

Political Culture of Democracy in El Salvador and in the Americas, 2014: Democratic Governance across 10 Years of the AmericasBarometer

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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID, and other donors. It then sends the draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for the addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into other languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country and comparative reports. Country-specific analyses are carried out by local teams.

While USAID has been the largest supporter of the surveys that form the core of the *AmericasBarometer*, Vanderbilt University provides important ongoing support. In addition, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden supported the project as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted as close in time as possible, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of the *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding former and current graduate students located throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert individuals and institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
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Prologue: Background of the Study

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The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) is a unique tool for assessing and comparing citizens' experiences with democratic governance across individuals within countries, across sub-national regions and countries, and over time. This report presents one set of those assessments, focused around the latest year of data collection: 2014. This year marks a milestone for the project: LAPOP began the AmericasBarometer project in 2004 and we can today look back at a decade of change in public opinion within and across the Americas. The 2014 AmericasBarometer is the largest and most sophisticated survey of the Americas to date. When completed it will include 28 countries and over 50,000 interviews, the majority of which were collected using sophisticated computer software that adds yet another layer to LAPOP's meticulous quality control efforts. This prologue presents a brief background of the study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

While LAPOP has decades of experience researching public opinion, Vanderbilt University has housed and supported the research institute and the AmericasBarometer since 2004. LAPOP's foundations date to the 1970s, with the study of democratic values in Costa Rica by LAPOP founder Mitchell Seligson. LAPOP's studies of public opinion expanded as electoral democracies diffused across the region in the intervening decades and have continued to grow in number as these governments have taken new forms and today's administrations face new challenges. The AmericasBarometer measures democratic values, experiences, evaluations, and actions among citizens in the Americas and places these in a comparative context.

The AmericasBarometer project consists of a series of country surveys based on national probability samples of voting-age adults and containing a common core set of questions. The first set of surveys was conducted in 2004 in eleven countries; the second took place in 2006 and represented opinions from 22 countries across the region. In 2008, the project grew to include 24 countries and in 2010 and 2012 it included 26 countries from across the hemisphere. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer is based on national surveys from 28 countries in the Americas. LAPOP makes all reports from the project, as well as all country datasets, available free of charge for download from its website, www.LapopSurveys.org. The availability of these reports and datasets is made possible by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation,

and a number of other supporters of the project, who are acknowledged in a separate section at the end of this prologue.

Our key objective is to provide a dataset that advances accurate descriptions and understandings of public opinion and behavior across the Americas. We succeed in this effort to the extent that the AmericasBarometer is of interest and relevance to citizens; NGOs; public officials and their governments; the international donor and development communities; and academics. We strive to create datasets and reports that meet the rigorous standards to which we are held by our fellow academics while also being accessible and valuable to those evaluating and shaping democratic governance across the Americas. Our progress in producing the 2014 AmericasBarometer and this particular report can be categorized into four areas: questionnaire construction; sample design; data collection and processing; and reporting.

With respect to *questionnaire construction*, our first step in developing the 2014 AmericasBarometer was to develop a new core questionnaire. We believe that democracy is best understood by taking into account multiple indicators and placing those in comparative perspective. For this reason, we have maintained a common core set of questions across time and countries. This shared content focuses on themes that have become viewed as standard for the project: political legitimacy; political tolerance; support for stable democracy; participation of civil society and social capital; the rule of law; evaluations of local governments and participation within them; crime victimization; corruption victimization; and electoral behavior. To make room for new questions, we eliminated some previously-core items in the 2014 survey. To do so, we solicited input on a long list of questions we proposed for deletion from our partners across the region and, after complying with requests to restore some items, we settled on a reduced set of common modules to which we then added two types of questions: new common content and country-specific questions.

To develop new common content, we invited input from our partners across the Americas and then developed and led a series of three, multi-day questionnaire construction workshops in Miami, FL in the spring of 2013. Country team members, experts from academia, individuals from the international donor and development communities, faculty affiliates, and students attended and contributed to these workshops. Based on the discussions at these workshops we identified a series of modules that were piloted in pre-tests across the Americas. Some of these items received widespread support for inclusion from our partners and were refined and included as common content – such as a new set of questions related to state capacity and an extended module on crime and violence – while others were placed onto a menu of optional country-specific questions. At the same time, our country teams worked with us to identify new topics of relevance to their given countries and this process produced a new set of country-specific questions included within the AmericasBarometer. Questionnaires from the project can be found online at www.LapopSurveys.org, and at the conclusion of each country report.

LAPOP adheres to best practices in survey methodology as well as with respect to the treatment of human subjects. Thus, as another part of our process of developing study materials, we developed a common “informed consent” form and each study was reviewed and approved by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and took and passed certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the questionnaire appendix of each study.



With respect to *sample design*, we continued our approach of applying a common sample design to facilitate comparison. LAPOP national studies are based on stratified probability samples of a minimum of approximately 1,500 voting-age non-institutionalized adults in each country. In most countries our practice is to use quotas at the household level to ensure that the surveys are both nationally representative and cost effective. Detailed descriptions of the samples are available online and contained in the annexes of each country publication.

In 2013 LAPOP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the premier Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan and one of the world's leading experts in survey methodology, Dr. Jim Lepkowski. Over the course of the year we worked with Dr. Lepkowski and his team of graduate students to review each previously developed sample design and to secure their input and advice on new designs.

Sample design typically relies on census information and maps. However, up-to-date information is not always available. To respond to this challenge, between 2013 and 2014, LAPOP developed a new software suite, which we call LASSO[®] (LAPOP Survey Sample Optimizer). This proprietary software allows us to estimate the number of dwellings in a given region using satellite images in the public domain, and then use a probabilistic method to locate sample segments (i.e., clusters) to draw a sample. While most of our sample designs are based on census data, we were able to successfully field test LASSO while working on the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

With respect to *data collection*, we have continued to innovate and increase the sophistication of our approach. The 2014 AmericasBarometer represented our most expansive use of handheld electronic devices for data collection to date. At the core of this approach is our use of the “Adgys”[®] questionnaire app designed by our partners in Cochabamba, Bolivia. The use of electronic devices for interviews and data entry in the field reduces data entry errors, supports the use of multiple languages, and permits LAPOP to track, on a daily basis, the progress of the survey, down to the location of interviews (which are monitored in real time but not recorded into the public datasets in order to preserve respondents' privacy) and the timing of the interviews. The team in Bolivia worked long hours to program the samples and questionnaires into the Adgys platform for the 18 countries in which we used this technology. In 2 other countries we continued our use of PDAs and a Windows Mobile-based software application supported by our hardworking partners at the University of Costa Rica.

Throughout the process of collecting the survey data, we worked in multiple ways to minimize error and maximize quality. We continued the process of pilot testing all questionnaires and training all interviewers in each country in accordance with the standards of LAPOP. In the process of collecting the data we monitored fieldwork in real time, when possible, and worked with local partners to replace (a small number of) low quality interviews while the study was in the field. For the few countries that still used paper questionnaires, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the electronic files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who then shipped those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing to ensure that the data transferred from the paper to the dataset was as close to error free as possible. In the case of some countries using electronic handheld devices for data entry in the field, a small subset of interviews were conducted with paper questionnaires due to security concerns; in these cases we followed a similar process by which the data were entered by the local team and audited for quality control by LAPOP at Vanderbilt. For all electronic databases, we checked the files for duplicates and consistency

between the coding in the questionnaire and the database. We also verified that the sample was implemented according to the design. In the few cases where we detected issues in the 2014 round, we worked with our local partners to resolve the problem, for example via the re-entry of a small set of paper questionnaires.

Finally, with respect to *reporting*, we have continued our practice of making reports based on survey data accessible and readable to the layperson. This means that our reports make use of easy-to-comprehend charts to the maximum extent that is possible. And, where the analysis is more complex, such as in the case of ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression analysis, we present results in standardized, easy-to-read graphs. Authors working with LAPOP on reports for the 2014 AmericasBarometer were provided a new set of code files generated by our exceptionally skilled data analyst, Carole Wilson, which allows them to create these graphs using Stata 12.0 or higher. The analyses presented in our reports are sophisticated and accurate: they take into account the complex sample design (i.e., stratified and clustered) and reporting on confidence intervals around estimates and statistical significance. Yet our approach to presenting these results is to make them as reader-friendly as possible. To that end we also include elsewhere in this report a note on how to interpret the data analyses.

We worked hard this round to turn around individual country results as quickly as possible. In a number of countries, this effort took the form of our newly developed “Rapid Response Report,” based in a MS PowerPoint template, which provided a mechanism for country teams to organize and present key preliminary findings in a matter of weeks following the completion of fieldwork and data processing. A number of these rapid reports formed the basis of government and public presentations and, given the level of interest and engagement in these sessions, we hope to see use of our rapid reports increase in years to come.

As another mechanism intended to increase the speed with which country-specific findings are disseminated, we changed the format of our country studies this year. In the past we asked country team authors to wait for the processing of the entire multi-country dataset, an effort that takes many months due to variation in timing of fieldwork and the effort involved in carefully auditing, cleaning, labeling, and merging the many datasets. For this year we asked our country team authors to develop a minimum of three chapters that focus specifically on topics of relevance to their countries. When a given country report was commissioned by USAID, the content of these chapters was based on input from the mission officers in that country. In other countries it was based on the local team’s or donor’s priorities.

Once fieldwork and data processing was complete for a particular country, we sent the 2014 national study dataset and a time-series dataset containing all data for that country for each round of the AmericasBarometer to our country team who then used these datasets to prepare their contributions. The resulting chapters are rich in detail, providing comparisons and contrasts across time, across sub-regions within the country, and across individuals by sub-group. To complement these chapters, we assigned ourselves the task of using the comparative dataset, once it was ready for analysis, to develop a set of chapters on key topics related to crime and violence; democratic governance (including corruption and economic management); local participation; and democratic values. The writing of these chapters was divided between the LAPOP group at Vanderbilt and a set of scholars of public opinion and political behavior with expertise in the Latin American and Caribbean region and who have worked with LAPOP on such reports in the past. In contrast to the country-



specific chapters, the objective of these chapters is to place topics and countries within the region in a comparative context.

This report that you have before you is one of a series of reports produced by LAPOP and our team to showcase key findings from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. It is the result of many drafts. Once a draft was completed and submitted to the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt, it was reviewed and returned to the authors for improvements. Revised studies were then submitted and reviewed again, and then returned to the country teams for final corrections and edits. In the case of country reports commissioned by USAID, we delivered the penultimate chapter drafts to USAID for their critiques. The country teams and LAPOP Central then worked to incorporate this feedback, and produced the final formatted version for print and online publication.

This report and the data on which it is based are the end products of a multi-year process involving the effort of and input by thousands of individuals across the Americas. We hope that our reports and data reach a broad range of individuals interested in and working on topics related to democracy, governance, and development. Given variation in preferences over the timeline for publishing and reporting on results from the 2014 AmericasBarometer, some printed reports contain only country-specific chapters, while others contain both country-specific and comparative chapters. All reports, and the data on which they are based, can be found available for free download on our website: www.LapopSurveys.org.

The AmericasBarometer is a region-wide effort. LAPOP is proud to have developed and coordinated with a network of excellent research institutions across the Americas. The following tables list the institutions that supported and participated in the data collection effort in each country.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		 
El Salvador		
Guatemala	 <p data-bbox="846 772 1157 919">Universidad Rafael Landívar Tradición Jesuita en Guatemala</p>	
Honduras	 <p data-bbox="618 961 873 1077">FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo de Honduras</p>	 <p data-bbox="1068 1035 1336 1098">Hagamos Democracia</p>
Mexico	 <p data-bbox="654 1234 846 1255">Opinión Pública y Mercados</p>	 <p data-bbox="963 1220 1450 1245">ITAM INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO</p>
Nicaragua		
Panama	 <p data-bbox="881 1581 1011 1612">Centro de Iniciativas Democráticas</p>	



Andean/Southern Cone

Argentina		
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		
Paraguay		
Peru		
Uruguay		
Venezuela		

Caribbean	
Bahamas	 <p>PublicDomain Research & Strategy</p>
Belize	 <p>B&A Borge y Asociados</p>
Dominican Republic	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p><i>Gallop Republic Dominicana, S.A.</i></p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;">  <p>intec Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo</p> </div> </div>
Guyana	
Haiti	<p>Université d'Etat d'Haiti</p> 
Jamaica	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA</p>
Suriname	 <p>DataFruit Your one-stop shop for fieldwork.</p>
Trinidad & Tobago	 <p>THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO</p>



Canada and United States

Canada	
United States	



Acknowledgements

Conducting national surveys across every independent country in mainland North, Central, and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean, requires extensive planning, coordination, and effort. The most important effort is that donated by individual citizens across 28 countries in the Americas, who as survey respondents either patiently worked with us as we pre-tested each country survey, or took the time to respond to the final questionnaire. It is due to their generosity that we are able to present this study and so we begin with a heartfelt note of gratitude to each respondent to the AmericasBarometer survey.

Each stage of the project has involved countless hours of work by our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, and donors. We thank all these individuals for their commitment to high quality public opinion research. Let us also make some specific acknowledgments.

The AmericasBarometer project has been made possible by core support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Vanderbilt University. We owe a debt of gratitude to both of these institutions. At USAID Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite have consistently contributed constructive insights to the project and facilitated its use as a tool for policymakers. At Vanderbilt John Geer has been a tireless advocate of the project, which is fortunate to be housed within and benefit from a department that is brimming with talent. We gratefully acknowledge the interest and support of the staff, students, and faculty in the department of political science, in other research units such as the Center for Latin American Studies, in the Office of Contract and Research Administration, and in the leadership at Vanderbilt. Support for selected data collection efforts associated with the 2014 AmericasBarometer came from USAID, Vanderbilt, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Tinker Foundation, Environics, Florida International University, and the Embassy of Sweden. We thank the individuals that we have worked with at each of these institutions for their important contributions.

We take special note of the LAPOP staff members who collectively put in tens of thousands of hours of work into this project, adroitly employing new skills and conscientiously keeping an eye on the smallest of details. These exceptional staffers are, in alphabetical order, Rubí Arana, Nicole Hinton, Daniel Montalvo, Ana María Montoya, Diana Orcés (now at Oakland University), Georgina Pizzolitto, Mariana Rodríguez, Emily Saunders, and Carole Wilson. We remain grateful as always to Tonya Mills, who generously shares her time with us and the department of political science as she works to manage a large and complex set of contracts and requirements. We thank Fernanda Boidi, who works with LAPOP out of an office in Montevideo, Uruguay, for her superb work on so many different aspects of our project. We also thank Eduardo Marengo, working from his home in Nicaragua, for his assistance in our efforts to disseminate our studies to diverse audiences in clear and informative ways. In addition, we thank Dr. Mary Malone for her expert advice on our development of the comparative discussion and analyses regarding crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas within this report.

We take seriously the development of new research capacities and scholars in the field of public opinion research and we find LAPOP provides a highly effective mechanism for these efforts.

Yet we in turn benefit immensely from the intellect and efforts contributed by our students. Supporting the 2014 AmericasBarometer was an exceptional group of young scholars. This includes our undergraduate research assistants John Clinkscales, Christina Folds, and Maya Prakash. It also includes several individuals who successfully completed their dissertations in the course of its development: Margarita Corral, Alejandro Díaz-Domínguez, Brian Faughnan, Mason Moseley, Mariana Rodríguez, and Vivian Schwartz-Blum. Others among our graduate students continue to work energetically on courses and dissertations while engaging in discussions and work related to the project: Fred Batista, Gabriel Camargo, Kaitlen Cassell, Oscar Castorena, Mollie Cohen, Claire Evans, Adrienne Girone, Matthew Layton, Whitney Lopez-Hardin, Trevor Lyons, Arturo Maldonado, Juan Camilo Plata, Gui Russo, Facundo Salles Kobilanski, Laura Sellers, Bryce Williams-Tuggle, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. We especially want thank those graduate students who worked alongside us as research assistants over the past two years on activities related to the development, implementation, auditing, analysis, and reporting of the 2014 AmericasBarometer.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries, and affiliations are listed below.

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We thank all of these people and institutions for their wonderful support.

Liz and Mitch
Nashville, Tennessee
November, 2014



Introduction

This report is the result of a research project on the political culture of Salvadorans based on a public opinion survey carried out from March 28th to April 30th, 2014 and managed by the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (*Fundación Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo*). This survey was executed under the auspice of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The report is part of a series of studies on El Salvador, including surveys carried out in 1991, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and the present one, in 2014. This research was based on a sample of 1,512 Salvadoran adults, representative of the population over the age of 18 residing in El Salvador. This sample was calculated with a 95% confidence level and a sampling error of $\pm 2.5\%$. The survey is part of a broader study on political culture in the countries of the Americas, the AmericasBarometer, directed by Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister.

The report is structured in two parts and consists of nine chapters. In the first part (*Insecurity, Governance, and Civil Society in El Salvador and the Americas*), five chapters are presented, which present the regional results of the AmericasBarometer: “Crime and Violence across the Americas,” “Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas,” “Corruption in the Americas,” “Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas,” and “A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas.” The second part, *Insecurity, Electoral Behavior, Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in El Salvador*, focuses on the results corresponding to the survey in El Salvador and consist of four chapters: “Citizen Security and Violence Prevention at the Local Level,” “Electoral Behavior and Political Parties,” “Civil Society and Citizen Participation,” and “Political Legitimacy and Tolerance.” Hereafter the most important results are presented.

The 2014 AmericasBarometer and this report mark an important milestone for LAPOP: we are now able to assess over a decade of values, assessments, and experiences that have been reported to us in first-hand accounts by citizens across the region. The AmericasBarometer surveys, spanning from 2004 to 2014, allow us to capture both change and continuity in the region on indicators that are vital to the quality and health of democracy across the Americas.

In looking back over the decade, one trend is clear: *citizens of the Americas are more concerned today about issues of crime and violence than they were a decade ago*. In Part I, the first chapter is devoted to understanding experiences associated with crime and insecurity in the region. The subsequent four chapters of Part I address topics that are considered “core” to the AmericasBarometer project: citizens’ assessments of the economy and corruption; their interactions with and evaluations of local government; and, their democratic support and attitudes. In each of these cases we identify key regional trends, developments, and sources of variation on these dimensions and examine links between these core issues and crime and insecurity. Thus, the goal of Part I is to provide a comparative perspective – across time, across countries, and across individuals – on issues that are central to democratic governance in the Americas, with a particular focus on how countries, governments, and citizens are faring in the face of the heightened insecurity that characterizes the region. Although this section of the report focuses largely on the region as a whole, in all chapters of Part I, the position of El Salvador is highlighted in graphs that make cross-country comparisons.

The first chapter demonstrates a number of ways in which the AmericasBarometer provides a unique tool for policymakers, academics, and others interested in issues related to crime, violence, and insecurity in the Americas. Data from police reports on crime can suffer from problems that make comparisons across countries and over time difficult; these include under-reporting by citizens, political pressures to adjust reports, and other problems. Data on homicides, in contrast, are sometimes viewed as more reliable, but in fact often obscure information such as where the crime took place and ultimately provide an overly narrow portrait of citizens' experiences, which can range across distinct types of crime: for example, from burglaries to extortion and from drug sales in the neighborhood to murders. The AmericasBarometer in general, and in particular with the addition of several new modules on crime and insecurity in the 2014 survey, provides a reliable and comprehensive database on citizens' experiences and evaluations of issues of crime and violence. Standardization of questionnaires that are administered by professional survey teams increases our ability to make comparisons across time, countries, and individuals and, as well, to investigate the correlates, causes, and consequences of crime, violence, and insecurity in the region.

Chapter 1 of the report documents change over time in the region with respect to citizens' perceptions of and experience with crime and violence. As noted above, citizens of the Americas are comparatively more concerned with issues related to security in 2014 than they have been since 2004. In 2014, on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 3 adults reports that the most important problem facing their country is one related to crime, violence, or insecurity.

Interestingly, average overall crime victimization rates have held steady for the region for the last decade, with the exception of a notable spike in 2010. As with just about any measure we examine in Part I, we find important differences within and across countries. Yet, *types* of crime experienced also vary across countries, which is another nuance examined in Chapter 1. While crime victimization in general matters, it is important to keep in mind that the types of crimes individuals experience and witness vary significantly according to the contexts in which they live.

One persistent theme in Part I of this report is that perceptions of insecurity in the region matter independently from crime victimization. Perceptions of insecurity and assessments of violence by citizens of the Americas are fueled by personal experiences *and* by the diffusions of news about the broader context; thus, being the victim of a crime is associated with higher levels of reported insecurity, and so is paying more attention to the media. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer we added to our standard module questions asking about safety concerns in locations close to the home and daily routines (given that our data affirm, as noted in Chapter 1, that most crime is experienced in proximity to where the individual lives). Specifically, the new questions asked how worried individuals are about safety on public transportation and in schools. Slightly more than 1 out of every 3 individuals across the Americas, on average, reports either a high level of fear for the likelihood of a family member being assaulted on public transportation and/or a high level of concern for the safety of children in school.

Chapters 2 through 5 focus on the broader set of standard dimensions of democratic governance typically considered part of the core thematic focus of the AmericasBarometer project: the economy, corruption, local government, and democratic values and support. In our analyses of these topics we considered not only major developments and notable findings for the region as a whole and over time, but we also considered the relevance of crime and violence to these dimensions.



Chapter 2 focuses on economic trends in the region and notes divergence between objective indicators of household wealth and subjective perceptions of households' financial situations. Objectively, the 2014 AmericasBarometer shows that citizens in across the region own more basic household goods than they have at any other time in the last decade. That said, gaps in wealth do continue to exist across groups, such that single individuals, those who are less educated, individuals with darker skin tones, and those who live in rural areas have comparatively lower wealth. Yet when citizens of the Americas are asked about their household financial situation, the proportion of people who say they are struggling to make ends meet has not improved noticeably in comparison to previous waves of the survey. Households may own more things, but they do not feel more financially secure.

Chapter 2 also looks beyond citizens' personal finances across the region and details how they assess national economic trends. On average, the national economy is viewed less positively than it was in recent waves of the survey. Across the Americas, citizen evaluations of the national economy are correlated with fluctuations in economic outcomes, but they also reflect differences in economic opportunity at the individual level as citizens who belong to economically and socially marginalized groups tend to have more negative opinions of national economic trends. Additionally, individuals throughout the Americas who live in high crime areas judge national economic performance more harshly.

Corruption is also frequent in many countries in the Americas. Chapter 3 shows that 1 in 5 people in an average country was asked to pay a bribe in the past year. While several countries saw corruption levels decrease significantly, these improvements are balanced out by corruption victimization levels increasing in other countries, leaving the overall average frequency of bribery in the Americas essentially the same as in most previous waves of the AmericasBarometer. This corruption is occurring in many different locations, including interactions with the police, local government officials, the courts, and in schools, health clinics, and workplaces. Moreover, individuals who live in areas where crime is common are more likely to report that they were asked for a bribe; while we cannot use these data to determine the reason for this association, there is a general correlation between insecurity and reported experience with poor governance for the region as a whole.

Given the frequency with which individuals are asked to pay bribes in the Americas, it is not surprising that many individuals consider corruption to be common among government officials. In fact, levels of perceived government corruption have changed relatively little since the AmericasBarometer first started surveying. The one bright spot in Chapter 3 is found in the fact that, despite the prevalence of corruption in many places in the region, a large majority rejects the idea that paying a bribe can occasionally be justified. This is true even among those individuals who were asked for a bribe in the last year. So while the high levels of corruption are likely to have political and economic costs for the region, the AmericasBarometer data suggest that many citizens of the Americas continue to reject the notion that these bribes are simply the cost of doing business.

It is typically the case that the level at which most citizens of the Americas interact with their government is local. In Chapter 4 we examine political participation in municipal government, evaluations of local services, and citizens' trust in local government. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer registered a new low in the rate of municipal meeting attendance in the Americas, with only 1 in 10 attending a meeting in the past 12 months. However, this low degree of engagement was balanced by an increase in citizens making demands of local officials. We find that those individuals in the Americas with the *greatest* and *least* satisfaction with local services are the most likely to make

demands, potentially indicating people engage with local governments when they are either successful in attaining services or when they are most in need of them.

Paralleling the increase in demand-making on local governments in the Americas, we find a small increase from 2012 in citizens' evaluations of general local services. Overall, citizens in nearly all countries in the region give their local government middling scores on local services. On average, for the region as a whole, local governments appear to be neither completely failing their citizens nor providing services that can be deemed outstanding in quality. Among a set of specific local services we find a small decrease from 2012 in evaluations of public schools and a slight increase in evaluations of public health care services; however, in both cases the average scores are in the middle of the scale.

With regard to trust in local governments, the 2014 AmericasBarometer finds a more pessimistic pattern across the Americas. The 2014 survey registered the lowest level of trust in local governments since 2004. The factors that most strongly predict an individual's trust in local government are experiences with corruption, physical insecurity, and satisfaction with local services, indicating a link between institutional trust and institutional performance.

Part I concludes with an assessment of the state of democratic legitimacy and democratic values in the Americas. Under this rubric, Chapter 5 considers support for democracy in the abstract, trust in a range of state institutions, support for the political system, political tolerance, and the attitudinal profiles that result from combining the latter two. In addition to regional comparisons for 2014, AmericasBarometer data now permit the assessment of a decade-long trend for each of these measures of democratic legitimacy. Of special emphasis in this chapter is on the institutions tasked with maintaining law and order – the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system – and how crime and violence may affect their legitimacy and, indeed, democratic support and values more broadly. Altogether, this chapter permits an inspection of the attitudinal foundations of democracy with an eye to one of its potential weak spots.

Our initial look at democracy's legitimacy in the Americas finds citizens strongly support democracy as form of government. While fairly stable over time, 2014 saw abstract support for democracy regress to one of its lowest levels in a decade. Going from this abstract notion of democracy to more particular political and social institutions changes the picture only somewhat. The armed forces and the Catholic Church maintain their pride of place as the most trusted institutions in the region; legislatures and, especially parties, continue to garner the least trust. But since 2012, trust has not increased in any major social, political, or state institution and, in most cases, it has decreased. Intriguingly, the ascent of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013 could not halt the slide in trust in the Catholic Church in the continent. The most precipitous drop was in trust in elections, a worrisome finding considering that roughly half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer held a national election in the time since our 2012 study. Among law-and-order institutions in the region – armed forces, national police, the justice system – public trust in the latter is lowest and has declined the most since 2012. Levels of trust in the armed forces and national police institutions appear most volatile where these institutions have recently played highly visible roles in maintaining public order. Individuals whose neighborhoods are increasingly insecure are losing trust in the police and courts. Law and order institutions in the region, it seems, must earn the public's trust by successfully providing the key public goods of safety and justice.



System support – the inherent value citizens place in the political system – fell in 2014 across the Americas. Beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and the system’s ability to protect basic rights deteriorated the most. Even within the two-year window between 2012 and 2014, several cases exhibit wide swings in support. The results of our analyses suggest system support in the region as a whole reflects how citizens evaluate and interact with the national and local governments. Specifically democratic legitimacy hinges on the system’s ability to deliver public goods in the areas of the economy, corruption, and security. These same factors do not, however, increase tolerance of political dissidents, a key democratic value. Rather, the happier citizens of the Americas are with the performance of national and local governments, the less politically tolerant they are. These contradictory results may signal a desire to insulate a high-performing system from those who denounce it. They nevertheless imply a Catch-22: improving governance may at once enhance the political system’s legitimacy but lower political tolerance. Lastly, we observe a decline in the percentage of citizens in the Americas who hold the combination of attitudes most conducive to democratic stability (high system support and high political tolerance) and a marked increase in the attitudes that can put democracy at risk (low system support and low political tolerance).

Part II includes four chapters that focus only on El Salvador, and analyzes the results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer for fundamental issues of democratic governance: crime and insecurity, electoral behavior, civil society, and democratic legitimacy. Chapter 6 presents views related to the topic of security and the community conditions associated with it. Perceptions of insecurity registered a slight increase in comparison to 2012, as the average score on the insecurity scale (which goes from 0 to 100) among Salvadorans increased from 43.8 in 2012 to 46.9 in 2014, although this difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the percentage of direct victimization by crime remained unchanged during the same time period. In 2014, 18.6% of people report having been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months, in contrast with 17.5% in 2012, although this difference is not statistically significant.

In 2014, the most important variables for explaining levels of insecurity are: a high level of education; the presence of gangs in the community where the respondent lives; the occurrence of robberies or extortions in the community; and the perception that police that patrol the neighborhood are involved in crime. On the other hand, the factors that explain the probability of being the victim of crime are: young age; a high level of education and material wealth; residence in an urbanized area; high perceptions of insecurity; having been asked to pay a bribe by the police; and the perception that the police are involved in crime.

For many of the people interviewed, the most serious problems in the community are related to the presence and activity of the youth: 55.9% of respondents indicated that young people wandering in the streets of the community doing nothing constitute a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem for community safety; while 46.7% highlight youth gang areas a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem. A second level of concern constitutes the sale of drugs in the community (31.9% consider this a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem), and assaults of people in the community (30.7% consider this a “very serious” or “somewhat serious” problem).

Results also indicate that 22.1% of Salvadorans think that school drop-outs among the youth due to the presence of gangs in the community is a “very serious” problem, while 41.6% believe that it is not a problem in their community. At the same time, 20.2% considers the recruiting of young people

into gangs outside of schools is a “very serious” problem, while 47.6% think that gang recruitment is not a serious issue for their community.

The study also explores the crimes that are most frequently witnessed by Salvadorans. 37.9% of respondents say that have witnessed or heard of a robbery in their community in the last 12 months. This is followed by the percentage of respondents that have witnessed or heard of murders (25.4%), the sale of drugs (23.2%), or extortions (22.9%)

The perception of the incidence of extortion in the community is directly associated with the size of the location where the respondent lives. More than 35% of people that live in large cities report knowing of extortions that occur in their community. On the other hand, no more than 25% of those who live in medium or small cities and less than 10% of those who live in rural areas report extortions in the communities where they live.

How much do Salvadorans support violence prevention efforts? Nearly 48% favor increasing the punishment of criminals, while 43% support preventive measures; 9.2% opt for favoring both types of measures. In regional terms, Salvadorans rank as the citizens that most favor the use of preventive measures to fight crime in comparison to the majority of citizens in other countries of the Americas. Men; people of older age; those with a higher level of education; and respondents that reside in small towns and rural areas have a greater probability of supporting crime prevention measures than the rest of the population. However, the most interesting results are those that show that support for preventive measures is higher among persons with the lowest perceptions of insecurity and that live in communities where problems related to violence are not as overwhelming.

How much do Salvadorans organize or know of community organization aimed at addressing the problem of violence? 15.6% of Salvadorans identify at least one prevention initiative within their community. This means that even though almost half of the people support preventive measures, only 15 out of 100 citizens live in communities where this type of effort is being implemented at the community level.

The AmericasBarometer survey also asked about the program called “*Comité de Prevención de la Violencia*,” which emerged as part of the national government’s strategy in El Salvador to reduce violence at the local level. Almost 20% of Salvadorans have heard of the program. Nevertheless, when respondents were asked if he or she has participated or knows of someone who has participated in a meeting of the *Comité de Prevención de la Violencia*, only 20% of those that know about the program say they have participated. This means that 4% of the total population interviewed has participated in a municipal meeting of the *Comité de Prevención de la Violencia*. The results to this question for 2014 are not particularly different than those obtained in the previous round of the AmericasBarometer (2012), when 19.9% of people indicated having heard about the *Comités Municipales de Prevención de la Violencia*.

The survey also collected opinions about the performance of the National Civil Police. According to the results, a little over half of the population say they are “satisfied” (49.8%) or “very satisfied” (3.7%) with the job of the police, while the rest (46.5%) say they are “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” with the performance of the police. The highest levels of satisfaction with the police’s performance are found in small cities and rural areas; on the other hand, the lowest levels of satisfaction are located in large cities and in the metropolitan area of San Salvador. The variables for



victimization and insecurity play an important role in levels of satisfaction with police performance. Persons who have not been victims of crime reveal much more enthusiasm toward the police than those that have been victimized. Similarly, satisfaction with the police is significantly reduced in the extent to which individuals feel more insecure in their neighborhood or community.

Around a third of respondents have seen the police conversing with residents of the community in which they live, while a similar percentage has seen police agents interact with the youth. Nearly 32% of respondents say they have seen the police support prevention initiatives in their community. Only reports of police participation in community meetings is significantly low (15.4%). If we join all of these responses and calculate the percentage of people who have seen the local police participate or interact with the community in any way, the data indicate that 56.6% of Salvadorans have seen a police agent interact with the community in the last year.

More than 85% of Salvadorans report favorable opinions about the participation of the military in the fight against crime. This means that, in comparison with other countries of the region, El Salvador displays the highest levels of approval for the use of the military in public security tasks.

In this report, we also explore attitudes toward domestic violence. The vast majority of interviewees say that they would not approve or understand violence against women under any circumstance; 57.9% say that they would not approve or understand if a man hits his wife because she was unfaithful; and 74.4% would not either in the case that the wife neglects household chores. Nevertheless, 36.8% say that they would not approve but would understand domestic violence in the case of infidelity, and 23.5% say the same in the case of neglect of household chores. Only 5.3% report that they would approve of the hitting of a wife for being unfaithful, while 2.1% say the same in the case of neglect of household chores.

In Chapter 7, we explore electoral behavior and evaluations of political parties. Five years after the 2009 elections that produced alternation of power in the executive branch, presidential elections took place on February 2, 2014, with the participation of five presidential candidates. Given that none of the candidates obtained the majority required by law, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal called for a run-off election on March 9, 2014. In this run-off, the FMLN obtained 50.11% of the votes and ARENA 49.89%, giving the victory to the candidate of the left by a small margin: 0.22%. The rate of voter turnout in the first round of the elections of 2014 was 54.27%, and it increased in the run-off of March 2014 reaching 60.25%.

We find four statistically significant determinants of intending to vote in presidential elections: age, vote effectiveness, education, and identification with a political party. Of these four variables, two correspond to socio-demographic factors (age and education) and two are political factors (voting effectiveness and identification with a political party).

We identify three types of reasons for which some citizens did not vote in the last elections: personal, technical problems, and political problems. With respect to the question about the reasons for which respondents did not vote, we observe a pretty even distribution of these three reasons: in first place, those that are political (32.2%), in second place, those that are technical (28.5%), and in third place, those that are personal (22.5%). When asked why respondents thought other people may not have voted, political reasons are predominate (84.4%), followed in a distant second place by technical

reasons (10.7%), and personal reasons in third place (4%). The predominance of political reasons is clearly observed among the reasons that respondents think “others” may not have voted.

When comparing results for the intention to vote in the two rounds of the 2014 presidential election, we observe that the two major parties retained an important percentage of respondents. Among those who voted for the ARENA candidate in the first round, 94.7% maintained their intention to vote for the same party in the run-off; while 97.1% maintained their intention to vote for the FMLN.

Regarding ideological orientations, 33.3% place themselves on the left, 36.7% in the center, and 29.9% on the right. When comparing these to our 2012 results, we observe an increase of 7.43 percentage points towards the left (25.87%), an increase of 3.24 percentage points in the center (33.46%), and a decrease of 10.77 percentage points on the right (40.67%). We observe a tendency toward the center of the ideological scale (1 left – 10 right) between 2004 and 2014, with an average ideological score of 6.9 in 2004, 5.7 in 2006, 5.3 in 2008, and 5.2 in 2010. In 2012, average ideology moved toward the right (with an average score of 6.0), and in 2014 average ideology returned to the center (5.2).

The AmericasBarometer also includes a question about trust in political parties. To simplify the analysis, the original categories of the answers to the question were recoded on a 0 to 100 scale. The survey data show a low level of trust in political parties, which significantly fell between 2010 and 2012, from an average of 39.1 to 34.4; trust then increased to 36.7 in 2014. This small increase between 2012 and 2014 is statistically significant.

Results reveal that the majority of Salvadorans are not interested in politics: 14.6% express a lot of interest, 16.7% some, 38.9% little, and 29.8% say they have no interest in politics. However, there was a statistically significant increase in interest in politics, recoded on a 0 (none) to 100 (a lot) scale, from 33.4 in 2012 to 38.4 in 2014. This increase is likely related to the saliency of the last presidential election.

Chapter 8 explores interviewee opinions about civil society and citizen political participation in the country. Results indicated that only 3 out of 10 Salvadorans tend to help solve problems in their communities. The vast majority of respondents (71.2%) say that in the last year they have never contributed or helped to solve problems in their community. 12.9% of respondents say that they have helped one or two times a year, 12.1% say one or two times a month, and only 3.8% say that they help at least once a week. Men, respondents of older age, and those with a greater level of education often intervene in the affairs of the community.

The data reveal a generally low level of citizen participation in politics. Most respondents report not having participated in the majority of organizations or associations, with the exception of religious groups. This is a particularly notable trend in the case of political parties and women’s groups (inquired about only with female respondents). In these cases, more than 85% of people say that they have never participated in these types of organizations, while 5% say they have participated once a week. The types of organizations in which most people participate are those of religious affiliation. Nearly 61% of Salvadorans attend meetings of religious organizations at least once a week, while 21% have never attended a meeting of a religious group.



Half of Salvadorans (49.9%) report that there is some sort of executive board or community association in their neighborhood. However, of those that say that this is the case, only 10.5% say they are an active member of the association. Placing this rate in the context of all Salvadoran respondents, we find that only 5.2% say they are a member of the executive board or community association in their neighborhood. Nevertheless, close to 30% of people that live in communities with this type of association report that they have attended at least one meeting in the last three months; while 24% say that they have performed some kind of voluntary work for the association in the last three months.

The distribution of responses with respect to interpersonal trust suggests that, in general terms, Salvadorans do not display much trust in their neighbors. A little less than a third of Salvadorans, 30.7%, say they have a lot of trust in the people of their community, 34.8% indicate having some trust, 25.4% report little trust, and only 9.1% say they have no trust in their neighbors. However, a cross-time comparison indicates that interpersonal trust has increased between 2012 and 2014.

In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer we explore the evaluations that citizens make about the representation of their interests by the central government, members of congress, and local government. In terms of the central government, 12.7% think that it represents their interests and benefits them “a lot,” 24.2% say “some,” 38.5% say “little,” and 24.7% of respondents say not at all. With respect to members of the national legislature, 4.3% say that members of congress represent their interest and benefit them “a lot,” 17.4% say “some,” 35.6% say “a little,” and 42.8% say not at all. Finally, as related to local government and municipal councils, 10% of respondents indicate that they represent their interests and benefit them “a lot,” 18.5% say “some,” 35.8% say a little, and 35.7% say not at all.

The results for 2014 also show that there has been a slight, but significant, increase in the negative opinions about the transparency of public officials, going from an average of 65.6 (on a 0 to 100 scale) in 2012 to 67.7 in 2014, despite responses being generally less critical than in 2006 and 2008, when they reached the most negative level in the last 10 years.

This trend does not correspond with the percentage of people that report having been the victim of corruption. As usual, the AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to collect data about various scenarios of bribe solicitation by public officials in the previous 12 months. These scenarios include bribes by the police, public employees, the municipal government, courts, public health centers, and schools, which together constitute a single indicator that measures the rate of corruption victimization in the previous year. 9.8% of Salvadorans report having been victim of some type of bribe solicitation in the previous 12 months. This represents the lowest corruption victimization rate in the last 10 years. In fact, the proportion of Salvadorans that report having been victimized by corruption went from 15.7% in 2004 to 11.3% in 2012 and to less than 10% in 2014. However, the difference between 2012 and 2014 is not statistically significant.

Finally, the AmericasBarometer survey in El Salvador asked citizens about the “*Ley de Acceso a la Información Pública*.” Results indicate that nearly 44% of respondents report having heard of the law. Among them, only 10.6% has requested some type of information from public institutions and 12.8% has visited an institutional website in search of public information. An interesting finding was that 79.3% of those that searched for information report finding what they were looking for.

Chapter 9 examines the topic of political legitimacy and tolerance. The system support scale seeks to measure the level of support citizens have for their system of government, without focusing solely on the current administration. In the political science literature, this is called “diffuse support” or “system support.” A 0 to 100 scale of system support was constructed by taking the average responses to each of the five questions the survey asks about political institutions in order to facilitate interpretation of results. Courts and the institutional protection of basic rights exhibit the highest level of support, with averages of 45.7 and 42.7, respectively. A more intermediate level of support was found for the question that asks how proud the respondent is to live under their political system (54.2). The highest levels of support were those expressed toward how much respondents think citizens should support the political system (64.3%) and regarding respect for institutions (69.5). For the more comprehensive index of system support we find an average level of 55.3 on the 0 to 100 scale.

Given that we now have 10 years’ worth of AmericasBarometer data, it is possible to track the evaluation of the levels of system support between 2004 and 2014. System support steadily decreased between 2004 and 2008: with an average of 59.5 in 2004, 55.4 in 2006, and 51.8 in 2008. System support then increased to 58.7 in 2010, only to fall again to 56.7 in 2012 and 55.4 in 2014. Between 2012 and 2014 the fall in average system support is not statistically significant, so we can say that system support has remained stable between 2012 and 2014.

In order to identify the factors that can help explain the levels of political system support in the 2014 round, we conducted a multiple regression analysis for which we find 12 statistically significant predictors: age; area of education; sex; quintiles of wealth; presidential job approval; satisfaction with democracy; interest in politics; vote effectiveness; ideology; perceptions of neighborhood insecurity; and crime victimization.

Our scale of political tolerance is based on four questions that measure the degree of approval for four types of civil liberties: the right to vote; the right to peacefully protest; the right to run for public office; and the right to freedom of expression. This scale was constructed from the average obtained from these four questions and results are recoded to a 0 to 100 scale. The average obtained for each of the tolerance questions in 2014 are: the right to run for public office (34.3), the right to freedom of expression (35.3), which represent the lowest averages of tolerance; the right to vote (49.6) and the right to peacefully protests (49.2), which, on the contrary, represent the highest averages in tolerance. The overall average found for the political tolerance scale in 2014 is 42.1.

It was also possible to use the AmericasBarometer data to track the evolution of levels of political tolerance between 2004 and 2014. Political tolerance increased from 51.3 in 2005 to 55.8 in 2006, while it slightly decreased to 54.2 in 2007, and then experienced a steeper decline to 45.1 in 2014. Tolerance continued to slightly decrease in 2012 (43.7) and in 2014 (42.1). However the change between 2012 and 2014 is not statistically significant, which means that the level of political tolerance has remained stable between 2012 and 2014.

With respect to factors that help explain levels of political tolerance in 2014, another multiple regression analysis produced four statistically significant predictors: sex, age, education, and interest in politics.

In an analysis of support for democratic stability, we explore the relationship between the political system support and the political tolerance scales, which were each divided into high and low



categories to create four possible combinations of high/low system support and tolerance. The 2014 distribution of respondents along these four categories is as follows: 19.3% of respondents fall in the “stable democracy” cell, 38.7% in the “stable authoritarianism” cell, 11.5 in the “unstable democracy” cell, and 30.6% in the “democracy at risk” cell.

Given the availability of data for 2004 to 2014, we can place these results in historical perspective. There are two findings that are particularly important. First, the cell for “democracy at risk” (low system support and low tolerance) has shifted from including 16% of respondents in 2004 to 30.6% in 2014, an increase of 14.6 percentage points. Second, the finding for the “democracy at risk” cell stands in contrast with the 12.9 percentage point decrease in the percentage of respondents in the “stable democracy” cell (high system support and high tolerance) between 2012 (32.2%) and 2014 (19.3%). This is a trend that should be given particular attention in future studies.

How has support for democracy changed in recent years in El Salvador? It decreased from an average of 68.8 in 2004 to 61.3 in 2006; it then increased to 68.4 in 2008, and decreased to 64.1 in 2010; and then it increased again to 65.6 in 2012 and 65.9 in 2014. The change between 2012 and 2014 is not statistically significant, which means that support for democracy remained stable between 2012 and 2014.

The study finds that Salvadorans exhibit a strong support for democracy as the best form of government: 10.9% of respondents are indifferent between a democratic and authoritarian government, while 76.2% prefer democracy, and only 12.9% indicate that in certain circumstances an authoritarian government is preferable.

The 2014 survey also found a slight increase in the levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, going from 50.9 in 2012 on a 0 to 100 scale, to 52.7 in 2014. For the 2014 measure, 4.8% feel “very satisfied” with democracy in El Salvador, 54.6% feel “satisfied,” 36.1% “dissatisfied,” and 4.5% “very dissatisfied” with the functioning of democracy.

Understanding Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on national probability samples of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the estimated mean values (the dots). When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap to a large degree, the difference between the two values is typically *not statistically significant*; conversely, where two confidence intervals in bar graphs do not overlap, the reader can be very confident that those differences are *statistically significant* at the 95% confidence level. To help interpret bar graphs, chapter authors will sometimes indicate the results of difference of means/proportion tests in footnotes or in the text.

Graphs that show regression results include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated (standardized) coefficient falls to the left of this line, this indicates that the variable has a negative relationship with the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the (standardized) coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive relationship. We can be 95% confident that the relationship is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a pre-release version of the 2014 AmericasBarometer that only includes a subset of 25 countries, out of the 28 planned for inclusion in the 2014 survey. The data for these countries was available for analysis at the time of writing this report. In addition, these figures use a conservative estimate of the sampling error that assumes independent, rather than repeated, primary sampling units (PSUs) for data aggregated across time. At the time this report was written, LAPOP was in the process of updating the datasets in order to more precisely account for the complex sample design.

Part I:
**Insecurity, Governance, and Civil
Society in El Salvador and in the Americas**



Chapter 1. Crime and Violence across the Americas

Nicole Hinton and Daniel Montalvo

with

Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga

I. Introduction

The pervasiveness of crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean raises serious concerns regarding the quality and stability of democracy in the region. Where regimes fail to adequately protect their citizens from violence and crime, not only are those citizens likely to become dissatisfied and less trusting of the institutions and public officials charged with providing security to citizens, but under some conditions they might also cast some blame on democracy itself for their perilous circumstances. Or, under conditions of rampant crime, they might become less committed to the key principles of the rule of law that allow democracy to thrive. Bailey (2009) warns against a vicious cycle in which countries find themselves in a “security trap,” where inefficient state bureaucracies and rampant corruption weaken the ability of states to provide public security and maintain the rule of law, invoking distrust in the legitimacy of democracy that in turn weakens the state. Having a strong state that can effectively respond to and deter crime and violence is critical to the flourishing of democracy in any context. As Karstedt and LaFree (p.6, 2006) eloquently state, “The connection between democracy and criminal justice is so fundamental as to be self-evident: the rule of law guarantees due process, and the observation of human rights is an integral part of the emergence and institutionalization of democracy.”

Scholars have provided consistent evidence that crime victimization and widespread insecurity can pose serious challenges to democracy in the Americas (Lipset 1994; Booth and Seligson 2009; Bateson 2010; Ceobanu, Wood et al. 2010; Malone 2010; Carreras 2013). According to the rich scholarship on the subject, there are at least three ways in which crime, violence, and threat can evoke reactions among the mass public that present a challenge to democratic quality and governance.¹ First, people concerned with insecurity can have increased authoritarian tendencies and preferences for centralization of power in executives who might then act with disregard for checks and balances (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). When individuals feel threatened or insecure they are more likely to tolerate, and even support, governments that restrict some core political rights and civil liberties.

A second threat to democratic quality and governance arises when citizens lose faith in the regime’s ability to provide adequate public security, and instead support less democratic alternatives to enhance security. The most obvious example of this scenario involves individuals taking matters into their own hands to fight crime in extralegal ways, or transferring authority to groups that pursue

¹ Such high rates of violent crime carry economic costs as well. High levels of violent crime can monopolize the resources of the state and siphon off funds from other vital public services. Rather than investing in public infrastructure and social services, democratic governments often find their resources dominated by rising levels of public insecurity. The World Bank noted that in addition to the pain and trauma crime brings to victims and their families, “crime and violence carry staggering economic costs” that consume approximately 8% of the region’s GDP, taking into account the costs of law enforcement, citizen security and health care” (World Bank 2011, 5). On both political and economic fronts, current murder rates threaten sustainable community development. We thank Mary Malone for these insights and for additional advising over the content of Chapters 1-3 of this report.

vigilante justice (Zizumbo-Colunga 2010). At the extreme, these groups include destabilizing and violent entities such as para-military groups, hit men, and lynching mobs. Unfortunately, these groups are increasingly present in various locations throughout the Americas today and they may be gaining heightened support from dissatisfied citizens, a dynamic that has the potential to threaten the monopoly of the use of force that is supposed to belong to the state.

Lastly, crime and insecurity can be detrimental to democratic quality by directly undermining interpersonal trust, and hence the development of social capital. Since the classic work of Alexis de Tocqueville, through the innovative work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, to the multi-method research of Robert Putnam, scholars in various fields of the social sciences have devoted enormous effort to explain how the social fabric shapes democracy (Tocqueville 1835, Almond and Verba 1963, Putnam 1993). The strength of such social fabric is threatened when security crises cause individuals to experience a drop in interpersonal trust (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) and those dynamics can fuel or be aggravated by additional erosion in trust in political institutions and state law enforcement (Corbacho et al. 2012).

What is the state of crime and violence in the Americas? Given the importance of this topic to democracy, this is an imperative question to answer. This chapter provides an assessment of the state of security in the Americas, drawing on secondary research and results from the Latin American Public Opinion Project's (LAPOP's) AmericasBarometer regional survey, which provides an unprecedented collection of public opinion data from over 25 countries for the last decade, 2004 to 2014.² Some of the key points that we document in this chapter are the following:

- The Latin America and Caribbean region has the highest homicide rate compared to any other region on earth (23 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), per the latest data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
- Central America stands out as the most violent region on the planet; in 2012, it had an average of nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.³
- Issues related to crime and violence are consistently perceived as top concerns among citizens of the Americas. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, just about 1 out of every 3 citizens identifies security as the most important problem facing their country.
- On average across the region, 17% of respondents to the 2014 AmericasBarometer report being the victim of a crime, a rate that has stayed fairly constant since 2004.
- The 2014 AmericasBarometer documents important ways that rates of burglaries, the sale of illegal drugs, extortion, and murders vary across countries of the Americas.
- Urban residents, those who are more educated, and wealthier individuals are the most likely to report being victims of a crime in the Americas in 2014.

² The 2014 AmericasBarometer will include surveys in 28 countries in total, but this report focuses on analyses of 25 countries for which the data had been gathered and processed at the time of this writing. Given that not all years of the AmericasBarometer contain all 25 countries, we report in footnotes on robustness checks for comparisons across time to analyses that contain only the subset of countries consistently represented in a given time-series.

³ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) notes that Southern Africa is tied with Central America in terms of highest number of average homicides for the region. The Central American region contains heterogeneity within it, with the homicide rates highest in the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.



This chapter is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the state of affairs in terms of the prevalence of crime and violence in the Americas, based on cross-national homicide indicators, as reported by UNODC. This section also discusses the advantages of using survey data to measure and analyze crime and insecurity. Section III examines data from LAPOP's AmericasBarometer to provide an overview of how citizens of the Americas perceive crime and violence in their countries. This section examines the extent to which security tops the list of most important problems in the AmericasBarometer countries across time and space. In the fourth section, we take a deeper look at the 2014 AmericasBarometer data by examining the frequency and types of crime victimization most commonly experienced by individuals in the region. We also examine the demographic factors that make some individuals more vulnerable to crime.

II. Background: The Prevalence of Crime and Violence in the Americas

Despite differences among the ways in which crime is defined and measured,⁴ Latin America and the Caribbean is widely regarded as a region with notoriously high crime incidents. In this section, we examine how this region fares in comparison to the rest of the world in terms of homicide, robbery, and burglary rates,⁵ some of the most commonly collected and referenced crime statistics by institutions such as the UNODC.⁶ We then turn to a discussion of the usefulness of this type of official crime data in comparison to self-reporting of crime victimization using surveys like the AmericasBarometer.

Official Rates of Intentional Homicide, Robberies and Burglaries

In terms of homicide rates, UNODC ranks the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region as one of the deadliest places on earth. As Figure 1.1 shows, the LAC region had a higher homicide rate in 2012 than any other region represented in the UNODC study. The 2012 LAC average rate of 23.0 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants is more than double the second highest regional mean, held by Sub-Saharan Africa⁷ (11.2 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), five times the rate in South Asia (4.4) and East Asia and the Pacific (3.9), seven times larger than the rate in the U.S. and Canada (3.2) and the Middle East and North Africa (2.9), and about 10 times greater than the rate found in Europe and Central Asia (2.5).

⁴ The most current conceptualizations of crime see it as part of the broader concept of citizen security, which is the personal condition of being free from violence and intentional dispossession. This condition includes not only victimization, but also perceptions of crime (Casas-Zamora 2013).

⁵ Other dimensions and measurements of the concept of crime include, but are not limited to assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion and violent threats.

⁶ Other key organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank (WB), and the World Health Organization (WHO) are also important sources for aggregate crime statistics. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) serves as a good source particularly in Central America.

⁷ In the most recent report UNODC (2013) provides sub-regional averages for Southern Africa (31), Middle Africa (18), and Western Africa (14), all of which are higher than the regional average for Africa and are more comparable to the Latin American and the Caribbean average.




Figure 1.1. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012⁸

As Figure 1.2 demonstrates, differences in intentional homicide rates exist across sub-regions within Latin America and the Caribbean and over time. As depicted in the figure, the Central American sub-region has the highest murder rates within the LAC region, with nearly 34 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.⁹ Homicide rates in this sub-region have increased at a concerning pace in recent years, reaching a peak in 2011. Within Central America, the most violent country is Honduras, which according to the UNODC had an intentional homicide rate of 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. In sharp contrast, Costa Rica is the least violent with a rate of 8.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.¹⁰




Figure 1.2. Intentional Homicide Rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) across Time

⁸ Rates are for 2012 or latest year available.

⁹ The UNODC analysis includes Mexico as part of the Central American sub-region. The rate of this particular country in 2012 was 21.5 per 100,000 persons.

¹⁰ Data on country rates are not presented here, but are available at: <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/>. Last accessed on October 24, 2014.



Trending in a way that is somewhat comparable to Central America, the Caribbean sub-region has also experienced an upward trend in homicide rates between 2000 and 2011 before dropping in 2012. Within this time period, the Caribbean's homicide rates increased from 12 to 21 per 100,000 inhabitants. The Caribbean country with the highest rate in 2012, per UNODC, is Jamaica (39.3) and the one with the lowest is Cuba (4.2).

South America, on the other hand, has seen a lower and more stable cross-time trend in homicides in recent years. On average in that region, homicide rates have not reached more than 21 per 100,000 inhabitants since 2002. In 2012 (the latest year for which these data are available), this sub-region experienced a mean murder rate of nearly 17 per 100,000 inhabitants. Yet, the homicide rate disparity in the South American sub-region is rather large. Among the most dangerous countries, Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil have intentional homicide rates of 53.7, 30.8, and 25.2 (per 100,000), respectively, according to the UNODC. Among the least dangerous, we find countries like Chile, Uruguay, and Peru, with murder rates of 3.1, 7.9, and 9.6, in that order.

We continue to see important differences across countries in the LAC region when we turn to other crime statistics available from the UNODC, such as aggregate rates of reported robberies and burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants. Figure 1.3 displays rates for 2012 (the latest available) for most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica are the countries in which robberies are the most prevalent (975, 618, and 522 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively) and the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Canada where they were the least (20, 68, 79, in that order). Interestingly, Guatemala ranks low on both robbery and burglary rates. Paraguay and El Salvador join Guatemala at the bottom of the chart for burglary rates. At the top of the burglary chart, we find both Canada and the United States (503 and 663 per 100,000 inhabitants) just below Barbados and Chile (690 and 679 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively).




Figure 1.3. Robbery and Burglary Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants), 2012

A few points are worth noting regarding the data reported in Figure 1.3. First, although examining crime trends beyond homicides may be informative, the UNODC and others warn that comparisons across countries should be examined with caution as definitions and ways of recording



incidents of robbery and burglary differ across state legal systems. Second, the ranking of countries like Guatemala and El Salvador at the bottom for rates of robberies and burglaries, while Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, and Canada are at the top may actually be a reflection of differences in the quality of crime reporting mechanisms, policing, or even trust in the system of law enforcement.¹¹ The reliability of such crime data is dependent on victims reporting incidents at all or accurately and the police recording the offense accordingly. Reported rates of crime other than homicides are shaped by trust in police (e.g., willingness to go to the police when there is a problem). Crime tends to be underreported in areas where trust in the police or institutions responsible for the rule of law is low (Skogan 1975).

Official crime statistics are also prone to errors in police, agency, and government recording processes (UNODC and UNECE 2010). To the degree that error rates in these processes are correlated with factors such as decentralization, corruption, economic development, etc. or with the levels of crime and violence themselves, these types of data may suffer important systematic biases. Even in terms of homicide rates, the variation in the definitions of crime, even among trusted institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program, and UNODC, and the consequent variation in the measurement of this phenomenon, can pose an important threat to the ability to make valid comparisons of levels of crime across time and space (Maxfield and Babbie 2010; Pepper, Petrie, and Sullivan 2010; Pepper and Petrie 2002).

Public Opinion Data as an Important Source for Crime Statistics

Survey research provides an important alternative technique by which to measure not only perceptions of but also experiences with crime and violence. The use of survey data for measuring crime victimization has a number of advantages over official statistics. First, it produces data free of accidental or intentional omission or misrepresentation of crime by government officials. Second, public opinion surveys administered by non-governmental firms can alleviate some of the non-reporting bias associated with citizens' distrust in law enforcement (Levitt 1998; Tyler and Huo 2002). Third, survey research allows us to access a first-hand account of the situation suffered by the interviewee rather than the situation as interpreted or registered by law enforcement. Fourth, it allows for differentiation between perceptions of and experiences with crime and violence. Fifth, it allows us to standardize the wording of questions about crime incidents across countries so that we are assessing similar phenomena and thus making valid comparisons. Finally, it allows us to collect and assess a more nuanced database of crime victimization than those often provided by general statistics referenced in official reports (Piquero, Macintosh, and Hickman 2002).¹²

The AmericasBarometer survey, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, provides us with an extensive database on crime victimization and perceptions of insecurity. It is the

¹¹ There is also a greater incentive to report property crimes (e.g., burglaries) in wealthier countries with better established insurance industries in which a police report is required to make a claim.

¹² An early example of the use of surveys to collect data on crime victimization is the effort by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) research consortium to conduct The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS). The surveys collected six waves of cross-national individual level data in many European countries. However, Latin America was only been peripherally represented (Kennedy, 2014). ICVS data did also report Latin America to be one of the most dangerous regions in the world (Soares & Naritomi, 2010). However, because data from countries in this region were collected exclusively during the 1996/1997 wave and only in the cities of San Juan (Costa Rica), Panama City (Panama), Asunción (Paraguay), Buenos Aires (Argentina), La Paz (Bolivia), Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia), the portrayal of crime and violence of the region coming from this source is not only outdated but incomplete.

only multi-country comparative project in the hemisphere to collect data on all of North, Central, and South America, plus a number of Caribbean countries. The AmericasBarometer survey records first-hand accounts of the state of crime and violence in the region, and also incorporates a range of standardized crime and security survey measures (e.g., experiences and perceptions) that are comparable across time and space. Crime victimization data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer is particularly valuable because the project relies on large national samples of voting age adults in 28 countries across the Americas, with a survey instrument that included an extensive series of modules on the topics of crime, violence, and insecurity. The result is an unprecedented dataset in terms of its quality and scope.

Due to their advantages, crime victimization surveys are widely regarded as at least a complementary, and in some ways a superior, source of data in comparison to official aggregate crime statistics. That said, some scholars (e.g., Bergman 2006) maintain that although surveys can provide a better picture of crime *trends* they can say little about actual crime *rates*. According to Bergman (2006), even when crime is defined and measured in similar ways, cross-sectional survey data on victimization can suffer inaccuracies due to, among other reasons, variations in tendencies to under-report violence or over-report property theft within and across countries. The AmericasBarometer overcomes some potential problems in cross-national and cross-time comparisons by standardizing wording across its surveys. Further, each question in the survey is carefully considered and pre-tested within each country prior to inclusion in the AmericasBarometer, in order to ensure that the wording comports with local norms and is as likely as possible to elicit truthful answers. Be that as it may, Bergman's caveat that differences in motivations and inclinations to over- or under-report crime incidents may vary across countries in ways that warrant further consideration. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer asks multiple questions¹³ not only about incidents of crime victimization but also about concerns surrounding violence and perceptions of insecurity in order to achieve as holistic an account of citizen security in the region as possible.

The remainder of this chapter presents a relatively brief overview of concerns about crime and crime victimization across the Americas. We note that the description and discussion only begin to scratch the surface of the extensive database on this topic available via the AmericasBarometer survey. While our analyses indicate important variation in rates of certain types of crime victimization incidents across the Americas, we do not focus here on the extent to which crime and insecurity are directly traceable to decentralized ordinary criminals or organized crime in particular. Organized crime is a notably pernicious problem in many Latin American countries given that, not only do criminal organizations engage in illegal activities, but they also seek to influence the state in order to attain certain political objectives (Bailey and Taylor 2009). The empirical evidence shows that organized crime puts the states' monopoly of the use of force at stake, since many governments have to constantly negotiate with criminal organizations in order to preserve an appearance of peace. In the Americas, criminal organizations vary widely in terms of size and scope. Those at the least organized end of the spectrum are domestic organizations arranged around fluid market transactions, such as small mafias, usurers, and extortionists. At the other end of the spectrum are transnational criminal organizations that engage in serious crimes or offenses across borders, such as drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, gang activity, and human trafficking (Manrique 2006, Bailey and

¹³ In addition, the AmericasBarometer crime victimization question has been developed to assist recall by providing a list of types of crimes; a follow-up question asking about what type of crime was experienced provides those using the AmericasBarometer dataset a second measure of victimization and, therefore, an additional means to assess and increase reliability of analyses of the data.



Taylor 2009, Farah 2012). Our look at crime concerns and victimization in this chapter does not trace these perspectives and experiences back to these varying criminal elements in the LAC region, but we are cognizant that indeed this variation in the nature of crime syndicates and criminals is important for a comprehensive understanding of the region.¹⁴

III. An Overview of Crime and Violence in the Minds of Citizens of the Americas

As a first step to examining the 2014 AmericasBarometer data on crime, we take a look at what citizens of the Americas view as the most important problem within their country. Respondents in all countries are asked the following open-ended question:¹⁵

A4. In your opinion, what is **the most serious** problem faced by the country?

Responses to the question in the field are coded into one of approximately forty general categories, which are then recoded in our analysis into five general baskets: economy, security, basic services, politics, and other.¹⁶ Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of responses for these five main categories, as provided by citizens across six waves of the AmericasBarometer survey project. Since 2004,¹⁷ the economy and security rank as two principle concerns expressed on average by the public

¹⁴ InSightCrime, a foundation that studies organized crime, lists 9 countries with the highest prevalence of organized crime in the region. In North America, Mexico is the largest and most sophisticated home for criminal organizations. Drug trafficking organizations, such as Zetas, Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Familia Michoacana, Juarez Cartel, Beltran Leyva Organization and the Knights Templar dominate Mexico's criminal activities. In Central America, countries within the so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) host some of the most violent crime organizations on earth. Particularly relevant organizations are Mendozas, Lorenzanas and Leones in Guatemala, MS13, Barrio 18, Cachiros and Valles in Honduras, and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, Perrones and Taxis Cartel in El Salvador. InSightCrime points to the problem of organized crime in Nicaragua, particularly the influence of drug traffickers on judicial rulings but compared to the countries in the Northern Triangle, this impact is on a completely different (smaller) magnitude. South America includes four countries on this list of countries with comparatively strong and prevalent criminal syndicates: Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru. While Peru and Colombia are the world's two largest cocaine producers, Brazil and Venezuela are drug transit hubs with important money laundering centers and human trafficking activities. The most salient groups in Colombia are FARC and ELN; Shining Path in Peru; Cartel of the Suns and Bolivarian Liberation Forces in Venezuela; and Red Command and First Capital Command in Brazil.

¹⁵ Though respondents may consider that many problems are worthy of mentioning, they are asked to state only one problem they think is the most important facing their country.

¹⁶ Responses included in Economy: unemployment; problems with or crisis of economy; poverty; inflation or high prices; credit, lack of; lack of land to farm; external debt. Responses included in Security: crime; gangs; security (lack of); kidnappings; war against terrorism; terrorism; violence. Responses included in Basic Services: roads in poor condition; health services, lack of; education, lack of, poor quality; water, lack of; electricity, lack of; housing; malnutrition; transportation, problems of; human rights, violations of. Responses included in Politics: armed conflict; impunity; corruption; bad government; politicians. Responses included in Other: population explosion; discrimination; popular protests (strikes, road blockades); drug addiction; drug trafficking; forced displacement of persons; environment; migration; and "other" which comprises of less than 3% of responses.

¹⁷ It is important to note that in 2004, we asked this question in 11 countries of the Americas only. These countries are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic. In 2006, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, the United States and Canada were incorporated to this list. In 2008, the AmericasBarometer included Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Belize, and since 2010 we have included Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela. These are the same 25 countries analyzed in this chapter. Figure 1.4 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

across the Americas.¹⁸ The economy still leads as the most salient concern in 2014, with a regional average of 36% of respondents declaring that the economy is the most important problem in their country.¹⁹ However, the economy as the most important problem has also experienced the biggest change across time: it decreased in public concern by approximately 25 percentage points from the first wave of the AmericasBarometer in 2004 to the most recent wave in 2014.




Figure 1.4. Most Important Problem Facing the Country over Time

Security has consistently registered as the second most important problem in the Americas, as self-reported by citizens since 2004. Narrowing our focus to the two most recent years of the AmericasBarometer, 2012 and 2014, we see only minor changes over time in all five main categories. That said, we do see evidence that security concerns increased in recent years: in 2012, 30.1% cited an issue related to security as the most important problem and in 2014 that figure is 32.5%. In short, in 2014, on average across the Americas, essentially 1 out of 3 respondents report an issue related to crime, violence, or insecurity as the most important problem facing their country.

How much variation is there in concerns about security across countries in the Americas? To answer this question, we turn our attention to country-level data on the identification of security (crime and violence) as the most important problem. Figure 1.5 presents these data. According to the 2014 AmericasBarometer, in two countries, Trinidad & Tobago and El Salvador, 2 out of 3 citizens identify security as the most important problem facing their country. In Uruguay, this rate is 1 out of 2 citizens or 50% of the adult population. Security concerns are elevated in a number of other countries in the Americas as well, including Jamaica, Honduras, Peru, and Guatemala. In sharp contrast, few citizens in

¹⁸ Using other survey data, Singer (2013) shows that the economy has consistently been cited as the most important problem in the hemisphere going back to the mid-1990s, although crime and security has increased in importance as the economy has strengthened and crime has gotten worse in many countries in recent years.

¹⁹ As is standard LAPOP practice, in all analyses of regional averages in this chapter and this report more generally, we calculate regional means via a process that weights each country equally rather than proportional to population.



Haiti and Nicaragua identify security as the most important issue facing the country: in each case, fewer than 5% of individuals respond to the most important problem question with an issue related to security. In fact, though not shown here, we note that these two countries rank the highest in number of people surveyed stating economy as the most important problem in 2014.





Figure 1.5. Percentage Identifying Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country, 2014

Variation in concerns about security exists not only across countries in the Americas, but also across time. And, in fact, we also see cross-national variation in change across time: that is, the extent to which security concerns are increasing or decreasing in a country, on average, differs throughout the region. Map 1.1 shows how security as the most important problem has shifted from 2012 to 2014 across countries in the region by graphing the change in percentage that identify security as the most important problem. Guyana (shaded with the darkest color in Map 1.1) is a country in which we find the second largest increase in security being identified as the most important problem; yet, as Figure 1.5 demonstrates, it still ranks low in comparison to other countries in the Americas in the percentage

of respondents that report security as the most important. Costa Ricans decreased in their tendency to identify security as the most important problem, when comparing 2012 to 2014, a shift that helps account for their fairly low ranking in Figure 1.5. On the other hand, Venezuela also experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of respondents indicating security as the most important problem, but the country still ranks at about the regional mean for the Americas in 2014.²⁰



Map 1.1. Shift between 2012 and 2014 in Security as the Most Important Problem Facing the Country²¹

²⁰ It should be noted that this significant change in the percentage of Venezuelans that identifies security as the main problem is driven in large part by a significant increase in concerns over scarcity of basic products. Scarcity of food and basic necessities became a serious and salient problem in Venezuela in 2014. Thus, it may not be that security concerns diminished in Venezuela in 2014 so much as concerns about basic goods increased.

²¹ Countries are categorized as having *decreased substantially* if the percentage of individuals reporting a security issue as the most important problem shifted downward between 10 and 40 percentage points between 2012 and 2014. They are categorized as *decreased modestly* if this downward shift is between 0 and 10 percentage points; *increased modestly* if the



IV. Experiences with Crime and Violence in the Americas: A View from the AmericasBarometer

On average across the Americas, as described in the previous section, issues related to crime, violence, and security rank high on the minds of citizens across the Americas when they consider the most important problem facing their country. But, what types of experiences with crime victimizations, and at what rates, do citizens in the Americas report? In this section, using data collected for the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we first examine the frequency and types of crime victimization across the Americas, including analysis from new questions asked in 2014. Then we discuss the factors that may be associated with the likelihood of falling victim to crime and use the AmericasBarometer data to explore the individual-level characteristics of those most likely to report being victims of crime.

Trends in Crime Victimization across the Americas

The AmericasBarometer has included several questions pertaining to crime victimization since 2004. One of these questions asks the individual whether he or she has been the victim of any type of crime over the past year. The specific wording is as follows:²²

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes [**Continue**] (2) No [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**]
 (88) DK [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**] (98) DA [**Skip to VIC1HOGAR**]

Figure 1.6 displays reported crime victimization rates since 2004 for the Americas. That is, the figure shows the percentage of individuals, on average across the region, who answer that they were the victim of (at least one) crime over the past 12 months.²³ We see that crime victimization has hovered around 17% in most years except 2010, when there was a small spike in reported crime victimization. These findings suggest that the frequency of crime victimization has remained rather constant across time, on average for the region. In a separate analysis, not shown here, we find that the cross-time pattern of mostly stable rates shown in Figure 1.6 is fairly consistent for both the rural vs. urban populations of the Americas. That said, those who live in urban areas are more likely to report having been victimized by crime: on average across the Americas, approximately 1 out of every 5

percentage of respondents selecting security shifted upward between 0 and 10; and *increased substantially* if that upward shift was over 10 percentage points.

²² LAPOP has conducted a set of experiments in Belize and in the United States to assess whether the change in question wording results in a higher rate of response. The results are mixed, such that - for example - in a study conducted by LAPOP in Belize in 2008 in which the questions were placed into a split-sample design, there was no statistically distinguishable difference in responses to the original versus the modified question. On the other hand, in an online study conducted in the United States in 2013, LAPOP found that those who received the modified question wording were more likely to indicate having been the victim of a crime. Therefore, we can say that it is possible that some variation between crime victimization rates recorded by the AmericasBarometer pre-2009 compared to post-2009 are due to question wording differences; rates within the periods 2004-2008 and 2010-2014 cannot be affected by question wording differences because no changes were introduced within those periods.

²³ Figure 1.6 would look roughly the same if we examine only the 11 countries that were surveyed since 2004 or the 22 countries that were surveyed since 2006. Though when looking only at the 11 countries surveyed in 2004, we find the spike from 2008 to 2010 to be greater (a 5-point difference) and the trend after 2010 to decline at a slower rate. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

adults living in an urban area reports having been victimized by crime, while approximately just 1 out of 10 rural residents reports the same phenomenon (a statistically significant difference).²⁴




Figure 1.6. Crime Victimization over Time

Figure 1.7 compares the percentage of citizens who have been victims of at least one crime in 2014, and documents important variation across countries. The top four spots in the chart are taken by South American countries: Peru (30.6%) is at the top, followed by Ecuador (27.5%), Argentina (24.4%), and Venezuela (24.4%). Three Caribbean countries rank at the bottom of the chart: Trinidad & Tobago (9.6%), Guyana (7.4%), and Jamaica (6.7%). The presence of Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago at the low end of Figure 1.7 is notable given that high percentages of individuals in these countries rate “security” as the most important problem facing their country in 2014 (see Figure 1.5).

²⁴ See also Figure 1.15.




Figure 1.7. Crime Victimization Rates, 2014

The 2014 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine the number of times that victimized individuals have experienced crime in the last 12 months. For this purpose, the survey asks:

VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months?
 [fill in number] _____ (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

As we can see in Figure 1.8, in 2014, on average for the Americas, a majority of crime victims (55.7%) report being victimized one time. One in four crime victims reports being victimized two times. One in ten crime victims has been victimized three or more times in the past year, and very small percentages are found in the higher bins in the figure.




Figure 1.8. Crime Victimization Frequency, 2014

The AmericasBarometer not only records the levels of crime experienced by each of the survey respondents, but it also evaluates if other members of the respondent’s household were victimized by any type of crime during the 12 months prior to the interview. To do so, between 2010 and 2014 the AmericasBarometer included the following question:

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

In Figure 1.9 we look at the region-wide levels of crime victimization within the household of the respondent since 2010.²⁵ We see a similar trend as we do with individual crime victimization; across time, levels of crime victimization within the household remain stable at about 17%, except for in 2010 when reports reach 19%. When examining crime victimization within the household in urban areas only, the trend remains the same though reports of crime victimization within the household are three percentage points higher than the general levels shown in the figure here.

²⁵ This question was not included in earlier rounds of the survey.




Figure 1.9. Crime Victimization within Household over Time

The AmericasBarometer also provides information on where the crime took place. Knowing the location of the crime can be useful in understanding differences in patterns of crime victimization within and across countries. Further, it may serve as information citizens can consider in taking precautionary measures to avoid crime, or may help local policy makers and law officers identify areas that need particular attention in order to increase citizen security. In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included the following item, which was asked of those who indicated that they had been victim of a crime during the 12 months prior to the survey:

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this municipality/canton/parish
- (4) In another municipality/canton/parish
- (5) In another country
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

Figure 1.10 shows the distribution of the location of crime victimization as reported by respondents across the Americas in 2014. We find a relatively equal distribution of respondents across categories. However, the most common locations where respondents report having been victimized are their homes (27%), in their neighborhood (26.8%), and in their municipality (26.9%). Victimization in other municipalities is less frequent (18.6%) and very few crime victims report the incident as having taken place outside of their country (0.6%).




Figure 1.10. Location of Crime Victimization, 2014

In 2014, the AmericasBarometer included an expanded series of survey items in order to obtain a sense of criminal activity within the neighborhood of the respondent. The new battery refers to the last 12 months, just as the crime victimization questions, and covers the following incidents: burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and murders. In the remainder of this section, we examine responses to these “VICBAR” questions:

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in that last 12 months in your neighborhood? [yes/no]

Figure 1.11 displays, by country, the percentage of respondents who answered yes to having experienced or heard of burglaries in their neighborhood. We see a great deal of variation across countries, from rates of affirmative responses of nearly 72% in Argentina, to 28% of respondents reporting such incidents in their neighborhood in Trinidad & Tobago. South American countries, like Argentina, Venezuela (69.9%), Brazil (69.6%), and Uruguay (69.2%), are grouped towards the top of those with the highest rates of burglaries, while Central American countries like Belize (37.6%), El Salvador (37.9%), Honduras (37.9%), Guatemala (41.0%), and Costa Rica (44.7%) are grouped somewhere in the middle of the figure. With the exception of the Dominican Republic, all of the Caribbean countries included in this report (Trinidad & Tobago, 28.2%; Guyana, 30.8%; Haiti, 32.9%;



and Jamaica, 34.7%) rank at the bottom in rates of witnessing or having heard about neighborhood burglaries.²⁶




Figure 1.11. Burglaries in the Neighborhood, 2014

Figure 1.12 examines the percentage of respondents across countries in 2014 that witnessed or heard of sales of illegal drugs in their neighborhood. Once again we see substantial cross-national variation in crime rates. More than half of the respondents of Brazil (64.6%), Costa Rica (58.2%), the Dominican Republic (56.1%), and Argentina (50.5%) report illegal drugs sales in their neighborhood in the 2014 AmericasBarometer study, whereas less than 10% of the respondents in Haiti make a similar report. Jamaica and Bolivia also show low rates, at 20.5% and 17.0%, respectively. When comparing the two occurrences, sales of illegal drugs and burglaries, in the neighborhood of the

²⁶ When examining only urban areas throughout the Americas, a similar ranking is found, but with increased percentage points per country (about a 5-8 increase in percentage points per country).

respondent most countries have similar positioning within the region in each chart; but Costa Rica (58.2%), Chile (48%) and Trinidad & Tobago (44.7%) see substantial moves in placement toward the top of the chart in sales of illegal drugs, when comparing their ranking here to their ranking in the chart related to burglaries.²⁷




Figure 1.12. Sales of Illegal Drugs in the Neighborhood, 2014

Next, Figure 1.13 displays the percentage of respondents across countries that report having witnessed or heard of extortion or blackmail within their neighborhood. The cross-national variation reveals a 25 point spread between the highest and lowest rate, which is so far the smallest variation and yet still substantial. On average, rates of reported extortion/blackmail in the neighborhood are among the lowest percentages reported in the VICBAR series (that is, the series of reported criminal incidents in the neighborhood). We continue to see the Dominican Republic (24.4%) at the top of the charts for

²⁷ Trends in urban areas reflect the national trends, but with increased percentage points (about a 3-8 increase in percentage points per country).



crime victimization within respondent's neighborhoods. However, overall we see a slightly different distribution of countries than we saw for burglaries and sales of illegal drugs. In second place is Haiti (24.2%), which has ranked lower on the two previous charts, comparatively. Guatemala (23.3%) and El Salvador (22.9%) are within the top five countries reporting extortion or blackmail, and again ranked much lower, comparatively, on the two previous measures. At the other end of the scale we find Uruguay, Guyana, and Nicaragua with a frequency of only 3.1%; 2.0%; and 1.4%, respectively.²⁸




Figure 1.13. Extortion or Blackmail in the Neighborhood, 2014

Finally, Figure 1.14 examines the percentage of respondents that reported having known of a murder occurring in their neighborhood. We see Brazil (51.1%) at the top of the chart with the highest percentage, where over half of respondents report being aware of a murder in their neighborhood in the 12 months prior to the survey. Venezuela is in the second position with 42.7%, followed by the Dominican Republic, which we find at the top of all figures examining the VICBAR series –

²⁸ When examining urban areas only for reports of extortion or blackmail within the neighborhood, we find a similar country ranking with a few more percentage points reported per country.

burglaries, sales of illegal drugs, extortion or blackmail, and now murders (33.9%). Costa Rica lies at the bottom of the chart (10.6%), just below Uruguay (11.9%) and Guyana (12%). The differences among those countries are not statistically significant.²⁹




Figure 1.14. Murders in the Neighborhood, 2014

Who is Likely to Be a Victim of a Crime?

Now that we have provided a broad picture of the frequency and nature of crime across the Americas as reported by the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we ask *who is most likely to report having been the victim of a crime?* Crime does not affect all population groups in the same way. Differences exist

²⁹ When examining urban areas only, the positioning of the countries remains, with less than a five percentage point increase per country.



by place of residence, economic status, gender, age, and education.³⁰ In general terms, the scholarly literature suggests that crime is more often an urban phenomenon in Latin America. Living in large, urbanized cities makes citizens more likely to be victims of crime than residing in less populated and less developed areas (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Heinemann and Verner 2006; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Gomes and Paz 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Cotte Poveda 2012; Muggah 2012).

Increasing attention has also been given to the role of wealth in crime victimization; however, the relationship is less straightforward than between crime and urban settings. On the one hand, wealthier individuals can be more attractive to criminals and therefore wealth could be positively correlated with risk of crime victimization (Anderson 2009). On the other hand, wealth implies the motivation and capability to have more resources with which to protect one's person and/or property, which reduces the risk of becoming a victim of crime (Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Barslund, Rand, Tarp, and Chiconela 2007; Gomes and Paz 2008; Justus and Kassouf 2013). Most recently, evidence indicates that wealth does indeed increase the probability of crime victimization, but the relationship is not linear, or non-monotonic. Once an individual has attained a certain level of wealth, the probability of falling victim to crime seems to diminish, likely because of the ability to guarantee self-protection (Justus and Kassouf 2013). This means that citizens belonging to the middle class may be more likely to be a victim of a crime than those that belong to the lowest or highest socioeconomic strata.

Scholars have also identified young adult males as those most susceptible to crime victimization (Beato, Peixoto, and Andrade 2004; Carvalho and Lavor 2008; Cole and Gramajo 2009; Muggah 2012). Those most vulnerable to violent crime in particular, are young male adults, especially those that are unemployed and have poor education. Victims of property crime, on the other hand, tend to also be young males, but are more likely to be those who have more education and frequently use public transportation (Bergman 2006).

Using the 2014 AmericasBarometer data, we first examine crime victims by location of their residence – whether an urban or rural location – and by their level of wealth.³¹ The results in Figure 1.15 show that respondents living in urban locations are almost twice as likely to be victims of crime as respondents living in rural locations (20.2% vs. 11.8%), which is in line with conventional views and expectations. Also, as quintiles of wealth increase, the likelihood of reporting having been the victim of a crime increases. The results display a linear relationship rather than a tapering off effect or a diminishing return once wealth reaches a certain point. Thus, on average across the Americas, wealth is simply and positively related to reported crime victimization.

³⁰ Differences also emerge when considering whether victimization is violent or non-violent, or involves property; our analyses here focus on crime victimization in general.

³¹ Wealth quintiles is a standard LAPOP variable created using the R-series questions about capital goods ownership to create a five-point index of quintiles of wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." AmericasBarometer Insights 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 1.15. Crime Victimization by Resident Location and Wealth, 2014

To further examine what factors predict crime victimization in the Americas, Figure 1.16 presents the results of a logistic regression analysis intended to examine determinants of self-reported crime victimization within the Americas in 2014.³² The figure displays the standardized regression coefficients as dots, with confidence intervals indicated by the horizontal lines. The figure shows that the most consequential factors associated with crime victimization are urban residence and education. Those living within an urban setting and having higher education levels are more likely to report being a victim of crime. Wealthy individuals are also more likely to report being a crime victim. On the other hand, women and those from higher age cohorts (the comparison category in the analysis is those of 36 to 45 years of age) are less likely to report being a victim of crime. We included a measure of respondent skin tone in the analysis, and see that it is not a significant factor in predicting crime victimization on average across the Americas. This result for skin tone and those that we report here for gender, education, and wealth are consistent with analyses of predictors of crime victimization using the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey, as presented in our last report (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister2012), which gives us confidence in the robustness of these findings for the Latin American and Caribbean region.

³² The analysis excludes the United States and Canada. Country fixed effects are included but not shown with Mexico as the base country. See corresponding table with the numerical results for the standardized coefficients in the Appendix.




Figure 1.16. Determinants of Self-Reported Crime Victimization, 2014

V. Conclusion

Issues related to crime, violence, and security are a serious challenge for democratic governance in the Americas. The AmericasBarometer has consistently recorded citizens' experiences with crime and violence in the region, and their concerns about these issues. In 2014, we expanded the study to include several new modules related to crime in order to allow even more detailed analysis of this topic. This chapter presents only a glimpse at this broader dataset, which we encourage those interested in the topic to explore in greater detail by accessing the survey data directly via LAPOP's website (www.lapopsurveys.org).

Among the key findings in this chapter is the fact that concerns about crime as the most important problem have been steadily increasing over recent years in the Americas. And at the same time that regional average crime rates have remained fairly constant, significant variation exists across countries with respect to crime rates in general and with respect to reported incidents of particular types of crime in the neighborhood.

We concluded the chapter with an assessment of which individuals are more likely to report having been the victim of a crime in the Americas. We find that those living in urban settings, those with more years of education, and those with higher levels of wealth are more likely to report being the victim of a crime.

Appendix

**Appendix 1.1. Determinants of Self-reported Crime Victimization, 2014
(Figure 1.16)**

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
66 years or older	-0.094*	(-5.09)
56-65 years	-0.069*	(-3.82)
46-55 years	-0.026	(-1.45)
26-35 years	0.004	-0.23
16-25 years	0.022	-1.18
Skin Tone	-0.033	(-1.75)
Wealth Quintiles	0.076*	-4.35
Years of Schooling	0.199*	-10.73
Woman	-0.071*	(-4.70)
Urban	0.212*	-10.61
Guatemala	-0.03	(-1.32)
El Salvador	-0.040*	(-1.98)
Honduras	-0.027	(-1.18)
Nicaragua	-0.050*	(-2.27)
Costa Rica	-0.135*	(-5.67)
Panama	-0.268*	(-8.69)
Colombia	-0.055*	(-2.74)
Ecuador	0.055*	-2.05
Bolivia	-0.024	(-0.92)
Peru	0.055*	(-3)
Paraguay	-0.125*	(-6.11)
Chile	-0.183*	(-6.84)
Uruguay	-0.014	(-0.70)
Brazil	-0.082*	(-3.93)
Venezuela	-0.016	(-0.87)
Argentina	-0.003	(-0.19)
Dominican Republic	0.004	(-0.17)
Haiti	-0.065*	(-2.89)
Jamaica	-0.253*	(-10.09)
Guyana	-0.225*	(-8.28)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.207*	(-8.87)
Belize	-0.073*	(-3.93)
Constant	-1.604*	(-85.00)
F	37.2	
Number of cases	38102	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		



Chapter 2. Economic Development and Perceived Economic Performance in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

The last decade has seen dramatic economic improvements throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Thanks to rising commodity prices, several countries enjoyed economic booms and, in turn, the region quickly recovered from the global economic slowdown. Improved education has narrowed skills gaps within the workforce (Kahhat 2010) and has boosted wages, particularly for low income workers (World Bank 2013). Many governments also launched ambitious social programs that helped provide more effective safety nets against poverty (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2012; Huber and Stephens 2012). As a result, aggregate poverty rates in Latin America have fallen (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010).¹ Indeed, the number of people in Latin America living in extreme poverty (less than \$2.50 a day) has dropped by 50% since 2000. In 2011, the number of people classified by the World Bank as middle class, measured as living on \$10-50 a day, surpassed the number of people in Latin America classified as poor (Ferreira et al 2013). Inequality in the hemisphere remains high but has also decreased in recent years (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010; Ferreira et al 2013).

These gains notwithstanding, the region's economies still face multiple challenges. Over 80 million people live in extreme poverty (World Bank 2013) and 40% of Latin Americans live on a precarious \$4-10 a day. The heralded growth of the middle class has been uneven—more pronounced in the Southern Cone than in the other places in the region. Moreover, as commodity prices have stabilized over the last two years, Latin America has seen its growth rates decrease. This development has led some observers to voice concerns over whether the region's economies are strong enough to continue raising people out of poverty.² Persistent inefficiencies in education systems and stubbornly large informal sectors in many countries hamper worker productivity.³ So despite some recent signs of economic resilience, the quest for economic development continues across much of the Americas.

While these economic trends are important in and of themselves, a large literature links political participation and democratic attitudes to economic development and performance (e.g. Lipset 1959; Easton 1975; Carlin 2006; Bratton et al 2005; see discussion in Booth and Seligson 2009). Rising living standards and a growing middle class may ultimately be good for democracy if they result in growing demands for political inclusion (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Yet if democratic values have not become fully dispersed within the hemisphere, economic weakening may create discontent with democratic institutions and practices if citizens become convinced that democracy cannot fully deliver (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Booth and Seligson 2009). Moreover, high levels of

¹ Data on poverty rates in the Caribbean are much more limited than are data on Latin America, thus while many reports speak of “Latin America and the Caribbean” in discussing the recent trends most of the data in them draws exclusively on Latin America. For a summary of some recent poverty data in the Caribbean, see Downes (2010).

²<http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview>; <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/aug/27/inequality-latin-america-undp>

³<http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21599782-instead-crises-past-mediocre-growth-big-riskunless-productivity-rises-life>

poverty and inequality may create opportunities for leaders who promise to fix those problems if delegated sufficient political authority to change the current status quo, perhaps at the cost of democratic checks and balances (Weyland 2013).

The 2014 AmericasBarometer provides a window into both the real improvements many citizens of the hemisphere experience as well as some lingering economic weaknesses. In particular, these data allow us to examine how the region's citizens view their current financial situation and the current state of the national economy. In doing so, we can see that while the average respondent is objectively better off than he or she was in the recent past, many people continue to report significant financial hardships. AmericasBarometer respondents also are tuned into the weakening macroeconomic situation; descriptions of the national economic situation are significantly lower in 2014 than they were in 2012 or 2010. In all of these trends, substantial differences in economic perceptions and household wealth within society reflect historic inequalities regarding access to education and the market that continue to shape patterns of inequality in the hemisphere.

II. Main Findings

In this chapter, we use the AmericasBarometer to track household access to basic services, ownership of common appliances, and other forms of household wealth along with subjective evaluations of whether one's income is sufficient to meet economic needs and subjective evaluations of recent economic trends. The main findings we document are as follows:

- The regional average level of household wealth is increasing, in particular, ownership of many household appliances.
- Access to household services like running water and sewage has increased more slowly, but continues to increase in the hemisphere.
- When asked subjectively about their financial situations and whether their income is sufficient to meet their needs, many respondents report that they are struggling. In fact, the number of households that cannot make ends meet in an average country remains almost unchanged from previous waves of the survey.
- Evaluations of national economic trends are generally negative, although they vary substantially across countries in ways that reflect recent macroeconomic trends; respondents in countries whose economies are growing the most slowly tend to have the least positive views of the economy.

Yet we consistently find that both objective levels of wealth and subjective perceptions of household finances and the national economy differ within countries in ways that reflect structural inequalities within society as well as non-economic factors.

- Education is a particularly strong predictor of both objective household wealth and subjective reports of being financially secure.
- Individuals who live in urban areas, are married, are middle age, have lighter colored skin, and are male tend to report owning more household items.

- Household wealth is strongly correlated with reporting the ability to make ends meet, but even among the wealthiest quintile in the sample, 29% of respondents report that their income is not enough to make ends meet.
- Those who are poor, indigenous, and/or female tend to have the most negative views of the national economy.
- Individuals who live in high crime areas or who experienced corruption in the past year tend to be more negative about their country's economic trajectory.

III. The Evolution of Household Wealth

One way we can track Latin America's economic evolution is by looking at trends in household ownership of various consumer items. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents if they own the following:

R3. Refrigerator	(0) No			(1) Yes	DK 88	DA 98
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two	(3) Three or more	88	98
R6. Washing machine	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R15. Computer	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R18. Internet	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
R1. Television	(0) No [Skip to R26]			(1) Yes [Continue]	88	98
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No			(1) Yes	88	98
						99 INAP

The list of household goods that the AmericasBarometer asks about has expanded over time, reflecting the advent of new technologies and the greater availability of other household items. The survey does not ask about the quality of the goods nor whether the respondent owns multiple versions of an appliance. Nevertheless, these measures allow us to break down some of the basic differences in household wealth in the hemisphere.

Figure 2.1 graphs the percentage of households in 2014 that claim to have each item. As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere. According to these AmericasBarometer data, some household goods have become nearly ubiquitous in the Americas. For example, over 91% of households surveyed have a television. That number has grown slightly since

2006 (when it was 89%).⁴ Of course this does not mean all homes are equal with regards to this one measure of wealth. Households will differ in the number and types of TV's they own. In fact, the 2014 AmericasBarometer added a question asking specifically about whether the respondent has a flat screen TV—less than 40% of respondents do. But at a basic level, access to television is high throughout the continent.




Figure 2.1. Ownership of Household Goods in the Americas, 2014⁵

⁴ In discussing trends in household wealth we focus on comparisons to 2006 because that was the year the AmericasBarometer expanded within South America and the Caribbean. If we restrict our attention to the countries in Central America and the Andes that were included in the 2004 wave and look at trends until the present day, the gains are even larger.

⁵ This figure excludes the United States and Canada because several of the household wealth questions were not asked there.



Telephone access is also high throughout the Americas. Over 91% of individuals have either a cell phone or a landline phone in their home. Of the two types, cellular phones are far more common; roughly 89% of respondents have a cell phone while 36% have a landline phone. And while the share of houses with at least one television has remained relatively constant over the last 8 years of the AmericasBarometer survey, telephone penetration has increased markedly. In 2006 only 75% of households had access to a phone of any kind, with 63% of households having cell phones and 43% landlines. Thus in 8 years reported access to telephones in the household has increased by 16 percentage points and reported cell phone ownership has gone up by 26 percentage points.

In general, access to electronic appliances has been on a significant upward trend in recent years. Refrigerator ownership was fairly common in 2006 but increased 7.5 percentage points in the last eight years, such that nearly 82% of households in the average country report owning one. Ownership of washing machines and microwaves is more limited, but both have grown in recent years. Since 2006, the proportion of respondents in an average country who report owning a washing machine has increased by 16 percentage points and microwave ownership is now 14.6 percentage points higher. We observe a large increase – 21 percentage points since 2006 – in computer ownership. Concurrently, household access to the internet also grew by 28 percentage points since the AmericasBarometer first asked about it in 2008.

Other forms of household wealth changed more slowly. Though most homes in the Americas have access to indoor plumbing and an indoor bathroom, the percentage of homes that do not has only fallen 4 percentage points since 2006 in the average country. The average number of homes with an indoor bathroom has also only increased by 4 percentage points over the same period of time. These major gains in wealth are, perhaps, the most difficult to achieve. Not only are they expensive, they often require local governments and utilities to provide reliable forms of infrastructure, access, and services. Yet we might also consider that while a 4 percentage-point gain in access does not sound like much compared to the large increases in ownership of other goods and services, it does mean that in the past eight years the number of homes without access to indoor plumbing or an indoor bathroom have been reduced by 18 and 14 percent respectively. Car ownership also remains relatively rare; about 30% of respondents own at least one car, although that is an increase over the 24% that reported owning cars in 2006.

To summarize these overall trends, in Figure 2.2 we create a simple index of household ownership that keeps track of the number of goods households in an average country own.⁶ We focus on the 12 items that were asked about in every survey since 2006 and count the number owned by each household.⁷ For simplicity we weight each item equally and take the average number of owned items

⁶ This index is a very simple index of wealth and differs from the one used elsewhere in the report that breaks wealth into quintiles. In most analyses in this report we use an index of household wealth that uses factor analysis to identify which goods distinguish the most well-off households from other households and which also incorporates differences in the kinds of wealth that are possible in urban and rural areas given differences in infrastructure (a well-to-do person in rural areas where electricity is scarce may own fewer electronic appliances, for example, than does a poor person living in an urban center). See Córdova, Abby. 2009. Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators. *AmericasBarometer Insight Report* 2008, no. 6. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en.pdf>. The index of household wealth used in the rest of the report breaks houses down into their quintiles by country but, by design, does not allow for comparisons across countries or within them over time in the number of goods that households actually own. Thus, here we look at a raw count of household goods.

⁷ Television of any kind, a flat screen television, refrigerator, telephone, car, washing machine, microwave, motorcycle, indoor plumbing, indoor bathroom, a computer, and the internet.

across the sample. The data show household access to these basic services and appliances increased in every wave of the AmericasBarometer.⁸




Figure 2.2. Average Wealth over Time, 12-Item Additive Index

While household wealth has increased on average, large disparities continue to exist within the Americas. We explore differences within and across societies using data from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. In Figure 2.3 we model a slightly modified version of the household wealth index presented in Figure 2.2 that adds ownership of a flat screen TV and internet access (questions added to the AmericasBarometer battery since 2006) to the set of household goods and examine how they differ within societies. We control for country fixed effects to account for unmeasured differences across countries, thus the results in Figure 2.3 reflect average within-country differences in household wealth.⁹

⁸ If we compare wealth within only those countries that are included in every survey since 2004, the same pattern of increasing wealth over time also occurs.

⁹ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. The coefficients are all standardized. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.1 at the end of the chapter.




Figure 2.3. Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014¹⁰

Average levels of household wealth vary significantly across socio-demographic groups. The largest correlate of household wealth is education. The more schooling an individual obtains, the more of these household items he or she tends to own. This pattern may exist for several reasons. It could be that as education levels continue to increase, opportunities to obtain household wealth also increase.¹¹ Yet inequalities with regards to access to education remain and these gaps in opportunities for children of different class and ethnic backgrounds and genders are likely to help further perpetuate inequalities in adulthood (Cruces et al. 2014).¹² It could also be that wealthy individuals are able to keep their children in school longer and that this correlation at the individual-level reflects differences in initial levels of wealth.

Other groups have systematically lower levels of wealth. Households in rural areas report having fewer household items than urban ones. Individuals with darker-toned skin tend to own fewer household goods than light-toned skinned individuals, even when holding the level of education and place of residence constant. Asset ownership varies with age in a non-linear way:¹³ the youngest age category reports owning many of the household goods, perhaps due to a lack of family responsibilities,

¹⁰ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States, Canada, or Uruguay because of missing values on some variables.

¹¹ In analyses not reported here we find that the average level of education among AmericasBarometer respondents has increased significantly since 2006, with the average respondent in 2014 reporting nearly half a year more schooling than did the average respondent in 2006, which reflects the expansion of education in recent decades (Cruces et al 2014) and the generational replacement as the younger, more educated generations come of age while the less educated generations drop out of the sample.

¹² In an analysis not reported here, we find that the largest correlates of respondents' educational attainment are their mother's education (which has by far the largest marginal effect-educated parents tend to have educated children), living in urban areas (rural areas tend to have lower average levels of education), gender (married women have lower average levels of education than do single women and single women have slightly lower levels of education than do single men although they are not significantly different than are married men), and age (younger respondents tend to be more educated).

¹³ The reference category in the model is the 36-45 years-old category.

being early adopters of technology, or because many of them still live at home or receive support from their parents. Household wealth then drops as respondents enter their late 20s and early 30s but increases with age until dropping among the oldest groups.

Wealth also differs across genders, although this gap is affected by marital status. We break respondents up into those who live in a household as part of a couple (marriage, common-law marriage, or civil union) and those who do not (single, separated, divorced, or widowed). Individuals living as a couple tend to have more resources than do those who are not. In further analysis we found that parents of children who do not live with another person tend to have fewer resources than do single individuals without children (and this is equally true for men and women) while men and women who are part of a couple and have kids tend to have more possessions than couples who do not have children. Yet among both single individuals and couples, men are more likely to report higher ownership of goods than women. The survey does not allow us to isolate why married women are less likely to report the same levels of *household* wealth as married men, given that we would expect the two groups on average to report the same levels of wealth. One explanation is suggested by a study done in Malawi on reporting of household wealth, which posits that women may be less likely to report ownership of an item if it is predominantly used by her husband (Miller, Msiyaphazi Zulu, and Cotts Watkins 2001).

In summary, these results remind us that across the Americas, as a whole, certain groups – the uneducated, darker skinned individuals, single individuals (especially single parents), women, and individuals living in rural areas still experience real disadvantages in accumulating household wealth despite recent improvements in overall wealth levels.

IV. Despite Improvements, Many Households Struggle to Make Ends Meet

Though the data in Figure 2.2 display a clear upward trend in the ownership of household goods, households do not necessarily feel financially secure. Many households obtained these goods by going into debt, which leaves them struggling to make payments.¹⁴ Moreover, rising aspirations may leave individuals unsatisfied even as they are better off (Easterlin 2001; Graham 2005). Thus, we move beyond objective measures of wealth to subjective measures of personal financial situations. Specifically, the AmericasBarometer asks respondents how well their income allows them to cover their financial needs.

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**
 (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
 (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
 (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
 (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
 (88) **[Don't read]** DK (98) **[Don't read]** DA

The citizens of the Americas are split almost equally between those who think that they can make ends meet and those who report that they are struggling to do so (Figure 2.4). These differences break down along objective wealth lines. In Figure 2.5, we divide the sample by quintiles of household

¹⁴ See dos Santos (2013) or Soederberg (2014) for a review of evidence about the expansion of credit markets. Also <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/economia/niveles-preocupantes-llega-deuda-de-hogares-colombianos-articulo-304173> and http://www.cps.fgv.br/cps/bd/DD/DD_Neri_Fgv_TextoFim3_PRINC.pdf



wealth (measured within each country), using the series of questions about household goods ownership following the approach by Córdova (2009). Over 29% of respondents in the lowest wealth category report they not only feel stretched but have a hard time making ends meet. This contrasts with less than 6% of those in the households with the most material benefits feeling they are in the same situation. Yet even in the highest wealth quintile, 3 out of every 10 individuals report that their income is not enough to comfortably meet their needs, and 53% of households in the median wealth quintile report that their income is not enough to meet their needs. Thus this question does not merely reflect income but also likely tracks the number of financial commitments households have taken on and the financial aspirations of different groups. At all levels of wealth across the Americas, on average, large numbers of individuals feel like they are financially stretched or worse.




Figure 2.4. Is The Household’s Income Sufficient to Meet Its Needs?, 2014




Figure 2.5. Perceptions of Household Finances across Household Wealth Quintiles, 2014

If we look over time, the regional average across the hemisphere has hardly changed since 2006; outside of an increase in perceived security in 2012, the differences between years are fairly small (Figure 2.6). More importantly, the relative stability of respondents' perceptions of their household situations stands in contrast to the growth seen in the sheer number of material objects households have accumulated. While individuals in the Americas today own more things than ever before, they are feeling no more financially secure.

Levels of financial contentment at the household level vary across countries. Following LAPOP standard practices, answers to question Q10D are scored on a 0-100 scale, with high values representing greater ability to cover household expenses. In 2014 Panama, Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Uruguay have the highest level of individuals who feel like their income meets their needs, while Honduras and Haiti have the most individuals who report financial struggles (Figure 2.7). Since the question was asked in prior years, we can present a comparison between the 2014 results and those obtained in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In this analysis, we find that while Haiti had the lowest levels of subjective economic security in 2012, subjective household security in Honduras has fallen by more than 13 points on the 0-100 scale over the last 2 years as many more respondents report having difficulty making ends meet. Venezuela also saw the number of households who feel financially secure fall; the financial perceptions index is 11 points lower in 2014 than in 2012. Canada and Colombia, in contrast, were the only two countries that saw even a 2-point increase in subjective household finances over the past two years.




Figure 2.6. Perceptions of Household Finances over Time




Figure 2.7. Perceptions of Household Finances by Country, 2014

V. How Do People Perceive the National Economy?

The citizens of the Americas offer mixed assessments of the national economy. In the AmericasBarometer survey respondents were asked how they perceived the recent performance of the national economy.

SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

The most frequent response in 2014 was the economy was getting worse while relatively few respondents said the economy was getting better (Figure 2.8). This represents a sizable drop in

economic assessments from the 2012 survey and, indeed, economic perceptions have not been this negative in the Americas since 2008 (Figure 2.9).




Figure 2.8. Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014





Figure 2.9. Perceptions of the National Economy over Time

Citizen evaluations of the national economy vary substantially across countries (Map 2.1). To facilitate the interpretation of this question, we have recoded it on a 0-100 scale where high values represent a belief that the economy has gotten better. Respondents in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile have the most positive views of their economy. Comparing these results for 2014 to those obtained from the

2012 AmericasBarometer, we can report that each of these countries saw a fairly large increase in economic optimism; the economic assessment measure in Ecuador is eight points higher in 2014 than it was in 2012, while Bolivia and Chile each saw their economic perceptions score rise by more than 12 points. The other country where citizens view the economy much more positively in 2014 than two years ago is the Dominican Republic. In fact, economic assessments there changed from some of the most negative in 2012 to among the most positive in 2014. If we shift our attention to countries where respondents are the least positive in 2014, Venezuelans lead the region followed by Guatemalans, Argentines, and Mexicans. Venezuela also saw the largest drop in economic assessments (30 points) since the previous AmericasBarometer. For its part, Argentina saw a substantial drop of 26 points compared to two years ago. In total, 11 of the 25 countries in Map 2.1 have economic perception indexes that shrank by 10 points or more compared to 2012. Economic assessments are more negative than they were two years ago in 17 of the 25 countries.



Map 2.1. Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014¹⁵

¹⁵ The estimated economic perceptions score for each country in Map 2.1 is available in Appendix 2.2. For 2012 scores, see *The Political Culture of Democracy in the Americas 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity* (Seligson, Smith and Zechmeister 2012).

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, widespread levels of economic pessimism are consistent with the weakening of many economies in the Americas. The IMF’s April 2014 World Economic Outlook database projects that the average GDP growth for the Latin American and Caribbean countries that are part of the 2014 AmericasBarometer was 3.9% in 2013 and will be 3.3% in 2014, compared to the 4.3% growth rate the hemisphere averaged between 2010-2012. The IMF’s projected inflation rate for the hemisphere in 2014 is 6.7%, an increase over the average inflation rates of 5.7 and 5.8 percent observed in 2012 and 2010 respectively. These estimates will be revised as more data become available, but they mirror the weakness that many AmericasBarometer respondents report.

Differences in economic opinions across countries often reflect differences in these macroeconomic indicators, although imperfectly. The Venezuelan economy, for example, is particularly weak, with the IMF forecasting a slight contraction in GDP for 2014 and inflation rates nearing 50% in 2014 (even after 1% growth in GDP and 40% inflation in 2013). Thus it is not surprising that Venezuelans hold the most negative views about the economy in the hemisphere in 2014. More generally, there is a positive association between the estimated GDP growth rate for the 12 months before the survey was conducted in each country and respondent’s views of how their economy was doing compared to the previous year; a particularly high growth in Paraguay in 2013 as it recovered from a contracting economy in 2012 weakens the relationship somewhat (Figure 2.10).¹⁶




Figure 2.10. GDP Growth and National Perceptions of the Economy, 2014

Yet differences across countries cannot be fully explained by macroeconomic trends. Even if the cautious assessments of the economy in Paraguay likely reflect recent economic volatility, there are

¹⁶ Following Singer (2013) we estimate the growth rate in the 12 months before each survey by taking the weighted average of the previous year’s growth rate and the current one, weighting them according to the number of months in 2014 that had passed when the bulk of respondents in each country completed the survey.



still some countries, like Guatemala, where respondents are particularly pessimistic given the state of the economy and others, such as Ecuador, where assessments of the economy seem more positive than one might expect given recent economic trends and forecasts. Moreover, citizens within these countries do not necessarily agree on how well the economy is doing, a finding consistent with work showing citizen evaluations of the economy not only reflect economic factors but also their personal economic experiences (Duch et al. 2000) and other non-economic outcomes (De Boef and Kellstedt 2004; Duch and Kellstedt 2011).

In Figure 2.11 we model citizens' evaluations of the economy in 2014 as a function of the estimated GDP growth rate in the country, demographic factors, and non-economic factors like whether the respondent reports crimes in his or her neighborhood¹⁷ and whether the respondent had to pay a bribe in the last 12 months.¹⁸ Because the GDP growth variable is measured at the country level, this model is estimated using a hierarchical linear model.¹⁹

These data confirm a positive association between the estimated GDP growth and citizen evaluations of the economy. Yet they also confirm the notion that citizen assessments significantly differ along demographic lines. Wealthy and educate individuals tend to have more positive views of the national economy, perhaps because they are better positioned to capture the benefits of any eventual economic growth. Individuals who receive financial assistance from the government also hold positive assessments of the national economy. In contrast, women and individuals with darker skin tend to have more negative perceptions of how the national economy is performing. Previous waves of the AmericasBarometer showed women and darker skinned individuals experienced high levels of economic discrimination (Seligson et al. 2012) and the analysis presented previously in this chapter in Figure 2.3 remind us that these groups continue to face disadvantages in accumulating wealth. These structural disadvantages may be reflected in their negative views of the economy even after controlling for current levels of wealth. Yet other differences do not have as clear of an economic explanation. Young respondents, for example, tend to be more positive than older cohorts. Finally, despite higher levels of poverty in rural areas, rural residents tend to report that the national economy is doing better.

¹⁷ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1; this series asks if burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail had occurred in the respondent's neighborhood or not.

¹⁸ See the discussion of this measure in Chapter 5; the measure is based on a series of questions to which respondents report being asked to provide a bribe (or not) to a government official, the police, a municipal government employee, in a court, to the military, in work, in a school, or in accessing public health care.

¹⁹ As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect.




Figure 2.11. Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy,²⁰ 2014

The high levels of crime and corruption in the Americas also seem to be spilling over into respondent views of the national economy. Individuals who report that there have been crimes in their neighborhood are less likely to have a positive view of the economy. Bribery victims also tend to see the economy negatively. As poor governance affects citizens, it colors how they view the overall economic state of their country.

VI. Conclusion

Recent macroeconomic reports coming out of Latin America and the Caribbean have emphasized both the major improvements that have occurred in many countries and a risk of seeing these gains erased as economies slacken. The same mixed message emerges out of the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Household wealth continues to improve but many households struggle to meet basic needs. Large inequalities in access to these goods exist within societies, with historically excluded groups still lagging behind in their objective wealth. Finally, as the macroeconomic climate has worsened, and as many states struggle to fully combat crime and corruption, citizens have become pessimistic about their country's economic progress.

These data remind us of the challenges facing the hemisphere in furthering economic development. Room for improvement exists with regards to household access to sanitation and water. Education levels can continue to improve while darker skinned individuals, women, and rural residents need to be further incorporated into the economy. If the gains the Americas have achieved over the past decade are going to continue, new economic opportunities for traditionally underrepresented

²⁰ The analyses in this figure do not include the United States or Canada because of missing values on some variables. The estimated coefficients are available in Appendix 2.3 at the end of the chapter.



groups are necessary. Additionally, improvements in the rule of law and clean government may both prevent money from exiting the market and also increase consumer confidence, further stimulating economic development.

These economic fluctuations may very well have implications beyond the economy. In particular, a classic viewpoint suggests that wealth is often positively correlated with the deepening of democratic values. If so, then the overall trends in economic development in the hemisphere should have a stabilizing force. Yet the high levels of economic insecurity that remain potentially place a strain on democracies as impoverished individuals and those who cannot make ends meet look for political actors who might be able to alleviate their economic pain. Moreover, a weak economy may also bring with it doubts about the efficacy of political institutions, although a normative commitment to democratic values may insulate democratic institutions from instability when the economy deteriorates. We examine these relationships in Chapter 5. But, before turning to that analysis, in the next chapter we look at another area of policy concern in the Americas – fighting corruption.

Appendix


Appendix 2.1. Coefficients for Figure 2.3-the Correlates of Household Wealth, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.175*	(-22.82)
Man in a Couple	0.035*	(5.57)
Woman in a Couple	-0.014*	(-2.25)
Woman Living Alone	-0.042*	(-7.43)
Level of Education	0.346*	(59.08)
Skin Tone	-0.134*	(-19.55)
16-25 Years	-0.003	(-0.49)
26-35 Years	-0.018*	(-3.18)
46-55 Years	0.008	(1.55)
56-65 Years	0.020*	(3.79)
66 Years or Older	0.004	(0.74)
Guatemala	-0.060*	(-6.21)
El Salvador	-0.083*	(-9.45)
Honduras	-0.034*	(-3.04)
Nicaragua	-0.142*	(-15.57)
Costa Rica	0.119*	(13.25)
Panama	0.033*	(3.29)
Colombia	-0.012	(-1.18)
Ecuador	-0.039*	(-3.12)
Bolivia	-0.130*	(-8.53)
Peru	-0.077*	(-9.08)
Paraguay	0.022*	(2.83)
Chile	0.076*	(8.88)
Brazil	0.093*	(10.67)
Venezuela	0.052*	(5.38)
Argentina	0.058*	(8.11)
Dominican Republic	-0.010	(-0.86)
Haiti	-0.162*	(-11.86)
Jamaica	0.024*	(2.39)
Guyana	0.017	(1.38)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.143*	(18.17)
Belize	0.010	(1.23)
Constant	-0.102*	(-11.69)
Number of observations	33769	
Population size	29411.22	
Design df	1912	
F(32, 1881)	413.07*	
R ²	0.3952	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics Based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Uruguay, the United States, and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.



Appendix 2.2. Estimated Perceptions of the National Economy by Country, 2014. Empirical Basis for Map 2.1



Appendix 2.3. Coefficients for Figure 2.12-Correlates of Citizen Perceptions of the National Economy, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(Z Statistic)
GDP Growth Rate (Estimated)	0.178*	(2.19)
Rural	0.018*	(2.82)
Woman	-0.060*	(-10.48)
Wealth Quintile	0.041*	(6.65)
Level of Education	0.037*	(5.16)
Skin Tone	-0.015*	(-2.18)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.035*	(6.13)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	-0.031*	(-5.32)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	-0.023*	(-3.92)
16-25 Years	0.038*	(5.23)
26-35 Years	0.020*	(2.79)
46-55 Years	0.000	(-0.03)
56-65 Years	0.003	(0.43)
66 Years or Older	-0.008	(-1.30)
Constant	-0.094	(-0.50)
var(Country-Level)	0.104	
var(Individual-Level)	0.901	
Number of groups	23	
Wald $\chi^2(14)$	385.25*	
Hierarchical Linear Model with z-Statistics in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are excluded because they are missing values on at least one variable.



Chapter 3. Corruption in the Americas

Matthew M. Singer, Ryan E. Carlin, and Gregory J. Love

I. Introduction

While corruption trails crime and the economy as public priorities in the Americas (see Figure 1.4), it remains a major problem in the hemisphere. For example, a recent analysis looking at various indicators of government success in fighting corruption compiled by the World Bank¹ finds, on average, Latin America's governments are less successful at fighting corruption than their counterparts in Western Europe and North America and trail Eastern Europe in promoting clean government (Mungiu-Pippidi, Martinez, and Vaz Mondo 2013). Latin America has comparable levels of corruption with Asia and has less corruption, again on average, than Sub-Saharan Africa and the members of the former Soviet Union. Yet corruption levels vary substantially across the hemisphere, with some countries ranking among the cleanest in the world while in neighboring countries bribery is a part of many citizens' everyday lives.

The failure to prevent officials from misusing their power for personal gain can have deleterious economic and social consequences. Economists have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth (Ugur 2014) and wealth distribution (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).² Because corruption diverts funds from public programs' intended beneficiaries, it lowers the efficiency and quality of public services (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Ehrlich and Lui 1999). The result may be higher death rates (Silverson and Johnson 2014). Of course corruption undermines the egalitarian administration of justice (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Pharr 2000; Méon and Sekkat 2005; Morris 2008; Fried, Lagunes, and Venkataramani 2010). Some have further suggested that corruption erodes social capital by making its victims less trusting of their fellow citizens (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Eek 2009).

Corruption also generates political costs. It has been shown to reduce citizen engagement in politics (McCann and Dominguez 1998; Chong et al. 2011; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2013) and hamper support for democratic institutions and democracy more generally (Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Booth and Seligson 2009; Salinas and Booth 2011). Indeed, some scholars argue that political governance outcomes like corruption have a larger impact on democratic stability than economic outcomes (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001).

Thus in this chapter we document how respondents in the 2014 AmericasBarometer perceived and experienced corruption. We focus on two related but distinct dimensions: whether or not the respondent was asked to pay a bribe to obtain services and if they perceive public officials as corrupt. These complimentary dimensions capture two different facets of corruption: measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government can also track grand corruption, such as national scandals, with which respondents have no personal experience. Furthermore, citizens often have different tolerances when it

¹ The AmericasBarometer is one of the indicators used by the World Bank when generating its governance indicators. See www.govindicators.org/.

² Although Latin America may have a different pattern; see Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010).

comes to what kinds of activities undertaken by public officials they consider corrupt (Treisman 2007; Donchev and Ujhelyi 2014). That is, these two types of questions provide windows into two different forms of governance failures, both of which can have negative consequences for democracy in the Americas.

Despite the differences in these indicators, the data confirm corruption in all of its forms is common across Latin America. Levels of perceived political corruption are high and have not significantly improved since the 2012 AmericasBarometer, though several countries have seen significant swings. Corruption victimization is also widespread among the population, although certain groups are more likely to be exposed than others. We conclude by considering whether respondents in the Americas are so accustomed to corruption that they have become acclimated to paying bribes. The one piece of good news is that the vast majority of 2014 AmericasBarometer respondents report that paying a bribe is never justifiable, even if they themselves had to pay a bribe in the last year. While this suggests the region's residents have not abandoned a commitment to clean governance, the failure of so many regimes to fully prevent corruption may have negative consequences for levels of political support for democracy and its institutions.

II. Main Findings

The findings in this chapter can be summarized as follows. First, with regards to key findings, we see the following patterns:

- In an average country in the hemisphere, roughly one in five AmericasBarometer respondents paid a bribe in the last year.
- Bribery victimization is reported at particularly high levels among citizens who have engaged with municipal governments, courts, and the police.
- Region-average bribe victimization levels are unchanged from 2012.
- Bribe victimization levels vary by country, with Haiti an extreme outlier.
- Most respondents think corruption is common among public officials, with average perceived corruption levels unchanged from previous years.
- While one in six AmericasBarometer survey respondents believe that paying a bribe can be justified in some circumstances, that number is much higher among those who paid a bribe during the year prior to the survey.
- Yet even among those who paid a bribe, the vast majority does not believe bribes are justifiable.

Second, we consider the factors that lead citizens to have different levels of exposure to corruption and perceptions of how common it is. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- Bribery victimization is more common for men, in urban areas, in places where crime is common, and for the middle aged.

- Bribery victimization is generally more common for wealthy respondents but also among individuals who receive financial assistance from the government.
- Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, wealthy respondents, and educated respondents are more likely to believe that the government is corrupt.

III. Personal Experiences with Corruption

The AmericasBarometer surveys have employed over time a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, focusing specifically on bribery because this is the form that is most common for average citizens. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking direct questions such as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions). By asking about the variety of ways in which individuals interact with government, the data provide an extensive snapshot of the forms corruption can take.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes → ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

In Figure 3.1 we break down responses to these questions in two ways; the left figure displays the average percentage of respondents that reported being asked for at least one bribe in each setting to measure the overall scope of different types of corruption victimization.³ Yet these numbers are affected by two factors: how frequently do interactions in each setting result in citizens being asked for a bribe and the frequency with which citizens have interactions in each of the settings the survey asks about. Since we also asked respondents about their interactions with different offices and institutions, we can also directly gauge the percentage of respondents whose interactions gave them the opportunity to be targeted for corruption subsequently paid a bribe. The right side of the figure thus looks at the number of people who were asked to pay a bribe in each setting as a percentage of the people who had relevant interactions. The questions about bribe requests from the police, soldiers, and government employees do not ask if respondents had any dealings with these officials and so the estimated percentages for these three categories are constant across the two parts of the figure.

The data in Figure 3.1 demonstrate the wide range of arenas where bribery occurs. For example, in the full population the most common corruption experiences occur with the police, as 10% of respondents reported a police officer asking them for a bribe in the past year. If we restrict our attention to individuals who actually had experiences with various public entities, however, we see they experience bribe requests in some settings at a significantly higher rate. For example, only 1.5% of the overall sample reported being asked for a bribe in court in the 12 months before the survey. Yet being required to present oneself in court is relatively rare – only 1 in 11 respondents had any dealings with courts in that period – but among those individuals who actually were in court, 14% were asked to pay a bribe. We see a similar pattern with corruption in the process of dealing with municipal government employees: while very few individuals had to process a document with the municipal government in the 12 months before the survey and thus only 2.9% of respondents reported being requested to pay a bribe, among those individuals who did try to process paperwork with the municipal government, 14.5% were asked for a bribe. Over 10% of individuals with children in school were asked for a bribe related to education while nearly 8% of respondents who accessed public health services were targeted. Although most interactions with public officials do not involve corruption, it is a fairly common element of citizen-state interaction in the Americas.

³ As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers in each figure represent the percentages who were asked for a bribe in each setting in an average country in the hemisphere. The data in Figure 3.1 include the United States and Canada




Figure 3.1. Corruption Experiences by Location, 2014

As we consider the wide range of activities in which corruption plays a part, citizens of the Americas have multiple opportunities to be targeted for corruption and many people are being asked to pay bribes each year. From this battery of questions we can then build a summary index of whether or not a person was asked for a bribe in at least one of these settings.⁴ In an average country, just under 1 in 5 AmericasBarometer respondents reported paying at least one bribe in the last 12 months (Figure

⁴ The measure, labeled CORVIC in the dataset documentation, looks at the percentage of the total sample that was asked for a bribe and does not adjust for whether or not individuals had any contact with government or other relevant officials in the past year. While most of the questions in the module refer specifically to interactions with government officials or institutions, it is possible that some of the corruption reported in this overall measure, CORVIC, relates to bribe solicitation by individuals who are not public officials.

3.2).⁵ This rate of corruption experiences is virtually unchanged from 2012 and is not significantly different from corruption levels in 2008 or 2006 (Figure 3.3).⁶




Figure 3.2. Overall Percentage of Individuals who were Corruption Victims in the Last Year, 2014

⁵ The data in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 include the United States and Canada. If we exclude those two countries, the regional average level of corruption victimization increases slightly to 20.5% for 2014. 2004 has slightly higher corruption than 2006 does because the 2004 sample had fewer countries and includes countries where corruption victimization is more common. Yet if we look only at countries that have been in the sample since 2004, the same pattern of corruption declining over time and then increasing in 2012 occur. Corruption victimization levels increase somewhat, however, in the countries that were not part of the 2004 sample while they have decreased in the Central American and Andean countries that were the emphasis of the first AmericasBarometer survey.

⁶ While 2004 saw significantly higher levels of corruption experiences than any other year in Figure 3.3, this is caused by the 2004 AmericasBarometer survey being limited to Mexico, Central America, and the Central Andes where corruption is slightly more common than in the rest of the hemisphere.




Figure 3.3. Corruption Victimization over Time

Yet these hemisphere averages mask large differences across countries (Figure 3.4). Haiti has the highest level of corruption victimization by a considerable margin; over two-thirds of Haitian respondents were asked to pay a bribe in the 12 months before being surveyed. Many of these corruption experiences in Haiti occur as citizens try to access social services; Haiti is actually right below the regional mean for police bribery requests but is an outlier for bribery occurring in schools, public health services, and work settings.⁷ Bolivia has the second highest level of bribery victimization (30%). Yet this represents a significant drop from 2012 when nearly 45% of Bolivians were corruption victims.⁸ Ecuador also saw a double-digit drop in corruption victimization from the 2012 poll, from nearly 41% to 26%. In contrast, Paraguay, Venezuela, Belize, and Panama all saw corruption victimization rates increase by seven percentage points or more since 2012. This moved Paraguay and Venezuela from around the hemispheric average to among the highest rates and moved Belize and Panama from comparatively low levels of corruption to around the regional average. The United States, Chile, Uruguay, and Canada have the lowest levels of corruption.

⁷ For example, 49% of Haitian respondents, and 74% of respondents with students in school, paid a bribe in a school in the 12 months before the survey. If we look at health care, 33% of all respondents and 76% of those who said they visited a health care facility paid a bribe as part of that process.

⁸ Corruption data from 2012 are not reported here but are available from Singer et. al (2012) or the LAPOP website.




Figure 3.4. Corruption Victimization by Country, 2014

To understand which individuals are most likely to be targeted for bribes, we model the summary variable of whether or not the respondents were asked for at least one bribe (the measure presented in Figure 3.2) with logistic regression. Just as in previous chapters, we focus on the demographic characteristics of the respondent and whether he or she lives in an urban or rural area. We also look at two features that might be related to respondents being in a position where corrupt interactions are likely to occur. First is whether or not the respondent received financial assistance from the government (excluding pensions or social security) to test if that interaction with the state places respondents at risk of being solicited for a bribe.⁹ Second, we model whether the respondent lives in a neighborhood where a crime occurred to test if corruption victimization is more likely to occur in places where the rule of law is objectively weaker.¹⁰ As we model these differences, we

⁹ Measured from the question WF1: “Do you or someone in your household receive regular assistance in the form of money, food, or products from the government, not including pensions/social security? Yes or No”

¹⁰ Specifically we use answers to the VICBAR series outlined in Chapter 1 that asked about burglaries, drug dealing, extortion and blackmail.



include country fixed effects to control for any unmeasured differences across countries, as such the estimated effects in the figure explain differences in likely corruption victimization within countries.¹¹

The results of this model in Figure 3.5 show that groups differ significantly in their exposure to corruption.¹² In interpreting these differences, it is important to remember that while several surveys specifically ask about officials requesting bribes, the questions do not ask if the respondent played any role in initiating the bribe. The survey does not attempt to determine between these two scenarios because many people will lie if asked if they offered the bribe (Kray and Murrell 2013). Yet in considering why some groups experience corruption more often than others, we should not discount the possibility that group diversity reflects differences in the shares of individuals that are willing to offer a bribe as well as differences in which groups are targeted by officials. Differences across groups can also potentially reflect differences in the frequency with which groups interact with specific institutions or government officials.

For example, corruption experiences break down on gender lines. Men are more likely to report being asked for a bribe than women. Yet across the types of corruption measured by the survey, we find exceptions to this pattern: corruption victims in schools and healthcare are slightly more likely to be female than male.¹³ This difference in corruption victimization patterns across settings does not occur because officials in education and health are particularly targeting women but rather because women were more likely to be users of these services. In fact, among users of these services, men and women are equally likely to be asked for bribes. Yet in the other forms of corruption we study men were more likely to pay bribes than women, even when we take into account differences in government and societal interactions across genders.

Within the Americas, solicitation of bribes is also more common among wealthy respondents. These individuals have the most to offer officials and thus are either frequently targeted for bribes, more frequently offer to pay bribes, or both. Educated individuals also are asked to pay more bribes. At the same time we see that individuals who receive welfare, who are overwhelmingly concentrated among poor individuals, are also significantly more likely to have been targeted for a bribe than non-welfare recipients. The implication may be that, in many parts of the Americas, the process of obtaining and maintaining welfare benefits involves corruption.

¹¹ The United States and Canada are excluded from this analysis because they are missing at least one of the questions used as controls.

¹² As in prior regression plots reported in this study, coefficients measuring each variable's effect are indicated by dots, and confidence intervals by whiskers (the horizontal lines extending to the right and left of each dot). If a confidence interval does not intersect the vertical line at 0.0, the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the right of the zero line indicates a positive and statistically significant net effect on the dependent variable. In contrast, a coefficient with a confidence interval to the left of the zero line indicates a negative and statistically significant net effect. Coefficients are standardized. The full set of coefficients is available in Appendix 3.1 at the end of the chapter.

¹³ We do not present the results of this analysis here but they are available from the authors upon request.




Figure 3.5. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014

Furthermore, people who live in high crime areas appear to be more likely targets for bribes. Further data analysis demonstrates that high-crime areas are, not surprisingly, highly correlated with being asked to pay bribes to policemen. Perhaps more surprising is that other forms of corruption are also correlated with respondents who live in high-crime neighborhoods. While we cannot state with any certainty whether high crime causes corruption, is caused by corruption, or both factors have common underlying causes, the breakdown of public security in parts of the Americas goes hand in hand with a broader weakness in the quality of governance. Finally, corruption victimization is more common in urban areas and is concentrated among respondents in the middle-age categories. There is no evidence that those with darker skin tones are more likely to be asked to pay bribes.

In summary, as we look across the Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole, the 2014 AmericasBarometer reminds us that while bribery may vary somewhat across groups and across countries, it is routine in many parts of the hemisphere.

IV. How Do the Citizens of the Americas Perceive Corruption in Government?

Given the frequency with which respondents are asked to pay bribe, we might suspect many people in the hemisphere, even those who personally were not asked for a bribe, will believe that corruption is common. Moreover, the Americas are not immune to scandals involving high-level government officials (Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 2014). Thus it is instructive to look beyond personal experiences to see how citizens of the Americas perceive corruption generally.

The AmericasBarometer survey asks respondents to consider the prevalence of corruption among public officials.¹⁴ Specifically, respondents are asked:

¹⁴ This question was not asked in Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read]

(1) Very common, (2) Common, (3) Uncommon, or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Following standard LAPOP procedures, responses to this question (EXC7) are re-coded on a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents the perception that corruption is “very uncommon” and 100 represents the perception that corruption is “very common.”

The average citizen of the Americas is convinced that corruption is common among public officials, and just under 80% of respondents said that corruption was either very common or common among public officials, with respondents being equally split between the two categories (Figure 3.6). The average public evaluation of corruption in 2014 is unchanged from 2012 (Figure 3.7). In fact, over the years, the AmericasBarometer survey has found persistent agreement that corruption is common among government officials; in every wave since 2006 the combined percentage of respondents who think corruption is somewhat or very common is between 79.9 and 80.9 percent. While there is variation in the number of people who consider corruption to be very common compared to merely being common, the data consistently show few residents of the Americas believe that their government is uncorrupt.




Figure 3.6. Perceptions of Corruption, 2014




Figure 3.7. Perceptions of Corruption over Time

Just as with corruption experiences, there is substantial variation across countries in how governments are perceived (see Figure 3.8). Respondents in Canada, Haiti, and Uruguay were the least likely to describe their government as corrupt in 2014. Yet even in these countries over 68% of respondents said that corruption was either common or very common. A number of countries have very high levels of perceived corruption, led by Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina.

It is worth highlighting that the countries where respondents report having frequently paid bribes (as tracked by Figure 3.4 above) are not necessarily the ones where governments are perceived as being corrupt in Figure 3.8. This difference is illustrated in Figure 3.9, which plots the average perceived levels of government corruption and the percentage of respondents who were asked at least once for a bribe in the 12 months before the survey. The largest difference is in Haiti; while Haiti has by far the highest rate of individual-level corruption victimization in the hemisphere, it has the second lowest level of perceived government corruption in the hemisphere. This may be because bribery in Haiti is frequently occurring in settings like the workplace, schools, or hospitals that many respondents do not necessarily connect to “the government” even if these tend to be public institutions. Yet Haiti is not the only exception and that difference is clear in the bottom figure of Figure 3.9 where we exclude Haiti (an outlier with regard to the level of corruption victimization) to make the differences within the rest of the sample clear. Perceived levels of government corruption in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Honduras are also substantially lower than one would expect given the frequency of citizens reporting paying bribes in those countries. Colombia, Argentina, Guyana, and Jamaica, in contrast, all have levels of reported corruption victimization that are below the hemisphere average but rank in the top seven countries where citizens perceive that corruption is common among government officials. As we noted above, the discrepancy between perceived levels of corruption and reported corruption rates is a common pattern in corruption studies because measures of corruption victimization tap the day-to-day corruption people observe and endure while questions about corruption in government often also track grand corruption such as national scandals that respondents do not have personal experience with as well as different tolerances for what kinds of activities are considered corrupt.




Figure 3.8. Perceptions of Corruption across Countries, 2014




Figure 3.9. Comparing Perceived Corruption Levels and Corruption Victimization rates Across Countries, 2014

Yet within countries, individuals who were asked to pay a bribe in the last year are more likely to say that corruption is common among government officials. Figure 3.10 is an ordered logistic analysis of corruption perceptions, with high values on the dependent variable representing the perception that corruption is very common. The model includes dummy variables for each country, so again the results should be read as explaining differences within countries not necessarily across them.¹⁵

¹⁵ The coefficients are standardized-the full specification of the model is available in Appendix 3.2 at the end of the chapter.




Figure 3.10. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014

We see above that there is a weak correspondence at the country level between the bribery victimization and perceptions of government corruption. Yet if we look within countries, individuals who were targeted for bribery in the last year judge their public officials as more corrupt than their counterparts. Personal experiences with corruption, on average, spillover into broad evaluations of political corruption even if the two concepts do not perfectly coincide.

Of course one does not have to be directly affected by corruption to believe corruption is common. The other correlates of perceived government corruption are similar to those of corruption victimization. Men, those who live in urban areas or in places where crime is common, and respondents who are comparatively wealthy, educated, and old are more likely to believe the government is corrupt even after controlling for these individuals' personal experiences with being asked to pay bribes. And although citizens who receive government assistance are more likely targets for bribery, they are *less* likely to believe the government is corrupt. Further analysis suggests this occurs because these individuals are more likely to support the government. Once we control for government approval, there is no significant association between receiving welfare benefits and corruption perceptions.

V. Do the Citizens of the Americas See Corruption as Justifiable?

So far our analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2014 survey suggests that levels of corruption victimization are high in the hemisphere and perceptions that the government is corrupt are widespread. In such circumstances, the worry is that citizens might begin to consider corruption a natural part of politics. Several recent studies have suggested individuals can see corruption as necessary to grease bureaucratic wheels, particularly when regulatory agencies are inefficient (Méon and Weill 2010; Dreher and Gassebner 2011). There is also some evidence the negative effects of corruption on respondent well-being become attenuated in high corruption contexts as citizens adapt to

their reality or begin to see it as one of the costs of doing business (Graham 2011). Thus the questions become whether citizens of the Americas believe that bribery is an acceptable practice and, in particular, whether those who engage in it are more likely to justify it.

The AmericasBarometer asks respondents about whether bribes can ever be justified.¹⁶

	No	Yes	DK	DA
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?	0	1	88	98

The percentage of people who think bribes can be justified – 16% (Figure 3.11) – is roughly the same as the number of people who were asked for bribes. The percentage is significantly higher, however, among those individuals who actually paid a bribe in the last year (Figure 3.12): almost 1 in 3 individuals who paid a bribe thought that paying a bribe could be justified compared to the 1 in 8 among those who did not pay a bribe.¹⁷

In analyses not presented here, we model which individuals were most likely to believe paying a bribe was justifiable. Corruption justification is more frequent among individuals who are younger, are male, and live in urban areas. It is more common among the wealthiest members of society. Individuals who reported that a crime occurred in their neighborhood are more likely to believe corruption could be justified as well. These differences exist regardless of whether or not the respondent was asked for a bribe and so they do not reflect differences in groups being targeted for bribery subsequently justifying that behavior. Yet if we compare bribery justification across those who were targeted for bribes and those who did not, an important pattern emerges: individuals who were targeted for a bribe and who get government assistance are more likely to find corruption justifiable than other bribery victims (Figure 3.13), which may imply that some see a connection between the bribe they paid and the benefits they receive and feel justified in their actions.¹⁸ All of these data suggest that corruption can create an atmosphere where corruption is more likely to be tolerated (see also Carlin 2013).

¹⁶ This question was not asked in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Chile, Brazil, or Trinidad & Tobago in 2014.

¹⁷ Research on the 2012 AmericasBarometer comes to a similar conclusion (see Carlin 2013).

¹⁸ In analysis not reported here, we model bribe justification as a function of the control variables in Figure 3.10 and interact corruption victimization and receiving government assistance and find that the two variables significantly modify their effect—the gap between corruption victims and non-victims is significantly ($p < 0.05$) larger among those who got help from the government than among the general population.




Figure 3.11. Do Respondents Think Paying a Bribe Can be Justified at Times, 2014




Figure 3.12. Corruption Justification is Higher among Those Who were Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014




Figure 3.13. Individuals Who Get Financial Assistance from the Government Are More Likely to Think Corruption Can Be Justified, Especially if they were Targeted for a Bribe, 2014

Yet we should not overlook the fact that *most* individuals – over 68% – who had to pay a bribe in the last year still believe it is *never* justifiable to pay a bribe. In other words, most citizens in the Americas reject bribery despite its prevalence in society and politics even as they may be in a position where they feel compelled to pay a bribe. Thus many citizens of the Americas may be offended by the corruption that pervades their society and this, in turn, may lead to them have negative views of democratic institutions. Analyses in the chapters to follow will address this possibility.

VI. Conclusion

Corruption has pernicious economic, social, and political effects. Yet despite progress in reducing corruption in some countries, corruption remains widespread in many countries in the Americas. On average, 1 in 5 citizens reported paying a bribe in the last year, with those bribes being paid in many different settings. Perhaps more disconcertingly, at least 68% of respondents in every country in which the survey was conducted in 2014 think that corruption is somewhat or very common among government officials in their country. In most countries that percentage is higher. While most citizens do not believe bribery can ever be justified, many citizens do and this is particularly true for those who have been involved in corrupt exchanges.

Thus the AmericasBarometer survey reminds us that citizens are frequently experiencing corruption in their daily lives and perceive it to be widespread at the elite level. The relative consistency of aggregate bribery rates and corruption perceptions across waves of the survey serve as reminders of the severity of these problems in the hemisphere. What worries democrats in the region is that, if left unchecked, corruption could undermine support for democracy itself. To address this



concern, Chapter 4 explores how corruption affects trust in local governments while Chapter 5 looks at how corruption (among other variables) affects attitudes towards the national political system.

Appendix

Appendix 3.1. Predictors of Being Asked to Pay a Bribe, 2014
(Figure 3.5)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Rural	-0.097*	(-4.51)
Woman	-0.262*	(-16.57)
Level of Education	0.081*	(3.88)
Wealth Quintile	0.132*	(6.68)
Received Assistance From the Government	0.081*	(4.77)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.326*	(17.12)
Skin Tone	-0.040	(-1.80)
16-25 Years	-0.090*	(-4.47)
26-35 Years	0.006	(0.28)
46-55 Years	-0.037	(-2.02)
56-65 Years	-0.089*	(-4.54)
66 Years or Older	-0.189*	(-8.57)
Guatemala	-0.056*	(-2.46)
El Salvador	-0.254*	(-9.39)
Honduras	-0.041	(-1.59)
Nicaragua	-0.177*	(-7.73)
Costa Rica	-0.166*	(-5.94)
Panama	-0.102*	(-3.11)
Colombia	-0.223*	(-8.68)
Ecuador	-0.065*	(-2.04)
Bolivia	0.029	0.89)
Peru	-0.032	(-1.49)
Paraguay	0.005	(0.29)
Chile	-0.364*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	-0.307*	(-12.16)
Brazil	-0.203*	(-7.15)
Venezuela	-0.049*	(-2.03)
Argentina	-0.120*	(-5.27)
Dominican Republic	-0.082*	(-3.22)
Haiti	0.393*	(15.17)
Jamaica	-0.237*	(-10.32)
Guyana	-0.124*	(-4.80)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.225*	(-9.03)
Belize	-0.059*	(-3.46)
Constant	-1.448*	(-63.98)
Number of observations	29123	
Population size	25866.08	
Design df	1969	
F(34, 1936)	55.79*	
Binary Logit with t-Statistics from Standard Errors Adjusted for Survey Design Effects in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The United States and Canada are not included in the model because of missing observations on at least one variable.



Appendix 3.2. Factors Associated with Perceived Government Corruption, 2014
(Figure 3.10)

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Asked to Pay a Bribe	0.076*	(5.00)
Rural	-0.083*	(-4.72)
Woman	-0.044*	(-3.51)
Level of Education	0.128*	(7.68)
Wealth Quintile	0.083*	(5.60)
Received Assistance From the Government	-0.034*	(-2.40)
Crimes Occurred in Neighborhood	0.123*	(8.58)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.27)
16-25 Years	-0.103*	(-6.55)
26-35 Years	-0.003	(-0.17)
46-55 Years	0.007	(0.45)
56-65 Years	0.024	(1.51)
66 Years or Older	0.054*	(3.69)
Guatemala	-0.043*	(-1.99)
El Salvador	-0.070*	(-3.45)
Honduras	-0.082*	(-3.69)
Nicaragua	-0.094*	(-4.52)
Panama	-0.095*	(-4.67)
Colombia	0.082*	(3.35)
Ecuador	-0.175*	(-6.03)
Bolivia	-0.136*	(-4.38)
Peru	0.035	(1.79)
Paraguay	0.062*	(3.07)
Uruguay	-0.151*	(-7.92)
Venezuela	0.040	(1.93)
Argentina	0.028	(1.58)
Dominican Republic	0.052*	(2.10)
Haiti	-0.156*	(-6.50)
Jamaica	0.047*	(2.27)
Guyana	0.055*	(2.32)
Belize	0.005	(0.27)
Cut1	-3.212	(-74.48)
Cut2	-1.429	(-50.13)
Cut3	0.404	(15.59)
Number of Interviews	22124	
Population size	20675.9	
Design df	1354	
F(31, 1324)	32.32*	
Ordered Logit with Standard errors Adjusted for Survey design in Parentheses. * p<0.05		

The model does not include Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, or Canada because these countries have missing observations on at least one variable in the model.



Chapter 4. Democracy, Performance, and Local Government in the Americas

Gregory J. Love, Ryan E. Carlin, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

When citizens interact with the state they do so far more frequently with representatives and officials of the local, rather than national or even regional, governments. For residents of the Americas, therefore, local government performance, responsiveness, and trustworthiness are central factors in the legitimacy of the political system. Furthermore, the performance of local services has crucial and material impacts on people's quality of life. Because of the recognition of the importance of local government, significant resources from international organizations and national governments have been used to further fiscal and political decentralization. This chapter examines a series of questions to assess citizens' view of their local government and its services and to measure community participation in the Americas. In particular, how often do they interact with their local government? How well do they evaluate those interactions? What are the trends over the past decade in evaluations of local government and services? Do national factors affect evaluations of local government?

While the local-level of government is often where citizens interact directly with the state, the power of local governments varies substantially within and across the countries of the hemisphere. In some places local authorities have significant resources, lawmaking prerogatives, and administrative power, while other local authorities have little political and fiscal autonomy. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. A core premise motivating this chapter is that local government can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole, a point that is demonstrated in Chapter 5.

II. Main Findings of this Chapter

This chapter examines three key aspects of citizen engagement with local government vis-à-vis the AmericasBarometer survey. The first is participation in local government affairs and community activities. Key findings around these issues are:

- In 2014 citizen participation in local government meetings reached a new low, with only 1 in 10 having attended a meeting in the past 12 months.
- More citizens made demands of their local officials than any time since 2006.
- Those most satisfied and those least satisfied with local services were most likely to attend local government meetings (compared to those with middling levels of satisfaction).
- Citizens in formally federal countries were more likely to make demands on their local government.

A second aspect of the chapter is evaluations of local services:

- Satisfaction with local services in general, and several specific ones, remains fair with most respondents viewing service provision as “neither good, nor bad.”
- Evaluations of public schools in the Americas declined somewhat between the 2012 and 2014 waves.
- Over the same period average evaluations of public health care increased (and evaluations of roads was unchanged).

The final section of the chapter looks at citizen trust in local governments:

- Region-average trust in local government reached a new low in 2014.
- Evaluations of local services are strongly correlated with trust in local government.
- Being a victim of corruption is negatively related to trust in local government.
- Perception of insecurity is also negatively related to trust in local government and is at its highest level since 2006.

The rest of the chapter focuses on three main aspects of local government and participation. First, we look at how and how often citizens in the Americas interact with their local governments and help improve their community. The section finishes with a focus on the individual factors related to when people make demands. We then turn to citizens’ evaluations of local services (roads, schools, and health care) along with the individual-level factors related to citizen evaluations of these services. Finally, we look at levels of trust in municipalities over time and in select countries as well as its individual-level correlates. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the patterns of interaction, support, and evaluations of the level of government most proximate to citizens.

III. Local Government, Participation, Institutional Trust, and Democracy

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). It has occurred simultaneously with the “third wave” of democratization in the hemisphere (Huntington 1991), fostering an environment of both strengthened local governments and widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level. However, there is significant variation in the success and extent of decentralization and subnational democratization (Benton 2012).

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of decentralization’s influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet’s study of Bolivia’s 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest needs in education, sanitation, and agriculture (Faguet 2008). Akai and Sakata’s findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth (Akai and Sakata 2002). Moreover, Fisman and Gatti’s cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal decentralization in



government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators (Fisman and Gatti 2002).

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill prepared. Bardhan warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly (Bardhan 2002). Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states (Willis, Garman, and Haggard 1999). Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky 2005). Moreover, as Van Cott (2008) argues, the success of local democracy often depends on whether the decentralization process was a bottom-driven (as opposed to top-down), the presence of effective mayoral leadership, party cohesiveness, and a supportive civil society. Relatedly, Falletti (2010) forcefully argues that the nature and extent of decentralization in a particular Latin American country is due to the territorial and partisan interests of elites at the time reforms were implemented. In total, the extant literature is mixed at best with regard to the effectiveness and extent of decentralization in the region.

The performance of local government may not only be about the quality of service provision to citizens and political participation by residents, but also have the potential to affect trust in democratic institutions and support for democratic norms. Since many citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences may be central to shaping trust decisions and democratic attitudes. In this chapter and the next we look at these linkages because a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson (2003) show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). Weitz-Shapiro (2008) also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole. According to her study, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Jones-West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. (Jones-West 2011) Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.

If local government performance and participation are central to democratic legitimacy, as we argue, then inclusion at the local-level of minorities and women is crucial for representation and the quality of democracy generally. A pivotal question in this realm is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests (Hirschmann 1970). Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation (Hayek 1945). If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups (Jones-West 2011).

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results (Pape 2007, 2008). Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies (Patterson 2002). West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government. The 2012 AmericasBarometer report found no relationship between gender and skin tone (a proxy for minority status), respectively, and which individuals made demands on local officials. However, the 2012 report did find significant linkages between trust in the local government and gender (positive) and darker skin tones (negative). In this chapter we explore if these are stable patterns or whether, instead, new or altered linkages have developed between local governments and women and minorities.

In the next section of the chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, when they make demands of their leaders, how they evaluate local political institutions, and if they participate in local community building. We focus on indicators of two types of direct participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*, and one indirect: *working to solve community problems*. We compare the extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2014 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). We also seek to understand the main determinants of the two types of governmental participation, with an emphasis on local government performance and racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services and trends in these evaluations. Finally, we examine trust in local government and seek to understand which citizens in the Americas trust their local governments to a greater or lesser extent.

We note that previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys, including the 2012 regional report, has examined in detail some of these phenomena, and that research stands as an additional resource for those interested in these topics (Montalvo 2009a; 2009b; 2010).

IV. Local Level Participation

The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]

Local Meeting Attendance

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years? Using all countries, Figure 4.1 shows levels of local participation in the Americas since 2004.¹ The first waves of the surveys were a high-water mark for participation in local government meetings. Since then, the rate of participation has remained fairly steady until 2014, with about 11% of people taking part in municipal meetings between the years 2008 and 2012. However, the most recent wave of the AmericasBarometer finds a new low point for public participation in local government. In the past two years there has been a significant one percentage-point drop in the local government meeting participation, a greater than 8% decline in the region-wide average for participation.²




Figure 4.1. Municipal Meeting Participation, 2004-2014

Figure 4.2 uses the 2014 AmericasBarometer data to display, for each country, the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see wide variation in the rate of citizen participation in municipal meetings across countries. As in the 2012 survey, the highest participation rates in 2014 are found in Haiti and the United States. While Haiti still has the highest rates, it has declined substantially from 2012 (21.2% attendance rate), with previous high value likely linked to the recovery and reconstruction of the devastated country following the massive earthquake in 2010. Again, Chile, Panama, and Argentina have some of the lowest participation rates. Participation rates are not directly tied to the level of decentralization in a country. While Panama and Chile are both unitary systems, and thus more likely to have weaker and less consequential local governments, Argentina has a strong and extensive federal system. Overall, some of Latin America's strongest federal systems (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) rate among the

¹ Following LAPOP conventions, all countries in the region are weighted equally, regardless of their population size.

² Figure 4.1, and all the over-time figures presented in the chapter (unless otherwise noted), would look roughly the same if we examine only the 22 countries that have been surveyed since 2006. We exclude these figures from the text for brevity and conciseness.

bottom third in terms of local-level participation. Somewhat surprisingly, this means that – per the 2014 AmericasBarometer – there is no significant relationship between formal political federalism and the rate of municipal meeting attendance.




Figure 4.2. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Demand Making on Local Government

While attending municipal meetings is a crucial way for citizens to engage their local governments, another important point of interaction is when citizens make demands of their local officials. Fortunately, the AmericasBarometer allows us to examine both activities. How has local demand making changed over time? In Figure 4.3, unlike Figure 4.1, we find some potentially encouraging patterns. In 2014 citizen demand making on local government reaches its highest level since 2006. The optimistic view of this change is that citizens feel that asking their local government



for changes is a potentially effective route to remedy problems. However, it is also possible to see this increase in a more negative light if increased demands are the result of local government having declining performance. As we will argue below, both interpretations appear to be accurate.




Figure 4.3. Demand Making on Local Government, 2004-2014

Figure 4.4 shows a significant difference in the percentage of citizens in each country who have made a request or demand to a person or agency in local government in the past year. As with local meeting attendance, the rate of demand making on local governments varies significantly across the region. With the aftermath of the Haitian 2010 earthquake fading, Haiti went from the top spot in 2012 (21.3%) to some of the lowest demand-making levels. The top three countries, and Ecuador, all saw substantial increases (+4-6 percentage points) in demand making. In most of the other countries in the Americas between 10 and 16% of respondents claimed to have made a demand on local government. Unlike with meeting attendance, the variance across countries in demand making in 2014 is correlated with political federalism.³ Demand making is about one percentage point greater in federal than unitary countries.

³ We follow Lijphart's (2012) approach and code as politically federal those countries whose constitutions specifically declare themselves federal and provide for strong, elected regional governments.




Figure 4.4. Demand Making on Local Government, 2014

To understand which types of individuals are most likely to make demands of local government we look at key individual experiences, evaluations, and socio-demographic factors using logistic regression with country fixed effects. Figure 4.5 shows that older citizens, those with higher levels of educational attainment, those who live in rural areas, and women are more likely to make demands. So are, intriguingly, corruption victims and those who attend local government meetings. Of all the factors, attending local meetings is most strongly linked to demand making. A person who has attended a municipal meeting in the last year is 32% more likely to make a demand on municipal government, indicating that many individuals who ask things of their municipality do so via formal channels (see Figure 4.5 below).



Wealthier citizens are generally less likely to make demands. As we discuss below, both the most and least satisfied with services make more demands. Demand making generally increases with age until people become elderly, at which point the likelihood of making a demand decreases, fitting a large literature on life cycles and political participation.




Figure 4.5. Factors Associated with Demand Making of Local Government, 2014⁴

In Figure 4.6 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand making on local government, on one hand, and attending local government meetings, corruption victimization, place of residence, and satisfaction with local services on the other hand. The bar chart in the top left in Figure 4.6 clearly shows that those who are active in local government, indicated by attending municipal meetings, are more likely to make demands of local government. Victims of corruptions are also more likely to make demands of local government; however, we are unable to tell if this is because they demand less corruption or if interaction with the state (by making demands) brings them into opportunities for corruption to occur. Both are possible, but the data cannot distinguish between the two potential processes (and both can be occurring simultaneously).

The bottom row (left side) shows respondents who reside in rural areas are more likely to make demands of their local government. Thus, social and/or geographic distance between the respondent and local government influence demand making.

The bottom right of Figure 4.6 shows a bimodal relationship between satisfaction with services and demand making. As Figure 4.5 shows, on average the more satisfied are less likely to make demands; however, we see in Figure 4.6 that this interpretation should be amended. Like the least satisfied with services, the most satisfied are also more likely to make demands. The bimodal relationship also is present in a multivariate analysis.

⁴ For this regression analysis, like all others in the chapter, the United States and Canada are excluded from the sample. And tabular results for each of the regression analyses are in the chapter appendix.




Figure 4.6. Who Makes Demands on Local Government, 2014

Not all citizen participation at the local level is via the local government. To help improve their communities, some citizens work through community organizations instead of, or in addition to, governmental pathways. To get a more general grasp on the pattern of citizen engagement in their local communities the AmericasBarometer includes the following question designed to measure if and how often people work to improve their communities:

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month
 (3) Once or twice a year (4) Never
 (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

Per LAPOP standards, we reverse and rescale the 1-4 responses from 0 to 100, with 0 meaning “never” and 100 meaning “once a week.”

Finally, Figure 4.7 shows that the average amount of effort individuals put towards solving community problems has remained relatively static since the question was introduced in the 2008 AmericasBarometer. The stability of community-level involvement in problem-solving contrasts with the decline in municipal meeting attendance noted at the outset of this chapter.




Figure 4.7. Efforts to Solve Community Problems, 2008-2014

V. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

Like previous rounds, the 2014 AmericasBarometer included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question is as follows:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]** (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2014 round included three questions first introduced in the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey:

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA


Finally, the last question, which measures trust in local government, is also one that has appeared in many previous waves. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Map 4.1⁵ we examine citizens’ average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been re-coded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. With a few exceptions, the average citizen in most countries in the Americas is essentially neutral towards local government services, meaning that average scores cluster around the midpoint (50) on the scale. Brazil and Jamaica have the lowest levels of satisfaction with local government in the hemisphere while Canada has the highest. As with the 2012 survey, the appearance of Nicaragua and Ecuador at the same level as the U.S. indicates that while there may be a link between satisfaction with services and national wealth, it is not an ironclad one. The biggest shift of any country between the last two waves of the AmericasBarometer was Haiti’s rise from the bottom of the list in 2012 (37.6 units or points on the 0-100 scale), up several places as respondents viewed services a bit more positively as the earthquake and its aftermath receded further into the past.

⁵ A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix.



Map 4.1. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

How do the aggregate 2014 results compare to previous waves of the AmericasBarometer? Figure 4.8, which presents annual average evaluations on a 0-100 scale, shows that there is some reason for optimism with regard to local service provision. After waves with little change, 2014 had a significant increase in citizens' satisfaction with local services of just over 1.5 units (or points). However, middling ratings of service provision remain, and have always been, the norm in the region.




Figure 4.8. Evaluation of Local Services, 2004-2014

In Figure 4.9 we further explore citizens' evaluations of their local government services. Since 2008, 4 out of 10 respondents see their local services as neither good nor bad. In general a few more people have a positive view of services than negative, with roughly 36% of respondents holding "Good" or "Very Good" views. In general, for the past six years (and likely longer) local governments have been neither highly effective at providing services nor completely failing citizens in service provision. The public sees services as generally middling in quality.




Figure 4.9. Evaluation of Local Government Services by Category

Not all local services are equally difficult to provide or equally valued by citizens; thus, respondents may evaluate some aspects of local service delivery more highly than others. In the next three figures, we examine levels of satisfaction in the Americas with the provision of services in three key areas: roads, schools, and health care.⁶ Figure 4.10 shows satisfaction with roads and highways, based on question SD2NEW2 (the wording of which was reported above in the text). Once again, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least satisfaction and 100 represents the most satisfaction. Across the region we find moderate levels of satisfaction with road infrastructure. Residents in several Caribbean and Central American countries hold particularly dim views of their road infrastructure. Levels of satisfaction with roads for most countries were stable between the 2012 and 2014 wave with the exception of Honduras. The continued political, economic, and security instability in the country may be taking its toll on service provision: Hondurans rate road infrastructure 10 units lower in 2014 than 2012.

⁶ We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.




Figure 4.10. Satisfaction with Roads in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Figure 4.11 examines satisfaction with public schools, based on question SD3NEW2 (again rescaled 0-100). Similar to roads and public health, there are no clear patterns between national wealth and satisfaction with schools with the possible exception that wealthier countries have lower ratings. It is possible that with greater resources come greater expectations. Looking at a few key countries unearths some interesting results. For example, Chile is one of the wealthiest and most stable countries in the region but again has one the lowest levels of satisfaction with education. This low level of satisfaction with public schools may be linked with the now long-running university and high school student protests in Chile that began in 2006. Whether this dissatisfaction is the cause or consequence of the protests, we cannot say. We also want to point out Venezuela's decline. Compared to 2012, Venezuelans rated schools 6.3 units lower in 2014, which may also be linked to the ongoing political and social instability in the country.




Figure 4.11. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Finally, in Figure 4.12 we assess satisfaction with public health services, based on question SD6NEW2 (rescaled 0-100). Though most countries average between 43 and 53 units, no country scores particularly high, and four countries are rated quite poorly: Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Haiti. Brazil, though has recently tagged as a rising global economic power (if faltering at the moment), receives significantly lower evaluations than nearly all other countries in the region for health services, roads, and education. Like public schools, evaluations of public health services has declined dramatically in Venezuela (52.1 units in 2012 vs. 42.3 units in 2014) adding more evidence that the environment in Venezuela is taking its toll on public evaluations of government performance.

Additionally, as the graphs tend to indicate, citizens' evaluations of educational services are more closely correlated with their evaluations of health services ($r = .44$) than the quality of roads ($r = .33$) and health services is also more weakly correlated ($r = .29$) with roads than education. While all three are key indicators of local government performance, it appears that citizens may evaluate hard

infrastructure, like roads, differently than the more complex services of the welfare state, such as health care and education.




Figure 4.12. Satisfaction with Public Health Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Looking at aggregate comparisons for the three types of services between the 2012 and 2014 waves we see mixed results (Figure 4.13). With regard to public schools, respondents in the Americas in 2014 rated them slightly higher than they did in 2012; however, they evaluated public health services and road quality similarly across the two waves. Unlike the questions about general local services (Figure 4.10) that saw an uptick in evaluations, when asked about specific services stasis is the norm. Of the three specific service areas, respondents' evaluations of roads were the most closely linked to their general evaluation of local services, although it only at a modest level ($r = .26$).




Figure 4.13. Trends in Satisfaction with Three Types of Services

While question SGL1 asks people about their evaluations of general local services, the previous sets of figures suggest people may evaluate specific local services quite differently than the abstract idea of local services. To see how respondents may differ in their views of services when they are asked about them specifically or generally we create an additive scale from responses regarding the condition of roads, public schools, and public health care.⁷ Figure 4.14 displays the average scores for this scale (0-100) across the countries in which the questions were asked. When compared to the general evaluations of services (SGL1), the results in several countries exhibit interesting contrasts. Chileans appear to be quite happy with their local services in the abstract (57.5 units) but when asked about specific services they take a much dimmer view (48.7). Likewise, Colombians prefer their services in the abstract (53.9) more than specific ones (45.1). On the flipside, citizens of the Dominican Republic have a more dismal view of services in the abstract (46.6) than when asked about specific services (54.4). Overall, the bivariate correlation between SGL1 and the Local Services Evaluations Scale is $r=.30$. While there is somewhat of a disconnect between the specific questions about services and the general question, it is important to note that we were not able to ask about all relevant local services.

⁷ A principle component analysis of these three variables (SD2NEW, SD3NEW, SD6NEW) indicate that there is only one underlying dimension and it is different than SGL1. Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the three variables is a moderate .62.




Figure 4.14. Satisfaction with Local Services (Additive Scale) in Countries of the Americas, 2014

To examine the individual factors and events that affect general evaluations of local services (SGL1) we use linear regression with country fixed effects. If we use the Local Services Evaluations Scale instead of SGL1 the results are substantively identical to those presented below. Figure 4.15 shows people in the more marginalized positions in society rate their municipality services the lowest. Specifically, people with darker skin tone; poorer and lower educated residents; and those with higher levels of perceived insecurity all rate local services lower. Of particular note is the result for corruption victims. People who report having been asked for a bribe rate services significantly lower; this finding combined with results from the previous chapter showing high rates of corruption victimization among those who interact with local government indicates that this a widespread and substantively important result. One of the overall patterns in the results is that citizens who often have physically more difficult lives (poorer, rural, fear for physical security, darker skin tone) feel their local government’s services are failing them.



We also find that people who have requested help of the municipality have more negative views of local services; however, if you are active in local government (by attending meetings), you are more likely to have a positive view of services. Thus, it is the nature of the interaction with local government that seems to matter with regard to views of local services. Finally, the national economy appears connected to evaluations of services: individuals who have positive perceptions of the national economy generally view local services in a more positive light. Whether it is local factors causing a positive national outlook or the reverse, we cannot say.




Figure 4.15. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Services, 2014

Trust in Local Government

Like the previous waves of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 survey asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 4.16, we look at trust in local government since 2004. While it appears that 2004 was a high point, the peak is a function of a smaller number of countries included in that wave. If we restrict the sample to only those countries that had been included since 2006 the general trend for trust in local governments remained steady for six years before taking a significant decline in 2014. The public now has substantially less trust in their local government than ever before, as measured by the AmericasBarometer. This decline coincides with the highest level of perceived insecurity in the region since 2006.





Figure 4.16. Trust in Local Government over Time



Map 4.2. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

While the average level of trust in local government declined in the region, this decline was not uniform in the hemisphere. Map 4.2 presents average levels of trust in local government across the Americas on a 0-100 scale.⁸ Compared to the 2012 wave most countries saw a slide in trust of local governments with Venezuela suffering the largest drop (from 59.4 to 50.2). Overall, the countries of the Southern Cone and North America appear to have the highest levels of trust in local governments although trust in local governments in Nicaragua is also high.

Comparing the results in Map 4.2 to those in Figure 4.8 there appears to be a linkage between trust in local government and satisfaction with local services across countries. For example, Chilean municipalities, which have moderate satisfaction with specific services, enjoy exceptionally high levels

⁸ A bar chart version of this information, with standard error bars, is in the appendix

of trust. However, across the region the individual-level measures of trust and satisfaction with local services (SGL1) are correlated ($r = .39$).

Next we look at the factors that shape how much an individual trusts their local government. Using linear regression with country fixed effects, we test to see if interaction with local government and evaluations of local services predict levels of local political trust. Figure 4.17 indicates the most important factor shaping citizens' trust in local government is how they perceive the quality of municipal services.




Figure 4.17. Determinants of Trust in Local Government, 2014

Attending a municipal meeting also exhibits a positive relationship with trust in the local government, but its coefficient is only about 1/8th the size of the coefficient for evaluation of services. Overall, we see individuals who interact with their local government and rate the performance of the municipality more favorably express higher levels of trust in the institution.

Again we find a halo-effect between individuals' views of the national economy and trust in their local government. The more positive is one's view of the national economic outlook, the greater the level of trust in the local government. While economic outlook is positively correlated with trust in local government, individual-level factors associated with more advanced economies are not. People with higher levels of educational attainment and who live in urban areas are *less* trusting of their local governments. Also, similar to the determinants of who makes requests or demands of their local government, skin tone is not related to trust in local government.⁹ People of darker skin tones, often minorities in the hemisphere (overall, though not necessarily in particular countries), appear to not view local governments any differently than others on average. If decentralization and local government reforms were designed to help enfranchise the traditionally disenfranchised (darker skin tone) these findings might be viewed as mixed. While people traditionally excluded from power have

⁹ Excluding the Caribbean countries and Guyana has no effect on the skin tone result.



similar levels of trust in their local government can be seen as a success, if we consider the effect of satisfaction with local services the outcome is more mixed. As Figure 4.15 illustrates, the poorest in society tend to have the lowest evaluations of services—a crucial predictor of trust in local government. Women appear to display similar levels of trust in local government as men; thus, also bringing evidence that decentralization may have the ability to improve gender parity for government responsiveness.

Finally, we observe that negative perceptions of physical security and corruption victimization have negative correlations with trust in local government. The result for perception of insecurity is particularly interesting because it occurs at a time when citizens of the Americas have the highest average level of perceived insecurity since 2006. These results are unchanged if we use reported neighborhood crime instead of insecurity perceptions.

VI. Conclusion

In 2014 we see two diverging trends with regards to citizen interaction with local government in the Americas. On the one hand, after eight years of decline, we observe an uptick in the number of people making demands of their local officials. On the other hand, 2014 marked a significant drop in the number of people attending local government meetings after years of stable levels. A potentially positive explanation may be the expansion of e-government in the region with countries like Mexico investing heavily in online communication linkages for citizens. However, in light of an overall decline in institutional trust, discussed below, it is difficult to be overly sanguine about the effects of declining participation. Moreover, while the number of people making demands on their local government continues to rise, satisfaction with local government services remains lower among those who made a demand on local governments than among those who did not, which may imply that the quality of the interactions citizens are having with local governments as they make these requests is poor.

Although the overall trend in citizen participation in local government declined somewhat, there are significant differences between the countries in the region. Haiti continues to have the greatest level of participation, with 15% attending a town meeting, while only 4.9% of Argentines report having attended. A similar spread is observed for making demands on local government; yet, Haitians are near the bottom while some countries with low meeting attendance rates are at the top (Uruguay). While the aggregate relationship between meeting attendance and demand making is weak at the national level, there is a strong link between participating in meetings and making demands at the individual level: those who attended meetings were 32% more likely to make demands or requests of their local government.

Turning to local government performance, many people view municipal services as neither good nor bad. In the region as a whole, there is a slight increase in the average assessment of services after eight years of no change. In a few countries people give particularly low scores (e.g., Haiti, Brazil, Jamaica) or high scores (e.g., Panama and Canada), but in most countries the average citizen gives services a middling score near 50 out of 100. This finding holds if we break local services down to three specific areas (public health care, public school, and roads). In short, perceptions of local government are mediocre: local governments are not failing the average citizen but, at the same time, there is clearly room for improvement.

More discouraging is the new low in citizens' trust in local government observed in 2014. Again Haiti, Brazil, and Jamaica (along with Peru) have some of the lowest trust in local governments. When looking at what factors are linked to high institutional trust we see trust in local government is significantly associated with the perceived performance of the government (via services) and whether or not they directly take part in local government meetings. The fact that these evaluations and levels of participation have increased somewhat while trust has declined implies other factors must be at work. Figure 4.17 indicates that corruption, perceptions of insecurity, and perceived negative economic outlooks are likely drivers for the drop in trust.

Since the local level of government is often the only place citizens come in to direct contact with the state, it seems reasonable that to expect citizens' attitudes toward local government reflect, or are reflected in, their broader political attitudes and belief systems. We assess this in the next chapter by investigating how perceptions of local government performance predict support for democratic norms, the legitimacy of political institutions, and political tolerance.



Appendix

Appendix 4.1. Making Demands of Local Government (NP2)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	0.196*	-11.05
Perception of Insecurity	0.027	-1.5
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	-0.117*	-6.16
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.551*	-39.67
Perception of the National Economy	0.033	-1.75
66 years or older	0.02	-1.08
56-65 years	0.059*	-3.14
46-55 years	0.050*	-2.52
26-35 years	-0.043	-1.96
16-25 years	-0.179*	-7.42
Skin Tone	0.033	-1.52
Wealth Quintiles	-0.064*	-3.2
Years of Schooling	0.078*	-3.53
Women	0.068*	-3.99
Urban/Rural	0.127*	-5.89
Guatemala	-0.105*	-4.56
El Salvador	-0.073*	-3.32
Honduras	-0.073*	-3.24
Nicaragua	0.067*	-3.12
Costa Rica	-0.112*	-4.26
Panama	-0.123*	-4.56
Colombia	-0.059*	-2.71
Ecuador	-0.073*	-3.08
Bolivia	-0.174*	-4.79
Peru	0.002	-0.1
Paraguay	-0.053*	-2.46
Chile	0.03	-1.17
Uruguay	0.100*	-4.48
Brazil	-0.031	-1.35
Venezuela	-0.105*	-5.14
Argentina	-0.003	-0.15
Dominican Republic	-0.027	-1.21
Haiti	-0.215*	-9.69
Jamaica	-0.091*	-3.77
Guyana	-0.186*	-7.74
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.073	-1.91
Belize	-0.063*	-2.4
Constant	-1.966*	-87.78
F	60.11	
Number of cases	35412	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 4.2. Evaluation of Local Services SGL


	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.034*	-5.36
Perception of Insecurity	-0.113*	-16.73
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.056*	-8.68
Requested Help from Municipal Office	-0.041*	-6.24
Perception of the National Economy	0.141*	-20.49
66 years or older	0	-0.02
56-65 years	-0.004	-0.64
46-55 years	0.001	-0.13
26-35 years	0.016*	-2.21
16-25 years	0.055*	-8.1
Skin Tone	-0.018*	-2.31
Wealth Quintiles	0.039*	-5.5
Years of Schooling	-0.016*	-2.09
Women	0.039*	-7.37
Urban/Rural	-0.034*	-3.8
Guatemala	0.01	-1.2
El Salvador	0.026*	-2.34
Honduras	0.025*	-2.73
Nicaragua	0.044*	-5.28
Costa Rica	0.009	-0.82
Panama	0.047*	-4.9
Colombia	0.009	-1.03
Ecuador	-0.005	-0.44
Bolivia	-0.008	-0.57
Peru	-0.026*	-3.05
Paraguay	0.009	-0.85
Chile	0.019	-1.91
Uruguay	-0.012	-1.17
Brazil	-0.073*	-6.78
Venezuela	-0.013	-1.36
Argentina	0.039*	-3.62
Dominican Republic	-0.049*	-3.75
Haiti	-0.026	-1.92
Jamaica	-0.093*	-8.95
Guyana	-0.046*	-4.45
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.016	-0.96
Belize	-0.005	-0.48
Constant	-0.002; -0.26	
F	47.69	
Number of cases	35412	
R-Squared	0.08	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		



Appendix 4.3. Trust in Local Government (B32)


	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Corruption Victimization	-0.049*	-8.45
Perception of Insecurity	-0.086*	-14.6
Satisfaction with Services of Local Government	0.361*	-57.08
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.043*	-7.96
Requested Help from Municipal Office	0.014*	-2.5
Perception of the National Economy	0.068*	-11.08
66 years or older	0.021*	-3.36
56-65 years	0.009	-1.41
46-55 years	0.000	-0.05
26-35 years	-0.014*	-2.16
16-25 years	0.004	-0.57
Skin Tone	0.004	-0.57
Wealth Quintiles	-0.009	-1.53
Years of Schooling	-0.040*	-5.93
Women	0.010*	-2
Urban/Rural	0.027*	-3.76
Guatemala	-0.060*	-6.87
El Salvador	-0.002	-0.18
Honduras	-0.009	-1.01
Nicaragua	-0.020*	-2.12
Costa Rica	-0.020*	-2.33
Panama	-0.088*	-8.98
Colombia	-0.068*	-7.24
Ecuador	-0.040*	-4.47
Bolivia	-0.062*	-5.29
Peru	-0.089*	-10.56
Paraguay	-0.003	-0.31
Chile	0.006	-0.57
Uruguay	-0.026*	-2.9
Brazil	-0.080*	-8.03
Venezuela	0.017	-1.62
Argentina	-0.048*	-4.54
Dominican Republic	-0.052*	-5.78
Haiti	-0.071*	-7.57
Jamaica	-0.092*	-11.32
Guyana	-0.040*	-4.13
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.133*	-9.93
Belize	-0.070*	-7.48
Constant	0.004; -0.51	
F	177.14	
Number of cases	35011	
R-Squared	0.2	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 4.4. Evaluations of Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas, 2014





Appendix 4.5. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas





Chapter 5. A Decade of Democratic Legitimacy in the Americas in the Americas

Ryan E. Carlin, Gregory J. Love, and Matthew M. Singer

I. Introduction

Philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick since the times of Plato. One of the secrets of democracy's success is that it can generate and maintain legitimacy while giving its detractors a political voice. Yet if democratic values start to slip, political instability could result. This chapter provides a time-lapsed photo of democratic legitimacy and political tolerance among the citizens of the Americas over the decade 2004–2014 and analyzes the factors that shape these orientations and values.

Because it captures the relationship between citizens and state institutions, legitimacy plays a defining role in the study of political culture and is key for democratic stability and quality (Almond and Verba 1963; Diamond 1999; Booth and Seligson 2009). LAPOP defines political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system. In theory, political legitimacy or “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract objects represented by the political system and the political institutions themselves. LAPOP's measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central to democratic survival (Booth and Seligson 2009).

Democratic legitimacy is a product of both contextual and individual factors. Prominent among the contextual explanations is the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy. Institutional features that make electoral defeat more palatable, e.g. that make legislative representation more proportional, can further bolster system support, especially among election losers (Anderson et al. 2005; Carlin and Singer 2011). Other scholars, however, propose that the level of economic development influences citizens' attitudes about the political system (e.g. Lipset 1963; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988). In particular, education is often shown to be strongly correlated with the development of democratic values in Latin America (Booth and Seligson 2009, Carlin 2006, Carlin and Singer 2011). Thus support for the political system is often theorized to be stable in the short run because strong most contextual factors are fairly static or slow moving.

However, this may not always be the case. Individual-level factors that change more frequently can partially determine the degree of legitimacy citizens accord the democratic system. In particular, a weakening economy, a rise in crime and insecurity, and poor governance can all undermine democratic legitimacy (Duch 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Booth and Seligson 2009; Seligson 2002, 2006; Morris 2008; Salinas and Booth 2011). The 2012 AmericasBarometer Regional Report found how citizens in the Americas perceive or experience economic outcomes; the integrity of state officials; and the security situation influences how they evaluate the political system (Carlin et al. 2013).

To understand what makes political support unstable, some scholars use the imagery of a reservoir: extended periods of strong performance raise the levels of support high enough so that in hard times the regime can draw on these reserves of legitimacy to sustain itself. In such circumstances, the regime takes on inherent value and political support is robust to economic shocks and short downturns in performance (Easton 1975; Lipset 1963). But few Latin American and Caribbean democracies have enjoyed long interrupted periods of prosperity and good governance. Thus the reservoirs of political support in the region are likely to remain shallow and to ebb and flow with recent performance.

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, political tolerance is defined as “the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree.” Intolerance has nefarious effects on the quality of democracy. Among both the mass public and elites, it is linked to support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms (Gibson 1988, 1995, 1998, 2008).

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat (Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 2007), gender (Golebiowska 1999), and religion (Stouffer 1955). At the macro level, more developed countries present higher levels of support for same-sex marriage (Lodola and Corral 2013) and have generally more tolerant citizenries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). External threats and security crises as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.

II. Main Findings

This chapter covers two main sets of themes. First, it documents the breadth of democratic attitudes in the Americas. Some key findings include:

- Support for democracy as a form of government is fairly stable but has fallen slightly since 2012.
- Levels of trust in political and social institutions are generally falling, with the Catholic Church and the Army the most trusted, and political parties the least. Of all institutions, trust in elections suffered the greatest decline between 2012 and 2014.
- Among law-and-order institutions – armed forces, national police, and justice system – the justice system enjoys the least public trust and that trust declined the most since 2012.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, overall political system support dropped in 2014. Components tapping beliefs about the legitimacy of courts and rights protection deteriorated most. Several cases exhibit great volatility over time.
- Though stable between 2004-2012, political tolerance decreased in 2014 both overall and across each of its components. Major volatility is detected over time in several cases.
- Previously steady levels of attitudes conducive to democracy stability fell as attitudes that place democracy at risk rose dramatically.



Second, this chapter considers what factors lead citizens to have different attitudes toward the political system. The evidence from these analyses is consistent with the following conclusions:

- System support in the Americas reflects the performance of and experiences with government at the national and local levels in broad policy areas such as neighborhood security, the economy, and corruption.
- Political tolerance is reduced among those who judge the president and local government as performing well. In short, those benefiting from the status quo are less likely to tolerate dissenting elements within society.
- Education and wealth have slight negative effects on system support, but strong positive effects on political tolerance. Compared to citizens aged 36-45, the younger and older cohorts are more supportive of the political system, and older cohorts are more politically tolerant. Women are more supportive of the political system than men but less politically tolerant.

The rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. Section III looks at stated support for “democracy” as the best form of government over time. Section IV examines trust in major political and social institutions in the region. Special attention is given to institutions responsible for establishing and upholding law and order. Section V’s goal is to explore the attitudes theorized to foster stable democracy. Its first two subsections describe levels of (a) Support for the Political System and (b) Political Tolerance from 2004 to 2014 and within the region in 2014. Regression analyses probe what kinds of citizens are most likely to hold these two sets of attitudes. A third subsection derives attitudinal profiles from these two measures in order to gauge (c) Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability at the regional level since 2004 and cross-nationally in 2014. Section VI concludes with the main findings and a discussion of their potential implications.

III. Support for Democracy

As an entrée into a decade of gauging democratic legitimacy in the Americas, we analyze support for democracy in the abstract. This diffuse form of political legitimacy is a basic requirement for democratic consolidation. One way the AmericasBarometer measures abstract support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Winston Churchill¹ and inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler (1996). The “Churchillian” question uses a 7-point response scale, which has been rescaled, as is standard practice at LAPOP, to run from 0 (“strongly disagree”) to 100 (“strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

While overall belief in democracy as the best system of government is reasonably high in the Americas, Figure 5.1 shows the 2014 regional average² is slightly lower than the 2012 level and its apex in 2008. The same pattern emerges among only those countries the AmericasBarometer has

¹ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

² As with all other figures in this report that display the regional average, countries are weighted equally and thus the numbers represent the percentages in an average country in the hemisphere.

included since 2006³ and by sub-region.⁴ Thus, support for democracy as a form of government in the Americas peaked in 2008, plateaued through 2012, but fell in 2014 to levels on par with those in the middle of the last decade.




Figure 5.1. Support for Democracy in the Americas over Time

IV. Trust in Political and Social Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Like previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the 2014 round asked about trust in a number of specific institutions. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented “not at all,” and 7 represented “a lot,” citizens responded to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B18. To what extent do you trust the National Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical/Protestant Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President/Prime Minister?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?

³ Among the Latin American countries, only Argentina is excluded since it was first surveyed in 2008.

⁴ Sub-regions refer to Mexico and Central America, the Andes, the Southern Cone, and the Caribbean. Only in the latter is the shape substantively different. Support for democracy peaked in 2004 and rebounded in 2012 and then fell all the more in 2014.



As per the LAPOP standard, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100. Results from the 2004-2014 AmericasBarometer reported in Figure 5.2 suggest levels of institutional trust form four distinct groupings. First, citizens of the Americas expressed the greatest levels of trust, on average, in the armed forces and the Catholic Church. The second most trusted set of institutions in the region includes the executive, the Evangelical/Protestant Church, elections, and national police forces. This set is followed by two major state organs: the justice system and the national legislature. Political parties stand alone as the least trusted institutions in the Americas.

Figure 5.2 also shows levels of trust in these social and political institutions over the decade 2004-2014. Trust has not increased in any of these institutions since 2012 and, in most cases, it has decreased.⁵ The largest drop-off since 2012 is in trust in elections (4.7 units). This drop has occurred despite almost half of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer holding a national election between the beginning of 2013 and the end of 2014 fieldwork.⁶ A drop in confidence in elections after elections have been held often reflects the disappointed opinions of supporters of the losing party (Anderson et al. 2005). Executive trust has also fallen on average since 2012 (4.1 units), although the variations across countries are substantial: it is bookended by a high of 71.1 in the Dominican Republic and a low of 36.5 in Venezuela. Trust in Evangelical/Protestant Churches fell substantially, as did trust in the Catholic Church, despite the naming of the first Pope from the Americas in 2013. Overall, this broad retreat in trust erases modest gains posted between 2008 and 2012 across all institutions.

⁵ This conclusion holds within the sub-sample continuously studied since 2004, with one exception: average levels of trust in the armed forces increased significantly.

⁶ Ecuador (February 2013, presidential/legislative), Trinidad & Tobago ((February 2013, presidential indirect), Venezuela (April 2013, presidential), Paraguay (April 2013, presidential), Argentina (October 2013, legislative), Chile (November 2013, presidential/legislative; December 2014, second-round presidential), Honduras (November 2013, presidential), Costa Rica (February 2014 first-round presidential; April 2014 second round), El Salvador (February 2014 first-round presidential; March 2014 second round), Colombia (March 2014, legislative; June 2014, presidential), Panama (May 2014).




Figure 5.2. Trust in Institutions in the Americas, 2004-2014

Following on the thematic focus at the start of this report on the public opinion consequences of insecurity in the Americas, we now turn to the regional distribution of trust in three key law-and-order institutions: the armed forces, the national police, and the justice system. According to Figure 5.3, trust in the armed forces is generally high throughout the Americas. Ecuador leads in trust, trailed closely by Canada, the United States, and Guatemala. Only in Venezuela does it dip below 50 units.

High and stable regional levels of citizen trust in the armed forces mask massive over-time shifts within countries. For example, Venezuela reached its region-low levels after falling precipitously from 60 in 2012 to 42 units in 2014. And in Honduras, trust in the armed forces jumped from 52 in 2008 to 61 units in 2010, before plunging to 48 units in 2012 only to skyrocket to 64 units in 2014. These and other examples suggest the legitimacy of this key institution may correspond to the actual and potential role the military plays in politics.

If the armed forces are generally well trusted throughout the Americas, Figure 5.4 shows, by contrast, the national police are not. Average levels of trust in the national police sit below 40 units in over one third of the countries in the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Canada and Chile top the region on this measure of institutional legitimacy, followed by Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Haiti. No country’s average level of trust in the national police surpasses 70 units.

Within the increasingly unruly Central American corridor, trust in the national police has been volatile over the 2004-2014 decade. Spikes and/or drops of 8 units or more on the 0-100 scale occurred in all cases except Mexico and Nicaragua. Since 2012, however, there is no uniform trend. Public trust



in the national police fell greatly in Belize (-13.8 units), moderately in Panama (-5.1), and slightly in El Salvador (-3.2); it rebounded mightily in Honduras (+18.1 units) and somewhat in Guatemala (+3.2); in Mexico and Nicaragua it did not change. In Brazil, where from 2011 to 2014 the national police played a central role in the “pacification” of slums in preparation for the World Cup, trust in the national police has fallen more than 7 units since 2010.

A third Figure (5.5), displays levels of trust in the justice system across the Americas in 2014. Of the three institutions of law and order, the justice system is clearly the one respondents view as the least legitimate. No country scores over 60 units, and most have mediocre trust levels of 40-49 units. Below that, in the 30-40 unit range, are two types of the countries: those in which trust in the justice system is perennially low (Peru and Paraguay) and those in which trust levels have eroded dramatically of late (Venezuela, Chile, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia).




Figure 5.3. Trust in Armed Forces in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.4. Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.5. Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

Looking across all three 2014 figures, average levels of trust in institutions of law and order are highly, but by no means perfectly, correlated.⁷ Yet two patterns stand out. Canada, the United States, Ecuador, and Nicaragua consistently register among the region's highest levels of trust, while Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia reliably register some of the lowest levels.

Of thematic interest is the role of neighborhood insecurity in the legitimacy of democratic institutions. An index based on the four questions introduced in Chapter 1 about burglary, drug dealing, blackmail/extortion, and murder in a respondent's neighborhood is used to capture this

⁷ Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the Armed Forces: $r = 0.62$; Trust in the Justice System and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.64$; Trust in the Armed Forces and Trust in the National Police: $r = 0.56$.

concept. Responses were recoded 1 (“yes” the form of neighborhood insecurity took place in the last 12 months) and 0 (“no” it did not) and combined into an additive index rescaled to 0-100.⁸

Figure 5.6 illustrates how neighborhood insecurity varies across the Americas in 2014. Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela stand out for their high levels of neighborhood insecurity. Most of the countries along the Andes-Central America-Mexico drugs supply chain fall within the next range, roughly equivalent to having one of these forms of neighborhood insecurity in the past year. Only Bolivia, Haiti, Jamaica, and Guyana are significantly lower than this threshold. Overall, then, the regional distribution runs from an average of just over two forms of neighborhood insecurity (50 units) to an average of less than one (20 units).

Does the low trust in rule of law institutions across the Americas reflect neighborhood insecurity? Below are fixed-effects regression models of trust in the national police (Figure 5.7) and trust in the justice system (Figure 5.8). Included are socioeconomic and demographic variables, a measure of presidential approval, and factors related to the performance of and experiences with local and national government.⁹ These analyses will help determine whether neighborhood security is partially responsible for the low levels of trust in these key security-related state institutions.

⁸ These items are, respectively, VICBAR1, VICBAR3, VICBAR4, and VICBAR7. Polychoric principal components analysis suggests a single factor explains 65% of the variance among these variables, and a Cronbach’s α coefficient of 0.64 suggests these variables form a fairly reliable scale.

⁹ Full results available in Appendix 5.1 and 5.2. Models exclude the United States and Canada.




Figure 5.6. Neighborhood Security in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.7. Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014

A straightforward inference from Figure 5.7 is that the more insecure citizens' neighborhoods are, the less they trust the national police. This effect is on par with that of being asked to pay a bribe. An auxiliary analysis not reported suggests the adverse effects of neighborhood insecurity are potentially larger than those of crime victimization. Citizens who are satisfied with municipal services are more trustful of the national police, as are those who approve of the executive. Rural residents and those of middle age or older are more likely to trust the national police than urbanites and younger cohorts. Education slightly weakens police trust.

Figure 5.8 reports an analysis of the factors related to individual-level trust in the justice system in the Americas. Neighborhood insecurity appears to erode trust in the justice system as well. Again, rosy perceptions of the municipal government and the executive correlate positively with trust in the justice system, as does attending local government meetings. Not only are the more educated less trustworthy, so are wealthier respondents. Citizens who live in rural areas and who are in the youngest cohort trust the justice system more than urban dwellers and all other age cohorts.




Figure 5.8. Factors Associated with Trust in the Justice System in the Americas, 2014

In sum, many institutions charged with upholding the law in the Americas lack citizen trust. Fairly high and stable regional levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police belie big changes within countries over time. Trust in the justice system is at critical levels in much of the Americas and has eroded quickly in some cases. The moderate correlation across these measures suggests that trust in one law and order institution does not necessarily translate into trust in the other two. Countries' rule of law outcomes, measured by the World Justice Project, are significantly correlated with trust in these institutions.¹⁰ Publics across the Americas, it seems, do not blindly grant legitimacy to the core institutions tasked with upholding law and order. Rather, these institutions must earn the public's trust and support.

V. Attitudinal Profiles Conducive to Democratic Stability

Stable democracies need citizens who grant their institutions legitimacy and who tolerate and respect the rights of dissenters. In other words, system support and political tolerance influence democratic stability or "consolidation." The ways in which tolerance and system support are expected to affect stable democracy, according to previous LAPOP studies, are summarized in Table 5.1. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, democracy is expected to be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and unsupportive of democratic institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk of degradation or even breakdown. A third possibility is an unstable democracy, where the majority exhibits high political tolerance but accords political institutions low legitimacy; these cases might see some instability but critiques of the system are grounded in commitment to core democratic values. Finally, if the society has high system support but

¹⁰ Order and Security correlates with trust in the armed forces ($r = .34$), the national police ($r = .67$), and the justice system ($r = .50$). Correlations between Criminal Justice and these three institutions are, respectively, $r = .44$, $r = .69$, and $r = .45$.

low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 5.1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Notably, this conceptualization has empirical support. For example, Booth and Seligson used the 2008 AmericasBarometer to trace the serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica (Booth and Seligson 2009; Pérez, Booth and Seligson 2010). A prior step to analyzing these attitudes in combination is to first examine these two dimensions – support for the political system and political tolerance – separately.

Support for the Political System

Booth and Seligson (2009) have proposed a general way of looking at public support for the political system by measuring “system support” – a summary belief in the legitimacy of political institutions in a country and overall levels of support for how the political system is organized. It is measured using an index created from the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Responses to each question were based on a 7-point scale, running from 1 (“not at all”) to 7 (“a lot”). Following the LAPOP standard, the resulting index is rescaled from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation.

Figure 5.9 compares levels of the system support index and its five components for countries included in the AmericasBarometer since 2006. On the whole, system support in the Americas in 2014 is down two units from readings in 2012 and 2010. Broken down into regions, however, one finds

decreases on the order of three to four units in the Andes, Southern Cone, and Caribbean but an increase of roughly three points in Mexico and Central America. On the other hand, significant declines across all regions in the beliefs that the courts guarantee a fair trial and that the political system respects citizens' basic rights combined to pull the index lower in 2014.¹¹ Considered in tandem with the low levels of trust in the justice system presented in Figure 5.5, the judiciary appears to pose a major hurdle to strong political support in the hemisphere.





Figure 5.9. System Support and Its Components in the Americas, 2006-2014

How does support for the political system vary within the Americas today? Map 5.1 presents the levels of system support in the AmericasBarometer study in 2014. System support peaks in Costa Rica (62.3 units) and bottoms out in Brazil (37.6 units). Costa Rica and Canada sit atop the regional list on this legitimacy indicator while the United States hovers around the regional average (around 50 units). Encouragingly, citizens in the violent and politically volatile countries in Meso-America remain supportive of their political system.

¹¹ However, if the analysis is confined to the nine core countries continuously the AmericasBarometer surveyed 2004-2014, modest gains in the system support index and in all of its components, except the belief that the courts guarantee a fair trial, are observed.



Map 5.1. System Support in the Americas, 2014

Because system support is supposed to tap the inherent value citizens place in democratic institutions it should be fairly stable over time. Radical shifts were nonetheless observed in several cases. Major gains were made, for example, in Honduras (+11.1 units), Panama (+9), Costa Rica (+6.4), and Ecuador (+6). Major losses, in turn, were recorded in Venezuela (-13.9 units), Belize (-12.2) Jamaica (-10.6), and Brazil (-7.8). A deeper look (not presented here) indicated that these swings do not correspond neatly with cross-time changes in economic perceptions.

What kinds of citizens are most supportive of their political systems? Fixed-effects regression is used to model system support as a function of, again, socio-economic and demographic variables, presidential approval, and local and national government performance and experience indicators.¹² As mentioned above, in long-standing democracies diffuse support for the political system is viewed as a

¹² Full results available in Appendix 5.3. Models exclude the United States and Canada.



deep-seated orientation that is relatively impervious to short-run changes in government performance. However in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean, perceived performances of and experiences with both national and local government may still be crucial predictors of system support.

How well do neighborhood security and the rest of these variables correlate with system support in 2014? To focus on the America's newer democracies the United States and Canada are removed from this particular analysis. The results of the analysis, presented in Figure 5.10, indicate individuals who live in more insecure neighborhoods have lower system support. An analysis not shown for reasons of space indicate that when entered into the model separately, rather than as part of an index, each of these four variables has a statistically significant and negative relationship with system support. Rooting out insecurity can help cement this dimension of democratic legitimacy.

Other performance evaluations matter as well. At the level of national government, rosy evaluations of past economic performance and executive approval are strongly related to support for the broader political system. At the local level, satisfaction with municipal government services has similarly positive effects. System support also reflects individuals' interactions with the state. Whereas those who have been asked to pay a bribe are less supportive, those who have attended a meeting of the municipal government are more supportive.¹³




Figure 5.10. Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

In addition, system support differs across demographic groups. Rural residents, the less wealthy, and women all support the political system more than their counterparts. Education has no discernible effect. The relationship between age and system support is non-linear: it is higher among the youngest and the two oldest cohorts than among those ages 36-45.

¹³ When presidential approval is excluded, economic, municipal government evaluations, and municipal meeting attendance gain strength. Corruption victimization and neighborhood security do not change appreciably. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

These findings support three main conclusions. First, despite the expectation that system support is a deeply rooted orientation resistant to short-run performance fluctuations, in the Americas system support appears to shift with changes in neighborhood security, the state of the economy, and recent corruption experiences. Second, while system support is often viewed as a national-level concept, it appears in part based on the performance of local governments: how citizens view and interact with their municipalities shapes how they view their national political system. Thirdly, while cohort effects account for the differences in system support across age groups, the results run contrary to theories that link political legitimacy to rising levels of wealth, education, and urbanization (Lipset 1963, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

Political Tolerance

High levels of support for the political system do not guarantee the survival of liberal democratic institutions. Liberal democracy also requires citizens to accept the principles of open democratic competition and tolerance of dissent. Thus the AmericasBarometer measures political tolerance for those citizens who object to the political system. This index is composed of the following four items in the questionnaire:

<p>D1. There are people who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: [Probe: To what degree?]</p>
<p>D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.</p>
<p>D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the [country's] form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</p>
<p>D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?</p>

As with all LAPOP indices, each respondent's mean (average) reported response to these four questions is calculated and then rescaled so that the resulting variable runs from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low tolerance and 100 represents very high tolerance. Responses for each component have also been rescaled from 0 to 100 for presentation below.¹⁴

Analyses by country (not shown) find levels of political tolerance are more than 4 units lower in countries with active high-profile dissident groups or actors.¹⁵ Venezuela, where many candidates for national and sub-national offices are outwardly critical of the regime, rates among the most tolerant countries in the Americas. Where former dissidents are now sitting presidents tolerance is relatively high (Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil), middling (Nicaragua), and low (Bolivia). Countries with active dissident groups, such as Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru, exhibit middling levels of tolerance.

¹⁴ The Cronbach's alpha for an additive scale of the four variables is very high ($\alpha = .85$) and principal components analysis indicates that they measure a single dimension.

¹⁵ These include Colombia (FARC/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and ELN/Ejército de Liberación Nacional), Peru (Shining Path/Sendero Luminoso), Mexico (EPR/Ejército Popular Revolucionario and FAR-LP/Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberación del Pueblo), and Paraguay (EPP/Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo).



How stable is political tolerance? While theoretically it should be quite stable, in actuality tolerance has changed drastically since 2012 in multiple countries. Gains in Venezuela (+7.6 units) and Honduras (+6.7) were overshadowed by huge losses in Panama (-19.8 units), Guatemala (-17.8), Guyana (-14.4), and Belize (-11.2). Most other publics became only somewhat less tolerant. Political tolerance is therefore no more or less stable than system support and, like many of the legitimacy measures analyzed here, has suffered a setback in the last two years.

To explore the evolution of political tolerance in the Americas, Figure 5.11 displays the regional means on political tolerance index in each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. Though relatively static from 2008 to 2012, regional levels of political tolerance declined in 2014. Tolerance of political dissidents' right to free expression and to compete for political office observed the largest decreases. A similar story emerges from an analysis (not shown) of the sub-sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2004.





Figure 5.11. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2004-2014

The geographical distribution of tolerance for political dissent in the region can be appreciated in Map 5.2, which maps countries by mean score range on the index from the 2014 AmericasBarometer. Tolerance is greatest in the United States and Canada (69.9 and 69.3 units on the 0-100 scale, respectively) and lowest in Guatemala and Panama (29.5 and 32.1 units, respectively).



Map 5.2. Political Tolerance and Its Components in the Americas, 2014




Figure 5.12. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Americas, 2014

What sorts of citizens on average are most politically tolerant in the comparatively new democracies of Latin America and the Caribbean? A fixed-effects regression model analyzes political tolerance as a function of the same socio-economic and demographic variables, performance perceptions, and experiences with local and national government as in the analyses above.¹⁶ The 2012 comparative report concluded that many of these predictors had opposing effects on system support and political tolerance (Carlin et al. 2013). Does this conclusion hold in 2014?

In many instances the answer is yes, according to Figure 5.12. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, is negatively associated with system support but positively associated with tolerating the political rights and civil liberties of people who are openly against the regime. Upon closer inspection, items tapping the presence of burglary and drug dealing appear to drive this relationship; blackmail/extortion and murder are not systematically related to political tolerance (analysis not shown).

But unlike system support, political tolerance does not consistently reflect evaluations of recent economic performance, corruption victimization, or participation in local government meetings.¹⁷ And whereas strong performance by the national executive and local government services are positively correlated with system support, they are negatively correlated with political tolerance. These results are troubling insofar as they suggest that popular national executives and good local service provision can hinder the consolidation of democracy. Yet they resonate with findings from Latin America that election losers are particularly tolerant of political dissidents and continue to mobilize in support of their rights while political winners are likely to delegate additional authority to “their” executive.

¹⁶ Full results available in Appendix 5.4. Models exclude the United States and Canada.

¹⁷ When presidential approval is excluded from the model, the same patterns hold with one exception: positive economic perceptions are negatively related to tolerance.

Results from the socio-economic and demographic variables reveal more evidence that system support and political tolerance have distinct micro-foundations. A single (marginal) year of education has the greatest effect on tolerance of any other variable considered. From a policy perspective, this suggests tolerance can be taught. In addition, wealthy, male, and darker-skinned respondents are more tolerant than poorer, female, and light-skinned ones. Place of residence has no systematic effect on tolerance. Age appears related to tolerance beyond a certain threshold. Those in the 36-45 age bracket are significantly less tolerant than the older cohorts in the model.

These results place democracy's champions in some awkward positions. Neighborhood insecurity, for example, appears to present a Catch-22: improving it may enhance the legitimacy of the political system but could simultaneously lower political tolerance. Satisfaction with incumbent governments presents another puzzle. Citizens who approve of the sitting executive and are happy with local services express relatively higher levels of system support but are, in turn, less tolerant of individuals who openly criticize the regime and question the value of democracy. Perhaps these contradictions signal a desire to insulate a system that delivers basic public goods and services from those who would destroy it. Yet somewhat paradoxically, strong democracy requires supporting the basic institutions undergirding the system *and* extending political and civil freedoms even to those who wish to undermine them. Reconciling these two sets of attitudes, then, is a major challenge for the development of the cultural foundations of democracy in the Americas (Singer n.d.). From a public policy standpoint the task is all the more daunting since neighborhood insecurity and citizen evaluations of incumbent governments appear to affect democracy's cultural foundations in different, and sometimes, contradictory ways.

Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability

To identify the attitudes theorized to bolster democracy, the data from the system support and political tolerance indices outlined in the previous two sections are combined. Individuals who scored above 50 (the midpoint) on both of the scales are considered to have attitudes conducive to *Stable Democracy*. Those who scored below 50 (the midpoint) on both scales are considered to hold attitudes that place *Democracy at Risk*. Individuals with high political tolerance but low system support have attitudes that favor *Unstable Democracy*. Lastly, individuals with high system support but low tolerance are said to foster *Authoritarian Stability*.




Figure 5.13. Democratic Attitudes Profiles over Time in the Americas, 2004-2014

How prevalent are these attitudinal profiles in the Americas? Regional trends across the four profiles from 2004 to 2014 are reported in Figure 5.13. Alarming, *Stable Democracy* attitudes reach their lowest region-average levels of the decade in 2014, and *Authoritarian Stability* and *Democracy at Risk* profiles hit their decade highs. These trends are similar in a restricted sample of countries surveyed continuously since 2006 and even more pronounced in the nine core countries measured in each wave 2004-2014. But whereas *Democracy at Risk* is the modal profile in Figure 5.13, in the nine-country continuous sub-sample *Authoritarian Stability* is the most common profile. All of these results, but especially the latter, may sit uneasily with democracy's champions in the region. To see how these profiles are distributed across countries please reference Figure 5.14.





Figure 5.14. Democratic Attitude Profiles in the Americas, 2014

Map 5.3 shows the percentage of citizens with the profile that favors *Stable Democracy* across the Americas in 2014. This snapshot identifies two clear outliers. At 56.8%, Canada boasts greater than 18% more citizens with stable democratic attitudes – high system support *and* high political tolerance – than any other country in the Americas. The next closest are Uruguay (38.5%) and the United States (37.1%). At 7.5%, Guatemala has statistically fewer citizens with attitudes favorable to stable democracy than any country except Panama, whose 95% confidence intervals overlap. Once again, we note dramatic declines from 2012 to 2014 in a handful of countries: Guyana (-28.0%), Jamaica (-20.6%), Guatemala (-17.2%), Belize (-16.7%), Colombia (-8.5%), and Brazil (-7.7%). Honduras and Haiti rebounded +9.6% and 5.4%, respectively, over the same period.



Map 5.3. Distribution of Stable Democracy Attitude Profile (High System Support and High Tolerance) in the Americas, 2014

VI. Conclusion

The future of democracy in the Americas hinges on its legitimacy. When citizens broadly trust its local and national institutions, believe in its core principles, and value the system for its own sake, democracy is most stable and effective. But when legitimacy wanes, democracy's fate is less certain. Therefore it is important to track the evolution of legitimacy in the Americas, to compare it across countries, and, most crucially, to understand what drives legitimacy among citizens. To these ends, this chapter unpacked legitimacy into its constituent parts and sought to explain them with factors of high policy and theoretical relevance. As signaled by the first section of this volume, the 2014 report puts special emphasis on the role of insecurity and the institutions tasked with addressing it.

A straightforward message from this comparative analysis is that most indicators of democratic legitimacy on average fell across the Americas since their last reading in 2012. An investigation of the role of insecurity in democratic legitimacy, however, reveals a nuanced relationship. For example, support for democracy in the abstract and system support actually increased in the nine Latin American countries extending southward from Mexico to Bolivia, arguably the Americas' most violent and insecure sub-region. Yet individuals in insecure neighborhoods are less supportive of the political system but more politically tolerant. Taken together, these results suggest neighborhood insecurity may contribute to the mixture of attitudes amenable to *Unstable Democracy*: low system support, high tolerance. If so, insecurity could have a potentially destabilizing effect on democracy in the Americas.

Another inference that one can draw from this study is that institutions whose missions include establishing and maintaining security, law, and order in the Americas enjoy distinct levels of citizen trust. Long among the most trusted institutions in the region, the armed forces are far more trusted than the national police or, particularly, the justice system. Citizen orientations to the justice system generally appear to be souring. Beyond flagging trust, across the Americas the belief that courts guarantee a fair trial was far less firm in 2014 than at any time in the decade between 2004-2014. While regional average levels of trust in the armed forces and the national police are generally stable, in countries where these institutions have taken more prominent political roles over the past decade, citizen trust in them has shown volatility. This may suggest that the greater a political role these institutions of national and local security play, the more frequently citizens update their beliefs about their trustworthiness.

A final noteworthy conclusion is that, contrary to what might be considered classic theoretical expectations, levels of democratic legitimacy remain volatile in the Americas. The regression analyses imply this is likely due to links between individual indicators of democratic legitimacy and evaluations and experiences of government performance in the recent past. Brief analyses of specific cases here indicate democratic legitimacy is also reflective of the real-time processes of democratization and de-democratization. In addition to actual levels of democratic legitimacy, short-term volatility may have important implications for democracy as well. Monitoring democratic legitimacy over long time periods, a core mandate of the AmericasBarometer, is crucial to knowing whether these are secular trends or merely a return to "normal".

To avoid an overly negative reading of the data, this chapter closes by noting that the association between government performance at the national and local levels and support for the political system and for democratic institutions can cut both ways. Although it finds, on average, downward trends in government performance in the Americas, other chapters also document public



concern about weak performance in areas of heightened importance to citizens in many countries. Evaluations of the economy have fallen despite evidence that wealth has risen. Personal security is becoming an increasingly important issue to citizens across the region despite the fact that crime victimization remains unchanged. Corruption victimization and perceptions of the corruption and crime situations remain at the relatively high levels documented in 2012 (Singer et al. 2012). Finally, while wealth levels in the region as a whole have improved, many countries continue to experience slowing economies, high levels of crime, and poor governance. If the region's political systems continue to fail in these respects, levels of democratic legitimacy could continue to tumble. Of course, frustrations with democratic institutions and their performance can either create space for actors to undermine those institutions or propel new modes of participation, such as reform movements, which can strengthen democratic institutions. Thus monitoring citizens' long-standing commitments to democratic principles and the norms of open political competition and tolerance is key to forecasting democracy's fate in the region.

Appendix

Appendix 5.1. Coefficients for Figure 5.7, Factors Associated with Trust in National Police in the Americas, 2014


	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.047*	(-6.24)
Sex	0.014*	(-2.54)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.031*	(-4.42)
Years of Schooling	-0.005	(-0.69)
Skin Tone	0.002	(-0.34)
16-25 years	-0.009	(-1.26)
26-35 years	-0.011	(-1.62)
46-55 years	0.021*	(-3.24)
56-65 years	0.022*	(-3.46)
66 years or older	0.042*	(-6.84)
Presidential Job Approval	0.199*	(-28.64)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.120*	(-19.79)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.007	(-1.28)
Corruption Victimization	-0.082*	(-13.34)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.043*	(-6.57)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.107*	(-15.58)
Guatemala	-0.038*	(-3.96)
El Salvador	0.017	(-1.80)
Honduras	-0.003	(-0.27)
Nicaragua	0.058*	(-5.96)
Costa Rica	0.047*	(-4.80)
Panama	0.046*	(-4.73)
Colombia	0.042*	(-4.36)
Ecuador	0.064*	(-6.70)
Bolivia	-0.082*	(-6.54)
Peru	-0.014	(-1.40)
Paraguay	-0.019*	(-2.07)
Chile	0.095*	(-9.26)
Uruguay	0.051*	(-5.17)
Brazil	0.041*	(-4.24)
Venezuela	0.019	(-1.90)
Argentina	0.033*	(-3.37)
Dominican Republic	-0.067*	(-6.58)
Haiti	0.082*	(-8.09)
Jamaica	-0.017	(-1.92)
Guyana	-0.047*	(-4.87)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.003	(-0.20)
Belize	-0.041*	(-3.95)
Constant	-0.007; (-1.04)	
F	135.06	
Number of cases	32152	
R-Squared	0.17	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		



Appendix 5.2. Coefficients for Figure 5.8, Factors Associated with Trust in Justice System in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.059*	(-8.49)
Sex	0.013*	(-2.31)
Years of Schooling	-0.022*	(-3.07)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.030*	(-4.73)
Skin Tone	-0.005	(-0.70)
16-25 years	0.026*	(-3.74)
26-35 years	-0.001	(-0.09)
46-55 years	0.01	(-1.46)
56-65 years	-0.001	(-0.17)
66 years or older	0.011	(-1.72)
Presidential Job Approval	0.235*	(-31.81)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.111*	(-18.21)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.017*	(-2.86)
Corruption Victimization	-0.050*	(-7.85)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.046*	(-6.86)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.075*	(-11.27)
Guatemala	-0.022*	(-2.44)
El Salvador	-0.029*	(-3.48)
Honduras	-0.026*	(-3.02)
Nicaragua	0.018*	(-2.04)
Costa Rica	0.074*	(-9.18)
Panama	-0.004	(-0.43)
Colombia	-0.013	(-1.55)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.105*	(-8.89)
Peru	-0.068*	(-8.48)
Paraguay	-0.078*	(-8.91)
Chile	-0.071*	(-8.02)
Uruguay	0.008	(-0.85)
Brazil	-0.041*	(-4.71)
Venezuela	-0.004	(-0.43)
Argentina	0.006	(-0.76)
Dominican Republic	-0.079*	(-8.79)
Haiti	-0.041*	(-4.30)
Jamaica	-0.018*	(-2.20)
Guyana	-0.040*	(-5.09)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.006	(-0.48)
Belize	-0.038*	(-4.31)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	103.2	
Number of cases	31909	
R-Squared	0.13	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

Appendix 5.3. Estimated System Support by Country, 2014; Empirical Basis for Map 5.1






Appendix 5.4. Coefficients for Figure 5.10, Factors Associated with System Support in the Americas, 2014

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	0.054*	(7.26)
Sex	0.017*	(3.29)
Years of Schooling	-0.015*	(-2.14)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.014*	(-2.18)
Skin Tone	-0.002	(-0.31)
16-25 years	0.042*	(6.25)
26-35 years	0.003	(0.49)
46-55 years	0.012	(1.87)
56-65 years	0.020*	(3.11)
66 years or older	0.038*	(5.95)
Presidential Job Approval	0.315*	(43.58)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	0.110*	(17.62)
Attended Municipal Meeting	0.013*	(2.43)
Corruption Victimization	-0.064*	(-10.56)
Perception of National Economic Situation	0.076*	(11.90)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	-0.066*	(-9.72)
Guatemala	-0.064*	(-6.93)
El Salvador	-0.055*	(-6.69)
Honduras	-0.063*	(-6.81)
Nicaragua	0.005	(0.55)
Costa Rica	0.099*	(11.16)
Panama	-0.052*	(-5.61)
Colombia	-0.048*	(-5.36)
Ecuador	-0.025*	(-2.61)
Bolivia	-0.107*	(-8.93)
Peru	-0.082*	(-8.59)
Paraguay	-0.122*	(-13.23)
Chile	-0.070*	(-7.04)
Uruguay	-0.006	(-0.60)
Brazil	-0.149*	(-13.80)
Venezuela	-0.039*	(-3.61)
Argentina	0.021*	(2.41)
Dominican Republic	-0.098*	(-10.67)
Haiti	-0.134*	(-12.55)
Jamaica	-0.091*	(-11.60)
Guyana	-0.069*	(-7.71)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.019	(-1.29)
Belize	-0.054*	(-6.00)
Constant	0.011; (1.45)	
F	155.91	
Number of cases	31976	
R-Squared	0.23	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

**Appendix 5.5. Estimated Political Tolerance by Country, 2014;
Empirical Basis for Map 5.2**






**Appendix 5.6. Coefficients for Figure 5.12, Factors Associated with Political Tolerance
in the Americas, 2014**

	Standardized Coefficient	(t)
Urban/Rural	-0.006	(-0.61)
Sex	-0.047*	(-8.75)
Years of Schooling	0.114*	(-15.05)
Wealth Quintiles	0.037*	(-5.21)
Skin Tone	0.022*	(-2.63)
16-25 years	0.009	(-1.28)
26-35 years	-0.012	(-1.63)
46-55 years	-0.013*	(-1.98)
56-65 years	-0.014*	(-2.06)
66 years or older	-0.016*	(-2.39)
Presidential Job Approval	-0.086*	(-10.97)
Satisfaction w/Local Government Services	-0.022*	(-3.31)
Attended Municipal Meeting	-0.007	(-1.08)
Corruption Victimization	-0.008	(-1.27)
Perception of National Economic Situation	-0.005	(-0.80)
Neighborhood Insecurity Index	0.046*	(-6.10)
Guatemala	-0.113*	(-11.22)
El Salvador	-0.019	(-1.91)
Honduras	-0.009	(-0.84)
Nicaragua	0.026*	(-2.25)
Costa Rica	0.002	(-0.14)
Panama	-0.095*	(-9.21)
Colombia	-0.001	(-0.14)
Ecuador	-0.037*	(-2.99)
Bolivia	-0.053*	(-3.60)
Peru	-0.042*	(-3.69)
Paraguay	0.021	(-1.80)
Chile	0.050*	(-3.93)
Uruguay	0.090*	(-7.10)
Brazil	0.035*	(-2.99)
Venezuela	0.068*	(-5.10)
Argentina	0.040*	(-3.29)
Dominican Republic	0.041*	(-4.07)
Haiti	0.041*	(-4.03)
Jamaica	0.050*	(-3.80)
Guyana	0.040*	(-3.42)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.131*	(-6.71)
Belize	0.032*	(-2.65)
Constant	0.000; (-0.02)	
F	55.94	
Number of cases	31853	
R-Squared	0.12	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design. * p<0.05		

**Appendix 5.7. Estimated Stable Democracy Attitudes by Country, 2014;
Empirical Basis for Map 5.3**



Part II:
**Insecurity, Electoral Behavior, Civil
Society and Democratic Legitimacy in
El Salvador**



Chapter 6. Citizen Security and Violence Prevention at the Local Level

José Miguel Cruz

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we explore the diverse opinions related to the topic of citizen security and community conditions within El Salvador and, therefore, this is the first chapter of the report that focuses exclusively on the data from the AmericasBarometer in El Salvador. One of the most important results in this chapter is about citizens' opinion on violence prevention programs at the local level. Salvadorans are practically divided down the middle when it comes to deciding on the best way to confront violence. A little more than half chooses the toughening of penalties while the rest prefer prevention alternatives. However, citizens know of very few prevention programs that have come out of their own community or neighborhood. Furthermore, the results that we show in this chapter indicate that the relationship with the police plays an important role in perceptions of security. The prevention programs seem to stimulate interactions among citizens and police and this interaction seems to have a positive effect on the reduction of insecurity and victimization.

In the criminology literature, socio-environmental conditions play an important role in the understanding of incidence of crime and insecurity (Almgren 2005). In the same fashion, several of the efforts in terms of public policy are based on the modification of social surroundings and personal interaction at the community level as a way to confront the problems of insecurity. This chapter is divided into various sections whose ultimate aim is the understanding of these conditions associated with the problem of insecurity at the local level. Special attention is paid to opinions on prevention programs and the police, but the chapter goes beyond those topics. The first section offers a review of the complexity of security problems at the local level; the next section addresses subjects such as citizen satisfaction with public service infrastructure at the local level; and there is another section following that that explores citizens' opinions of the police. The chapter ends describing opinions on domestic violence, and, finally, we present our conclusions.

II. Security Problems at the Local Level

The violence and insecurity that have affected El Salvador over the past two decades have distinct manifestations at the local level. In general, given the lack of information, the data on the problem of insecurity have been concentrated mainly on hard homicide rates and on public opinion surveys that show the population's perception of security. In this round of the AmericasBarometer, we have placed special emphasis on gathering data and opinions that contribute to the understanding of the various aspects that are at the foundation of the problem of insecurity.

We designed two batteries of questions that tap into the problems of insecurity in the neighborhoods or communities where Salvadorans live. In the first place, we asked respondents to rate the seriousness of the following issues: young people loitering, young people as gang members, selling and trafficking of drugs in the neighborhood, fights in the neighborhood, and drug addicts in the streets. The questions were formulated in the following way:

Now, I am going to read a list of situations that might or might not be a problem in some neighborhoods. Please, tell me if the following situations are a problem that is very serious, somewhat serious, a little serious, not serious at all, or are not a problem in your neighborhood . [Repeat after each question: "Is this very serious, somewhat serious, a little serious, not serious at all, or not a problem in your neighborhood?" to help the interviewee]							
	Very serious	Somewhat serious	A little serious	Not serious at all	Not a problem	DK	DA
DISO7. Young people or children in the street doing nothing, wandering around here in your neighborhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
DISO8. Young people or children living here in your neighborhood who are in gangs	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
DISO10. Selling or trafficking of illegal drugs here in your neighborhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
DISO18. Gangs fighting here in your neighborhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
DISO14. Drug addicts in the streets here in your neighborhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
DISO16. Assaults of people while they walk on the streets here in your neighborhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
DISO17. Shootings here in your neighborhood	1	2	3	4	5	88	98

Citizens' responses show interesting tendencies. The presence of young people in public spaces seems to generate high social apprehension on the communities. For example, and as Table 6.1 shows, young people loitering in the streets of the community and young people belonging to gangs constitute the most serious problems for Salvadorans at the local level. However, that does not necessarily translate into elevated preoccupation with fights among gangs in the community. In fact, street fights among gangs display the highest percentage of people who say that it is not a problem at all.

Table 6.1. Opinions on Problems in the Community, El Salvador 2014
(percentages)

Question	Opinion				
	Very Serious	Somewhat Serious	A Little Serious	Not Serious At All	Not A Problem
Young people wandering	38,3	17,6	14,9	6,4	22,8
Young people in gangs	33,5	13,2	15,0	10,5	27,9
Sale of drugs	22,9	9,0	10,9	14,6	42,5
Fights among gangs	18,5	5,9	9,2	17,1	49,3
Drug addicts in the streets	19,8	9,2	15,8	14,9	40,3
Assaults in the community	20,2	10,5	17,4	14,2	37,7

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

In order to make a comparison in the simplest way possible, we recoded the answers to each question into a 0 to 100 scale where the opinion that the problem is very serious received a score of 100 while the opinion that the problem is not serious received a score of 0. Figure 6.1 shows the averages for each item. As we can see, young people loitering and in gangs constituted the most serious safety issue for Salvadorans – much greater than crimes like assault, drug sales, and gunshots in the neighborhood. These data, therefore, clearly highlight the important role that youth and gangs play in the perception of insecurity that overwhelms the population.




Figure 6.1. Opinions on Problems in the Neighborhood, El Salvador 2014

In the case of El Salvador, it was asked to what extent does the presence of gangs generate other security problems as they relate to schools in the community. The questions are part of the previous battery but they focus on the problem of gangs in the schools. Just like in the previous battery, responses were recoded into a 0-100 scale.

	Very Serious	Somewhat Serious	A Little Serious	Not Serious At All	Not A Problem	DK	DA
ELSDISO18. Recruiting young people into gangs as they exit the school premises	1	2	3	4	5	88	98
ELSDISO19. Drops out due to the presence of gangs	1	2	3	4	5	88	98

The results show that nearly 22.1% of Salvadorans think that young people dropping out of school due to the presence of gangs in the community is a very serious issue, while 41.6% believe that it is not a problem in their community. 20.2% consider that recruitment of young people into the gangs at school exits is a very serious problem while 47.6% think that gang recruitment is not a serious issue in their community. The rest centers around average levels of concern. In fact, only two people in the entire sample (more than 1,500 people) said that they took their children out of school because of the presence of gangs.




Figure 6.2. Opinions that Young People in Gangs Constitute a Serious Problem in the Community by Variables, El Salvador 2014 (averages)



Given the relevance of the gang problem in El Salvador, we proceeded to create a few cross-sections in order to determine some of the demographic and ecological characteristics associated with the respondents that usually see gangs as the most serious problem within their respective communities. The statistical analyses are shown in Figure 6.2. According to that figure, people 66 years of age or older make up the social group in which preoccupation over young people in gangs is the lowest compared to the rest of the population. The data also reveal that the most concerned with the presence of young people in gangs within the community are those respondents that have a high school education or higher. This result is surprising because it is possible to hope that the respondents most concerned about gangs are those that share social characteristics with people who inhabit neighborhoods plagued by youth gangs.

On the other hand, and as we might expect, concern about young people in gangs within the community is significantly lower among people who live in rural areas of the country; in contrast, in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area, and in large cities (like Santa Ana, Santa Tecla, and San Miguel), concern about the presence of gangs within the community is much higher than in any other region of the country.

Finally, the data show that people who fall within the first wealth quintile¹ and that, therefore, have a lower level of wealth than the remaining 80% of the population, think that recruitment of young people into gangs constitutes a serious problem within their community. This means that there usually exists more concern over the problem of youth joining gangs among the people that make up part of the poorest group of the country's population.

These opinions reflect, in a certain way, citizens' perceptions of security in the community in which they live. However, they do not necessarily reflect the prevalence of violent acts and delinquency that they suffer directly. In order to get a better approximation of this issue, the AmericasBarometer Survey included another battery of questions that collects the acts of violence that the respondents have witnessed or those they have heard about in the last twelve months within their community of residence. The items collect information on the occurrence of robberies, the sale of illegal drugs, blackmail, and murder. The questions were asked to the respondents in the same way as they are presented below.

¹ For an explanation on how wealth levels were determined, see: Córdova (2009). "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators." *AmericasBarometer Insights* No. 8.

Given your experience or what you have heard, which of the following criminal acts have happened in the last 12 months in your neighborhood.	Yes	No	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year
VICBAR1. Were there burglaries in the last 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to VICBAR3]			
VICBAR1F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3
VICBAR3. Have there been sales of illegal drugs in the past 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to VICBAR4]			
VICBAR3F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3
VICBAR4. Has there been any extortion or blackmail in the past 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to VICBAR7]			
VICBAR4F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3
VICBAR7. Have there been any murders in the last 12 months in your neighborhood?	1 [Continue]	2 [Skip to FEAR10]			
VICBAR7F How many times did this occur: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year?			1	2	3

The results presented in Figure 6.3 indicate that robbery is the most frequently-reported crime by Salvadorans. Almost 30% of the respondents reported having witnessed or having heard about a robbery committed in their community in the last 12 months. Surprisingly, murders follow right behind at 25.4%, the sale of drugs at 23.2%, and blackmail at 22.9%. The high percentage of reported murders in the survey may be due to the impact that this sort of crime generates in people, who tend to remember serious deeds with greater ease. However, after a fashion, these results also suggest a high level of occurrence of violent homicide in El Salvador, where 1 out of every 4 Salvadorans acknowledges knowing about a murder committed in their neighborhood during the year before the survey was taken.




Figure 6.3. Acts of Crime that have Occurred in the Respondent's Community in the Past Year, El Salvador 2014

How do the prevalence of crimes like blackmail and murder compare to the rest of the region? In order to have an idea of what the percentages mean within a regional context, we compare those results with those of the rest of the countries that included those questions in the 2014 AmericasBarometer. As we can see in Figure 6.4, El Salvador falls within the group of countries with the highest percentage of blackmails witnessed within the respondent's community of residence, next to the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Guatemala. In each of these countries, more than 22% of the citizens report blackmails during the past year. When it comes to the crime of murder, the data place El Salvador among the countries with a high percentage of occurrences, but not among the highest as in the case of blackmail. In any event, these data reinforce the argument that the problem of insecurity hits Salvadoran communities particularly hard. Both types of crimes, blackmail and murder, are made up of very serious acts because on the one hand, they erode communities' ability to generate public trust and, on the other, they indicate the level of complexity of the insecurity problem. Crimes like blackmail imply relatively high levels of organization and territorial control on the part of the criminal enterprises while crimes like murder have to do directly with the use of violence.




Figure 6.4. Blackmail and Murder in the Community in Comparative Perspective, 2014

In which communities are the crimes of murder and blackmail most frequent? The occurrence of these crimes is more present, in general, in public spaces and usually generates greater levels of insecurity among the population than robbery or the sale of drugs. The AmericasBarometer survey did not gather information about the community’s characteristics, but rather a way to understand the characteristics of the communities in which the crimes of murder and blackmail are the most common is to cross the data with data from the regions which the respondents inhabit.

Figure 6.5 shows that the perception of blackmails in the community is directly associated with the size of the locality in which the respondent lives. More than 35% of people that live in large cities report knowing of blackmails that occurred in the community. In comparison, no more than 25% of those people living in medium-sized and small cities and less than 10% of those living in rural areas report blackmails in their community of residence. In terms of the geographic region of the country, the data show a significant difference between the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador and the rest of the country.

According to the data, in the AMSS, nearly 36% of residents know of blackmails in their community. In the rest of the country, in contrast, no more than 20% know of cases of blackmail in their communities. These data suggest that in spite of the fact that the blackmail problem is significantly spread out throughout the country (including in the areas where this crime is lower - the same is reported by 16%), there are very important differences across regions and by the size of the



municipality. In general, it can be said that San Salvador and the surrounding urban area make up the most problematic areas for the occurrence of blackmail.




Figure 6.5. Percentage of People Who Know of Blackmail in their Community by Variables, El Salvador 2014

However, the variable that is apparently most related to the occurrence of blackmail in the community is the presence of teenage gangs. In the communities in which people perceive a large gang presence, more than half of them (53.2%) report having known about blackmail in their neighborhood. This percentage gets reduced among those who perceive some or little presence of gangs, and it is almost insignificant (3.9%) among those who report that there are no gangs in their community. In terms of the presence of a local crime prevention program, the results do not show significant differences.²

When it comes to murder, the data register some differences (see Figure 6.6). The results do not register significant changes in the identification of murder in function of the size of the city, but they do register such changes in function of whether or not the person lives in urban or rural areas. Almost 30% of respondents that live in cities (large or small) know of a murder committed in their community in comparison with only 18.2% of those who reside in rural areas.

² In this case, the presence of violence prevention program was measured using the question on whether or not the community leadership promotes prevention programs. The theme of the violence prevention programs is addressed in greater detail in Section IV of this chapter. Given that these programs have not been implemented randomly in practice, we cannot conclude from these results that they are not effective.

In other words, the people that live in urban areas report double the quantity of homicides in their community of residence than people who live in the countryside. In the case of the regions of the country, the data do not show significant differences among the majority of the regions. Only in the western region is the percentage of people who report witnessing or having knowledge of a homicide is less than 20%. Again, the data show that the presence of gangs plays an important role in the reported occurrence of homicides. Reported homicides go from 47.2% among people that indicate that there is a large gang presence in their community to 10% among those that affirm that there are no teenage gangs in their neighborhood.




Figure 6.6. Percentage of People Who Know of Homicides in their Community by Variable, El Salvador 2014

Furthermore, what value do Salvadorans place on levels of violence in their neighborhoods in comparison to other neighborhoods and in comparison to the past? The AmericasBarometer included the following questions to determine to what extent citizens feel overwhelmed by the problem of insecurity.

<p>PESE1. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighborhood is higher, about the same, or lower than in other neighborhoods?</p> <p>(1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower</p>
<p>PESE2. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighborhood is higher, about the same, or lower than 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Higher (2) About the same (3) Lower</p>

The results indicate that in 2014, the majority of Salvadorans (76.8%) perceive lower levels of violence in their neighborhood in comparison to other neighborhoods in the country (see Figure 6.7).



Only 6.6% of the people think that neighborhood violence is greater than in other places while 16.5% think that it is the same. Regarding the comparison over time, the results indicate that a plurality of citizens (43.3%) considers that neighborhood violence has remained the same in comparison to the previous year, while a percentage close to 40% think that violence is lower, and almost 18% think that it is greater. These results suggest that throughout 2014, Salvadorans showed a relatively favorable perception of the insecurity situation in their neighborhood in comparison to other places. At a difference, the comparison over time (with the previous year) shows a less favorable evaluation. These results agree with those that show that concerns over the insecurity levels would have gone up slightly with respect to the 2012 survey (see Figure 6.8)³.




Figure 6.7. Opinions on Changes in Violence Levels in Comparison to other Neighborhoods and to the Previous Year, El Salvador 2014

All of these data contribute to understanding the Salvadorans' general opinions on perceptions of insecurity. Asked directly, 45.7% report feeling insecure or very insecure in their neighborhood because of violence, while 54.3% report feeling secure. This question, that was a part of the AmericasBarometer Surveys from 10 years ago, was asked in the following way:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe

The comparison of the results of this question throughout 10 years reveals that the Salvadorans have had changing perceptions with regard to the insecurity problem. For purposes of comparison, the

³ This increment is not statistically significant with respect to 2012. But, on the one hand, it interrupts the falling trend between 2010 and 2012 and, on the other hand, shows that insecurity levels vary a lot from year to year.

results were averaged on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents the highest level of perception of insecurity. As we can see in Figure 6.8, which shows the averages on the scale by year, perceptions of insecurity in 2014 are almost at the same level as they were in 2012 (the difference is not statistically significant), but they are lower than in 2010 when they reached the highest averages of insecurity in the past decade. These data suggest that in spite of the apparent general concern regarding the problem of insecurity in El Salvador, perceptions of the same have been higher in the past, specifically in the years 2006 and 2010. Whatever the case, these tendencies indicate that perceptions regarding insecurity are changing and do not follow a general pattern over the course of the last 10 years.




Figure 6.8. General Perception of Insecurity in El Salvador, 2004-2014 (0-100 averages)

What are the variables associated with perceptions of insecurity in general? In order to establish the most important conditions associated to the Salvadorans' insecurity, we ran a linear multivariate regression analysis in which we aimed to establish whether direct crime victimization, the presence of gangs, the occurrence of crimes within the community and police performance play an important role in the respondents' insecurity.

The results are presented in Figure 6.9 and, as we observe, the most important variables to explain insecurity levels are: the presence of gangs in the community of residence, the incidence of robberies and blackmail in the same communities and the impression that the police in the community are involved in crime.⁴ This last variable seems to play a central role in the feeling of insecurity because upon including it in the analysis, the significance of other variables such as direct victimization, the corruption of agents of the police, and the incidence of homicides seems to fade away. In other words, the way in which the police are perceived has a very important impact on citizens' insecurity, apparently much more than the prevalence of crime.

⁴ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.




Figure 6.9. Determinants of Perceptions of Insecurity, El Salvador 2014

The demographic variables, with the exception of education level, do not seem to be associated with perceptions of insecurity. Gender, age, wealth quintiles, and place of residence do not seem to be directly connected with the level of insecurity that citizens perceive. In the case of years of schooling, the data indicate that people that have fewer years of schooling tend to feel more insecure than the rest of the population.




Figure 6.10. Perceptions of Insecurity by the Occurrence of Blackmail in the Community and Perceptions that the Police are Involved in Crime, El Salvador 2014

However the variables that we find most strongly associated with feelings of insecurity, controlling for demographic variables and crime victimization, are the incidence of extortion and the perception of police involvement in crime. As Figure 6.10 shows, people living in communities rife with blackmails and who perceive that the local police are associated with crime feel much more insecure than the rest of the population. This last finding is particularly important because, as we will see below, the police play a fundamental role in the way in which Salvadoran citizens confront the problem of crime and insecurity stemming from crime.

III. Satisfaction with Public Service Infrastructure in the Neighborhood

How satisfied are Salvadorans with their social services and with the infrastructure in the community in which they reside? In this section, we include the topic of social services because the opinion on the performance of those services is usually an indirect indicator of the level and quality of the presence of the State. And, as we have noted above, citizens' satisfaction with the community's infrastructure may be related to the variables of insecurity and violence. In other words, the more insecurity there is, the more dissatisfaction with public services there may be. In order to gather opinions with respect to this point, the AmericasBarometer Survey of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (2014 round) included a battery of questions about how satisfied are citizens with certain fundamental services in the community in which they live.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? Are you... [Read alternatives]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? Are you... [Read alternatives]			
(1) Very satisfied	(2) Satisfied	(3) Dissatisfied	
(4) Very dissatisfied	(99) N/A (Does not use)	(88) DK	(98) DA

In general, the majority of Salvadorans show being satisfied with the public services in their community. As we can see in Table 6.2, almost 70% of the respondents report being satisfied or very satisfied with the public schools; 62.6% report being satisfied or very satisfied with the streets and roads of their community and 54.2% say that they are satisfied with healthcare services offered in their community of residence.

Table 6.2. Satisfaction with Infrastructure and Services in the Community, El Salvador 2014 (In Percentages)

Type of Service	Level of Satisfaction			
	Very Satisfied	Satisfied	Unsatisfied	Very Unsatisfied
Public Streets and Roads	7.0	55.6	32.4	5.0
Public Schools	6.9	63.0	26.5	3.5
Public Health and Medical Services	5.3	48.9	36.3	9.5

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; SLVts14_081914



Who feels the most satisfied with the public services in their community? In order to answer this question, we created an aggregate index on satisfaction with public services. The results of each one of the questions were recoded on a 0-100 scale, where 100 represents maximum satisfaction with public services, and then, we created a variable that averages the answers to the three questions. This variable was used to run a regression with the main sociodemographic variables associated with satisfaction towards the public services in citizens' community of residence. Also, we added the variables of crime victimization and perception of insecurity in order to measure whether or not the conditions of insecurity affect citizens' judgment of infrastructure and social services. This analysis follows the contributions of a part of the academic literature in criminology which indicates that the presence of high levels of violence and insecurity are indicators of social disorganization and that, in general, it usually has an impact on how citizens evaluate the distribution of social services (see, for example, Kawachi et al. 1999).

The results of the regression can be observed in Figure 6.11.⁵ People who have lower levels of education and who belong to the lowest wealth quintiles are those who show most satisfaction with the social services in their community. However, the most interesting data is the one showing that people who have not been victims of crime and who display low levels of insecurity feel more satisfied with the infrastructure and social services in their community. The variables of gender, age, and size of locality of residence did not show any significant relationship.




Figure 6.11. Sociodemographic and Security Determinants of Satisfaction with Social Services in the Community, El Salvador 2014

These relationships can be seen more clearly in Figure 6.12. The people that have not been victims of crime show, on average, more satisfaction with public services than those who have been victims of crime. Along the same lines, the extent to which the Salvadorans surveyed feel more

⁵ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.

insecure, they tend to show less satisfaction in the quality of public services to which they have access in their community.




Figure 6.12. Satisfaction with Social Services by Relevant Variables, El Salvador 2014

In other words, these data indicate that satisfaction with the services that the State provides at the local level would be related to the levels of violence and insecurity that exist in that community. This relationship could be the result of various intervening conditions that have not been measured here, such as the quality of existing infrastructure and the presence of other informal authority figures in the community (such as organized crime bosses). The data also suggest that the citizens’ sense of security is also influenced by their satisfaction with local conditions.

IV. Violence Prevention Initiatives

To what extent are Salvadorans in favor of prevention efforts to reduce violence? In general, it is possible to posit that in the debate, two positions are presented in terms of public policies – one that favors raising the severity of the law as the main way of reducing violence and one that favors the modification of the social conditions that produce crime. It is also possible to conceive a combination of both types of policy. With the purpose of exploring Salvadorans’ opinions on this topic, the survey included the following question:

AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: Implement preventive measures or Increase punishment of criminals?
 (1) Implement preventive measures
 (2) Increase punishment of criminals
 (3) **[Don't read]** Both
 (88) DK
 (98) DA

The responses to the question indicate a divided opinion regarding the topic of how to confront violence. Almost 48% favor making criminals' punishments more severe while 43% support prevention measures (see Figure 6.13). A lower percentage reports favoring both measures.




Figure 6.13. Opinion Regarding the Best Way to Combat Crime, El Salvador 2014

In order to place these results within a regional context, Figure 6.14 shows the percentage of people that is in favor of prevention measures for each country. The data indicate that, in spite of the fact that less than half of Salvadorans are in favor of prevention to reduce criminal activity, El Salvador shows one of the highest percentages of support for prevention measures in comparison to other countries in the hemisphere – the same level as Uruguay and Nicaragua and above the rest of the countries in the northern part of Central America (Honduras at 30%, Guatemala at 23.8% and Belize at almost 14%). These results suggest that in El Salvador, citizens are more open to considering alternatives to the iron fist method in combatting crime than in most of Latin America.




Figure 6.14. Opinion in Favor of Violence Prevention Measures to Reduce Crime in a Comparative Perspective, El Salvador 2014

But then, who favors prevention methods? The survey allows us to identify the variables and characteristics associated with these opinions. Given that the dependent variable is divided among those who support prevention methods and those who do not, we proceeded to run a logistic regression (see Figure 6.15).⁶ In other words, the dependent variable is divided among those who exclusively support prevention methods as a way to confront crime and the rest of the population. According to the results from the logistic regression, which is shown in the figure below, men, older people, those that have a high level of education and people that live in small towns and in rural areas have a greater probability of supporting crime prevention methods than the rest of the population. The most interesting results are those than that show that support for prevention is higher among people with lower perceptions of insecurity and those that live in communities where the issues of violence are not so overwhelming. Expressed in another way, these data suggest that perceptions of insecurity lower

⁶ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.



people's level of support for prevention methods to confront violence and that, therefore, they lean more towards responses that imply raising the level of punishment for criminals. These relationships can be seen more clearly in Figure 6.16.




Figure 6.15. Determinants of the Opinions in Favor of Crime Prevention Measures, El Salvador 2014




Figure 6.16. Opinions in Favor of Crime Prevention by Variables, El Salvador 2014

On the other hand, what initiatives exist at the community level to confront criminal activity? To what extent do Salvadorans organize themselves or know of community organizations that confront issues of violence? Various questions were included in the survey to explore prevention measures against violence. Two questions focus on whether or not some prevention effort exists within the community and they are outlined below:

CP25. In the last three months, has the neighborhood association or the leadership of this neighborhood promoted violence prevention activities, such as taking security measures for the neighborhood or other activities?	Yes	No
CP26. Is there another association or institution that is promoting crime prevention programs in this neighborhood?	Yes	No

A mere 8.2% of all Salvadorans surveyed report that the leaders of the community or community organization promote prevention measures in their community of residence. This means that in the great majority of cases, preventative responses coming from the community or neighborhood do not exist to confront criminal activity. The percentage of prevention initiatives rises slightly – although it is not statistically significant – when we take into account the efforts of other organizations that contribute to prevention: in that case 10% of the people surveyed report that other organizations carry out prevention methods. If we combine these two responses to determine the percentage of respondents that report that some prevention initiative exists in their community, either from the community leaders or other organizations, 15.6% of Salvadorans identify that there is less than one prevention initiative in their community. The latter means that in spite of the fact that less than half of citizens support prevention methods, only 15 out of 100 citizens live in communities in which this type of response was being implemented by their own community.




Figure 6.17. Percentage of People Who Say there are Violence Prevention Initiatives in their Community, El Salvador 2014

The previous answers speak to the initiatives that exist at the neighborhood level or within the respondent’s community of residence, but there are also other programs that are administered by local governments. The AmericasBarometer Survey asked about the program called “Violence Prevention Committees” which was put into use as a strategy by the national government of El Salvador to reduce violence at the local level. Said committees aim to support local leadership and secure spaces by the participation of diverse actors with the purpose of reducing all forms of violence that affect the municipality. The questions that reference this program were formulated in the following manner:

ESCP27. Have you Heard of the Violence Prevention Committee or Council in this city?	Yes	No
ESCP28n. In the last three months, have you attended or had knowledge of a meeting assembled by the Violence Prevention Committee or Council in this city?	Yes	No

Nearly 20% of Salvadorans have heard of the Violence Prevention Committee’s (Comité de Prevención de la Violencia) program (see Figure 6.18). However, when we asked the respondent if he or she had attended or knew of someone who had attended a meeting of the Violence Prevention Committee, only 20% of those that know of the program report having attended. This means that 4% of the entire population surveyed has attended a meeting of the Violence Prevention Committee.




Figure 6.18. Knowledge of Violence Prevention Committee Program, El Salvador 2014

The results of this question for 2014 are not particularly different than those obtained in the previous round of the AmericasBarometer. In fact, in 2012, 19.9% of citizens reported having heard about the Violence Prevention Committee’s program. This means that the level of knowledge of Violence Prevention Committees has not changed over the course of the past two years.

When we analyze the data in order to identify what variables or characteristics are associated with the knowledge of Violence Prevention Committees, the results in general do not show statistically significant differences among different sociodemographic groups or in function of the community’s context.⁷ The only variable that showed a significant difference in terms of knowledge of the program is the age of the respondent: older people display more knowledge of Prevention Committees (see Figure 6.19). This means that as age rises (up to age 65), Salvadorans become more aware of the violence prevention program in their municipality. After 66 years of age, there is a notable decline in such knowledge. Said relationship can be explained by the fact that economically active adults pay more attention to what happens inside their community than do young people.

⁷ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.




Figure 6.19. Knowledge of Violence Prevention Committee Program by Age, El Salvador 2014

V. Opinions Regarding Police Performance

In order to gather opinions on police performance, we used a battery of questions. These questions allow us to have a very detailed idea of how the Salvadoran police are viewed and their relationship to other variables associated with public security. The first questions have to do with satisfaction with the police's performance and with the perception of their presence via their patrolling of the neighborhood. The questions were asked in the following way:

POLE2N. In general, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied**, or very **dissatisfied** with the performance of the police in your neighborhood?

[If respondent says there is no police, mark 4 "Very dissatisfied"]

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA

ICO2. How frequently do the national civil police patrol **here in your neighborhood**? Would you say:

- (1) Several times per day
- (2) At least once per day
- (3) A few times per week
- (4) A few times per month
- (5) Rarely
- (6) Never
- (88) DK (98) DA




Figure 6.20. Satisfaction with Police Performance in a Comparative Perspective El Salvador, 2014

According to the results, a little more than half of the population reports being satisfied (49.8%) or very satisfied (3.7%) with the job the police are doing, while the rest (46.5%) report being unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with police performance. In order to compare these results with the rest of the region, we proceeded to place the results on a scale of 0 to 100, where an average near 100 means greater satisfaction with police performance while a score with an average near 0 implies great dissatisfaction with police performance. Figure 6.20 reveals that the average citizen satisfaction in El Salvador towards the police is located nearly on the middle point of the scale – that is to say, at an average of 50.2. This means in comparative terms that perceptions of the Salvadoran police’s performance are located at intermediate levels in comparison with the region. In other words, Salvadorans are averagely satisfied with the work their police are doing in comparison with the rest of the countries in the American hemisphere.

On the other hand, 24.2% of the population report that the police patrol their community several times per day while 20.3% of the respondents report that the police patrol their community at



least one time per day and 21.3% report that the police patrol their community a few times per week (see Figure 6.21). The previous statements indicate that around 66% of the population reports that the police patrol their community at a certain frequency. The rest, one-third of the respondents say that the police make rounds in their community of residence in a more or less irregular manner.




Figure 6.21. Frequency at which Police Patrols Neighborhoods, El Salvador 2014 (percentages)

What are the determining factors in citizen satisfaction as it relates to police performance? With the aim of identifying these variables, we carried out a linear regression including not only the sociodemographic variables but also the variables associated with conditions of security within the community. Figure 6.22 shows the results of the regression.⁸ As we can see, age, education level, the size of place of residence, crime victimization, perceptions of insecurity, identification of problems within the community, perception that community leaders promote prevention, having been a victim of bribery by a police agent and the perception of police patrols are factors or conditions that are associated with satisfaction with the job the police are doing.

⁸ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.




Figure 6.22. Determinants of Satisfaction with Police Performance, El Salvador 2014

The relationship among some of these variables and satisfaction with police performance can be seen with greater clarity in Figure 6.23, which details the satisfaction averages in function of different conditions. In terms of the locality in which the respondent lives, the highest satisfaction levels with the job police are doing are found in the *pueblos* (small towns) and in rural areas; on the contrary, the lowest satisfaction levels are found in large cities and in the San Salvadoran Metropolitan Area. The variables of crime victimization and insecurity play a very important role in satisfaction with police performance. Citizens who have not been victims of crime show much more enthusiasm towards the police than people who have been victimized. In the same way, satisfaction with the police shrinks significantly as citizens feel more insecure within their neighborhood or community.

These data indicate the importance that crime has on the judgments that Salvadorans make on police performance. However, one factor that according to the data, influences those evaluations in a significant fashion is the frequency with which the police patrol the community. As we can see in the figure in question, satisfaction with police performance goes from an average of 60 points (on a 0-100 scale) among those who see police patrols daily to an average of nearly 30 points among those who never see police patrols. Expressed in other terms, the more the police patrol a given area, the more satisfaction citizens express with their job performance.




Figure 6.23. Satisfaction with the Job Police Are Doing by Variables, El Salvador 2014

An important part of the police force’s work is its relationship with citizens and the community. In this study, the AmericasBarometer included a battery of questions that gather data on the interaction and contact that the respondents report having had with the police. These interactions are: conversing with neighborhood residents, attending community meetings, participating in crime prevention, and getting to know young people. We can see the questions themselves below.

In the last 12 months, which one of the following activities have you seen the National Civil Police participate in within your community?	Yes	No
CPOL1. Conversing with residents of the neighborhood	1	2
CPOL2. Attending neighborhood meetings	1	2
CPOL3. Have you seen the National Civil Police helping to organize crime prevention programs in the neighborhood?	1	2
CPOL4. Interacting with children and teenagers in the neighborhood via school and recreational activities	1	2

Around one-third of respondents have seen police conversing with the residents of their community, another third have seen agents of the police getting to know young people and almost 32% of those people surveyed report that they have seen the police support crime prevention initiatives in their community (see Figure 6.24). Only in the case of participation in community meetings on the part of the police is the percentage significantly lower (15.4%). If we link all of these responses and we calculate the percentage of citizens that have witnessed local police participating in or interacting with the community, the data indicate that 56.6% of Salvadorans have seen an agent of the police interacting with the community within the last year.




Figure 6.24. People that have seen the Police Interacting with the Community, El Salvador 2014

What are the variables associated with the opinions about police interacting with the community? In order to have an idea of the characteristics of the people and the communities in which interaction with the police is most visible, we proceeded to create a scale variable based on the four previous questions. The positive responses were recoded as 100 while the negative were recoded as 0 and then we averaged the responses. A result near 100 means that the police interacts strongly with the respondent’s community of residence while a 0 means that the police is distant from what goes on within that community. The data obtained from the linear regression indicate that the variables of gender, size of the municipality, victimization, perception of insecurity, and the presence of violence prevention programs are related to police interaction with the community (see Figure 6.25).⁹

In the case of gender, women report more interaction with police in the community than men. This is to be expected given that, according to the studies that address community participation based on gender, women usually pay more attention to what happens within their communities than men. In the case of city size, the people that live in small towns and rural areas perceive more community interaction with the police. However, the data that are most interesting are those that show that the respondents perceive greater interaction with the police in places where there are violence prevention programs, whether they are municipal (Violence Prevention Committees) or from community itself.

⁹ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.




Figure 6.25. Determinants of Perceptions of Police Interacting with the Community, El Salvador 2014

The previous results can be seen more clearly in Figure 6.26. In the communities in which the community leaders promote prevention measures to combat crime, the score police interacting in their community is significantly greater (51.3) than in communities where no local violence prevention initiatives exist. Much in the same way, in those communities in which there is knowledge of a Municipal Violence Prevention Committee, noticing the presence of and interaction with the police is almost 15 points higher than among people who have not heard of the Prevention Councils or Committees.

These findings suggest that the presence of prevention programs usually stimulate interactions among the police and the community. The survey did not include questions on specific penalty-stiffening programs in order to be able to compare their effect on police intervention within the community, but these data indicate that prevention projects may serve as a very useful tool to bring the police closer to citizens in a constructive fashion.




Figure 6.26. Police Interaction with the Community by Violence Prevention Programs, El Salvador 2014 (averages)

However, police interaction with the community may also be determined by violence and insecurity levels. According to this line of thinking, it could be expected that the communities most affected by insecurity had higher levels of police presence and, therefore, interaction with the community. Thus, the community-police interaction variable was crossed with crime victimization and with perceptions of insecurity. The results shown in Figure 6.27 indicate that there is a relationship among these conditions but not in the direction one may expect. Rather, the data indicate that the people who have not been victims of violence and that do not feel insecure tend to interact more with the police.

Nevertheless, the best way of interpreting these results is to conceptualize the relationship the opposite way. That is to say, that levels of insecurity and violence could be, in part, the result of the level of police interaction within the community: the greater the presence and contact the police have with the community, the less crime victimization and insecurity occur. These results reinforce the argument on the benefits of police interaction with the community. Prevention programs initiated by the community or by the local government not only contribute to police involvement in community affairs (whether it be through participation in City Council meetings, support for prevention programs or through personal relationships with residents), but rather, according to the data shown here, it could also result in a significant drop in crime victimization and insecurity.




Figure 6.27. Crime Victimization and Perceptions of Insecurity by Interaction with the Police, El Salvador 2014

Finally, there is another dimension of police work which is important to highlight. Using the following question, we asked Salvadorans whether or not the police protect the citizens, or, on the contrary, are involved in crime;

AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community (town, village) protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think?

[Read options]

- (1) Police protect people from crime or
- (2) Police are involved in crime
- (3) [Don't Read] Neither, or both
- (88) DK (98) DA

According to the results, 40.3% of Salvadorans think that the police protect people from crime; 35.6% believe that, on the contrary, the police are involved in crime, and the rest of the population (24.1%) is divided, reporting that in reality, the police do both things: protect people from crime and also participate in it. This question has been included in the AmericasBarometer Surveys since 2004 and therefore it is possible to track its evolution in public opinion since then. Figure 6.28 shows the arc this question travels with regard to people reporting that the police protect the citizens. As we can see, the positive opinion towards the police has suffered a significant drop in recent years. However, in 2014, there was an important recovery of positive opinions towards the police in spite of the notion that police protection does not rise to the levels it did 10 years ago.




Figure 6.28. Opinions that the Police Protect Citizens by Year, El Salvador 2004-2014

Finally, in this section on police, we analyze a question that asked citizens about police response speed to emergency calls. With the purpose of making a comparison, this question was formulated in conjunction with a similar question about firefighters as outlined below:

INFRA1. Suppose someone enters your home to burglarize it and you call the police. How long do you think it would take the police to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? **[READ ALTERNATIVES]**

- (1) Less than 10 minutes
- (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes
- (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour
- (4) More than an hour and up to three hours
- (5) More than three hours
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** There are no police/they would never arrive
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

INFRA2. Suppose now that your house catches fire. How long do you think it would take the firefighters to arrive at your house on a typical day around noon? **[READ ALTERNATIVES]**

- (1) Less than 10 minutes
- (2) Between 10 and 30 minutes
- (3) More than 30 minutes and up to an hour
- (4) More than an hour and up to three hours
- (5) More than three hours
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** There are no firefighters/they would never arrive
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

According to the results, 10.5% of Salvadorans think that the police would arrive in less than 10 minutes. 31.7% say that the police would arrive within 10 to 30 minutes. 22.5% maintain that the police would arrive within 30 minutes and an hour and 16.6% say that the police will arrive within one to three hours. The remaining 18.7% of Salvadorans think that police would arrive more than three hours after the occurrence of a crime or that they would never arrive at all. This distribution of response time to an emergency is very similar to that of firefighters as we can see in Figure 6.29.



The aforementioned means, in the first place that Salvadorans in general think that the institutions that respond to emergency situations usually do so with late: in both cases, more than 55% of citizens think that they would respond with more than a 30-minute delay; in second place, the data suggest that Salvadorans do not see important differences in police and firefighter response times. In other words, in the citizens' opinion, the police are not particularly faster than the firefighters.

In the case of the police, when we cross the data on police response times with the data on the existence of violence prevention programs within the community, the results do not show statistically significant differences among those that have violence prevention programs and those that do not. In both contexts, the police are seen as having the same reaction times to emergencies.




Figure 6.29. Opinions on Police and Firefighter Emergency Response Times, El Salvador 2014

VI. The Use of the Military in Public Safety Tasks

A good portion of the debate on how to confront insecurity problems has been concentrated on whether or not it is necessary to use the Armed Forces to combat crime, especially organized crime and youth gangs. The 2014 AmericasBarometer included a question that explores Salvadorans' opinions on the participation of the military in public safety tasks. The question is outlined as follows:

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree." A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.
MIL7. The Armed Forces ought to participate in combating crime and violence in [country]. How much do you agree or disagree?

More than 85% of Salvadorans show having favorable opinions on the participation of the military in combatting crime. Only a minority - less than 7% - show that their opinion goes against the popular trend. What do these results mean in a regional context? Again, in order to compare the data, the scale of responses (from 1 to 7) was recoded into a 0-100 scale, where an average score of 100 represents the maximum level of favorable opinions. The results are presented in Figure 6.30 and reveal that El Salvador has the highest levels of approval for the use of the military in combatting crime in comparison to the rest of the countries in the region. Although military participation is seen in a predominantly positive light in almost all the Latin American nations and the Caribbean, the opinions of Salvadorans stand out above the rest.




Figure 6.30. Support for the Idea that the Armed Forces should Participate in Combatting Crime in a Comparative Perspective, 2014

Given the level of approval across the Salvadoran public opinion regarding the Armed Forces' participation in combatting crime, it makes little sense to perform an analysis of the variables that differentiate Salvadorans' responses because almost all of them demonstrate that they are in agreement with the use of soldiers in combatting insecurity. In fact, an analysis of the variables that can be associated with these opinions shows that the difference among some conditions and others are minimal due to the fact that the large part of citizens tend to favor military participation. Additionally,



a comparison among these opinions and identification with a political party (which is not shown here for reasons of space) reveals that there do not seem to be differences of opinion on this topic even among supporters of ARENA and the FMLN.

VII. Justification of the Use of Violence in the Domestic Environment

In this chapter, we also explore attitudes with respect to one of the most serious security problems. This problem, however, in general, usually goes unnoticed in the debate around insecurity: the problem of domestic violence. El Salvador is the country with the highest rate of murders of women worldwide and data from many organizations have noted elevated levels of violence against women (De los Reyes 2013). For example, during the period from January to December 2013, the National Civil Police recorded a total of 3,052 domestic violence complaints (ORMUSA 2014). This means that during that year, there were a little more than 8 domestic violence complaints per day in El Salvador.

The AmericasBarometer aimed to measure the attitudes that are behind domestic violence in El Salvador. In order to accomplish this, we included two questions in the questionnaire:

Now I am going to read some situations in which some people think that it is justified that the husband hits his wife/partner and I will ask your opinion.....	Would approve	Would not approve but understand	Would not approve or understand
DVW1. His wife neglects the household chores. Would you approve of the husband hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	1	2	3
DVW2. His wife is unfaithful. Would you approve of the husband hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	1	2	3

The results indicate that in both cases, less than 6% of those surveyed would approve of the husband hitting his wife (see Figure 6.31). However, in the case of infidelity, almost 37% of Salvadorans “would understand” the use of violence against the spouse in contrast to 23.5% in the case of neglecting household chores. While 74.4% of those surveyed would not approve of nor understand that the husband would hit his wife for neglecting household chores, a significantly lower percentage (57.9%) would not approve of nor understand the husband hitting his wife for being unfaithful.




Figure 6.31. Justification of the Use of Violence against the Spouse, El Salvador 2014

The results of these two questions were integrated into one sole indicator to identify the general characteristics of respondents that usually justify violence against the wife with more frequency. The scale is a result of averaging the responses to the questions about citizens' approval of the use of violence in which a score of 100 represents approval while a score of zero represents people that completely reject the use of violence. In other words, the higher the average, the more attitudinal inclination there is in favor of the use of violence against the domestic partner.

Using that scale as a dependent variable, we performed a linear regression in order to identify the sociodemographic variables associated with approval of domestic abuse. For reasons of space, we do not display the regression figure,¹⁰ but Figure 6.32 presents the results of crossing some of the variables that turned out to be statistically significant. As we can see, among people with lower levels of education and among those who live in geographic areas further away from the capital, we usually find more justification for the use of spousal violence (the results also showed that men and those who live in rural areas are the ones who are more likely to justify the use of violence).

Although we cannot generalize these results, it is clear that low levels of schooling play an important role in the attitudinal systems that are behind spousal violence. On the other hand, the data did not show any relationship between these attitudes and the presence of violence prevention programs at the community level.

¹⁰ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.




Figure 6.32. Justification of the Use of Violence against the Spouse by Education Level and Area of the Country, El Salvador 2014

In any event, these results make clear the necessity to dig deeper into the study of attitudes and norms that are behind violence against women and in the household.

VIII. Corollary

Before concluding this section, it is important to review the main indicators of insecurity. We have already presented the regional results regarding the indicators of insecurity in the first chapter of this report and it is shown that El Salvador is one of the countries in which people are most concerned with the problem of crime. With regard to the concrete theme of crime victimization, the results reveal that El Salvador is counted among the countries with medium-high levels of crime victimization.

However, how has crime victimization varied in El Salvador in recent years? In 2010, the AmericasBarometer modification the questions measuring crime victimization and the new formulation came out the following way:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 6.33 presents the information for the question VIC1EXT. As we can see, it drops from a rate of 24.2% in 2010 to a rate of 17.4% in 2012 and rises slightly to 18.6% in 2014 although this

increment is not statistically significant. Therefore, crime victimization has not significantly changed between 2012 and 2014.




Figure 6.33. Crime Victimization, El Salvador 2010-2014

In order to better understand the factors associated with the prevalence of crime victimization, we performed a logistic regression analysis with some of the most important variables associated with victimization. Figure 6.34 presents the results of the regression and indicates that the variables of age, level of education, wealth quintiles, and size of place of residence are associated with the probability of being a victim of crime. In concrete terms, these findings suggest that the youngest people, people with higher levels of education and those that have more wealth in their household report being victims of crime more frequently than the rest of the population.

However, the most interesting findings are those that show that the police play a fundamental role in the chances that people may be victims of crime. In concrete terms, people living in communities in which the police interact with community members are less likely to report being victims of crime than the rest of the population; while the people that have been victims of bribery by the police usually are also victims of crime. These results seem to confirm the importance of police performance as noted in Section VI.




Figure 6.34. Determinants of Crime Victimization, El Salvador 2014

IX. Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented the results from the AmericasBarometer that are related to problems of violence and insecurity at the local level. They indicate that the major portion of security concerns are related to young people associated with gangs and that for the most part, they are concentrated in the urban areas of the country. The majority of Salvadorans see the youth and their recruitment into gangs as some of the most serious problems within their community of residence. In fact, the presence of gangs in the community seems to be closely related to serious crimes like blackmail and murder. The data also indicate that, although levels of citizen insecurity remain elevated, the great majority of people have the impression that their neighborhood is less insecure than other neighborhoods and that insecurity in general has not risen significantly with respect to previous years.

Some of the most relevant results in this chapter have to do with the existence of violence prevention programs at the local level. Salvadorans are practically divided down the middle when it comes to deciding the best way to confront violence. A little more than half say that they should toughen up the penalties while the rest prefer violence prevention alternatives. However, within a regional context, Salvadorans favor the use of prevention measures to combat criminal behavior much more than citizens of other countries. Nevertheless, the Salvadorans surveyed have very little knowledge of prevention programs that have come out of their own community or neighborhood. The Municipal Violence Prevention Committee (Comité de Prevención Municipal de la Violencia), probably the most popular, is known by one in every five respondents.

In any event, the survey data show that relationship to the police plays an important role in levels of insecurity, but especially in relation to violence prevention programs. These seem to stimulate citizen interaction with the police and this interaction seems to have positive effects on the reduction of

insecurity and crime victimization. The results also show that the police play an important role in whether or not crime victimization occurs. It usually occurs with greater frequency among people that have been victims of police bribery and less among people that live in communities where the police interact with the people.

The data also show a majority approval by Salvadorans regarding the participation of the Armed Forces in combatting crime. This level of support is so elevated that it appears to cross all demographic, social, and political lines.

Finally, the survey reveals that in spite of the fact that the majority of Salvadorans reject attitudes of justification of domestic abuse, there are a number of them that still justify violence against women. This number increases in rural areas and among people that have lower education levels.



Appendix

Appendix 6.1. Determinants of insecurity perceptions, El Salvador 2014 (Figure 6.9)

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Gender	0.053	(1.93)
Age	0.008	(0.25)
Education Level	-0.076*	(-2.35)
Wealth Quintiles	0.030	(1.00)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.036	(-1.26)
Crime Victimization	0.051	(1.61)
Gang Presence in Neighborhood	0.062*	(2.16)
Robberies	0.107*	(3.91)
Sale of Drugs	0.005	(0.14)
Blackmail	0.144*	(4.51)
Murder	0.044	(1.58)
Police asked for a Bribe	-0.008	(-0.31)
Police Involved in Crime	0.169*	(7.05)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	15.83	
Number of cases	1160	
R-squared	0.12	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.2. Sociodemographic and Security Determinants of satisfaction with social services in the community, El Salvador 2014 (Figure 6.11)

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Age	-0.045	(-1.68)
Female	-0.003	(-0.11)
Education Level	-0.078*	(-2.33)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.063*	(-2.17)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.044	(-1.51)
Crime Victimization	-0.059*	(-2.26)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.178*	(-5.85)
Constant	-0.000	(-0.00)
F	9.06	
Number of cases	1,498	
R-squared	0.05	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.3. Determinants of the opinions favoring prevention measures, El Salvador 2014 (Figure 6.15)

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Age	0.288*	(4.37)
Female	-0.154*	(-3.19)
Education Level	0.378*	(5.58)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.066	(-1.07)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.172*	(-2.63)
Crime Victimization	0.001	(0.02)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.260*	(-4.09)
Problems of Insecurity	-0.150*	(-2.44)
Constant	0.097	(1.65)
F	12.06	
Number of cases	1,481	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.4. Determinants of knowledge of Prevention Committees

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Age	0.191*	(2.54)
Female	-0.021	(-0.33)
Education Level	0.154	(1.64)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.044	(-0.59)
Size of Place of Residence	0.065	(0.93)
Crime Victimization	0.084	(1.34)
Perception of Insecurity	0.081	(1.11)
Problems of Insecurity	0.137*	(2.28)
Constant	-1.432*	(-20.10)
F	1.88	
Number of cases	1,498	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		



Appendix 6.5. Determinants of satisfaction with police performance, El Salvador 2014 (Figure 6.22)

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Age	0.047*	(2.07)
Female	0.020	(0.86)
Education Level	-0.107*	(-3.94)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.004	(-0.19)
Size of Place of Residence	0.081*	(2.93)
Crime Victimization	-0.077*	(-3.55)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.201*	(-8.96)
Problems of Insecurity	-0.089*	(-4.40)
Leadership Promotes Violence Prevention	0.059*	(2.87)
Police asked for a Bribe	-0.094*	(-3.13)
Frequency of Patrols	0.346*	(15.57)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	53.85	
Number of cases	1,485	
R-squared	0.28	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.6. Determinants of the perception of police interacting with the community, El Salvador 2014 (Figure 6.25)

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Gender	0.047*	(2.09)
Age	0.026	(1.06)
Education Level	-0.036	(-1.47)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.005	(-0.19)
Size of Place of Residence	0.165*	(4.32)
Crime Victimization	-0.045*	(-2.04)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.121*	(-4.88)
Leadership Promotes Violence Prevention	0.194*	(6.86)
Knowledge of Violence Prevention Committee	0.174*	(6.98)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	22.92	
Number of cases	1,498	
R-squared	0.14	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.7. Determinants of justifying the use of violence against the spouse, El Salvador 2014

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Gender	-0.055*	(-2.21)
Age	-0.022	(-0.82)
Education Level	-0.155*	(-5.40)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.015	(-0.61)
Size of Place of Residence	0.066*	(2.33)
Leadership Promotes Violence Prevention	-0.018	(-0.92)
Knowledge of Violence Prevention Committee	0.044	(1.60)
Constant	0.000	(0.00)
F	8.32	
Number of cases	1,499	
R-squared	0.04	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 6.8. Determinants of Crime Victimization, El Salvador 2014 (Figure 6.34)

	Standardized coefficients	(t)
Gender	-0.080	(-1.09)
Age	-0.195*	(-3.02)
Education Level	0.251*	(2.97)
Wealth Quintiles	0.170*	(2.29)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.184*	(-2.75)
Problems of Insecurity	0.382*	(5.91)
Leadership Promotes Violence Prevention	0.051	(0.80)
Knowledge of Violence Prevention Committee	0.123	(1.92)
Police asked for a Bribe	0.226*	(3.44)
Police has Relationship with the Community	-0.185*	(-2.41)
Constant	-1.679*	(-23.16)
F	10.88	
Number of cases	1498	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		



Chapter 7. Electoral Behavior and Political Parties

Ricardo Córdova Macías

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we explore electoral behavior and certain aspects of Salvadoran political participation. In the first place, we analyze electoral behavior in the first and second rounds of the recent 2014 presidential elections, focusing on the determinants of the vote; and exploring opinions regarding presidential elections. Later, the analysis focuses on a comparison between the voter's intention in the 2014 elections and in the 2012 legislative elections. Towards the end of the chapter, we will present the opinions regarding political parties. Furthermore, we will analyze Salvadorans' political leanings in order to later focus on interest in politics. Among the most important results in this chapter are the main determinant factors in voters' intentions in the last round of the presidential election: age, education level, efficacy of the vote, and whether or not an individual identifies with a political party. Later on, we will analyze the respondents' opinions regarding reasons not to vote, finding that for respondents, the main reason why they did not vote were solely political. In terms of ideological orientation, Salvadorans are divided into three groups: 33.3% are on the left of the scale, 36.7% are in the center and 29.9% are on the right. Finally, we find a decrease in interest in politics among Salvadorans.

II. Determinants of the Vote in the First Round of Presidential Elections - 2014

Various elements assist in analyzing the electoral process that played out in 2014. In the first place, after 20 years of governance by the Nationalist Republican Alliance Party (*Alianza Republicana Nacionalista* –ARENA-), in the presidential elections of 2009, a change occurred in the Executive Branch with a reduced margin of victory by the candidate Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional –FMLN-): 51.3% versus 48.7% from ARENA (Córdova, Loya, y Nevitte 2009). As was put forth in the corresponding 2012 report (Córdova, Cruz, y Seligson 2013), the victory of Mauricio Funes and the FMLN in the presidential elections closes an electoral cycle that was begun with the general elections in 1994, the first one since the signing of the Peace Agreements (*Acuerdos de Paz*).¹

On the second of February, 2014, presidential elections were held with the participation of five candidates for the Presidency of the Republic that obtained the following results: Salvador Sánchez Cerén, from the FMLN party – 48.93%; Norman Quijano from the ARENA party – 38.96%; Elías Antonio Saca, from the UNIDAD² Coalition – 11.44%; René Rodríguez Hurtado, from the Salvadoran Progressive Party (*Partido Salvadoreño Progresista* or PSP) - 0.42%; and Óscar Lemus, from the Salvadoran Patriot Brotherhood (*Fraternidad Patriota Salvadoreña* or FPS) - 0.25%.

¹ For an analysis on the demand and management of change in the new political cycle, see: UNDP (2011).

² This alliance was formed by the following parties: Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (GANU), Partido de Conciliación Nacional (PCN) and Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC).

Due to the fact that none of the candidates obtained the majority required by law, the Electoral Supreme Court (TSE) called for a second round on March 9, 2014. In the second round, the FMLN obtained 50.11% and ARENA 48.89%, meaning that the candidate from the left side of the aisle won by a narrow margin: 0.22%. Nevertheless, appeals for annulment of the elections and recount of votes by the ARENA party were declared inadmissible by the TSE; and the appeal presented to the Supreme Court of Justice was declared inadmissible. Therefore, on the 24th of March, the TSE put forth Decree 4: “The definitive recount is hereby declared firm as is the declaratory of the second election of the President and Vice President of the Republic of El Salvador, carried out on the ninth of March of the current year.” (TSE, 2014).

We present the information on the rate of electoral participation³ for the presidential elections carried out in the period from 1999 to 2014 in Table 7.1. In 1999, there was a low rate of electoral participation with 37.28%; for the 2004 elections, there is a significant increase, reaching 66.16%, then dropping slightly to 62.43% in 2009, and then it falls to 54.27% in the first round in 2014, and contrary to what had occurred in the electoral processes for the second time in the recent history of the country (1984 and 1994), electoral participation rose during the second round in March 2014, reaching 60.25%.

Table 7.1. Voter participation rate in the presidential elections - 1999 to 2014

	1999	2004	2009	2014	
				1st Round	2nd Round
Total number of people on electoral rolls	3,171,224	3,442,330	4,226,479	4,955,107	4,955,107
Total number of valid votes	1,182,248	2,277,473	2,638,588	2,688,936	2,985,266
Rate of voter participation (%)	37.28	66.16	62.43	54.27	60.25

Source: Author’s estimates based on data from TSE (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014).

At the level of the presidential elections, we can observe a party system dominated by the two main political powers (FMLN and ARENA), although in the first round, there is a third political force, the UNIDAD coalition, with an important positioning capturing 11.44% of the votes. It is a rather competitive party system, due to the fact that the last two presidential elections have been defined by a narrow margin of victory: 2.64% in 2009 and 0.22% in 2014. In the polarized elections of 2009, and in the second round in 2014, the electorate appears to be practically divided down the middle.

In the following pages, we analyze electoral behavior with regard to the 2014 presidential elections. According to the results from the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, 74.5% of respondents show having voted in the first round of the presidential elections, which is higher than the population effectively demonstrated at the ballot (54.27%). In various studies on electoral behavior, it has been found that after an electoral cycle, there is a tendency among the people surveyed to over-report their voting intention (Seligson, Smith, and Zechmeister 2013, 79; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2012:10, Córdova and Cruz, 2009, 149).

Due to our the fact that our dependent variable is dichotomous (whether or not they voted in the first round of the presidential election in February 2014), we have used a logistical regression to examine the determinant factors of the reported vote. In Figure 7.1, we present the results of the

³ Calculated over the total of valid votes cast and the number of people recorded in the electoral registry (electoral roll).



logistical regression with the predictors of the voting intention when each one of the other variables stays the same.⁴ Basically, there are four statistically significant predictors: age, efficacy of the vote, education level, and whether or not an individual identifies with a political party.




Figure 7.1. Predictors of voter participation in the first round, El Salvador 2014

Of these four variables, two correspond to purely political factors (efficacy of the vote⁵ and identification with a party⁶), and two factors of socio-demographic characteristics (education level and age). In Figure 7.2, we can observe these bivariate relationships. Those that identify with a political party exhibit a greater reported vote than those that do not; along the same lines, those that think their vote is effective have a greater vote reported. On the other hand, vote intention is greater for those who have superior levels of education than those who have only primary and secondary levels of education and this difference is statistically significant. Finally, the 18-25 age group shows the lowest reporting of their vote and this rises until the age of 46-55 to later drop for the 56-65 age group to later rise slightly for the 66+ age group.

⁴ See the table with the corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.

⁵ Question: “VB49: Do you think that the vote can change the way things will be in the future or do you believe that it does not matter how you vote, things will not get better? (1) The vote can change things (2) It does not matter how I vote (88) DK (98) NA”

⁶ Question: “VB10. At this moment, do you identify with a political party? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (NA)”




Figure 7.2. Participation in the first round of the presidential elections, by relevant variables, El Salvador 2014

III. Opinions on the 2014 Presidential Elections

In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included various questions on exploring the reasons why respondents did not vote. Thus, we included a question directed to only those who reported not having voted in the first round (February):

VB4NEW. [ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DIDN'T VOTE. DON'T READ ALTERNATIVES]
[If respondent says "I didn't vote because I didn't want", ask why did not he/she want]
 Why did you not vote in the last presidential election? **[Only allow one response]**

- (1) Was confused
- (2) Didn't like any of the candidates, didn't like the campaign
- (3) Do not believe in elections/electoral authorities
- (4) Do not believe in democracy
- (5) Bureaucratic matters (voter registry)
- (6) Age-related matters (too young, too old)
- (7) Not in the district/away from home
- (8) Not interested in politics
- (77) Another reason
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) INAP (voted)



The results are presented in Table 7.2. The main reason is that they are not interested in politics (12.6%), followed by that they do not like the candidates or the campaign (9.3%), bureaucratic issues (registering, electoral roll) (8.8%), they were not in the district or was travelling (8.2%), and they do not believe in elections or the electoral authorities (7.1%).

Table 7.2. Reasons for which People did not Vote in the First Round of the Presidential Elections, El Salvador 2014

Reason for not Voting	Frequency	%
I was confused.	16	4.4
I did not like the candidates or the campaign.	34	9.3
I do not believe in elections or in the electoral authority.	26	7.1
I do not believe in democracy.	17	4.7
Bureaucratic issues (registering or with the electoral roll).	32	8.8
Issues with age (very young / very old).	4	1.1
I was not in the district / I was travelling.	30	8.2
I am not interested in politics.	46	12.6
Other reasons.	159	43.7
Total	364	100.0

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

With respect to the second round of voting, we included two questions, one purposed for measuring the reasons for which the respondent did not vote, the results of which are presented in Table 7.3:

<p>[ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DIDN'T VOTE] ELSVB100a. Why didn't you vote in the second round of the last presidential elections in March of 2014? (March 9, 2014) [Only allow one response]</p> <p>(01) Lack of transportation (02) Illness (03) Lack of interest (04) I did not like any of the candidates (05) I do not believe in the system (06) Lack of DUI (<i>documento único de identidad</i>) (07) I did not appear on the electoral rolls (08) I was not of voting age (09) I arrived late and the polls were closed (10) I had to work / Lack of time (11) Physical incapacitation or handicap (12) Fear of electoral violence (13) Lack of trust in the parties (14) Expired DUI card (77) Other reasons (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP</p>
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Taking into consideration the high rate of electoral participation in the second round, respondents' opinions are interesting. Insofar as the reasons for which they did not vote, they can be classified into three types: personal, technical, and political problems (Códorva and Loya 2009b).

With regard to the reasons for which the respondents did not vote, there is a relatively even distribution among the three groups of reasons: in first place, political reasons (32.2%): lack of interest (13.1%), they did not like any of the candidates (10%), they do not believe in the system (7%), lack of trust in the parties (1.5%), and for fear of electoral violence (0.6%); in second place, the technical reasons (28.5%): lack of a DUI (*documento único de identidad* or unique identification card) (16.1%), they were not on the electoral roll (8.8%), their DUI was expired (1.8%), and lack of transportation (1.8%); in the third position, personal reasons (22.5%): illness (13.1%), having to work or lack of time (8.5%), arrived late to vote and polls were closed (0.6%), and physical incapacitation or disability (0.3%). Other reasons make up 16.7%.

Table 7.3. Reasons for which people did not vote in the second round of the presidential elections, El Salvador 2014

Reasons	Frequency	%
Lack of transportation	6	1.8
Illness	43	13.1
Lack of interest	43	13.1
Did not like either candidate	33	10.0
Does not believe in the system	23	7.0
Lack of DUI (<i>documento único de identidad</i>)	53	16.1
Was not found on the electoral rolls	29	8.8
Arrived late and the polls were closed	2	0.6
Had to work / lack of time	28	8.5
Physical incapacitation or handicap	1	0.3
For fear of electoral violence	2	0.6
Lack of trust in the parties	5	1.5
DUI expired	6	1.8
Other reasons	55	16.7
Total	329	100,0

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

7.4: The other question explore why others did not vote, the results of which are presented in Table



ELSVB100b. As you know, a large number of people did not vote in the second round of the past presidential elections in March of 2014 (March 9). Which of the follow reasons explains why people did not vote?

- (01) Lack of transportation
- (02) Illness
- (03) Lack of interest
- (04) I did not like any of the candidates
- (05) I do not believe in the system
- (06) Lack of DUI (*documento único de identidad*)
- (07) I did not appear on the electoral rolls
- (08) I was not of voting age
- (09) I arrived late and the polls were closed
- (10) I had to work / Lack of time
- (11) Physical incapacitation or handicap
- (12) Fear of electoral violence
- (13) Lack of trust in the parties
- (14) Expired DUI card
- (77) Other reasons
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

However, upon questioning the motives for which the others did not vote, political reasons strongly predominate (84.4%): lack of interest (32.6%), they did not like any candidate (17.9%), they do not believe in the system (15.8%), fear of electoral violence (9.1%), and lack of trust in the parties (9%); followed in distant second place by technical reasons (10.7%): lack of DUI (*documento único de identidad* or unique identification card) (7.4%), expired DUI (1.5%), they were not found on the electoral roll (1.1%), and lack of transportation (0.7%); and in a very reduced third place, personal reasons (4%): illness (1.9%), having to work or lack of time (1.4%), they arrived late and the polls were closed (0.4%), and physical incapacitation or disability (0.1%), not being of the required age (0.2%). Other reasons make up 1%.

Table 7.4. Reason for which others did not vote in the second round of presidential elections, El Salvador 2014

Reasons	Frecuencia	%
Lack of transportation	10	0.7
Illness	27	1.9
Lack of interest	469	32.6
Did not like any candidate	257	17.9
Does not believe in the system	227	15.8
Lack of DUI (<i>documento único de identidad</i>)	107	7.4
Was not found on the electoral rolls	16	1.1
Not of legal age	3	0.2
Arrived late and polls were closed	5	0.4
Had to work / lack of time	20	1.4
Physical incapacitation / handicap	1	0.1
For fear of electoral violence	131	9.1
Lack of trust in the parties	129	9.0
DUI expired	21	1.5
Other reasons	15	1.0
Total	1.438	100

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

We included in the survey a question purposed for measuring the sources of information used to decide for whom to vote:

Now I am going to read a series of information sources that people use to make a decision regarding for whom to vote. Please tell me if you use each one of these sources to decide who to vote for:				
	Yes	No	DK	DA
ELSVB55A. Radio Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
ELSVB55B. Television Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
ELSVB55C. Newspapers Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
ELSVB55D. Internet Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
ELSVB55E. Facebook Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
ELSVB55F. Twitter Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
ELSVB55G. Friends or relatives Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
ELSVB55H. Flyers, billboards, and meetings Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)



ELSVB55I. Forums with the candidates Do you use this source of information in order to make a decision regarding for whom to vote?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)
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The results are presented in Figure 7.3. In order of importance, the respondents mention television in first place (42.8%); radio in second place (27.6%), friends and relatives (26%), the newspapers (25%), and a third group, the forums (22.1%), and the Internet (19%); in the fourth group flyers/billboards/candidate meetings (14.6%) and Facebook (13.8%); and on the lowest level, Twitter appears at (5.9%).




Figure 7.3 Sources of information used in deciding for whom to vote, El Salvador 2014.

Another question in the AmericasBarometer explores political clientelism, the outline of which is as follows:

CLIEN1na And thinking about the last presidential elections of 2009, did someone offer you something, like a favor, gift or any other benefit in return for your vote or support?
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

In Figure 7.4, we can observe that only 4% shows that in the past presidential election a favor/gift/benefit has been offered in exchange for their vote:




Figure 7.4. Political Clientelism, El Salvador 2014

Recapitulating, upon inquiring into the reasons for which respondents did not vote in the past elections, there is a rather even distribution among the three groups of reasons: in first place, the political reasons (32.2%), in second place, the technical reasons (28.5%), and in third place, the personal reasons (33.5%). However, upon inquiring into the motives for which “others” did not vote, the political reasons strongly predominate (84.4%), followed in distant second place by technical reasons (10.7%) and in a very reduced third place, personal reasons (4%). In this sense, in the reasons expressed by “others”, we can see a dominance of reasons of a political nature (lack of interest, they did not like any of the candidates, they do not believe in the system, fear of electoral violence and lack of confidence in the parties), that constitute a challenge for raising levels of electoral participation.

IV. Comparison of Voting Intention in the 2014 Presidential Elections and in the 2012 Legislative Elections

Base on 2014 round data it is possible to analyze the voting reported in the first and second round of the 2014 presidential election. That is to say, to explore the consistency of the vote for the same party in the two electoral rounds (see Table 7.5). Of those that voted for the ARENA candidate in the first round, 94.7% maintained their voting intention for the same party for the second round; while those who voted for the FMLN, 97.1% maintained their voting intention. That is to say, the two main political powers maintained a very high percentage of their voters in the two electoral rounds. While of those who voted for GANA in the first round, 45.45% voted for ARENA, 48.48% for FMLN and 6.06% left the ballot blank in the second round. However, this data should be regarded with caution given the small number of cases in the survey that reported having voted for GANA.

Table 7.5. Vote reported in the first and second rounds of the presidential elections, El Salvador 2014 (percentage)

First Presidential Round	Second presidential round			
	Left the ballot blank	Norman Quijano, ARENA	Salvador Sánchez Cerén, FMLN	Total
Nobody	66.7	25.0	8.3	100.0
Norman Quijano, ARENA	0.0	94.7	5.3	100.0
Salvador Sánchez Cerén, FMLN	0.0	2.9	97.1	100.0
Antonio Saca, Unidad	6.1	45.5	48.5	100.0
Total	1.4	35.7	62.9	100.0

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

It is also possible to analyze voter intention in the 2014 presidential elections and the legislative 2012 elections with the data. That is to say to explore the voter consistency with respect to voting for the same party in the last electoral cycle. Of those who voted for the ARENA party in the 2012 legislative elections, 86.24% maintained their voting intention for the candidate of the same party in the second round of 2014; while of those who voted for FMLN in the 2012 legislative elections, 96.69% maintained their voter intention for the second round of the 2014 presidential elections. Of those that did not vote in the legislative elections of 2012, 47.4% voted for FMLN in the 2014 presidential elections, 36.3% for ARENA and 10.37% for GANA. We made no comment on the other options due to the fact that there are very few cases in the 2014 survey.

Table 7.6. For which party voted in the March 2012 congressional elections and in the 2014 presidential elections (percentage)

2012 Legislative Elections	First Round of 2014 Presidential Elections					
	None	Another	Norman Quijano, ARENA	Salvador Sánchez Cerén, FMLN	Antonio Saca, UNIDAD	Total
ARENA	0.5	0.0	86.2	9.6	3.7	100.0
FMLN	0.9	0.0	1.8	96.7	0.6	100.0
PCN/CN	0.0	0.0	15.8	52.6	31.6	100.0
Partido de la Esperanza	0.0	0.0	14.3	85.7	0.0	100.0
CD	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
GANA	0.0	0.0	13.6	54.6	31.8	100.0
Null vote / blank	60.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Did not vote	5.2	0.7	36.3	47.4	10.4	100.0
Was not of legal voting age	4.8	0.0	28.6	61.9	4.8	100.0
Other	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	100.0
Total	2.1	0.1	33.8	59.0	5.0	100.0

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

V. Opinions of Political Parties

In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included four questions to inquire into citizens’ opinions about the political parties. In the first question, we explore whether or not citizens identify with one political party. We asked:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

From the perspective of time, the results indicate that there was a statistically significant rise between 2006 and 2008 in identification with one political party, but later there was a drop in 2010 and 2012, almost to the same level of 2006. In the 2014 measurements, we see an important rise, which is statistically significant. It is possible that this is related to the interest generated around the 2014 presidential elections. In accordance with the last measurement, around 44.7% of people surveyed in El Salvador actuality identify with some political party (see Figure 7.5). Regardless of the rise, these results stand in contrast to the elevated level of responses on voter turnout that we see in a previous section and suggest that in reality, 4 out of every 10 Salvadorans identify with a political party.




Figure 7.5. Identification with a political party, El Salvador 2006-2014

How do these levels of identification with political parties compare with those in the region? Figure 7.6 displays the averages of identification with political parties in a comparative perspective for countries in the region. The countries with the highest level of identification are Costa Rica, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic followed by Nicaragua, Panama, Ecuador, El Salvador and Venezuela in a second group.




Figure 7.6. Percentage of people who identify with a political party in the Americas, 2014

A second dimension explored in the survey is the party with which one identifies. We inquired into which political party is the one with which respondents identified: 65.42% with FMLN, 32.79% with ARENA, 0.65% with GANA, 0.82% with PCN/CN, 0.16% with PDC/Partido de la Esperanza and 0.16% with some other party. It is possible that this question at the time of the survey fieldwork was impacted by the results of the recent electoral cycle. If it is possible to observe that the level of identification is stronger for identifiers of FMLN, followed by ARENA, the data for other parties should be taken with caution due to the reduced number of cases presented.

Finally, in this section we report responses to the question that was included in the AmericasBarometer since the 2004 measurement on trust in political parties:

B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

In order to simplify the analysis, the original question has been recoded into a 0-100 scale. According to Figure 7.7, taking the 2004 (39.9) measurement as a reference, there is a reduction in trust for 2006 (35.1) and 2008 (35.6) which later rises in 2010 (39.1). In 2012, there is a drop in the lowest level in the analysis period (34.4) and for 2014 there is a rise (36.7). This small rise for 2014 with respect to 2012 is statistically significant. The political parties, as a key institution for the political system, receive the lowest institutional trust levels for the 2004-2014 period (Córdova 2012). One hypothesis that could be put forward is that the presidential elections (2004, 2009, and 2014) contributed to the rise, although moderately, of the low levels of trust in political parties.




Figure 7.7. Trust in political parties, El Salvador 2004-2014

How do we compare levels of trust in Salvadoran political parties with those of the region? Figure 7.8 shows the trust averages in political parties from a comparative perspective for countries in the region. Countries with the highest levels of trust in their parties are Uruguay and Canada followed in second group by Guyana, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.




Figure 7.8. Averages of trust in political parties in the Americas, 2014

A third dimension we explored has to do with the relationship parties have with the citizenry. We included two questions:

EPP1. Thinking of the political parties in general, to what extent do the Salvadoran political parties represent their voters well?

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

The questions were formulated in order to examine respondents' opinions on a scale of 1-7 and in order to simplify their interpretation, they were recoded to a 0-100 format. The results are presented in Figure 7.9. On average, the respondents assign a score of 48.2 to the idea that the parties represent their voters well. While the respondents grant an average of 37.6 points on the 0-100 scale regarding the affirmation that the parties listen to their voters. This last data coincides with the levels of trust in political parties.




Figure 7.9. Opinions on political parties, El Salvador 2014

VI. Political Orientations

In this section, we analyze the Salvadorans’ political preferences. This has two dimensions. One the one hand, we find the topic of partisan preferences – that is – for which party citizens voted, which has been analyzed in a previous section. On the other hand, we find ideological orientation – that is to say – on which side of the left-to-right political spectrum respondents are located, for which the following question has been utilized to elicit ideological self-placement.

L1. Now, to change the subject... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK	DA
										88	98
Left										Right	

In Figure 7.10, we show the distribution of Salvadorans according to the ideological scale from the 2014 measurement. 33.3% of Salvadorans position themselves on the left of the ideological scale (between points 1 and 4); 36.7% locate themselves on the center of the scale (points 5 and 6) and 29.9% towards the right (between points 7 and 10). Upon comparing this with the 2012 study, we observe a rise of 7.43 points on the left (25.87%), a rise of 3.24 points in the center (33.46%) and a drop of 10.77 points on the right (40.67%).




Figure 7.10. Salvadoran ideological orientation, 2014

How is it possible to compare Salvadorans' ideological orientation in 2014 to that of previous measurements? The answer is found in Figure 7.11 wherein it is possible to observe that Salvadorans would have initially moved from a predominantly rightist orientation (6.9 in 2004) to one more of the center (5.7 in 2006, 5.3 in 2008 and 5.2 in 2010), reaching the most centrist point in 2010, probably as a product of voter preferences for the leftist party candidate in 2009, that brought to the change in the Presidency of the Republic. Three years after the change in administration, in the 2012 measurement we observe movement towards the right (6.0). In the 2014 measurement, within the context of past presidential elections, we observe movement returning to the most centrist point (5.2).




Figure 7.11. Salvadoran average ideological orientation, 2004-2014

How are these ideological orientations related to voter preferences in the 2014 presidential elections? In accordance with the data from the AmericasBarometer, they relate in a very clear manner in terms of ideological position. We used the vote reported during the second round, given that it gathered a higher level of political polarization in past elections. In the following figure, we show the average of the ideological scale with a vertical line (5.09) and, in the same, we observe the average of ideology for each one of the parties voted for. The FMLN voters in the second round of 2014 are located on the left of the political spectrum (3.65); whereas the ARENA party voters are located on the right of the scale (7.54).




Figure 7.12. Voter ideological self-identification and electoral preferences in the second round of presidential elections, El Salvador 2014

In a study on the March 2009 presidential elections, the following was reported of the voter distribution for the contending parties across the self-locating ideological spectrum: “each one of the two parties has its main base of voters on one pole: the left is in favor of FMLN and the right for ARENA, but they both managed to attract voter identification from those who define themselves ideologically in centrist positions” (Córdova and Loya 2009, 133). Within this context, it is possible to argue that the dispute among the two main contending political powers in the past presidential election was about winning the centrist vote.

Within the context of the past 2014 presidential election, in order to better understand the positioning of the three main political powers in the first round, in Figure 7.13 we present the distribution of political party preference for the first round in the ideological self- placement scale. The FMLN has a strong position on the left, but with an important group of voters in the center; while ARENA has its main positioning right, but also an important segment of voters in the center. The UNIDAD coalition has its main positioning around the center, and then a small segment of voters to the right. It is interesting to see that in the last presidential election, the dispute of the three political powers focuses on the political center (values 5 and 6). In the case of those who expressed no party affiliation (annulled the vote), although they are few cases, they are distributed between the center and right




Table 7.13. Ideological percentage scale by voter intention in the 2014 presidential elections.

VII. Interest in Politics

In the AmericasBarometer, interest in politics was measured by the following question:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA

The results reveal that the majority of Salvadorans are not interested in politics. In fact, 68.7% say they have little or no interest in politics and only 14.6% expressed a high interest (Figure 7.14).




Figure 7.14. Interest in politics, El Salvador 2014

To compare this level of interest in politics with previous years, we proceeded to create a 0-100 scale, ranging from none (0) to a lot (100) of interest in politics. The results shown in Figure 7.15 show an increased interest in politics in 2006 (33.8), in 2008 (37.8), maintaining the same level in 2010 (37.7), which then decreases in 2012 (33.4) and increases in 2014 (38.4). These data generally show that in recent years, most Salvadorans have not been particularly interested in political affairs, although interest in politics increased between 2012 and 2014, which is probably related to interest in the past election.




Figure 7.15. Interest in politics in El Salvador, 2006-2014

How do Salvadorans' levels of interest in politics compare of with those in the region? Figure 7.16 shows the average interest in politics in comparative perspective for the countries of the region. The highest levels of interest in politics are in the United States and Canada; followed by a second group made up of Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay; and El Salvador is located in a third group.




Figure 7.16. Interest in politics in the Americas, 2014



VIII. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that there are four main determinants of the voter intention in the last presidential elections of February 2014: age, education level, the effectiveness of voting and identification with a political party.

As to the reasons why citizens did not vote in past elections, they are classified into three types: personal, technical problems and political problems. Regarding the question about the reasons why they (the respondents) did not vote, there is a fairly even distribution of the three groups of reasons: first, political reasons (32.2%), second, technical reasons (28.5%), and in a third place, personal reasons (22.5%).

While in asking why others did not vote, political reasons strongly dominated (84.4%), followed in a distant second by technical reasons (10.7 %) and in a greatly reduced third place, personal reasons (4%).

Upon comparing the voter intention in the two rounds of the 2014 presidential elections, we show that the two major parties hold a significant percentage of voters. Of those who voted for the ARENA candidate in the first round, 94.7% maintained their intention to vote for the same party during the second round; while those who voted for the FMLN, maintained 97.1%.

44.7% of citizens expressed identification with a political party. This represents an increase from the measurements reported in 2010 and 2012.

In terms of ideological orientations, 33.3% are located on the left, 36.7 % in the center and 29.9% are located on the right. Regarding this trend, from 2004-2010, we observe a process with a centrist orientation going from the average (scale 1 left - 10 right) of 6.9 in 2004 to 5.7 in 2006, 5.3 in 2008 and 5.2 in 2010; in the 2012 measurement we find a movement towards the right (6.0); and in the 2014 measurement, we observe a return to the most centrist point (5.2).

The survey data show a low level of trust in political parties and this has decreased between 2010 and 2012, from 39.1 to 34.4, and then increased to 36.7 in 2014 (on a 0-100 scale).

We found a low level of interest in politics: 14.6 % report a lot of interest in politics, 16.7 % say somewhat interested, some 38.9% say a little interested and 29.8 % have no interest in politics at all. There would have also been an increase in interest in politics, moving from 33.4 in 2012 to 38.4 in 2014, possibly related to the interest generated around the past elections.

Appendix

Appendix 7.1. Predictors of voter participation in the first round of presidential elections, El Salvador 2014 (Figure 7.1)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Efficacy of the vote	0.213*	(3.25)
Age	0.568*	(6.83)
Male	0.001	(0.01)
Age	0.274*	(2.88)
Large city	0.076	(1.16)
Medium-sized city	-0.109	(-1.59)
Small city	0.113	(1.80)
Rural	0.000	(0.00)
Wealth quintiles	0.022	(0.35)
Identification with a political party	0.187*	(2.69)
Interest in politics	0.166	(1.98)
Constant	1.195*	(17.19)
F	8.24	
Number of cases	1451	
Regression- Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		



Chapter 8. Civil Society and Citizen Participation

José Miguel Cruz and Ricardo Córdova Macías

I. Introduction

Since Alexis de Tocqueville's (1988) analytical study of democracy in the United States, social scientists have underscored the importance of citizen participation in the establishment and maintenance of democracy. Democracy is founded upon citizen participation, not only because the citizens are those who periodically elect the officials of a governmental regime, but rather because officials' actions are or should be held accountable by citizen supervision via political institutions and organizations of civil society. It is the citizenry that defines the relevance of civil rights and policies in determined moments and that, via civic organization and participation, defines the priorities of the *polis*.

In this chapter, we explore some aspects of the relationship between citizens and civic participation. In the first place, we analyze the Salvadorans' civic participation; followed by a discussion on participation in protests; subsequently we analyze interpersonal trust and the opinion citizens have regarding the political representation of their interests. After that, we explore opinions on corruption and, finally, we inquire into opinions on public information access law. Among this chapter's most relevant results is that Salvadorans tend to participate very little in the goings-on of their community and the majority do not participate in social organizations with the notable exception of religious groups. Along the same lines, Salvadorans rarely participate in public protests. This chapter's results also indicate that Salvadoran citizens express a low opinion of how elected authorities represent their interests and benefit them as citizens.

II. Civic Participation

Civic participation has various dimensions. There is not just one way in which citizens participate civically in the goings-on of their communities. In this section, we will explore some forms of participation, above all those that revolve around volunteerism and civic organization.

How frequently do Salvadorans contribute to resolving the problems in their community? How frequently do the citizens of El Salvador aid in solving the problems that affect their immediate surroundings? The AmericasBarometer questionnaire aimed to address these topics with the following question:

CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it **at least** once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?

- (1) Once a week
- (2) Once or twice a month
- (3) Once or twice a year
- (4) Never
- (88) Doesn't know
- (98) Doesn't answer

The vast majority of Salvadorans (71.2%) report that in the past year, they have never contributed to or assisted in the resolution of problems within their community (see Figure 8.1). 12.9% of respondents report having helped once or a few times per year, 12.1% report helping one or twice per month and only 3.8% report having helped at least once per week. Stated another way, these results indicate that only 3 of every 10 Salvadorans usually get involved in solving their communities' problems.




Figure 8.1. Frequency with which Salvadorans Contributed to Solving a Problem in their Community, El Salvador 2014

With the purpose of establishing the demographic characteristics of the people who most actively participated in solving community problems, we recoded the results of this question into a 0-100 scale where 100 signifies higher levels of participation. Then, we carried out a multivariable regression analysis which found that men, the elderly, and those with high education levels usually intervene more in community affairs¹. This can clearly be seen in Figure 8.2, which shows the cross between participation and the variables of age and education level.

In the case of age, participation levels increase among middle-aged adults and remain high throughout age groups but later drop slightly among people 66 years and older. In the case of education level, the fundamental difference is among those who have higher-level studies and the rest of the population. In other words, upper-level education is associated with the reports of greater citizen participation in solving community problems. Other variables like wealth levels or area of residence did not turn out to be statistically significant in their relationship with this citizen participation index.

¹ See the table with corresponding results in the Appendix of this chapter.




Figure 8.2. Frequency with which Salvadorans Contributed to Solving Problems in their Community by Respondent's Age and Education Level, El Salvador 2014 (averages)

How do the Salvadorans' participation levels compare with those of the region? Figure 8.3 shows the participation averages in a comparative perspective with the countries of the region. As we can see, El Salvador falls into the group of countries with the lowest participation averages for solving problems. In Central America, only the Costa Ricans report being less involved in the resolution of problems in their communities.




Figure 8.3. Averages of Participation in the Resolution of a Community Problem in the Americas, 2014

A large part of citizen participation consists of the formation and integration of social groups around common interests and purposes. As we normally do in the AmericasBarometer Survey, we included a series of questions that explored Salvadorans' participation in different groups. The battery was outlined in the following way:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat “once a week,” “once or twice a month,” “once or twice a year,” or “never” to help the interviewee]

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CP20. [WOMEN ONLY] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4
CPSS1. During the last two years, have you participated as a player with other people in the practice of a sport? [Read alternatives]	1	2	3	4

The data reveal very low citizen participation on the Salvadorans' part in general (see Table 8.1). In the majority of organizations or associations which we consulted, with the exception of religious groups, the majority of respondents reported no participation at all. This is especially clear in the cases of political parties and women's groups (only for the female population). In these cases, more than 85% of the people report having never participated in these kinds of events. Although low, participation in parents' associations is, however, greater than participation in the majority of social groups.

Table 8.1. Participation Levels in Various Groups, El Salvador 2014
(percentages)

	Once per Week	Once or Twice per Month	Once or Twice per Year	Never
Religious organization	60.9	11.5	6.6	21.0
Parents' association meetings	1.5	28.1	10.0	60.4
Community improvement committees	2.0	11.3	7.2	79.5
Political party	2.0	4.1	7.2	86.6
Athletic group	14.6	6.8	3.1	75.5
Women's groups*	2.2	3.8	2.3	91.7

*Data only refer to the female population.

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

In fact, participation in religious groups does not constitute the norm when it comes to forms of civic participation. Some social capital and citizen participation theorists have pointed out that religious activism is usually different than other forms of civic participation (Coleman 2000; Putnam 1995). With the purpose of comparison in mind, we recoded the results to a 0-100 scale. We assigned the 100 value to the participation responses of “once per week” while to responses of “once or twice per week”, we assigned a 66; “once or twice per year” received a coding of 33 and “never” received a 0. Then, these values were averaged in order to obtain the citizen participation index for each one of the groups we consulted. Figure 8.4 shows the participation averages in each one of the groups included in the survey.




Figure 8.4. Averages of Citizen Participation in Various Groups, El Salvador 2014

Apart from participation in religious groups, in reality the Salvadorans participate very little in parental associations and in athletic groups (which are strongly concentrated in the male population), and very little in community improvement groups. Moreover, the participation in political parties and women’s groups indices are extremely low. In the case of political parties, these data suggest that an enormous gap still exists among the citizenry in general and political parties, something that is discussed in greater depth in another part of this chapter. In the case of women’s groups, the data indicate the difficulty in getting women to organize in order to have their voice heard.

Participation in religious groups constitutes an exceptional case: almost 61% of Salvadorans attend meetings of religious organizations at least once time per week, while 21% have never attended meetings of religious groups. According to a lineal regression analysis carried out in order to identify the demographic characteristics of the people that most participate in this type of organization, women and older people usually participate in religious groups with much more frequency than any other demographic group.

The regression did not show differences in terms of education or wealth levels or size of municipality of residence. However, a variable that turned out to be strongly associated with frequency in participation in religious organizations is the respondent’s religious denomination. As Figure 8.5



shows, the people that report belonging to the Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations along with the people who say they belong to other religions score higher on the participation scale in religious groups than Catholics and this gap is wider with respect to those who report no religious affiliation.




Figure 8.5. Participation in Religious Groups by Religious Denomination, El Salvador 2014

However, returning to general participation averages, how do we compare the 2014 data with corresponding data from previous years? Figure 8.6 reveals that participation in various organizations has undergone important changes depending on the type of organization. For example, participation in religious organizations has increased in a significant manner in recent years. It has gone from a score of 36.8 (on a 0-100 scale) in 2004 to 45.6 in 2008, to 62.1 in 2010 and landed on 70.6 in 2014. Said another way, participation in religious organizations in El Salvador has doubled in the last 10 years.

The other type of organization that has experienced certain growth is political groups. Political groups went from an average score of 5.2 in 2004 to 7.1 in 2014. In spite of the fact that this growth is minimal, the difference between 2014 and 2004 is statistically significant. In the rest of the organizations that have a registry going back two years, the data indicate that there has been a standstill or even a drop in the last ten years. For example, participation in parents' association meetings has gone from 26.7 in 2004 to 23.3 in 2014 much in the same way community improvement meetings have gone down from an average of 16 in 2004 to 11.8 in 2014, with some variations during the intervening years.




Figure 8.6. Citizen Participation Averages in Certain Settings, El Salvador 2004-2014

All of these results suggest that in general, citizen participation has been in decline in recent years. The rise of participation in religious groups, although important to the creation of social networks and community connections, has another kind of repercussion that does not necessarily always translate into citizen involvement in events that affect immediate community surroundings.

In Chapter 6, we explored the involvement of community leadership and organizations whose purpose is crime prevention. This section concentrates on the formation of community association boards in general and citizen involvement in this type of group. The questions at hand were formulated in the following way:

	Yes	No
CP21A. Is there a neighborhood association or community association board in this neighborhood?	1	0
CP22. Are you a member of the neighborhood association or community association board?	1	0
CP23. In the last three months, have you attended a meeting assembled by the community association board or a neighborhood association?	1	0
CP24. In the last three months, have you done volunteer work for the community association board or neighborhood association?	1	0

Half of Salvadorans (49.9%) report that there is a community association board or community association in their neighborhood (see Figure 8.7). These data are surprising under the light of the low level of participation reported above and considering the low percentage of community associations dedicated to the task of violence prevention reported in Chapter 6.




Figure 8.7. Is there a Neighborhood Association or Community Association Board in this Neighborhood? El Salvador 2014

However, of the people that report that there is a community association board in their neighborhood, only 10.5% say that they are an active member in that association. If we place this number within the context of all the respondents, instead of only those who report that there is a community association board in their neighborhood, only 5.2% of all the respondents report being members of a community association or community association board. However, close to 30% of people that live in communities in which there is a community association board report that they have attended meetings of the board at least once in the last three months; while 24% say that they have done volunteer work for the association in the last three months.

Table 8.2. Participation in Community Association Board Activities, El Salvador 2014 (Percentages regarding the population that reports that there are community association boards in their neighborhoods and regarding the population in general)

	Population Communities in which there are Community Association Boards	Total Population
Member of the community association boards	10.5	5.2
Has been to a meeting of the community association board	31.1	15.6
Has done volunteer work for the board	24.3	12.1

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

III. Participation in Protests

There is another dimension of citizen participation that favors involvement in public events in an anti-establishment way. Salvadoran participation in protests, however, has been historically low since the signing of the Peace Accords at the beginning of the 1990s. On this occasion, the AmericasBarometer Survey once again included the question (as is shown below) and the results reveal that only 3.4% of respondents report having participated in protests in the past year.

<p>PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA</p>
--

If we compare these results with those from the available previous measurements, we have practically the same percentage of people that have participated in public protests in comparison with 2010 and 2012. In spite of the fact that the number is a little lower on this occasion, the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure 8.8. Participation in Protests by Survey Year, El Salvador 2010-2014

Another comparison with the rest of the region (see Figure 8.9) reveals that El Salvador continues to occupy one of the lowest positions in terms of citizen participation in protests. The results indicate that only Jamaica, Guyana and Guatemala have lower public protest participation percentages. In the majority of countries in the American hemisphere, more than 5% of people report having participated in a public protest in the last year.




Figure 8.9. Percentage of Citizens that Participated in a Protest in the Americas, 2014

A regression analysis did not show statistically significant associations with demographic variables. In reality, the probability of finding differences among different conditions is very low given the sparse percentage of people that report having participated in a protest.



IV. Interpersonal Trust

In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, we explore interpersonal trust, employing the classic question:

IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?
 (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy
 (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA

A little less than one-third of Salvadorans (30.7%) report having a lot of trust in the people in their community. 34.8% report having some trust, 35.4% report having little trust and only 9.1% of respondents report having no trust. This distribution of the responses suggests that in general terms, Salvadorans do not place much trust in their neighbors.




Figure 8.10. Trust in People in the Community, El Salvador 2014

In order to facilitate a comparison with previous measurements, the question was recoded on a single interpersonal trust scale (following a 0-100 format) where 0 signifies no trust whatsoever and 100 signifies a lot of trust, aiming to capture a general measurement of trust that citizens have for one another. In Figure 8.11, we observe that interpersonal trust has had a slight rise between 2012 and 2014 which is statistically significant according to the test of means.




Figure 8.11. Trust in People in the Community, El Salvador 2004-2014

How do we compare Salvadorans' levels of interpersonal trust with those of the region? Figure 8.12 shows averages of interpersonal trust in a comparative perspective with countries in the region. Paraguay, followed by Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, Canada, Argentina, Guyana, Costa Rica, Colombia, The United States, and El Salvador have the highest levels of trust. In the figure, we can see that El Salvador is located in an intermediate position among countries on the continent.




Figure 8.12. Interpersonal Trust in the Americas, 2014

V. Representation of Interests

In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, we explored citizens' opinions on representation of their interests on the part of the Central Government, congresspeople, and Local Governments. We used three questions:

EPN3A. To what extent does the Central Government represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen? Does it represent your interests a lot, somewhat, a little or not at all?
 (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) A little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA

EPN3B. To what extent do the Congresspeople of the Legislative Assembly represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen?
 Do they represent your interests a lot, somewhat, a little or not at all?
 (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) A little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA

EPN3C. To what extent do the Office of the Mayor and City Council represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen?
 Do they represent your interests a lot, somewhat, a little or not at all?
 (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) A little (4) Not at all (88) DK (98) DA

With respect to the Central Government, 12.7% believe that they represent their interests well and benefit them a lot, 24.2% somewhat, 38.5% a little and 24.7% of respondents reports they do not benefit at all nor are their interests well-represented (see Figure 8.13).




Figure 8.13. To What Extent do Political Institutions Represent Your Interests and Benefit You as a Citizen?, El Salvador 2014

With respect to congresspeople from the Legislative Assembly, 4.3% report that they represent their interests and benefit them a lot, 17.4% somewhat, 35.6% a little and 42.8% of respondents say that they do not benefit nor do they have their interests well-represented (see Figure 8.13). With respect to the Office of the Mayor and the City Council, 10% report that they represent their interests well and benefit them a lot, 18.5% somewhat, 35.8% a little and 35.7% of respondents say not at all.

In order to facilitate the comparison among the three questions, we recoded the response options to a 0-100 format where 0 signifies not at all and 100 signifies a lot. As we observe in Figure 8.14, on average, respondents express a more positive opinion regarding the representation of their interests and how they benefit as a citizen thanks to the Central Government (41.6) followed by the Office of the Mayor and the City Council (34.3) and, at the lowest level, congresspeople (27.7). These differences are statistically significant.




Figure 8.14. Comparison of Representation of Citizens' Interests, El Salvador 2014

This battery of questions measures the perception of representation of citizens' interests, which is different than trust in institutions. As we discuss in Chapter 9, citizens express a higher level of institutional trust in local governments, followed by the President, and then by the Legislative Assembly.

VI. Opinions on Corruption

In this section, we do a brief review of the data on corruption perceptions and victimization in El Salvador. On the one hand, we asked respondents whether or not they believe that corruption among public functionaries is generalized in the country. Concretely, the question was outlined in the following way:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is: [Read]
 (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon
 or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

Respondents' answers were recoded into a 0-100 scale where 100 signifies that the respondents think that corruption is very generalized among public officials while 0 signifies that the respondents think that corruption is not generalized at all. The results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer show that Salvadorans scored an average of 67.7 (on the 0-100 scale). Upon comparing this average with previous years, we can see that there has been a slight but significant rise in negative opinions regarding corruption in the last four years in spite of the fact that in general the answers are less critical than in 2006 and 2008 when they reached the highest level within the last 10 years.




Figure 8.15. Opinions that Corruption among Public Officials is Generalized, El Salvador, 2004-2014

This trend does not correspond to the percentage of people that report having been victims of bribery. As we usually do, the AmericasBarometer included a series of questions that gather data on different types of bribes over the last 12 years. Those events included bribes by police, public employees, those working for the mayor’s office, judges, in health centers, and in schools. The results of these questions were compiled into one sole indicator that shows the percentage of people that have been victims of one of these events at least once in the last year.

The questions corresponding to the corruption indicator are shown below.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?	--	0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?	--	0	1	88	98
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?	--	0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

The results indicate that in 2014, 9.8% of Salvadorans report having been victims of some type of bribery in the past year. This constitutes the lowest percentage of the last 10 years. As we can see in Figure 8.16, the proportion of Salvadorans that report being victims of bribery went from 15.7% in 2004 to 11.4% in 2010 and, as we have seen, to less than 10% in 2014.




Figure 8.16. Victimization by Different Types of Bribes in the past Twelve Months, El Salvador, 2004-2014

In order to understand the characteristics of those who are usually bribery victims, we performed a logistic regression analysis with the basic sociodemographic variables and some characteristics from the immediate surroundings. The data are presented in Figure 8.17 and reveal that men, younger people, people that live in the most urbanized cities, and the total number of respondents' children surveyed increase the chances of reporting having been a victim of corruption. The relationship between number of children and victimization by bribery is quite interesting because it indicates that to the extent to which people have more children, the better the chance that they deal with more acts of corruption in their daily lives. Along the same lines, it is interesting that those most exposed to bribes are younger people. This is probably an indicator of vulnerability of children in the face of predatory officials.




Figure 8.17. Determinants of Victimization by Different Types of Bribery in the past Twelve Months, El Salvador, 2014

VII. Opinions Regarding The Public Information Access Law

In the month of December 2010, the Legislative Assembly passed the “Access to Public Information Law” known as LAIP, which was vetoed with observations by the President of the Republic on the 5th of March, 2011², forcing the Legislative Assembly to partially accept the observations in the plenary session on March 3rd, 2011³. The LAIP Law came into effect on May 8th, 2011.

Since the topic at hand is a recently created and important law that allows citizens to exercise their right to access public information, we included three questions to investigate the Access to Public Information Law in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer.

INFO1. Have you Heard of the “Access to Public Information Law”?
(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA
INFO2. With the purpose of soliciting some information ¿have you contacted one or more of the following institutions in the past year: Central Government, Office of the Mayor, Legislative Assembly or Judicial Branch?
(1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA
INFO3. Have you consulted the website of any public institution looking for public information?
(1) Yes (0) No (88) NS (98) DA

In the first question, we explore knowledge of the law. Out of all the respondents, if we take into consideration how recent the law is, a relatively high number of them (43.9%) have heard of the

² Legislative decree 534, 2 of December 2010, published in the Official Diary Volume 371, No, 70 from April 8th, 2011.

³ By way of legislative decree 303 from February 8th, 2013 reforms to LAIP were approved.

LAIP law (see Figure 8.18), although it does not mean that they know the law. It is possible that this is due to media coverage. It also does not indicate that the citizenry knows the basic content of the law.




Figure 8.18. Opinions Regarding the Access to Public Information Law, El Salvador 2014

In the following figure (8.19), on the left-hand panel, we can see that people with greater interest in the news, that is to say those people who watch the news daily, demonstrate a higher level of knowledge regarding the LAIP law in comparison with those who only watch the news a few times per week, a few times per month, rarely or never. On the other hand, in the right-hand panel, we observe that just as there is an upward rise in respondents' education level, there is also growth in the amount of knowledge about the LAIP law.




Figure 8.19. Knowledge of the Access to Public Information Law by Interest in the News and Education Level, El Salvador 2014

In Figure 8.20, in the left-hand panel, we can observe that knowledge levels of the LAIP law is much greater in urban areas in comparison to rural areas; and in the right-hand panel, knowledge of the LAIP law is greater among men in comparison to women.




Figure 8.20. Knowledge of the Access to Public Information Law by Area of Residence and Gender, El Salvador 2014

Additionally, in relation to the exercise of soliciting or looking for some kind of information from some public institutions around which the INFO2 question was based, citizen involvement is relatively low: 10.6% have solicited some kind of information from public institutions (Central Government, Office of the Mayor, Legislative Assembly or Judicial Branch); 12.8% have consulted a public institution's website looking for information. We only asked those that consulted a website if they indeed found what they were looking for: an interesting datum is that 79.3% report having found what they were searching for⁴.

VIII. Conclusion

In general, we may say that Salvadorans participate very little in community affairs. In 2014, seven of every 10 citizens report that they have never contributed to solving problems in their community, although this percentage is greater among men, middle-aged people, and among people that have upper-level educations.

On the other hand, the only organizations in which Salvadorans participate actively are the ones of a religious bent. 80% of Salvadorans have attended a meeting of this kind of organization in the last year before the survey. On the contrary, in the rest of the organizations, particularly those of partisan character and women's organizations, the participation rates are extremely low. Moreover, the data indicate that, with the notable exception of religious organizations, in the vast majority of citizen organizations, there has been a drop in the frequency of participation.

Much in the same way, participation levels in public protests are also notably low. The majority of Salvadorans in the measurements of the AmericasBarometer report not having participated in public protests and these percentages do not seem to have grown in recent years; rather, quite the opposite.

On the other hand, trust levels around people in their communities have not varied in the last decade. On average, 6 of every 10 Salvadorans show that they have interpersonal trust.

Salvadorans express a low opinion regarding how elected officials represent their interests and benefit them as citizens. The one that is the best-evaluated is the Central Government (41.6), followed by the Office of the Mayor and City Council (34.3) and in last place, congresspeople (27.7).

Finally, not considering how recently the Access to Public Information Law has come into effect, 43.9% have heard something about it. However, with respect to soliciting/finding some kind of information, citizen involvement is relatively low: 10.6% have solicited some kind of information from public institutions (Central Government, Legislative Assembly or Judicial Branch), and 12.8% have consulted a public institution's website looking for information.

⁴ The question was formulated in the following way: "INFO4. Did you find what you were looking for? (1) Yes (0) No"



Appendix

Appendix 8.1. Determinants of Contribution to Solving Problems in the Community, El Salvador 2014

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Female	-0.067*	(-2.53)
Age	0.159*	(5.65)
Education Level	0.119*	(3.78)
Wealth Quintiles	0.006	(0.19)
Size of Area of Residence	-0.017	(-0.55)
Constant	0.000	(-0.00)
F	11.06	
Number of cases	1,499	
R-squared	0.03	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 8.2. Determinants of Victimization by Different Types of Bribes in the last Twelve Months, El Salvador, 2014 (Figure 8.17)

	Coefficientes estandarizados	(t)
Female	-0.276*	(-3.09)
Age	-0.416*	(-3.25)
Education Level	-0.025	(-0.22)
Wealth Quintiles	0.080	(0.94)
Lives in a Rural Area	-0.353*	(-3.34)
Receives Remittances	0.059	(0.63)
Number of Children	0.272*	(2.44)
Constant	-2.334*	(-24.25)
F	4.35	
Number of cases	1,496	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		



Chapter 9. Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

Ricardo Córdova Macías

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we address the topic of how Salvadorans political attitudes support the democratic political stability and it is structured in seven sections. In the first section, we present a theoretical framework as a reference; in the second section we examine support for the political system; in the third, we address the topic of political tolerance; in the fourth, democratic stability. In the fifth section, we address the legitimacy of other institutions; in the sixth we examine support for democracy; in the seventh section, support for democracy as a political regime, continuing with satisfaction with democracy and finally the conclusions. Among this chapter's most relevant results, with regard to political legitimacy, there is data that shows that support for the system has remain stable during recent measurements but on the lower end of the scale. One aspect to point out is that as a consequence of the reduction in political tolerance in recent years, a significant rise in the “at-risk democracy” cell would appear (low support for the system and low tolerance), moving from 16% in 2004 to 30.6% in 2014. However, the results indicate that Salvadorans maintain high levels of support for democracy as a form of government.

II. Theoretical Framework

The legitimacy of the political system has been focused in the literature as a crucial element of democratic stability (Booth and Seligson 2009; Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2005; Gilley 2009). Seymour Martin Lipset (1981, 1994) defined legitimacy as “the capacity of a system for generating and maintaining the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate for society.”

In this chapter, we address the understanding of political legitimacy more in depth. In the AmericasBarometer studies from recent years and in the first part of this report, political legitimacy has been defined in terms of “support for the system” that in combination with tolerance towards political opposition may produce warning signs that could be useful in locating which democracies in the region would be especially fragile. The theory points out that both attitudes (support for the system and political tolerance) are necessary for democratic stability in the long term. Citizens should believe in *both* – the legitimacy of their political system and also be disposed to tolerate the political rights of other people (Seligson 2000). The chart outlined in Table 9.1 represents all the possible combinations of system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided into high and low levels.

Table 9.1. Relationship between System Support y Political Tolerance

System Support (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable democracy	At-risk democracy

Table 9.1 shows the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance, we will review each cell individually. Political systems inhabited by citizens that have high levels of system support and political tolerance are able to produce more stability. This box is labelled “stable democracy”. The systems that are politically legitimate (demonstrated by positive support for the system) and that have citizens that are reasonably tolerant of minorities’ rights are inclined to enjoy democratic stability (Dahl 1971). If the majority of citizens demonstrate high levels of support for the system and high tolerance, we would expect that democracy remains stable and consolidated.

When support for the system is high, but there is low political tolerance, the system could remain stable (given that the system has high support), but democracy could be jeopardized over the medium term. Such systems may lean towards an authoritarian form of government in which democratic rights become restricted.

A third situation is low system support and high political tolerance, a box that Seligson (2000) has called “unstable democracy”. On the other hand, it is not a good sign for the democracy if citizens have low support for the system and low tolerance. In the political systems in which important sectors of the population neither support the basic institutions of the nation nor support minority rights, those people are more susceptible to a democratic breakdown, the reason for which this box contains “at-risk democracy”.

It is important to keep in mind a limitation in this analysis chart. The relationships discussed herein only apply to political systems that are already institutionally democratic. In other words, they are systems in which there are regular, competitive elections, and in which ample participation is permitted.

III. Support for the Political System

In order to analyze the belief in legitimacy of the Salvadoran political system, we use a legitimacy index called “Political support / Alienation”, which has been developed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University (LAPOP). In this index we aim to measure the levels of support that citizens grant to their system of government without focusing on the ruling government. In the political science literature, this phenomenon is called “diffuse support” or “system support” (Easton 1975). The items utilized to create the “system support” index are those that follow below:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in El Salvador guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7, or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of El Salvador?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of El Salvador?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of El Salvador?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of El Salvador?

The questions from the System Support Index have a 1-7 format and following the guidelines from the AmericasBarometer, they were recoded into a 0-100 scale in which 0 means “very little support” and 100 means “a lot of support”.

In Figure 9.1, we present the average obtained for each one of the questions in the measurement of the 2014 round: the highest levels correspond to respect for political institutions (69.5) and system support (64.3); we find that pride for living under the political system at an intermediate level (54.2); and at the lowest levels we find basic rights (45.7) and courts (42.7).




Figure 9.1. Components of Support for the Political System, El Salvador 2014

Thanks to the available data from the surveys carried out from 2004-2014, it is possible to see the evolution of system support levels (Figure 9.2). In the next figure, we can see the evolution of the five questions. In general terms, during the period of 2004-2008 we can identify a decreasing trend for four questions (courts, basic rights, pride, and support). With regard to institutions, there is a rise from 2004 to 2006 and later there is a drop in 2008.

In the 2010 measurement, there is a revert to this decreasing trend but later observe a rise in the five questions although only in three of them is this rise statistically significant. In the 2012 measurement, we observe a reduction in two of the questions (support and pride) and there are no

statistically significant variations for the other three (institutions, basic rights and courts). In the 2014 measurement, if we take into account the test of means, we can conclude that in four of the questions, there are no variations (institutions, support, pride, basic rights) and in one there are statistically significant differences (courts) with respect to the 2012 measurement.

Throughout the period from 2004 to 2014, Salvadorans had the highest levels for institutions respect and system support. Pride for living under the political system is placed at an intermediate level. Lastly, basic rights and courts are found at the lowest levels.




Figure 9.2. Components of Support for the Political System, El Salvador 2004-2014

Using the five questions as a base, we constructed an index that measures system support as an average of the five items shown in Figure 9.1. In Figure 9.3 we present the results of the surveys carried out during the 2004-2014 period. As we can see, system support drops in a sustained manner



during the the 2004-2008 period: with an average of 59.5 points on an 0-100 index in 2004, 55.4 in 2006 and 51.8 in 2008. Since 2010, we observe an important increase to 58.7 points which is statistically significant reaching an average close to what was obtained in 2004. Later there is a slight drop in 2012 (56.7) and also in 2014 (55.3)¹. However, system support has remained stable during the 2012-2014 period, because the difference is not statistically significant.




Figure 9.3. Averages of System Support, El Salvador 2004-2014

How do Salvadoran levels of system support compare with those of the rest of the region? Figure 9.4 shows the system support averages in a comparative perspective with countries in the region for 2014. In the figure, we can see that El Salvador is located in a relatively high position among countries on the continent – under Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Canada, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Argentina.

¹ For the 2014 survey, the reliability coefficient for the system support scale is 0.7415.




Figure 9.4. System Support in a Comparative Perspective, 2014

With the purpose of identifying factors that help explain the system support levels in El Salvador for the 2014 round, we ran a multiple regression analysis. In the Appendix (at the end of the chapter) we present the coefficients. There are 12 statistically significant predictors in this regression: age, area of residence, education, gender, wealth quintiles, approval of the President's performance, satisfaction with democracy, interest in politics, effectiveness of the vote, ideology, perceptions of security in the neighborhood and crime victimization.




Figure 9.5. Determinants of Support for the Political System, El Salvador 2014

Of these, we only present 10 in their bivariate relationship. Four on sociodemographic aspects (area of residence, gender, education, and age); four on political aspects (interest in politics, approval of the President's performance, satisfaction with democracy and the effectiveness of the vote), and two aspects on security (perception of security in the neighborhood and crime victimization). In Figure 9.6 we can observe that the residents of rural areas and women show a higher level of system support. On the other hand, young people 18-25 years of age show higher levels of system support in comparison to the rest of the age groups. Additionally, system support drops to the extent to which education level rises. This last point possibly has to do with the fact that people of high education levels have better information available to them and they are more critical with respect to the surroundings in which citizens develop.




Figure 9.6. System Support by Area of Residence, Gender, Education, and Age, El Salvador 2014

In Figure 9.7 we may see that people with greater interest in politics who feel more satisfied with democracy and who believe in the effectiveness of the vote² exhibit greater levels of system support. Furthermore, those who express a positive opinion of the President’s performance tend to support the system more.

² In the sense that the vote can change the way things will be in the future. See Question VB49 in the questionnaire.




Figure 9.7. System Support by Interest in Politics, Approval of the President’s Performance, Satisfaction with Democracy and the Effectiveness of the Vote, El Salvador 2014

In Figure 9.8 we can see that people with a higher perception of security in the neighborhood/district/place of residence and who have not been victims of crime exhibit greater levels of system support.




Figure 9.8. System Support by Perception of Security in the Neighborhood and Crime Victimization, El Salvador 2014

In previous studies (Córdova, Cruz, and Seligson 2006, 2008) it was reported that an important political variable for explaining differences in system support levels has been the respondent’s political preferences. While the ARENA party was in power, its followers exhibited higher levels of system support and this support was lower for the FMLN followers. This is the finding of the 2006 and 2008 round.

In 2009 there was a change in the executive branch and we reported the following for the 2010 AmericasBarometer measurement: “there certainly has been an important rise for followers of the FMLN/Funes (going from 40 in 2008 to 58.3 in 2010); but in the case of ARENA/Ávila followers, it practically has not varied (going from 59.4 in 2008 to 59.6 in 2010). Consequently, in the 2010 measurement, there are no statistically significant differences among the followers of both parties” (Córdova, Cruz, and Seligson 2010: 118).

Within the measurement of system support for 2014, in the regression we included a question for which party did respondents vote in the second round of the last presidential election. However this did not turn out to be statistically significant and was therefore removed from the model. Due to the importance of the topic of respondents’ political preferences, we present the bivariate result in Figure 9.9 of support levels and the party for which respondents voted in the second round of the 2014 presidential elections. In this case, with the FMLN in government, we observe that its followers have a higher level of support for the system (57.7) while it is lower for followers of the ARENA party (51.9). This difference is statistically significant.




Figure 9.9. System Support by Party Voted for the Presidential election, El Salvador 2014

IV. Political Tolerance

In order to analyze political tolerance, we use an index developed by LAPOP. The items used to create the “political tolerance” index are the following:

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in El Salvador. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Salvadorean form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Salvadorean form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?

In the questionnaire we included questions that speak about four basic civil liberties: the right to vote, the right to peaceful demonstrations, the right to run for public office and the freedom of expression for the people that say bad things about the form of government in El Salvador. The questions from the tolerance index are on a 1-10 format and for analytical purposes following guidelines from the AmericasBarometer, they were recoded into a 0-100 scale where 0 represents “very little tolerance” and 100, “a lot of tolerance”³

³ For a review of the methodological aspects of the tolerance measurement and its evolution in the Americas for the 2006-2012 period, see: Hiskey, Moseley and Rodriguez (2013).

We present the average obtained in each one of the questions of the 2014 round in Figure 9.10: right to vote (49.6), peaceful protests (49.2), freedom of expression (35.3) and running for public office (34.2).




Figure 9.10. Average of Political Tolerance, El Salvador 2014

How has political tolerance evolved over time in El Salvador? Thanks to using data from the 2004-2014 surveys it is possible to see the evolution of political tolerance levels. In Figure 9.11 we can observe a rising trend for the 2004-2008 period in the right to vote. For peaceful demonstration, running for public office and freedom of expression there is a rise between 2004 and 2006, but later there is a slight drop in 2008. In the 2010 round we observe an important and statistically significant drop in the four questions, making the gap in freedom of expression more important (49.4 to 39.8).

In the 2012 round there is a slight drop in the four questions, but it is not statistically significant. In the 2014 round there is a drop in two of the questions (running for public office and peaceful demonstration), a slight increase in the right to vote. However these are not statistically significant, and only the reduction in freedom of expression is statistically significant.

If we compare the data between the 2012 and 2014, while taking into consideration the test of means; there is a statistically significant drop in three of them: running for political office, freedom of expression and peaceful demonstration. The right to vote shows a slight increase that is statistically significant.

Another way of analyzing these data is to focus on the difference between the first measurement (2004) and the last one (2014). In this sense, the right to vote drops 4.9 points, peaceful demonstration drop 6.2 points, running for public office drops 9.3 points and the freedom of expression drops 16.2 points. These differences are statistically significant.




Figure 9.11. Political Tolerance Component by Year, El Salvador 2004-2014

From the four questions we have built an index that measures political tolerance which is an average of the four items shown in Figure 9.10⁴. In Figure 9.12 we present the results of the surveys carried out during the 2004-2014 period. Political tolerance rises from 51.3 in 2004 to 55.8 in 2006, later drops slightly to 54.2 in 2008, making an important drop to 45.1 in 2010, shrinking again to 43.7 in 2012 and finally sliding down slightly once again to 42.1 in 2014. The results of the 2014 AmericasBarometer provide evidence that the level of political tolerance is eroding. Since the 2010 fall, tolerance levels remain on lowest level since first registered in 2004, the initial year of measurement in the survey. However, between 2012 and 2014 there was a drop that is not statistically significant, meaning that the political tolerance levels remain stable. The implication is that these findings have regarding the erosion of political tolerance levels demonstrates the need to make efforts to raise them in the country.

⁴ For the 2014 survey, the Cronbach Alpha for the political tolerance scale is 0.7608.




Figure 9.12. Political Tolerance Average by Year, El Salvador 2004-2014

How do we compare Salvadorans tolerance levels to those in the region? Figure 9.13 shows the averages of political tolerance in a comparative perspective with countries in the region in 2014. In the figure we can see that El Salvador is located in a lower position among the countries of the continent but above Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, and Guatemala. In Chapter 5 of this report, we point out that in the Americas, “in spite of remaining relatively static between 2008 and 2012, the regional political tolerance levels declined in 2014.” In the Americas, the political tolerance average declined from 54.5 in 2012 to 50.1 in 2014.




Figure 9.13. Political Tolerance in Comparative Perspective, 2014

With the purpose of looking to identify factors that could help to explain political tolerance levels in El Salvador in the 2014 round, we ran a multiple regression analysis whose results are presented in Figure 9.14. In the Appendix (at the end of the chapter), we present the coefficients. Basically there are four statistically significant predictors: gender, age, education and interest in politics.




Figure 9.14. Determinants of Political Tolerance, El Salvador 2014

In Figure 9.15 we present the bivariate relationship for these four variables. Men, young people, people with a greater level of education, and those that have greater interest in politics show a greater level of political tolerance.




Figure 9.15. Political Tolerance by Gender, Age, Education and Interest in Politics, El Salvador 2014



In previous LAPOP studies for the AmericasBarometer (2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012), there was a finding reported that men show higher levels of political tolerance than women. In the case of the 2014 measurement in El Salvador, taking into consideration that gender and education have turned out to be statistically significant in the regression model, in Figure 9.16 we present tolerance levels by educational level by gender. Independently from educational level, women are less tolerant than men.




Figure 9.16. Political Tolerance by Educational Level by Gender, El Salvador 2014

Córdova, Cruz and Seligson (2006 and 2008) report that an important political variable for explaining differences in levels of political tolerance has been respondent's political preferences. While the ARENA party was in power, its followers showed lower levels of political tolerance while levels for FMLN followers were higher. This is the finding of the 2006 and 2008 rounds. In 2009 there was a change in the executive branch, bringing the FMLN party to power. For the 2010 round it was reported: "for ARENA followers, it practically has not changed (going from 45.8 in 2008 to 45.2 in 2010); but for FMLN/Funes followers, there has been a significant drop (going from 69.1 in 2008 to 46.3 in 2010). Consequently, in the 2010 round there were not any statistically significant differences among the ARENA followers (45.2) and Funes/FMLN followers (46.3)" (Córdova, Cruz and Seligson 2010: 128).

In the 2014 round we included as part of the regression the question on the political party for whom respondents voted in the second round of the last presidential elections. This did not turn out to be statistically significant, and for this reason it was removed from the model. However, due to the importance of the topic of respondents' political preferences, we present the bivariate result of political tolerance levels in Figure 9.17 and the party for which respondents voted in the second round of the 2014 presidential elections. In this case the FMLN being in power, we observe that FMLN followers have a lower level of political tolerance (42) while ARENA followers levels are higher (43.8) although this difference is not statistically significant.




Figure 9.17. Political Tolerance by Party Voted in the Presidential Elections, El Salvador 2014

In Figure 9.18 we explore the relationship between tolerance and educational level by party voted in the second round of the last presidential elections. For followers of both parties, as education levels rise so does the political tolerance. For those that have no education or who have only obtained primary education, tolerance is greater for followers of ARENA but this is equated for those with secondary education. For those having higher education, political tolerance it is higher for FMLN followers.




Figure 9.18. Political Tolerance by Education Level by Party Voted in the Last Presidential Elections, El Salvador 2014

V. Democratic Stability

As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, system support and political tolerance are vital for the stability of a democracy. In Table 9.2 we can observe that according to the 2014 round, 19.3% of respondents fall within the stable democracy cell, 38.7% within the authoritarian stability cell, this being the most populated cell of the table. While 11.5% are located within the unstable democracy cell and 30.6% within the at-risk democracy cell, the second most populated cell of the table.

Table 9.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance, El Salvador 2014

System Support	Political Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable democracy	Authoritarian stability
	19.3%	38.7%
Low	Unstable democracy	At-risk democracy
	11.5%	30.6%

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; SLVts14_081914

These results may be situated within a historical perspective due to the fact that we have the data from the surveys carried out from 2004-2014. In Table 9.3 we can observe the evolution of the four cells. The “stable democracy” cell remains at 32.2% for 2004 and 2006, drops to 23.4% in 2008. It later increases to 25.7% in 2010 before dropping to 22.8% in 2012 and to 19.3% in 2014.

The “authoritarian stability” cell drops from 34.6% in 2004 to 27.4% in 2006 and increases to 29.3% in 2008. It later increases to 41.7% in 2010 before dropping to 38.9% in 2012 and down to 38.7% in 2014. The “unstable democracy” cell increases from 17.2% in 2004 to 24.6% in 2006 and later rising to 26.9% in 2008. It falls to 10.8% in 2010 and later increases to 12.1% in 2012, before finally dropping to 11.5% in 2014.

Finally, the “at-risk democracy” cell goes from 16% in 2004 to 15.8% in 2006 and rises to 20.5% in 2008. It increases again to 21.8% in 2010, jumps up to 26.2% in 2012 and rises yet again to 30.6% in 2014. This last cell (“at-risk democracy”) has gone from 16% in 2004 to an increased 30.6% in 2014, practically having doubled in size. This contrasts with the 12.9 percentage point reduction observed in the “stable democracy” cell upon comparing the 2004 (32.2%) and 2014 (19.3%) measurements. This is a topic that deserves to be followed up in a future measurement.

Table 9.3. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance, El Salvador 2004-2014 (percentage)

System Support	Political Tolerance											
	High						Low					
	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
High	Stable democracy						Authoritarian stability					
	32.2	32.2	23.4	25.7	22.8	19.3	34.6	27.4	29.3	41.7	38.9	38.7
Low	Unstable democracy						At-risk democracy					
	17.2	24.6	26.9	10.8	12.1	11.5	16.0	15.8	20.5	21.8	26.2	30.6

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

In order to simplify understanding the data presented in Table 9.3, we created Figure 9.19. We remind ourselves that the (“at-risk democracy”) cell has gone from a concentrated 16% in 2004 to 30.6% in 2014, a 14.6 percentage point increase. This contrasts with the 12.9 percentage point reduction observed in the “stable democracy” cell when comparing the 2004 (32.3%) and 2014 (19.3%) measurements.




Figure 9.19. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance, El Salvador 2004-2014

From a regional perspective it is important to remember that in Chapter 5 of this report, it is stated that “in an alarming way, the attitudes of stable democracy reach their lowest average regional level of the decade in 2014 and the authoritarian stability and at-risk democracy profiles reach their maximum score of the decade.”

How has the percentage of citizens in El Salvador with attitudes that are more favorable towards stable democracy evolved over time? In Figure 9.20 we present the percentage of citizens who express high levels of system support and tolerance from 2004 to 2014. It has gone from 32.2% in 2004 and 2006 to 23.4% in 2008. It rose to 25.7% in 2010 but later dropped to 22.8% in 2012 and dropped again to 19.3% in 2014. When taking the confidence interval into account, favorable attitudes towards stable democracy after the 2008 fall would have stabilized for the 2008-2014 period. Although in 2014, we observe the lowest level for the entire period.




Figure 9.20. Stable Democracy Cell (System Support and High Tolerance), El Salvador 2004-2014

In Figure 9.21 we present the percentage of citizens that express high levels of system support and low levels of tolerance (authoritarian stability) from 2004 to 2014. This cell has gone from 34.6% in 2004 to 27.4% in 2006 before rising to 29.3% in 2008. It rises again to 41.7% in 2010 but then drops to 38.9% in 2012 and drops slightly to 38.7% in 2014. Taking the confidence interval into account, after the 2010 increase, attitudes of authoritarian stability have dropped in 2012 and 2014. We can affirm that these attitudes have stabilized for the 2010-2014 period.




Figure 9.21. Authoritarian Stability Cell (High System Support and Low Tolerance), El Salvador 2004-2014

In Figure 9.22 we present the percentage of citizens that express low levels of system support and high levels of tolerance (unstable democracy) from 2004 to 2014. This cell has gone from 17.2% in 2004 to 24.6% in 2006 and increasing to 26.9% in 2008. It dropped to 10.8% in 2010 but later increased to 12.1% in 2012 before dropping slightly to 11.5% in 2014. Taking the confidence interval into account after the 2010 drop attitudes of unstable democracy have also stabilized for the 2010-2014 period.




Figure 9.22. Unstable Democracy Cell (Low System Support and High Tolerance), El Salvador 2004-2014

Taking into consideration the finding about the reduction in levels of political tolerance, we present the percentage of citizens that express low levels of system support and low levels of tolerance in Figure 9.23. The at-risk democracy cell has gone from 16.0% in 2004 to 15.8% in 2006, rose to 20.5% in 2008 and to 21.8% in 2010. It later rose again to 26.2% in 2012 before reaching 30.6% in 2014. The increase of more than four percentage points between 2012 and 2014 is statistically significant. This is a finding to which should pay greater attention in future studies for the effects that could have over democratic stability in El Salvador in the medium-term.




Figure 9.23. At-risk Democracy, El Salvador 2004-2014

In the following figure we can see the positioning of El Salvador in the 2014 measurement in terms of the average of the two variables analyzed in this section (system support and political tolerance) compared to the rest of the countries considered in this study. In the 2014 round, El Salvador is located within the box labeled “authoritarian stability”, the category into which it has been placed since the 2010 measurement until now.




Figure 9.24. System Support and Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas, 2014

Taking into consideration that as we have previously pointed out in past studies, that an important political variable for explaining the differences in the levels of system support and political tolerance has been the respondent's political preferences. In Figure 9.25 we present the average of support for the political system and political tolerance for the followers of the ARENA and FMLN parties. Once again, we utilize how people voted by party in the second round of the last presidential elections. As we have already noted before, ARENA party followers have an average of 43.8 in tolerance and 51.9 in system support while followers of FMLN show an average of 42 in tolerance and 57.7 in system support. With regard to the national average, ARENA followers are a little more tolerant (although the difference with FMLN is not statistically significant), and the FMLN followers support the system more (in this case the difference is statistically significant).




Figure 9.25. Average of System Support and Political Tolerance by Party for whom One Voted in the Second Round of the Last Presidential Elections, El Salvador 2014

VI. Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens of El Salvador support their main political institutions? In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, in addition to questions about system support, we also asked respondents about their attitudes towards many specific institutions. We included the Catholic Church, the Evangelical (Protestant) Church and media, which although are not institutions of the democratic political system, they are reference institutions in Latin America that enjoy high levels of trust among the population.



B11. To what extent do you trust the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (Supreme Electoral Court)?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the Legislative Assembly?
B18. To what extent do you trust the Policía Nacional Civil (National Civil Police)?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Evangelical Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?
B32. To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
ESB48. To what extent do you trust the Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública (Institute of Public Information Access)?

Figure 9.26 presents the levels of support for each one of these specific institutions from the survey carried out in 2014. For the questions, we used a 1 to 7 scale where 1 signifies “none” and 7 “a lot” and as we usually do in the AmericasBarometer analyses, we recoded the responses to a 0 to 100 format. In a first group, it shows that the group of institutions that enjoy the highest levels of trust are the Armed Forces (68.6), the Protestant Church (66.4) and the Catholic Church (60.5). In a second group, we find the trust in the Supreme Court (56.1), municipal government (55.3), elections (55) and the president (55). In a third group we find the National Civil Police (50.8), the Access to Public Information Institute (50.2), and the Legislative Assembly (48.2). Political parties are found at the lowest levels of trust of all the institutions (36.7).




Figure 9.26. Trust in Institutions, El Salvador 2014

VII. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy -in an abstract sense- is also considered a requisite for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, we assess support for democracy asking respondents their opinion on a modified quote from Winston Churchill⁵ via a question inspired by Rose and Mishler’s study (1996) on the theme. The answers to question ING4 use a 7-point scale in which 1 signifies

⁵ Churchill’s words reference democracy as “the worse form of government with the exception of all others.”



“strongly disagree” and 7 “strongly agree”. However, in order to make these results more understandable we converted them into a metric scale of a 0-100 range.

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Next we show the average responses to the ING4 question for El Salvador during the 2004-2014 period. Support for democracy goes from 68.8 in 2004 to 61.3 in 2006 and increasing to 68.4 in 2008. It later dropped to 64.1 in 2010 before rising to 65.6 in 2012 and again to 65.9 in 2014. Although these differences are not statistically significant, we could affirm that the level of support for democracy remains stable over the last four years.




Figure 9.27. Support for Democracy, El Salvador 2004-2014

This question (ING4) measures general support for democracy which does not turn out to be contradictory to the previously reported finding in which we indicate that the corresponding box “stable democracy” has shown a decrease and the box for “at-risk democracy” has shown an increase. In the following table, we are able to observe that those that fall into the “stable democracy” box (high system support and high tolerance) show an average of 72 on the support for democracy scale while respondents who make up the “at-risk democracy” cell (low system support and low tolerance) average only 60.1. This difference is statistically significant.

Table 9.4 Support for Democracy, El Salvador 2014

	Stable Democracy	At-risk Democracy
Support for democracy	72.0	60.1

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914

VIII. Support for Democracy as a Political Regime

The survey also explored Salvadorans opinions on the preference for democracy as a political regime. The following question was included:

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most:
 (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or
 (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or
 (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.
 (88) DK (98) DA

In the 2014 round, democracy is the preferred type of regime for Salvadorans: 76.2% respond this way to the question while 12.9% say that an authoritarian government would be preferable and 10.9% express indifference. This indicates that either an authoritarian government or a democratic government would be equally preferable.

These results are more interesting when we compare them to the measurements from previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer. In Table 9.5 we can see majority support for a democratic regime: it drops from 75.4% in 2004 to 72.7% in 2006 later rising to 78.4% in 2008 before dropping again to 74.5% in 2010 to 72% in 2012 and increasing to 76.2% in 2014. While the responses of indifference received relatively low percentages, the level of indifference went from 11% in 2004 to 14.9% in 2006 later dropping to 12% in 2008 and dropping again to 11% in 2011 and 2012 and once more to 10.9% in 2014.

As support for an authoritarian government was 13.5% in 2004, it drops to 12.4% in 2006 dropping again to 9.7% in 2008 and later rising to 14.6% in 2010. Then reach 17.1% in 2012 and finally dropping to 12.9% in 2014. In the last measurement it has reversed the levels of support for an authoritarian government from 2008 to 2012.

Upon review of the 2012 and 2014 measurements, the increase in support for democracy as a form of government and the drop in support for an authoritarian government are statistically significant.

Table 9.5. Preferred Type of Regime, El Salvador 2004-2014 (percentage)

Preferred Type of Regime	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic	11.0	14.9	12.0	11.0	11.0	10.9
Democracy is preferable to any other form of government	75.4	72.7	78.4	74.5	72.0	76.2
Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one	13.5	12.4	9.7	14.6	17.1	12.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2014; v.SLVts14_081914



IX. Satisfaction with Democracy

In the 2014 AmericasBarometer, we asked citizens about how satisfied they are with the way in which democracy works in their country:

PN4. In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied** or very **dissatisfied** with the way democracy works in El Salvador?
 (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK
 (98) DA

The results reveal that only 4.8% of the population report feeling very satisfied with the performance of democracy while 54.6% say that they are satisfied. 36.1% report that they are unsatisfied with democracy and 4.5% say that they are very unsatisfied (see Figure 9.28).




Figure 9.28. Satisfaction with Democracy, El Salvador 2014

In order to facilitate the comparison of the results with the previous surveys, from the response options we created a 0-100 scale where 100 represents the maximum average level of satisfaction with democracy in El Salvador. In figure 9.29 we can observe that the satisfaction with democracy average for 2004 is 54.5 which drops to 46.4 in 2006, then to 44.5 in 2008 which then increases in an important and statistically significant manner to 54.7 in 2010, later dropping to 50.9 in 2012 and rising once again to 52.7 in 2014. If we take into consideration the test of means, the level of satisfaction with democracy has stabilized between 2012 and 2014.




Figure 9.29. Average of Satisfaction with Democracy, El Salvador 2004-2014

X. Conclusion

In this chapter we show that system support, a fundamental component of political legitimacy, has been dropping in a sustained way from 2004 to 2008 and increasing significantly in 2010 – reaching an average near that which it had in 2004 – only to later drop slightly in 2012 and 2014. The data shows stabilization in the levels of system support in the 2010-2014 rounds in the upper part of the scale (above the average of 50).

While political tolerance, another component of political legitimacy, increased between 2004 and 2006 dropping slightly in 2008 and again falling significantly in 2010 and later dropped slightly in 2012 and 2014. This drop would place the level of political tolerance for the 2010-2014 rounds at a lower level than the initial point of measurement in the 2004 survey. The data show stabilization in the levels of political tolerance in the 2012 and 2014 measurements in the lower part of the scale (below the average of 50).

For the 2008 and 2010 rounds, we observe two trends running in contrary directions. On the one hand, the drop in system support reversed itself and on the other hand, political tolerance fell. In the 2012 and 2014 measurement, although there was slight dropping trend, levels of system support and political tolerance remains stable.

With the purpose of looking to identify factors that help to explain system support levels in the 2014 round, we performed a multiple regression analysis. We found that there are 12 statistically significant predictors: age, area of residence, education, gender, wealth quintiles, approval of the president’s performance, satisfaction with democracy, interest in politics, effectiveness of the vote, ideology, perception of security in the neighborhood and crime victimization.



With respect to political tolerance levels in the 2014 round, we found four statistically significant predictors in the multiple regression analysis. These are: gender, age, education and interest in politics. In this case, men, young people, people with higher education levels and those that have a greater interest in politics are those that show a higher level of political tolerance.

In the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer, ARENA party followers have an average of 43.8 on the political tolerance scale and a 51.9 for system support while FMLN followers have an average of 42 in political tolerance and 57.7 in system support. With regard to the national average, ARENA followers are a little more tolerant (although the difference to FMLN is not statistically significant) and the FMLN followers support the political system more (in this case the difference is statistically significant). Given the degree of importance that the levels of system support and political tolerance has for a democratic system, this is a topic to which should pay more attention in future studies in order to improve our understanding of this theme.

Regarding the analysis of political legitimacy in the 2014 measurement, the cross of the data for system support and political tolerance indicate that 19.3% of respondents fall within the stable democracy cell, 38.7% are situated within the authoritarian stability cell, while 11.5% are located within the unstable democracy cell and 30.6% within the democracy at risk cell.

The results may be placed within a historical context thanks to the fact that we have the data from the surveys carried out during the 2004-2014 period. There are two aspects to which we would like to draw attention. First, the “at-risk democracy” cell (low system support and low tolerance) has gone from 16% in 2004 to increase to 30.6% in 2014; an increase of 14.6 percentage points. Second, this contrasts with the observed reduction of 12.9 percentage points in the “stable democracy” cell (high support and high tolerance) upon comparing the 2004 (32.2%) and 2014 measurements (19.3%). This is an aspect to which should follow up in future studies.

In this chapter, we reported in general terms that support for democracy goes from an average of 68.8 in 2004 to 61.3 in 2006, to climb to 68.4 in 2008. Later it falls to 64.1 in 2010 then increasing to 65.6 in 2012 and again to 65.9 in 2014. Although these last difference are not statistically significant which imply that the levels of support for democracy remain stable for the 2010-2014 rounds in the upper part of the scale (above the average of 50).

At the same time, Salvadorans show a significant level of support for democracy as a political regime in 2014 (76.2%), while 12.9% of the respondents express that an authoritarian government would be preferable and 10.9% voiced indifference.

Furthermore the majority of Salvadorans are satisfied with democracy: 54.9% of the population says they feel very satisfied and satisfied with the performance of democracy, while 40.6% declare that they are dissatisfied and very dissatisfied with democracy. A comparison with the results of previous measurements shows that the average satisfaction with democracy in 2004 was 54.5, which drops to 46.4 in 2006, then to 44.5 in 2008, then increases significantly and in a statistically significant way to 54.7 in 2010, then falling to 50.9 in 2012 and slightly increasing again to 52.7% in 2014.

Appendix

Appendix 9.1. Determinants of Support for the Political System in El Salvador, 2014 (Figure 9.5)

	Standardized Coefficients	(t)
Crime victimization	-0.053*	-2.35
Effectiveness of the vote	-0.081*	-3.44
Age	-0.059*	-2.09
Male	-0.104*	-3.87
Years of education	-0.113*	-3.43
Wealth quintiles	-0.064*	-2.35
Interest in politics	0.085*	3.07
Satisfaction with democracy	0.143*	5.81
Perception of security in the neighborhood	-0.076*	-2.52
Approval of the President's performance	-0.194*	-7.25
Urban	-0.099*	-3.84
Ideology	0.083*	2.84
Perception of personal economic situation	-0.056	-1.87
Perception of national economic situation	-0.053	-1.59
Constant	0.000	0.000
F	23.08	
Number of cases	1318	
R-squared	0.19	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

Appendix 9.2 Determinants of Political Tolerance in El Salvador, 2014 (Figure 9.14)

	Coefficients	(t)
Crime victimization	0.015	0.54
Effectiveness of the vote	0.002	0.07
Age	-0.069*	-2.09
Male	0.083*	2.75
Years of education	0.097*	2.88
Wealth quintiles	0.051	1.45
Interest in politics	0.080*	2.3
Satisfaction with democracy	0.007	0.2
Perception of security in the neighborhood	0.022	0.82
Approval of the President's performance	0.051	1.43
Urban	0.009	0.33
Ideology	0.038	1.2
Perception of personal economic situation	-0.037	-1.16
Perception of national economic situation	0.042	1.17
Constant	0.000	0.000
F	4.2	
Number of cases	1318	
R-squared	0.05	
Regression-Standardized Coefficients with t-Statistics based on Standard Errors Adjusted for the Survey Design * p<0.05		

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Appendices



Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent



March, 2014

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been randomly chosen to participate in a public opinion study. I come on behalf of Vanderbilt and the Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo Foundation (FUNDAUNGO). The project is financed by AID from the United States. The interview will last 45 minutes.

The main objective of the study is to get to know people's opinion on different aspects of the situation in El Salvador. The study will be carried out in a way that we will be able to better understand what people think across the country although we do not offer any specific benefit. We plan to hold a series of conference based on the results of what the people say. We will never reveal an individual opinion.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may skip questions without responding or end the interview at any time. The answers that you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous. You will not receive any payment for your participation but neither will you incur any expenses.

If you have questions regarding the study, you can speak with María Elena Rivera at 22437816 or by email at me.rivera@fundaungo.org.sv. We will leave this card with you in case you want to look it over. The IRB number of the study is 110627.

Do you wish to participate?



Appendix B. Sample Design

Sample Design for the 2014 AmericasBarometer Survey in El Salvador

1. Methodology

The total inhabitants of the country according to the population projections for 2012, obtained from the VI Census of Population and the V Housing Census of the General Directorate of Statistics and Census of El Salvador (DIGESTYC) conducted in 2007, is 6,236,182.

2. Target Population

The target population was all those citizens equal to or greater than 18 years of age and above living in households in the 14 departments of El Salvador. The distribution of this population is presented by department and gender in Table 1.

Table 1. Population Projections for those 18 years or older; Distribution by department and gender. 2012

Department	Total	Males	Females
Ahuachapán	197,567	90,661	106,906
Santa Ana	363,400	165,858	197,542
Sonsonate	278,345	123,203	155,142
Chalatenango	119,509	53,665	65,844
La Libertad	469,201	212,817	256,384
San Salvador	1,148,151	499,771	648,380
Cuscatlán	151,953	70,953	81,000
La Paz	205,315	93,883	111,432
Cabañas	93,473	40,696	52,777
San Vicente	109,522	50,302	59,220
Usulután	228,355	103,126	125,229
San Miguel	295,299	131,376	163,923
Morazán	115,288	51,259	64,029
La Unión	160,040	70,275	89,765
Total	3,935,418	1,757,845	2,177,573

3. Sampling Design

Within the population referenced, we distinguish two types of populations:

- Urban Population

Population residing in the urban areas recognized by the DIGESTYC in the VI Population Census and V Census of Households.

- Rural Population

Population residing in the rural areas recognized by the DIGESTYC, in the VI Population Census and the V Census of Households.

In regard to the census map used, this corresponds to the surveys conducted by DIGESTYC in the 1990s. Such mapping includes urban and rural areas of the country. It was not possible to use census maps from the VI Population Census and the V Census of Households conducted in 2007, given that these are not available at the housing level, which precluded obtaining census segments. It would have been necessary to conduct a survey at the household level, but for reasons of cost and time, it was not feasible.

4. Sample Size

The sample size was established within the guidelines for the "Design of sample surveys of the 2012 Round of the Americas Barometer" (Guidelines for the 2014 Round), with 1,500 surveys. However, we chose to make a total of 1512 interviews in order to obtain a margin that took into consideration the possible errors that could occur in the phase of data processing.

The sampling error was estimated from the formula for simple random sampling for infinite populations. Thus, the maximum permissible error for the whole country was + / - 2.5%.

$$E = \frac{\sqrt{k^2 pq}}{n}$$

Where:

- k = 1.96 95% confidence
- p = q = 0.5 Value that provides the largest sample size
- n = 1500 Sample size

The sample size was distributed by department, municipality and area. According to the guidelines for the 2014 round, segments were allocated proportionately to the size of the large municipalities¹. We also selected four segments in the remaining municipalities (medium and small).

¹ Large municipalities are those with a population greater than 100,000; medium-sized cities have between 25,000-100,000; and small cities have less than 25,000.

5. Sampling Method

The sampling method used was Systematic Sampling with Probability Proportional to Size (PPS). This included four stages:

- First Stage:

In the first sampling stage municipalities were considered as primary sampling units (PSUs). They were ordered according to their size and grouped into large, medium and small. Large municipalities are those municipalities that according to the population projections for 2012 of DIGESTYC have a resident population of 100,000; medium-sized municipalities are those municipalities that according to population projections for 2012 from DIGESTYC have a resident population between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, and small municipalities are those municipalities that according to population projections for 2012 from DIGESTYC have a resident population of less than 25,000 inhabitants. A distribution of the number of cities in each of these conceptions and their corresponding population is presented in Table 2.

Tabla 2. Number of municipalities by size and their populations

Size	Municipalities	Population
Large	12	2,124,200
Medium	50	2,285,772
Small	200	1,826,210
Total	262	6,236,182

We decided to consider large municipalities as self-represented. This is to say that they were selected to be part of the sample automatically. These are presented, along with their population, in Table 3.

Table 3. Population of self-represented municipalities

Departament	Municipality	Population
Ahuachapán	Ahuachapán	115,788
Santa Ana	Santa Ana	262,853
La Libertad	Santa Tecla	133,255
La Libertad	Colón	115,107
San Salvador	San Salvador	298,988
San Salvador	Soyapango	274,163
San Salvador	Apopa	160,263
San Salvador	Mejicanos	149,491
San Salvador	Ciudad Delgado	129,821
San Salvador	Ilopango	121,976
San Salvador	Tonacatepeque	117,857
San Miguel	San Miguel	244,638
Total		2,124,200

The selection of medium and small municipalities was conducted in each stratum with probability proportional to size (PPS) of the municipality's population age of 18 years and older. According to the guidelines for the "Design of sample surveys of the 2012 Round of the Americas Barometer" (Guidelines for the 2014 round), we determined a fixed number of 24 surveys per municipality (medium and small), which was considered as a reasonable number of surveys in the sample.

The allocation of interviews within each municipality took into account the distribution of the population living in each geographical area (urban and rural), yielding the following results.

Table 4. Stratification of municipalities and selected segments

Size of municipality	Households in sample		
	Rural	Urban	Total
Large	60	492	552
Medium	216	312	528
Small	288	144	432
Total	564	948	1,512

- Second Stage:

Census segments were considered as Secondary Sampling Units (SSU). The census segments are geographical areas with approximately 100 occupied households. In the second stage of sampling, census blocks were arranged within municipalities. First, they were ordered by geographical area (urban and rural) and within the geographical area by segment number. Previously, these segments were numbered in a "serpentine" way in order to get a better geographical distribution. In each municipality, depending on their size, segments were selected corresponding proportionally to their geographical area and their selection was made in a systematic way², the results by municipality stratification of the selected segments are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Types of Municipalities and segments in sample

Size of municipality	Segments in sample			Municipalities in sample
	Rural	Urban	Total	
Large	10	82	92	12
Medium	36	52	88	22
Small	48	24	72	18
Total	94	158	252	52

² The Systematic Sampling is a procedure that requires the use of a list of sampling units in the population, selecting a unit at intervals or every K-th unit in the list ($K = N / n$). To choose the first unit using a table of random numbers and then added K to the first unit, that is, if "a" is the first unit, the entire series would be: a, a + k, a + 2k, to + 3k, ..., a + (n-1) k.

- Third Stage:

The Tertiary Sampling Units (TSU) were the households. In the third stage of the sampling, censal blocks with two household each were formed.³ After forming the blocks, three of them were selected in a systematic way in order to obtain the 6 households for each selected segment.

In each segment selected the northwest point was located and then the count of households began along the route of the blocks in a clockwise direction. The housing unit was located on the selection sheet designed for the selection of household.

- Fourth Stage:

In the fourth stage of the sampling, a list of household members with ages of 18 and above was produced. From this point, a household member was selected according who had the nearest birthday, taking special care that the age and gender structure of the country remained similar in the sample. This household member became the Final Sampling Unit (FSU).

6. Estimation of Sampling Errors

The domains of estimation that we defined were the following:

- Total of 14 departments (the entire country)
- Population of large, medium-sized, and small cities (the entire country)
- Urban population and Rural population (the entire country)

From this distribution of domains, the following approximate errors obtained for each of them were:

Table 6. Domains by department, size of municipality and area with its respective approximate errors

Municipality or area	Approximate error
Total of the 14 departments	2.50%
Large municipalities	4.20%
Medium-sized municipalities	4.30%
Small municipalities	4.70%
Urban area	3.20%
Rural area	4.10%

Although we did not initially consider the five geographic regions into which the country can be divided as domains of estimation,⁴ the use of sample design Probability Proportional to Size (PPS)

³ The number of blocks in the segment is the number of housing units divided by 2. For example, if the number of housing units is 80, there are 40 blocks.

⁴ The regions are the following: Western region: Ahuachapán, Santa Ana, Sonsonate. Central REgion I (also called Central): Chalatenango, La Libertad, San Salvador, Cuscatlán. Central Region II (also called Paracentral): La Paz, Cabañas, San Vicente. Región Oriental: Usulután, San Miguel, Morazán, La Unión. Región Área Metropolitana de San Salvador

provided reliable estimates at the level of regions – in this measurement, the approximate errors are presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Surveys by region, area, and their approximate errors

Region	Number of Interviews by Area			Approximate error
	Rural	Urban	Total	
Western region	156	156	312	5.5%
Central region I	108	156	264	6.0%
Central region II	108	84	192	7.1%
Eastern region	180	132	312	5.5%
AMSS	12	420	432	4.7%
Total	564	948	1,512	2.5%
Approximate error	4.1%	3.2%	2.5%	

7. Fieldwork

Fieldwork development was carried out by FUNDAUNGO’s personnel.

Firstly, a pre-test pilot was developed with the objective to evaluate the instrument. This was carried out in rural as well as in urban areas on January 17th and 18th, 2014. Secondly, the training of supervisors and interviewers was completed on March 17th and 18th which was delivered by an agent of LAPOP Central and by personnel from FUNDAUNGO. Thirdly, the pilot test took place on March 19th 2014.

The lifting was initiated on the 28th of March and concluded on the 30th of April 2014. The personnel assigned for this task were: 1 field manager, 3 supervisors, 12 survey takers, and 2 coordinator-supervisors in the office – all personnel from FUNDAUNGO. The interviews were carried out in the residences of each of the respondents and we did not perform telephone interviews.

8. Information Processing

For the development of the survey, we used cellular telephones with an ANDROID operating system. The process used for loading and unloading the interviews was:

- i. In the office we assigned the corresponding cluster (segments) to each work group according to the previous programming and work routes. This procedure took place every day one day in advance of the programmed task.
- ii. The data were loaded on the cellular phones.
- iii. In the field, the interviewers uploaded the surveys that were taking in the precise moment of completing them.
- iv. In the office, we reviewed the surveys using the Adgys System and ensured that the surveys from the programmed cluster were uploaded to the system. This supervision was carried out throughout the work day and at day’s end. In the event that there was a

(AMSS): La Libertad, Santa Tecla, Antiguo Cuscatlán, San Salvador, Soyapango, Apopa, Mejicanos, Ciudad Delgado, Ilopango, Tonacatepeque, San Martín, Cuscatancingo, San Marcos, Ayutuxtepeque y Nejapa.



- discrepancy between the programmed task and the number of surveys by cluster in Adgys, we proceeded to upload the information from the cellular telephones by WiFi. In the event that a survey was carried out in an incorrect cluster or quota, we saved a register so that at the end of the fieldwork, we would generate a report of those errors with the objective of informing LAPOP to make the necessary corrections.
- v. The in-office revision process included a review of the uploaded surveys, the time it took to carry out the revision, and the responses discharged. This control was applied to a selection of surveys.

9. Statistical Analysis

Relatively simple methods of statistical analysis were used. In order to establish the association between two numeric variables, we used the Pearson correlation coefficient. This has values from 0 to 1. When there is perfect correspondence between two values, the coefficient is equal to 1. While establishing the association between a continuous variable and categorical variable we use variance analysis. In order to establish whether or not there is a statistically significant relationship between two categorical variables, we used the chi-square test. To integrate information from several questions on the same topic, we also constructed scales and used the Cronbach alpha coefficient. Coefficients of 0.70 or more are considered reliable and consistent, but in some cases we used scales whose ratio was below these values. We also used factor analysis to determine the number of dimensions or factors involved in a series of questions on the same subject.

On repeated occasions, we estimated multiple linear regression models using ordinary least squares. Usually the dependent variable in these models is an index constructed with various questions. The regression coefficients of these models (and their significance) allow concisely evaluate the co-factors that "explain" these indexes. Although we sometimes refer to these co-factors as "determinants", in fact, with the information available it is not possible to establish causal relationships. We only have "associations". In the regression models also presents the standardized regression coefficients "Beta". These are useful in assessing the relative importance of the different explanatory factors in the model, for measuring the effects of standard units. As an indicator of the goodness of fit of the model as a whole we used the coefficient of determination "R squared". This coefficient reports the proportion of variance explained by the model as a whole, compared with the explanation you would get a "null" model (dependent variable estimated simply by their average). Also, we used binary logistic regression models when the dependent variable takes dichotomous values.

For statistical analyses in this report, we used Stata, Version 12.

10. Precision of the Results

All sample surveys are affected by two types of errors: sampling errors and non-sampling errors. Non-sampling errors are those that are made for the collection and processing of information, the latter can be controlled by constructing a suitable measuring instrument, training the interviewers on the correct application of the instrument, supervising field work, creating an efficient data capture program, revising the questionnaire and providing adequate coding such as file cleaning, among others. These errors can be controlled but cannot be quantified. However, a comparison of the results of the

sample with the population gives an idea of whether these errors have generated biases that taint the representativity of the sample.

Sampling errors, on the other hand, are the product of chance and come from interviewing a sample and not the entire population. When selecting a sample, this is one of many possible samples selected from the population. The variability among all these possible samples is the sampling error, which could be measured if one possessed all of these samples, obviously an unreal situation. In practice, what is done is to estimate this error on the variance obtained from the same sample. To estimate the sampling error of a statistic (mean, percentages, differences and total), we calculate the standard error is the square root of the sample variance under the same conditions. To calculate this error is very important to consider the design that the sample was selected. The design effect (DE), indicates the efficiency of the design used in relation to a simple random sample design (SRS). A value of 1 indicates that the variance obtained for both designs (complex and SRS) is the same, i.e. the complex sample is as efficient as a SRS with the same sample size. If the value is less than 1, indicating that the variance obtained with the complex sample is less than that obtained with the SRS.

11. Final Sample


Below, we present a chart detailing the final result obtained by department and area (rural-urban).

Table 8. Total Valid Surveys by Area of Residency

Departament	Urban	Rural	Total
Ahuachapán	42	54	96
Santa Ana	66	78	144
Sonsonate	48	24	72
Chalatenango	24	24	48
La Libertad	108	36	144
San Salvador	414	18	432
Cuscatlán	30	42	72
La Paz	24	48	72
Cabañas	30	18	48
San Vicente	30	42	72
Usulután	36	36	72
San Miguel	60	60	120
Morazán	12	36	48
La Unión	24	48	72
Total	948	564	1,512

Appendix C. Questionnaire

El Salvador 2014, Versión # 15.2.2.3 IRB Approval: 110627



LAPOP: El Salvador, 2014

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PAIS. País:					03
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam	28. Bahamas	29. Barbados			
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]					_ _ _ _
ESTRATOPRI: Región					_ _
(1) Occidental (2) Central I (3) Central II (4) Oriental (5) AMSS					
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad [población en edad de votar, según censo; modificar por cada país, usando número de estratos y rangos de poblaciones apropiados]:					_
(1) Grande(más de 100,000) (2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 - 100,000)					
(3) Pequeña (< 25,000)					
UPM [Unidad Primaria de Muestreo, normalmente idéntico a "MUNICIPIO"]					_ _ _
PROV. Departamento: _____					3 _ _
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____					3 _ _
ELSSEGMENTO. Segmento censal: _____					_ _ _ _
CLUSTER. [Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral]: _____					_ _ _
[Cada cluster debe tener 6 entrevistas; código asignada(o) por el supervisor de campo]					
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					_
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:					_
(1) Capital Nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana					
(4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural					
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español					_
Hora de inicio: _____:_____					_ _ _ _
FECHA. Fecha Día: _____ Mes: _____ Año: 2014					_ _ _ _

¿Vive usted en esta casa?
 Sí→continúe
 No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista
 ¿Es usted ciudadano salvadoreño o residente permanente de El Salvador?
 Sí→continúe
 No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista
 ¿Cuántos años tiene? [Seguir solo si tiene por lo menos 18]
 Sí→continúe
 No →Agradezca al entrevistado y termine la entrevista
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO Y OBTENER EL ASENTIMIENTO DEL ENTREVISTADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA.

Q1. Género [ANOTAR, NO PREGUNTE]:	(1) Hombre	(2) Mujer	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Q2Y. ¿En qué año nació? _____ año	(8888) NS	(9888) NR	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho(a) está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]	(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Algo satisfecho(a)	(3) Algo insatisfecho(a)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)?	(88) NS	(98) NR		

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	1 (19) Impunidad 20 (61)
Caminos/vías en mal estado	2 (18) Inflación, altos precios 21 (02)
Conflicto armado	3 (30) Los políticos 22 (59)
Corrupción	4 (13) Mal gobierno 23 (15)
Crédito, falta de	5 (09) Medio ambiente 24 (10)
Delincuencia, crimen	6 (05) Migración 25 (16)
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	7 (56) Narcotráfico 26 (12)
Desempleo/falta de empleo	8 (03) Pandillas 27 (14)
Desigualdad	9 (58) Pobreza 28 (04)
Desnutrición	10 (23) Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.) 29 (06)
Desplazamiento forzado	11 (32) Salud, falta de servicio 30 (22)
Deuda externa	12 (26) Secuestro 31 (31)
Discriminación	13 (25) Seguridad (falta de) 32 (27)
Drogas, consumo de; drogadicción	14 (11) Terrorismo 33 (33)
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	15 (01) Tierra para cultivar, falta de 34 (07)
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	16 (21) Transporte, problemas con el 35 (60)
Electricidad, falta de	17 (24) Violencia 36 (57)
Explosión demográfica	18 (20) Vivienda 37 (55)
Guerra contra el terrorismo	19 (17) Otro 38 (70)
NS	88 NR 98

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses ? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses ? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) No sabe (98) No responde	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
---	--



<p>NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) No responde</p>	<p> </p>
<p>SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
<p>Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno. CP4A. ¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación a alguna autoridad local como el alcalde o un concejal? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>

<p>CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Una vez a la semana (2) Una o dos veces al mes (3) Una o dos veces al año (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
---	------------

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: **por lo menos** una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	INAP	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
CP21. ¿Reuniones de grupos deportivos o recreativos? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98		
CPSS1. Durante los últimos dos años, ¿usted ha participado como jugador junto a otras personas en la práctica de algún deporte? [Leer alternativas]	1	2	3	4	88	98		

<p>IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable o nada confiable? (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
--	------------

	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP	
CP21A. ¿Hay una asociación o junta directiva de vecinos en este barrio [Si la respuesta es NO, NS o NR, pase a CP26]	1	0	88	98		
CP22. ¿Es usted miembro de esa asociación o junta directiva?	1	0	88	98	99	
CP23. En los últimos tres meses, ¿ha asistido usted a una reunión convocada por la asociación o junta directiva de vecinos?	1	0	88	98	99	
CP24. En los últimos tres meses, ¿ha realizado usted trabajo voluntario para esa asociación o junta directiva?	1	0	88	98	99	
CP25. En los últimos tres meses, ¿ha promovido la asociación o junta directiva de vecinos de este barrio actividades para prevenir la delincuencia, tales como tomar medidas de seguridad para el vecindario u otras actividades?	1	0	88	98	99	
CP26. ¿Hay alguna otra asociación o institución que esté promoviendo programas para la prevención de la delincuencia en este barrio?	1	0	88	98		

	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP	
ESCP27. ¿Ha oído hablar del Comité o Consejo de Prevención de la Violencia de este municipio? [Si la respuesta es NO, NS o NR, pase a L1]	1	0	88	98		
ESCP28n. En los últimos tres meses, ¿ha asistido usted o algún conocido a una reunión convocada por el Comité o Consejo de Prevención de la Violencia de este municipio?	1	0	88	98	99	

[ENTREGAR TARJETA "B"]	NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO							Anotar 1-7, NS=88 NR=98 INAP=99				
Usando esta tarjeta en donde hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Podría decirme...												
ESCP29. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que el Comité o Consejo de Prevención de la Violencia de este municipio ha logrado reducir el nivel de la delincuencia?												

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR	
										88	98	
izquierda										Derecha		

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR	
--	--



Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	□□□
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	□□□

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre la Asamblea Legislativa y gobierne sin Asamblea Legislativa?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	□□□
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VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí **[Siga]** (2) No **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]** (88) NS **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**
(98) NR **[Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]**

VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses?
[Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? **[Leer alternativas]**

(01) Robo sin arma **sin** agresión o amenaza física
(02) Robo sin arma **con** agresión o amenaza física
(03) Robo con arma
(04) Agresión física sin robo
(05) Violación o asalto sexual
(06) Secuestro
(07) Daño a la propiedad
(08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie
(10) Extorsión [o alguien le pidió "renta"]
(11) **[No leer]** Otro
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP (no fue víctima)

VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincencial del cual usted fue víctima? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) En su hogar
(2) En este barrio o comunidad
(3) En este municipio
(4) En otro municipio
(5) En otro país
(88) NS
(98) NR
(99) INAP

VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o **algún otro tipo** de acto delincencial en los últimos 12 meses?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)

En los últimos 12 meses, cuáles de las siguientes actividades ha visto a la Policía Nacional Civil hacer en este barrio...	SÍ	No	NS	NR	
CPOL1. Conversar con los residentes de este barrio	1	2	88	98	□□□
CPOL2. Asistir a reuniones de vecinos de este barrio	1	2	88	98	□□□

CPOL3. Ha visto a la Policía Nacional Civil ayudar a realizar actividades de prevención de la delincuencia en este barrio	1	2	88	98	□□□
CPOL4. Relacionarse con los niños y jóvenes de este barrio a través de actividades recreativas y escolares	1	2	88	98	□□□

POLE2N. En general, usted está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con el desempeño de la policía en su barrio o colonia? [Si responde que no hay policía en el barrio marcar "(4) Muy insatisfecho"] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
ICO2. ¿Con qué frecuencia la policía nacional civil patrulla aquí en su barrio ? Usted diría: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (5) Varias veces al día (6) Al menos una vez al día (7) Algunas veces por semana (8) Algunas veces por mes (5) Rara vez (6) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/la colonia donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a) ? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
PESE1. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor que el de otras colonias o barrios en este municipio? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
PESE2. ¿Considera usted que el nivel de violencia actual en su barrio es mayor, igual, o menor que el de hace 12 meses? (1) Mayor (2) Igual (3) Menor (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas o maras? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delinquentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) La policía protege a la gente frente a la delincuencia, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] Ninguna, o ambas (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigue al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR					□□□
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delinquentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delinquentes (3) [No leer] Ambas (88) NS (98) NR					□□□

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "B"]

Usando de nuevo la tarjeta B, en la cual 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Entonces, ¿hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						Mucho	No sabe	No responde

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de El Salvador garantizan un juicio justo? <i>(Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)</i>	_ _
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de El Salvador?	_ _
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político salvadoreño?	_ _
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político salvadoreño?	_ _
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político salvadoreño?	_ _
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	_ _
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Tribunal Supremo Electoral?	_ _
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fuerza Armada?	_ _
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Legislativa?	_ _
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional Civil?	_ _
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	_ _
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Iglesias Evangélicas?	_ _
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	_ _
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	_ _
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipalidad?	_ _
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	_ _
ESB48. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Instituto de Acceso a la Información Pública?	_ _
Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	_ _
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	_ _
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	_ _
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿hasta qué punto los partidos políticos salvadoreños representan bien a sus votantes?	_ _
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted?	_ _
NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas salvadoreñas respetan los derechos humanos de los salvadoreños hoy en día?	_ _
MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América?	_ _
MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América deberían trabajar junto con las Fuerzas Armadas de El Salvador para mejorar la seguridad nacional?	_ _
Utilizando la misma escala de 1 a 7, donde 1 es "nada" y 7 es "mucho", cuál es la probabilidad que tendría de ser castigado por las autoridades alguien que en su barrio haga las siguientes acciones...	(88) NS (98) NR
PR3A. Compre DVDs piratas. ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	_ _
PR3B. ¿Y si se conecta a la electricidad sin pagar (colgados)? ¿Qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	_ _
PR3C. Y si alguien en su barrio se toma un terreno desocupado, ¿qué tan probable es que sea castigado por las autoridades?	_ _
PR4. ¿Hasta qué punto siente usted que el Estado salvadoreño respeta la propiedad privada de sus ciudadanos? Seguimos con la misma escala de 1-nada a 7-mucho.	_ _

[RECOGER TARJETA "B"]

<p>PR5. ¿Usted cree que el Estado salvadoreño tiene el derecho a tomar la propiedad privada de una persona en nombre del interés nacional incluso si esa persona no está de acuerdo, o cree que el Estado no tiene el derecho a hacerlo?</p> <p>(1) El Estado tiene el derecho de tomar la propiedad (2) El Estado no tiene el derecho (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
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<p>M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Mauricio Funes es...?: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
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<p>SD2NEW2. Y pensando en esta ciudad/área donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas?</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
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<p>SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? ¿Está usted...[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a)? (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
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<p>SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? ¿Está usted...[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
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<p>INFRA X. Suponga que alguien se mete a robar a su casa y usted llama a la policía. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que la Policía se demoraría en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay Policía/ No llegaría nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
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<p>INFRA 2. Suponga ahora que su casa se incendia. ¿Cuánto tiempo cree que se demorarían los bomberos en llegar a su casa un día cualquiera, a mediodía?[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y hasta 30 minutos (3) Más de 30 minutos y hasta una hora (4) Más de 1 hora y hasta 3 horas (5) Más de 3 horas (6) [NO LEER] No hay bomberos/ No llegarían nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>
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[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo		NS	NR

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

<p>ROS1. El Estado salvadoreño, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?</p>	<p> </p>
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ROS4. El Estado salvadoreño debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase? Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	□□□
ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	□□□
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	□□□
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	□□□
MIL7. Las Fuerzas Armadas deben participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en El Salvador. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	□□□

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

ENV1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: a proteger el medio ambiente o a promover el crecimiento económico? (1) Proteger el medio ambiente (2) Promover el crecimiento económico (3) [No leer] Ambas (88) NS (98) NR	□□□
PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en El Salvador? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	□□□
W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando peligra la salud de la madre? (1) Sí, se justificaría (2) No, no se justificaría (88) NS (98) NR	□□□

EPN3A. ¿Qué tanto el Gobierno Central representa sus intereses y le beneficia como ciudadano? ¿Representa mucho, algo, poco o nada de sus intereses? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	□□□
EPN3B. ¿Qué tanto los Diputados de la Asamblea Legislativa representan sus intereses y le benefician como ciudadano? ¿Representa mucho sus intereses, algo, poco o nada de sus intereses? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	□□□
EPN3C. ¿Qué tanto la Alcaldía y Concejo Municipal representan sus intereses y le benefician como ciudadano? ¿Representa mucho sus intereses, algo, poco o nada de sus intereses? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	□□□

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted <i>desaprueba firmemente</i> y el 10 indica que usted <i>aprueba firmemente</i> . Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 NS	98 NR
Desaprueba firmemente										Aprueba firmemente	

	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	□□□
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	□□□

E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en El Salvador. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos	1-10, 88=NS, 98=NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de El Salvador. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	

[Recoger tarjeta "D"]

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?	--	0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno)?	--	0	1	88	98	
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado un soborno o mordida?	--	0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la alcaldía de la ciudad donde vive en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en la alcaldía, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR			
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (o soborno) en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98			
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (o soborno) en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98			
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98			
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → MARCAR 99 Y PASAR A ESEXC16A Si la respuesta es Sí → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) en la escuela o colegio? [DESPUES PASAR A EXC18]	99	0	1	88	98			
ESEXC16A. ¿Por qué no tuvo hijo en la escuela? [No leer alternativas] (1) Violencia (2) Pandillas (3) Drogas (4) Trabajo (5) Embarazo (6) No hay cupo en la escuela (7) Muy lejos (8) No tiene hijos (9) No tiene hijos en edad escolar (solo pre-escolares o adultos) (88) NS (89) NR (99) INAP								
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno)? (0) No (1) Sí (88) NS (98) NR								
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR								
Ahora voy a leerle una lista de situaciones que pueden o no ser problema en algunos barrios. Por favor dígame si las siguientes situaciones son un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no son un problema en su barrio . [Repita después cada pregunta “es esto un problema muy serio, algo serio, poco serio, nada serio o no es un problema” para ayudar al entrevistado]								
	Muy serio	Algo serio	Poco serio	Nada serio	No es un problema	NS	NR	
DISO7. Jóvenes o niños en las calles sin hacer nada, que andan vagando en su barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO8. Jóvenes o niños que viven aquí en su barrio/colonia en pandillas o maras	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	

DISO10. Venta o tráfico de drogas ilegales aquí en su barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO18. Riñas o peleas de pandillas o maras aquí en su barrio	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO14. Gente drogada en las calles de aquí de su barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO16. Asaltos a las personas cuando caminan por la calle de aquí, de su barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
DISO17. Balaceras aquí en su barrio/colonia	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
ELSDISO18. Reclutamiento de jóvenes en las pandillas a la salida de los centros escolares	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	
ELSDISO19. Deserción de jóvenes en las escuelas debido a la presencia de pandillas	1	2	3	4	5	88	98	

Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿cuáles de los siguientes actos de delincuencia han ocurrido en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia.	Sí	No	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	NS	NR	INAP	
VICBAR1. Han ocurrido robos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1 [Continúe]	2 [Pasar a VICBAR3]				88	98		
						[Pasar a VICBAR3]			
VICBAR1F ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año?			1	2	3	88	98	99	
VICBAR3. Han ocurrido ventas de drogas ilegales en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1	2				88	98		
VICBAR4. Han ocurrido extorsiones o cobro de impuesto de guerra en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1 [Continúe]	2 [Pasar a VICBAR7]				88	98		
						[Pasar a VICBAR7]			
VICBAR4F ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año?			1	2	3	88	98	99	
VICBAR7. ¿Han ocurrido asesinatos en los últimos 12 meses en su barrio/colonia?	1 [Continúe]	2 [Pasar a FEAR10]				88	98		
						[Pasar a FEAR10]			
VICBAR7F. ¿Cuántas veces ocurrió eso: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año?			1	2	3	88	98	99	

	Sí	No	NS	NR	
FEAR10. Para protegerse de la delincuencia, en los últimos 12 meses ha tomado alguna medida como evitar caminar por algunas zonas de su barrio/colonia porque puedan ser peligrosas?	1	0	88	98	
VIC44. En los últimos 12 meses, por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	1	0	88	98	
VB1. ¿Tiene Documento Único de Identidad (DUI)? (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (88) NS (98) NR					
VB2. ¿Votó usted en la primera vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2014? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB4NEW] (88) NS [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (98) NR [Pasar a ELSVB2n]					
VB3n. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2014? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, [Pasar VB101] (97) Ninguno (anuló su voto) [Pasar VB101] (301) Norman Quijano, ARENA [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (302) Salvador Sánchez Cerén, FMLN [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (303) Antonio Saca, Unidad [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (304) Óscar Lemus, FPS [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (305) René Rodríguez Hurtado, PSP [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (377) Otro [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (88) NS [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (98) NR [Pasar a ELSVB2n] (99) INAP (No votó) [Pasar a VB4NEW]					
VB4NEW. [SOLO PARA LOS QUE NO VOTARON. NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] [Si dice “no voté porque no quería”, preguntar por qué no quiso votar] ¿Por qué no votó en la primera vuelta de las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [Una sola respuesta] (1) Estaba confundido (2) No me gustaron los candidatos o la campaña (3) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (4) No creo en la democracia (5) Cuestiones burocráticas (registro, padrón) (6) Cuestiones de edad (muy joven, muy viejo) (7) No estaba en el distrito/estaba de viaje (8) No me interesa la política (77) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Sí votó) [DESPUÉS DE ESTA PREGUNTA IR A ELSVB2n]					
VB101. [SOLO A LOS QUE RESPONDIERON “NINGUNO (BLANCO O NULO)” EN VB3n] ¿Por qué votó usted nulo o blanco en la primera vuelta de las pasadas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (1) Estaba confundido (2) Quería demostrar su descontento con todos los candidatos, no le gustó ninguno (3) No creo en la democracia, quería protestar contra el sistema político (4) No creo en las elecciones o autoridades electorales (5) No me interesa la política (6) Mi voto no marca la diferencia (7) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP					

<p>ELSVB2n. ¿Votó usted en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales el 9 de marzo de 2014? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a ELSVB100a] (88) NS [Pasar a ELSVB100b] (98) NR [Pasar a ELSVB100b]</p>	<p> </p>
<p>ELSVB3u. ¿Por cuál partido votó para presidente en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones el 9 de marzo de 2014? (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (301) ARENA (302) FMLN (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no votó) [DESPUÉS DE ESTA PREGUNTA IR A ELSVB100b]</p>	<p> </p>
<p>ELSVB100a. [Sólo para los que no votaron] ¿Por qué no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de marzo de 2014 en segunda vuelta [9 de marzo]? [Anotar una sola respuesta] [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de DUI (07) No se encontró en padrón electoral (08) No tener edad necesaria (09) Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado (10) Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo (11) Incapacidad física o discapacidad (12) Por temor a violencia electoral (13) Falta de confianza en los partido (14) Tener el DUI vencido (77) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	<p> </p>
<p>ELSVB100b. Como usted sabe, un número importante de gente no votó en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de marzo de 2014 en segunda vuelta [9 de marzo]. ¿Para usted, cuál es el principal motivo que explica por qué la gente no votó? [Anotar una sola respuesta] [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS] (01) Falta de transporte (02) Enfermedad (03) Falta de interés (04) No le gustó ningún candidato (05) No cree en el sistema (06) Falta de DUI (07) No se encontró en padrón electoral (08) No tener edad necesaria (09) Llegó tarde a votar y estaba cerrado (10) Tener que trabajar / Falta de tiempo (11) Incapacidad física o discapacidad (12) Por temor a violencia electoral (13) Falta de confianza en los partidos (14) Tener el DUI vencido (77) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p> </p>



<p>ELSVB48. ¿Por cuál partido votó para diputados en las elecciones pasadas de marzo de 2012? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) ARENA (2) FMLN (3) PCN/CN (4) PDC/Partido de la Esperanza (5) CD (6) GANA (7) PP (8) PNL (9) Candidatos no partidarios (10) Votó nulo, en blanco (11) No votó (12) No tenía edad para votar (77) Otros (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>(301) FMLN (302) ARENA (303) GANA (304) PCN/CN (305) PDC/Partido de la Esperanza (306) CD (307) FPS (308) PSP (309) PDS (310) PSD (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
<p>VB49. ¿Cree usted que el voto puede cambiar la forma de cómo las cosas van a ser en el futuro o cree que no importa cómo vote, las cosas no van a mejorar? (1) El voto puede cambiar las cosas (2) No importa cómo vote (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Ahora le voy a leer una serie de fuentes de información que la gente usa para tomar la decisión de por quién votar. Por favor dígame si usted usa cada una de esas fuentes para decidir por quién votar:					
	Sí	No	NS	NR	
ELSVB55A. La Radio ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ELSVB55B. La Televisión ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ELSVB55C. El Periódico ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ELSVB55D. Internet ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

ELSVB55E. Facebook ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	
ELSVB55F. Twitter ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	
ELSVB55G. Amigos o parientes ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	
ELSVB55H. Volantes, vallas, mítines ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	
ELSVB55I. Foros con candidatos ¿Usa esta fuente de información para tomar la decisión de por quién votar?	(1)	(0)	(88)	(98)	
CLIEN1n. Pensando en las últimas elecciones nacionales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció un favor, regalo u otro beneficio a alguna persona que usted conoce para que lo apoye o vote por él? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR					
CLIEN1na Y pensando en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2014, ¿alguien le ofreció a usted un favor, regalo o beneficio a cambio de su voto? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR					
[ENTREGAR TARJETA G] FOR1n. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre sus opiniones respecto de algunos países. ¿Cuál de los siguientes países es el que tiene más influencia en América Latina? [Leer opciones] (1) China, o sea, China continental y no Taiwán (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Brasil (6) Venezuela (7) México (10) España (11) [No leer] Otro país (12) [No leer] Ninguno (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR					
FOR4. Y dentro de 10 años, en su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países tendrá más influencia en América Latina? [Leer opciones] (1) China continental (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Brasil (6) Venezuela (7) México (10) España (11) [No leer] Otro país (12) [No leer] Ninguno (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR					
[RECOGER TARJETA "G". ENTREGAR TARJETA "H"] FOR5. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro de nuestro país? [Leer opciones] (1) China continental (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Singapur (6) Rusia (7) Corea del Sur (10) Brasil (11) Venezuela, o (12) México (13) [No leer] Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo (14) [No leer] Otro (88) NS (98) NR					
[RECOGER TARJETA "H"] FOR6. Y pensando ahora sólo en nuestro país , ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en nuestro país? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucha [Sigue] (2) Algo [Sigue] (3) Poca [Sigue] (4) Nada [Pasar a FOR6b] (88) NS [Pasar a FOR6b] (98) NR [Pasar a FOR6b]					
FOR7. En general, ¿la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa? (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP					



<p>FOR6b. Y pensando ahora sólo en nuestro país, ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene EEUU en nuestro país? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Mucha [Sigue] (2) Algo [Sigue] (3) Poca [Sigue] (4) Nada [Pasar a MIL10A] (88) NS [Pasar a MIL10A] (98) NR [Pasar a MIL10A]</p>	_ _
<p>FOR7b. ¿La influencia que Estados Unidos tiene en nuestro país es muy positiva, positiva, negativa, o muy negativa?</p> <p>1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	_ _

Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en **los gobiernos** de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.

	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	_ _
MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	_ _
MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	_ _

Ahora le voy a leer algunas situaciones en las que algunas personas creen que está justificado que el esposo golpee a su esposa/pareja y le voy a pedir su opinión....	Aprobaría	No aprobaría, pero lo entendería	No lo aprobaría, ni lo entendería	NS	NR	
DVW1. La esposa descuida las labores del hogar. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	1	2	3	88	98	_ _
DVW2. La esposa es infiel. ¿Usted aprobaría que el esposo golpee a su esposa, o usted no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, o usted ni lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	1	2	3	88	98	_ _

<p>WF1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda regular en dinero, alimento o en productos de parte del gobierno, sin contar las pensiones?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	_ _
<p>CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso (PATI), ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	_ _
<p>CCT1C. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa Comunidades Solidarias, ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	_ _

ELSMAR1. Ahora pasando a otro tema. En diciembre pasado, el gobierno uruguayo legalizó la producción y el consumo de la marihuana en ese país. ¿Usted estaría muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con que el gobierno salvadoreño legalizara la producción y el consumo de la marihuana en el país?

(1) Muy de acuerdo
 (2) De acuerdo
 (3) **[NO LEER]** Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
 (4) En desacuerdo
 (5) Muy en desacuerdo
 (88) NS
 (98) NR

|_|_|

ELSMAR7a. Algunas personas consumen o han probado marihuana. Por favor dígame, ¿alguna vez probó marihuana?

(1) No, nunca
 (2) Sí, una vez
 (3) Sí, dos o más veces
 (88) NS
 (98) NR

|_|_|

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
 Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total
[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						_ _
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15				
No sabe	88						
No responde	98						

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? **[NO LEER OPCIONES]**

(00) Ninguno
 (01) Primaria incompleta
 (02) Primaria completa
 (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto
 (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo
 (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta
 (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa
 (07) Universitaria incompleta
 (08) Universitaria completa
 (88) NS
 (98) NR

|_|_|



<p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones] [Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11] (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'í). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>
<p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>
<p>OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas] (1) Trabajando? [Siga] (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a PR1] (4) Es estudiante? [Pase a PR1] (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a PR1] (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a PR1] (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a PR1] (88) NS [Pase a PR1] (98) NR [Pase a PR1]</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>
<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal? (2) Asalariado en el sector privado? (3) Patrono o socio de empresa? (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia? (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>
<p>PR1. La vivienda que ocupa su hogar es... [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]: (1) Alquilada (2) Propia, [Si el entrevistado duda, decir "totalmente pagada o siendo pagada a plazos/cuota/hipoteca"] (3) Prestada/cedida o compartida (4) [NO LEER] Otra situación (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>
<p>INFO1. ¿Ha escuchado hablar sobre la Ley de Acceso a la Información Pública? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>
<p>INFO2. Con el fin de solicitar algún tipo de información ¿ha contactado a una o más de las siguientes instituciones en el último año: Gobierno Central, Alcaldía, Asamblea Legislativa u Órgano Judicial? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>
<p>INFO3. Ha consultado el sitio web de alguna institución pública buscando información pública? (1) Sí [Sigue] (0) No [Pasar a Q10NEW] (88) NS [Pasar a Q10NEW] (98) NR [Pasar a Q10NEW]</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"> _ _ </p>

<p>INFO4. ¿Encontró lo que buscaba? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	<p>□□</p>
<p>[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”]</p>	
<p>Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$40 (02) \$40 - \$55 (03) \$56 - \$75 (04) \$76 - \$100 (05) \$101 - \$125 (06) \$126 - \$150 (07) \$151 - \$170 (08) \$171 - \$200 (09) \$201 - \$235 (10) \$236 - \$270 (11) \$271 - \$325 (12) \$326 - \$380 (13) \$381 - \$440 (14) \$441 - \$550 (15) \$551 - \$780 (16) Más de \$780 (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p>□□</p>
<p>PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]</p> <p>Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? [Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, en concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$40 (02) \$40 - \$55 (03) \$56 - \$75 (04) \$76 - \$100 (05) \$101 - \$125 (06) \$126 - \$150 (07) \$151 - \$170 (08) \$171 - \$200 (09) \$201 - \$235 (10) \$236 - \$270 (11) \$271 - \$325 (12) \$326 - \$380 (13) \$381 - \$440 (14) \$441 - \$550 (15) \$551 - \$780 (16) Más de \$780 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)</p>	<p>□□</p>
<p>[RECOGER TARJETA “F”]</p>	
<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p>□□</p>
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	<p>□□</p>



Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas] (1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] (1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Q11n. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas] (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Q12Bn. ¿Cuántos niños menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? [Contar todos los hijos del entrevistado, que vivan o no en el hogar] _____ (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-salvadoreña, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (301) Castellano/español (302) Náhuatl (306) Inglés (304) Otro (nativo) (305) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? [Leer opciones] (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR					<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...	Correcto	Incorrecto	No sabe	No responde	
G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]	1	2	88	98	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
G1X4. ¿En qué continente queda Nigeria? [NO LEER: África]	1	2	88	98	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en El Salvador? [NO LEER: 5 años]	1	2	88	98	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

G17. ¿Cuántos diputados tiene la Asamblea Legislativa? [ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]	Número: _____	8888	9888	_ _ _ _
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	(88) NS	(98) NR
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R12. Agua potable dentro de la vivienda	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R18. Servicio de Internet	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R1. Televisor	(0) No [Pasa a R26]	(1) Sí [Sigue]	(88) NS	(98) NR		
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de saneamiento/desagüe/drenaje?	(0) No	(1) Sí	(88) NS	(98) NR		

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

FORMATQ. Favor indicar el formato en que se completó ESTE cuestionario específico	_
1. Papel	
2. Android	
3. Windows PDA	

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____	_ _ _
(97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____	_ _ _
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	_ _ _
SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	_
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo.	_ _ _

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____
Firma del supervisor de campo _____
Comentarios: _____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____
[No usar para PDA/Android] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____




Tarjeta A (L1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				




Tarjeta B






Tarjeta C





Tarjeta D





Tarjeta G

Brasil

China continental

España

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Venezuela

Tarjeta H

Brasil

China continental

Corea del Sur

Estados Unidos

India

Japón

México

Rusia

Singapur

Venezuela



Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$40
- (02) \$40 - \$55
- (03) \$56 - \$75
- (04) \$76 - \$100
- (05) \$101 - \$125
- (06) \$126 - \$150
- (07) \$151 - \$170
- (08) \$171 - \$200
- (09) \$201 - \$235
- (10) \$236 - \$270
- (11) \$271 - \$325
- (12) \$326 - \$380
- (13) \$381 - \$440
- (14) \$441 - \$550
- (15) \$551 - \$780
- (16) Más de \$780



Paleta de Colores





[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
 _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15				
No sabe	88						
No responde	98						

[NO ENTREGAR A ENTREVISTADOS. ESTA TARJETA ES SOLO PARA ENTREVISTADORES]

Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? **[No leer opciones]**

[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]

(01) Católico

(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).

(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).

(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)

(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).

(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).

(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esotérica).

(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)

(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)

(12) Testigos de Jehová.

(88) NS

(98) NR

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in research collaborations with LAPOP. LAPOP's efforts are directed at producing objective, non-partisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. These studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behaviors related to democracy and quality of life. Over the course of the AmericasBarometer's duration, the project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, the University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the Kellogg Institute at Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The most recent surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in 2014 via face-to-face interviews in Latin American and Caribbean countries, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. The same surveys were conducted by internet to national samples in the United States and Canada. Interviews were conducted in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer includes surveys conducted in 28 countries across the Americas and more than 50,000 interviews. Common core modules and standardized techniques allow for comparison across individuals, between certain sub-national regions within countries, across countries, and over time.

The Latin American Public Opinion Project offers its AmericasBarometer country datasets free to the public via its web page: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles and books that LAPOP produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed via our "data repositories" and subscribing institutions in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate in the pursuit of excellence in academic and policy research and analysis throughout the Americas.

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