Dan Caspi, Mitchell A. Seligson

Toward an Empirical Theory of Tolerance: Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica

Reprinted from Comparative Political Studies
Volume 15, No. 4 (January 1983)
TOWARD AN EMPIRICAL THEORY OF TOLERANCE
Radical Groups in Israel and Costa Rica

DAN CASPI
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
MITCHELL A. SELIGSON
University of Arizona

Among the factors believed fundamental to the maintenance of democratic regimes, tolerance of dissent is one that has received considerable attention. For many years theorists argued that democratic politics composed of citizens who are willing to grant unpopular groups a wide range of civil liberties are polities that, other things being equal, are more likely to survive as democracies than ones characterized by citizen intolerance. However, empirical research conducted over the past 25 years has brought this view into question. These studies quite consistently seem to show that democratic rule can exist in spite of high

AUTHORS' NOTE: A grant for collection of the Israeli data was provided by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which also provided a Lester Martin Fellowship to Seligson, permitting him to spend the Spring 1979 semester in Israel.

© 1983 Sage Publications, Inc.
0010-4173/83/040285-21 $00.75
levels of public intolerance. These findings have resulted in a number of reformulations of democratic theory. The landmark studies of Stouffer (1955), Prothro and Grigg (1960), and McClosky (1964) led to the conclusion that in the United States tolerance of such groups as communists and atheists by the mass public was very low. In the light of this evidence, an elite theory of democracy emerged, which essentially held that democracy has been possible because elites are bearers of a political culture of tolerance and are able to overcome mass intolerance.

Confidence in elite tolerance began to waver after R. Jackman (1972) reanalyzed the Stouffer data, upon which much of the elite theory had rested. Jackman found that the higher tolerance among elites was due almost entirely to their higher levels of education. Jackman's findings seriously undermined the view that elites were bearers of the democratic creed, leaving little basis to support the view that democracy has survived in America because of elite tolerance (but see St. Peter et al., 1977, and Jackman, 1977).

If it was not, elites who were to be thanked for the survival of democracy, then Jackman's findings led some to conclude that it had to be the better educated. Moreover, it was argued, as levels of education increase, tolerance is bound to do so as well. A test of precisely this hypothesis, Davis (1975) and Nunn et al. (1978) found data to support it. In the United States between the 1950s and 1970, at a time of rapidly rising levels of education, tolerance for communists was shown to have increased markedly.

The education hypothesis was soon to run into difficulty, however. Lawrence (1976) found that when controls for other variables were introduced, the role of education was much weaker than previously had been supposed. M. Jackman (1978) reported even more damaging findings when she demonstrated the lack of any link at all between education and tolerance with respect to racial integration, although her findings have recently been disputed by Margolis and Hagie (1981).

The most devastating criticism of the education hypothesis was made by Sullivan et al. (1979), who showed that the increases of tolerance that

Israel. We would like to thank Thomas O. Jakam and Edward N. Muller for allowing us to see several of the questionnaire items they desired for their study of New York City, and Susan Berk-Seligman, John A. Band, Jim Budge, Peter Mc Donough, Eva Estrada-Haley, Charles Lieberman, Allen Mauer, Stephen Sullivan, and Bernard Dunne, as well as Muller and Jakam, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1979, Washington, D.C.

had been found by Davis (1975) and Nunn et al. (1978) were merely illusory. According to this critique, the apparent marked increase in political tolerance uncovered by Davis and Nunn et al. emerged as a result of ignoring shifts in the relative popularity or unpopularity of the target groups. Since the 1950s communists have become less threatening to American society, while the PLO and other terrorist groups have emerged as villains. As a result it would be unreasonable to expect an increase in tolerance toward communists because the hostilities of many Americans have shifted to these terrorist groups.

Using a different method of measuring tolerance, one not subject to the problem encountered by Davis and Nunn et al., Sullivan et al. (1979) concluded that tolerance had not in fact increased over the years. Rather, they found that on some key civil liberties, namely the right to organize, the right to hold public office, and the right to peaceful assembly, two-thirds to over four-fifths of the American public were intolerant.

In an effort to account for the survival of democracy in the United States, Sullivan et al. (1979: 792-793) argued that it is unrealistic to expect mass tolerance in a democratic society. Moreover, they believe it is unnecessary to take recourse to expounding an elite theory of democracy. Rather, they argue that Madisonian pluralism provided the basis for understanding the survival of democratic rule. They postulate the thesis of pluralistic intolerance, so that "even though levels of intolerance are now quite high in American society, the diversity of the targets of intolerance presents, for the time being, a substantial threat to civil liberties." Nonetheless, they warn, as in the McCarthy era, intolerance could once again become focused on a single target, with the expected unfortunate outcome.

The thesis of pluralistic intolerance is an intriguing one, one that merits further testing. A way of doing so is through cross-national comparative analysis. If the thesis can explain the maintenance of civil liberties for unpopular groups in the United States, can it also go on to other democratic policies? Hence, is the thesis of pluralistic intolerance one that has broader applicability to democratic policies in general, or is it to be confined to some subset of them? Unfortunately, little comparative research exists on the subject of tolerance. Two notable exceptions are Budig's (1976) study in England, and the Dennis et al. (1968) study of the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and the United States. However, neither of these studies employed the refined measurement techniques devised by Sullivan and his colleagues, and, furthermore, the Dennis et al. research was limited in that it focused exclusively on school children.
This article initiates the comparative study of the pluralistic intolerance thesis by comparing tolerance in two small democracies: Israel and Costa Rica. The study proceeds by reporting on the targets and levels of intolerance in Israel and Costa Rica. It concludes by evaluating the pluralistic intolerance thesis in light of the findings.

The Israeli data for this investigation are taken from a battery of items included in the Continuing Survey conducted jointly by the Israel Institute for Applied Social Research (IIASR) and the Communications Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.1 A probability sample, consisting of 490 respondents, was interviewed in 1979. The sample was constructed to represent the Jewish population, 20 years of age or older, residing in Israel's four urban centers (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and its satellite towns, Haifa and its satellites, and Beersheba). An indication of the accuracy of the sample is provided by the data displayed in the appendix, where it is shown that age and sex distributions in the sample do not differ significantly from those of the comparable population data. Additional details of the survey are contained in Seligson and Caspi (1983).

The Costa Rican data were gathered in 1980 as part of an ongoing opinion assessment conducted by the Oficina de Información Pública in that country. Personal interviews were conducted with 280 Costa Ricans residing in greater metropolitan San José, the nation's capital. San José is the major urban center of the meseta central, the intermountain central valley in which 79% of Costa Rica's population resides (Fernández et al., 1976: 82). The sample, of multisite area probability in design, included all those age 18 and over. Appendix B provides sex and age distributions for the sample and the population. Additional sample design information on this and previous waves of the survey are contained in Muller and Seligson (1982) and Muller et al. (1982).

MEASUREMENT

Extremist groups frequently give rise to strong feelings of intolerance among the population at large. In 1954 Stouffer found that only 27% of Americans would be willing to grant freedom of expression to communists. Even among individuals who are normally supportive of the civil rights of those with whom they disagree, there are many who will not extend these rights to radical groups.

The Stouffer investigation of political tolerance asked respondents questions regarding specific groups, namely atheists, communists, and socialists. Stouffer asked, for example, "Should an atheist be allowed to speak?" and "Should a communist be allowed to teach?" Implicit in this approach is the assumption that the particular groups in question (e.g., atheists and communists) are disliked by all respondents, and that, therefore, differences in responses can be attributed to differences in the levels of tolerance held by individual respondents. Clearly, however, the assumption upon which the Stouffer items were devised is faulty. Some respondents may be sympathetic with positions taken by communists, for example, and indeed, some respondents may be communists themselves. Such differences in political sympathies might easily account for much (and perhaps all) intersubject variation in responses.

In order to provide a more refined measure of tolerance toward radical groups, we followed the methodology suggested by Sullivan et al. (1979), and presented respondents in Israel and Costa Rica with a list of radical groups, asking them to select from the list the group they liked least. In Israel there were eight groups; the Black Panthers, a militant protest movement demanding greater socioeconomic equality for Jews who come from Asia and North Africa (Cohen, 1972); Peace Now, a leftist coalition seeking the return of the administered territories in exchange for peace with the Arab nations; the Jewish Defense League, a militant Zionist group seeking the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and the expansion of Israel's borders to include all areas occupied by the Jews in the time of King David (Dolgin, 1977); the National Front (Block of the Faithful), a militant rightist group favoring the retention of all administered territories and their immediate settlement by Jews (D'Dea, 1976; Sprinzak, 1977; Avrich, 1978-1979); the Israeli High Command (sometimes spelled Karta, or Karta), a fanatic ultrareligious Jewish group which has been described by its leaders as non-Zionist and anti-Zionist, a group that does not recognize the existence of the political state of Israel (Rafael, 1975); Mapam (sometimes spelled Mapzen), which is the party of the extreme Jewish left; and the extreme Zionist group, with an anti-Zionist and Trotskyist ideology (Yaffe, 1977; Communists, some of whom are represented in the Knesset by the Israeli Communist Party (Knesset in Israel as a political party, with the Hebrew acronym Rakah), and who sometimes have supported terrorism against Israel as an efficacious response to the plight of the Palestinians and supporters of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a group that, although it does not have any formal legal existence in Israel, is represented by the Progressive National Movement and other front organizations. An extensive discussion of most of these radical groups can be found in Seligson (1994).

In Costa Rica we focused on five groups; the Communist Party, usually going under the name of the Partido Socialista Costarricense (PASO), was founded in 1932 and has been active in Costa Rican politics ever since; the Movimiento de Costa Rica Libre (MCRL), a
right-wing organization that has frequently advocated taking drastic measures against leftists and has sometimes been associated with right-wing terrorism; the Asociación de Fomento Económico (ANFE), which is an influential private group of conservative businessmen who have continually engaged in a widespread publicity campaign to promote their economic views among the electorate; the banana worker unions, of which there are several—these are generally associated with leftist politics and the Communist Party and have repeatedly engaged in strikes against the major transnational fruit companies such as United Brands, Castle and Cook, and Del Monte; and revolutionary students, a catch-all term for radical students in the nation's universities who, over the past decade, have frequently argued for radical transformations of the system of government.3

TARGETS OF INTOLERANCE

We had anticipated that the great majority of Israeli respondents would select PLO supporters as the least-liked group. The PLO is generally seen as initiating and/or supporting much of the terrorism afflicting Israel in recent years. It is not surprising, as shown in Table 1, that 58% of the Israeli public selected the PLO supporters as the least-liked group. The Communists, whose views on the Palestinian question are often consistent with that of the PLO, were the next most frequently chosen, with 17% of the respondents selecting this group. Each of the remaining groups was selected by less than 5% of the respondents. Hence, much as we had expected, PLO supporters and the groups in Israel that support it were chosen by the bulk of the Israeli Jewish population as the group liked least.

In Costa Rica we had expected that the Communist Party would be the primary target of intolerance, and this is precisely what we found. A major issue over which the Civil War of 1948 was fought was the role of Communists in government.4 Many Costa Ricans remain suspicious of the Communist Party, fearing a left-wing takeover should the Party become too popular. These fears were probably heightened by the increasingly leftist direction that the revolutionary Sandinista government in neighboring Nicaragua was taking at the time of the survey. Dislike of the left was not only focused on the Communist Party, but also on banana unions and revolutionary students. In total, 34% of the sample selected a left-wing group as the one least liked. Of those who selected a right-wing group, the great majority selected the more politically visible MCRL rather than ANFE.

| Table 1: Distribution of Least-Liked Group in Israel and Costa Rica* |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| ISRAEL | Costa Rica | |
| **BRANCH** | **PLO supporters** | **Communists** | **Banana Worker Unions** | **ANFE** | **MCRL** | **Revolutionary Students** |
| **ISRAEL** | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.8 | 4.2 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 17.3 | 77.8 |
| **COSTA RICA** | 65.00 | 14.5 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 1.3 | 100.00 |

*(N = 400, with 6.7 percent, or 31 cases, of non-response)

In sum, it is very clear that in both Israel and Costa Rica one point on the political spectrum stands out as the target of dislike; in Israel it is the PLO supporters, while in Costa Rica it is the Communist Party and other leftist movements. In marked contrast stands the United States. At approximately the same moment in time (1978), Sullivan et al. (1979-1980) found that the least tolerated group was the Communists, with 58% of Americans selecting them as the most disliked. The next most disliked group was the NCA, with 17.3% of the respondents selecting it. The remaining groups were selected by less than 5% of the respondents. Hence, much as we had expected, PLO supporters and the groups in Israel that support it were chosen by the bulk of the Israeli Jewish population as the group liked least.
found a much greater dispersion of targets in that country. Communists in the United States were chosen as the least-liked group by 29% of a national sample of Americans, while the Ku Klux Klan was chosen by 24%. Other targets of intolerance were widely dispersed among a wide variety of groups (e.g., atheists, John Birch Society, Symbionese Liberation Army, etc.). Hence, while Sullivan et al. find a dispersion of targets in the United States, the data from Israel and Costa Rica reveal a concentration of targets.

The absence of a dispersion of targets is not the only striking contrast between the United States on the one hand and Israel and Costa Rica on the other. The dispersion of targets in the United States does not imply that the least-liked groups are well tolerated by most Americans. Indeed, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the dispersion of targets, most Americans would deny their least-liked group many basic civil liberties. Sullivan et al. (1979: 787) report that only 16% of the American public would allow members of their least-liked group to become President of the United States. 19% would allow them to teach in public school, 29% would oppose the group being outlawed, and 34% would allow members to hold public rallies. Only two liberties evoked tolerant views from a majority of citizens: freedom of speech (59%) and freedom from governmental tapping of phones (56%). Hence, while pluralistic intolerance may be an appropriate description of American attitudes toward the civil liberties of extremist groups, in Israel and Costa Rica the pattern is sharply different. As is shown below, in those countries a pattern more akin to concentrated tolerance emerges.

Levels of Tolerance

In order to measure the levels of tolerance toward the least-liked groups in Israel and Costa Rica, we asked a series of questions regarding tolerance of the exercise of four key civil rights: suffrage, assembly, seeking public office, and freedom of expression. The actual questions read as follows:

(1) voting.
(2) holding a public demonstration.
(3) holding political office.
(4) appearing on radio or TV.

Each individual in the sample responded with reference to a ten-point scale ranging from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve."
TABLE 3
Reliability of Scale of Tolerance Toward Least-Liked Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Costa Rica</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding a powerful</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding public office</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearing on the mass</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean inter-item r</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standardized item alpha</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evidence for the reliability of the scale in the two samples is reported in Table 3. While the Israeli data provides a more reliable scale, the Costa Rican data achieves acceptable levels as well.

An overall scale of tolerance for each sample was computed by summing the responses for each of the four tolerance items and then dividing the total by four and rounding to whole numbers in order to produce a scale ranging from one to ten. The distribution of the scales is presented in Figure 1. Two conclusions are apparent. First, the overall levels of tolerance in the two countries is virtually identical (mean in Israel = 5.2; mean in Costa Rica = 5.3). Second, the pattern of distribution of tolerance is very different in the two systems. In Israel, nearly two-thirds of the respondents (62.9%) are concentrated at the extremes, with a somewhat larger proportion of Israelis concentrated at the extremely intolerant end of the continuum than at the extremely tolerant end (34.1% versus 26.9%). Costa Rican tolerance, in contrast, rarely reaches extreme levels; only 3.7% were extremely intolerant and only 1.7% extremely tolerant.

Two very different interpretations could be drawn from the comparison of these distributions. One interpretation is that Israeli political culture is punctuated by extremist attitudes in comparison to the political culture of Costa Rica. Several factors could easily account for this difference, the most important of which would be Israel's multiparty system compared to the essentially two-party system in Costa Rica. It has long been argued that multiparty systems, irrespective of their ideology, tend to promote and/or sustain extremist politics, whereas two-party systems promote accommodationist politics. Extremism and accommodationist politics, in turn, tend to reinforce the existing party
system (Lipart and Rokkan, 1967). This argument suggests that even though the Israeli party system grew out of fundamental cleavages in the society present during the prestate (or yesha) period, its persistence for over three decades has served to reinforce and perhaps exacerbate splits within the polity. In Costa Rica, on the other hand, two-party politics has been characteristic of the system since the emergence of parties at the end of the last century. The modern party system, emerging after the Civil War of 1948, has been characterized by one dominant party (the National Liberation Party, PLN) and a shifting coalition of parties that unite for electoral purposes (Sellisog, forthcoming).

A second explanation for the apparent greater prevalence of extremist attitudes in Israel than in Costa Rica rests on the possibility of an artificial impact of the questions employed in the surveys. Whereas the Sullivan technique for measuring tolerance is an improvement over previous efforts for the reasons noted above, it nevertheless has its limitations. Specifically, it tends to ignore differences in the nature of the least-liked groups selected. For example, in the studies done in the United States by Sullivan et al., some respondents selected various feminist liberation or sexual freedom groups (e.g., gay liberation), whereas others selected terrorist groups. Respondents who selected the former as their least-liked group might feel justified in supporting the civil liberties of those groups, while these same individuals might deny these liberties to terrorist groups. Such individuals might offer the following reasoning: "Even though I despise feminism, it's alright with me if they hold a demonstration. The Symbionese Liberation Army, however, is another matter; they are out to kill our leaders! I wouldn't grant them the right to hold a demonstration!"

The potential artificial impact of the Sullivan items might be affecting the results derived from the two countries under study in this article. For the overwhelming proportion of Israelis, the primary target of intolerance is groups supporting the PLO, an organization that has repeatedly challenged the right of Israel to exist as a Zionist state and advocates the expulsion of nearly all Jews living there. Hence, Israelis who are unwilling to extend basic civil liberties to PLO supporters may well feel that to do so would be giving license to those who wish to eliminate the Israeli system; such Israelis, therefore, offer an extreme (intolerant) response to these questions. In Costa Rica, on the other hand, neither the Communist Party nor any other target of intolerance openly advocates the destruction of the Costa Rican system, nor do any of them suggest, for example, that most Catholics be expelled. Civil libertarians in Costa Rica, therefore, might well find it easier to justify allowing these groups to enjoy a wide range of liberties. Data are available to test which of these two explanations is the more convincing. In both surveys a second set of questions was asked.

identical in format to the set previously discussed, except for one difference: the target of intolerance was not the least-liked group, but rather, "people who say bad things about the system of government." The advantage of this item is that all respondents in both countries focused on the same object, namely, critics of the system. Hence, the artificial impact produced by the Sullivan series should be attenuated. If Israeli tolerance does in fact tend toward an extremist position, then this series should produce a pattern of responses similar to that generated by the first series of questions. On the other hand, if the extremist pattern is at least in part artificial, then the pattern of responses should smooth out. It is also to be expected that in both countries the level of tolerance will be higher because the focus is no longer on the respondents' least-liked group.

Figure 2 presents the results of the analysis of the second series of tolerance items. It displays the distribution of responses on the four-item scale of tolerance toward critics of the system, constructed in the same way as the scale reported in Figure 1. Once again a test of reliability was run on the items in the scale and it was found that they are both sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this explanatory investigation (Israel: alpha = .80; Costa Rica: alpha = .78).

As expected, in both Israel and Costa Rica tolerance toward critics is higher than tolerance toward the least-liked group, as is demonstrated by a comparison of the mean scores shown at the bottom of Figures 1 and 2. More importantly, the distribution of the responses supports the second explanation offered above, namely, that the extreme responses in Israel were largely a function of the nature of the groups that were the target of intolerance rather than a function of some sort of a political culture of extremism. Extreme intolerance in Israel shrinks from 34.1% of the sample to 9.0% of the sample. The distribution of the Costa Rican data, as expected, is little changed from Figure 1. Most Costa Ricans continue to report intermediate levels of tolerance, although there has been a reduction of the already small proportion expressing extremely intolerant responses and a notable increase in those expressing extremely tolerant responses. Hence, in Costa Rica, shifting the target of intolerance away from the least-liked group toward critics of the system has only served to increase somewhat the overall level of tolerance without altering the distribution pattern of the scores.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This article has attempted to test the thesis of pluralist intolerance advocated by Sullivan and his colleagues. It has done so by using the
methodology they suggest for measuring tolerance, transporting it beyond the United States to two small democratic nations, Israel and Costa Rica.

The findings reveal that the thesis of pluralistic intolerance does not fit either of the cases under study here. Specifically, in both Israel and Costa Rica it was found that the targets of intolerance are heavily concentrated, whereas in the United States, at least in 1978, they were dispersed. However, despite the concentration of targets in both Israel and Costa Rica, levels of tolerance in both countries were surprisingly high. Sullivan et al. (1979: 788) report that only 34% of a cross-section of Americans express tolerance toward the right of members of their least-liked group to hold a public rally. In Israel, in contrast, 48% were tolerant, and in Costa Rica 57% were tolerant of the right of the least-liked group to hold a public demonstration. Hence, while in the United States a pattern of dispersion of targets accompanied by high levels of intolerance is encountered, in Israel and Costa Rica a pattern of concentration of targets and comparatively high tolerance emerges.

Pluralistic tolerance may well explain the survival of democracy in the United States. It does not, however, seem to be of much relevance for the Israeli and Costa Rican cases. Other factors are operating in those nations to sustain such comparatively high levels of tolerance. Since educational levels in Israel are close to, but do not equal those in the United States, and educational achievement in Costa Rica falls far below that of the United States, once again we cannot resort to the educational hypothesis as an explanation for these large differences.

If the evidence presented in this article is at all convincing, it leads to the conclusion that political tolerance by itself cannot explain the survival of democracy in either Israel or Costa Rica; nor, for that matter, is it likely to be able to explain it elsewhere. Investigations that are limited to this one factor as a unicausal explanation are bound to uncover contradictions such as the ones presented in this discussion.

Political tolerance is one element linking belief systems to democratic politics. What are the others? Dahl (1971: 124-138) argues that authority, trust, effectiveness, and cooperation are all critical components of a belief system that can sustain democratic, or what he calls, polyarchic, rule. Dahl's views have been incorporated in a massive study of several cases where democracy has broken down, namely, in the recent work by Linz and Stepan (1978). That work focuses on legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness as key antecedent components of a belief system conducive to the survival of democracy, although it provides little systematic survey data to test the proposition.
This is not the place to elaborate further on the need to incorporate attitudes other than tolerance in studying the survival of democratic rule. Rather, we merely wish to point out that research needs to be widened in scope. Failure to do so is likely to continue to lead researchers to posit elite theses, pluralistic intolerance theses, and so on, in vain attempts to explain how democratic stability persists in light of citizen intolerance.

APPENDIX A
Comparison of Israel’s Urban Jewish Population: Sample and Census Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
<th>TOLERANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 1.82; df = 1; \text{sig.} = .18 \]

AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
<th>TOLERANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 5.1; df = 10; \text{sig.} = .67 \]


APPENDIX B
Comparison of the Metropolitan Area of Costa Rica: Sample and Census Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX</th>
<th>SAMPLE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 2.81; df = 1; \text{sig.} = .10 \]

NOTES

1. Directed by Louis Gutman, the Continuing Survey is the oldest and best-respected public opinion poll in Israel. Interviews have been conducted approximately twice a month for the past eleven years in the homes of a cross-section of urban Jewish residents of Israel. A general bibliography of publications based upon the Continuing Survey, as well as other studies of the IASS, is contained in Gurevich (1973). A very useful empirical introduction to political attitudes in Israel, based upon the Continuing Survey, is contained in Elimelech-Hatréy (1977).

2. One section of Mapgen, the Red Front, appeared for the “liquidation of the Zionist State.” In 1972 five members of Mapgen were arrested for spying for the Syrian Secret Service (Schmitt, 1979: 101).
REFERENCES


