Political Legitimacy and Participation in Costa Rica: Evidence of Arena Shopping

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Considerable research has failed to establish a link between political legitimacy and system breakdown. This does not mean, however, that researchers should abandon the concept of legitimacy altogether, since it may have other important effects that shape the character of the political system. We explore the impact, or lack thereof, of legitimacy on citizen behavior. Specifically, we test the proposition that legitimacy may have complex effects by differentially affecting a variety of modes of citizen participation. Empirical evidence from a 2002 national survey in Costa Rica, a consolidated Latin American democracy, reveals how legitimacy shapes citizens' political participation and civil society activism. We find that legitimacy has no uniform relationship across diverse modes of political participation. Some legitimacy dimensions increase certain participation modes while they decrease others, but have yet no effect on other modes. Specifically, other factors held constant, greater belief in two dimensions of legitimacy, "political community" and "trust in local government," increase voting and civil society activism. Low rather than high levels of "system support" increase party activism-instrumental contacting and communal activism, and low trust in regime institutions elevates civil society activism. Contradictory findings emerge on the impact of low legitimacy on protest participation. An important and novel finding is that two legitimacy-participation relationships are curvilinear. These findings suggest that prior research, based on a unidimensional notion of legitimacy and binary treatment of participation as conventional vs. unconventional may have been misleading. We discuss the implications of these patterns for political stability and legitimacy theory.

Legitimacy is a theoretically rich concept and is widely invoked by political scientists. In his classic work Political Man Lipset (1961) emphasized the long-term, historical process by which regimes over time and evolve into political systems whose legitimacy is broadly accepted and in frequently challenged, except by fringe groups or after protracted crises of performance. According to this theory, most citizens in consolidated democracies do not challenge their regimes' right to rule. Yet, in the United States and many other established democracies, surveys have shown that in recent decades the legitimacy of quintessentially democratic institutions (especially legislatures and parties) has eroded markedly. Scholars and public figures have repeatedly voiced alarm that legitimacy's decline might threaten democracy itself (Preston, Briggs, Kornberg, and Clarke 1983; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Nye 1997; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; Norris 1999b; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Yet despite this trend, over the same period there have been no democratic breakdowns in advanced industrial democracies. Indeed, there has been no hint of such breakdowns. These empirical "facts on the ground" challenge fundamentally the role of political legitimacy for political stability (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2004).

1 See the extensive bibliography collected by Norris (1999) and contributors to her Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, and by Nye, Zelikow, and King (1997); contributors to their Why People Don't Trust the Government. See also Nye and Zelikow (1997); Citrin (1974); Finkel, Muller, and Seligson (1989); Gibson, Caldeira, and Spencer (2003); Hardin (1999); Warren (1999).

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2 It is widely assumed, but not satisfactorily tested, that citizens' support for their regime somehow affects the regime's survival chances. For example, the collapse of the Weimar Republic and Hitler's election to power are regularly attributed to that regime's lack of legitimacy, but there has been no empirical research to support that contention (Berman 2003). To the extent that support for the political system shapes citizens' actions in the political arena, then erosion of support might increase behavior that could undermine democratic institutions, leaving such regimes caught in what Rose and Shin (2001) have called a "low-level equilibrium trap." Some studies have linked legitimacy norms to other attitudes such as expression of support for protests or military coups and there have been some efforts at linking protest behavior to low levels or certain patterns of legitimacy (Barnes and Kase 1979; Muller 1979; Muller, Jukam,and Seligson 1982; Baumann 1987: 212; Kornberg and Clarke 1992: 239; Myers and O'Connell 1998: 193-211; Seligson and Carrion 2002). Parment, Clarke, Jenson, and LeDuc (1993) found that support for the national political community led Quebecers to vote "no" in the 1980 referendum on independence. Kornberg and Clarke (1992:239) reported little effect of support on verbal persuasion and campaign activity among Canadians. Norris reported in 44 nations weakly positive effects that "greater confidence in the core institutions of representative democracy... [leads to] more active involvement" in conventional political participation but slightly less in protest activities (1999: 261-63). Newton (1999: 185) demurred: "There is not a close or consistent association between social and political trust and political behavior, or between activity in voluntary associations and political attitudes of trust and confidence."
In light of the failure of declining levels of legitimacy to produce democratic breakdown, should we discard legitimacy theory entirely? We believe it is too early to do so. Rather, we contend it is important to determine whether legitimacy matters, but does so in ways less dramatic than directly driving democratic breakdown. Consolidated democracies may be very unlikely to fall, as Przeworski et al. (2000) have found, but their characters can be transformed in important ways. One key way in which democracies can change is in the arena of political participation, which virtually all theories of democracy regard as essential to its functioning. In essence, if there is no participation, there is no democracy. As Norris (2002: 3) in her cross-national study of participation ominously warns, “The conventional wisdom suggests that in the late twentieth century many postindustrial societies experienced a tidal wave of citizen withdrawal from the traditional channels of political participation. Symptoms of this malady include sagging electoral turnout, rising antipathy sentiment, and the decay of civic associations.” This view, of course, is consistent with that of Putnam’s well-known studies of the decline of social capital.

In light of these findings, our research question is to ask: While legitimacy’s direct links to democratic stability or breakdown have not yet been demonstrated, does legitimacy nonetheless affect political participation? To begin to answer this question, we have carried out a survey in a consolidated democracy characterized in recent years by declining levels of political legitimacy as well as declining voter turnout. Costa Rica, which has been a stable democracy for decades and regularly ranks near the top of democracy indices reported by Freedom House, Bollen and Paxton (2000), Vanhanen (1997), and others, has nonetheless experienced since 1998 a sharp decline in voter turnout and declines in political legitimacy as measured by several surveys (Seligson 2002c). To examine the legitimacy-participation link, we have carried out a survey and incorporated batteries of items that are unusually rich in the measurement of both legitimacy and participation variables. In this article we first review the literature on the attitudinal construct of political legitimacy and present the variables and dimensions we have used to measure it. We then turn to the dependent variable, participation, and outline our dimensional approach to its definition and measurement. Finally, we concentrate our empirical effort on what we call the “so what?” question—“does legitimacy matter?”—by examining the impact of legitimacy on political participation.

The Dimensions of Legitimacy: Prior Research

Until recently political legitimacy (broadly conceived as citizen support for government) remained inadequately explored and poorly verified empirically. Following the seminal theoretical contributions of David Easton (1965, 1973) a number of studies employed items believed to measure political legitimacy, yet its construct validity remained poorly explored as research on the topic were limited and scattershot. Seeking to impose some order on the study of political support, Easton (1975: 435) asked: “Can a valid distinction be made between specific and diffuse support? Ought support in either of these modes to be construed as uni- or multidimensional?” His argument in favor of multidimensionality strongly shaped subsequent discussion and research on this question. Easton defined legitimacy as citizens’ attitudes, specifically as “the conviction ‘that it is right and proper . . . to obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime’” (1975: 451). He then distinguished legitimacy per se from compliance attitudes and behaviors, thus explicitly linking political support to political participation (Easton 1975: 453-56). We define legitimacy as Easton does, as citizens’ orientations of support for and trust in (or rejection of and mistrust of) the political regime at its various levels.

Drawing upon Easton’s theory, researchers explored various aspects of support, but efforts at construct validation lagged. Moved by the possibility that Canada might fragment in the 1970s and 1980s over the issue of Quebecois separatism, a group of researchers identified and explored multiple levels of support and their implications (Kornberg and Clarke 1983, 1992; Kornberg and Stewart 1983). Building from this work and a discussion by Nye and Zelikow (1997), Norris (1999) and Dalton (1999) further refined Easton’s conceptualization of legitimacy’s dimensionality. Norris theorized that political legitimacy (in the orientations of citizens) would not have two dimensions as Easton has proposed, but instead have five dimensions based on opinion favoring or critical of certain defining objects: the political community (the nation), regime principles (core values of the political system), regime performance (the functioning of the regime in practice), regime institutions (the actual institutions of the government), and political actors (incumbent leaders) (Norris 1999c: 11-12). Norris, too, argued that citizens’ behavior flowed from their legitimacy norms. She explicitly linked political support to voting, partisan activity, political protest and rebellion (Norris 1999c: 24-25, 1999a).

Empirical support validating the multidimensional nature of legitimacy advanced substantively when Kornberg and Clarke (1992), working on the Canadian case, identified three hierarchical dimensions: support for political community, regime institutions, and incumbent political authorities. Klingemann (1999) comparatively analyzed mid-1990s public opinion data collected by the World Values Surveys from 39 countries. He detected three hierarchically ordered legitimacy dimensions cross-nationally (political community, regime principles, and regime performance) and reported national level variation in support on these dimensions. Dalton (1999) analyzed a national election study series from advanced industrial democracies and found legitimacy dimensions that evolved over time. Canache (2002: 50-51) identified three somewhat interrelated dimensions of legitimacy in Venezuela in a 1995 survey. Also ranging from...
the most concrete to the most abstract, they were support for the incumbent government, support for the political system, and support for the form of government.

No validation of the Norris multi-dimensional scheme, however, had been accomplished until our recent construct validation effort based on the same Costa Rican data set analyzed in this paper. Using a structural equation model, we explored the structure of legitimacy to a level of detail not previously undertaken elsewhere (Seligson, Booth, and Gómez Barrantes 2003; Booth, Seligson, and Gómez Barrantes 2005). As a stable democracy for over five decades, Costa Rica provides an excellent setting for the study of legitimacy in a democratic context. In late 2002, we collected interviews from a national sample of 1,016 Costa Rican voting age citizens. The survey included several dozen questions crafted to allow direct testing of the Eastonian legitimacy scheme as expanded upon by Norris. Employing confirmatory factor analysis, we found seven dimensions of legitimacy in Costa Rica, confirming more extensively than before the construct validity of political support.

Five of the dimensions we isolated corresponded directly to the predictions of Norris and company—political community, support for core regime principles, support for regime performance, support for regime institutions, and support for political actors. As noted, Kornberg and Clarke (1992) had identified dimensions quite similar to three of these—political community, regime institutions, and actors.

Canache (2002) had identified support for the incumbent government (like our support for political actors dimension), support for the political system (like both our system support and support for regime institutions), and support for the form of government (like support for core regime principles). We also found two additional dimensions related to regime institutions not studied explicitly by Norris, Kornberg, and Clarke or Canache—system support and support for local government. The dimension of system support, conceptually related to support for regime institutions, had emerged theoretically and empirically from research carried out earlier by Muller, Jukam, and Seligson (1982) in studies in Germany, the U.S., and Costa Rica. We incorporated their system support items and found that they, too, formed a latent structure in our confirmatory factor analysis. As we expected, system support was strongly associated with support for regime institutions.

In reviewing the literature on legitimacy, we had been surprised to find virtually no mention of support for local government despite a rapidly growing literature on the importance of local government and decentralization throughout the world. As we will show in our analysis, the incorporation of local government legitimacy contributes to our efforts to account for some forms of participation.

We found the seven Costa Rican legitimacy dimensions to be internally coherent and intercorrelated, especially system support and support for regime institutions. We found that the greatest number of Costa Ricans supported the more abstract referents (national community and democratic principles), that many gave support to more concrete ones such as regime performance and particular institutions, and that few supported the most concrete referents such as particular actors and for local government (Booth, Seligson, and Gómez 2004). These findings are consistent with expectations based on prior research. We further found that Costa Rican legitimacy norms tend strongly toward the positive end of the continuum. This is exactly what we had expected in a country like Costa Rica, given its long tradition of democratic stability and its lack of regime repression found so commonly among newer democracies. From our perspective, if legitimacy affects citizen behavior then Costa Rica provides a good place to look for such effects. In this article we examine the impact of legitimacy on citizen engagement in one consolidated democracy. In future efforts we hope to examine support-participation effects in other countries in Latin America where preliminary research shows that legitimacy is often far lower.

**Legitimacy and Political Participation**

Do the legitimacy norms held by Costa Rican citizens actually move them to take, or not to take, certain political actions? Classics of political science recognize that political participation, whether conventional or unconventional, poses benefits and risks for political systems. A fundamental thesis of Civic Culture (Almond and Verba 1963) was that a stable polity would include many more passive, subject-oriented citizens

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4 The data for this analysis were drawn from a national probability sample designed by Miguel Gómez B. The sample is representative of the national population 18 to 69 years of age, and was designed as multi-stage stratified, clustered, and probability proportionate to size (PPS). Specifically, the nation was divided into five geographic strata: the greater Metropolitan San José area, other urban areas in the Central Valley, rural areas in the Central Valley, the remaining urban areas and, finally, the remaining rural areas. The Metropolitan sample was further stratified into three socioeconomic zones: high, medium, and low. Within each stratum there was a two-stage selection process. The first stage consisted of selecting census segments from the 2000 national census, using PPS techniques, and within each segment a cluster of eight households was designated. The second stage, at the household, followed the sampling procedures suggested by Saxhym (1966). The resulting sample included 1,016 cases and was weighted to reflect the actual distribution of the population, as provided by the 2000 census.

There are multiple items for each object of evaluation, as well as many more items to measure citizen support for other institutions, including local government not included directly in the Easton/Norris framework. Drawing upon the conceptualization of legitimacy dimensions in Norris (1999), we developed several dozen questions designed specifically to elicit support for various political objects. We included items developed specifically for the Norris scheme and that were included in her comparative study drawn from the World Values Survey and the Eurobarometer (Norris, 1999). We added other items commonly used to measure political support in other studies, with a large number of institutional and actor referents (Pinkel, Muller, and Seligson, 1989; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Muller and Williams 1980; Seligson 2002a). We included measures of support for political actors and their policies, specifically the Costa Rican president. Finally, we added new items, especially a series related to local government as the object (Seligson 2002b; Seligson, Jukalva, and Córdova 2002c). Exploratory analysis allowed us to identify a core set of items related to the dimensions of legitimacy, and to eliminate some others from subsequent analysis.
than activist, participation-oriented ones who might engage the system too much. More participation was viewed as positive, but only up to a point. Huntington (1968) clearly viewed participation similarly in his theory of political stability in developing countries. He argued that citizens might participate so much that their demands or protests could overwhelm an emerging political system and lead to its decay.

How might legitimacy values affect the political behavior of citizens? The starting point in the literature consists of two hypotheses related to conventional vs. unconventional participation. Several scholars (Kornberg and Clarke 1992: 19-30; Newton 1999: 185; Norris 1999a: 258-64, 1999c; Rose, Shin, and Murro 1999; Canache 2002) have stated one or both of them:

$H_1$: Citizens with high legitimacy values are more likely to engage in conventional political participation (within institutional channels), and vice versa. There exists a linear and positive relationship between support and within-channels political activism. Supportive citizens engage within the system, while critical citizens withdraw.

To surmise that the relationship between legitimacy levels and citizen engagement within the system is linear and positive certainly makes sense for some behaviors. To put it in the negative, why should a citizen bother to vote or contact public officials if she believes that political actors and institutions are corrupt or untrustworthy?

$H_2$: Citizens with low legitimacy values are more likely to engage in unconventional or protest participation. There exists a linear and positive relationship between low support and outside-of-channels participation and protest: Critical citizens may protest or rebel, but supportive citizens generally do not.

As Norris argues for the second hypothesis, “it is widely believed that political cynicism fuels protest activity” (Norris 1999a: 261). Framing the argument negatively, Canache (2002: 136) reports for Venezuela in the turbulent mid-1990s and in other Latin American countries that “people tend to oppose political violence and protest when support for democracy is high.” Indeed, researchers have argued that growing citizen antagonism toward the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran military regimes of the 1970s and early 1980s led to increasing levels of opposition group activity, protest, and rebellion against the repressive governments ruling those countries (Booth 1999; Foley 1996).

The literature on legitimacy’s behavioral effects thus tends to dichotomize participation by focusing mainly either on participation within channels (voting or party activism) or outside of channels (protest or, more commonly studied, support for protest). Thus the legitimacy literature at least minimally recognizes that political participation is multidimensional, but does not fully appreciate the import of this finding. We believe that merely to dichotomize participation into engaging within-channels vs. protesting incorrectly frames the complexity of citizens’ involvement and the multiple arenas in which it may occur. In our Costa Rican case, with seven legitimacy dimensions and, as will be defined below, several modes of citizen engagement in politics and civil society, the matrix of possible support-participation relationships is large. Not all dimensions of legitimacy are likely to affect each mode of participation in the same way. For some legitimacy dimensions and participation modes there might be no logical relationship at all. Moreover, the simple linear assumptions cited above, while having merit, appear to underestimate the possible range of legitimacy-participation effects by ignoring important nuances of participation in diverse contexts.

Given the multidimensionality of legitimacy and political participation, we surmised that different dimensions of legitimacy would likely affect different participation modes in different ways. We thus anticipated that support for local government, absent in prior studies, would likely differentially affect participation taking place in institutionally diverse contexts. For example, one legitimacy dimension, support for local government, might not normally lead a citizen to contact a national public official but could well be linked to more frequent contacting of a local council member. This approach, therefore, emphasizes the importance of the context or institutional arena of participation (see Norris, Welgrave, and Van Aelst 2004), which we believe to be central to the study of participation. Citizens may engage in politics within the national government arena by voting or contacting national officials, of course. But citizens might also engage in local government, collaborate with their neighbors to solve local problems, or join organizations. Thus we anticipated from the outset that support for a democratic regime or system support (both national-level orientations) might have little effect on citizens’ propensity to engage in the more immediate contexts of community problem solving or voluntary associations.

We further suspected that critical attitudes toward national institutions might encourage rather than discourage nonprotest participation in certain arenas—for example in community problem solving or civil society activity. The implicit assumption that a citizen with low legitimacy norms confronts only a binary choice between dropping out or protesting overlooks the opportunities offered by multiple participation modes shaped by multiple institutional arenas. It is reasonable, we believe, to suspect that that low support for political actors and regime institutions could lead citizens to behaviors other than withdrawing or protesting. Disgruntled citizens, for instance, might avoid national institutional arenas (voting,

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3 See, however, a new line of argument by Norris, Welgrave, and Van Aelst (2004: 3) arguing that the theory that diss satisfaction with the political system leads to protest "receives little, if any, support from the available systematic empirical studies of the survey evidence."

6 Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971) and Verba and Nie (1972) published the pioneering work on participation’s dimensions. The multidimensionality of political participation in Latin America and in Costa Rica in particular has been confirmed by previous studies (Booth 1976, 1979).
contacting national officials), yet nevertheless pursue their interest in the more accessible arenas of civil society activism or local level involvement. We thus contend that critical citizens might engage more intensively in within-channel (but non-national-level) activities like civil society or community improvement efforts precisely because they offer opportunities to pursue political goals in arenas other than national political institutions. In such alternative arenas the disgruntled citizen may seek private or collective goods, remaining engaged within the system but avoiding the risks of protest. This perspective permitted us to formulate a third hypothesis:

H\textsubscript{3}: Citizens with low national-level legitimacy norms are more likely to engage in non-protest participation in political arenas outside national political institutions such as local government, communities or voluntary associations. Critical citizens may “arena shop” by engaging in non-protest activities in political contexts outside national institutions.

We also felt uncomfortable with the assumptions of simple linearity made by virtually all previous researchers.\textsuperscript{7} In prior research, one of the authors of this article encountered in Peru a curvilinear relationship between legitimacy and approval of coups d'état (Seligson and Carrión 2002). This suggested by analogy that a possibly curvilinear support-participation function might obtain under certain circumstances. Citizens holding extremely polarized legitimacy positions (whether high or low) might be moved to similarly high levels of participation. In contrast to those who moderately approve or disapprove of institutions (whom researchers since The Civic Culture have assumed to participate at moderate rates), citizens who either intensely approve or intensely disapprove of government may be moved to high levels of civic engagement, especially in a polity with a good human rights climate (as is the case in Costa Rica). The content and goals of participation by the most critical and supportive citizens would likely be quite different, of course, but their engagement mode the same. This led us to a fourth hypothesis:

H\textsubscript{4}: In a democracy, citizens holding both the highest and lowest legitimacy norms may participate more than citizens holding intermediate legitimacy values. This implies that some legitimacy-participation functions might be U-shaped. Both the more supportive and more critical citizens engage more in politics than those with intermediate legitimacy positions.

This hypothesis predicts that, especially in countries where it is reasonably safe to criticize or oppose the government, the moderately contented or indifferent citizen would be less active than either the very contented or the very discontented citizen. For example, those most supportive of incumbent political actors would likely vote and campaign more intensely to re-elect them than those who are merely moderately supportive, indifferent, or moderately opposed citizens precisely because they wish to keep their party in power. Meanwhile, absent repression to discourage their involvement, those citizens most critical of the incumbents might also vote and campaign more intensely than those holding intermediate support norms precisely in order to help vote out a detested incumbent.

A final concern involves the distribution of legitimacy norms among the population. In a democracy with most people sharing high legitimacy norms (i.e., a left or negatively skewed distribution), there would likely be important proportions of citizens active within national institutional channels (voters, contactors, party activists). Their behavior would tend to reinforce the system’s institutions. In contrast, out on the low legitimacy (left) tail of the distribution the intensely discontented or critical citizens would be so few that their behavior would have little effect on the national system. This would be true whether the discontented few opted out of national participation by not voting, shifting participation modes (to communal or civil society activism, for example), or even supporting anti-system parties or protesting.\textsuperscript{8}

\textbf{Analysis}

\textit{Legitimacy Dimensions and Levels}

We can explore these issues and their implications using our 2002 Costa Rican data set. Because Costa Rica is a stable democracy of long standing with an exemplary record on elections and human rights, we expect that, overall, a majority of citizens will have legitimacy values on the positive end of the scale. The Appendix lists the seven legitimacy dimensions we previously identified in Costa Rica, presenting mean scores on the combined measures making up each one. The mean scores on the dimensions are mostly in the positive range, with five of seven items having means of 55.57 or above on a 100 point scale (100 being the most positive).

\textsuperscript{7} Costa Rican legitimacy norms are overall left-skewed (see below), but there are other possible scenarios that warrant mention. First, where legitimacy norms are right-skewed (i.e., many are upset with the system), the implications for political behavior could be destabilizing. The overall share of outside-of-national-channels, confrontational participants could be much higher while the share of within-channels participants would be smaller. Thus the ratio of activist malcontents would be high, raising the likelihood of protest or rebellion. A high proportion of critical citizens could be hard to manage, especially for a weak or ineffective government. Second, either relatively flat or bimodal distributions of legitimacy norms would increase the potential for conflict between activist system supporters and activist malcontents. Mobilization and increased political activism might occur among those on the extremes, increasing the likelihood of conflict between pro- and anti-system citizens. One suspects that the Haitian situation prior to the ouster of President Aristide in 2004 would have had such a polarized distribution of legitimacy norms driving pro- and anti-Aristide conflict.

\textsuperscript{8} But see Muller (1979) who argued that violent protest behavior would be found only among those at the extreme low-end of system support. Norris, Waigrau, and Van Aelst (2004), however, argue strongly that empirical evidence about support impact on participation does not support this theory.
Only the local government and political actors' indexes fall slightly below scores of 50. Thus, even though Costa Rican legitimacy levels have fallen from levels observed some years earlier, they remain relatively high when compared to other Latin American countries we have surveyed.

It is helpful to deviate briefly from treating legitimacy norms as multidimensional and consider the overall distribution of legitimacy norms among Costa Ricans. In order to provide us with this larger perspective, and for illustrative purposes only, we combine all the legitimacy norms items into a single overall political legitimacy variable. The mean grand for overall political legitimacy in Costa Rica (each dimension weighted equally) is 72.08, and the mode is 68.68. Almost 63 percent of the respondents fall between index scores of 65 and 83, well above the overall legitimacy scale midpoint of 50.

Thus writ large, Costa Ricans overwhelmingly regard their political system as legitimate. Even so, malcontented or critical citizens exist. About 1 in 16 respondents falls below a mean score of 50 overall (in the disapproving end of the overall legitimacy index). For the legitimacy dimensions of support for political actors and support for local government the share of critical citizens is just above half the sample. These dimensions with much lower citizen support will help us examine how critical legitimacy orientations affect political participation.

**Independent and Control Variables: Legitimacy and Socio-demographics**

We developed measures to represent each of the seven previously identified legitimacy dimensions: existence of political community, support for core regime principles, evaluation of regime performance, system support, support for regime institutions, support for local government, and support for political actors. Also included in the analysis are six socio-demographic variables often found to influence both participation and legitimacy norms, but are not central to our analytical effort in this paper: gender, age, number of children below voting age, household income, standard of living, and education (see Appendix for descriptions of these variables).

**Dependent Variables: Participation and Civil Society**

Our data set incorporates many measures of political participation and civic engagement. We examined 14 conventional participation items: five measures of working with neighbors to solve community problems, six measures of contacting public officials (including both appointed and elected as well as national and local officials), two voting items (both first round and runoff presidential elections of 2002), and a measure involvement in political party activity. We factor analyzed these political participation items and found they formed four distinct factors: voting, presidential contacting, partisan activism-instrumental contacting, and communal activism. We developed an index of each mode as a distinctive dependent variable (see the Appendix for components and index distribution characteristics).

We also have six measures of civil society activism, each representing the intensity of engagement in civic groups (e.g., Rotary), cooperatives, unions, professional associations, church-related groups, and school-related (parent-teacher) groups. Some scholars treat civil society or organizational activism as distinct from political participation per se, often as a predictor of participation; others treat group membership as a simple participation variable. We believe that involvement in organizations often produces direct or indirect political engagement through the articulation and communication of interests to government and parties. Interest groups are important in the political landscape of many nations, and certainly of Costa Rica. We also believe citizens' legitimacy norms (trust in one or another aspect of government) may well shape their particular organizational attachments. Civil society activism thus warrants examination as a dependent participation variable. Therefore from these items we construct a fifth dependent variable, an index of civil society activism (see Appendix).

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9 This combination of the legitimacy norms into a single overall measure for illustrative purposes is justified by the interrelatedness among the legitimacy dimensions, which are all positively correlated with one another (Booth and Seligson 2004).

10 The legitimacy index construction was by the following method: The seven legitimacy dimensions, previously identified through confirmatory factor analysis (Booth, Seligson, and Gómez 2004), were each defined as an interrelated item cluster (items making up each dimension are specified in the Appendix). Exploratory factor analysis (oblimin rotation) revealed the same 7-factor structure as did CFA, each factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. For simplicity of interpretation the index scores presented in the Appendix are the item cluster means, using the original scaling of the questionnaire items on a 0-100 range. For further statistical analysis we employed exploratory factor analysis of each cluster of legitimacy items in the questionnaire to generate a set of factor scores corresponding to each legitimacy dimension. Factor scoring recalibrates the item numbers to create new measures with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.0. These factor scores are used below in the regression analysis rather than the summed average of the dimension clusters' items as presented in the appendix.

11 The number of children below Costa Rica's voting age of 18 approximates the likelihood of a respondent having minor children at home. This situation often involves parents in the community, but may also constrain their ability to participate due to childcare obligations.

12 Following Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971), we used exploratory factor analysis to examine the fourteen participation items. Principal components extraction (eigenvalue greater than 1.0) and both varimax and oblimin rotations reveal four clearly defined factors or participation modes from this set of variables (results not shown to conserve space). Voting is composed of reporting having voted in the first-round and runoff presidential election. Presidential contacting consists of reporting having contacted the president or contacted the first lady. Partisanship-instrumental contacting consists of attendance at political party meetings, and contacting each of the following: legislative deputy, ministry or national agency official, cantonal (county) council member, or the sindico (another local representative). Communal activism consists of affirmative responses to five items concerning contributing to community problem solving activities. Indexes were constructed accordingly (Appendix).
### Table 1

**Regression Results: Legitimacy's Effects on Political Participation and Civil Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Voting Beta</th>
<th>Voting Sig.</th>
<th>Presidential Contacting Beta</th>
<th>Presidential Contacting Sig.</th>
<th>Party/Local Cont. Beta</th>
<th>Party/Local Cont. Sig.</th>
<th>Communal Activism Beta</th>
<th>Communal Activism Sig.</th>
<th>Civil Society Beta</th>
<th>Civil Society Sig.</th>
<th>Protest Participation Beta</th>
<th>Protest Participation Sig.</th>
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<td>.675</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.595</td>
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<td>.033</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.556</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>.000</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.280</td>
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<td>.036</td>
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<td>.011</td>
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<td>.184</td>
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<td>No. of Children Below</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Voting Age</td>
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<td>.000</td>
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Note: Bold face cell values are for beta coefficients significant at the .05 level or less.

Finally, we have a measure of protest participation, a direct measure of unconventional political activity. Respondents were referred to a number of demonstrations and protests that had taken place in early 2002 and asked whether they had participated in or helped with these in any way (see Appendix).

**Legitimacy and Political Engagement**

Table 1 presents the results of ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis of legitimacy's effects on political participation and civil society activism. It provides for each independent participation variable a regression model that includes as independent variables indexes for all seven legitimacy dimensions. To account for the possibility that some of the relationships between legitimacy and participation may be U-shaped, we also include in each model the squared value of each legitimacy dimension as a separate variable. Also included in the models are six sociodemo-

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13 The factor scores used for the legitimacy norms (see note 9) in this part of the analysis have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1.0. Thus squaring them effectively produces values mimicking a U-shaped function by folding the original values around the mean.
graphic variables. These serve as control variables since we focus in this article on the impact of legitimacy on political participation. For readability's sake, Table 1's significant betas (standardized coefficients) are presented in boldface. Significance levels for each beta appear in an adjacent column in italics.

The voting model in Table 1, as expected, indicates significant positive contributions by certain sociodemographic factors (age, number of children below voting age, and education). With respect to legitimacy dimensions, belief in the existence of political community, support for regime institutions, and support for local government contribute positively and significantly to voting. This finding supports H_i's prediction that those who view the system as legitimate (in this case, believing in a political community, supportive of regime institutions, and supportive of local government) will be more likely to vote, and vice versa. This reveals that components of legitimacy at both the most abstract (shared political community) and more concrete levels (support for regime institutions and local government) contribute positively to citizen engagement in the national arena of elections. No other legitimacy dimension, nor any of their squared forms, significantly affects voting. Overall the model accounts for 12 percent of voting's variance.

The presidential contacting model in Table 1 provides a more complicated result than voting. Other factors held constant, support for core regime principles contributes positively and significantly to presidential contacting. This finding supports H_i's prediction of a positive-linear association between legitimacy and conventional participation. Also noteworthy in the second model is the significant effect of the squared term of support for regime principles on presidential contacting. This indicates that, independent of other legitimacy dimensions including the linear expression of support for regime principles, there exists a curvilinear effect as suggested by H_i; both those who are the most and the least supportive of regime principles (i.e., most and least favorable toward democratic governance) engage in more presidential contacting than those lying between them on this support dimension.

Table 1 further reveals that, other factors held equal, those unhappy with regime performance contact the president more rather than dropping out. Here we observe disgruntled citizens taking their grievances within channels to the leader of the nation rather than dropping out (as per H_4), and also doing so rather than engaging in protest or rebellion (H_5). Below we will again encounter the phenomenon of Costa Rica's critical citizens taking part more intensely rather than reducing their participation for another mode of engagement. The overall national context of a longstanding democracy with an untarnished record of respect for human rights helps explain, we believe, why Costa Rica's "critical citizens" remain within channels to express their grievances. In other, more repressive contexts in Latin America we would expect to find different patterns.

One must, however, interpret this model for presidential contacting very cautiously because it explains only 3.3 percent of variance and the model overall fails overall to attain statistical significance. Even though the only variables contributing significantly to presidential contacting are legitimacy norms, the low overall explained variance in presidential contacting is not surprising considering that only 3 percent of the sample reported engaging in this participation mode.

The third participation mode analyzed in Table 1 is partisan activism-instrumental contacting (PAIC), which involves both attendance at political party meetings and contacting various types of governmental officials (other than the president). With respect to contacting other officials, Costa Ricans often ask government at various levels for financial assistance for small community-betterment projects; the usual way is to petition a legislative deputy, cantonal/district council member, or ministry office directly. Only two legitimacy dimensions associate with PAIC participation. Citizens who positively evaluate political actors engage in more partisan activism-instrumental contacting. This conforms to the pattern predicted by H_i. It also makes sense that, given Costa Rica's tradition of pork-barrel lobbying, those seeking resources for community or neighborhood improvement projects would lobby local officials if they hold them in positive regard.

A contrasting effect in the model is that lower rather than higher levels of national system support predict more partisan activism-instrumental contacting. Costa Ricans who are disgruntled with the national political system—critical citizens—engage in more of this activity (especially the contacting). This runs directly counter to H_i's prediction of a linear positive relationship. Instead of withdrawing from participation, here again we find that critical citizens in Costa Rica engage the system through contacting governmental representatives at the county, legislative, and ministerial levels. This combines with party activism, a behavior which probably facilitates access to some government officials.

To explain this participation mode briefly, in Costa Rica's political system, cantonal governments, the National Assembly (both chosen through partisan elections), and national governmental agencies all distribute pork-barrel funds for community-level projects and public works. (Carey 1996) Civic and community organizations seek governmental largesse to improve local infrastructure (roads, schools, parks, drainage). Individuals and groups thus regularly lobby individual local and national officials for resources. The items sought range from a few dozen bags of cement or loaned construction equipment and their operators up to larger grants of funds. Individuals with partisan connections to the party in power (and often personally acquainted with the officeholders) frequently serve as the go-betweens in these lobbying efforts. The composition of the PAIC mode, which associates partisan activism with instrumental contacting of public officials, thus corresponds neatly with the structure and operation of government as the authors have observed in Costa Rica. Pork-barrel funds used to be the preserve of deputies from the ruling party, but recent reforms have redirected those funds down to the district (i.e., sub-county) level.

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14 They may, of course, also be protesting in addition to presidential contacting.
This conforms to the prediction of $H_1$ that citizens critical of the national system may not withdraw from politics but instead shift to more amenable arenas. We surmise Costa Ricans critical of the national system engage in instrumental problem solving in part because it allows them to derive benefit for themselves or for their communities even from their distrusted national system. 

The fourth model in Table 1 is for communal activism, an index of community mutual self-help and betterment engagement. Identified in previous studies in Costa Rica and in other Central American nations, this form of political participation takes place almost exclusively on the local level. One might reasonably expect little relationship between the more abstract legitimacy dimensions (national political community, regime principles, and regime performance) and communal activism. Indeed, no such relationships emerge. One might also expect that those critical of national institutions might direct their activism toward the likely more acceptable community arena ($H_2$). As anticipated, Table 1 demonstrates a significant negative relationship between system support and communal activism. Critical citizens (those with low system support scores) are more active, not less, in community betterment projects. These critical citizens opt for an alternative arena and mode of participation rather than dropping out or protesting (as predicted by $H_1$ and $H_2$, respectively). In short, we have now identified yet a second participation mode (in addition to partisan-instrumental contacting noted above) other than protest or rebellion driven by disapproval of some aspect of the system.

Continuing with communal activism, we expected a positive-linear effect by which support for local government would encourage this form of engagement. However, Table 1 reveals a significant U-shaped relationship between support for local government and communal activism. Thus local government’s most supportive citizens do indeed engage in high levels of communalism, but so do its most critical citizens. Both engage in more communal activism than those in the middle ranges of this dimension of legitimacy.

We can gain further insight into these relationships by examining separately the quadratic relationship between support for local government and communal activism. Figure 1 shows the linear vs. the curvilinear effects. Only the quadratic specification is significant while the linear is not. Costa Ricans with both very low and very high support for local government were more likely to engage in communal activism.

Table 1 next presents a model for civil society activism. Age, number of children below voting age, household income, education, and being female all elevate this mode of engagement. Concerning legitimacy norms, citizens who agree that Costa Rica has a shared political community (the

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16 This resembles the behavior, identified by Verba and Nie (1972), of the U.S. "parochial participants" (mainly contacters) who were disgruntled or disinterested in politics but specialized in benefit-seeking actions.

17 Several of the sociodemographic variables affect communal activism significantly and positively (age, number of children below voting age, and education); women participate somewhat less than men.

18 This result was produced by first running the regression equation shown in Table 1 for communal activism including all variables except support for local government. Standardized residuals were produced, and then used as the dependent variable in the regression results shown in Figure 1.
most abstract level of legitimacy) and those who support local government (one of the most concrete levels of legitimacy norms) are more active in civil society. However, other factors held equal, citizens critical of regime institutions engage more in civil society organizations. Once again, we find critical citizens who are more engaged rather than less so. But these critical citizens are working with each other in organizations, rather than engaging the national political system directly through official channels. Low on support for regime institutions, they pursue their interests by organizational activity apart from government. As noted before, $H_2$ predicts that critical citizens would protest, and $H_1$ that they would drop out. Alternative $H_3$ argues, however, that disapproval of some aspect of the system may drive citizens to engage in an alternative arena (here groups).

The final model in Table 1 is for protest participation. $H_2$ predicts a negative relationship between high legitimacy and protest. We find that, other factors held constant, the relationship between the support for regime principles legitimacy mode and protest, as expected, has a significantly negative beta. However, other factors held constant, higher evaluation of regime performance positively relates to protest (although the beta coefficient indicates a weaker relationship than for support for regime principles). Thus our findings concerning how legitimacy affects protest behavior are inconclusive. Five of seven legitimacy norms have no effect; and two have countervailing effects. Protesting Costa Ricans tend to be more prosperous and better educated than those who do not protest. Overall this model accounts for over 7 percent of the variance of protest, and the model is significant.

**Conclusions**

To summarize, we have found all four possible relationships between legitimacy and political engagement. One form (see especially the results for voting) is linear-positive and conforms to the traditional literature's expectation ($H_4$) that higher support engenders greater participation. A second form is the linear-negative and conforms to the literature's expectation ($H_2$) that lower legitimacy should drive protest. Complicating this finding, however, is that one form of low legitimacy (disagreement with regime principles) correlated with higher protest (as predicted), while another (lower support for regime performance) correlated with lower protest.

We also suspected that rather than dropping out or protesting, critical citizens might instead participate in other arenas through conventional, non-protest participation ($H_3$). Indeed, we found this effect for partisan activism-instrumental contacting, communal activism, and civil society. We identified two participation modes with a curvilinear relationship to legitimacy norms ($H_4$), the weakly modeled presidential contacting and the robustly modeled communal activism. Finally, as we expected, not all legitimacy dimensions are germane to all types of participation, leaving many insignificant relationships.

What, then, is the importance of legitimacy in shaping Costa Ricans' political participation? Some significant and positively sloped relationships stand out: Support for the political community, regime institutions and local government all independently contribute to voting. Citizens supportive of political actors engage more in civil society and partisan activism-instrumental contacting. The negatively sloped relationships are particularly intriguing. Some critical citizens, those who disagree with regime principles, do protest more. Prior research generally suggested that low legitimacy norms would contribute either to quiescence (confirmed in some cases) or to protest (observed in one instance). However, here we also find low legitimacy (especially system support and support for regime institutions) elevating rather than reducing some conventional participation (partisan-local contacting, communal activism, and civil society). Particularly unexpected is the finding that higher regime performance legitimacy norms contributed to higher rather than lower protest. In Costa Rica, even some contented citizens protest.

What is particularly noteworthy, we believe, is that critical citizens tend to participate in conventional arenas at least partly outside of national institutions—local communities and civil society. These patterns support our contention that implicitly dichotomizing participation between the conventional and unconventional, as many prior researchers have done, obscures the complexity of support's impact on participation and therefore also overlooks the possibility of arena shopping by the politically disgruntled. In a democracy like Costa Rica, the critical citizen has arenas other than national institutions and other modes than protest or quiescence with which to pursue her goals.

Also worth careful scrutiny are the U-shaped relationships. Especially interesting is the relationship between the square of support for local government and communal activism. Both the strong supporters and strong critics of local government engage more in community betterment activism. Support for regime principles has a U-shaped relationship to presidential contacting. In neither case is it surprising that the most supportive citizens are politically active. What is both interesting and novel in our findings is that the most critical citizens are also active and within the same channels. One thing these two modes of engagement have in common is that they are costly in terms of the effort to perform them. For costly participation modes it seems logical that those at middling support levels will tend toward low engagement, while only those who are either extremely supportive or extremely unsupportive of the system will have sufficient motivation to incur participation's high costs.

We find it meaningful that we have discovered that very critical Costa Ricans are not always either disengaged or protesting. This clearly indicates that critical Costa Ricans actively engage in diverse conventional forms of participation (whether in the U-shaped form for presidential contacting or communal activism or the negatively sloped form for instrumental contacting, communalism, and civil society). This tells us that Costa Rica, as a socially homogeneous
and consolidated democracy, provides many comfortable arenas for participation even for its critics. Critics engage the system through national and local level participation and through civil society; a finding similar to one for Belgium in 1999 (Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2004: Table 3). We question whether this Costa Rican pattern would prevail equally elsewhere in Latin America, in countries with far more conflictual pasts or where repression is considerably higher. Costa Rica’s excellent human rights performance means the state imposes few repressive barriers activist regime critics. Indeed, Costa Rica is a place where even some contented citizens protest. In more repressive environments (or even newly democratized countries with fairly recent high repression and violence levels—in example, Guatemala, El Salvador, or Colombia) one might well encounter different patterns. In more repressive countries critical citizens may well opt out of participation in the dangerous national arena (producing more linear-negative legitimacy effects on participation and fewer U-shaped ones). Instead they may turn to civil society or local politics (linear-negative relationships), or they may turn more to protest politics. Indeed, Booth and Richard (1996, 2001) have reported system-level repression linked to such opting out and opting for other arenas in a comparative analysis of Central American nations.

We conclude that legitimacy matters, but does so in some ways the literature did not fully predict. The effects of legitimacy on participation are complex, even in homogenous and consolidated democracies. In the absence of strongly politicized social cleavages or repression, then, critical citizens may choose other arenas rather than opt out of all politics in conventional forms, and they therefore may be less likely to protest than the literature has heretofore suggested. To the extent that Costa Rica is a useful model, what critical citizens appear to be doing is “arena shopping” for their participation. That is, those disgruntled about one aspect or another of the system may either stay in the national arena and participate intensely there, or if they prefer, engage in local politics or civil society as alternatives. Thus in countries where legitimacy overall is high, even if it has fallen in recent years, our research suggests that its distribution will contribute to stability because the system’s critics do not automatically drop out or turn to protest, but remain politically active in conventional ways.

### APPENDIX

#### VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY

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Dependent variables (participation)

| Voting | Index: Respondent receives 1 point each for reporting voting in each round of the 2002 presidential election (range 0-2). | 1.50 | .78 |
| Presidential-level contacting | Index: Respondent receives 1 point each for reporting contacting the president or the first lady (range 0-2). | .04 | .22 |
| Partisan Activism-Instrumental Contacting | Index: Respondent receives 1 point each for reporting contacting municipal council representative, local representative, legislative deputy, or ministry, plus 0-1.0 points for reported frequency of party organization activism. | .30 | .65 |
| Communal Activism | Index: Respondent receives 1 point for taking part in each of 5 community problem solving activities with neighbors (range 0-5). | 1.30 | 1.68 |
| Civil Society Activism | Index: Combines scores for respondent's intensity of meeting attendance (0 = none ... 3 = frequently) in six civil society organizations: church, school, community improvement, civic groups, professional groups, cooperatives, and unions (range 0-18). | 2.33 | 2.41 |
| Protest Participation | "Did you take part in or support in some way any of the protests, demonstrations, or street blockages that took place early in 2002?" (1 = yes; 0 = no) | .05 | .22 |

Demographic measures (control variables)

| Gender | Male = 1, Female =2 (501 males, 515 females) | 1.51 | .50 |
| Age | Range: 18 - 69. | 36.53 | 13.41 |
| Number of Children Less Than Voting Age | Range: 0-9. | 1.25 | 1.36 |
| Household Income | Income cohorts for all members of household (ordinal variable, ranging from lowest = 1 to highest = 11). | 5.15 | 2.42 |
| Standard of Living | Index: Number of seven types of household artifacts indicative of standard of living (e.g., vehicles, color televisions, microwave ovens, refrigerators, washing machines, computers, phone). | 4.68 | 2.04 |
| Education | Total years of formal education completed (range 1-23). | 8.60 | 4.09 |

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