



Political Culture of Democracy in Dominican Republic and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

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
Towards Equality of Opportunity

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This study was performed with support from the Program in Democracy and Governance of the United States Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed in this study are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the point of view of the United States Agency for International Development.

November 2012



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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the AmericasBarometer. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the AmericasBarometer findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized “oversample” areas with national trends. In this sense, AmericasBarometer is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The AmericasBarometer also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The AmericasBarometer builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call “LAPOP Central,” first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the AmericasBarometer's largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of AmericasBarometer. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

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Prologue: Background to the Study

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Vanderbilt University

We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full-swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central, planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November, 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we

had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, field work commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and approval for research on human subjects was granted by the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB). All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified, thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and

requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire data base had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs which present confidence intervals taking into account the “design effect” of the sample.¹ Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.²

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the AmericasBarometer project.

¹ The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.

² All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called “WT” which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent’s weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called “WEIGHT1500” that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

Country	Institutions		
Mexico and Central America			
Costa Rica			
El Salvador			
Guatemala			
Honduras			
Mexico			
Nicaragua			
Panama			

Caribbean	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname	
Trinidad & Tobago	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		 
Paraguay	 Centro de Información y Recursos para el Desarrollo	
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		



Canada and United States			
Canada	 UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	YORK  <small>UNIVERSITÉ UNIVERSITY</small> redefine THE POSSIBLE.	 THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY	 MIAMI CONSORTIUM <small>FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES</small>	PERLA <small>Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America</small> <small>Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina</small> 

Acknowledgements

The study was made possible by the generous support of many institutions, foremost among them the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite assisted selflessly in all aspects of the project. We are very grateful to the Tinker Foundation, and especially to Ms. Rente Rene for ongoing support for the entire LAPOP endeavor. At the UNDP, we thank Heraldo Muñoz, Rafael Fernández de Castro, and Freddy Justiano for their strong support of the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer. At the Inter-American Development Bank we are especially grateful to Eduardo Lora and Fabiana Machado for providing critical support as well as intellectual guidance. At the World Bank, thanks go to Norbert Feiss for enthusiastic and insightful contributions. We are deeply grateful to Nat Stone at Algonquin College for securing the financing for the Canadian survey, for providing research assistants to help with the production of the Canadian country report, and for helping us with the French translation for Canada. Thanks also to François Gélinau for important help with the translation of the French questionnaire. Great thanks also go to Keith Neuman and the Environics Institute for generous support of and partnership in the 2012 round in Canada. We want to take special note of the support that the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia provided to our Bolivia team, and to thank Daniel Moreno for writing the grant proposal and obtaining the funding.

Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and field work. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contract and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K.

Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of field work operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubi Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia), Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA - LAPOP Central	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science ●Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Professor of Spanish Linguistics, Department of Spanish and Portuguese ●Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Program Coordinator for Field Operations, LAPOP, Uruguay ●Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor, Iowa State University
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El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Miguel Cruz, Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida International University, USA ●Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Orlando J. Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. John Booth, Emeritus Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-Director of the Estado de la Nación Project, Costa Rica ●Ronald Álfaro Redondo, Doctoral Student, University of Pittsburgh, and Researcher, Universidad de Costa Rica, Estado de la Nación Project
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Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants ●Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
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Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Jack Menke, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Suriname
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Argentina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Germán Lodola, Assistant Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR Venezuela and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA
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Canada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●Nat Stone, Professor, Marketing and Business Intelligence Research Program, School of Business, Algonquin College ●Dr. Simone Bohn, Associate Professor of Political Science, York University ●Dr. François Gélneau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval ●Dr. Keith Neuman, The Environics Institute

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012



Executive Summary

Definitions of democracy almost always consider equality of opportunities as an essential component of the system, and those who promote democracy around the world boost the equality of conditions in access to social goods. To what extent have the countries of Latin American and the Caribbean been successful in realizing this ideal of equality of opportunities, which should characterize democracy? This is the central theme of this report of the 2012 AmericasBarometer. Surveys were conducted in 26 countries between January and May 2012, and more than 41,000 people in the region were interviewed. The Dominican survey was carried out between January and February, and 1,512 people were interviewed.

Chapter 1 examines the magnitude of economic and social inequality in the Americas and in the Dominican Republic specifically. It shows that the average levels of inequality are surprisingly high throughout the region, being among the highest in the world, and that the region is relatively homogenous when comparing levels of income between one country and another. Through a linear regression analysis, the chapter evaluates how gender, race, age, and rural or urban residence are associated with the level of education attained by respondents. In the Dominican Republic, the data demonstrate that older age, from 35 years and up, is associated with less education. Having dark skin and living in a rural area are also correlated with less education. Sex of the respondent, however, has no statistically significant relationship with educational level. On the other hand, the education of the respondent's mother has a clear association with the education of the child. On average, interviewees with mothers that had no schooling did not complete primary school, while interviewees with mothers that achieved higher education have an average schooling of 14.2 years. At the regional level, the Dominican Republic is located in second position on the survey item asking whether the state should implement firm public policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor, and in first position in the opinion that men should have preference over women in the labor market. In recent years, a program known as *Tarjetas de Solidaridad* has been established, and 31% of those interviewed indicated that they or someone in their household has a card in this program.

Chapter 2 focuses on political participation. It examines how gender, race and poverty affect participation and political opportunities in the region. There are large differences between countries in electoral participation, and the Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position with 70.5% participation, even though there are countries where the vote is obligatory. The statistical analysis for the Dominican case demonstrates that less wealth and less education is association with more electoral participation, except among those with higher education who register greater levels of electoral participation than those with secondary education. A clear linear predictor is the education of the mother: less education for the mother, more electoral participation. To a certain extent, these findings contradict the argument that people with more resources participate more in politics. In community participation, the Dominican Republic registers an average level of 32.9 points and has the sixth highest level of participation of the countries included in the survey. 17.1% said that they have a position of leadership in the organizations in which they participate. The most notable relationship that we observe here is that women report higher levels of community participation than men.

The Dominican Republic occupies second place in the region with 31.6% of interviewees who said that they had tried to convince other people to vote for some party or candidate. Additionally, the Dominican Republic occupies third place with 16.8% of interviewees who said that they had worked

for a party or candidate. On both questions, the Dominican Republic manifests a relatively high level of political involvement. The largest relationship that we observe for these variables is for gender: men indicated higher levels of participation in electoral campaigns than women. The country occupies second place among countries in the region with a high average level of support for the idea that men make better political leaders than women, with an average of 47.9 points. Having a right-leaning ideological position has a statistically significant relationship with support for this idea about the superiority of male leaders. On the other hand, women, people with more education and those whose mothers had more education are less likely to think that men make better political leaders than women. On the other hand, the majority of Dominicans interviewed said that male politicians were more corrupt than females, and there is a high level of support for gender quotas in elections.

Chapter 3 examines the knowledge that citizens indicate having about their country's problems (internal efficacy), the perception that those who govern are interested in what people think (external political efficacy), and the perception that the parties listen to the people (representativeness of parties). The average levels of external efficacy and of perceptions about the representativeness of parties are less than 50 points in all the countries, and there is variation in the region. While some countries approach 50 points, others are around 25. Within this range, the Dominican Republic is located in a relatively high position in the view that those who govern are interested in what the people think, with an average of 41.6 points, and in an intermediate position with 34 points on the opinion that parties listen to the people. Regression analysis demonstrates that more political interest is associated with the view that those who govern are interested in what people think. However, less education is associated with more external efficacy. Political interest and being a woman have a positive relationship with the perception that parties represent the people, while education has a negative relationship.

Linear regression analysis examining how support for the Dominican political system is shaped by the characteristics and experiences of the interviewees shows that level of political interest and being a woman have positive relationships with support for the system. Discrimination (by government and in other places), wealth, and education level have negative relationships with support for the system. When analyzing support for democracy, none of the variables considered in the regression have a negative relationship, while three have a positive relationship: political interest, wealth and age.

Chapter 4 analyzes the magnitude and impact of victimization by crime and corruption as well as perceptions of insecurity and corruption, examining their relationships with support for the political system and the rule of law as well as a diverse set of social and demographic variables. In general, the citizens of the Americas tend to perceive high levels of corruption. The Dominican Republic is located among those that register high perceptions of corruption, with a score of 78.1 which is similar to the averages registered in previous years. The percentage of people who were corruption victims oscillates between 67.0% in Haiti and 3.4% in Canada. The Dominican Republic occupies the eighth highest position with 21.7% victimization. The percentage of victims who reported any type of corruption victimization varied between 2004 and 2012. While there was a reduction in 2006 and 2008 with respect to the previous survey, there were increases in 2010 and 2012. People with the highest levels of education and men were those most likely to report having been victims of corruption.

As for perceptions of citizen insecurity and crime victimization, the data show regional variation. Mexico City and Lima had the highest average levels of perceived insecurity with 54.7 and 53.9 points respectively, and Santo Domingo was located in an intermediate position on this variable



with its average of 45.4 points. As far as crime victimization, Santo Domingo was again in an intermediate position. 23.3% of those interviewed reported having been victims of a crime in the 12 months prior to being interviewed, and 23.4% reported that another person in their household had been a crime victim within the past year. Quito and Tegucigalpa had the highest percentages of crime victims. The level of education is the only variable with a statistically significant relationship with crime victimization in the Dominican case, in the sense that people with higher levels of education are more likely to report having been victims. Regression analysis examines the impact of perceptions of insecurity and experiences as crime victims on support for the political system in the Dominican Republic. People who have been victims of corruption, those who perceive a lot of corruption, those who perceive high levels of citizen insecurity and those with more education have less support for the political system. Women are more supportive of the political system than men.

Chapter 5 argues that support for the system and political tolerance have important effects of the consolidation of democracy. The survey shows statistically significant declines in support for the Dominican political system of almost 9 points over the period from 2006 to 2012 and of about 5 points between 2010 and 2012. The Dominican Republic has 48.8 points on the system support scale, and in regional perspective, the majority of countries have scores slightly higher. Women support the system more than men, as do those who are more satisfied with democracy and those who evaluate the current government's performance favorably. The level of political tolerance varies considerably throughout the region, ranging from an average of 72.6 points in the United States to 36.6 points in Honduras. The Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position with 54.2 points. The average levels of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic declined steadily between 2006 and 2010, but registered a statistically significant upturn in 2012. Women are less tolerant as are those who have more negative evaluations of the national economy, while those who have been crime victims, have darker skin, more education, and more support for democracy are less tolerant.

The percentage of those interviewed who expressed high system support and high tolerance vary across the region from 51.5% in Canada and 7.2% in Honduras. The Dominican Republic is in a middle position with 24.3%. Although this is only one of the indicators that might be used to evaluate the stability of democracy in a country, it is significant that those countries in the region with more political instability register low scores on this measure of democratic stability. The percentage of Dominicans with a high level of system support and high tolerance declined significantly between 2006 and 2010, but remained almost exactly the same between 2010 and 2012. This suggests that there has been a stabilization of the decline in attitudes supportive of stable democracy. The people who have more political interest and who have more positive evaluations of presidential performance are more likely to have attitudes supportive of stable democracy.

With respect to institutional trust, once again the media and churches obtained the highest scores in the Dominican Republic, while the police and the political parties were the lowest. With respect to support for democracy, all those countries in the survey had levels of support over 50 points, but there was regional variation: Uruguay had the highest score with 86.5 points and Honduras had the lowest with 52.6, while the Dominican Republic was in the middle with 70 points. In terms of changes in the level of support for Dominican democracy, we find that between 2006 and 2010 there was a statistically significant decline from 78.7 to 68.6 points, but from 2010 to 2012 there was slight improvement from 68.6 to 70 points.

Chapter 6 analyzed the relationship in citizens' attitudes about local government and their experiences with them, as well as their orientations toward democracy in light of the decentralization processes that have occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. The percentage of respondents in each country of the Americas who said they had attended a municipal meeting in the past year oscillated between 21.2% in the case of Haiti and 4.1% in Chile. The Dominican Republic was in the third highest position with 18.3%. In the Dominican Republic, there was a statistically significant decline in local participation between 2010 and 2012, but we observe higher rates of participation in 2006 as well as 2010, which are both years in which municipal elections were held and therefore had higher levels of citizen participation in municipal meetings. The level of satisfaction with the services provided by local government vary across the region, oscillating between 59.5 points in the case of Canada and 37.6 points in the case of Haiti, while the Dominican Republic averages 47.5 points. The over-time trend with respect to satisfaction with local services in the Dominican Republic shows a statistically significant decline of 10.1 points between 2006 and 2012. As for confidence in local government, the Dominican Republic occupies a relatively low position with only 45.5 points and only six countries registering lower levels of confidence. Linear regression analysis demonstrates that satisfaction with local services has a statistically significant positive relationship with support for the system.

Chapter 7 analyzes levels of confidence in justice from various perspectives. The chapter utilizes questions about general perceptions of the justice systems and others that look to capture more specific information, some refer to the justice system itself and others to the police. The data demonstrate that since 2008 there has been a decline in confidence in the justice system in the Dominican Republic. The decline between 2008 and 2010 was statistically significant, but the decline between 2010 and 2012 was not. In regional comparison on the scale of confidence in the justice system, the Dominican Republic is located among those countries with less confidence. This suggests that despite the justice system reforms carried out since 1997, confidence in the system remains weak in the comparative regional context and over time in the country. Regression analysis of the confidence in the justice system measure finds that those who have less trust are people who have been victims of corruption, those who perceive higher levels of corruption in the country, those who have been crime victims, and those with more education. On the other hand, people who feel more involved in politics tend to trust more in the justice system, as do those with greater interpersonal trust.

The Dominican Republic is located among the countries with lower trust in the police, with an average of 34.9 points. Additionally, Dominican confidence in the police has been declining since 2008 when there was the highest average during the 2004-2012 period. Regression analysis of confidence in the police demonstrates that those who have been victims of corruption and those who perceive more corruption have less confidence in the police; on the other hand, those with less wealth have more confidence. The variables that have a positive and statistically significant relationship with trust in the police are being a sympathizer of the PLD, living in a rural zone, and living in a poor municipality.

The AmericasBarometer formulated various questions that seek to determine with greater specificity the levels of insecurity perceived by the population as well as concrete, illicit actions that contribute to citizen insecurity. The results from the specific question about the sense of security or insecurity felt by Dominican respondents over a period of almost 20 years reveals that perceived insecurity increased steadily from 1994 to 2006, then declined considerable in 2008, likely due to the implementation of the *Barrio Seguro* program, and has maintained roughly the same with some

variation between 2010 and 2012. Logistic regression analysis of this question about people's sense of (in)security demonstrates that those who feel less secure are people who have been crime victims, those with less interpersonal trust, women, those with more education, and those who live in wealthy municipalities. The Dominican Republic leads the region in perceptions that the neighborhood where respondents live is affected by gangs, with an average of 48.6 points. Additionally, this perception has increased in a significant way since 2006, although the change between 2010 and 2012 is not statistically significant. Moreover, 27.9% of Dominican respondents indicated that they had seen someone in their neighborhood selling drugs in the past 12 months, which represents a statistically significant increase with relation to 2008.

Chapter 8 analyzes themes related to political parties and government efficacy. The data about partisan affiliations shows here support the view of a relatively strong Dominican party system. In all the years surveyed since the 1990s, more than 50% of the Dominican population has indicated identification with a political party. The Dominican Republic heads the list of surveyed countries in the percentage of partisan supporters in 2012 with 63.4%. Over time comparison shows a statistically significant increase between 2010 and 2012, although increases in partisan support tends to increase in years of presidential elections when a large number of people become more involved in party politics. Combining the question about partisan support with one about party membership, we find that at the time of the survey the country was divided approximately into thirds: 33.1% said that they only identified with a party, 30.3% said that they belong to a party, and 36.6% said they neither sympathized nor belonged to a party (the so-called independents). People who identify more with the right side of the ideological spectrum express greater levels of partisan support, as do public employees and older respondents. On the other hand, women are less likely to support a party than men. Supporters of the PRSC have less education than the other categories, followed by supporters of the PLD, the PRD and then independents who have the highest average levels of education. In terms of political ideology, PRSC and PLD supporters identify as further to the right than supporters of the PRD and independents.

In the past, the Dominican Republic had occupied first or second place in the region in terms of right-leaning ideological identification, but this was not the case in 2012 when the country was located in sixth place on the ideology scale with 55.5 points. The tendency toward less right-leaning ideological self-identification can also be observed in the Dominican data over the past several years. Between 2006 and 2012, there was a decline in the average right-leaning ideological identification of almost 15 points, with an average of 68.2 in 2006 and an average of 55.5 points in 2012, and the decline has been steady. The survey found that 76% of the interviewed population had not received clientelist offers during the electoral campaign while 24% had received them frequently or occasionally. Supporting a political party does not have a statistically significant effect on receiving clientelist offers, according to logistic regression. Finally, government efficacy was measured with four questions about combatting poverty, the promotion and protection of democratic principles, combatting corruption, and improving citizen security. In these four areas, the averages for 2012 are less than those for the previous years, which indicates a decline in evaluations of government efficacy. In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic is located among the countries with the least government efficacy according to citizens' opinions.

Chapter 9 explores the themes of gender, migration, and race. About gender, the data demonstrate that from 2010 to 2012 there has been a slight increase in support for women in politics. The value of the scale measuring support for women in politics, which is constructed using five

questions, increased from an average of 65.5 points in 2010 to 69.8 in 2012. Among men, the scale increased from 60 points to 64.8, and among women from 71.6 to 75 in 2012. Respondents who support women in the workplace, those who think women should make important household decisions, who have more education, more wealth, live in urban areas and who are women are more likely to support women's political participation. Also, the Dominican Republic is located among those countries with the most support for gender quotas, even though the idea that men are better leaders than women persists. As far as reproductive rights, the Dominican Republic has 61.7% support for interruption of a pregnancy (abortion) in cases when the mother's health is at risk. This support is greater among people with more political tolerance, those who think religion is less important, those with more education, and those who do not think that men alone should make important household decisions.

About the rights of immigrants, the case of Haitians is the most prominent in the Dominican Republic. In 2012, we observe a slight increase in support for the idea that the children of Haitian immigrants born in Dominican territory should have Dominican citizenship. The average level of acceptance for this idea increased from 48.3 points in 2010 to 54.8 points in 2012, and the difference is statistically significant. As far as acceptance of the idea that undocumented Haitians be allowed to obtain work permits, there was a slight increase from 42.4 points in 2010 to 46.2 in 2012, but this difference is not statistically significant. Using these two previous questions, a scale measuring support for the rights of Haitian immigrants was constructed and then analyzed using linear regression. This analysis finds that darker skin color, support for democracy, political tolerance, education, being a woman, and wealth all have positive, statistically significant relationships with support for Haitian rights in the Dominican Republic. In addition to civil and labor rights, the survey asked about perceptions of discrimination against Haitians, according to the perception of Dominicans themselves as well as the observation of discriminatory acts. The average score on a scale measuring the perception that Haitians encounter discrimination in the Dominican Republic is 5.3 points, while 35.8% of those interviewed said that had observed an act of discrimination against a Haitian. 60.6% of those interviews agree that immigrants do the jobs that Dominicans do not wish to do, and the scale measuring support for the government offering social services to immigrants had an average score of 60.6 points on a 0-100 point scale.

Regarding the migration of Dominicans abroad, the survey investigated receipt of remittances and the intention to emigrate in the near future. The percentage of the Dominican population interviewed who said that their household receives remittances was 23.4%. The Dominican Republic occupies four place in the region on this measure, with only Guyana (32%), Jamaica (43%), and Haiti (66.7%) scoring higher. In the majority of the countries, less than 15 of those interviewed said that their household receives remittances. As far as intentions to move to another country, Dominican again place in fourth position in the region with 31.9%, only surpassed by Guyana, Jamaica and Haiti. The people with more intentions to leave are the young, those with more education and wealth, and men.

In terms of race, the majority of Dominicans self-identify as *indio/mestizo*, and we do not observe statistically significant differences between racial groups in their average levels of wealth.



Understanding the Figures in this Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each *data point* (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a *confidence interval*, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most graphs in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are “complex” (i.e., *stratified* and *clustered*). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

The numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at “0.” When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or trait we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please realize that the data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer prior to that made available to the public.

Part I:
Equality of Opportunity and
Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. The life-chances that individuals have are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often conditioned and either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in turning the ideal of equality of opportunity into reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically very high levels of inequality.¹ More impressive has been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.²

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality seem to have only highlighted the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. Research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction.³ Socially, inequality tends to be accompanied by an increase in violent crime (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).⁴

Inequality is not just a social or economic problem, but it is also a fundamentally *political* one, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality often foments unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows

¹ Income and wealth are related, but still conceptually distinct terms. For example, the AmericasBarometer surveys contain questions that ask about income (the sum of funds coming into the household each month due to work and remittances) and that ask about wealth in terms of ownership of household items.

² López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

³ De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, and Michael Walton. 2004. *Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History?* Washington DC: The World Bank.

⁴ Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Loayza, Norman. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

that inequality creates public discontent,⁵ fosters political instability and violence,⁶ and decreases trust in democracy.⁷ LAPOP research has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust, the basic “glue” that holds together democratic societies.⁸ Second, inequality is a problem governments seek to address through public policies, and candidates to office compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that political systems pay more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, this constitutes a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of “perfect” equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to differences in outcomes over the course of a lifetime.⁹ However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even though they may in part be the outcomes of past efforts and abilities, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that, in the seven Latin American countries analyzed, about ten percent of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.¹⁰ Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious circles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help retain them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. Throughout the study, we pay attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then assess if and how marginalization may be undermining key values that are crucial for a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in the Dominican Republic and in the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the region.

⁵ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

⁶ Alesina, Alberto, and Roberto Perotti, 1996. “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,” *European Economic Review* 40: 1203-1228; Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 425-52.

⁷ Uslander, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

⁸ Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁰ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

After assessing objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask, who *perceives* that they have been discriminated against? Moreover, we examine what citizens think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section explores previous research on inequality in the Dominican Republic and in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries within a region.¹¹ The horizontal (X) axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical (Y) axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both dimensions. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high, by far the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income between one country and another are considered.




Figure 1. Gini Indices by World Regions

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth across the region by comparing Gini coefficients in South, Central, and North America, as well as the Caribbean.¹² As we can see, levels of inequality are, on average, much higher in South and Central America than in North America and the Caribbean.

¹¹ See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

¹² The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini Index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. The average Gini Index is estimated in each




Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine the relative positions of the citizens of different countries in the global income distribution. In Figure 3 researchers have assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile includes 5% of the income distribution).¹³ The figure compares Brazil, in many ways a prototypically unequal country of the region, with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia, and dramatically suggests the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilian citizens are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and at the top percentile of the global income distribution. For the Dominican Republic, the Gini index was 47.2 in 2010,¹⁴ close to the Caribbean average.

region based on the World Bank's most recent entry for each country since 2000. Several countries (Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, and the United States) were dropped because they had no reported Gini Index since 2000.

¹³ Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.

¹⁴ Data from the World Bank <http://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/SI.POV.GINI>.




Figure 3. The Positions of Citizens of Four Countries in the Global Income Distribution

However, levels of inequality are evolving in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.¹⁵ In Figure 4, we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

For the Dominican case, various reports suggest that despite high economic growth in recent decades, the country maintains a high level of poverty and inequality that negatively influences the Human Development Index. According to the Human Development Report, Dominican Republic 2008 (the most recent for the country), the international trend shows that higher income countries, have higher human development, but in the Dominican Republic, this relationship has been weak. For example, improvement in health and education indicators has been less than the increase in growth, which indicates that the country has not achieved adequate use of wealth to improve the quality of life for the majority of the population.¹⁶ In the period from 2007 to 2010, the Gini index changed very little: 48.7 in 2007, 49.0 in 2008, 48.9 in 2009, and 47.2 in 2010.¹⁷ Additionally, the rate of poverty over the national poverty line (as a percent of the population) declined only a little from 36.3% in 2006 to 34.4% in 2010.¹⁸

¹⁵ López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press y United Nations Development Programme.

¹⁶ Oficina de Desarrollo Humano, Informe de Desarrollo Humano, República Dominicana 2008: Desarrollo Humano, una cuestión de poder. Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, Santo Domingo, 2008, p.60.

¹⁷ Datos del Banco Mundial, <http://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/SI.POV.GINI>.

¹⁸ Datos del Banco Mundial, <http://datos.bancomundial.org/indicador/SI.POV.GINI>.




Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

How will inequality continue to evolve over the next decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since the changes in inequality are arguably attributable to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.¹⁹ For the Dominican Republic, a crucial factor is social investment. For example, while the *Ley General de Educación* stipulates that annual public investment in education should correspond to 4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the average investment in education in recent years has been around 2% of GDP. Low social investment and low quality public services are often noted as one of the main reasons why Dominican economic growth and rising income levels have not translated into better human development indices. Improving social investment is one of the challenges facing the government of President Danilo Medina, which began August 16, 2012.

Economic inequality goes hand in hand with pronounced social inequalities in the Americas. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).²⁰ Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI based on a country’s level of inequality. Figure 5 demonstrates the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, the gap in Latin America and the Caribbean between the average HDI and the average IHDI is the largest in the world. The Dominican Republic occupies position 98 of 187 countries on the 2011 Human Development Index, which places it near the middle. Dominican HDI increased from 0.686 in 2010 to 0.689 in 2011, placing it 24th of 33 countries in Latin America and the

¹⁹ Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

²⁰ Human Development Index (HDI) is an index between 0 and 1 that measures the average of achievement of a country on three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education, and income. The calculation are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a) and IMF (2011).

Caribbean according to the 2011 Global Report on Human Development. Nevertheless, the country loses 9 positions when the index is adjusted for inequality, fundamentally due to inequalities in income and education. In education, the country is 29th of 33 countries in Latin America, and it occupies position 117 of 187 countries at the global level. In health there are also gaps, albeit smaller ones. The Dominican HDI-D is 0.510.²¹




Figure 5. Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

Figure 6 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in the region, calculated as the percentage difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequality. For the Dominican Republic, the loss of human development due to inequality in education is 26.8% and the loss due to income inequality is 33.8%.²²

²¹<http://odh.pnud.org.do/noticias/aumenta-indice-desarrollo-humano-de-rd-pero-persisten-desigualdades> y UNPD <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/DOM.html>.

²² <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/DOM.html>.




Figure 6. Overall loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

Figure 7 allows one to discern differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children with advantaged (dark green bar) and disadvantaged (light green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.²³ For example, the graph shows that a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica has odds of completing sixth grade on time that register at just over 80%, while his/her peer with an advantaged background is only slightly more likely (the odds are close to 90%) to complete sixth grade on time. By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have lowest probabilities of achievement. The situation in the Dominican Republic is similar to that found in these countries.

²³ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.




Figure 7. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in the Dominican Republic: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Some questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent citizens perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies citizens might endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently or have different employment opportunities.²⁴ Such discrimination may occur either because of actual negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of "statistical discrimination," meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain

²⁴ For a review, see Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, and that women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are especially so.²⁵ Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often thought in many countries of Latin America.²⁶

The first major social divide we examine is that between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, inequality in labor force participation among men and women has become more equal.²⁷ Moreover, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.²⁸ Furthermore, a gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.²⁹ So, the trend in gender discrimination is certainly positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides by racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued unequal economic and social discrimination, especially in terms of wage differences and employment types/occupations.³⁰ Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development.³¹ Additionally, discrimination by race/ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas.³² Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race/ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.³³

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in some other parts of the Americas, trumping the

²⁵ Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. "Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil." *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. "Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil." *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. "The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach." *Económica* L (1-2).

²⁶ Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. "Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, y Urzúa. 2009b. "An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. "Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan and Máximo Torero. 2009. "Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru." In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

²⁷ Abramo, Laís and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. "Women's Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America." *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

²⁸ Hite, Amy Bellone, and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 "Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure." *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

²⁹ Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. "The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean." SSRN eLibrary (April). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

³⁰ De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

³¹ Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

³² De Ferranti et al., 2004, *Ibid*.

³³ Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.



effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited in the previous paragraphs, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas.³⁴

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 by examining what Dominicans of different racial, gender, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The 2010 and 2012 AmericasBarometer questionnaires included many measures of the social groups to which respondents belonged. We assessed respondents' racial and ethnic groups in several ways.³⁵ Question **ETID** asks respondents whether they identify as white, *indio/mestizo*, blacks or mulattos. In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a color palette.³⁶ At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin color of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see Figure 8). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of citizens from varying groups across the region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing sponsorship, we again included the color palette in 2012.³⁷

³⁴ Véase, e.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 73. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³⁵ The full text of all questions is provided in the questionnaire in Appendix C.

³⁶ Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid*.

³⁷ In 2012, the skin color palette was used in 24 countries, except the US and Canada. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, also excluding Haiti.



Figure 8. Skin Color Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. The latter group of questions, found in the **R series**, is used to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.³⁸ For the first time, we also asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in income earned with question **GEN10**.

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) **[DON'T READ]** No salary income

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a few questions on family background or class, in addition to the measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. In addition, self-identified social class is

³⁸ This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators". *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

measured in question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.³⁹

Finally, we included two new questions on food security developed by our team in Mexico in cooperation with Yale University, but now used in all countries: **FS2** and **FS8**.⁴⁰ Taken together, these measures provide an important opportunity to examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.		
	No	Yes
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1

Through regression analysis we assess how gender, race, age, and urban-rural status are associated with educational status on the Dominican Republic. In all the regression figures, the variables have been standardized. The coefficients that measures the effect of each variable and indicated with dots, and the confidence intervals are demarcated with horizontal lines that extend to the left and right of each dot. If the confidence interval does not cross the center line of 0.0, this means that the variable has a statistically significant effect (at $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval that falls completely to the right of the zero line indicates that the variable has a positive relationship with the dependent variable. On the other hand, a coefficient with a confidence interval that falls entirely to the left of the zero line indicates a net effect that is negative and statistically significant.⁴¹

Figure 9 indicates that age has a statistically significant, negative relationship with education level: older respondents have less education. Darker skin color and residence in a rural area are also associated with less education. Sex of the respondent does not have a statistically significant relationship with education. Figure 10 shows that average educational attainment among the two younger age groups is 11.3 and 11.2 years, while it is only 4.7 years for those over 65. Residents in urban areas have on average two more years of schooling than residents in rural zones. As detailed in Figure 11, people with lighter skin have slightly higher levels of schooling than those with darker skin.

³⁹ Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. 2013. Inequality Matters: The Role of Education in Defining Social Class in Colombia vs. Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 86. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁴⁰ These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

⁴¹ In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical “0” line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be 95% confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on reading and interpreting LAPOP graphs and figures, please refer to page xxxvii.




Figure 9. Determinants of Education Level in the Dominican Republic




Figure 10. Education Associated with Age and Place of Residence in the Dominican Republic




Figure 11. Relationship between Education and Skin Color, Estimated Effects

Next we evaluate the extent to which type of family or family origins affect level of education in the Dominican Republic. We did not include our measure of family background, **ED2**, in the multivariate regression model because the question was only asked of half the sample.⁴² Limiting analysis to half the sample would reduce inferential power regarding the effects of the other variables. Figure 12, which shows the respondent's years of schooling (y-axis) according to the level of education his/her mother obtained (x-axis), indicates that the level of education of the respondent's mother has a clear relationship with the educational attainment of her child. Respondents with mothers who had no education do not, on average, complete primary school, while those with mothers who have attained higher education have an average schooling of 14.2 years.

⁴² In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, many new questions were asked of split samples of respondents in order to maximize questionnaire space.




Figure 12. Mother's Educational Level as a Determinant of Respondent Education Level in the Dominican Republic

We now ask whether the same factors that are related to the respondent's level of education are also associated with income level. How does income vary according to age, race, gender, rural or urban residence, and family origins in the Dominican Republic? Figure 13 uses regression analysis to evaluate the determinants of personal income among respondents who said that they were employed at the time of the interview.⁴³ Education and age (65 years and below) have statistically significant, positive relationships with personal income. Being a woman and living in a rural area have negative relationships with personal income, while skin color does not have an influence on level of personal income. Figure 14 shows that there is a clear positive relationship between level of education and personal income.

⁴³ Income (both Q10NEW, family income, and Q10G, personal income) is coded on a scale from 0 to 16, with response categories corresponding to increasing ranges in the income distribution. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information.




Figure 13. Determinants of Personal Income in the Dominican Republic, among those who work




Figure 14. Relationship between Personal Income and Education Level among Those who Work in the Dominican Republic

Figure 15 shows that average personal incomes are greater in urban areas than rural ones and that women have lower incomes than men in the Dominican Republic. As we explained above, the survey item **GEN10** asks respondents who are married or who live with a partner about their level of personal income compared to the income of their partner. Figure 16 shows the differences in incomes, only for those women and men who said that they were employed. The majority of men report earning more than their partner (65.7%). In Figure 17 we observe differences in incomes for men and women by the color of their skin (including only those who are employed). The figure demonstrates that men's incomes decline as they have darker skin, except among the group with the very darkest skin where the level of personal income rebounds. In the case of women, personal income declines in nearly linear fashion as skin color darkens, and it declines more markedly among women with the darkest skin. This suggests that the racial effect on personal income is greater among Dominican women than men.




Figure 15. Personal Income Related to Respondent's Sex and Place of Residence in the Dominican Republic




Figure 16. Income of the Respondent Compared to that of his/her Partner in the Dominican Republic, among Those who Work




Figure 17. Skin Color and Personal Income in the Dominican Republic, among Respondents who Work

Finally, we assess the extent to which Dominican respondents' family of origin affect their personal income. Figure 18 shows that the level of education of the mother is associated with the level of the respondent's income: greater education attainment of the mother, more personal income for the

child. This supports the idea that class of origin is crucial in social positions, not only in terms of education, but also for personal income.




Figure 18. Mother's Educational Level as Determinant of Respondent's Income in the Dominican Republic, Among Respondents who Work

Does access to food follow similar patterns? In Figure 19 we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of food insecurity. Questions **FS2** and **FS8** are summed to create an index of food security that goes from 0 to 2. Higher numbers indicate higher food security.⁴⁴ Of the variables included in the analysis, skin color and education of the mother have statistically significant effects. Insecurity is greater among people with darker skin, as illustrated in Figure 20, and among those whose mothers had less education, as illustrated in Figure 21.

⁴⁴ Recall that these questions were asked of a split sample (that is, of only half of respondents). Since mother's educational level was asked of the same half-sample, we include it in the multivariate regression analysis here.




Figure 19. Determinants of Food Insecurity in the Dominican Republic




Figure 20. Skin Color and Food Insecurity in the Dominican Republic




Figure 21. Level of Mother's Education and Food Insecurity in the Dominican Republic

Another way of viewing social and economic discrimination is from the point of view of the purported victim. In 17 countries of the Americas, we included questions tapping whether respondents perceived themselves to have been victims of discrimination. The questions were a slightly modified battery that had first been used in 2008, and were optional in each country:

Now, changing the subject, and thinking about your experiences in the past year , have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

In Figure 22 we report the percentage of respondents who said they had been the victim of discrimination in the workplace or in school for the countries where question **DIS3** was asked. The Dominican Republic occupies fifth place with 13.3% of interviewees indicating that they experienced this sort of discrimination.




Figure 22. Self-reported discrimination in the workplace or school by country

Figure 23 shows the results of logistic regression analysis examining the determinants of victimization by discrimination in the workplace or school as reported by respondents in the Dominican Republic. The sociodemographic variables included in the statistical analysis do not have effects on reported discrimination, with the exception that older people express less discrimination. This finding may be because these respondents are likely not in the labor force due to their age or because they are more established in their employment and as a result feel less discrimination. It is surprising that neither being a woman nor having darker skin have statistically significant relationships with having been a victim of discrimination since these groups frequently encounter discrimination. It is worth clarifying here that we are only measuring self-reported perceptions victimization by discrimination.




Figure 23. Determinants of Victimization by Self-Reported Employment Discrimination in the Dominican Republic

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among Dominicans across the groups defined by gender, race, rural or urban status and family origins. However, they have not told us a great deal about why these inequalities persist, however. In particular, we have not yet assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be due in part to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The 2012 AmericasBarometer included several questions that provide a look at how social and economic inequalities are related to general attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

First, we examine norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labor force.⁴⁵ In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following question, on a 7-point scale:

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

⁴⁵ Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented in the Conference *Marginalization in the Americas*, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Figure 24 presents the average level of support for this idea in the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison with other variables. The Dominican Republic has the highest average among countries in the region with 54.9 points on this measure of support for the idea that men should have priority over women in securing employment. The United States and Canada have the lowest average support for this opinion, 20.7 and 21 points respectively. This means that the Dominican Republic has levels of discriminatory attitudes toward women in the labor market that are stronger than the other countries in the region.




Figure 24. Agreement that Men should have Labor Market Priority in the Countries of the Americas

Average levels of agreement with the statement that men should have employment priority obscure substantial variation among Dominicans in their responses. Figure 25 evaluates these responses in more detail, returning to the original 1-7 scale on the question. 52.8% responded 5, 6, or 7 on the scale, which is to say that they expressed support for the idea that men should have priority in obtaining work.




Figure 25. Attitudes about Priority for Men in the Labor Market in the Dominican Republic

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also asked citizens across the Americas about their perceptions of the reasons for racial and ethnic inequalities. This round, we included the following question in every country of the Americas.⁴⁶

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this?
 [Read alternatives, just one answer]
 (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly
 (3) **[Do not read]** Another response

In Figure 26 we present the percentage of respondents who agreed that poverty was due to the “culture” of people with dark skin. The Dominican Republic appears in third position, with one of the highest percentages in the region (31.2%). Although the majority of the population in all the surveyed countries indicated that poverty among darker skinned people is due to the unjust manner in which they are treated, the objective of this question was to assess the percentage of the population that indicated that the culture of dark-skinned people was the cause of their poverty. Therefore, it is significant to note that in comparison to other countries, the Dominican Republic registers a relatively high percentage of people who credit their culture as an explanation for poverty.

⁴⁶ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.




Figure 26. Percentage agreeing that Poverty is due to “Culture” in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the major social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the range of this report and answering this question with precise solutions would require, in part, taking positions on important normative and ideological debates that are the purview of citizens and politicians, rather than the authors of this study. Nonetheless, we outline here some common policy proposals, and present public opinion related to those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked citizens across the region what they thought the role of the state is in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

ROS4. The Dominican government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse into the extent to which citizens agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a public policy problem that governments should actively address. Here we present the average agreement with this statement in each country in the region. As always, we have recoded responses to run from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 100 (“Strongly agree”). The Dominican Republic is located in second place, showing strong support for the idea that the state should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor, which indicates a strong statist tendency. There is the least support for this idea in the United States and in Haiti.




Figure 27. Agreement that the State should Implement Policies to Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many of the region's governments have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their children in school.⁴⁷ The most well-known and largest of these programs include *Oportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo* in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also widely expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in Latin America are seen as being effective strategies toward assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region. In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, "CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the groups and weight of children, especially among the smallest."⁴⁸ However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depend, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policy-makers to develop well-planned and effective programs.⁴⁹ These social assistance and CCT programs are widely attributed to help reduce inequality and poverty in some of the region's most historically unequal contexts.

In 2012, the AmericasBarometer measured levels of receipt of public assistance and CCT programs across the region, using the question CCT1NEW.

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
(1) Yes (2) No

Levels of receipt of social assistance and CCTs vary greatly across the region. In Figure 28, we present the percentage of respondents in each country of the region who said that some member of their household received public assistance. The Dominican Republic is located in second place with 22.6% of respondents indicating that they or someone in their household received public assistance. However, this percentage is less than those who said they have a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* in their household, which is 31.3% as indicated in Figure 29. The difference in these percentages may be due to the fact that some of those who have a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* do not identify themselves as receiving assistance or help from the state. It is also worth noting that in the 2010 AmericasBarometer 33.8% of respondents in the Dominican Republic said they had a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*, which suggests a consistency with the data presented here for 2012. According the regression analysis (not

⁴⁷ Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 66. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁴⁸ Valencia Lomelí, Enrique. 2008. "Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475-499. p. 490.

⁴⁹ Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. "Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean." Social Protection Working Paper #0605. The World Bank.

shown in a figure), people with greater likelihood of having a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad* are those who said that they support the PLD, those with less wealth, those with less education, and younger people. We do not find a statistically significant difference by gender, rural or urban residence, nor supporting the PRD or PRSC (as compared to independents). Seventy percent of the beneficiaries of *Tarjetas de Solidaridad* said that they receive 1000 pesos or less, and the main programs that people participated in were, in this order, *Bono Gas*, *Comer es Primero* and *Bono Luz*.




Figure 28. Receipt of Public Assistance in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 29. Percentage of Households that Receive a Tarjeta de Solidaridad in the Dominican Republic

The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about CCT and other public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.⁵⁰

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

The answers were coded on a scale from 1 to 7 in which 1 represents “strong disagreement” and 7 is “strong agreement.” Figure 30 presents levels of agreement with this statement in the Americas. Answers were recoded on a scale from 0 to 100 to facilitate comparison with other questions on the survey. The Dominican Republic is located in a roughly intermediate position, with a score of 42.6. Note that some Latin American countries with extensive social programs are among those with the highest recorded support for the view that welfare recipients are lazy.

⁵⁰ This question was asked of a split sample of respondents.




Figure 30. Belief that Recipients of Public Assistance are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

Affirmative Action

Another possible policy solution that has very recently attracted attention in some places within Latin America is affirmative action. While in the United States affirmative action has a history of several decades, in Latin America it is a very recent phenomenon, and has only been seriously considered in a handful of countries with the largest populations of Afro-descendants.⁵¹

⁵¹ For further information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see Smith, Amy Erica. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* 49. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked about support for affirmative action in every country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was administered to a split sample of respondents, who were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a scale from 1 to 7.

RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 31 we examine support for affirmative action across the Americas. Here, responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison with other public opinion items. In the Dominican Republic, the level of support is 54.3 points, placing it among the countries with stronger support for the idea that universities should reserve places for students with dark skin, even if this results in excluding others.




Figure 31. Support for Affirmative Action in the Countries of the Americas

V. Conclusion

The great differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. While inequality has recently been improving in many countries of the Americas that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and where these then place them within their country's social structure.

This chapter has shown that the average levels of inequality within countries in the region are very high, the highest in the world, in fact, and we have seen that the region is relatively homogenous when comparing levels of income between one country and another. Additionally, average levels of inequality are higher in Central and South America than in North America and the Caribbean.

The data demonstrate that the Dominican Republic is far from the democratic goal of offering equality of opportunities for its population. Through linear regression analysis, we evaluated how gender, race, age and rural or urban residence are associated with level of education in the Dominican Republic. The data demonstrated that older people have less education. Darker skin and living in a rural area also have negative relationships with education. But sex has no statistically significant effect. This indicates that there have been advances in access to education by gender and among younger sectors of the population. Mother's education is significantly related to the level of education of the child: respondents with mothers who had no formal education on average do not complete primary school, while those with mothers who have higher education have average schooling of 14.2 years.

The determinants of personal income among respondents who were employed at the time of the survey are education and age (at least among groups less than 66 years old). Both variables have a positive relationships with personal income. Being a woman and living in a rural area have negative relationships with personal income. This suggests that even though there have been gains in education for women, significant income differences between the sexes persist. We also found that men's income declines as they have darker skin, except for the group with the darkest skin tone among whom there is a recovery in personal income. In the case of women, personal income declines in near-linear fashion as skin tone become darker, and it declines quite markedly among those with the darkest skin color. This suggests that the effect of race is stronger among Dominican women than Dominican men. Higher levels of mother's education are associated with greater personal income for the child, a finding that supports the idea that class origin is crucial in social position in terms of both education and income.

The Dominican Republic places second regionally in support for the idea that the state should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. Twenty-three percent of respondents said that they receive assistance or help from the state, while 31.3% said that they or someone in their household had a *Tarjeta de Solidaridad*. We suspect that the difference in these percentages is due to the fact that many people with *Tarjetas de Solidaridad* do not perceive themselves as recipients of state assistance. This can happen with questions of this nature.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Color


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.¹ This measure of skin tone provides an arguably more objective measure of skin color than a question asking for individuals' racial identification.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

Differences in Educational Achievement by Skin Tone in the Americas



95% Confidence Interval (Design-Effect Based)

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable **ED**, self-reported years of education.

Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious.¹ While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.

As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

Perceptions of Severe Crisis, Skin Color, and Household Wealth, 2010 AmericasBarometer



¹ The variable measuring economic crisis perceptions is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.¹ The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.


The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients. Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality trait of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ The variable measuring support for marriage to indigenous persons is **RAC3B**.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to politics, examining how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. Chapter Two is thus divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits significant attention given its pertinence to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that might exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Perhaps beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on the "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine *who* participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.¹ An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, as those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.² Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart puts forth four principal concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do citizens, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than lower class citizens. Second, this low turnout among poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, as policies naturally reflect the preferences of voters more than those of non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, turnout has been declining in countries across the world, and shows no signs of rebounding. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been substantiated by strong empirical evidence, as the ills of uneven participation are especially deleterious in countries like Switzerland and the United States, where overall turnout is particularly low.³

¹ Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

² Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas." *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

³ Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 80 (1): 17-43; Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

Uneven voter turnout certainly has some concerning implications for the representation of traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies. Unfortunately, biased turnout also seems to be the rule rather than the exception. But what about other forms of political participation? Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al., not only is turnout biased, but other forms of participation besides voting are actually *more* biased against certain groups.⁴ For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap between turnout among rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter-writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.⁵ Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few wield an inordinate amount of political power almost universally.

Inequalities in participation exist not only along lines of class or wealth, but also along gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.⁶ Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.⁷ Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to inequalities within households in the gendered division of labor.⁸ Perhaps the greatest gender inequalities are seen for the most difficult types of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women are strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.⁹

Some scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven across ethnic and racial groups, though here national context seems to play a more important role. Even in the US, which has historically been characterized by very stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities available to different ethnic groups, some evidence suggests that apparent differences

⁴ In the US, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. In Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru." *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

⁵ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁶ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation Among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218.

⁷ Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. Political Participation of Women in Latin America. *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1. pp. 156-173.

⁸ Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730.

⁹ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.

across ethnic groups may be explained by differences in economic (or other) resources and social status.¹⁰ In Latin America, while the indigenous have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization brought important indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.¹¹ Nonetheless, there is some evidence that indigenous *women*, in particular, may experience particularly strong barriers to participation.¹²

Unequal participation has very real consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day, it stands to reason that they will also be overrepresented in terms of the policies that elected officials enact. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also home to the most equal distributions of income.¹³ In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed, and the policy issues that governments prioritize (e.g. education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus, more even processes of development.¹⁴

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies have demonstrated that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, as do representatives from certain racial minority groups.¹⁵ Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect by which participation and representation go hand in hand.¹⁶ Thus, the effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multifarious and significant, making any discrepancies we discover in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while any lack of discrepancy might be considered cause for optimism

¹⁰ Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid.* Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American." *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

¹¹ Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123-1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism." *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹² Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women": The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes. *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

¹³ Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation." *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155

¹⁴ See also Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

¹⁵ Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

¹⁶ Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge how unequal political participation actually is in the Americas, using data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys. While data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exist in terms of rates of participation across various social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind vis-à-vis participatory inequality in the Americas. Particularly given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the possibility remains that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Turnout

First, we examine inequalities in turnout in the Dominican Republic and the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In parliamentary countries, the question is revised to ask about the most recent general elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections in 2010? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS ASK ABOUT THE FIRST]**
(1) Voted **[Continue]**
(2) Did not vote **[Go to VB10]**

Figure 32 presents turnout by gender across the Americas. The data demonstrate that there are large differences in electoral participation across countries. It is high in countries like Peru and Uruguay, where at least one of the genders reports more than 90% electoral participation; and it is relatively low in Honduras, Paraguay and Jamaica, where at least one of the two genders has turnout less than 60%. It is important to emphasize that the vote is compulsory in some countries in the region, while it is voluntary in others; these institutional differences impact the level of participation. The vote is voluntary in the Dominican Republic, which is located in an intermediate position in turnout. On the other hand, the data from all the countries in the AmericasBarometer indicate that men and women participate at similar rates; in fact, women's turnout is slightly higher than men across the region. This finding reflects what survey data from the developed world has indicated in recent years: when it comes to electoral participation, women have largely closed the gap with men. In the Dominican case, the gender difference is miniscule: 70.5% turnout among men and 70.6% among women.¹⁷

¹⁷ It is worth noting that the United States is an anomalous case, where men report much higher rates of turnout (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies. First, in the last election in the United States, more women voted than men (66% and 62% respectively), and second, in the survey reported turnout rates are much higher than they are in reality. This over-reporting is not rare in recent presidential elections in the United States. See the report from the U.S. Census Bureau: "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," of July 20, 2009 <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>, consulted July 21, 2012 and the article by Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," of February 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>, consulted July 21, 2012.




Figure 32. Gender and Turnout in the Countries of the Americas

The specific data of inequality in turnout in the Dominican Republic demonstrate that less wealth and less education are associated with higher turnout (with the exception that people with university educations report higher turnout than those with secondary education). A clear linear predictor of turnout is mother's education: a less educated mother is associated with greater electoral participation for the respondent. These data for the Dominican Republic contradict the argument that people with more resources participate more in politics. At least for turnout, this is not the case in the Dominican Republic.




Figure 33. Sociodemographics and Turnout in the Dominican Republic

Beyond Turnout

Turnout does not include everything relative to political participation. There are myriad ways that citizens can engage their democratic system, and participation in these activities across groups may or may not conform to the patterns observed in turnout. The AmericasBarometer surveys include an extensive battery of questions on other political participation besides voting. Among numerous other topics, these questions inquire about whether and how often citizens contact their representatives, and if they take part in certain community organizations. By looking at how groups might differ in terms of their involvement in these types of political activities, we obtain a more holistic view of whether or not certain sub-sections of society have unequal influence in the political process.

The AmericasBarometer by LAPOP has long included a series of questions to gauge whether and how frequently citizens participate in a variety of community groups. In 2012, we also included questions to measure whether a person who says that he or she participates takes a leadership role. The text of the CP battery is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.

CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never

CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never

CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...

(1) Once a week (2) Once or twice a month (3) Once or twice a year, or (4) Never



After each question, respondents who said that they participated at least once or twice a year received a follow-up question (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says “both” mark “leader”]
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says “both” mark “leader”]
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says “both” mark “leader”]

Figure 34 examines the extent to which citizens participate in community groups. The left side of the figure presents the levels of participation in the community for each country in the Americas. Community participation is calculated as the average response to CP6, CP7, and CP8, and has been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents never participating in any group, and 100 represents participating very frequently in all groups. It is worth noting here that in the Dominican case there was a decline between 2010 and 2012 in community participation in the organizations listed in CP6, CP7, and CP. In religious meetings (CP6), participation declined from an average of 60.5 points in 2010 to 54.7 points in 2012, and in community improvement organizations (CP8) participation dropped from an average of 25 points in 2010 to 19 points in 2012.

The right side of the figure presents the percentage of respondents in each country who said they had a leadership role in any community group. The Dominican Republic has a high level of community participation, with an average of 32.9 points, and the country has the sixth highest level of participation among the countries surveyed. The highest average is in Haiti with 41.6 points, and the lowest is Uruguay with 12.4 points. Additionally, 17.1% of Dominican respondents said they held a leadership position in the community organization in which they participate; this corresponds to fourth place among the countries included in the study. The highest percentage of organizational leadership was in Haiti with 29.8% and the lowest was in Argentina with 6.3%. This means that in the Dominican Republic there is a relatively high level of community participation and that an important percentage of respondents hold leadership positions in these organizations.




Figure 34. Community Participation in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 35 and Figure 36, we examine the results further within the Dominican Republic, showing the average levels of participation among Dominicans by demographic group. There is not significant variation in community participation by levels of wealth or education. There is slight variation according to the level of mother's education, although the data suggest that more educated mothers are associated with less participation among respondents. The most notable difference is by gender, with more women than men reporting community participation. This gap is due to the fact that women participate more than men in religious and school-related organizations, and these two types of organizations are included in the community participation scale. In terms of leadership, we see linear relationships for both level of respondent's education and level of mother's education. In both cases, less education is associated with more leadership. This contradicts the argument found in the literature about democracy and citizen participation, which supposes that more education is associated with greater social participation. Additionally, the data indicate that while women report more community participation than men, female respondents are no more likely than men to be leaders.




Figure 35. Sociodemographics and Community Participation in the Dominican Republic




Figure 36. Sociodemographics and Percent Taking a Leadership Role in a Community Group in the Dominican Republic

Many citizens also participate in campaign related activities beyond simply voting. Questions PP1 and PP2 seek to gauge citizen participation in these sorts of activities.

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? **[Read the options]**

(1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA

PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] elections of 2006?

(1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 37 depicts participation in campaign activities in the Americas. The left side of the figure presents the percentage of citizens who say they have “tried to persuade others” either “frequently” or “occasionally.” The right side presents the percentage who said they had worked for a campaign. The Dominican Republic occupies second place with 31.6% of respondents who said they had tried to convince someone to vote for a particular party or candidate and third place with 16.8% who said they had work for a campaign. This suggests that the Dominican Republic has a relatively high level of political involvement.




Figure 37. Campaign Participation in the Countries of the Americas

To examine the Dominican case more closely, in Figure 38 we recode all those who report that they tried to persuade others either frequently or occasionally as having attempted to persuade others. The data indicate that more wealth, more education (of respondents and of their mothers) and being a man are the variables positively associated with trying to convince others to vote for a particular party or candidate. The largest differences are evident for gender and respondent’s level of education.




Figure 38. Sociodemographics and Attempts to Persuade Others in the Dominican Republic

In Figure 39 we present the percentage of respondents in different social groups who said they worked for a candidate or party in the most recent elections. The most notable difference is between genders: men report having participated in the electoral campaign at higher rates than women. Mother's education also has a negative relationship with participation in campaigns: more educated mothers are associated with less campaign participation for respondents, while respondents who attained university education were more likely to participate in campaigns than those with less education. There is little variation across wealth quintiles.




Figure 39. Sociodemographics and Campaign Participation in the Dominican Republic

In the preceding analysis, we have found evidence for some participatory inequalities by gender. However, it is quite likely that rates of participation vary by women's positions in the labor market and family.¹⁸ Figure 40 presents rates or levels of participation by gender and, for woman, by family and labor market status. The data show that being a married woman without her own income reduces the probability of working in a campaign and of trying to convince others to vote for a party or candidate, that is in two forms of political participation that require greater effort and knowledge.

¹⁸ See, for instance, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.




Figure 40. Gender Roles and Participation in the Dominican Republic

Figure 41 presents the levels of each form of participation according to skin color. The lines in the graph demonstrate that there is little variation in participation according to this variable.




Figure 41. Skin Color and Participation in the Dominican Republic

III. Public Opinion towards Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Citizens who think that women's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, are less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life, or to vote for such candidates. In this section, we review the results for a number of questions that seek to quantify the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

Note that responses to these questions are likely subject to what public opinion scholars call "social desirability bias," meaning that citizens will be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.¹⁹ This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give the "socially desirable," non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions may be lower than their actual levels in the population.

¹⁹ Some recent scholarship in Latin America addresses the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when it comes to the issue of vote buying by designing experiments (see, for instance, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad K. de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W. Nickerson. 2012. Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

Public Opinion towards Women's Leadership

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions tapping attitudes toward women in positions of political leadership, **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.²⁰ The text of these questions is as follows:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?		
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	
(3) Disagree	(4) Strongly disagree	
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) Both the same
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) It does not matter

Figure 42 presents the results of question **VB50** after being recoded to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 points, where higher values indicate more support for the idea that men are better political leaders than women. The Dominican Republic is in second place among countries in the region scoring 47.9 points on the scale measuring support for this idea. Guyana had the highest score with 53.3 points, and Uruguay had the lowest with 26.6.

²⁰ VB51 and VB52 were administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.




Figure 42. Belief that Men Make Better Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 43 depicts the results of regression analysis of **VB50**. Having a right-leaning ideology has a statistically significant, positive relationship with support for the view that men make better political leaders than women. Of the variables in the statistical analysis, this is the only one that has this effect. Age, being a woman, and education of both the respondent and the respondent's mother have statistically significant, negative relationships with support for the view that men make better political leaders than women. That is, women, people with more education and with mothers who had more education are less likely to think that men are better political leaders than women; and therefore, are less likely to oppose women's participation in politics. Figure 44 shows in detail the statistically significant linear relationship between ideology and the view that men make better political leaders than women. More right-leaning ideology is associated with support for men's superiority as political leaders. Figure 45 demonstrates that men are more likely to support this idea. Average support among men is 53.7 points, while it is only 42 points for women. Figure 46 presents the relationships education of the respondent and education of the respondent's mother have with attitudes about the gender of

political leaders. More education translates into less support for the idea that men make better political leaders.




Figure 43. Determinants of Opposition to Women in Politics in the Dominican Republic




Figure 44. Relationship between Ideology and Opposition to Women in Politics, Dominican Republic (estimated values)




Figure 45. Relationship between Sex of the Respondent and Opposition to Women in Politics in the Dominican Republic




Figure 46. Relationships that Education of the Respondent and Education of the Respondent's Mother Have with Opposition to Women in Politics in the Dominican Republic

Even though many Dominicans think that men are better political leaders than women, they also think that male politicians are more corrupt than female politicians. Answers to question **VB51** “Who do you think are more corrupt as politicians?” are detailed in Figure 47. Sixty-five percent considered men to be more corrupt than women, 32.6% viewed both as equally corrupt, and only 2.8% saw women as more corrupt. In fact, the Dominican Republic ranks first place in regional perspective with the highest percentage of respondents who considered men more corrupt. On the other hand, with respect to question **VB52** about who would manage the economy better, only 20.4% said men, while 40.6% said women, and 39% had no preference. But this 20.4% who said men would manage the

economy better than women, places the Dominican Republic in third place in the region with one of the highest percentages of respondents who viewed men as better managers of the economy.




Figure 47. Attitudes about Women as Politicians in the Dominican Republic

Public Opinion towards Leadership by Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included one question on attitudes toward people of darker skin in positions of political leadership, **VB53**

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.

VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

[Interviewer: “dark skin” refers to blacks, indigenous, “non-whites” in general]

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|
| (1) Strongly agree | (2) Agree |
| (3) Disagree | (4) Strongly disagree |

The levels of resistance to politicians according to their skin color are generally less than the resistance to female politicians. This is evident in Figure 42 which displays the average scores from the question about whether men are better leaders than women, which oscillate between 53.3 (Guyana) and 26.6 (Uruguay) with higher values indicating more support for the idea that men are better leaders. In Figure 48, the scores range from 34.3 (Chile) to 15.4 (Uruguay), with higher scores indicating support for the idea that people with dark skin are not good leaders. While the Dominican Republic places in the second highest position in Figure 42 with an average of 47.9. In Figure 48 the country places in an average position with an average score of 25.7. This means that the Dominican Republic has greater support for the idea that men are better leaders than women as measured in question **VB50**, than for the idea that people with dark skin are not good leaders, as measured in question **VB53**.




Figure 48. Belief that Dark-skinned Politicians are Not Good Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards Political Participation by Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included question **D5** on attitudes toward gays running for public office.

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

Figure 49 shows that there is a large difference between the countries of the Americas in their answers to question **D5**. Higher scores mean greater acceptance for homosexuals running for public office. Canada, Uruguay, and the United States have the highest levels of acceptance, all with averages over 70 points, while Haiti has the lowest score. The Dominican Republic places among the countries with relatively low acceptance of homosexuals running for public office.




Figure 49. Support for Homosexuals Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

Public Opinion towards the Participation of the Disabled

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question on attitudes toward those who are physically disabled being allowed to run for public office.²¹

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?




Figure 50. Support for the Disabled Running for Office in the Countries of the Americas

On a scale from 0 to 100, higher numbers indicate more support for disabled people being permitted to run for public office. Figure 50 shows widespread support in many countries, and only

²¹ This question was administered in a split sample, that is, to only half of respondents.

two countries have average scores less than 50 points, The Dominican Republic ranks among the countries with the lowest average scores with 56.8 points.

IV. Public Opinion towards Common Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, for at least some indicators of political engagement, there seem to exist nontrivial discrepancies in rates of participation between men and women, different racial groups, and social classes. While these results are certainly troubling, there are reasons to be optimistic about closing this gap, as American democracies have already come a long way in terms of political equality. Moreover, these differences are not present everywhere, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation, based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.²² The general idea is that when more members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are thus more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. Unfortunately, however, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.²³

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure 51 depicts support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. Almost all the countries surveyed register average support for women's candidacies of 50 points or more. The Dominican Republic is in second position in support for this idea, averaging 78.5 points. This may be due to the fact that this theme has been on the public agenda in the Dominican Republic since the implementation of the gender quota reform to the electoral law in 1997. Although the parties initially tried to violate the quota, controls were later established to enforce compliance with the provision that women fill at least 33% of candidacies for the Chamber of Deputies and the municipal councils.

²² Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents." *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation." <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

²³ This question was administered to a split (half) sample of respondents.




Figure 51. Support for Gender Quotas in the Countries of the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.²⁴ While about half of countries in the Latin American and Caribbean region have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.²⁵ One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in election is less

²⁴ Lijphart, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

²⁵ Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, would suggest that compulsory voting also does not have the expected effect in terms of reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in economic inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way in closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.²⁶

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lower where economic inequality is at its highest, which has particular relevance to Latin America, the most unequal region in the world.²⁷ While the relationship with socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,²⁸ material wealth and education exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, it seems that economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

This chapter examined how gender, race and poverty affect political participation and opportunities in the region. The goal was to explore the level of inequality in participation, patterns in public opinion about the political participation of disadvantaged groups, and attitudes toward possible solutions to reduce political inequality.

Despite declines in inequality in recent decades, we showed that in the Americas inequalities in certain important aspects of political participation persist. The data on electoral participation indicate that there are inequalities across countries such that turnout is very high in some countries like Peru and Uruguay, where at least one gender reported 90% electoral participation; while turnout is relatively low in Honduras, Paraguay, and Jamaica, where at least one gender reported participation less than 60%. It is worth noting that voting is compulsory in some countries in the region and voluntary in others. These institutional differences certainly contribute in part to explaining this cross-national variation. The Dominican Republic, where voting is not compulsory, is located in an intermediate to low position in terms of reported turnout. The data indicate that men and women participate at roughly equal rates, that is to say there is not a gender gap.

Statistical analysis of the Dominican data showed that less wealth and less education are associated with higher turnout, with the exception of people with university educations who report higher turnout than those with only secondary education. Mother's education is a linear predictor of turnout: less educated mothers are associated with higher turnout. These Dominican data contradict the

²⁶ Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid*.; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid*.

²⁷ Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas." Working paper.

²⁸ Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

argument that people with more resources participate more in politics; at least electorally, this is not the case in the Dominican Republic.

In community participation, the Dominican Republic has an average level of 32.9 points, placing the country in sixth place among those surveyed, and 17.1% said they held leadership positions in the organization in which they participate. The largest sociodemographic difference that we observe is for gender, with women reporting greater participation than men, in part due to the fact that the community participation scale includes participation in religious and school-based organizations, where women participate more than men.

The Dominican Republic occupies second place in the region with 31.6% of those surveyed saying that they tried to convince someone to vote for a particular party or candidate. Additionally, the country is third in the region in the share of respondents who worked for a political campaign with 16.8%. On both questions, the Dominican Republic manifests a relatively high level of political involvement. The greatest observed demographic difference is by gender: men were more likely than women to have worked for a campaign. The education of the respondent's mother had a negative effect of participation in election campaigns: more educated mothers were associated with less participation; while the education of respondents themselves favors greater participation, at least at the level of university education. There was little variation across wealth quintiles. In the case of trying to convince others to vote for a certain party or candidate, the Dominican data show that more wealth, more education (both of the respondent and the respondent's mother), and being a man are variables that have positive effects. The largest difference is in the cases of gender and respondent's education level. The data show that being a married woman without income is strongly associated with less campaign work and less efforts to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate – the forms of political participation that require greater effort and knowledge.

Among countries in the region, the Dominican Republic has the second highest level of support for the view that men make better political leaders than women with a score of 47.9 points. Right-leaning ideology has a significant, positive relationship with this attitude. On the other hand, women, people with more education, and those whose mothers had more education are less likely to think that men make better political leaders than women. However, the majority of Dominican respondents said that male politicians are more corrupt than women, and there is a high level of support for gender quotas. Taking into account gender, race, and sexual orientation in relation to political participation in the Dominican Republic, there is more support for the idea that men make better political leaders than for the idea that dark-skinned people are not good leaders, and there is low support for the view that homosexuals should be allowed to run for public office.

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.¹ In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?


The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.

Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php>.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.¹

Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation². The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically

Predicted Probabilities for Men's and Women's Political Participation in Latin America



more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

¹ The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, POL1; political knowledge (Uruguay only) G11, G13, G14; persuading others, PP1; working on a campaign, PP2; protest, PROT3; working on a campaign, CP2, CP4A, CP4; attending government meeting, NP1; attending party meeting, CP13; attending women's group meetings, CP20.

² In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.

Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.


Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and non-compulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept included but not shown here



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP, 2010

Country fixed effects and intercept

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas are willing to report social and political attitudes that disfavor the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we ask, what are the consequences for democracy in the Americas? How do political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities? Furthermore, how do they affect their perceptions of their political systems and the democratic regime? Are there further consequences for the stability of the region's political systems?

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect what is often called "internal political efficacy": one's perception of one's own political capabilities. There are two ways this could happen. On the one hand, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a signal of their social worth, and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.¹ Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy, while the more educated and those with higher wealth have higher efficacy.² On the other hand, perhaps citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust react by becoming mobilized and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could boost political efficacy. Thus, the relationship between marginalization and internal efficacy may vary depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect what is often called "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. Some citizens have had previous contact with politicians, or their close friends and family members may have done so. These citizens may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences, whether favorable or unfavorable, with specific politicians.³ If politicians actually treat some groups better than others, citizens who have contact with politicians will draw conclusions from their own experiences,

¹ Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform." *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford, and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation." *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

² Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³ Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296.

leading to an association between group membership and external efficacy.⁴ In addition, citizens with a sense of collective identity – those who perceive that their fate is linked to that of the group – may well base their judgments of political leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same characteristics, more generally.⁵

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system, meaning the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.⁶ Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure, and of leaders' ineffectiveness. This could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.⁷ When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may have downstream consequences, spilling over and depressing "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the AmericasBarometer 2010 found that it was resistant to the effects of economic crisis.⁸

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. In an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.⁹ However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.¹⁰

⁴ For evidence on police officers differentially targeting citizens based on perceived social class, see Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheendar Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 45 (1): 76-97.

⁵ Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality." *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

⁶ Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁷ Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

⁸ Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

⁹ Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?" *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

¹⁰ Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America." Presented at the Marginalization in the Americas Conference, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the US context, Schildkraut found that among non-acculturated US Latinos, discrimination increased participation but decreased legitimacy of the political system. See Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. "The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination," *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of social movement participation among such groups as well.¹¹ However, discrimination certainly also at some moments constitutes a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, with famous examples such as the US civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.¹²

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. Cleary, on the one hand, finds little link between discrimination and ethnic rebellion; Moreno Morales, on the other, finds in the AmericasBarometer that perceiving that one has been the victim of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.¹³ And scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as “important rallying cries” during democratization,¹⁴ and raise “the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action.”¹⁵ It appears, however, that group identity may need to be politicized, and group consciousness to form, to translate deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines into activism.¹⁶

In this chapter, we assess how experiences of marginalization affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. First we examine measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representation affect such more general attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups affects protest participation.

¹¹ Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid.*

¹² Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹³ Cleary, Matthew. 2000. “Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Lovell, Peggy. 2000. Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil. *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. Women’s Social Movements in Latin America. *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

¹⁵ Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. “Inequality and Insurgency.” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

¹⁶ Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism. *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s. *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

II. Inequality, Efficacy and Perceptions of Representation

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we included a number of questions to tap internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions of representation. Two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the latter measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7 point scale running from 1 (“Not at all”) to 7 (“A lot”). All three questions are recoded for the analysis in this chapter to run from 0 to 100.¹⁷

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

The questions that evaluate group characteristics and equality of opportunity were detailed in Chapters 1 and 2. These questions include measures of gender, skin color, household wealth, gender inequalities within the household, and self-reported discrimination victimization in government offices, public places, and the workplace.

We analyze how these factors are related to internal efficacy in the Americas using question **EFF2**. Figure 52 shows that there is variation across the countries in the region in the level of understanding of political issues that people report having. The United States and Canada have the highest average reported understanding, while Brazil and Paraguay have the lowest. The Dominican Republic places in an intermediate position with an average of 50.6 points.

¹⁷ This question was administered to a split sample, meaning to half of all respondents in each country.




Figure 52. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

How do social inequalities and experiences of discrimination affect internal efficacy? In Figure 53, we use linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences. Level of political interest has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the confidence that Dominicans have in their understanding of important political issues in the country. Greater political interest is associated with greater reported understanding. There are also positive relationships observed for education level and age; with more education and older age, there is a greater understanding of political issues. Being a woman is the only other variable included in the regression analysis that has a statistically significant relationship, but in the reverse; that is, as postulated at the beginning of the chapter women report less understanding of important political issues in the country. Feeling discrimination, either in a government office or other places (that is the workplace, school, or a public place) do not have statistically significant relationships.¹⁸

¹⁸ Discrimination in government is question DIS2: “thinking about your experiences in the past year, has there been a time that you felt discriminated against or were treated worse than other people in the following places? In government offices [courts, ministries, municipalities]”. Discrimination in other places is based on questions DIS3 and DIS 5 about discrimination “In the workplace or school or when seeking employment” or “In public places, like the street, the plaza,




Figure 53. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in the Dominican Republic

Figure 54 presents in greater detail how personal characteristics are related to citizens' belief in their ability to understand the political system in the Dominican Republic. Level of education and political interest have positive linear relationships with understanding of political issues. In the case of age, the tendency is linear and positive, but with a decline in understanding among the oldest age groups. Men report a level of understanding 11 points above that reported by women. Of all the variables, the largest effect is for political interest: those who have no political interests express an average internal efficacy of 37.5 points, compared to 68.9 points for the group that has a lot of political interest.

stores, or the market.” An affirmative answer to DIS3 or DIS5 means a positive score on the variable called “discrimination in other places.”




Figure 54. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in the Dominican Republic

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. Variables **EFF1** and **EPP3** are described here: the first refers to external efficacy measured using attitudes about the extent to which those who govern are interested in what people think and the other refers to the representativeness of the political parties measured with a question about whether the parties listen to the people. Figure 55 shows the distribution of these two items for the countries of the Americas. In general, the perceptions that those who govern are interested in what people think or that the parties listen to the people are not very high in the region. No country has average scores over 50 points on these scales. There is variation in the region with some countries nearing 50 points, but others closer to 25. Within this range, the Dominican Republic places relatively high in the opinion that those who govern are interested in what people think with an average of 41.6 points, and in an intermediate position of 34 points on the view that the parties listen to the people.




Figure 55. External Efficacy and Perceptions of Party Representation in the Countries of the Americas

Who within the Dominican Republic thinks that those who govern the country are interested in what people think? And who agrees with the idea that political parties represent the people? In the next few graphs, we use linear regression analysis to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that lead citizens to report high external efficacy and strong perceptions of representation by the parties. Figure 56 shows that political interest has a positive, statistically significant relationship with external efficacy in the Dominican Republic: more political interest, more support for the view that those who govern are interested in what people think. However, there is a significant negative relationship in the case of education: less education is associated with greater external efficacy. The other variables included in the regression analysis do not have statistically significant effects. Figure 57 shows that political interest and being a woman have positive relationships with the view that parties are representative in the Dominican Republic; while education has a negative relationship.




Figure 56. Determinants of External Efficacy in the Dominican Republic




Figure 57. Determinants of the Belief that Parties are Representative in the Dominican Republic

To further understand what factors are associated with these two attitudes, in Figure 58 and Figure 59 we examine how several of the most important variables from the regression analysis are related to internal efficacy and perceptions of party representation. Figure 58 shows a positive linear

relationship between external efficacy and political interest (more political, interest, a greater sense that those who govern pay attention to the people) and a positive linear relationship between external efficacy and education level. Figure 59 shows a positive linear trend between political interest and perceived representation by political parties, although the line is not perfectly straight. We can also see a negative relationship with education, which is also not perfectly linear. Women feel more represented by political parties than men and people who have not felt discriminated against in government offices also have a more positive view of the representativeness of the parties, although in this last case the relationship is not very significant.




Figure 58. Factors Associated with External Efficacy in the Dominican Republic




Figure 59. Factors Associated with Belief in Party Representation in the Dominican Republic

III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination may also affect more abstract political attitudes. As discussed above, discrimination could be seen as a failure of the political system, and could lower support for the general political system. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we tap a number of more general political attitudes; the most important of these are support for the political system and support for democracy in the abstract. In Chapter Five we describe in detail how these are measured, as well as the levels of these attitudes across the region and over time within the Dominican Republic. In the present section, we consider how personal characteristics and experiences of discrimination shape these attitudes that are so critical for democratic stability.

In Figure 60 we use linear regression analysis to assess how respondents' individual traits and reported experiences are associated with levels of political support in the Dominican Republic. As shown in the bar graph, greater political interest is associated with more support for the system, and women also have higher levels of system support. On the other hand, perceived discrimination by the government and in other places, wealth, and level of education have negative relationships with system support.




Figure 60. Determinants of Support for the Political System in the Dominican Republic

To assess in greater depth the most important factors determining support for the political system, Figure 61 examines the specific relationship between some personal characteristics and system support. Perceived discrimination in government offices or in other places have similar impacts on system support: people who have felt discrimination by the government have system support levels of 42.1 points and those who have felt discrimination in other places have support levels of 44.5 points. Political interest has an ascending linear relationship with system support; the level of support is 42.6 points for those without any political interest, compared to 53.2 points among those with a lot of interest in politics. Level of wealth has a negative relationship: those with less wealth display more system support (54.7 points). The same is true of education: those with no formal education have greater levels of system support (63.8 points). Finally, women have average system support of 51.2 points compared to 46.5 points among men.




Figure 61. Factors Associated with System Support in the Dominican Republic

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination might also have spillover effects on support for democracy in the abstract. We performed linear regression analysis in order to assess how the set of personal traits we reported above are associated with the belief that “democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.” Figure 62 indicates that there are three variables with a positive relationship: political interest, wealth, and age. That is, more political interest, more wealth, and older age are associated with greater support for the idea that democracy is better than any other form of government.




Figure 62. Determinants of Support for Democracy in the Dominican Republic

Figure 63 continues to examine the variables identified as important in the regression analysis above. Political interest and age have positive, linear relationships with support for democracy – the score increases steadily as political interest and age increase. In the case of wealth, the tendency is positive, but not exactly linear.




Figure 63. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in the Dominican Republic

IV. Protest Participation

As we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups – at least those that are highly politicized – to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting may be becoming a more “normalized” method of political participation: “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest.”¹⁹ In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including most importantly **PROT3**.

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]**

In Figure 64 we examine the levels of political protest throughout the Americas. In general, participation in protest by the people of the Americas is not particularly high. Bolivia, Haiti, Peru, Paraguay, and Chile register participation rates above 10%. Of these five countries, the first four are the least stable in the region. The Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position with an 8% rate of participation in protests.

¹⁹ Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America.” *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 64. Protest Participation in the Countries of the Americas

Who are the people who protest in the Dominican Republic? In Figure 65 we use logistic regression analysis to assess how marginalization and discrimination affect protest participation. Of the variables included in the analysis, none has a negative effect, while two variables have positive effects: education and the perception of having been discriminated against in places other than government offices. More education and perceived education are both associated with a greater likelihood of participation in popular protests.




Figure 65. Determinants of Protest Participation in the Dominican Republic

Figure 66 illustrates how participation in protests relates to a series of variables identified in Figure 65. We find that the perception of discrimination more than doubles participation in protests, while education has a positive linear relationship and those with secondary or university education have participated in protests at much higher rates than those with less education.




Figure 66. Factors Associated with Protest Participation in the Dominican Republic

V. Conclusion

This chapter examined the consequences that discriminatory attitudes have toward certain segments of the population, evaluated how political and social inequalities affect the perceptions people have of their own capacities, and how these inequalities affect their perception about the political system and the democratic regime.

There is cross-national variation in the levels of internal efficacy – that is, the level of understanding that respondents report having concerning important political issues in their country. The United States and Canada have the highest levels of internal efficacy, while Brazil and Paraguay have the lowest. The Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position with an average of 50.6 points on the measure of internal efficacy. In the regression analysis of internal efficacy in the Dominican case, the following variables had statistically significant, positive relationships: political interest, education level, and age, except among the oldest respondents. Being a woman had a statistically significant, negative impact on internal efficacy, as hypothesized in the introduction.

The perceptions that those who govern are interested in what people think (external political efficacy) or that parties listen to the people (representativeness of the parties) are not very high throughout the region. No country registered average scores over 50 points on either measure, and there is regional variation on both dimensions: while some countries approach 50 points, others are closer to 25 points. Within this parameter, the Dominican Republic has a relatively high position in terms of support for the opinion that those who govern pay attention to what people think, with an average of 41.6 points, and it falls in an intermediate position at 34 points on the opinion that the parties listen to the people. For the Dominican Republic, there is a positive relationship between



external political efficacy and political interest: more political interest is associated with greater support for the perception that those who govern are interested in what people think. However, lower levels of education are associated with more external efficacy. The other variables included in the linear regression analysis do not have statistically significant effects on external efficacy. Political interest and being a woman have positive relationships with the perception that parties are representative, while education has a negative relationship.

The linear regression analysis that examines how respondents' characteristics and experiences are associated with their level of support for the political system in the Dominican Republic shows that more political interest is associated with greater system support. Women also have more support for the system. Perceived discrimination, wealth, and education have negative relationships with system support. None of the variables considered in the regression have negative relationships with support for democracy; while three variables have a positive relationship: greater political interest, wealth and age are associated with more support for the idea that democracy is a better form of government than any other.

In general, participation in protests throughout the region is not particularly high. Bolivia, Haiti, Peru, Paraguay, and Chile have protest participation rates over 10%. The Dominican Republic is located in an intermediate position with 8% participation in protests. In using logistic regression analysis to assess the effects of marginalization and discrimination on protests in the Dominican Republic, we found no variables with negative relationships and two variables with positive relationships: education and perceived discrimination in places besides government. That is, more education and more perceived discrimination is associated with more participation in popular protests.

Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?¹


The second figure illustrates that both individuals' **opportunity** to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' **motivation** to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge gap between urban and rural areas.

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access to education and in access to media at home.

Urban/Rural Knowledge Divide and Motivational Versus Opportunity Explanations



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP



Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

¹ For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support



This box reviews findings from the paper “The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America,” by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.¹ The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.

Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.² Thus, discrimination can have pernicious democratic effects.

Experiences with Discrimination in Eight Countries



Source: Americas Barometer by LAPOP, 2010

¹ The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: DIS11, DIS12, DIS13, RAC1A, RAC1D, RAC1E from the 2010 questionnaire.

² The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, B1, B2, B4, and B6; protest, PROT3; interpersonal trust, IT1.

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information


This box reviews findings from the 2012 report “Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results,” by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.


The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.¹ As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

Average support for democracy, by year and survey



Percentage who have received information about candidates, by gender and year



Source: Baseline and Follow-Up Surveys by LAPOP, 2010-2012

¹ This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.”

Part II:
Governance, Political Engagement, and
Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

High crime rates and persistent public sector corruption are two of the largest challenges facing many countries in the Americas today. Since the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the global shift towards democracy, the study of corruption and implementation of initiatives to combat corrupt practices have been on the rise.¹ Corruption, often defined as the use of public resources for private gain, obviously was commonplace under previous authoritarian regimes in various countries throughout the Americas; however, given widespread media censorship and the great personal risk for those who chose to report on corruption, it was impossible to determine just how much corruption existed and in what public spheres was it more common.

Studies from the field of economics have noted corruption's adverse impact on growth and wealth distribution. Because corruption takes funds from the public sector and places them in private hands, it often results in the inefficient expenditure of resources and in lower quality of public services. There is, then, growing understanding in academia of the corrosive effects that corruption has on economies as well as of the challenges corruption creates for democratic governance, particularly the egalitarian administration of justice.²

At the level of public opinion, there is a substantial body of evidence indicating that those who are victims of corruption are less likely to trust the political institutions and political actors of their country, and these effects hold across the region.³ However, others show that such opinions do not spill over onto attitudes towards democracy more generally.⁴ Some scholars even suggest that corruption can at times simply lead to citizen withdrawal from politics, or even *help* specific governments

¹ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

² Pharr, Susan J. 2000. Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies. In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

³ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries." *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America." *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

⁴ Canache, Damarys, and Michael E Allison. 2005. "Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (3): 91-111.

maintain public support.⁵ Some have also suggested that corruption victimization could erode social capital, making those who experience corruption less trusting of their fellow citizens.

Recently, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the importance of perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies, both using AmericasBarometer data, have indicated that perceiving higher rates of corruption is linked to lower levels of trust in key state institutions, independently of individuals' experiences with corruption.⁶ However, having experienced corruption is not particularly strongly linked to high perceptions of corruption, and for that reason LAPOP normally prefers to both data on actual corruption victimization as well as data on corruption perceptions.

Crime is another serious and growing problem in many countries of the Americas. Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean were estimated at 15.5 per 100,000 citizens by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2011, more than double the global homicide rate of 6.9 per 100,000, and nearly five times the homicide rate in Europe (3.5 per 100,000).⁷ While South America has been following the worldwide trend downward in homicide, rates in Central America and the Caribbean have been on the upswing.

Given this context of extremely high crime, it is imperative that political scientists and policymakers understand the effects that crime victimization and the fear associated with crime have on democratic governance and stability. It is easy to comprehend how crime victimization might affect citizen support for the political system and perhaps even democracy, since it is that system that can be blamed for not delivering citizen security.⁸ Moreover, citizens might become less trusting, and potentially less tolerant, of their fellow citizens if they fear or have experienced crime, thus eroding social capital and leading to lower support for civil liberties and liberal institutions. Crime victimization could even lead citizens to seek to emigrate to other countries.⁹ Fear of or experience with crime might also lead to decreased support for and faith in certain key political institutions, particularly the police, but also the judiciary.¹⁰

As with corruption, it is unclear whether an individual's perception of crime or actual crime victimization is more important in shaping her attitudes towards the democratic system. Even in places

⁵ Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior." *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

⁶ Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico." *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

⁷ Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>

⁸ Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C.; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review*.

⁹ Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 64. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁰ Malone, Mary Fran T. 2010. "The Verdict Is In: The Impact of Crime on Public Trust in Central American Justice Systems." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 2 (3).

where crime rates are high compared to global figures, the probability that an individual will be murdered or become the victim of a serious crime, fortunately, remains quite low in most countries, even though in some Central American countries the rate is disturbingly high. However, individuals might read about violent crimes in the newspaper, see images on the television, or know people who have become the victims of such crimes. The fear of becoming a victim, which is possible for anyone regardless of past experience with crime, might have a greater impact on attitudes than actually having been a crime victim.

This chapter seeks to understand the extent of corruption and crime in the Americas and to clarify how corruption and crime affect democratic attitudes and feelings about the rule of law across the region.

II. Corruption

The Latin American Public Opinion Project has developed a series of questions that measure corruption victimization, which are deployed in the AmericasBarometer surveys. Following initial tests in Nicaragua in 1996¹¹, these items have been refined and improved. Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by asking such questions as: “Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?” We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police agents, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings (see below for the exact questions).¹² This series has two particular strengths. First, it allows us to determine in which social settings corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to construct a corruption scale, distinguishing between those who have experienced corruption in only one setting and those who have been victimized in more than one setting. We assume that with corruption, as with crime, multiple victimizations are likely to make a difference.

¹¹ Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates, and Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates.

¹² Question **EXC20**, on bribery by military officials, was introduced for the first time in 2012.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE “FUERZA PÚBLICA”] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipal government? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98

Another item that taps perceptions of rather than experiences with corruption is also included in the questionnaire. The question reads as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among **public officials** is **[Read]**
(1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon?

We rescale this variable from 0-100, where 0 represents a perception that corruption is very uncommon, and 100 a perception that corruption is very common.

Perceptions of Corruption

Figure 67 shows that citizens tend to perceive high levels of corruption throughout the Americas. All the countries, with the exception of Suriname, have average scores on the perceived corruption measure that exceed 50 points. The Dominican Republic is located among the countries with higher levels of perceived corruption at 78.1 points, which is similar to the averages registered in previous years, as shown in Figure 68.




Figure 67. Perceptions of Corruption in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 68. Perceptions of Corruption over Time in the Dominican Republic

It is important to note that high levels of perceived corruption might not always correspond to high, or even rising, levels of corruption. Thus, although perceptions of corruption might be high, actual victimization might be low. In the next section, we analyze respondents' actual experiences with corruption victimization.

Corruption Victimization

This section addresses the extent to which citizens in the Americas have been victimized by corruption. To this end, Figure 69 presents the percentage of respondents in each country who report that they have been asked for a bribe in at least one location in the last year, and it reveals wide variation in the rates of corruption in the different countries in the region. The percentages range from 3.4% in Canada to 67.0% in Haiti. The Dominican Republic has the eighth highest level of corruption victimization with 21.7%. The countries with the lowest rates of victimization are Canada, the United States, and Chile, and those with the highest rates are Haiti, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The first three correspond to the most developed and ordered economies, while the other three are some of the least developed and most impoverished economies. Although poverty level is not the only indicator associated with more corrupt practices, it is one of the primary ones.




Figure 69. Percentage Victimized by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

Some citizens received requests for a bribe in many instances, while others received requests in one or none. Next, we assess the number of instances in which citizens reported being victimized by corruption in the Dominican Republic. This information is presented in Figure 70, where we can see that 78.3% report not having experienced corruption in the past 12 months, 15.7% experienced corruption only one time, and 6% experienced it two or more times.




Figure 70. Number of Instances Victimized by Corruption in the Dominican Republic

How have the levels of corruption victimization varied over time in the Dominican Republic? Figure 71 displays the percentage of respondents who reported being a corruption victim in each of the survey years indicated. While there were reductions in 2006 and 2008 with respect to the previous year, there were increases in 2010 and 2012.




Figure 71. Percentage Victimized by Corruption over Time in the Dominican Republic

Who is Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

In order to paint a clearer picture of corruption victimization, we computed a logistic regression model to identify those socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that were positively and negatively associated with corruption victimization. Figure 72 displays the results of this regression. More education is associated with greater reported victimization, and women report less victimization than men. Wealth also has a statistical relationship, although not as strong as in the case of education level. This may mean that those who solicit bribes see men as well as people with more wealth and more education as possessing resources. It could also be that these groups interact more with public institutions, and another possibility is that men and people with more education and wealth are more likely to report incidents of corruption.




Figure 72. Determinants of Corruption Victimization in the Dominican Republic

To better observe the impact of a given independent variable on the likelihood that an individual has been victimized by corruption, we present bivariate results in Figure 73. While 31.5% of men reported being victims of corruption, only 11.9% of women did. The gap between the different education groups is marked: among people without any education only 7.2% reported having been victims of corruption, while the percentage increases to 32% in the case of people with higher education.




Figure 73. Demographics and Corruption Victimization in the Dominican Republic

III. Perceptions of Insecurity and Crime Victimization

The Americas Barometer measures citizens' perception of their safety by asking question AOJ11:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very **unsafe**?
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe
 (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe

Following LAPOP standard practices, responses were recalibrated on a 0-100 scale, where higher values mean greater perceived insecurity. Given that the most criminal acts take place in urban areas, especially national capitals, we decided to present the data about crime for the capitals of 24 countries in the sample (we do not include the United States or Canada due to sampling issues).

Figure 74 presents the results for AOJ11 for the capitals of each country. Mexico City and Lima have the highest average levels of insecurity with 54.7 and 53.9 points respectively, while Port of Spain and Kingston have the lowest levels with 32.7 and 29.0 points. Santo Domingo is located in an intermediate position with 45.4 points (the data refer to greater Santo Domingo).




Figure 74. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Capital Cities of the Americas

Figure 75 shows the overtime changes in perceptions of insecurity in the Dominican Republic at the national level, using data from previous years of the AmericasBarometer survey which asked respondents the same question. In 2012, there is a slight reduction in the level of insecurity compared to 2010, but the average in 2012 remains higher than in 2008, the year in which there was the lowest average perceived insecurity in the period examined here. However, the differences between 2012 and both 2008 and 2010 are not statistically significant.¹³ In 2005-2006 there were a series of criminal acts that rocked the country and led the government to promote the crime prevention plan known as *Barrio Seguro*. Initially, the plan was well received, possibly contributing to the perception that insecurity had

¹³ The differences between bars are statistically significant where the gray boxes that appear at the end of the bar do not overlap with each other.

declined in 2008. Subsequently, however, the plan lost vitality and ability to effectively curb criminal acts, perhaps increasing perceptions of insecurity in the years since 2008.




Figure 75. Perceptions of Insecurity over Time in the Dominican Republic

In which regions of the country are perceptions of insecurity more severe? In Figure 76, we can see that the metropolitan region of Santo Domingo has the highest level of perceived insecurity with 46.3 points, followed by the northern region with 44.7, the south with 39.5, and the east with 37.9. These regions have population concentrations in the same ascending order as the average levels of insecurity, which is to say that the largest share of the population is concentrated in metropolitan Santo Domingo while the smallest share is in the east. In this sense, there is a linear relationship between perceptions of insecurity and population density.




Figure 76. Perceptions of Insecurity in the Regions of the Dominican Republic

Once again, as we found in the case of corruption, it is important to consider that the high levels of perceived insecurity do not necessarily correspond to elevated levels of crime. So the perception of insecurity may be high while the actual victimization is relatively low. The next section deals with the issue of crime victimization.

IV. Crime Victimization

How do perceptions of insecurity compare to individuals' experiences with crime? Since 2010, the Americas Barometer has used an updated series of items to measure crime victimization, which reads as follows:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**

- (1) In your home
- (2) In this neighborhood
- (3) In this municipality
- (4) In another municipality
- (5) In another country

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No

Figure 77 presents answers to **VIC1EXT** (on the left), which shows the percentage of respondents living in the capital cities of the region who said they had been a crime victim, and answers to **VIC1HOGAR** (on the right), which displays the percent who said someone in their household had been a victim of crime. Santo Domingo is located in a relatively intermediate position in both graphs, with 23.3% of respondents saying they had suffered an act of crime in the past 12 months, and 23.4% who said someone in their household had been a crime victim. Quito and Tegucigalpa have the highest victimization rates on both questions. It is important to remember, however, that our survey is only administered to adults of voting age or older, making it possible for youth crime victimization that family members do not know about to go underreported. It is also important to remember that responses are individuals' self-reported crime victimizations. In some contexts, certain crimes (particularly those that are perpetrated almost exclusively against particular marginalized groups) might be normalized and thus reported with less frequency than that with which they occur.




Figure 77. Personal and Household Crime Victimization in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 78 shows the places where most crimes in the Dominican Republic occurred. According to respondents, crime was distributed similarly across their homes, their municipality, their neighborhood and other municipalities, with percentages between 29.2 and 20.5.




Figure 78. Location of Most Recent Crime Victimization in the Dominican Republic

Figure 79 illustrates patterns in self-reported crime victimization, combining the percentage of respondents who were crime victims and those with a victim in their household. That is to say it includes the data from both **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR**. The metropolitan region of Santo Domingo has the highest total percentage of crime victims with 39.4%, followed by the east region with 32.8%, the south with 27.8% and the north with 23.5%.




Figure 79. Total Crime Victimization by Region in the Dominican Republic

Figure 80 illustrates trends in self-reported crime victimization in the Dominican Republic between 2010 and 2012. Here we again combine the responses to **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR**. We observe a slight but statistically insignificant increase in victimization from 2010 to 2012.




Figure 80. Total Crime Victimization over Time in the Dominican Republic

Who is Most Likely to be a Crime Victim?

Figure 81 depicts the results of a logistic regression model assessing who is likely to be a victim of crime in the Dominican Republic. Level of education is the only variable with a statistically significant effect. People with more education are more likely to report having been a victim of crime. These are people who perhaps due to their lifestyle are perceived as having more resources and as a result become targeted as victims of theft. Figure 82 shows in more detail the relationship between education and crime victimization. There is a linear relationship between the two variables, and people with higher education are almost three times more likely to be victims than people without any education: 28.2% compared to 10.1%.




Figure 81. Determinants of Personal Crime Victimization in the Dominican Republic




Figure 82. Education and Personal Crime Victimization in the Dominican Republic

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on Support for the Political System

What are the effects of high rates of crime and corruption victimization, as well as the perceptions of corruption and insecurity, on political legitimacy in the Dominican Republic? In order to answer this question, we now turn to a multivariate linear regression which estimates how perceptions of and victimization by crime and corruption influence support for the legitimacy of the political system. Figure 83 depicts the impacts of perceptions of and experiences with crime and insecurity on system support.¹⁴ Of the eight variables included, five have statistically significant relationships with support for the political system: corruption victimization, perceptions of corruption, perceptions of insecurity, gender, and education level. Women have more system support than men. People who have been victims of corruption, who perceive a lot of corruption, who perceive more insecurity, and who have more educations have less support for the political system.




Figure 83. Determinants of System Support in the Dominican Republic

Figure 84 and Figure 85 delve further into the effects of the independent variables on system support, presenting the bivariate relationships between system support and corruption and crime perceptions and experiences. People who think corruption is very widespread have system support about 10 points less on average than those who think corruption is not very widespread. A similar

¹⁴ System support is calculated as the respondent's mean of responses to five questions: B1 (perception that the courts guarantee a fair trial), B2 (respect for the political institutions of the country), B3 (belief that citizens' basic rights are well-protected in the country), B4 (pride in living under the country's political system), and B6 (belief that one should support the political system of the country). The resulting variable is rescaled to run from 0 to 100. For more information, see Chapter 5.

distance occurs between people who feel very secure and those who feel very insecure. Being a corruption victim has a slightly larger impact on system support than crime victimization. The largest gap we observe is for education level: those without any schooling have system support of 63.8 points on average compared to 44.8 points among those with a university education.




Figure 84. System Support and Perceptions of Crime and Corruption in the Dominican Republic




Figure 85. Factors Associated with System Support in the Dominican Republic

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section addresses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is often conceptualized as the universal application of the laws of the state, or the supposition that no group has legal impunity.¹⁵ Previous studies by LAPOP found a wide variation of the willingness of citizens in the Americas to accept violations of the rule of law by the police in order to fight criminals. Consistent with the threat hypothesis, those that perceive higher levels of crime and those who are victimized by crime are more likely to accept transgressions of the rule of law.¹⁶ To measure support for the rule of law in the Americas, we use a single item which taps the extent to which the authorities should be bound by the law while pursuing justice.

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?
 (1) Should always abide by the law
 (2) Occasionally can cross the line

Figure 86 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 in each country of the Americas who express support for the rule of law, versus those who believe that, at times, the police and other authorities may act with impunity. All the surveyed countries have percentages over 50 points, which suggests that there is a tendency toward support for the rule of law. However, the percentages vary

¹⁵ See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. Why the Rule of Law Matters. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

¹⁶ Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

across the region: Jamaica has the highest levels of support with 74.9% and Bolivia has the lowest levels with 53.3%. The Dominican Republic is located among those countries with the highest support for the rule of law with 72.9%.




Figure 86. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 87 shows levels of support for the rule of law over time in the Dominican Republic. It is positive for democracy that after a decline in 2006, the levels of support for the rule of law increased in the following years from 59.4% in 2006 to 72.9% in 2012. It was worth noting that 2005-2006 was a moment in which Dominican society became more aware of the crime problem in the face of serious thefts involving assault and murder. The recovery in support for the rule of law is especially notable in the context of continued high levels of perceived insecurity over the same period.




Figure 87. Percentage Supporting the Rule of Law over Time in the Dominican Republic

Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the determinants of support for the rule of law in the Dominican Republic. Figure 88 presents the results of logistic regression analysis used to identify these factors. None of the variables included in the analysis have statistically significant effects on support for the rule of law.




Figure 88. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in the Dominican Republic

VII. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the magnitude and impact of victimization by corruption and crime as well as perceptions of corruption and insecurity, and support for the political system and the rule of law, assessing the relationships between these and other sociodemographic variables in the Dominican Republic.

In general, the people of the Americas tend to perceive high levels of corruption. All the countries, with the exception of Suriname, have average levels of perceived corruption that exceed 50 points. The Dominican Republic is located among those countries that have high levels of perceived corruption with 78.1 points, which is similar to levels in previous survey years. The percentage of respondents who were victims of corruption range from 3.4% in Canada to 67.0% in Haiti; the Dominican Republic is the country with the eighth highest rate of corruption victimization with 21.7%. The countries with the lowest percentages of corruption victims are Canada, the United States, and Chile, and those with the highest are Haiti, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The first three countries correspond to some of the most developed and ordered economies in the region, while the latter three are some of the least developed and most impoverished. In the Dominican Republic, men and people with more education are among those most likely to report having been victims of corruption.

In terms of perceived insecurity and crime victimization, that data show regional variation. Mexico City and Lima have the highest average levels of perceived insecurity with 54.7 and 53.9 points respectively, and Santo Domingo is located in an intermediate position with an average of 45.4 points. In crime victimization, Santo Domingo also places in an intermediate position regionally. 23.3% of Dominicans interviewed reported having been a crime victim in the past 12 months, and

23.4% said that someone in their household had been victimized over the same period. Quito and Tegucigalpa have the highest rates of victimization. Level of education is the only variable with a statistically significant effect on crime victimization in the Dominican case – people with more education are more likely to report being victims.

We used logistic regression analysis to assess the impact of perceptions of and experiences with crime and corruption on support for the political system. The analysis revealed that corruption victimization, perceptions of corruption, perceptions of insecurity, gender and education level have statistically significant relationships with system support. People who have been corruption victims, who perceive corruption and crime to be widespread, and who have more education manifest lower system support. Women support the political system more than men.

With respect to the rule of law, all the countries surveyed had percentages over 50 points, which suggests that there is a general tendency toward supporting the rule of law. However, the level of support varied in the region: Jamaica had the highest support with 74.9% and Bolivia the lowest with 53.3%. The Dominican Republic is among the countries with more support for the rule of law with 72.9%. It is a positive sign for Dominican democracy that the levels of support for the rule of law have increased from 59.4% in 2006 to 72.9% in 2012. This increase is particularly notable because perceptions of insecurity have remained high.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. While some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,¹ others have shown that citizen attitudes and values play a key role, highlighting legitimacy as key for democratic consolidation.² Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions, central to the study of political culture and key for democratic stability.³

In LAPOP studies using AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Further, “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.⁴ While specific support can be measured by questions addressing the incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to a generalized attachment to the more abstract object represented by the political system and the political offices themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confound these two dimensions, LAPOP’s measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimension of support that is central for democratic survival.⁵ This chapter examines political legitimacy and tolerance across the Americas, seeking to understand what factors explain variation in these attitudes at the individual level.

While some argue that certain cultures naturally have higher political legitimacy, others have proposed that economic development or politicians’ proximity to citizens’ policy preferences have an important effect on citizens’ attitudes about the political system.⁶ Institutional variables have also been

¹ Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial, ; Przeworski Adam. 1999. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P. 1991., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press..

² Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America”. *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³ See also Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

⁴ Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America.” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29

⁵ Booth and Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

⁶ Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart Ronald, 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008. “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3 (May): 808-842; Peter Kotzian, 2011. “Public support for liberal democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1 (January 1): 23 -41. Geoffrey Evans and

shown to be important determinants of system support. Some studies have found, for instance, that systems that incorporate features that make electoral defeat more acceptable, i.e. that reduce disproportionality, have positive impacts on support for the system, especially among the losers in the democratic game.⁷

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with measures such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties and their perception that they are represented by those parties.⁸ In addition, the research has shown political system support to be related to participation in local and national politics and support for the rule of law.⁹

Political tolerance is a second key component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."¹⁰ Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious effects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance, among both the mass public and elites, is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms and with perception of lack of freedom among those who are targets of intolerance.¹¹ Gibson has found that racism within a community is associated with a lessened sense of freedom of expression. Additionally, he has found racial intolerance to have a negative impact on political freedom for both blacks and whites.

Why do people become intolerant? Scholars have found many factors affecting tolerance, including perceptions of high levels of threat,¹² authoritarian personality,¹³ and religion.¹⁴ At the

Stephen Whitefield, 1995. "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

⁷ Anderson, Christopher. 2007., *Losers' consent: elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

⁸ Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis (trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

⁹ Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

¹⁰ Seligson, Mitchell. 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11(2): 5-29.

¹¹ Gibson, James L.. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L. 2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L. 1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3 : 819-850; Gibson, James L. 1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599..

¹² Marcus George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*, 1st ed. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press; Merolla, Jennifer L. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2009. *Democracy at Risk: How Terrorist Threats Affect the Public*, 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Huddy, Leonie et al. 2005 "Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 : 593-608; Brader, Ted,

macro-level, social identity and social dominance theorists have proposed looking at intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.¹⁵ Finally, external threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are related to tolerance.¹⁶ LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same sex marriage is linked not only to the religious denomination but also the centrality of religion in individuals' lives. Additionally, more developed countries present higher levels of support for this right.¹⁷

Research by Golebiowska has found that an individual's sex has a direct effect on tolerance, such that women are less tolerant than men.¹⁸ It also has strong indirect effects, because women are more religious, perceive more threats, are less likely to tolerate uncertainty, are more inclined towards moral traditionalism, have less political expertise, and are less supportive of democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects on democratic consolidation. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who are tolerant and respectful of the rights of others. The ways in which tolerance and political legitimacy are expected to affect stable democracy, according to LAPOP previous studies, are summarized in 2. If the majority shows high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and distrustful of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 1. The Relationship between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat," *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 4 : 959-978.

¹³ Altemeyer Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians*.

¹⁴ Postic, Robert K.2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest); Stouffer, Samuel A.1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc.).

¹⁵ Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶ Peffley, Mark and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257..

¹⁷ Lodola, Germán, and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁸ Golebiowska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiowska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

It is worth noting that this conceptualization has found empirical support. Using 2008 AmericasBarometer data, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras just before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled the then president Zelaya to Costa Rica.¹⁹

II. Support for the Political System

LAPOP's "system support" index is estimated as the mean of responses to the following questions from the AmericasBarometer survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask you that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in (country) guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of (country)?

B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of (country)?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of (country)?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of (country)?

Following the LAPOP standard, we rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low support for the political system, and 100 represents very high support.

How Does Support for the Political System Vary across the Americas?

In Figure 89 we present the levels of system support in 2012. The results vary between an average of 41.4 points in the case of Honduras and 61.7 points in the case of Belize. The Dominican Republic has a score of 48.8, and the majority of countries score slightly higher than this.

¹⁹ Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; see also Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. *The Honduran Catharsis. AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina (LAPOP).




Figure 89. Support for the Political System in the Countries of the Americas

Average levels of support on some of the individual dimensions that make up the support for the political system index are higher than on others. Figure 90 presents the levels of agreement with each of the five components of the system support scale in the Dominican Republic. Respect for institutions receives the highest score and assessments of basic rights protection receives the lowest. This suggests that while Dominicans respect their political institutions, they do not think that the rights of the citizens are well-protected. The component with the second lowest score is support for the view that the courts guarantee a just trial, which reflects citizens' distrust with respect to the protection of basic rights.




Figure 90. Components of Support for the Political System in the Dominican Republic

Figure 91 depicts a statistically significant decline of almost 9 points in Dominican system support over the period from 2006 to 2012. The statistical significance is evidenced by the lack of overlap between the gray blocks at the top of each bar.




Figure 91. Support for the Political System over Time in the Dominican Republic

Figure 92 presents linear regression analysis of support for the political system. Three variables have statistically significant positive relationships with system support: evaluations of the current government, gender, and satisfaction with democracy. Figure 93 displays in more detail the relationships system support has with gender, satisfaction with democracy, and evaluations of the current government. Women have more system support, as do those who are more satisfied with democracy and those who evaluate the efficacy of the current government positively. The difference between those who are very unsatisfied with democracy and those who are very satisfied is some 20 points (36.8 compared with 57.0), and the difference between those who view the government as very ineffective and those who view it as very effective is about 45 points (from less than 30 to more than 70 points).




Figure 92. Determinants of Support for the Political System in the Dominican Republic




Figure 93. Factors Associated with Support for the Political System in the Dominican Republic



III. Political Tolerance

The second component that the Americas Barometer uses to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. This index is composed of the following four items in our questionnaire:

- | |
|--|
| <p>D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Dominican form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote? Please read me the number from the scale [1-10 scale]: [Probe: To what degree?]</p> |
| <p>D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.</p> |
| <p>D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Dominican form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?</p> |
| <p>D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?</p> |

As with all LAPOP indexes, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance. Figure 94 indicates that the level of political tolerance varies considerably across the region. The United States has the highest average with 72.6 points, while Honduras has the lowest with 36.6 points. The Dominican Republic is located in a middle position with an average of 54.2 points.




Figure 94. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 95 shows the levels of citizen agreement with each of the four components of tolerance in the Dominican Republic. The right of those who oppose the democratic regime to participate in peaceful demonstrations receives the highest score (66.1), followed by the right to vote (55.7), the freedom of expression (48.7), and the right to seek public office (46.8). The last two citizen rights to be granted to those who oppose the Dominican system of government do not reach average levels of support of 50 points.




Figure 95. Components of Political Tolerance in the Dominican Republic

Figure 96 presents the average levels of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic for each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2006. The level of tolerance declined in a systematic way between 2006 and 2010, but it experienced a statistically significant recovery in 2012, increasing to 54.2 points.




Figure 96. Political Tolerance over Time in the Dominican Republic

What affects levels of tolerance in the Dominican Republic? In Figure 97 we develop a linear regression model to answer this question. Sex of the respondent and perceptions of the national economy have statistically significant, negative relationships with political tolerance: women are less tolerant as are those people who evaluate the national economic situation more negatively. The variables in the regression analysis that have positive relationships with political tolerance are: darker skin color, level of education, support for democracy, and crime victimization. People with darker skin, with more education, who support democracy and who have been crime victims are more tolerant.




Figure 97. Determinants of Political Tolerance in the Dominican Republic

Figure 98 and Figure 99 explore these regression results, showing the variables of greatest theoretical interest, and those that are most important in the analysis. Crime victims have higher levels of tolerance than those who have not been victims with 59.7 and 52.9 points, respectively. Education from the primary level through higher education displays an increase in tolerance from 48.8 points to 59.7, although people who have no formal schooling have more tolerance than those with primary education. Men have average political tolerance of 57.9 points compared with 50.4 points for women. Figure 99 displays the significant increase in tolerance when one has more support for democracy as well as the higher levels of tolerance among those with darker skin.




Figure 98. Factors Associated with Political Tolerance in the Dominican Republic




Figure 99. Political Tolerance, Support for Democracy, and Skin Color in the Dominican Republic

IV. Democratic Stability

As we discussed in the introduction of this chapter, both system support and political tolerance are critical for democratic stability. Figure 100 presents the extent to which citizens across the Americas hold this combination of attitudes. The numbers in the graph reflect the percentage of respondents in each country who expressed high support for the political system and high tolerance. The highest percentage of 51.5 is in Canada, and the lowest of 7.2 is in Honduras. That is to say that in Honduras, few people expressed both high system support and high political tolerance. The Dominican Republic occupies an intermediate position with 24.3%. Although this is only one of the indicators that can be used to evaluate democratic stability in a country; it is significant that the countries with the greatest political instability in the region register low percentages on this measure.




Figure 100. Stable Democratic Attitudes in the Countries of the Americas

How has the percentage of Dominicans with the combination of attitudes most compatible with stable democracy evolved over time? In Figure 101 we present the percentage of Dominicans with high system support and high tolerance from 2006 to 2012. As we can see, there was a statistically significant decline from 2006 to 2012, but between 2010 and 2012 the percentage remained almost exactly the same. This means that there has been a stabilization in the attitudes conducive to stable democracy.




Figure 101. Stable Democratic Attitudes over Time in the Dominican Republic

Table 2 summarizes the evolution of the percentages in each of the categories developed to conceptually describe the relationship between system support or legitimacy and political tolerance. From the point of view of these indicators, Dominican democracy has suffered a deterioration in recent years, and this decline continued in 2012. The stable democracy box remained virtually unchanged between 2010 and 2012; the authoritarian stability box decreased significantly, the unstable democracy box increased significantly, and the democracy at risk box remained at similar levels.

Table 2. System Support and Tolerance over Time in the Dominican Republic

System Support (Legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	<u>Stable Democracy</u>	<u>Authoritarian Stability</u>
	2006 38.2%	2006 23.0%
	2008 29.0%	2008 31.2%
	2010 24.8%	2010 32.5%
	2012 24.3%	2012 21.8%
Low	<u>Unstable Democracy</u>	<u>Democracy at Risk</u>
	2006 22.7%	2006 16.1%
	2008 20.5%	2008 19.3%
	2010 19.3%	2010 23.4%
	2012 28.6%	2012 25.3%

What are the factors that influence whether citizens have attitudes that support stable democracy? Figure 102 presents the results of logistic regression analysis. Political interest and approval of the president's job performance have statistically significant, positive relationships with stable democracy. The other variables considered do not have statistically significant relationships in one direction or another.




Figure 102. Determinants of Stable Democracy Attitudes in the Dominican Republic

In Figure 103 we continue to explore the bivariate relationships between democratic stability (measured as support for political system and tolerance) and the most important variables in the

regression analysis. People who approve of the president's job performance have greater system support and tolerance – that is, they adhere to the concept of stable democracy used here. In the case of political interest, the tendency is also upward, from 15.6 to 33.0 points as interest goes from none to a lot.




Figure 103. Factors Associated with Attitudes of Stable Democracy in the Dominican Republic

V. The Legitimacy of Other Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Dominican Republic support the country's major political and social institutions? In the AmericasBarometer's 2012 round, we asked about attitudes toward many specific institutions, in addition to the more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represented "not at all," and 7 represented "a lot," we asked citizens to respond to the following questions:

- B10A.** To what extent do you trust the justice system?
- B11.** To what extent do you trust the JCE (Junta Central Electoral)?
- B12.** To what extent do you trust the armed forces?
- B13.** To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
- B18.** To what extent do you trust the Police?
- B20.** To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
- B20A.** To what extent do you trust evangelical churches?

Figure 104 examines the level of support for each of these institutions. As is typical in analysis of the AmericasBarometer, responses have been adjusted from the original scale of 1 to 7 to a scale

ranging from 0 to 100 in order to ease presentation. Once again, the media and the churches obtained the highest levels of legitimacy, while the police and political parties have the lowest.




Figure 104. Trust in Institutions in the Dominican Republic

How do these results compare with those from prior years in the Dominican Republic? In Figure 105, we present results for all the rounds of the AmericasBarometer since 2004. The data indicate that since the economic crisis of 2004 there has been a general increase in institutional trust. The numbers in 2006 are greater than those for 2004 for all the institutions included in those years. Nevertheless, since 2006 and especially since 2008, there has been a general decline in institutional trust, with the exception of trust in the media. This should serve as a warning regarding the state of democracy in the country. Lower institutional trust reveals discontent with the key institutions in the democratic system, and as we showed previously in Figure 91 there has also been a decline in support for the political system in general.




Figure 105. Trust in Institutions by Year in the Dominican Republic

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, we measure support for democracy by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,²⁰ and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Miller.²¹ The “Churchillian” question again uses a 7 point response scale, this time running from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

In Figure 106 we examine the average levels of agreement with this statement across the countries of the Americas. It is positive for the stability of democracy that all the countries have levels

²⁰ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

²¹ Rose, Richard and William Mishler 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.

of support for democracy that exceed 50 points, but there is considerable regional variation. Uruguay has the highest score with 86.5 points, and Honduras the lowest with 52.6. The Dominican Republic is in an intermediate position with 70 points.




Figure 106. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas

How has support for democracy evolved in recent years in the Dominican Republic? In Figure 107 we examine changes in support for democracy based on the previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer. Between 2006 and 2010 there was a statistically significant decline of 10.1 points, but from 2010 to 2012 there was only a little variation in support for democracy, increasing from 68.8 to 70 points.




Figure 107. Support for Democracy over Time in the Dominican Republic

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have argued that system support and political tolerance have important implications for the consolidation of democracy. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who tolerate and respect the rights of others. We used a crosstab between system support and political tolerance in order to specify for situations: stable democracy, stable authoritarianism, democracy in crisis, and democracy at risk. The survey data indicate a statistically significant decline of nearly 9 points in support for the Dominican political system from 2006 to 2012, and a decline of almost five points (also statistically significant) between 2010 and 2012. While the Dominican Republic has a score of 48.8 on support for the political system, the majority of countries have slightly higher scores. Three variables have a statistically, significant positive relationship with system support: perceptions of government efficacy, gender, and satisfaction with democracy. Women support the system more, as do those who are more satisfied with democracy and those who have more positive evaluations of the current government.

The level of political tolerance varies considerably in the region, from an average of 72.6 points in the United States to 36.6 points in Honduras. The Dominican Republic is in an intermediate position with an average of 54.2 points. The average levels of political tolerance in the Dominican Republic have declined systematically between 2006 and 2010, but there was a recovery in 2012. Women seem less tolerant than men, as do people who have more negative evaluations of the national economic situation, while people with darker skin, more education, those who support democracy more, and those who have been victims of crime appear more tolerant.



The percentage of respondents who expressed high support for the political system as well as high tolerance vary throughout the region between a high of 51.5 in Canada and a low of 7.2 in Honduras. The Dominican Republic occupies an intermediate position with 24.3%. Although this is only one of the indicators that can be used to evaluate democratic stability in a country, it is significant that the countries with the greatest political instability in the region register low percentages using this measure of stability. The percentage of Dominicans with a high level of system support and high tolerance declined significantly between 2006 and 2012, but between 2010 and 2012 the percentage remained the same. This means that there has been a stabilization in attitudes conducive to a stable democracy. People who have more political interest and who evaluate the president's performance more positively are more likely to have attitudes conducive to a stable democracy.

With respect to institutional trust, the media and the churches have the highest scores in the Dominican Republic, while the police and the political parties are the lowest. In terms of support for democracy, measured using the question asking whether this system is preferable to others, all the countries surveyed have levels of support over 50 points. The Dominican Republic is located in a comparatively intermediate position with 70 points. Between 2006 and 2010, there was a statistically significant decline from 78.7 to 68.6 points, but from 2010 to 2012 there was a slight improvement from 68.6 to 70 points.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter we explore the relationship between citizens' experiences and views about local government and their orientations towards democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect system support at the national level?

The power of local governments varies across countries and works in different ways in different political systems. In some places citizens only have contact with local authorities and do not have access to levels above that. Some local authorities have little administrative and fiscal autonomy, while others have more. Moreover, local governance takes place in more democratic ways in some places than in others. Thus, the extent to which local government is efficient and democratic may shape citizens' attitudes towards democracy as a whole.

Decentralization has been taking place to varying degrees among developing countries, and is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ This process happened simultaneously as the "third wave" of democratization took place in the hemisphere.² Citizens all over Latin America and the Caribbean not only experienced the strengthening of local governments, but also saw the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views. Some authors argue that local politics has generally positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows that it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities that most needed projects in education, sanitation, and agriculture.³ Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization across different states in the United States has a positive impact on economic growth.⁴ Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds that, contrary to some conclusions of previous studies, fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.⁵

However, others argue that local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results, and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill-prepared. Bardhan

¹ Rondinelli, Dennis, Nellis, John, and Cheema, Shabbir. 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

² Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

³ Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

⁴ Akain, Nobuo & Sakata, Masayo. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence From State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

⁵ Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

warns that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites willing to take advantage of institutions and to frustrate service delivery and development more broadly.⁶ Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.⁷ Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.⁸

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, they can only form impressions about democracy from those experiences. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.⁹ Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.¹⁰ Citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship holds especially for minorities.¹¹ Hence, local politics can be crucial for democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is also an important topic. The big question is whether decentralization can improve representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually sees local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.¹² Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at getting information about minority preferences and effectively enhancing minority representation.¹³ So, if decentralization may contribute to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.¹⁴

⁶ Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

⁷ Willis, Eliza, Garman, Christopher, and Haggard, Stephen. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7–56.

⁸ Galiani, Sebastian, Gertler, Paul, and Schargrodsky, Ernesto. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andres.

⁹ Hiskey, Jonathan, Seligson, Mitchell. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64–88.

¹⁰ Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285–308.

¹¹ West, Karleen. 2011. *The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.

¹² Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

¹³ Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519–530.

¹⁴ West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed results.¹⁵ Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.¹⁶ West uses the 2010 round of the Americas Barometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion and access to local government.¹⁷ In this chapter we seek to develop more systematic evidence, in the context of the entire region

In the next section of this chapter we will examine to what extent citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *presenting requests to local offices*. We compare to what extent citizens from different countries participate in local politics through such institutional channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years (2006, 2008, and 2010). We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, focusing especially on the relationship between racial and gender inequality and citizens' participation in local politics. Last, we assess the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments, and we focus on the relationship between satisfaction with local government and system support.

Previous works using the AmericasBarometer surveys already examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo has shown that the determinants of citizens' demand-making on municipal governments include not only individual level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.¹⁸ Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.¹⁹ In a different study, Montalvo found that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing that perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.²⁰ Finally, Montalvo also showed that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.²¹

¹⁵ West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "‘This is Not a Meeting for Women’: The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women’s Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. 2009. "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125.

¹⁶ Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal’s Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

¹⁷ West, *ibid*.

¹⁸ Montalvo, Daniel 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁹ Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

²⁰ Montalvo, Daniel 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

²¹ Montalvo, Daniel 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Participation at the Local Level

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, a municipal council meeting, or another meeting called by the local government during the last 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official, or municipal councilperson in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to SGL1]
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No

Local Meeting Attendance

In Figure 108 we examine the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who say they have attended a local meeting in the past year. The numbers vary from 4.1% in Chile to 21.2% in the case of Haiti, while the Dominican Republic is in the third highest position in the region with 18.3%. It is surprising that the two countries with the highest levels of local meeting attendance are the poorest (Haiti) and the richest (United States) of the Americas.




Figure 108. Municipal Meeting Participation in the Countries of the Americas

How has participation in municipal meetings evolved in recent years in the Dominican Republic? In Figure 109 we examine levels of local participation since 2006. We see that there was a statistically significant decline between 2010 and 2012, and we also observe the highest percentages in 2006 and 2010. This may be because there were municipal elections held in those two years, and as a result, more citizens participated in municipal meetings.




Figure 109. Participation in Municipal Meetings over Time in the Dominican Republic

Demand-Making on Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who makes requests or demands of their local government. In Figure 109 we analyze question NP2 to present the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have made a request or demand of some person or agency in local government in the past year. The percentages vary from 21.3 in Haiti to 6.3 in Panama, while the Dominican Republic is in an intermediate position with 12%. Given the comparatively high level of Dominican participation in local meetings, as shown above and the clientelist tradition in the country, this level of demand-making seems relatively low.




Figure 110. Demand-Making on Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 111 we examine the percentage of citizens who have made demands on local government since 2006. Here we once again note that the highest percentages appear in 2006 and 2010, two years in which there were municipal elections. This suggests that these demands have a clientelist-electoral component.




Figure 111. Demand-Making on Local Government over Time in the Dominican Republic

Finally, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens' demands and requests were satisfied. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said that they had made a demand or request, which in the case of the Dominican Republic was 181 respondents. These responses can provide important information regarding the capacity of local government officials to offer solutions, at least from citizens' perspectives. Figure 112 shows the answers to MUNI10 in the Dominican Republic, where 26.1% said their problem was resolved and 73.9% said that it was not. If we consider that 12% said that they sought help and only 26.1% of these said their problem was resolved, then of the population surveyed only about 3% of the population found resolution to a problem they explicitly raised with the local government.




Figure 112. Resolution of Demands Placed on Local Governments in the Dominican Republic

Who chooses to make demands on local government? In Figure 113, we develop a logistic regression model to examine a number of factors that may affect local government demand-making in the Dominican Republic. The size of respondents' place of residence and wealth have negative relationships with making demands of local governments. That is, larger cities and more wealth are associated with a lower probability of present demands to the local government. Age, level of education, and participation in municipal meetings have positive relationships. Older people, those with more education, and those who participate more in local meetings are more likely to make demands on their local government. These data provide evidence that a more active citizenry translates into more interaction with local government, independent of confidence in local government, which is a variable that has no statistically significant effect on local government demand-making in the case of the Dominican Republic.




Figure 113. Determinants of Demand-Making on Local Government in the Dominican Republic

In Figure 114 we examine in further detail the bivariate relationships between demand-making on local government and a number of important factors assessed in the logistic regression analysis. The variable that has the largest impact on demand-making of local government is participation in local meetings. 31.3% of those who participate in such meetings make demands on local government as compared to 7.7% of those who did not participate. The other variable with a significant effect is the size of the local area in which respondents live: 21.4% of respondents who live in small cities (less than 25,000 inhabitants) report having made a petition to local government, while only 7.9% of those living in Santo Domingo or other large cities (more than 100,000 residents) made demands. In the case of education, although those with secondary education are slightly more likely to make demands compared to those with less education, the percentage declines among those with higher education.




Figure 114. Factors Associated with Demand-Making on Local Government in the Dominican Republic

III. Satisfaction with and Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]**
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad

In addition, the 2012 round featured three new questions that tapped satisfaction with particular basic services that may be delivered by local or national governments: roads, public schools, and public health or medical services.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied

Satisfaction with Local Services

In Figure 115 we examine citizens' average levels of satisfaction with local government services across the Americas, using question SGL1. Following the AmericasBarometer standard, responses have been recoded to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. The data demonstrate that the level of satisfaction with local government services varies across the region, ranging from 59.5 points in Canada to 37.6 points in Haiti, while the Dominican Republic scores 47.5 points.




Figure 115. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas

In Figure 116 we further explore the extent to which citizens are satisfied or dissatisfied with local government in the Dominican Republic. Respondents were divided into three segments: 32.2% considered the services good or very good, 34% evaluated them as neither good nor bad, and 33.7% considered them to be bad or very bad.




Figure 116. Evaluation of Local Government Services in the Dominican Republic

In Figure 117 we examine the trends with respect to satisfaction with local services over the past 6 years in the Dominican Republic. We can see that there was a statistically significant decline in evaluations by 10.1 points between 2006 and 2012, although the decline was largely produced between 2008 and 2010, and evaluations did not recover in 2012.




Figure 117. Evaluations of Local Government Services over Time in the Dominican Republic

The survey selected three services to evaluate more directly. The following three graphs display the levels of satisfaction with the state of the roads, the schools, and health services in the Americas.²² Figure 118 presents satisfaction with streets and highways, according to answers to questions **SD2NEW2**. As always, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. On this item, the Dominican Republic is positioned relatively well with a score of 51.3; seven countries score better and 16 score worse. Ecuador ranks highest with 60.8 points and Jamaica is lowest with 34.9.

²² We recognize that responsibility for this type of service provision may come from varying levels of government across the countries in the Americas.




Figure 118. Satisfaction with the Roads in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 119 examines satisfaction with public schools according to answers to question **SD3NEW2**. Here the Dominican Republic is located in a position that is relatively low compared to that observed for evaluations of roads above. Here 14 countries have average evaluations of public schools that are higher than the Dominican Republic and 9 are worse. The score for the Dominican Republic is 53.6, while Costa Rica has the highest score with 64.1 and Chile the lowest with 42.8. It is worth emphasizing that these data are based on perceived public satisfaction with the quality of education, which does not necessarily mean that the public education system in Chile is the worst in the region. It should also be noted that the Chilean survey took place during a time of widespread protests about the education system, which probably affected the attitudes of Chilean respondents.




Figure 119. Satisfaction with Public Schools in the Americas

Finally, in Figure 120 we evaluate satisfaction with public health services, according to responses to **SD6NEW2**. The Dominican Republic occupies an intermediate position with 48.7 points; 12 countries have higher average evaluations and 11 have lower evaluations. Costa Rica has the highest evaluations of health services (as with public schools) with 56.8 points, and the lowest are in Trinidad and Tobago with 33.3 points.




Figure 120. Satisfaction with Health Services in the Americas

Trust in Local Government

In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked citizens not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted that government. This question may tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government. In Figure 121 we present average levels of trust in local governments across the Americas. In regional perspective, the Dominican Republic occupies a relatively low position with 45.5 points, and only 6 countries have lower levels of trust. Particularly striking is the relatively low position of the Dominican Republic in Figure 115 on overall evaluations of local government services, and in Figure 121 on trust in local government, when in the graphs depicting evaluations of specific services the average position of the Dominican Republic was

comparatively higher. One possible interpretation is that in the Dominican Republic roads, public schools and public health services generally come from the central government, not local government.




Figure 121. Trust in Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services on System Support

As we argued in the introduction of this chapter, many citizens have little contact with any level of government except for local government. As a result, perceptions of local government may have an important impact on attitudes towards the political system more generally. In Figure 122 we develop a linear regression model to determine if satisfaction with local services is associated with support for the political system in the Dominican Republic, while controlling for other factors that may affect system support. Size of the place of residence, wealth and level of education have negative,

statistically significant relationships with system support. That is, smaller cities/towns, less wealth, and less education are associated with less support. On the other hand, women, those who have positive evaluations of their family's economic situation, those with more political interest, those who approve of the president's performance, and those with more favorable evaluations of local government services have higher levels of system support.




Figure 122. Satisfaction with Local Services as a Predictor of Support for the Political System in the Dominican Republic

In Figure 123, we present the bivariate relationship between satisfaction with local services and support for the political system. It is clearly evident that more satisfaction is associated with more system support. Those who evaluate local services as very bad have an average level of system support of 42.5 points, and those who evaluate the services as very good have system support of 57.1.




Figure 123. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in the Dominican Republic

V. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the relationship between citizens' opinions about local governments and their experiences with them, as well as their orientations toward democracy in light of the decentralization processes that have been taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years. The percentage of respondents in the Dominican Republic who said they attended a municipal meeting in ranked third highest among the countries included in the 2012 AmericasBarometer with 18.3%. The two countries with the highest percentages are Haiti, the poorest in the Americas, and the United States, the richest.

In the Dominican Republic there was a statistically significant decrease in local participation between 2010 and 2012. We also observed higher participation rates in 2006 and 2010, years when municipal elections were held, and as a result, there were higher levels of participation in municipal meetings. Another aspect of local involvement is demand-making. The percentage of respondents who made requests or demands on a local government official in the past year ranged from 21.3 in Haiti to 6.3 in Panama, while the Dominican Republic was in an intermediate position with 12%. Given the comparatively high level of Dominican participation in municipal meetings and the country's clientelist tradition, this seems to be a relatively low percentage of demands made. When respondents who made demands of local government were asked if the authorities resolved their problem, 26.1% said yes and 73.9% said no. That is, a small proportion of the population sought help (12%) and of those, only 26% said the authorities resolved the matter raised.



The variable that has the greatest impact on making demands on local government was participation in municipal meetings. 31.3% of those who participated in these meetings made demands, compared with 7.7% of those who did not participate. The other variable with a significant impact is the size of the respondent's place of residence: 21.4% of respondents living in small towns petitioned their municipal government, compared with 7.9% among people who live in Santo Domingo or another major city. Demand-making was slightly higher among those with a secondary education compared to less educated groups, but the rate of petitions declines among people with higher education.

The level of satisfaction with local government services varies across the region, ranging from 37.6 points in the case of Haiti to 59.5 points in the case of Canada. The Dominican Republic scores 47.5 points. The over-time trend regarding satisfaction with local services in the Dominican Republic shows a statistically significant decline of 10.1 points between 2006 and 2012. In terms of trust in local government, the Dominican Republic occupies a relatively low position with 45.5 points, and only six countries have lower levels of trust. Satisfaction with local services has a statistically significant positive relationship with the political system support in the Dominican case.

Part III: Beyond Equality of Opportunity

Chapter Seven: The Justice System

I. Introduction

A society with guaranteed rights is essential for democracy. Without rights it is impossible to build effective citizenship or establish reliable rules for organizing social life, economic transactions and political competition.

For most of Dominican history, the judicial system has been subordinated to political power in ways typical of authoritarian regimes. But beginning in the early 1990s, the country underwent a series of major reforms with the goal of making the judicial system more independent, transparent, and competent. The pivotal moment was the constitutional reform of 1994, which established the *Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura* with the authority to appoint judges to the *Suprema Corte de Justicia* (SCJ). In 1997 the first SCJ was appointed under this system and the 2010 Constitution established mechanisms in order to strengthen the judicial system. Undoubtedly, the constitutional change of 1994 and the new mechanism for selecting the justices gave the Supreme Court a new air of independence. That first SCJ was reconstituted in 2011, based on new selection criteria established in the 2010 Constitution. For its part, the *Escuela Nacional de la Judicatura* has sought, in the past two decades, to train many of the judges who enter the court system in career positions. The engine of these reforms has been to improve the judicial services offered, to make justice more accessible to the public, and to build greater public confidence in the judicial system.

In this chapter, we analyze levels of trust in the justice system from various angles. We use questions regarding general perceptions of the justice system along with others that seek to capture more specific information. Some refer to the judicial system and others to the police.

II. Trust in the Judicial System

The AmericasBarometer includes a set of questions that allow us to evaluate the feelings of the population with respect to the Dominican judicial system and the services it offers. The first three questions that we present below address the issue of public trust in the justice system. Following the guidelines of the AmericasBarometer, we adjusted the index from the original scale of 1-7 to a scale ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 means lack of trust in the judicial system and 100 means high trust. Then, from the three questions, we created an index of overall trust in the justice system.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in the Dominican Republic guarantee a fair trial?
B10A. To what extent do you trust the judicial system?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?

The averages for these three variables and the general index of trust in the judicial system are detailed in Figure 124. As we can see, trust in the Supreme Court is slightly higher than trust in the courts and the justice system, but in all three cases the average score is less than 50 points. The scale of confidence in the judiciary constructed from these three questions has an average of 45.1 points.




Figure 124. Scale of Trust in the Justice System and its Components in the Dominican Republic

Figure 125 displays the scores on the trust in the judicial system scale over time in the Dominican Republic. These data demonstrate that since 2008 there has been a deterioration in trust in the judicial system. The decline between 2008 and 2010 was statistically significant, and though the pattern of decline continues in 2012, the change since 2010 is not significant.




Figure 125. Scale of Trust in the Justice System, 2006-2012

Figure 126 presents the regional comparison for the scale measuring trust in the judicial system. The Dominican Republic is located among those countries with low trust: 19 countries have greater trust in the judicial system and only six have less trust. In the case of these last six, all are countries that have experienced high levels of political instability in recent decades, and in two of them there have recently been coups (Honduras and Paraguay). In terms of average trust, the Dominican Republic is 20 points from Suriname which has the highest level of trust, and less than 10 points from Paraguay which has the lowest level. This suggests that despite the reforms to the judicial system carried out since 1997, trust in the judicial system remains weak in the comparative regional context and over time in the country.




Figure 126. Scale of Trust in the Judiciary in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 127 presents regression analysis of the scale measuring trust in the judiciary. The variables that have statistically significant, negative relationships with trust are corruption victimization, perceptions of corruption, crime victimization, and education. This means that people who have been victims of corruption, who perceive more corruption in the country, who have been crime victims, and who have more education tend to have higher levels of trust in the judicial system. On the other hand, the variables that have statistically significant positive relationships are having received a clientelist offer, being a supporter of the PLD, and having more interpersonal trust. This means that people who are more involved in politics tend to trust the judiciary more as do those who are generally more trusting of others.




Figure 127. Determinants of Trust in the Judiciary in the Dominican Republic

Figure 128 details some of the statistically significant bivariate relationships. People without formal schooling have trust in the justice system that averages 15 points more than those with higher education (55.9 and 41.5 points). A difference of close to 14 points separates PLD supporters from those who are not. Being a victim of crime and of corruption reduces trust in the judicial system by about 7 points compared to those who have not been victimized.




Figure 128. Factors Associated with Trust in the Judicial System in the Dominican Republic

Table 3 presents multilevel analysis of trust in the judiciary. The objective here is to examine the impact exerted by the municipal context, specifically the level of poverty in the municipality. The coefficient in the table shows that there is a positive, statistically significant relationship between poverty at the municipal level and trust in the judicial system: more municipal poverty, more trust. In other words, trust is greater in poor communities than in wealthier ones.

Table 3. Determinants of Trust in the Judicial System in the Dominican Republic, Multilevel Analysis

Independent Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error
<i>At the Municipal Level</i>		
Municipal Poverty	.09*	.04
<i>At the Individual Level</i>		
Corruption Victimization	-.03	.02
Perceptions of Corruption	-.12*	.02
Crime Victimization	-.03	.02
Perceptions of Insecurity	-.04	.02
Received a Clientelist Offer	.06*	.02
PLD Supporter	11.47*	1.45
Interpersonal Trust	.04*	.02
Skin Color	.35	.35
Woman	.13	1.39
Rural	1.25	1.47
Wealth Quintiles	-.84*	.54
Education	-.42	.19
Age	-.07	.05
Constant	52.01*	5.31
Municipal-level Variance Component	.00	.02
N. of individuals	1207	
N. of municipalities	39	
Log-likelihood	-5496.96	
χ^2 (14 degrees of freedom)	190.99 (.00)	
* p<0.05 for individual-level variables		
* p<0.10 for municipal-level variables		

The following question examines a more specific theme concerning justice. The purpose is to reduce the abstractness of evaluations and consider situations that could occur, such as being a crime victim. The answers have been converted to a scale ranging from 0 to 100, where 0 is no confidence that the judicial system would punish a criminal who perpetrated an act of robbery or assault and 100 is a lot of confidence.

AOJ12. If you were a victim of robbery or assault, to what extent would you trust the judicial system to punish the perpetrator? **[Read the options]**
 (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) Not at all

Figure 129 presents the comparative data for the region. The Dominican Republic is located slightly ahead of the regional average with 48.1 points, closer to the highest average scored in Nicaragua than to the lowest average in Costa Rica. Eight countries have average scores higher than the Dominican Republic, and 17 countries have lower average levels of confidence that the judicial system would punish a criminal act.




Figure 129. Confidence that the Judicial System would Punish the Perpetrator in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 130 shows that level of confidence that the system would punish the perpetrator of a criminal act in the Dominican Republic over time. In the period from 2004 to 2012, levels of confidence have varied significantly from year to year, except in 2012 when the increase with respect to the previous survey is not statistically significant. In other words, the level of confidence that the system would punish the perpetrator of a criminal act has maintained similar levels in the past two years.




Figure 130. Confidence that the Justice System would Punish the Perpetrator in the Dominican Republic, 2004-2012

Figure 131 presents linear regression analysis of confidence that the justice system would punish the perpetrator of a crime. Perceptions of corruptions, perceptions of insecurity, and education level have statistically significant, negative relationships. That is, more perceived corruption, more perceived insecurity, and more education are associated with less confidence that the guilty would be punished. Supporting the PLD has a significant positive relationship. Figure 132 details the statistically significant relationships. People without an education have confidence levels nearly 30 points higher than those with higher education, and the graph displays a clear linear relationship. We can see the same tendency in the cases of perceptions of insecurity and corruption. Those who feel more secure and those who do not see any corruption have confidence levels 15 points higher than those who feel very insecure or perceive a lot of corruption. Supporting the governing party (PLD) increases trust that the justice system would punish the guilty by more than 10 points.




Figure 131. Determinants of Confidence that the System would Punish the Guilty in the Dominican Republic




Figure 132. Factors Associated with Confidence that the System would Punish the Guilty in the Dominican Republic



III. Trust in the Police

Trust in the police is important for understanding citizens' perceptions of the judicial system because the police are generally the first point of contact in cases of common crime and also because the police have as one of their central functions promoting public order and protecting the citizenry. If the police fail in their role of protecting the population or in assisting the victims of crime, levels of insecurity increase as does lack of institutional trust. In the previous section, we showed that people who feel more secure have greater confidence in the judicial system.

The AmericasBarometer used the following question to understand the level of confidence in the police. The original 7-point scale was converted to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 where higher values indicate more trust.

B18. To what extent do you trust the police?

Figure 133 shows the comparative regional data for this question about trust in the police. The Dominican Republic is located among the countries with the least trust with a score of 34.9 points. Only Trinidad and Tobago and Honduras have less trust. On the other hand, trust in the police in the Dominican Republic has been declining since 2008, when there was the highest average for the 2004-2012 period, as shown in Figure 134.




Figure 133. Trust in the Police in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 134. Trust in the Police in the Dominican Republic, 2004-2012

Figure 135 presents linear regression analysis of trust in the police. The variables with statistically significant, negative relationships are corruption victimization, perceptions of corruption, and wealth. This means that those who have been victims of corruption, those who perceive more corruption, and those who are more wealthy have less trust in the police. The variables with positive, statistically significant relationships are supporting the PLD and living in a rural area. The bivariate relationships are detailed in Figure 136. Perceptions of corruption do not have a strictly linear relationship, but people who perceive more corruption express less trust in the police, while victimization by corruption produces a difference of 14 points between those who have been victimized and those who have not. Being a PLD supporter increases trust in the police by 14 points. The wealth quintiles have a linear relationship with trust: more wealth, less trust in the police, with a difference of 11 points between the two extremes.




Figure 135. Determinants of Trust in the Police in the Dominican Republic




Figure 136. Factors Associated with Trust in the Police in the Dominican Republic

Table 4 presents the results of multilevel analysis. As indicated above, the goal here is to observe the impact that municipal-level poverty has on institutional trust, here trust in the police. The coefficient in the table shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between poverty at the municipal level and trust in the police: trust is greater in poor municipalities than rich ones.

Table 4. Determinants Trust in the Police in the Dominican Republic, Multilevel Analysis

Independent Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error
<i>Municipal-level</i>		
Municipal Poverty	.11*	.06
<i>Individual-level</i>		
Corruption Victimization	-.08*	.02
Perceptions of Corruption	-.10*	.03
Crime Victimization	-.03	.02
Perceptions of Insecurity	-.04	.03
PLD Supporter	11.34*	1.89
Interpersonal Trust	.06	.03
Skin Color	.36	.45
Women	2.14	1.82
Rural	3.35	1.92
Wealth Quintiles	-1.67*	.71
Education	-.36	.25
Age	.11	.06
Constant	34.26*	6.94
Municipal-level Variance Component	.00	.00
Number of individuals	1210	
Number of municipalities	39	
Log-likelihood	-5836.52	
χ^2 (14 degrees of freedom)	150.69 (.00)	
* p<0.05 for individual-level variables		
* p<0.10 for municipal-level variables		

IV. Perceptions of Insecurity

The AmericasBarometer included several questions that seek to determine with more certainty the levels of insecurity perceived by the population as well as the specific illegal actions that may contribute to increased citizen insecurity.

DOMAOJ11B When you are at home or out, do you feel more secure, the same level of security, or less security than five years ago? (1) More secure (2) The same (3) Less secure
AOJ17. To what extent would you say that your neighborhood has been affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, some, a little, or not at all? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) Not at all
AOJ16A. In your neighborhood, have you seen someone selling drugs in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No

Figure 137 presents the results of the question about the sense of insecurity felt by the respondents over the past 20 years in which this same question has been asked, first in the DEMOS surveys (1994-2004) and then in the AmericasBarometer (2006-2012). We see that feelings of

insecurity increased steadily between 1994 and 2006, and then declined considerably in 2008, probably due to the implementation of the *Barrio Seguro* program, and then has been fluctuating from 2010 to 2012. We should point out that since 1997, more than 50% of respondents have indicated that they feel less secure than five years ago.




Figure 137. Percentage who Feel Less Secure Than Five Years Ago in the Dominican Republic, 1994-2012

In Figure 138 we conduct logistic regression analysis to explain feelings of insecurity. Two variables have a statistically significant negative relationship with feeling less secure (interpersonal trust and skin color), while four variables have statistically significant positive relationships (crime victimization, gender, education level and age). In Figure 139 we present the most important of these bivariate relationships from the regression analysis. Those who were victims of crime feel less secure (74.3%) than those who were not victims (63.2%). Interpersonal trust has a clearly linear relationship with feeling insecure. Women feel less secure than men, and those with more education feel less secure, especially those with a university education.




Figure 138. Determinants of Feeling Less Secure Than Five Years Ago in the Dominican Republic




Figure 139. Factors Associated with Feeling Less Secure Than Five Years Ago

Table 5 presents the results of a multi-level analysis of perceptions of insecurity in the Dominican Republic. At the municipal level, municipal poverty has a statistically significant, negative relationship with perceptions of less security. That is, people living in wealthier municipalities are more likely to feel more insecure than five years ago as compared to people living in poor municipalities. It is important to emphasize that this is a perception because it may be that in reality people living in municipalities with more resources have greater security; however the perception of insecurity remains higher than in poorer municipalities.

**Table 5. Determinants of the Perception of Less Security
in the Dominican Republic Using Multilevel Analysis**

Independent Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error
<i>At Municipal Level</i>		
Municipal Poverty	-.26*	.15
<i>At Individual Level</i>		
Crime Victimization	.09*	.03
Interpersonal Trust	-.11*	.04
Skin Color	-.42	.70
Woman	5.46*	2.60
Rural	1.17	3.01
Wealth Quintiles	.93	1.05
Education	.65	.37
Age	.33*	.09
Constant	57.01	.15
Municipal-level Variance Component	102.22*	42.18
Number of individuals	1300	
Number of municipalities	39	
Log-likelihood	-6842..10	
χ^2 (14 degrees of freedom)	38.59 (.00)	
* p<0.05 for individual-level variables		
* p<0.10 for municipal-level variables		

In Figure 140 we present the data about perceptions of gang presence in one's neighborhood. To measure this, we use a scale of 0 to 100 points where higher values indicate people reporting a greater gang prevalence in their neighborhood. The Dominican Republic leads the region in the perception that respondents' neighborhoods are affected by gangs with an average of 48.6 points. Figure 141 shows how this perception has increased in the Dominican Republic between 2006 and 2012, which are the years for which we have this information. Although the difference between 2010 and 2012 is not statistically significant, the change between 2006 and 2012 is significant. This means that in the past 6 years there has been a statistically significant increase in the perception that gangs affect Dominicans' communities.




Figure 140. Attitudes about the Prevalence of Gangs in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 141. Perceptions of Gangs in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

Figure 142 shows a significant increase in reports about concrete criminal acts about which the survey inquired. Question **AOJ16A** asked the following: in your neighborhood, have you seen someone selling drugs in the past 12 months? Twenty-eight percent responded affirmatively, which marks a statistically significant increase since 2008. The importance of this question is that it does not refer to an opinion or a feeling, but rather to having seen a specific behavior that constitutes an illegal act with negative consequences for citizen security.




Figure 142. Dominicans Who Have Seen Someone Selling Drugs in their neighborhood, 2006-2012

V. Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed levels of confidence in the justice system from various angles. We used questions about general perceptions of the justice system and questions that sought to capture more specificity. Some refer to the justice system itself and others to the police.

The data demonstrate that since 2008, there has been a deterioration in trust in the justice system in the Dominican Republic. The decline between 2008 and 2010 was statistically significant, but it was not significant between 2010 and 2012. In regional perspective, the Dominican Republic placed among the countries with the lowest levels of trust in the justice system: 19 countries have more trust and only six have less trust. These six countries have experienced a high level of political instability in recent decades, and in two of them there have recently been coups (Honduras and Paraguay). In relation to average trust in the judiciary observed in other countries, the Dominican Republic is about 20 points away from Suriname, which has the highest level of trust, and it is less than ten points from Paraguay, which has the lowest average level of trust. This suggests that despite reforms to the Dominican justice system since 1997, trust in the system remains weak in the regional context and also over time within the country. In regression analysis of the scale measuring trust in the justice system, we found that people trust less in the justice system if they have been victims of corruption, if they perceive more corruption in the country, if they have been crime victims, and if they have more education. On the other hand, people who feel more involved in politics tend to trust the justice system more, as do those who have more interpersonal trust.

In terms of confidence that the judicial system will punish those guilty of criminal acts, the Dominican Republic is slightly above the regional average with 48.1 points, closer to the highest average of 57.3 scored in Nicaragua than the lowest one of 35.8 in Costa Rica. Eight countries have averages higher than the Dominican Republic, and 17 countries have lower scores. In the period between 2004 and 2012, the level of confidence in the Dominican Republic has varied with statistically significant gains and losses, except in 2012 when there was not statistically significant change from the previous survey. In other words, the level of confidence that the justice system would punish the guilty has remained about the same in the last two years. Regression analysis of confidence that the justice system would punish those guilty of criminal acts showed that more perceived corruption, more perceived insecurity, and more education were associated with less confidence that the guilty would be punished. The key variable with a positive statistically significant relationship is being a supporter of the PLD.

The Dominican Republic places among the countries with the least trust in the police with an average of 34.9 points; only Trinidad and Tobago and Honduras have less trust. Additionally, trust in the police in the Dominican Republic has been declining since 2008, when we observed the highest average for the 2004-2012 period. Regression analysis of trust in the police demonstrated that those who have been victims of corruption, those who perceive more corruptions, and those with more wealth have less trust in the police. The variables with statistically significant positive relationships are being a PLD supporter and living in a rural area. Additionally, more municipal-level poverty is associated with more trust in the police.

The AmericasBarometer asked various questions seeking to determine with more specificity the levels of insecurity perceived by the population and the occurrence of illegal acts that might increase citizen insecurity. The results from the specific question about feelings on insecurity among the Dominican population over the past 20 years reveals that insecurity increased steadily between 1994 and 2006, then declined considerably in 2008 probably due to the implementation of the *Barrio Seguro* program, and has been fluctuating between 2010 and 2012. We should note that since 1997, more than 50% of those interviewed have said in survey after survey that they feel less secure than they did five years ago. Logistic regression analysis of feeling less secure showed that those who were victims of violence are more likely to feel less secure (74.3%) than those who were not victims (63.2%). Less interpersonal trust is associated with higher levels of insecurity. Women feel less secure than men as do those who higher education. People living in wealthier municipalities feel more insecure than people living in poorer municipalities.

The Dominican Republic leads the region in the perception that the neighborhood where respondents live is affected by gangs, with 48.6 points on average. Additionally, this perception has grown in a statistically significant manner from 2006 to 2012, although the increase from 2010 to 2012 was not significant. On the other hand, 27.9% of Dominican respondents indicated that they had seen someone in their neighborhood selling drugs within the past 12 months. This percentage represents a statistically significant increase with respect to 2008. The importance of this question is that it does not reference an opinion or a perception, but rather a specific illicit behavior that has negative consequences for citizen security.

Chapter Eight: Political Parties and Government Effectiveness

I. Introduction

Since the transition to democracy in 1978, the Dominican Republic has been characterized by stability in the party system, although there have been some important changes in electoral preferences. At the time of the transition, two parties dominated: the Reformist Party, then called *Partido Reformista Social Cristiano* (PRSC), and the *Partido Revolucionario Dominicano* (Dominican Revolutionary Party –PRD). Over the decade of the 1980s in the face of accumulated failings of the PRD while in government, the small *Partido de la Liberación Dominicana* (Party of Dominican Liberation –PLD) was increasing its vote share, in large part from those who were disenchanted with the PRD. As a result, from 1986 to 2000 a three-party system existed.

The deaths of the *caudillos* of these three parties (Juan Bosch, José Francisco Peña Gómez y Joaquín Balaguer) produced a new repositioning in the party system. The PRSC was incapable of rearticulating itself following the death of Balaguer in 2002 and experienced a rapid decrease in electoral support. Before each election, the *reformistas* fragmented over disputes about the party with which they should align. Given that since 1996, the PLD has been the party that has governed most, many PRSC supporters moved toward the PLD government and this facilitated a formal alliance between the PRSC and the PLD in the 2012 presidential elections. At that time, many key PRSC leaders were high-ranking officials in the government of Leonel Fernández. For the first time in its history, the PRSC did not nominate its own candidate.

Between 1996 and 2012, the PLD governed for 12 years (1996-2000 and 2004-2012), and the PRD governed for four (2000-2004). The PLD was reelected in 2012, and at the end of this term, which continues until 2016, the party will have governed 16 of the past 20 years. Many of the economic and social problems of the Dominican Republic persist or have intensified under the PLD governments: citizen insecurity, corruption, clientelism, precarious electricity supply, unemployment and low wages. But the maintenance of relative macroeconomic stability during the governments of Leonel Fernández has allowed the party to remain in power in recent years. The PRD, however, has faced difficulty maintaining macroeconomic stability when it has governed, a situation that repeated itself in the party's last administration from 2000-2004 when the country underwent a severe financial crisis, and the party faces internal tensions.

In the post-transition since 1978, Dominican democracy has been structured as a highly clientelist system which penetrates all social sectors. Hence the country still records high levels of party support, despite a process in which the party organizations have lost their ideological moorings.

II. Partisan Identification

In the past two decades, surveys of political culture have revealed a high percentage of the Dominican population expressing sympathy for the political parties. The historical legacy of political polarization of the three great post-Trujillo *caudillos* (Balaguer, Bosch and Peña Gómez) together with the clientelism that has expanded during the democratic period have promoted stability in the

Dominican party system, despite the weakening of the PRSC and low level of democratic institutionalization of all three parties.

The data concerning partisan identification in this study support the view of strength in the party system. In all the years surveyed since 1992, more than 50% of population has indicated that they identify with a political party. The consistency over time is striking as is the high level of partisan identification when the Dominican Republic is compared to other countries.

The following question about partisan identification was asked in the survey:

VB10. In this moment, do you identify with a political party?
(1) Yes (2) No

As we have seen in previous years of the AmericasBarometer, the Dominican Republic leads the list of countries surveyed in the percentage of respondents who identify with a political party (63.4%). Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Guatemala have partisan identification below 20%, as seen in Figure 143. Figure 144 depicts over time change in the Dominican Republic, indicating a statistically significant increase between 2010 and 2012. This frequently occurs in presidential election years when a large number of people are more involved in party politics. We see that the percentage in 2008 and 2012 is greater than those in 2006 and 2010. Also note the decline between 2006 and 2010 and between 2008 and 2012. This suggests that even though levels of partisan identification remain high in the Dominican Republic, there has been a certain decline when we directly compare years in which similar elections were held.




Figure 143. Percentage who Identify with a Political Party in the Americas




Figure 144. Percentage who Sympathize with a Political Party in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

When we combine the partisan identification question with one that asks about party membership, we find that at the time of the survey (early 2012) Dominicans were divided into approximately thirds. Figure 145 indicates that 33.1% said they identify with a party, 30.3% said they belong to a party, and 36.6% said they neither belong nor identify (called independents in the figure). In the two previous rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the data on this topic was as follows. In 2008, 29.4% said they identified, 30.9% said they were members and 29.7% were independents. In 2010, 23.8% said they identified, 30.6% were members and 45.5% were independents. It is important to clarify that 2008 and 2012 are most comparable because they were both presidential election years; while in 2010 there were only Congressional and municipal elections. Nevertheless, there is a lot of consistency in the share of people who said they were party members.




Figure 145. Party Members and Identifiers in the Dominican Republic, 2012

Figure 146 presents logistic regression analysis of partisan identification. The bars indicate that rightest ideology, being a public employee, and age have positive relationships with party identification. This means that people who self-identify as more right-leaning on the left-right ideological spectrum expressed higher levels of partisan identification, as did those who were public employees or older in age. Of the variables included in the regression, being a woman is the only one that has a negative relationship with partisan identification. That is, women tend to identify with political parties less than men. Figure 147 and Figure 148 display the significant relationships from the regression in more detail. The largest effect we can see in these figures is for ideology.




Figure 146. Determinants of Partisan Identification in the Dominican Republic, 2012




Figure 147. Factors Associated with Partisan Identification in the Dominican Republic, 2012




Figure 148. Demographic Factors and Partisan Identification in the Dominican Republic, 2012

Figure 149 shows the distribution of identification by political party. Those who do not identify with any party constitute the largest percentage, followed by those who support the PLD and then the PRD. Identification with the other parties, including the PRSC, is minimal. This is an indicator of a return to a two-party system, which we noted in the introduction to this chapter.




Figure 149. Distribution of Partisan Identification in the Dominican Republic, 2012

Figure 150 shows the education level of each partisan identification category. Supporters of the PRSC have the lowest average level of education, and the gap between this group and the others is statistically significant. The difference in the average schooling of PLD and PRD supporters is not statistically significant, but the gap between the PLD and independent is significant. Finally, there is no statistically significant difference in education levels of PRD supporters and independents. These two groups have the highest levels of educational attainment.




Figure 150. Average Years of Education for Party Supporters and Independents, Dominican Republic 2012

In order to have an idea of the ideological positioning of respondents, the AmericasBarometer employed the following question:

L1. Changing topics, on this card we have a 1 to 10 scale that goes from left to right in which 1 means left and 10 means right. These days when people talk about political tendency, many people talk about those who identify more with the left or with the right. According to the meaning that you have for the terms “left” and “right” when you think about your political point of view, where would you place yourself on this scale?

To analyze these data, the original values of the 1-10 scale were converted to a scale ranging from 0 to 100 where higher values indicate a more right-leaning orientation. Figure 151 shows that independents self-identify as more leftist than all the other groups, although the difference with PRD supporters barely achieve statistical significance. On the other hand, PLD supporters are more rightist than PRD identifiers and independents, and the differences are statistically significant. PRSC identifiers, who have traditionally been to the right, have an average of 68.5, which is quite similar to the 69.1 average by PLD supporters. The reason that the gray box at the end of the PRSC bar is so large is because there is more uncertainty surrounding this average given that so few people identified with the PRSC (only 1.4% of respondents). These data provide evidence that in the past decade since the death of Joaquín Balaguer, his former supporters have repositioned their sympathies toward the PLD.




Figure 151. Ideology of Party Identifiers and Independents, Dominican Republic 2012

Figure 152 presents the ideological positioning of all the countries surveyed. In previous years of the AmericasBarometer, the Dominican Republic has occupied first or second place in the comparative graph depicting right-leaning ideological self-identification. But in this survey the country is in sixth place with an average of 55.5 points on the scale where higher values indicate greater rightward orientation, although the difference with Suriname in first place is less than 4 points. The tendency toward declining rightward ideological identification can also be observed in Figure 153. Between 2006 and 2012, there has been a decline of almost 15 points in right-leaning ideological identification, with an average of 69.2 points in 2006 and 55.5 in 2012, and the decline has been accelerating. It is notable that while this change has been occurring none of the major parties, and virtually none of the minor ones, have offered left-leaning policy proposals as we have seen in other Latin American countries.




Figure 152. Ideology Scale in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 153. Ideology Scale in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

III. Attitudes toward Political Parties and Reelection

It has been a constant in the survey data from the last two decades that the Dominican population identifies with parties at a high rate (always more than 50%), but the parties are not evaluated positively. In this section we examine citizens' evaluations of political parties. The first question asks whether or not there is a need for political parties in democracy. The scale from 1 to 7 utilized in the question as put to respondents has been converted to a 0-100 scale for our analysis here. Higher values represent the belief that democracy can exist without political parties. The question was:

DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. Using a scale from 1-7, to what point do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 154 shows that the Dominican Republic places in an intermediate position with an average of 45.4 points. Haiti, with a very precarious liberal democracy, and the United States, with a solid liberal democracy, occupy the first two positions holding the belief that democracy can exist without political parties. The greatest rejection of this idea is in Costa Rica and Venezuela. Although the Dominican Republic is in an intermediate position, Figure 155 shows a statistically significant increase between 2006 and 2012 in the view that democracy can exist without political parties.




Figure 154. Attitudes about the Role of Political Parties in Democracy in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 155. Attitudes about the Role of Political Parties in Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

Regression analysis of the **DEM23** question appears in Figure 156 and shows that only three of the variables considered have statistically significant relationships: gender, level of wealth, and age. Men are more likely than women to think that democracy can exist without political parties, as are those with less education and younger. The specific values associated with these three variables are presented in Figure 157. Age also has a slightly curvilinear relationship, while wealth has an almost linear relationship.




Figure 156. Determinants of Attitudes toward the Role of Political Parties in Democracy




Figure 157. Factors Associated with Attitudes toward the Role of Political Parties

Another way to learn the opinion of citizens about parties is to ask about their perceptions of parties' actions. Here we consider whether parties represent voters well. This question was administered to only half the respondents. The original scale of 1 to 7 was converted to a 0-100 scale for the statistical analysis. Higher values indicate more agreement with the view that parties represent the voters well.

EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Dominican political parties represent their voters well?

Figure 158 shows that the Dominican Republic places in a relatively intermediate position in the region with an average of 41.6 points. Figure 159 shows a statistically significant decline in citizens' assessments of parties, from 49.8 to 41.6 points.




Figure 158. The Political Parties Represent Voters Well, Attitudes in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 159. The Political Parties Represent Voters Well, Attitudes in the Dominican Republic

In the linear regression analysis that appears in Figure 160, we can see that two variables have statistically significant relationships with the opinion that parties represent the voters well: ideology and partisan identification. People who have more right-leaning ideological orientations and those who identify with a party have more favorable evaluations of the representation Dominican parties offer. Then in Figure 161 and Figure 162, we see the specific details of these relationships.




Figure 160. Determinants of the Attitude that Political Parties Represent Voters Well




Figure 161. Ideology and the Attitude that Political Parties Represent Voters Well




Figure 162. Partisan Identifiers and the Attitude that Political Parties Represent Voters Well

Reelection has been a topic of great interest and debate in Dominican society. After the 1978 transition, the system for presidential elections has changed three times: in 1994, 2002 and 2010. The 1966 Constitution established indefinite, consecutive reelection which gave Joaquín Balaguer the possibility of running consecutively in all the elections between 1966 and 1994 (almost 30 years). In the face of Balaguer's efforts to continue in power in 1994, there was a post-electoral crisis that led to a constitutional pact by whereby Balaguer would only govern for two years (until 1996) and consecutive reelection was subsequently prohibited. Balaguer could not run in the 1996 elections, but he did run in 2000 on the verge of death. In 2002, President Hipólito Mejía promoted a constitutional reform only to modify the article related to presidential reelection with the goal of running for immediate reelection in the 2004 presidential elections. In 2009, President Leonel Fernández promoted a constitutional reform that culminated in the enactment of a new constitution on January 26, 2010, which reestablished indefinite, non-consecutive reelection as in 1994.

Figure 163 presents responses to a question about reelection, which was asked in the following way due to the reintroduction of indefinite, non-consecutive reelection in 2010.

DOMVB25. Tell me about reelection [Read options]

- (1) Agree that a president should be allowed to be reelected repeatedly
- (2) Agree that a president should be allowed to be reelected only once
- (3) Not in agreement with presidential reelection

The largest percentage of those interviewed said they were not in agreement with reelection (42.8%), while the rest were equally divided between those who considered only one reelection appropriate and those who supported more than one reelection, with 28.5% and 28.7% respectively.

These data may be interpreted to indicate that a plurality opposes reelection, but it also suggests that a majority approves of some sort of reelection. Given that a tendency toward reelection has dominated in the Dominican Republic, politicians have assumed that a majority approves of some sort of reelection.




Figure 163. Attitudes about Presidential Reelection in the Dominican Republic

IV. Clientelism

Political clientelism is a phenomenon characteristic of societies in Latin America and other less-developed countries. In the Dominican Republic specifically, clientelism has been a recurrent theme, and governments have always cultivated clientelist practices in order to achieve their political goals. On special holidays and during the electoral campaign, it is custom that the parties and the candidates distribute objects and money to marginalized sectors. At the same time, the opposition always denounces the government's clientelism in the campaign and identifies it as one of the key factors in explaining defeat. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer respondents were asked the following question about clientelism in order to capture the magnitude of this phenomenon in electoral campaigns:

CLIEN1. In recent years and thinking of electoral campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food or some other item or benefit, for you in exchange for your vote or to support that candidate or party? Has this happened frequently, rarely, or never?
 (1) Frequently (2) Rarely (3) Never

Figure 164 presents the results for the Dominican Republic: 76% said they had never received a material offer in exchange for their vote, 9.6% rarely, and 14.4% frequently. The data in the 2010 survey were similar: 77.8% said they never received a clientelist offer, 7.7% rarely, and 14.5% frequently.




Figure 164. Frequency of Clientelism in the Dominican Republic, 2012

Logistic regression analysis of the question about clientelist offers during election campaigns is presented in Figure 165. People with darker skin and men report receiving more clientelist offers than people with lighter skin and women. People with more education receive more clientelist offers than those at lower levels of education, while younger people receive more offers than the old. Identifying with a political party has no statistically significant effect on clientelist offers according to this regression analysis. In Figure 166 we can see the specific values according to sex and education level, and in Figure 167 we present the values by skin color and age. The largest difference we observe is for the skin color variable, where people with dark skin have twice the probability of receiving clientelist offers than white respondents.




Figure 165. Determinants of Having Received a Clientelist Offer in the Dominican Republic




Figure 166. Sex, Education and Clientelist Offers




Figure 167. Skin Color, Age and Clientelist Offers

V. Effectiveness of Incumbent Government

Trust in governmental institutions is fundamentally molded by citizens' perceptions of government effectiveness. This argument is supported for the Dominican case in analysis of previous surveys conducted by Rosario Espinal, Jonathan Hartlyn, and Jana Morgan (2006), and also with data presented in previous editions of this AmericasBarometer report. Because of the importance of institutional trust for democracy, we dedicate this section of the analysis to perceptions of government effectiveness.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked many questions that allow us to explore this theme, and of these questions we have selected four that capture the general sense of the population with respect to government performance. For questions N1, N3, N9 and N11 which appear below, interviewees responded on a 1-7 scale, but for the analysis we have converted the scale to range from 0 to 100 where higher values indicate more favorable opinions of government performance in the specific area of the question.

- | |
|---|
| N1. To what extent would you say the current government combats poverty? |
| N3. To what extent would you say the current government promotes and protects democratic principles? |
| N9. To what extent would you say the current government combats government corruption? |
| N11. To what extent would you say the current government improves citizen security? |

As shown in Figure 168, we find that at the time of the survey in early 2012, evaluations of government effectiveness in these three areas were worse than in previous years, and in all cases the difference between 2012 and previous years are statistically significant.




Figure 168. Effectiveness of the Incumbent Government: Individual Variables in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

With the four variables mentioned above, we created a scale measuring government effectiveness in a general sense, ranging from 0 to 100 points. The data for each country appear in Figure 169. The Dominican Republic is located among the countries with the lowest scores on government effectiveness with an average of 40.7 points. It is notable that countries with stable political systems like the United States and Costa Rica have lower scores than the Dominican Republic and lower scores than countries with great political instability.




Figure 169. Scale of Government Effectiveness in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 170 presents the changing values in government effectiveness in the Dominican Republic over time. From 2006 to 2012, there was a decline of 15 points in citizen perceptions of government effectiveness, a difference that is statistically significant. The decline has also been consistent from survey to survey, although it was greater from 2010 to 2012.




Figure 170. Government Effectiveness Scale in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, we analyzed themes related to political parties and government effectiveness. The partisan identification data suggest strength in the Dominican party system. In all the surveys since the beginning of the 1990s, more than 50% of the Dominican population has identified with a political party. The over-time consistency is notable as is the high level of partisan identification in the Dominican Republic compared with other countries. As occurred in previous years, the Dominican Republic leads the list of surveyed countries in the percentage of partisan identifiers in 2012 with 63.4%. In over-time comparison, we observed a statistically significant increase between 2010 and 2012. This happens frequently in presidential election years when a large number of people are more involved in party politics. In 2008 and 2012, the percentage of partisan identifiers is higher than in 2006 and 2010. But we also see a decline between 2006 and 2010 and between 2008 and 2012, which suggests that although levels of partisanship remain high, there has been a certain decline in partisan identification when comparing similar elections.

Adding a question about party members to the one about partisan identification, we find that the country was divided into approximate thirds at the time of the survey: 33.1% said they identify with a party, 30.3% said they belong to a party, and 36.6% said they neither identified nor belonged to a party (independents). The people who self-identify as more right-leaning on the ideological spectrum expressed higher levels of partisan identification, as do people who were public employees and older. On the other hand, women are less likely than men to identify with a political party. PRSC supporters have less education than others, while independents have the highest average level of education. PRSC and PLD supporters self-identify as more right-leaning than independents and PRD supporters.



In terms of respondents' self-identified left-right ideological identification, in the past we found that the Dominican Republic occupied first or second place in the region in terms of right-leaning ideological orientation. But this was not the case in 2012, when the country placed sixth position with an average of 55.5 points on the 0-100 scale where higher values represented more right-leaning identification. The tendency toward less right identification can also be observed in the Dominican data over the past several years. Between 2006 and 2012, there is a decline of almost 15 points in average identification with the right, from an average of 69.2 points in 2006 to 55.5 points in 2012, and the decline has been escalating.

We also observe a certain deterioration in general evaluations of the political parties. From 2006 to 2012, the view that democracy may exist without political parties increased among Dominican respondents, although the difference between the two years is not statistically significant. On the other hand, the view that the parties represent voters well declined from 2008 to 2012. People who identify with the right and those who identify with a political party offer the most favorable evaluations of party representation. Opinions about reelection are divided into thirds: 42.8% are not in agreement with reelection, 28.5% consider reelection appropriate for only one time, and 28.7% support repeated reelection.

Clientelism has been a recurrent theme in the Dominican Republic, and governments have always cultivated clientelist practices in order to achieve their political goals. To investigate this here, we asked a question about clientelist offers during election campaigns, and found that 76% of respondents had not received such offers, while 24% had received them frequently or rarely. People with darker skin and men received more clientelist offers during election campaigns than those with lighter skin and women, while more educated and younger people also receive more clientelist offers. Identifying with a political party does not have a statistically significant effect on receiving clientelist offers according to the regression analysis we conducted.

Finally, governmental effectiveness was measured with four questions about fighting poverty, promoting and protecting democratic principles, fighting corruption, and improving citizen security. We found that for these four issues, the averages for 2012 were lower than in previous years, which indicate a decline in evaluations of government effectiveness. In regional comparison, the Dominican Republic was located among the countries with the lowest governmental effectiveness according to the citizens.

Chapter Nine: Gender, Migration, and Race

I. Gender

In recent decades, there has been a process of economic and political transformation in the Dominican Republic, which promotes changes in social attitudes and practices related to gender. The country has achieved higher levels of industrialization, urbanization and integration into the global economy through migration, tourism, commerce and communications. Additionally, in 1978 the country experienced a transition to democracy which has now been in place for over 30 years.

With the passage of time and these changes, social pressure to broaden citizen rights and improve the quality of democracy increased in the 1980s. Diverse civil society organizations and NGOs emerged with an agenda of change. In the case of women, advocacy work, education and assistance with international financial help was notable. And in general, the topic of gender and the incorporation of women into the labor force and politics has been an important component in the social programs of diverse public and private institutions.

In this chapter, we broaden the analysis of gender which we explored partially in Chapters One and Two. Here we specifically present the results of questions that have been asked in the Dominican Republic since the 1990s in the DEMOS surveys, and since 2006, the AmericasBarometer has continued using these question to give continuity to this valuable information. The question guiding our inquiry is: to what extent has Dominican society changed in recent decades with respect to conception of gender in terms of social equality and the participation of women in politics?

The accumulated data from the surveys conducted in the Dominican Republic in the last two decades show that there have been important changes in public opinion with respect to gender rights and acceptance of women's equality in the public and domestic realms. Various factors have contributed to this phenomenon, including the inclusion of women in the education system and the workforce as well as the work of gender education carried out by several women's organizations and the media.

This change in opinion, favorable toward greater participation of women in politics, has been accompanied by reforms in Dominican law that favor participation. So it was with the approval of a gender quota in 1997, which established a minimum quota of 25% women as candidates to the Chamber of Deputies and municipal councils. Then, in 2000, the quota increased to 33% with the aim of accelerating the process of incorporation. This minimum percentage of 33% has not been achieved in concrete results at the congressional level, although it has for municipal councils, and the quota has served to keep the issue of women's political representation on the public agenda.

Gender and Politics

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included once again a set of questions that seek to capture people's opinions with respect to women's rights as well as social and political equality. The survey includes a battery of questions that has been used since the beginning of the 1990s in the DEMOS surveys to capture opinions about women's political participation. With five of these questions, we have constructed a scale of support for the political participation of women. We present the questions

below, and with them we also constructed a 0-100 scale showing the level of support for women in politics.

DOMW6. To what extent do you agree or disagree that politics is for men?
DOMW7. To what extent do you agree or disagree that women should participate more in politics?
DOMW8. We are going to continue talking about women. When you go to vote, who inspires more confidence, a man or a woman?
(1) A man (2) A woman (3) THEY ARE THE SAME, BOTH [DO NOT READ]
DOMW9. Do you think that a woman has more or less capacity to govern than a man?
(1) More (2) Less (3) THE SAME [DO NOT READ]
DOMW10. About the participation of a woman in politics, with which of these opinions do you agree most: : [Read]
(1) It is not convenient that she participate
(2) She should participate only when family obligations permit
(3) She should participate the same as a man

Figure 171 displays the changes in public opinion for each one of the five questions for the 1994-2012 period. That is, the percentage of respondents who disagreed that politics is for men, who agreed that women should participate more in politics, who agreed that women should participate the same as men, who had the same or more confidence in women than men, and who consider women to have the same capacity to govern as men. As we can see in the graph, between 1994 and 2001 there has been a notable change in favor of women's political participation. However, between 2004 and 2012 we observe that the levels of support stabilized, declined or were unstable. In 2010, 57% disagreed that politics is for men, and in 2012, 65% disagreed. In 2010, 78% agreed that women should participate more in politics, and in 2012, 80% agreed. In 2010, 76% agreed that women should participate in politics the same as men, and in 2012, 81% agree. In 2010, 58% thought that female candidates inspire more confidence than men, and in 2012, 60% had this view. In 2010, 60% said that women have the same capacity to govern as men, and in 2012, 63% held this opinion.




Figure 171. Components of the Scale Measuring Support for Women in Politics in the Dominican Republic

Figure 172 shows over-time change on the scale measuring support for women in politics constructed from the five questions listed above. The levels of support increased from 2010 to 2012 in a statistically significant way, and the gap between women and men remained, with women expressing more support. The value of the scale in general increased from 65.5 points in 2010 to 69.8 in 2012. The scale for men increased from a 60-point average in 2010 to 64.8 in 2012, and among women the values moved from 71.6 points in 2010 to 75 points in 2012.




Figure 172. Scale Measuring Support for Women in Politics by Sex in the Dominican Republic, 1994-2012

In Figure 173 we conduct linear regression analysis of the scale measuring support for women in politics. Among the variables considered in the analysis, seven have statistically significant relationships. Those who support women working, those who think the woman should make important decisions in the home, women, those with more education and wealth, and those living in urban areas are all more likely to support women's political participation. Figure 174 and Figure 175 display the statistically significant relationships from the regression. These data reveal that support for the political participation of women is strongly correlated with other attitudes toward women, such as the rights to make important decisions in the home and to work outside the home, as well as with socio-demographic variables related to education level and urban life.




Figure 173. Determinants of Support for Women in Politics




Figure 174. Attitudes about Women in Society and in Politics




Figure 175. Factors Associated with Support for Women in Politics

Figure 176 presents the level of support for women in politics by partisan identification. Those who support the PLD and those without any partisan identification have the highest levels of support, 71.8 and 71.2 points respectively. It is surprising that despite the support PLD identifiers have for women in politics and that women have voted overwhelmingly for that party in the past two presidential elections (2008 and 2012), that PLD governments have nominated so few women to cabinet positions.




Figure 176. Support for Women in Politics by Party Supporters and Independents

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked a question about gender quotas. In the first place, various Latin American and Caribbean countries have legal requirements that women be nominated for specific percentages of the seats for particular government offices. Additionally, the central theme of the 2012 round is equality of opportunities. The Dominican Republic is one of the countries of the region with a gender quota law. This requirement was incorporated in the 1997 modification of the *Ley Electoral*. There it was stipulated that 25% of the nominees to the Chamber of Deputies and for positions on municipal councils must be women. In the congressional and municipal elections of 1998, many women were placed at the end of the party lists and were therefore not elected, or the quota requirement was simply not met. Hence, efforts were initiated so that the *Junta Central Electoral* requires parties to comply with the quota under a penalty of not being permitted to register candidates if the party failed to comply with the requirement. Additionally, in 2000 the law was amended to raise the quota to 33% female nominations for both types of offices.

Question **GEN6** seeks to measure the level of support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. Due to concerns about time and costs, this question, as with some others in the questionnaire, were only asked of half of the respondents. The original response scale of 1 to 7 was converted to 0-100 for the statistical analysis, where higher values indicate more support for the quota.

GEN6. The state should require political parties to reserve some spaces for women on their candidate lists, even if they have to exclude or leave off some men. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

The Dominican population surveyed had a high level of support for the quota. As we observe in Figure 177, the country is located in second position with an average of 78.5 points. The regional values range from 81.3 points in El Salvador to 46.4 in Trinidad and Tobago. However, as shown in Figure 42 in Chapter 2, Dominican respondents had a relatively high level of support for the idea that

men make better political leaders than women with an average of 47.9 points, occupying second place in the region. This finding does not coincide with the attitudes about gender quotas presented in this chapter. Nevertheless, as seen in Figure 178, the people who support women in politics tend to support gender quotas; although there is not a significant relationship between support for women as political leaders and support for the quota. In that figure, we observe that only support for women in politics has a positive, statistically significant relationship. On the other hand, wealth has a negative relationship – those with more wealth have less support for gender quotas. Figure 179 presents these two variables with statistically significant relationships, while Figure 180 shows the level of support for quotas by partisan identification. Supporters of the PLD and PRD are most supportive of gender quotas.




Figure 177. Support for Gender Quotas in the Americas




Figure 178. Determinants of Support for Gender Quotas in the Dominican Republic




Figure 179. Factors Associated with Support for Gender Quotas in the Dominican Republic




Figure 180. Support for Gender Quotas by Party Affiliation

Gender and Social Relations

We also asked various questions with the goal of learning about public attitudes with respect to the equality and autonomy of women in the home and the labor market. Here we analyze three of these questions:

DOMW11. Do you think a woman should only work when the man's income is not enough?

- (1) Yes, she should only work when the man's income is not enough
- (2) No, she should not only work when the man's income is not enough

DOMW12. Who do you think should make important decisions in the household? [Read alternatives]

- (1) The man
- (2) The woman
- (3) The woman and the man

DOMW13. Some people think that a man should never hit his wife and others think that it is sometimes justified for a man to hit his wife. With which opinion do you agree most? [READ ALTERNATIVES]

- (1) Under no circumstance should a man hit his wife
- (2) Sometimes it is justified for a man to hit his wife

Below, in separate graphs, we present the results from these three questions by sex. The majority of Dominicans think that a woman should not only work when the man's income is not enough, and this opinion is stronger among women than men as we can see in Figure 181. The majority also believe that both the woman and the man should make the most important decisions in the household, but this view is stronger among women as evidenced in Figure 182. The great majority do not find it justifiable for a man to hit his wife as seen in Figure 183. Nevertheless, there are many femicides in the Dominican Republic.




Figure 181. Support for Women in the Workplace, by Sex in the Dominican Republic




Figure 182. How Household Decisions are Made, by Sex in the Dominican Republic




Figure 183. Attitudes about Violence in the Home by Sex in the Dominican Republic

Reproductive Rights

The theme of reproductive rights has generated great debate in recent years in the Dominican Republic, above all when discussing the constitutional reform. Article 37 of the Dominican Constitution of 2012 (number 30 in the reform) generated a lot of controversy because it established life as beginning at conception, thereby inhibiting the possible approval of a decriminalization of abortion for reasons such as in cases where the mother's health is at risk. With the purpose of capturing the sense of public opinion regarding abortion, the AmericasBarometer asked the following question in the surveyed countries:

W14A. And now thinking of other topics, do you think interruption of a pregnancy, that is abortion, would be justified when the mother's health is at risk?

(1) Yes, it would be justified (2) No, it would not be justified

Figure 184 displays the percentage in each country who considered interrupting pregnancy or abortion to be justified if the mother's health is at risk. The largest percentage was in Uruguay, followed by the United States. Both countries are well-above the others, with the differences being statistically significant. The Dominican Republic is located in eighth position, with 61.2% support. The lowest level of support is in Honduras with only 33%. Figure 185 shows the gender gap for the Dominican Republic on this question, which is not statistically significant: 62.1% for women and 60.4% for men.




Figure 184. Attitudes toward Abortion When the Pregnancy Places the Mother's Health at Risk in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 185. Attitudes about Abortion When Pregnancy Places the Mother's Health at Risk

Figure 186 presents logistic regression analysis of support for abortion in cases of the mother's health being at risk. Among the variables considered, five have statistically significant relationships. Support for democracy: greater support for democracy is associated with more support for abortion when the mother's health is in danger. Political tolerance: more political tolerance is associated with more support for abortion if the mother's health is at risk. The importance of religion; greater importance for religion is associated with less support for abortion under the circumstance of the mother's health being at risk. The view that men should make important household decisions: more support for this view correlates with less support for abortion. Education: people with higher education levels have more support for abortion. The specific values for three of the variables with statistically significant relationships are included in Figure 187. In the case of the importance of religion, there is a linear relationship, but the greatest difference is produced in comparing those for whom religion is very important to everyone else, while the differences between those for whom religion is not important, a little important or somewhat important are not statistically significant. Education has a linear relationship in which those with a secondary education or higher are significantly more supportive of abortion than those with less education.




Figure 186. Determinants of Attitudes about Abortion When the Pregnancy Places the Mother's Health at Risk in the Dominican Republic




Figure 187. Factors Associated with Attitudes about Abortion When the Pregnancy Places the Mother's Health at Risk, Dominican Republic

II. Migration

Migration is a topic of crucial importance for Dominican society due to the significant migratory flows into and out of the country. This migratory circuit has socioeconomic, cultural and political causes and consequences.

Migration into the Dominican Republic is fundamentally composed of Haitians who enter into distinct areas of the economy, above all in agriculture and construction. It is a migration composed primarily of poor workers with low levels of education or occupational training. Due to the history of conflict between the two countries, this migration generates considerable public controversy in Dominican society, making it interesting to use survey data to learn about the attitudes of the Dominican population toward Haitian immigrants.

On the other hand, many Dominicans have emigrated to the United States, Europe and other countries in Latin American and the Caribbean for the same reasons that the Haitians go to the Dominican Republic: in search of jobs and better opportunities. In the past three decades, various studies have been conducted about Dominican migration, its transnational character and the support that it provides to Dominican society. The AmericasBarometer does not cover this entire range of themes, but it does offer a baseline for understanding the importance of migration in Dominican households and the migratory plans of the Dominican population.

In order to evaluate Dominican's opinions regarding Haitian migration and the living conditions of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, we asked the following questions:

DOMHAI1. To what extent do you agree that the children of Haitian immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should have Dominican citizenship?
DOMHAI2. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the Dominican government give work permits to undocumented Haitians who live in the Dominican Republic?
DOMHAI4. There are people that say that Haitians are discriminated against in the Dominican Republic, others say they are not. To what extent do you believe that Haitians are discriminated against?
DOMHAI5. Have you witnessed an act of discrimination against a Haitian in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No
DOMHAI6. In what place did you observe the most recent act of discrimination against a Haitian? [Do not read]
(1) In the street (2) In the workplace (3) In school (4) In a hospital
(5) On public transport (6) Markets (7) in your community (8) Other place

Figure 188 presents the data from 2006 to 2012 about acceptance of the view that the children of Haitian immigrants born in the Dominican Republic should have Dominican citizenship. We observe a trend toward more support of this idea over the period under analysis, and for the first time in 2012 the average surpassed 50 points, from 48.3 points in 2010 to 54.8 points in 2012. Additionally, the difference between 2010 and 2012 is statistically significant. In terms of acceptance of undocumented Haitians obtaining work permits, there was a slight increase from 42.4 points in 2010 to 46.2 in 2012, but this change is not statistically significant, as we can see in Figure 189.




Figure 188. Attitudes about the Citizenship Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012




Figure 189. Attitudes about the Rights of Haitians to Work in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

With these two questions, we constructed a scale measuring support for the rights of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic, and we conducted linear regression analysis of this scale, the results of which are presented in Figure 190. This analysis allows us to identify the variables that have statistically significant effects on the opinions of Dominicans on this topic. The variables that had statistically significant relationships were; skin color, support for democracy, political tolerance, education, being a woman, and wealth. People with darker skin have more support for these immigrant rights as do the people who have more support for democracy, who are more tolerant, and who have more education and more wealth. Figure 191 and Figure 192 present the bivariate relationships for these significant variables with support for Haitian immigrant rights.




Figure 190. Determinants of Support for the Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic




Figure 191. Demographic Factors Associated with Support for the Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic




Figure 192. Support for Democracy and Support for the Rights of Haitians in the Dominican Republic

In addition to the civil and labor rights presented above, the survey also asked about Dominicans' perceptions of discrimination with respect to Haitians and about observations of discriminatory acts. On the scale measuring the perception that Haitians face discrimination in the Dominican Republic presented in Figure 193, the average score was 57.3 points. The other bar in the figure shows that 35.8% of respondents said they had observed an act of discrimination against a Haitian in the last 12 months. Figure 194 shows where these acts of discrimination were observed, a question that was asked of only the 35.8% of respondents who said they had been present during an act of discrimination against a Haitian. Of the places where discrimination was observed, the street was the most frequent with 52.2%.




Figure 193. Discrimination against Haitians in the Dominican Republic




Figure 194. Places of Discrimination against Haitians in the Dominican Republic

Below we present two general questions about the migration of foreigners to the Dominican Republic, formulated with the goal of learning the opinions of Dominicans about immigrants broadly, not just Haitians. But given the great Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic, there is a possibility that in answering these questions respondents were thinking about Haitians.

IMMIG2. In general, would you say that people from other countries who come to live here do jobs that Dominicans do not want or that they take Jobs from Dominicans? **[Be sure to emphasize in general]**

- (1) They do jobs that Dominicans do not want
- (2) They take jobs from Dominicans

IMMIG1. To what extent do you agree that the Dominican government should offer social services, like health assistance, education, housing, to undocumented immigrants who come to live here in the country? Are you... **[Read alternatives]**

- (1) Strongly in agreement
- (2) Somewhat in agreement
- (3) Neither in agreement nor in disagreement
- (4) Somewhat in disagreement
- (5) Strongly in disagreement

Figure 195 shows that 60.6% of respondents think that immigrants do jobs that Dominicans do not want. On the other hand, the scale measuring agreement with the government offering social services to immigrants has an average of 60.6 points.




Figure 195. Attitudes toward Immigrants in the Dominican Republic

We conducted logistic regression analysis to determine the variables that have significant relationships with the opinion that immigrants do the jobs that Dominicans do not want. Figure 196 shows that perceptions of respondents' personal economic situation and that of the national economy, education, being a woman, and wealth have positive, statistically significant relationships with this attitude. None of the variables we considered have negative effects. Figure 197 presents the specific effect of wealth and education. People with more education and wealth are much more likely to think that immigrants do the jobs that Dominicans do not want to do.




Figure 196. Who is more likely to Accept that Immigrants Do Jobs that Dominicans Do not Want?




Figure 197. Factors Associated with the Perception that Immigrants Only Do Jobs that Dominicans Do Not Want



As we discussed above, in the past 50 years there has been a significant flow of Dominican migrants abroad. Many of them send remittances to their families, and the economic improvement that they have experienced seems to have created a spiral of migratory expectations. With the goal of capturing these two phenomena, the AmericasBarometer formulated the following questions:

Q10A. Do you or someone who lives in your house receive remittances, that is, economic help from abroad?	(1) Yes	(2) No
Q14. Do you have any intentions to leave to live or work in another country in the next three years?	(1) Yes	(2) No

Figure 198 presents the percentage of respondents in each country that said they or someone in their household receives remittances. The Dominican Republic is in fourth place with 23.4%. At the top are Guyana with 32%, Jamaica with 43% and Haiti with 66.7%. On the other hand, in the majority of countries fewer than 15% of respondents said that they receive remittances. Figure 199 presents the over-time trend in the Dominican Republic. We observe a slight but sustained increase of the percentage of Dominican respondents who receive remittance from 17.9% in 2006 to 23.4% in 2012.




Figure 198. Percentage who Receive Remittances in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 199. Percentage who Receive Remittances in the Dominican Republic, 2006-2012

As far as the intention to move to another country, Figure 200 shows that Dominicans place in fourth position in the region with 31.9%, only surpassed by Guyana with 35%, Jamaica with 48.1% and Haiti with 58.1%. In the majority of countries, less than 25% of respondents have the intention to leave to live or work in another country in the next three years. Figure 201 shows the over-time trend in the Dominican Republic. The largest percentage was observed in 2006 after the economic crisis of 2003-2004. In 2008, the percent declined significantly. It increased once again in 2010, but according to the data it has remained stable in 2012. Figure 202 indicates that men as well as younger, more educated, and wealthier people are more likely to have the intention to go live or work in another country. The differences in the cases of age and education are quite marked.




Figure 200. Percentage with Intentions to Leave to Live or Work in Another Country in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 201. Percentage with Intentions to Leave to Live or Work in Another Country, 2006-2012




Figure 202. Demographic Factors and Intentions to Leave to Live or Work in Another Country in the Dominican Republic

III. Race

The construction of race and race relations have been themes of historical importance in Dominican society and in social research. The issue is particularly complex in the Dominican case because of its intermixing with nationality due to the proximity to Haiti, a country with a predominantly black population and with high migration to the Dominican Republic. This migration phenomenon has kept alive the historical tension that originated in the independence period when Haiti occupied the Dominican Republic for 22 years (1822-1944).

Determining the race of a person in societies that have experienced *mestizaje* (mixing of races) like the Dominican Republic is not an easy task. Who makes the determination: the person in question or others? What are the social implications of assuming the identity of a certain racial group or to be associated through physical characteristics with a particular racial group? In order to provide information in the effort to elucidate these and other questions relevant to this issue, the AmericasBarometer asked several questions. The first is racial self-identification, that is, with which racial group the respondent identifies. In the comparative questionnaire for all the countries included in this study, the question is described in ethnic terms (with the code **ETID**). The reason is that in many countries the differences are not only of skin color, but also of ethnicity or cultural differences. For the majority of Dominicans, however, the **ETID** question presented below, has a fundamentally racial dimension, pertaining to skin color and other physical characteristics, not ethnicity. In this sense, in presenting the data it is important to understand the specific connotation of the question for the Dominican case.

ETID. Do you consider yourself a person who is white, mestizo (indio), black/black Dominican, mulatto, or something else?
 (1) White (2) Indio/mestizo (4) Black/Black Dominican (5) Mulato (7) Other

The distribution of answers to this question appears in Figure 203. As has occurred in previous surveys, the majority of respondents identified as *mestizo/indio*, although in the Dominican case this term does not refer to the indigenous population (which essentially does not exist), but rather it is a term that is used to locate oneself between white and black regardless of the gradation of skin color.




Figure 203. Racial Self-identification in the Dominican Republic

In the survey, interviewers were also asked to use a color palette to indicate the skin color of each respondent on a scale from 1 to 11. Figure 204 presents the average skin color score made by the interviewers on the 1-11 scale for each self-identified racial category. The data show that those who self-identified as white also received lighter skin color assessments as scored by the interviewers, while the other groups were scored as having darker skin color. That is to say that there is a strong correlation between racial self-identification and the skin color identification made by the interviewers. Figure 205 shows the average levels of wealth for each self-identified racial category. We do not observe statistically significant differences between the groups, although the lowest levels of wealth are found among those who identify as black.




Figure 204. Skin Color (classified by interviewer) by Self-identified Race




Figure 205. Levels of Wealth of Racial Groups in the Dominican Republic

We also considered the extent to which people discriminate against each other because of race. To assess this, we used question **DIS35D** which was asked in some of the surveyed countries:

I am going to read a list of various groups of people, could you tell me if there are any of them that you would not like to have as neighbors?		
	No, do not want them as neighbors	Do not have a problem with having them as neighbors
DIS35D. Black Dominicans	1	0

Figure 206 displays the percentages by country. The United States leads the list with 10.3% of respondents indicating that they do not want to have black neighbors. In the Dominican Republic, 3.8% expressed this opinion. It is worth emphasizing that as this type of attitude is considered discriminatory and many people are aware of this fact; therefore, it is likely that for all the countries the real percentages of people who hold this opinion are actually higher than those in the graph.




Figure 206. Percentage Who do not Want Blacks as Neighbors in the Countries of the Americas

IV. Conclusion

The 2012 AmericasBarometer once again includes a group of questions that seek to capture the opinions of the population with respect to the rights of women, the rights of immigrants, and race. On the topic of gender, the survey included a battery of questions that has been used since the beginning of the 1990s in the DEMOS surveys to capture the opinions of the population about women's political participation and that has been continued in the AmericasBarometer in the Dominican Republic.

The data show that from 2010 to 2012 there was a slight increase in support for women in politics. The value of the scale measuring support for women's political participation, which was constructed with five questions related to the topic, saw an increase from 65.5 points in 2010 to 69.8 points in 2012. Among men the average score on the scale increased from 60 points to 64.8 points, and among women average scores increased from 71.6 points in 2010 to 75 points in 2012. Among the variables considered in the regression analysis of the scale, seven have a statistically significant relationship. Those more likely to support women's political participation are those who support women working, who think important household decisions should be made by women or by the couple together, who have more education and more wealth, who live in urban areas and women. Also, the Dominican Republic is located among the countries with the highest level of support for gender quotas even though many hold the view that men are better leaders than women.

In terms of reproductive rights, the Dominican Republic had 61.2% of respondents who support the interruption of pregnancy in cases where the mother's health is in danger. Among the variables considered in regression analysis of this item, five had statistically significant relationships. More support for democracy, more political tolerance, and more education are all associated with more support for interrupting pregnancy when the mother's health is at risk. Whereas more importance given to religion and more support for male decision-making in the household are associated with less support for abortion.

About the rights of immigrants, the case of Haitians is the most prominent in the Dominican Republic. In 2012 we observe an increase in support for the idea that the children of Haitians born in Dominican territory should have Dominican nationality. Average support increased from 48.3 points in 2010 to 54.8 points in 2012, and this difference was statistically significant. As far as acceptance of work permits for undocumented Haitians, there was a slight increase from 42.4 points in 2010 to 46.2 in 2012, but the difference is not statistically significant. Using these two questions, we constructed a scale of support for the rights of Haitian immigrants in the Dominican Republic and conducted regression analysis. This analysis found the following variables to have statistically significant relationships: skin color, support for democracy, political tolerance, education, gender and wealth. In addition to civil and labor rights, the survey also inquired about perceptions of discrimination against Haitians and about observed acts of discrimination. On a scale measuring the perception that Haitians face discrimination in the Dominican Republic, the average score was 57.3 points; while 35.8% of respondents said they had observed an act of discrimination against a Haitian. Sixty-one percent of respondent think that immigrants do jobs that Dominicans do not want, and the scale of support for the government offering social services to immigrants averaged 60.6 points.

Regarding Dominican migration abroad, the survey asked about remittances and intentions to emigrate in the near future. The percentage of Dominican respondents who said that they or someone in their household receive remittances was 23.4%. The Dominican Republic was in fourth place in the



region in remittance recipients, surpassed only by Guyana with 32%, Jamaica with 43% and Haiti with 67%. In the majority of countries, less than 15% of the respondents said that there were remittances received in their household. In the over-time trend for the Dominican Republic, we observe a slight but sustained increase in remittance recipients from 17.9% in 2006 to 23.4% in 2012. In terms of intentions to leave and live or work in another country, Dominicans were located in fourth position with 31.9%, only surpassed by Guyana, Jamaica, and Haiti. The people most likely to have plans to leave and live or work abroad are men, people, and those with more education and wealth.

Determining the race of a person in societies characterized by *mestizaje* (mixing of races) like the Dominican Republic is not an easy task. Who makes the determination: the person in question or others? With what terms? As observed in other surveys, the majority of Dominican respondents that we interviewed self-identified as *indio*. Only 3.8% of Dominican respondents said that they would not want black neighbors, compared to 10.3% in the United States. Although it is worth emphasizing that as this type of attitude is considered discriminatory and many people are aware of this fact; therefore, it is quite probable that for all the countries where the question was asked, the real percentages of people who hold this opinion are actually higher.

Appendices

Appendix A. Letter of Informed Consent



Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.



VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

January, 2012

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been selected at random to participate in a study of public opinion. I am here on behalf of Vanderbilt University and Gallup Dominican Republic to ask you to participate in an interview that will last for 45 minutes.

The principle goal of the study is to learn about the opinion of people regarding different aspects of the situation in the country.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may skip questions without answering or terminate the interview at any time. The answers you provide will be completely confidential and anonymous. You will not be paid for your participation, but it will not cost you anything either.

If you have any questions with respect to the study, you may contact Gallup at 567-5123 and ask for Carlos Acevedo, the person responsible for this project. The IRB number for the study is 110627.

¿Do you wish to participate?

Appendix B. Sample Design

<i>Country</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Sample Size</i>	<i>Weighted/Unweighted</i>	<i>Fieldwork dates</i>
Dominican Republic	2012	1,512	Unweighted	January 15 th to February 15 th

LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2012 round of surveys

In its effort to collect the highest quality data possible, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) decided to adopt a new sample design for the AmericasBarometer 2012 round of surveys. The two main reasons for this decision were: (1) updating the sample designs to reflect the population changes as revealed by recent census information, and (2) standardizing the sample sizes at the level of the municipality in order to both reduce the variance and provide an initial basis for using multi-level analysis drawing on municipal data. This change in the sample design makes the sample representative by municipality size¹ for all countries, to enable the use of the municipality as a unit of analysis for multilevel statistical analysis.

- 1) Prior LAPOP surveys were based on the 2000 round of national census data. Since new censuses have been carried out in many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over the last few years, the samples were updated in order to take into account population shifts, so that sample designs are based on the most current population distributions available (by sex and age and also across geographical units within each country). Unfortunately, not all nations in our sample had updated census data available at the time LAPOP designed the 2012 AmericasBarometer. We plan to integrate new census information for future rounds as they become available.
- 2) With the objective of making it possible to perform subnational multi-level analyses and therefore assess the impact of both contextual and individual level characteristics at the subnational level, LAPOP adopted a new strategy for designing survey samples that allocate a somewhat larger number of cases to smaller municipalities within each country. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of considering both the effects of municipal as well as regional characteristics on citizens' attitudes and behaviors; however, multilevel analyses are only feasible if a reasonable number of interviews are carried out in each municipality, and if those interviews are reasonably well distributed throughout each municipality. Prior LAPOP samples were PPS2 adjusted to the municipal level, but this meant that some municipalities had a very small number of interviews, while others were quite large. A single large municipality, e.g., the capital of the country, could have drawn a very larger number of interviews. For the 2012 round, we continued to use PPS in the selection of the municipalities themselves, but established a target minimum sample size for each municipality of 12 respondents for larger countries and 24 respondents in smaller countries, in both cases divided into clusters of six respondents each. The

¹ The new sample design included three different strata of municipalities classified according to their size. Municipalities were grouped in sizes appropriate for the country. One common grouping was (1) Municipalities with less than 25,000 inhabitants, (2) Municipalities with between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, (3) Municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.

² Probability Proportional to Size

clusters were distributed in direct proportion to the urban/rural breakdown of a given municipality³. Thus, by increasing the number of interviews per municipality in the smallest municipalities, LAPOP seeks to facilitate investigating subnational patterns using multilevel modeling techniques. For the larger municipalities, we also retained the PPS approach, but would often subdivide the large cities into districts (or equivalent units) whenever possible so that a large city might have 4 or even 6 PSUs. Our rationale there was to treat the district as a unit for the purposes of calculating the intra-class correlations (rho statistic). The largest gains from this new sample design will come in subsequent rounds of surveys, as aggregated data across time will provide users with larger municipal sample sizes. The 2012 round established the basis for collecting useful data at the municipal level that can be merged with future round of surveys using the same sample design.

Simulations were carried out using the 2010 data set in order to determine the impact of revising the sample designs. Those simulations demonstrated the efficacy of the new design proposal, but required some modification for the largest countries in the sample. At the same time, the 2012 round sample design continue to utilize the very same strata as in prior years in order to maintain the reporting continuity of prior studies.

The remaining pages of this technical note describe the sample design of the Dominican Republic AmericasBarometer 2012 survey.

Dominican Republic 2012 AmericasBarometer Round

This survey was carried out between January 15th and February 15th of 2012, as part of the LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2012 wave of surveys. It is a follow-up of the national surveys of 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 carried out by the LAPOP. The 2012 survey was conducted by Vanderbilt University with the field work being carried out by Gallup República Dominicana. The 2012 AmericasBarometer received generous support from many sources, including USAID, UNDP, IADB, Vanderbilt U., Princeton U., Université Laval, U. of Notre Dame, among others.

The project used a national probability sample design of voting-age adults, with a total N of 1,512 people. It involved face-to-face interviews conducted in Spanish. The survey used a complex sample design, taking into account stratification and clustering.

The sample consists of four strata representing the four main geographical regions: Santo Domingo Metropolitan Area, North, East, and South. Each stratum was further sub-stratified by urban and rural areas. Respondents were selected in clusters of 6 interviews in urban and rural areas.

The Table shows the unweighted sample size in each of the four regions (strata) and by municipality size.

³ It should be noted that in some countries particular circumstances forced some deviation from this norm of 12 and 24 respondents per municipality. Users of the database should examine the variable PSU included in the UNWEIGHTED dataset to find sample sizes per municipality (or subunits of municipalities when the population size of the municipality was very large).

**Sample sizes by Strata and Municipality Size in the 2012
AmericasBarometer Survey in the Dominican Republic**

Strata	Unweighted Sample Size
Santo Domingo Metropolitan Area	540
North Region	528
East Region	192
South Region	252
Total	1,512
Size of Municipality	
Large (More than 100,000 inhabitants)	864
Medium (Between 25,000-100,000 inhabitants)	336
Small (Less than 25,000 inhabitants)	312
Total	1,512

The sample consists of 41 primary sampling units and 151 final sampling units. A total of 936 respondents were surveyed in urban areas and 576 in rural areas. The estimated margin of error for the survey is ± 2.5 .

Quotas for gender and age were adopted since multiple recalls in a national sample such as this are impractical from a cost standpoint. Our experience shows that even three recalls leave the sample with a notable gender imbalance (more women than men). Rather than have to include post-hoc weights to adjust for this sample error, we resolve the problem in the field via quotas.

Weighting of the Dominican Republic datasets

The AmericasBarometer samples of Dominican Republic are self-weighted. The dataset contains a variable called WT which is the “country weight” variable. Since in the case of Dominican Republic the sample is self-weighted, the value of each case = 1. The variable “WEIGHT1500” should be activated to produce representative national results. When using this dataset for cross-country comparisons, in order to give each country in the study an identical weight in the pooled sample, LAPOP reweights each country data set in the merged files so that each country has an N of 1,500. In SPSS this is done via the “weight” command.

The complete report and questionnaire can be found at The Political Culture of Democracy in Haiti and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity, written by Jana Morgan and Rosario Espinal. Readers can access the publication through a link on the LAPOP website: www.AmericasBarometer.org.

Appendix C. Questionnaire

República Dominicana 2012, Versión # 10.0.3.0 IRB Approval: 110627

 USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE	 <i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i>
 Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina	 AmericasBarometer Barómetro de las Américas www.AmericasBarometer.org
 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	

El Barómetro de las Américas: República Dominicana, 2012

PAIS. Country:					
01. Mexico	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	<div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div> </div>
06. Costa Rica	07. Panama	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	
11. Peru	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brazil	
16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Dom. Rep.	22. Haiti	23. Jamaica	
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad & Tobago	26. Belize	40. United States	41. Canada	
27. Suriname					
IDNUM. Questionnaire number [assigned at the office]					<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
ESTRATOPRI.					
(2101) Metropolitan Region		(2102) North Region			<div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
(2103) East Region		(2104) South Region			
(2105) Extension of the Metropolitan Region					
ESTRATOSEC. Size of the Municipality: (1) Large (more than 100,000)					<div> <div></div> </div>
(2) Medium (25,000-100,000) (3) Small (< 25,000)					
UPM (Primary Sampling Unit) _____					<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
PROV. Province: _____					<div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
MUNICIPIO. Municipality: _____					<div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
DOMDISTRITO. District: _____					<div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
DOMSEGMENTO. Census Segment _____					<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
DOMSEC. Sector _____					<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
CLUSTER. [CLUSTER, Final sampling unit, or sampling point]: _____ [A cluster must have 6 interviews]					
UR. (1) Urban (2) Rural [Use country's definition]					
TAMANO. Size of place: (1) National Capital (Metropolitan area) (2) Large City (3) Medium City (4) Small City (5) Rural Area					
IDIOMAQ. Questionnaire language: (1) Spanish					
Start time: ____:____					<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
FECHA. Date Day: ____ Month: ____ Year: 2012					<div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> <div></div> </div>
Do you live in this home?					
Yes → continue					
No → Thank the respondent and end the interview					
Are you a [country] citizen or permanent resident of [country]?					
Yes → continue					
No → Thank the respondent and end the interview					

Are you at least 18 years old?

Yes → continue

No → Thank the respondent and end the interview

NOTE: IT IS COMPULSORY TO READ THE STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEW.

Q1. [Note down; do not ask] Sex: (1) Male (2) Female

LS3. To begin, in general how satisfied are you with your life? Would you say that you are... **[Read options]?**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Somewhat satisfied (3) Somewhat dissatisfied
(4) Very dissatisfied (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]

A4. In your opinion, what is the **most serious** problem faced by the country? **[DO NOT READ THE RESPONSE OPTIONS; ONLY A SINGLE OPTION]**

Water, lack of	19	Impunity	61
Roads in poor condition	18	Inflation, high prices	02
Armed conflict	30	Politicians	59
Corruption	13	Bad government	15
Credit, lack of	09	Environment	10
Crime	05	Migration	16
Human rights, violations of	56	Drug trafficking	12
Unemployment	03	Gangs	14
Inequality	58	Poverty	04
Malnutrition	23	Popular protests (strikes, road blockages, work stoppages, etc.)	06
Forced displacement of persons	32	Health services, lack of	22
External debt	26	Kidnappings	31
Discrimination	25	Security (lack of)	27
Drug addiction	11	Terrorism	33
Economy, problems with, crisis of	01	Land to farm, lack of	07
Education, lack of, poor quality	21	Transportation, problems of	60
Electricity, lack of	24	Violence	57
Population explosion	20	Housing	55
War against terrorism	17	Other	70
Doesn't know	88	Doesn't answer	98
N/A	99		

SOCT1. How would you describe **the country's** economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

SOCT2. Do you think that **the country's** current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was **12 months ago**?

(1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO1. How would you describe **your** overall economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
(88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer

IDIO2. Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't Answer	
--	--

Now, moving on to a different subject, sometimes people and communities have problems that they cannot solve by themselves, and so in order to solve them they request help from a government official or agency.

In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from...? [Read the options and mark the response]	Yes	No	DK	DA	
CP2. A member of Congress	1	2	88	98	
CP4A. A local public official or local government for example, a mayor, municipal council, councilman	1	2	88	98	
CP4. Any ministry or minister, state agency or public agency or institution	1	2	88	98	

Now let's talk about your local municipality...

NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]	
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? [Read options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer	

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	DK	DA	
CP5. Now, changing the subject. In the last 12 months have you tried to help to solve a problem in your community or in your neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did it at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year or never in the last 12 months.	1	2	3	4	88	98	

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. [Repeat "once a week," "once or twice a month," "once or twice a year," or "never" to help the interviewee]									
	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	Attend/member	Leader/Board member	DK	DA	INAP
CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
				[Go to CP7]					
CP6L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]					1	2	88	98	99
CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
				[Go to CP8]					
CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]					1	2	88	98	99
CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
				[Go to CP9]					
CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]					1	2	88	98	99
CP9. Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP13. Meetings of a political party or political organization? Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	
CP20. [Women only] Meetings of associations or groups of women or home makers. Do you attend them...	1	2	3	4			88	98	99
CP21. Meetings of sports or recreation groups?	1	2	3	4			88	98	
IT1. And speaking of the people from around here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...? [Read options] (1) Very trustworthy (2) Somewhat trustworthy (3) Not very trustworthy (4) Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA									
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] MIL6. Now, changing the subject, how proud are you of the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic? [Read options] (1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud (4) Not at all proud or (5) Do you not care? (88) DK (98) DA MIL5. How proud do you feel to be Dominican when you hear the national anthem? [Read options] (1) Extremely proud (2) Very proud (3) Somewhat proud (4) Not at all proud or (5) Do you not care? (88) DK (98) DA									

[GIVE CARD A]

L1. [Use L1B in United States, Canada, and Guyana] Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98		
Left										Right			

[TAKE BACK CARD A]**[Give Card A]**

L1B. [For the United States, Canada, and Guyana] (Liberal-Conservative Scale) Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from liberal to conservative. One means liberal and 10 means conservative. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of liberals and conservatives. In other words, some people sympathize more with the liberals and others with the conservatives. According to the meaning that the terms "liberals" and "conservatives" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DK 88	DA 98		
Liberal										Conservative			

[Take back Card A]

PROT3. In the **last 12 months**, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?

- (1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to PROT6]**
 (88) DK **[Go to PROT6]** (98) DA **[Go to PROT6]**

PROT4. How many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in **the last 12 months**?
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PROT7. And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space as a form of protest?

- (1) Yes, participated (2) No, did not participate
 (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PROT6. In the **last 12 months** have you signed any petition?

- (1) Yes, signed (2) No, has not signed
 (88) DK (98) DA

PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut?

- (1) Yes, has done (2) No, has not done
 (88) DK (98) DA

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? **[Read the options after each question]:**

JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
--	--	--	---------	---------	--

JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress and govern without Congress?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
JC16A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Supreme Court and govern without the Supreme Court?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA	
VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (88) DK [Skip to VIC1HOGAR] (98) DA [Skip to VIC1HOGAR]					
VIC1EXTA. How many times have you been a crime victim during the last 12 months? ____ [fill in number] (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A					
VIC2. Thinking of the last crime of which you were a victim, from the list I am going to read to you, what kind of crime was it? [Read the options] (01) Unarmed robbery, no assault or physical threats (02) Unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats (03) Armed robbery (04) Assault but not robbery (05) Rape or sexual assault (06) Kidnapping (07) Vandalism (08) Burglary of your home (thieves got into your house while no one was there) (10) Extortion (11) Other (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (was not a victim)					
VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? [Read options] (1) In your home (2) In this neighborhood (3) In this municipality (4) In another municipality (5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A					
VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)					
ARM2. If you could, would you have your own firearm for protection? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA					

Out of fear of being a crime victim, in the last 12 months						
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP	
VIC40. Have you limited the places where you go to shop?	(1)Yes	(0) No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC41. Have you limited the places where you go for recreation?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC43. Have you felt the need to move to a different neighborhood out of fear of crime?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC44. Out of fear of crime, have you organized with the neighbors of your community?	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA		
VIC45. In the last twelve months, have you changed your job out of fear of crime? [If does not work mark 99]	(1)Yes	(0)No	(88)DK	(98)DA	(99) INAP	

I am going to read you some things you hear on the street or in the media when people talk about ways to combat crime. Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree somewhat, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with each one of them. The best way to fight crime...

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK	DA	
VIC101. is to create prevention programs. Do you: [Read Alternatives]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	DK	DA	
VIC102. The best way to fight crime is to be tougher on criminals	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC103. The best way to fight crime is to contract private security	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

Following, I am going to read you a series of situations that you could see at any time. I would like for you to indicate for each one if you would approve, would not approve but would understand, or would neither approve nor understand.

	Would approve	Would not approve, but would understand	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA	
VOL207. Suppose that in order to teach a child, a parent hits the child each time he or she disobeys. Would you approve of the parent hitting the child, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL206. Suppose that a man hits his wife because she has been unfaithful with another man. Would you approve of the man hitting his wife, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL202. Suppose that a person kills someone who has raped a son or daughter. Would you approve of killing him, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL203. If a person frightens his community and someone kills him, would you approve of killing the person, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

VOL204. If a group of people begin to carry out social cleansing, that is, kill people that some people consider undesirable, would you approve of them killing people considered undesirable, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
	Would approve	Would not approve, but would understand	Would not approve or understand	DK	DA	
VOL205. If the police torture a criminal to get information about a very dangerous organized crime group, would you approve of the police torturing the criminal, or would you not approve but understand, or would you neither approve nor understand?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line? (1) Should always abide by the law (2) Occasionally can cross the line (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA	

AOJ12. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish the guilty? [Read the options] (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ17. To what extent do you think your neighborhood is affected by gangs? Would you say a lot, somewhat, a little or none? (1) A lot (2) Somewhat (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ18. Some people say that the police in this community protect people from criminals, while others say that the police are involved in the criminal activity. What do you think? [Read options] (1) Police protect people from crime or (2) Police are involved in crime (3) [Don't Read] Neither, or both (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ20. And thinking about your and your family's security, do you feel safer, equally safe, or less safe than five years ago? (1) Safer (2) Equally safe (3) Less safe (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ21. I am going to mention some groups to you, and I would like you to tell me which of them represents the biggest threat to your safety: [READ ALTERNATIVES. MARK JUST ONE RESPONSE] (1) People from your neighborhood or community (2) Gangs (3) The police or military (4) Organized crime and drug traffickers (5) People in your family (6) Common criminals (7) [DO NOT READ] Other (8) [DO NOT READ] None (88) DK (98) DA	
AOJ22. In your opinion, what should be done to reduce crime in a country like ours: [read options] (1) Implement preventive measures (2) Increase punishment of criminals (3) [Don't read] Both (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD B TO THE RESPONDENT]

On this card there is a ladder with steps numbered 1 to 7, where 1 is the lowest step and means NOT AT ALL and 7 the highest and means A LOT. For example, if I asked you to what extent do you like watching television, if you don't like watching it at all, you would choose a score of 1, and if, in contrast, you like watching television a lot, you would indicate the number 7 to me. If your opinion is between not at all and a lot, you would choose an intermediate score. So, to what extent do you like watching television? Read me the number. **[Make sure that the respondent understands correctly].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Not at all				A lot			Doesn't know	Doesn't Answer
Note down a number 1-7, or 88 DK and 98 DA								
I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.								
B1. To what extent do you think the courts in the Dominican Republic guarantee a fair trial? (Read: If you think the courts do not ensure justice <u>at all</u> , choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)								
B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of the Dominican Republic?								
B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of the Dominican Republic?								
B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of the Dominican Republic?								
B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of the Dominican Republic?								
B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?								
B11. To what extent do you trust the JCE (Junta Central Electoral)?								
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?								
B13. To what extent do you trust the national legislature?								
B18. To what extent do you trust the police?								
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?								
B20A. To what extent do you trust the evangelical churches?								
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?								
B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?								
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court of Justice?								
B32. To what extent do you trust the municipal government?								
B43. To what extent are you proud of being Dominican?								
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?								
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?								

Now, using the same ladder, [continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale]	88 =DK,
NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	98 =DA
N1. To what extent would you say the current administration fights poverty?	
N3. To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?	
N9. To what extent would you say the current administration combats government corruption?	
N11. To what extent would you say the current administration improves citizen safety?	
N15. To what extent would you say that the current administration is managing the economy well?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES		Note
[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]		1-7,
And continuing to use the same card,		88 = DK,
NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT		98 = DA,
EPP1. Thinking about political parties in general, to what extent do Dominican political parties represent their voters well? (99) N/A		99 = N/A
EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you? (99) N/A		

Now, using the same ladder, [continue with Card B: 1-7 point scale] NOT AT ALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A LOT	Note 1-7, 88 = DK, 98 = DA
MIL1. To what extent do you believe that the Dominican Armed Forces are well trained and organized?	
MIL2. To what extent do you think that the Armed Forces in the Dominican Republic have done a good job when they have helped to deal with natural disasters?	
B3MILX. To what extent do you believe that the Dominican Armed Forces respect Dominican human rights nowadays?	
MIL3. Changing the topic a little, how much do you trust the Armed Forces of the United States of America?	
MIL4. To what extent do you believe that the Armed Forces of the United States of America ought to work together with the Armed Forces of the Dominican Republic to improve national security?	

[Take Back Card B]

M1. Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Leonel Fernández? [Read the options] (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad (88) DK (98) DA	
M2. Now speaking of Congress, and thinking of the deputies as a whole, without considering the political parties to which they belong, do you believe that the deputies of the Congress are performing their jobs: very well, well, neither well nor poorly, poorly, or very poorly? (1) Very well (2) Well (3) Neither well nor poorly (fair) (4) Poorly (5) Very poorly (88) DK (98) DA	

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied , or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	
SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? [Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?] (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA	

[GIVE CARD C]

Now we will use a similar ladder, but this time 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” A number in between 1 and 7 represents an intermediate score.

Write a number 1-7, or 88 = Doesn't Know, 98 = Doesn't Answer

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98	
Strongly disagree						Strongly agree		Doesn't know	Doesn't answer

Note down 1-7, 88 = DK 98=DA

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements	
POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?	
POP107. The people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?	
POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?	

We are going to continue using the same ladder. Please, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

Write a number 1-7, or 88=DK and 98=DA

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
DEM23. Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98)DA**

ROS1. The Dominican government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS2. The Dominican government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS3. The Dominican government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS4. The Dominican government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
ROS6. The Dominican government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?	
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA, HAITI, OR PANAMA]	
MIL7. The Armed Forces ought to participate in combatting crime and violence in the Dominican Republic. How much do you agree or disagree?	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS CCT3-RAC2A SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]

CCT3. Changing the topic...Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

Now I would like to know how much you are in agreement with some policies I am going to mention. I would like you to respond thinking about what should be done, regardless of whether the policies are being implemented currently. **[Write Down Number 1-7, 88 for those who DK, 98 for those who DA, 99 for N/A.]**

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree? (99) N/A

[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous, "non-whites" in general]

[Take Back Card C]

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES
[QUESTIONS W14-PN5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]

W14A. And now, thinking about other topics. Do you think it's justified to interrupt a pregnancy, that is, to have an abortion, when the mother's health is in danger?

(1) Yes, justified (2) No, not justified (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PN4. And now, changing the subject, in general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in the Dominican Republic?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

PN5. In your opinion, is the Dominican Republic very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?

(1) Very democratic (2) Somewhat democratic (3) Not very democratic
 (4) Not at all democratic (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

[Give the respondent Card D]

Now we are going to use another card. The new card has a 10-point ladder, which goes from 1 to 10, where 1 means that you strongly disapprove and 10 means that you strongly approve. I am going to read you a list of some actions that people can take to achieve their political goals and objectives. Please tell me how strongly you would approve or disapprove of people taking the following actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 Doesn't know	98 Doesn't Answer
Strongly disapprove							Strongly approve				

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
E5. Of people participating in legal demonstrations. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E8. Of people participating in an organization or group to try to solve community problems. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E11. Of people working for campaigns for a political party or candidate. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E15. Of people participating in the blocking of roads to protest. Using the same scale, how much do you approve or disapprove?	
E14. Of people seizing private property or land in order to protest. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E3. Of people participating in a group working to violently overthrow an elected government. How much do you approve or disapprove?	
E16. Of people taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals. How much do you approve or disapprove?	

The following questions are to find out about the different ideas of the people who live in the Dominican Republic. Please continue using the 10 point ladder.

	1-10, 88=DK, 98=DA
D1. There are people who only say bad things about the Dominican Republic form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's right to vote ? Please read me the number from the scale: [Probe: To what degree?]	
D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? Please read me the number.	
D3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Dominican Republic form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office ?	
D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches ?	

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to **run for public office**?

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[QUESTIONS D6-D8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]

D6. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of same-sex couples having the right to marry? (99)
N/A

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office? (99) N/A

D8. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the state/government having the right to prohibit newspapers from publishing news that can be **politically damaging** to it? (99) N/A

[Take back Card D]

[THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY]

I'm going to read you a list of several groups of people. Can you tell me if there are some groups that **you wouldn't like** to have as neighbors?

	Mentions [Does not want as neighbors]	Does not mention [Does not mind with having as neighbors]	DK	DA
DIS35A. Gays. Would you mind having them as neighbors?	1	0	88	98
DIS35B. Poor people	1	0	88	98
DIS35C. People from other countries	1	0	88	98
DIS35D. Afro-Dominican/blacks	1	0	88	98
DIS35D1. Haitians	1	0	88	98
DIS35D2. Chinese	1	0	88	98

DEM2. Now changing the subject, which of the following statements do you agree with the most:

- (1) For people like me it doesn't matter whether a government is democratic or non-democratic, or
 (2) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government, or
 (3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one.
 (88) DK (98) DA

DEM11. Do you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or do you think that problems can be resolved with everyone's participation?

- (1) Iron fist (2) Everyone's participation (88) DK (98) DA

AUT1. There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? **[Read the options]**

- (1) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected
 (2) Electoral democracy is the best
 (88) DK (98) DA

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA	
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"]		0	1	88	98	
EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?						
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipal government?	99					
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?		0	1	88	98	
EXC13. Do you work?	99					
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98	
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts?	99					
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98	
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?	99					
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?		0	1	88	98	
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months?	99					
If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98	
EXC18. Do you think given the way things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified?		0	1	88	98	
EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA						
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] EXC7MIL. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption in the Armed Forces is [Read options] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA						

[QUESTIONS DIS2-DIS5 ARE OPTIONAL FOR EACH COUNTRY.]					
Now, changing the subject, and thinking about your experiences in the past year , have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

VB1. Are you registered to vote? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Being processed (88) DK (98) DA	
INF1. Do you have a national identity card? (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA	

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of 2008? [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.] (1) Voted [Continue] (2) Did not vote [Go to VB10] (88) DK [Go to VB10] (98) DA [Go to VB10]	
VB3. Who did you vote for in the last presidential elections of 2008? [DON'T READ THE LIST] (00) Ninguno (2101) Leonel Fernández (PLD) (2102) Miguel Vargas Maldonado (PRD) (2103) Amable Aristy Castro (PRSC) (77) Otro (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA (Did not vote)	
VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to POL1] (88) DK [Skip to POL1] (98) DA [Skip to POL1]	
VB11. Which political party do you identify with? [DON'T READ THE LIST] (2101) PRD (2102) PLD (2103) PRSC (77) Otro (88) DK (98) DA (99) NA	

POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None (88) DK (98) DA	
--	--

VB20. If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? [Read options] (1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the incumbent candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot blank or would purposely cancel my vote (88) DK (98) DA	
--	--

PP1. During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the options] (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA	
PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections of 2008? (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA	
VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA	

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES [QUESTIONS VB51-AB5 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER ("1" "3" "5" "7" OR "9")]	
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) Both the same (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter? (1) A man (2) A woman (3) It does not matter (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians. VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? [Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous, "non-whites" in general] (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this? [Read alternatives, just one answer] (1) Because of their culture, or (2) Because they have been treated unjustly (3) [Do not read] Another response (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
Changing the subject, and talking about the qualities that children ought to have, I am going to mention various characteristics and I would like you to tell me which one is the most important for a child: AB1. (1) Independence, or (2) Respect for adults (3) [Don't read] Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
AB2. (1) Obedience, or (2) Autonomy (self-sufficiency, taking care of oneself) (3) [Don't read] Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	
AB5. (1) Creativity, or (2) Discipline (3) [Don't read] Both (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES [QUESTIONS SNW1A-MIL11E SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]	
SNW1A. Do you personally know an elected official or some person who was a candidate in the most recent national or local elections? (1) Yes (2) No [Go to FOR1] (88) DK [Go to FOR1] (98) DA [Go to FOR1] (99) N/A	
SNW1B. And is this position at the local or national level? (1) Local (3) National (4) Candidates at more than one level (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A	

<p>FOR1. Now we are going to talk about your views with respect to some countries. When we talk about “China” in this interview, we are talking about mainland China, the People’s Republic of China, and not the island of Taiwan. Which of the following countries has the most influence in the Caribbean?</p> <p>[READ CHOICES]</p> <table> <tr> <td>(1) China</td> <td>(2) Japan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(3) India</td> <td>(4) United States</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(5) Brazil</td> <td>(6) Venezuela</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(7) Mexico</td> <td>(10) Spain</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or</td> <td>(12) [Don’t read] None [Go to FOR4]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(88) [Don’t read] DK [Go to FOR4]</td> <td>(98) [Do not read] DA [Go to FOR4]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(99) N/A</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	(1) China	(2) Japan	(3) India	(4) United States	(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela	(7) Mexico	(10) Spain	(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or	(12) [Don’t read] None [Go to FOR4]	(88) [Don’t read] DK [Go to FOR4]	(98) [Do not read] DA [Go to FOR4]	(99) N/A				
(1) China	(2) Japan																
(3) India	(4) United States																
(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela																
(7) Mexico	(10) Spain																
(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or	(12) [Don’t read] None [Go to FOR4]																
(88) [Don’t read] DK [Go to FOR4]	(98) [Do not read] DA [Go to FOR4]																
(99) N/A																	
<p>FOR2. And thinking of [country mentioned in FOR1] do you think that its influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?</p> <table> <tr> <td>(1) Very positive</td> <td>(2) Positive</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative</td> <td>(4) Negative</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(5) Very negative</td> <td>(6) [Do not read] Has no influence</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(88) [Do not read] DK</td> <td>(98) [Do not read] DA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(99) N/A</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	(1) Very positive	(2) Positive	(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative	(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence	(88) [Do not read] DK	(98) [Do not read] DA	(99) N/A								
(1) Very positive	(2) Positive																
(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative																
(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence																
(88) [Do not read] DK	(98) [Do not read] DA																
(99) N/A																	
<p>FOR3. [Ask ONLY if the country mentioned in FOR1 was NOT China]</p> <p>And thinking of China and the influence it has in the Caribbean, do you think that this influence is very positive, positive, negative or very negative?</p> <table> <tr> <td>(1) Very positive</td> <td>(2) Positive</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative</td> <td>(4) Negative</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(5) Very negative</td> <td>(6) [Do not read] Has no influence</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(88) DK</td> <td>(98) DA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(99) N/A</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	(1) Very positive	(2) Positive	(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative	(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A								
(1) Very positive	(2) Positive																
(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative																
(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence																
(88) DK	(98) DA																
(99) N/A																	
<p>FOR4. And within 10 years, in your opinion, which of the following countries will have most influence in the Caribbean?</p> <p>[Read options]</p> <table> <tr> <td>(1) China</td> <td>(2) Japan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(3) India</td> <td>(4) United States</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(5) Brazil</td> <td>(6) Venezuela</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(7) Mexico</td> <td>(10) Spain</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or</td> <td>(12) [Don’t read] None</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(88) DK</td> <td>(98) DA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(99) N/A</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	(1) China	(2) Japan	(3) India	(4) United States	(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela	(7) Mexico	(10) Spain	(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or	(12) [Don’t read] None	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A				
(1) China	(2) Japan																
(3) India	(4) United States																
(5) Brazil	(6) Venezuela																
(7) Mexico	(10) Spain																
(11) [Don’t read] Another country, or	(12) [Don’t read] None																
(88) DK	(98) DA																
(99) N/A																	
<p>EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES</p>																	
<p>[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER (“0” “2” “4” “6” “8”).]</p>																	
<p>FOR5. In your opinion, which of the following countries ought to be a model for the future development of our country? [Read options]</p> <table> <tr> <td>(1) China</td> <td>(2) Japan</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(3) India</td> <td>(4) United States</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(5) Singapore</td> <td>(6) Russia</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(7) South Korea</td> <td>(10) Brazil</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(11) Venezuela, or</td> <td>(12) Mexico</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(13) [Do not read] None/We ought to follow our own model</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>(14) [Do not read] Other</td> <td>(88) DK</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(98) DA</td> <td>(99) N/A</td> </tr> </table>	(1) China	(2) Japan	(3) India	(4) United States	(5) Singapore	(6) Russia	(7) South Korea	(10) Brazil	(11) Venezuela, or	(12) Mexico	(13) [Do not read] None/We ought to follow our own model		(14) [Do not read] Other	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A	
(1) China	(2) Japan																
(3) India	(4) United States																
(5) Singapore	(6) Russia																
(7) South Korea	(10) Brazil																
(11) Venezuela, or	(12) Mexico																
(13) [Do not read] None/We ought to follow our own model																	
(14) [Do not read] Other	(88) DK																
(98) DA	(99) N/A																
<p>FOR6. And thinking now only of our country, how much influence do you think that China has in our country? [Read options]</p> <table> <tr> <td>(1) A lot</td> <td>(2) Some</td> <td>(3) A little</td> <td>(4) None [Go to FOR8]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(88) DK [Go to FOR8]</td> <td>(98) DA [Go to FOR8]</td> <td>(99) N/A</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	(1) A lot	(2) Some	(3) A little	(4) None [Go to FOR8]	(88) DK [Go to FOR8]	(98) DA [Go to FOR8]	(99) N/A										
(1) A lot	(2) Some	(3) A little	(4) None [Go to FOR8]														
(88) DK [Go to FOR8]	(98) DA [Go to FOR8]	(99) N/A															
<p>FOR7. In general, the influence that China has on our country is [Read alternatives]</p> <table> <tr> <td>(1) Very positive</td> <td>(2) Positive</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative</td> <td>(4) Negative</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(5) Very negative</td> <td>(6) [Do not read] Has no influence</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(88) DK</td> <td>(98) DA</td> </tr> <tr> <td>(99) N/A</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	(1) Very positive	(2) Positive	(3) [Do not read] Neither positive nor negative	(4) Negative	(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A								
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(5) Very negative	(6) [Do not read] Has no influence																
(88) DK	(98) DA																
(99) N/A																	

FOR8. How much do you agree with the following statement: "Chinese business contributes to the economic development of the Dominican Republic? Do you [Read alternatives] ... (1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neither agree nor disagree (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A					
According to what you have heard, do Chinese businesses operating in the Dominican Republic suffer from any of the following problems? [Read alternatives.]					
	It is a problem	It is not a problem	No opinion/DK	DA	N/A
FOR9A. Labor relations, such as disputes with workers or unions. Do you think that it is a problem, or that it is not, or do you not have an opinion on the matter?	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9B. Problems that arise from failure to understand the culture and customs of the Dominican Republic.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9C. Lack of knowledge of the political, legal, and social values and rules in the Dominican Republic.	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9D. Lack of communication with the media and residents.	1	2	88	98	99

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES							
[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]							
Now, I would like to ask you how much you trust <u>the governments</u> of the following countries. For each country, tell me if in your opinion it is very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or if you don't have an opinion.							
	Very trust-worthy	Somewhat trust-worthy	Not very trust-worthy	Not at all trust-worthy	DK/No opinion	DA	N/A
MIL10A. The government of China. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10B. That of Russia. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10C. Iran. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10D. Israel. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99
MIL10E. United States. In your opinion, is it very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99

Now I would like to ask you about the relations in general of our country with other nations around the world. When you think of our country's relationship with **China**, would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?

	Closer	About the same	More distant	No opinion	DA	N/A
MIL11A. China.	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11B. And our country's relationship with Russia. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[ASK ONLY FOR RESPONDENTS WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS IN AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" "8").]

MIL11C. And with Iran. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11D. And with Israel. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99
MIL11E. Finally, with the United States. Would you say that in the last 5 years our relationship has become closer, more distant, or has it remained about the same, or do you not have an opinion?	1	2	3	88	98	99

On a different subject...

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[ASK ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8"), AND ONLY IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, MEXICO, AND PERU]

CCT1B. Now, talking specifically about the Tarjeta de Solidaridad, are you or someone in your house a beneficiary of this program?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

ED. How many years of schooling have you completed?

____ Year _____ (primary, secondary, university, post-secondary not university) = _____ total number of years [Use the table below for the code]

	1 ⁰	2 ⁰	3 ⁰	4 ⁰	5 ⁰	6 ⁰	7 ⁰	8 ⁰
None	0							
Primary	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Secondary	9	10	11	12				
University	13	14	15	16	17			
NS	88							
NR	98							

ODD QUESTIONNAIRES

[ED2 AND MOV1 SHOULD ONLY BE ASKED FOR INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN ODD NUMBER("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]

ED2. And what educational level did your mother complete? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]

- (00) None
- (01) Primary incomplete
- (02) Primary complete
- (03) Secondary incomplete
- (04) Secondary complete
- (05) Technical school/Associate degree incomplete
- (06) Technical school/Associate degree complete
- (07) University (bachelor's degree or higher) incomplete
- (08) University (bachelor's degree or higher) complete
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) N/A

MOV1. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the ...? [READ OPTIONS]

- | | | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|------------------|-----|
| (1) Upper class | (2) Upper middle class | (3) Middle class | (4) |
| Lower middle class, or | (5) Lower class? | | |
| (88) DK | (98) DA | (99) N/A | |

Q2D-Y. On what day, month and year were you born? [If respondent refuses to say the day and month, ask for only the year, or ask for the age and then calculate the year.]

_____ Day _____ Month (01 = January) _____ Year
 (For Q2D and Q2M: 88 =DK and 98 = DR)
 (For Q2Y: 8888 = DK and 9888 = DR)

___|Q2D
 Day
 ___|Q2M
 Month
 ___|___|Q2Y
 Year

Q3C. What is your religion, if any? [Do not read options]

[If the respondent says that he/she has no religion, probe to see if he/she should be located in option 4 or 11]

- (1) Catholic
- (2) Protestant, Mainline Protestant or Protestant non-Evangelical (Christian; Calvinist; Lutheran; Methodist; Presbyterian; Disciple of Christ; Anglican; Episcopalian; Moravian).
- (3) Non-Christian Eastern Religions (Islam; Buddhist; Hinduism; Taoist; Confucianism; Baha'i).
- (4) None (Believes in a Supreme Entity but does not belong to any religion)
- (5) Evangelical and Pentecostal (Evangelical; Pentecostals; Church of God; Assemblies of God; Universal Church of the Kingdom of God; International Church of the Foursquare Gospel; Christ Pentecostal Church; Christian Congregation; Mennonite; Brethren; Christian Reformed Church; Charismatic non-Catholic; Light of World; Baptist; Nazarene; Salvation Army; Adventist; Seventh-Day Adventist; Sara Nossa Terra).
- (6) LDS (Mormon).
- (7) TrAdditional Religions or Native Religions (Candomblé, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Mayan TrAdditional Religion; Umbanda; Maria Lonza; Inti; Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).
- (10) Jewish (Orthodox; Conservative; Reform).
- (11) Agnostic, atheist (Does not believe in God).
- (12) Jehovah's Witness.
- (88) DK (98) DA

Q5A. How often do you attend religious services? [Read options]

- | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) More than once per week | (2) Once per week | (3) Once a month | (4) Once or twice a year |
| (5) Never or almost never | (88) DK | (98) DA | |

Q5B. Please, could you tell me how important is religion in your life? [Read options]

- | | | | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|---------|
| (1) Very important | (2) Rather important | (3) Not very important | (4) Not at all important | (88) DK |
| (98) DA | | | | |

<p>OCUP4A. How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently [Read options]</p> <p>(1) Working? [Continue]</p> <p>(2) Not working, but have a job? [Continue]</p> <p>(3) Actively looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(4) A student? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(5) Taking care of the home? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(6) Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled to work [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(7) Not working and not looking for a job? [Go to Q10NEW]</p> <p>(88) DK [Go to Q10NEW] (98) DA [Go to Q10NEW]</p>	
<p>OCUP1A. In this job are you: [Read the options]</p> <p>(1) A salaried employee of the government or an independent state-owned enterprise?</p> <p>(2) A salaried employee in the private sector?</p> <p>(3) Owner or partner in a business</p> <p>(4) Self-employed</p> <p>(5) Unpaid worker</p> <p>(88) DK</p> <p>(98) DA</p> <p>(99) N/A</p>	

[GIVE CARD "F"]

<p>Q10NEW. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children?</p> <p>[If the interviewee does not get it, ask: "Which is the total monthly income in your household?"]</p> <p>(00) No income</p> <p>(01) Less than 1,010 pesos</p> <p>(02) 1,010 - 2,010 pesos</p> <p>(03) 2,011 - 3,020 pesos</p> <p>(04) 3,021 - 4,020 pesos</p> <p>(05) 4,021 - 5,030 pesos</p> <p>(06) 5,031 - 6,040 pesos</p> <p>(07) 6,041 - 8,030 pesos</p> <p>(08) 8,031 - 9,050 pesos</p> <p>(09) 9,051 - 10,560 pesos</p> <p>(10) 10,561 - 12,070 pesos</p> <p>(11) 12,071 - 18,110 pesos</p> <p>(12) 18,111 - 24,140 pesos</p> <p>(13) 24,141 - 48,280 pesos</p> <p>(14) 48,281 - 60,350 pesos</p> <p>(15) 60,351 - 72,420 pesos</p> <p>(16) More than 72,420 pesos</p> <p>(88) NS</p> <p>(98) NR</p> <p>(99) NA (Not working, not retired)</p>	
---	--

[ASK ONLY IF RESPONDENT IS WORKING OR IS RETIRED/DISABLED/ON PENSION (VERIFY OCUP4A)]

Q10G. How much money do you personally earn each month in your work or retirement or pension? **[If the respondent does not understand: How much do you alone earn, in your salary or pension, without counting the income of the other members of your household, remittances, or other income?]**

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than 1,010 pesos
- (02) 1,010 - 2,010 pesos
- (03) 2,011 - 3,020 pesos
- (04) 3,021 - 4,020 pesos
- (05) 4,021 - 5,030 pesos
- (06) 5,031 - 6,040 pesos
- (07) 6,041 - 8,030 pesos
- (08) 8,031 - 9,050 pesos
- (09) 9,051 - 10,560 pesos
- (10) 10,561 - 12,070 pesos
- (11) 12,071 - 18,110 pesos
- (12) 18,111 - 24,140 pesos
- (13) 24,141 - 48,280 pesos
- (14) 48,281 - 60,350 pesos
- (15) 60,351 - 72,420 pesos
- (16) More than 72,420 pesos
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) NA (Not working, not retired)

[TAKE BACK CARD "F"]

Q10A. Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances, that is, economic assistance from abroad?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

Q14. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years?

- (1) Yes
- (2) No
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

Q10D. The salary that you receive and total household income: **[Read the options]**

- (1) Is good enough for you and you can save from it
- (2) Is just enough for you, so that you do not have major problems
- (3) Is not enough for you and you are stretched
- (4) Is not enough for you and you are having a hard time
- (88) **[Don't read]** DK
- (98) **[Don't read]** DA

Q10E. Over the past two years, has the income of your household: **[Read options]**

- (1) Increased?
- (2) Remained the same?
- (3) Decreased?
- (88) DK
- (98) DA

EVEN QUESTIONNAIRES

[FS2 AND FS8 SHOULD BE ASKED ONLY OF INTERVIEWEES WHOSE QUESTIONNAIRE NUMBER ENDS WITH AN EVEN NUMBER ("0" "2" "4" "6" OR "8")]

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.

	No	Yes	DK	DA	N/A
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98	99

Q11. What is your marital status? [Read options] (1) Single [Go to Q12C] (2) Married [CONTINUE] (3) Common law marriage [CONTINUE] (4) Divorced [Go to Q12C] (5) Separated [Go to Q12C] (6) Widowed [Go to Q12C] (88) DK [Go to Q12C] (98) DA [Go to Q12C]	
GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries [Read alternatives] (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all; (2) You earn less than your spouse; (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse; (4) You earn more than your spouse; (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing. (6) [DON'T READ] No salary income (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP	
Q12C. How many people in total live in this household at this time? _____ (88) DK (98) DA	
Q12. Do you have children? How many? _____ (00 = none → Skip to ETID) (88) DK (98) DA	
Q12B. How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household? _____ 00 = none, (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP (no children)	
ETID. Do you consider yourself white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or of another race? (1) White (2) Indio/Mestizo (4) Black, black Dominican (5) Mulatto (7) Other (88) DK (98) DA	

LENG1. What is your mother tongue, that is, the language you spoke first at home when you were a child? [Mark only one answer] [Do not read the options] (2101) Spanish (2106) Haitian Creole (2104) Other (native) (2105) Other foreign (88) NS (98) NR	
--	--

WWW1. Talking about other things, how often do you use the internet? [Read options] (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) [Don't read] DK (98) [Don't read] DA	
---	--

For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information people have about politics and the country... G10. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never (88) DK (98) DA				
	Correct	Incorrect	Don't know	Don't answer
G11. What is the name of the current president of the United States of America? [Don't read: Barack Obama, accept Obama]	1	2	88	98
G14. How long is the presidential term in the Dominican Republic? [Don't read: 4 years]	1	2	88	98
G17. How many deputies does the Chamber of Deputies have? [NOTE EXACT NUMBER. REPEAT ONLY ONCE IF THE INTERVIEWEE DOESN'T ANSWER]	Number: _____		8888	9888

To conclude, could you tell me if you have the following in your house: **[read out all items]**

R1. Television	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R3. Refrigerator	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R4. Landline/residential telephone (not cellular)	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R4A. Cellular telephone	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R5. Vehicle/car. How many? [If the interviewee does not say how many, mark "one."]	(0) No	(1) One	(2) Two
			(3) Three or more
R6. Washing machine	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R7. Microwave oven	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R8. Motorcycle	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R12. Indoor plumbing	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R14. Indoor bathroom	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R15. Computer	(0) No [GO TO R16]	(1) Yes	
R18. Internet	(0) No	(1) Yes	(99) N/A
R16. Flat panel TV	(0) No	(1) Yes	
R26. Is the house connected to the sewage system?	(0) No	(1) Yes	

These are all the questions I have. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

COLORR. [When the interview is complete, WITHOUT asking, please use the color chart and circle the number that most closely corresponds to the color of the face of the respondent]	_____
(97) Could not be classified [Mark (97) only if, for some reason, you could not see the face of the respondent]	
Time interview ended _____ : _____	_____
TI. Duration of interview <i>[minutes, see page # 1]</i> _____	
INTID. Interviewer ID number: _____	_____
SEXI. Note your own sex: (1) Male (2) Female	
COLORI. Using the color chart, note the color that comes closest to your own color.	_____

I swear that this interview was carried out with the person indicated above.

Interviewer's signature _____ Date ____ / ____ / ____

Field supervisor's signature _____

Comments: _____

[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who entered the data _____

[Not for PDA use] Signature of the person who verified the data _____


**Card A (L1)**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Left					Right				

Card A (L1B)


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Liberal					Conservative				

Card B






Card C



Card D





Card E

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Defends the rich					Defends the poor				

Card F

- (00) No income
- (01) Less than 1,010 pesos
- (02) 1,010 - 2,010 pesos
- (03) 2,011 - 3,020 pesos
- (04) 3,021 - 4,020 pesos
- (05) 4,021 - 5,030 pesos
- (06) 5,031 - 6,040 pesos
- (07) 6,041 - 8,030 pesos
- (08) 8,031 - 9,050 pesos
- (09) 9,051 - 10,560 pesos
- (10) 10,561 - 12,070 pesos
- (11) 12,071 - 18,110 pesos
- (12) 18,111 - 24,140 pesos
- (13) 24,141 - 48,280 pesos
- (14) 48,281 - 60,350 pesos
- (15) 60,351 - 72,420 pesos
- (16) More than 72,420 pesos



Color Palette



Appendix D. Regression Tables

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 1

Additional Table 1. Regression Analysis of Years of Education

	Coefficientes	t
Rural	-0.198*	(-6.18)
Mujer	-0.037	(-1.55)
Color de piel	-0.091*	(-3.19)
26-35 años	-0.011	(-0.46)
36-45 años	-0.138*	(-6.97)
46-55 años	-0.244*	(-9.85)
56-65 años	-0.320*	(-12.18)
66 años o más	-0.418*	(-22.15)
Constante	0.001	(0.03)
R-cuadrado=0.276		
N. de casos=1509		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 2. Regression Analysis of Household Income

	Coefficiente	t
Rural	-0.171*	(-4.37)
Mujer	-0.218*	(-8.68)
Color de piel	-0.116*	(-3.91)
26-35 años	0.018	(0.52)
36-45 años	0.016	(0.57)
46-55 años	-0.048	(-1.82)
56-65 años	-0.078*	(-2.89)
66 años o más	-0.151*	(-5.30)
Constante	-0.012	(-0.32)
R-cuadrado=0.107		
N. de casos=1281		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 3. Regression Analysis of Food Insecurity

	Coefficientes	t
Rural	0.041	(0.93)
Educación de la madre	-0.096*	(-2.35)
Mujer	0.051	(1.43)
Mestizo/Indio	0.019	(0.39)
Negro	0.081	(1.47)
26-35 años	-0.031	(-0.70)
36-45 años	0.062	(1.27)
46-55 años	0.088	(1.74)
56-65 años	0.014	(0.32)
66 años o más	0.012	(0.18)
Constante	-0.041	(-0.83)
R-cuadrado=0.043		
N. de casos=643		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 4. Logistic Regression Analysis of Discrimination in the Workplace

	Coefficientes	(t)
Rural	-0.109	(-1.34)
Mestizo/Indio	-0.019	(-0.14)
Negro	0.093	(0.67)
Mulato	0.090	(0.85)
Mujer	0.011	(0.14)
Color de piel	0.048	(0.46)
26-35 años	-0.038	(-0.42)
36-45 años	-0.115	(-1.35)
46-55 años	-0.114	(-1.10)
56-65 años	-0.234*	(-2.29)
66 años o más	-0.571*	(-3.35)
Constante	-1.984*	(-22.22)
F=1.48		
N. de casos=1478		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 2

Additional Table 5. Regression Analysis of the Perception that Men are better Political Leaders

	Coefficientes	t
Rural	0.026	(0.80)
Educación de la madre	-0.091*	(-2.66)
Nivel de educación	-0.175*	(-5.25)
Mujer	-0.195*	(-5.90)
Color de piel	-0.025	(-0.77)
26-35 años	-0.033	(-0.95)
36-45 años	-0.019	(-0.53)
46-55 años	-0.097*	(-2.30)
56-65 años	-0.118*	(-3.48)
66 años o más	-0.090*	(-2.22)
Ideología	0.092*	(3.20)
Constante	-0.000	(-0.01)
R-cuadrado=0.097		
N. de casos=1095		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 3

Additional Table 6. Regression Analysis of Internal Efficacy

	Coefficientes	t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.025	(0.97)
Mujer	-0.119*	(-4.28)
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.033	(-0.99)
Edad	0.086*	(3.32)
Educación	0.147*	(4.86)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.006	(-0.18)
Interés político	0.303*	(10.75)
Color de piel	-0.000	(-0.00)
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.038	(1.54)
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.027	(-0.90)
Constante	-0.003	(-0.09)
R-cuadrado=0.153		
N. de casos=1427		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 7. Regression Analysis of External Efficacy

	Coefficientes	t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.025	(-0.80)
Mujer	0.007	(0.21)
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.014	(-0.42)
Edad	0.014	(0.44)
Educación	-0.147*	(-4.06)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.027	(-0.84)
Interés político	0.111*	(3.66)
Color de piel	0.007	(0.29)
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.017	(-0.65)
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.023	(-0.72)
Constante	-0.007	(-0.24)
R-cuadrado=0.040		
N. de casos=1383		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 8. Regression Analysis of the Attitude that Political Parties Listen

	Coefficientes	t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.041	(-1.02)
Mujer	0.118*	(2.55)
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.079	(-1.37)
Edad	0.012	(0.28)
Educación	-0.163*	(-3.58)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.052	(1.18)
Interés político	0.174*	(4.03)
Color de piel	0.025	(0.79)
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.076	(-1.78)
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.044	(-1.14)
Constante	-0.013	(-0.34)
R-cuadrado=0.067		
N. de casos=709		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 9. Regression Analysis of System Support

	Coefficientes	t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.046	(-1.77)
Mujer	0.116*	(4.45)
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.022	(-0.66)
Edad	-0.005	(-0.17)
Nivel de educación	-0.122*	(-4.49)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.074*	(-2.55)
Interés político	0.195*	(6.29)
Color de piel	0.031	(1.00)
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.075*	(-2.44)
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.059	(-2.00)
Constante	0.002	(0.06)
R-cuadrado=0.091		
N. de casos=1421		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 10. Regression Analysis of Support for Democracy

	Coefficientes	t
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.006	(-0.26)
Mujer	0.019	(0.61)
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.020	(-0.60)
Edad	0.136*	(4.62)
Educación	0.000	(0.01)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.061*	(2.72)
Interés político	0.076*	(3.17)
Color de piel	-0.034	(-1.24)
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.018	(0.55)
Discriminado en otro lugar	0.000	(0.01)
Constante	0.001	(0.06)
R-cuadrado=0.029		
N. de casos=1386		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 11. Logistic Regression Analysis of Protest Participation

	Coefficientes	(t)
Participó en una protesta		
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.099	(-0.84)
Mujer	-0.127	(-1.13)
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.085	(-0.67)
Educación	0.463*	(3.30)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.059	(0.54)
Interés político	0.124	(1.18)
Color de piel	0.145	(1.58)
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.065	(0.68)
Discriminado en otro lugar	0.209*	(2.11)
Constante	-2.634*	(-19.84)
F=3.45		
N. de casos=1441		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 4

Additional Table 12. Logistic Regression Analysis of Corruption Victimization

	Coeficientes	(t)
Nivel de educación	0.450*	(6.78)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.106	(1.57)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.084	(-1.19)
Mujer	-0.639*	(-9.31)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.142	(2.00)
Color de piel	0.048	(0.71)
Constante	-1.461*	(-23.37)
F=25.23		
N. de casos=1500		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 13. Logistic Regression Analysis of Crime Victimization

	Coeficientes	(t)
Nivel de educación	0.392*	(5.43)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.099	(1.15)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.083	(-1.00)
Mujer	-0.111	(-1.58)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.122	(1.42)
Mestizo/Indio	0.065	(0.66)
Negro	-0.072	(-0.81)
Mulato	0.108	(1.27)
Constante	-1.537*	(-18.01)
F=6.18		
N. de casos=1500		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 14. Regression Analysis of System Support

	Coefficientes	t
Nivel de educación	-0.091*	(-3.65)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.028	(-1.00)
Color de piel	0.026	(0.88)
Mujer	0.063*	(2.93)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.100*	(-4.02)
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.025	(-1.04)
Percepción de corrupción	-0.190*	(-9.41)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.100*	(-3.64)
Constante	-0.017	(-0.64)
R-cuadrado=0.097		
N. de casos=1418		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 15. Regression Analysis of Support for the Rule of Law

	Coefficientes	(t)
Apoyo al Estado de Derecho		
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.042	(-0.65)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.073	(-1.01)
Percepción de corrupción	0.094	(1.32)
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.040	(-0.54)
Nivel de educación	-0.090	(-1.12)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.119	(1.91)
Color de piel	0.059	(0.97)
Mujer	0.036	(0.54)
Confianza interpersonal	0.064	(1.00)
Ideología	0.055	(0.80)
Constante	1.005*	(18.45)
F=1.15		
N. de casos=1229		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 5

Additional Table 16. Regression Analysis of System Support

	Coefficientes	t
Evaluación de los servicios de los gobiernos locales	0.096*	(3.87)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.383*	(17.81)
Interés político	0.174*	(6.17)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.058*	(2.15)
Nivel de educación	-0.121*	(-4.81)
Mujer	0.101*	(5.20)
Color de piel	0.020	(0.69)
Edad	0.019	(0.70)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.079*	(-3.20)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.080*	(-3.12)
Constante	-0.005	(-0.19)
R-cuadrado=0.257		
N. de casos=1419		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 17. Regression Analysis of Political Tolerance

	Coefficientes	t
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	-0.056*	(-2.06)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	-0.003	(-0.12)
Percepción de inseguridad	0.023	(0.80)
Victimización por delincuencia	0.067*	(2.52)
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	-0.001	(-0.03)
Importancia de la religión	0.042	(1.12)
Apoyo a la democracia	0.187*	(7.27)
Nivel de educación	0.154*	(5.35)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.002	(0.05)
Color de piel	0.097*	(3.71)
Mujer	-0.129*	(-5.80)
Constante	0.010	(0.30)
R-cuadrado=0.091		
N. de casos=1408		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 18. Logistic Regression Analysis of Support for Stable Democracy

	Coefficientes	(t)
Apoyo al sistema alto y tolerancia alta		
Victimización por delincuencia	0.060	(0.79)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.028	(-0.46)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.045	(-0.50)
Percepción de corrupción	-0.085	(-1.34)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.143	(1.93)
Mujer	0.023	(0.37)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.100	(-1.41)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.135*	(-2.02)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.471*	(6.93)
Interés político	0.313*	(4.24)
Constante	-1.225*	(-15.30)
F=8.19		
N. de casos=1394		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 6

Additional Table 19. Logistic Regression Analysis of Soliciting Help from the Municipal Government

	Coefficientes	(t)
Confianza en el gobierno local	-0.051	(-0.68)
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.636*	(9.81)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.048	(-0.50)
Nivel de educación	0.339*	(4.50)
Mujer	0.040	(0.47)
Color de piel	0.158	(1.80)
Edad	0.368*	(4.69)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.195*	(-2.07)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.355*	(-3.85)
Constante	-2.286*	(-21.45)
F=23.68		
N. de casos=1477		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 20. Regression Analysis of the Influence of Local Service Evaluations on System Support

	Coefficientes	t
Evaluación de los servicios de los gobiernos locales	0.096*	(3.87)
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.383*	(17.81)
Interés político	0.174*	(6.17)
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	0.058*	(2.15)
Nivel de educación	-0.121*	(-4.81)
Mujer	0.101*	(5.20)
Color de piel	0.020	(0.69)
Edad	0.019	(0.70)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.079*	(-3.20)
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.080*	(-3.12)
Constante	-0.005	(-0.19)
R-cuadrado=0.257		
N. de casos=1419		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 7

Additional Table 21. Regression Analysis of Confidence in the Justice System

	Coefficientes	t
Edad	-0.059	(-1.64)
Educación	-0.078*	(-2.58)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.035	(-1.24)
Urbano / rural	0.030	(1.02)
Mujer	0.016	(0.61)
Color de piel	0.033	(1.04)
Confianza interpersonal	0.060*	(2.16)
PLD	0.214*	(10.55)
Ha recibido una oferta clientelista	0.082*	(3.19)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.027	(-0.93)
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.056*	(-2.20)
Percepción de corrupción	-0.154*	(-6.18)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.067*	(-2.52)
Constante	-0.011	(-0.42)
R-cuadrado=0.125		
N. de casos=1334		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 22. Regression Analysis of Confidence that the System would Punish the Guilty

	Coefficientes	t
Edad	-0.018	(-0.69)
Educación	-0.157*	(-4.05)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.007	(-0.22)
Urbano / rural	0.048	(1.72)
Mujer	-0.052	(-1.98)
Color de piel	0.047*	(2.10)
Confianza interpersonal	0.016	(0.60)
PLD	0.100*	(3.52)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.109*	(-3.38)
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.045	(-1.69)
Percepción de corrupción	-0.124*	(-4.38)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.053	(-1.94)
Constante	0.004	(0.15)
R-cuadrado=0.102		
N. de casos=1328		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 23. Regression Analysis of Trust in the Police

	Coefficientes	t
Edad	0.014	(0.45)
Educación	-0.048	(-1.60)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.066*	(-2.25)
Urbano / rural	0.065*	(2.08)
Mujer	0.035	(1.36)
Color de piel	0.032	(1.00)
Confianza interpersonal	0.049	(1.65)
PLD	0.161*	(6.03)
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.028	(-1.00)
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.035	(-1.55)
Percepción de corrupción	-0.103*	(-4.12)
Victimización por corrupción	-0.112*	(-4.80)
Constante	-0.011	(-0.46)
R-cuadrado=0.103		
N. de casos=1337		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 24. Logistic Regression Analysis of Feeling Less Secure than 5 Years Ago

	Coefficientes	(t)
Edad	0.234*	(4.59)
Educación	0.184*	(2.64)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.054	(0.81)
Urbano / rural	0.052	(0.79)
Mujer	0.130*	(2.20)
Color de piel	-0.135*	(-2.53)
Confianza interpersonal	-0.164*	(-3.19)
Victimización por delincuencia	0.185*	(3.28)
Constante	0.644*	(9.25)
F=10.91		
N. de casos=1434		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 8

Additional Table 25. Logistic Regression Analysis of Partisan Identification

	Coefficientes	(t)
Educación	-0.109	(-1.46)
Edad	0.228*	(3.20)
Mujer	-0.125*	(-2.14)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.042	(0.56)
Urbano / rural	-0.039	(-0.59)
Color de piel	-0.021	(-0.29)
Empleado público	0.117*	(2.14)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.115	(1.60)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.009	(0.13)
Ideología	0.379*	(6.03)
Constante	0.677*	(10.13)
F=7.29		
N. de casos=1303		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 26. Logistic Regression Analysis of Receiving a Clientelist Offer

	Coefficientes	(t)
Edad	-0.161*	(-2.35)
Educación	0.229*	(2.46)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.121	(-1.42)
Rural	-0.123	(-1.73)
Mujer	-0.255*	(-4.65)
Color de piel	0.250*	(3.68)
PRD	0.044	(0.62)
PLD	0.062	(0.84)
PRSC	0.027	(0.45)
Constante	-1.231*	(-15.58)
F=5.81		
N. de casos=1465		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 27. Regression Analysis of the Attitude that Democracy can Exist without Political Parties

	Coefficientes	t
Edad	-0.111*	(-2.63)
Educación	-0.014	(-0.27)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.126*	(-3.07)
Mujer	-0.083*	(-2.26)
Color de piel	0.067	(1.71)
Rural	-0.036	(-0.74)
Simpatiza con un partido	0.003	(0.08)
Los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente	0.085	(1.88)
Ideología	-0.066	(-1.58)
Ha recibido una oferta clientelista	-0.057	(-1.48)
Constante	-0.006	(-0.12)
R-cuadrado=0.051		
N. de casos=616		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 28. Regression Analysis of the Attitude that Parties Represent Voters Well

	Coefficientes	t
Edad	-0.064	(-1.48)
Educación	-0.071	(-1.49)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.034	(-0.73)
Mujer	0.018	(0.42)
Color de piel	-0.044	(-1.06)
Rural	-0.005	(-0.11)
Simpatiza con un partido	0.155*	(3.80)
Ideología	0.180*	(3.98)
Ha recibido una oferta clientelista	-0.020	(-0.51)
Constante	0.013	(0.32)
R-cuadrado=0.077		
N. de casos=627		
* p<0.05		

Tables of Regressions in Chapter 9

Additional Table 29. Regression Analysis of Support for Women in Politics

	Coefficientes	t
Casado/Unido	-0.031	(-1.03)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.061*	(2.01)
Educación	0.182*	(5.63)
Edad	0.045	(1.58)
Rural	-0.099*	(-3.14)
Color de piel	-0.039	(-1.52)
Mujer	0.127*	(5.26)
La mujer debe tomar las decisiones en el hogar	0.109*	(5.11)
Los dos deben tomar las decisiones en el hogar	0.181*	(7.73)
Apoyo a la mujer en el trabajo	0.221*	(8.20)
Constante	-0.007	(-0.22)
R-cuadrado=0.219		
N. de casos=1462		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 30. Regression Analysis of Support for Gender Quotas

	Coefficientes	t
Casado/Unido	-0.015	(-0.49)
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.119*	(-2.67)
Educación	0.048	(1.06)
Edad	0.089*	(2.04)
Rural	-0.044	(-1.24)
Color de piel	0.051	(1.61)
Mujer	0.037	(1.03)
Apoyo a la mujer en la política	0.250*	(4.88)
Los hombres son mejores líderes políticos	0.034	(0.70)
Constante	0.012	(0.34)
R-cuadrado=0.082		
N. de casos=708		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 31. Logistic Regression Analysis of Support for Interrupting Pregnancy when the Mother's Health is at Risk

	Coefficientes	(t)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.106	(1.59)
Rural	-0.072	(-1.05)
Edad	-0.031	(-0.45)
Educación	0.243*	(2.68)
Color de piel	0.068	(1.08)
El hombre debe tomar las decisiones en el hogar	-0.224*	(-4.57)
Apoyo a la mujer en el trabajo	0.024	(0.44)
Importancia de la religión	-0.198*	(-3.17)
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	-0.062	(-0.96)
Tolerancia política	0.126*	(2.40)
Apoyo a la democracia	0.131*	(2.10)
Mujer	0.096	(1.84)
Constante	0.494*	(6.65)
F=7.72		
N. de casos=1369		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 32. Regression Analysis of Support for Haitian Rights

	Coefficientes	t
Quintiles de riqueza	0.096*	(3.37)
Rural	-0.040	(-1.17)
Edad	-0.037	(-1.08)
Mujer	0.061*	(2.49)
Educación	0.100*	(2.96)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.045	(1.49)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.032	(1.24)
Tolerancia política	0.072*	(2.45)
Apoyo a la democracia	0.122*	(4.54)
Color de piel	0.062*	(2.16)
Constante	0.000	(0.00)
R-cuadrado=0.070		
N. de casos=1410		
* p<0.05		

Additional Table 33. Logistic Regression Analysis of the Attitude that Immigrants do the Jobs that Dominicans do not Want

	Coefficientes	(t)
Quintiles de riqueza	0.122*	(2.22)
Rural	0.015	(0.27)
Edad	0.059	(0.88)
Mujer	0.150*	(2.47)
Educación	0.341*	(4.55)
Color de piel	0.055	(0.89)
Percepción de la situación económica nacional	0.174*	(2.87)
Percepción de la situación económica personal	0.134*	(2.12)
No trabaja y no busca trabajo	0.012	(0.19)
Desempleado	0.049	(0.82)
Constante	0.453*	(8.50)
F=7.46		
N. de casos=1422		
* p<0.05		

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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