
Political Culture of Democracy in Ecuador, 2010

Democratic Consolidation in the Americas in Hard Times

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES	V
LIST OF TABLES	XI
PREFACE	XIII
PROLOGUE: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY	XV
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>xxii</i>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	XXV
PART I: HARD TIMES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DEMOCRACY	1
CHAPTER I . HARD TIMES IN THE AMERICAS: ECONOMIC OVERVIEW	3
<i>Introduction</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Economic Overview.....</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Ecuador</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Trends in Democratic Development.....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Dimensions of Democracy in Ecuador.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy.....</i>	<i>16</i>
CHAPTER II . CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES DURING HARD TIMES IN THE AMERICAS	19
<i>Introduction.....</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?.....</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>The Ecuadorian Case.....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Personal Experiences with Economic Instability</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Job loss.....</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Socio-Demographic Factors and Employment in Ecuador.....</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>Reported Decrease in Household Income</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Who Was Most Affected by the Economic Crisis?.....</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Perceptions of Personal and National Economic Situations</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	<i>35</i>
CHAPTER III . DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN HARD TIMES	37
<i>Introduction.....</i>	<i>37</i>
<i>Support for Democracy</i>	<i>46</i>
<i>Support for the Political System</i>	<i>50</i>
<i>Satisfaction with democracy.....</i>	<i>58</i>
<i>Support for Military Coups</i>	<i>63</i>
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	<i>70</i>
PART II: RULE OF LAW, CRIME, CORRUPTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY	71
CHAPTER IV . RULE OF LAW, CRIME, AND CORRUPTION	73
<i>Introduction.....</i>	<i>73</i>
<i>Theoretical background</i>	<i>73</i>
<i>Perception of Insecurity and Crime</i>	<i>74</i>
<i>Crime Victimization.....</i>	<i>76</i>
<i>Corruption.....</i>	<i>82</i>
<i>Theoretical Background</i>	<i>82</i>
<i>Measuring Corruption</i>	<i>83</i>
<i>Perception of Corruption.....</i>	<i>84</i>
<i>Victimization by Corruption</i>	<i>86</i>
<i>The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy.....</i>	<i>91</i>
<i>Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity.....</i>	<i>92</i>
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	<i>96</i>
CHAPTER V . LEGITIMACY, SYSTEM SUPPORT, AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE.....	97
<i>Introduction.....</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>Theoretical Background.....</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>The Legitimacy and Tolerance Equation.....</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>A. Support for the Political System.....</i>	<i>99</i>
<i>Theoretical Background</i>	<i>99</i>
<i>B. Political Tolerance.....</i>	<i>103</i>

Theoretical Background	103
C. <i>Support for a Stable Democracy</i>	106
Who is more likely to Support a Stable Democracy?	109
D. <i>Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions</i>	112
<i>Attitudes toward Democracy</i>	114
Support for Democracy	115
Satisfaction with Democracy	116
Conclusion.....	119
CHAPTER VI . CIVIL SOCIETY AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION.....	121
Introduction	121
Theoretical Background	121
Interpersonal Trust.....	122
Civic Participation	127
Participation in Protests and Demonstrations	130
Electoral Participation.....	131
Interest in Politics and Activism.....	136
Conclusion.....	138
CHAPTER VII . LOCAL GOVERNMENT	141
Introduction	141
Theoretical Background	143
Participation in Local Government Meetings	144
Demand-Making on the Municipal Government	150
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	156
Citizen Participation in Local Government, Satisfaction with Services Provided by the Municipality and its Impact on Respect for State Political Institutions.....	164
Conclusion.....	166
PART III: BEYOND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS	169
CHAPTER VIII . WHAT ARE THE OPINIONS OF ECUADORIANS ON STATE DECENTRALIZATION?	171
Introduction	171
Literature Review	172
Theoretical Background	174
Measuring Public Support for the Decentralization of the State.....	175
A. Administrative Decentralization.....	176
B. Fiscal Decentralization	178
C. Political Decentralization	180
Discussion and Conclusions.....	198
CHAPTER IX . LEFT, RIGHT OR NOT IMPORTANT? POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN ECUADOR.....	201
Introduction	201
Theoretical Background	201
American Political Ideology.....	202
Political Ideology in Ecuador	204
Conclusion.....	212
REFERENCES.....	213
APPENDIXES	221
Appendix I: Regression Tables	223
Appendix II: Technical Description of the Sample Design.....	239
Appendix III: Informed Consent Form	271
Appendix IV: Questionnaire	273

List of Figures

Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections, 2007-2011	4
Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009 as Reported by the World Bank.....	6
Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010.....	7
Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008-2009.....	8
Figure I.5. Variation in GDP per Capita, 2000-2009.....	9
Figure I.6. Annual Unemployment Rate, 2000-2009	10
Figure I.7. Urban Poverty and Indigence Measured by Level of Income, 1999 - 2008	11
Figure I.8. Freedom in the World: Global Gains Minus Declines from 2003-2010, by Reporting Year..	12
Figure I.9. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas	14
Figure I.10. Trends in Authority	15
Figure I.11. Freedom in Ecuador	16
Figure II.1. Perception of an Economic Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean (Percentage of the Total Population)	20
Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population that Perceived There is an Economic Crisis	21
Figure II.3. Perception of the Economic Crisis in Ecuador (Percentage of the Total Population).....	22
Figure II.4. Who is Responsible for the Economic Crisis? (Percentage of the Total Population)	23
Figure II.5. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? Results by Region, 2010	24
Figure II.6. Who is Responsible for the Crisis? Ecuador, 2010	25
Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010.....	26
Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at Least One Family Member Who Lost a Job in the Past Two Years.....	27
Figure II.9. Percentage of Ecuadorians Who Lost Jobs.....	28
Figure II.10. Percentage of Ecuadorians Who Lost Jobs by Sex, Age, Education, Area of Residence	29
Figure II.11. Changes in Reported Household Income in the Americas, 2008-2010.....	30
Figure II.12. Has your household income decrease, remain the same, or increase over the past two years? (Percentage of Total Population).....	31
Figure II.13. Percentage of Individuals in the Americas Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010	32
Figure II.14. Percentage of Ecuadorians Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010	33
Figure II.15. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy During Hard Times in the Americas, 2010	34
Figure II.16. Relation between the Reduction in Household Income and Economic Perceptions in Ecuador	35
Figure III.1. Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008.....	39
Figure III.2. Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction, 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of the Total Population).....	40
Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Perceptions of their Personal Retrospective Economic Situation.....	41
Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Total Population).....	43
Figure III.5. Determinants of Change in Life Satisfaction in Ecuador.....	44
Figure III.6. Impact of Satisfaction with the Current President's Performance on Change in Life Satisfaction in Ecuador	45

Figure III.7. Impact of the Perception of the Government's Economic Performance on Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction.....	46
Figure III.8. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010.....	47
Figure III.9. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample).....	48
Figure III.10. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Ecuador, 2010.....	49
Figure III.11. Perception of the Government's Economic Management and Support for Democracy	50
Figure III.12. Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010.....	52
Figure III.13. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample)	53
Figure III.14. Determinants of Support for the Ecuadorian Political System.....	54
Figure III.15. Perception of the Ecuadorian Government's Performance and Support of the Ecuadorian Political System, 2010	55
Figure III.16. Perception of Government's Economic Performance, 2008 vs. 2010.....	56
Figure III.17. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis.....	57
Figure III.18. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Subnational Level Analysis.....	58
Figure III.19. Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010.....	60
Figure III.20. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample).....	61
Figure III.21. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador, 2010	62
Figure III.22. Perception of the Government's and Current President's Economic Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador, 2010.....	63
Figure III.23. Justification of a Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010	64
Figure III.24. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample)	65
Figure III.25. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in Ecuador, 2010	66
Figure III.26. Perception of the Economic Crisis and Support for Military Coups.....	67
Figure III.27. Support for Military Coups by Negative Perception of the National Economic Situation and by Those Who Lost Their Jobs	68
Figure III.28. Support for Military Coups by Level of Education and Age	68
Figure III.29. Satisfaction with the Current President's Performance and Support for Military Coups	69
Figure IV.1. Perception of Insecurity in Latin America, 2010	75
Figure IV.2. Perception of Insecurity in Ecuador: 2001-2010.....	76
Figure IV.3. Victimization by Crime at the Individual Level, Ecuador 2010	77
Figure IV.4. Victimization by Crime in Ecuador by Year.....	78
Figure IV.5. Victimization by Crime in the Home, Ecuador 2010.....	78
Figure IV.6. Place of Respondent's Crime Victimization, Ecuador 2010.....	79
Figure IV.7. Percentage of People Victimized by Crime in a Comparative Context, 2010	80
Figure IV.8. Who is likely to be a victim of crime in Ecuador? (2010).....	81
Figure IV.9. Victimization by Crime by Size of City, Level of Education and Age in Ecuador, 2010	82
Figure IV.10. Perception of Corruption in the Americas	85
Figure IV.11. Perception of Corruption in Ecuador: 2001-2010.....	86
Figure IV.12. Victimization by Corruption in a Comparative Context, 2010.....	87
Figure IV.13. Index of Victimization by Corruption, Ecuador 2010	88
Figure IV.14. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption by Year in Ecuador	89
Figure IV.15. Who is more likely to be a victim of corruption in Ecuador? (2010)	90
Figure IV.16. Corruption Victimization by Age, Gender, and Education, Ecuador 2010.....	90
Figure IV.17. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Political System Support in Ecuador (2010).....	91
Figure IV.18. Impact of Perception of Insecurity, Corruption and Crime Victimization on System Support in Ecuador (2010).....	92

Figure IV.19. Support for the Rule of Law in Ecuador (2010)	93
Figure IV.20. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law from a Comparative Perspective, 2010	94
Figure IV.21. Determinants of Support for Respect for the Rule of Law in Ecuador, 2010	95
Figure IV.22. Support for the Rule of Law and Crime Victimization, Ecuador 2010	95
Figure V.1. Components of System Support in Ecuador, 2010	101
Figure V.2. System Support in a Comparative Perspective, 2010	102
Figure V.3. Support for the Ecuadorian Political System by Year	103
Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance in Ecuador, 2010	104
Figure V.5. Political Tolerance in a Comparative Perspective	105
Figure V.6. Political Tolerance in Ecuador by Year	106
Figure V.7. Support for a Stable Democracy in a Comparative Perspective (Percentages)	108
Figure V.8. Who is more likely to support a stable democracy in Ecuador?	109
Figure V.9. Support for a Stable Democracy by Size of Place of Residence and Whether or Not One is Employed, Ecuador 2010 (in Percentages)	110
Figure V.10. Support for a Stable Democracy, Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President and Perception of Insecurity (in Percentages)	111
Figure V.11. Trust in Ecuadorian Institutions, 2010	113
Figure V.12. Trust in Ecuadorian Institutions by Year	114
Figure V.13. Support for Democracy in a Comparative Context	115
Figure V.14. Support for Democracy in Ecuador by Year	116
Figure V.15. Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador, 2010	117
Figure V.16. Satisfaction with Democracy in a Comparative Context	118
Figure V.17. Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador by Year	119
Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador, 2010	122
Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in a Comparative Context	123
Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Confidence in Ecuador by Year	124
Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador (2010)	124
Figure VI.5. Region, Size of Area of Residence and Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador	125
Figure VI.6. Gender, Age, Education, Perception of Insecurity and Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador	126
Figure VI.7. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Ecuador (2010)	128
Figure VI.8. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations by Year in Ecuador	129
Figure VI.9. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March, a Comparative Perspective	131
Figure VI.10. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in the Last Presidential Elections	132
Figure VI.11. Percentage of Citizens Reporting to have Voted in the Last Elections, by Year, in Ecuador	133
Figure VI.12. Predictors of Electoral Participation in Ecuador, 2010	134
Figure VI.13. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted by Size of Place of Residence and Level of Education	135
Figure VI.14. Ideological Self-Identification and Electoral Preferences	135
Figure VI.15. Interest in Politics in Ecuador, 2010	136
Figure VI.16. Interest in Politics by Year in Ecuador	137
Figure VI.17. Percentage of Persons Who Worked to Try to Persuade Others to Work for Political Parties or Candidates in the Last Elections	138
Figure VII.1. Participation in Local Government Meetings in a Historical and Comparative Context ..	145
Figure VII.2. Factors that Affect the Levels of Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings	146
Figure VII.3. Participation in Improvement Committees and Town Hall Meetings	147
Figure VII.4. Presentation of Petitions to the Municipal Government and Participation in Town Hall or City Council Meetings	148
Figure VII.5. Sociotropic and Idiotropic Variables and Participation in City Council Meetings	149

Figure VII.6. Region of Residence and Participation in Town Hall Meetings.....	150
Figure VII.7. Presentation of Petitions to the Government from a Historical and Comparative Context.....	151
Figure VII.8. Who is most likely to seek help or present a petition to the local government?.....	152
Figure VII.9. Participation in improvement Committees and Presentation of Petitions to the Local Government	153
Figure VII.10. Participation in Municipal Meetings and Petitions to the Local Government.....	154
Figure VII.11. Age and the Presentation of Petitions to the Local Government.....	155
Figure VII.12. Region of Residence and Presentation of Petitions to the Local Government	156
Figure VII.13. Satisfaction with the Services Provided by the Municipality in a Historical and Comparative Context	157
Figure VII.14. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services	158
Figure VII.15. Sociotropic and Idiotropic Variables and Satisfaction with Government Services.....	159
Figure VII.16. Institutional Confidence and Satisfaction with Local Government Services	160
Figure VII.17. Age and Satisfaction with Local Government Services	161
Figure VII.18. Household Wealth and Satisfaction with Local Government Services	162
Figure VII.19. Size of Place of Residence and Satisfaction with Local Government Services	163
Figure VII.20. Region of Residence and Satisfaction with Local Government Services.....	163
Figure VII.21. Determinants of Support for Respect of State Political Institutions	164
Figure VII.22. Satisfaction with Local Services and Respect for State Institutions.....	165
Figure VII.23. Institutional Confidence and Respect for State Institutions.....	166
Figure VIII.1. Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization in Ecuador between 2008 and 2010	177
Figure VIII.2. Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization.....	178
Figure VIII.3. Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization in 2008 and 2010	179
Figure VIII.4. Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010	180
Figure VIII.5. Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010	181
Figure VIII.6. Factors Related with Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010.....	182
Figure VIII.7. Confidence in the National Government and Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010	183
Figure VIII.8. Confidence in the Municipality and Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010	184
Figure VIII.9. Perception of the National Economic Situation and Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010	185
Figure VIII.10. Geographic Location of Residence and Support for Administrative Decentralization ..	186
Figure VIII.11. Factors Related to Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010	187
Figure VIII.12. Frequency of Participation in Improvement Committees and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010	188
Figure VIII.13. Confidence in the National Government and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010	189
Figure VIII.14. Confidence in the Municipality and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010	190
Figure VIII.15. Perception of the National Economic Situation and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010	191
Figure VIII.16. Level of Wealth and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010	192
Figure VIII.17. Factors Related to Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010	193
Figure VIII.18. Confidence in the National Government and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization	194
Figure VIII.19. Confidence in the Municipality and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010	194
Figure VIII.20. Direct Democracy and Citizen Support for Decentralization, 2010.....	195
Figure VIII.21. Level of Education and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010	196

Figure VIII.22. Gender and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010	197
Figure VIII.23. Geographic Location and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization	198
Figure IX.1. Political Ideology in the Americas	203
Figure IX.2. Factors that Facilitate Ideological Identification in Ecuador, 2010	205
Figure IX.3. Percentage of Persons Who Answered the Political Ideology Question by Gender and Level of Interest in Politics, Ecuador, 2010.....	206
Figure IX.4. Interest in Politics by Gender, Ecuador 2010.....	207
Figure IX.5. Predictors of Political Ideology in Ecuador, 2010	208
Figure IX.6. Ideological Distribution by Region: Ecuador, 2010	209
Figure IX.7. Electoral Preferences According to Political Ideology: Ecuador, 2010.....	210
Figure IX.8. Factors that Influence the Perception of the Role of the State in the Economy, Ecuador 2010	211

List of Tables

Table I.1. Global Trends in Freedom, 1979 – 2009	13
Table V.1. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance	98
Table V.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance: Ecuador 2010 ...	107
Table IX.1. Percentage of Answers and Non-Answers to the Ideological Self-Identification Scale Question	204

Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While their primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, the surveys also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID. *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and donors to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country and training local researchers. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University first develops the questionnaire and tests it in each country. It then consults with its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument, and involves them in the pretest phase. Once this is all set, local surveyors conduct house-to-house surveys. With the help of its partner, the Population Studies Center at the University of Costa Rica (CCP), interviewers are now entering the replies directly into Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in several countries. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt’s team reviews it for accuracy and devises the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* biggest supporter, this year the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Swedish Development Corporation (SIDA), Princeton University, the University of Notre Dame, and York University and Université Laval (Canada) helped fund the surveys as well. Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Science made a major contribution to the effort. Thanks to this support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses. Also new this year, the country reports now contain three sections. The first one provides an overall assessment of the economic crisis. The second section deals with particular themes key to democracy. Finally, the third section delves into country-specific themes and priorities.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson’s leadership of *AmericasBarometer* and welcomes Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister to his team. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Regards,

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Prologue: Background of the Study

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This study serves as the latest contribution of the AmericasBarometer series of surveys, one of the many and growing activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The 2010 study is the largest we have undertaken, and we believe that it represents the largest survey of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas. It covers every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and all of the larger (and some of the smaller) countries in the Caribbean. In 2010 we added, for the first time, Trinidad & Tobago, as well as Suriname. The study involved the tireless efforts of our faculty, graduate students, national team partners, field personnel, donors and, of course, the many thousands of citizens of the Americas who took time away from their busy days to be interviewed. This prologue presents a brief background of this study and places it in the context of the larger LAPOP effort.

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. All reports and respective data sets are available on the LAPOP website: www.LapopSurveys.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies. Other donors in 2010 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); York University and Université Laval in Canada; and Princeton University, Notre Dame University, and Vanderbilt University in the United States.

We embarked on the 2010 AmericasBarometer in the hope that the results would be of interest and of policy relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments, and the international donor community. We are confident that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community, which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values and behaviors are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The Inter-American Development Bank provided a generous grant to bring together leading scholars from around the globe in January 2009 to consider how the sharp economic down might influence democracy in Latin America and

the Caribbean. The scholars who attended that meeting prepared proposals for inclusion of question modules in the 2010 round of surveys. All of those proposals are available on the LAPOP web site.

The LAPOP Central Team then considered each of these proposals and, as well, sought input from its country teams and the donor community. The initial draft questionnaire was prepared in early 2009, and we began the arduous task of determining which items from prior **AmericasBarometer** surveys would be cut so as to make room for at least some of the new items being proposed for 2010. We were able to keep a very strong core of common questions, but deleted some items and modules on which we had already conducted extensive research and believed we had a good understanding of the issues involved.

We then distributed the draft questionnaire to our country teams and donor organizations and built a Wiki on which we placed the draft so that all could make comments and suggestions. We began pretesting the instrument, first here on the Vanderbilt campus, then in the local Hispanic community, and then in countries throughout the hemisphere. Very slowly, over a period of months spent testing and retesting, we refined the survey by improving some items and dropping modules that were just not working. We sent repeated versions to our country teams and received invaluable input. By late October, we had a refined working draft of the core questionnaire.

We then brought all of our country teams and several members of the donor community to San Salvador, El Salvador in November. Building on experiences from the 2004, 2006 and 2008 rounds, it was relatively easy for the teams to agree upon the final core questionnaire for all the countries. The common nucleus allows us to examine, for each country, and between nations, themes such as political legitimacy, political tolerance, support for stable democracy, participation of civil society and social capital, the rule of law, evaluations of local governments and participation within them, crime victimization, corruption victimization and electoral behavior. For 2010, however, we also focused on new areas, especially the economic downturn and how it was affecting citizens. Each country report contains analyses of the important themes related to democratic values and behaviors.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication.

The El Salvador meeting was also a time for the teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. For 2010 the reports are cantered on the economic downturn. Part I contains extensive information on the economic problem as it affected citizens and shows in what ways economic issues are related to key support for democracy variables. Yet, we did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons to the results in the other countries. So, we included a Part II, in which each team developed their own discussion of those common core issues, and, finally a Part III of each report, in which each country team was given the freedom to develop its own discussion relevant to their country of focus.

¹ With the exception in 2010 of larger samples in Bolivia (N = 3,000), Brazil (N = 2,500), Chile (N = 1,965), and Ecuador (N = 3,000).

A common system of presenting the data was developed as well. We agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7 as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an index (as opposed to a scale) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson reader, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree that those graphs should always follow a multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also agreed on a common graphical format using STATA 10. The project’s lead data analyst, Dominique Zéphyre, created programs using STATA to generate graphs which presented the confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of the results of our surveys, as we are now able to have a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data.² In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study now take into account the design effect of the sample. The implementation of this methodology has allowed us to assert a higher level of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.³ Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphical form with their respective confidence intervals. For 2010 we have refined these programs further, making the results, we hope, easier to read and quicker to comprehend.

Finally, a common “informed consent” form was prepared, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus

² The design effect becomes important because of the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implicates. In this sense, LAPOP has achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

³ All **AmericasBarometer** samples are self-weighted except for Bolivia and Ecuador, Brazil, Trinidad & Tobago, Suriname and the United States. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file, which in the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that makes each country file weighted to a sample size of 1,500 so that no one country would count any more than any other in a comparative analysis.

protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.












Our concern from the outset was minimization of error and maximization of the quality of the database. We did this in several ways. First, we agreed on a common coding scheme for all of the closed-ended questions. Second, all data files were entered in their respective countries, and verified (i.e., double entered), after which the files were sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt for review. At that point, for those countries still using paper questionnaires, now a minority of all countries, a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers was sent back to each team, who were then asked to ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. This audit consisted of two steps. The first involved comparing the responses written on the questionnaire during the interview with the responses entered by the coding teams. The second step involved comparing the coded responses to the data base itself. If a significant number of errors were encountered through this process, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated on the new data base. Fortunately, this occurred in only one case during the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer. The problem for that country was quickly resolved after all of the data were re-entered. Finally, the data sets were merged by our expert, Dominique Zéphyr into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file.

An additional technological innovation in the 2010 round is the expansion of the use of personal digital assistants (PDAs) to collect data in 17 of the countries and the use of the Windows Mobile platform for handheld computers using the system. Our partners at the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the program, EQCollector and formatted it for use in the 2010 round of surveys. We have found this method of recording the survey responses extremely efficient, resulting in higher quality data with fewer errors than with the paper-and-pencil method. In addition, the cost and time of data entry was eliminated entirely. Another benefit of the PDAs was that we could switch languages used in the questionnaires in countries where we used multi-lingual questionnaires. Our plan is to expand the use of PDAs in future rounds of LAPOP surveys, hopefully making it universal in the next round.


In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean and for Atlantic coastal America, as well as a French Creole version for use in Haiti and a Portuguese version for Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo, as well as our standard Caribbean English. In the end, we were using versions in 15 different languages. All of those questionnaires form part of the www.LapopSurveys.org web site and can be consulted there or in the appendixes for each country study.

Country teams then proceeded to analyze their data sets and write their studies. The draft studies were read by the LAPOP team at Vanderbilt and returned to the authors for corrections. Revised studies were then submitted and they were each read and edited by the LAPOP Central team. Those studies were then returned to the country teams for final correction and editing and were sent to USAID for their critiques. What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of scores of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 40,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in Latin America.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the project.

Country	Institutions	
Mexico and Central America		
Costa Rica		
El Salvador		
Guatemala		
Honduras		
Mexico		
Nicaragua		
Panama		

Andean/Southern Cone	
Argentina	
Bolivia	
Brazil	
Chile	 
Colombia	 
Ecuador	 
Paraguay	
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>
Uruguay	 
Venezuela	

Caribbean		
Dominican Republic		
Guyana		
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Suriname		
Trinidad & Tobago		

Canada and United States		
Canada		
United States		

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At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support, while the Office of the Provost provided space. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt and facilitated its integration with the busy schedule of the Department. Tragically, Neal died during the development of the 2010 round and never saw its completion. His position was filled by Professor Bruce Oppenheimer, who supported the project above and beyond the call of his temporary duty. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu and Efren Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts. Tonya Mills, our Grants Manager and Tina Bemby, our Program Coordinator, have provided exceptional support for the project. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. Fernanda Boidi, who received her Ph.D. from our program last year, played a major role in the pretesting in many countries. She invested countless hours refining the questionnaire for us and saving us from many errors. María Clara Bertini ably supported us from her perch in Quito, Ecuador by running our web page, handling the subscriptions to the databases and by formatting many of the reports written by country teams. We also want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Margarita Corral (Spain) Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Juan Carlos Donoso (Ecuador), Brian Faughnan (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Diana Orcés (Ecuador), Daniel Montalvo (Ecuador), Mason Moseley (USA), Scott Revey (USA), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico).

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Associate Professor of Spanish and Portuguese Department ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP ●Dr. Abby Córdova, Post-doctoral Fellow, LAPOP
Mexico and Central America Group	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Pablo Parás García, President of DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ●Dr. Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA ●Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Miguel Cruz, Visiting Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. José Rene Argueta, University of Pittsburgh, USA ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. John Booth, Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación project, United Nations
Panama	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Caribbean Group	
Dominican Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jana Morgan, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee, USA ●Dr. Rosario Espinal, Professor of Sociology, Temple University, USA
Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dominique Zéphyr, Research Coordinator of LAPOP, Vanderbilt University, USA
Jamaica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Balford Lewis, Lecturer in research methods, Department of Sociology, Psychology and Social Work, UWI, Mona ●Dr. Lawrence Powell, Professor of Methodology and Director of Surveys, Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Political Science, University of the West Indies, Mona
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Trinidad & Tobago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine ●Mr. Niki Braithwaite, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
Andean/Southern Cone Group	
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Peru	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Julio Carrión, Professor at the University of Delaware in the USA, and Researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima ●Patricia Zárate Ardela, Researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima
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Paraguay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Manuel Orrego, CIRD

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Germán Lodola, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and University of Illinois, USA
North America Group	
United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP and Centennial Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP and Associate Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, USA
Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Simone Bohn, Assistant Professor of Political Science, York University

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 40,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
July, 2010

Executive Summary

Chapter 1 analyzes the trajectories of the economic crisis and the “democratic recession” (Freedom House 2010) at the global, regional and national levels. In economic terms, this Chapter shows that the world GDP at constant prices systematically fell from 3.9 percent in 2007 to 3.0 percent in 2008; continuing to fall to -1.4 percent in 2009. It is also estimated that by the end of 2010, there will be 90 million more people that live in extreme poverty, or in other words, with earnings less than \$1.25 per day. In labor terms, it is estimated that almost 34 million more people were found to be unemployed between 2007 and 2009.

The data for Latin America shows that economic crisis is not unknown to the region. This is seen in the GDPs of the seven largest economies in the region, which fell from an average of 4.8 in 2008 to -2.0 percent in 2009. In labor terms, the unemployment rate increased to 8.5 percent in the first trimester of 2009, compared to 7.8 percent during the same period in 2008, implying that more than 1 million Latin American workers could not find work. The workers classified as living in extreme poverty, with earnings less than \$1.25 per day, increased from 7 to 9.9 percent in 2009.

In Ecuador, it is of particular interest to note that according to the data from CEPAL, the economy grew 5.4 percent in 2009 and decreased only -1.4 percent in 2009, placing the country among the group *moderately* affected by the “Great Recession.” However, CEPAL’s employment data is less encouraging: Between 2008 and 2009, Ecuador’s unemployment rate rose from 6.9 to 8.6 percent, placing Ecuador above last year’s regional average. In terms of poverty and extreme poverty in urban zones, CEPAL shows that the country has maintained stability in terms of poverty (39 percent in 2007 and 2008) but, in the case of extreme poverty, experienced an increase of almost two percentage points (12.4 to 14.2 percent) between 2007 and 2008.

With regard to democratic development, the economic crisis seems to be associated with an *overall erosion of freedom*; for the fourth consecutive year, the erosions in freedom have outweighed the advances in this area. According to Freedom House, the number of countries classified as “not free” increased from 42 to 47 between 2008 and 2009, corresponding with 20 and 24 percent of the world’s population, respectively. In the specific case of Latin America and the Caribbean, Central America experienced the sharpest decline, in terms of democratic development, during the 2008-2010 periods. This decline was highlighted by the 2009 coup in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of the country from its previous classification as an “electoral democracy.” Other decreases in freedom were found in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Venezuela. Finally, Ecuador’s case shows that while there has been a sudden change in its status of democratic consolidation, since 2007 the country’s political system is classified as “partially free”, a “hybrid regime”, or an “anocracy” by Freedom House, The Economist Intelligence Unit, and Polity IV, respectively.

Chapter II examines citizens’ perceptions and experiences during difficult economic times in the region. To begin with, the survey conducted by LAPOP across the continent found that 90% of those surveyed believe that their countries are going through an economic crisis. Of this group, half believe that the crisis affecting their country is not very serious, while the rest think that the economic crisis is extremely serious. When asking the respondents who they believed is to blame for the poor economic times in their countries, the current and previous governments were most frequently mentioned, at a rate of 20.8% and 19.4%, respectively. Regarding the issue of unemployment, the survey found that

approximately 16% of respondents had lost their jobs in last two years, with only half being able to secure new employment at the time of the survey. Finally, the data show that in 50% of the continent's homes, household income levels remained the same, while 28% of American households reported decreases in income, and only 22% of those surveyed reported an increase in household income.

Chapter II also examines the Ecuadorian situation in particular. Unlike the regional average, 98% of Ecuadorians think the country is going through an economic crisis. However, most respondents (58.2%) think that the crisis is not very severe. Another difference between Ecuador and the rest of the region is regarding the perception of who is to blame for the economic difficulties facing the country: 31% of Ecuadorians blame the previous government for the current economic crisis, while only 14% of respondents believe that the fault lies with the current government. As one can see, these figures are above the regional average in the first case and below in second. As for unemployment, data from Ecuador is consistent with regional trends: 16% of Ecuadorians had reported losing their job over the past two years, and of these, only 9% were able to secure new employment. Finally, in regards to changes in household income during this period, the data shows that 53% of households report that their income remained unchanged, while 32% of households reported a decrease and only 15% reported an increase.

Chapter III analyzes the extent to which the economic crisis has affected various attitudes supporting democracy among citizens of the Americas and Ecuador. It shows that economic variables are important in explaining the lower levels of support for various aspects of democracy, including changes in levels of life satisfaction, support and satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system. It also shows the effects that perceptions of governmental management of the economy and presidential performance have in mitigating the negative effects of the crisis. It is of value to highlight the importance of the policies implemented by governments to combat the effects of the crisis. Specifically, when people believe that their governments and presidents have implemented effective policies to help address difficult times, support for various aspects of democracy remains high, despite the fact that these individuals have experienced the consequences of the crisis, such as unemployment.

Chapter III also examines the determinants of citizen support for military coups in the Americas and Ecuador. It is shown that high levels of support for military coups are displayed among those who believe that the crisis is very serious, report that at least one family member lost his/her job and those who have a negative perception of their nation's current economic situation. At the same time, it is noted that perception, in terms of citizen satisfaction with presidential performance, reduces support for military coups in the Americas. It is important to highlight that public perception of the effectiveness of the president's performance during times of crisis mitigates support for authoritarian alternatives. Transparent policies and measures appear to be the key to consolidating democratic political culture in all countries, including the Americas and Ecuador.

Chapter IV looks at the experiences and perceptions of citizens on crime and corruption, analyzing the effect they may have on respondents' attitudes toward democracy. The data show that the perception of insecurity in Ecuador has remained relatively high and stable since 2001, while recorded crime victimization increased by 9% between 2008 and 2010. Looking at Ecuador from a regional perspective, the data show that Ecuador has the second highest rate of crime victimization in the Americas, as 29% of Ecuadorians reported having been a victim of crime in the year prior to the survey. This figure is only surpassed by Peru, where 31% of Peruvians reported being victimized by crime during the preceding year.

Corruption is another topic addressed in Chapter IV. The data show that in most of the continent's countries the perception of corruption in the public sector is quite high, with a regional average of over 70 points on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 indicates that corruption in public sector is widespread. The AmericasBarometer survey also measures the experiences of citizens with corruption in the public and private sectors. In Ecuador, 21% of respondents reported having to pay a bribe to initiate or complete a public or private process, with judicial institutions registered as the local with the highest rate victimization in the country. While this percentage may be considered high, it is important to mention that there has been a 4.4% decrease in victimization by corruption in Ecuador, and the 2010 figure is the lowest in the country since 2001. Finally, this report's detailed quantitative analysis concludes that high perceptions of insecurity and corruption, combined with the increase in crime victimization, have a negative effect on individual support for Ecuador's political system.

Chapter V examines the characteristics of a stable democracy. We find that for a democracy to remain stable, both political system support and political tolerance need to be present. In Ecuador, trends in the levels of system support and political tolerance have been increasing over time. When looking specifically at system support, there was increase of *nearly 10 points* in almost 10 years: from an average of 39.5 points in 2001 to 48.9 points in 2010 (on a scale of 0-100). Political tolerance also increased from 46.1 to 50.2 points during this same period.

The percentage of Ecuadorians exhibiting high levels of political tolerance and system support, which has been called "support for a stable democracy," is also discussed in Chapter V. In 2010, approximately 19.7% of respondents belonged to this category, as compared to only 13.4% in 2001. The factors influencing support for a stable democracy include: the size of the respondent's area of residence; economic factors, such as unemployment; and political factors, such as satisfaction with the work of the incumbent president; and the perception of insecurity. All of these proved to be important determinants that affect support for a stable democracy.

Similarly, Chapter V shows that trust and confidence in Ecuadorian institutions has also increased over time. In Ecuador, the Catholic Church receives the highest levels of public trust and confidence, while political parties receive the lowest. It is worth noting that while political parties are the rated poorly in comparative terms, they have exhibited improvements in recent years, registering an 11 point increase in public confidence levels in just 4 years. While confidence in political parties was only 15.1 points in 2006, it reached 26.4 points in 2010. This chapter also examines support for democracy as measured by the "Churchillian" question commonly used in democracy research. The results show that there is an increasing trend in levels of support and satisfaction with democracy. This is certainly good news for democracy in Ecuador.

Chapter VI explores social capital in Ecuador. When examining interpersonal trust, a key element of social capital, we note that Ecuador has one of the lowest levels of interpersonal trust in the region, only ahead of Bolivia, Belize and Peru. At the same time, we note that there are no statically significant changes in these levels over time, averaging around 54 points. With respect to participation in organizations of civil society, the percentage of Ecuadorians who participate in such activities is also lower than the average for the region. This also applies to levels of public participation in addressing community problems and activities related to public demonstrations and protests. Only 7.9% of the Ecuadorian population, for example, participated in a protest or demonstration in the last twelve months. In contrast, regarding electoral participation, a high percentage of Ecuadorians (92.2%) voted in recent presidential elections and, although voting is compulsory, this percentage is higher than in other countries with compulsory voting policies. This chapter also addresses the existence of the correlation between Ecuadorian ideological self-identification and the election of their leaders.

Finally, Chapter VI indicates that level of education is among the factors that significantly impacts interpersonal trust and civic participation. People with higher levels of education tend to trust others more. They are also more frequently involved in protests and public demonstrations than people with less education. This highlights the importance of promoting education in Ecuador as an avenue to fostering increased interpersonal trust and civic participation. These are two key elements of capital social, which in turn, will help to further strengthen democracy in Ecuador. It is important to note that public demonstrations and protests in Ecuador are understood by the Ecuadorian public as a positive form of civic participation.

Chapter VII carries out an analysis on the association between individual – local government and institutional legitimacy. In particular, we study the effects of citizen behavior in local government and perceptions of institutional performance, in relation to their levels of confidence in state political institutions. In terms of civic participation, data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer show that there has been a significant decrease in levels of attendance at municipal and town hall meetings in comparison to 2001 (from 10.8 percent in 2001 to 7.0 percent in 2010). The same is true for the presentation of petitions to the local government. In 2001, 18.4 percent of individuals filed a petition with the municipality, while in 2010 only 10.2 per percent did the same. Although the levels of Ecuadorian public participation at the municipal level are quite low when compared with other Latin American and Caribbean countries, the degree of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government has remained relatively high over time, around 54 points on a scale from 0 to 100.

The statistical models in this chapter show that public participation and satisfaction with the services provided by local governments have a somewhat unclear relationship, with respect to confidence in Ecuadorian state institutions. However, a clear, meaningful and robust association is found in the correlation between institutional trust and respect for state political institutions. As confidence in the municipality or the national government grows, so does the legitimacy of the Ecuadorian political institutions.

Finally, Chapter VII provides systematic evidence to conclude that the Ecuadorian region of residence is not only crucial for civic participation, but also in the levels of satisfaction with municipal services. First, individuals living on the coast tend to participate more in town hall meetings than those living in the highlands. Individuals living in the East filed more petitions with the municipality than those who live on the coast. Finally, those living in the highlands have lower levels of satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality compared to their coastal counterparts.

Chapter VIII analyzes levels of support, by Ecuadorians, for the decentralization of the state, proposing various factors that could affect these levels of support. This chapter finds that 60.5 percent of Ecuadorians believe that the mayor, and not the president of the republic (or both), should have greater authority over their city of residence. However, when approaching the topic of administrative decentralization, 41.7 percent of Ecuadorians believe that both the national and municipal governments should equally share the responsibility for providing public services. Finally, when considering who should administer the country's existing public funds, 38.0 percent of Ecuadorians believes that it is the national government, more than the municipality (or both), who should be in charge.

In regards to factors affecting levels of public support for the decentralization of the state, this chapter shows that institutional trust and geographical location of residence are systematically associated with each and every one of the dimensions of decentralization (administrative, fiscal and political). In the case of the national government, as trust increases, so does support for the re-centralization of the state. Correspondingly, as confidence in the municipality increases, public support for decentralization also

rises. Finally, regarding location of geographic residence in Ecuador, this chapter shows that in contrast to what one might expect, citizens living in the rural highlands and in the Northeast support administrative decentralization; those in the urban and rural highlands, the Northeast and Southeast support fiscal decentralization; and inhabitants of the Southeast support political decentralization. These results are in contrast to the common belief that those who would most likely support state decentralization are those who live on the urban coast.

Chapter IX provides an analysis of Ecuadorian ideological orientation and the effect it has on voting behavior and preference for certain public policies. This chapter shows that on the ideological identification scale, where 1 represents the left and 10 represents the right, Ecuadorians are located near the center, with an average of 5.4. A peculiar fact is that over 30% of respondents did not answer this question, meaning that one third of the sample refused or was unable to identify their ideological orientation. However, the report emphasizes that this is not an isolated case, as the percentage of non-response to the question of ideological orientation exceeded 20% in several American countries. An analysis of the factors that can influence the formation of ideology reveals that people who are able to identify their ideology using the ideological scale report a higher level of interest in politics, as compared to those who do not or could not identify themselves on the ideological scale. Finally, this chapter reveals that interest in politics in Ecuador is relatively low.

The second part of Chapter IX is an analysis of the role of ideology in Ecuadorian political culture. The survey results show that political ideology in Ecuador can be considered a predictor of the vote. The analysis conducted in the report found, for example, that people who voted for President Correa are located to the left on the ideological spectrum, while voters for Álvaro Noboa are located to the right. Interestingly, while the report concludes that ideology may influence Ecuadorian voting behavior, it was not found to play an important role in expressed preferences for certain public policies. An analysis of the factors that affect the preference for increased state involvement in the country's economy, finds that the Ecuadorian political ideology has no significant effect on citizens' beliefs about the role of government in the economy. The dominant factor regarding citizens' beliefs of the role of government in the economy is their evaluation of the effectiveness of the current government's policies.

Part I: Hard Times and Their Effects on Democracy

Chapter I. Hard Times in the Americas: Economic Overview

Introduction

After the last round of the AmericasBarometer in 2008, the world experienced the most severe global economic recession since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The recent crisis affected many countries around the world and the countries that make up the Americas were not an exception. However, various American countries appear to have handled the crisis unusually well, without doubt mitigating the potential impact on democracy. This study will first briefly examine information about the economic crisis, and then analyze the data from the surveys conducted by the AmericasBarometer, the most extensive public opinion survey conducted in the western hemisphere. This report will analyze the data from the 2008 round of surveys, which took place before the crisis made its full impact, as well as the data from the 2010 round, when many countries were recuperating from this global economic crisis.

Influenced by a cumulative number of financial difficulties in the United States, the problem reached crisis level in September of 2008; several months before the field work for the 2008 round of the AmericasBarometer had been completed. The result was a slowing in global economic growth, with increased unemployment and increasing levels of poverty that is still disproportionately felt around the world.

In this series' previous report, the impact of various indicators of governance in support of a stable democracy was examined. This round of the 2010 AmericasBarometer analyzes the characteristics of those affected by the economic crisis, especially those who lost their jobs and stated that their personal economic situation had deteriorated. We ask "Is this crisis linked with citizen support for democracy and democratic principles?" and "Is the economic crisis a threat to support for democracy?"

This chapter starts with an overview of the economic crisis in terms of economic growth, unemployment and levels of poverty, followed by an analysis by region and country. It conducts a global and regional analysis of the "democratic recession" (Freedom House), and discusses the state of democracy in each country. This chapter concludes by identifying the most important relationships, about which scholars have hypothesized and concluded, between economic decline and the decline of democracy.

Economic Overview

The 2010 AmericasBarometer survey took place within the context of the most significant global economic crisis in the past 80 years. In terms of economic expansion, the growth of the world GDP at fixed prices fell systematically from 3.9 to 3 percent by the end of 2008 and to -1.4 percent in 2009 (see Graphic I.1).¹ Nevertheless, as the 2010 survey began, there were projections that the economic recovery was on its way. Furthermore, although some countries were seriously affected by the crisis, others were not as affected, and were even able to maintain an acceptable level of economic growth within the context

¹ IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2009: Crisis and Recovery* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2009).

of a deteriorating world economy. In fact, it appears that in contrast to past economic crises, that had severely damaged Latin America and Caribbean economies, careful handling of counter-cycle policies has prevented some of this crisis's worst economic consequences in this region of the world.

Even though the world economy showed some signs of economic recovery when the 2010 round of surveys began, the effects of the crisis were still being felt around the world. Forty-three poor countries suffered serious consequences due to the economic crisis of 2009, with low yields in vital areas such as education, health, and infrastructure. By the end of 2010, even with the recovery, it is believed that about 90 million people more than in 2009 will live in extreme poverty, on less than \$1.25 per day. In addition, it is expected that more than one billion people will live in hunger, reversing many of the benefits that had been attained through the successful anti-poverty programs developed during previous decade².




Figure I.1. World Real GDP Growth Estimates and Projections, 2007-2011
(Source IMF, World Economic Outlook (2010)³)

The increase in unemployment related to the crisis was substantial and widespread. According to the International Labour Organization, the rate of unemployment worldwide for 2009 was estimated at 6.6 percent, equivalent to approximately 212 million people. This signified an increase of almost 34 million people in comparison with the number of individuals unemployed in 2007, with a large portion of this increase occurring in 2009. In addition, many workers had to accept less secure jobs, which provide poorer benefits, increasing the vulnerability of being without steady work, and effectively raising the number of working poor in the world. It was estimated that unemployment increased the vulnerability of more than 100 million workers between 2008 and 2009.⁴ In addition, although the number of workers living in “extreme poverty”, less than \$1.25 per day, fell 16.3 percentage points between 1998 and 2008, by the end of 2008, the number of workers considered living in extreme poverty constituted 21.2 percent of all employed persons. This means that by the end of 2008, approximately 633 million workers and their families lived on less than \$1.25 per day around the world.⁵

All these figures point to the severity of the impact of the economic recession around the world. Yet, the crisis did not impact all regions or countries uniformly. While some regions and countries

² See www.worldbank.org/financialcrisis/bankinitiatives.htm

³ IMF, *World Economic Outlook 2010: Rebalancing Growth* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2010).

⁴ ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010* (Geneva: International Labor Organisation, 2010), 42.

⁵ Ibid. 22.

experienced pronounced economic setbacks, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan to name a few, the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean as a region was more uneven and not as severe in many countries.⁶ Recent data from the World Bank indicate that after nearly a decade of strong performance, GDP growth in Latin America and the Caribbean decreased from an average of 5.5 to 3.9 percent between 2007 and 2008, and fell even further in 2009 (2.6%).⁷ Economic recovery, however, seems to be underway based on the latest projections available as of this writing, and show that real GDP growth may increase from 3.1 and 3.6 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively.⁸ On the other hand, other projections from the Inter-American Development Bank suggest that Latin American exports are likely to decrease significantly for a time until world-wide demand is restored. Similarly, terms of trade between Latin American and advanced industrialized countries are also likely to deteriorate, as the prices of primary commodities have fallen.⁹

The financial disaster has also had a negative impact on the job markets in Latin America. The unemployment rate is estimated to have increased to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 compared to 7.8 percent during the same period in 2008, suggesting that more than one million more Latin American workers were unable to find jobs (UN 2010). Similarly, even though the working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$2 a day) decreased by 6.2 percentage points between 2003 and 2008, best estimates are that a reversal took place in 2009.¹⁰ Furthermore, the extreme working poor (i.e., those living on less than \$1.25) rose from 7 to 9.9 percent in 2009.¹¹ These are just some examples of the serious effects that the financial crisis has had on Latin America.

The economic crisis in the U.S. and other advanced industrial nations also affected the level of remittances (that is, money sent home by family members working abroad) on which so many families in Latin America depend. For example, some estimates suggest that remittances constitute more than half the income for about 30% of recipient families, helping to keep these families out of poverty.¹² Remittances represent an important percentage of inflows to many local economies. Seven of the region's nations receive 12% or more of GDP from their families abroad: Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In many of these countries, remittances have become the first or second source of revenue, sometimes exceeding exports, tourism, and foreign investment (UNDP 2009). As early as 2008 the growth rates of remittances declined considerably across Latin America, even becoming negative in some countries (see Figure 1.2).

⁶ Following an estimated economic growth decline of 2.5% in 2009, the U.S. is expected to grow by 2.1% in 2010. Japan, on the other hand, the country that most severely felt the consequences of the crisis (-5.4%) compared to other industrialized nations is expected to grow only marginally in 2010 (0.9%).

See <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/wess/wesp2010files/wesp2010pr.pdf>

⁷ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Eduardo Fernandez-Arias and Peter Montiel, "Crisis Response in Latin America: Is the 'Rainy Day' at Hand?," (Inter-American Development Bank, 2009).

¹⁰ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects: Crisis, Finance, and Growth 2010* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010).

¹¹ ILO, *Global Employment Trends: January 2010*, 30.

¹² See <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1910986> and <http://www.ifad.org/events/remittances/maps/latin.htm>




Figure I.2. Declines in Remittances to Latin America, 2007-2009 as Reported by the World Bank

Figure I.2 shows that throughout the year 2009, the growth rate of remittances decreased and turned negative in Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, all countries that are major recipients of remittances. For example, remittances in Mexico decreased by 13.4 percent in the first nine months of 2009 from a consistent remittance growth rate of over 25 percent in 2006. Declines in remittances were also registered in South American countries, such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.¹³

The most recent data available as of the writing of this report shows that while the crisis was the worst experienced in the region over the last two decades, by 2010 recovery was underway.¹⁴ As shown in Figure I.3, drawn from a recent IDB study, which is based on the seven largest economies in the region (collectively accounting for 91% of the region's GDP), the growth decline in 2009 was -2.0%, but the rebound in growth for 2010 is forecast to be a positive 3.7% growth rate.¹⁵

¹³ See <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1110315015165/MigrationAndDevelopmentBrief11.pdf>

¹⁴ Alejandro Izquierdo and Ernesto Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean* (Washington, D. C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010).

¹⁵ These data are based on the seven largest economies in the region (which together, account for 91% of the region's GDP).




Figure I.3. Annual Change in Real GDP in Latin America, 1991-2010
(Source: Izquierdo and Talvi, 2010, p. 25)

The Mexican economy, for instance, experienced the steepest contraction compared to other countries in the region, dropping from a growth rate of 3.4 percent in 2007 to -6.5 percent in 2009. The general economic problems world-wide were exacerbated in Mexico in part due to the outbreak of the AH1N1 flu virus that produced declines in the important tourism industry. Brazil, in contrast, one of the relatively least affected countries in the region, still experienced a reduction in growth from 5.7 to -0.5 percent between 2007 and 2009. Projections for both countries indicate economic growth is expected to recover to between 3.5 and 3.9 percent in 2010-2011. The change from 2008-2009 in real GDP is shown in Figure I.4. As can be seen, all but eleven of the countries covered by the AmericasBarometer suffered declines in GDP.

The changes in the growth rates between 2008 and 2009 varied from country to country. For example, in Ecuador the rate of economic growth in 2008 was 6.5%, while in 2009 it was -1%. The change in Mexico went from 1.3% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009.¹⁶

¹⁶ Data on economic growth come from different sources and are not always consistent across time or between sources; as various parts of this report were written, we used the databases that seemed most trustworthy and that were available at the moment of the writing.




Figure I.4. Change in Real GDP, 2008-2009

Fortunately, the potential impact of the crisis was reduced due to a number of factors. As the IDB's latest analysis states:

“...even at the peak of the crisis, with the bottom of the abyss nowhere in sight, emerging markets in general and Latin America in particular, for the most part performed surprisingly well. True, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, stock and bond prices tumbled, currencies depreciated sharply and growth came to a halt as the region slipped into a recession in 2009. However, the region avoided currency and debt crises and bank failures so typical of previous episodes of global financial turbulence (1982, 1998 and 2001). The ability of the region to withstand an extremely severe shock without major financial crises was truly remarkable....¹⁷

According to the IDB, the consensus opinion is that a combination of low inflation, the availability of fiscal surpluses and international reserves, a largely flexible exchange rate system and sound banking systems made the impact of this crisis so much less severe than in the past.

¹⁷ Izquierdo and Talvi, *The Aftermath of the Global Crisis: Policy Lessons and Challenges Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1.

Dimensions of the Economic Crisis in Ecuador

Ecuador's economy seems to be particularly vulnerable to exogenous shocks, because the external sector revenues are largely dependent on oil prices, remittances from migrants and raw goods.¹⁸ However, as mentioned earlier, the annual rate of change in the Gross Domestic Product in 2008 and 2009 suggests that the impact of the crisis was less severe in Ecuador than in half of Latin America and the Caribbean countries, at least in terms of production. Figure I.5 shows the per capita GDP growth over the past 10 years.¹⁹




Figure I.5. Variation in GDP per Capita, 2000-2009

In general terms, the rate of economic growth in the decade following the dollarization of Ecuador's economy has been above the average the Latin America and the Caribbean region, with the exception of years 2000, 2006 and 2007. The GDP per capita rates of growth were highest in 2004 and 2008, at 6.8 and 5.4 percentage points, respectively. However, it is of particular interest to note that while the region grew 3.0 percentage points in 2008 and decreased to -2.9 points in 2009, Ecuador grew 5.4 percent and decreased only -1.4 percent during the same period.

The results are slightly less encouraging for Ecuador when analyzing the trends in unemployment. The data displayed in Figure I.6 show that there was a significant increase in the unemployment rate between 2000 and 2003 for all of the region, but especially in Ecuador, where unemployment rose from 9.0 to 11.5 percentage points. While the historical trend of unemployment in Ecuador fell below, and remained below, the regional average starting in 2003, the economically active population began to feel

¹⁸ For a more detailed analysis about the balance of payments, see www.bce.fin.ec.

¹⁹ The difference from Figure I.4 is that it shows the variation in the real GDP.

the effects of the "Great Recession" in 2009. It is in this past year, for the first time in five years, that the unemployment rate in Ecuador again surpasses the regional average, at 8.6 percentage points.²⁰




Figure I.6. Annual Unemployment Rate, 2000-2009

These results suggest that there may be an effect of unemployment on poverty or indigence in Latin America and the Caribbean in general, and in Ecuador in particular. In fact, the downward regions trend in terms of poverty and indigence, which started in 1999, has slowed in the first case (poverty) and has risen in the second (indigence). Figure I.7 shows that although poverty in Ecuador has been declining during the last decade (with the exception of 2008); it remains well above the average levels for Latin America and the Caribbean. However, Ecuador's significant declines in the levels of indigence has placed it very close to the Latin American average, except in 2008 when the rate again increased, possibly due to crisis related job losses. In 2008, the percentage of Ecuador's poor and indigent reached 39.0 and 14.2 percentage points, respectively. Paradoxically, during the past 20 years, Ecuador's levels of GDP per capita have maintained at, on average, the same level as other Latin American countries (1.5 percent from 1990, according to CEPAL data). However, poverty in the country has remained relatively higher. The explanation for this phenomenon requires further analysis beyond the scope of this study.

²⁰ The time series for unemployment data in Latin America must be taken into consideration with care because of the change in methodology in the calculations five years ago. However, it was decided to conduct the time series analysis for illustrative purposes. For more information on the methodology used to measure unemployment visit: www.eclac.cl




Figure I.7. Urban Poverty and Indigence Measured by Level of Income, 1999 - 2008²¹

In order to mitigate the harmful effects of global economic crisis, the Ecuadorian government established an anti-cyclical economic policy, aimed to boost production, encourage employment and contain the spread of poverty and indigence. This policy consists of five fundamental measures:²²

- The solution to the imbalance in the external sector is through regulation of the domestic liquidity coefficient. Part of this imbalance would be corrected through the repatriation of capital that private banks hold abroad and by a tax increase on capital outflows from 1 to 2 percent, on transactions greater than \$ 500.
- The channeling of public savings to investment through the repatriation of the Free Access Reserve in order to convert public savings into loans for the National Financial Corporation.
- The promotion of social justice, combating tax evasion, and improved distribution of income. This is through the prepayment of income tax by enterprises with minimum taxes. Also, taxes will be levied on dividends received by shareholders of for-profit concept companies. It also increases the special consumption tax (ICE) on cigarettes, alcoholic beverages and soda. Finally, tariffs of 12 percent IVA will be levied on the importation of paper used for newspapers and magazines.
- Provide incentives for the productive sector, through the Law, for the refund of IVA to Tour Operators for inbound tourism. It also provides more flexibility for the reinvestment of profits in science and technology subject to employment levels. It also expands the benefit of the "0 IVA" rate to skilled artisans by the Ministry of Production and Defense Council of Craftspeople.

²¹ CEPAL series on poverty and urban poverty shows no data for 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004, so there is a cut of the series not displayed in the graph to show overall trends.

²² Taken from: http://www.elciudadano.gov.ec/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5181:gobierno-presento-medidaseconomicas- for-the-production-and-the-job. Access date: June 2010.

- Finally, the stimulation of internal household domestic demand, through prorated payments from the Reserve Fund. Also, it is proposed to pay the wages of public servants fortnightly, as well as reduce rates for some financial services.

It is estimated that the effect of these measures will be seen in the short and medium term, so that the next round AmericasBarometer could carry out a counter-factual analysis and/or historical series to assess the effects of these measures in preventing the economic crisis. Meanwhile, the next section will continue with an analysis of the effects of the crisis on democracy.

Trends in Democratic Development

While the economic recession was a major event in many countries, politically it has been accompanied by a reversal in democratic development in many parts of the developing world.²³ According to the Freedom House Report 2010 *Global Erosion of Freedom*, for the fourth consecutive year, freedom declines offset gains in 2009 (Figure I.8). This is the longest uninterrupted period of democracy's decline in the 40 year history of the Freedom House series.²⁴ Many countries around the world suffered an escalation in human rights violations, at the same time as non-democratic nations became even more repressive (e.g., Iran, Russia). Even countries that had experienced increases in freedom in recent years have now undergone declines in political rights and civil liberties (e.g., Bahrain, Jordan, and Kenya).




Figure I.8. Freedom in the World: Global Gains Minus Declines from 2003-2010, by Reporting Year

Examining Freedom House's specific classification of countries (Table I.1), we find that in 2009, 89 countries continue to belong to the "free" category, representing 46 percent of the world's 194 countries as well as 46 percent of the global population. The number of countries that are considered "partly free" decreased from 62 to 58 between 2008 and 2009, while the number of "not free" nations

²³ Arch Puddington, "The Freedom House Survey for 2009: The Erosion Accelerates," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).

²⁴ Freedom House includes two measures of democracy: *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Both measures contain numerical ratings between 1 and 7 for each country with 1 indicating the "most free" and 7 the "least free."

rose from 42 to 47 during the same period, corresponding to 20 and 24 percent of the world's population, respectively. More than 2.3 billion individuals reside in “not free” countries, that is, ones where their political rights and civil liberties are violated in one form or another. One nation, China, makes up 50 percent of this figure. Electoral democracies also diminished to 116 from 123 in 2006 and nine of the 47 countries considered “not free” scored the lowest possible ratings in both civil liberties and political rights.²⁵

Table I.1. Global Trends in Freedom, 1979 – 2009

Year	TOTAL COUNTRIES	FREE		PARTLY FREE		NOT FREE	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1979	161	51	32	54	33	56	35
1989	167	61	37	44	26	62	37
1999	192	85	44	60	31	47	25
2006	193	90	47	58	30	45	23
2007	193	90	47	60	31	43	22
2008	193	89	46	62	32	42	22
2009	194	89	46	58	30	47	24
Source: Freedom House 2010							

Within Latin America and the Caribbean region, Central America experienced the greatest setbacks in democratic development, according to Freedom House, in the 2008-2010 period, highlighted by the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras, which resulted in the removal of this country from the “electoral democracy” category. Other decreases in freedom were registered in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Venezuela.²⁶ Figure I.6 indicates that of the 35 countries in the Americas, nine are not considered “free” by Freedom House, that is, 26% of Latin American nations are rated “partly free” because they exhibit deficiencies in their democracies, measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties. All these figures point to a current “democracy recession” in the Americas, much as there is a “democracy recession” in the world as a whole.

²⁵ See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1120>

²⁶ *Ibid.*




Figure I.9. Free, Partly Free, and Not Free Countries in the Americas

While Freedom House registers a decline in freedom in the world, and declines in Latin America, this does not mean that citizens have lost faith in democracy. Rather, the Freedom House measure focuses on institutions, not political culture, which is the focus of this study. It is central to the theory of political culture that over the long term culture and institutions should be congruous with each other, but over the short term significant incongruities can emerge.²⁷ For example, in the years prior to the emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico, political culture there exhibited strong support for democracy.²⁸ So, too, it may well be that the democracy recession that is affecting institutions may be “corrected” over the long term by citizen support for democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes may reinforce an anti-democratic political culture.

Dimensions of Democracy in Ecuador

Taking into account the observations made regarding the AmericasBarometer reports’ levels of democracy measures, the 2010 edition of this study consulted several sources to better determine the state of democracy in Ecuador. These sources are: a) *Polity IV*; b) *Freedom House*; c) *Vanhanen*; d) *Przeworski et al. / Cheibub and Gandhi*; and e) *The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index*. While the use of various sources could make up for the deficiencies that one or the other might have, especially in conceptual terms (maximalist vs. minimalism) and empirical (validity vs. reliability), it should be noted that there is a very high statistical correlation between all possible combinations paring these measures.²⁹

²⁷ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

²⁸ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Political Culture and Democratization: Evidence from Mexico, Nicaragua and Costa Rica," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Political Culture and Regime Type: Evidence from Nicaragua and Costa Rica," *Journal of Politics* 55, no. 3 (1993).

²⁹ With the exception of the measure proposed by the *Economist Intelligence Unit* that was not part of the statistical analysis, all correlation pairs between the other four measures of democracy are greater than 0.681 and statistically significant at one




Figure I.10. Trends in Authority
(Source: Polity IV, 2010)

Consistent with what has happened around the world, Ecuador has experienced not only stagnation, but also a reversal in its process of democratic consolidation, especially since the second half of the nineties. Since 2007, as measured by *Polity IV* and illustrated in Figure I.10, Ecuador is rated 5 points on a scale from -10 (consolidated authoritarian) to +10 (consolidated democracy). This means that, according to *Polity IV*, Ecuador's political system is an "anocracy", or a system of "mixed" authority which is located between authoritarianism and democracy.³⁰ These results are generally consistent with the measurement made by *Freedom House*, which according to the illustration in Figure I.11, places Ecuador, since 2000, at 8 points on an inverted scale of 0 (Not free) to 12 (Free).³¹ That is, Ecuador is considered "partly free" by *Freedom House*.³²

percent. For more information, see Table 3.2 of Pippa Norris's *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

³⁰ See <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

³¹ This scale was created by subtracting 14 from the sum of the value of the securities for political rights and civil liberties.

³² See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439>




Figure I.11. Freedom in Ecuador
(Source: Freedom House, 2010)

Corroborating the ratings by *Polity IV* and *Freedom House* is the measurement from *The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index*, which gives Ecuador 5.6 points, since 2007, on the scale ranging from 0 (authoritarian regime) to 10 (full democracy). This assessment places Ecuador within the category of a "hybrid regime", i.e., below the categories "full democracy" and "flawed democracy" and higher than an "authoritarian regime."³³

For reasons of space, mainly because the time series does not cover most of the last decade, the measures by Vanhanen and Przeworski et al. are not described in this section of the report.³⁴ But as one might expect, due to the high levels of statistical correlation, these measures classify Ecuador at similar levels of democracy as the measures reviewed in this chapter.

The Relationship between Hard Times and Democracy

Should we be concerned that the economic crisis has affected democracy? Are the declines measured by Freedom House in 2009 partially a result of economic troubles? Or can we find evidence in the AmericasBarometer of a robust democratic culture that has withstood the challenges brought on by hard times? Over the years, many scholars have examined the apparent connection between economic crisis and democratic instability, approaching the problem from two schools of thought. The first has focused on the individual, analyzing the impact of economic crisis on democracy through the lens of ordinary people—in short, how do individuals react to perceived economic decline? Much of the literature tells us that certain segments of society are more vulnerable to supporting anti-democratic alternatives than others. The poor in particular seem to lead this group of “democracy’s fickle friends”³⁵, as they are seen as having led the backlash against democratic governments during times of economic

³³ See http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/Democracy_Index_2007_v3.pdf and

<http://a330.g.akamai.net/7/330/25828/20081021185552/graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf>

³⁴ Vanhanen covers the period from 1810 to 2000, while Przeworski et al. covers the period from 1946 to 2002.

³⁵ Nancy Gina Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

crises. The current economic crisis has, as noted, produced more impoverished Latin American citizens, thereby creating potentially problematic conditions for democracy in the region.

Other research has addressed the effects of national level economic conditions on democracy, focusing specifically on how underdevelopment, sluggish economic growth, and severe income inequality affect democratic consolidation. In their often-cited analysis of the relationship between economic development and democracy, Przeworski et al.³⁶ found that no democracy had collapsed where the country's per capita income exceeded \$6,055. In Latin America, however, only Chile and Argentina currently lie above that threshold, meaning that most Latin American countries enter the current economic crisis without the "inoculation" protection of historically adequate levels of economic development.³⁷

In terms of economic growth, Przeworski et al. also found that "democracies in poorer countries are more likely to die when they experience economic crises than when their economies grow."³⁸ As mentioned above, economic growth in Latin America has slowed to a crawl in most of the countries placing most nations in Przeworski et al.'s danger zone. Finally, scholars have demonstrated that the grievances brought on by high levels of inequality can produce violent forms of political participation and potentially destabilize democracies.³⁹ Historically, Latin America has had the highest levels of income inequality of any region in the world.

While widespread democratic breakdown seems inconceivable in Latin America after so many years of democratic stability, the breakdown in Honduras and the continued declines in Venezuela show that democracy remains fragile in some countries. Might the economic crisis undermine citizen support for key components of liberal democracy and weaken democratic stability?⁴⁰ In this round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, including over 40,000 interviews in twenty-six countries, we have the data to explore that very question.

Following a discussion of the economic crisis' impact on the region and Ecuador, this chapter looked at how democracy has fared during the economic crisis in the Latin American and Caribbean region, and more specifically in Ecuador. It also analyzed the trends in democratic development in the last few years and concluded with a brief discussion of the theoretical relationship between economic crisis and democracy. In the following chapter, we will focus on citizen perceptions of the economic downturn as measured by the 2010 AmericasBarometer. In Chapter III of this study we will examine how well the political culture of democracy has fared under economically difficult times. In that chapter we will examine three main variables, namely, support for democracy, system support, and life satisfaction, to understand the impact of the crisis on democracy in the region as a whole, and in Ecuador, since 2008.

³⁶ Adam Przeworski et al., "What Makes Democracies Endure?," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 1 (1996).

³⁷ Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52, no. 2 (2010).

³⁸ Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 117.

³⁹ Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Insurgency and Inequality," *American Political Science Review* 81 (1987).

⁴⁰ Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America," *PS: Political Science and Politics* (2009), Abby Córdova and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean," *Latin American Politics and Society* 52.no. 2 (2010).

Chapter II. Citizen Perceptions and Experiences During Hard Times in the Americas

Introduction

The previous chapter provided an overview of the effects of the economic crisis on the world, the Americas and on the Ecuadorian economy, followed by a summary of trends in democratic development since the last AmericasBarometer survey in 2008. Chapter II will focus on the perceptions and experiences of citizens during difficult times by trying to answer the following questions: 1) how did citizens perceive the crisis, 2) who did they blame for it and 3) how did citizens experience the crisis in the Americas? First, we present a comparative regional assessment of citizen perceptions of the crisis and discuss where Ecuador is located in relation to other countries in the Americas. Then we evaluate the experiences of citizens in relation to the economic instability in the countries included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey.

Perceptions of the Magnitude of the Economic Crisis

In order to specifically analyze the economic crisis, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) developed two new questions. This is the first time these questions have been used by LAPOP in the AmericasBarometer and were developed especially for the 2010 round of surveys. The two questions represent a sequence. First, respondents were asked if they perceived an economic crisis. Then, among those who thought they had, they were asked who was responsible. The text of these questions is:

CRISIS1. Some say that our country is suffering a very serious economic crisis; others say that we are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, another group says that there isn't any economic crisis. What do you think? **[Read options]**

- (1) We are suffering a very serious economic crisis
- (2) We are suffering a crisis but it is not very serious, or
- (3) No economic crisis

CRISIS2. Who is the most to blame for the current economic crisis in our country from among the following: **[READ LIST, MARK ONLY ONE RESPONSE]**

- (01) The previous administration
- (02) The current administration
- (03) Ourselves, the Ecuadoreans
- (04) The rich people of our country
- (05) The problems of democracy
- (06) The rich countries **[Accept also United States, England, France, Germany, and Japan]**
- (07) The economic system of the country, or
- (08) Never have thought about it
- (77) **[Don't read]** Other

Taking into account the Americas as a whole, including the 25 countries of the 2010 AmericasBarometer, one can see in Figure II.1 that most citizens in the Americas perceived that an economic crisis existed, be it serious or not.




Figure II.1. Perception of an Economic Crisis in Latin America and the Caribbean
(Percentage of the Total Population)

Among all countries, as shown in Figure II.2, Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua and the United States have the highest percentages with respect to the citizen perceptions of the crisis. However, the percentage of citizens who perceive a crisis is extremely high in all countries.




Figure II.2. Percentage of the Population that Perceived There is an Economic Crisis




Figure II.3. Perception of the Economic Crisis in Ecuador (Percentage of the Total Population)

The case in Ecuador is no exception; Figure II.3 shows that a large majority of respondents believe that there is an economic crisis in Ecuador. However, almost 60% of Ecuadorians feel the crisis is not very serious, while only 39% believe that it is. In comparing these percentages with the average for the Americas as a whole, as shown in Figure II.1, we see that Ecuadorians tend to more moderately assess the severity of the economic crisis that affects them

Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis?

This section will examine to whom Latin Americans attribute responsibility for the crisis economic. First, an overview of the results is given for the Americas as a whole.




Figure II.4. Who is Responsible for the Economic Crisis? (Percentage of the Total Population)

Most citizens who perceive that there is a crisis in the Americas are as quick to blame the current government as they are the previous government. (Figure II.4). Less than 10 percent of Latin Americans who perceive a crisis blame rich or developed countries, in contrast to what might be expected, especially in the Latin American context. Rather, many people in these countries blame themselves for the economic crisis. Figure II.5 displays the results for the major regions in the Americas. As one can see, in the eyes of the respondents, both current and previous governments are to blame for the crisis. However, it is important to mention that in the Caribbean, 17.4% of respondents assigned themselves as having primary responsibility for the economic crisis in their countries.




Figure II.5. Who is to Blame for the Economic Crisis? Results by Region, 2010

The Ecuadorian Case

As shown in Figure II.3, the majority of Ecuadorians perceive that there is an economic crisis but are divided as to its severity. Most respondents feel that the country's economic crisis is not serious, while another significant percentage believes the opposite. But who do Ecuadorians blame for the country's difficult economic situation? Figure II.6 displays the results. 38% of the respondents believe that the previous government is responsible for the economic crisis. This figure, however, creates some uncertainty. The government immediately prior to the Economist Rafael Correa, the current President of the Republic, was divided into two parts. The first part took place under the command of Colonel (r) Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa, who was dismissed by the National Congress in April 2005. Gutiérrez was succeeded by Alfredo Palacio, his vice-president, who's Minister of Economy during the first months in office was Rafael Correa, the current Constitutional President. This leads us to assume that by referring to the previous government, Ecuadorians are referring to Colonel Gutiérrez's government, who is also one of Correa's leading political opponents and came in second in the 2009 presidential election. However, in this election, Rafael Correa won the presidency in the first round, something that has not been seen since the nineteenth century.

The country's economic system is another of the factors named, with 14% of respondents assigning it responsibility for the crisis in Ecuador. Finally, only 13.5% of Ecuadorians blame the current government for perceived economic crisis, which reinforces the previous argument that Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez's administration is, according to Ecuadorians, mainly responsible for the country's current difficult economic situation.




Figure II.6. Who is Responsible for the Crisis? Ecuador, 2010

Personal Experiences with Economic Instability

In the previous section, we analyzed the magnitude of the economic crisis and who is responsible for it. The following pages explore how citizens have personally experienced the crisis.

Job loss

The questions used for this section's analysis are as follows:

OCUP1B1. Have you lost your job in the past two years? **[Read options]**

- (1) Yes, you lost your job but found a new one
- (2) Yes, you lost your job and have not found a new one
- (3) No, you did not lose your job
- (4) No, you did not work because you decided not to work or because of disabilities

OCUP1B2. Besides you, has anyone in your household lost his or her job in the past two years? **[Read options]**

- (1) Yes
- (2) No

The results for the Americas as a whole are shown in Figure II.7. Although three quarters of the population reported not having lost their jobs, about 7% lost their jobs but were able to secure new employment, while 8.5% of respondents lost their jobs and were unable to find a new one. In analyzing the overall situation of the Latin American household, more than 16% of respondents reported job losses.




Figure II.7. Job Loss in the Americas, 2010

For a more complete picture of the jobs lost, a composite indicator based on the two questions was developed (Figure II.8), showing the percentage of households in which at least one member of household member lost his/her job during the past two years. In comparative terms, Ecuador is among the countries moderately affected by the economic crisis as 28.7% of respondents reported a job loss by at least one member of his/her household.




Figure II.8. Percentage of Households with at Least One Family Member Who Lost a Job in the Past Two Years

As one can see, Ecuador has not been exempt from problems with job loss and unemployment. Figure II.9 shows that 16% of respondents reported having lost their jobs in the past two years. Of those, more than half reported finding another job, while the rest remained unemployed. It is important to note that the people who responded to this survey did not differentiate between formal employment and underemployment, which is why the figures reported in this report do not necessarily coincide with Ecuador's official unemployment figures.




Figure II.9. Percentage of Ecuadorians Who Lost Jobs

Socio-Demographic Factors and Employment in Ecuador

Figure II.10 highlights the diversity of Ecuador's labor force. It can be seen that of people who report having a job, half are men and half are women, which speaks to the massive participation of women as part of the Ecuador's economically active population. Similarly, we can see that the country's workforce is mainly composed of people between 26 and 55 years of age, almost half of whom have a secondary level of education, while another quarter report having studied at higher levels. Another conclusion to be drawn is that both employment and unemployment are more common in urban than rural areas. This is not a surprise as urban areas are more densely populated and economic activity is more latent than in the country's rural areas. In respect to Ecuadorians who do not work by choice or for reasons of disability, they mainly belong to two age groups; those between 16 and 25 years of age and elderly people, identified as being over the age of 65. Finally, it is important to note that 75.8% of those who voluntarily do not work in Ecuador are women. This implies that although there is significant female participation in the country's labor force, many women still choose not to work in pursuit of other activities.




Figure II.10. Percentage of Ecuadorians Who Lost Jobs by Sex, Age, Education, Area of Residence

Reported Decrease in Household Income

Now we examine the responses of those interviewed about the changes that occurred in their household income. The specific question was:

Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**
 (1) Increased? **[Go to Q11]**
 (2) Remained the same? **[Go to Q11]**
 (3) Decreased? **[Go to Q10F]**

The results for the Americas as a whole (see Figure II.11) show that about half of the respondents report that their income has remained the same, while almost 30% report that their incomes have decreased, and a fifth report increases in their household income between 2008 and 2010.




Figure II.11. Changes in Reported Household Income in the Americas, 2008-2010

Figure II.12 shows the results by country, sorted by the percentage of those who say their income has declined. As can be seen, there is wide variation in the Americas, with almost half of the respondents in some countries reporting a decline in income, while in other countries situation is reversed, with almost half of respondents reporting an increase in income. These findings reinforce the argument that the economic crisis has affected the countries making up the Americas very differently. In Ecuador, 53% of people reported that their income was unchanged over the past two years. Meanwhile, 32% reported that their incomes had declined and only 15.4% of Ecuadorians reported an increase in household income.




Figure II.12. Has your household income decrease, remain the same, or increase over the past two years? (Percentage of Total Population)

Who Was Most Affected by the Economic Crisis?

In Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, as shown in Figure II.13, a higher percentage of people in rural areas reported that their household revenue decreased over the past two years in comparison to those living in urban areas.

In addition, Figure II.13 shows that as family wealth declines, the proportion of people reporting a decrease in their household income increases; in other words, the poorest in the region are also the most likely to report a decrease in household income. Although previous LAPOP studies have used an indicator for wealth based on an unweighted index of home asset ownership, the 2010 study implemented a new indicator using the same variables, but based on a different methodology to measure relative wealth, based on Principal Component Analysis. This methodology permits the classification of people from poor to rich while taking into account the local economic conditions.¹

¹ For more information on how this indicator was calculated and its reliability, see Cordova, Abby B. 2009 "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Household Wealth using Asset Indicators." In the *AmericasBarometer Insight Series*. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).




Figure II.13. Percentage of Individuals in the Americas Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010

The trends observed in the Americas are repeated in Ecuador, although in a more marked way. Figure II.14 shows that Ecuadorians who live in rural areas are slightly more affected by declines in household income than those living in urban areas, although the difference is not statistically significant. On the other hand, Figure II.14 also shows that Ecuador's poorest populations are the ones who have suffered the largest declines in household income. Of those who occupy the first quintile of wealth in Ecuador (i.e., the group with least amount of purchasing power in the country), 45.7% endured a decrease in income over the past two years. On the other hand, Ecuadorians belonging to the highest quintile (i.e., those with the most purchasing power) have been less affected by the reductions in household income, but have definitely not been immune, as over 20% of this group also reported a decline in household income since 2008.




Figure II.14. Percentage of Ecuadorians Reporting a Decrease in Their Household Income by Area of Residence and Level of Wealth, 2010

Perceptions of Personal and National Economic Situations

The AmericasBarometer has traditionally reported respondents' perceptions of their personal and national economic situations. It also asked respondents to rate their current personal and national economic situations as compared to the previous year. Here are the questions utilized in the survey:

<p>SOCT1. How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</p> <p>(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad</p> <p>(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>
<p>SOCT2. Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>
<p>IDIO1. How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?</p> <p>(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad</p> <p>(88) Don't know (98) Doesn't answer</p>
<p>IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago?</p> <p>(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer</p>

Now we combine the above questions to those regarding reported declines in household income. As shown in Figure II.15, those who perceive their personal economic situation as very poor are more likely to have experienced a loss of household income, compared to those who report that their personal economic situation is very good. Similar results, though less pronounced, are found in relation to the respondents' perceptions of the national economy. They also prove to be valid in relation to the

respondents' perceptions of their personal and national economic situation, in comparison with the previous year.




Figure II.15. Relationship between Citizens' Experiences and Perceptions of the Economy During Hard Times in the Americas, 2010

In Ecuador, the continental trends are again repeated. As shown in Figure II.16, 54.6% of respondents who believe that national economic situation is very bad have suffered a decrease in income over the past two years. Also, of respondents who consider that their personal economic situation is very bad, 67.9% experienced a reduction in their income during this same period of time. These trends are sustained when low-income individuals assess their personal and national economic situations as worse in comparison to the previous year.




Figure II.16. Relation between the Reduction in Household Income and Economic Perceptions in Ecuador

Conclusion

As in the rest of the continent, Ecuadorian citizens perceive that the country is going through an economic crisis. However, unlike other countries in the region, the perceived severity the crisis is more varied. While 97% of respondents perceive the existence of a crisis, most consider that the crisis is not very severe. Another difference between Ecuador and the rest of the American continent is the low level of responsibility that people assign to the current government. In most of the region, the current and previous governments have been targeted as being to blame for the crisis. In Ecuador, only a part of this statement is true. Ecuadorians pointedly blame the previous government, but only 13 percent of those interviewed think that the government of current President Rafael Correa is to blame for the crisis. Despite this, the country has not escaped the effects of the global economic crisis. As in the rest of the Americas, an increase in reported household income only occurred in the minority of cases over the past two years, while a significant percentage of respondents' incomes have fallen, leading to negative perceptions about the current state of their personal and national economic situations.

Chapter III. Democratic Values in Hard Times

Introduction

Up to this point, we have analyzed the situation of Latin American citizens during the great economic recession that began in 2008, particularly in relation to their experiences with unemployment, household income, and their perceptions of personal and national welfare. In this chapter, we aim to go one step further and see how key attitudes towards democracy have developed during these difficult times.

Bad economic times have been frequently linked in the academic and journalistic literature to challenges to democracy. For example, some research suggests that poor people, who, as we saw earlier, were most affected by the reductions in household income in the current crisis afflicting large parts of the region, are particularly vulnerable to increasing support for anti-democratic alternatives during difficult economic times.¹ Some suggest that underdevelopment of the national economy and low rates of economic growth also affect democracy, while poor national economic indicators can also affect citizen support for key components of democracy.²

Given the severity of the most recent economic recession in many regions of the world, and to a lesser extent in Latin America and the Caribbean, we want to know how citizens' democratic values have fared during this difficult period. Has the crisis been associated with declines in support for democracy as a system of government and satisfaction with democracy? Furthermore, has system support (i.e., political legitimacy) declined when times got tough, or have citizens rallied around governments that have dealt effectively with the crisis? And most importantly, do Latin American citizens express greater authoritarian preferences under crisis conditions? We saw in previous chapter that the economic recession had different effects in different regions of the Americas. In 2010 AmericasBarometer, these questions are examined in more detail through the analysis of the results by region, paying particular attention to the case of Ecuador.

Under the difficult global economic conditions, we want to know how the citizens of the Americas perceived the crisis. We begin by analyzing the most general of all the measures which is that of subjective well-being, commonly referred to as "life satisfaction" or "happiness." We do this because research suggests that economic conditions are linked to people's feelings about their lives in general, with those individuals who are experiencing difficult economic times presumably expressing lower levels of subjective well-being, with individuals enjoying relatively better economic conditions expressing high levels of happiness.³ On the other hand, this same research takes note of the contradictions that exist between economic conditions and life satisfaction or happiness.⁴

¹ However, see the work of Bermeo, who reviews the thesis and in the end rejects it: Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*.

² Cordova and Seligson, "Economic Shocks and Democratic Vulnerabilities in Latin America and the Caribbean", Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*.

³ Frey S. Bruno and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Genes, Culture, Democracy, and Happiness," in *Culture and Subjective Well-Being*, ed. Ed Diener and M. Eunkook Suh (Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 2000).

⁴ Carol Graham, *Happiness around the World: The Paradox of Happy Peasants and Miserable Millionaires* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), Carol Graham, Eduardo Lora, and Inter-American Development Bank., *Paradox and*

When we focus on the specific case of the Americas, we wanted to know, “How satisfied are Latin Americans with their lives in the aftermath of the economic downturn compared to two years ago?” To answer this question we examine two questions in this survey, one that asks people about their current level of happiness and the other on how happy they were in 2008, before the crisis was evident. We subtract the respondents’ current level of happiness with their level of reported happiness in 2008 and calculate the national averages for each of the countries in the Americas. The questions asked are as follows:

[Give Card "A"]
LS6. On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 0 to 10. 0 is the lowest step and represents the worst life possible for you. 10 is the highest step and represents the best life possible for you.
 On what step of the ladder do you feel **at this moment**? **Please choose the ladder that represents best your opinion.**
[Point out the number on the card that represents "the worst life possible" and the number that represents "the best life possible." Indicate to the interviewee that he/she can choose an intermediate score].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98
Worst life possible						Best life possible					Doesn't Know	Doesn't Answer

LS6A. On which step would you say you stood two years ago, that is to say in 2008?

Figure III.1 shows that there is an even division among the Americas, with approximately half of the countries’ citizens reporting that, on average, they are happier today than in 2008, while the other half reporting that they are less happy in 2010 than in 2008. Examining Figure III.1, we note that the Uruguayans, Guyanese, Brazilian and Paraguayans are, on average, generally more satisfied with their lives in 2010 than in 2008. In sharp contrast, Jamaicans reported that their level of happiness in 2010 is considerably lower than it was 2008. Other countries where the average levels of happiness reported for 2010 is lower than that which respondents reported they had in 2008 include Belize, the United States, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Honduras.⁵ Therefore, we have our first indication that even though the economic crisis had various affects throughout the Americas, it has not been associated with a widespread decline in life satisfaction/happiness. However, this is a very general finding, so in the next section we examine a series of questions specifically designed to measure citizens’ perceptions of the economic recession.

Perception: Measuring Quality of Life in Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship: Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

⁵ To clarify, we are not comparing the surveys from 2008 with 2010, but two questions from the 2010 survey to investigate present (2010) and past (2008) levels of happiness. We do not use panel design in this survey (we have a cross section series) and therefore do not know the actual levels of happiness in 2008 for those who were interviewed in 2010.




Figure III.1. Average Increases and Decreases in Reported Life Satisfaction in 2010 vs. 2008

Careful examination of the data by segment of survey population reveals the percentages of those who expressed a decline, an increase, or no difference in levels of life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010. These results are displayed in Figure III.2. In some countries, such as Jamaica, more than half of the population expressed a decrease in life satisfaction, whereas in Surinam, in contrast, less than one-fifth reported a decrease, and just under half expressed an increase in their overall life satisfaction.




Figure III.2. Perceptions of Changes in Life Satisfaction, 2008 vs. 2010 (Percentage of the Total Population)

The following examines whether changes in life satisfaction are related to the respondents' retrospective assessments of their personal economic situations. The previous chapter discussed how respondents assessed their own personal and national economic situations at the time of interview and in comparison to the prior year.




Figure III.3. Percentage of the Population Who Perceived a Decline in Life Satisfaction by Perceptions of their Personal Retrospective Economic Situation

Now considering only those who expressed a decrease in their current life satisfaction, as shown in this chapter, Figure III.3 shows that there is a systematic link with respondent's retrospective perception of his/her personal economic situation. Figure III.3 reveals that this occurs in all the countries included in the study. The overall conclusion is that in almost all parts of the Americas, life satisfaction decreases when individuals perceive that their personal economic conditions have deteriorated.

Putting this finding in a broader context, we can examine multiple determinants of changes in levels of life satisfaction. These results are shown in the regression chart in Figure III.4. It is necessary to emphasize that we are not explaining the levels of life satisfaction, but the *changes* in life satisfaction reported by our respondents when comparing the level of satisfaction reported at the time of the interview with the level they identified as having two years earlier.⁶ In this regression equation, we added the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables including age, gender, education, area of residence (urban vs. rural) and wealth quintiles. While previous LAPOP studies have used an indicator of wealth based on an unweighted index of property and certain goods in the home, this study implemented a new indicator with the same variables, but based on relative wealth.⁷ Also included in the regression are variables that measure economic perceptions, and the economic performance of government.

The results shown in regression plot (Figure III.4) are controlled for variation by country (the "country fixed effects"), the variation that was shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 of this chapter. Each variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of these variables on attitudes of support for democracy is shown graphically by a dot, which if located to the right of the vertical "0" line indicates a positive contribution, and if it appears to the left of "0" line, a negative contribution. The statistically significant contributors are shown with confidence interval lines that extend to left and right of each item, only when the confidence intervals do not intersect the vertical "0" line is the factor significant (at 0.05 or better). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e. "beta weights").

The results show that basic socio-economic characteristics such as wealth and place of residence have no significant effect on life satisfaction. It is noted that the demographic characteristics of age and gender matter to some extent; women report a positive change in life satisfaction during the 2008-2010 period. Older respondents indicate the contrary, reporting that they are less satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. This result, however, may be influenced by the normal aging process, such that older people suffer from more health limitations on average, and therefore have more reason to report a decrease in their life satisfaction.

The set of economic variables, however, has a more consistent and, in most cases far stronger impact on life satisfaction. The strongest impact by far, already shown in Figure III.3 was that respondents with negative perceptions of his/her own retrospective personal economic situation, reporting much lower levels of life satisfaction. Also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction is the respondent's perception that he/she is experiencing a serious economic crisis. Not only does the perception of one's economic situation matter, but the factual information (taken from information provided by the survey) of a decline in household revenue over the same period (2008-2010) is associated with lower levels of life satisfaction. In a similar vein, but still having its own independent effect, is living in a household where at least one member lost his or her job during this period.

However, of all the variables included in the regression that point to changes in perceived life satisfaction between 2008 and 2010, the variable with the strongest positive and most significant impact is the *perception of the government's economic performance*.⁸ Interestingly, the level of satisfaction with

⁶ We emphasize that this is not a panel design and therefore we have no data on the same respondent in 2008 and 2010. We based on self-reported satisfaction levels with current and past life.

⁷ For more information on this indicator, see Cordova, Abby B. 2009 "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth using Household Asset Indicators." In the AmericasBarometer Insights Series. (<http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries>).

⁸ This is examined by two questions in the survey, N1 and N12, which measure the evaluation by respondents regarding effectiveness of the government in fighting poverty and unemployment.

the general performance of the current president, which is also included in the regression equation (and also had a positive effect), signifies that although people may perceive that they are not doing well economically, and may have also lived in a home that has experienced unemployment, when people perceive that the government is managing the economy well, life satisfaction is higher. This finding points to the importance of government policy in managing the economy in times of hardship and crisis.




Figure III.4. Determinants of Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction in the Americas, 2010 (Total Population)

In the case of Ecuador, Figure III.5 shows that among the basic socio-economic characteristics, only age is statistically significant, indicating that older Ecuadorians report being less satisfied in 2010 than they were in 2008. However, when analyzing the set of economic variables, we find that these variables have a stronger impact on life satisfaction. First, Ecuadorians who have a negative retrospective perception of their personal economic situation, as well as a negative perception of their current situation, have lower levels of life satisfaction. Similarly, objective information about the decline in household income during the same period (2008-2010) and, although there was only a marginal affect, living in a household where at least one member lost his or her job is also associated with lower levels of life satisfaction.




Figure III.5. Determinants of Change in Life Satisfaction in Ecuador

Despite all these factors that explain, to some extent, the life satisfaction among Ecuadorian citizens, there are other variables that have a greater impact. As in the analysis of the full sample, Figure III.5 shows that the satisfaction of Ecuadorians with the overall performance of their current executive leader increases life satisfaction. However, the factor that has the strongest impact on life satisfaction is the perception of the government's economic performance, once again suggesting the important role of governmental policies in the management of the economy during difficult times. We now continue with a more detailed analysis of these variables.

Figure III.6 shows that a negative perception of the current president's performance is associated with a feeling of dissatisfaction with life in 2010 as compared to 2008 or, in other words, Ecuadorians were more satisfied in 2008 than today. In contrast, a positive evaluation of the president's performance translates into greater levels of life satisfaction, showing that the positive perception of the president's managerial effectiveness during difficult times enables citizens to maintain their positive attitude towards life.




Figure III.6. Impact of Satisfaction with the Current President's Performance on Change in Life Satisfaction in Ecuador

The same can be seen in Figure III.7 as it relates to the perception of the government's economic performance. The less favorable the perception of government performance, the lower the respondent's current levels of life satisfaction in comparison to two years ago. On the other hand, Ecuadorians who report more favorable perceptions of the government's economic management reveal greater levels of life satisfaction. Note that the impact of a favorable evaluation of the government's performance exceeds that of the president. These results once again confirm the importance of economic policies during difficult periods, and its positive impact on life satisfaction over time.




Figure III.7. Impact of the Perception of the Government's Economic Performance on Perceived Change in Life Satisfaction

Support for Democracy

This round of the AmericasBarometer provides evidence that, despite the economic crisis, support for democracy in the region has not declined. The results comparing support for democracy in 2008 and 2010 are shown in Figure III.8.⁹ The dark blue bar on the graph displays *average* levels of support for democracy in 2010 whereas the light blue bars show average levels found in 2008.¹⁰ The reader should keep in mind that when the two grey areas overlap, the differences between the two years are not statistically significant. For example, support for democracy in Mexico decreased from 68.5 to 66.8, but this decrease is not statistically significant. In fact, what we find is that in many countries the changes are not significant in either direction. The only countries that experienced a significant decline in support for democracy in 2010 compared to 2008 are Argentina, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, Canada and the Dominican Republic. The decline in Canada was the most abrupt. In addition, support for democracy, at least as measured using the "Churchillian" question, which has been widely used in comparative studies of democracy, only increased significantly from 2008 to 2010 in the case of Chile. None of the other countries exhibited statistically significant increases.

⁹ Support for democracy is measured by the "Churchillian" question: ING4. Democracy may have problems, but is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (On a scale from 1 to 7). This question, like most questions used in the reports LAPOP, was re-coded on a scale of 0 to 100 to facilitate comparison and understanding.

¹⁰ Keep in mind that some countries (Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname) have no data for 2008, therefore only one bar appears.




Figure III.8. Average Support for Democracy across the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

While national averages in support for democracy declined significantly in only a few countries, this does not mean that the crisis itself had no effect. Support for democracy, as with all attitudes, is affected by a variety of factors, the economic crisis being only one of them. A country may have been severely beaten by the economic downturn, but if the crisis was well managed by the government, it is likely that citizens have not lost faith in their political systems. To get a better idea of the magnitude of the impact that these difficult times had on *individual attitudes towards democracy*, we carried out a regression analysis (see Figure III.9).




Figure III.9. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample)

Figure III.9 shows that age and education are two of the most important determinants in support for democracy. It is important to note that the effect of education is consistent with our previous studies on democracy in the Americas, and once again reinforces the idea that education is one of the most effective ways to build a political culture that is supportive of democracy. Elsewhere in this report we discuss the power of education to increase political tolerance, another key element in a democratic political culture. We also found that those living in urban areas are more supportive of democracy than those who live in rural areas, a finding previously discussed in prior LAPOP reports. Women often tend to exhibit less support for democracy, a finding confirmed here, even when controlling for other variables, including education. While there are controversies about the theoretical impact of wealth on support for democracy, the 2010 AmericasBarometer, considering the region as a whole (but controlling for the impact of country of residence, the "country fixed effect") finds that higher levels of wealth are positively associated with greater support for democracy.¹¹

What is surprising about the results shown in Figure III.9 is that the economic crisis has only a limited impact in reducing support for democracy. In households where a member has lost his/her job, there is a small reduction in support for democracy. However, economic perceptions do not play an important role in any way. Also, there is a *negative* but weak impact relating to the perception that the economic crisis is very severe. But far more important is the strong effect, once again, of a positive perception of the government's management of the economy. We found that, like life satisfaction, when citizens perceive that their government is managing the economy well, they are more supportive of democracy.

¹¹ John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Inequality and Democracy in Latin America: Individual and Contextual Effects of Wealth on Political Participation," in *Poverty, Participation, and Democracy*, ed. Anirudh Krishna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Our conclusion is that at the very general level of support for democracy, we do not find an overall national trend in the direction of decline, nor do we find that individual perceptions and economic experiences during the crisis lowered support for democracy. This is certainly encouraging news, suggesting greater resilience of democracy than many analysts had predicted and feared. It also suggests that the democracy recession observed by Freedom House does not seem to have affected public commitment to democracy in most of the Americas. Now, we look to see if the same trend is found in the case of Ecuador.




Figure III.10. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Ecuador, 2010

Figure III.10 shows that education and age are important determinants of support for democracy in Ecuador. These results are consistent with the previously described determinants found in the analysis of the Americas as a whole. Education continues to be a significant factor in the consolidation of Ecuadorian democratic political culture. At the same time, older Ecuadorians show greater support for democracy, which makes sense. These results could reflect the experiences of older citizens during Ecuador's dictatorship (1970-1979), leading them to be more likely to defend democracy as a form of government.

Similarly, in contrast to forecasts of the crisis's severe impact on citizen's attitudes towards democracy, Figure III.10 shows that the only economic variable with a statistically significant negative effect is the negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation, which is surprising, as one would have expected a greater impact by the economic variables. In fact, the most pronounced effect is the positive perception of governance in the economy. Specifically, we found that, like life satisfaction, when Ecuadorians perceive that their government is doing a good job managing the economy, they are more supportive of democracy.




Figure III.11. Perception of the Government's Economic Management and Support for Democracy

When we further analyze the impact of Ecuadorian government's perceived economic performance in Graph III.11, we observe that on a scale of 0 to 100, the difference between those showing higher levels of favorability toward the government's management of the economy versus those who perceive the government's management negatively, is 10 points. That is, a negative perception of the government's economic performance results in diminished support for democracy. However, it is important to note that the lower levels of support for democracy remain around the midpoint of a scale of 0 to 100, demonstrating that even when the role of the government on economic issues is negatively perceived, Ecuadorians still show high levels of support for democracy.

In summary, there is not an overall trend of diminishing support for democracy, in Latin America, nor in Ecuador. Neither individual perceptions nor experiences during the economic crisis have reduced support for democracy. As mentioned previously, this is good news as there appears to be widespread support for the defense of democracy, even in difficult times. We now move on to the evaluation of system support.

Support for the Political System

The belief in the legitimacy of a country's government (i.e., support for the political system in a country where an individual lives) is a key requirement for political stability. In extensive research, based on LAPOP survey data, John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson found that legitimacy comes from multiple sources, but the government's performance in meeting the needs and demands of its citizens is

fundamental.¹² Some research suggests that there has been a steady decline in political support for the system, even in many advanced industrial democracies, over the past 30 years.¹³ Does this mean that low levels of system support are placing democracy at risk? So far, there is no indication of this in the case of the advanced industrial democracies. But what happens in the case of democracies in process of consolidation in Latin America and the Caribbean? This issue was discussed in depth in the national reports from the 2006 round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, but will now be discussed in this year's report in the context of the severe economic crisis.

For many years LAPOP has used an index of System support index based on five variables, each one measured on a scale of 1 to 7, but converted to the traditional LAPOP scale of 0 to 100 for better understanding of the results:

- B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)
- B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?
- B3.** To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?
- B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?
- B6.** To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

¹² The political system support is a composite index of five questions. A more detailed explanation of how this index was created can be found in Chapter V, Part II of this study. See John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

¹³ J. Russell Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).




Figure III.12. Average System Support in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

To understand the dynamics of "political system support," we compare the levels of support from 2008 to those in 2010. As shown in Figure III.12, some countries have experienced significant changes in their levels of political system support. For example, in Honduras, after the coup and the elections that restored democracy, support shot up from a low of 46.4, before the coup, to 60.4 points after elections. Keep in mind, however, that the survey in Honduras was conducted just a month after the new administration came into power, and therefore the level of support can be artificially raised by the well known "honeymoon" period new governments usually experience. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay also experienced a statistically significant growth in political system support, despite the economic crisis. In addition, only Belize, Canada, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic suffered statistically significant (but quantitatively small) decreases in system support from 2008 to 2010. The other countries in the survey remained statistically unchanged.

Turning now to the determinants of system support, we see that, indeed, the perception of a very serious economic crisis correlates negatively with the system support in Latin America, as can be seen in Figure III.13. In addition, similar to the findings related to support for democracy, those with a pessimistic view of the national and personal economic situation also express low levels of system support. Interestingly, older people and women show significantly higher system support, but the effect is quite small. Unemployment also has a significant negative impact on system support.




Figure III.13. Determinants of System Support in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample)

The greatest impact on system support, as in the case of support for democracy, is the perception of the government's economic performance. Once again, we see that people in the Americas are strongly affected by their perceptions of government performance. Also, it is clearly seen that satisfaction with the performance of the president is important; however, government performance matters more. This finding reinforces the idea that the impact of the economic crisis on support for the political system and democracy has been mitigated by governments that are perceived as effective in responding to difficult times.

When examining the determinants of Ecuadorian system support, Figure III.14 shows that socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, age and area of residence have some statistically significant impact. Specifically, it appears that men, the elderly and those living in urban areas show lower levels of support for the Ecuadorian political system.




Figure III.14. Determinants of Support for the Ecuadorian Political System

When analyzing the economic variables in Figure III.14, we note that the only effect that is statistically significant is a negative perception of the current national economic situation; in other words, the more negative the perception of the nation's economy, the lower the support for the Ecuadorian political system. However, as previously discussed in relation to both Latin America and Ecuador, the *greatest impact on system support, as seen in the case of life satisfaction and support for democracy, is the perception of the government's economic performance*. These results reaffirm that Ecuadorians are strongly affected by the perception of governmental effectiveness during times of economic crisis. Similarly, while we see that satisfaction with the performance of the president is important, the effect is smaller than that of the perception of the effective economic management by the government as a whole.

Upon closer evaluation of the impact of perception regarding the Ecuadorian government's management of the economy (Figure III.15), we see that there is a difference of up to 30 points in levels of system support among Ecuadorians with highly favorable and less than favorable perceptions of government performance. These results indicate the magnitude of the importance of public perceptions regarding the effectiveness of policies implemented by governments, especially in critical moments, such as an economic crisis.




Figure III.15. Perception of the Ecuadorian Government's Performance and Support of the Ecuadorian Political System, 2010

In analyzing these results by country, as in Ecuador, citizens of many other countries have favorable perceptions of their governments, as shown in Figure III.16. It is noted that in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, United States, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador, the principal country of analysis in this study, there are a statistically significant increases in terms of favorable citizen perceptions of governmental economic management. Only in Belize, Costa Rica, Colombia, Guatemala and Jamaica were significant reductions seen between the two surveys.




Figure III.16. Perception of Government's Economic Performance, 2008 vs. 2010

The evidence, at the national level, indicates that improvements in the perception of the government's economic performance affect levels of system support, as seen in Figure III.17. In this Figure, the country averages are shown for the average change in perceptions of government performance and the change in the system support between 2008 and 2010. The results are clear: the larger the change in satisfaction with the government's management of the economy, the greater the change in system support.




Figure III.17. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Country Level Analysis

This result was found not only at the national, but the subnational level as well. Graph III.18 examines the same relationship between the change in the perception of government performance and change in system support, but using the sub-national stratum. For example, in Bolivia, each department is a stratum from a different distinct sample, while in other countries, regions are used as strata. The details of the sample design can be found in the corresponding Appendix in each country report. What is observed is here is that even at the sub-national level, when the average perception of the government's economic performance is oriented in a positive direction, average levels of system support also increases.




Figure III.18. Change in Perceptions of Government Economic Performance as a Predictor of Change in System Support (2008-2010), Subnational Level Analysis

In summary, the favorable perception of the government's economic performance during economic crises is the most important factor in explaining support for the political system. We found a strong effect in both Latin America and Ecuador. Now, we continue on with an evaluation of the determinants of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy.

Satisfaction with democracy

While support for democracy as a system of government remains very high in the Americas, despite the economic crisis, what about satisfaction with democracy? Satisfaction with democracy is another variable commonly used in tracking democratic consolidation around the world. Research in advanced industrial democracies have found there has been a decline in satisfaction with democracy over the long-term, a process that started several decades ago and still continues, indicating that it is not a process directly related to the economic downturn.¹⁴ During periods of economic crisis in the Americas, is it more likely that citizens will express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy? That is certainly a classic assumption found in much of what social science literature suggests, as noted in Chapter I. Put another way, citizens can continue to support democracy in principle as the best form of government, while in practice, they may feel that democracy has not lived up to its expectations in their own countries. The question then becomes: Are Latin American citizens less inclined to express satisfaction with democracy in their countries when they are experiencing difficult economic conditions? Evidence from the AmericasBarometer indicates that this may indeed be the case, at least in some countries.

¹⁴ Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*.

An examination of Figure III.19 shows that, in several countries, average satisfaction with democracy decreased between 2008 and 2010. In Mexico, for example, a country particularly affected by the economic crisis, satisfaction declined from 50.4, on our scale of 0 to 100, to 44.6, a decline that is statistically significant. Venezuela suffered the largest decline in the Americas, falling from 58.8 to 46.3 points. Other statistically significant decreases occurred in Argentina, Canada, Guatemala, Guyana and the Dominican Republic. Similarly, in the U.S., where the effects of the crisis were felt by the majority of citizens, there was a statistically significant decrease in the levels of satisfaction with democracy, from 57.3 to 50.6, during this period.

On the other hand, there are some countries where satisfaction with democracy increased pronouncedly. Such is the case in Honduras, a country that experienced a coup in 2009.¹⁵ In this country, satisfaction increased from 44.8 to 57.8. The largest change, however, occurred in Paraguay, a country with the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy in 2008, with a score of 30.2, and rising to 49.9 in 2010. The 2008 survey in Paraguay was conducted just before the April 2008 election that ended decades of single party domination. There is no doubt that this is a factor in the sharp increase in satisfaction with democracy registered by the 2010 survey.

Another statistically significant increase occurred in El Salvador, where, as in the case of Paraguay, the opposition (in this case the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) won power for the first time in 15 years. Also, significant increases were noted in Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay. In many countries, however, there were no statistically significant changes in satisfaction with democracy from 2008 to 2010, despite the severe economic crisis that left its mark worldwide.

¹⁵ Mitchell A. Seligson and John A. Booth, "Trouble in Central America: Crime, Hard Times and Discontent," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010).




Figure III.19. Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

In analyzing the determining factors of satisfaction with democracy, it is found that the perception of a very serious economic crisis is negatively correlated with satisfaction among Latin Americans, as shown in Figure III.20. It is also observed that negative perceptions of personal and national economic situations, as well as negative retrospective perceptions of personal and national economic situations, are associated with lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy functions in the Americas. In addition, older people are significantly more satisfied with democracy, while individuals with higher levels of education and those living in urban areas show lower levels of satisfaction. However, these effects are quite small.




Figure III.20. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample)

Even more interesting, as we found with life satisfaction, support for democracy, and system support, the main impact on satisfaction with democracy is the perception of the government's economic performance, in addition to satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Once again, we see that citizens of the Americas are highly influenced by their perceptions of their government's performance. However, in this case, we find that satisfaction with the current president matters most when it comes to satisfaction with democracy, suggesting that although the perception of the government's management of the crisis is important, the perception of the president's performance during difficult economic times is also very important.

In Ecuador, Figure III.21 shows that the perception of a very severe economic crisis is negatively correlated with Ecuadorian satisfaction with democracy. In addition, it appears that the negative perceptions of current personal and national economic situations are also associated with lower levels of satisfaction. Among the more important socio-economic variables, we note that women and wealthier citizens tend to have lower levels of democratic satisfaction. These effects, however, are limited. In fact, the data continues to stress that the strongest positive effects on support for and satisfaction with democracy are *the perceptions of government's economic performance and satisfaction with the performance of the current president*. As we have seen, Ecuadorians are strongly influenced by their perceptions of government performance, as well as the performance of its president.




Figure III.21. Determinants of Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador, 2010

Among the most significant effects, Figure III.22 shows the relationship between the perception of the government's economic performance and satisfaction with the performance of the current president on satisfaction with democracy. First, note that the effect of satisfaction with the performance of the president is higher than that of the government, shown by a steeper line. In other words, the difference in satisfaction with democracy among those who evaluated the performance of the current president as "very good", as compared to "very bad", spans almost 40 points on a scale of 0 to 100. The difference between those who perceived the economic performance of government favorably, versus those who perceived it negatively, is less than 30 points. These two effects are statistically significant and highlight the critical role that both governments and presidents play when facing a crisis of great magnitude, such as the one beginning in 2008.




Figure III.22. Perception of the Government's and Current President's Economic Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador, 2010

Support for Military Coups

An extreme reaction in difficult times is when the military takes power through a coup. Historically, in Latin America, a series of coups have been attributed to economic crises, but militaries have also been forced to relinquish power when economic crises broke out during their period of authoritarian rule. The 2009 coup in Honduras reawakened interest in military coups, which many thought were a thing of the Latin America's dark history. In the context of the current economic crisis, we now evaluate public support for this authoritarian alternative. We asked our respondents if they would justify a coup under three specific conditions: high unemployment, high crime and high corruption.¹⁶

¹⁶ The Index of Support for Military Coups was created from three questions. They ask: Now, changing the subject, some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **JC1**. When there is high unemployment. **JC10**. When there is a lot of crime. **JC13**. When there is a lot of corruption. Response options were (1) A military take-over of the state would be justified; and (2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified. These were later recoded into 100 = a military coup is justified and 0 = a military coup is not justified.




Figure III.23. Justification of a Military (Police) Coup in the Americas, 2008 vs. 2010

Comparisons between levels for support for a military coup found in 2008 and 2010 are shown in Figure III.23. We do not have comparative data for all the countries as three countries do not have an army (Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti) and were not made to answer these questions in 2008. In 2010, however, these three countries were asked about the seizure of power by police forces to create some form of alternative hypothesis. Furthermore, the question regarding a military coup was not asked in Jamaica or Paraguay in 2008.

The results show that support for a coup is very low in most countries, and found to be particularly low in Panama and Costa Rica. On our scale of 0 to 100 points, two countries obtained a score above 50, indicating high levels of support for a coup. This kind of support was very high in Honduras in 2008, the only country in addition to Guyana which scored above 50 and where, not surprisingly, a coup occurred in 2009. After the coup, citizen support for such forms of unlawful seizure of power in a democratic system was drastically reduced in Honduras. It may be that the coup itself resolved the problems that Hondurans were having with the regime and now see no reason for it, or it could be that experience of the coup itself reduced support for such actions. We leave the discussion on the question of coups for the more detailed country report on Honduras. Support for coups was also significantly reduced in 2010, as opposed to 2008, in Nicaragua, Ecuador and Guyana. Between 2008 and 2010, support for a military coup increased significantly in only one country for which we have data, Guatemala.

Returning to the relationship between economically difficult times and authoritarian tendencies is support for military coups higher among those who perceive an economic crisis or who are unemployed? As we see in Figure III.24, unfortunately, this is the case. Among Latin Americans, unemployment and the perceptions of a very serious economic crisis are associated with greater support for military coups. In addition, people who report negative perceptions of the current and retrospective national economic situation also exhibit greater support for military coups, suggesting that citizens in the Americas, under conditions of crisis, take into account economic factors when thinking about ways to punish those in power, even if it would jeopardize democratic stability.




Figure III.24. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in the Americas, 2010 (Complete Sample)

Interestingly, older, wealthier and more educated individuals are less likely to express support for military coups. An expected finding, consistent with the previously described results, is the positive effect of satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Those who positively evaluate the president's performance show lower levels of support for coups, indicating the important role the president plays in reducing support for authoritarian alternatives. On the other hand, the perception of the government's effectiveness did not yield significant results when it comes to support for military coups.




Figure III.25. Predictors of Support for Military Coups in Ecuador, 2010

When we take a closer look at the factors that influence support for military coups in Ecuador, we see in Figure III.25 that the perception of a very serious economic crisis relates to much greater support to military coups. Also, Ecuadorians reporting negative perceptions of the national economic situation also report increased support for this authoritarian alternative, reiterating that, in the case of Ecuador, individuals under conditions of economic crisis tend to want to punish the government and political authorities, even if this would endanger democracy.

Reviewing the socio-demographic variables, older people and those with higher levels of education show a lower tendency to favor military coups. As seen before, Ecuadorians who have a favorable perception of the president show lower levels of support for coups. This finding is in line with the findings presented so far, emphasizing the positive impact that satisfaction with the current president's performance has on the population. Surprisingly, the perception of the government's economic performance did not reach statistical significance.




Figure III.26. Perception of the Economic Crisis and Support for Military Coups

We now examine each of these effects. As seen in Graph III.26, support for military coups in Ecuador is around 15 points higher, on a scale of 0 to 100, among those who perceive a very serious economic crisis than those who perceive an economic crisis, but believe that it is not very serious. These differences are statistically significant. However, also note that this support does not pass the scale's midpoint, suggesting that although Ecuadorians are more likely to support military coups under conditions of severe economic crisis, this support remains relatively low.

In Figure III.27, we note that the negative perception of the national economic situation is similar to the unemployment of at least one household member, in increasing support for military coups. The Ecuadorians who perceive the national economy as "very bad" reveal average support around 50 points on the scale of 0 to 100, while those who perceive the economy as "bad", "regular", "good" and "very good" reveal average support for military coups at 42, 35, 32 and 40 points respectively, on the same scale. Also, support for military coups is higher among Ecuadorians who live in a household where at least one member lost his or her job.




Figure III.27. Support for Military Coups by Negative Perception of the National Economic Situation and by Those Who Lost Their Jobs




Figure III.28. Support for Military Coups by Level of Education and Age

The differences in support for coups among those who said they had suffered loss of work (43) and those who responded to the contrary (34) are statistically significant, suggesting that economic variables are important when assessing their governments, including in giving support to authoritarian alternatives. These results are unfortunate for the ongoing process of democratic consolidation in Ecuador, especially when one is facing a very acute financial crisis. But as we shall later see, the perception of effective management by the president could mitigate support for undemocratic solutions.

Among the socio-demographic variables, we observe in Figure III.28 that support for military coups is seen more in young men and the portion of the Ecuadorian population with lower levels of formal education. Moreover, this support is significantly lower among the older and more educated citizens. These findings point, to some extent, to the possibility that older Ecuadorians tend to show less support for military coups because they have personally experienced it during Ecuador's dictatorship (1970-1979), and as a result, reject of the idea of another military takeover.




Figure III.29. Satisfaction with the Current President's Performance and Support for Military Coups

Finally, Figure III.29 shows the impact of satisfaction with the performance of the current president, which has the strongest effect in the regression (Figure III.25) on support for military coups. We see that the more negatively Ecuadorians evaluate the performance of the incumbent president, the greater the support they exhibit for military coups. On the other hand, when Ecuadorians perceive the work of the president as "very good", support for military coups decreases significantly. If the perception of the president's or government's performance is positive, Ecuadorians will not only remain against authoritarian solutions, as in the case of a military coup, but defend democratic actions in response to economic problems.

Conclusion

Several conclusions emerge in this chapter. First, the economic crisis has affected virtually all of Latin America. Second, the magnitude of impact varies by country. Third, the economic crisis has had various effects within each country, as was verified by our deeper analysis of Ecuador, the country of focus in this study.

One of the main objectives of this chapter was to see to what extent the economic crisis affected support for several democratic attitudes among citizens of the Americas and Ecuador. We saw, both in the case of Latin America and the Caribbean and in the case of Ecuador, economic variables mattered when explaining lower levels of support for various aspects of democracy, including change in life satisfaction, support and satisfaction with democracy and support for the political system. However, the effects of positive perceptions related to the government's management of the economy, as well as the performance of the president, has mitigated the negative effects of the crisis. Repeatedly stated throughout this chapter, these results demonstrate the important role played by policies implemented by governments. Thus, when people believe that their governments and presidents have implemented effective policies to help combat difficult times, support for various aspects of democracy remain high, even among the individuals who have personally experienced the direct consequences of the crisis, such as unemployment.

Another important finding in this chapter is that there was greater support for military coups, in Americas as a whole and Ecuador specifically, among those who felt that the crisis was very serious, those who reported that at least one family member lost his/her job and those who expressed negative perceptions of the current national economic situation. Interesting, in this case, the impact of a favorable perception of the current government's economic management had no mitigating effects, as was observed in several other democratic factors. In contrast, only the satisfaction with the current president's performance reduces support for military coups. It is important to emphasize that the positive perception of the president's performance under crisis conditions mitigates support for authoritarian alternatives. If the current president is committed to implementing effective policies to address economic problems, it is likely that people will remain defenders of democracy as a form of government; otherwise, people will take economic factors into account when they think about ways to punish those in power, even if it would put democracy at risk. Transparent and effective policies appear to be the key in the consolidation of democratic political culture in the Americas, as well as in Ecuador.

Part II: Rule of Law, Crime, Corruption, and Civil Society

Chapter IV. Rule of Law, Crime, and Corruption

Introduction

Part I of this study provided a general overview of the economic crisis and democratic development. We also focused on citizens' perceptions of the economic crisis by answering the question: *Who was most likely to be affected by the crisis?* We gave a regional comparative assessment of citizens' perceptions of key economic variables, followed by an evaluation of the impact of the crisis in terms of unemployment and perceptions of national and personal economic welfare. We concluded Part I with a general assessment of the extent to which those who report being affected by the crisis may express lower support for democracy. Part II of this study attempts to test key hypotheses relating to the rule of law, crime, and corruption. The objective of this section is to specify the degree to which crime and corruption influence support for democracy. The variables used to measure the economic crisis in Part I are also used as additional control or predictor variables in Part II, but are not the central focus of analysis.

Theoretical background

At the beginning of XXI century, violence has become a major social problem worldwide. According to data from the World Health Organization, approximately 1.6 million people lose their lives each year because of violence.¹ With the exception of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America is the most violent region in the world. The main difference is that while violence in Africa is caused by civil war and ethnic conflict, the main sources of violence in Latin America are social violence and criminality.

Despite the large number of deaths caused by non-political violence in Latin America, few studies have examined the impact of violence caused by crime. This is because, historically, the survival of democracies in Latin America has been considered mainly taking into account economic and social development of the political regimes, and not the regimes' abilities to generate public safety.²

The rise in violent crime in various parts of the region has drawn attention to its potential effects on political processes, particularly on democracy.³ Although most existing academic studies focus more on the impact of democracy on the judicial system or on violent crime, in recent years, there have been some studies whose principal focus has been the effect that criminal violence in America may have on the quality of democracy in the continent.⁴ These studies will become increasingly important considering that the violence generated by crime is an increasing problem for many democracies, both new and stable.⁵

¹ Krug, Etienne H., Dahlberg, Linda L., Mercy, James A., Zwi, Anthony B. and Rafael Lozano. (Eds). *World Report on Violence and Health*. Geneva: World Health Organization Publications, 2002.

² Bates, Robert. *Prosperity and Violence. The Political Economy of Development*. New York: Norton, 2001. Tilly, Charles. *The Politics of Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

³ Bodemer, Klaus. *The new scenario of (in)security in Latin America: A threat to democracy?* Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 2003.

⁴ Cruz, José Miguel. Violence and democratization in Central America: the impact of crime on the legitimacy of the postwar regimes. *Latin America Today* 35 (2003): 19-59. Pérez, Orlando. Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala. *Political Science Quarterly*, 118 (4) (2003). Winter 2003-2004. Seligson, Mitchell and Azpuru, Dinorah. "The size and political impact of crime in the Guatemalan population." In Luis Rosero Bixby (ed). *Population of the Isthmus 2000: Family migration, violence and the environment*. San Jose: Central American Population Center, 2000.

⁵ LaFree, Gary and Tseloni, Andromachi. "Democracy and crime: a multilevel analysis of homicide trends in forty-four Countries, 1950 - 2000. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605 (6) (2006): 26-49.

Perception of Insecurity and Crime

The AmericasBarometer deals with the issue of insecurity and crime in two ways. The first has to do with citizens' perceptions of their own security in their daily environments. The question used to measure the perception of insecurity is the following:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat **unsafe** or very **unsafe**?

a) Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.1 displays a comparative view of the American continent in terms of citizen perceptions of insecurity. It should be noted that the above question was re-coded to a scale of 0 to 100, where zero means "very safe" and 100 means "very unsafe." The chart shows that the United States and Canada are the countries with the lowest perceptions of insecurity in the region, while Peru, Argentina and El Salvador are the countries where citizens feel most unsafe. Ecuador is also near top of the chart with a score of 46.6, which means that Ecuadorians feel only "somewhat safe" in their daily environments.




Figure IV.1. Perception of Insecurity in Latin America, 2010

b) Perception of Insecurity Over Time

Figure IV.2 displays the perception of insecurity by Ecuadorian citizens over time. As one can see, it has not changed much during the nine years that LAPOP has been conducting this survey. While there have been minor variations in the values shown in Figure IV.2, these are not statistically significant, allowing us to state that public perception of insecurity in the country has remained stable from 2001 through 2010.




Figure IV.2. Perception of Insecurity in Ecuador: 2001-2010

Crime Victimization

a) The Measurement of Crime Victimization

The second way in which the AmericasBarometer examines the issue of crime and insecurity is through the measurement of citizens' experiences with these phenomena. For the 2010 edition, LAPOP developed a new item to measure crime victimization more accurately by soliciting more precise responses. In previous surveys, respondents were asked: *Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?* In this round, the question was slightly modified and is now accompanied by some examples of possible criminal acts. The following questions are used in the questionnaire:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

VIC2AA. ¿Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred?[Read options]

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this Parish
- (4) In another Parish
- (5) In another country

(88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. ¿Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (88) Doesn't Know
- (98) Doesn't Answer




Figure IV.3. Victimization by Crime at the Individual Level, Ecuador 2010

Continuing our discussion of Ecuador, Figure IV.3 reveals that 29.1% of respondents were victims of a criminal act, including robbery, theft, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion or threats. When analyzing the time series data, it is obvious that this is the highest rate of crime victimization in Ecuador since 2001, as seen in Figure IV.4. It is important, however, to point out that although the increase in the percentage of victims in Ecuador may well reflect an actual increase in the levels of criminal activity, this figure could also be the result of the change in the formulation of the question, which now specifies various forms of victimization by crime.




Figure IV.4. Victimization by Crime in Ecuador by Year

Another one of the changes implemented in the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer, in order to more precisely assess acts of crime victimization, is the additional measurement of victimization in the home. Figure IV.5 shows the results of this measurement. As can be seen, in 17% of the respondents interviewed, both the respondent and a family member were victims of a criminal act in the home. In 20.7% of cases, the respondent reported that a household member was victim of the criminal act, while 12.1% of respondents reported being the only victim of the criminal act.




Figure IV.5. Victimization by Crime in the Home, Ecuador 2010

Finally, Figure IV.6 shows where crime victimization occurs with the most frequency; 48% of crime victims were victimized in the city where they reside, 23% were victimized in their neighborhood, while 17.2% of crime victims in the Ecuador were victimized in their own homes.




Figure IV.6. Place of Respondent's Crime Victimization, Ecuador 2010

b) Crime Victimization in Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.7 displays the percentage of people victimized by crime on the continent. It should be clarified that while the previous comparisons exhibited differences between years, these differences could be due to the change in question formulation. However, in Figure IV.7, all countries have been exposed to the same change, so the differences between countries are real and are due to the different levels of criminality in the American nations. The results shown in Figure IV.7 indicate that Peru is the country with the highest levels of crime victimization, with 31.1% of the respondents having been victimized by a criminal act in the 12 months preceding the survey. Ecuador is in second place with 29.1%, while Bolivia and Venezuela are close behind with 26.2%. This indicates that, per the data collected by the AmericasBarometer, the Andean countries are the most dangerous in the region. At the other end of the chart, we find countries like Guyana, Jamaica and Panama, where crime victimization only affected around 10% of the population in the 12 months preceding the survey.




Figure IV.7. Percentage of People Victimized by Crime in a Comparative Context, 2010

c) Who is most likely to be a Victim of Crime?

Figure IV.8 displays a visual representation of a logistic regression designed to uncover who in Ecuador is more likely to be a victim of crime. Based on the results of this regression we can say that, for example, geographical factors such as the size of one's place of residence and the region where one lives may influence the likelihood of being victimized by crime. In other words, taking into account all the factors considered in the regression model, people who live in smaller cities are less prone to crime than those living in large cities (Figure IV.9). Furthermore, people living in the urban northern highlands and the Northeast are less likely to be victims of crime than those living in the urban coast.




Figure IV.8. Who is likely to be a victim of crime in Ecuador? (2010)

In analyzing the data, we also find that age and levels of education are important to predicting crime victimization in Ecuador. Specifically, the elderly are less likely to be victims of crime. This relationship can be seen more clearly in Figure IV.9. Surprisingly, also illustrated in Figure IV.9, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between education and crime victimization in Ecuador, meaning that those with higher levels of education are victimized at higher rates than those with lower levels of education.




Figure IV.9. Victimization by Crime by Size of City, Level of Education and Age in Ecuador, 2010

Corruption

Theoretical Background

Corruption is identified by Latin Americans as a major threat to the region's democracies. According to Rose-Ackerman,⁶ the institutionalization of corruption is a clear signal that the state does not function properly, a statement that corroborates the AmericasBarometer, which in its 2006 edition showed, that along with high levels of crime, widespread corruption is one of the two reasons that lead large proportions of the population to support military coups.⁷ Corruption is present in all strata of society, from the lowest to the most elite economic and political classes. In the last decade, government officials, including the constitutional presidents of Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru and Ecuador, have faced criminal charges for engaging in acts of corruption during the execution of their duties.

Arvind Jain⁸ defines corruption as the misuse of a public office for private gain by the one who occupies it. The misuse of a public office suggests that there are flaws within the society's political institutions. However, corruption can also be the product of beneficial rules or inefficient public policies; for example, the payment of a bribe to avoid a larger fine or offering unwarranted payment to avoid an unnecessary delay in transactions within bureaucratic processes.⁹

⁶ Rose-Ackerman, Susan. *Corruption and Development*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1997.

⁷ Cruz, Jose Miguel. "The Impact of Crime on the Political Culture of Latin America." In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence From the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007*, edited by Mitchell Seligson, 2007.

⁸ Jain, Arvind, ed. *The Political Economy of Corruption*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

⁹ Svensson, Jakob. "Eight Questions About Corruption." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 3 (2005): 19-42.

Most countries with high levels of corruption share similar characteristics. Many tend to be developing countries or those facing a political transition. They also tend to be nations with low levels of income and high levels of centralization in their governments.¹⁰ Corruption, however, is not exclusive to countries with these characteristics. In 2000, Daniel Treisman conducted a study which showed that in controlling for low incomes and democratic instability, Latin American countries were not significantly more corrupt than the consolidated industrial democracies of Western Europe and North America.¹¹

One of the major problems that researchers and scholars have found in dealing with corruption is how to measure it. In a sense, corruption is like democracy, recognizable when one sees it but very difficult to measure, mainly because corruption is secretive by nature. It is known that corruption exists, but there are usually few witnesses, and those who have direct knowledge of what happened frequently prefer to keep quiet to protect their own interests.¹² The difficulties that arise when measuring the concept of corruption usually results in confusing the operationalizations used to measure the concept itself.¹³ However, in order to effectively combat corruption one must first quantify it, and so there have been several efforts by academics who have attempted to quantify corruption and have contributed to its understanding, especially in the development of various tactics to combat it.¹⁴

Measuring Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of items to measure victimization by corruption. These items were first tested in Nicaragua (Seligson, 1999, Seligson, 1997) and have been refined and improved through the many studies since then. Because definitions of corruption can vary by culture, we avoid ambiguity by defining corrupt practices in asking such questions as: "Within the last year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about bribery demands at the local level of government, in public schools, at work, in the courts, public health facilities and elsewhere. This series provides two kinds of information. First, we can find out where corruption most frequently occurs. Secondly, we can construct generalized scales of corruption victimization, enabling us to distinguish between respondents who have experienced corrupt practices in only one setting and those who have been victimized in multiple settings. As in studies of crime victimization, we assume it makes a difference if one has a single experience versus multiple experiences in being victimized by corruption.

The full series of questions relating to corruption is as follows:

¹⁰ Weyland, Kurt. "The Politics of Corruption in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998): 108-21.

¹¹ Treisman, Daniel. "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study." *Journal of Public Economics* 76 (2000): 399-457.

¹² Kaufmann, Daniel, Art Kraay, and Massimo Mastuzzi. "Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realities." In *Global Corruption Report*, edited by Transparency International: Cambridge University Press

¹³ Babbie, E. *The Practice of Social Research*. Bémont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995

¹⁴ Graf, Johan. "Corruption Perception Index 2006." In *Global Corruption Report* published by Transparency International: Cambridge University Press 2007.

Lavers, Tom. "The Global Corruption Barometer 2006." In *Global Corruption Report* published by Transparency International: Cambridge University Press 2007.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the city/town /Village council office? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document like a permit, for example, did you have to pay any money beyond that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

An item related to this topic but that measures the perception (rather than victimization) of corruption, was also included in the questionnaire:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is **[Read]**
(1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) Doesn't Know
(98) Doesn't Answer

Perception of Corruption

a) Comparative Perspectives of the Perception of Corruption

The differences among countries in the Americas, in terms of the perception of widespread corruption in the public sector, are illustrated in Figure IV.10. This Figure displays a re-coding of the question shown in the box above, where 100 means that citizens perceive corruption among officials as "very widespread" and zero means that people believe that corruption is "not widespread." As can be seen, the citizens of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Peru have the highest perceptions of corruption on the continent, while in Surinam, Uruguay and Canada, the perception is lower, despite the fact that they remain above the scale's half-point. This means that although there are important differences between

countries, in general, the citizens of the Americas have a relatively high perception of corruption in the public sector. Finally it is stressed that Ecuador is more or less in the middle of this Figure, with a score of 73.9 points on the scale of 0 to 100, meaning that Ecuadorians perceive corruption in the public sector as "somewhat widespread."




Figure IV.10. Perception of Corruption in the Americas

b) Perception of Corruption Over Time

Figure IV.11 shows how the perception of corruption in the Ecuador's public sector has changed from 2001 to 2010. As can be seen, Ecuadorians have always had a very high perception of corruption in their public officials. This perception was at its highest in 2006, from which point the trend has declined. While the difference between the perception of corruption in 2008 and 2010 is minimal, it is important to

note that the perception of corruption this year is the lowest recorded by the AmericasBarometer in Ecuador.




Figure IV.11. Perception of Corruption in Ecuador: 2001-2010

Victimization by Corruption

Now that we have seen how corruption in public officials is perceived in Ecuador and the rest of the region, it is important to know the citizens' experiences with corruption in the Americas. The battery of questions developed by LAPOP to measure victimization was detailed earlier in this section. These questions aim to describe citizen experiences with corruption in their countries' public (courts, municipalities) and private sectors (respondent's place of employment).

a) Comparative Perspective of Victimization by Corruption

Figure IV.12 displays the percentages of people, by country, who were victims of corruption at least once in the 12 months preceding the survey. As can be seen, the experiences of corruption in the Americas are varied. Mexico, Bolivia and Peru are the countries with the highest levels of victimization by corruption on the continent, with more than 30% of citizens reporting that they have had to pay a bribe at least one time during the 12 months preceding the survey. This means that in these three countries, one in three people was a victim of corruption during the prior year. At the other extreme, in countries such as Uruguay, the United States, Chile and Canada, rates of victimization did not even reach 10%.




Figure IV.12. Victimization by Corruption in a Comparative Context, 2010

In Ecuador, 21.1% of respondents reported having been victims of corruption during the year prior to the survey. This means that approximately one in five Ecuadorians have had to pay a bribe in a public institution or private institution. Figure IV.13 shows that of the 21.1% of Ecuadorians who were victimized by corruption, almost 8%, or slightly less than half, were victimized on more than one occasion.




Figure IV.13. Index of Victimization by Corruption, Ecuador 2010

b) Corruption Victimization Over Time

Figure IV.14 shows good news in terms of a reduction in corruption in Ecuador. As one can see, in 2001 more than 48% of Ecuadorians reported being the victim of an act of corruption. This amount was reduced to 34% in 2004, then from 32% in 2006 to 25.5% in 2008 and finally to 21.1% in 2010. While Ecuador has not experienced a change as dramatic as that seen between 2001 and 2004, the rate of victimization in Ecuador has been declining with each LAPOP survey, and is currently at its lowest point since the first survey in 2001. This means that in 2010, Ecuador has the lowest levels of actual victimization by corruption and perceptions of corruption since the existence of the AmericasBarometer.




Figure IV.14. Percentage of the Population Victimized by Corruption by Year in Ecuador

c) Who is More Likely to Be a Victim of Corruption?

Figure IV.15 illustrates the results of a logistic regression model created to distinguish those who are most likely to be victims of corruption in Ecuador. Unlike what happens with crime, geographical factors are not important when predicting the likelihood of being victimized by corruption in Ecuador. On the other hand, some factors found to be important in predicting the likelihood of crime victimization are also important in understanding the likelihood of victimization by corruption. Figure IV.15 shows that both age and education have a significant relationship with victimization by corruption, although the direction of the relationship is different in both cases. Age has a negative relationship with victimization, meaning that older people are less likely than their younger counterparts to be victimized by corruption. Education and corruption, however, are positively related, meaning that people with higher levels of education are more likely to be victims of corruption, than those with less formal education. The regression results also show that women are less likely to be victimized than men. In addition, people who rate their household economic situation positively are victimized less than those who rate their family's economic situation as bad. Finally, those with more children have a higher probability of becoming victims of corruption. Not surprisingly, when one has more children, there are more interactions with school officials and more opportunities to be victimized by corruption. Figure IV.16 illustrates some of these relationships.




Figure IV.15. Who is more likely to be a victim of corruption in Ecuador? (2010)




Figure IV.16. Corruption Victimization by Age, Gender, and Education, Ecuador 2010

The Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Democracy

To measure the impact of crime and corruption on the functioning of Ecuador's democracy, a linear regression model, whose results are displayed in Figure IV.17, was developed. This model attempts to assess the impact of Ecuadorians' perceptions and experiences with crime and corruption on citizen support for the political system. The dependent variable used in the regression model is "system support."¹⁵




Figure IV.17. Impact of Crime, Insecurity and Corruption on Political System Support in Ecuador (2010)

The results of the linear regression show that there are several factors that affect citizen support for Ecuador's political system, both positively and negatively. Factors such as interest in politics and approval of the current president's job performance positively affect political system support. We can also see that women expressed a higher level of system support than men. On the other hand, older people are less supportive of the Ecuadorian political system than young people. Most importantly, the regression shows that perceptions of corruption and insecurity and the experience of being victimized by crime have negative and statistically significant effects on support for the Ecuadorian political system. In other words, those who feel unsafe or have been victimized by crime and those who perceive the Ecuadorian public sector as corrupt have much lower levels of confidence and trust in the Ecuadorian political system.

Figure IV.18 shows, in more detail, the effects that perception of corruption, sense of insecurity and crime victimization have on political system support in Ecuador. It is interesting how perceptions are found to be more important than actual experiences in their impact on political system support. As

¹⁵ The support system is an index created from five questions. **B1.** To what extent do you think the courts in Ecuador guarantee a fair trial? **B2.** To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Ecuador? **B3.** To what extent do you think citizen's basic rights are well protected by the Ecuadorian political system? **B4.** To what extent do you feel proud of living under the Ecuadorian political system? **B6.** To what extent do you think one should support the political system of Ecuador? A more detailed analysis of this concept is offered in the next chapter.

illustrated in Figure IV.18, those who feel very safe and perceive that corruption in the public sector is not widespread have support for the political system that is 10 points higher (on a scale of 0 to 100) than Ecuadorians who believe that corruption is widespread in public sector and feel that their safety is constantly threatened. On the other hand, those who were victims of a criminal act are only 4 points lower (on the scale of 0 to 100) than those who had not been victimized by crime.




Figure IV.18. Impact of Perception of Insecurity, Corruption and Crime Victimization on System Support in Ecuador (2010)

Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

The term "rule of law" is not easy to define, its importance, however, is beyond debate. The ability of a nation to create and maintain the rule of law is crucial when assessing democracy and its prospects for consolidation.¹⁶ Rule of law embodies constitutional guarantees and without it, many of the authoritarian tendencies that have historically existed in this region would resurface to threaten and destabilize democratic institutions. Rule of law is built when the authorities are strictly regulated and abide in good faith to the country's constitution and laws¹⁷, providing people the security of feeling protected by their legal and political systems. The question developed by LAPOP, shown below, aims to discover citizens' sense of respect for the rule of law in Ecuador.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) Doesn't Know
 (98) Doesn't Answer

¹⁶ Ungar, Mark. *Elusive Reform: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

¹⁷ Dorsen, Norman, and Prosser Gifford, eds. *Democracy and the Rule of Law*. New York: CQ Press, 2001.




Figure IV.19. Support for the Rule of Law in Ecuador (2010)

Figure IV.19 displays the results of this question. As can be seen, more than half of the respondents support the authorities in acting outside of the law in order to capture perpetrators of crime. While this trend may be due to the increase of crime in Ecuador, the fact, referred to earlier in this chapter, is that the attitudes of the majority regarding the validity of the rule of law in Ecuador is worrisome, as the values expressed are in opposition to values consistent with democracy, such as the right to due process for all people.

a) Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law from a Comparative Perspective

Figure IV.20 shows the percentage of people by country who believe that the authorities should always abide by the law and that they can't cross the line in order to catch criminals.




Figure IV.20. Support for the Respect of the Rule of Law from a Comparative Perspective, 2010

Figure IV.20 illustrates that in all the countries, with only three exceptions, over 50% of respondents supported complete respect for the rule of law. The only three cases where support for the rule of law was found to be the minority was Peru, El Salvador and Ecuador, where the rates of victimization by crime are among the highest on the continent.

b) Impact of Crime Victimization and Perception of Insecurity on Respect for the Rule of Law

To reveal the factors determining public support for the rule of law, we have built a logistic regression model, whose results are shown in Figure IV.21. These results confirm the suspicion that crime victimization in Ecuador is a determining factor in explaining the low percentage of people who believe that the authorities should always respect the law. The logistic regression shows that, in Ecuador, those who have been victimized by a criminal act show less support for the rule of law than their non-

victimized counterparts. The relationship between these two variables is detailed in Figure IV.22. This Figure shows that of people who were victimized by crime, only 39.4% think that the authorities must respect the law without exception, while of the respondents who were not victimized by a criminal act in the twelve months preceding the survey, 48.1% supported the rule of law in the country. This is a low percentage overall and barely exceeds the percentage of support for the rule of law by all Ecuadorians, which is only 45.5%.




Figure IV.21. Determinants of Support for Respect for the Rule of Law in Ecuador, 2010




Figure IV.22. Support for the Rule of Law and Crime Victimization, Ecuador 2010

Conclusion

This chapter contains a wealth of information on crime and corruption in Ecuador, as well as their effects on support for the rule of law and the country's political system. As crime is concerned, the data show that although crime victimization has apparently increased in the country (the new way of formulating this question may be partly responsible for the results), and given that Ecuador is one of the countries with the highest crime rate in the region, the perception of insecurity among citizens has remained relatively unchanged from 2001 to 2010. On the other hand, the news about corruption in Ecuador is encouraging. The data show a decrease in both the perception of corruption in the public sector, as well as in the experiences of citizens with corruption in the public and private sectors. The reduction of corruption and crime are necessary for the health of Ecuador's democracy. The data also show that perceptions of insecurity and corruption have a negative effect on support for the Ecuadorian political system. Finally, crime victimization in Ecuador is found to be a factor that negatively impacts not only political system support, but also the support for the rule of law, a fundamental pillar of democracy that needs to be strengthened.

Chapter V. Legitimacy, System Support, and Political Tolerance

Introduction

The legitimacy of the political system has been conceived as an essential element in democratic stability.¹ Recent research has emphasized the importance of legitimacy (Gibson *et al.* 2005) for many aspects of democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009, Gilley 2009). In this chapter, we deepen our understanding of political legitimacy by first returning to research that has appeared in prior studies published by LAPOP, namely those that look at the joint effect of political legitimacy and political tolerance as a predictor of future democratic stability. In this regard, scenarios of greater legitimacy and political tolerance are seen as most favorable to the development of a stable democracy.

Theoretical Background

The Legitimacy and Tolerance Equation

In previous AmericasBarometer studies, political legitimacy, defined in terms of "system support" along with tolerance for political opposition, were used together to create a kind of warning indicator for those democracies that could be particularly vulnerable. The theory is that the two attitudes are necessary to maintain long-term democratic stability. Citizens must believe in the legitimacy of its political institutions *and* also be willing to tolerate the political rights of others. It is only in these contexts that permit the existence of majority rule accompanied by the rights for minorities, a combination of attributes often viewed as the quintessential definition of democracy (Seligson 2000). Ideally, a political system should have high levels of system support and high levels of political tolerance, however, several combinations can occur, depending on precise degree to which a society gives legitimacy to its institutions and supports tolerance, or the right of opposition by minorities. Table V.1 shows all theoretically possible combinations between system support and tolerance when the two variables are divided into levels of high and low.

Before focusing on the results, it is important to explain how the "system support" and tolerance indicators are constructed. System support is a measure of the degree to which individuals trust in the country's political institutions, thus respecting and feeling supported by them. It is the result of the average of responses given to the following questions:

- | |
|---|
| B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.) |
| B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)? |
| B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)? |
| B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)? |
| B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)? |

¹ Dictatorships, of course, can be popular and have the support from broad sectors of the population, but when they fail to do so, they turn to repression to maintain power. In democracies, governments that try to use repression fall fast.

Following the usual procedure, the original scale of one to seven is transformed into a new scale of zero to 100, in which zero represents the least amount of system support possible and 100 represents the maximum support possible.

Now, we review the construction of the index for political tolerance. We asked citizens to identify until what point they were willing to approve a series of political rights for those who are against the country's system of governance. The questions used were:

- D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: [**Probe: To what degree?**]
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

The original responses were provided using a scale of one to 10, where one indicated no agreement and 10 represented strong agreement. Thus, low values indicate a low tolerance for the political rights of those who do not agree with the form of government, or low political tolerance. The original values for each of the questions were re-coded on the scale of zero to 100 and were used to create an index by taking the simple average of the respondents' answers to the four questions.

Table V.1. Theoretical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

System Support (i.e., legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

From the theoretical point of view, we analyze the relationship between political system support, or legitimacy, and tolerance, for which it is necessary to dichotomize both scales into "high" and "low."² Table V.1 shows the four possible combinations between legitimacy and tolerance.

Political systems with a majority of citizens exhibiting high levels of system support and political tolerance are those systems that are predicted to be the most stable, those predicted to have a *stable democracy*. This prediction is based on the logic that, in non-coercive contexts, high levels of systemic legitimacy are needed for the political system to be stable. If citizens do not support their political system, and they have the freedom to act, system change would likely be the inevitable outcome. Systems that are stable, however, will not necessarily be democratic, unless minority rights are assured. Such assurance could, of course, come from constitutional guarantees, but unless citizens are willing to tolerate the civil liberties of minorities, there will be little opportunity for those minorities to run for and win elected office. Under these conditions, of course, majorities can always suppress the rights of minorities. Systems that are both politically legitimate, as demonstrated by positive system support, and

² Each of these scales has a range from zero to 100, so the midpoint selected is 50. Thus, values of system support under 50 have been classified as "low", and system support values above 50 are considered "high." Similarly, for political tolerance, values below 50 are considered "low" and values above 50 are "high."

have citizens who are reasonably tolerant of minority rights, are most likely to enjoy a stable democracy. (Dahl 1971).

When system support remains high, but tolerance is low, the system tends to remain stable (through the high support), although democratic rule could be jeopardized in the medium term. Such political systems would tend to transition towards authoritarian (oligarchic) rule, in which democratic rights would be restricted.

A situation of low system support is expressed in the bottom two squares of Table V.1, and both could be directly linked to political instability. The instability, however, need not result in a reduction of civil liberties, since the instability could serve for the system to deepen its level of democracy, especially when values move toward tolerance. Therefore, in a situation of low support and high tolerance, it is difficult to predict if the instability will lead to greater democratization or a protracted period of instability, which could be characterized by considerable violence; because of this, this situation is described as a scenario of *democratic instability*.

Moreover, in situations of low support and low tolerance, democratic breakdown appears to be the eventual outcome. Obviously we cannot predict the breakdown of democracy solely based on opinion polls, as this process involves many other factors, including the role of elites, the position of the military and the support or opposition by the international actors, all who are crucial to this process. However, systems where public opinion does not support a nation's basic institutions, nor supports minority rights, are vulnerable to a democratic breakdown, and therefore, this context is described as a *democracy at risk*.

It is important to note two caveats that apply to this scheme. First, one must consider that the relations discussed here only apply to systems that are already institutionalized democracies. That is, there are systems in place, competitive elections are regular and these elections enable wide public participation. These same attitudes in authoritarian systems would have entirely different implications. For example, low system support and high tolerance might produce the breakdown of the authoritarian regime, and its replacement by a democracy. Secondly, the assumption being made is that in the long term, the attitudes of both citizens and governing elites represent a difference in the regime type. Attitudes and the type of regime may remain incongruent for long periods of time. In fact, as Seligson and Booth have shown for Nicaragua, this incongruity is what could have helped the fall of the Somoza regime. However, the case of Nicaragua was one in which the existing system was authoritarian and repression was used for a long time to maintain the authoritarian regime, perhaps in spite of the tolerant attitudes of its citizens (Booth and Seligson 1991; Seligson and Booth 1993, Booth and Seligson 1994). In addition, remembering the most recent case of Honduras, the military coup carried out in July of 2009 was preceded by low levels of system support and low levels of political tolerance, as indicated by the 2008 AmericasBarometer survey and reported in the 2008 country report on Honduras. For a more detailed study of this case, see the 2010 LAPOP report on Honduras.

A. Support for the Political System

Theoretical Background

As seen in the previous pages, system support is key to the prevalence of democracy as a form of government, but only in combination with political tolerance, since both are essential elements for a

stable democracy. In this section, we focus on the analysis of political system support. We first examine each of its components, moving on to a comparison across countries and end with an analysis of political system support over time.

Previous studies suggest that support for the political system consists of several dimensions, including: a sense of belonging to the political community, the principals of the regime and the performance of the regime, its institutions and political actors (Dalton 2004, Dalton 2006; Easton 1965, Easton 1975, Easton 1976, Norris 1999).³ Concretely, political system support is more commonly known as *targeted* support that mainly responds to and depends on the current government's popularity. *Diffuse* support refers to more abstract support where the political system's level of legitimacy is concerned. However, it is thought that diffuse support is influenced by specific support, especially when it comes to all matters relating to the perception of the incumbent president's performance, that is, whether the president is popular or not. We now continue with an analysis of each one of these components.

Figure V.1 displays the average levels of support for the various components of the Ecuadorian political system. First, we see that respect for Ecuador's institutions receives the most citizen support, with an average of 56.5 points on a scale from 0 to 100. This component is followed by the level of overall political system support (54.8), the pride of living under the Ecuadorian political system (49.8) and the belief that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system (46.4). Finally, the component with the lowest levels of support is the Ecuadorian courts, with an average of 36.4 points. It is important to note that the levels of support for the various components of system support vary significantly, with the highest levels of support going to the Ecuadorian political institutions and lowest levels going to the courts and justice system. All of these components, however, measure the concept of system support.⁴

³ David Easton (1965, 1975) focuses on the analysis of support for the political system by taking into account three dimensions: political community support, the regime and the authorities.

⁴ These items constitute a reliable scale with a Cronbach alpha of 0.77.




Figure V.1. Components of System Support in Ecuador, 2010

Now, how does the level of support for the Ecuadorian political system as a whole compare with that of other countries in the Americas? Figure V.2 shows that Ecuador is among the countries with lower levels of system support, along with Jamaica, Peru, Paraguay, Argentina and Trinidad and Tobago. All these countries have levels lower than the midpoint. At the other end, Uruguay and Costa Rica are the countries with the highest levels of support. We also see that Honduras reveals support significantly higher than that found in previous years. As noted in Chapter III of this report, the 2010 survey was conducted in Honduras just a month after the elections that restored democracy in the country, and therefore the level of support could be elevated by the well-known "honeymoon" effect, frequently experienced by new governments. Other countries exhibiting levels of support exceeding 60 points, on the scale of zero to 100, are Colombia and Panama.




Figure V.2. System Support in a Comparative Perspective, 2010

Ecuador, the primary country of this study, is among the countries with the lowest levels of system support. Is there reason to worry? Has this support increased, decreased, or remained the same in comparison to previous years?




Figure V.3. Support for the Ecuadorian Political System by Year

Figure V.3 shows the evolution of support for the Ecuadorian political system over the years, reaching its highest level in 2010, with an average of 48.9 points on the scale of 0 to 100. Support for the Ecuadorian political system increased from an average of 39.5 points in 2001 to 48.9 points in 2010, a statistically significant difference of almost 10 points in almost ten years. Also observed in Figure V.3 is a minimum drop in system support between 2004 and 2006, from 42.1 to 37.4 points, which rebounded again in 2008 to 44.4 points. Overall, these findings show that trust in Ecuador's political system has been strengthened over time, which is good news for democracy. But do these results go hand in hand with political tolerance?

B. Political Tolerance

Theoretical Background

Up to this point, we have seen that support for the Ecuadorian political system is relatively high. However, we wondered whether this support goes hand in hand with political tolerance. As mentioned above, if levels of system support are high, but levels of tolerance are low, democracy could be endangered. Specifically, the consolidation of democratic political systems not only requires high levels of support for the political system, but also the protection of minority rights. This combination is imperative for a democracy to remain stable over time.

Some researchers believe that intolerant attitudes could increase and jeopardize those who are the target of the political intolerance.⁵ Intolerant attitudes have important implications because they can

⁵ Gibson, James L. and Raymond M. Duch. 1993. Political Intolerance in the USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion. *Comparative Political Studies* 26:286-329. Prothro, JW, and CW Grigg. 1960. Fundamental Principles of

create citizens of a “second class who are denied equal rights and protection.”⁶ Respect for minorities is essential to live harmoniously under the same political system. In general, to be truly legitimate democracies, citizens must respect the human rights of minorities in order to achieve democratic stability.

Before turning to a more comprehensive analysis of political tolerance, we first examine its components. Figure V.4 shows that among the components of political tolerance, indicated by higher levels of acceptance for those who constantly criticize the system of government, the component with the highest levels of acceptance is the right to hold peaceful demonstrations (58.2), followed by the right to vote (53.9), freedom of expression (44.6) and finally, the right, for those who constantly criticize the government to run for public office (44.4).




Figure V.4. Components of Political Tolerance in Ecuador, 2010

In summary, Ecuadorians are more prone to tolerate peaceful demonstrations and the right to vote, as forms of expressing criticism of the system of governance, and are less supportive of the freedom of expression and the opportunity to run for public office, as expressions of dissent. Now, let us see where Ecuador is regarding political tolerance in relation to other countries in the Americas.⁷

Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement. The Journal of Politics 22:276-94. Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

⁶ Merolla, Jennifer L., and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p.12.

⁷ These items constitute a reliable scale with a Cronbach alpha of 0.84.




Figure V.5. Political Tolerance in a Comparative Perspective

Figure V.5 shows that Ecuador is located, as was the case with system support, among the countries with lower levels of political tolerance, but still has an average of at least 50 points on the scale of 0 to 100, beating Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia and El Salvador, all who have average levels of tolerance lower than the midpoint. The countries with highest levels of political tolerance are the United States, Argentina, Costa Rica and Trinidad and Tobago, all with averages higher than 65 points.

Ecuadorians, in comparison to other countries in the Americas, have low levels of political tolerance, but remains higher than the midpoint. Has this average remained the same over time? Figure V.6 shows that in 2010, Ecuadorians reported the highest levels of political tolerance experienced in the past 10 years, a difference that is statistically significant.




Figure V.6. Political Tolerance in Ecuador by Year

During the period from 2001-2008, there was little variation in political tolerance, only noting a slight increase from 46.1 points in 2001 to 48 points in 2004, returning to the same level in 2006 and again rising marginally, to 47.3 points, in 2008. The most important jump recorded, and found to be statistically significant, took place in 2010 when political tolerance reached an average of 50.2 points on the scale of 0 to 100. These results are encouraging, as has been discussed in this chapter, because in order to obtain democratic stability, it is imperative to have a combination of the two key elements - system support and political tolerance.

C. Support for a Stable Democracy

Support for the political system and political tolerance are both important in measuring democratic stability. Next, we examine the combination of the two dimensions mentioned and, as in previous studies; create a typology of citizen with respect to the propensity for democratic stability over time. This typology, based on a dichotomous version of the two dimensions, shows four types citizens:

First, note that Ecuadorians who show high system support and high tolerance would promote democratic stability. Table V.2 shows that about 19.7% of respondents in the 2010 fall into this category, as compared to only 13.4% in 2001. This is undoubtedly good news for Ecuadorian democracy as there has been a constant increase in the percentage of Ecuadorians who support a stable democracy since 2001, except in 2006 where there was a small decline.

Second, Ecuadorians who exhibit low levels of system support and high levels of political tolerance would demonstrate attitudes supporting an unstable democracy. As can be seen in the lower left square in Table V.2, 25.1% of Ecuadorians are currently located in this category, compared to 25.9% ten years ago. It is important to stress that this percentage has remained the same over time, with a small increase in 2006, but returning to the previous levels during the last four years.

Table V.2. Empirical Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance: Ecuador 2010

System Support (legitimacy)	Tolerance									
	High					Low				
High	Stable Democracy (%)					Authoritarian Stability (%)				
	2001	2004	2006	2008	2010	2001	2004	2006	2008	2010
	13.4	14.9	11.9	15.1	19.7	15.5	18.0	15.2	23.1	26.4
Low	Unstable Democracy (%)					Democracy at Risk (%)				
	2001	2004	2006	2008	2010	2001	2004	2006	2008	2010
	25.9	26.9	29.7	25.5	25.1	45.2	40.2	43.3	36.3	28.8

Third, those who profess high support for the system but express low levels of political tolerance favor authoritarian stability. 26.4% of Ecuadorians exhibit this pattern in 2010, while only 15.5% did in 2001. These results are somewhat alarming because, as was observed in the case of support for a stable democracy, there is also a growing trend of support among Ecuadorians for a culture of authoritarian stability. Are these real concerns for Ecuadorian democracy? What happens in relation to a democracy at risk?

Finally, when a high proportion of citizens show low levels of both system support and political tolerance, democracy could be at risk. In Ecuador, 28.8% of respondents were placed in this category in 2010, while in 2001, the percentage was 45.2%. Therefore, a steady decline in the values that can endanger Ecuadorian democracy is observed, suggesting that Ecuadorians are increasingly consolidating their democratic political culture and support for a stable democracy continues to grow over time.




Figure V.7. Support for a Stable Democracy in a Comparative Perspective (Percentages)

This is undoubtedly good news for Ecuador's democracy, especially in difficult times where one would have expected a more radical change in the democratic attitudes of the people. As noted in the Chapter III of this report, the prevailing thought has been that people experiencing unstable economic conditions are more likely to support authoritarian alternatives. However, we have shown here that this is not the case in Ecuador. On the contrary, there is a growing trend towards support for democratic stability. However, about Ecuador in relation to other countries? We now examine Ecuador support for democracy from a comparative perspective.

Figure V.7 shows that, unfortunately, Ecuador is among the countries with the lowest percentage of citizen support for a stable democracy, only above Peru and Paraguay. At the other end, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Suriname, Canada and the United States show that higher percentages of their populations support democratic stability (over 40%). This is not surprising as these countries represent the most stable democracies in the Americas.

Who is more likely to Support a Stable Democracy?

To uncover which factors influence citizen support for a stable democracy, we implemented a multivariate linear regression model using support for a stable democracy as the dependent variable. Traditional socio-demographic variables were incorporated into this equation, including place of residence, wealth quintile, age and level of education.




Figure V.8. Who is more likely to support a stable democracy in Ecuador?

In addition, economic variables, such as the perception of the economic crisis, the perception of who is blame for it and its consequences, and unemployment, were incorporated into the logistic regression. The graph also includes political variables such as interest in politics, satisfaction with the performance of the president, current perceptions of corruption and insecurity, and finally, victimization by corruption and crime. The results are displayed in Figure V.8.

Of the most important results, one can see that among the socio-economic variables, the size of a person's place of residence is the only variable that reaches statistical significance. Among the economic variables, the unemployed are least likely hold the values necessary to support democratic stability. Finally, among the political variables, the most important factor in explaining support for a stable democracy is the satisfaction with the performance of the current president. Thus, the more favorable the perceptions of the president's performance, the more likely Ecuadorians are to support a stable democracy. There is, however, a negative and statistically significant impact on support for a stable democracy in relation to the perception of insecurity: those who report higher perceptions of insecurity are less likely to support a stable democracy.




Figure V.9. Support for a Stable Democracy by Size of Place of Residence and Whether or Not One is Employed, Ecuador 2010 (in Percentages)

A more detailed analysis of these factors, as displayed in Figure V.9, shows support for a stable democracy by the respondent's size of place of residence and unemployment status. The highest percentages of Ecuadorians who support democracy tend to live in smaller cities (23%), while only 18% live in urban areas. In addition, the right side of Figure V.9 shows that the percentage of Ecuadorians who support a stable democracy is lower among the unemployed (13.1%) and higher among their employed counterparts (20.4%); these differences are statistically significant. The results show that economic and socio-demographics factors are important in explaining support for stable democracy.




Figure V.10. Support for a Stable Democracy, Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President and Perception of Insecurity (in Percentages)

Figure V.10 confirms that political factors are also important. We see that the proportion of Ecuadorians who support a stable democracy is greatest when they are very or somewhat satisfied with the performance of the president, while the opposite is true among those who negatively evaluate presidential performance. These findings underscore the importance of the president's role in establishing the basic conditions required for building democratic stability.

Moreover, in focusing on the right side of Figure V.10, we see that almost 30 percent of Ecuadorian citizens support democracy when they report low perceptions of insecurity, or when they feel secure. The opposite happens among those who feel insecure, as the percentage of those who feel insecure and support a stable democracy drops to nearly 12 percent. If citizens have acute feelings of insecurity, it is likely that they will blame their government leadership, leading to a negative perception of the government, which could then expand to an unfavorable perception of the political system in general. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the *specific* support, attributed to the government and its leadership, could have an impact on levels of *diffuse* support, that is, the support for the political system as a whole. In this case, the results shown here once again confirm the important role played by governments and their policies. For example, effective anti-crime policies can contribute to reduced perceptions of insecurity, while at the same time helping to increase support for a stable democracy.

In summary, we have seen that for a democracy to be stable, it is important not only to have system support, but political tolerance as well. We also saw that Ecuador's democratic political culture is much more evident today, than it was almost ten years ago (2001). The 2010 LAPOP survey recorded the highest levels of system support among Ecuadorians since the AmericasBarometer began in 2001. Finally, the factors that influence support for a stable democracy including, the size of the citizen's place

of residence; economic factors, such as unemployment; political factors, such as satisfaction with the performance of the current president; and the perception of insecurity, are all important determinants that influence support for a stable democracy. We now turn to the analysis of confidence in other democratic institutions.

Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

Figure V.11 displays the confidence that citizens have in several key Ecuadorian political institutions. First, note that the institution with the highest levels of confidence, among Ecuadorians, is the Church Catholic, with an average of 67.3 points on the scale of 0 to 100, followed by the Armed Forces (64.8), the President (58.1), the National Government (55.8), and the media (56). All these levels of confidence are greater than the midpoint. On the other hand, other political institutions displayed in Figure V.11 show confidence levels below 50 points, including the National Police (49.1), elections (49.1), the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (now the National Electoral Council) (45.3), Parliament (National Assembly) (41.5), the justice system (38.2), and the Supreme Court (now the National Court of Justice) (36.9). Finally, in Ecuador, political parties are evaluated as the worst institution, confirming previous studies which show that confidence in political parties remains low in several Latin American countries.⁸

⁸ Boidi, Maria Fernanda. 2008. "Throw Them All Out"? Attitudes toward Political Parties in the Americas. In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007*, In M.A. Seligson, Vanderbilt University - Center for the Americas - USAID. Mainwaring, Scott. 2006. The Crisis of Representation in the Andes. *The Journal of Democracy* 7 (3):13-27.




Figure V.11. Trust in Ecuadorian Institutions, 2010

When analyzing Ecuadorian institutional trust over time, Figure V.12 shows a general trend of increased confidence in most institutions. First, the Catholic Church remains as the highest evaluated institution over time, averaging 67 points in confidence from 2006-2010. We also see that confidence in the armed forces has increased significantly, from 52.5 points in 2006 to an average of 64.8 points in 2010, an increase of almost 12 points in just four years. The national government also exhibits a significant increase during the same period, going from only 21.7 points in 2006 to more than 50 points in 2010. Also, the National Electoral Council, National Court of Justice, National Assembly, National Police and political parties all exhibit the same pattern. However, as shown in Figure V.11 and V.12, political parties have been the lowest rated institution, comparatively, over the years.




Figure V.12. Trust in Ecuadorian Institutions by Year

It is also important to note that public confidence in elections and the justice system has been strengthened over time, while confidence in the president has remained the same. Of all the Ecuadorian institutions, the one that breaks with the general pattern is the media. Confidence in the media decreased from 58 points in 2006 to 52.6 points in 2008, but again increased to 56 points in 2010. Overall, these results display the improvements in various aspects of Ecuadorian institutions, which have produced positive perceptions, helping to restore public confidence on these institutions.

Attitudes toward Democracy

In this chapter, we have examined the importance of system support and political tolerance for a stable democracy. We have also analyzed public confidence in several of Ecuador's key political institutions. In this section, we focus on the support for two basic democratic values: support for and satisfaction with democracy. Although there was a brief reference to these two points in Chapter III, the objective in the remainder of this chapter is to discuss these values in more detail, as they specifically relate to Ecuador. First, we examine where Ecuador is located in comparison to other countries with

respect to democratic support and how it has fluctuated over time. The chapter concludes with the same analysis for satisfaction with democracy.

Support for Democracy




Figure V.13. Support for Democracy in a Comparative Context

When democracy is measured using the "Churchillian" question, as is widely used in comparative studies of democracy, Ecuador is among the countries with lowest levels of support for democracy, as seen in Figure V.13. However, this average remains greater than 65 points on the scale of 0 to 100. The countries exhibiting lower levels of support for democracy are Peru, Honduras, Guatemala, Paraguay and El Salvador, all with averages less than 65 points. On the other hand, Uruguay and Costa Rica, two countries known for their democratic stability, have the highest levels of support for democracy with averages of 80 points or higher.




Figure V.14. Support for Democracy in Ecuador by Year

In assessing Ecuadorian support for democracy over time, Figure V.14 shows that it has remained relatively stable since 2004, but has exhibited slight increases in support at every survey. In 2004, average support for democracy by Ecuadorians was 64.1 on the scale of 0 to 100, followed by an average of 65.5 points in 2006, 66.6 points in 2008 and finally reaching 68.4 points in 2010. These findings reveal that Ecuadorians have been gradually consolidating their democratic political culture, which refers to support for various democratic values, including support for democracy.

Satisfaction with Democracy

So far, we have seen that the Ecuadorians have exhibited steadily increasing support for the concept of democracy since 2004. But in practice, do Ecuadorians report satisfaction with the way democracy functions in Ecuador? Figure V.15 shows that over 50% of Ecuadorians feel either "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with democracy, while 45% report the opposite, feeling "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied." Overall, the majority of Ecuadorians are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. But how satisfied the Ecuadorians in comparison to the other citizens of the Americas?




Figure V.15. Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador, 2010

In Figure V.16, we see that Ecuadorian citizens have an average level of satisfaction with how democracy works located at the scale's midpoint (51.3). This level of democratic satisfaction is less than the average levels of support for democracy previously discussed. Thus, one could argue that Ecuadorians, in theory, support the concept of democracy but, in practice, are less satisfied with it.

In comparing Ecuador's levels of satisfaction with democracy with the other countries in the sample, Ecuador is located in the middle but exhibits higher levels of satisfaction than over half of the countries. Those with the lowest levels of satisfaction are Guyana, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Peru, with an average less than 45 points on the scale of 0 to 100. In contrast, Uruguay, Panama and Costa Rica exhibit an average satisfaction with democracy greater than 60 points, which is not surprising, as it is well known that Uruguay and Costa Rica represent the most stable democracies in the region.




Figure V.16. Satisfaction with Democracy in a Comparative Context

In analyzing satisfaction with democracy over time, we first note that satisfaction with democracy has significantly increased since 2004, when the question was asked for the first time. Satisfaction increased from an average of 40.3 in 2004 to 51.3 points in 2010, an increase of more than 10 points. It is important to point out, however, that there is a slight decrease in satisfaction registered in 2010, as compared to 2008, but this change is not statistically significant.




Figure V.17. Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador by Year

Overall, Ecuadorians have demonstrated improved satisfaction with the way democracy works in recent times, reflecting that some of the measures taken by the government have led to increased levels of citizen satisfaction. In other words, both in theory and in practice, Ecuadorians are increasingly consolidating their support and satisfaction with democracy.

Conclusion

In the first part of this chapter, we saw that system support and political tolerance are two key factors for democratic stability. In the case of Ecuador, there has been an increasing trend in the levels of these two elements, resulting in statistically significant increases in levels of system support and political tolerance over the past 10 years.

Second, regarding the factors found to influence support for democratic stability in Ecuador (support for the political system and political tolerance), the size of the citizens' place of residence, referring to the size of the city/town of residence; economic factors, such as unemployment; political factors, such as satisfaction with the current president's performance; and the perception of insecurity, all proved to be important determinants of support. These results once again confirm the important role played by governments and their policies. One could argue that effective policies against crime can help reduce perceptions of insecurity among citizens while, at the same time, work to increase support for a stable democracy.

Third, we found that confidence in Ecuadorian institutions has also increased over time. As in previous years, the Catholic Church holds the highest levels of public confidence, in comparison with other Ecuadorian institutions, with political parties receiving the worst confidence rating. It is important to note that although political parties are the rated lowest in comparative terms, citizen confidence in this institution has increased in recent years.

Finally, support for democracy, as measured by the "Churchillian" question commonly used in democracy research, and satisfaction with democracy are currently at their highest levels since 2004. These results clearly show that Ecuador's democratic political culture has been strengthened over time, despite the fact that Ecuador has also experienced the impact of various external factors, including the most recent global economic crisis. Overall, these results are good news for democracy in Ecuador.

Chapter VI. Civil Society and Civic Participation

Introduction

In this chapter we focus on the analysis of interpersonal trust and civic participation, more commonly known as social capital. Academia has come to focus on this issue through the very influential work of Robert Putnam: *Making Democracy Work* (1993).¹ Putnam and other social capital scholars argue that both interpersonal trust and civic participation are fundamental to strengthening democracies. Countries and communities with high levels of these democratic values have citizens who trust each other and their governments, leading to the consolidation of democratic political culture.

Theoretical Background

Social capital theory suggests that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work together, and eventually learn to trust each other. This means that trust interpersonal originates from active participation in civic and social organizations. Social capital is also important because it increases tolerance for others by fostering interaction between people who may not think alike, but are willing to work together.²

Many studies have shown that citizens who are active in multiple associations express greater levels of interpersonal trust.³ However, in the specific case of Latin America, low levels of interpersonal trust are found despite high levels of civic participation, which goes against what is suggested by social capital theory. Apparently, in Latin America, the two do not always go hand in hand. Among the factors that contribute to low levels of confidence in the region, one of these factors is social inequality.⁴

New studies suggest that there exists a form of negative social capital, meaning that many contentious social movements, such as gangs, militias, and even authoritarian populist movements, have strengthened thanks to social capital.⁵ In a recent study published in *Perspectives from the AmericasBarometer*, by LAPOP, it was shown that interpersonal trust can lead to greater support for citizens to take justice into their own hands, especially when it coincides with a lack of confidence in the

¹ Putnam, Robert D (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

² Cordova, Abby (2008). *Social Trust, Economic Inequality, and Democracy in the Americas*. In M. Seligson (Ed.), *Challenges to democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007* (pp. 147-176). Nashville, Tenn: Center for the Americas at Vanderbilt. Latin: Latin American Public Project (LAPOP): United States. Fukuyama, Francis (1995). *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: The Free Press, 1995. Inglehart, Ronald (1990). *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Uslander, Eric M (2002). *The Moral Foundations of Trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

³ Putnam, Robert D (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Paxton, Pamela (2007). "Association Memberships and Generalized Trust: A Multilevel Model Across 31 Countries." *Social Forces* 86, no. January 47-76.

⁴ Cordova, Abby (2008). *Social Trust, Economic Inequality, and Democracy in the Americas*.

⁵ Armony, A.C. (2004). *The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Bourgois, P. (1996). *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Barrio*. Cambridge University Press. Tarrow, S (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

state's law enforcement institutions.⁶ However, despite these potential negative effects, many agree that social capital has important benefits for democracy.

This chapter begins by examining interpersonal trust and levels of citizen participation in solving community problems. Then, we analyze the different forms of civic participation. The final section addresses the levels and factors impacting political participation.

Interpersonal Trust

As discussed earlier, interpersonal trust is one component of social capital and is important for democracy. Interpersonal trust enables people who do not necessarily think alike to willingly work together, fostering the consolidation of democratic political culture among citizens. In this section, we first examine the levels of interpersonal trust among Ecuadorians. This is followed with an analysis of interpersonal trust in a comparative context. We then assess levels of interpersonal trust over time, concluding with an assessment of the factors that explain interpersonal trust in Ecuador.

The following item measures interpersonal trust.

IT1. Now, speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? **[Read options]**
 (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy
 (4) Untrustworthy (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer




Figure VI.1. Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador, 2010

⁶ Zizumbo-Colunga, Daniel (2010). *Explaining Support for Vigilante Justice in Mexico*. Insights Series. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), no.29.

Figure VI.1 displays the levels of interpersonal trust among Ecuadorians. Over 50% of Ecuadorians think people in their community are very or somewhat trustworthy, while 43% think that people are only a little or not at all trustworthy. These findings show that, in general, Ecuadorians seem to have rather high levels of interpersonal trust as the proportion of Ecuadorians who believe their fellow citizens somewhat or very trustworthy is greater than those who think otherwise. However, where are Ecuadorians located with respect to other countries in the Americas?

In Figure VI.2 shows that Ecuador is a country with one of the lowest levels of interpersonal trust in the Americas. With an average of 54.2 points on a scale from 0 to 100, Ecuador is only just ahead of Bolivia, Belize and Peru. In other words, we see that Ecuadorians are somewhat distrustful of each other, in comparison with Costa Ricans, United States' citizens and Canadians who have significantly higher levels interpersonal confidence, with averages above 65 points.




Figure VI.2. Interpersonal Trust in a Comparative Context

Has the levels of trust among the Ecuadorians increased, decreased or remained the same over time? Figure VI.3 shows that interpersonal trust has not changed significantly over the years. The only statistically significant change occurs between 2001 and 2004, where interpersonal trust increased from 51 to 56.8 points on a scale of 0 to 100. However, it declined to 53.9 points during the following two

years and remains relatively stable through 2010, leading us to believe that although Ecuadorians show levels interpersonal trust above 50 points, they have not shown improvements in these levels over time.




Figure VI.3. Interpersonal Confidence in Ecuador by Year




Figure VI.4. Determinants of Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador (2010)

These results suggest that there are factors influencing the levels of interpersonal trust and confidence among Ecuadorians. What are these factors? Figure VI.4 displays the determinants of interpersonal trust in Ecuador. Among the traditional socio-demographic variables, we see that the region, the size of the place of residence, as well as age, gender and levels of education all influence levels of interpersonal trust. Not surprisingly, however, is that the perception of insecurity has the strongest effect, suggesting that the more insecure Ecuadorians feel, the lower their levels of interpersonal trust. If we recall the analysis in the previous chapter, the negative impact of the perception of insecurity is also evident on the levels of support exhibited for a stable democracy. To get a better idea of the purpose, direction and magnitude of these factors, we analyze each of them independently:




Figure VI.5. Region, Size of Area of Residence and Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador

Figure VI.5 displays the relationship between the region, size of place of residence and interpersonal trust among Ecuadorians. First, we see that those who live in the East show an average level of interpersonal trust significantly higher, with 61.8 points on a scale of 0 to 100, than those living on the coast (54.4 points) and the highlands (53.3 points). We also note that those who live in rural areas tend to have higher levels of interpersonal trust than those living in larger cities, a difference found to be statistically significant. In observing an average level of interpersonal trust of 59.8 points in rural areas, those who live in metropolitan areas exhibit levels at least 10 points lower (49.1), indicating that place of residence is important in explaining levels interpersonal trust among Ecuadorians.

These results are not surprising as the eastern region of Ecuador has a higher proportion of rural areas. As is widely known, residents of smaller and rural areas tend to better know those in their communities than those who live in larger cities. It is also possible that smaller communities are less prone to violence, facilitating increased interpersonal trust among those in the community. Unfortunately, in larger cities, crime is endemic and more likely to generate feelings of acute insecurity. If we recall the results previously discussed in this chapter, the perception of insecurity significantly reduces interpersonal trust.




Figure VI.6. Gender, Age, Education, Perception of Insecurity and Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador

Figure VI.6 displays the relationship between the most salient socio-demographic variables and interpersonal trust. Note that men generally have higher levels of trust than women. This product may be due to women feeling more defenseless when they are out in the community, lowering their levels of interpersonal trust. Age also appears to be an important factor. Interestingly, older Ecuadorians show higher levels of trust than younger people. Similarly, education has a positive effect, meaning that those with higher levels of education exhibit higher levels of interpersonal trust. Many democracy scholars have suggested that education is a key determinant for the development of democratic values. This means that people, through education, better understand the democratic values fundamental to the consolidation of democracy, one of which is interpersonal trust.

In Figure VI.6, it is important to note that the difference between respondents with higher levels of perceived insecurity and those who feel more secure is at least 35 points on a scale of 0 to 100, highlighting the severe impact that the perception of insecurity has on social capital. Consequently, this affects Ecuador's ability to increase the quality of democracy in the country and slows its movement toward democratic consolidation, especially with the increasing strength and presence of organized crime in recent years.⁷ Not surprisingly, more crime produces higher levels of perceived insecurity.

⁷ To have a deeper understanding of the topic, see: <http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/eeuu-ecuador-es-vulnerable-al-crimenorganizado-by-weakness-of-institutions-public-395386.html>
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Civic Participation

To attain a more profound understanding of social capital in Ecuador, we continue with an analysis of those who contribute to solving community problems through civic participation. If we recall the theory at the beginning of this chapter, social capital suggests that citizens who participate in civil society learn to work together, and eventually learn to trust each other, facilitating the strengthening of democracy. But for this, active participation in organizations of civil society is necessary. The questionnaire utilizes the following questions:

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat for each question "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year" or "never" to help the respondent]							
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Doesn't Know	Doesn't Answer	
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4	88	Doesn't Answer 98	N/A 99

This section first examines the participation of Ecuadorians in several civic organizations. Here, we explore the differences in participation levels over the years. It continues with a focus on Ecuadorian participation in protests or demonstrations and participation in elections. The section concludes with an analysis of interest in politics and political activism in Ecuador.

Figure VI.7 shows that Ecuadorians are most active in religious organizations, followed by parents associations and improvement committees or boards. At the other end, the lowest levels of participation are found in professional organizations and women's associations. What has happened with participation in these organizations over the years?




Figure VI.7. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations in Ecuador (2010)

Figure VI.8 displays Ecuadorian participation in several civic organizations by year. First, we see that participation in religious organizations is relatively high over time, in comparison with other organizations. From 2001 to 2010, the average level of participation was 39.3 points in 2001, down to 37.3 in 2004, rising again to 58.1 points in 2006 (the highest level of participation in religious organizations during this period) and then decreasing to 47.5 points in 2008 and 39.7 points in 2010. Overall, participation in religious organizations is exactly the same as was recorded almost 10 years ago.




Figure VI.8. Participation in Meetings of Civic Organizations by Year in Ecuador

Figure VI.8 also shows that participation in women's organizations was lower in 2010 compared to 2008; however, this change is not statistically significant. Although participation in meetings of improvement committees or boards remains rather high, its highest levels were registered in 2001. As previously mentioned, participation in religious organizations remained similar to previous years. Furthermore, we see that Ecuadorian participation in professional organization meetings has decreased over the years, being at its highest point (10.7) in 2001 and falling almost 4 points, to an averaged 7.4 points, by 2010; a change found to be statistically significant over the 10 year period.

In summary, Ecuadorian participation in meetings of civic organizations exhibits a general decline over time. It is clearly seen that in all cases, civic participation was higher in 2001 than the present. The only observed increase was in 2006, but civic participation returned to its previous levels in the following years. Are these results bad for democracy? Many social capital scholars suggest that low levels of participation reflect a decline in the quality of a democracy, since a principal characteristic of a democracy is active civic participation. Will we observe the same pattern with respect to Ecuadorian political participation?

Participation in Protests and Demonstrations

Some studies have shown that there is a decline in citizen satisfaction with democracy and a growing distrust of political leaders and political institutions (e.g., legislatures, political parties, military, etc) in industrialized countries. This growing dissatisfaction is seen as a result of citizens' changing demands for better quality democracies.⁸ Those who are more dissatisfied with the way democracy functions appear more likely to engage in forms of extralegal political participation, while those who have more trust in the government, and are supportive of the current regime, are more likely to take part in the formal means of political participation available to them.⁹

In this section, we examine the levels of participation in protests or demonstrations by Ecuadorians in comparison to the rest of the Americas. We will then analyze the most common modes of participation, such as voting in elections. The question below measures participation in protests or demonstrations:

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to JC1]** (88) Doesn't Know **[Go to JC1]**
(98) Doesn't Answer **[Go to JC1]**

⁸ Dalton, Russell J. 2004. *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, Russell J. 2006. *Citizens Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. Fourth ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Norris, Pippa, ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁹ Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Postmodernization and Modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Putman, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.




Figure VI.9. Participation in a Demonstration or Protest March, a Comparative Perspective

Figure VI.9 shows that only 8% of Ecuadorians report involvement in some kind of demonstration or public protest. However, when compared with participation rates throughout the Americas, Ecuador is among those with median levels of participation. While Argentina, the United States, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia indicate rates of public participation in protests or demonstrations higher than 10%; Panama, Chile, El Salvador, Guyana and Jamaica exhibit rates below 5%.

Electoral Participation

In the previous section, we discussed where Ecuadorian participation in public demonstrations or protests is located in relation to other American countries. Interestingly, Ecuador has a relatively high percentage of participation in this type of civic expression. Now, we continue with an analysis of Ecuadorian voter turnout. The next question measures whether or not respondents voted in the last presidential election:

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of 2009?
 (1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**
 (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**

Figure VI.10 shows that 92.2% of Ecuadorians voted in the most recent presidential elections, preceded only by Uruguay and Chile. We must take into account that voting is mandatory in Ecuador, and that this policy, which has also been implemented in other countries in the region, results in a high percentage of electoral participation. However, we observe that other Latin American countries with compulsory voting policies, such as Argentina and Brazil, exhibit lower rates of voter participation than those found in Ecuador. It is important to note that in Chile and Uruguay, the two countries demonstrating the highest percentages of electoral participation, have higher rates of voter turnout than the countries with mandatory voting policies. Has Ecuadorian levels of electoral participation remained this high over the years? Figure VI.11 confirms that this is the case.




Figure VI.10. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted in the Last Presidential Elections

The percentage of Ecuadorians who report having voted in presidential elections has been increasing over time, reaching its highest level in 2010 (92.2%).¹⁰ The only small decrease in voter turnout was between 2004 (87.1%) and 2006 (83.8%). This percentage, however, increased again in 2008, with 89.9% of Ecuadorians reporting having voted in the last presidential election, a percentage even greater than that recorded in 2004.




Figure VI.11. Percentage of Citizens Reporting to have Voted in the Last Elections, by Year, in Ecuador

We have seen that Ecuadorian voter turnout has been increasing over the years, reaching its highest levels in 2010. However, it worth highlighting that the last presidential election, which took place in April 2009, re-elected Rafael Correa, who won over 50% of the vote in the first round. The data presented here reflects the levels of participation in those elections. Now, what factors influence voter turnout in Ecuador? Using a multivariate regression, we examine multiple determinants of electoral participation. These results are shown in the regression found in Figure VI.12. In this regression equation, the traditional socioeconomic and demographic control variables were added, including age, gender, education, area of residence (urban or rural), region and wealth quintiles. Also included in the regression are variables that measure economic evaluations, satisfaction with the current president's performance and level of political interest.¹¹

¹⁰ The last presidential election was held in April 2009 and field work to collect the survey data in Ecuador was carried out between February and March of 2010 and, a year after the general election. Thus, the results shown in Figure VI.10 reflect voter turnout for 2009.

¹¹ Each variable included in the analysis (Figure VI.12) is on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each of these variables on attitudes of support for democracy is shown graphically by a dot, which, if located to the right of the vertical "0" line indicates a positive contribution, and if it appears to the left of the "0" line, a negative contribution. Statistically significant variables are shown by confidence intervals lines that extend to the left and right of each item, only when the confidence intervals do not intersect with the vertical line "0" is the factor statistically significant (at a level of 0.05 or better.) The relative importance of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (i.e., "beta weights").




Figure VI.12. Predictors of Electoral Participation in Ecuador, 2010

In Figure VI.12, we see that the place of residence, level of education and satisfaction with presidential performance, all increase the likelihood of electoral participation in Ecuadorian citizens. When we look more closely at each of these effects, as shown in Figure VI.13, we note that as the size of the place of residence increases, so does the percentage of Ecuadorians who voted in recent presidential elections. A similar affect occurs between voter turnout and level of education. Specifically, almost 95% of Ecuadorians with higher levels of education voted in recent presidential elections, as compared to less than 75% of uneducated Ecuadorians. These findings demonstrate the importance of education on electoral participation. Many democracy scholars have stressed the value of education in the consolidation of democratic political culture. This is apparently the case when it comes to electoral participation in Ecuador. It should be emphasized that those with no formal education are less involved in electoral processes, even though voting is mandatory. It is possible that these groups of people are not aware of the mandatory nature of presidential elections.




Figure VI.13. Percentage of Citizens Who Voted by Size of Place of Residence and Level of Education




Figure VI.14. Ideological Self-Identification and Electoral Preferences

Figure VI.14 displays the ideological self-identification of voters and their electoral preferences from the last presidential elections, which took place in 2009. Ecuadorians who voted for Rafael Correa

are located marginally to the left on the scale of 1 to 10, while those who voted for Lucio Gutiérrez and Álvaro Noboa are located to the right, with averages of 5.7 and 6.1 points, respectively. As can be seen, the Ecuadorians who voted for Álvaro Noboa are further right ideologically than those who voted for Lucio Gutiérrez.

Interest in Politics and Activism

Up to this point, we have seen that a high percentage of Ecuadorians involve themselves in protests or public demonstrations. Furthermore, the data shows that a high percentage of Ecuadorians voted in the last presidential elections and that the election of public officials is, to some extent, influenced based on the voters' ideological orientation. We now continue with the assessment of Ecuadorians' interest in politics. The question used in the survey is as follows:

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none?
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer

Figure VI.15 shows that the majority of Ecuadorians have little or no interest in politics. Specifically, almost 75% of Ecuadorians are not interested in politics, while only 20% are very or somewhat interested. Looking back on the regression of determinants for electoral participation, one can see that interest in politics had no significant effect on voter turnout.




Figure VI.15. Interest in Politics in Ecuador, 2010

Originally, it could have been argued that the more interested people are in politics, the greater the voter turnout. However, in the specific case of Ecuador, we found no evidence to support this assumption. And regarding interest in politics among Ecuadorians, what will we find with regard to this interest over time?

In analyzing the levels of political interest among Ecuadorians by year, as shown in Figure VI.16, we see political interest has increased over time. In 2006, interest in politics only averaged 22.3 points on a scale of 0 to 100. From 22.3 points, the levels of interest rose to 28.3 points in 2008 and reached 30.0 points in 2010, a statistically significant increase of almost 9 points in a four year period.




Figure VI.16. Interest in Politics by Year in Ecuador

It is one thing to speak of interest in politics, and another thing to measure one's experiences in politics. The following looks at how active Ecuadorians are in elections and electoral campaigns. The following questions measure political activism.

PP1. During election time, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**

(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely (4) Never (88) Doesn't Know
(98) Doesn't Answer

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last general elections of [year]?

(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer




Figure VI.17. Percentage of Persons Who Worked to Try to Persuade Others to Work for Political Parties or Candidates in the Last Elections

Figure VI.17 shows that 25% of Ecuadorians convinced others to vote for a particular political party or candidate, while 8.8% worked for a political party or candidate during the electoral campaigns. Overall, Ecuadorians appear to show low levels of interest in politics, as well as political activism. But despite this, interest in politics has been increasing over time, leading us to think that Ecuadorian citizens are just beginning to actively participate in the political process, and may become even more involved in the future.

Conclusion

In this chapter we explore the state of social capital in Ecuador. In the case of interpersonal trust, an important element of social capital, we saw that Ecuador has one of the lowest levels in the region, only ahead of Bolivia, Belize and Peru. Also, we notice that these levels of interpersonal trust have remained relatively stable.

With respect to participation in civic organizations, the percentage of Ecuadorians involved in such activities is lower than the regional average. This is also true regarding participation in organizations that seek to address community problems, as well as activities related to public demonstrations or protests. In contrast, where voter turnout concerned, a high percentage of Ecuadorians voted in recent presidential elections. Although voting is obligatory in Ecuador, the percentage of this form of civic participation was higher than in other countries with mandatory voting policies. In this chapter, we also saw the relationship that exists between the ideological orientations of Ecuadorian voters and the selection of public officials.

Among the factors that significantly affect interpersonal trust and civic participation, it is worth emphasizing that people with higher levels of education tend to have more trust in others and more frequently participate in protests and public demonstrations, compared to their less educated counterparts. These findings point to the importance of promoting education to develop interpersonal trust and promote civic participation, two key elements of social capital, which incidentally, will help to strengthen democracy in Ecuador.

Chapter VII. Local Government

Introduction

What role do local governments play in shaping public opinion regarding state political institutions? In many countries (except, perhaps, countries with highest levels of government centralization) the most direct contact between citizens and public officials occurs at the local level.¹ To file a petition, issue a complaint, or simply attend a meeting where officials make decisions, citizens who live far from the nation's capital can more easily go to the municipality than travel to central government offices. This is the reason why at least a part of public evaluations and perceptions of state institutional performance could be formed on the basis of their direct contact with their local government.

This chapter will analyze the association between individuals - local government and institutional legitimacy. In particular, we will study the possible effects that citizens' interactions with local government have on the perception of the performance of state political institutions. This is intended to demonstrate support for the belief that "all politics are local"², based on the importance of the municipality in relation to citizens' evaluations of the institutions that make up the local political system.

The expectation of this study is consistent with social capital theory, which suggests that those who participate in community activities learn to trust others and be tolerant of dissent, thus improving the chances of legitimizing a democratic system.³ In this analysis, it is expected that those who participate in municipal meetings and contribute to the transmission of the needs and concerns of the citizenship to local government officials, express a greater degree of respect for state political institutions. Moreover, satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality may also increase system legitimacy.

However, it is necessary to note that there are other studies that criticize social capital theory, indicating that increased interpersonal contact may instead highlight certain irreconcilable disagreements between individuals with different beliefs and needs, to the point of taking ideologies to the extreme and endangering the chances of state democratic consolidation.⁴ Therefore, constant contact with the local government could, moreover, also generate widespread discontent with the system if the municipality fails in satisfying public expectations.

¹ Hiskey, Jonathan, and Mitchell Seligson. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 4 (2003): 25; O'Neill, Kathleen. *Decentralizing the State: Elections, Parties and Local Power in the Andes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Treisman, Daniel. "Fiscal Decentralization, Governance, and Economic Performance: A Reconsideration." *Economics and Politics* 18, no. 2 (2006): 219-35; Montalvo, Daniel.

"Decentralize or centralize? Challenges for Reform of the State and Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean." In *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007*, Mitchell Seligson, 299. Nashville: USAID, 2008.

² This phrase was used by Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States in the eighties, to suggest that the success of a politician depends on his/her ability to understand the will of the voters in each district. Since then, the use this phrase has been widely generalized within American political culture.

³ Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963; Putnam, Robert D. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

⁴ Armony, Ariel. *The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization*. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2004.

As suggested above, an analysis of these phenomena is essential as several of the region's countries have opted for state decentralization as a mechanism to improve the relationship between the governing and the governed. It should be remembered that Latin America was largely governed by military dictatorships, which dramatically increased the centralization of state power, during the sixties, seventies and part of the eighties. The result of this concentration of power led to deeper levels of authoritarianism, systematic violations of human rights, and widespread political illegitimacy that forced the military juntas to gradually transfer power to civil society.⁵ This transfer of power, commonly known as the "third wave of democratization in Latin America" brought not only a horizontal separation of powers (executive, legislative and judicial), but also a vertical transfer of power between national and subnational levels of government.

Today, many of Latin American politicians, with support from international development agencies, enthusiastically continue to push for political reforms supporting increased state decentralization. However, empirical studies determining the positive and negative effects of decentralization remain scarce. Has decentralization and the proliferation of local governments achieved the goal of improving the relationship between citizens and the public system of governance? What is the effect of this change on the relationship between the individual and the state, in regards to the legitimacy of state political institutions?

In theory, the closeness of the government to the people should empower citizens to more actively participate in the country's political institutions, as well as enable them to monitor the actions of public officials. However, some warn that the proliferation of local governments may give rise to subnational authoritarianism, fostering separatism or increasing corruption.⁶ Other researchers believe that the effects of decentralization on governance and democratic governability are rather mixed, depending on the structure of the local governments prior to decentralization.⁷ In other words, if decentralization takes place in a context of subnational authoritarianism, this national authoritarianism "prevention plan" could result in a concentration of power that would be much worse than the very thing it was meant to prevent.

The following chapter uses a case study to determine whether or not there is an association between local political life and respect by the citizenry for Ecuador's democratic institutions. The next section provides a series of propositions about the relationship between civil society – local government and institutional legitimacy. It then reviews the factors that may influence levels of citizen participation in local government and satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality. An empirical analysis is conducted to verify the degree of association between political participation, satisfaction with local government services and respect for Ecuadorian democratic institutions. Finally, we carry out a detailed analysis of the significant factors associated with local government and institutional legitimacy, concluding with some recommendations for public policy and further studies.

⁵ Huntington, Samuel. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

⁶ Prud'homme, Remy. "On The Dangers of Decentralization." *World Bank Research Observer* 10, no.2 (1995): 201-20; Treisman, Daniel. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁷ Hiskey, Jonathan and Mitchell Seligson. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 4 (2003): 25; Montalvo, Daniel. *Democratizing the Latin American Ethos: Does Decentralization Work?* Nashville, Forthcoming.

Theoretical Background

What are the factors that could affect levels of citizen participation in local government? To answer this question, we analyzed two of the most representative forms of participation in local politics: citizen participation in municipal or town hall meetings and the presentation of petitions to the municipality. Of course, these two variables are intended to be only indicative and not a comprehensive analysis of all forms of citizen participation available in Ecuadorian municipalities.⁸ These data also do not reflect citizen participation in the intermediate provincial level governments, nor in rural parishes.

According to the literature on social capital, community participation in civic organizations, and other forms of political participation, may be positively correlated with participation in municipal meetings and the presentation of petitions to the local government.⁹ These concepts are operationalized in this study to analyze the correlation between participation in improvement committees and in elections, with municipal meeting participation and the presentation of petitions to the local government. If social capital theory is correct, one would expect to find a robust correlation and positive relationship between these factors.

However, a *negative* correlation could also be found between participation in improvement committees and in municipal meetings, when individuals feel they are not finding solutions to their problems through the government institutions. In this case, citizens may seek to form their own organizations to replace the activities that by law are the responsibility of the municipality, resulting in the deterioration of opportunities for institution consolidation by the local government.¹⁰ This would then suggest that the more participation there is in improvement committees, the lower the participation will be in formal municipal institutions, or what has been named: *the side-effects of social capital*.

Another factor related to levels of participation is imparted by the school of institutional trust. The theory suggests a positive correlation between the level of trust in democratic institutions and the degree of citizen participation.¹¹ To operationalize this concept, this chapter analyzes confidence in the national and local governments, and the degree of citizen participation. It is expected that individuals who have higher levels of trust and confidence in these institutions, will also exhibit higher levels of participation in the municipality. However, it is worth noting that, in some cases, the correlation can be *negative* because those who rely more on their municipality could be left to solve community problems alone, without support or supervision of the citizenship.

Finally, we analyze the possible correlation between factors of economic perception, which make up the core of this report, with the degree of citizen participation. To operationalize this hypothesis, sociotropic (perception of the national economic situation) and idiosyncratic (perception of one's personal economic situation) variables are used. One could then guess that those who have a better perception of one's personal and national economic situation could participate less in local government institutions, if they do not feel as though they have economic problems that need to be resolved by the state. However, it is very likely that the perception of the role of state in the economy is more associated with the national

⁸ Other instances are participation in the municipal include participatory budgeting, the occupation of the "empty chair", offices for the denouncement of acts of corruption, political entities assigned to the municipality, mingas called by local dignitaries, office of tax payments and fees, among others.

⁹ Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963, Putnam, Robert D. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

¹⁰ Montalvo, Daniel. *Democratizing the Latin American Ethos: Does Decentralization Work?* Nashville, Forthcoming.

¹¹ Norris, Pippa. *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

rather than local levels of government, thus, an independence could exist between sociotropic and idiotropic variables and levels of participation at the local level of government.

The above does not necessarily apply to satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality. In this case, it is more likely that those who are on good economic terms, and view the national economy favorably, are generally satisfied with the overall political system, and through political inertia, with local government. As for trust, one would expect a positive correlation between satisfaction and trust with the local government. However, individuals who have more confidence in the national government may express *less* confidence in the municipality, especially when there is political opposition between the municipal leader and president of the republic, or if the services provided by the national government better meet citizens' needs and expectations than the services provided by the municipality. Finally, citizen participation could present a duality in terms of its relationship with citizen satisfaction: The association could be positive if participation helps improve the citizen perception of local public services, but on the contrary, it could also be negative, if the individuals involved experience firsthand the shortcomings that exist in the local political system.

How could participation and satisfaction with the municipal services affect the respect that Ecuadorians have for their political institutions? Based on the schools of social capital and institutional trust, one would expect a positive association between these factors. However, it is worth noting that this study is not meant to establish causality, since there is a deep level of endogeneity between these variables. In other words, it is possible that citizen participation and satisfaction with the services provided by the local government may result in greater respect for state political institutions, but at same time, it is plausible to propose that those who feel a deep respect for these institutions are those who more frequently participate and express higher levels of satisfaction with municipal public services.

Next, an empirical analysis is carried out to verify the hypotheses proposed in this section. First, a multivariate model is established to determine who is more likely to participate in town hall meetings. We then study the factors that may determine citizen satisfaction with services provided by the local government. Finally, we statistically analyze the association (or lack of) between citizen participation in local government and satisfaction with public services with respect to state political institutions.

Participation in Local Government Meetings

In order to determine which individuals have a higher probability of participating in Ecuador's municipal or town hall meetings, the AmericasBarometer has asked the following question:

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or village meeting in the past 12 months?			
(1) Yes	(2) No	(88) Doesn't know	(98) Doesn't answer




Figure VII.1. Participation in Local Government Meetings in a Historical and Comparative Context

The results of this question are illustrated in Figure VII.1. The chart on the left side of the figure displays the results of this question over time. As can be seen, there has been a significant decrease in participation levels since 2001, where 10.8 percent of the sample reported attending town hall or municipal meetings, falling to 7.0 percent by 2010. However, it seems that there has been some recovery in public participation given that this figure reached a low of 4.9 percent in 2006. However, these differences are not statistically significant, so it cannot be concluded with certainty that this recovery is real.

The right side of Figure VII.1 illustrates the level of Ecuadorian participation in city and town hall meetings as compared with the other countries in our sample. Ecuador is the fifth lowest country, in terms of public participation in town hall and municipal meetings, among the 25 countries in the region, just above Panama, Chile, Argentina and Costa Rica, and well below much more centralized countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua or Guatemala.¹²

¹² For more information on the levels of decentralization in Latin America, see Robert Daughters and Leslie Harper, "Fiscal and Political Decentralization Reforms." In *The State of State Reform in Latin America*, 213-61 (Palo Alto and Washington: Stanford University Press, 2007).




Figure VII.2. Factors that Affect the Levels of Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings

Who is more likely to participate in a town hall or city council meeting? Figure VII.2 displays the results of a multivariate logistic model showing various factors that increase or decrease the probability of participating in local government meetings.¹³ Figure VII.2 shows that participation in improvement committees, the presentation of petitions to the municipal government, the perception of one's personal economic situation and geographic location of residence all affect the likelihood of participating, or not, in town hall and municipal meetings. We now analyze each of the statistically significant factors one by one.

¹³ In this Figure, each factor or variable included in the statistical model is presented on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each variable on the probability of participating in municipal meetings is shown graphically by a point. A point placed to the right vertical "0" line indicates a positive contribution, while if it falls to the left of the "0" line a negative contribution is indicated. Statistically significant contributors, shown by confidence intervals represented by horizontal lines located to the left and right of each point. Only when the confidence intervals do not cross the vertical "0" line is the variable statistically significant (at 0.05 or higher). The relative strength of each variable is indicated by standardized coefficients (eg. "beta weights").




Figure VII.3. Participation in Improvement Committees and Town Hall Meetings

Figure VII.3 shows a positive association, significant and robust between participation in improvement committees and town hall meetings. This association indicates that the more one participates in community improvement committee meetings, the more likely they also are to attend town hall and city council meetings. The slope of the line shows that the largest effect occurs when the increase in participation in improvement committees goes from 0 to 33, i.e., the category "never" to the category "once or twice a year, and 66 at 100, that is, more "one to two times a month" to "once a week." In contrast, the increase between 33 and 66, i.e., more "once or twice a year" to "once or twice a month", does not appear to be highly correlated with the percentage of participation in meetings of city council.

What does the AmericasBarometer data tell us regarding the association between those who have presented a petition to the municipal government and participation in meetings of the municipality? The results of the multivariate regression indicate that those individuals who have submitted a petition to a municipal office, officer, councilman or trustee during the past 12 months are more likely participate in city council or town hall meeting. These results can be seen in Figure VII.4.




Figure VII.4. Presentation of Petitions to the Municipal Government and Participation in Town Hall or City Council Meetings

Figure VII.4 shows that only 3.8 percent of Ecuadorians who have not submitted any petition to the municipal government during the last 12 months participated in a town hall meeting, while 35.4 percent of Ecuadorians who did submit requests participated in meetings of the municipality.

Continuing with the possible factors that affect levels of citizen participation in municipal meetings, we study the association of idiosyncratic and sociotropic variables, or the perception of the national economic situation and one's personal economic situation, respectively. Figure VII.5 shows that as the perception of the national economic situation improves, the percentage of people taking part in town hall meetings decreases. The chart on the left side of Figure VII.5 shows a rather broken line, indicating that although the correlation between these two variables tends to be negative, especially at the beginning of the scale measuring the perception of the national economy, the correlation becomes less clear on the second half of the scale.




Figure VII.5. Sociotropic and Idiotropic Variables and Participation in City Council Meetings

On the other hand, the correlation between the idiotropic variable and participation in town hall or city council meetings is positive, suggesting that as the perceptions of one's personal economic situation improves, the percentage of those more actively involved in town hall or city council meetings also increases. In contrast to what happens between the sociotropic variable and municipal meeting participation, the idiotropic variable more clearly affects the odds of public participation starting in the second half of the perception scale. These results are displayed in the chart on the right side of Figure VII.5.

Finally, this section examines the association between place of residence and the proportion of people participating in town hall meetings. As illustrated in Figure VII.6, people living in the highlands attend municipal council meetings with less frequency than those who live on the coast. Although Figure VII.6 shows that people living in the east are more involved in town hall meetings than those living on the coast, the confidence intervals (the gray regions of the bars) overlap indicating that the difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot reach a conclusion with any certainty regarding this difference.




Figure VII.6. Region of Residence and Participation in Town Hall Meetings

At this point, we have analyzed the factors that significantly contribute to the likelihood of Ecuadorian participation in their local town hall or city council meetings. In summary, we have found that social capital variables and economic perceptions are statistically associated with local levels of participation. However, we found no statistical evidence to establish a relationship between the variables of institutional trust and participation in meetings of the municipality. The following section will look at the relationship of these variables with the presentation of petitions to the local government.

Demand-Making on the Municipal Government

What are the characteristics of Ecuadorians who more frequently submit petitions to the municipality? To answer this question, the AmericasBarometer asks the following questions:

NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the city/town/village within the past 12 months?

(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to SGL1]** (88) Doesn't know **[Go to SGL1]**
 (98) Doesn't answer **[Go to SGL1]**

MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request?

(1) Yes (0) No (88) Doesn't Know (98) Doesn't Answer (99) N/A




Figure VII.7. Presentation of Petitions to the Government from a Historical and Comparative Context

Figure VII.7 shows the percentage of individuals who have requested help or submitted a petition to a local official. The graph on the left side of Figure VII.7 shows a downward trend in the submission of public petitions to their local government. In 2001, 18.4 percent of individuals filed a petition with the municipality, while only 10.2 percent did the same in 2010. Judging by the error bars (the gray sections of the percentage bars), the most statistically significant decrease in the presentation of petitions occurred between 2001 and 2004, from which time the rates have remained essentially unchanged.

In looking at the submission of petitions to the local government from a comparative perspective, the graph on the right side of Figure VII.7 shows that Ecuador is located among the four countries whose citizens are least likely to request assistance from the municipality. As was the case in municipal meeting participation, Ecuadorians presented fewer petitions to their local governments than residents of more centralized countries, such as Uruguay, Guatemala and El Salvador.

An additional question asked to people who had sought assistance or filed a petition with the municipality, consisting of 10.2 percent of Ecuador's population, was whether or not their question or request was resolved. In Ecuador, 41.7 percent of individuals reported that yes, their question or request was resolved, while 58.3 percent reported that it was not.

What are some of the determinants for Ecuadorians filing petitions with the municipality? Figure VII.8 shows the results of a multivariate logistic regression. As in Figure VII.2, the impact of each factor on the probability of making a request to the municipality located to the right vertical "0" line indicates a positive contribution, while those that fall to the left of the "0" line indicate a negative contribution.




Figure VII.8. Who is most likely to seek help or present a petition to the local government?

Figure VII.8 shows that participation in improvement committees and in town hall meetings, age and geographical area of residence contribute, at a statistically significant level, to the probability that Ecuadorians will submit a petition to the municipality. As before, a case by case analysis will be carried out on the results that prove to be statistically significant.

As in the association with municipal meeting attendance, participation in improvement committees shows a positive, significant and robust correlation with the presentation of petitions to the local government. Thus, increasing participation in improvement committees corresponds with an increase in the presentation of petitions with the municipality. The results of this association are illustrated in Figure VII.9.




Figure VII.9. Participation in improvement Committees and Presentation of Petitions to the Local Government

Figure VI.9 shows that the more pronounced segment of the line's slope is between those who never participate in improvement committees and those who participate once or twice a year. In this segment, it can be observed that the percentage of people who submitted petitions to the local government goes from 5 to 20 percent. Meanwhile, the lowest variation in participation is seen among those who participate in improvement committees once or twice year and those who participate once or twice a month (an increase of about one and a half percent). Finally, 26 percent of those who participate in such a committee at least once a week, also present petitions at a frequency 4.5 percentage points above those who participate in improvement committees once or twice a month.

What percentage of people who submitted requests to the local government also participated in town hall meetings? Data from the AmericasBarometer show that 51.5 percent of Ecuadorians who reported having participated in a municipal meeting during the 12 months prior to the survey also submitted a petition to the local government, while only 7.1 percent of those who did not participate in a municipal meeting had submitted petitions. These results are shown in Figure VII.10.




Figure VII.10. Participation in Municipal Meetings and Petitions to the Local Government

As we have seen so far, the variables for citizen participation in local government, as well as in civic organizations, are statistically correlated with each other. This study found that participation in municipal meetings, the filing of petitions with the municipality and involvement in improvement committee are all positively associated; in other words, as one increases, the other two also rise. However, it is necessary note that when analyzing other types of political participation, such as voting, no statistically significant correlation is found in relation to the other variables.

Another issue to remember is that this study does not include an analysis of causality. The relationship between these variables is highly endogenous, thus we cannot show, with certainty, which of these variables is causing the behavior of the other variables. However, one could speculate that in terms of participation, a "virtuous circle" could exist; meaning that once a person begins to participate in any one of these activities, the likelihood that the person would also begin participating in other social capital generating activities could rise. Nevertheless, more studies are needed to corroborate this preliminary hypothesis, which has resulted from the systematic analysis of empirical evidence provided by the AmericasBarometer over the years.

It is important to note that the citizen participation variables are not only associated with each other, but also appear affected by some of the individual socio-economic and demographic characteristics as well. Figure VII.11 shows that age is a key variable when analyzing the probability of an individual filing a petition with their municipality.




Figure VII.11. Age and the Presentation of Petitions to the Local Government

Figure VII.8 shows the relationship between age and the likelihood of filing a petition with the municipality. As the point is to the right of the vertical "0" line, and confidence interval does not cross this line, the correlation is found to be positive and statistically significant. This indicates that as the Ecuadorian population ages, there could be an increase in the number of people presenting petitions to the municipality.

However, Figure VII.11 shows that the relationship between age group and presentation of petitions to the local government is more pronounced for Ecuadorians between 26 and 55 years of age. The other age groups (from 18-25 to 26-35 and 46-55 to 66 years of age and older) display a possible negative correlation, in other words, an inverse association with the presentation of petitions to the municipality.¹⁴

Finally, Figure VII.12 analyzes the final variable in the multivariate logistic model statistically correlated with the presentation of petitions to the municipality, geographic location of residence. According to this chart, nearly twice as many people living in east submitted petitions to the local government, in comparison to those living in the highlands or on the coast.

¹⁴ It is important to note that the variable measuring the respondents' age was inserted into the model as an ordinal variable. However, in Figure VII.11, age was converted into age groups in order to simplify the presentation of the results.




Figure VII.12. Region of Residence and Presentation of Petitions to the Local Government

Up to this point, we have analyzed the factors that are statistically associated with the presentation of petitions to the municipal government. It is important to note that this section did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that there is some sort of relationship between trust, the sociotropic and idiosyncratic variables, satisfaction with local government services and the likelihood of Ecuadorians presenting petitions to their municipality.

Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The next section conducts a statistical analysis of factors that may affect the levels of satisfaction felt by Ecuadorians with the services provided by the municipality. To measure the levels of satisfaction regarding local government performance, the AmericasBarometer uses the following question:

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]**
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
 (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer




Figure VII.13. Satisfaction with the Services Provided by the Municipality in a Historical and Comparative Context

Unlike citizen participation, satisfaction with the services provided by the local government has remained relatively stable over time. The graph on the left side Figure VII.13 shows that the level of satisfaction by year remains between 54 and 58 points, on a scale of 0 to 100. Because the error bars cross each year, there is insufficient statistical evidence to conclude that there has been an actual change in the levels of satisfaction with local government performance over time.

Another interesting finding, which differs from the low levels of citizen participation in the local government, is the satisfaction levels of Ecuadorian citizens in comparison with other countries in the Americas. Whereas Ecuadorians are usually located in the lower third part of the scale, in comparison with other countries in the hemisphere, where satisfaction with municipal services is concerned, Ecuadorians are located in the upper third of the scale, only below Colombia, Canada, Uruguay and Nicaragua.

If we breakdown the percentage of citizens found within each group on the scale of question SGL1, the following results are found: The majority of Ecuadorians believe that the services provided by the municipality are neither good nor bad (40.4 percent). This percentage is closely followed by Ecuadorians who answered that the municipal services are good (35.8 percent) and, finally, the percentage of Ecuadorians who reported that the municipal services provided are very good, bad and very bad is 5.4, 14.8, and 3.6 percent, respectively.

What are some of the determinants for satisfaction with local government services? Figure VII.14 shows that the sociotropic and idiosyncratic variables, institutional trust, age, individual wealth (as measured

by the material possessions in the home), the size of the place of residence and region are statistically significant contributors to satisfaction with municipal services.¹⁵




Figure VII.14. Determinants of Satisfaction with Local Government Services

In the case of satisfaction with local government services, citizen participation variables are not statistically significant. Despite this, the "p" value of the coefficient for the voter turnout variable is only slightly below the level required for statistical significance (0.06). Consequently, one cannot conclude with certainty whether or not a statistically significant relationship exists between this variable and satisfaction with local services.¹⁶

In contrast, two variables that are statistically correlated with satisfaction with local services are the sociotropic (perception of the national economic situation) and idiotropic (perception of one's personal economic situation) variables. The results of this correlation are illustrated in Figure VII.15.

¹⁵ As mentioned earlier, statistical significance is shown in Figure VII.14 where the error bars that accompany the point, do not cross a vertical "0" line, at 95 percent.

¹⁶ This is to avoid what in statistical terms is known as a type I or type II error, which is no more than concluding that that two variables are not statistically correlated when they actually are (type I error) or that two variables are statistically correlated when they are not (type 2 error).




Figure VII.15. Sociotropic and Idiotropic Variables and Satisfaction with Government Services

Figure VII.15 shows that both the sociotropic and idiotropic variables are positively correlated with satisfaction with municipal government services. In other words, as public perceptions about the national and/or personal economic situation(s) improve, so does satisfaction with the performance of the municipality. These results are displayed in the graphs that make up Figure VII.15.

Although the coefficients of the sociotropic and idiotropic variables are statistically significant, the effect of the latter is stronger than the effect of the sociotropic variable. In looking carefully at Figure VII.15, one can conclude that the effect of the perception of the national economic situation, on satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality, goes from a low of 46 to a maximum of 57 points, while the effect of the perception of one's personal economic situation changes from a low of 43 to a maximum of 70 points. This means that when measuring the total effect of these variables on satisfaction with local services, the idiotropic variable is the most important.




Figure VII.16. Institutional Confidence and Satisfaction with Local Government Services

What does the AmericasBarometer data tell us regarding the effect of institutional trust? In looking at Figure VII.16, we see that trust in the municipality has a clearer, more robust and significant effect than confidence in the national government, in relation to satisfaction with municipal government services. In any case, the effect of both variables is positive, suggesting that as institutional trust increases, satisfaction with the performance of the municipality also increases.

In this case, it must again be clarified that due to the high level of endogeneity between the variables of institutional trust and satisfaction with local government services, this study is not intended to determine the direction of causality of this correlation. In other words, the levels of institutional trust could be causing Ecuadorians to be satisfied, or not, with local services, but it is also plausible that it is the satisfaction with the services provided by municipality that is determining the levels of institutional trust.

With regard to socioeconomic and demographic variables, this study found that age is a determining factor in the evaluation of the services provided by the municipality. It is shown that as Ecuadorians age, their satisfaction with municipal services declines. These results are shown in Figure VII.17.




Figure VII.17. Age and Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The above Figure shows that the largest decline in satisfaction with municipal government services occurs when individuals pass from the 56-65 age group to the over 66 age group. This can be seen in observing the slope of the broken lines which together form the correlation between age and satisfaction in Figure VII.17.

Although the general trend is a negative correlation, there is a group of individuals that when changing from the 46-55 group to the 56-65 years of age group, the correlation becomes positive. This suggests that in contrast to what happens in the majority of Ecuadorians, as this group of individuals age, satisfaction increases. However this happens only during the previously mentioned age groups, following which, the correlation is again negative.




Figure VII.18. Household Wealth and Satisfaction with Local Government Services

In addition to age, household wealth, as measured by the consideration of assets in the home, shows a statistically significant correlation with levels of satisfaction with local government services.¹⁷ In this case, as the possession of capital goods in the home increases, satisfaction with services provided by the municipality also increases. The results of this correlation can be observed in Figure VII.18.

However, the graph also shows that there is a period in which the correlation changes direction. This happens between wealth quintiles three and four, where the association between the possession of material goods in the home and satisfaction with the municipal services is negative. Nevertheless, the correlation again becomes positive when individuals are between the fourth and fifth wealth quintiles.

¹⁷ Quantifying weighted assets that can be found in the selected households is conducted using the method presented by Abby Córdova, in *Methodological Note: Measuring relative wealth using household indicators* (Nashville: The Barometer of the Americas, January 19, 2009). For more information visit <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries> (website last visited on June 16, 2010). In particular, goods are quantified for the possession of, or not, a TV, refrigerator (fridge), conventional telephone/landline, vehicle washing machine, microwave, water inside the house, bathroom in the house, and computer. In particular goods are quantified for the possession or not TV, refrigerator (fridge), conventional telephone / landline, vehicle, washing machine, microwave, water inside the house, bathroom in the house, and computer.




Figure VII.19. Size of Place of Residence and Satisfaction with Local Government Services




Figure VII.20. Region of Residence and Satisfaction with Local Government Services

The last two variables correlated with the level of satisfaction with local government services are the size of the place the residence and geographical location. The results of these associations can be seen in Figures VII.9 and VII.20. The size of the place of residence indicates that individuals living in larger cities tend to be more satisfied with municipal services compared to those living in small towns. Finally,

residents of the highlands are found to be less satisfied with the services provided by the municipality, in comparison to individuals living on the coast.

This section analyzed some of the factors that may determine levels of satisfaction with the services provided by the local government. The last section of this chapter explores the possible impact of citizen participation in local government and institutional satisfaction on levels of respect for state political institutions among Ecuadorians.

Citizen Participation in Local Government, Satisfaction with Services Provided by the Municipality and its Impact on Respect for State Political Institutions

The theoretical section of this chapter proposed that the variables of public participation in the local government and satisfaction with municipal services could be correlated with respect for state institutions.




Figure VII.21. Determinants of Support for Respect of State Political Institutions

To determine the effect of the variables of public participation and satisfaction with municipal services on the level of respect for state institutions, we used a linear multivariate statistical model, whose results are illustrated in Figure VII.21. Again, the statistically significant coefficients are those points whose confidence intervals do not cross the vertical "0" line, and whose contribution is positive if they are located to the right of the "0" line, or negative if they are located to the left.

It can be seen that there is not enough empirical evidence to conclude that the presentation of petitions to the municipality is statistically correlated with respect for Ecuadorian institutions. However, the other variable, participation in local government meetings, is found to be significant at one percent; however, it would be premature to conclude whether or not there is an empirical relationship between this

variable and institutional respect in Ecuador.¹⁸ The statistically significant correlation found in this model is the association between satisfaction with municipal services and respect for state institutions.




Figure VII.22. Satisfaction with Local Services and Respect for State Institutions

However, as shown in Figure VII.22, this relationship is not very clear. Although the regression indicates that the correlation is negative, meaning that as the level of satisfaction with services provided by the municipality increases, respect for state institutions decreases, there is a segment of the correlation that is positive. The portion of the scale between those who rated the municipal services as “neither good nor bad” and who rated the municipal services as “good” exhibit a positive correlation in relation to respect for state institutions.

A much clearer relationship is found between institutional trust and respect for state political institutions. This relationship can be seen in the two graphs that make up Figure VII.23. This Figure indicates that as confidence in the national government increases, as with confidence in the municipality, holding all factors constant, respect for Ecuador’s political also increases. Both the lines representing institutional trust show that its relationship to institutional respect is clear, significant and robust.

¹⁸ This is because it might make a statistical error Type I or Type II.




Figure VII.23. Institutional Confidence and Respect for State Institutions

Finally, among the control variables, gender is noted to have a statistically significant correlation relating to respect for Ecuadorian state institutions. This association indicates that women, as compared to men, have more respect for political institutions. The rest of the control coefficients do not exhibit evidence of statistically significant correlations in relation to levels of respect for state democratic institutions.

Throughout this chapter, we have analyzed a number of factors that could determine the levels of participation in municipal meetings, the presentation of petitions to the local government, levels of satisfaction with the municipal services, and the potential effect of all these factors on respect for state institutions. The last section of this chapter provides a brief discussion of the results, followed by our conclusions and proposals of potential topics for future research regarding the subnational governments of Ecuador.

Conclusion

This chapter found that, in Ecuador, public participation and satisfaction with municipal services have a tenuous relationship with the respect that Ecuadorian citizens have for state institutions. On one hand, those who participate in town hall or city council meetings appear to have greater respect for state political institutions in general, but due to the weak statistical correlation, it cannot be concluded with certainty that this association is significant. What can be concluded, with a high degree of certainty, is that there is not a relationship between the presentation of petitions to the local government and respect for state institutions.

Interestingly, increasing citizen satisfaction with the services provided by local governments is correlated with *decreasing* respect for state political institutions. This finding contradicts the part of the hypothesis, developed earlier in this chapter, based on social capital theory. Possibly, this result possibly indicates a disconnect between the local and national levels of government, or a partnership between the national government and the concept of state political institutions. Those who are satisfied or very satisfied with the performance of the municipality, in terms of the provision of services, could have poor perceptions of the performance of national level institutions. Because the statistical correlation between these two variables is not very strong, future studies are recommended to more accurately determine what Ecuadorians think when they associate satisfaction with local services and institutional respect.

Where a clear, significant and robust relationship was found is between institutional confidence and respect for state political institutions. As confidence in the municipality or national government increases, the legitimacy of Ecuadorian political institutions also increases. But how can one increase institutional confidence, especially at the municipal level? Other studies by the AmericasBarometer have provided some avenues that could encourage this kind of confidence in Latin America. In a previous study, Montalvo concludes that:

The most obvious policy recommendation would be to increase organizational effectiveness based on citizen needs. As shown, citizen evaluations of municipal performance show the strongest effect on trust in this particular institution, which is why these assessments could be used as a source input for the development of public policies at the municipal level. Another important implication, in terms of public policy, is support for public participation in municipal and community activities. Activating, for example, mechanisms of participatory budgeting, which bring citizens and local government officials together in the search for solutions to common problems, has proven to be one of the most efficient mechanisms for connecting citizens with local government (2010:4).¹⁹

In addition, this chapter evaluates some of the factors affecting public participation in the local government and citizen satisfaction with municipal services. A variable found to be consistently and positively associated with participation in town hall meetings and the presentation of petitions to the local government, is participation in improvement committees. This result suggests a kind of "virtuous circle of participation," meaning that those who are involved in improvement committees, are also more likely to be involved in other activities in the municipality, and vice versa.²⁰ However, no statistical association was found between participation in improvement committees and satisfaction with municipal services.

Finally, this chapter systematically provided evidence that one's region of residence is crucial, not only for civic participation, but also for satisfaction with municipal services. First, individuals living on the coast tend to participate more in town hall meetings than those living in the highlands. Secondly, those living in the East present more petitions to the municipality than those who live on the coast. Finally, individuals living in the highlands have lower levels of satisfaction with the services provided by the municipality, in comparison with those who live on the coast. Perhaps for these reasons, coastal residents support further governmental decentralization, as will be seen in the next that chapter.

¹⁹ Montalvo, Daniel. "Understanding trust in local government." Perspectives of the AmericasBarometer. 35. Vanderbilt University LAPOP, March 2010.

²⁰ The opposite could also occur; i.e., a "vicious circle of non-participation", where those not participating in civic organizations also do not participate in meetings of the local government.

Part III: Beyond the Economic Crisis

Chapter VIII. What are the Opinions of Ecuadorians on State Decentralization?

Introduction

For those who have not yet noticed, institutional reforms including decentralization and other issues of administrative, fiscal and political autonomy have been generating much debate, social mobilization and collective action in recent years. It is unlikely that any other state reform processes, with the exception of democracy itself, has such a diverse variety of fans, from Rafael Correa to Jaime Nebot and Marlon Santi. Of course, decentralization can be conceptualized in various ways, depending on the point of view, as the term itself has not been clearly and unequivocally defined.¹ It is for this reason that there exists profound disagreement on the design and implementation of these state reform processes.

Despite the extensive discussions and socialization processes that facilitators have conducted between national and subnational political elites to define the optimal degree of decentralization, few efforts have been implemented to know the opinions of those who will supposedly be the direct beneficiaries of these reforms, the citizens. Given the countless benefits, at least regulatory benefits, that are shown in the literature regarding the consequences of decentralization,² one would expect that these state reforms would garner broad public support. However, the current balance of power and territorial concentration of political ideology could suggest differing levels of support for decentralization based on region of residence. Other factors potentially related to public support for decentralization: institutional trust and satisfaction with government performance.

The main objective of this chapter is to determine Ecuadorian levels of support for the processes of state decentralization, and propose various factors that could affect these levels of support. In this context, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions: 1) To what point do Ecuadorians support the processes of state decentralization?; 2) What are the differences in support for political, administrative and fiscal decentralization?; 3) What theoretical and socio-demographic factors are related to support for the decentralization in Ecuador?, and 4) What are the possible public policy recommendations that can be made based on the findings of this study?

In order to measure support for state decentralization, this chapter employs the most frequently cited definition to operationalize the concept of decentralization.³ Decentralization is understood as the vertical transfer of political, administrative and/or fiscal power from the higher to the lower levels of

¹ Treisman, Daniel. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

² Riker, William. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, and Significance*. Boston: Little Brown, 1967; Nickson, Andrew. *Local Government in Latin America*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, Sousa, Celina. "Redemocratization and Decentralization in Brazil: The Strength of the Member States." *Development and Change* 27, no. 3 (1996): 529-55; Montero, Alfred P., and David J. Samuels. "The Political Determinants of Decentralization in Latin America: Causes and Consequences." In *Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Alfred P. Montero and David J. Samuels, 32. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.

³ Nickson, Andrew. *Local Government in Latin America*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995. Norris, Pippa. *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Falleti, Tulia. "New Fiscal Federalism and the Political Dynamics of International Institutions." *International Institutions, Global Processes, Domestic Consequence*. Durham: Duke University, 1999; Treisman, Daniel. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, Montalvo, Daniel. "Understanding trust in local government." *Perspectives from the AmericasBarometer*. 35. Vanderbilt University Public Opinion Project, March 2010.

government. Political decentralization empowers citizens to be able to directly elect subnational authorities, who would otherwise be appointed by higher level government entities. Fiscal decentralization empowers subnational governments to generate their own resources through the collection of taxes or in receiving transfers or loans from other government agencies. Finally, administrative decentralization transfers autonomy to subnational governments, empowering these entities to make decisions in the development and implementation of public policies.

Decentralization differs from *devolution*, in which the transfer of funds and responsibilities are directed to appointed, rather than elected, local authorities; from *delegation* or *privatization*, where the national government sells or delegates state functions; and from *deconcentration*, where the executive transfers the power to make decisions to a number of ministries and departments at the national level. This chapter will focus entirely on political, administrative and fiscal decentralization, excluding the concepts listed above.

The next section discusses the theoretical background for processes of decentralization in Latin America, with a particular focus on Ecuador. Then, the levels of public support for administrative, fiscal and political decentralization will be discussed. Later, various statistical analyses are carried out to determine the theoretical, socio-economic and demographic factors that could affect public opinion on the decentralization of the Ecuadorian state. Finally, a set of public policies that could serve as tools in the debate on land management, autonomy and decentralization will be presented and discussed.

Literature Review

There exist several schools of thought in the literature regarding the causes of decentralization. In general, several of these schools of thought can be classified into two broader perspectives: the causes of decentralization are "top-down" or "bottom-up". Just as Montero and Samuels showed, one might be tempted to say that both are equally important, but there are conditions for which one is more important than the other when explaining the causes of decentralization.⁴ In relation to the top-down causes, for example, national legislators and presidents-elect may support decentralization in scenarios that would promote their political survival. These scenarios can be as varied as re-election, securing a legislative majority, or creating and/or strengthening the grassroots political organizations essential to party survival. However, other national political actors may disfavor decentralization as it may restrict political maneuvering.

In the case of bottom-up causes of decentralization, local political actors can exert pressures on the national government to gain financial, political and administrative autonomy, with the objective to guarantee areas of local power. These areas can empower local elites to increase their political capital via the implementation of targeted public policies, or sponsorship of programs and projects designed by local civil society organizations. However, decentralization may also result in overburdening local elites because as voters recognize the decentralization of the state, they could consequently demand more from their subnational authorities.⁵

⁴ Montero, Alfred P., and David J. Samuels. "The Political Determinants of Decentralization in Latin America: Causes and Consequences." In *Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Alfred P. Montero and David J. Samuels, 32. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.

⁵ Treisman, Daniel. *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Within the study of decentralization from a top-down or bottom-up approach, there exist various hypotheses regarding the causality of institutional reform. This study includes the most common factors, which of course is not intended to constitute an exhaustive analysis of all the causes of decentralization. First, we present the arguments for *decentralization as a form of neo-liberal reform*. The proposals under this rubric follow a logic of political economy that primarily manifests in countries where the developmental state model is exhausted, giving rise to a political emergency oriented towards free-markets, requiring the transfer of centralized power to the peripheral.⁶ The authors who proposed this hypothesis link the most recent wave of decentralization with the crisis of the import substitution model, the regulation of markets and extensive state intervention. Overall, the argument is that the fiscal imbalance caused by high levels of debt in the eighties put endogenous and exogenous forces into motion, which have driven the transfer of goods and public services to subnational levels of government.⁷

This hypothesis has been challenged in several studies that suggest that both neo-liberal governments and developing states have historically been decentralized *and* recentralized. Development regimes, such as Juan Peron in Argentina and Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil, used decentralization, as would their neo-liberal successors during the eighties and nineties.⁸ This is why other authors hypothesize that *decentralization is a result of international factors*. It is not only neo-liberal reforms that are accompanied by decentralization, some researchers believe that openness to foreign investment, the transnationalization of production, and international funding agencies have persuaded national governments to distribute power among subnational levels of government.⁹ However, some authors, such as Falleti suggest that the push by international entities for decentralization began with the "Washington Consensus", whose policies were implemented well after the beginning of the last wave of decentralization.¹⁰

Another hypothesis is that *decentralization is a result of democratization*. Coinciding with the third wave of democratization in the mid-seventies, proponents of this hypothesis indicate that the transitions opened spaces for citizen participation in the areas of local politics and policy making, thus promoting decentralization. It is also argued that democratization is not only the horizontal separation of powers between executive, legislative and judicial, but also a vertical separation of powers among the various levels of government. However, the correlation between democratization and decentralization is less clear in establishing causality, and some authors even point to empirical evidence showing that several authoritarian governments (like Pinochet in Chile and Videla in Argentina) have used the decentralization process to consolidate authoritarian subnational governments.¹¹

⁶ Cavarozzi, Marcelo. "Beyond Transitions to Democracy in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Politics*, 1992: 665-84.

⁷ Rodinelli, Dennis. "Decentralizing Public Services in Developing Countries: Issues and Opportunities." *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* 14, no. 1 (1989): 77-98.

⁸ Montero, Alfred P., and David J. Samuels. "The Political Determinants of Decentralization in Latin America: Causes and Consequences." In *Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Alfred P. Montero and David J. Samuels, 32. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.

⁹ Willis, Eliza. "Industrial Location Through Influencing Regional and Local Development in Federal States: Some Lessons." *International Review of Administrative Science* 62 (1996): 401-11; Schuurman, Frans. "The Decentralisation Discourse: Post-Fordist Paradigm or Neo-Liberal Cul-de-Sac?" In *Globalization, Competitiveness, and Human Security*, by Christopher Kay. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

¹⁰ Falleti, Tulia. "New Fiscal Federalism and the Political Dynamics of International Institutions." *International Institutions, Global Processes, Domestic Consequence*. Durham: Duke University, 1999.

¹¹ Sousa, Celina. "Redemocratization and Decentralization in Brazil: The Strength of the Member States." *Development and Change* 27, no. 3 (1996): 529-55.

A fourth group of researchers argue in favor of *socio-structural causes of decentralization*. In particular, these researchers suggest that after the modernization of the state, urbanization rates have exponentially increased, promoting the strengthening of local governments. Some authors note, for example, that urbanization makes the provision of goods and services by centralized levels of government less effective, compared to the provision of goods and services at the local level. Due to the closeness between citizens and local government, local governments can more accurately identify the needs of residents in a specific territory. However, there is not a clear understanding of how these factors have affected decentralization in Latin America, because most studies in this area have focused on micro-factors, such as decision making of local elites, and have ignored long-term structural factors that can be generalized to other parts of the world.¹²

There are other hypotheses, such as the *political-institutional* or *electoralism* hypotheses, that explain the causes of decentralization through "rational choice", where political actors evaluate state reform through the benefits and incentives they receive in negotiating for power. These benefits and incentives are generally related to electoral institutions, the internal structure of political parties, and more importantly, rational assessment of one's chances for political survival.¹³ However, several academic groups have widely criticized the use of the "rational choice" method for studying social phenomena, in that the incentives and benefits are perceived differently according to the psychological scenario (generally, in the position of loss or gain) in which the individual is found.¹⁴

Theoretical Background

Despite the extensive work done to describe the various factors that could explain the causes of state decentralization, there have been surprisingly few public opinion studies on the subject, especially taking into consideration that most Latin American countries are democratic, and the essence of democratic life is to collect, interpret and implement the will of the people. This chapter conducts an initial analysis on the will of Ecuadorian citizens with respect to decentralization. Specifically, this study analyzes the extent to which Ecuadorians support processes of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization, and the major theoretical, socio-economic and demographic factors that explain the support for these reform processes.

The first of this study's expectations is related to support, in and of itself, for state decentralization. Due to the extensive socialization process of the Territorial Organization, Autonomy and Decentralization Code¹⁵ by the National Assembly, the President of the Republic and various mayors, in addition to efforts undertaken by other political actors, international agencies and NGOs, and the private sector, among others, one would expect there to be broad support from society for the processes of political, administrative and fiscal decentralization. However, due to the geographical distribution of Ecuadorian political ideology and regional pressures by certain local governments, significant differences in the level of support based on one's region of residence could be expected.

¹² Montero, Alfred P., and David J. Samuels. "The Political Determinants of Decentralization in Latin America: Causes and Consequences." In *Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by Alfred P. Montero and David J. Samuels, 32. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004.

¹³ Riker, William. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, and Significance*. Boston: Little Brown, 1967.

¹⁴ For more information about the criticism of the method of "rational choice" see the literature on prospect theory. "

¹⁵ For more information on the Territorial Organization, Autonomy, and Decentralization Code, visit <http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ec/tramite-de-las-leyes.html>

The second expectation concerns the subjective and/or objective evaluation of performance relating to the different levels of government, and the confidence generated by state institutions. Specifically, we expect that individuals who have higher levels of satisfaction with the goods and services provided by the municipality will be more supportive of decentralization. Also, individuals who have more confidence in the municipality would be more willing to support a greater transfer of political, administrative and fiscal power to the local government. In contrast, those individuals who have more confidence in the President of the Republic might be inclined to support a process of state re-centralization in Ecuador.

A third expectation of this study is that public participation directly affects the likelihood of supporting decentralization. Individuals who actively participate in local political life might be interested in receiving more power in order to increase their chances of political survival. Likewise, those involved in local organizations such as improvement committees, may prefer decentralization so that the municipality can carry out the improvements needed in the community. Finally, those directly involved in the municipality, through the presentation of petitions, may be interested in increasing the responsibilities of the local government so they would not have to travel to big cities or the capital to file these petitions and request assistance. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that increased contact with the municipality and participation in political and community activities could have a negative effect on support for decentralization, mainly due to the potential for citizen disappointment with their first-hand experience with local government entities.

Finally, one might expect that there is a direct and positive relationship between the level of human development and support for government decentralization. Individuals who enjoy higher levels of wealth could support lower levels of intervention by a centralized, national government and the transfer of responsibilities to the local level. Similarly, individuals with more education may also be more aware of the benefits (at least politically) that decentralization produces. However, individuals with a higher socioeconomic status could also be wary of the harmful consequences that decentralization could have if performed in the context of subnational authoritarianism, and thus may be inclined to reject these kinds of reforms.

While this chapter examines public opinion about state decentralization, it does not seek to exhaustively analyze all causes that can influence the will of Ecuadorians with respect to decentralization. This chapter also does not seek to determine if decision makers act or do not act based on the will of the people, and if there is actually consultation with the intended beneficiaries of this state reform. Finally, although this work can be constituted as a source of information for other studies, it should be noted that the study is only carried out in Ecuador, and that various contextual factors could interfere with the generalization of the results to other countries or regions.

Measuring Public Support for the Decentralization of the State

To measure citizen support for state decentralization, this study utilizes three questions that seek to operationalize the concepts of administrative, fiscal and political decentralization. These questions aspire to better capture the overall concept of decentralization, because if one directly asked the public on their views regarding decentralization, a conceptual bias would occur as the definition of the term may differ vastly from one person to another.¹⁶ Additionally, the questions in this survey only refer to national

¹⁶ A solution to this potential problem could be in holding focus groups in order to understand what Ecuadorians think when it comes to decentralization. However, that method of investigation is beyond the scope of this study.

and local levels of government. The intermediate, or provincial, level of government is not included in the 2010 AmericasBarometer questionnaire.¹⁷

The questions are designed to understand whether Ecuadorians would support a process of decentralization, or on the contrary, favor a re-centralization of administrative, fiscal and political power. It should be noted that the questions about administrative and fiscal decentralization are presented to the interviewee through a zero sum game; i.e., the interviewee is asked to choose which level of government should handle, to a greater or lesser extent, a pre-existing amount of administrative and financial responsibility. This manner of formulating a question intends to isolate the possibility of confusion during the interview, as alternate wording could lead to interpretations regarding the creation of more taxes and bureaucracy instead of a *transfer* of power between levels of government, which is typical of decentralization.

The first question corresponds with support for *administrative decentralization*:

A. Administrative Decentralization

LGL2A. Taking into consideration the country's existing public services, who should be given **more responsibility** in the administration and provision of these services?

- (1) Much more to the national government
- (2) Some more to the national government
- (3) The same amount between the national and municipal government
- (4) Some more to the municipality
- (5) Much more to the municipality
- (88) I don't know
- (98) No response

This question looks to study public opinion about which level of government should have more administrative responsibilities. Here are the results of this question, comparing 2008 to the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer:

¹⁷ Although the provincial level is not included in this round, we expect to include it in future studies of the Americas Barometer.




Figure VIII.1. Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization in Ecuador between 2008 and 2010

Figure VIII.1 shows the percentage of individuals located within each category, representing the different levels of support for the decentralization or re-centralization of the state. In addition, we show a categorical temporal comparison of responses, biannually. First, it is interesting to note that between 2008 and 2010, there is an 11 percent increase (from 30.9 to 41.7 percent) in the number of individuals who believe that there should be a balance in the number of responsibilities handled by the government at the national and local levels. Secondly, we note that the category "much more to the municipality" increased 2.5 percentage points in 2010, in comparison with 2008. The three remaining categories, "some more to municipality", "some more to national government" and "much more to the national government", decreased by 4.6, 2.5, and 6.2 percentage points, respectively.

Overall, is there more support for the re-centralization or decentralization of the state? The answer to this question is illustrated in Figure VIII.2. In 2010, the percentage of Ecuadorians who believe that the municipality should receive some more and much more responsibility is 31.9 percent, while the percentage considering that the national government who should receive some more and much more responsibility is 26.4 percent. However, it is worth noting that most Ecuadorians (41.7 per percent) feel that administrative responsibilities should be evenly distributed between the local and national levels of government.



Figure VIII.2. Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization

Does this trend continue when it comes to fiscal decentralization? In order to study public opinion on the management of the economic resources available in the Ecuadorian state, the AmericasBarometer included the following question on *support for fiscal decentralization*:

B. Fiscal Decentralization

LGL2B. And taking into consideration the country's current economic resources, who should **administer more of the money?** [Read the options]

- (1) Much more by the national government
- (2) Some more by the national government
- (3) The same amount by the national and municipal governments
- (4) Some more by the municipality
- (5) Much more by the municipality
- (88) Don't know
- (98) No response

The results of this question are illustrated in Figure VII.3. As seen in the case of support for administrative decentralization, the percentage of individuals who believe that there should be a more equitable sharing of economic resources between the local and national governments increases, in this case by 4.6 percentage points (from 30.4 to 35.0 percent), between 2008 and 2010. The change in levels of support for fiscal decentralization is also similar to levels for administrative decentralization, as there was an increase for "much more by the municipality" of 1.6 points (from 12.6 to 14.2 percent). However, the category "some more by the municipality" also increased 0.2 percent (from 12.6 to 12.8 percent). The remaining two categories, "some more by the national government" and "much more by national government", decrease 0.4 and 5.9 percentage points, respectively, in 2010 compared to 2008 (from 11.9 to 11.5 and from 32.5 to 26.6 percent).




Figure VIII.3. Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization in 2008 and 2010

Despite the similarities between trends in support of administrative and fiscal decentralization, data from the AmericasBarometer shows a fundamental difference in the support for these processes of state reform. In the case of administrative decentralization, Ecuadorians prefer that the municipality instead of the national government take on more administrative responsibilities (see Chart VIII.2), when speaking of the financial resources, Ecuadorians prefer that the national government, instead of local government, administers more of the available resources. These results are illustrated in Figure VIII.4, where one can see that 38 percent of people prefer that “some more” and “much more” of the available financial resources be managed by the local government, while only 26.9 percent of respondents believe that “some more” and “much more” of the responsibility for managing these resources should go to the municipality.




Figure VIII.4. Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010

Another important finding is that unlike support for administrative decentralization, the equitable sharing of fiscal resources between the national government and the municipality has fewer supporters (only 35.0 percent vs. 41.7 percent). These data suggest that where fiscal policy is concerned, Ecuadorians prefer that the national government takes a greater role in the management of existing economic resources.

C. Political Decentralization

LGL2C. Please tell me who should have **more authority** over the municipality in which you live, the mayor or the president of the republic? **[Read the options]**

(1) The mayor	(2) The president of the republic	(3) Both
(88) Don't know	(98) Don't Answer	

Up to what point do Ecuadorians support the mayor as having greater authority in their municipality as compared to the president of the republic? One component of *support for political decentralization* is the distribution of authority between different levels of government. In the case of Ecuador, it was decided to use this question, instead of the classic one¹⁸, to measure support for political decentralization, as at the moment there is not a discussion regarding whether or not mayors should be elected by popular vote.¹⁹ Figure VIII.5 illustrates the results of this question.

¹⁸ The classic question on decentralization policy is: Do you think that the mayor of his city must be popularly elected or appointed by the president of the republic?

¹⁹ In fact, Ecuador is one of the few countries that, during the military dictatorship, did not suspend the election of mayors by popular vote.




Figure VIII.5. Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010

In Ecuador, 60.5 percent of those interviewed in 2010 said that the mayor is who should have greater authority over their city.²⁰ Following this, 25.5 percent of Ecuadorians believe that both the mayor and the president should have the same level of authority, while only 14 percent of respondents believe that the president should have greater authority over their city than the mayor.

As we have seen so far, there is wide variation in levels of citizen support for decentralization, according to the type of decentralization being studied. In the case of political decentralization, there is a firm belief that it is the mayor, and not the president, who should have greater authority over a municipality. With respect to administrative decentralization, the majority of Ecuadorians think there must be an equitable distribution of responsibilities between the national government and the municipality. Finally, most Ecuadorians think that it is the national government who should manage the state's existing financial resources.

What are some factors that might be influencing the responses of Ecuadorians regarding their support for the decentralization of the government? A statistical model was developed to try to explain the relationship between some of the factors supporting the processes of state decentralization, with the goal of creating an index combining the three questions into a single indicator; however, factor analysis determined that these dependent variables should be analyzed separately.²¹

The first statistical model analyzed in this section pertains to *support for administrative decentralization* of the Ecuadorian state. In this model, we analyze the impact of a number of factors, including citizen participation, trust in the national and local governments and perceptions of one's personal and national economic situation (idiotropic and sociotropic variables, respectively), and the

²⁰ This question about levels of authority at the local level was not used in 2008, which is why the results presented are only for 2010.

²¹ The Cronbach alpha for this analysis was only 0.45.

socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of those who support administrative decentralization or re-centralization.




Figure VIII.6. Factors Related with Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010

The multivariate regression results, using the least squares method, are illustrated in Figure VIII.6.²² Through this graph we can infer that, keeping all other factors constant, the confidence in the national and local levels of government, the perception of the national economic situation (sociotropic variable) and the geographic location of the individual, are statistically correlated with support for administrative decentralization. This study did not find sufficient statistical evidence to conclude that public participation, the perception of one's personal economic situation (idiotropic variable), education, gender, and individual wealth status, affects levels of citizen support for administrative decentralization. We now move one to an individual analysis of each factor statistically correlated with the dependent variable.

²² In this Figure, each factor or variable included in the statistical model is presented on the vertical (y) axis. The impact of each variable on support for the administrative decentralization of the Ecuadorian state is graphically shown by a dot, which, when placed to the right of the vertical "0" line indicates a positive contribution, and if placed to the left of the "0" line indicates a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributors are shown by confidence intervals represented as horizontal lines to the left and right of each point. Only when these confidence intervals do not cross the vertical "0" line are they found to be statistically significant (at 0.05 or higher). The relative strength of each variable is indicated through standardized coefficients (for example, "beta weights").




Figure VIII.7. Confidence in the National Government and Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010

Figure VIII.7 shows the negative correlation between trust in the national government and support for administrative decentralization. In other words, this study finds that as confidence in the national government increases, public support for administrative decentralization decreases. However, the broken line in Figure VIII.7 shows certain levels of variation according to the level of trust on the scale of 0 - 100. For example, individuals who rated their level of trust at 17 points are most supportive of the administrative decentralization of the Ecuadorian state, even above those who reported not having any trust in the national government. Likewise, those individuals who rated their level of confidence at 67 points out of 100, show greater support administrative decentralization than those whose confidence level was at 50 or 33 points. Despite these peaks, the overall trend represents a negative correlation, indicating that confidence in the national government generates a desire for administrative re-centralization.




Figure VIII.8. Confidence in the Municipality and Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010

What is the direction of the correlation when studying trust in the municipality? Although there is a relationship between citizen trust in the municipality and support for administrative decentralization, Figure VIII.8 shows us that, in this case, the direction is positive. That is, those individuals who express more confidence in their municipality also support increased management of public services by their local government. As can be seen in Figure VIII.8, the line resulting from the correlation of these two variables is smoother, suggesting a clearer, more direct and robust relationship.

As expected, those individuals who claim not to have any confidence in the municipality show much more support for the transfer of administrative responsibilities to the national government. The slope of this line is more pronounced when the respondents' levels of trust increases from 0 to 17 on the scale of 0 - 100. This suggests that the most important effect occurs when confidence in the municipality is just beginning to increase. However, the upward slope of the line decreases between confidence points 17 and 50, returning to increase at a significant rate between 50 and 100 points.

In the two previous charts, we analyzed the effects of institutional trust on support for the redistribution of administrative responsibilities for state public services. In the following graph, we study the correlation between the perception of the national economic situation (the sociotropic variable) and support administrative decentralization.




Figure VIII.9. Perception of the National Economic Situation and Support for Administrative Decentralization, 2010

Figure VIII.9 displays a negative correlation between the sociotropic variable and support for the administrative decentralization of the state. In other words, as the perception of the national economic situation improves, Ecuadorians prefer that it is the federal government who provides the public services and other administrative duties. As can be seen in Figure VIII.9, the effect of the sociotropic variable is more pronounced when the level of satisfaction with the country's economic performance increases from 75 to 100 points. Although the general trend of the correlation is negative, there is a slight change in the direction of the slope, becoming positive, when the perception of the country's economic situation increases from 50 to 75 points on the scale of 0 to 100. This could be the reason that the correlation between these two variables is only significant at five percent; this variable's confidence intervals came close to intersecting the vertical "0" axis, as displayed in Figure VIII.6.

So far, we have analyzed the impact that several theoretical variables could have on public opinion regarding administrative decentralization of the Ecuadorian state. In the next section, we analyze the only factor from the socio-economic and demographic group of variables that is statistically correlated with support for this dimension of decentralization: *the geographic region residence*.

The variable used to study the respondents' geographic region of residence is categorical, and is divided into urban coast, rural coast, urban highlands, rural highlands, Northeast and Southeast.²³ In order to explore the statistical relationship between geographical location and support for administrative decentralization, the region "urban coast" has been selected as the category on which we base the interregional comparisons. This category was chosen because it could be expected, theoretically, that this region's residents would support a greater degree of decentralization, especially given the social mobilizations for autonomy that arose prior to the development of this study.

²³ These categories correspond to a stratified group sample, according to the sample design technique used in this study, and are representative of the groups themselves.




Figure VIII.10. Geographic Location of Residence and Support for Administrative Decentralization

Figure VIII.10 shows that, in contrast to what one would expect, those who inhabit the “rural highlands” and “Northeast” regions, show higher levels of support for administrative decentralization than those living in urban coast. However, this study found no statistically significant differences in the levels of support for administrative decentralization among residents of the “rural coast”, “urban highlands” and “Southeast”, as compared to those living on the “urban coast.”

This section has shown that trust in the national and local governments, the perception of the national economic situation and the respondents’ geographic area of residence, are statistically correlated with support for the administrative decentralization of public services and other state responsibilities. As trust in the national government or the perception of national economy increases, Ecuadorians report increased support for administrative recentralization. In other words, they believe that it is the national government who should have more administrative responsibilities, including the provision of public services, than the municipality. In contrast, individuals who have more trust in the municipality believe that more administrative responsibility should be held by the local levels of government. Finally, those living in the rural highlands and the Northeast are more supportive of administrative decentralization, than those living on the urban coast.




Figure VIII.11. Factors Related to Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010

What are the factors related to public support for the fiscal decentralization of the Ecuadorian state? The variables analyzed in Figure VIII.11 include citizen participation, institutional trust, perception of the local government's performance, perception of one's personal and national economic situation, and various socio-economic and demographic characteristics, in relation to citizen support for fiscal decentralization.²⁴ Figure VIII.11 shows that participation in improvement committees, trust in the national and municipal governments, perception of the national economic situation, levels of individual wealth and geographic location of residence, are all statistically significant in correlation with support for fiscal decentralization.²⁵

²⁴ It is worth noting that the analysis of fiscal decentralization in this study focuses only on the intergovernmental transfer economic capital and not the increase in tax capacity or external borrowing.

²⁵ As presented in the statistical model analyzing support for administrative decentralization, the impact of each variable on support for fiscal decentralization is graphically represented by a dot, which when located to the right of the vertical "0" line indicates a positive contribution, and if to the left of the "0" line, a negative contribution. Statistically significant relationships at 0.05 percent are those whose confidence intervals do not cross the vertical "0" line.




Figure VIII.12. Frequency of Participation in Improvement Committees and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010

Figure VIII.11 suggests that as the frequency in which one participates in improvement committees increases, the support for fiscal decentralization also increases. This correlation becomes more evident when analyzing Figure VIII.12. The correlation line between participation in improvement committees and support for fiscal decentralization has a completely smooth, positive slope, suggesting a strong relationship between the two variables. However, this was not the case with support for administrative decentralization, as none of the variables used to measure citizen participation exhibited a statistically significant correlation.

Nevertheless, in the case of the variables measuring institutional trust, the effects on support for fiscal decentralization is similar to those found in relation to support for administrative decentralization, as reported in the previous section.




Figure VIII.13. Confidence in the National Government and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010

Figure VIII.13 shows the clear, robust and negative correlation between confidence in the national government and support for fiscal decentralization. In other words, increased trust in the national government also increases citizen support for the national government's management of public financial resources. Despite the clear negative correlation between those who awarded between 17 and 100 points of trust in the national government and support for the re-centralization of fiscal management, the association between those who report between 0 and 17 points of confidence in the national government and support for fiscal decentralization is less clear.

But what happens when analyzing trust in the municipality? The data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer suggests a positive, although less clear, relationship between trust in the municipality and support for fiscal decentralization. First, the slope of the line showing the relationship between these two variables is more pronounced for those who reported between 83 and 100 points of trust in the municipality, followed those who reported between 0 and 17 points of trust, on the scale of 0 to 100. This phenomenon may indicate that the more pronounced marginal changes in the level of trust in the municipality and support for fiscal decentralization takes place at the extremes of municipal trust, as is illustrated in Figure VIII.14.

Figure VIII.14 also suggests that the correlation between confidence in the municipality and support for fiscal decentralization is less clear among those reporting between 17 and 57 points of trust, and even negative among those reporting between 67 and 83 points of trust on the scale of 0 to 100.




Figure VIII.14. Confidence in the Municipality and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010

Up to this point, we have analyzed the impact of the citizen participation and institutional trust variables on support for fiscal decentralization. However, there is another theoretical variable that also affects support for administrative decentralization, and exhibits a negative contribution to support for fiscal decentralization; this variable is the perception of the national economic situation, or sociotropic variable.

Figure VIII.15 shows that as the perception of the national economy improves, support for the national government to assume increased fiscal responsibility increases. Although the correlation between these two variables is negative, there is a slight deviation to a positive slope seen in the sociotropic variable's lower scores, on the scale of 0 to 100. In other words, the relationship between the sociotropic variable and support for fiscal decentralization is less obvious, and even misleading, in the first quartile of the scale pertaining to the respondents' perceptions of the government economic performance.




Figure VIII.15. Perception of the National Economic Situation and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010

Not only is the relationship between the perception of the national economic situation and support the fiscal decentralization significant, but so is the relationship between levels of relative wealth, as a weighted measure of goods available in the home, and fiscal decentralization. As shown in Figure VIII.16, the correlation is positive, thus, as individuals increase their possession of household goods, they also exhibit increased support for municipal management of public funds.²⁶

The same chart also shows that the most pronounced effect occurs in going from the first to second wealth quintile. This phenomenon is apparent as the slope of the line indicates the statistically significant correlation between wealth and support for fiscal decentralization. Another pronounced effect is displayed by the steep increase in support from the third to fourth wealth quintiles. Finally, the increases from the second to the third and the fourth to fifth quintiles indicate a less pronounced change in support for increased fiscal decentralization, in comparison with the changes observed between the other quintiles.

²⁶ Quantifying weighted assets that can be found in the selected households is conducted using the method developed by Abby Córdova Methodological Note: Measuring relative wealth using household indicators (Nashville: The AmericasBarometer, January 19, 2009). For more information visit: <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/AmericasBarometerInsightsSeries> (website last visited on June 16, 2010). In particular goods are quantified for possession or not: TV, refrigerator (fridge), conventional telephone / fixed vehicle, washing machine, microwave, water inside the house, bathroom in the house, and computer.




Figure VIII.16. Level of Wealth and Support for Fiscal Decentralization, 2010

Finally, the respondent's geographic area of residence is statistically correlated with the degree of support for the fiscal decentralization of the Ecuadorian state. As was the case in the study of geographical location and support for administrative decentralization, the "urban coast" region was used as the point of comparison for the other regions in Ecuador.

Again, residents of the rural highlands exhibit more support for fiscal decentralization than those living on the urban coast. Likewise, those who reside in the urban highlands, Northeast and Southeast, in comparison with those living on the urban coast, also support the municipality's administration of public funds, as opposed to increased administration by the national government. Finally, the data from the AmericasBarometer indicates that there is no statistical difference in support for fiscal decentralization among those residing on the urban and rural coast.

This section has described some of the theoretical, socio-economic and demographic variables that are statistically correlated with support for fiscal decentralization. Among those studied were participation in improvement committees, trust in the national and municipal governments, perception of the national economic situation, level of wealth and geographic area of residence.

However, this study did not find any statistical association between the variables measuring citizen participation (the presentation of petitions to municipal government and electoral participation) and support for fiscal decentralization. Likewise, variables that measure government performance, such as victimization by corruption, do not exhibit a statistically significant relationship with the support for this dimension of decentralization. Finally, the perception of one's personal economic situation, level of education, gender and age, show no statistical relationship with support for the transferring of fiscal management from the national to the municipal level of government, or vice versa.

The third and final section of this chapter analyzes a series of factors that affect support for *political decentralization*. The model in Figure VIII.17 shows the impact of a number of factors,

including institutional trust, support for a direct democracy over a representative democracy, citizen participation, socio-economic and demographic factors, and public support for the mayor, over the president, in having greater authority in the town of residence.²⁷




Figure VIII.17. Factors Related to Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010

Figure VIII.17 shows that some of the factors analyzed have a statistically significant impact on support for state political decentralization. As was the case regarding support for administrative and fiscal decentralization, institutional trust is statistically correlated with support for political decentralization. While the correlation between trust in the national government and support for political decentralization is negative, the impact of trust in the municipality is positive. These results are illustrated in Figures VIII-18 and VIII-19, respectively.

²⁷ As in the previous analyses, the multivariate regression results are obtained using the method of least squares. Figure VIII.17 shows each factor, or variable, included in the statistical model on the vertical y-axis. The impact of each variable on support for the political decentralization of the Ecuadorian state is graphically displayed by a dot that, when located to the right of the vertical "0" line, indicates a positive contribution, if located to the left of the "0" line, indicates a negative contribution. Statistically significant contributions are shown by confidence intervals, represented by horizontal lines, located to the left and right of the dot. Only when these intervals confidence do not cross the vertical "0" line is the contribution statistically significant (at 0.05 or higher).




Figure VIII.18. Confidence in the National Government and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization




Figure VIII.19. Confidence in the Municipality and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010

One of the citizen participation variables exhibiting a rather negative correlation with support for political decentralization is support for a direct democracy over a representative democracy. This correlation suggests that increasing support for the idea that the people should rule directly, and not through elected representatives, increases support for the president of the republic to have authority greater than that of the mayor in the municipality. These results are illustrated in Figure VIII.20.




Figure VIII.20. Direct Democracy and Citizen Support for Decentralization, 2010

As can be seen in Figure VIII.20, support for political decentralization markedly decreases as support for the idea of a direct democracy increases,²⁸ with the exception of a group of individuals between 50 and 67 points, on the scale of 0 to 100. A similar correlation could occur among individuals who are highly involved in political parties. In other words, those individuals who participate in political parties would prefer a re-centralization of political authority, compared to those not involved in these types of political organizations.

However, the correlation between political party involvement and political decentralization is only significant at one percent. Thus, in order to avoid misinterpretations that can arise from the weak statistical association between these variables, we are unable to reach a conclusion on the relationship between these two variables.

²⁸ The item included in the questionnaire to measure this variable is: "The people must rule directly and not through elected representatives. To what extent do you agree or disagree? "




Figure VIII.21. Level of Education and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010

Among the socio-economic and demographic variables included in this study, the level of education is statistically correlated with support for political decentralization. The direction of this association is positive, suggesting that with increasing levels of education, Ecuadorian support for political decentralization also increases. These results are reflected in Figure VIII.21.²⁹

What other socio-economic and demographic variables impact beliefs regarding who should have greater authority over Ecuadorian cities? The 2010 data from the AmericasBarometer show that these factors include: the respondent's gender and geographic area residence.

In the case of gender, men, as compared to women, show slightly greater support the processes of political decentralization. In other words, women tend to prefer that the president of the republic has greater authority, than the mayor, over the cities of Ecuador. However, this is a small difference in substantive terms (only 4 points on a scale from 0 to 100). These results are illustrated in Figure VIII.22.

²⁹ The level of education variable included in the model is ordinal; i.e., reflects the number of years of education the interviewee has completed. However, in order to facilitate the graphic illustration of the association between level of education and support for political decentralization, we constructed a categorical variable with four groups: one for individuals who have not completed any level of education, a second group for individuals who have completed primary education, a third group for individuals who have completed secondary education, and a final group for individuals who have completed a higher level of education.




Figure VIII.22. Gender and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization, 2010

The respondent's geographic area of residence is the other socio-demographic factor statistically associated with support for state political decentralization. As in the case of geographical location and support for administrative and fiscal decentralization, the region on which we base this analysis is the "urban coast." Figure VIII.23 illustrates that those residing in the Southeast support further political decentralization, in comparison to those living on the urban coast.

However, data from the AmericasBarometer show no statistically significant differences between those residing on the rural coast, in the urban or rural highlands, or the Northeast, as compared to urban coast residents, in relation to their position on whether the mayor or president of the republic should have more authority over the city in which they reside.




Figure VIII.23. Geographic Location and Citizen Support for Political Decentralization

This last section has described the factors that are statistically associated with support for political decentralization. The final section of this chapter discusses the relevant findings and proposes some conclusions that can serve as instruments for public policy and potential topics for further research.

Discussion and Conclusions

This chapter has presented the key results of a study of Ecuadorian public opinion on the decentralization of the Ecuadorian state. First, it is interesting to note that 60.5 per percent of Ecuadorians believe that the mayor, and not the president of the republic (or both), should have greater authority over the city where they live. This result might suggest that when addressing the issues of political decentralization, Ecuadorians have defined political hierarchies according to the division of territories (municipalities - nation).

However, when it comes to administrative decentralization, most Ecuadorians (41.7 per percent) felt that both the national and the municipal government should equally share the responsibility of providing public services, as opposed to designating only one of these levels to fulfill this governmental role. This balance of functions might suggest that Ecuadorians want both levels of government to provide public services alike, but could also be understood as being due to ignorance of what public services correspond with each level government, resulting in the tendency for respondents to locate themselves in the middle of the scale. Additional studies would need to be carried out in order to more precisely determine which of these hypotheses is correct.

Finally, when the question of who should administer the country's public funds, the majority of Ecuadorians (38.0 per cent) replied that the national government, and not the municipality (or both), should have the responsibility. This support for a process of fiscal re-centralization could be due to

several factors. First, because citizens can more directly monitor the use of public funds at the local level, in comparison with those of Central Bank or the Ministries, individuals may be more disillusioned with the way funds are managed in the municipality. Second, because some municipalities have more precarious horizontal systems of checks and balances than national level institutions, there may be the impression that public funds are better managed at the national level. Finally, support for fiscal re-centralization may also be due to Ecuadorians simply being accustomed that most of their taxes (IVA and income tax, for example), are collected by a national entity and their smaller taxes (such as property or sales taxes) being collected by the subnational levels of government.

What factors most frequently affect public support for the decentralization of the Ecuadorian state? The results of this study suggest that institutional trust and internal geographic factors are related to each dimension (administrative, fiscal and political) of decentralization. Regarding institutional trust and confidence, it is not surprising to see that increasing confidence in the national government is correlated with increasing support for the re-centralization of the state. In the same vein, as trust in the municipality increases, citizen support for decentralization also expands. So if one wants a decentralized state to have political legitimacy, an obvious recommendation would be to improve the trust of the people in their municipality. But how would one do this? Previous studies suggest that, in addition to improving the perception of the municipality's performance, political legitimacy could be achieved through the promotion of citizen participation in the municipality, particularly in town hall meetings and the construction of participatory municipal budgets.³⁰

In the case of geographical area of residence, this study finds that in contrast to what might be expected, residents of the rural highlands and the Northeast support administrative decentralization; those who live in the rural and urban highlands, Northeast and Southeast support fiscal decentralization; and inhabitants of the Southeast support the case of political decentralization, as compared to the level of support for these dimensions of decentralization among residents who live on the urban coast. This suggests that despite this region's social movements for autonomy, particularly in the city of Guayaquil, the inhabitants of the highlands and the East are most supportive of decentralization. Interestingly, these results appear to coincide with the geographic regions with the highest concentrations of indigenous peoples and communities.

The inclusion of the variable reflecting the respondents' ethnic identification showed no statistically significant association with support for decentralization. However, this could be because the sample design does not appear to contain a sufficient number of indigenous persons in order to facilitate a representative sample of all indigenous peoples and communities in Ecuador. For this reason, conducting an over-sample of these populations to more accurately determine the association is recommended.

Other factors related to support for state decentralization is citizen participation and the perception of institutional performance. However, the impact of these factors is somewhat less clear than institutional trust or geographic region of residence. In the case of citizen participation, participation in improvement committees is positively correlated with support for fiscal decentralization. However, the idea that the people should rule directly, and not through elected representatives, is negatively correlated with political decentralization. The first scenario could be that the lack of economic capital in the municipality mobilizes citizens to directly address community problems themselves, and not with local government assistance. The second situation may respond to disenchantment with public servants, especially those at the municipal level. Other instances of citizen participation, such as the presentation of

³⁰ Montalvo, Daniel. "Understanding Trust in local government." *Perspectives from the AmericasBarometer*. 35. Vanderbilt University LAPOP, March 2010.

petitions to the municipality or participation in municipal government meetings, showed no direct statistical relationship with support for state decentralization.

Finally, in the case of institutional performance, this study found that individuals whose perception of the national economic situation is positive, will more readily support the fiscal and administrative re-centralization of the state. However, there was no association found between this variable and political decentralization. Interestingly, other measures of government performance, such as victimization by corruption at the municipal level and satisfaction with local services, appear to be statistically associated with Ecuadorian support *for* decentralization.

This section has carried out an analysis of multivariate regression results to determine some of the factors that, according to state reform theory, could affect Ecuadorian support in the ongoing efforts to find the most appropriate levels of administrative, fiscal and political decentralization. However, it is important to note that this is not intended to be an exhaustive study of all possible factors that could influence public opinion about decentralization in Ecuador. Nor does it provide an assessment of the institutional reforms currently underway in the country, through the design and implementation of the Territorial Organization, Autonomy and Decentralization Code. This study could simply provide a guideline for researchers and designers of public policy on the thoughts and opinions of Ecuadorians regarding the decentralization or re-centralization of the Ecuadorian state.

Chapter IX. Left, Right or not Important? Political Ideology in Ecuador

Introduction

In recent years, polarization has become a recurrent theme in Ecuadorian politics. In a country where politics are intensely lived, successive governments generate strong feelings in those who sympathize with, as well as in those in opposition, the current government and their public policies. One of the most important dimensions of polarization is political ideology. This chapter will attempt to uncover the meanings that the terms "left" and "right" have for Ecuadorians and analyze whether political ideology truly plays an important role in Ecuador's political democratic culture.

Theoretical Background

The terms "left" and "right" are often used to describe politics around the world. However, the average citizen, as we will show in this chapter, is often haphazardly or misinformed on the political issues that affect their daily lives.¹ The lack of information regarding political issues is partly caused by the strategies of political elites who propose plans that are intentionally ambiguous and confusing, but also by lack of incentives for people to take an interest in politics. One tool to address the lack of information and foster better comprehension of political issues and events is the use of ideological labels left-right.² The use of ideological labels has two purposes. On the one hand, it can help individuals to assess and make political decisions with greater accuracy. On the other hand, it facilitates political dialogue between elites and the general public, offering a convenient mode of communication.³

In its relation to the meaning and content of ideological labels, the literature identifies at least three different dimensions; symbolic, public policy and matters of general value to society. The symbolic meaning of ideological labels exists to the extent that they help the individual to differentiate between different political groups without reference to specific positions on public policy. In Europe, for example, one's location on the ideological spectrum from left to right is closely related to support for certain political parties.⁴ The public policy component, as its name implies, refers to the extent which ideological labels predict an individual's position on various state policies. As an example, some authors suggest that the left-right ideological divide is manifested in the differentiation of economic policies, that is to say, a distinction between those who prefer a higher or lower state involvement in the country's economy.⁵ Finally, ideological labels also have a component that deals with matters of general value to society. In

¹ Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. And Donald E. Miller Stokes (1960), *The American Voter*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter (1996), *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matter*, New Haven, Yale University Press

² Zechmeister, Elizabeth (2006), *which is left and who is on the right of Mexican politics. An approach to method Q study of ideological labels*, *Politics and Government*, Volume VIII, No 1.

³ Fuchs, Dieter and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1990), "The Left-Right Schema", in M. Kent Jennings, Jan W. Van Deth et al., *Continuities in Political Action*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter.

⁴ Inglehart, Ronald and Hans D. Klingemann (1976), "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics", chap. 13, Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie (eds.), *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition*, Chichester, Wiley.

⁵ Inglehart, Ronald. (1997). *Postmodernization and Modernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. (2010). *Latin American Party Systems*. Cambridge University Press.

many Latin American democracies, political campaigns often focus on issues that relate to an end, not necessarily to the policies needed to achieve it. The component relating to matters of general value to society refers to an end's appropriation by an individual or group. Even though these matters may not be related to the left-right political ideological spectrum, if a political movement successfully appropriated these ends, the voters will eventually associate those stated political ends with ideological identity of that movement.⁶

In Ecuador, political ideology has been closely associated with regional, ethnic and cultural divides.⁷ Since the return of democracy in 1979, Ecuador has been governed by leaders belonging to various political tendencies. The chair of the president has seen leaders as conservative as Leon Febres-Cordero of the Social Christian Party, social democrats such as Rodrigo Borja from the Democratic Left, eminently populist leaders and those without a defined political ideology, such as Abdalá Bucaram, the founder of the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party. The diversity of political tendencies that have come to power in Ecuador since 1979 and the collapse of the party system seen in recent years, reflects the prevailing personalism in Ecuadorian electoral politics, as well as the versatility Ecuadorians exhibit to feel identified with different ideological standpoints.

American Political Ideology

The question used by the Public Opinion in Latin America to measure political ideology on the continent is as follows:

L1. [Use L1B in United States, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica and Haiti] Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. One means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98
Left										Right	

Figure IX.1 shows the average self-positioning on the above ideological scale by all the countries that included this question as part of the survey. As can be seen, all of the countries included in Figure IX.1 are very close to the midpoint of the scale, which is 5.5. The country whose citizens are located furthest to the right of the ideological spectrum is Honduras, with 6.7, while the other extreme is Uruguay, with a national average of 4.7. In Ecuador, the average placement of all the respondents on this scale is 5.4, close to the scale's midpoint. This indicates that the vast majority of respondents in the Ecuador chose to identify with the center of the ideological spectrum rather than one of the two extremes.

⁶ Petrocik, John R. (1996), "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study", *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 825-850.

⁷ Muratorio, B (1980), "Protestantism and Capitalism Revisited in the Rural Highlands of Ecuador", *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol 8, Issue 1, pp. 37-60.




Figure IX.1. Political Ideology in the Americas

One thing that Figure IX.1 does not show, however, is the large number of people who did not respond the question. In Ecuador, for example, the non-response rate for this question was 32.7%, the highest for any question in the survey. This means that large numbers of Ecuadorians are unable or unwilling to place themselves on the ideological spectrum, beyond their personal preferences for specific political candidates or public policies. Ecuador, however, is no exception in this regard. Table IX.1 shows the non-response rates in all the American countries where this question was asked.

Table IX.1. Percentage of Answers and Non-Answers to the Ideological Self-Identification Scale Question

Country	Answer	No Answer
Mexico	85.08%	14.92%
Guatemala	73.40%	26.60%
El Salvador	94.45%	5.55%
Honduras	89.10%	10.90%
Nicaragua	77.27%	22.73%
Costa Rica	62.33%	37.67%
Panama	78.52%	21.48%
Colombia	79.08%	20.92%
Ecuador	67.30%	32.70%
Bolivia	79.49%	20.51%
Peru	87.73%	12.27%
Paraguay	75.57%	24.43%
Chile	77.30%	22.70%
Uruguay	90.93%	9.07%
Brazil	74.98%	25.02%
Venezuela	95.47%	4.53%
Argentina	78.30%	21.70%
Dominican Republic	79.47%	20.53%
Belize	63.76%	36.24%
Suriname	45.38%	54.62%

As can be seen, in the majority of the countries listed in the table, over 20% of people did not answer the question regarding ideological orientation. The most extreme case is Surinam, where the percentage of non-response consisted of more than half of the survey participants. Belize and Costa Rica were two other countries where large numbers of people did not answer this question. On the other hand, 95% of respondents in Venezuela answered the question regarding their political beliefs. Other countries where almost all respondents also answered survey's question on political ideology: El Salvador and Uruguay.

Political Ideology in Ecuador

a) Factors that Affect the Formation of Political Ideology in Ecuador

To identify the factors that led respondents to answer the survey's question on political ideology, we designed a logistic regression model, illustrated in Figure IX.2. The dependent variable is a dichotomization of the original question, where all those who responded to the question are assigned a value of 100 and those who did not response are assigned a value of 0. In addition to including socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, education, wealth and the area where respondents lived, the model also included independent variables such as the respondents' interest in politics, how often they watched or read the news, and an index of political knowledge. The political knowledge index was derived from three questions asked of the respondents: if they know the name of the President of the United States, the number of provinces that make up Ecuador, and the duration of the Ecuadorian presidential term.




Figure IX.2. Factors that Facilitate Ideological Identification in Ecuador, 2010

The logistic regression results show that two variables have significant influence on either or not a respondent answers the question on political ideology. These variables are the respondent's level of interest in politics and gender. As seen in Figure IX.3, 82% of people who say they are highly interested in politics answered the question on political ideology in the AmericasBarometer survey. In contrast, of people who reported no interest in politics, only 61% answered the question. As for the difference between men and women, the figure shows that 78% of men answered the question on political ideology, while only 62% of women did the same.




Figure IX.3. Percentage of Persons Who Answered the Political Ideology Question by Gender and Level of Interest in Politics, Ecuador, 2010

The logistic regression results raise an interesting question. If interest in politics was a key factor in whether or not the respondents answered the question regarding their political ideological orientation, and if men answered in much greater numbers than women, would it be fair to assume that men are more interested in politics than women in Ecuador? Figure IX.4 responds to that mystery and reveals something else. On one hand, Figure IX.4 confirms that a significant difference exists in the levels of interest in politics between men and women. On the other hand, it is important to note that although men report higher levels of interest in politics, it is still not very high, considering that this is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, where zero reflects no interest in politics and 100 reflects the maximum degree of interest. Figure IX.4 shows that men's level of interest rests at 35.4 points, and women at 26.5 points, leading to the conclusion that general levels of interest in politics in Ecuador are relatively low.




Figure IX.4. Interest in Politics by Gender, Ecuador 2010

b) Factors that Influence Ideological Identification

To find the main predictors of political ideology for Ecuadorian citizens, a linear regression model was designed. This regression's independent variables include socio-demographic factors such as age, education, wealth, region, etc. Other variables included in the model are satisfaction with the current president's performance, the perception of the current government's effectiveness, interest in politics, the frequency of which people watch or read the news and the respondent's level of political knowledge. The regression results are illustrated in Figure IX.5. One of the most common perceptions about Ecuadorian political culture is regarding the ideological differences between geographic regions. This perception appears to be confirmed by the data from the AmericasBarometer. According to the results produced by the linear regression model, in comparison to the urban coast, residents of the urban and rural highlands and the northern Amazonian region are located more to the left on the ideological spectrum. Another socio-demographic variable with a significant impact on the Ecuadorian political ideology is gender. The regression shows that women in Ecuador are farther right on the ideological spectrum than men. Finally, satisfaction with the performance of the current president is an important factor in Ecuadorian ideological identification. Figure IX.5 shows that the greater the satisfaction with President Correa's performance, the greater the likelihood that respondents are located to the left on the political ideology scale used in this survey.




Figure IX.5. Predictors of Political Ideology in Ecuador, 2010

Figure IX.6 shows the distribution of Ecuadorians on the political ideology scale according to the region they inhabit. The first thing Figure IX.6 enables us to observe is the difference between the inhabitants of the coast and the rest of the country in terms of political ideology. While respondents from the East and highlands are considered people with leftist ideologies, the people of the coast identify with the right. Another obvious factor is pervasiveness of ideological moderation among Ecuadorians. While there is a difference between coastal residents and the rest of the country, in terms of political ideology, we see that Ecuadorians remain very close to the center of the scale, which is 5.5. The urban coast is the most identified with the right, with an average of 5.8, while the rural highlands are the most identified with the left, with an average of 4.9. In closing, we must stress that the difference between the two extremes of ideological identification in Ecuador is very small, as the inhabitants of the urban coast and Ecuadorians living in the rural highlands are separated by less than one point on an ideological scale of 1 to 10.




Figure IX.6. Ideological Distribution by Region: Ecuador, 2010

c) The Role of Ideology in Ecuadorian Political Culture

As we have seen so far, political ideology is not an easy variable to understand or explain within the context of Ecuadorian political culture. On one hand, over 30% of respondents did not answer question designed to measure political ideology. On the other hand, the ideological preferences of those who responded agreed with historical perceptions of the regional ideological differences within Ecuador. This section will focus on analyzing what role Ecuadorians' ideological tendencies play when it is time to vote and what influence it has relating to the preferred role of the Ecuadorian government in the country's economy.

The last presidential elections were held in Ecuador in April 2009. This electoral process was different as one of the candidates was the presiding Constitutional President, Rafael Correa. Upon the approval of Ecuador's new Constitution, by public referendum in September of 2008, it was required that new presidential elections be held before the end of President Correa's original 4-year term. That was how on April 26, 2009, receiving over 50% of the vote in the first round, Rafael Correa became the first president re-elected in Ecuador in 52 years. His closest contenders were a former president ousted in 2005, Lucio Gutiérrez, and Álvaro Noboa, who in his fourth attempt to achieve the presidency in Ecuador, failed to reach the second round for the first time.

President Correa took office representing the Proud and Sovereign Fatherland Movement (Movimiento Patria Altiva I Soberana (PAIS)) identified with leftist ideologies. The PAIS movement preaches an economic doctrine that rejects neoliberal principles and is based on the idea of regional integration that will eliminate dependence on other larger economies. His immediate opponent, Lucio Gutiérrez, also had taken office, in 2003, on a leftist platform and in alliances with indigenous sectors. During his presidency, however, he distanced himself from these sectors and his economic policy became to open and support a Free Trade Agreement with the United States, and thus did not exhibit a consistent political ideology. Finally, in recent years, businessman Álvaro Noboa has been the Ecuadorian right

leader with a clear message of open commerce and has repeatedly questioned other leftist governments in Latin America, such as Bolivia and Venezuela.




Figure IX.7. Electoral Preferences According to Political Ideology: Ecuador, 2010

Figure IX.7 shows the ideological distribution of Ecuadorians by their electoral preferences. As one can see, those who voted for Rafael Correa, making up the majority of the sample, average 5.3 on the ideological scale of 1 to 10. This means that they are slightly to the left of the scale's center, which is 5.5. On the other hand, people who voted for Álvaro Noboa, the candidate for the right, average 6.1 on the scale, meaning they have located themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum. Voters for Lucio Gutiérrez averaged 5.7, which is slightly right of the scale's center. This indicates that even more than Gutiérrez's discourse, which resonated with voters in the April 2009 elections, was his actions as President of the Republic. Finally there is Martha Roldan, the candidate who represented a leftist coalition in the April 2009 elections. People who voted for her are located almost on the center of the ideological scale, with an average of 5.6. While 5.6 is technically on the right of the spectrum, Roldós is considered a more moderate leftist than Correa, which is consistent as her voters are more near the center of the ideological scale than those who voted for President Correa. In conclusion, Figure IX.7 shows first that the ideological range of Ecuadorians is quite short and that the majority of Ecuadorians are located near the center of the ideological spectrum, as the largest difference between voters for a candidate from the left and the right is 0.8 on a scale of 1 to 10. The second finding is that there is a relative consistency between Ecuadorians' ideological self-identification and their electoral preferences.

Finally, we will see if ideology is a valid variable in predicting Ecuadorian perceptions of the role of the state in the economy. In previous chapters, we mentioned that the Ecuadorian people, in general, think the state should play a leading role in the country's economy. It is worth remembering that the measurement of the role of the state is based on an indexing of the questions shown below.⁸

⁸ These items constitute a reliable scale with a Cronbach alpha of 0.78.

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7
(88) DK (98)DA

ROS1. The Ecuadorian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS2. The Ecuadorian government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS3. The Ecuadorian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The Ecuadorian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS5. The Ecuadorian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for providing retirement pensions. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS6. The Ecuadorian government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure IX.8 illustrates the results of a linear regression model designed to predict factors influencing Ecuadorians' perspectives on the role of the state in the economy. As can be seen, the only factor that negatively influences perceptions regarding the role of state in economy is the perception of corruption in the public sector. This means that people who believe that corruption in the public sector is widespread also believe that the state should have a smaller role in national economy; while those who believe that corruption in the Ecuadorian public sector is not widespread believe that the state should assume a more active role in the management of the economy. Another important factor is the influence of the perception of the government's performance. Figure IX.8 shows that those who believe President Correa's government has done an effective job in combating poverty and corruption, improving security, fighting unemployment and in protecting democratic principles, tend to support a more active state role in the management of the economy.




Figure IX.8. Factors that Influence the Perception of the Role of the State in the Economy, Ecuador 2010

Figure IX.8 also shows that individuals' political ideologies are not a determining factor in their beliefs about the role the Ecuadorian government should have in the economy. This conclusion seems to

be strengthened by the examination of differences in perceptions about the role of government in the economy among the different regions in Ecuador. The regression results show that, compared with the urban highlands, the inhabitants of the urban coast believe that the state should have a larger role in managing the national economy. We have previously shown that coastal residents are located to the right on the ideological spectrum, while those who live in the highlands are located to the left. This suggests that there is an apparent contradiction between ideological identification and preferences for certain public policies.

Conclusion

To discuss the role of ideology in the Ecuadorian political context is complicated. In the first place, the data from the AmericasBarometer show that over 30% of respondents were unwilling or unable to place themselves on the ideological scale showed to them by the interviewers. This means that the terms "left" and "right", as commonly used in Ecuadorian political discourse, should be used with care and in the proper contexts. The data also show that the ability of Ecuadorians to identify themselves on an ideological spectrum is primarily determined by their levels of interest in politics, which remains surprisingly low.

For those people who placed themselves on the ideological scaled used in the LAPOP survey, their preferences in terms of political ideology was largely influenced by their satisfaction with the current president's performance and geographic region of residence. The ideological distribution seen at the regional level appears to confirm the general perception that people from the coast are more identified with the right, while residents of the highlands identify with the left. The data provides mixed conclusions about the influence of ideology on Ecuadorian political perceptions. On one hand, we find an apparent contradiction in that a region identified with the right supports a more active government role in the national economy, in comparison to the region most identified with the left. On the other hand, we see that there is a relative consistency between electoral preferences and ideological trends among Ecuadorians. Perhaps this is because Ecuadorians tend to be more familiar with candidate speeches and electoral discourse than with real ideological precepts.

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Appendixes

Appendix I: Regression Tables

Table A1. Change in Perceived Life Satisfaction in Latin America		
	Coef.	t
Female	0.025*	(4.58)
Age	-0.067*	(-10.98)
Urban	-0.007	(-0.94)
Education Level	-0.015*	(-2.09)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.013	(-1.90)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.027*	(3.25)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	-0.001	(-0.09)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.020*	(-2.94)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.115*	(-14.37)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.151*	(-18.48)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	-0.048*	(-7.52)
Decrease in household income	-0.104*	(-15.70)
Economic crisis is very severe	-0.023*	(-3.54)
There is no economic crisis	-0.005	(-0.81)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.056*	(6.20)
Guatemala	0.023*	(3.12)
El Salvador	-0.014*	(-2.08)
Honduras	-0.007	(-0.80)
Nicaragua	-0.013	(-1.40)
Costa Rica	-0.015	(-1.57)
Panama	0.008	(0.96)
Colombia	0.036*	(5.16)
Ecuador	0.018	(1.92)
Bolivia	0.013	(1.14)
Peru	0.025*	(3.30)
Paraguay	0.027*	(2.99)
Chile	-0.002	(-0.20)
Uruguay	0.026*	(3.17)
Brazil	0.023*	(2.38)
Venezuela	0.006	(0.67)
Argentina	0.040*	(5.37)
Dominican Republic	0.018*	(2.36)
Jamaica	-0.022*	(-2.54)
Guyana	0.043*	(3.94)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.008	(1.03)
Belize	-0.007	(-0.67)
Suriname	0.029*	(3.91)
Constant	0.003	(0.50)
R-squared = 0.122		
N. of cases = 32699		
* p<0.05		

Table A2. Support for Democracy in Latin America		
	Coef.	t
Female	-0.029*	(-5.09)
Age	0.112*	(17.93)
Urban	0.024*	(2.71)
Education Level	0.080*	(10.41)
Wealth Quintiles	0.044*	(5.84)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.036*	(4.40)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	0.006	(0.81)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.009	(-1.30)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	0.002	(0.22)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.010	(-1.47)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	-0.017*	(-2.61)
Decrease in household income	0.012	(1.81)
Economic crisis is very severe	-0.026*	(-3.57)
There is no economic crisis	-0.011	(-1.59)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.056*	(6.01)
Guatemala	-0.010	(-1.06)
El Salvador	-0.020*	(-2.42)
Honduras	-0.015	(-1.39)
Nicaragua	0.048*	(4.43)
Costa Rica	0.090*	(9.01)
Panama	0.052*	(5.20)
Colombia	0.025*	(2.63)
Ecuador	0.004	(0.34)
Bolivia	0.014	(1.02)
Peru	-0.047*	(-4.77)
Paraguay	-0.018	(-1.67)
Chile	0.038*	(3.75)
Uruguay	0.100*	(10.71)
Brazil	0.046*	(2.60)
Venezuela	0.041*	(3.26)
Argentina	0.096*	(7.63)
Dominican Republic	0.014	(1.66)
Jamaica	0.029*	(2.52)
Guyana	0.049*	(3.96)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.029*	(2.86)
Belize	0.052*	(4.91)
Surinam	0.073*	(8.55)
Constant	0.006	(0.75)
R-squared = 0.070		
N. of cases = 32182		
* p<0.05		

Table A3. System Support in Latin America

	Coef.	t
Female	0.022*	(4.62)
Age	0.036*	(6.44)
Urban	-0.036*	(-4.66)
Education Level	-0.023*	(-3.38)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.006	(-0.91)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.134*	(17.87)
Percentage that have been a victim of corruption	-0.047*	(-7.69)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	-0.058*	(-8.54)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.005	(-0.74)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.052*	(-7.62)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.008	(-1.35)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	-0.020*	(-3.62)
Decrease in household income	-0.003	(-0.54)
Economic crisis is very severe	-0.019*	(-2.84)
There is no economic crisis	0.006	(0.90)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.387*	(48.04)
Guatemala	-0.042*	(-5.57)
El Salvador	-0.032*	(-4.57)
Honduras	-0.009	(-1.39)
Nicaragua	-0.039*	(-5.23)
Costa Rica	0.018*	(2.17)
Panama	-0.036*	(-3.67)
Colombia	-0.001	(-0.16)
Ecuador	-0.146*	(-15.52)
Bolivia	-0.095*	(-8.08)
Peru	-0.061*	(-8.07)
Paraguay	-0.087*	(-11.05)
Chile	-0.119*	(-13.84)
Uruguay	-0.012	(-1.51)
Brazil	-0.156*	(-12.93)
Venezuela	-0.073*	(-8.62)
Argentina	-0.062*	(-5.91)
Dominican Republic	-0.040*	(-5.79)
Jamaica	-0.014	(-1.44)
Guyana	-0.041*	(-3.74)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.098*	(-12.26)
Belize	0.006	(0.61)
Suriname	-0.009	(-1.16)
Constant	-0.005	(-0.73)
R-squared = 0.308		
N. of cases = 32961		
* p<0.05		

Table A4. Satisfaction with Democracy in Latin America		
	Coef.	t
Female	0.001	(0.20)
Age	0.018*	(3.07)
Urban	-0.024*	(-3.19)
Education Level	-0.037*	(-5.56)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.005	(-0.73)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.207*	(26.47)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	-0.080*	(-11.75)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.021*	(-3.18)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.067*	(-9.91)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.025*	(-4.23)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	-0.009	(-1.66)
Decrease in household income	-0.018*	(-2.87)
Economic crisis is very severe	-0.045*	(-7.27)
There is no economic crisis	0.018*	(3.08)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.183*	(24.34)
Guatemala	0.038*	(4.55)
El Salvador	0.046*	(5.86)
Honduras	0.073*	(7.84)
Nicaragua	0.039*	(4.51)
Costa Rica	0.096*	(9.67)
Panama	0.083*	(9.79)
Colombia	0.022*	(2.56)
Ecuador	0.021*	(1.98)
Bolivia	0.073*	(6.32)
Peru	0.013	(1.58)
Paraguay	0.019*	(2.53)
Chile	0.005	(0.51)
Uruguay	0.080*	(9.75)
Brazil	0.020	(1.53)
Venezuela	0.009	(1.05)
Argentina	0.039*	(3.86)
Dominican Republic	0.039*	(4.76)
Jamaica	0.070*	(6.43)
Guyana	-0.031*	(-3.22)
Trinidad & Tobago	0.008	(0.94)
Belize	0.075*	(7.55)
Suriname	0.035*	(4.05)
Constant	0.002	(0.30)
R-squared = 0.233		
N. of cases = 32403		
* p<0.05		

Table A5. Support for a Military Coup in Latin America		
	Coef.	t
Female	0.009	(1.66)
Age	-0.116*	(-17.97)
Urban	-0.005	(-0.50)
Education Level	-0.071*	(-9.33)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.027*	(-3.74)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	-0.016*	(-2.00)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	0.052*	(6.80)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	0.016*	(2.23)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.011	(-1.52)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.023*	(-3.32)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	0.062*	(10.09)
Decrease in household income	-0.007	(-0.96)
Economic crisis is very severe	0.054*	(7.73)
There is no economic crisis	-0.014	(-1.73)
Perception of the government's economic performance	-0.013	(-1.58)
Guatemala	-0.010	(-0.98)
El Salvador	-0.031*	(-3.39)
Honduras	-0.095*	(-9.70)
Nicaragua	-0.066*	(-6.73)
Costa Rica	-0.081*	(-7.04)
Panama	-0.101*	(-12.30)
Colombia	-0.062*	(-6.37)
Ecuador	-0.047*	(-3.34)
Bolivia	-0.065*	(-4.60)
Peru	0.008	(0.77)
Paraguay	-0.048*	(-4.92)
Chile	-0.074*	(-7.00)
Uruguay	-0.065*	(-6.23)
Brazil	-0.090*	(-5.87)
Venezuela	-0.070*	(-5.15)
Argentina	-0.132*	(-12.00)
Dominican Republic	-0.063*	(-6.34)
Jamaica	-0.067*	(-5.43)
Guyana	-0.032*	(-2.16)
Trinidad & Tobago	-0.056*	(-5.56)
Belize	-0.003	(-0.33)
Suriname	-0.093*	(-9.42)
Constant	0.011	(1.25)
R-squared = 0.070		
N. of cases = 32376		
* p<0.05		

Table A6. Change in Perceived Life Satisfaction in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Female	0.016	(0.61)
Age	-0.071*	(-3.05)
Urban	0.017	(0.72)
Education Level	-0.035	(-1.37)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.031	(-1.23)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.052*	(2.08)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	-0.027	(-1.12)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.016	(-0.61)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.124*	(-3.71)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.078*	(-2.90)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	-0.052	(-1.98)
Decrease in household income	-0.152*	(-7.61)
The economic crisis is very severe	-0.019	(-0.78)
There is no economic crisis	0.019	(0.76)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.105*	(3.04)
Constant	0.001	(0.04)
R-squared = 0.127		
N. of cases = 2630		
* p<0.05		

Table A7. Support for Democracy in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Female	-0.025	(-1.10)
Age	0.144*	(5.44)
Urban	0.011	(0.42)
Education Level	0.080*	(3.40)
Wealth Quintiles	0.058	(1.90)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.037	(1.09)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	0.016	(0.56)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.014	(-0.48)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	0.004	(0.15)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.066*	(-2.45)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	-0.008	(-0.36)
Decrease in household income	0.021	(0.92)
The economic crisis is very severe	-0.027	(-1.02)
There is no economic crisis	-0.032	(-1.40)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.103*	(2.59)
Constant	0.017	(0.60)
R-squared = 0.049		
N. of cases = 2527		
* p<0.05		

Table A8. System Support in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Female	0.054*	(3.68)
Age	-0.047*	(-2.54)
Urban	-0.063*	(-2.41)
Education Level	-0.014	(-0.45)
Wealth Quintiles	0.009	(0.32)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.090*	(3.81)
Percent of Population Victimized by Corruption	-0.037	(-1.61)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	-0.079*	(-3.47)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	0.008	(0.30)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.018	(-0.69)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.022	(-0.96)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	-0.010	(-0.44)
Decrease in household income	0.027	(1.36)
The economic crisis is very severe	0.013	(0.45)
There is no economic crisis	-0.033	(-1.41)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.382*	(12.61)
Constant	-0.054*	(-2.03)
R-squared = 0.236		
N. of cases = 2627		
* p<0.05		

Table A9. Satisfaction with Democracy in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Female	-0.060*	(-2.62)
Age	0.015	(0.59)
Urban	-0.034	(-1.08)
Education Level	-0.017	(-0.54)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.077*	(-2.84)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.201*	(6.62)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	-0.075*	(-2.59)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.020	(-0.80)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.069*	(-2.60)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.009	(-0.40)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	0.012	(0.60)
Decrease in household income	0.041	(1.56)
The economic crisis is very severe	-0.050*	(-2.28)
There is no economic crisis	-0.006	(-0.26)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.191*	(7.62)
Constant	0.006	(0.21)
R-squared = 0.197		
N. of cases = 2529		
* p<0.05		

Table A10. Support for a Military Coup in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Female	0.038	(1.67)
Age	-0.079*	(-3.53)
Urban	0.029	(0.73)
Education Level	-0.073*	(-2.91)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.007	(-0.24)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	-0.085*	(-3.21)
Negative perception of the national economic situation	0.053*	(2.09)
Negative retrospective perception of the national economic situation	-0.001	(-0.04)
Negative perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.034	(-1.17)
Negative retrospective perception of one's personal economic situation	-0.023	(-0.92)
Households where at least one family member lost his/her job	0.069*	(3.05)
Decrease in household income	0.035	(1.44)
The economic crisis is very severe	0.133*	(4.87)
There is no economic crisis	-0.003	(-0.15)
Perception of the government's economic performance	0.054	(1.78)
Constant	0.012	(0.33)
R-squared = 0.057		
N. of cases = 2594		
* p<0.05		

Table A11. Crime Victimization in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Education	0.180*	(2.95)
Female	-0.084	(-1.53)
Age	-0.253*	(-4.55)
Wealth Quintiles	0.057	(0.95)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.473*	(-3.49)
Perception of the Household Economic Situation	-0.043	(-0.71)
Rural Coast	-0.002	(-0.02)
Urban Highlands	-0.153*	(-2.12)
Rural Highlands	0.170	(1.51)
Northeast	-0.205*	(-2.23)
Southeast	-0.111	(-1.55)
Constant	-1.202*	(-20.07)
F = 12.16		
N. of cases = 2964		
* p<0.05		

Table A12. Percentage that have been a Victim of Corruption in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Perception of the Household Economic Situation	-0.142*	(-2.39)
Education	0.239*	(3.11)
Female	-0.158*	(-3.49)
Age	-0.248*	(-2.95)
Wealth Quintiles	0.078	(1.19)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.012	(-0.09)
Number of Children	0.200*	(2.06)
Rural Coast	-0.115	(-1.13)
Urban Highlands	-0.082	(-1.02)
Rural Highlands	-0.085	(-0.76)
Northeast	-0.166	(-1.86)
Southeast	-0.121*	(-2.12)
Constant	-1.452*	(-23.73)
F = 8.31		
N. of cases = 2967		
* p<0.05		

Table A13. System Support in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Victimization by Crime	-0.050*	(-2.65)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.093*	(-3.95)
Percentage that have been a victim of corruption	-0.024	(-0.98)
Perception of Corruption	-0.100*	(-4.93)
Previous Government's Fault	0.020	(0.98)
Current Government's Fault	-0.019	(-0.74)
Fault of the Wealthy	-0.021	(-0.95)
Blames the Problems of Democracy	-0.029	(-1.02)
Temporarily Unemployed	-0.017	(-0.84)
Unemployed	0.015	(0.58)
Not Working by Choice	0.031	(1.68)
Family Member Lost His/Her Job	0.013	(0.59)
Perception of the Household Economic Situation	0.017	(0.64)
Education	-0.017	(-0.52)
Female	0.052*	(3.29)
Age	-0.090*	(-4.08)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.003	(-0.10)
Size of Place of Residence	0.088*	(2.98)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.283*	(13.42)
Interest in Politics	0.083*	(4.15)
Constant	-0.019	(-0.55)
R-squared = 0.161		
N. of cases = 2520		
* p<0.05		

Table A14. Support for the Rule of Law in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Victimization by Crime	-0.162*	(-3.26)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.007	(-0.17)
Trust in the Judicial System	0.093	(1.72)
Education	0.085	(1.66)
Female	0.034	(0.78)
Age	0.085	(1.87)
Wealth Quintiles	0.101	(1.60)
Perception of the Household Economic Situation	0.080	(1.54)
Size of Place of Residence	0.020	(0.14)
Rural Coast	-0.121	(-1.07)
Urban Highlands	-0.136	(-1.87)
Rural Highlands	-0.111	(-0.87)
Northeast	-0.127	(-1.64)
Southeast	-0.101	(-1.34)
Constant	-0.218*	(-3.54)
F = 4.12		
N. of cases = 2770		
* p<0.05		

Table A15. Who is Most Likely to Support Democracy in Ecuador?		
	Coef.	t
Victimization by Crime	0.007	(0.14)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.146*	(-2.15)
Victimization by Corruption	-0.014	(-0.23)
Perception of Corruption	-0.051	(-0.97)
There is not an Economic Crisis	-0.138	(-1.75)
The Previous Government is to Blame	-0.072	(-0.63)
The Economic System is to Blame	-0.000	(-0.00)
Others are to Blame	-0.200	(-1.49)
Temporarily Unemployed	0.008	(0.13)
Unemployed	-0.130*	(-2.06)
Not Working by Choice	0.082	(1.59)
Family Member Lost His/Her Job	-0.037	(-0.64)
Perception of the Household Economic Situation	0.021	(0.33)
Education Level	0.059	(0.86)
Female	0.021	(0.47)
Age	-0.007	(-0.14)
Wealth Quintiles	0.121	(1.88)
Size of Place of Residence	0.129*	(2.12)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.325*	(4.46)
Interest in Politics	0.089	(1.37)
Constant	-1.435*	(-25.41)
F = 5.81		
N. of cases= 2565		
* p<0.05		

Table A16. Interpersonal Trust in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Victimization by Crime	0.008	(0.50)
Perception of Insecurity	-0.293*	(-13.03)
Perception of the Household Economic Situation	0.027	(0.98)
Education Level	0.075*	(2.32)
Female	-0.069*	(-3.63)
Age	0.107*	(5.29)
Wealth Quintiles	0.031	(0.94)
Size of Place of Residence	0.077*	(2.88)
East	0.004	(0.11)
Highlands	-0.044*	(-2.06)
Constant	0.008	(0.32)
R-squared = 0.123		
N. of cases = 2905		
* p<0.05		

Table A17. Percentage of Respondents Who Voted in the Last Ecuadorian Elections?		
	Coef.	t
Interest in Politics	-0.137	(-1.31)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.146*	(2.17)
Perception of the Household Economic Situation	-0.057	(-0.52)
Education Level	0.473*	(4.01)
Female	0.001	(0.01)
Age	0.155	(1.19)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.020	(-0.16)
Size of Place of Residence	0.202*	(2.28)
East	-0.044	(-0.53)
Highlands	-0.055	(-0.65)
Constant	2.615*	(33.23)
F = 3.05		
N. of Cases = 2918		
* p<0.05		

Table A18. Participation in Town Hall Meetings		
	Coef.	t
Participation in Improvement Committees	0.455*	(5.65)
Voted in the Last Election	-0.125	(-1.27)
Presentation of a Petition to the Municipal Government	0.810*	(12.23)
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	-0.113	(-0.94)
Perception of the National Economic Situation	-0.282*	(-2.43)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.406*	(2.62)
Trust in the National Government	-0.019	(-0.15)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.124	(0.96)
Education	0.128	(1.03)
Female	-0.156	(-1.26)
Age	0.101	(1.03)
Wealth Quintiles	0.030	(0.31)
Size of Place of Residence	0.130	(1.37)
Highlands	-0.331*	(-3.24)
East	0.072	(0.68)
Constant	-3.012*	(-24.33)
F = 16.32		
N. of cases = 2768		
* p<0.05		

Table A19. Presentation of a Petition to the Municipal Government		
	Coef.	t
Participation in Improvement Committees	0.348*	(4.10)
Voted in the Last Election	0.084	(1.00)
Participation in Town Hall Meetings	0.697*	(12.49)
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	0.092	(0.84)
Perception of the National Economic Situation	0.122	(1.36)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	-0.152	(-1.70)
Trust in the National Government	0.138	(1.39)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.013	(0.14)
Education	0.075	(0.60)
Female	0.007	(0.09)
Age	0.242*	(2.68)
Wealth Quintiles	0.051	(0.47)
Size of Place of Residence	0.182	(1.68)
Highlands	0.157	(1.60)
East	0.340*	(4.17)
Constant	-2.237*	(-23.75)
F = 18.88		
N. of cases = 2768		
* p<0.05		

Table A20. Satisfaction with Local Government Services		
	Coef.	t
Participation in Town Hall Meetings	-0.016	(-0.62)
Presentation of a Petition to the Municipal Government	0.025	(0.92)
Participation in Improvement Committees	-0.006	(-0.33)
Voted in the Last Election	0.032	(1.97)
Perception of the National Economic Situation	0.064*	(2.03)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.082*	(4.10)
Trust in the National Government	-0.149*	(-5.03)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.479*	(19.33)
Education	-0.047*	(-2.00)
Female	0.019	(1.03)
Age	-0.083*	(-4.10)
Wealth Quintiles	0.051*	(2.11)
Size of Place of Residence	-0.113*	(-3.72)
Highlands	-0.083*	(-2.40)
East	-0.010	(-0.29)
Constant	0.004	(0.13)
R-squared= 0.274		
N. of cases = 2768		
* p<0.05		

Table A21. To What Extent Do You Respect Ecuador's Political Institutions?		
	Coef.	t
Participation in Town Hall Meetings	0.046	(1.75)
Presentation of a Petition to the Municipal Government	-0.008	(-0.40)
Satisfaction with Local Government Services	-0.062*	(-2.35)
Trust in the National Government	0.219*	(9.10)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.208*	(8.35)
Education	0.002	(0.09)
Female	0.053*	(2.64)
Age	-0.037	(-1.78)
Wealth Quintiles	0.014	(0.53)
Size of Place of Residence	0.041	(1.37)
Highlands	-0.063	(-1.53)
East	0.044	(1.55)
Constant	-0.012	(-0.38)
R-squared = 0.118		
N. of cases = 2711		
* p<0.05		

Table A22. Administrative Decentralization		
	Coef.	t
Presentation of a Petition to the Municipal Government	0.005	(0.19)
Participation in Improvement Committees	0.052	(1.84)
Trust in the National Government	-0.071*	(-2.95)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.098*	(3.23)
Perception of the National Economic Situation	-0.043*	(-2.00)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.030	(1.31)
Education	0.024	(1.05)
Female	-0.027	(-1.34)
Age	0.019	(0.87)
Wealth Quintiles	0.037	(1.24)
Rural Coast	0.017	(0.41)
Urban Highlands	0.041	(1.33)
Rural Highlands	0.093*	(2.65)
Northeast	0.043*	(2.16)
Southeast	0.012	(0.53)
Constant	0.034	(1.25)
R-squared = 0.028		
N. of cases = 2784		
* p<0.05		

Table A23. Fiscal Decentralization		
	Coef.	t
Presentation of a Petition to the Municipal Government	0.009	(0.36)
Participation in Improvement Committees	0.079*	(3.06)
Trust in the National Government	-0.189*	(-7.04)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.127*	(6.65)
Victim of Corruption	-0.049	(-1.91)
Voted in the Last Election	0.041	(1.97)
Perception of the National Economic Situation	-0.065*	(-2.65)
Perception of Personal Economic Situation	0.010	(0.39)
Education	-0.016	(-0.57)
Female	-0.035	(-1.57)
Age	0.025	(0.96)
Wealth Quintiles	0.055*	(2.32)
Rural Coast	0.022	(0.63)
Urban Highlands	0.080*	(2.42)
Rural Highlands	0.092*	(2.54)
Northeast	0.161*	(7.85)
Southeast	0.072*	(2.43)
Constant	0.023	(0.80)
R-squared = 0.081		
N. of cases = 2772		
* p<0.05		

Table A24. Political Decentralization		
	Coef.	t
Presentation of a Petition to the Municipal Government	-0.043	(-1.70)
Political Parties	-0.052*	(-2.05)
Trust in the National Government	-0.131*	(-5.36)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.144*	(5.00)
The public should govern directly, and not through elected representatives	-0.102*	(-3.95)
Education	0.073*	(3.01)
Female	-0.057*	(-2.37)
Age	0.002	(0.10)
Wealth Quintiles	0.058	(1.95)
Rural Coast	0.022	(1.08)
Urban Highlands	-0.020	(-0.74)
Rural Highlands	0.009	(0.32)
Northeast	0.011	(0.52)
Southeast	0.064*	(3.13)
Constant	-0.004	(-0.17)
R-squared = 0.065		
N. of cases = 2702		
* p<0.05		

Table A25. Percentage of Respondents Who Answered the Political Ideology Question		
	Coef.	t
Female	-0.369*	(-5.55)
Wealth Quintiles	0.148	(1.57)
Age	-0.135	(-1.87)
Education	0.132	(1.41)
Urban / Rural	-0.079	(-0.85)
Political Knowledge Index	-0.022	(-0.29)
Frequency of Watching / Reading the News	0.020	(0.29)
Interest in Politics	0.348*	(4.26)
Constant	0.851*	(8.08)
F = 8.12		
N. of cases = 1752		
* p<0.05		

Table A26. Ideology in Ecuador		
	Coef.	t
Female	0.061*	(2.55)
Age	-0.083*	(-2.01)
Education	-0.030	(-0.77)
Size of Place of Residence	0.018	(0.31)
Urban / Rural	0.058	(0.61)
Wealth Quintiles	-0.018	(-0.65)
Interest in Politics	-0.051	(-1.07)
Political Knowledge Index	-0.027	(-0.76)
Frequency of Watching / Reading the News	0.044	(1.71)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	-0.124*	(-3.08)
Effectiveness of the Current Government	-0.008	(-0.18)
Rural Coast	-0.067	(-0.69)
Urban Highlands	-0.101*	(-3.16)
Rural Highlands	-0.201*	(-2.39)
Northeast	-0.110*	(-2.49)
Southeast	-0.090	(-1.56)
Constant	-0.060	(-1.41)
R-squared = 0.064		
N. of cases = 1245		
* p<0.05		

Table A27. Role of the Ecuadorian State		
	Coef.	t
Ideology	0.038	(1.55)
Female	0.014	(0.57)
Age	0.035	(1.46)
Education	0.027	(0.76)
Size of Place of Residence	0.092	(0.65)
Urban / Rural	0.047	(0.51)
Wealth Quintiles	0.029	(0.55)
Perception of Corruption	-0.087*	(-2.99)
Satisfaction with the Performance of the Current President	0.020	(0.69)
Effectiveness of the Current Government	0.151*	(4.04)
Frequency of Watching / Reading the News	0.213*	(5.08)
Costa Urbana	0.217*	(3.69)
Rural Coast	0.025	(0.31)
Rural Highlands	-0.087	(-0.93)
Northeast	0.130*	(2.13)
Southeast	-0.007	(-0.11)
Constant	-0.088*	(-2.10)
R-squared = 0.139		
N. of cases = 1946		
* p<0.05		

Appendix II: Technical Description of the Sample Design

Fieldwork Report AmericasBarometer 2010 - LAPOP ECUADOR

By: A. Polibio Córdova, Ph.D.

Executive President of CEO CEDATOS / GALLUP International

The Research and Information Center (CEDATOS), a member of the Gallup International Association, was selected after careful analysis of their professional competence by the directors of LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project) in 2001, under the scientific direction Prof. Mitchell A. Seligson, Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Prof. Seligson is currently a Centennial Professor of Political Science and Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University. This survey was conducted in Ecuador in 2004, 2006 and 2008, under the general direction of Dr. Polibio Cordova, who subsequently was commissioned to conduct the LAPOP sampling studies in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. CEDATOS was responsible for the sample design, fieldwork (with the use of PDAs in 100% of the interviews), data validation and development of the database for the 2010 LAPOP survey in Ecuador. A breakdown of the activities, various aspects of interest regarding the development of the survey and data processing, commentary regarding the questionnaire and the use of PDAs, and a listing of the CEDATOS interviewers and field supervisors are detailed in this Fieldwork Report.

THE APPROACH TO THE FIFTH STUDY

The fifth study in a series public opinion surveys on **Political Culture** in Ecuador, has once again proved to be a success, especially following the positive experiences of the 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008 surveys. Over the years, CEDATOS has established a very valuable professional relationship with Prof. Mitchell Seligson, who has defined the methodologies for this research, from the overall design, sampling designs, questionnaires used in the survey, the review of the data collected, data and file processing, and developing and editing the more recent edition of this study. This survey, in all aspects, was established through the first-hand experience of previous studies carried out under the scientific direction of Prof. Seligson and the sampling leadership by the author of this Field Report, as carried out in Central America, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile and several Caribbean countries. CEDATOS was responsible for surveys in Venezuela and Argentina in 2008 and for the surveys in Venezuela and Ecuador in 2010.

1. PERSONAL INFORMATION

- (i) Project Director:** Dr. Ángel Polibio Córdova
- (ii) Field Supervisor:** Vincente Paccha
- (iii) Organization:** CEDATOS
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2. SAMPLE

The design and selection of the sample did not present a problem for CEDATOS, as it has the information, maps, knowledge and experience necessary for these types of jobs. The sample sizes were appropriate for the survey. Information from the 2001 population census provided important information in the design and data processing phases, as well as in the calculation of weights by respondent gender and age and the strata considered in the study, urban and rural, as well as by national geographic regions.

The census mapping used in the survey was updated for several new urban and rural sectors. This material was of great importance in order to make the design of panels, which remained similar to the units used in the 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008 surveys' cluster units, through which new households and adults were selected for the interviews.

a. CATCHMENT AREA

This survey employed a national catchment area, covering the three regions of mainland Ecuador: Highlands, Coast and the East, including both urban and rural areas. The Galapagos archipelago was not included in the survey. In 2001, this survey was extended to specific areas of frontier provinces, where the survey was conducted independently and with similar research tools.

b. POPULATION

The units of study are composed of non-institutionalized civilians, excluding populations living in hospitals, orphanages, schools, barracks, etc. However, if private households were located in these institutions, they were included in the sample population.

c. OBSERVATION UNIT - FINAL SELECTION UNIT

As the study included topics concerning the interviewee (adult 18 or older, able to vote, speak Spanish or Quichua, but not another language monolingual), the head of the household and household members, the statistical unit of observation used in this study is the household, from which an adult is selected.

Every household inhabits a physical home that can be shared with other households. Housing is an easy unit of identification in the field, with relative permanence over time; a feature that enables it to be considered as the final unit of selection and chosen in a block in urban areas, or in zoned segments in rural areas (townships).

d. SAMPLING METHOD

The sampling method is a procedure which determines the size of the sample, conforming to the fields of study, the definition of the sampling unit selection stages, population estimates from sample data and the calculation of implicit errors in these estimates.¹

The following considerations were taken into account in the selection of the sampling method:

¹ CORDOVA, P.: "Introducción a la Investigación por Muestreo". Edit. DGEA/México, 1972. With Presentation by Leslie Kish and M. Seligson, Edition 2006. Ecuador.

a) Obtain representative samples for the following levels, strata and fields of study.

- Entire country

Layers of first stage:

1. Sierra
2. Costa
3. East

Layers of second stage:

1. Urban area
2. Rural area

Fields of study:

1. Quito
2. Guayaquil
3. Cities with 100 thousand inhabitants, including forced
4. Cities with 25 thousand to 100 thousand inhabitants
5. Cities with less than 25 thousand inhabitants.
6. Rural parishes²

b) Calculate the sampling errors corresponding to these estimates

c) Facilitate the implementation of the survey

d) Optimal allocation fostering a reasonable equilibrium between budget, sample size and the level of accuracy of the results.

e) Use the best and most current sampling frames available for each city (census, mapping, and current housing listings).

From this background, the method used corresponds to a probability sampling at all stages, stratified, multistage, by cluster, with the random selection of the units in each stage, including the final selection of the adult to be interviewed in the household sample selected.

Sampling is stratified by region (Coast, Highlands and East) and areas (urban and rural) and is multistage because of the selection of the Primary Sampling Units (PSU, cantons); followed by secondary units in each PSU formed by census sectors; then Third Stage Units (blocks or segments) and Final Sampling Units (FSU) formed into clusters sizes of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each these cluster's housing units, a single household unit was selected as the unit of observation and then, as a Final Unit of Study, s one and only one adult of voting age was selected by a random process (Kish System / Cordova).³ In the 2004, 2006 and 2008 studies, we used a quota system to select the adult in each household, which was selected probabilistically. These quotas considered gender categories and three age groups. The probabilistic selection rule did not support the substitution or replacement of the selected units. (See relevant procedure below).

The sample considers the allocation size to ensure the consistency, adequacy and efficiency of sampling for each stratum and the total aggregate domain. The interior of the stratum is a self-weighted, but requires weights for the aggregation of the strata (Sierra, Costa and Oriente) given the smaller size of the East. Within each stratum, the selection of the sample is done with probability proportional to size of each domain.

² In the sampling design and approach for rural areas, we used townships (towns) with housing zones or created "segments" equivalent to blocks, when town housing was not structured in such natural units.

³ CORDOVA, P: Op. Cit.

The design allows timely and versatile calculations, with results by stratum, domains and aggregates for the entire population, for the principal variables and socio-demographic characteristics considered in the study.^{4,5} Additionally, and with the goal enabling accurate comparisons between 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008 studies, the units of selection remained consistent with the previous final units.

e. SAMPLING FRAME

The sampling frame consists of a cartographic inventory and listing of homes by city and parish from sample information obtained from the National Population and Housing Census of 2001, with updated maps with new buildings and housing counts made by CEDATOS in 2010.

The creation of sampling frames in a city covered the following stages:

1. Update mapping information obtained from public and private institutions and through field verification of city map limits and mapping of areas with new developments, with the goal to record the creation or elimination of blocks and rural segments.
2. Count buildings, houses and resident population by age, listing their addresses and the identification of houses by block, for all cartographic sections making up the sample in every city and parish selected. This is work that CEDATOS has been doing in its over 35 year of direct research in urban and rural areas.

f. SAMPLE SIZE

To determine the sample size, the following criteria were used: a cluster sampling procedure with final cluster sizes from 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. The latter is the determinant of the design and variability function.⁶ The resulting design effect of the cluster sampling (DEF) is estimated at 1.022, on average, in the case of the three layers, with cluster sizes from 6 to 12.

The adjustment in the sample size from a simple random sample, adjusted by cluster, is given by:

$$E = Z \sqrt{\frac{PQ(DEF)}{n}}$$

$$n = \frac{Z^2 PQ (DEF)}{E^2}$$

Where:

- E = Interval of probable error (+ / - 0.05)
P = Percentage of population with an attribute given from 50%.
Q = (1-P) Percentage of the population without the considered attribute in P. Q = 50%.

⁴ KISH, L.: "Survey Sampling": John Wiley & Sons. 1965.

⁵ RAJ, D.: "Sampling Theory". McGraw-Hill. 1968. See Chapters 4 - 5 for an extensive application of these selection methods.

⁶ Ver: KISH, L.: "Statistical Design For Research". - John Wiley. 1987. Design effect treatment, Chapters 2 and 7 and "Survey Sampling" Chapters 2 and 11.

DEF = Design effect. The variance ratio of the sample design utilized, by cluster, as compared to a simple random sample. This value fluctuates between 1.0 and 2.0, tending to be lower as the cluster size decreases and the actual variance of the stratified sample.⁷ There is a direct tradeoff between the increases in real variance by the effect of cluster sampling with the reduction in real variance by stratification with the assignation of sizes proportional to the size of the stratum. From this basis and from the DEF tables, the estimate for the present design is a DEF = 1.022⁸ for the Coast and Highland regions, and a DEF = 1.011 for the East.

Z = Value of normal distribution. For a 95% confidence, this value is 1,965.

n = Sample size

g. SIZE CALCULATIONS FOR STRATA, DOMAINS, PSU AND SAMPLE POINTS

The sample design considered the assigning of selection units for the 23 provinces, while the sample is not sufficient to represent the respective province, but it is sufficient to represent the Coast, Highlands and East. From the first stage, constituting the selection of the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), these were categorized into urban and rural populations for the assignation of sizes with probability proportional to the size. The East region is considered to have three divisions: Northeast and Southeast.

In total, the sample consists of 423 sample points: 291 urban and 132 rural, distributed among 61 cantones in the 23 mainland provinces.

The size aggregates (nh) produce sizes (nd) by domain (1. Quito, 2. Guayaquil, 3. Cities with 100 thousand or more inhabitants, as forced inclusion, probability 1; 4. Cities with 25 to 100,000 inhabitants; 5. Cities with less than 25,000 inhabitants, and 6. Rural parishes) sufficient for the estimation of the total results and disaggregated by grouping of age and other sociodemographic variables.⁹

$$nd = \sum_h n_{hd}$$

h. SAMPLE SIZE, LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE AND MARGINS OF ERROR

The confidence level expected for the entire national sample was 95% ($Z_{.95} = 1.965$) with a margin of error of + / - 2%, assuming a 50/50 ratio ($P = 0.50$, $Q = 1 - P$); for the dichotomous variables, in the worst of cases. It assumes a DEF of 1.022 by the system of cluster sampling for the highlands and coast, and a DEF of 1.011 for the East, which had been internally stratification by north and south.

With this background, the probable margin of error by strata for a simple random sample and the cluster sample actually used are:

⁷ FRANKEL, M. "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". ISR; The University of Michigan. 1971.

⁸ FRANKEL, M: Op. Cit. DEF tables and discussion.

⁹ GUENTHER, W.: "Introducción a la Inferencia Estadística". McGraw-Hill. 1968. Chapters 3 – 5, application preactice.

Table No. 1
SAMPLE SIZE AND MARGINS OF ERROR
Level of Confidence: 95%

Strata	Sample size	Margin of Error (%)	
		M. S. A.	M.P.C.
REGIONS			
Highlands	1 191	2.90	2.97
Coast	1 317	2.70	2.79
East	492	4.49	4.54
BY AREA			
Urban	1 863	2.30	2.38
Rural	1 137	2.90	2.99
TOTAL COUNTRY	3000	1.82	1.86

i. ADJUSTMENT FOR NON-COVERAGE

To ensure the efficiency, adequacy and accuracy of the sample, an “Adjust for non-coverage” sample system was adopted, ensuring the implementation of the sample sizes as minimum estimates within the confidence levels and maximum allowable error.¹⁰ Additionally, the system ensures the elimination of bias resulting from the substitution or replacement of units that are unable to be survey subjects. While this system presents a significant cost for CEDATOS, it ensures the quality of the information. The method is possible by the knowledge that CEDATOS has regarding "No Coverage" observed in similar studies in national, urban and rural areas.

The system is applied to the sample sizes (n) estimated for each stratum, domain and PSU of non-coverage factor (t), which calculates the final operating selection size (n*), given by:

$$n^* = (1 + t) n$$

t = Rate of non-interview. This rate considers non-coverage situations (no interview, refusals, vacant housing, absence of adults, or the inability to interview the candidate after the 3rd visit, among other possible events). It is the experience of CEDATOS, and information available from other CEDATOS studies, that the t-rate varies by province, region, city size, household socioeconomic level, urban or rural area, etc.

n* = Final sample size to be selected: $n^* = (1 + t) n$

The average t-rate for the national sample was 0.18, thus:

$$n^* = (1 + 0.20) 3000 = 3.600 \text{ adultos a ser entrevistados.}$$

¹⁰ CORDOVA, P: Op. Cit.

The size actually obtained at the end of the survey was 3,000 adults, the expected number for the national sample. By strata and by urban and rural areas, the sample was optimally fulfilled.

j. SURVEY STAFF

CEDATOS made every effort to ensure that this study was carried out successfully. Expected sample sizes were met without having to resort to subsequent weights due to incomplete sample sizes, which would introduce significant sampling and non-sampling errors; confidence levels and margins of error that are within or better than what was expected, providing an additional guarantee of sufficient sample sizes and the quality of the survey.

CEDATOS assigned a total of 112 people to this investigation, classified as follows:

Table No. 2
CEDATOS STAFF ASSIGNED TO THE STUDY
"POLITICAL CULTURE 2010"

FUNCTIONS	Total people
1. Field coordinator	7
2. Field supervisors	15
3. Interviewers	45
4. Bilingual interviewers Quichua / Spanish	5
5. Bilingual supervisors Quichua / Spanish	2
6. Field information validators	12
7. Critic / Coders	10
TOTAL IN THE FIELD	
AND IN ADMINISTRATION	96
8. Managerial and professional	12
9. Clerical	4
TOTAL HUMAN RESOURCES	112

**k. CATCHMENT AREA, TOTAL POPULATION, BY REGION (COSTA, SIERRA AND EAST),
BY URBAN AND RURAL AREAS AND BY DOMINIONS OF STUDY**

ECUADOR: TOTAL POPULATION, YEAR 2009

Thousands of Residents

	Country Total	HIGHLANDS	COAST	EAST
Total	13981	6294	6950	694
Urban	9239	3804	5126	307
Rural	4742	2490	1824	387

Percentage Distribution (%)

	Country Total	HIGHLANDS	COAST	EAST
Total	100%	45%	50%	5%
Urban	100%	41%	55%	3%
	66%	60%	74%	44%
Rural	100%	53%	38%	8%
	34%	40%	26%	56%

HIGHLAND AND COASTAL STRATA

Thousands of Residents

	Total Highlands and Coast	HIGHLANDS	COAST
Total	13244	6294	6950
Urban	8930	3804	5126
Rural	4314	2490	1824

Percentage Distribution (%)

	Country Total	HIGHLANDS	COAST
Total	100%	48%	52%
Urban	100%	43%	57%
	67%	60%	74%
Rural	100%	58%	42%
	33%	40%	26%

Source: INEC. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos.

Prepared by: OPERACIONES DEPT., CEDATOS.

URBAN

HIGHLANDS

Cities with 100 thousand or more habitants

PROVINCE	CITY	POPULATION	%	SAMPLE	PSU	Sample points
PICHINCHA	Quito	1599361	55%	296	12	45
CHINCHA	Sto. Domingo	228384	8%	42	2	7
IMBABURA	Ibarra	151146	5%	28	1	5
TUNGURAHUA	Ambato	217076	7%	40	1	6
CHIMBORAZO	Riobamba	181962	6%	34	1	4
AZUAY	Cuenca	388420	13%	72	2	9
LOJA	Loja	152018	5%	28	1	4
			100%			
TOTAL 100 mil +		2918367	77%	540	20	80
OTHER URBAN HIGHLANDS						
(25 mil a 100 mil Hab.)		437854	12%	81	5	12
OTHER URBAN HIGHLANDS						
(Less than 25 mil Hab.)		447690	12%	83	12	12
TOTAL URBAN HIGHLANDS		3803911	100%	704	37	104
RURAL						
IN CANTONS WITH OVER 100 MIL		747627	30%	146	20	15
OTHER RURAL HIGHLANDS						
(25 mil to 100 mil Hab.)		1029963	41%	202	5	21
OTHER RURAL HIGHLANDS						
(Less than 25 mil Hab.)		712575	29%	139	12	26
TOTAL RURAL HIGHLANDS		2490165	100%	487	37	62
TOTAL HIGHLANDS SAMPLE				1191	37	166
COAST						
URBAN						
Cities with 100 Mil and more Habitantes						

PROVINCE	CITY	POPULATION	%	SAMPLE	PSU	Sample points
GUAYAS	Guayaquil	2253987	62%	414	15	65
GUAYAS	Milagro	128788	4%	24	1	4
GUAYAS	Durán	198144	5%	36	1	6
ESMERALDAS	Esmeraldas	122003	3%	22	1	3
MANABI	Portoviejo	247528	7%	45	1	7
MANABI	Manta	207939	6%	38	1	6
LOS RIOS	Quevedo	142481	4%	26	1	4
LOS RIOS	Babahoyo	115972	3%	21	1	3
EL ORO	Machala	245791	7%	45	2	7
			100%			
TOTAL 100 MIL +		3662633	71%	673	24	105
OTHER URBAN COAST						
(25 mil to 100 mil Hab.)		900580	18%	166	10	30
OTHER URBAN COAST						
(Less than 25 mil Hab.)		563460	11%	103	8	17
TOTAL URBAN COAST		5126673	100%	942	42	152
RURAL						
OTHER RURAL COAST						
(25 mil to 100 mil Hab.)		1119456	61%	230	10	27
OTHER RURAL COAST						
(Less than 25 mil Hab.)		705152	39%	145	8	16
TOTAL RURAL COAST		1824608	100%	375	18	43
TOTAL COAST SAMPLE				1317	42	195
TOTAL HIGHLANDS AND COAST						
URBAN				1646	79	256
RURAL				862	79	105
TOTAL				2508	79	361

I. SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE BY STRATA.

	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL
HIGHLANDS	Total	Total	Total
Over 100 mil	540	146	686
25 to 100 mil	81	202	283
- 25 mil	83	139	222
Total Highlands	704	487	1191
COAST			
Over 100 mil	673		673
25 to 100 mil	166	230	396
- 25 mil	103	145	248
Total Coast	942	375	1317
Total Highlands and Coast	1646	862	2508
	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL
EAST	Total	Total	Total
NORTH ZONE	118	160	278
SOUTH ZONE	99	115	214
Total East	217	275	492
TOTAL	1863	1137	3000
GENERAL SUMMARY			

COUNTRY TOTAL	SAMPLE	PSU	Sample points
BY REGION			
HIGHLANDS	1191	37	166
COAST	1317	42	195
EAST	492	10	62
TOTAL	3000	89	423
BY AREA			
URBAN	1863	89	291
RURAL	1137	89	132
TOTAL	3000	89	423

m. SELECTION OF THE SAMPLE BY STRATA AND TOWNS AND PARISH AREAS NATIONAL SURVEY: SAMPLE SELECTION

NATIONAL SURVEY: SAMPLE SELECTION

1. BY STRATA (REGIONS: COAST, HIGHLANDS AND EAST)

2. BY AREA (URBAN Y RURAL)

3. BY PSU

4. BY CANTONS, PROPORTIONAL PROBABILITY BY SIZE (pps)

5. POINTS OF SAMPLE, FINAL SIZE, PROPORTIONAL PROBABILITY BY SIZE (pps)

HIGHLANDS													
SELECTION (100 Mil o More Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Sample Size			Size of Selection		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
1	Imbabura	Ibarra	La Esperanza	1	1	5	2	28	19	47	34	23	57
2	Pichincha	Quito	Puembo	15	1	45	4	296	39	335	361	48	409
3	Pichincha	Sto. Domingo	Alluriquin	2	1	7	2	42	21	63	51	26	77
4	Tungurahua	Ambato	Quizapincha	2	1	6	2	40	19	59	49	23	72
5	Chimborazo	Riobamba	Cubijiles	2	1	4	2	34	15	49	41	18	60
6	Azuay	Cuenca	San Joaquín	3	1	9	2	72	21	93	88	26	113
7	Loja	Loja	Taquil	1	1	4	1	28	12	40	34	15	49
		TOTAL				80	15	540	146	686	659	178	837

OTHER HIGHLANDS													
SELECTION (From 25 to 100 Mil Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Sample Size			Size to be selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
8	Imbabura	Otavallo	San Pablo	1	73.4/125.4	2	4	12	36	48	15	44	59
9	Pichincha	Rumiñahui	Cotogchoa	1	74.4/125.4	2	4	11	42	53	13	51	65
10	Cotopaxi	Latacunga	Belisario Quevedo	1	116.7/125.4	4	4	25	37	62	30	45	76
11	Bolívar	Cuaranda	Guanujo	1	73.1/125.4	2	4	16	40	56	20	49	68
12	Cañar	Azogues	Cojitambo	1	67.8/125.4	2	5	17	47	64	21	57	78
		TOTAL				12	21	81	202	283	99	246	345

OTHER HIGHLANDS													
SELECTION (Less than 25 Mil Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Sample Size			Size to be selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
13	Carchi	Montúfar	La Paz	1	32.6/125.4	1	2	7	14	21	9	17	26
14	Imbabura	Cotacachi	Imantag	1	36.2/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10	18
15	Pichincha	Mejía	Tandapi	1	60.6/125.4	1	3	7	19	26	9	23	32
16	Cotopaxi	Saquisilí	Canchagua	1	15.8/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10	18
17	Tungurahua	Baños	Lligua	1	17.2/125.4	1	2	7	14	21	9	17	26
18	Chimborazo	Guano	San Gerardo	1	40.5/125.4	1	2	6	13	19	7	16	23
19	Chimborazo	Guamote	Palmira	1	33.9/125.4	1	2	7	14	21	9	17	26
20	Cañar	Biblián	Turupamba	1	23.8/125.4	1	2	7	9	16	9	11	20
21	Azuay	Santa Isabel	Abdón Calderón	1	21.3/125.4	1	3	7	16	23	9	20	28
22	Azuay	Chordeleg	San Martín de Puzhi	1	9.9/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10	18
23	Loja	Calvas	El Lucero	1	31.0/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10	18
24	Loja	Catamayo	San Pedro de la Ben	1	24.5/125.4	1	2	7	8	15	9	10	18
		TOTAL				12	26	83	139	222	101	170	271

COAST													
SELECTION (100 Mil or More Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Sample Size			Size to be selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
25	Guayas	Guayaquil		15	1	65		414		414	505		505
26	Guayas	Milagro		1	1	4		24		24	29		29
27	Guayas	Durán		1	1	6		37		37	45		45
28	Esmeraldas	Esmeraldas		1	1	3		23		23	28		28
29	Manabí	Portoviejo		1	1	7		45		45	55		55
30	Manabí	Manta		1	1	6		38		38	46		46
31	Los Ríos	Quevedo		1	1	4		26		26	32		32
32	Los Ríos	Babahoyo		2	1	3		21		21	26		26
33	El Oro	Machala		2	1	7		45		45	55		55
			TOTAL			105	0	673	0	673	821	-	821

OTHER COSTA													
SELECTION (From 25 to 100 Mil Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Sample Size			Size to be Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
34	Esmeraldas	Quinindé	La Unión	1	93.4/152.6	3	3	16	27	43	20	33	52
35	Manabí	Jipijapa	América	1	98.1/152.6	3	3	16	27	43	20	33	52
36	Manabí	Sucre	San vicente	1	100.5/152.6	3	3	15	28	43	18	34	52
37	Manabí	Chone	Canuto	1	126.2/152.6	3	3	20	25	45	24	30	55
38	Guayas	Daute	Limonal	1	88.4/152.6	3	3	15	29	44	18	35	54
39	Guayas	Santa Elena	Atahualpa	1	104.8/152.6	3	3	20	25	45	24	30	55
40	Guayas	El Empalme	El Rosario	1	65.9/152.6	3	3	15	28	43	18	34	52
41	Los Ríos	Ventancas	Zapotal	1	72.8/152.6	3	2	15	14	29	18	17	35
42	El Oro	Huaquillas	Hualtaco	1	41.8/152.6	3	2	15	13	28	18	16	34
43	El Oro	Santa Rosa	La Avanzada	1	65.1/152.6	3	2	19	14	33	23	17	40
			TOTAL			30	27	166	230	396	202	280	483

OTHER COAST													
SELECTION (Less than 25 Mil Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Sample Size			Size to be Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
44	Esmeraldas	Atacames	Tonchigue	1	22.8/152.6	3	2	17	20	37	21	24	45
45	Manabí	Bolívar	Quiroga	1	43.1/152.6	3	2	17	17	34	21	21	41
46	Manabí	Rocafuerte	Resbalón	1	29.2/152.6	3	2	17	17	34	21	21	41
47	Guayas	Colimes	General Vernaza	1	21.6/152.6	1	2	8	19	27	10	23	33
48	Guayas	Yaguachi	Virgen de Fátima	1	56.0/152.6	1	2	8	19	27	10	23	33
49	Los Ríos	Urdaneta	Ricaurte	1	28.1/152.6	1	2	8	18	26	10	22	32
50	Los Ríos	Buena Fe	Patricia Pilar	1	34.1/152.6	2	2	11	18	29	13	22	35
51	El Oro	El Guabo	Borbones	1	41.4/328.3	3	2	17	17	34	21	21	41
			TOTAL			17	16	103	145	248	126	177	302

EAST (NORTH ZONE)													
SELECTION (From 25 to 100 Mil Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Sample Size			Size to be Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
52	Sucumbíos	Lago Agrio	El Eno	1	65.5/60.9	6	5	36	36	72	44	44	88
53	Napo	Tena	Puerto Misahuallí	1	56.9/60.9	4	3	22	34	56	27	41	68
54	Orellana	Orellana	San Luis	1	32.7/60.9	4	3	22	34	56	27	41	68
			TOTAL			14	11	80	104	184	98	127	224

SELECTION (Less than 25 Mil Hab.)													
	PROVINCE	Urban Canton	Rural Parish	PSU	Selection Probability	Sample Points		Size of Sample			Size to be Selected		
						Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	TOTAL	Urban	Rural	TOTAL
55	Scumbíos	Cascales	Sevilla	1	16.3/60.9	3	2	20	28	48	24	34	59
56	Napo	Quijos	Cosanga	1	6.7/60.9	3	2	18	28	46	22	34	56
			TOTAL			6	4	38	56	94	46	68	115

GENERAL SUMMARY									
BY REGION	Number of Cantons	SAMPLE POINTS		SAMPLE SIZE			SIZE TO BE SELECTED		
		URBAN	RURAL	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL	TOTAL
HIGHLANDS	24	104	62	704	487	1191	859	594	1.452
COAST	27	152	43	942	375	1317	1.149	457	1.606
EAST	10	35	27	217	275	492	265	335	600
TOTAL	61	291	132	1863	1137	3000	2.272	1.387	3.659
BY AREA	61	291	132	1863	1137	3000	2.272	1.387	3.659

n. MAP OF ECUADOR. SAMPLE LOCATION.

FIGURE No. 1
ECUADOR
AUDIT OF DEMOCRACY 2006
Geographic Distribution of Sample



Developed by: CEDATOS - GALLUP International Association, Ecuador

o. DETAILS OF DESIGN: SAMPLING FRACTIONS

The sampling fractions (f) is determined considering the different stages of selection.¹

$$f = f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4$$

$$f_i = \frac{n_i}{N_i}$$

¹ CORDOVA, P.: Op. Cit. "Metodología de la Encuesta Nacional de hogares". Edit. DANE, Colombia, 1972-1984.

f_i = Stage i sampling fraction
 n_i = Sample size for stage i
 N_i = Total number of dwellings in stage i

For each stage of selection the resulting fraction will be:

$$f_4 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_2 \times f_3 \times f_4} \quad (\text{stages 1, 2, 3 y 4})$$

Where:

f_1 = Probability of selection in stage 1: PSU
 f_2 = Probability of selection in stage 2: Sectors
 f_3 = Probability of selection in stage 3 (blocks or segments)
 f_4 = Probability of selection of the cluster within the block or segment

Given that clusters of h homes by sample block, the fraction becomes:

$$f_2 = \frac{f}{f_1 \times f_3 \times h / TVM}$$

Where:

TVM = the total number of homes in the block or segment

The global sampling fraction (probability of selection within each PSU) should satisfy the condition:

$$PU = \frac{TVS}{TVU} \times \frac{TVM}{TVS} \times \frac{h \times NH}{TVM}$$

TVU = Total homes in the PSU
 TVS = No. of homes in the sector
 TVM = No. of homes on the block
 NH = No. of households in the h homes of the selected cluster
 h = h households selected in each cluster and 1 person from each of those households

Final probability of selection

The final probability of selection of the cluster (g) is given by:

$$P(g) = \frac{T_s}{T_T} \times \frac{T_m}{T_s} \times \frac{T_g}{T_m} \times \frac{T_g}{T_T} = \frac{1}{T_T}$$

Where:

T_T = Total number of dwellings in the city (PSU)
 T_s = Number of homes in the sector
 T_m = Number of homes in the selected block
 T_g = Number of clusters of h homes per block

In general, the probability of selecting a cluster either in a town or rural area c is given by:

$$P_c = \frac{T_{Mc}}{T_{Tc}} = \frac{n_c}{N_c} = f_c$$

Where:

P_c	=	Probability of selecting a cluster of h homes in the c city.
T_{Mc}	=	Number of blocks to be selected in the city and in these the h final homes
T_{Tc}	=	Total number of homes in the city
n_c	=	Size of sample c city
N_c	=	Size of the area c population
f_c	=	Global sampling fraction by c city (PSU)

P. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES FROM THE SAMPLE

The sample results should be addressed at the level of each PSU to produce estimates of the total population.² The restitution factor to be applied to each selected PSU is defined as the product of:

- Basic weight (F). The basic weight is equal to the "selection range" of the PSU.
- Adjustment for non-response coverage (R_{hj}). The nonresponse adjustment is calculated for each block (cluster) and applies to each household interviewed (with full interview) within the cluster.
- The result of dividing the number of households selected and successful interviewees (full interview) in the block. The final restitution factor (W_{hj}) applied to each block is the product of the two.³ Review the estimated total for a characteristic X of the population, given by:

$$d) \quad X' = \sum_{h=1}^d \sum_{j=1}^{nh} X_{hj} W_{hj}$$

$$W_{hj} = (F) \cdot (R_{hj})$$

Where:

h	=	1, 2, h domain units
j	=	1, 2 blocks selected for the sample in the h city.
n_h	=	Total number of blocks in the h city sample.
W_{hj}	=	Restitution factor of the j block in the h city
X	=	Statistic X for j block in h city

² KAJ, D.: Op. Cit. Chapter 9, errors calculation methods for several types of sampling. CORDOVA P.: Op. cit.

³ DANE: op. cit. CORDOVA P.: Op. cit.

$$X = \sum_{k=j}^{Thj} Xhjk$$

X_{hjk}	=	Statistic X for k home, j block, in h city.
k	=	1,2,..... households with completed interviews in j block in h city
T_{hj}	=	Total of households with complete interview on the j block in h city
F	=	Basic Weight
R_{hj}	=	Adjustment factor for non-response coverage of the block j in the h city.

The above procedure restores the information from the sample frame from which it came. As this frame can have shortcomings and imperfections, it is convenient to bring the sample results to an independent estimate of the population, similar to a population projection. The corresponding factor is:

$$L = \frac{\text{Projected population at the time of the survey}}{\text{Returned to the frame population}}$$

The estimation of the total population will then be:

$$X = X' \cdot L$$

Q. ACCURACY OF RESULTS AND LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE

The population characteristics are estimates calculated from the elements included in the sample. This estimate depends on the sample design and the particular combination of elements that are selected.

Since the estimates are based on probability sample, the statistics could contain two kinds of errors.

- a) Non-sampling errors resulting from the procedures of observation, interviews, fieldwork, processing, and typing, which are never perfect. These errors are common in all statistical research.
- b) Errors due to sampling, which can be estimated when the processing is probabilistic and occur because only a fraction of the total population is being studied. In this way the selected sample is one of a combination of N elements taken in groups of n, through a random process. The variation in results would be due to chance given these NC_n samples⁴, which determines the sampling error.
- c) We are primarily interested in the calculation of sampling errors due to both theoretical importance and implementation. Its importance lies in the fact that its recognition permits the estimation of the statistic's real value within the limits of a confidence interval. The standard deviation of the sampling distribution of an estimate is called the standard error and is the root of this distribution variance. To calculate the variance of a rate, ratio, or proportion (r) in a cluster sample, use the following formula.⁵

⁴ Number of combinations of N elements taken in groups of n.

⁵ The variance is an estimation of the total, obtained from product $X \text{ var}(r)$.

⁶ KISH, L.: Op. cit. 1965. Cap. 6. Op. cit. 1987. Cap. 4. CORDOVA, P. Op. cit.

$$\text{Var}(r) = \frac{1}{x^2} \left[\text{var}(y) + r \text{vr}(x) - 2 \text{cov}(x, y) \right]$$

Where:

$$r_x = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^a y_i}{\sum_{i=1}^a x_i}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, a$$

- a = Total of the segments or clusters in the sample
 y_i = Sum of the values of the y variable in the i -th cluster
 x_i = Sum of the values of x variable in the i -th cluster
 y = Total sum of the values of variable y , in the sample
 x = Total sum of the values of variable x , in the sample

For calculation purposes, the formula can be abbreviated as follows:

$$\text{Var}(r) = \left[\frac{1}{X^2} \cdot \frac{a}{a-1} \right] Z_i^2$$

Where:

$$Z_i = (y_i - rx_i)$$

Standard Error (SE) of r is:

$$\text{SE}(r) = \sqrt{\text{var}(r)}$$

And the variation coefficient in percentage terms:

$$\text{C.V.}(r) = \frac{\text{SE}(r)}{r} \times 100$$

According to the sample design, as noted in another section, it is useful to calculate the DEF, as a measure to determine the efficiency of the sample design.⁷ The DEF is the reason for the variance of a sample of clusters with respect to the variance of a simple random sample with the same number of elements, namely:

⁷ FRANKEL, M.: "Inference from Survey Samples: An Empirical Investigation". Edit. ISR, U. of Michigan. 1971. See especially Appendix E.

$$\text{DEF} = \frac{\text{S2 cong.}}{\text{S2 msa}}$$

A design effect value of 1 indicates that the sample is as efficient as a simple random sample, and a value greater than 1 indicates that there are losses in efficiency due to the formation of clusters. For the present case, the DEF is estimated at 1.022 for the Coast and Highland regions and 1.011 for the East.

Confidence levels calculated after taking the survey from the sample sizes actually observed, signal an error of + / - 1.86% for a confidence level of 95% for the aggregate national sample, and + / - 2.97% for the Highlands; + / - 2.79% for the Coast and + / - 4.54% for the East. By area, the error margins are estimated at: + / - 2.38% for Urban and + / - 2.99% for Rural.

R. WEIGHTS FOR AGGREGATION OF DOMAINS AND STRATA

The sampling method used is considered a distribution of self-weighted sample sizes, internally by the Highland and Coast regional strata; however, the East did not use this method due to the significant differences in the populations of the East, as compared to the other regional strata.

Additionally, as a result of the random selection within each household, the sample was unable to accurately project the census population by gender, which infers the need for adjustments to the sample to observe the census distribution by gender. Finally, while PSU was selected with probability proportional to size of each primary unit, the asignment of fixed-size clusters by urban and rural areas, introduces variations that require adjustments using the weights of both the urban / rural distribution as the proportion of the sample by the PSU against the actual proportion of the population, also by PSU.

With this background, the factor weights were calculated per sample point, both urban and rural areas, resulting in the chain of components that follows:

- W_{pi} = Weight of each sample point i according to its population against the population of its region.
- W_{mi} = Weight of each sample point i as the sample size allocated to it against the sample size compared to its region.
- W_{gi} = Male / female ratio observed in the survey sample point i
- W_{Gi} = Male / female ratio observed in the sample unit i according to the latest population census (2001) and CEDATOS projections for 2009.
- W_{ai} = Urban / rural distribution observed in the survey sample point i.
- W_{Ai} = Urban / rural distribution observed in the sample point i, according to the 2001 census and 2006 population projections.

Using the previously formed values, we proceed to calculate the following factors:

$$F1i = W_{pi} / W_{mi} ;$$

$$F2i = W_{gi} / W_{Gi} ; y$$

$$F3i = W_{ai} / W_{Ai}$$

With these partial factors (F_{ji} , $j = 1, 2, 3$, $i = 1, \dots, 436$), the final weighting factor by location is estimated:

$$F_{fi} = F1i \cdot F2i \cdot F3i$$

This F_{fi} is incorporated into the data file for each sample point i .

3. Questionnaire

The questionnaire was partly similar to that used in 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008, with the updating of names, parties, dates and other specific topics for 2010. It is important to note that there a reaction of surprise and some discomfort was perceived by some of the respondents to the text of question RAC1C. In the future, it would be useful to revise the text of options 1 and 2, to the extent that it will not affect the research objective of the question.

The questionnaire, although it is very long, did not present difficulties in its handling; it is agile, dynamic, clear, fluid, and arouses some interest in the interviewee. With these adjustments, and given the experiences of 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008, the interviewers, a majority who carried out the first study in 2001, averaged 50 minutes in the completion of the questionnaire. The experiences of 2010 will also be used for future studies. The use of auxiliary cards and the color palette was appropriate, although there were some difficulties in their use in rural areas and areas less developed than the national average. These difficulties were overcome with proper instruction to the respondent by the CEDATOS interviewers.

The questionnaire passed through several versions before the final version was established, but went through fewer changes than earlier surveys. As in 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008, there was sufficient training for the national, regional and local supervisors, who in turn trained the field interviewers. Field tests were conducted in urban and rural areas. Discussion, review, analysis and suggestions were made by CEDATOS, with the participation of Dr. Juan Carlos Donoso, Ph.D., and sent to LAPOP at Vanderbilt University.

It is noteworthy that CEDATOS used a version of the questionnaire that had been translated into Quichua for the selected households and adults who did not know the Castilian language and required that the interview be conducted in their native language.

This year the survey was conducted using PDAs. The program used was EQSoftware, the same that was provided by Vanderbilt University. CEDATOS maintained constant communication with Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes, who was responsible for modifying the software and developing the Spanish and Quichua PDA versions of the questionnaire. CEDATOS performed continuous reviews and corrections for each questionnaire version sent by Vanderbilt University, to ensure that the final questionnaire was

correct. Field work began once we received final approval on the questionnaires from Vanderbilt University.

4. Pilot Test

a. Undertaken: January 13, 14, 15, 19 of 2010

b. Places Visited

i) Pilot testing in urban areas:

1. Pichincha Province, Municipality of Quito, Quito Canton, sector La Gasca, People's Committee, Cotocollao, Roldós.
2. Azuay Province, Municipality of Cuenca, Cuenca Canton, residential, Manuel J. Calle Street and Paucarbamba.
3. Guayas Province, Municipality of Guayaquil, Guayaquil Canton, Hospital Security sector, Boyacá, including Manuel Urdaneta and Galecio.

ii) Pilot testing in rural areas:

1. Pichincha Province, Municipality of Quito, Tumbaco sector.

c. Number of interviews conducted during the pilot:

i) Urban: 29

ii) Rural: 10

In the pilot test verified the sampling procedures, correct administration of the questionnaire with PDA and use of auxiliary cards.

5. Supervisor and Interviewer Training

a. Dates and Places

PLACES	DATES
Region: Quito	January 11, 2010
Region: Guayaquil	January 15, 2010
Region: Cuenca	January 19, 2010

The training received by the interviewers and supervisors was key to the success of this year's survey. The seminars for the interview trainers worked well this year, as it has in previous years.

It is important to reiterate the value and advantages that the stability of CEDATOS interviewers and supervisors bring to this study, who contributed their considerable experience to this fifth survey. The interviewers had sufficient practice to identify sample units and make the final selection of the households and adults sampled, skillfully administering the questionnaire, auxiliary tables and quota management in the final selection of the adult to be interviewed.

b. Staff responsible for training

CEDATOS: Carlos Cordova and Betty Miño
Vanderbilt University: Juan Carlos Donoso

The delegate from Vanderbilt University, Juan Carlos Donoso, PhD, was present in the training and pilot testing of the surveys in Quito and Guayaquil.

c. Interviewers and supervisors who participated in training

Quito Region: 4 supervisors and 12 interviewers
Guayaquil Region: 4 supervisors, 12 interviewers
Cuenca Region: 2 supervisors, 6 interviewers

The interviewers had sufficient practice in the identification of sample units, final selection of households, selection of adults in the sampled households and quotas in the final selection of the adult to be interviewed; in addition, they skillfully administered the questionnaire, using the auxiliary cards and the color palette, which were new for this study; however, their use presented no problems for the CEDATOS interviewers. The interviewers also ably managed the PDAs and EQSoftware used in the administration of this survey.

6. Fieldwork

The interviews were conducted in accordance with the agreed upon timeline, despite the field staff experiencing some difficulties, including the assault of three staff, resulting in the loss of equipment.

Most people were found to be very receptive to completing the questionnaire. In urban areas, as on other occasions, there was some resistance and lack of interest by those in the higher socioeconomic classes, especially due to the length of the questionnaire. Supervisors played an effective role throughout the field.

As in the first three studies, a number of respondents expressed interest in the results of the study; others exhibited very little interest in political affairs, although expressed opinions on the mistrust of various institutions and the fight against poverty and corruption. These observations become helpful in planning the distribution of the results to the interviewees and the general public, in urban and rural areas, in addition to academic groups and political leaders.

7. Supervision

a. Description of the monitoring process (organization of equipment, verification of the interview process and data validation, etc.).

PDAs were used to administer this study. The distribution of the sample by team took into consideration the number of respondents assigned by supervisor and town, so in meeting the 40% direct

information validation quota and permit the verification of answers, 3 interviewers were assigned to each supervisor.

100% supervision at sample locations (to confirm that the interview was done in the sample household and randomly selected person) assured the quality of information. The selection of the sample with previous inclusion of the no coverage rate makes it possible to complete the expected sample. The 18% non-coverage rate was met with higher non-response rates in large cities and medium-high and high socioeconomic classes.

The validation of the information, re-interview and test responses were conducted on 40% of the sample. This was accomplished through the assignment of 1 supervisor for every 3 interviewers.

Once the PDA version was approved, quotas were distributed to each interviewer and a unique questionnaire ID was assigned to each team. The information collected through the interviews was sent via Internet, with a back-up of the data taking place in the office, to verify compliance with the quotas assigned to each interviewer.

b. Problems identified by the core team

EQSoftware system is still being developed and there are a number of elements that significantly hindered the preparation of the fieldwork. The system can not assign or re-allocate interviews by varying the number of teams assigned to the project unless one copies the entire database and delete records that are not assigned to each computer manually. This represents a potential hazard since the interviews completed may be lost if one copies or inadvertently deleted records in the PDA or PC that are responsible for the updating of the files and records. Moreover, the system does not make use of geo-referencing (GPS) functions that the CEDATOS systems use to manage the PDA-based interviews, which would provide the capacity to more efficiently handle surveys of any size, with support from immediate automatic answers, completed questionnaires and permit control for duplication errors or the inadvertent removal of data, in addition to the ability to identify the GPS location of each household interviewed.

8. Dates of data collection by region

REGION	DATA COLLECTION PERIOD
HIGHLANDS	February 10 to March 08
COAST	February 02 to March 19
EAST	February 12 to March 05

9. Number of supervisors and interviewers assigned to the field

REGION	NUMBER OF SUPERVISORS	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWERS
HIGHLANDS	4	12
COAST	4	12
EAST	2	6

10. Final Sample

a. Estimated and Final Sample

Age and Gender Quota	Estimated Sample			Final Sample		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
Males 18-25	146	237	383	146	237	383
Males 26-40	180	310	490	180	310	490
Males 41-55	128	211	339	128	211	339
Males 56 and older	106	158	264	106	158	264
Females 18-25	146	239	385	146	239	385
Females 26-40	189	318	507	189	318	507
Females 41-55	135	214	349	135	214	349
Females 56 and older	108	175	283	108	175	283
Total	1138	1862	3000	1138	1862	3000

11. Response Rate

Reason	Failed Surveys		
	Coast	Highlands	East
1. Refused (Refused to be interviewed)	14%	18%	9%
2. Incomplete survey	2%	5%	3%
3. Individual selected was never at home	-	-	-
4. Households where no people resided during the survey	-	-	-
5. Homes in construction	-	-	-
6. Not Ecuadorian / Only spoke a foreign language	-	-	-
7. No one at home	3%	5%	2%
8. Respondent unfit to be interviewed (deaf, mentally ill, drunk, aggressive, etc)	-	-	-
9. Outside the quota	-	-	-
10. No adults in the home	-	-	-
11. Other	-	-	-

12. File processing, quality control and auditing by Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University

In parallel to other CEDATOS survey activities, the Computing Center technical team worked on the development of programs for data entry and file creation in SPSS. The work was adjusted to LAPOP requirements and was submitted in a timely manner.

Questionnaires were sent, as dictated in the contract, so that they could be audited by LAPOP. Professor Seligson reported complete satisfaction with the finished product. The key to this success was the quality control measures applied by CEDATOS at every stage of the study.

Data processing utilized EQControl. The data collected in the PDA was imported to EQControl, assuring that the interviewer quotas were correct. The data was subsequently exported to SPSS, where the base was purified and the corresponding weights assigned.

13. Communications

Constant communication was maintained between LAPOP at Vanderbilt University and CEDATOS, regarding the coordination of survey's development and to discuss issues that required clarification. As in the three previous studies, Professor Seligson was very positive and provided assistance to CEDATOS as needed. Email was used as the primary mode of communication.

In references to the PDAs utilized in this study, constant communication was maintained with Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes, to finalize the necessary details prior to loading the questionnaires on the PDAs. Rubi Arana (LAPOP) reviewed the final questionnaires.

14. Final Observations

a. Problems and difficulties encountered during the field work

The use of PDAs facilitated, to some extent, the administration of the questionnaires but was not always convenient due to the security issues currently facing Ecuador. Unfortunately three interviewers from two separate teams were assaulted and beaten in the theft of the PDAs, which were unable to be recovered, resulting in losses for CEDATOS. However, despite the theft of equipment, CEDATOS took appropriate measures to ensure that the work scheduled and quality of the information obtained was not affected. If Ecuador's internal security situation should worsen, it would be advisable to replace the use of PDAs with pencil and paper questionnaires in areas of high insecurity.

b. Comments on the questionnaire

Due to the nature of the questions, as the topics covered are of great interest to the general population, people were open to participate in this study. However, as at other times, there was some resistance in urban areas, especially in the higher socioeconomic classes, due to the length of the questionnaire. The supervisors were effective during the fieldwork.

As in previous studies, respondents showed interest in the survey results, especially on the issues of democracy and security. The topics of least interest were regarding politics.

c. Comments on specific questions of the questionnaire by the interviewers (through their experience in applying the questionnaire)

1) **RAC1C**. *According to the data from the Population Census, black people are poorer, in general, than the rest of the population. What do you think is the principal reason for this?*

Respondents expressed some discomfort due to the nature of the above question, as they felt some of the options are offensive to blacks, such as the option "Because black people are less intelligent."

2) **RAC3B**. *You would agree to one of your daughters or sons marrying a(n) indigenous/black/darker colored person. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?*

Some respondents considered the above question inappropriate, feeling it was discriminatory.

15. Annex

a. List of Interviewers.

HIGHLANDS REGION

SUPERVISORS

NAME	SEX	CI	CODE
LUIS ANGO TUZA	Male	171249147-9	001
FERNANDO LINDAO CAJAMARCA	Male	170998249-8	002
GONZALO PACCHA MEDINA	Male	110339564-4	003
JUAN PAZMIÑO BIANCULLI	Male	170646292-4	004
JULIO TORRES V.	Male	0104436522	005
EDGAR LOJA P.	Male	0105029144	006
RUTH CAGUANA	Female	0104793518	007

INTERVIEWERS

NAME	SEX	CI	CODE
BERTHA CONTRERAS MORALES	Female	120084993-1	5
VERONICA SANCHEZ	Female	171046276-1	15
EUFEMIA MADERA TORRES	Female	170548438-2	10
JORGE SIMBA	Male	050147313-6	16
MERY MANTILLA HERRERA	Female	170536591-2	9
RODRIGO POLIT VILLARROEL	Male	170858730-6	13
MIRIAN ARAÚZ FELICITA	Female	171487234-6	1
PAUL BASTIDAS ARIAS	Male	171634275-1	3
MARCO AULESTIA RUÍZ	Male	171317114-6	2
MONICA CAJAS ESPINOZA	Female	170808181-3	47
CRISTOBAL JIJÓN ALMEIDA	Male	170555740-1	8
MAURICIO GAVILANEZ	Male	170628644-8	6
BLANCA GUERRERO CÁCEREZ	Female	180001382-1	7
FELIX NUGRA S.	Male	0101861446	39
DIEGO BARRERA	Male	0104051404	49
VERONICA SALTO	Female	0105248459	47
CARMEN RODAS C.	Female	0100949590	40
JANETH JIMENEZ	Female	1104039712	48
EDGAR LOJA P.	Male	0105029144	37
JULIO TORRES V.	Male	0104436522	36
MARILLU GUILLEN A	Female	0101989903	44
VANESSA SANCHES L.	Female	1103504864	41
GISELLA VERA	Female	1308199825	43

COASTAL REGION

SUPERVISORES

NAME	SEX	CI	CODE
JEFFERSON FALCON	Male	0923281828	008
MARIA I. ORDOÑEZ	Female	0923578223	009
NORMA RODRIGUEZ	Female	0912201761	010
JUAN CAMPOVERDE	Male	1102802574	011
JESSENIA GARCIA	Female	1309490512	012
GONZALO PACCHA MEDINA	Male	110339564-4	003
JUAN PAZMIÑO BIANCULLI	Male	170646292-4	004

INTERVIEWERS

NAME	SEX	CI	CODE
JESSICA GARCIA	Female	0920230851	25
ADRIANA ABAD	Female	0920683869	29
MARIELA REINEL	Female	0915284533	21
JUANA TORRES	Female	0908755895	26
MARIA RAMON	Female	097266133	35
CINTHIA NEIRA	Female	0921912325	34
ISIDRO SEGURA	Male	1303391054	24
MARINO SANCHEZ	Male	0908362916	20
BEATRIZ OCAÑA	Female	0906653035	27
ROXANA MURILLO	Female	0915592745	23
MARLENE MACIAS	Female	0910853910	17
ANGELA CEDEÑO	Female	1305451823	19
MERY MANTILLA HERRERA	Female	170536591-2	9
RODRIGO POLIT VILLARROEL	Male	170858730-6	13
JORGE SIMBA	Male	050147313-6	16
MELBA COFRE	Female	0909916892	33
ANGEL CAMPOVERDE	Male	0913815593	18
ALEX PAGUAY	Male	0921034344	22
BERTHA CONTRERAS MORALES	Female	120084993-1	5
JEFFERSON FALCON	Male	0923281828	28
RAFAEL SANCAN	Male	0917709917	30

EAST REGION**SUPERVISORS**

NAME	SEX	CI	CODE
JULIO TORRES V.	Male	0104436522	013
RUTH CAGUANA	Female	0104793518	014
FERNANDO LINDAO CAJAMARCA	Male	170998249-8	002

INTERVIEWERS

NAME	SEX	CI	CODE
MONICA CAJAS ESPINOZA	Female	170808181-3	4
CRISTOBAL JIJÓN ALMEIDA	Male	170555740-1	8
VERONICA SALTO	Female	0105248459	47
FELIX NUGRA S.	Male	0101861446	39
ROBERTO SINCHE VEGA	Male	1103084065	14
MIRIAN ARAÚZ FELICITA	Female	171487234-6	1
PAUL BASTIDAS ARIAS	Male	171634275-1	3
MARCO AULESTIA RUÍZ	Male	171317114-6	2
DIEGO BARRERA	Male	0104051404	49
CARMEN RODAS C.	Female	0100949590	40
CARMEN BERNAL G.	Female	0104846340	45

Appendix III: Informed Consent Form



Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been chosen by lottery to participate in a study of public opinion, which is funded by Vanderbilt University. I come on behalf of CEDATOS Gallup International to request an interview lasting 30 to 40 minutes.

The main objective of this study is to find out people's opinions about various aspects of your country's current situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You can leave questions unanswered or end the interview at any time. The answers you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous.

If you have questions about the study, you may contact CEDATOS at phone number 2558640 and ask for Vicente Paccha, the person responsible for this project.

Would you like to participate?

Appendix IV: Questionnaire

Ecuador, Versión # 10.1a IRB Approval: #090103

 USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE		
		

El Barómetro de las Américas: Ecuador, 2010

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PAIS.					9
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____					
ESTRATOPRI:					
(901) Costa Urbana (902) Costa Rural (903) Sierra Urbana (904) Sierra Rural					9 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
(905) Oriente Norte (906) Oriente Sur					
UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
PROV. Provincia: _____					9 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
MUNICIPIO. Cantón: _____					9 <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
ECUDISTRITO. Parroquia: _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
ECUSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
ECUSEC. Sector _____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
ECUZONA. Zona: _____					
CLUSTER. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral) [Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
UR. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:					
(1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande					<input type="text"/>
(3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural					
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Quichua					<input type="text"/>
Número de visitas a la casa: 1 2 3					
Hora de inicio: _____:_____					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2010					<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA					

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP2. ¿A algún Asambleísta de la Asamblea Nacional?	1	2	88	98
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, prefecto, concejal, intendente o comisario?	1	2	88	98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...	
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal del municipio en su ciudad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1]	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	
LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más al gobierno nacional (2) Algo más al gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno nacional y al municipio (4) Algo más al municipio (5) Mucho más al municipio (88) NS (98) NR	

<p>LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Mucho más el gobierno nacional (2) Algo más el gobierno nacional (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno nacional y el municipio (4) Algo más el municipio (5) Mucho más el municipio (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LGL2C. Por favor dígame quién debería tener mayor autoridad sobre el municipio en el que Ud. vive: ¿el alcalde o el presidente de la república? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) El alcalde (2) El presidente de la república (3) Ambos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
<p>CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	
<p>Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]</p>							
	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	

CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98	INAP 99

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “A”]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas numeradas del cero al diez. El cero es la grada más baja y representa la peor vida posible para usted. El diez es la grada más alta y representa la mejor vida posible para usted.

¿En qué grada de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos? **Por favor escoja la grada que mejor represente su opinión.**

[Señale en la tarjeta el número que representa la “peor vida posible” y el que representa “la mejor vida posible”. Indíquelo a la persona entrevistada que puede seleccionar un número intermedio en la escala].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98	
La peor vida posible							La mejor vida posible				NS	NR	

LS6A. ¿En qué [grada] escalón diría usted que se encontraba hace dos años, es decir, en el 2008?

[RECOGER TARJETA “A”]

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS
(98) NR

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la cual el número 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88) (NR=98)	
Izquierda						Derecha					

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

<p>IMMIG1. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno de Ecuador ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? Está usted... [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IMMIG2. En general, ¿usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los ecuatorianos no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los ecuatorianos? [Asegurarse de enfatizar en general]</p> <p>(1) Hacen los trabajos que los ecuatorianos no quieren (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los ecuatorianos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IMMIG3. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Los problemas de crimen en Ecuador se empeoran por la gente que viene a vivir aquí de otros países?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IMMIG4. ¿Usted diría que la cultura del Ecuador es generalmente debilitada o enriquecida por gente que viene a vivir aquí de otros países?</p> <p>(1) Debilitada (2) Enriquecida (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IMMIG5. ¿Usted diría que es bueno o malo para la economía del Ecuador que la gente de otros países venga a vivir aquí?</p> <p>(1) Malo (2) Bueno (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública?</p> <p>(1) Sí ha participado [Siga] (2) No ha participado [Pase a JC1] (88) NS [Pase a JC1] (98) NR [Pase a JC1]</p>	
<p>PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses? _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? [NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante]</p> <p>(1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades) (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa) (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción) (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas) (5) Derechos humanos (6) Temas ambientales (7) Falta de Servicios públicos (8) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)</p>	

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

ECUJC20. Frente a una expansión del conflicto armado de Colombia a Ecuador.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(88) NS	(98) NR	
--	--	---	---------	---------	--

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre la Asamblea y gobierne sin la Asamblea?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Nacional de Justicia y gobierne sin la Corte Nacional de Justicia?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses?. Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? _____[Marcar el número]_____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

<p>VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincriminal del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincriminal sufrió? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa (10) Extorsión [o alguien le pidió “renta”] (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)</p>	
<p>VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincriminal del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio o recinto (3) En esta ciudad/ parroquia/cantón (4) En otra ciudad/ parroquia/cantón (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincriminal en los últimos 12 meses?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley?</p> <p>(1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio/ recinto donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)?</p> <p>(1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy inseguro(a) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría...</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **[REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA]**

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS	NR	
ST1. La Policía Nacional	1	2	3	4	99	88	98	
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	99	88	98	
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	99	88	98	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con gradas [escalones] numeradas del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta ver mucha televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada						Mucho	NS	NR

Anotar el número 1-7 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Ecuador garantizan un juicio justo? (*Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para nada la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan mucho la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio*)

B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Ecuador?

B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político ecuatoriano?

B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema político ecuatoriano?

B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político ecuatoriano?

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?

B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Asamblea Nacional?

B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?

B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?

B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía Nacional?

B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?

B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?

B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Evangélica?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Presidente de la República?	
B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los sindicatos?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Nacional de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su municipio?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser ecuatoriano(a)?	
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General del Estado o Abogado del Estado?	
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?	
ECUB40A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos afro-ecuatorianos?	
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social?	
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudan a mejorar la economía?	
B51. ¿Hasta que punto tiene Ud. confianza en las Organizaciones No Gubernamentales, las ONGs, que trabajan en el país?	
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?	
ECUB50 (B50). ¿Ha oído mencionar la ONG “Participación Ciudadana”? Si dice “no” marcar 99 y pasar a N1. Si dice “sí” preguntar: ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en esta organización?	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera [continúe con la tarjeta C: escala 1-7] NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 99 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

WT1. ¿Qué tan preocupado(a) está usted de que haya un ataque violento por terroristas en Ecuador en los próximos 12 meses? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado(a), o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	
WT2. ¿Qué tan preocupado(a) está de que usted o alguien de su familia sea víctima de un ataque violento por terroristas? ¿Está usted muy, algo, poco, o nada preocupado(a), o diría usted que no ha pensado mucho en esto? (1) Muy preocupado (2) Algo preocupado (3) Poco preocupado (4) Nada preocupado (5) No ha pensado mucho en esto (88) NS (98) NR	

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Rafael Correa es...?: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	
M2. Hablando de la Asamblea y pensando en todos los Asambleístas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los miembros de la Asamblea Nacional están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “D”]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	NS	NS
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	88	98
							Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP102. Cuando la Asamblea estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin la Asamblea. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP103. Cuando la Corte Nacional de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema de Justicia debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es la clase dominante u oligarquía que se aprovecha del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	

Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases.

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

**Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y
98 para los NR**

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. El Estado ecuatoriano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado ecuatoriano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado ecuatoriano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado ecuatoriano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS5. El Estado ecuatoriano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado ecuatoriano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo.

	Anotar 1-7 88=NS, 98=NR
RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para Ecuador. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona negra. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	
RAC3C. A Ud. le gustaría que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?	

[RECOGER TARJETA "D"]

PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Ecuador? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Ecuador es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “E”]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indica que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente						Aprueba firmemente				88	98
										1-10, 88, 98	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											

[No recoja tarjeta “E”]

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Ecuador. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			88	98
										1-10, 88, 98	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Ecuador, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: <i>[Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]</i>											
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.											
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Ecuador. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?											
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?											

D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo género puedan tener el derecho a casarse?	
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	

[Recoger tarjeta “E”]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, O</p> <p>(2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, O</p> <p>(3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?</p> <p>(1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>ECUDEM14. Cual es la mejor forma para fortalecer la democracia en el país. [Leer respuestas]</p> <p>(1) Fortalecer la Justicia</p> <p>(2) Fortalecer los gobiernos locales</p> <p>(3) Combatir la corrupción</p> <p>(4) Desarrollar fuentes de empleo</p> <p>(5) Educar en valores</p> <p>(6) Mejorar la seguridad ciudadana</p> <p>(7) [NO LEER] Ninguna de las anteriores</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o</p> <p>(2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez</p> <p>(4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una coima en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado una coima?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en la municipalidad en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna coima en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una coima en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna coima para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna coima en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una coima?		0	1	88	98	
EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos en el país está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (88) NS (98) NR						

[Entregar otra vez la Tarjeta “D”] Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escalera del 1 al 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			NS	NR

Usted se considera una persona que es:

PER1. Sociable y activa

PER2. Una persona critica y peleonera

PER3. Una persona confiable y disciplinada

PER4. Una persona ansiosa y fácil de molestarse

PER5. Una persona abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual

PER6. Una persona callada y tímida

PER7. Una persona generosa y cariñosa

PER8. Una persona desorganizada y descuidada

PER9. Una persona calmada y emocionalmente estable

PER10. Una persona poco creativa y con poca imaginación

[Recoger Tarjeta “D”]

CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave, otros dicen que estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero que no es muy grave, mientras otros dicen que no hay crisis económica. ¿Qué piensa usted? **[Leer alternativas]**

(1) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica muy grave

(2) Estamos sufriendo una crisis económica pero no es muy grave, o

(3) No hay crisis económica **[Pase a VB1]**

(88) NS **[Pase a VB1]** (98) NR **[Pase a VB1]**

CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el principal culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: **[LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

(01) El gobierno anterior

(02) El gobierno actual

(03) Nosotros, los ecuatorianos

(04) Los ricos de nuestro país

(05) Los problemas de la democracia

(06) Los países ricos **[Acepte también: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón]**

(07) El sistema económico del país, o

(08) Nunca ha pensado en esto

(77) **[NO LEER]** Otro

(88) **[NO LEER]** NS

(98) **[NO LEER]** NR

(99) Inap

VB1. ¿Está empadronado para votar?

(1) Sí

(2) No

(3) En trámite

(88) NS

(98) NR

VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]	
VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2009? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS (902) Lucio Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP (903) Martha Roldos Bucaram, Alianza Izquierda Unida- RED/MIPD (904) Carlos Sagnay De La Bastida, Movimiento Triunfo Mil- MTM (905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - PRIAN (906) Melba Jacome, Movimiento Tierra Fertil- MTF (907) Diego Delgado Jara, Movimiento de Integracion y Transformacion Social- MITS (908) Carlos Gonzales Albornoz, Movimiento Independiente Justo y Solidario- MIJS (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)	
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]	
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA] (901) Red Etica y Democracia (RED) (902) Movimiento Poder Ciudadano (MPC) (903) Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) (904) Izquierda Democrática (ID) (905) Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) (906) Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción Nacional (PRIAN) (907) Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo País (Pachacutik) (908) Unión Demócrata Cristiana (UDC) (909) Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD) (910) Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio (PS-FA) (911) Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (PSP) (912) Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) (913) Alianza PAIS-Patria Altiva I Soberana (PAIS) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR	

<p>CLIEN1. En los últimos años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca?</p> <p>(1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Pase a RAC1C] (88) NS [Pase a RAC1C] (98) NR [Pase a RAC1C]</p>	
<p>CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?</p> <p>(1) Más inclinado (2) Menos inclinado (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

<p>RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población las personas negras son más pobres, en general, que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto?</p> <p>[Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta]</p> <p>(1) Porque las personas negras no trabajan lo suficiente (2) Porque las personas negras son menos inteligentes (3) Porque las personas negras son tratadas de manera injusta (4) Porque las personas negras tienen bajo nivel educativo (5) Porque las personas negras no quieren cambiar su cultura (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p>RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas negras son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?</p> <p>(1) Mucho mejor (2) Mejor (3) Igual (4) Peor (5) Mucho peor (88) NS (98)NR</p>	

Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

<p>y pensando en los últimos cinco años, ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o ha sido tratado mal o de manera injusta: [Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]</p>						
	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR
<p>DIS11. Por su color de piel?</p> <p>¿Usted diría que eso ha sucedido muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98
<p>DIS13. Por su condición económica</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98
<p>DIS12. Por su género o género</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98

Ahora pensando en lo que le pudo haber sucedido a otra persona, ¿ha usted vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido discriminada, tratada mal o injustamente: **[Repetir después de cada pregunta: muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca]**

	Muchas veces	Algunas veces	Pocas veces	Nunca	NS	NR	
RAC1A. Por su color de piel? muchas veces, algunas veces, pocas veces, o nunca?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
RAC1D. Por su condición económica?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
RAC1E. Por su género o género?	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Pasando a otro tema...

CCT1. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno, como por ejemplo: **Bono Solidario y Bono de la Vivienda?**
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16			
NS	88						
NR	98						

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años
(888 = NS 988 = NR)

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos] [Si la persona entrevistada es mayor de 25 años pasar a Q3C]

Y1. Dentro de cinco años, ¿se ve usted desempeñando algún papel en la política del país, como por ejemplo... **[Leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]**

- (1) Participando en una asociación civil (ONG), comunitaria o un partido político
- (2) Postulándose a algún cargo público en las elecciones
- (3) Participando en un movimiento revolucionario
- (4) Ninguna de estas
- (5) **[NO LEER]** Otra

(88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]

Y2. ¿Qué temas o problemas le preocupan con frecuencia?

[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA] [Si dice “el futuro” preguntar ¿y qué cosas del futuro le preocupan?]

- (1) Trabajo, empleo, salarios, ingreso, estabilidad económica o laboral
- (2) Pasarla bien, fiestas, deportes, club, citas, pareja, formar familia, chicas o chicos
- (3) Posesiones materiales (ropa y calzado, celulares, ipods, computadoras)
- (4) Obtener o terminar educación, pagar educación
- (5) Seguridad, crimen, pandillas
- (6) Relacionamiento interpersonal (relación con padres, familia, amigos y otros)
- (7) Salud
- (8) Medio ambiente
- (9) Situación del país
- (10) Nada, no le preocupa nada
- (11) Otra respuesta
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]

Y3. En su opinión, en términos generales, ¿el país se está encaminando en la dirección correcta o en la dirección equivocada?

- (1) Correcta
- (2) Equivocada
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

[Preguntar a las personas entrevistadas de 25 años o menos]

HAICR1. Podría decirme, ¿cómo se informa usted principalmente sobre la situación del país? **[NO leer alternativas, MARCAR SOLO UNA]**

- (01) TV
- (02) Diario
- (03) Radio
- (04) Iglesia
- (05) Centro comunitario
- (06) Escuela
- (07) Familiares
- (08) Compañeros de trabajo o estudio
- (09) Amigos
- (10) Vecinos
- (11) Portales de internet (excluye diarios)
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

<p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones] [Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11] (01) Católico (02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava). (03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i). (04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión) (05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra). (06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones). (07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica). (10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado) (11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios) (12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas] (1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes (4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante (4) Nada importante (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”] Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$60 (02) Entre \$61- \$100 (03) \$101-\$200 (04) \$201-\$300 (05) \$301-\$500 (06) \$501-\$750 (07) \$751-\$1000 (08) \$1001-1500 (09) \$1501-\$2000 (10) \$2001 y más (88) NS (98) NR [RECOGER TARJETA “F”]</p>	

<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a Q10C] (88) NS [Pase a Q10C] (98) NR [Pase a Q10C]</p>	
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10A3. [Sólo si recibe remesas] En los últimos doce meses, ¿la cantidad de dinero que recibe del exterior ha disminuido, aumentado, permanecido igual, o no recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses?</p> <p>(1) Ha aumentado (2) Se ha mantenido igual (3) Ha disminuido</p> <p>(4) No recibió dinero del exterior en los últimos doce meses (88) NS (98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo “Sí”, preguntar ¿en dónde?]</p> <p>[No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente [Siga]</p> <p>(2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países [Siga]</p> <p>(3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) [Siga]</p> <p>(4) No [Pase a Q14]</p> <p>(88) NS [Pase a Q14]</p> <p>(98) NR [Pase a Q14]</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con qué frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Todos los días</p> <p>(2) Una o dos veces por semana</p> <p>(3) Una o dos veces por mes</p> <p>(4) Rara vez</p> <p>(5) Nunca</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>(99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar</p> <p>(2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades</p> <p>(3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades</p> <p>(4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades</p> <p>(88) [No leer] NS</p> <p>(98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) ¿Aumentó? [Pase a Q11]</p> <p>(2) ¿Permaneció igual? [Pase a Q11]</p> <p>(3) ¿Disminuyó? [Pase a Q10F]</p> <p>(88) NS [Pase a Q11]</p> <p>(98) NR [Pase a Q11]</p>	

<p>Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(1) Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario (2) Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo (3) Bajaron las ventas/El negocio no anduvo bien (4) El negocio familiar se quebró (5) Las remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse (6) Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó, murió o se fue del hogar (7) Desastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo (9) Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos (8) Otra razón (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP ("Aumentó", "Permaneció igual" o NS/NR en Q10E)</p>	
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	
<p>ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-ecuatoriana, codificar como (4) Negra]</p> <p>(1) Blanca [Pase a ECUETIDA] (2) Mestiza [Pase a ECUETIDA] (3) Indígena [Siga] (4) Negra [Pase a ECUETIDA] (5) Mulata [Pase a ECUETIDA] (7) Otra [Pase a ECUETIDA] (88) NS [Pase a ECUETIDA] (98) NR [Pase a ECUETIDA]</p>	
<p>ECUETID2. ¿A qué pueblo indígena pertenece usted? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(01) Achuar (02) Awá (03) Chachi (04) Cofán (05) Epera (06) Huaorani (07) Manta (08) Quito (09) Secoya (10) Shuar (11) Siona (12) Tsachila (13) Zaparo (14) Quechua (15) Saraguros (16) Salasacas (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	

<p>ECUETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata?</p> <p>(1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa?</p> <p>[acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(901) Castellano (902) Quichua (904) Otro (nativo) (905) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban</p> <p>[Leer alternativas]:</p> <p><i>(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.)</i></p> <p>(1) Sólo castellano (2) Castellano e idioma nativo (3) Sólo idioma nativo (4) Castellano e idioma extranjero (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Según la Constitución del Ecuador, las autoridades de las comunidades, pueblos y nacionalidades indígenas tienen el derecho de administrar justicia según sus tradiciones ancestrales.</p> <p>INDAOJ1. Según su opinión, quien debe encargarse de juzgar a una persona indígena que haya cometido un delito dentro de la comunidad indígena en la que vive?</p> <p>(1) Las autoridades de la comunidad indígena (2) La justicia ordinaria (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IND1. ¿Cree usted que los grupos indígenas están ayudando a que nuestro país sea más democrático, menos democrático o ellos no están teniendo ningún impacto en nuestra democracia?</p> <p>(1) Más democrático (2) Menos democrático (3) No tienen impacto (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IND2. ¿Cuánta influencia cree usted que los grupos indígenas han tenido en la promulgación o aprobación de nuevas leyes en este país? [Leer Alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Mucha (2) Algo (3) Poca [Pasar a IND4] (4) Ninguna [Pasar a IND4] (88) NS [Pasar a IND4] (98) NR [Pasar a IND4]</p>	
<p>[Preguntar solo a los que respondieron “Mucho” o “Algo” a IND2]</p> <p>IND3. En su opinión, ¿por qué algunos grupos indígenas han sido efectivos en tener influencia sobre los debates políticos en este país? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Porque tienen más dinero/recursos (2) Porque pueden trabajar bien con grupos no-indígenas (3) Porque ellos representan a la población indígena (4) Porque tienen buenas ideas (5) Porque tienen buenos líderes (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>[Preguntar a Todos]</p> <p>IND4. ¿Qué tan efectivos son los grupos indígenas para convencer a la gente de que los temas indígenas son importantes?</p> <p>(1) Muy efectivos (2) Algo efectivos (3) Poco efectivos (4) Nada efectivos (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Diariamente
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana
 (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Rara vez
 (5) Nunca
 (88) NS **[No leer]** (98) NR **[No leer]**

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...

G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]:** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR (98) NR

G11. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? **[NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]** (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No responde

G13. ¿Cuántas provincias tiene el Ecuador? **[NO LEER: 24]**

- (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Ecuador? **[NO LEER: 4 años]**

- (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (88) No sabe (98) No Responde

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos?	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No	(1) Sí

OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Trabajando? **[Siga]**
- (2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? **[Siga]**
- (3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (4) Es estudiante? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (88) NS **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**
- (98) NR **[Pase a OCUP1B1]**

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?
- (2) Asalariado en el sector privado?
- (3) Patrono o socio de empresa?
- (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?
- (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? **(Probar: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]**

- (1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)
- (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)
- (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)
- (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)
- (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)
- (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)
- (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.)
- (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados
- (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)
- (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra)
- (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros)
- (12) Artesano
- (13) Servicio doméstico
- (14) Obrero
- (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

<p>OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo. (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo. (3) No, no perdió su trabajo (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

<p>OCUP1ANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba el jefe de su hogar cuando usted tenía 15 años? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Artesano (13) Servicio doméstico (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
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<p>PEN1. ¿Tiene usted un fondo de jubilación?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SAL1] (88) NS [Pase a SAL1] (98) NR [Pase a SAL1]</p>	
<p>PEN3. ¿Qué tipo de fondo de jubilación es el que usted utiliza? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Cuentas individuales, es decir una AFP (Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones) (2) Sistema público o de seguro social (7) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

PEN4. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, usted cotizó/contribuyó a su fondo de jubilación/pensión? [Leer alternativas]: (1) Todos los meses (2) Por lo menos una o dos veces al año, o (3) No cotizó/contribuyó (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
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[Preguntar a todos]

SAL1. Tiene usted seguro médico? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Finalizar] (88) NS [Finalizar] (98) NR [Finalizar]	
SAL2. Es su seguro médico... [Leer opciones] (1) Del gobierno, parte del seguro social (2) De otro plan del Estado (3) Es un plan privado [No leer]: (4) Tiene ambos, del gobierno y un plan privado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene seguro médico)	
SAL4. ¿En su plan de seguro médico, es usted titular o beneficiario? (1) Titular (2) Beneficiario (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap	

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] ____ (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
SEXI. Anotar su género: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer	
COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote su color de piel _____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____


Comentarios:

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____

Tarjeta "A"


¿En qué escalón [grada] de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




Tarjeta “B”

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				


Tarjeta "C"



Tarjeta “D”



Tarjeta "E"



Tarjeta “F”

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$60
- (02) Entre \$61- \$100
- (03) \$101-\$200
- (04) \$201-\$300
- (05) \$301-\$500
- (06) \$501-\$750
- (07) \$751-\$1000
- (08) \$1001-1500
- (09) \$1501-\$2000
- (10) \$2001 y más

Ecuador, Versión # 10.1a IRB Approval: #090103



Barómetro de América Latina: Ecuador, 2010

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MAMALLAKTA.					
01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	
06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	9
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	
27. Surinam					
IDNUM. Tapuykunapak yupay [llankana ukupi churashka]					<input type="text"/>
ESTRATOPRI:					
(901) Kuntisuyu villa (902) Kuntisuyu uchilla llakta (903) Punasuyu villa					9 <input type="text"/>
(904) Punasuyu uchilla llakta (905) Antisuyu ñawpa (906) Antisuyu washa					
UPM. (Shuk Niki Rikuchik)					<input type="text"/>
PROV. Marka:					9 <input type="text"/>
MUNICIPIO. Kiti:					9 <input type="text"/>
ECUDISTRITO. Uchilla llakta:					<input type="text"/>
ECUSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL					<input type="text"/>
ECUSEC. Ayllu llakta:					<input type="text"/>
ECUZONA. Suyu:					
CLUSTER. (Tukuripi Rikuchik o Rikuchik) [8 tapuchishkakuna kana villakuna, 12 uchilla llakatakuna]					<input type="text"/>
UR. (1) Villa (2) Uchilla llakta [censal del país shimiwan llankay]					<input type="text"/>
TAMANO. Suyupak tupu:					
(1) Mamallaktapak Kapakllakta (Jatun suyu) (2) Jatun villa					<input type="text"/>
(3) Uchillalla villa (4) Uchilla villa (5) Uchilla llakta					
IDIOMAS. Tapuykunapak shimi: (1) Mishu shimi (2) Kichwa					<input type="text"/>
Wasiman purishkakunapak raki: 1 2 3					
Kallarínapak pacha: _____:					<input type="text"/>
FECHA. Capuchina punllapak pacha: _____ killa: _____ wata: 2010					<input type="text"/>
RIKUY: MANARAK TAPUYKUNATA KALLARISHPA ARI NISHKA PANKATA WIÑAY WIÑAYLLA KILLKAKATINAMI KAN					

Q1. [Ama tapuy killkay] Kari-warmi: (1) Kari (2) Warmi

Q1A. [KILLKANA] Tapuy tukushkaka warmi kakpi: Runa llakta churakunata churakushkachu (anaku, runa camiza, shuktak) (1) Ari (2) Mana (99) Inap.	
Q1B. [KILLAKANA] Tapuy tukushkaka kari kakpi: Suni achata charin (rikrakaman chayan mana kashpaka ashtawan urakaman) (1) Sí (2) No (99) Inap.	
Q1C. [KILLAKANA] Tapuy tukushkaka kari kakpi: Suni achata charin (rikrakaman chayan mana kashpaka ashtawan urakaman: Runa llakta churakunata churakushkachu (ruwana, shuktak) (1) Ari (2) Mana (99) Inap.	

LS3. Kallarinkapak, ¿Tukuypi, Imashina kushillatak kikipak kawsaywan kanki? ¿Kikinka nimanchari kanki: [Kaykunata killkakaty] (1) Sumak kushilla(a) (2) Ashata kushilla(a) (3) Ashata llakilla(a) (4) Ashkata llakilla(a) (88) NS (98) NR	
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A4. Kikinpak yuyaypi ¿Maykantak kikipak ashtawan sinchi llakita mamallaktaka yallikun?		<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	
[AMA KAYKUNATA KILLKATINA; SHUKLLATA AKLLANA]			
Yaku, illaymanta	19	Kamachita jawa	61
Ñankuna/ñankuna mana allikunami	18	Kullki illarin, chani mirarin	02
Ayñi makanakuy	30	Ñawpaman pushakkuna	59
Mana allita llankankuna (shuwankuna)	13	Mana alli mamallaktata ñawpaman pushak	15
Kullkita mañay, illaymanta	09	Pachamamapi tiyak	10
Shunakuykuna, wañuchik,	05	Shuk kart llaktaman rikkuna	16
Runakunapak alli kawsaymanta	56	Mana alli imakunata katunakuy	12
Llankay mana tiyan/ llankay illaymanta	03	Tantanakushka llakichik runakuna	14
Mana tukuyllapa shina	58	Wakchakuna	04
Irki runakuna	23	Llaktakunapak mañaykuna (makanakuykuna, ñankunata wichay, llankaykuna shayari, etc.)	06
Minishtimanta shukman kawsakrikkuna	32	Alli kawsay, kawsaypak ministi illay	22
Shuk llaktapak pagana	26	Runata shuway	31
Mana allikachispa rimay	25	Alli kawsaymanta (illaymanta)	27
Droga upiaykuna	11	Terrorismo	33
Kullki, llakikunawan, llakimanta	01	Allpa tarpunkapak, illaymanta	07
Yachakuy, illaymanta, mana alli	21	Pushak antawakuna, llakikunawan	60
Micha, illaymantaf	24	Wakllichikuna	57
Yapa wawakuna wacharikuna	20	Wasi	55
Makanakuy llakichikkunawan	17	Shuk	70
NS	88	NR	98

SOCT1. Kunan, Kullkimanta rimanakushpa. ¿Imashinatak mamallaktapak kullkita rikunki? ¿Kikin ninkimancha sumakimi, alli, shina shinalla, mana alli mana kashpaka may mana alli? (1) Sumakmi (2) Alli (3) Shina shinalla (4) Mana alli (5) May mana alli(pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	
SOCT2. Kikin kunanpi chunka ishkay killa washamanta mamallaktapak kullkika allimi, shinallatakmi mana kashpaka mana allichu ninkimancha? (1) Alli (2) Shinallatak (3) Ashtawan mana alli (88) NS (98) NR	

SOCT3. Kikinka kay chunka ishkay killa ukupi mamallaktapak kullkika allimi, shinallatakmi mana kashpaka kunanpi yalli mana allichu ninkimancha? (1) Alli (2) Shinallatak (3) Ashtawan mana alli (88) NS (98) NR					
IDIO1. Imashinatak tukuyki kikinpakpacha kullkita rikunki? kikin sumakmi, allimi, allilla, shina shinalla, mana alli, may mana alli ninkimancha? (1) Sumak (2) Allilla (3) Shina shinalla(regular) (4) Mana alli (5) May mana alli(pésima) (88) NS (98) NR					
IDIO2. Kikinka kunanpi kikinpakpacha kullkita allimi, shinallatakmi mana kashpaka mana allichu chunka ishkay killa washamanta ninkimancha? (1) Alli (2) Shinallatak (3) Ashtawan mana alli (88) NS (98) NR					
IDIO3. Kikinka kay chunka ishkay killa ukupi kikinpacha kullkika allimi, shinallatakmi mana kashpaka kunanpi yalli mana allichu kanka ninkimancha? (1) Alli (2) Shinallatak (3) Ashtawan mana alli (88) NS (98) NR					

Kunan, shuk imamanta rimankapak, wakinpi runakunapash ayllu llaktakunapash llakikunatak charinkuna chyakunataka paykunallatak allichiyachina kankuna, allichinkapakka yanapayta wakin ñaupaman pushakunata mana kashpaka mamallaktapak pushakpak ukupichu mañankuna.					
¿Wakinpi kikinka llakikunata allichita ushankapak yanapayta mañashkakichu mana kashpaka minkata ... [Shuk shuk akllayta killkakaty tikrachita killkay]	Sí	No	NS	NR	
CP2. ¿Shuk Asamblea Nacional ukumanta asambleista?	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. ¿Shuk kitimanta ñawpaman pushakta (alcalde, prefecto, concejal, intendente, comisario)?	1	2	88	98	
CP4. ¿Shuk ministerio nishka uku /secretario nishka uku, institución pública nishka uku, mana kashpaka mamallaktamanta uku?	1	2	88	98	

Kunan kikinpak villa ñawpaman pushakmanta rimakrinchik...					
NP1. Uchilla llaktata ñawpaman pushak paskashka tantanakuypi kashkankichu mana kashpaka shuk villata ñawpaman pushakpak kay 12 tukury killakunapi? (1) Ari (2) Mana (88) Mana yachan (98) Mana tikrachinchu					
NP2. Wakin ukupi, llaktata ñawpaman pushak, concejal nishka villata ñawpaman mana kashpaka sindico nishka ñawpaman pushakka kay tukury 12 killakunapi? (1) Ari[kati] (2) Mana [Yalli SGL1man] (88) NS [Yalli SGL1man] (98) Mana tikrachin [Yalli SGL1man]					
MUNI10. ¿Allichirka kikinpak llakita mana kashpaka mañayta? (1) Ari (0) Mana (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP.					
SGL1. ¿Kikinka villata ñawpaman pushakaka alli ruraykunatachu runaman kukun ninkimancha: [Akallaykunata killllkatina] (1) Sumak (2) Allilla (3) Shina shinalla(regulares) (4) Mana alli (5) May mana alli(pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR					
LGL2A. Mamallaktapi tiyak runakunapak yanapayta rikushpaka, Pimantak ashtawan llankayta kuna kanka? [Akllaykunata killkatina] (1) Ashtawanpacha mamallaktata pushakman (2) Ashata ashtawan mamallaktata pushakman (3) Shinallata mamallaktata pushakmanpash villata ñawpan pushakmanpash (4) Ashata ashtawan villata ñawpaman pushakman (5) Ashtawanpacha villata ñawpaman pushakman (88) NS (98) NR					

<p>LGL2B. Mamallaktapi kullkikuna tiyaktapash rikushpaka Pitak ashtawan kullkitak rikuna kana kanka? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Ashtawanpacha mamallaktata pushakman Mucho más el gobierno nacional (2) Ashata ashtawan mamallaktata pushakman (3) Shinallata mamallaktata pushakmanpash villata ñawpan pushakmanpash (4) Ashata ashtawan villata ñawpaman pushakman (5) Ashtawanpacha villata ñawpaman pushakman (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LGL2C. Rimapay pitak ashtawan ushayta villata ñawpaman pushakpi kikin kawsak llaktapi: Villata ñawpaman pushak mana kashpaka mamallaktata pushak? [Aklaykunata killkatina]</p> <p>(1) Villata ñawpaman pushak (2) Mamallaktata ñawpaman pushak (3) Ishkandi (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

	Kanchis punllapi shuk kuti	Killapi Shuk mana kashpaka ishkay kutikuna	Watapi Shuk mana kashpaka ishkay kutikuna	Mana ima puncha	NS	NR	
<p>CP5. Kunan, shukta rimankapak, Kikinka kay tukury chunka ishkay killunapi kikipak uchilla llaktapi shuk llakikunata allichipi yanapashkanki mana kashpaka kikipak kawsak llaktamanta runata? Rimapay, niway rurashka kashpaka kanchis punllapi shuk kutillatapash, killapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkay kutikuna, watapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkay kutikuna tukury 12 killakunapi.</p>	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Tawka tantanakuytapash ñawpaman pushak ukukunatapash killkakatikrini. Rimapay, kay ñawpaman pushak ukukunatapash tanatanakuyman rinki: kanchis punchapi shuk kuti, killapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkey kutikuna, watapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkey kutikuna, mana kashpaka mana ima puncha. **[Kutin nina “kanchis punchapi shuk kuti”, “killapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkey kutikuna”, “watapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkey kutikuna”, mana kashpaka “mana ima puncha”.tapuykunta tikrachik runata yanapankapak]**

	Kanchis punllapi shuk kuti	Killapi Shuk mana kashpaka ishkey kutikuna	Watapi Shuk mana kashpaka ishkey kutikuna	Mana ima puncha	NS	NR	
CP6. Tantakuykuna wakin yaya Diosta rikuk uku? Rinki	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP7. Yachana wasimanta tantanakushka taytakunapak tanatanakuykuna? Rinki...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP8. ¿Ñawpaman pushakpak tantanakuykuna mana kashpaka uchilla llaktatapash allichik tantanakuy? Rinki...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP9. Yachakushka, katukkuna, rurakkuna, ayllu llaktamanta runakunapakpash tantanakuykuna? Rinki...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP13. Shuk partido nishka mana kashpaka ñawpaman pushankapak tantarishkapak tanatanakuy? Rinki...	1	2	3	4	88	98	
CP20. [Warmikunalla] Tanatarishkakuna mana kashpaka warmikunapak tantarishka mana kashpaka wasipi llankak warmikuna? Rinki...	1	2	3	4	NS 88	NR 98	INAP 99

[TAPUCHISHKAMANKA UCHILLA PANKA “A” NISHKATA KUNKI]

LS6. Kay uchilla pankapika shuk yupaykunawan chakana tiyan, sarunaka illakmanta chunkakaman yupaykunawanmi. Illak sarunaka ashtawan uchillami kan ashtawan mana alli kawsayta kikipak kankata rikuchin. Chunka sarunaka ashtawan allimi kan ashtawan alli kawsayta kikipak kanata rikuchin. Imapitak chakamanta sarunapika kay punlla kikinka kani yuyanki? **Akllapay sarunata kay alli kikipak yuyay rikuchinmi.**

[Kay uchilla pankapi yupayka “ashtawan mana alli kawsay kankata” rikuchin shinallata “alli kawsay kankata” rikuchin. Tapuchishka runaka chakanamanta chawpi yupayta akllay ushanmi].

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88	98	
Ashatawan mana alli kawsay kankata						Alli kawsay kankata					NS	NR	

LS6A. Ima sarunapitak kikinka sarun ishka watata, alli nishpaka, 2008 watapi kani ninkiman?

[UCHILLA PANKA “A” NISHKATA TANATACHINA]

IT1. Kunan, kaymanta runakunamanta rimakushpa, Kikipak uchilla llaktamanta runakuna kan ninkimancha: **[Akllaykunata killkatina]**

(1) Alli minkana (2) Ashata minkana (3) Ashallata minkana (4) Mana minkana
(88) NS (98) NR

TAPUCHISHKA UCHILLA PANKATA “B” NISHKATA KUNKI]

L1. Shuktak rimashpa, kay uchilla pankapi llukimanta alliman yupay, chaypi 1 yupay lluki nishka chunkaka allinishkapash. Kunan puncha shuk mushuk yuyaykunamanta rimanchi, tawka runakuna llukimanta yuyayta ashtawan alli nishpa rimashpa kankuna mana kashpaka allimanta yuyaywan. Kikipak rikuypi “lluki”pash “alli”pash nishka shimipi yuyarishpa kikipak politica nishka rikuy, Maypitak kay chakanapika kani ninkiman? Ashtawan kikipak yuyaypi chayanapi churay.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	(NS=88) (NR=98)	
Lluki										Alli	

[UCHILLA PANKA “B” NISHKATA TANTACHINA]

IMMIG1. Mashnatak kikinka Ecuador mamallakta ñaupaman pushak llaktakunata yanapay, kusha nishkawan ari ninki, shina alli kawsaymanta yanapay, yachakuy, wasikuna, **shuk llaktamanta runakuna** q mamallaktapi kawsankapak mana kashpaka llankankapak? Kikinka kanki... **[Akllaykuna killkatina]**

(1) May ari ninki
(2) Ashata ari ninki
(3) Mana ari nin, mana mana ninchu
(4) Ashata mana nin
(5) May mana nin
(88) NS (98) NR

<p>IMMIG2. Tukuypi, Shuk llaktamanta runakuna kawsankapak shamukkunaka kaypi Ecuadormanta runakuna mana munashka llankayta rurankuna mana kashpaka Ecuadormanta runakunapak llankayta kichun ninkicha? [Tukuypi kutin rikuy]</p> <p>(1) Ecuadormanta runakuna mana munashka llankayta rurankuna (2) Ecuadormanta runakunapak llankayta kichun (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IMMIG3. [Tukuyllata tapuchina] ¿Shuk llaktamanta runakuna kawsankapak kaypi shamushkamanta Ecuadorpi wañuchik llakikunaka ashtawan mana allichu?</p> <p>(1) Ari (2) Mana (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IMMIG4. Kikinka Ecuador tukuy ñukanchik kawsayka irkiyashka mana kashpaka mirarishka shuk llaktamanta runakuna kaypi kawsankapak shamushkamanta?</p> <p>(1) Irkilla (2) Mirarishka (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IMMIG5. Kikinka allimi mana kashpaka mana allichu shuk llaktamanta runakuna kaypi kasankapak shamukpi Ecuadorka kullkimanta?</p> <p>(1) Mana alli (2) Allilla (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>PROT3. Kunan tukury 12 killakunapi yuyarishpa, Tukury 12 killakunapi mañaykunapi mana kashpaka ñanpi rimaypi kashkaki? (1) Ari kashkami [Kati] (2) Mana kashkachu [Yalli JC1man] (88) NS [Yalli JC1man] (98) NR [Yalli JC1man]</p>	
<p>PROT4. Mashna kutikunata mañaykunapi mana kashpaka ñanpi rimaypi tukury 12 killakunapi kashkaki? (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>[Tapuchishka runakunata 23 watata mana kashpaka kipakunata ñanpi rimay- mañay shuk kuti kay tukury 12 killakunapi kashkata tapuna]</p> <p>Y4. Imamantata ñanpi kapary mana kashpaka mañaymanta jarkay karka? [MANA KILLKAKATINA. SHUKLLATA AKLLAY. Shuk kuti kashkata, kunanpimanta ashtawan tapuna. Tiayarka shukta yalli imaraykumanta, ashtawan yalli imaraykuta tapuna]</p> <p>(1) Kullkimanta (llankay, mashna valic, chani mirarin, illay ima rurankuna) (2) Yachakuy (illay ima rurankuna, yaykunkapak kullki mirarin, mana alli, yachakuypak kamachi) (3) Política nishka (Ñanpi kapari kamachikunamanta, partido nishka mana kashpaka ñawpaman pushankapak munakkuna, anchuchik, mana alli llankay) (4) Mana alli kay llakikuna (wañuchikkuna, awkakkuna, mana alli tantanakuykuna) (5) Kawsaypak alli kana (6) Mama pachapak rimay (7) Illay llaktakunatakyanapay (8) Shuktak (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap (Mana ñanpi kaparishpa mañay kashka mana kashpaka 23 wata ñawpa kashka)</p>	

Kunan shuktak rimankushpa. Wakin runakuna ima tiyakpi kay mamallaktamanta awkak runakuna ñawpaman pushayta golpe de estado nishkata rurashpa japinkuna allimi ninkimancha. Kikinpak yuyaypi awkak runakunamanta golpe de estado nishka tiyakpi kay kity imaraykukunamanta allimi ninkimancha...? [Ayllaykunata shuk shuk tapuyta kati killakatina] :					
JC1. Ashka llankay illay ñawpa.	(1) Allimi ninkiman awkak runakuna mamallaktapak kamachi jawata yallishpa ushayta japichun.	(2) Mana alli ninkimancha awkak runakuna mamallaktapak kamachi jawata yallishpa ushayta japichun	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Tawka wañuchik shuwakkuna ñawpa8.	(1) Allimi ninkiman awkak runakuna mamallaktapak kamachi jawata yallishpa ushayta japichun	(2) Mana alli ninkimancha awkak runakuna mamallaktapak kamachi jawata yallishpa ushayta japichun	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Ashka mana allí ruray ñawpapi	(1) Allimi ninkiman awkak runakuna mamallaktapak kamachi jawata yallishpa ushayta japichun	(2) Mana alli ninkimancha awkak runakuna mamallaktapak kamachi jawata yallishpa ushayta japichun	NS (88)	NR (98)	
ECUJC20. Colombia mamallaktamanta Ecuadorman llakikikuna mirary ñawpapi	(1) Allimi ninkiman awkak runakuna ushayta japichun	(2) Mana alli ninkimancha awkak runakuna ushayta japichun	(88) NS	(98) NR	

JC15A. Kikin mamallaktapi imakuna may shinchipi kakpi mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka Asamblea wichashpak Asamblea illa ñawpaman pushan allimi yuyankichu?	(1) Allimi nin	(2) Mana allichu	(88) NS	(98) NR	
JC16A. Kikin mamallaktapi imakuna may shinchipi kakpi mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka Corte Nacional de Justicia anchuchispak Corte Nacional de Justicia illa ñawpaman pushan allimi yuyankichu?	(1) Allimi nin	(2) Mana allichu	(88) NS	(98) NR	

VIC1EXT. Kunan, shuktak rimashpa, ¿Kikinta kay 12 killakunapi shuwakuna mana alli runakuna llakichishkachu?. Alli nishpa, Kikinta shuwashka, maktashka, manchachishka, mana kashpaka shuk laya llakikuna kay 12 tukury killakinapi charishkankichu? (1) Ari [Kati] (2) Mana [Yallina VIC1WASIman] (88) NS [Yallina VIC1WASIman] (98) NR [Yallina VIC1WASIman]					
VIC1EXTA. Mashna kutikunatak kikinta kay tukury killakunapi llakichishka? _____[Yupayta churana]_____	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP		

<p>VIC2. Chairalla kikinta llakichishkata yuyarishpa, kay kati killkashkata killkagrini, Imashinatak llakichirka? [Ayllaykunatak killkatina]</p> <p>(01) Shuway ayñi illak mana waktarka mana kashpaka manchachirka (02) Shuway ayñi illak waktarka mana kashpaka manchachirka (03) Shuway ayñiwan (04) Waktarka mana shuwashpa (05) Wakllichi mana kashpaka warmita wakllichi (06) Runakunata shuway (07) Imakunatak wakllichi (08) Wasita shuaway (10) Manchachi [mana kashpaka pipish kullkita mañarka wasipi kawsashkamanta] (11) Shuktak (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (mana llakichishkachu)</p>	
<p>VIC2AA. Maypitak kikinta chayraklla makaywan shuwashpa llakichirka? [Akllaykunata killkatina]</p> <p>(1) Kikipak wasipi (2) Kay ayllu llaktapi mana kashpaka suyu (3) Kay villapi/ uchilla llakta/ kiti (4) Shuk villapi/ uchilla llakta/ kiti (5) Shuk mamallaktapi (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>VIC1WASI. Kikipak wasipi kawsak shuk aylluta sarun 12 killakunapi llakichishkachu? Shuk shimipi nishpaka, Kikipak wasipi kawsak shuk aylluta sarun 12 killakunapi llakichishka shuwashpa, waktashpa, manchachishpa shuway mana kashpaka shuk laya llakichikuna?</p> <p>(1) Ari (2) Mana (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ8. Shuwakunata japi ushankapa, Kinkinka ñauwpaman pushakkuna wiñay wiñaylla kamachikunata katina kan yuyanki mana kashpaka wakinpika kamachi jawata?</p> <p>(1) Wiñay wiñaylla kamachiwan kana (2) Wakinpika Karachi jawata rural ushan (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ11. Suyumanta rimanakushpa mana kashpaka kikipak kawsak llakta mana kaspakapa kikipak kawsak suyupi, shamuk punllapi shuway llakichy tukunapi yuyashpa, Kinkinka may alli kani yuyarinki, shina sinalla alli kani yuyanki, ashata mana alli kani yuyanki mana kashpaka mana alli kani yuyanki?</p> <p>(1) May alli kawsay (2) Shina shinalla kani yuyanki (3) Ashata mana alli (4) Mana alli (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ11A. Mamallakmanta tukuyta parlashpa, Imashinatak kinkinka kay llakichikunaka kunanpi kay llakikunaka shamuk punllapi allí kawsayta wakllichikun? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Ashka ashka (2) ashata (3) ashakuta (4) Mana imata (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ12. Kinkinka shuway llakichy tukushka kashpaka, Mashnatak kay sistema judicial nishkaka juchayukta llakichinata minkakiman? [Akllaykunata killkakatina] Minkakiman...</p> <p>(1) Ashka ashka (2) Ashata (3) Ashakuta (4) Mana imata (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>AOJ17. Imakamanta kikipak kawsak llaktaka mana alli tantanakushka runakunamanta wakllichishka kan? ¿Ashka ashka, ashta, ashakuta, mana kashpaka mana imata ninkiman?</p> <p>(1) Ashka ashka (2) Ashata (3) Ashakuta (4) Mana imata (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

Kikin mañayta mana kashpaka shuk punlla pipish kikipak ayllu mañayta churashka kay kati ukukunapi, Allimi ninki, ashata allimi, ashata mana alli, mana kashpaka mana alli? **[AKLLAYKUNAPAK TIKRACHITA SHUK SHUK TAPUYKUNA KUTIN NINA]**

	Allimi	Ashata alli	Ashata mana alli	Mana alli	[Mana Killkatina] Mana mañaykunata rurarka	NS	NR	
ST1. Policía Nacionalka	1	2	3	4	99	88	98	
ST2. juzgadokunaka o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	99	88	98	
ST3. Fiscalíaka	1	2	3	4	99	88	98	

[UCHILLA PANKATA “C” TAPUCHISKAMAN KUNKI]

Kay uchilla pankapi chakanapak sarunakuna [sarukuna] yupashka shukmanta kanchishkaman, chaypi 1 sarunaka ashtawan uchillami, MANA IMA nishka 7 sarunaka ashtawan jatunmi, ASHKA nishka. Shinata, ñukaka payta tapusha imakamantatak televisionta rikunkapak munashpaka, Kikin mana imata rikunkapak munashpaka, 1 yupayta akllankiman. Mana kashpaka ashkata televisionta rikunkapak munaki nuwankiman 7yupayta. Kikipak yuyaypi mana imapash ashkapash kakpi allankiman chaypilla yupayta. Shinaka, Imakamantatak televisionta rikunkapak munanki? Yupayta killkakatiway.

[Tapuchishkata alli intindichun alli rikuy].

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Mana ima						Ashka	NS	NR

1-7 yupayta killkakatina 88 kayman NS y 98 kayman NR

Tawka tapuyta rurakrini, tikrachinkapak kay chakamanta yupaywan tikrachi nishpa mañakrini. Yuyaru maykanpash yupaywan tikrachi ushanki.

B1. Imakamantak kikinka Ecuadorkap tribunal de justicia allipacha rurayta rikuchinchu? (**Tapuy:** Kikinka kay tribunalkuna mana alli mana imata justiciaka yuyanki, 1 yupayta akllay; kay tribunalkuna allipacha ashka justiciaka yuyanki, 7 yupayta akllay mana kashpaka chaypillamanta yupayta akllay)

B2. Imakamantak kay Ecuadormanta politica uku nishkata kasuyta charinki?

B3. Imakamantak kay runakunapak alli kawsayta Ecuadorkap politico Kamachimanta alli jarkashka kan?

B4. Imakamanta kay Ecuador político Kamachi ukupi kawsashpak alli kushilla kanki?

B6. Imakamantak kikin Ecuadorkap politico kamachita yanapana kanki?

B10A. Imakamantak sistema judicial nishkapi minkasha ninki?

B11. Imakamantak kay Consejo Nacional Electoral nishkapi minkasha ninki?

B12. Imakamantak kikinka awkak runakunapi minkasha ninki?

B13. Imakamantak Asamblea Nacionalpi alli nishpa minkasha ninki?

B14. Imakamantak kikinka ñawpaman pushakpi minkasha ninki?

B15. Imakamanta kikinka mamallaktapak Fiscalía Generalpi minkasha ninki?

B18. Imakamanta kikinka mamallaktapak chapakunapi minkasha ninki?

B19. Imakamanta Contraloría nishka ukupi minkasha ninki?

B20. Imakamanta Católica Iglesiapi minkasha ninki?	
B20A. Imakamanta ashtawan mamallaktapi riksishka Iglesiapi minkasha ninki?	
B21. Imakamanta partido político nishka tantakushkapi minkasha ninki?	
B21A. Imakamantak kikinka mamallaktapak ñawpaman pushakpi minkasha ninki?	
B23. Imakamantak kikinka sindicatokuna nishka tantanakushkapi minkasha ninki?	
B31. Imakamantak kikinka Corte Nacional de Justicia nishkapi minkasha ninki?	
B32. Imakamantak kikinka kikipak villata ñawpaman pushakpi minkasha ninki?	
B43. Imakamantak kikinka Ecuador mamallaktamanta kashpa may kushilla kanki?	
B16. Imakamantak Procuraduría General del Estado nishka mana kashpaka mamallaktapak abogado nishkapi minkasha ninki?	
B17. Imakamantak kikinka Defensoría del Pueblo nishka ukupi minkasha ninki?	
B37. Imakamantak kikinka willachik ukukunapi minkasha ninki?	
B40. Imakamantak kikinka runakunapak tantanakushkapi minkasha ninki?	
ECUB40A. Imakamantak kikinka afro-ecuatorianokuna tantanakushkapi minkasha ninki?	
B46 [b45]. Imakamantak kikinka Consejo de Participación Ciudadana y Control Social nishka pi minkasha ninki?	
B47. Imakamantak kikinka ñawpaman pushkkunata akllaykunapi minkasha ninki?	
B48. Imakamantak kikinka katuna rantina ari nishkaka kullkita mirachinkapak yanapan yuyankichu?	
B51. Imakamantak kikinka Organizaciones No Gubernamentales nishka mamallaktapi llankak ONGs nishkapi minkasha ninki?	
B50. Imakamantak kikinka Tribunal Constitucional nishkapi minkasha ninki?	
ECUB50 (B50). ONG “Participación Ciudadana” nishkata uyashkanckichu? “mana” nikpi churay 99 yalli N1man. “Ari” nikpi tapuna: Imakamantak kikinka kay ukupiminkasha ninki?	

Kunan, chay chakanawanllata [C uchilla pankawan katipay: akllay 1-7]	Killkay 1-7,
N1. Imakamantak kunan mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka wakchakunamanta mankanakun ninkiman?	
N3. Imakamantak kay mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka democracia yuyayta jarkanpash tarpunpash ninkiman?	
N9. Imakamantak kay mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka mana alli ruraykunataka anchichin ñawpaman pushaypi ninkiman?	
N11. Imakamantak kay mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka llaktakunapak alli kawsayta allichishka ninkiman?	
N12. Imakamantak kay mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka llankaykuna illaymanta llankashka ninkiman?	
N15. Imakamantak kay mamallaktata ñawpaman pushakka kullkimanta alli <input type="checkbox"/> hayan rurakun ninkman?	

[“C” UCHILLA PANKATA TANTACHINA]

WT1. Imashinallatak kikinka yuyaypi charishkanki kikipak mamallaktapi wañuchik runakuna kay 12 sarun kilkunapi wañuchik tiyanka yuyashpa? Kikinka ashkata, ashata, ashakuta, mana imata mana kashpaka kikin kayta mana yuyarishkanichu ninkiman? (1) Ashka llakirishka (2) Ashata llakirishka (3) Ashakuta llakirishka (4) Mana imata llakirishka (5) Kayta mana yuyarishkachu (88) NS (98) NR	
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WT2. Imashinallatak kikinka yuyaypi charishkanki kikin mana kashpaka pipish kikipak ayllu wañuchik runakunamanta wañuchishaka □hayan? ¿ Kikinka ashkata, ashata, ashakuta mana kashpaka mana imata, mana kashpaka kikin kayta mana yuyarishkanichu ninkiman? (1) Ashka llakirishka (2) Ashata llakirishka (3) Ashakuta llakirishka (4) Mana imata llakirishka (5) Kayta mana yuyarishkachu (88) NS								
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POP113. Maykan chawpi yalliwan mana ari nishkkunaka mamallaktapak mana allita kan . Imakamantak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki?
(88) NS (98) NR

Kay chanakanatallawan. Nipay, imakamantak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninkikay kati yuyaykunawan.

EFF1. Mamallakta ñawpaman pushaktaka kikin shina runakunaka. Imakamantak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay yuyaykunawan?

EFF2. Kikin alli intinkikapak kay politicokuna yuyayta ashtawan alli niki. Imakamantak, ari ninki manka kashpaka mana ninki kay yuyaykunawan?

**Shuk yupayta killkana 1-7, 88 chaykunapak
NS shinallatak 98 chaykunapak NR**

ING4. Democraciaka llakikunata chary ushan, shinapish maykanpash alli shuk laya ñawpaman pushana. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay yuyaykunawan?

DEM23. Democraciaka partido políticokuna illak tiyay ushan. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay yuyaykunawan?

Kunan shuk mamallaktapak ruray yuyaykunata killkakatikrini. Nipay imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan. Chay chakanallawanllata 1 a 7 katishun.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. Ecuador mamallaktaka, shuk runapakpak suyupirandi, mamallakta jatun empresayuk shinallatak industriayuk kana kanchu. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan?

ROS2. Ecuador mamallaktaka, runakunata ashatawan yalli, runakunapk alli kawsaymanta ashtawan llankanami kan. Imakamanta ari ninki manka kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan?

ROS3. Ecuador mamallaktaka, shuk runapak empresa nishkata yalli, llankaykunata ashtawan wiñachishpa llankanami kan. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan?

ROS4. Ecuador mamallaktaka **shinchi** yuyaykunata mirachina ama shuk yalli shuk yalli charikkunawan wakchakunawan shuk kayta anchichinkapak. Imakamanta ari ninki manka kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan?

ROS5. Ecuador mamallaktaka, shuk runakunapak empresakunata ashtawan yalli, tawka watakunata llankashka runakunaman kunanpi yuyak kakpi kullkita kuna llankanami . Imakamanta ari ninki manka kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan?

ROS6. Ecuador mamallaktaka, shuk runakunapak empresakunata ashtawan yalli, alli kawsaymanta yanapayta kushpa llankami kan. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan?

Kunan shuk rimaykunata killkakatikrini shinallatak tikrahichun munashkayman imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kaykunawan, kay chakanawan 7 iñukunamanta, maypi 1 mana ari nishkami shinallatak 7 ari nishkami.

**Killkana 1-7
88=NS,
98=NR**

RAC3A. Shuk laya rukakuna chapurika Ecuadorkan allimi kan. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay rimaykunawan?

RAC3B. kikinta shuk ushi mana kashpaka churi yana runawan sawarichun ari ninkiman. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay rimaykunawan?

	Killkana 1-7 88=NS, 98=NR	
RAC3C. kikinka ashtawan yuraklla kankapak. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay rimaykunawan?		

["D" UCHILLA PANATA TANTACHINA]

PN4. Tukuypi, ¿Kikinkka sumakmi ninkiman, allillami, mana alli mana kashpaka ashtawan mana alli Ecuadorpi democraciawan ñawpaman pushayka?	
(1) Sumak (2) Allilla (3) Mana alli (4) Ashtawan mana alli (88) NS (98) NR	
PN5. Kikinpak yuyaypi, ¿Ecuador mamallaktaka may democráticomí kan, ashata democrático, ashakuta democrático, mana kashpaka mana democrático?	
(1) May democrático (2) Ashata democrático (3) Ashakuta democrático (4) Mana democrático (88) NS (98) NR	

["E" UCHILLA PANKATA TAPUCHISHKAMAN KUNKI]

Kunan shuk uchilla pankata churakrinchik. Kay mushuk uchilla pankaka shuk chakanata charin 1 manta 10 kaman, 1 rikuchin kikinka mana nishkata shinallatak 10 rikuchin kikinka ari nishkata. Shuk tawka ruraykunata killkakaturkiri mana kashpaka imakunata runakunaka rural ushan paykunapak munayta shunallatak ñawpaman pushayta paktachinkapak. Kikin nichun munashkayman ari ninkiman mana kashpaka mana ninkiman runakuna kay katy ruraykunata rurachun.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Mana ari ninki									Ari ninki	88	98
										1-10, 88, 98	
E5. Runakuna kaparichun paykunapak mañayta Kamachi sakishakaman. Imakamanta ari ninki manka kashpaka mana ninki?											
E8. Runakuna shuk tanatanakuyupi <input type="checkbox"/> hayan mana kashpaka tantarishkapi llaktakunpak llakikunata allichinata rikunchapapak. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki?											
E11. Runakuna akllaykunapi shuk partido político mana kashpaka ñawpaman <input type="checkbox"/> haya tukunkapak munakpi llankachuno candidato. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki?											
E15. Runakuna ñankunata wichaypi mana kashpaka ñankunata jarkaypi mana ari nishpa kaparishpa kan. Chay chakanawanllata, Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki?											
E14. Runakuna shukpak imakunata mana kashpaka shukpak allpakunaman yaykushpa mana ari nishpa kaparishpa kan. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki?											
E3. Runakuna tantanakushpa makanakuywan akllashka mamallakta ñawpaman pushakta anchichinkapak munakta. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki?											
E16. Runakuna mana mamallakta wañuchikkunata llachikpika paykunallata llakichina kan. Imakamanta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki?											

["E" uhilla pankata ama tantachy]

Kay katy tapuykunaka kikinpak yuyaykunata yachankapakmi kankuna imashina Ecuadorpi kawsak runakuna shuk shuk yuyaykunata charinkuna. Katypay chakanata 10 ifukuna.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NR
Mana ari ninki										Ari ninki	
										88	98

	1-10, 88, 98
D1. Wiñay wiñaylla mana alli ñawpaman pushakta runakuna tiyan, mana katy katy ñawpaman pushakkunatalla, mana shinachu kay imashima ñawpaman pushayta, Imashinata kikinka kay yuyayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki chashna runakuna shintana kankuna? Chakanamanta yupayta killkakatiyay: [Rikupay: ¿Imkmantak?]	
D2. Imashinata kikinka kay yuyayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay runakuna mana ari nishpa kaparikunata rurashpa shamunkuna paykunapak yuyayta ninkapak munaymanta? Yupayta kilkatipay.	
D3. Wiñay wiñaylla Ecuadorta mana alli ñawpaman pushayta yuyakushpa. Imashinata kikinka kay yuyayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay runakuna ñawpaman <input type="checkbox"/> haya tukunkapak yaikuy ushanchu?	
D4. Imashinata kikinka kay yuyayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay runakuna televisionpi rimashpak llukshichun kun?	
D5. Kunanka, shuktak rimashpa, kari-warmi runakunapi yuyarishpa. Imashinata kay yuyayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay runakuna ñawpaman <input type="checkbox"/> haya tukunkapak yaikuy ushanchu?	
D6. Imashinata kay yuyayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay kari-warmi runakuna sawary ushayta charichun?	
D37. Imashinata kay yuyayta ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay ñawpaman pushakta willachik ukumanta rimakpi upallayachin?	

["E" uchilla pankata tantachina]

Kunan shuktak rimashpa.

DEM2. Maykanwantak kikinka kay katy yuyaykunata ashtwan ari ninki: (1) Ñuka shina runaman, kikinpakka democratico ñawpan pushayka mana democráticopash shinallatakchu, man kashpakao (2) Democraciaka munashkami kan maykanpash shuk laya ñawpaman pushayka, mana kashpaka (3) Wakinpi yapa shinchi ñawpaman pushak randi shuk democraticomi kana kan. (88) NS (98) NR	
DEM11. Ñukanchik mamallaktaka shinchi makiwan ñawpaman pushakta ministin, mana kashpaka tukuyllami yanapashpallami llakikunata allichy ushan yuyanki? (1) Shinchi maki (2) Tukuylla yanapay (88) NS (98) NR	

ECUDEM14. Maykan ñanta ashtawan mamallaktapi democraciata. **[Tikrachikunata killkakatina]**

- (1) Justiciata shinchiyachina
 (2) Suyu ñawpaman pushakta shichiyachina
 (3) Mana alli ruraykunata anchuchina
 (4) Imashina llankaykunata mirachina
 (5) Alii kawsayta yachachina
 (6) Llakatapi alli kawsayta allichina
 (7) **[MANA KILLKAKATINA]** Mana maykan puntakuna nishkakunachu
 (88) NS (98) NR

AUT1. Runakunaka nikkuna tiyan shuk shinchi apuktami minishtinchik ama shitashpak akllashka □hayan. Shukkuna □hayant, mana imakunatak alli rikpi, akllaypak democracia mana kashpaka, llaktakunapak akllayka wiñay wiñaylla allimi kan. Kikinka imatak yuyanki?

[Akllaykunata killkakatina]

- (1) Shuk shinchi apuktami minishtinchik ama shitashpak akllashka □hayan, mana kashpaka
 (2) Llakunapak akllayka allimi kan
 (88) NS (98) NR

PP1. Akllanakupki, wakin runakunaka shuk partidoman mana kashpaka ñawpaman □haya tukukukman shitachun ari ninchinkapak munan. Mashna kutitak kikinka shukkunata shuk partidoman mana kashpaka ñawpaman □haya tukukukman shitachun ari ninchichishkanki

[Ayllaykunata killkakatina]

- (1) Tawka kutikkuna (2) Wakinpi (3) Wakinpilla (4) Mana ima (88) NS
 (98) NR

PP2. Shuk partidopak llankan runakuna tiyan mana kashpaka shuk ñawpaman □haya tukunkapak munapak akllay pachapi llankankuna. ¿Kikinka shuk ñawpaman □haya tukunkapak munapak mana kashpaka shuk partidopak kay sarun 2009pi ñawpaman pushakta akllaykunapi llankarkankichu? (1) Ari llankarka (2) Mana llankarka
 (88) NS (98) NR

	INAP Mana rimashka man kashpaka riksita charirka	Mana	Ari	NS	NR
Kunan kikinpak kawsay yachayta rimankapak munanchik imakunawan □hayan □hayan kawsaypi rikurin...					
EXC2. Wakin chapakunaka shuk imamantapash kay 12 killkunapi kullkita mañarkachu?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. Kay 12 sarun killkunapi, shuk llaktatak yanapak kullkita mañashkachu?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. Shuk villata ñawpaman pushakta kay sarun 12 killkakunapi mañashkankichu? Tikrachi Mana Kakpi → Aspi 99 Tikrachi ari Kakpi → Tapuna: Villata ñawpaman pushakpi shk mañayta rurankapak, shina, shuk katunkapak mañay, kay sarun watapi, Shuk kullkita kamachimanta nishka yallita pagana kashkankichu kamachimanta nishka yallita?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. ¿Kikinka llankakichu? Tikrachi Mana kakpi → Aspi 99 Tikrachi Ari kakpi → Tapuna: Kikinpak llankaypi, sarun 12 killkunapi imamantapash kullkita mañashkachu?	99	0	1	88	98

	INAP Mana rimashka man kashpaka riksita charirka	Mana	Ari	NS	NR
EXC14. Sarun 12 killakunapi, juzgadokunawan shuk rimayta charirkankichu? Tikrachy Mana kakpi → Aspi 99 Tikrachy Ari kakpi → Tapuna: Kay sarun watapi, juzgadokunapi imamantapash kulkita pagana kashkankichu?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Kay sarun 12 killakunapi mamallaktapak yanapak janpi wasipi kashkanichu? Tikrachy Mana kakpi → Aspi 99 Tikrachy Ari kakpi → Tapuna: Kikinpak llankaypi, sarun 12 killakunapi, Jatun janpi wasipi mana kashpaka uchilla janpi wasipi asha kulkita pagana kashkankichu?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Kay sarun watapi, Wawata yachana wasipi charirkankichu? Tikrachy Mana kakpi → Aspi 99 Tikrachy Ari kakpi → Tapuna: Kayna watapi yachana wasipi, Wakin kulkita pakalla pagana karka?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC18. ¿Imashinatak wakinpi imakunapipish kulkita pagana urmakpi allimi yuyankichu?		0	1	88	98

EXC7. Kikinpak kawsay yuyayta rikushpa mana kashpaka parlakta uyashkankichu, Mamallaktapak yanapak runakuna mana allita ruraypimi kan: [KILLKAKATINA] (1) Tukuyllapi (2) Wakin (3) Ashalla (4) Mana ima (88) NS (98) NR	
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["D"]uchilla pankata shuk kuti kuna Kunan, killkakatikrini tawka imashina runa kashkata kikinpi □hayanta mana kashaka mana □hayanta. Chay chakanawanllata 1manta 7kaman rikuchinkapak imakamantak ari ninki mana kashpaka mana ninki kay yuyaykuna kikinpi chayan. Rikunami imakamantak kikinpi imashina kikin kashka chayan, manarak wakin kikin kashka chayshukpi shina chayan.									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
May mana ari nini							May ari nini	NS	NR
Kikinka yuyanki kashna shuk runami kani:									
PER1. Tukuylla runakuwan rimak shinallatak shinchilank									
PER2. Shuk yapa rimak runa shinallatak makanakuk									
PER3. Shuk minkanalla runa shinallatak kazuk									
PER4. Shuk mana kasilla shinallatak pankalla piñarik runa									
PER5. Shuk paskshka yuyaykunapak mushuk ruraykunapak shinallatak mushk yachakuykunapakpash runa									
PER6. Shuk upalla shinallatak pinkay tukuklla runa									
PER7. Shuk llakik yanapak runa									
PER8. Shuk sakirishka shinallatak mana alli rurak									
PER9. Shuk pankalla shunku wiñay wiñaylla kushilla									
PER10. Shuk ashallatak mushuk yuyaywan shinallatak pishi yuyaykunawan									

[“D”uchilla pankata tantachina]

<p>LLAKIKUNA1. Wakinkun ñukanchik mamallaktaka shinchi kullkki llakikunatami charin ninkuna, shukkunaka mana kullkki llakikunaka tiyanchu ninkuna. Imatak kikinka yuyanki? [Akllaykunata killkakatina] (1) Shinchi kullki llakikunapimi kanchik (2) Kullki llakikunapimi kanchik shinapish mana (3) Mana kullki llakikuna tiyanchu [Yalli VB1man] (88) NS [Yalli VB1man] (98) NR [Yalli VB1man]</p>	
<p>LLAKIKUNA2. Pitak kay mamallaktapi kullki llakikuna tiyapak juchayuk kan?: [KAYKUNATA KILLAKATINA, ASPI SHUK TIKRACHYTALLA] (01) Punda ñawpaman pushak (02) Kay ñawpaman pushak (03) Ñukanchik, Ecuadorpi kawsakkuna (04) Ñukanchik mamallaktamanta charik runakuna (05) Democraciamanta llakikuna (06) Charik mamallaktakuna [Ari nipash: Estados Unidos, Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania y Japón] (07) Mamallaktapak kullki kamachi, mana kashpa (08) Mana ima punlla kaykunapi yuyashkani (77) [MANA KILLKAKATINA] Shuktak (88) [MANA KILLKAKATINA] NS (98) [MANA KILLKAKATINA] NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>VB1. Kikinpak shutika churashkachu shitankapak? (1) Ari (2) Mana (3) Mañaypi (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VB2. VKikinka sarun 2009pi ñawpaman pushak akllaypi shitarkankichu? (1) Ari shitarka [kati] (2) Mana shitarkachu[Yalli VB10man] (88) NS [Yalli VB10man] (98) NR [Yalli VB10man]</p>	
<p>VB3. Pimantak sarun 2009pi ñawpaman pushak akllaypi shitarkanki? [KAYKUNTA MANA KILLKAKATINA] (00) Manapi (shitankapak rirka shinapish pankata yurapi sakirka, wakllichirka mana kashpaka manapiman kikinka kurkanki) (901) Rafael Correa, Movimiento Alianza País - PAIS (902) Lucio Gutiérrez, Partido Sociedad Patriótica - PSP (903) Martha Roldos Bucaram, Alianza Izquierda Unida- RED/MIPD (904) Carlos Sagnay De La Bastida, Movimiento Triunfo Mil- MTM (905) Álvaro Noboa, Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional - PRIAN (906) Melba Jacome, Movimiento Tierra Fertil- MTF (907) Diego Delgado Jara, Movimiento de Integracion y Transformacion Social- MITS (908) Carlos Gonzales Alborno, Movimiento Independiente Justo y Solidario- MIJS (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Mana shitarka)</p>	
<p>VB10. Kay pachapi, maykan partido políticowan kanki? (1) Ari [Katy] (2) Mana [Yalli POL1man] (88) NS [Yalli POL1man] (98) NR [Yalli POL1man]</p>	

<p>VB11. Maykan partido políticowantak kanki? [AMA KAYKUNATA KILLKATICHU]</p> <p>(901) Red Etica y Democracia (RED) (902) Movimiento Poder Ciudadano (MPC) (903) Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) (904) Izquierda Democrática (ID) (905) Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) (906) Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción Nacional (PRIAN) (907) Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik - Nuevo País (Pachacutik) (908) Unión Demócrata Cristiana (UDC) (909) Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD) (910) Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio (PS-FA) (911) Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (PSP) (912) Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) (913) Alianza PAIS-Patria Altiva I Soberana (PAIS) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>POL1. Imakamantak kikinka politicata munanki: ashka, ashata, ashakullata mana kashpakak mana imata?</p> <p>(1) Ashka (2) Ashata (3) Ashakullata (4) Mana imata (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>VB20. Kay kanchis punllapi ñawpaman pushak akllay karpika , imatak kikinka rurankiman? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Mana shitankiman (2) Ñawpaman pushak tukunamanta shitankiman mana kashpakak kay partidomanta ñawpaman pushakmanta shitankiman (3) Ñawpaman pushak tukunamanta shitankiman mana kashpakak kay partidomanta shuk ñawpaman pushakmanta shitankiman (4) Shitankapak rinkimancha shinapish pankata yuyapi sakinkiman mana kashpaka manapiman shitankiman, man kashpaka (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>CLIEN1. Kay sarun watakunapi shinallatak akllaykunapi yuyarishpa, Shuk ñawpaman pushak tukunakunkapak munak mana kashpaka shuk partido políticoka imatapish karasha nirkachu, shuk yanapayta, mikunata man kashpaka shuktak imakunata mana kashpaka kikipak alli kanata shinapish kikin shitachun mana kashpaka chay ñawpaman pushak tukunakunkapak munakman yanapay mana kashpaka partidoman? Kayaka imakutitak shinapi kashkanki wakinpi mana kashpaka mana ima punlla.?</p> <p>(1) Wakinpi [KATY CLIEN2wan] (2) Wakinpilla [AKTY CLIEN2wan] (3) Nunca [Yalli RAC1Cman] (88) NS [Yalli RAC1Cman] (98) NR [Yalli RAC1Cman]</p>	
<p>CLIEN2 Chairaklla kutipi ima yallishkapi yuyarishpa, Imakunatak ñawapaman pushak tukunaka kikinman karasha nishkaka kikipak shitayka chaymanchu karka mana kashpaka ashata chayman yanapay mana kahpakak mana chayman shitankapak mana kashpaka chay partidoka karasha nishpaka allitachu karasha nirka?</p> <p>(1) Ashtawan shitankapak (2) Ashata shitankapak (3) Mana ashtawan mana ashalla shitankapak (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

RAC1C. Llaktakunata yupaymanta rikushkami yana runakunaka ashtawan wakchami kan, tukuyupi, kay llaktamanta shuk runakunamanta yalli. Imamantatak kayka kan kikinka yuyanki?

[Akllaykunata killkakatina] [Shuk tikrachitalla ari nina]

- (1) Imashpak yana runakunaka mana paktankakaman llankankuna
- (2) Imashpak yana runakunaka pishi yuyayta charinkuna
- (3) Imashpak yana runakunaka mana alli rimay tukushka kankuna
- (4) Imashpak yana runakunaka ashalla yachakushkata charinkuna
- (5) Imashpak yana runakunaka mana mushuk kawsayta munakuna
- (88) NS
- (98)NR

RAC4. Kikinka yana runakunaka mana allipacha rikushka kankuna yuyanki sumak, alli, shinallatak, ashtawan mana alli mana kashpaka ashtawan mana allipacha yura runakunawan rikushpaka yuyanki,?

- (1) Sumak
- (2) Alli
- (3) Shinallata
- (4) Mana alli
- (5) Ashtawan mana allipacha
- (88) NS
- (98)NR

Kunanka, shukta rimashpa...

Sarun pichika watakunapi yuyarishpa, Ima punllapish mana alli rikushka kashkanki mana kashpaka mana alli rimay tukushka mana kashpaka mana allipacha: **[Kutin nipay kipaman shuk shuk tapuykunta: Tawka kutikuna, wakinpi, wakinpipacha, mana kashpaka mana ima punlla]**

	Tawka kutikuna	Wakinpi	Wakinpipacha	Mana ima punlla	NS	NR
DIS11. Kikinpak aycha karamanta? Kikinka tawka kutikuna, wakinpi, wakinpipacha, mana kashpaka mana ima punlla kashka ninkiman?	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS13. Kikinka wakcha kashkamanta	1	2	3	4	88	98
DIS12. Kikin warki – kari Kashakamanta	1	2	3	4	88	98

Kunan imatashi shuk runaka yallirka yuyarishpa, Kikinka kawsashkaki mana kashpaka shuk runata mana alli kachik, mana alli kachishpa rimakta, mana allipachata rikushkankichu? **[KKutin nipay kipaman shuk shuk tapuykunta: Tawka kutikuna, wakinpi, wakinpipacha, mana kashpaka mana ima punlla]**

	Tawka kutikuna	Wakinpi	Wakinpipacha	mana ima punlla	NS	NR
RAC1A. Kikinpak aycha karamanta? Tawka kutikuna, wakinpi, wakinpipacha, mana kashpaka mana ima punlla kashka?	1	2	3	4	88	98

RAC1D. Kikinka wakcha kashkamanta?	1	2	3	4	88	98	
RAC1E. Kikin warki – kari Kashakamanta?	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Kunanka, shukta rimashpa...

CCT1. ¿Kikin mana kashpaka pipish kikipak wasimanta mamallaktapak ñawpaman pushakmanta Bono nishka kullki yanapayta killan killan chaskinchu mana kashpaka imakunapipish. Shina: **[Bono nishka kullki yanapay shinallatak Wasichinkapak Bono nishkata** mamallaktapak ñawpaman pushakpak yanapay?
(1) Ari (2) Mana (88) NS (98) NR

ED. Ima watatak kikipak yachakuyta tukuchirka man kashpaka yallirkancki?
_____ Watamanta _____ (kallari yachana wasi, katy yachana wasi, Sumak yachana wasi, yalli yachakuy mana Sumak yachana wasi) = _____ TTukuy watakuna
[Katipi kaymanta yupaywan ruray]

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Mana ima	0						
Kallari yachakuy	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Katipi yachakuy	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Sumak yachana wasi	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
yalli yachakuy mana Sumak yachana wasi	13	14	15	16			
NS	88						
NR	98						

Q2. Mashna wata paktashka kanki? _____ watakuna
(888 = NS 988 = NR)

☐ ☐

[25 watata mana kahpaka kipa tapuchishka runakunata tapuy] [Tapuchishka runaka 25 watatak yalli charikpika Q3Cman yalli]

Y1. Pichika wata ukupi, Kikinka mamallaktapak llankashpak yuyarinki, shina....

[Akllaykunata killkakatina, SHUKLLATA ASPY]

(1) Llakta ukumanta tantanakuyipi (ONG), ayllu llaktapi mana kashpaka shuk partido políticopi

(2) Kay akllaykunapi ñawpaman pushak tukunpak munanki

(3) Mushuk yuyaywan tanatanakushkapi kashpa

(4) Kaykunamanta mana maykanta

(5) **[AMA KILLKAKATINA]** Shuktak

(88) NS

(98) NR

(99) INAP

[25 watata mana kahpaka kipa tapuchishka runakunata tapuy]

Y2. Imakunatak mana kashpaka kikinta ima llakikunatak wainpi llakiyachin?

**[MANA akllaykunata killkakatina, ASPY SHUKLLATA] [“Shamuk punlla” nikpi tapuna
¿Imakunakutak shamukpunllamanta llakiyachin?]**

- (1) Llankay, llankay tiyana, killapi kullkita japina, Kullki, kullki tiyana mana kashpaka llankay
- (2) Alli yallina, raymikuna, pukllaykuna, tantanakuy, tuparinakuna, kusa-warmi, ayllutak charina, kuitzakuna mana kashpaka wanprakuna
- (3) Charinakuna imakuna (churakunakuna shinallata zapatos, celulares, ipods, computadoras)
- (4) Charina mana kashpaka yachakuyta tukuchina, yachakuymanta pagana
- (5) Alli kawsanamanta, wañuchik, tantanakushka mana alli runakuna
- (6) Imashina shuk runkunawan (taytamamawan, ayllu, mashikuna shinallatak shukkunawan)
- (7) Alli kawsay
- (8) Pachamama
- (9) Mamallaktamanta
- (10) Mana imamanta
- (11) Shuk tikrachikuna
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

[25 watata mana kahpaka kipa tapuchishka runakunata tapuy]

Y3. Kikinpak yuyaypi, tukuyta rikushpa, Mamallaktaka alli ñantachu rikun mana kashpaka pantarishpa shuk ñantachu rikun?

- (1) Alli
- (2) Pantarishpa
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

[25 watata mana kahpaka kipa tapuchishka runakunata tapuy]

HAICR1. Nipay, Imashinatak kikinka kikinpak mamallakta kakta yachak chayanki? **[MANA akllaykunata killkakatina, SHUKLLATA ASPY]**

- (01) TV
- (02) Willachikunata killkashka panka
- (03) Anta
- (04) Apunchikpak wasipi
- (05) Ayllu llaktapak wasipi
- (06) Yachana wasi
- (07) Ayllukuna
- (08) Llankaymanta mashikuna mana kashpaka yachakuymanta
- (09) Mashikuna
- (10) Kikinpak llakatapi kawsak runa
- (11) Internet nishkapi (excluye diarios)
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

<p>Q3C. Kikin shuk religiómanta kashpa, Nipay, Maykanmantatak kanki? [Mana religiontak mana charinichu nikpika shktawan tapuchy kay akllaykunapi 4 mana kashpaka 11pimi kanka]</p> <p>(01) Católico</p> <p>(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).</p> <p>(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).</p> <p>(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)</p> <p>(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).</p> <p>(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).</p> <p>(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).</p> <p>(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)</p> <p>(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)</p> <p>(12) Testigos de Jehová.</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5A. ¿Mashna kutitak kikinka apunchikpak wasiman rinki? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Shuk kuti yalli kanchis punllapi (2) Shuk kuti kanchispunllapi (3) Shuik kuti killapi</p> <p>(4) Shuk mana kashpaka ishkey kuti watapi (5) Mana ima punlla man kashpaka ña mana ima punlla (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5B. Niway, Imakamanta religiónka kikipak kawsaypika? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Shuk nikimi (2) Ashata (3) Ashakulla (4) Mana imachu</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>[“F”UCHILLA PANKATA TAPUCHISHKAMAN KUNKI]</p> <p>Q10. Imapitak kikipak ayllupak killapi kullkika kay wasipi yayakukka kay katy killkashkapi rikushpa, karu llaktamanta shamuk kullkita tantachishpa shinallatak tukuylla llankak rukukunapakpash shurikunapakpash?</p> <p>[Mana intindikpika, tapuy: ¿Mashna kullkita tukuy killapi kikipak wasiman yaykun?]</p> <p>(00) Mana ima kullki</p> <p>(01) \$60 manta uray</p> <p>(02) \$61- \$100</p> <p>(03) \$101-\$200</p> <p>(04) \$201-\$300</p> <p>(05) \$301-\$500</p> <p>(06) \$501-\$750</p> <p>(07) \$751-\$1000</p> <p>(08) \$1001-1500</p> <p>(09) \$1501-\$2000</p> <p>(10) \$2001 ashtawan</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>[“F”UCHILLA PANKATA TANTACHINA]</p>	

<p>Q10A. Kikinka mana kashpaka kikipak wasipi kawsak karu llaktamanta kullkita chaskinchu? (1) Ari [katy] (2) Mana [Yalli Q10Cman] (88) NS [Yalli Q10Cman] (98) NR [Yalli Q10Cman]</p>	
<p>Q10B. [Karu llaktamanta kullkitalla chaskikpi] Imakamantak karu llaktamanta kullkilla kay ayllupak wasiman yaykun? [Akllaykunata killkakatina] (1) Ashka (2) Ashata (3) Ashakulla (4) Mana imata (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10A3. [Karu mamallaktamanta kullkita chaskikpilla] kay sarun killakunapi, ima jatunta karumanta kullkika (yanapay kullki) pishiyashkachu, mirarishkachu mana kashpaka shinallatak chaskin? (1) Mirarishka (2) Shinallatak (3) Pishiyashka (4) Kay 12 killakunapi mana karu mamallaktamanta killkita chaskika (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q10C. [Tukuyllata tapuna] Kikinka kikipak ayllu punta kay wasipi kawsarka shinallata kunanka shuk karu llaktapi kawsakta charinkichu? [“Ari”nikpika, tapuna ¿Maypitak?] [Mana akllaykunata killkakatina] (1) Ari, Estados Unidospilla [Katy] (2) Ari, Europapi shinallatak shuk mamallaktakunapi [Katy] (3) Ari, shuk mamallaktakunapi (mana Estados Unidospi) [Katy] (4) Mana [Yalli Q14man]] (88) NS [Yalli Q14man] (98) NR [Yalli Q14man]</p>	
<p>Q16. [Ari kutichishkunapaklla Q10Cpi] Mashna kutitak paykunawan rimanki? [Akllaykunata killkakatina] (1) Tukuy punllakuna (2) Kanchis punllapi shuk mana kashpaka ishkay kutikuna (3) Killapi shuk mana kashpaka ishkay kutikuna (4) Wakinpilla (5) Mana ima punlla (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>Q14. [Tukuyllata tapuna] Kikinka shuk llaktaman kawsankapak rinkapak munanki mana kashpaka shuk mamallaktaman kay shamuk kimas watapi llankankapak rinkapak munankichu? (1) Ari (2) Mana (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. Llankaymanta kullki mana kashpaka kikin killkapi chaskik kullki shinallatak tukuy kikipak wasiyan yaykuk kullki: [Akllaykunata killkakatina] (1) Alli paktan shinallatak wakichy ushankuna (2) Pakta pakta paktan mana shinchi llakikunawan (3) Mana paktanchu shinallatak llakikunata charin (4) Mana paktanchu shinallatak jatun llakikunata (88) [Mana killkakatina] NS (98) [Mana killkakatina] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. Kay sarun ishkay watakunapi, kikipak wasiman yaykuk kullki: [Akllaykunata killkakatina] (1) Mirarirka? [Yalli Q11man] (2) Shinallatakmi? [Yalli Q11man] (3) Pishiyarka? [Yalli Q10Fman] (88) NS [Yalli Q11man] (98) NR [Yalli Q11man]</p>	

<p>Q10F. ¿Imantatak kay sarun ishkay watakunapi kikipak wasiman yaykuk kullkika pishiyarka? [Mana killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Pishiyarka llankay pachakuna mana kashpaka killapi kullki (2) Shuk ayllu ukumanta llankay mana charin (3) Katuna uraykurka/ Katuna randina mana alli rinchu (4) Aykkupak katuna randina tukurirka (5) Karu llaktamanta shamuk kullki pishiyarka mana kashpaka chakita sakirka (6) Shuk ayllu ukumanta kullkita chaskik unkurka, wañurka man kashpaka wasimanta rirka (7) Pachamamapi llaki/ tarpushka chinkarka (9) Tukuy ashtawan kullkita minishtin, wasiman yaykuk kullki mana paktanchu (8) Shuk imamanta (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (“Mirarirka”, “Shinallatak” mana kashpaka NS/NRpi Q10E)</p>	
<p>Q11. Kikinka sawarisha kanki? [Mana akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Mana warmiyuk/ kusayuk (2) Warmiyuk/ kusayuk (3) Tantanakushk kawsan (4) Warmi illak/ kusa illak (5) Jichurishka (6) warmi illak/ kari illak (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12. Wawata charin? ¿Mashnatak? _____ (00= manapi → Yalli ETIDman)</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q12A. [Wawakunatak harikpi] Mashna wawakunatak kikipak wasipi kikinwan kawsan?</p> <p>00 = manapi, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (mana wawata charincho)</p>	
<p>ETID. Kikinka shuk yurak, misha, runa, yana, mana kashpaka shuk? [Tapuchiska runaka Afro-ecuatoriana kani nikpi, churay shina (4) Yana]</p> <p>(1) Yurak [Yalli ECUETIDaman] (2) Misha [Yalli ECUETIDaman] (3) Runa [Katy] (4) Yana [Yalli ECUETIDaman] (5) Yana chapu [Yalli ECUETIDaman] (7) Shuktak [Yalli ECUETIDaman] (88) NS [Yalli ECUETIDaman] (98) NR [Yalli ECUETIDaman]</p>	
<p>ECUETID2. Ima llaktamantak kikinka kanki? [Mana akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(01) Achuar (02) Awá (03) Chachi (04) Cofán (05) Epera (06) Huaorani (07) Manta (08) Quitu (09) Secoya (10) Shuar (11) Siona (12) Tsachila (13) Zaparo (14) Quechua (15) Saragurukuna (16) Salasacakuna (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	

<p>ECUETIDA. Kikinpak mamaka shuk yurak warmi, misha, runa, yana mana kashpaka yana chapu?</p> <p>(1) Yurak (2) Misha (3) Runa (4) Yana (5) Yana chapu (7) Shuktak (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LENG1. Maykanta kikinpak mama shimika, mana kashpaka shik niki shimika wasipi uchilla kashpa rimarkanki? [Shuk akllaytalla ari nipay, man ashtawan]</p> <p>(901) Castellano (902) Kichwa (904) Shuktak (llaktamanta) (905) Shutak shuk mama llaktamanta (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>LENG4. Taytamamapak shimikunamanta rimashpa riksirka, Kikinpak taytamama riman man kashpaka rimarka [Akllaykunata killkakatina]:</p> <p><i>(Tapuchik: Taytamamamanta shukka shuk shimitalla rimarka shinallatak shukka shukta yalli rimarka, kilkanar 2.)</i></p> <p>(1) Castellanollata (2) Castellanopash shuk paypak llaktamanta shimita (3) Shuk paypak llaktamanta shimitalla (4) Castellanopash shuk karu llaktamanta shimita (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Ecuadorpak kamachikmanta, llaktakunata ñawpaman pushakkuna, llaktakuna shinallatak shuk shuk llaktamanta runakuna punda ayllunapak paykupak kamachikuwan allipachata ruranata charinkuna.</p> <p>INDAOJ1. Kikinpak yuyaypi, pitak shuk runa paypak kawsak llaktapi mana allita rurashka kakpi allipachata rurankapak minkarina kan?</p> <p>(1) Runa llaktamanta apukuna (2) Mamallaktapak kamachiwan (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IND1. Kikinka tantanakushka runakunaka ñukanchik mamallaktapi ashtawan democratico kachun yanapaknchu, asha democratico mana kashpaka paykunaka mana ñukanchik democraciapi yanapanchu?</p> <p>(1) Ashtawan democrático (2) Asha democrático (3) Mana yanapanchu (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>IND2. Mashnatak kikinka tantanakushka runaknaka willanata charishka mana kashpaka kay mamallaktapak mushuk kamachikunata ari nishkpa mana kashpaka mana nishpa yanapan yuyanki? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Ashka (2) Ashata (3) Ashakulla [Yallina IND4man] (4) Mana imata [Yallina IND4man] (88) NS [Yallina IND4man] (98) NR [Yallina IND4man]</p>	
<p>[Tapuna “Ashka” nishpa tikrachiskakunamanlla “Ashata” IND2man]</p> <p>IND3. Kikinpak yuyaypi, Imashpatak wakin tantanakushka runakunaka paykunapak yuyayta churashka kashkakuna kay mamallaktapak politicamanta rimanakuypi? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Imashpatak ashtawan kullkita charinkuna (2) Imashpatak mana runa tantanakushkunawan alli llankay ushankuna (3) Imashpatak paykunaka runakunata ñawpaman pushan nin (4) Imashpatak alli yuyaykunata charinkuna (5) Imashpatak alli apukkuna charinkuna (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap</p>	
<p>[Tukuyllata tapuna]</p> <p>IND4. Imakamantak tantanakushka runakunaka runakunata runa kawsayka alli nishpa ari nichinkapak allikunami kankuna?</p> <p>(1) Sumakkuna (2) Allikuna (3) Ashata allikuna (4) Mana allikuna (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

WWW1. Ima shukkunamanta rimashpa, Mashna kutiktak kikinka Internetpi kanki? [Akllaykunata killkakatina] (1) Punllan punllan (2) Kanchis punllapi wakinpi (3) Killapi wakinpi (4) Wakinpilla (5) Mana ima punlla (88) NS [Mana killkakatina] (98) NR [Mana killkakatina]	
Yupanamanta, kunan yachankapak munanchik mashnatak mamallaktamanta runakunaka politicamanta yachakta shinallatak mamallakta runakunata charin... G10. Mashna kutiktak willaykunata katin, televisión nishkapi, antapi, willachik pankakunapi, mana kashpaka Internetpi? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]: (1) Punllan punllan (2) Kanchis punllapi wakinpi (3)) Killapi wakinpi (4) Wakinpilla (5) Mana ima punlla (88) NS (98) NR (98) NR	
G11. Imashutitak Estados Unidospak kay ñawpaman pushakka? [Mana killkakatina: Barack Obama, ari nina Obama] (1) Ari (2) Mana (88) Mana yachanchu (98) Mana tikrachinchu	
G13. Mashna markakunatak Ecuadorka charin ? [Mana killkakatina: 24] (1) Ari (2) Mana (88) Mana yachanchu (98) Mana tikrachinchu	

G14. Mashna watatak Ecuadorpi ñawpaman pushakkunaka kanka? [Mana killkakatina: 4 watakuna] (1) Ari (2) Mana (88) Mana yachanchu (98) Mana tikrachinchu	
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Tukuchinkapak, niway kikipak wasipi charinki: **[Tukuylla killkakatina]**

R1. Televisor	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo (no celular)	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R5. Vehículo. ¿Mashna?	(0) Mana (1) Shuk (2) Ishkay	(3) Kimsa ,ashtwan
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R7. Microondas nishkata	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R8. Moto	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R12. Wasipi yaku	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R14. Wasi ukupi baño	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R15. Computadora	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana nishkata	(0) Mana	(1) Ari
R18. Internet nishkata	(0) Mana	(1) Ari

OCUP4A. Imatatak kikinka ruranki? Kunanpi kikinka: **[Akllaykunata killkakatina]**

- (1) Llankakunki? **[Katy]**
- (2) Kunanpi mana llankakunki shinapish llankayta charinki? **[Katy]**
- (3) Kunanpi llankayta mashkakunki? **[Yalli OCUP1B1man]**
- (4) Yachakukkmi kanki? **[Yalli OCUP1B1man]**
- (5) Wasipi kikipak llankayta charinki? **[Yalli OCUP1B1man]**
- (6) Tawka watata llankashka samakunkichu kikinka mana llankay ushanki? **[Yalli OCUP1B1man]**
- (7) Mana llankamchu shinallatak mana llankayta mashkakunki? **[Yalli OCUP1B1man]**
- (88) NS **[Yalli OCUP1B1man]**
- (98) NR **[Yalli OCUP1B1man]**

OCUP1A. Kikipak llankaypika kikinka: **[Akllaykunata killkakatina]**

- (1) Mama llaktapak kushkita chaskik mnan kashpaka mamallaktapak empresa?
- (2) Shuk empresamanta kushkita chaskik?
- (3) Amu mana kashpaka chwpi empresayuk?
- (4) Llankak paypaktapacha?
- (5) Llankak mana kullkita japin / mana paganchu?
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

OCUP1. Maykantak kikipa llankay mana kashpaka imatak ruranki? **(Rikuna: Imapitak kikinka llankanki?) [Mana akllaykunata killkakatina]**

- (1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, sumak yachana wasipak yachachik, janpik runa, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.)
- (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor)
- (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.)
- (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.)
- (5) Mama llaktapak llankak runa (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública)
- (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.)
- (7) Katuk runa (purishpak katuk, Katuna ukuyukmana kashpaka katuna panpapi katuk, etc.)
- (8) Katuna ukupi katushpa llankak shinallatak katuna panpapi
- (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.)
- (10) Panpapi kawsak panpapi llankak, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (allpayuk)
- (11) Panpapi llankak (shukpak llankan)
- (12) Maki rurashkata rurak
- (13) Wasi ukupi llankak
- (14) Obrero
- (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.)
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

<p>OCUP1B1. Kikinka sarun ish kay watapi llankayta sakirkanki? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Ari, Kikinka kikinpak llankayta mana charinki shinapish shuk mushuktak tarishkanki. (2) Ari, Kikinka kikinpak llankayta mana charinki shinallatak mana shuk mushuktak tarishkankichu. (3) Mana, mana llankayta sakishkachu (4) Kikinmantallata mana kashpaka kikinka chaki paki mana llankayta chariskanki (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>OCUP1B2. Kikinmanta shukpash, pipish kikinpak wasipi kawsak kay sarun ish kay watapi sakishkachu?</p> <p>(1) Ari (2) Mana (88) NS (98)NR</p>	
<p>OCUP1ANC. Imatak rurauk karkanki mana kashpaka imatak kikinpak taytaka kikin 15 watata charikipika rurak karkakikipak taytaka ? [Mana akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, sumak yachanapak yachachik, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Mamallaktapak llankak (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de maquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Katuk (Purishpa katuk, katunakuna ukukunayuk man kashpaka katuna panpi katuk, etc.) (8) Katuna ukupi shinallatak katuna panpapi katuk runa (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) (10) Panpapi kawsak, panpapi tarpuk, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (allpayuk) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Maki rurashkata rurak (13) Wasi ukupi llankak (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	
<p>PEN1. Kikinka llankakushpa tantachishka kullki kunanpi ña mana llankakushpa charinkichu?</p> <p>(1) Ari [Katy] (2) Mana [Yalli SAL1man] (88) NS [Yalli SAL1man] (98) NR [Yalli SAL1man]</p>	
<p>PEN3. Imalayatak kikinka llankakushpa tantachishka kullki kunanpi ña mana llankakushpa charinkichu ¿Qué tipo de fondo de jubilación es el que usted utiliza? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]</p> <p>(1) Shukpi wakichishka, alli nishpaka shuk AFP (Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones) (2) Sistema público o de seguro social (7) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>	

PEN4. Kay sarun 12 killkunapi, kikinka ña mana llankakushpa kikipak kulllkita tanchikukpi churarkankichu/ tapushkankichu? [Akllaykunata killkakatina]: (1) Tukuy killkunata (2) Watapi shuk kuti mana kashpaka ishkay kutikuna, mana kashpaka (3) Mana tapurkanki/churarkanki (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
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[Tukuyllata tapuna]

SAL1. Kikinka janpichun seguro nishkata charinkichu? (1) Ari [Katy] (2) Mana [Tukuchina] (88) NS [Tukuchina] (98) NR [Tukuchina]	
SAL2. Kikipak seguro nishachujanpik... [Akllaykunata Killkkakatina] (1) Mamallaktapak, seguro socialmanta (2) Shuktak mamallaktamanta (3) Shukmantapachami kan [Mana killkakaktina]: (4) Ishkandi charinkichik, mamallaktapak shinallatak shukmantapacha (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (mana janpik segurota charinchu)	
SAL4. Kikipak seguro nishkamanta janpik, alli nishpak kikipakpachachu mana kashpaka pipaktak? (1) Kikipakpacha (2) Shukpak (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap	

Kay tukuykunatalla charini. Kikipak yanapaymanta ashtakata yapaychani.

TINI. [Tapuykunamanta shukllishpa, MANA TAPUNA, kulur kukur pankapi killkay, shinallata aycha Kulurmanta tapuypak yupayta rikuchypay] ____ (97) Mana akllay ushashpa [Churay (97)talla, imamantapish, tapuchishka runata mana ñawita rikuy ushaspa]	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
Tapuykuna tukury pacha ____ : ____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
TI. Tapuykuna rurashka pachakuna [uchillakuna, # 1 pankata rikuy] ____	
INTID. tapuchishkapak riksina yuyapay: ____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
GÉNERO. Kikinka kari / warmi kashpash killkana: (1) Kari (2) Warmi	
TINI. Kukur kulur pankakunapi, Kikipak aycha kulurta killkaypay ____	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>

Ñuka kay tapuykunaka akllashka runawanmi rurashka kan nishpa arinini.

Tapuchikpak aspik _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Rikukpak aspik _____


Yuyaykuna:

[Mana kaypak PDA] Kayta kilkkak runapak aspik _____

[Mana kaypak PDA] Willykunata rikuk runa aspik _____

“A” UCHILLA PANKA


Imapitak kay punllakunapi chakamanta sarunapita kikinka kani yuyanki?




“B”UCHILLA PANKA

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Lluky					Alli				


“C”UCHILLA PANKA



“D”UCHILLA PANKA



“E”UCHILLA PANKA



“F”UCHILLA PANKA

- (00) Mana kullki yaykun
- (01) \$60manta uray
- (02) \$61- \$100 wakinpi
- (03) \$101-\$200
- (04) \$201-\$300
- (05) \$301-\$500
- (06) \$501-\$750
- (07) \$751-\$1000
- (08) \$1001-1500
- (09) \$1501-\$2000
- (10) \$2001 ashtawan