuals from approving that path as a means to achieve their political objectives. However, Honduras, which up until now has had a relatively peaceful political landscape, is populated by individuals who seem far more willing to embark upon aggressive political participation. Those in the unstable democracy cell of Honduras represent the largest proportion of the entire sample (42 percent), and are far more supportive of aggressive actions than any other group in any other country in the survey. These potential activists are second only to the unstable democracy cell in Nicaragua.

10 The actual question asked was: To what extent (on a ten-point scale) would you approve or disapprove of people taking over factories, offices or other buildings in order to achieve their political objectives?
where comparatively high levels of support for violent actions are also found. It is notable that in both Honduras and Nicaragua, support for violent political participation is also relatively high even in the stable democracy cell.

**Ethnicity and the Stability of Democracy in Guatemala**

Now let us turn to an examination of the Guatemalan data set alone. Here we once again utilize the 1993 Guatemalan democracy study. We anticipated differences between the 1992 cross-national study and the 1993 study because the latter was national in nature and the former only urban. As we have seen before, the urban samples differ from the national results. Moreover, since the scoring method of the 1993 differed from that of the 1992 six-nation study, the percents in each cell vary considerably. Examining the sample as a whole, we see that the pattern of the 1993 study is similar to the 1992 study, with the 1992 sample for urban Guatemala showing 33 percent in the two democracy cells, compared to 27 percent for the 1993 national study. Where there is marked variation is the substantially higher proportion of the respondents in the 1993 study in the breakdown cell. We cannot determine whether this is a function of the different scoring method utilized or an indication of a genuine shift in the direction of breakdown.

The most important conclusion to be drawn from Table IV-4 is the notable difference between the Indian and ladino population. On the basis of dress and language, we have defined Indians and ladinos in Table IV-4 in different ways. Irrespective of the manner of definition, Indians have a twice as high a proportion of their respondents in the stable democracy cell as do non-Indians. In addition, Indians as defined by dress, have a far higher percentage of respondents in the unstable democracy cell than do the ladinos.
Kiche Indians once again stand out, with none of them in the stable democracy cell but nearly half in the unstable democracy cell. This indicates their greater support for democratic norms but their lower support for the system of government. Finally, it is notable that for all subgroups of the study, with the exception of the Kiche, the largest concentration of Guatemalans can be found in the breakdown cell.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Stable Democracy</th>
<th>Unstable Democracy</th>
<th>Sum of Democracy Cells</th>
<th>Oligarchy</th>
<th>Democratic Breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entire country</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians (defined by language)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiche Indians</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians (defined by dress)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Indians (defined by Western Dress)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monolingual Spanish speakers</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percents do not always total 100 owing to rounding.
Source: 1993 Guatemalan Democracy Study
V. Political Violence in Guatemala

The previous chapter discussed the combination of attitudes that could lead to democratic breakdown in Guatemala. One of the most destructive factors in the maintenance of stable democracy is political violence. Violent solutions to political disagreements represent the breakdown of democratic principles; in which peaceful mechanisms of dispute resolution are shunted aside and praetorian politics comes to the fore.

Violence has been an unfortunate legacy of Guatemala’s history. While much has been written about that history, our interest in this analysis is to examine its impact on the prospects for democracy.

![Victimization of Violence in Guatemala](image-url)

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993
Figure V-1
Victimization Due To Political Violence

We need to establish first the levels of political violence suffered by the respondents to our survey. Figure V-1 reports on the answers to two of the questions in the instrument. We first asked, "Let's talk a bit about kidnapping, murders, bombings and massacres. That is what is called political violence. Have you or a member of your family suffered some of these kinds of political violence?" For the country as a whole, 16.7 percent of the population replied in the affirmative. The metropolitan region of Guatemala City and the Northeast were above the national average, the other areas below.

We then asked whether "a family member has disappeared or has sought refuge in another country because of political violence." We found that 8.6 percent of our sample had suffered from this kind of violence, with the highest levels in the Northwest, as is shown in Figure V-1. Victims of violence seem to be dispersed throughout the ladino and Indian communities, with little or no difference detected by the survey in the level by ethnic group. One caveat, we suspect that the sensitivity of the item may be responsible for less than candid responses among those who were most likely to have been victims of violence. Gender also had no relationship to victimization. Education, however, is related to victimization, with the highest educated respondents being somewhat more likely to have suffered from the violence. These finding are shown in Figure V-2. Indeed, among the tiny proportion of the sample that reports having postgraduate education, 60 percent report having been a victim of violence but the sample of this group is too small to make any generalizations.
Perceptions of Violence in Guatemala

Compared to its neighbors, Guatemala has suffered an extraordinary amount of violence. The country's armed conflict is over 30 years old. Only El Salvador, which fought a 12-year civil war, has been more violent. Figure V-3 shows the popular perception of the degree of political violence coincides quite well with reality.¹ Within Guatemala, our 1993 survey does not find significant differences in perception by sex, age, wealth or ethnicity.

¹. The item read, "Do you believe that there is a lot, a little or no political violence in (country)?"
Throughout Central America there is widespread agreement that inequalities between rich and poor are a major cause of political violence. Figure V-4 shows the results for the region. Certainly, popular perception fits in with the most current research on the subject.² Not surprisingly, however, in both Nicaragua and Panama, where the violence has been directly linked to international factors (the contra war in Nicaragua and the U.S. invasion of Panama), the proportion of the population that sees inequality as a cause of violence is somewhat lower than it is in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

Figure V-4

Cause of Political Violence: Gap Between Rich and Poor

% who agree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project, 1992
For Guatemala as a whole, we can compare various perceived causes of violence. Figure V-5 shows how three commonly mentioned causes were ranked by our respondents. As can be seen, land inequality was listed even more commonly than income inequality as a cause of violence. Differences between Indians and ladinos was the third most commonly noted cause, but even in this case it was mentioned by over half the sample.

---

3. Note that differences in question wording do not allow direct comparison between the Central America survey results and the 1993 Guatemala democracy study.
Although most Guatemalans are in agreement that these are the major causes of political violence in the country, there are some notable differences based on education. For example, Figure V-6 below shows that the higher the education, the more the respondent believes that the income gap is a cause for violence.

**Gap Between Rich and Poor as a Cause for Violence**

**By Education**

![Graph showing the gap between rich and poor as a cause for violence by education level.](image)

*Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993*

**Figure V-6**

Even more notable is the systematic difference in the levels of support for democratic liberties and the respondent's views of the causes of violence. As can be seen in Figure V-7, for each of the possible causes mentioned, support for democratic liberties, measured by the right-to-dissent scale, is higher (sig. <.01) among those who agree that the given cause does produce violence. The same findings (not shown) emerge for the overall scale of support for democratic liberties.

**Institutional Defenses Against Violence**

In contrast to the findings showing that democratic liberties are higher among those who believe that social problems are a cause of violence, system support is lower among those who think this way, as is shown in Figure V-8. The differences are statistically significant.
(<.01) on all but the rich/poor item. Thus, those who believe that social ills (inequality and discrimination) cause violence are more educated, more supportive of civil liberties and less supportive of the Guatemalan system of government. Presumably, these individuals hold that system at least partially responsible for these social ills and the resultant violence.

In democratic societies, citizens have defenses against violence. The key institutional defenses are the police and the court system. In Latin America, where the Army often plays a police role, the Army can defend citizens against violence. But armies and police forces in Latin America have often been major perpetrators of violence against their own citizens. How do Guatemalans feel about these three key institutions?
We asked our respondents the following question: "I am going to name various organizations in order for you to tell me if they defend the right to life. Tell me please if you believe that the right to life of the inhabitants of this country are respected and defended by.... the police, the army, judges." The responses are displayed in Figure V-9. Belief in these institutions hovers around the middle point on the scale, with the police and army slightly below and judges slightly above.
We can observe a close positive relationship between support for these institutions that can defend citizens against violence and our measure of system support (Figure V-10). Furthermore, there is also a negative relationship between support for democratic liberties and belief in these institutions. Both are statistically significant (< .001). These results show that the greater one believes in the ability of the police, army and courts to defend the right to life in Guatemala, the greater support for the system one has but the lower support for democratic liberties. One can think of this finding in another way: those who support civil liberties are less likely to believe that the right to life is being protected by key institutions. Again this may reflect the experience of respondents as well as the historical experience of Guatemala.
Support for Aggressive Political Participation

In countries in which the basic rules of the game have not been fully accepted by all citizens, people sometimes resort to illegal acts such as blocking streets, participating in land invasions, taking over public buildings, or even trying to overthrow elected regimes. We wanted to find out how much approval there was for such acts in Guatemala. We should note that since such acts are illegal, we suspect that support is frequently understated. For this series of questions, the respondent had two options: approve, disapprove. But interviewers coded as "indifferent" those who were uncertain about which option to pick but who still wanted to give an opinion. Since that group varied little from question to question (from 9-11 percent of the sample), we focus here exclusively on those who approve of such aggressive acts.

Figure V-11 presents two surprises. First, we were surprised that support for aggressive political participation was as high as it turned out to be. We had expected a far
smaller proportion of the sample to admit to supporting such acts. But an even greater surprise is that approval of "overthrowing violently a government elected by the people" was higher than it was for less drastic forms of civil disobedience. One would have assumed that support for such a drastic measure would have been lower than for other forms of protest, but apparently in Guatemala the more gradual, nuanced, "ramping-up" strategy of civil disobedience has not emerged at the level of the overall attitudes of Guatemala. (It should be noted that limited civil protest did take place as part of the reaction to the May, 1993 coup, indicating that this tendency may be nascent, although not fully reflected in the attitudes measured.) Rather, there is evidence here of an "all-or-nothing" strategy. Indeed, when these four items are included in a factor analysis to determine if they form part of a single dimension, the overthrowing an elected government item proves to be distinct from the others.\(^4\) Of course, given the history of Guatemala, perhaps one should not be surprised by these results. Even so, it is disturbing to learn that over one-fifth of Guatemalans would support the violent overthrow of a democratically elected government.

\(^4\)The four items do form a single factor, but the loadings on the overthrow item are .5, compared to about .8 for the other items.
Support for aggressive political participation is not confined to any one socio-economic or ethnic group. We found few differences within the sample, other than to note that land invasions and takeovers of buildings was supported significantly more by the poor, less-well educated than the rich and well educated. Religion, ethnicity, age and gender had no systematic relationship to aggressive political participation.

Support for Government Repression of Dissent

The flip side of the aggressive political participation question is violence committed by the government. We asked two questions to determine levels of support for a hard line to be taken by the government. First, we asked, "Do you think that in our country what is needed is a dictatorial government (gobierno de mano dura), or that problems can be resolved by everyone participating?" Our second question was: "Some people say that to stop political violence, the only way is to also use official violence. Are you in agreement, somewhat in agreement or in disagreement with this view?"
Figure V-12 shows that approximately two-thirds of the respondents opposed the use of state violence as a means to stop political violence. Somewhat less support for democracy was shown in the response to the question on dictatorship versus democracy. In that item, a slim majority of Guatemalans preferred democratic participation over the "mano dura." When, however, those who did not respond are included in the tabulation, the situation is reversed and a slight majority favors the "mano dura."

Both of these variables are closely linked to education. As can be seen in Figure V-13, the higher the education of the respondent, the more likely he/she will be to select the democratic alternative. This is an encouraging sign since education levels have been increasing in Guatemala in recent years and are likely to continue to increase in the years to come. Among those with college education in Guatemala, 78 percent oppose state violence and 68 percent prefer democracy over authoritarian rule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference for Democracy vs. State Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% prefer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose state violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993
Figure V-12

Age also is directly associated with the preference for democracy over authoritarian rule, as can be seen in Figure V-14. The highest support is found among the youngest
respondents in the survey, although there is some tendency for pattern to reverse itself among the oldest respondents. The difference is statistically significant (<.01).

Finally, there is also a directly relationship between system support and support for democratic liberties and these two variables. That is, as expected from our previous analysis, system support is associated with lowered support for democracy while support for democracy is associated with lower use of state violence. We do not show these two relationships here because of the close theoretical linkage between the independent and dependent variables.

![Preference for Democracy/Opposition to State Violence By Education](image)

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure V-13
Support for Democracy
By Age

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993
Figure V-14
VI. Conventional Political Participation

Guatemala in Comparative Perspective

Most Latin American countries, whether they formally have been unitary or federal states, have operated with a strong central authority and relatively weaker local authorities. In fact, the process of consolidation of state authority in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries focused on the assertion of national over regional or local interests. However, most countries have maintained some level of local government with some (often very minimal) political and administrative functions. Guatemala is no exception. Therefore, in looking at the entire political process, it is important to examine participation at both the national and local levels. In this chapter, we examine a variety of channels of participation open to individual Guatemalans, and look at their willingness to use these channels and the relative importance they assign to various levels of government as demonstrated by their forms of participation.

It is worth noting that the sorts of violent forms of political participation we discussed in the previous chapter often are more likely to make headlines. However, the more conventional forms discussed in this chapter are what far more often form the stuff of daily politics in Guatemala and elsewhere in Latin America.\(^1\) Political violence is more clearly a hallmark of the inability of the more conventional forms to effectively channel political concerns and political demands.

Communal Participation

In Figure VI-1, we show the overall pattern of participation in a wide variety of community groups. We have data on five of Central America's six nations. Costa Rica is absent from this data set, but the information from that country should be available by the end of 1993.\(^2\) The results show that Guatemala's levels of conventional participation are generally quite high compared to its neighbors in the region. In terms of church committees and school-related committees, Guatemala ranked second in the region. In terms of community development associations, Guatemala ranked first. It tied for first or second place in professional group associations and unions, and was ranked second in

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\(^2\)The items were coded with a four-point scale, ranging from "frequent" participation to no participation. We converted this scale to have a 0-100 range, with "frequent" made equivalent to 100, and no participation equal to 0.
cooperatives and civic clubs. The differences among the five nations in the study are statistically significant (< .001).

We believe that these findings are important because they reveal a very positive aspect of Guatemalan political participation that could serve as the basis on which to build a stronger democracy. Although as we have already seen many Guatemalans lack trust in their system of government, that attitude has not prevented them from participation in community associations. Indeed, it may well be that frustration with national political institutions has led Guatemalans to become more reliant upon community institutions in which they may feel more trust. Efforts to build democracy in Guatemala might well find fertile terrain at the local level.

![Community Participation in Comparative Perspective](image)

**Source:** University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project, 1992

**Figure VI-1**

Participation in organizations is not the same thing as direct involvement in community problem solving. Individuals may join organizations merely to socialize or because they feel community pressure to do so. Perhaps a better test of the impact communal participation is to look at the extent to which individuals volunteer their time, labor and even money to help solve local problems. Figure VI-2 shows the data for Central
America. Differences among the countries are statistically significant (< .001). The first set of bars show the proportion of the respondents who have attempted to help solve a community problem. Here we see that Guatemala is no longer the leader, with Nicaragua and Panama having the highest levels of local problem solving. Yet, its levels are far higher than in Honduras, which is the least participant of any of the five countries.

The remaining bars on the chart refer only to those individuals who have in fact done something to help solve a community problem. Hence, we are comparing here levels of participation only among the active part of the population. Guatemalans are particularly low in terms of donating materials or money, and also somewhat low in organizing groups. Their level of communal work participation and attendance at organized meetings is not very different from the other countries in the region.

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3 The responses were scored "yes" and "no," and the coding was done to give 100 points for those who said "yes" and zero points for those who said "no."
Our last form of conventional participation moves our focus away from community groups and toward public officials. We asked our respondents if they had asked for the help or cooperation of the following officials or institutions in trying to solve community problems: the President of the country, a legislator, the mayor, an agency of the national government. Figure VI-3 shows the results. It is not surprising that the levels of contacting public officials is far lower than the levels of communal participation we observed in figures VI-1 and VI-2. Only in Honduras, where respondents were less active in working to solve local community problems were they significantly more active in contacting national public officials. Guatemala ranks at an intermediate level on this set of items.

![Graph showing contacting national officials/agencies](image)

**Source:** University of Pittsburgh Central American Public Opinion Project, 1992

**Figure VI-3**

**Voting**

Prior to the 1980s, competitive, free and fair elections were the exception rather than the rule in Central America. Only Costa Rica had a long history of elections that, by any standard, were a model of electoral probity. As a result, very little was known then about the Central American voter and it was not then possible to undertake a serious empirical analysis of voting behavior along the classical lines developed by political scientists in the United States and Western Europe.
But, times have changed. Regular elections are beginning to become a normal feature of the Central American political landscape. Costa Rica’s elections have a long tradition, dating back to the early part of the twentieth century, having been interrupted only once, in 1948. After the 1980 constituent assembly election, Honduras has had democratic presidential elections since 1981, with the Liberal Party winning in that year and again in 1985, to be defeated by the National Party in the 1989 election. Guatemala began a formal transformation to civilian rule in 1984 with the election of a constituent assembly, and since has held competitive presidential elections in 1985 and 1990 and most recently local elections in 1993. In El Salvador elections have gone on throughout much of the 1980s but only in 1989 did moderate leftist parties participate. However, not until 1994, when the FMLN will be allowed to participate, will fully competitive elections take place. Nicaragua held free and fair elections in 1984 and again in 1990.\textsuperscript{4} In that latter election the Sandinistas lost control to the UNO opposition coalition. Finally, Panama held competitive elections in 1989, but the military annulled them.\textsuperscript{5}

Perhaps the two most basic parameters in any study of voting are turnout of eligible voters and turnout as a percent of registered voters. While at first it might appear that these figures are readily available, in fact they are not. Indeed, we argue that at best it is possible to provide only approximate turnout figures for any country in the region except Costa Rica, where more accurate totals are available.

In order to have accurate turnout figures, one must have accurate population data. Such data are based on censuses and projections made from those censuses. The most recent Costa Rican census prior to the survey analyzed in this paper dates from 1984. The Costa Rican census bureau, however, regularly makes projections on that base, adding births and immigrants, subtracting deaths and emigrants. This procedure produces highly reliable census data and makes calculation of turnout possible. In the other countries, however, the estimates are far more problematical. In El Salvador, for example, the most recent published population census dates back to 1971, although a new census was conducted in 1992, the results of which are not yet available. Moreover, the civil war raging there for most of the decade has resulted in massive deaths and migration, a full account of which is not available. The situation is similarly confused in Nicaragua, where the most recent population census was taken in 1971. The census data for the other countries are

\textsuperscript{4}The 1984 election was widely evaluated as being free and fair, but the withdrawal of the opposition meant that the Sandinistas faced little serious opposition to their rule. Hence, it was not until 1990 that the elections were free, fair and competitive.

more recent (Guatemala, 1981; Honduras, 1988; and Panama, 1990, but the Panamanian census is still being tabulated).

A far more complex issue is that of obtaining accurate data on registration and voting. In Panama, for example, there is probably no way of obtaining an accurate count for the 1989 election, the one that preceded our survey. Three days after that election, the count was halted and the elections annulled by the military government. In Honduras, the registration system was undergoing a major modification during the period prior to the last election, but delays in its implementation meant that on the eve of the election a substitute system had to be developed and utilized.⁶

A further difficulty in comparing our survey data to those of official counts is that the Central America data set is urban in nature. Turnout in rural areas is often lower than in urban areas, in part because of the greater cost (in time and money) involved in reaching a polling place. In a country like Costa Rica, where virtually all rural areas have schools, and schools are utilized as polling places, the problem is far less serious. But remoteness is only one factor limiting voting in rural areas. Education and income levels in the countryside, two variables known to have an impact on turnout, are generally far lower than in the cities.

We also recognized another limitation of survey data, namely that of over-reporting. According to voter validation studies conducted by the University of Michigan, survey data overreported voting by 18 percent in the 1970s in the United States.⁷

These obstacles present formidable barriers to developing good estimates of turnout against which we can compare the survey data. Table VII-1 provides the best data that we were able to develop. One of the major challenges was to obtain reasonable population estimates and then to calculate from those the voting-age

---


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election date/ survey date</th>
<th>Total population (millions) for election year</th>
<th>Voting-age population (millions)</th>
<th>Number of votes (millions)</th>
<th>% Voting of voting-age population</th>
<th>Number of registered voters (millions)</th>
<th>% turnout of registered voters</th>
<th>Survey results</th>
<th>Voting compulsory/ not compulsory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica:</td>
<td>1990/1990</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban &quot;meseta</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador:</td>
<td>1991/1991</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater San Salvador</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala:</td>
<td>1990(1st round)/1992</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>not compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1.96 (1990)</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras:</td>
<td>1989/1991</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tegucigalpa</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Pedro Sula</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua:</td>
<td>1990/1991</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>not compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managua</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama:</td>
<td>1989/1991</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>not compulsory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama City</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Population data are taken from CELADE (1991). Voting age is 18 for all countries in Central America except Nicaragua, where it is 16. The population projections from CELADE group all those from 15-19 years of age into a single cohort. Interpolation was used to estimate the population of 18 and older (16 and older in Nicaragua). Although
different population figures can be obtained from other sources, it was determined that the use of a single, highly respected source for all six countries would help standardize the errors across all of the cases. As better data become available, the estimates made by CELADE will change. For example, a May, 1992, estimate of the 1991 population of El Salvador shows 5.28 million inhabitants, compared to the 5.38 million reported in the 1991 publication (which was based on 1986 estimates) shown in the above table. See MIPLAN (1992). The preliminary estimates of the 1992 population census show 5.047 million.

Sources for voting data:

**Costa Rica:** Data are from the district totals as reported by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones, Cómputo de votos y declaratorias de elección, 1990. San José: TSE. A total of 38 districts were included in the sample. Note that the voting districts in some cases cover rural as well as urban areas, whereas the sample is completely urban. As a result, a precise match between the sample and the voting data is not possible. Population estimates for sampled areas come from, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, Costa Rica: Calculo de población (por provincia, cantón y distrito) al 1° de enero de 1990. San José, 1991.

**El Salvador:** Population estimates for greater San Salvador are from 1992 CELADE estimates for the election year of 1991. See Ministerio de Planificacíon y Coordinación del Desarrolla Económico y Social, Dirección General de Población y Desarrollo Territorial, Dirección de Población, Estimación de la población de El Salvador por departamento y municipio (cifras preliminares), San Salvador, mayo, 1992, mimeo. Estimates for the country as a whole are from the 1991 CELADE publication (using 1986 estimates) in order to maintain the continuity of the series for all six countries. However, the preliminary population figures from the 1992 population census of El Salvador shows 5.05 million persons compared to the 5.38 million estimated by CELADE. But the preliminary figures for greater San Salvador for the 1992 census are 1.52 million vs. 1.42 for the CELADE estimates. See "Ministerio de Economía, La Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, "Resultados Preliminares del V Censo de Población y IV de Vivienda 1992," Prensa Gráfica January 19, 1993, p. 34. Voting data from Ricardo Córdova Macías, "Procesos electorales y sistema de partidos en El Salvador (1982-1989)," Documentos de Trabajo, Series Análisis de la Realidad Nacional 92-1, FUNDAUNGO, San Salvador, December, 1992.


**Honduras:** Censo nacional de población y vivienda, 1988: Características generales de la población y de las viviendas por barrios y colonias, San Pedro Sula y Tegucigalpa (Tegucigalpa, Diciembre, 1990); unpublished data, Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones. Note that the number of registered voters in Tegucigalpa is given as larger than the voting age population. This may be a result of the underestimation of the voting age population, estimates made from the CELADE population estimates or from differences in the way the area included in the population census for Tegucigalpa vs. the voting districts included as part of the city.

**Nicaragua:** Data for Managua are for the "Region III", which includes Managua and the surrounding areas. No voting data are available for the city itself, but the population of the city of Managua was 903,620, whereas the Region III had a population of 1,067,881. Hence, the city was 84.6 percent of the region. Latin American Studies Association, Commission to Observe the 1990 Nicaraguan Election, "Electoral Democracy Under International Pressure," March 15, 1990, mimeo; "Cómo voto Nicaragua: los resultados electorales, Envío (Managua-UCA) April, 1990, pp. 1-24. Abstention rates of registered voters taken from Castro and Prevost (1992:223); Vanessa Castro and Gary Prevost, The 1990 Elections in Nicaragua and their Aftermath. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992.

**Panama:** OEA (1992:40). Results based on recount. Estimates of turnout vary from 54% to 75%. Our calculations based on data from the Electoral Tribunal and reported by the Comité de Apoyo a los Observadores Internacionales, Testimonio de un Proceso Electoral (1990) show 76% turnout rate of registered population in the areas in which we surveyed. It is important to note that the 1989 election was aborted before the full count of the votes was completed, hence the true vote totals are not known. The best estimates are that approximately one-fifth of the votes were not counted.
population for the urban areas in which we conducted the surveys. Our survey data theoretically coincide most closely with the percentage of the voting-aged population that voted rather than the turnout of registered voters. This is because we interviewed from a universe of all households, not just those in which the respondent was registered to vote. For completeness, however, we also provide the best data we could find on the number of registered voters for each country and city in which we conducted our study, as well as the turnout of registered voters in those cities.

How well did we do on the vote variable? Theoretically, our confidence interval was as large as 4.5 percent for Panama and Honduras, where our sample was approximately 500, and as small as 3.3 percent in Guatemala and El Salvador where our sample was approximately 900. In Costa Rica where the percent of the voting-age population that voted was 89 percent, our survey revealed 84 percent, with a confidence interval that would go as high as 87.3 percent. In Tegucigalpa, Honduras we came even closer, with the survey showing 83 percent and the actual turnout 87 percent. Survey results in San Pedro Sula, Honduras were not as close, exceeding the actual totals by 7 percent. The survey was also quite close in Managua, Nicaragua, with the lower confidence interval at 75 percent and the actual vote at 71 percent. In the other samples, our estimates were considerably higher than the actual vote. In Panama City, for example, our lower estimate was 73.5 percent, whereas the vote was 64 percent. In El Salvador, the lower estimate for the survey was a little over 59 percent, whereas the actual vote was 49 percent. Finally, the worst estimate was in Guatemala where the survey dramatically overestimated the vote.

The general pattern we found in these data is for the survey to overestimate the vote. This pattern is consistent with surveys done elsewhere, as a result of the built-in social desirability factor, the likelihood that a respondent will report what is considered to be socially desirable or acceptable behavior. This factor is exacerbated in all of Central America except Nicaragua and Panama, because the vote is compulsory. Individuals admitting to not voting are admitting to a violation (albeit technical) of the voting laws. The only instance where the survey underreported the vote was in urban Costa Rica, although it is of note that the survey does overestimate the national vote totals and in that sense is consistent with the other countries. We suspect that another factor inflating the reported vote totals is sample bias that may have excluded significant numbers of recent urban migrants to new shanty towns not yet recorded on the census maps we used to draw our samples.

We now move on to place the Central America data within an international comparative context. Figure VI-4 shows a comparison of Central America with the
United States, Japan and four European countries. Since the data from the countries outside of Central America are national, whereas the Central America data are urban, we assume that we have overestimated the Central American turnout rates and underestimated the non-Central American rates. In fact, the underestimate for the non-Central American cases is only slight, since the urban and rural differentials are not nearly so great in these developed countries as they are in Central America. Hence, the national-level data for the non-Central American cases reported in Figure VI-4 probably are close approximations of urban turnout and hence directly comparable to the Central American cases.

The turnout rates for the non-Central American cases is taken from Powell (1986:38). These data are for the eligible (i.e., voting age) population. The Central American data are from the six surveys. Since the survey was conducted among voting-age adults in each country, all of the respondents were eligible, although not all were registered voters as will be discussed below. We had to adjust the figures reported here to take account of those respondents who were too young to vote in the election prior to the survey.
Examination of Figure VI-4 reveals a wide distribution in turnout rates. In Central America, they range from a low of 63 per cent of voting age respondents in our survey to a high of 90 percent. Guatemala is the second lowest of the six countries. In no Central American case was turnout as low as it was in the United States, and only Italy (of all of the 20 countries in the Powell study) exceeded the highest turnout rate in Central America.

Intra-Guatemala Comparisons

We will now explore the factors that influence participation within Guatemala. In order to simplify the analysis, we have created an index of participation. First, however, we show all of the forms of communal participation on a single chart so that the reader can see which ones are practiced more frequently and which ones less so. As can be
seen, church group participation is highest, followed by school committee (e.g., PTA) participation.
A factor analysis\(^9\) of the seven types of local participation shown in the above figure revealed two distinct factors: communal participation (church, school, community development association) and occupation-related participation (professional association, civic association, trade union and cooperative). We formed two indexes, one called "communal participation" and the other called "occupation-related participation."

We found that communal participation was not at all related to education, ethnicity, gender, age or urban/rural distinctions. Rather, it was significantly associated with system support and religiosity. Figure VI-5 shows the relationship between system support (defined in terms of the index created in Chapter III) and communal participation (Figure VI-6). It can be seen that as support increases, participation increases.

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\(^9\)A varimax rotation produced two distinct factors. There was, however, a distributed loading on the community development association variable, but it loaded more heavily on the communal participation factor, so we included it there.
The relationship between religiosity and communal participation is shown in Figure VI-7. The more frequently respondents attend church, the higher their communal participation. This finding is not surprising since church groups form part of the communal participation index. Indeed, when the church committees are removed from the index, the relationship is weakened considerably. We also found that other measures of religiosity, such as frequency of prayer, relate directly to communal participation.

It is quite clear from examining Figure VI-8 that various "non-Catholic" Christian groups, largely Protestant fundamentalist, exhibit significantly (< .001) higher communal participation than do Catholics. We also found that those with no religion had the lowest level of participation (not shown on figure). These findings speak directly to the debate as to the role of the expansion of non-Catholic groups in Guatemala. Apparently, these new groups do help stimulate local level participation.

![Communal Participation and Religion](image)

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure VI-8
It is fortunate that we created a separate index for occupation-related participation since its correlates are quite different from those of communal participation. Participation in occupation-related groups is significantly (< .001) related, in order of importance, to education, gender and ethnicity.\textsuperscript{10} Religion and system support play no role. As can be seen in Figure VI-9, although there is a steady increase in participation as education increases, the real surge occurs at the highest levels of education.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{occupation_related_participation.png}
\caption{Occupation-Related Participation and Education}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Figure VI-9}

Gender’s relationship to professional participation is shown in Figure VI-10. Although the level of such participation remains low, males are found to have double the level of females (sig. < .001). This difference, of course, is in part a function of the higher rate of economic activity among males in Guatemala.

\textsuperscript{10}The order of importance is determined by the beta weights in the regression equations.
Finally, ethnicity is related to occupation-related participation, but the relationship is complex. Defining Indians by dress shows that ladinos participate more than Indians, but the difference is not significant for three of the four variables in the occupation-participation index. However, cooperative participation is significantly higher among Indians (sig. < .001) than ladinos. When Indians are self-defined, cooperative participation remains significantly higher among Indians, and also higher among the other variables as well, although not significantly so. An examination of occupation-related participation and Indians defined by language spoken produced inconsistent results, with some groups participating at far higher levels than others. We suspect that these differences might be a function of idiosyncratic factors in these small samples; therefore, we think it inappropriate to present these findings here.

Figure VI-10

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993
Contacting Public Officials

One of the most direct forms of political participation is contacting public officials. Of course, in many instances such contacting is for personal rather than communal gain. Nonetheless, it represents an important form of participation. We found that contacting the mayor (Alcalde Municipal) was the most common of this form of contacting, whereas contacting a legislator was the least common. Figure VI-11 shows the results.

The variables that are related to this form of participation are rather different from what we have seen before. The small number of respondents who have contacted a legislator showed no significant relationship with any of the demographic or socioeconomic variables we have examined in this study, but it was significantly and positively related to system support. Contacting the government produces similar patterns to those which we have already observed. We focus here, therefore, on the mayor as the variable that was most directly related to several others in our study. Our analysis is based on multiple

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure VI-11
regression results, such that each of the variables discussed below are significant predictors of contacting the mayor.

In Figure VI-12, we see that education has the expected relationship to participation: higher educated respondents are more likely to contact the mayor than less-well educated. We also found that system support is positively and significantly associated with higher levels of contacting of mayors.

Contacting the Mayor and Educational Level

![Graph showing the relationship between education and contacting the mayor.](image)

**Source:** Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

**Figure VI-12**

Up until this point in our investigation, rural/urban differences have not made an impact on participation (after we control for other variables, such as education), but in contacting the mayor, rural Guatemalans are significantly more active than urban Guatemalans in spite of their lower levels of education (see Figure VI-13).

In light of the above findings, it is not surprising that wealth also turns out to have a negative, significant relationship to contacting of mayors. As we see in Figure VI-14, contacting is highest among the poorest citizens, many of whom live in rural areas. This relationship holds even when education is held constant (in a multiple regression equation).
Contacting the Mayor by Urban/Rural Residence

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure VI-13
Finally, we examine the question of ethnicity and contacting the mayor. We found that ethnicity was significantly related to this form of political participation, such that Indians exhibited higher levels of contacting than ladinos. This finding held for each Indian group except K'ekchi (see Figure VI-15). We conclude this exploration of contacting public officials as a form of political participation by noting that the results indicate significant opportunities for stimulating democracy at the local level in Guatemala. We have found that among the poor in rural Guatemala, contacting is greater than among the urban and better off. We have also found that Indians are more likely to contact their mayors than ladinos. In El Salvador, USAID is attempting to stimulate local participation through the Municipalities in
Action program. There a study has shown that such a program appears to offer numerous possibilities for stimulating the development of democracy.11

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**Contacting the Mayor and Language Spoken**

![Bar Chart]

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure VI-15

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VII. Support for Military or Civilian Rule

Comparative Perspectives

We have focused thus far on democratic attitudes. In this chapter, we look at the flip side of the equation, support for military rule. It is important to do so since not all individuals who are supportive of democratic liberties are completely hostile to the idea of military rule. Similarly, not all who express little or no support for democratic norms would be supportive of a military takeover.

We begin this analysis by first examining direct support for a military coup. We follow that exploration with a more detailed look at those policies with which citizens of Central America would feel more or less comfortable when implemented under military rule. In this analysis, we exclude Costa Rica, which has not had experience with military rule in over 40 years. In that nation, therefore, there are large components of the population for whom questions about military rule would not be very meaningful.

In Figure VII-1, we see the responses to the question: "Do you think there is any reason that would justify a coup d'etat that would interrupt the democratic process that our country has been experiencing?" The question was phrased in such a way so that it would likely elicit a positive response only from hard-core supporters of military rule. As can be seen, Guatemala scored higher than any other country, although Panama was nearly as high. At the other extreme was Honduras, where only a tiny fraction of the population would support a coup. In short, over one-quarter of residents of Guatemala City in 1992 supported military intervention in politics.

![Support for a Coup d'etat](image)
We asked a series of 11 distinct items to our Central American sample in an effort to determine in which areas citizens believed that military governments had done a good job. In each area we asked, "From what you know about military governments in this country, do you think that they have helped or hurt..." Table VII-1 below contains the results. The strongest support for military rule in Guatemala is expressed on the item measuring its ability to stop crime, followed by its ability to stop guerrillas. A similar response on crime is found in Honduras, but in El Salvador the advantage of military rule is seen more in terms of revolutionaries. The weakest support for the efficacy of military rule in Guatemala is on the economic development questions, including unemployment and inflation.

### TABLE VII-1
How Military Government Affects Major Development Concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Economic development</th>
<th>Reduce Unemployment</th>
<th>Reduce Inflation</th>
<th>Make better laws</th>
<th>Reduce crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guatemala % (N)</td>
<td>Honduras % (N)</td>
<td>El Salvador % (N)</td>
<td>Nicaragua % (N)</td>
<td>Panama % (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>60.5% (184)</td>
<td>74.0% (419)</td>
<td>74.2% (675)</td>
<td>63.8% (330)</td>
<td>73.8% (369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>22.4% (68)</td>
<td>22.6% (128)</td>
<td>22.2% (202)</td>
<td>23.2% (120)</td>
<td>23.8% (119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>17.1% (52)</td>
<td>3.4% (19)</td>
<td>3.6% (33)</td>
<td>13.0% (67)</td>
<td>2.4% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (304)</td>
<td>100.0% (566)</td>
<td>100.0% (910)</td>
<td>100.0% (517)</td>
<td>100.0% (500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>64.1% (195)</td>
<td>66.6% (377)</td>
<td>81.2% (739)</td>
<td>65.6% (339)</td>
<td>70.8% (354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>20.1% (61)</td>
<td>30.0% (170)</td>
<td>16.0% (146)</td>
<td>21.9% (113)</td>
<td>27.0% (135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>15.8% (48)</td>
<td>3.4% (19)</td>
<td>2.7% (25)</td>
<td>12.6% (65)</td>
<td>2.2% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (304)</td>
<td>100.0% (566)</td>
<td>100.0% (910)</td>
<td>100.0% (517)</td>
<td>100.0% (500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>63.5% (193)</td>
<td>71.9% (407)</td>
<td>83.8% (763)</td>
<td>62.5% (323)</td>
<td>80.2% (401)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>19.1% (58)</td>
<td>24.4% (138)</td>
<td>13.0% (118)</td>
<td>24.4% (126)</td>
<td>16.2% (81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>17.4% (53)</td>
<td>3.7% (21)</td>
<td>3.2% (29)</td>
<td>13.2% (68)</td>
<td>3.6% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (304)</td>
<td>100.0% (566)</td>
<td>100.0% (910)</td>
<td>100.0% (517)</td>
<td>100.0% (500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>52.6% (160)</td>
<td>72.3% (409)</td>
<td>65.8% (599)</td>
<td>66.2% (342)</td>
<td>75.4% (377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>32.6% (99)</td>
<td>23.9% (135)</td>
<td>30.0% (273)</td>
<td>19.5% (101)</td>
<td>22.6% (113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>14.8% (45)</td>
<td>3.9% (22)</td>
<td>4.2% (38)</td>
<td>14.3% (74)</td>
<td>2.0% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% (304)</td>
<td>100.0% (566)</td>
<td>100.0% (910)</td>
<td>100.0% (517)</td>
<td>100.0% (500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>47.4% (144)</td>
<td>53.2% (301)</td>
<td>69.7% (634)</td>
<td>69.1% (357)</td>
<td>62.0% (310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>42.1% (128)</td>
<td>44.7% (253)</td>
<td>27.5% (250)</td>
<td>18.6% (96)</td>
<td>35.6% (178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>10.5% (32)</td>
<td>2.1% (12)</td>
<td>2.9% (26)</td>
<td>12.4% (64)</td>
<td>2.4% (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### How Military Government Affects Major Development Concerns (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Guatemala % (N)</th>
<th>Honduras % (N)</th>
<th>El Salvador % (N)</th>
<th>Nicaragua % (N)</th>
<th>Panama % (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% 304</td>
<td>100.0% 566</td>
<td>100.0% 910</td>
<td>100.0% 517</td>
<td>100.0% 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Halt Student Strikes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Panama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>61.2% 186</td>
<td>64.8% 367</td>
<td>65.9% 600</td>
<td>70.2% 363</td>
<td>67.0% 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>22.7% 69</td>
<td>32.0% 181</td>
<td>30.4% 277</td>
<td>16.6% 86</td>
<td>30.2% 151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>16.1% 49</td>
<td>3.2% 18</td>
<td>3.6% 33</td>
<td>13.2% 68</td>
<td>2.8% 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% 304</td>
<td>100.0% 566</td>
<td>100.0% 910</td>
<td>100.0% 517</td>
<td>100.0% 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Put a halt to guerrillas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Panama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>44.7% 136</td>
<td>54.9% 311</td>
<td>68.7% 625</td>
<td>66.5% 344</td>
<td>52.2% 261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>40.1% 122</td>
<td>38.0% 215</td>
<td>27.5% 250</td>
<td>19.5% 101</td>
<td>39.6% 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>15.1% 46</td>
<td>7.1% 40</td>
<td>3.8% 35</td>
<td>13.9% 72</td>
<td>8.2% 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% 304</td>
<td>100.0% 566</td>
<td>100.0% 910</td>
<td>100.0% 517</td>
<td>100.0% 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Prevent takeovers of public buildings by revolutionary groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Panama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>50.3% 153</td>
<td>58.5% 331</td>
<td>52.1% 474</td>
<td>64.6% 334</td>
<td>55.2% 276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>28.6% 87</td>
<td>34.8% 197</td>
<td>44.6% 406</td>
<td>21.1% 109</td>
<td>37.2% 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>21.1% 64</td>
<td>6.7% 38</td>
<td>3.3% 30</td>
<td>14.3% 74</td>
<td>7.6% 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% 304</td>
<td>100.0% 566</td>
<td>100.0% 910</td>
<td>100.0% 517</td>
<td>100.0% 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Remove political extremists from public office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Panama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>46.7% 142</td>
<td>76.5% 433</td>
<td>47.0% 428</td>
<td>58.8% 304</td>
<td>63.2% 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>27.0% 82</td>
<td>14.8% 84</td>
<td>45.6% 415</td>
<td>25.1% 130</td>
<td>28.6% 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>26.3% 80</td>
<td>8.7% 49</td>
<td>7.4% 67</td>
<td>16.1% 83</td>
<td>8.2% 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% 304</td>
<td>100.0% 566</td>
<td>100.0% 910</td>
<td>100.0% 517</td>
<td>100.0% 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Stop strikes of unionized workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Panama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>54.6% 166</td>
<td>63.4% 359</td>
<td>57.7% 525</td>
<td>65.2% 337</td>
<td>69.4% 347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>22.4% 68</td>
<td>32.7% 185</td>
<td>37.9% 345</td>
<td>20.9% 108</td>
<td>27.2% 136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>23.0% 70</td>
<td>3.9% 22</td>
<td>4.4% 40</td>
<td>13.9% 72</td>
<td>3.4% 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% 304</td>
<td>100.0% 566</td>
<td>100.0% 910</td>
<td>100.0% 517</td>
<td>100.0% 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Stop lock-out strikes of businesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Honduras</th>
<th>El Salvador</th>
<th>Nicaragua</th>
<th>Panama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hurts</td>
<td>56.3% 171</td>
<td>68.6% 388</td>
<td>59.8% 544</td>
<td>67.5% 349</td>
<td>70.0% 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps</td>
<td>21.4% 65</td>
<td>24.7% 140</td>
<td>35.8% 326</td>
<td>18.0% 93</td>
<td>24.6% 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>22.4% 68</td>
<td>6.7% 38</td>
<td>4.4% 40</td>
<td>14.5% 75</td>
<td>5.4% 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0% 304</td>
<td>100.0% 566</td>
<td>100.0% 910</td>
<td>100.0% 517</td>
<td>100.0% 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Support for a Coup

In the 1993 Guatemalan democracy study we changed somewhat the overall item regarding support for a coup. We asked: "Do you think that sometimes there could be a sufficient reason for the military to take over the government by force, or do you think that there never is sufficient reason for that?" Support for a coup was much higher than in 1992. We cannot say if this increase was because of that changed wording or because of the political atmosphere prevailing on the eve of the Serrano coup. For the country as a whole, the results are presented in Figure VII-2 below. As can be seen, a plurality opposes a coup, but over one-third support it. If one discounts the nonresponses, support for a coup totals 44 percent of the population. An exploration of the predictors of attitudes toward a coup did not produce any significant relationships (in a multiple regression equation), and hence in order to determine more fully the factors that are related to support for military rule, we turn to our more specific measures.
Efficacy of Elected versus Military Rule

We used a series of items similar to the ones shown above for the Central America survey to measure the extent to which Guatemalans believed that military rule is more or less efficacious than elected, civilian rule. The question we asked was: "I am going to read to you a list of problems that we have in the country, so that you can tell me who can solve them better; a civilian government elected by the people or a military government imposed by force." For the sample as a whole, the results appear in Table VII-2.

As can be seen in the table, most of the items have a narrow range of response; about 10-15 percent of Guatemalans support military rule over civilian rule. Only on the items of controlling political violence and crime, does the proportion of those who support military over civilian rule increase notably.

What is especially noteworthy in these responses is the relatively high proportion of responses that supported the view that neither military nor civilian governments would be effective at dealing with the problems mentioned. On the items concerning political violence, poverty, foreign debt, immorality, inflation, crime and corruption, more Guatemalans opted for the "neither" response than either the military or the civilians. We interpret these results as an indicator of deep alienation. This makes us wonder how strongly civilian government will be supported in Guatemala. Quite clearly, civilian government would need to demonstrate its ability to deal with these important issues to begin to build a favorable consensus regarding the democratic political process.

We next sought to determine the factors that are associated with support for military rule. To do this we formed an overall scale of support for military rule. We find that system support is positively associated with support for military rule, as is shown in Figure VII-3 below. This might come as a surprise to some, but if the discussion of system support presented earlier in this report is recalled, it will become clear that support for the system does not necessarily imply support for a democratic system. The relationship between the two variables is not particularly strong, however, as indicated by the very gentle slope of the line in the figure.

1 The nine items had an Alpha reliability coefficient of .85. In order to focus exclusively on those who believe that the military is more efficacious than civilian government, we recoded the items so as to assign one point if the respondent preferred the military option, and zero points if he/she did not. The items were then summed and transformed into a 0-100 range.
Table VII-2. Efficacy of Civilian versus Military Rule

Unemployment

- Elected: 47.6%
- Military: 10.9%
- DK: 12.2%
- Neither: 29.4%

Worker/Peasant Abuses

- Elected: 47.2%
- Military: 10.3%
- DK: 19.5%
- Neither: 22.8%

Political Violence

- Elected: 32.9%
- Military: 18.1%
- DK: 14.2%
- Neither: 34.7%

Poverty

- Elected: 34.3%
- Military: 8.3%
- DK: 13.8%
- Neither: 43.6%
Corruption

- Military 13.7%
- Elected 24.2%
- Neither 47.1%
- DK 15.0%

Source: 1993 Guatemalan Democracy Study
A second variable related to support for military rule is whether the respondent or member of the respondent's family has suffered from political violence. As we see in Figure VII-4, those who have so suffered are more supportive of the military than those who have not. Once again this finding might surprise some readers. But recall that military rule is seen by Guatemalans as being more effective in controlling violence, both political and criminal. As a result, those who have suffered from such violence might be more supportive of military rule unless, of course, they blame the military for the violence in the first place. No doubt some of the victims of military violence do indeed blame the military, but the majoritarian tendency in the sample was to side with the military.

**Support for Military Rule and System Support**

![Graph showing support for military rule across different levels of system support](image)

**Source:** Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

**Figure VII-3**

The final item that produced a significant relationship with support for military rule was religion. As shown in Figure VII-5, Catholics were more supportive than Protestants. Catholics are more likely to represent a more traditional set of attitudes than Protestants in the Guatemalan context. This may be part of the explanation for the difference.
Even though no other variables (in the multiple regression equation) proved to have a significant relationship with support for military rule, we did find that wealth was nearly significant and, when looked at in the bivariate situation, was significant (.02). Figure VII-6 shows that poorer Guatemalans expressed higher support for military rule than the wealthier.

![Support for Military Rule and Victim of Political Violence](image)

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Survey, 1993

Figure VII-4
Support for Military Rule and Religion

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure VII-5

Support for Military Rule and Wealth

Source: Guatemalan Democracy Study, 1993

Figure VII-6
VIII. Conclusions

We have examined the results of two sets of national surveys, a cross-national study of attitudes toward the political process in principal (most often capital) cities in the six countries in Central America undertaken in 1992, and a national (urban and rural) study of the same basic set of attitudes for Guatemala undertaken in 1993. We have used the former survey to provide a basis for cross-national comparisons in order to better understand the results of the latter survey.

We need to begin this analysis by noting that in historical terms, Guatemala has only a very limited experience with democracy. Except for two brief periods, 1944-1954, and 1984 to the present, Guatemala's politics has been dominated by the military, governing by the use of authoritarian means, although sometimes disguised in democratic forms. For example, dictators have used fraudulent elections to legitimize their rule. In this respect, there is little on which to base the development of a democratic set of political beliefs. In the balance of this chapter, we will summarize Guatemalan national public opinion on key elements of the belief necessary to promote stable, democratic development in Guatemala. We will look first at the legitimacy accorded the forms of government, i.e., the level of support for the system. We will then look at support for democratic liberties, both in terms of support for widespread participation and in terms of support for the right of minority dissent. Then, we will examine the interrelationship of the two sets of valuative underpinnings of a stable democratic order: system support and democratic liberties. Finally, we will look at certain political issues of concern to an ongoing democratic process, such as political violence, conventional political participation and preference for military over civilian rule.

System Support

The first important set of attitudes are those regarding system support, defined as the legitimacy accorded by respondents to the political system in general and to its component institutions. Attitudes covered under this rubric include the overall acceptance and support of the system of government, and of political institutions, such as the legislature, the courts, the military and the principal agents for the protection of citizens' rights. System support is the attitudinal underpinning of a stable political order, one able to manage conflict within the confines of its political institutions. Reviewing the principal conclusions on this set of variables, drawn from the two surveys, we may note the following:

- Guatemala sat in the middle for most elements of system support when compared with other countries in Central America (1992 survey).
highest system support on an institution-by-institution basis was expressed for the human rights ombudsman, the lowest for congress and the political parties (1993 Survey). At a conceptual level, respondents expressed an almost universal patriotic pride as Guatemalans, but felt that their political system did not defend human rights.

The mean for a set of questions to determine an overall score for system support was 40, indicating support that was only "lukewarm" toward political institutions and the political system as a whole.

Higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of system support. Guatemala City is associated with lower levels of system support, probably as a function of higher educational levels.

System support is highest among the poorest segments of the population, lowest among the wealthier segments.

The indigenous population (as measured by form of dress) expresses lower system support than the ladino population, despite that lower education is associated with higher system support.

Only K'iche speakers stand out as having dramatically lower system support than other indigenous peoples (indigenous measured by language spoken) and ladinos.

The single most important factor in explaining system support is ethnicity, followed by wealth and then by education.

To sum up our findings regarding system support, Guatemalans demonstrate only a modest level of support for their system of government. The most important elements associated with system support are ethnic background, wealth and education of the respondents. K'iche' speakers are the least likely to support the political system. The poorest and the most educated segments of the population are also likely to be the least supportive of the political system.

Support for Democratic Liberties

System support, that is to say, support for a stable political order, does not guarantee democracy. Loyalty to the system may very well serve to bind individuals to an authoritarian order as well as it can bind individuals to the support of a democratic order. Therefore, we looked at an additional set of values that focus on the acceptance of democracy within the context of a stable political order. Support for democracy can be couched in terms of belief in a system of widespread political participation (extensive political cultures) and/or support for the right of minority dissent (inclusive political cultures).
Both elements are necessary for a full-fledged democratic order, one that assures the maximum liberty to participate in the making of rational and effective choices, and one that tolerates a full range of democratic dissent. The following conclusions can be drawn regarding respondents views of both the exclusive and inclusive aspects of democratic culture:

- Guatemalans, in comparison with other Central American countries (1992 survey), have little tolerance for the right to dissent and for conventional modes of participation (legal demonstrations, communal decision making and election campaigns).

- The majority of Guatemalans in the 1993 survey are more concerned about protection of their own liberties than they are about rights of other Guatemalans to express dissent.

- According to our index of democratic liberties, males are more likely than females to support democratic liberties.

- Higher levels of education are associated with higher levels of support for democratic liberties.

- Indigenous peoples express higher support for democratic liberties than do ladinos, above all with respect to the right to dissent.

- K'iche', among indigenous peoples, are more likely to express support for democratic liberties than other groups, according to data from the broad national sample. Looking at the data from a special sample of indigenous peoples, we found that both Mam and K'iche' score higher on their support of democratic liberties than do other indigenous groups.

- Indigenous peoples, especially the K'iche', are less likely to be supportive of the Guatemalan political system while, at the same time, being more supportive of democratic liberties, above all the right to dissent.

- Education was the strongest predictor of increasing support for democratic liberties. Higher education is associated with higher levels of support for democratic liberties. Gender was second, with women lower than men in their support of democratic liberties. Ethnicity, defined in terms of use of Indian garb, was the next best predictor of democratic liberties, and being a K'iche' increased the likelihood of support of democratic liberties.

In summary, Guatemalans as a whole demonstrate low levels of support in comparison to elsewhere in Central America for democratic attitudes regarding both the...
right to participate and the right to dissent. They are more concerned about their individual range of political action than the rights of other Guatemalans. Education was the strongest predictor of higher levels of support of democratic liberties, suggesting that education may serve as a route for the formation of such beliefs.

The Interrelationship of System Support and Democratic Norms

The prospect for democratic development is a function of the relationship between support of the overall political system and the support for democratic participation and democratic liberties. We have examined each set of attitudes separately. Combining these attitudes by means of a typology, we can identify four different regime types: stable democracies, unstable democracies, oligarchic regimes and democratic breakdown regimes. This typology begins with the assumption that regimes being analyzed are all at least formally democratic, having, at a minimum, competitive regular elections with widespread political participation. As its history context demonstrates, Guatemala is a recent arrival to the category of a formal democratic order (the last eight years). Using this typology and looking at the distribution of attitudes among respondents in the 1992 and 1993 surveys, we have drawn the following conclusions:

In comparative perspective (based on the 1992 survey):

- Guatemala is the Central American country with the lowest proportion of its citizens supporting stable democracy.
- Guatemala is the Central American country with the highest proportion of its citizens whose attitudes support "democratic breakdown".
- Guatemala is the country with the fewest individuals who support democracy overall (are in either the stable or unstable democracy cells).

In terms of a national sample (based on the 1993 data):

- The most important difference in the distribution of overall attitudes toward democracy is according to ethnicity. Indigenous peoples have twice as high a proportion of their respondents in the stable democratic cell as do ladinos. (K'iche' are to be found in the unstable democratic cell because of their low level of system support.)
- The largest concentration of Guatemalans are in the democratic breakdown cell, with the exception of the K'iche'.

One of the implications of this analysis is that Guatemala's democracy is set on an extremely weak attitudinal base. The events in May, 1993, suggest that mobilization in
support of democracy is possible under certain circumstances. However, it is clear that the attitudinal base needs to be strengthened to make such crises less likely in the future.

**Political Violence In Guatemala**

Violent solutions to political disagreements represent the breakdown of democratic principles. Democracy, in essence, is a system to contain political violence and direct dispute resolution toward peaceful channels, within the context of the freedom to express and tolerate dissident viewpoints. Violence has been a hallmark of Guatemalan history. Repression has been a tool of authoritarian regimes throughout Guatemala's political history. Violence also has been a tool for political change. The future of Guatemalan democracy must include the ability to limit and control violence and to open up the possibility of peaceful expression of alternative viewpoints. The attitudes of the Guatemalans surveyed regarding political violence resulted in the following observations and conclusions:

- Around 17 percent of those interviewed report being victims of what can be defined as political violence.
- Higher levels of education are associated with a greater likelihood of being a victim of political violence.
- The vast majority of Guatemalans believe that they live in a society with a high level of political violence (1992 study).
- The three most commonly cited causes of political violence are inequality of land distribution, followed by the gap between rich and poor and lastly by the differences between indigenous peoples and ladinos.
- The higher the educational level, the more likely that an individual will feel that the income gap is a cause of political violence.
- Higher levels of support for democratic liberties are found among those who believe that political violence has social causes. Conversely, lower levels of system support are found among those who believe that political violence has social causes.
- The greater one believes in the ability of the police, the Army and the courts to defend the right to life in Guatemala, the greater support for the system one has, but the lower the support for democratic liberties. Stated in other terms, faith in the police, the Army and the courts goes with support for the political system. A lack of faith in these institutions goes with support for basic democratic liberties. (These institutions are seen largely as agents of repression and not as agents to protect citizens' rights.)
Surprisingly high levels of Guatemalans (from 13-22 percent) support violent political measures, such as land seizures, building takeovers and coups. The greatest support level is for coups (22 percent).

Takeovers of land and buildings are more likely to be supported by the poor and less-well educated.

A large majority of those interviewed opposed the use of state violence as a means to stop political violence.

Only a slim majority supported democracy over the use of the 'mano dura' (authoritarian rule).

The higher the educational level, the more likely that the individual will oppose state violence and oppose the mano dura.

The younger a respondent is, the more likely he or she is to oppose state violence and choose democratic participation over the mano dura;

System support is related to more support for state violence and the mano dura, while support for democratic liberties is associated with more opposition to state violence and more support for democracy over the mano dura.

The conclusions reached regarding these data suggest two broad areas of concern. One area relates to the means of preserving public order. Reflecting historical patterns, the police, the military and the courts, which in a democracy represent forces of order that can assure the peaceful resolution of conflict, are viewed as agents of state violence and repression. The other area of concern is the degree to which Guatemalans accept the notion of the use of force, and above all the maximum force expressed in a coup, as appropriate means of effecting political change.

In a more positive vein, a high portion of those interviewed do not endorse state violence as the means to controlling political violence. Perhaps the failure of military action to win a victory over the guerrillas may have conditioned this set of responses.
Conventional Political Participation

The forms of political participation most closely associated with stable democracy are such activities as voting, petitioning officials either informally or formally and organizing at the community level or through interest groups to promote a specific set of policies. Our data allow us to draw the following conclusions regarding these forms of participation:

From the 1992 survey:

- Guatemala demonstrates a high level of community participation, second highest in the region.
- Guatemala ranks in the middle with respect to respondent involvement in community problem solving.
- Guatemala ranks in the middle among the countries in the region regarding frequency of contacting public officials.
- Guatemala has the second lowest voting turnout rate of all countries in the region;

From the 1993 survey:

- Communal participation was related only to levels of system support and religiosity. Higher levels of communal participation were associated with higher levels of system support. The more frequently respondents attended church, the higher their communal participation.
- Participation in occupation-related groups is linked to education, gender and ethnicity. Males are more likely to participate than females. Better educated individuals are more likely to participate than lesser educated individuals. Ladinos are more likely to participate than indigenous peoples, except in the case of cooperatives.
- Contacting the mayor (as opposed to other levels of government) was the most common form of communication with public officials. Higher educated respondents are more likely to contact the mayors. Rural Guatemalans are also more likely to do so than urban Guatemalans. Indigenous peoples are more likely to contact their mayors than are ladinos.
- There are significant opportunities for stimulating democracy at the local level.

In sum, the Guatemalans in our study, whether they are in urban or rural areas, are most comfortable with participating at the community level. Formally, the current
Constitution encourages that sort of participation. What may be needed is an expansion of the opportunities and the skills to undertake such participation.

Support for Military or Civilian Rule

We have examined the role of state violence in preserving an existing political order. We have also examined the overall possibilities for the maintenance or breakdown of the Guatemalan democratic order. Finally, we need to turn to the option, always present in Guatemalan history, between military and civilian control of the political order. Our data allow us to reach the following conclusions regarding the choice between military or civilian control of government and the political process:

From the 1992 survey: Guatemala had the highest score of all countries in the region on support for a military coup—over one-quarter of the residents of Guatemala City in 1992 supported military intervention in politics.

From the 1993 survey:

- More than a third of the respondents in May of 1993 on a national level supported a coup.
- A smaller portion (10-15 percent) of those responding believed that military rule was more effective than civilian rule in dealing with a wide range of public issues.
- System support is weakly albeit positively associated with support for military rule.
- Those who have suffered political violence are more likely to support military rule.
- Catholics are more supportive of military rule than Protestants or those who profess no religious beliefs.
- Poorer Guatemalans expressed higher support for military rule than wealthier Guatemalans.

As the data suggest, while the majority of the Guatemalans in our study do not support the idea of a coup, a significant proportion do in fact support a military takeover. This represents a constant danger to the existing democratic order, a danger that argues for increased efforts to strengthen democratic institutions and processes and to strengthen the attitudinal support of Guatemalans for democracy.

In Summary
Using the 1992 survey to compare Guatemala City with the other Central American capital cities and the 1993 survey to probe a national sample of Guatemalans, we have described the key values that shape the vision that Guatemalans have of their political order and the possibility for its development as a democracy. We have noted that Guatemalans start out with an important handicap—the absence of the long tradition of democratic practice.

The results of this analysis are that Guatemalans demonstrate only a modest level of support for their system of government in comparison to other Central Americans. They demonstrate a low level of support for attitudes regarding both the right to participate and the right to dissent, basic liberties associated with a full-blown democratic order. Guatemalans, when compared with other Central Americans, are the least likely of all Central Americans to support a democratic political order. In short, the future of democracy in Guatemala rests on very weak attitudinal supports.

The brightest ray of hope in the data we have gathered comes from two observations. Education is the best predictor of higher levels of support for democratic liberties. The groups that historically have benefited the least from the political system, the indigenous population, most notably the K'iche and the Mam, demonstrate considerable support for democratic liberties, for the right of all Guatemalans to participate and to enjoy the right of dissent.

Political development literature suggests that the expansion of access to the educational process may be a powerful tool for strengthening the democratic order. Clearly, our data support this notion. Those seeking to promote democracy in Guatemala need to take this into consideration.

Support for grassroots participation in Guatemala, particularly among indigenous peoples, is likely to expand support for democratic liberties. Thus, it is likely to expand the possibilities for democratic development. This will be more likely to be the case if expansion of such liberties goes hand in hand with access to and participation in local and national government, Then Guatemala may move closer to broad-based attitudinal support for democracy.
APPENDIX ONE

Calculation of Weight Factor for 1993 Guatemala Democratic Norms Sample

I. The sample underestimates the poor, uneducated portion of the population.

1. One major reason for this was that the sample interviewed an equal number of people outside of Guatemala City in urban areas as it did in rural areas. That is, an equal number of sample segments was selected from the urban and rural lists of segments even though the census data show a much higher proportion of rural than urban.

2. According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Estimaciones de población urbana y rural por departamento y municipio, 1990-95), 38% of Guatemala is urban and 63% is rural. The sample was 62% urban and 38% rural.

3. Weighting the sample to correct this bias, results in weight factors of .614 for the urban respondents and 1.632 for the rural.

4. However, correcting the sample by this factor does not sufficiently correct the sample's underestimate of poorly educated Guatemalans, a factor to be discussed below.

5. Another part of that explanation is a result of the sample design, which excluded the most remote census segments
from the population (those with fewer than 10 dwelling units), in order to reduce the cost of the field work.

6. Another component of the explanation has to do with rejection rates. While we are still waiting for the rejection rate data from ASIES, and while we know that rejection is higher in the cities than in the countryside, we suspect that within the countryside, it was higher among the most isolated individuals, especially those with no knowledge of Spanish, even though our interviewers were equipped to administer the questionnaire in the major Indian languages.

7. We know that our sample design excluded mono-lingual speakers of the minor Indian languages, most of whom can be assumed to have very little or no formal education.

II. The evidence of the undersampling of the poorly educated is that the sample shows only 6.6% of the population illiterate, when the 1981 population census (p. 78) shows the illiteracy rate at 53% for the 18 and older population (identical age group to our sample frame).

1. The questionnaire only asked about literacy with those with less than 2 years of education, and hence missed many Guatemalans with 2 or more years of education who were, nonetheless, educated. It is usually assumed that three full years of school are needed to achieve literacy. Those in the sample with 3 or fewer years of education = 37%.

III. The sample also seems to have underestimated the rural portion of the population. The 1981 census (p. 37) shows 67% rural, while the sample shows 37.5%
IV. These two census-derived parameters, however, are ambiguous and problematical, since

1. The definition of literacy and urban/rural are subjective.

   A. The census defines literate as "being able to read a simple passage in Spanish or another language." In fact, we suspect that few people were required to read such a passage in the course of the census, and even fewer Guatemalans in Indian dress were given a passage in their own language (or Spanish for that matter).

   B. Urban is defined in the census by nomenclature rather than population size: "ciudad" "villa" or "pueblo" are taken as urban, whereas "aldea" "caserío" or "finca" were taken as rural. As a result, the 1981 census finds that 35% of the population of the Department of Guatemala is rural.

2. Conclusion: these two variables cannot be used successfully to weight the sample, even though the large differences between census and sample do suggest the need for such weighing.

V. The only objective criterion we could devise is years of education completed. We do not feel that this variable is subject to subjective interpretation the way that literacy/illiteracy and urban/rural are. These data are available in the 1981 census¹, broken down by age cohorts, thus allowing for the exclusion of the population too young to be included in the survey (younger than 18).

1. The only difficulty that remains, however, is adjusting for the increases in education since 1981.

2. We made this adjustment by assuming that the annual percentage increase in education from 1981 through 1993 was identical to the overall increase in education (defined as % of population with at least some schooling) from 1973 (the prior population census\(^2\)) to 1981 (the most recent census). It was not possible to use the earlier census to establish a longer time frame for this projection since 59.3% of the 1964 census had missing data for the education variable.

VI. According to the United Nations,\(^3\) in 1973, 50.4% of the economically active population 10 years and older had not attended any school. In 1981, this figure had dropped to 36.5.

1. This is a 13.9% decline over 8 years, or 1.7% per year.

2. That would mean that from 1981-1993, a 12 year period, the decline could have been 12 x 1.7 = 20.4%. That is, a 20.4% decline in not attending school by 1993, or 16.1%.

3. This would mean that in 1993, 16.1% of those 10 years and older (down from 36.5% in 1981) should have not attended school. A higher % should be found among those in the 18 and over cohorts.

\(^2\)Dirección General de Estadística, Ministerio de Economía, Guatemala, VIII Censo de población y III de habitación, 26 de marzo de 1973: Resultado de tabulación por muestreo: población, serie II, tomo I, n.d.

\(^3\)Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990, pp. 60-62.
A. But, in 1981, 35% of 10 year olds had no school, vs. 37% of 20-24 year olds, so the underestimate of those with no education resulting from the inclusion of the 10-17 age groups when our interest is 18 and over, is very minor. We ignore it here.

4. The sample, which includes 18 and older, shows 16.4% with no school. This is almost identical to our estimate and suggests no weighing of sample is in order.

VII. The weaknesses of this estimate

1. It refers to a subset of the entire population (economically active) and therefore is dominated by males.

2. The 1981 census shows that 38% of males 18 and over were illiterate, compared to 54% of females.

3. This means that male illiteracy rates are lower than female, and therefore the rate of decline, 1981-93 of illiteracy among the economically active population was probably lower than in the population as a whole (since it started from a lower base). But since we can't be certain about this.

4. The second weakness is that it deals with 10 and older, whereas our sample is 18 and older.

VIII. So, another approach: examine the decline in Guatemalans with no school from 1973-1981 by age cohort.

1. This is not possible because the 1973 census figures report those with 0-3 years of school and do not separate out those with no school.
2. But, we do have the 0-3 census data for both 1973 and 1981 that we can examine by cohort as in the following table.

Guatemalan Population with 3 or Fewer Years of School:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>30-65+</th>
<th>Weighted Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>70.9</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. This estimate shows a decline of 8.6% from 1973-81, or 1.1% per year (8.6/8 = 1.1).

4. This would mean that over the 12-years, 1981-1992, the decline would have been 13.2% (1.1% x 12) for the population in the 0-3 year education grouping.

5. Thus, by 1993, the % with 3 or fewer years of education should be 56.4%.

6. The sample, however, shows only 37.0% with 3 or fewer years of education.

7. The results of the two projections are shown on Figure 1:
8. This suggests that our suspicions of underrepresentation of the lower levels of education are confirmed.

9. To correct for this, we weight up the lower educated respondents to the survey, and weigh down the more highly educated. This would increase the weight of the 444
respondents with 3 or fewer years of education, and
decrease the weight of the 756 respondents with more
education. In order to have all cases weighted, this
requires the inclusion of the 3 respondents who did not give
their education. We assume that they are in the 4 years
and above group (since 2/3 of the sample was in that
group). The weight factor (wtfac) would be as follows:

10. Compute wtfac = 0.


12. If (P110 le 3)wtfac = 1.53.

13. If (P110 ge 4)wtfac = .69.

14. weight by wtfac.

IX. What impact does this weighting have on the other variables in the
study?

1. It increases the illiterate portion of the sample from 6.6% to
10% (but recall, this question was not ask this question
well).

2. It only slightly increases the % of self-defined Indians (from
33% to 35%) and does not change more than a fraction of
a % the language item.

3. It does increase the "trabajadores agrícolas" from 12.8% to
16.6%.

4. Its most positive impact is to increase the rural part of the
sample from 37.5% to 42.9%, still low, however.
5. Weighting by rural/urban as described above, does not sufficiently correct the education variable, raising the 0-3 years education group to 43.8 percent when it should be 56.7 percent.

6. We conclude, therefore, that weighting by education, a variable found to be very important world-wide in increasing political tolerance, is more appropriate than weighting by rural/urban.

The results of this weighting on the education variable are shown on the following table:

**Weighted sample:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cum Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>301</td>
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<td>25.1</td>
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<td>2DO. DE PRIMARIA</td>
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<td>8.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>3RO. DE PRIMARIA</td>
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<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5TO. DE PRIMARIA</td>
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<td>UNIVERSIDAD INCOMPLE</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIVERSIDAD COMPLETA</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>99.7</td>
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<td>POST-GRADO</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.3</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Missing cases</strong></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Unweighted sample:

**P110 CUAL FUE EL ULTIMO GRADO QUE APROBO EN LA ESCUELA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cum Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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