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Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia and in the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity

Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Ph.D.
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
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Preface

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) takes pride in its support of the *AmericasBarometer*. While the surveys' primary goal is to give citizens a voice on a broad range of important issues, they also help guide USAID programming and inform policymakers throughout the Latin America and Caribbean region.

USAID officers use the *AmericasBarometer* findings to prioritize funding allocation and guide program design. The surveys are frequently employed as an evaluation tool, by comparing results in specialized "oversample" areas with national trends. In this sense, *AmericasBarometer* is at the cutting-edge of gathering high quality impact evaluation data that are consistent with the 2008 National Academy of Sciences recommendations to USAID and the new evaluation policy put in place by USAID in 2011. The *AmericasBarometer* also alerts policymakers and international assistance agencies to potential problem areas, and informs citizens about democratic values and experiences in their countries relative to regional trends.

The *AmericasBarometer* builds local capacity by working through academic institutions in each country by training local researchers and their students. The analytical team at Vanderbilt University, what we call "LAPOP Central," first develops a core questionnaire after careful consultation with our country team partners, USAID and other donors. It then sends that draft instrument to its partner institutions, getting feedback to improve the instrument. An extensive process of pretesting then goes on in many countries until a near final questionnaire is settled upon. At this point it is then distributed to our country partners for addition of modules of country-specific questions that are of special interest to the team and/or USAID and other donors. Final pretesting of each country questionnaire then proceeds, followed by training conducted by the faculty and staff of LAPOP Central as well as our country partners. In countries with important components of the population who do not speak the majoritarian language, translation into those languages is carried out, and different versions of the questionnaire are prepared. Only at that point do the local interview teams conduct house-to-house surveys following the exacting requirements of the sample design common to all countries. Interviewers in many countries enter the replies directly into smartphones in order to make the process less error-prone, avoiding skipped questions or illegible responses. Once the data is collected, Vanderbilt's team reviews it for accuracy. Meanwhile, Vanderbilt researchers also devise the theoretical framework for the country reports. Country-specific analyses are later carried out by local teams.

While USAID continues to be the *AmericasBarometer's* largest supporter, Vanderbilt University's College of Arts and Sciences and the Tinker Foundation provide important ongoing support. In addition, in this round the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank, the Swedish Embassy of Bolivia, the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq), Duke University, Algonquin College, Florida International University, the University of Miami, and Princeton University supported the surveys as well. Thanks to this unusually broad and generous support, the fieldwork in all countries was conducted nearly simultaneously, allowing for greater accuracy and speed in generating comparative analyses.

USAID is grateful for Dr. Mitchell Seligson's and Dr. Elizabeth Zechmeister's leadership of *AmericasBarometer*. We also extend our deep appreciation to their outstanding graduate students from throughout the hemisphere and to the many regional academic and expert institutions that are involved with this initiative.

Vanessa Reilly
LAC/RSD/Democracy and Human Rights
Bureau for Latin America & the Caribbean
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Prologue: Background to the Study

Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D.
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and
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and Associate Director of LAPOP,
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We are delighted to present the results of the fifth round of the AmericasBarometer, the flagship survey effort of Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). This round, we tackle a fundamental social, political, and ethical problem in the Americas: the tremendous gaps in opportunities experienced and resources available to the region's citizens. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences in economic development *across* countries, we focus here on inequalities *within* the countries of the Americas. We ask questions such as: to what extent are social and political opportunities and resources distributed equitably across social groups as defined by gender, race, and class? Moreover, to what extent do the citizens of the Americas hold discriminatory attitudes towards the political and economic participation of historically marginalized groups? And, to what extent do they endorse commonly proposed policies to remedy these inequalities? Finally, how do citizens' varying opportunities and resources affect their attachment to and engagement with their political systems?

LAPOP, founded over two decades ago, is hosted (and generously supported) by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. The AmericasBarometer is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, 24 countries throughout the Americas were included. Finally, in 2010 the number of countries increased to 26. As in 2010, this round incorporates every independent country in mainland North, Central and South America, and many countries in the Caribbean. The 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer constitute the largest surveys of democratic values ever undertaken in the Americas.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has provided the principal funding for carrying out these studies, with generous ongoing funding also provided by Vanderbilt University and the Tinker Foundation. Other donors in 2012 are the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); the World Bank; the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia; the Brazilian Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa (CNPq); and Duke University. Florida

International University, the University of Miami, Algonquin College and Princeton University supported the research effort in many important ways as well.

Our selection of the theme of equality of opportunity and marginalization draws on many discussions with our partners at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including Eric Kite and Vanessa Reilly as well as many Democracy and Governance officers in USAID Missions in the Americas. Our concerns with equality of opportunity also derive from our findings based on our last round of surveys. In 2010 we investigated the social and political impacts of the economic crisis that was at that point shaking the region. As described in our *Insights* report Number 76, we found that while in many countries the crisis was only moderate, it disproportionately affected certain groups of citizens, including those with lower household wealth, darker-skinned citizens, and women (see Special Report Box 1). These findings convinced us of the need to explore equality of opportunity and marginalization in greater depth in the current round.

While the data we report here were collected in the first months of 2012, this report represents the culmination of two years of work on the part of thousands of individuals and a large number of institutions and organizations across 26 countries of the Americas. Preparations for the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer began in the last quarter of 2010, as we were finishing analysis and reporting from the 2010 round, and continued full swing throughout 2011. In the first semester of 2011 we invited a number of leading scholars who study issues related to equality of opportunity in Latin America and the Caribbean to visit and consult with us in Nashville. We asked them to tell us: What are the most important questions needed to be included in the survey? We thank Lisa Baldez of Dartmouth University, Jana Morgan of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer of the University of Missouri, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson of Texas A&M University for very insightful contributions during this period. We also received important input from Edward L. Telles of Princeton University throughout the period of planning for the AmericasBarometer. As we listened to scholars who had dedicated their careers to studying equality of opportunity in the region, we drafted new survey questions, turning their concerns into a format enabling us to gather comparable, reliable, accurate data from citizens across the Americas.

The process of designing the survey involved three phases of development and pretesting, spanning a year. It was a very participatory process, involving thousands of hours of work by countless individuals. Between February and September 2011, our highly skilled fieldwork personnel, María Fernanda Boidi and Patricia Zárate, led the first phase of pretests in Uruguay and Peru, focused on developing new questions. We also received important feedback from Abby Córdova, Daniel Montalvo, and Daniel Moreno, who conducted pretests in El Salvador, Ecuador, and Bolivia. As they reported which questions were well understood, which ones needed minor tweaking, and which ones were entirely unworkable, we began to develop a core group of questions that would examine the many facets of equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas. We became excruciatingly detail-oriented, picking apart sentences and axing ambiguous turns of phrases to develop questions that came as close as possible to meaning the same thing to all respondents, everywhere.

At the same time, we selected the set of questions asked in 2010 and prior rounds that we would repeat in 2012. Repeating a core series of questions enables us to maintain a time series spanning a decade or more (e.g., the time series for some Central American countries dates back to

the early 1990s), portraying democratic attitudes and personal experiences of citizens across the Americas. We vetted this “reduced core” with our academic partners from across the Americas, as well as with officers and staff from USAID missions throughout the region and our International Advisory Board. Based on this feedback, we reinstated some questions, while ultimately deciding to drop others.

By early October 2011, following a long series of internal meetings debating each proposed survey item, we had developed a first draft of the complete survey. This draft included both new questions and ones used in prior waves. We sent this draft out to USAID missions and our academic partners in each country, soliciting broad feedback. Our 2012 AmericasBarometer Startup Conference, held in Miami, hosted by the University of Miami and Florida International University at the end of October, enabled us to hear directly from this large team of USAID officers and academic partners; following the Startup, we made 1,016 changes to the core questionnaire over the next three months.

The 2012 Startup Meeting provided an important opportunity to bring the large team together to agree on common goals and procedures over the coming year. Dr. Fernanda Boidi, who heads our office in Montevideo, Uruguay and Dr. Amy Erica Smith of LAPOP Central planned the event. To kick off the meeting, for the first time we held a public conference for the Miami policymaking and academic communities. The “Marginalization in the Americas Conference” was made possible by the extensive collaboration we received from the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, and was generously hosted by the U of M. Presentations focused on our 2012 theme, publicizing findings from the 2010 round of surveys that were relevant for the topic of equality of opportunity and marginalization in the Americas. We are especially grateful to Ms. Rubí Arana, who heads up our Miami Office at the University of Miami, who handled all local arrangements for both the Marginalization Conference and the AmericasBarometer Startup Conference.

In November 2011 a second phase of survey development and pretesting began: creation of the specific questionnaire to be administered in each of the 26 countries. We first adapted questionnaires to local conditions. For instance, we customized the names of national legislative bodies, inserted the names of presidents, and adjusted the terms used in Spanish to refer to bribery. Second, we added in new, country-specific questions developed by the respective USAID missions and academic team members in each country. We then rigorously pretested each country-specific questionnaire, further seeking to ensure that both the core and new questions were understandable in local contexts and idioms.

The third phase of questionnaire development and pretesting involved adapting paper questionnaires for use with smartphones. Surveys are administered in many countries using smartphones, rather than traditional paper-based questionnaires. Our partner Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes and the Universidad de Costa Rica developed and enhanced the EQCollector program for the Windows Mobile Platform, and formatted it for use in the 2012 round of surveys. In Bolivia, Daniel Moreno worked with a team of computer engineers to design an alternative questionnaire delivery software program using the Android platform. That platform is our most sophisticated to date and the one we plan to use widely for the next round of surveys. In 2012, 16 countries were able

to use smartphones. These devices streamline data entry, prevent skipped questions, and thus enabled us to maximize quality and minimize error in survey data.

Another benefit of the smartphones is that we can switch languages, even in mid-question, in countries using multi-lingual questionnaires. In the case of countries with significant indigenous-speaking population, the questionnaires were translated into those languages (e.g., Quechua and Aymara in Bolivia). We also developed versions in English for the English-speaking Caribbean, the United States, and Canada; as well as a French version in Canada, French Creole in Haiti and Portuguese in Brazil. In Suriname we developed versions in Dutch and Sranan Tongo. In the end, we had versions in 13 different languages. All of those questionnaires are posted on the www.americasbarometer.org web site and can be consulted there. They also appear in the appendixes for each country study.

Finally, fieldwork commenced in January of this year, and was concluded in the last countries by early May. We heard from over 41,000 citizens of the Americas, from northern Canada to Chilean Patagonia, from Mexico City to the rural Andean highlands. In 24 of the 26 countries, the questionnaire was administered in face-to-face survey interviews in respondents' homes; only in the US and Canada was the survey administered via a web interface because of the unacceptably high cost of in-person interviews in those two countries. This was the same procedure followed in 2010. These citizens contributed to the project by sharing with us their attitudes towards their political systems and governments, as well as such experiences as victimization by crime and corruption among other things.

A common sample design has been crucial for the success of this comparative effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probability sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals per country. Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in annexes of each country publication. For 2012 we altered the samples somewhat, continuing with our past practice of stratifying each country into regions. Now, however, the municipality is the primary sampling unit, and is selected in probability proportional to size (PPS), with each municipality having a standard size within a given country. The only exceptions are the large cities, which we might have subdivided into sectors, each with its own set of interviews. Capital cities were all self-selected, as were other major cities.

Another important feature of the 2012 surveys is our objective measure of skin color. Following a successful partnership in our 2010 round, Professor Edward Telles, Director of the Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America at Princeton University, again sponsored the use of color palettes in 24 countries of the Americas. These palettes, described in the *AmericasBarometer Insights* Report No. 73, enable the interviewer to rate the skin color of the interviewee on an 11 point scale, where 1 is the lightest skin tone and 11 the darkest. In this report, we use the resulting ratings to examine how skin tone is associated with equality of opportunity and marginalization across the Americas.

LAPOP surveys utilize a common "informed consent" form, and the Vanderbilt University Institutional Review Board (IRB) granted approval for research on human subjects. All investigators involved in the project studied the human subjects protection materials utilized by Vanderbilt and then took and passed the certifying tests. All publicly available data for this project are de-identified,

thus protecting the right of anonymity guaranteed to each respondent. The informed consent form appears in the appendix of each study.

When data collection was completed in each country, we underwent a rigorous process of data entry and verification to minimize error in the data. These procedures, following internationally recognized best practices, give us greater faith in the validity of the analytical insights drawn from the data. First, we utilized a common coding scheme for all questions. Second, we instituted rigorous screening to minimize data entry error in countries using paper questionnaires. All data entry occurred in the respective countries, and was verified (i.e., double entered), except when smartphones were used, in which case the data had already been entered within the respondent's household. When LAPOP received each file, we selected a random list of 50 questionnaire identification numbers and requested that the team ship those 50 surveys via express courier to LAPOP for auditing. If a significant number of errors were encountered, the entire database had to be re-entered and the process of auditing was repeated. Finally, the data sets were merged into one uniform multi-nation file, and copies were sent to all teams so that they could carry out comparative analysis on the entire file. Each team also received a data set composed of the 2012 survey as well as all prior AmericasBarometer surveys for their country, so that longitudinal comparisons could be made.

Thus began a new phase of the project. In the third and fourth quarters of 2012, we began to produce a large number of country and other reports. LAPOP believes that the reports should be accessible and readable to the layperson, meaning that we make heavy use of bivariate graphs. But we also agree on the importance of multivariate analysis (either OLS or logistic regression), so that the technically informed reader can be assured that the individual variables in the graphs are (or are not) indeed significant predictors of the dependent variable being studied.

We also developed a common graphical format, based on programs for STATA 10/12. These programs generate graphs that present confidence intervals taking into account the "design effect" of the sample.¹ Both the bivariate and multivariate analyses as well as the regression analyses in the study take into account the design effect of the sample. This approach represents a major advancement in the presentation of our survey results, allowing a higher level of certainty regarding whether patterns found are statistically significant.²

Finally, as of December 1, 2012 we have made the raw data files available to the public. We are delighted that for the first time in 2012 and forward, the country-specific data files will be available for download from the LAPOP website for users worldwide, without cost. At the same time, following a recent change in LAPOP policy, we continue to make available to institutional and

¹ The design effect results from the use of stratification, clustering, and weighting in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then affect confidence intervals. While the use of stratification tends to decrease standard errors, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys and not assume, as is generally done in public opinion studies, that the data had been collected using simple random samples.









² All AmericasBarometer samples are self-weighted except for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Haiti, Trinidad & Tobago, the United States, and Canada. Users of the data file will find a variable called "WT" which weights each country file. In the case of the self-weighted files, each respondent's weight is equal to 1. The files also contain a variable called "WEIGHT1500" that weights each country file to a sample size of 1,500 so that all countries count as having the same sample size in comparative analysis.

individual subscribers a merged 26-country database, as well as technical support from the LAPOP team.

What you have before you, then, is the product of the intensive labor of a massive team of highly motivated researchers, sample design experts, field supervisors, interviewers, data entry clerks, and, of course, the over 41,000 respondents to our survey. Our efforts will not have been in vain if the results presented here are utilized by policy makers, citizens and academics alike to help strengthen democracy in the Americas.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the AmericasBarometer project.

Country	Institutions
Mexico and Central America	
Costa Rica	  
El Salvador	
Guatemala	
Honduras	 
Mexico	 
Nicaragua	
Panama	

Caribbean	
Belize	
Dominican Republic	 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
Suriname	
Trinidad & Tobago	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT ST. AUGUSTINE, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Andean/Southern Cone		
Argentina		CIPPEC ^{PP}
Bolivia		
Brazil		
Chile		
Colombia		
Ecuador		 
Paraguay		
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>	
Uruguay		
Venezuela		

Canada and United States			
Canada	 UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL	 YORK UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY redefine THE POSSIBLE.	 THE ENVIRONICS INSTITUTE
United States	 VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY	 MIAMI CONSORTIUM FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN STUDIES	 PERLA Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Proyecto sobre Etnicidad y Raza en América Latina

Acknowledgements

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Many academic institutions also contributed to this project. Important support and guidance came from the China Research Center at Duke University; thanks go especially to John Aldrich, Liu Kang, and Alexandra Cooper. We also thank Florida International University and the United States Naval Postgraduate School, for their important contributions to the study, as well Lucio Renno at the University of Brasília, who provided generous support from his Brazilian CNPq grant to expand the Brazil survey. Professor Ed Telles at Princeton continued a partnership formed in 2010, sponsoring the inclusion of palettes for coding skin color again in the 2012 round of surveys. We are very grateful to the Miami Consortium, a partnership of the University of Miami Center for Latin American Studies and Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center, for hosting the October 2011 Miami conference on Marginalization in the Americas. Thanks especially to Professors Ariel Armony from the University of Miami and Cristina Eguizábal from Florida International University for their sponsorship, as well as to Jordan Adams and Israel Alonso at the University of Miami for highly competent logistical support.

We also owe special thanks to Jeisson Hidalgo Céspedes of the CCP at the Universidad de Costa Rica, who designed the EQ Mobile software for smartphones. Jeisson provided tireless, round-the-clock user support over the course of many months of questionnaire preparation and fieldwork. In addition, his eagle eye caught important questionnaire design issues on a number of occasions.

At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generosity, collaboration, and hard work of many individuals. The College of Arts & Sciences provided critical support. John Geer, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt, has provided unwavering support and leadership. Professors Jon Hiskey, Zeynep Somer-Topcu, and Efrén Pérez of the Department of Political Science made many helpful suggestions as the research effort proceeded. Tonya Mills, LAPOP Grants Administrator, was the financial backbone of the project, handling the extraordinarily complex financial details involving countless contracts and consulting agreements. Patrick D. Green, Executive Assistant Director, Office of Contract and Research Administration, performed heroically in managing the countless contract details of the project. Attorney Jeffrey K. Newman, Associate Director, Contract Management of the Office of Contract and Research Administration, navigated the complex legal issues involved in contracts spanning the hemisphere. Attorney Dahlia M. French, Director of the Vanderbilt International Services and International Tax handled numerous visa and tax issues for us.

Fernanda Boidi served as director of fieldwork operations, managing and tracking progress across 26 countries simultaneously with an incredibly elaborate system of spreadsheets. She also oversaw pretesting and training, and with great equanimity acted as a liaison between country team members, USAID missions, and LAPOP. Amy Erica Smith took a lead role in many aspects of the 2012 round: developing the questionnaire, planning and coordinating the Startup Conference, working with Fernanda to oversee survey operations, and developing the template for the country and regional reports. Rubí Arana took charge of the complex task of synchronization of the many versions of each country questionnaire and our common core. Without her careful eye, we would have missed many minor but critical errors in the translations and country customization process. And as in previous rounds, Abby Córdova provided important feedback on many issues of questionnaire design; her insights will be much missed at LAPOP. Hugo Salgado provided enthusiastic and highly competent assistance with many technical aspects of the project, and also assisted with pretesting and training in several countries. Georgina Pizzolitto likewise conducted training and pretesting in a number of countries, and provided important feedback and help in some areas of questionnaire development.

Our computer Guru, Professor Adrian Lauf, has provided the overall computer infrastructure in which we work. He built our online data library system by which users worldwide can download our data set, and also constructed the data uploader by which teams exporting enormous data files could do so with ease. He also was our consultant on the new Android platform of smartphones, and fixed up our desktop computers when things went wrong.

Finally, we want to name all of the Ph.D. students at Vanderbilt who did so much to make this round the best ever: Marco Araujo (Brazil), Frederico Batista Pereira (Brazil), Mollie Cohen (USA), Margarita Corral (Spain), Ted Enamorado (Honduras), Arturo Maldonado (Peru), Alejandro Díaz Domínguez (Mexico), Brian Faughnan (USA), Jordyn Haught (USA), Matt Layton (USA), Whitney Lopez-Hardin (USA), Trevor Lyons (USA), Mason Moseley (USA), Juan Camilo Plata (Colombia),

Mariana Rodríguez (Venezuela), Guilherme (Gui) Russo (Brazil), and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (Mexico). The template for this report is the product of a team of graduate students coordinated by Amy Erica Smith, and with substantial editing by Professors Seligson and Zechmeister as well as Dr. Smith. The graduate student authors and data analysts are Frederico Batista Pereira, Mollie Cohen, Arturo Maldonado, Mason Moseley, Juan Camilo Plata, Mariana Rodríguez, and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga. Mollie Cohen wrote all Special Report Boxes with the exception of Box 1.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and institutional affiliations are listed below.

Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA - LAPOP Central	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director of LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science •Dr. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Associate Director of LAPOP, and Associate Professor of Political Science •Dr. Susan Berk-Seligson, Professor of Spanish Linguistics, Department of Spanish and Portuguese •Dr. María Fernanda Boidi, Program Coordinator for Field Operations, LAPOP, Uruguay •Dr. Amy Erica Smith, formerly Research Coordinator of LAPOP and currently Assistant Professor, Iowa State University
Mexico and Central America Group	
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Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Dinorah Azpuru, Senior Associate at ASIES in Guatemala and Associate Professor of Political Science at Wichita State University, USA •Sample design and coordination of field survey: Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Miguel Cruz, Visiting Assistant Professor, Florida International University, USA •Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Executive Director of FUNDAUNGO
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Orlando Pérez, Professor and Chair of Political Science at Central Michigan University, USA
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. John Booth, Emeritus Regents Professor of Political Science, University of North Texas, USA
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Guyana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Everette Cleveland Marciano Glasgow, Development Policy and Management Consultants •Mark Bynoe, Director, Development Policy and Management Consultants
Haiti	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Amy Erica Smith, Formerly, Research Coordinator of LAPOP and Currently, Assistant Professor, Iowa State University, USA •Dr. François Gélinau, Associate Professor of Political Science, Université Laval
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Suriname	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Jack Menke, Professor of Social Sciences, University of Suriname
Trinidad & Tobago	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Dr. Marlon Anatol, Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, St. Augustine
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Country/ Institution	Researchers (located in country of study unless otherwise noted)
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Venezuela	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr. Damaris Canache, CISOR Venezuela and Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, USA
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Finally, we wish to thank the more than 41,000 residents of the Americas who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
Summer 2012

Executive Summary

This report, *The Political Culture of Democracy in Colombia and the Americas, 2012: Towards Equality of Opportunity*, marks nine years of studies (2004-2012) for the AmericasBarometer. It also marks the fifth report containing comparative data on the countries of the hemisphere. This year's round in 26 countries focuses on the disparities in economic, social, and political opportunities and resources available to citizens of the region. While these disparities are certainly visible in differences of economic development across countries, our focus is on inequalities within the countries of the Americas—in this case, specifically in Colombia. Questions in the study thus deal with social and political opportunities, discriminatory attitudes, support for public policies aimed at remedying inequality, and the impact of disparities along lines of sex, race, and social class on democratic values.

Chapter One examines how countries of the region have sought to promote equality in social and economic opportunities. It begins with an overview of previous research on social and economic inequalities in Colombia and the Americas. Although inequality levels within countries of the region are surprisingly high, the region is relatively homogeneous when income levels are compared between countries. Next, we explore the perceptions and opinions held by citizens of the region on issues such as discrimination and social and economic inequality. The end of the chapter considers possible public policy solutions and citizens' opinions on those policies.

Chapter Two, which forms the core of the report, examines the relation between equality in opportunities and political participation by discussing how gender, race, and poverty affect participation and political opportunities in the region. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first reviews what the existing literature says about the implications of social and economic inequality on political participation and available resources for participation.

The second section explores the degree of inequality in political participation in the Americas by using the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey data. Electoral participation, for instance, varies widely between countries in the Americas: participation in Peru is close to 90%, while in Honduras only 50% reported voting in the last presidential election. Colombia is on the lower-end of participation with about 60% saying they voted. These differences are partly due to the compulsory voting laws of some countries. Nonetheless, the data indicate that the degree of electoral participation for men and women is more or less equal in the countries of the study. And while the literature suggests a negative bias against the participation of disadvantaged groups, Colombia seems exempt from that phenomenon. Electoral participation is almost the same across income quintiles, while women's electoral participation seems to exceed men's though not with statistical significance, and skin color does not appear related to electoral participation. Education, however, has an important effect, albeit not in the way suggested by the literature: political participation is greatest among those with the highest *and* the lowest levels of education.

Since voting is obviously not the only way to measure political participation, the third section examines the differing levels of community participation across various social groups. Comparative analysis shows that Colombians participate much less than Haitians, Guatemalans, and Bolivians. And less than one out of ten Colombians who participate in these groups do so in a leadership capacity.

This is a proportion much lower than in countries such as Haiti and El Salvador, where one out of four or five individuals, respectively, consider themselves leaders in their community groups. Detailed data from Colombia suggests women participate more in community activities than men. Race also shows a notable difference: those with darker skin tend to participate with slightly more frequency in community groups. Finally, income and education do not produce significant differences in levels of community participation.

We examined citizen participation in political campaigns as another way of measuring participation. Data from Colombia shows that informal political campaigning or proselytizing—trying to persuade others to vote for a candidate—increases among higher income quintiles. This kind of political activity is also associated with education levels: those with a higher education tend to try to politically persuade others more than those with lower education levels. And those with lighter skin engage in attempts at electoral persuasion more frequently than those with darker skin. Finally, men appear more active than women, but the difference is not significant.

The 2012 AmericasBarometers also examined citizen attitudes toward the presence of certain social groups in positions of political leadership. Agreement with the supposed superiority of men as political leaders over women in Colombia was among the lowest for the region—only Uruguay's was significantly lower. As expected, attitudes on this question were linked to the gender of the respondent: women are in less agreement with the idea of men making better leaders. Likewise, people with more education showed lower levels of prejudice against women's leadership.

Interviewees were also asked about their attitudes towards people with darker skinned as political leaders. The only sociodemographic factor with an affect on these attitudes is education; those with higher education levels are less prejudiced against the possibility of darker skinned leaders. While Uruguay has the least prejudices related to the skin color of politicians, Chile shows the most, and Colombia is at an intermediate position, although without statistically significant differences with most countries in the study.

Opinion on the participation of homosexuals in politics was another line of questioning. Colombia appears toward the upper-end of a list of countries ranked in support of homosexuals' participation; in Latin America, Colombia is superseded only by Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina, while Haiti is where tolerance is lowest. Higher-income and more educated Colombians tend to show greater support for homosexuals running for public office.

Finally, we included a question about citizen support for the participation of people with disabilities in politics. Uruguay and Brazil are the only two countries in Latin America that significantly exceeded Colombia in support of people with physical disabilities holding or running for public office. Support is more likely among Colombians in higher quintiles and with a higher education.

The last section of the chapter turns toward levels of support for public policies aimed at solving the problem of inequalities in political participation and representation. Many Latin American countries have adopted gender quotas giving women an equal number of seats in legislative bodies, albeit with generally inconclusive on whether these quotas reduce inequality. In Colombia, agreement is relatively high with the idea of setting quotas for women on party's slate of candidates;

support for the idea is higher only El Salvador, Dominican Republic, and to a lesser extent in Paraguay.

Chapter Three examines the effect of unequal opportunities and discrimination on political legitimacy and participation. The first section looks at indicators of involvement, including internal and external efficacy. For Colombia, the perception that issues of public concern are understood in the country (internal efficacy) increases as the age and education of the respondent increases. It follows that interest in politics is a key predictor of internal efficacy, along with news consumption (radio and print). Skin color, experiences of discrimination, and income level, however, bear no relation. Meanwhile, the perception that policymakers take the public interest into account (external efficacy) is directly related to interest in politics and education levels. It is worth mentioning that Venezuela—with 49 on a 0 to 100 scale—is the country with the greatest level of external efficacy in the region, significantly beating out Colombia (30) and Brazil (27).

Next, the chapter analyzes more general attitudes toward the political system with special attention toward how perceptions of representation affect those attitudes. Age and a person's interests in politics are positively correlated to support for both democracy and the political system. Education has a positive affect on support for democracy, but a negative affect on support for the political system. Finally, the results found no relation between experiences of discrimination and attitudes toward democracy and the political system.

Chapter Four considers the issues of corruption, crime, and democracy. Colombia ranked highest in perceptions of corruption for the region: 82 on scale of 0 to 100. Perceptions of corruption in the country have increased steadily since 2008; this is an important result considering that just two years ago perceptions of corruption in Colombia were below those of Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago. Colombia stands apart from countries such as Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, where rates of victimization by corruption have been dropping. In fact, the percentage of people who report being victims of corruption grew by 50% in one year alone, reaching heights unseen since the AmericasBarometer began working in Colombia in 2004. Country results indicate that people living in the larger cities, working-age adults, and those with a higher education are the most likely to be victims of corruption.

As for crime, in analyzing perceptions of insecurity in capital cities of the Americas we found that Mexico City and Lima are the cities where perceptions of insecurity are highest. But Quito and Tegucigalpa are where reports by respondents of being victims of a crime are highest. In Bogotá, the perception of insecurity is comparatively low, but victimization—particularly among those claiming household members as victims—is high, reaching fourth place among the capitals of the region.

It is worth pointing out that the perception of insecurity did not decrease during the Álvaro Uribe administration—and, in fact, peaked in 2009—notwithstanding his administration's emphasis on security. Despite the critiques from some quarters about the supposed security deterioration during Juan Manuel Santos' administration, perceptions of insecurity have not increased since 2010 and have, in fact, slightly decreased in the last year. As far as the probability of falling victim to crime, as in past years, we found that young people, particularly those between the ages of 18 and 25, are twice as likely to be victims of crime than someone between the ages of 26 and 55.

The chapter concludes by analyzing the impact of insecurity and corruption on support for the rule of law. Interestingly, if we control for other sociodemographic factors, ideology, and interpersonal trust, then neither crime nor corruption have significant effects on respect for the law. What we do find, however, is that wealthier Colombians express less respect for the rule of law.

Chapter Five analyzes political legitimacy and tolerance. With support for the political system as a measure of legitimacy, Colombia finds itself slightly above the regional average, close to countries such as Costa Rica and Argentina. Support for the system declined slightly since 2010, coinciding with the change in administrations. High levels of support for the system during the Uribe administrations might stem from his high popularity, meaning that Santos' lower popularity standing may partly explain the general decline. In terms of political tolerance, Colombia is in the lower half of the rankings, only above Haiti, Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Honduras. Low levels of political tolerance have been a constant in Colombia since the start of the AmericasBarometer in the country. Colombians with higher levels of education are more tolerant, while those who consider religion very important in their lives show lower levels of political tolerance.

High political tolerance and high support for the system are conducive to a stable democracy. In Colombia, 27% of respondents expressed this combination, putting the country near the regional average, but substantially lower than countries like Canada, Guyana, and the United States. Victims of delinquency and corruption in the country are less likely to have high support for the system and high tolerance. A perception of insecurity is also associated with less favorable attitudes for democratic stability. However, people with a higher interest in politics are more likely to have high levels of support for the system and tolerance. Meanwhile, 34% of Colombians have high levels of support for the system, but a low level of political tolerance, a combination conducive to authoritarian stability.

The chapter continues with an analysis on trust in different institutions. The Colombian institutions with the highest levels of trust are the Armed Forces, the Catholic Church, and the media. The least trusted institutions are political parties, the Protestant Church, and the National Electoral Council. In terms of support for democracy, Colombia is ranked relatively low in the hemisphere, above only Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras. Colombians expressing the highest levels of support for democracy are those who are older, more educated, interested in politics, and who are on the right end of the political spectrum.

Chapter Six delves into a classic theme of AmericasBarometer studies: the relationship between citizens' opinions about local governments, their experiences, and their thoughts about democracy. Among the countries included in the study, Haiti had the highest percentage of citizens who claimed having attended a municipal meeting over the preceding year, followed by the United States, and the Dominican Republic. Colombia had relatively low percentages of participation in such meetings, but it was still significantly higher than percentages in countries such as Costa Rica, Argentina, and Chile.

Participation in municipal meetings and the petitioning of local government in Colombia are comparatively low and have remained stable over time. And yet, between 2011 and 2012, local authorities' responses to these petitions have increased from 30% to 40%. Petitions to local

government are more frequent in rural areas and small municipalities than in large cities or the capital.

Evidence from the Colombian case shows that, despite having dropped from first place, satisfaction levels with local government services have not substantially changed over time. In terms of satisfaction with highway infrastructure, however, Colombia is nearly 20 points below Ecuador on a 0 to 100 scale (0 being total dissatisfaction and 100 being total satisfaction).

The chapter proceeds with an analysis on citizen confidence in local government. High levels of confidence in local governments were found in El Salvador, Venezuela, and Chile, while Colombians' confidence was intermediate along with Ecuador and Guyana on a scale from 0 to 100.

Finally, the chapter concludes with a reflection on the importance of the local scale as a favorable site for the construction of a democratic political culture; the reasoning is that those who feel most satisfied with municipal services tend to show higher levels of support to the political system.

Chapter Seven concerns party affiliation and ideology in Colombia and the Americas. The Dominican Republic and the United States top the list in percentages of respondents who identify with a particular political party, while Colombia is ranked considerably low. The evidence from Colombia shows that confidence in political parties in the last year dropped considerably and is at its lowest point since 2004.

The percentage of Colombians who identify with the Liberal Party again increased in 2012 and has been climbing since 2010, becoming the majority this year among people who identify with a political party. Interestingly, the expansion of the Liberal Party has particularly come at the expense of those who feel close to the *Partido de la U (La U)*. The proportion of sympathizers of La U has declined from 42% in 2010 to 27% in 2012. The *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (Alternative Democratic Pole or "Polo") party has also seen a decline in sympathizers.

The chapter also traces some sociodemographic characteristics of political affinities. Followers of the Liberal, Conservative, and La U parties are generally less educated and from rural areas. Those who identify as Liberal or Conservative are also relatively older in age. Followers of the *Polo* and the Green Party, in contrast, have stronger support among urban and more educated sectors. Support for the Green Party is much more concentrated among young and well-off voters than it is for other parties.

As in previous years, Colombia is, on average, one of the most right-wing countries in the region along with Suriname, Jamaica, and Paraguay; while Uruguay, Guatemala, and Haiti are on the opposite end of the spectrum. Despite the slight shift to the left in Colombia seen in 2011, the trend reversed in 2012 and the country again moved rightward. Our analysis also found that ideological positions in Colombia are relatively consistent with party affinities.

Next, the chapter more deeply explores the content of the ideological positions described in the previous section. We analyze attitudes on substantive issues that are commonly associated with ideology. On the economy, for example, followers of the *Polo* and the Green Party express more

favorable attitudes on state intervention in the economy than sympathizers of the Liberal Party. On moral/social issues, the differences are starker, with followers of the *Polo* and the Green Party identifying with more liberal and progressive policies, and followers of La U and *Cambio Radical* (Radical Change) exhibiting more conservative attitudes.

The chapter concludes by analyzing ideological position alongside sociodemographic factors such as age, education level, and place of residence. Those younger, more educated, and urban tend toward the left end of the ideological spectrum, while social/moral dimensions are a significant predictor of ideology in the opposite direction.

Chapter Eight studies different anti-democratic attitudes. The questionnaire includes a battery of questions aimed at examining to what degree the citizens of the Americas harbor attitudes in contradiction with principles of liberal democracy. First, we inquire about the degree to which those surveyed are in agreement with limiting the voice of political opponents. On this point, Colombia is in a relatively high position in comparison to other countries; that is, respect for the opposition is lower in Colombia than in other countries. Nonetheless, Colombians' respect for this basic democratic principle has increased over time, particularly since 2010 and the end of Álvaro Uribe's administration. Colombians' agreement with the idea that the people should govern without elected representatives is less intense than in most countries of the Americas. But these anti-democratic attitudes have eased over time. As for the idea that those not in the majority constitute a threat, Colombia is in an intermediate position, but again this anti-democratic attitude has eased over time. Preference for a government without a congress and without courts has also diminished over time, but the tendency seems to have abated between 2011 and 2012. Colombia is near the average in the Americas in terms of approval for the idea of the president being able to dissolve congress or the courts.

Both education and income reduce illiberal attitudes, while those who consume their news on the Internet also tend to be more democratic. On the other hand, those who express greater approval of the president have more anti-democratic attitudes. Similarly, those who identify with the Party of La U show greater agreement with ideas contrary to democratic principles than followers of the Green Party or the *Polo*. Accordingly, those who place greater confidence in the president than in congress—that is, those who express greater personalistic attachment to the figure of the president—tend to have less democratic attitudes.

The chapter ends with an analysis of citizen support for a hypothetical military coup amid three extreme circumstances: high unemployment, high crime, and high corruption. A coup amid high unemployment is the situation that generates the least support—not only in Colombia, but in the Americas as well. For the three circumstances, Colombia is in an intermediate position in relation to the other countries of the region. Support for a coup in a case of high unemployment has diminished markedly since 2004, while support for coups in cases of high crime and high corruption have stayed constant, albeit with declines since 2009. In any case, more than half of Colombians justified a coup in one of these hypothetical situations. Older and more educated respondents are less likely to justify a military coup. Justifications more frequently came from those on the right-wing of the ideological spectrum and those who consume news via television.

Finally, **Chapter Nine** studies Colombians' attitudes on the conflict and post-conflict. The first section looks at six types of victimizations related to the conflict: killing of a relative, displacement, fleeing the country, torture, forced recruitment, and sexual violence. Around one-fourth of Colombians have lost a family member to the conflict and one-fifth has had a relative displaced—these are the two most common forms of victimization. Fleeing the country and torture of a relative has affected about 5% of Colombians. Finally, almost 4% of Colombians have had a relative forcibly recruited and 2% say a relative has been the victim of sexual violence. Only 10% of those who report having a relative victimized in some way say it happened in the last year. The most common perpetrators are the guerrillas with 47% of the cases, followed by paramilitaries with 28%. Ten percent of the victims surveyed did not identify a perpetrator, either because they did not know or because they did not want to say.

The second section of this chapter focuses on some methodological innovations introduced into the report. Using a multi-level model, we are able to take into account not only the personal characteristics of the respondent, but also their local context—in this case, the municipality—in relation to support for a negotiated solution to the conflict. Support for a negotiation with the guerrillas has remained high in the country with close to 60% support. On an individual level, Colombians who are on the right-end of the ideological spectrum show less support for a negotiated solution to the conflict. Those who feel greater affinity with the Party of La U and the Conservative Party are less supportive. Not surprisingly, though it could have implications for a post-conflict situation, those who have been victims of the guerrillas are more reluctant to support the negotiations. The multi-level analysis studies two characteristics of the municipalities: development levels—as measured by the municipal human development index (HDI)—and insecurity, as measured by the homicide rate (murders per 100,000 inhabitants). Only HDI seems to have a direct effect on opinions about the negotiation: municipalities with a better HDI show less approval for a negotiated solution than less developed municipalities. None of the municipal variables, however, significantly condition results at an individual level.

The final section of the chapter concludes with an analysis of attitudes on the post-conflict. Sixty percent of Colombians are in agreement with having a demobilized combatant as a neighbor, particularly those who are younger, less educated, and those in favor of a negotiated solution to the conflict.

Understanding Figures in the Study

AmericasBarometer data are based on a sample of respondents drawn from each country; naturally, all samples produce results that contain a margin of error. It is important for the reader to understand that each data point (for example, a country's average confidence in political parties) has a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. Most figures in this study show a 95% confidence interval that takes into account the fact that our samples are "complex" (i.e., stratified and clustered). In bar charts this confidence interval appears as a grey block, while in figures presenting the results of regression models it appears as a horizontal bracket. The dot in the center of a confidence interval depicts the estimated mean (in bar charts) or coefficient (in regression charts).

In the first case, numbers next to each bar in the bar charts represent the values of the dots. When two estimated points have confidence intervals that overlap, the difference between the two values is not statistically significant and the reader should ignore it.

Graphs that show regressions also include a vertical line at "0." When a variable's estimated coefficient falls to the left of this line, it indicates that the variable has a negative impact on the dependent variable (i.e., the attitude, behavior, or characteristic we seek to explain); when the coefficient falls to the right, it has a positive impact. We can be 95% confident that the impact is *statistically significant* when the confidence interval does not overlap the vertical line.

Please note that data presented and analyzed in this report are based on a prerelease version of the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey.

Part I: Equality of Opportunity and Democracy in the Americas

Chapter One: Equality of Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

With Mariana Rodríguez, Frederico Batista Pereira, and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Equality of opportunity is at the very core of virtually all definitions of democracy. The notion of a level playing field resonates with advocates of democracy nearly everywhere in the world. Individuals' life-chances are strongly affected by the opportunities they have to attend good schools, receive quality health care, have access to credit, and so on. Indeed, children's life-chances are strongly affected by their parents' own position in society and the economy, such that future achievement is often either limited or advanced by the conditions of one's youth. Moreover, the life circumstances that affect success are also affected by societal levels of prejudice and norms related to groups' roles in society, since these attitudes can constrain economic opportunity and political participation.

How successful have the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean been in making the ideal of equal opportunities a reality? A look at economic opportunities provides important initial insight. Narrowing our view for a moment to the sub-region of Latin America, this set of countries has long been known as the region of the world with the greatest inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. In recent years, however, income inequality, although not wealth inequality, has gradually declined in some Latin American countries with historically extreme levels of inequality.¹ More impressive have been the notable declines in poverty that a number of countries have experienced.²

These encouraging signs of lower levels of income inequality and poverty do not mean, however, that the pervasive problem of inequality of opportunity in the Americas has been overcome. Quite the contrary, the recent small declines in income inequality also highlight the overall picture of persistent economic inequality. This matters because research has increasingly shown that high levels of income inequality slow economic growth and hinder continued poverty reduction (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).³

Inequality does not merely cause economic and social problems, but also political ones, for several reasons. First, particularly among the region's "have-nots," inequality can foment unrest and dissatisfaction, affecting voting behavior and the stability of governments. Research shows that

¹ Income and wealth are related, but are nonetheless conceptually distinct terms. For instance, AmericasBarometers contains questions about income (the sum of funds a household attains each month through work or remittances) while at the same time asks about wealth in terms of existing assets in the home.

² López-Calva, Luis Felipe and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.

³ Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza. 2002. "Inequality and Violent Crime." *Journal of Law and Economics* 45: 1-39.

inequality can create public discontent,⁴ foster political instability and violence,⁵ and decrease trust in democracy.⁶ Research using LAPOP data has shown that inequality seriously erodes interpersonal trust—the basic “glue” that holds together democratic societies. Second, inequality is a political problem because solutions are largely a matter of public policy, and candidates running for office often compete on the basis of how they propose to address this problem. Third, to the extent that inequalities result in political systems paying more attention to the voices of some citizens (those with the resources to make demands) than others, nations deviate from their commitment to political equality. This deviation represents a core challenge to democratic consolidation, and indeed to the notion of democracy itself.

Of course, even conditions of “perfect” equality of opportunity would not prevent all inequalities, since individuals are naturally endowed with different strengths that lead to different outcomes over the course of a lifetime.⁷ However, the extreme gaps between the wealthy and the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean are *prima facie* evidence that opportunities have not been equally distributed; even more importantly, inequality is self-reinforcing. Unequally distributed resources, even if they may in part be the outcomes of effort and ability, affect future opportunities for economic achievement. For instance, a recent study by the World Bank shows that in the seven Latin American countries analyzed about 10% of income inequality can be attributed to differences in mothers’ educational attainment alone.⁸ Equality of opportunity, moreover, extends far beyond economic issues, and includes political participation and access. Inequalities in these areas exacerbate vicious cycles in which those born with greater opportunity create the rules of the game that help keep them and their children in positions of wealth and power.

To what extent do gender, race, ethnicity, class, and sexual orientation translate into barriers to equality of opportunity, and therefore sources of long-term marginalization, in the Americas? And how do such inequalities affect public opinion toward the political system? In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we measure economic, social, and political marginalization, developing objective measures based on experienced inequalities as well as subjective indicators, including measures of prejudice and of group-related norms. In every study, we pay particular attention to multiple sources of marginalization. We then evaluate to what extent and in what form marginalization might be undermining the necessary key values for the existence of a democratic political culture.

In this chapter we examine the extent of economic and social inequality in the Americas. First, in Section II of this chapter we take stock of previous research on economic and social inequalities in Colombia and the Americas, reviewing data and findings from international institutions and academic researchers. In Section III, we take a look at the 2012 AmericasBarometer, examining what these data tell us about equality of economic and social opportunities in the entire region. After assessing objective disparities in economic and social outcomes, we turn to public opinion. We ask,

⁴ De Ferranti et al., 2004, Ibid.

⁵ Uslaner, Eric M. and Mitchell Brown. 2005. “Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement.” *American Politics Research* 33: 868-894.

⁶ Córdova, Abby B. 2008. “Divided We Failed: Economic Inequality, Social Mistrust, and Political Instability in Latin American Democracies.” PhD Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.

⁷ Przeworski, Adam. 2010. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁸ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

who perceives that they have been discriminated? Moreover, we examine what individuals think about social and economic inequalities in the region. Finally, we discuss possible policy solutions, examining questions such as who supports racial quotas for education.

II. Background: Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in the Americas

This section reviews some previous research on inequality in the Americas, based in part on a number of objective measures of inequality. World Bank researchers have compared the levels of global inequality in North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean, relative to other world regions. Figure 1 takes a look at inequality both *within* countries and *between* countries of a region.⁹ The horizontal axis presents average levels of inequality within each country in the region, while the vertical axis presents differences between countries within a region in levels of income. Latin America and the Caribbean stand out on both fronts. On the one hand, average levels of inequality within the countries of the region are remarkably high—by far, the highest in the world. On the other hand, the region is relatively homogeneous when levels of income from one country and another are considered.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of wealth in the region comparing the Gini coefficients of South, Central, and North America as well as the Caribbean.¹⁰ Clearly, average levels of inequality in South and Central America are higher than in North America and the Caribbean. With a Gini index of 55.9 in 2010, inequality in Colombia is above average for what is already a highly unequal region.

⁹ See Milanovic, Branko and Shlomo Yithaki. 2001. "Decomposing World Income Distribution: Does the World Have a Middle Class?" World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 2562.

¹⁰The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenses) between individuals or households in an economy deviate from a distribution of perfect equity. A Gini score of 0 represents perfect equity while a score of 100 denotes perfect inequality. The average Gini is calculated on the latest data from the World Bank for each country since 2000.




Figure 1. GINI Indices by World Regions




Figure 2. Inequality in the Americas

Another way to view income inequality is to examine how citizens of different countries fare in relation to global distributions of income. In the data shown in Figure 3, researchers assessed the living standards of citizens in four countries of the world, by ventile within each country (a ventile

includes 5% of the income distribution).¹¹ The figure compares Brazil—in many ways a prototypically unequal country of Latin America—with three others: France, Sri Lanka, and rural Indonesia. The figure dramatically highlights the highly unequal living conditions in South and Central America. The poorest 5% of Brazilians are worse off than the poorest 5% in Sri Lanka or Indonesia, and rank very close to the bottom percentile of the world income distribution. However, the richest 5% of Brazilians do as well as the richest 5% of French citizens, far better than the richest ventile of Sri Lankans or rural Indonesians, and are at the top percentile of the global income distribution.




Figure 3. Income Location of Citizens of Four Countries

Levels of inequality are changing in the region. At the same time that we see differences across the Americas, we also find some evidence that levels of inequality are converging. A recent report by the Brookings Institution argues that since 2000, inequality has been improving in some of the most notoriously unequal countries of the region.¹² In Figure 4 we present time series data for the Gini Index for four countries between 2005 and 2009. While inequality has been dropping to some extent in two historically highly unequal countries, i.e. Brazil and Honduras, in the two countries with lower historical levels of inequality it has been rising (Costa Rica) or unchanging (Uruguay).

¹¹ Milanovic, Branko. 2006. "Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3865.

¹² López-Calva, Luis Felipe, and Nora Claudia Lustig. 2010. *Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and United Nations Development Programme.




Figure 4. Changes in Inequality in Four Countries of the Americas

Figure 5 shows that the evolution of the Gini index in Colombia over the last decade has varied and levels of inequality remain high. Over the last ten years, inequality reached its highest point in 2002 with a value of 60.68 and reached its lowest point in 2010 at 55.91.




Figure 5. Evolution of Inequality in Colombia 1999-2010

How will inequality evolve over the coming decade in the Americas? This is a difficult question to answer, since changes in inequality are partly linked to national economic growth, to the international economic environment, and to domestic public policies. Thus, the future course of

inequality in any one country depends in part on the broader national, regional, and world economies, including the economies of China, the United States, and Europe.¹³

Economic inequality goes hand-in-hand with social inequalities. Latin America and the Caribbean have typically been found to have middle to high levels of human development, as gauged by the Human Development Index (HDI).¹⁴ Since 2010, however, the United Nations has also produced the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI), which “discounts” each dimension of the HDI based on a country’s level of inequality. Figure 6 shows the differences between the HDI and the IHDI in various regions of the world. We find that in absolute and relative terms, Latin America and the Caribbean have the largest gap between the average HDI and the average IHDI in the world. With an HDI of 0.71 Colombia is in line with countries with high levels of human development, but it is at the lower end (0.741) and below average for Latin America and the Caribbean. As for IHDI, with a score of 0.479 Colombia is well below the regional average.




Figure 6. Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index in Six World Regions

¹³ Powell, Andrew. 2012. *The World of Forking Paths: Latin America and the Caribbean Facing Global Economic Risks*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.

¹⁴ The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index running from 0 to 1, and measuring a country’s average achievement in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and income (standard of living). Calculations are based on data from UNDESA (2011), Barro and Lee (2010), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2011), World Bank (2011a), and IMF (2011).

Figure 7 presents the overall loss in human development due to inequality in each world region, calculated as the percentage of difference between HDI and IHDI. According to this metric, the region loses 26% of its potential for human development because of persistent inequalities. In Colombia, high inequality translates into a 32.5% loss in human development potential, losing more than the regional average, approaching even levels in Sub-Saharan Africa.




Figure 7. Overall Loss in Human Potential Due to Inequality

Nonetheless, these HDI and IHDI measures obscure how human development in Colombia is highly uneven across the country's different regions. Figure 8 shows the average municipal HDI (M-HDI) for each department of Colombia (including Bogotá, D.C.). The huge difference between the capital and the rest of the country is clear. Vaupés, the department with the second-best ranking, is a full point below Bogotá. And, not surprisingly, Chocó is at the end of the list at more than two points below Bogotá, confirming one again the department's precarious social and economic conditions.




Figure 8. Average Municipal HDI by Department in Colombia

Figure 9 depicts the differences in the probability of completing sixth grade on time for children from advantaged (light green bar) and disadvantaged (dark green bar) family backgrounds in a number of countries in the Americas.¹⁵ For example, the graph shows that the odds of a student from a disadvantaged background in Jamaica of completing sixth grade on time is just over 80%, while his/her peer from an advantaged background has only a slightly better chance (with odds close to 90%). By these measures, Brazil, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Peru are the countries where children from disadvantaged backgrounds have the lowest probabilities of achievement. Central and South American countries stand out for being highly unequal. The graph reiterates Colombia's persistent inequalities: the probability that a child from an advantaged home finishes the sixth grade on time is 95%, while for a disadvantaged child this probability nears 15%.

¹⁵ Barros, Ricardo Paes de, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, José R. Molinas Vega, and Jaime Saavedra Chanduvi. 2009. *Measuring Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.




Figure 9. Family Background and Educational Achievement in the Americas

III. Equalities in Economic and Social Opportunities in Colombia: A View from the AmericasBarometer

The previous section provided a bird's eye view of the state of economic and social inequality in the Americas. But who is most affected by inequalities? And what do the citizens of the Americas think about equality and inequality of opportunity in the region? Questions included in the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer allow us to assess the extent to which key measures of opportunity such as income and education differ across measures such as one's race, gender, and family background. We also take a detailed look at public opinion: who thinks they have been discriminated against, to what extent do individuals perceive inequalities as natural or desirable, and what public policies might citizens endorse to redress inequalities.

Studies of discrimination across the Americas seek to document the extent to which people with the same skills and education, but who are members of different social groups, are paid differently or have different employment opportunities.¹⁶ Discrimination may occur either because of

¹⁶ For a review of this literature, see: Ñopo, Hugo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro, eds. 2009. *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

negative attitudes towards the group discriminated against, or because of “statistical discrimination,” meaning that employers infer lower levels of desired skills or human capital from membership in certain marginalized groups. Such studies of discrimination generally indicate that women remain underpaid relative to men with similar characteristics, while women from marginalized ethnic and racial groups are particularly underpaid.¹⁷ Nonetheless, a recent series of experimental and observational studies suggests that some forms of overt labor market discrimination may be lower than often assumed in many countries of Latin America.¹⁸

The first major social divide we examine is the one between men and women. According to scholars of gender inequality in the Americas, although large gaps still exist, labor force participation rates among men and women have become more equal.¹⁹ Indeed, the region has experienced growing equality in terms of class composition between genders.²⁰ Furthermore, the gender gap in educational levels has also shrunk significantly.²¹ In all, the overall trend in gender discrimination is positive according to most studies.

Second, we examine divides between racial and ethnic groups. According to recent academic studies, racial, ethnic, and linguistic minorities experience continued economic and social inequalities, especially in terms of pay and occupation.²² Such discrimination tends to be higher in regions exhibiting low levels of socioeconomic development. Additionally, discrimination by race and ethnicity is more prevalent than gender discrimination in the Americas.²³ Nevertheless, accuracy in the measurement of discrimination by race and ethnicity is difficult to achieve given the lack of sufficient and reliable data.²⁴

Finally, we examine how family background and social class affect economic and social opportunities in the Americas. Differences in social class have long been considered the driving forces behind inequality in Latin America, if not also in other parts of the Americas, trumping the

¹⁷ Lovell, Peggy A. 2000a. “Race, Gender and Regional Labor Market Inequalities in Brazil.” *Review of Social Economy* 58 (3): 277 – 293; Lovell, Peggy A. 2000b. “Gender, Race, and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (6) (November 1): 85-102. Ñopo, Hugo. 2004. “The Gender Wage Gap in Peru 1986-2000. Evidence from a Matching Comparisons Approach.” *Económica* 1 (1-2).

¹⁸ Bravo, David, Claudia Sanhueza, and Sergio Urzúa. 2009a. “Ability, Schooling Choices, and Gender Labor Market Discrimination: Evidence for Chile.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*, ed. Hugo Ñopo, Alberto Chong, and Andrea Moro. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank; Bravo, Sanhueza, and Urzúa. 2009b. “An Experimental Study of Labor Market Discrimination: Gender, Social Class, and Neighborhood in Chile.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo, Natalia Candelo, Alejandro Gaviria, Sandra Polanía, and Rajiv Sethi. 2009. “Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor: A Field Experimental Study.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*; Petrie, Ragan, and Máximo Torero. 2009. “Ethnic and Social Barriers to Cooperation: Experiments Studying the Extent and Nature of Discrimination in Urban Peru.” In *Discrimination in Latin America: An Economic Perspective*.

¹⁹ Abramo, Laís and María Elena Valenzuela. 2005. “Women’s Labour Force Participation Rates in Latin America.” *International Labour Review* 144 (December): 369-399; De Ferranti et al., 2004, Ibid.

²⁰ Hite, Amy Bellone and Jocelyn S. Viterna. 2005 “Gendering Class in Latin America: How Women Effect and Experience Change in the Class Structure.” *Latin American Research Review* 40 (2): 50–82.

²¹ Duryea, Suzanne, Sebastian Galiani, Hugo Ñopo, and Claudia C. Piras. 2007. “The Educational Gender Gap in Latin America and the Caribbean.” SSRN eLibrary (April). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820870.

²² De Ferranti et al., 2004, Ibid; Patrinos, Harry Anthony. 2000. The Cost of Discrimination in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 35, no. 2 (June): 3-17.

²³ Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. “Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment”. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, 2: 359-72.

²⁴ Telles, Edward Eric. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

effects of race or gender. Recent studies, including many cited above, have increasingly shown the importance of these other factors in affecting life choices. Nonetheless, statistical analyses continue to show that family background remains perhaps the most robustly important social characteristic affecting opportunities in the Americas; and we, therefore, take this into consideration in our analyses.²⁵

We begin our analysis using the AmericasBarometer 2012 data by examining what citizens of the Americas from different gender, racial, and class-based groups, as well as ones living in rural versus urban areas, told us about their economic and social resources. The 2010 and 2012 AmericasBarometer questionnaires included many measures used to determine a respondent's social group. Thus, we can assess respondents' racial and ethnic identities in two principal ways.²⁶ Question **ETID** (see the questionnaire in the appendix of this publication for all question items referred to in the text) simply asks respondents whether they identify as white, mestizo, indigenous, black, mulatto, or other (with variation in the specific wording for each country). In addition, beginning with the AmericasBarometer 2010, with the sponsorship of Professor Ed Telles from Princeton University, we pioneered the use of a skin tone palette.²⁷ At the end of each interview, interviewers are asked to rate the facial skin tone of the respondent on a scale from 1 (lightest) to 11 (darkest) (see Figure 10). The 2010 data from the resulting variable, **COLORR**, proved extremely useful for understanding differences in the experiences of individuals from varying groups across the region (see, for instance, Special Report Boxes 1 and 2). Thanks to Professor Telles' ongoing support, we again included the skin tone palette in 2012.²⁸

²⁵ See, v.g., Barros et al., 2009, *Ibid*; Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. "Pigmentocracy in the Americas: How is Educational Attainment Related to Skin Color?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (73). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

²⁶ The complete text of the questionnaire is in Appendix C.

²⁷ Telles, Edward, and Liza Steele. 2012. *Ibid*.

²⁸ In 2012, the skin tone palette was used in 24 countries, with the United States and Canada being the exceptions. In 2010, the palette was used in 23 countries, with Haiti also being excluded.



Figure 10. Skin Tone Palette Used in the AmericasBarometer

We also included a number of questions on social and economic resources in the 2012 questionnaire. As in previous years, we included questions on education, family income, and household assets, ranging from indoor plumbing to ownership of flat-screen television sets and vehicles. We used this group of questions, found in the **R** series, to create a five-point index of quintiles of household wealth, which is standardized across urban and rural areas in each country.²⁹

We also incorporated a number of new questions on social and economic resources in 2012. For the first time, we asked those respondents who reported working at the time of the interview about their personal incomes (**Q10G**). For respondents who were married or living with a partner, we sought to tap intra-household inequalities in earned income with question **GEN10**.

²⁹ This variable is called **QUINTALL** in the merged 2012 database. For more information on the variable, see Córdova, Abby. 2009. "Methodological Note: Measuring Relative Wealth Using Household Asset Indicators." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 6. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

GEN10. Thinking only about yourself and your spouse and the salaries that you earn, which of the following phrases best describe your salaries [Read alternatives]

- (1) You don't earn anything and your spouse earns it all;
- (2) You earn less than your spouse;
- (3) You earn more or less the same as your spouse;
- (4) You earn more than your spouse;
- (5) You earn all of the income and your spouse earns nothing.
- (6) [Don't Read] No salary income
- (88) DK
- (98) DA
- (99) INAP

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also contained a few questions on family background or class, in addition to measures of household wealth. Question **ED2** examines family background by asking respondents to report their mother's level of education. And self-identified social class is measured with question **MOV1**, which asks respondents whether they consider themselves to be upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, or lower class.³⁰

Finally, we included two new questions in all countries on food security: **FS2** and **FS8**.³¹ Together, these questions, which were developed by our LAPOP team in Mexico in collaboration with Yale University, help us examine how social and economic resources are distributed in the countries of the region.

Now I am going to read you some questions about food.				
	No	Yes	DK	DA
FS2. In the past three months, because of a lack of money or other resources, did your household ever run out of food?	0	1	88	98
FS8. In the past three months, because of lack of money or other resources, did you or some other adult in the household ever eat only once a day or go without eating all day?	0	1	88	98

With a linear regression analysis³² we evaluated how gender, race, age, and urban or rural location affected educational levels in Colombia. Figure 11 shows the results.³³

³⁰ Álvarez-Rivadulla, María José and Rosario Queirolo. 2013. Inequality Matters: The Role of Education in Defining Social Class in Colombia vs. Uruguay. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³¹ These questions were administered to a split sample of respondents in each country, meaning that only half of respondents received the questions.

³² In an effort to facilitate interpretation, all LAPOP reports present the results of multivariate analyses graphically. Each independent variable included in the analysis is listed on the vertical axis. The dot represents the impact of the variable, and the bar represents the confidence interval. When the bar does not intersect the vertical "0" line, that variable is statistically significant, meaning, that we can be confident that the independent variable has the displayed relationship with the dependent variable. For more information on tables and figures, see page xxviii.

³³ Table 18 of Appendix D shows the complete results of this model.





Figure 11. Determinants of the Level of Education in Colombia

The model suggests those who live in the urban centers of Colombian municipal districts reach an average education level that is higher than those in the rural areas of the municipal district (Figure 12). Meanwhile, in terms of age structures, older respondents report receiving fewer years of education than younger respondents (Figure 13).



**Figure 12. Years of Schooling by Area of Residence
(Controlling for All Other Factors)**




Figure 13. Years of Schooling by Age Group (Controlling for All Other Factors)




Figure 14. Years of Schooling by Skin Tone (Controlling for All Other Factors)

In terms of vulnerable or traditionally discriminated groups, the model indicates no differences in education levels between men and women. However, skin tone is significantly associated with educational achievement levels. People with darker skin tend to have fewer years of education than those with lighter skinned, as shown in Figure 14.

Finally, we assess the extent to which family or family background affect educational levels in Colombia. The multivariate regression model did not include item **ED2**, which measures family background, given that this question was only administered to half the sample.³⁴ Limiting the analysis to only half the sample would reduce our capacity to infer the effects related to other variables. Nonetheless, Figure 15 shows a positive relationship between the respondent's average educational level on the vertical axis in relation to the educational level attained by their mother (left panel) and their father (right panel). Colombians whose mother obtained a higher education had, on average, double the amount of years of schooling than those whose mother had no education. Moreover, in Colombia and in four other countries (El Salvador, Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay) respondents were also asked about their father's education levels, showing practically the same relationship. In short, the relationship between educational levels and social immobility are a recurring pattern in many countries of the region.




Figure 15. Years of Schooling by Parents' Education Levels in Colombia

It is worth asking if the same factors associated with education also crop up with income. That is, how do personal incomes vary by age, race, gender, as well as the size and place of residence? In Figure 16, we use linear regression analysis to assess the determinants of personal income among respondents who told us that they had a job at the time of the interview.³⁵

³⁴ In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, many of the questions were administered to only half of the sample so as to maximize space on the questionnaire.

³⁵ Income—both **Q10NEW** (family income) and **Q10G** (personal income) are coded on 0 to 16 scale, from lower to higher income level. See the questionnaire in Appendix C for more information. The detailed results of the model are in Table 19 of Appendix D.




Figure 16. Determinants of Personal Income in Colombia, Among Respondents who Work

Unlike education levels, the results on income indeed show a gap between employed men and women, as shown in Figure 17.





Figure 17. Personal Income by Sex (Controlling for All Other Factors)

The previous graph shows that women receive less personal income than men in Colombia. As noted above, item **GEN10** asks married interviewees or those with conjugal partners about their personal income compared to that of their spouse. Figure 18 shows income differences exclusively between those men and women who reported having employment.



**Figure 18. Respondent's Income Compared to Their Spouse's in Colombia
Among Respondents who Work**

While two out of three men in Colombia say they make more than their spouse, less than one in ten women make the same claim. In contrast, four out of five women say they make less than their spouse, compared to only 16% of men.

Meanwhile, as with education levels, people who live (and work) in urban areas receive significantly more income than those in rural areas, as shown in Figure 19.




Figure 19. Personal Income by Area of Residence (Controlling for All Other Factors)

People with darker skin also tend to have lower incomes, as Figure 20 illustrates.




Figure 20. Personal Income by Skin Tone (Controlling for All Other Factors)

Compared to those between the ages of 18 and 25 (the baseline cohort), people between the ages of 26 and 55 receive higher incomes, as shown in Figure 21.




Figure 21. Personal Income by Age Group

Finally, we also evaluate to what extent family background affect Colombians' personal income levels. Figure 22 shows that personal income in Colombia is strongly correlated with the educational attainment of the parents. The jump in income is particularly sharp for those having parents with a higher education—a minority among respondents. Only in 7% of the cases did the mother have a university-level education, while in the case of the father only 10% had an education beyond high school.




Figure 22. Personal Income by Parents' Education Level in Colombia

Arguably, the most critical basic resource to which individuals need access is food. We have seen that personal income is not distributed equally in Colombia. Does access to food follow a similar pattern? In measuring levels of food insecurity, we combined the **FS2** and **FS8** variables to create an index that goes from 0 (low food insecurity) to 2 (high food insecurity). Figure 23 shows the percentage of people in each country with high food insecurity. In Colombia, one in every ten respondents fall into this category, a significantly lower level than countries such as Jamaica and Haiti, but more than double that of Chile.




Figure 23. High Food Insecurity in the Americas

Figure 24 shows the results of a linear regression analysis to establish the determinants of food insecurity.³⁶




Figure 24. Determinants of Food Insecurity in Colombia

The only factor that significantly predicts food insecurity is the respondent's education level. Figure 25 shows how food insecurity is considerably higher among those with lower education levels and decreases as education levels increase.




Figure 25. Food Insecurity by Education Level

³⁶ Questions on food insecurity were administered to half of those interviewed. Detailed results of the model are shown in Table 20 of Appendix D.

Another way of looking at social and economic discrimination is from the point of view of the victim. In 17 countries of the Americas, we included questions asking whether respondents perceived themselves to have been victims of discrimination. The questions were from a slightly modified battery first used in 2008; they were optional in each country.

Now, changing the subject, and thinking about your experiences in the past year, have you ever felt discriminated against, that is, treated worse than other people, in the following places?					
	Yes	No	DK	DA	INAP
DIS2. In government offices [courts, agencies, municipal government]	1	2	88	98	99
DIS3. At work or school or when you have looked for work	1	2	88	98	99
DIS5. In public places, such as on the street, in public squares, in shops or in the market place?	1	2	88	98	

In Figure 26, we show the percentage of citizens who said they had been victims of discrimination in government offices for the countries where the **DIS2** question was asked. We can see that in Colombia close to 15% of respondents said they had felt discriminated against in a government office, one of the highest percentages reported in the study—albeit, significantly lower than that of countries such as Bolivia, for instance. The percentage of Colombians who reported feeling discriminated against at the workplace, school, or while looking for employment was slightly higher at 17%, a percentage similar to Bolivia's, as shown in Figure 27. Finally, the percentage of Colombians who feel discriminated against in public places such as parks and plazas is comparatively low. Figure 28 shows that just over 8% reported this kind of discrimination, a proportion similar to what we found in Mexico and Uruguay.




Figure 26. Self-Reported Discrimination in Government Offices in the Americas




Figure 27. Self-Reported Discrimination in the Workplace, School, or Seeking Employment




Figure 28. Self-Reported Discrimination in Public Places in the Americas

Figure 29 shows the results of logistic regression analysis examining the determinants of victimization by discrimination in the workplace, school, or in looking for employment reported by respondents in Colombia.³⁷

The figure indicates that perceptions of discrimination do not depend on the sex or skin tone of interviewees, suggesting that these perceptions are not necessarily related to more objective measures of discrimination (Ñopo et al. 2009).³⁸ More noticeable, however, is that perceptions of being discriminated against are lower among older respondents than among those between the ages of 18 and 25, but this could stem from the question not distinguishing between those with jobs and those without jobs.




Figure 29. Determinants of Discrimination at the Workplace, School, or Seeking Employment

Public Opinion on Racial and Gender Inequality

The previous sections have shown that economic and social resources are not distributed equally among different groups in Colombia defined by gender, race, urban/rural status, and family background. Yet to be explored, however, is why these inequalities persist. In particular, we have not assessed the extent to which differences in socioeconomic outcomes might be partly due to discriminatory norms or attitudes. The AmericasBarometer 2012 included several questions that provide a look at attitudes regarding the economic roles of men and women, and the economic achievements of different racial groups.

³⁷ Detailed results of the model appear in Table 21 of Appendix D.

³⁸ Ñopo, et al. 2009. *Ibid.*

First, we examine social norms regarding men's versus women's work. Many studies have suggested that citizens throughout the Americas continue to hold attitudes that imply different roles for men and women in the labor force.³⁹ In 2012, we asked respondents to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, using a 7-point scale:

GEN1. Changing the subject again, some say that when there is not enough work, men should have a greater right to jobs than women. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

In Figure 30 we present the average levels of agreement with this statement across the Americas. In the figure, responses have been rescaled to run from 0 to 100, for ease of comparison. Although Colombia appears in the middle range in terms of agreement with the idea that men should have priority over women in the labor market, it is well below countries such as the Dominican Republic, but considerably higher than Uruguay or Brazil.




Figure 30. Agreement that Men Should Take Priority Over Women in the Labor Market in the Americas

Average levels of agreement with this statement obscure notable variation in responses among Colombians. Figure 31 looks at the responses in more detail and again rescales the 1 to 7 range. Only a third of citizens are in total disagreement with the idea of giving priority to men in the labor market, while at least one out of ten respondents say they are in total agreement.

³⁹ Morgan, Jana and Melissa Buice. 2011. "Gendering Democratic Values: A Multilevel Analysis of Latin American Attitudes toward Women in Politics." Presented at the conference Marginalization in the Americas, Miami, FL; Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality & Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.




Figure 31. Agreement that Men Should Take Priority Over Women in the Labor Market in Colombia

AmericasBarometer 2012 also asked citizens of the Americas about their views on why racial and ethnic inequalities still exist. In this round, the following question was asked in all the countries of the Americas:⁴⁰

RAC1CA. According to various studies, people with dark skin are poorer than the rest of the population. What do you think is the main reason for this? [Read alternatives, just one answer]

(1) Because of their culture, or	(2) Because they have been treated unjustly
(3) [Do not read] Another response	(88) DK (98) DA

Figure 32 shows the percentage of respondents who agree with the idea that the poverty of dark-skinned people is “cultural.” In Colombia, at least a fifth of interviewees subscribed to this idea, a proportion considerably larger than Uruguay’s, for example.

⁴⁰ The question was asked to half of the sample.




Figure 32. Percentage Who Think the Poverty of Dark-Skinned People is Due to their “Culture”

IV. Public Opinion on Policy Proposals for Greater Equity

What, if anything, should the governments of the Americas do about the social and economic inequalities faced by their citizens? Answering this question fully is beyond the scope of this report and would require taking positions in normative and ideological debates that are better left to the citizens of the Americas than to the authors of this report. Nonetheless, we outline below some commonly proposed policy solutions and then explore public opinion on those proposals.

In 2010 and 2012, the AmericasBarometer asked individuals across the region what they thought the role of the state should be in reducing inequality. In question **ROS4**, respondents were asked to agree or disagree, on a 7-point scale, with the following statement:

ROS4. The Colombian State should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question provide a first glimpse on the extent to which Colombians agree, in the abstract, that inequality constitutes a problem that governments should actively address with public policies. Figure 33 presents the average agreement with this statement in each country of the region. We rescaled the 1-7 responses to run from 0 (“Strongly disagree”) to 100 (“Strongly agree”).

Across the Americas, there are high levels of agreement with the notion that the state should enact strong policies for reducing income inequality. With the exception of the United States, which has a long tradition of libertarianism and minimal State involvement in civilian life, the rest of the

countries do not show major differences on the idea of the State having a generic role as an agent charged with battling inequality. The average level of agreement in Colombia is not far from Nicaragua, the country with the largest rate of agreement, or from Venezuela, which shows much more disagreement.




Figure 33. Agreement that the State Should Reduce Inequality in the Countries of the Americas

Conditional Cash Transfer and Public Assistance Programs

In the past two decades, many governments in the region have transformed their social assistance programs, providing means-tested, conditional assistance to their most disadvantaged citizens in exchange for those citizens participating in public health programs and keeping their children in school.⁴¹ The most well-known and largest of these programs include *Oportunidades* in Mexico, *Bolsa Família* in Brazil, *Familias en Acción* in Colombia, and the *Asignación Universal por Hijo*

⁴¹ Barrientos, Armando, and Claudio Santibáñez. 2009. "New Forms of Social Assistance and the Evolution of Social Protection in Latin America." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 41(1): 1-26; Bruhn, Kathleen. 1996. "Social Spending and Political Support: The 'Lessons' of the National Solidarity Program in Mexico." *Comparative Politics* 28(2): 151-177; Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. *Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank; Layton, Matthew L., and Amy Erica Smith. 2011. "Social Assistance and the Presidential Vote in Latin America." *AmericasBarometer Insights* (66). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

in Argentina. At the same time, many governments throughout the region have also broadly expanded non-conditional social assistance programs. In general, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs are seen as an effective means for assisting the poorest citizens throughout the region.

In addition to having positive effects on school enrollment and attendance, “CCTs have increased access to preventive medical care and vaccination, raised the number of visits to health centers and reduced the rate of illness while raising overall consumption and food consumption, with positive results on the growth and weight of children, especially among the smallest.”⁴² However, recent studies have also found that the effectiveness of these and similar programs depends, in large part, on how such programs are designed and implemented in specific countries, making clear the need for policymakers to develop well-planned and effective programs.⁴³ The reduction in inequality and poverty in some of the region’s most historically unequal contexts is widely attributed to these social assistance and CCT programs.

In 2012, we measured receipt levels of public assistance and CCT programs across the region using a new question:

CCT1NEW. Do you or someone in your household receive monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Levels of receipt of social assistance from the government vary greatly across the region. In Figure 34, we present the percentage of respondents in each country who said that a member of their household received public assistance. Bolivia has by far the largest percentage of households receiving public assistance—more than half of those surveyed (54.9%). A large group of countries range between 15% and 23% of respondents claiming assistance, including Colombia with 16%. Finally, in countries such as Venezuela, Paraguay, and Peru, among others, less than a tenth of respondents receive government aid.

⁴² Valencia Lomeli, Enrique. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers as Social Policy in Latin America: An Assessment of their Contributions and Limitations.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 475–499. p. 490

⁴³ Lindert, Kathy, Emmanuel Skoufias, and Joseph Shapiro. 2006. “Redistributing Income to the Poor and Rich: Public Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean.” *Social Protection Working Paper* #0605. The World Bank




Figure 34. Percentage of Recipients of Public Assistance (CCT/TCDE) in the Americas

Figure 35 shows that receipt of public assistance in Colombia is most concentrated in the Caribbean region (the exception being the Former National Territories, where, due to being sparsely populated, the confidence interval is wide enough for percentage levels to be statistically indistinguishable from other regions). Bogotá is where the fewest people—proportionately—receive public assistance.




Figure 35. Percentage of Recipients of Public Assistance by Region in Colombia

The survey in Colombia had a specific question about the *Familias en Acción* program that was formulated as follows:

CCT1B. Now, talking specifically about the Programa Familias en Acción, are you or someone in your household a beneficiary of this program?
 (1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA

Interestingly, even though only 16% of Colombians considered themselves recipients of “monthly assistance in the form of money or products from the government” as we saw in Figure 34, the proportion increases to 22% when the name of the program is explicitly mentioned in the question. The discrepancy might stem from the formulation of the question and perhaps that Colombians consider the benefits of program *Familias en Acción* as something different from “monthly assistance in the form of money or products.”⁴⁴

In any case, the program is principally designed to benefit women and this is evident in the results of the 2012 AmericasBarometer. Figure 36 also shows the relationship between a person’s skin tone and their situation of precarity, which makes them eligible for the program.




Figure 36. Beneficiaries of *Familias en Acción* by Sex and Skin Tone

The 2012 AmericasBarometer provides an opportunity to assess what citizens of the region think about public assistance programs. While the survey did not ask directly about *support* for such programs, question **CCT3** did ask about attitudes towards recipients.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ In past years, a slightly different wording of the question about affiliation with the Familias en Acción program generated affirmative responses ranging from 13% to 17%.

⁴⁵ This question was asked to a split sample of respondents.

CCT3. Changing the topic... Some people say that people who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy. How much do you agree or disagree?

The responses have been recoded from the original 1 to 7 scale—“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”—to a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparisons with other surveys. Figure 37 presents the levels of agreement with this statement in the Americas.




Figure 37. Belief that Recipients of Public Assistance are Lazy in the Countries of the Americas

One thing that stands out in the results is that Argentina and Uruguay, which have strong welfare State traditions (including broad state coverage in services such as health and education), are the countries where welfare recipients are most stigmatized as lazy. This could be tied to a new dynamic in those countries in which traditional working class sectors—the main beneficiaries of the old welfare State—are critical of the new forms of assistance, which are mainly geared towards groups excluded from the formal economy and employment amid new market dynamics.⁴⁶

In Colombia, unlike Argentina and Uruguay, a relationship exists between the respondent's economic status and their attitude towards those receiving public assistance. Figure 38 shows that wealthier people are more likely to characterize recipients of State welfare as lazy—a trend absent in Argentina and Uruguay.

⁴⁶ This hypothesis emerged from a conversation with María José Álvarez Rivadulla, a Uruguayan sociologist interested in comparative studies on what she calls “inequality tolerance.”




Figure 38. Belief that Those Receiving Public Assistance are Lazy by Wealth Quintile in Colombia

Affirmative Action

Another possible policy solution to inequality that has recently attracted attention in some quarters of Latin America is affirmative action. While in the United States affirmative action has a history going back decades, in Latin America it is a more recent phenomenon, and has only been seriously considered in a handful of countries with the largest populations of Afro-descendants.⁴⁷


In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer, we asked about support for affirmative action in every country of the region. Question **RAC2A** was administered to a split sample of respondents, who were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, on a scale from 1 to 7.

RAC2A. Universities ought to set aside openings for students with darker skin, even if that means excluding other students. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure 39 examines support for affirmative action across the Americas. Here, again, responses have been recoded on a 0 to 100 scale for ease of comparison. We can see the United States, which has a long tradition of affirmative action in favor of African Americans, is where citizens disagree the most with this kind of policy aimed at solving structural disadvantages. Colombia showed medium levels of agreement, barely above the mid-point of the 0 to 100 scale and significantly below

⁴⁷ For more information on support for affirmative action in Brazil, see: Smith, Amy Erica. "Who Supports Affirmative Action in Brazil?" *AmericasBarometer Insights* (49). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

countries such as Paraguay, Honduras, and Argentina, but above El Salvador and Suriname, for instance. These differences do not appear to be tied to the average skin tone of people in each country; in fact, average skin tones in Paraguay and Honduras, for example, are not significantly different from those in Colombia or El Salvador, as shown in Figure 40.



V. Conclusion

The vast differences in the life circumstances and opportunities facing citizens of the Americas constitute one of the most important political, social, and economic problems facing the governments of the Americas. While inequality has recently been improving in many countries that have historically had the highest levels of inequality, we have seen that important differences remain in the opportunities and resources available to citizens depending on their personal characteristics and how these position them within their country’s social milieu.

The results analyzed in this chapter show some structural characteristics that are worth reviewing. First, we found that educational achievement is linked to area of residence and skin tone. Those with darker skin and those living in rural areas tend to report fewer years of schooling than those with lighter skin or those who live in urban areas. We also found a strong relation between the education levels of respondents and those of their parents. For example, a person whose father or mother had a higher education had on average double the years of schooling than a person whose parents had no education at all.

As for income, women in Colombia gain significantly less personal income than men. Moreover, the percentage of women who say they earn less income than their spouse is almost five times the rate of men. As in educational achievement, income is also associated with location of residence (urban or rural) and skin tone. Similarly, we found a strong positive relationship between interviewees' personal income and the education levels of their parents.

For food security, we found that almost one in ten respondents in Colombia experience high levels of food insecurity, a substantially high percentage despite being in the middle range when compared to other countries of the region. Food insecurity is especially high among people with low levels of education.

Fifteen percent of interviewed Colombians reported feeling discriminated against at government offices, a high percentage second only to Bolivia in South America. The workplace shows a similar pattern: 17% of respondents reported feeling discriminated at work. Discrimination in public places is considerably lower at 8%, not only in comparison to the other spaces, but also in relation to other countries of the hemisphere. Workplace discrimination is fundamentally associated with age: older people reported more incidents of discrimination at work. Importantly, when controlling for other factors, skin tone was not ultimately a significant predictor of discrimination on the job.

As for attitudes related to discrimination and marginalization, the level of acceptance that men should have priority over women in the labor market is close (37 on a 100-point scale) to the regional average—less than Bolivia, but higher than Uruguay. Meanwhile, rather than attributing the poverty of people with darker skin to discrimination, one in five people displayed racist attitudes by attributing it to their “culture.”

Finally, although Colombia, like the other countries of the region (except for the United States), holds the view that the State should combat situations of inequality and marginalization, the level of agreement is more mixed on concrete policies such as affirmative action for darker skinned citizens and—to a lesser extent—direct economic assistance to vulnerable populations.

Special Report Box 1: Educational Achievement and Skin Tone


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 73, by Edward L. Telles and Liza Steele. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To explore relationships between race and social outcomes, in 2010 AmericasBarometer interviewers discreetly recorded respondents' skin tones.¹ Unfortunately, because the 2010 survey in Haiti was focused on the earthquake's aftermath, skin color was not coded. Nonetheless, results from other countries are instructive.

The figure indicates that, across the Americas, there are significant differences in years of education between the lightest and darkest skinned residents of almost every country, with the exceptions of Panama, Suriname, Belize, and Guyana.

Multivariate regression analysis is used to control for differences in social class and other relevant sociodemographic variables. This analysis indicates that skin color still has an independent predictive effect on educational outcomes. The impact of skin color on education is notable in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. The effect of skin tone on education is even stronger, however, in Bolivia and Guatemala, both countries with large indigenous populations. These results suggest that, contrary to scholarly wisdom, skin color does matter in Latin America. Furthermore, the results from Bolivia and Guatemala are consistent with research suggesting that indigenous groups are particularly marginalized in a number of Latin American countries.

Differences in Educational Achievement by Skin Tone in the Americas



95% Intervalo de confianza (Efecto de diseño incorporado)

Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

¹ The variable used to measure a respondent's skin tone is **COLORR**. Education is measured using the variable ED, self-reported years of education.

Special Report Box 2: Economic Crisis, Skin Tone, and Household Wealth


This box summarizes the findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 76, by Mitchell A. Seligson, Amy Erica Smith, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. This and all other reports may be Accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

To measure the impact of the economic crisis, the 2010 AmericasBarometer asked 43,990 citizens across the Americas whether they perceived an economic crisis, and if they did so, whether they thought it was serious. ¹ While most citizens in the Americas perceived an economic crisis, in many countries of the region, the crisis' impact was surprisingly muted. However, the impact of the crisis was not evenly distributed across important sub-groups within the population, with reports of economic distress varying by race and social status.


As this figure shows, respondents with darker facial skin tones were much more likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Among those with the lightest skin tones, the percentage of individuals who reported perceiving a grave economic crisis was around 40-45%, on average across the Latin American and Caribbean regions; at the other end of the scale, for those with the darkest skin tones, over 50% of individuals expressed the belief that their country was experiencing a severe economic crisis.

Similarly, the figure demonstrates that respondents from wealthier households were much less likely to perceive a severe economic crisis. Finally, we also uncover some limited evidence that women were more likely to be affected by the crisis. While 44.8% of men in the Americas perceived a severe economic crisis, 48.1% of

Perceptions of Severe Crisis, Skin Tone, and Household Wealth, 2010 AmericasBarometer



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

women did so, a difference that is statistically significant, but not especially large. This leads us to conclude that the crisis especially hurt the region's most vulnerable populations: those who were worse off prior to the crisis felt its negative effects most strongly.

¹ The variable measuring the economic crisis is **CRISIS1**.

Special Report Box 3: Support for Interethnic Marriage

The box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 77, by Mollie Cohen. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.



In order to gauge levels of support for interethnic marriage in countries with high indigenous populations, in the 2010 AmericasBarometer respondents in four countries, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru and Guatemala, were asked to what extent they would support their child's hypothetical marriage to an indigenous person.¹ The first figure indicates that a plurality of respondents indicated high levels of support for such a marriage. Nonetheless, there is still important variation in response to the question.

The second figure illustrates the results from a multivariate regression analysis of the sociodemographic predictors of interethnic marriage. A respondent's ethnicity has a statistically significant impact on support for marriage to indigenous persons, with all ethnic groups reporting significantly lower levels of support than self-identified indigenous respondents. Members of privileged groups—particularly self-identified whites and mixed individuals—indicate the least support for a child's hypothetical interethnic marriage.

Sociodemographic factors are largely irrelevant in predicting support for interethnic marriage, with a respondent's gender (not shown here to preserve space), wealth, education level, and the size of a respondent's place of residence all yielding statistically insignificant coefficients.

¹ The variable measuring support for interethnic marriage is **RAC3B**.

Levels of Support for Interethnic Marriage in Four Countries, and Predicted by Sociodemographics and Values



Interestingly, self-reported political tolerance and the personality characteristic of openness to experience both positively predict support for interethnic marriage, all else equal.

Chapter Two: Equality of Political Participation in the Americas

With Mason Moseley and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we turn our attention to an assessment of how gender, race, and poverty affect political involvement and opportunities across the region. The chapter is divided into four parts. First, we review the literature on unequal participation, making the case for why this topic merits attention given its relevance to democratization and economic development. Second, we focus on current levels of participation in electoral politics and civil society as measured by the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. In doing so, we attempt to gauge the extent to which participatory inequalities are present in the Americas. We then turn to public opinion related to disadvantaged groups' participation in politics and public office. Finally, we review potential remedies for some of the participatory inequalities that exist in the region.

Why does unequal participation matter? Beginning with Almond and Verba's seminal work on "civic culture," political scientists and sociologists alike have sought to determine who participates in democratic politics, and how to explain variation in participation across groups and contexts.¹ An inevitable consequence of this literature has been that scholars have discovered that certain groups participate more in politics than others, and that there is a great deal of variation in levels of participation across democratic societies. The consequences of this variation are often manifested in political representation and policy outputs, since those who participate are also more likely to have their interests represented in government.

Why does unequal participation matter? In his address to the American Political Science Association in 1997, Arend Lijphart suggested that unequal political participation was the next great challenge for democracies across the world.² Focusing on voter turnout in Europe and the Americas, Lijphart put forth several concerns regarding unequal political participation in modern democracies. First, unequal turnout is biased against less well-to-do individuals, as the middle and upper classes are more likely to vote than those belonging to lower classes. Second, lower turnout by poor citizens leads to unequal political influence, to the degree that policies better reflect the preferences of voters compared to non-voters. Third, participation in midterm, regional, local, and supranational elections tends to be especially low, even though these elections have a crucial impact on a wide range of policy areas. Fourth, political participation has decreased in diverse countries around the world, and the trend shows no signs of reversing. Many of Lijphart's arguments have been corroborated with empirical evidence; for instance, the harmful effects of participatory inequality in elections in Switzerland and the United States have been well documented.³

¹ Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

² Lijphart, Arend. 1997. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemmas". *American Political Science Review* 91 (1): 1-14.

³ Jackman, Robert W. 1987. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies". *The American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424. Powell, G. Bingham. 1986. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective". *American Political Science Review* 81(2): 405-424.

If traditionally disadvantaged groups in democracies vote in lower numbers, then uneven voter turnout can obviously lead to inequalities in representation. Unfortunately, studies suggest that biased turnout seems to be more the rule rather than the exception, but what about other forms of political participation: Is political engagement outside the voting booth also unevenly distributed across various groups within society?

According to Verba et al. (1995), bias is not limited to electoral participation; in fact, other forms of political participation are even more biased against certain groups in society.⁴ For example, while we continue to observe a significant gap in turnout between rich and poor citizens, the gap widens even further when we consider letter writing, donating to campaigns, and volunteering for political parties or in local organizations.⁵ Particularly in a day and age when money has become a hugely important factor in political campaigns in countries across the world, it seems clear that a select few are able to exercise a comparatively high amount of political influence

Inequalities in participation exist along lines of not only class and wealth, but also gender and ethnicity. While turnout has largely equalized between men and women, such that in most countries women vote at approximately the same rate as men, women remain underrepresented in many other forms of participation.⁶ Substantial gaps in participation persist in areas such as communicating with representatives or volunteering for campaigns.⁷ Research suggests that many inequalities are due in part to household inequalities and the gendered division of labor.⁸

Some of the greatest gender inequalities occur in the most elaborate forms of participation, such as running for and holding public office. Inequalities in women's rates of holding office may aggravate inequalities in participation at other levels, since studies show that women can be strongly influenced to participate by visible female leaders.⁹

Scholarship suggests that participation has historically been uneven along ethnic and racial lines, but the national context is a critical point to consider. In the United States, for instance, where

Review 80 (1): 17-43; Timponi, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States". *American Political Science Review* 92 (1): 145-158.

⁴ For the United States, see Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Leighley, Jan E. and Arnold Vedlitz. 1999. "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations". *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 1092-1114. For Latin America, see Klesner, Joseph L. 2007. "Social Capital and Political Participation in Latin America: Evidence from Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru". *Latin American Research Review* 42 (2): 1-32.

⁵ Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

⁶ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Harvard University Press.; Desposato, Scott, and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation." *British Journal of Political Science* 39 (1): 141-162; Kam, Cindy, Elizabeth Zechmeister, and Jennifer Wilking. 2008. "From the Gap to Chasm: Gender and Participation among Non-Hispanic Whites and Mexican Americans." *Political Research Quarterly* 61 (2): 205-218.

⁷ Burns et al. 2001. Aviel, JoAnn Fagot. 1981. "Political Participation of Women in Latin America". *The Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 156-173

⁸ Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Welch, Susan. 1977. "Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences". *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 711-730

⁹ Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

stark inequalities in the political resources and opportunities available to different ethnic groups have long existed, there is evidence to suggest that some of the apparent differences across ethnic groups are attributable to differences in access to economic (or other) resources and social status.¹⁰ In Latin America, where indigenous groups have historically been economically and culturally marginalized, democratization has catalyzed vibrant indigenous social movements in many countries of the region.¹¹ Nonetheless, evidence shows that indigenous women, in particular, face particularly strong barriers to participation.¹²

Unequal participation has consequences for democratic representation. When certain groups are overrepresented on Election Day (or via other channels of citizen input), it follows that their interests will be overrepresented in terms of policies enacted by elected officials. In Mueller and Stratmann's (2003) cross-national study of participation and equality, they find that the most participatory societies are also those with the most equitable distributions of income.¹³ In other words, while widespread political participation might not generate wealth, it can affect how wealth is distributed and how governments prioritize policy issues (e.g., education and welfare programs). Put simply, high levels of democratic participation also beget high levels of representativeness in terms of public policy and thus more even processes of development.¹⁴

Another potential consequence of low levels of participation among traditionally disadvantaged groups is that those groups are underrepresented in legislative bodies. When women, ethnic minorities, and poor people vote at high rates, they often elect representatives that share similar backgrounds. Numerous studies demonstrate that female representatives prioritize different issues than males, just as representatives from different racial and ethnic groups prioritize different issues.¹⁵ Moreover, having minority representatives in the national legislature might also mobilize minority participation, generating a cyclical effect in which participation and representation go hand in hand.¹⁶ In short, the potential effects of unequal participation on social and economic development are multiple and significant, making any discrepancies in terms of rates of participation across groups cause for concern, while lack of discrepancies might be considered cause for optimism.

¹⁰ Leighley and Vedlitz 2000, *Ibid.* Lien, Pei-Te. 1994. "Ethnicity and Political Participation: A Comparison Between Asian and Mexican American". *Political Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 237-264; Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman H. Nie. 1993 "Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States". *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 453-497.

¹¹ Cleary, Matthew R. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America". *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (9) (November 1): 1123 -1153; Nagengast, Carole, and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness, and Political Activism". *Latin American Research Review* 25 (2) (January 1): 61-91; Yashar, Deborah J. 2005. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹² Pape, I.S.R. 2008. "'This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Socio-Cultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives*, 35(6): 41-62.

¹³ Mueller, Dennis C., and Thomas Stratmann. 2003. "The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation" *Journal of Public Economics* 87: 2129-2155

¹⁴ See also, Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press.

¹⁵ Kenworthy, Lane, and Melissa Malami. 1999. "Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis." *Social Forces* 78(1): 235-268; Lublin, David. 1999. "Racial Redistricting and African-American Representation: A Critique of 'Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?'" *American Political Science Review* 93(1): 183-186; Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2006. "Still Supermadres? Gender and the Policy Priorities of Latin American Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3): 570-85.

¹⁶ Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2004. "The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 65-75.

II. Participation in the Americas in 2012

In this section, we attempt to gauge inequalities in political participation in the Americas. To do so, we use data from the 2012 AmericasBarometer survey. Although data from past studies indicate that significant disparities exist in terms of participation rates across social groups, we embark on this analysis with an open mind. Given the lack of empirical evidence on this topic in Latin America and the Caribbean to date, the *a priori* possibility exists that rates of participation are relatively equal across socioeconomic and racial groups, and between men and women.

Voter Turnout

First, we examine inequalities in electoral participation in Colombia and in the rest of the Americas. In the AmericasBarometer surveys, electoral participation is measured using question **VB2**. In countries with a parliamentary system, the question is modified to ask about the most recent elections.

VB2. Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)?
 [IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST.]
 (1) Voted [Continue]
 (2) Did not vote [Go to VB10]
 (88) DK [Go to VB10] (98) DA [Go to VB10]

Figure 41 shows electoral participation by gender in the Americas. The figure clearly demonstrates two things. First, inequality in electoral participation *across* countries of the Americas is large: almost 90% in Peru and barely 50% in Honduras say they voted in the last presidential election. An obviously important point is that voting is compulsory in some countries and not in others. And these institutional differences certainly contribute to the cross-national variation in turnout. In Colombia, where voting is voluntary, electoral participation is in the lower range at 60%.¹⁷

¹⁷ It is worth noting that the United States is an anomalous case in Figure 41, where men had higher participation (86.8%) than women (77.6%). There are two anomalies. First, in the last U.S. elections, more women voted than men (66% and 62%, respectively) and, second, the survey reported much higher turnout rates (18% more) than the actual turnout. This kind of over-reporting is not rare for recent presidential elections in the United States. See the report on the United States Census, "Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports," from July 20, 2009, <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html>, accessed July 21, 2012, and the article: Allyson L. Holbrook and Jon A. Krosnick, "Social Desirability Bias in Voter Turnout Reports: Tests Using the Item Count Technique," from February 2009, <http://comm.stanford.edu/faculty/krosnick/Turnout%20Overreporting%20-%20ICT%20Only%20-%20Final.pdf>, accessed July 21, 2012.




Figure 41. Gender and Voter Turnout in the Countries of the Americas

Second, data from the 26 countries of the AmericasBarometer indicate that turnout for men and women is more or less the same. These findings reflect recent surveys from developed countries showing that women have closed the gender gap in terms of electoral participation. In Colombia, in fact, women actually reported higher turnout (65%) than men (62%), though the difference is not significant.

Figure 42 provides more details on the differences in turnout for population groups in Colombia.




Figure 42. Sociodemographic Factors and Voting in Colombia

Contrary to the findings of the literature cited above, disadvantaged groups in Colombia do not seem to face a negative bias in participation. Voting percentages are practically the same for all the wealth quintiles (top-left panel in the figure). And, as just mentioned, women report higher levels of voter participation than men (top-right panel), though not to a significant degree. As for education, the two groups with the highest turnout are those without any education and those with a university-level education, while those with elementary and high school educations vote proportionately less. Finally, skin tone does not introduce differences in turnout.

Beyond Voter Turnout

Electoral participation does not account for everything. Citizens certainly have myriad ways of taking part in the democratic system beyond voting in elections; participation of different groups in other kinds of activities may or may not parallel tendencies exhibited in electoral participation. The AmericasBarometer includes various questions that ask about citizens' political participation in activities beyond voting. Among other things, these questions ask about how and with what frequency citizens communicate with their representatives and if they participate in community organizations. By analyzing whether participation in political activities differs between groups, we can gain a general perspective on the influence—or lack thereof—of particular social sectors in the political process.

Over the years, LAPOP's AmericasBarometer has included a series of questions that ask about the frequency with which citizens participate in different community groups. In 2012, we also included some questions in the survey about the interviewee's role in the leadership of community groups. The wording of the questions in the **CP** series is as follows:

I am going to read you a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never.

CP6. Meetings of any religious organization? Do you attend them...

(1) once a week (2) once or twice a month (3) once or twice a year (4) never (88) DK (98) DA

CP7. Meetings of a parents' association at school? Do you attend them...

(1) once a week (2) once or twice a month (3) once or twice a year (4) never (88) DN (98) DA

CP8. Meetings of a community improvement committee or association? Do you attend them...

(1) once a week (2) once or twice a month (3) once or twice a year (4) never (88)DK (98) DA

After each question, the interviewees who said they participated at least once or twice a year were asked (**CP6L**, **CP7L**, and **CP8L**):

CP6L ¿And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]

CP7L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]

CP8L. And do you attend only as an ordinary member or do you have a leadership role or participate in the board? [If the interviewee says "both," mark "leader"]

To what degree do the citizens of the Americas participate in community groups? Figure 43 examines this question. The left side of the figure presents the levels of community participation in each country of the Americas. Community participation is calculated as an average of the responses to questions **CP6**, **CP7**, and **CP8**, adjusted to a 0-100 scale, in which 0 indicates never participating in a group and 100 indicates frequent participation in groups. The right side of the figure presents the percentage of interviewees in each country who said they were leaders of a group.




Figure 43. Participation and Leadership in Community Groups in the Americas

Participation by Colombians appears significantly lower than that in countries such as Haiti, Guatemala, and Bolivia, and somewhat lower than Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador. But it is significantly higher than in countries such as Uruguay and Argentina, probably given the more secular culture of these countries, where participation in religious organizations is considerably lower.

As for leadership, less than one in every ten people that participate in these groups does so in a position of leadership. By comparison, in Haiti and El Salvador, where participation is high (albeit to a lesser extent in the latter), one out of four and one of every five individuals—respectively—consider themselves leaders in their community groups.

Figure 44 and Figure 45 examine the results from Colombia with greater detail, showing average levels of participation among different demographic groups in the country.




Figure 44. Sociodemographic Factors and Community Participation in Colombia




Figure 45. Sociodemographic Factors and Leadership in Community Groups in Colombia

Participation in community groups is gendered with women participating significantly more than men—likely because of persistent gender differences in access to the labor market. Differences along racial lines are also noticeable: darker-skinned respondents tend to participate more frequently in community groups, but the difference is not considerable. Finally, income and education level do not present significant differences in terms of community participation.

Education, however, does seem to produce a difference in terms of leadership roles. The percentage of participants in community groups who consider themselves leaders is small but significantly larger among those who have education levels beyond primary and secondary school. Income, sex, and race, however, do not show a difference.

Besides exercising their right to vote, many citizens also participate in political campaign activities. The goals of questions **PP1** and **PP2** are aimed at measuring the participation of citizens in campaign activities.

- PP1.** During election times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate? [Read the options]
 (1) Frequently (2) Occasionally (3) Rarely, or (4) Never (88) DK (98) DA
- PP2.** There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential elections of 2010?
 (1) Yes, worked (2) Did not work (88) DK (98) DA




Figure 46. Participation in Political Campaigns in the Americas

Figure 46 shows participation in activities related to political campaigns in the Americas. The left side of the figure shows the percentage of citizens who claim they have tried to influence the political persuasions of others “frequently” or “occasionally.” The right side shows the percentage of interviewees who reported that they worked for a political campaign.

In Colombia, a fifth of respondents have campaigned either frequently or occasionally¹⁸—the Dominican Republic is the only country in Latin America that significantly exceeds this rate. The informal activism in favor of a candidate or party, however, is not resoundingly reflected in the formal participation of Colombians in electoral campaigns. Less than one out of ten citizens say they worked for a party or candidate in the 2010 presidential election.

The results from Colombia are analyzed in more detail below. Figure 47 recodifies as positive all the responses from interviewees that indicated they “frequently” or “occasionally” tried to politically persuade others. This form of informal campaigning is related to individuals’ income level; those in the richest quintiles are more frequently engaged in trying to politically persuade others to vote for a candidate or a party. It also appears related to education levels; those with superior education tend to proselytize more often than those with lower levels of education. Engagement in political persuasion is more frequent among lighter-skinned people. Finally, men appear more active than women, but the difference is not significant.

¹⁸ This percentage is significantly greater than that 13% reported by the 2011 AmericasBarometer survey in Colombia.




Figure 47. Sociodemographic Factors and Individual Informal Political Proselytism in Colombia

Figure 48 shows the percentage of respondents from different groups that reported having worked for a political party or a candidate's campaign during the most recent election. The most significant sociodemographic factor is, once again, education. Formal participation in the last campaign cycle was more frequent among those with post-secondary education. And in terms of skin tone, those with darker skin had higher rates of participation




Figure 48. Sociodemographic Factors and Participation in Electoral Campaigns in Colombia

The previous analysis shows some slight participatory inequalities along gender lines. Nonetheless, the variation in participation is likely to fluctuate depending on women's position in relation to the labor market and the family.¹⁹ Figure 49 shows participation levels by gender and, in the case of women, their status in the family and in the labor market. In Colombia, the sex of the respondent did not translate into significant differences for the kinds of participation analyzed in this study. What is clear, however, is that women—independent of the family or labor market status—are more frequently involved with community groups than men. A very slight difference is also perceptible in levels of informal electoral persuasion; men engage in political proselytism more frequently than do women who are married and who do not earn an income, but otherwise the difference between men and women disappears.

¹⁹ See, for example, Iverson, Torben, and Frances Rosenbluth. 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press.




Figure 49. Gender Roles and Participation in Colombia

III. Public Opinion on Opportunities and Discriminatory Attitudes

How much do members of society support equal opportunities for minority groups? Public support for equality of opportunity has obvious and important consequences. Individuals who think that a woman's place is in the home, or that members of certain ethnic groups do not make good political leaders, may be less likely to tolerate those groups' participation in public life or to vote for such candidates. And, in turn, those attitudes can create barriers for selected individuals to participate in politics. In this section, we review the results from a number of questions that seek to measure the extent to which certain populations are discriminated against.

We note that responses to these questions may be subject to what public opinion scholars call "social desirability bias," meaning that individuals may be less likely to report discriminatory attitudes because they recognize that prejudicial attitudes are socially taboo.²⁰ This means that even respondents who privately harbor discriminatory attitudes may give a "socially desirable," non-discriminatory response in the survey context to avoid displeasing the interviewer. As a result, the levels of discriminatory attitudes we report based on these survey questions could very well be lower than their actual levels in the population.

²⁰ Some recent work in Latin America has broached the problem of social desirability in public opinion surveys when dealing with vote-buying through design experiments, see, for example, Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad K., de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio and David W. Nickerson 2012. "Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua". *American Journal of Political Science*, 56: 202–217.)

Public Opinion towards Political Leadership by Women

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included three questions querying attitudes towards women in positions of political leadership: **VB50**, **VB51**, and **VB52**.²¹ The text of these questions is as follows:

VB50. Some say that in general, men are better political leaders than women. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?		
(1) Strongly agree	(2) Agree	(3) Disagree
(4) Strongly disagree	(88) DK	(98) DA
VB51. Who do you think would be more corrupt as a politician, a man or a woman, or are both the same?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) Both the same
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A
VB52. If a politician is responsible for running the national economy, who would do a better job, a man, or a woman or does it not matter?		
(1) A man	(2) A woman	(3) It does not matter
(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A




Figure 50. Belief that Men Make Better Political Leaders than Women in the Countries of the Americas

The results in Figure 51, showing the degree of agreement with the notion of men being better political leaders than women, seem consistent with the already stated findings on gender differences not being significant for the forms of political participation being analyzed in this study. In fact, Colombia has some of the lowest levels of agreement with the supposed superiority of men as political leaders in the region—only Uruguay's is significantly less.

²¹ Questions **VB51** and **VB52** were administered to a split sample—that is, only half of those interviewed.




Figure 51. Sociodemographic Factors and Prejudice Against Women Politicians in Colombia

As Figure 51 shows, prejudiced attitudes against women as political leaders is tied to the sex of the respondent; as could be expected, women are in less agreement with the idea that men make better political leaders. Similarly, people with higher education levels also show less prejudice against women's leadership.

Public Opinion towards Political Leadership by Those from Marginalized Racial/Ethnic Groups

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also asked about attitudes towards people of darker skin in positions of political leadership. Question **VB53** was as follows:²²

Now we are going to talk about race or skin color of politicians.

VB53. Some say that in general, people with dark skin are not good political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree?

[Interviewer: "dark skin" refers to blacks, indigenous, "non-whites" in general]

(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Disagree (4) Strongly disagree

(88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

Figure 52 shows average levels of agreement with this statement for each one of the countries. Original responses are recoded onto the usual 0 to 100 scale. The figure indicates that the country with the least prejudices towards politicians' skin tone is Uruguay, while the country with the most prejudices is Chile. Colombia is at an intermediate position, having no statistically significant differences with most of countries in the region.

²² The question was administered to a split sample—that is, to half of those interviewed.




Figure 52. Belief that Dark-Skinned Politicians do not Make Good Political Leaders in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 53, meanwhile, shows that the only sociodemographic factor with a clear relation to prejudicial attitudes towards dark-skinned politicians is education. Those with higher levels of education tend to be less prejudicial in regards to skin tone. Other factors are not statistically significant.




Figure 53. Sociodemographic Factors and Prejudice Against Dark-Skinned Politicians in Colombia

Public Opinion towards Political Leadership by Homosexuals

As in 2010, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included question **D5** on attitudes towards homosexuals running for public office.

D5. And now, changing the topic and thinking of homosexuals, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office?

Figure 54 shows that Haiti is, by far, the country with the most prejudices against homosexuals in public office, while Canada, Uruguay, and the United States are the most tolerant. Colombia is in the middle-upper range of the list of countries, exceeded only by Brazil, Chile, and Argentina (besides the countries already mentioned) and is well above the other countries.




Figure 54. Support for Homosexuals Running for Public Office in Countries of the Americas

Figure 55 shows support for homosexual public officials is positively correlated with a respondent's economic position and education levels: better-educated and wealthier individuals tend to be more supportive of homosexuals running for office.




Figure 55. Sociodemographic Factors and Support for Homosexuals Running for Public Office in Colombia

Public Opinion towards Political Leadership by People with Disabilities

Finally, the 2012 AmericasBarometer included a new question about whether individuals with disabilities should be able to run for public office²³.

D7. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of people who are physically handicapped being permitted to run for public office?

Figure 56 shows that only in the United States, Uruguay, Canada, and Brazil was support significantly greater than in Colombia for individuals with physical disabilities running for public office.

Figure 57, meanwhile, shows that support for disabled public office holders is greater among individuals in the upper wealth quintiles and with higher educational levels.

²³ The question was administered to a split sample—that is, to only half of those interviewed.




Figure 56. Support for Individuals with Disabilities Running for Public Office in the Countries of the Americas




Figure 57. Sociodemographic Factors and Support for Individuals with Disabilities Running for Public Office Colombia

IV. Public Opinion on Policy Proposals

Unfortunately, at least with some indicators of political engagement and in some countries more than others, there are still disparities in rates of participation between men, women, racial groups, and social classes. While these results are cause for concern, there are also reasons to be optimism about the gains made toward participatory equality. Differences are more severe in certain countries than in others, which means that there might be lessons we can learn from the countries where unequal participation is not as pronounced. Below, we review public opinion towards several commonly proposed potential remedies for unequal participation based on results from the 2012 AmericasBarometer.

Gender Quotas

One potential policy solution to the problem of unequal participation and representation among women is gender quotas, which have been hailed as an effective way to more fully incorporate women into politics.²⁴ The general idea is that when members of marginalized groups see people like them on the ballot and in office, they are more motivated to participate in politics than they are where political role models are scarce. In Latin America, several countries have adopted gender quotas, whereby the law mandates that women occupy a certain percentage of the seats in the national legislature. However, as described in Special Report Box 5, the evidence on whether gender quotas reduce inequalities in participation is mixed.

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included one question, **GEN6**, enabling us to tap support for gender quotas across the Americas.²⁵

GEN6. The state ought to require that political parties reserve some space on their lists of candidates for women, even if they have to exclude some men. How much do you agree or disagree?

Figure 58 shows averages of support for gender quotas in the countries of the Americas. The responses, originally recorded on a 1 to 7 scale, were recoded onto the usual 0 to 100 scale. The chart shows that Colombians have a comparatively high level of agreement with the creation of gender quotas for women on parties' electoral lists. Only in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and, to a lesser extent, Paraguay was support significantly higher than in Colombia.

²⁴ Desposato, Scott W., and Barbara Norrander. 2009. "The Gender Gap in Latin America: Contextual and Individual Influences on Gender and Political Participation". *British Journal of Political Science*; Campbell, David E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2006. "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents". *Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 233-47; Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press; Waring, Marilyn. 2010. "Women's Political Participation". <http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/43896/1/130393.pdf>.

²⁵ The question was administered to a split sample—that is, to half of those interviewed.




Figure 58. Support for Gender Quotas in the Americas

Compulsory Voting

Another potential remedy for unequal participation that has received much attention in the literature is compulsory voting.²⁶ While about half of the included countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have some type of compulsory voting law, the extent to which these laws are enforced varies a great deal between countries. For example, Costa Rica has a compulsory voting law that is only weakly enforced, while not voting in Peru can actually prevent citizens from having access to certain public services.²⁷ One would expect that in a country where turnout is high, participation in elections is less unequal. Unfortunately, some new research, described in Special Report Box 6, suggests that compulsory voting may not always have the expected results in reducing participatory inequalities.

Reduction in Economic and Social Inequality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, reductions in inequality and poverty would seem to go a long way towards closing the participation gap between citizens. One of the most important determinants of participation across the hemisphere is socioeconomic class. While female participation in the workforce itself can have a powerful positive effect on participation, socioeconomic status and education might render irrelevant any effects for gender or race on rates of participation.²⁸

²⁶ Lijphardt, 1997, *Ibid.*; Jackman 1987, *Ibid.*

²⁷ Fornos, Carolina, Timothy Power, and Jason Garand. 2004. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000". *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 909-940.

²⁸ Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, *Ibid.*; Morgan and Buice 2011, *Ibid.*; Verba et al., 1993, *Ibid.*

At the aggregate level, scholars have found that political engagement is lowest where economic inequality is highest—a particularly relevant finding for Latin America, the most unequal region of the world.²⁹ While the relationship between participation and socioeconomic status certainly differs across political contexts,³⁰ material wealth and educational levels exert a positive impact on political participation in virtually every democracy. Indeed, economic development can go a long way in reducing not only economic inequalities, but participatory ones as well.

V. Conclusion

Despite declines in inequality in recent decades, this chapter has shown that in general throughout the Americas inequalities persist in the realm of political participation. Nonetheless, biases against the participation of some vulnerable groups in Colombia are not as prevalent as they are in other countries—for instance, the lack of differences in Colombians voter turnout along lines of sex, education, class, and skin tone.

Participation in community organizations in Colombia is relatively high in comparison to other countries of the region. But this participation is not necessarily linked to leadership roles within the community groups themselves. Women and darker-skinned individuals tend to be more involved in community organizations, while education and economic status bear no perceptible impact on participation in community groups.

A fifth of voting-age adults in Colombia frequently engage in informal political proselytism, while only one in ten claim to have worked for the formal campaign of a party or candidate in the 2010 elections.

In terms of opportunities for political participation and educational levels, Colombians show comparatively few discriminatory attitudes with regard to women's involvement in politics and are in league with the regional average in regard to the political participation of darker-skinned individuals. Discriminatory attitudes against homosexuals and individuals with disabilities are also comparatively mild. Finally, Colombian respondents expressed relatively high support for policies aimed at gender equity in politics and quotas.

²⁹ Uslaner and Brown, 2005, *Ibid*; Seawright, Jason. 2008. "Explaining Participatory Inequality in the Americas". Working Paper.

³⁰ Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-On Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Special Report Box 4: Political Participation and Gender


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 78, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across the Latin American and Caribbean regions, differential levels of community participation were reported by men and women in response to two questions posed to 40,990 respondents by the AmericasBarometer in 2010.¹ In almost every country in the region, men reported significantly higher levels of community participation than women. What accounts for these differences?


The top figure indicates that a number of variables from a mainstream model of political participation are significant in determining community participation. Thus, as expected, higher levels of education, wealth, external efficacy and political interest are associated with higher levels of community participation. However, these variables do not account for the gendered difference in participation—gender is still significant when other sociodemographic and motivational variables are accounted for.

We observe in the bottom figure that adherence to different gender roles has large impacts on predicted levels of community participation. While men and women without children participate at fairly similar rates, there is a substantial difference in predicted participation between men and women with two children, with men being substantially more likely to participate in local community affairs. Similarly, we see that those whose primary employment is as a caregiver or housewife report substantially lower levels of community participation than non-housewives. This suggests that women in Latin America and the

Effects of Gender and Control Variables on Participation and Predicted Community Participation by Gender Roles



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP

Caribbean who have children and/or take on the role of homemaker face important barriers to participation in community affairs.

¹ To measure levels of community participation, questions CP5 and CP8 were used.


Special Report Box 5: Gender Quotas and Women's Participation

This box reviews findings from the recipient of the 2011 AmericasBarometer Best Paper Award, by Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. The full paper may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/papers-ab-smallgrants.php>.

Gender quotas have been introduced in a number of Latin American countries since 1991. What, if any, effects have these gender quotas had on female participation not only at the elite level in politics, but in mass-level political engagement?

Data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey are used to explore whether differences in male and female political participation differ across countries with and without gender quotas for females at the elite level. As the figure shows, in three areas of political participation—political interest, having attended a party meeting, and having signed a petition—the gaps between male and female participation were smaller in countries with gender quotas in place than in countries where no such quota law has been implemented. However, these differences are small, and do not extend to the other kinds of political participation tested, including voting, persuading others to vote, working for a political campaign, protesting, attending a local government meeting, and attending women's group meetings.¹

Predicted Probabilities for Men's and Women's Political Participation in Latin America



Analysis of a single case—Uruguay—was performed using data from the 2008 and 2010 rounds, before and after the implementation of gender quotas for the election of the party officials in that country in 2009. There is little change found between pre- and post-quota implementation.² The only gender gap that is statistically distinguishable from zero is that for petitioning government officials; in both 2008 and 2010, women were statistically more likely to report having petitioned an official than men. Across all other measures of participation, the gap between men and women did not achieve statistical significance, and, except for the difference in political knowledge, in which women are more knowledgeable in 2010, the gap favors Uruguayan men.

¹ The questions used for these analyses are as follows: political interest, **POL1**; political knowledge (Uruguay only) **G11**, **G13**, **G14**; persuading others, **PP1**; working on a campaign, **PP2**; protest, **PROT3**; working on a campaign, **CP2**, **CP4A**, **CP4**; attending government meeting, **NP1**; attending party meeting, **CP13**; attending women's group meetings, **CP20**.

² In 2014, there will be gender quotas to elect legislators.

Special Report Box 6: Compulsory Voting and Inequalities in Political Participation


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 63, by Arturo L. Maldonado. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

It has been postulated that compulsory voting changes the profile of voters, decreasing socioeconomic differences between voters and non-voters; in a statistical analysis, the implication is that indicators such as education and wealth would not be significant predictors of turnout in compulsory voting systems. This proposition was tested in the Latin American and Caribbean regions using data from the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, and in particular, a question (VB2) asking respondents from 24 countries whether they had voted in their country's last presidential or general elections.


Classic predictors of turnout are found to be significant in countries across the Americas, with older, wealthier, and more educated people more likely to report having voted. Similarly, those working for political parties and those reporting greater support for democracy were more likely to report having turned out to vote in their country's most recent elections.

Importantly, the figures illustrate that these differences in the profiles of voters versus non-voters hold across compulsory and noncompulsory voting systems. This suggests that, contrary to what a substantial body of political science literature has argued, changes in a country's voting rules might not affect the profile of voters (and thus, potentially, the profile of politicians who are elected). Although levels of turnout are higher in compulsory voting systems, changing from voluntary to compulsory voting might not, in fact, affect the profile of the average voting citizen. Rather, the findings

The Impact of Socio-Demographic and Political Variables on Turnout



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010

reported here suggest that differences between voters and non-voters would likely persist in spite of such a change to the rules.

Chapter Three: The Effect of Unequal Opportunities and Discrimination on Political Legitimacy and Engagement

With Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

As we have seen, there are important ways in which economic, social, and political opportunities and resources are distributed unevenly in the Americas. Moreover, sizable minorities of citizens across the Americas report social and political attitudes that would restrict the participation of some groups. Such attitudes may reinforce unequal opportunities and resources. In this chapter we examine the consequences of unequal opportunities and discrimination for democracy in the Americas. We assess how political and social inequalities affect citizens' perceptions of their own capabilities. The chapter also explores how inequalities affect citizen perceptions of their respective political systems and democratic regimes along with the consequences of these perceptions on the stability of the region's political systems.

There are many ways that discrimination may affect citizens' political attitudes. First, being a member of a socially and politically marginalized group may affect "internal political efficacy": an individual's perception of their own ability to make an impact on the political system and get things done. There are two ways this could happen. First, marginalized groups might interpret their disadvantages as a societal view of their worth and downgrade their estimates of their own capabilities.¹ Indeed, a recent *Insights* report by LAPOP indicates that across the Americas, women have lower internal efficacy than men, while the more educated and those with more wealth have higher internal efficacy.² On the other hand, citizens who recognize discrimination as unjust may react by mobilizing and becoming more empowered and engaged in politics. If so, under some circumstances being the victim of discrimination could actually boost political efficacy depending on the marginalized group's level of politicization.

Discrimination might also affect "external political efficacy": perceptions of leaders' receptiveness to citizen input. There are a couple of ways advantages and disadvantages accruing to one's group could affect external political efficacy. First, politicians might treat some groups of citizens better than others in the course of everyday personal interactions. Thus, members of discriminated groups may base their judgments of the receptiveness of politicians in general on actual experiences with specific politicians.³ In addition, even citizens who have not had personal contact with politicians may well base their judgments of leaders' receptiveness on the experiences of others with whom they share the same group characteristics.⁴

¹ Lassen, David Dreyer, and Søren Serritzlew. 2011. "Jurisdiction Size and Local Democracy: Evidence on Internal Political Efficacy from Large-scale Municipal Reform". *American Political Science Review* 105 (02): 238-258. See also, Miller, Robert L., Rick Wilford and Freda Donoghue. 1999. "Personal Dynamics as Political Participation". *Political Research Quarterly* 52 (2): 269-292.

² Borowski, Heather, Rebecca Reed, Lucas Scholl, and David Webb. 2011. "Political Efficacy in the Americas". *AmericasBarometer Insights* 65. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

³ Kahne, Joseph, and Joel Westheimer. 2006. "The Limits of Political Efficacy: Educating Citizens for a Democratic Society". *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39 (2): 289-296

⁴ Ashmore, Richard D., Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. "An Organizing Framework for Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality". *Psychological Bulletin* 130 (1): 80-114.

If discrimination diminishes external efficacy, this could, in turn, have downstream consequences for the legitimacy of the entire political system—by which we mean the perception that the political system is right and proper and deserves to be obeyed.⁵ Citizens who perceive that politicians care about and represent their views and interests may well reciprocate by supporting the political system. But discrimination might affect political legitimacy in other ways, as well. Citizens who perceive that they have been treated unfairly, whether by their fellow citizens or by political leaders, may see this unjust treatment as an indication of a society-wide failure and of leaders' ineffectiveness. This perception could lower evaluations of incumbents' performance and what is often called "specific political support": support for the particular people in office.⁶ When specific support for elected leaders declines, this may spill over and depress "diffuse support," or trust in the broader political system. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that diffuse support for the system is a relatively stable attachment; analysis of the 2010 AmericasBarometer found that it was generally resistant to the effects of economic crisis.⁷

Prior evidence on the relationship between discrimination and legitimacy is mixed. For example, in an extensive examination of 2006 AmericasBarometer data from Guatemala, Azpuru showed that there is not an ethnic divide in political legitimacy between Ladinos and Mayas in that country.⁸ However, in an analysis of 2010 AmericasBarometer data, Moreno Morales found that self-reported victimization by discrimination depresses system support.⁹

Finally, discrimination and membership in marginalized groups could affect participation in social movements, with consequences for the shape of democracy and political systems in the Americas. If individuals from groups that are discriminated against respond by withdrawing from political activity, we might find lower levels of protest participation among such groups as well.¹⁰ However, discrimination can also constitute a grievance that catalyzes protest among groups that are discriminated against, as famously occurred with the U.S. civil rights movement or the recent Andean movements for indigenous rights.¹¹

Again, however, evidence on the relationship between discrimination and protest participation is mixed. The ties between discrimination and ethnic rebellion are weak, according to

⁵ Gilley, Bruce. 2009. *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*. Columbia University Press; Booth, John A., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy". *American Political Science Review* 53 (1): 69-105; Weber, Max. 1919. "Politics as a Vocation". In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶ Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley; Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support" *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October): 435-7.

⁷ Seligson, Mitchell A., and Amy Erica Smith. 2010. *Political Culture of Democracy, 2010: Democratic Consolidation in the Americas During Hard Times: Report on the Americas*. Nashville, TN: Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.

⁸ Azpuru, Dinorah. 2009. "Perceptions of Democracy in Guatemala: an Ethnic Divide?". *Canadian Journal of Latin America and Caribbean Studies* 34 (67): 105-130.

⁹ Moreno Morales, Daniel. 2011. "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America" Presented at the conference Marginalization in the Americas, University of Miami, Miami, FL, October 28. Also, in the context of the U.S., Schildkraut found that among non-aculturated Latinos in the U.S. discrimination produced an increase in participation at the same time that it reduced the legitimacy of the political system. See, Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2005. "The Rise and Fall of Political Engagement among Latinos: The Role of Identity and Perceptions of Discrimination". *Political Behavior*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.285-312.

¹⁰ Iverson and Rosenbluth *Ibid*.

¹¹ Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cleary's research, but Moreno Morales finds evidence in the AmericasBarometer indicating that experiences of discrimination increases the likelihood of participating in protests.¹² Other scholars argue that inequalities along gender, racial, and socioeconomic lines can serve as important "rallying cries" in struggles for democratization,¹³ and raise "the probability that at least some dissident groups will be able to organize for aggressive collective action."¹⁴ However, it appears that group identity must first be politicized and a group consciousness formed before deprivation along racial, gender, or socioeconomic lines translates into activism.¹⁵

In this chapter, we consider how experiences of marginalization might affect attitudes towards and engagement with the political system. We begin by assessing measures of engagement, including internal and external efficacy. We then turn to more general attitudes towards the current political system, with attention to how perceptions of representativeness affect such attitudes. Finally, we examine whether and how membership in marginalized or discriminated groups relates to protest participation.

II. Inequality, Efficacy, and Perceptions of Representation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer round included a number of questions tapping internal and external efficacy, as well as perceptions on the representativeness of political parties. The following two questions are part of the AmericasBarometer's long-standing core questionnaire (the first measuring external efficacy, the second measuring internal efficacy):

EFF1. Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

These questions were both coded on a 7-point scale running from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 7 ("Strongly Agree"). In addition, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked citizens to respond to the following question, **EPP3**, on a 7-point scale running from 1 ("Not at all") to 7 ("A lot"). All three questions for the analysis in this chapter were recoded to run from 0 to 100.¹⁶

EPP3. To what extent do political parties listen to people like you?

Questions measuring group characteristics and equality of opportunities have been

¹² Cleary, Matthew. 2000. "Democracy and Indigenous Rebellion in Latin America". *Comparative Political Studies*. 33 (9). pp.1123-53. Moreno Morales, *Ibid*.

¹³ Lovell, Peggy. 2000. "Gender, Race and the Struggle for Social Justice in Brazil". *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 85-102; Safa, Helen Icken. 1990. "Women's Social Movements in Latin America". *Gender and Society*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 354-369.

¹⁴ Muller, Edward N. and Mitchell Seligson. 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency". *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 2, pp. 425-452.

¹⁵ Nagengast, Carole and Michael Kearney. 1990. "Mixtec Ethnicity: Social Identity, Political Consciousness and Political Activism". *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 25, No. 2 pp. 61-91; Uhlaner, Carole, Bruce E. Cain, and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. "Political Participation of Ethnic Minorities in the 1980s". *Political Behavior*. Vol. 11 No.3. pp.195-231; Yashar, Deborah. 1998. "Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America". *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 23-42.

¹⁶ The question was administered to a split sample—that is, to only half the sample.

described in detail in Chapters One and Two. These questions include measures of gender, skin tone, class, household wealth, intra-household inequalities by gender, and self-reported victimization by discrimination in government offices, public places, and the workplace.




Figure 59. Internal Efficacy in the Countries of the Americas

We begin by considering the distribution of internal efficacy, **EFF2**, across the countries of the Americas. Figure 59 shows the average level of agreement for all the countries in the study. Clearly, citizens in the United States have the highest perception of internal efficacy followed by Canada and Venezuela. Colombia is on the opposite extreme of the list—among countries with the lowest perceptions of efficacy, only significantly better than Paraguay.

How are social inequalities and experiences of discrimination related to internal efficacy? In Figure 60, we use linear regression analysis to examine the association between internal efficacy and personal characteristics and experiences as well as behavioral patterns.¹⁷ Besides sociodemographic characteristics, we included experiences of discrimination at government offices and other places, degree of interest in politics (question **POL1**), and the frequency of news consumption by radio (**A1**), television (**A2**), newspapers (**A3**), and Internet. (**A4i**)

The results of the model suggest that women report less understanding of the political issues facing their country, even though gender roles have no impact. Internal efficacy increases as the respondent's age and education levels also increase. Interest in politics is a strong predictor of

¹⁷ The details of this model appear in Table 22 of Appendix D.

internal efficacy as is also the consumption of news via radio and newspaper (television has no impact). These relationships are summarized in Figure 61.

An important point is that neither skin tone nor experiences with discrimination have a relationship with internal efficacy in Colombia when other factors are controlled for. Similarly, economic status does not have an impact on the self-reported level of understanding about the country's problems when factors such as age and education are held constant.




Figure 60. Determinants of Internal Efficacy in Colombia




Figure 61. Factors Associated with Internal Efficacy in Colombia

Now we turn to examine two variables that reflect citizens' perceptions that the political system represents and listens to them. The **EFF1** and **EPP3** variables were described above. Figure 62 shows the distribution of these variables across the countries of the Americas. Notably, we find that Venezuela has the highest averages of external efficacy as well as party receptiveness and representativeness among the countries of the study. Uruguay, for its part, also has high averages on both counts. Costa Ricans, on the other hand, tend to be much more skeptical of the capacity for politicians and parties to listen and attend to the needs of average citizens. Colombia, is much closer to Costa Rica on both fronts.




Figure 62. External Efficacy and Perceptions of the Representativeness of Political Parties in the Americas




Figure 63. Determinants of External Efficacy in Colombia

Which citizens of Colombia agree more that “those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think”? And who agrees more with the notion that “political parties listen to people like you”? Figure 63 shows the results of a regression analysis to examine the personal characteristics and experiences that leads respondents to report high levels of external efficacy.¹⁸

The clearest predictors are education level and interest in politics, as shown in Figure 64. The model also indicates that older individuals tend to be more skeptical of the idea that representatives are interested in the needs of common people. The same occurs with inhabitants of the Former National Territories compared to those living in Bogotá (the model’s regional reference category).

¹⁸ Detailed results of the model appear in Table 23 of Appendix D.




Figure 64. External Efficacy by Educational Level and Interest in Politics in Colombia

Figure 65 displays a similar query, but in this case the goal was to find determinants of the perception that political parties listen to citizens.¹⁹

The model indicates that the most important factors are the respondent's regional location and their ethnic self-identification. Residents of Bogotá are much more skeptical about the representativeness of parties than those living in the Caribbean, Central, or Eastern regions of the country.

Meanwhile, individuals who self-identify as non-white and non-mestizo—that is, as ethnic minorities—see parties as much less representative. The results are outlined in Figure 66.

¹⁹ Detailed results of the model appear in Table 24 of Appendix D.




Figure 65. Determinants of Perceptions of Political Parties Representativeness in Colombia




Figure 66. Perceptions of Political Parties Representativeness by Region and Ethnic Self-Identification in Colombia

III. System Support and Engagement with Democracy

Experiences of marginalization and discrimination may also affect more abstract political attitudes. As discussed above, discrimination could be seen as a failure of the political system, and could lower support for the political system in general. In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we tap a number of broader political attitudes; the most important of these are support for the political system and support for democracy in the abstract. In Chapter Five we describe in detail how these are measured and the indicator levels on these attitudes over time in Colombia. But in this section, we consider how personal characteristics and experiences of discrimination are related to these attitudes that prove so critical for democratic stability.

In Figure 67 we show results of a linear regression analysis used to examine the relation between personal characteristics and experiences reported by respondents and their levels of support for the political system in Colombia.²⁰




Figure 67. Determinants of System Support in Colombia

For a deeper assessment of the factors that influence support for the political system, Figure 68 examines the relationships between some personal characteristics and experiences and support for the system. The model indicates that older individuals and those more interested in politics expressed greater support for the system in Colombia, while those with less education and those living in larger cities expressed less support. System support, however, does not seem tied to regional differences or experiences with discrimination.

²⁰ The results of this model are shown in Table 25 of Appendix D.




Figure 68. System Support by Age, Education, Size of Place, and Interest in Politics in Colombia

Experiences with marginalization and discrimination do seem to affect support for democracy in the abstract. We used a linear regression analysis to determine if the personal characteristics mentioned before are associated with the belief that “democracy, with all its faults, is still the best system of government.” The results appear in Figure 69 and are shown in more detail in Table 26 of Appendix D.




Figure 69. Determinants of Support for Democracy as a Form of Government in Colombia

Figure 70 takes a closer look at the variables highlighted as relevant by the previous analysis. As with support for the political system, older individuals express stronger support for democracy as the best form of government. Education also has a positive effect on support for democracy. However, respondents who report being victims of discrimination expressed far less support for democracy—the difference is slight but statistically significant according to the results of the model. Finally, those who expressed more interest in political issues show much clearer support for democracy.




Figure 70. Support for Democracy by Age, Education, Discrimination, and Interest in Politics in Colombia

IV. Protest Participation

Last, as we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, marginalization and discrimination may lead some groups—especially those who are highly politicized—to join social movements and participate in protest politics. Previous LAPOP studies have presented evidence that in at least some countries throughout the Americas, the act of protesting is becoming a more “normalized” method of political participation: “individuals who protest are generally more interested in politics and likely to engage in community-level activities, seemingly supplementing traditional forms of participation with protest.”²¹ In the 2012 AmericasBarometer, we asked a number of questions related to protest, including, most importantly, **PROT3**:

PROT3. In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to **PROT6**]

Figure 71 shows levels of participation in protests for various countries of the Americas. Only in Bolivia, Haiti, and Peru is the percentage of people who reported having participated in a protest within the last year significantly higher than in Colombia, where close to 9% of respondents said they had participated in a protest activity.

²¹ Moseley, Mason and Daniel Moreno. 2010. “The Normalization of Protest in Latin America”. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 42. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).




Figure 71. Protest Participation in the Countries of the Americas

Who is most likely to participate in protests in Colombia? In Figure 72, we used logistic regression analysis to determine the effects of marginalization and discrimination on protest participation in Colombia.²²




Figure 72. Determinants of Protest Participation in Colombia

²² Detailed results are shown in Table 27 of Appendix D.

Figure 73 illustrates how protest participation is related to a series of variables included in the model.




Figure 73. Protest Participation by Education and Ideological Position in Colombia

We found that in addition to interest in politics, which is a robust predictor of different forms of participation discussed in this chapter, education levels also influence the probability of participation in protests. Individuals with post-secondary education participate in protests with considerably more frequency than others—this could be due to the fact that some protests in the country are tied to the universities. Related, individuals who position themselves on the left of the political spectrum are more frequently involved in protests than those on the right or center.

V. Conclusion

In Colombia, internal efficacy—conceived as the perception of understanding the political issues in a country—increases as the age and education level of the respondent also increases. Interest in politics is a strong predictor of internal efficacy, as is the consumption of news via radio and newspaper, but we found no relation with skin tone, class position, or experiences with discrimination. External efficacy—that is, the perception that politicians take into account the interests of average citizens—is positively associated with an interest in politics and with educational achievement.

We found no evidence suggesting that those reporting experiences of discrimination had less support for the political system in Colombia. Participation in protests, meanwhile, was positively related to respondent's interest in politics (the most robust predictor of political participation) and to education levels. Those on the left of the political spectrum also tend to be more frequently involved in protests.

Excluding Canada and the United States, Venezuela is the country with the highest average level of internal efficacy—well above Colombia, which has one of the lowest. The average Colombian also tends to be skeptical about the capacity and willingness of politicians and parties to take into account the interests of common citizens—on this front, Colombia is well below Venezuela, which leads in external efficacy.

Age and interest in political issues are positively linked to support for both democracy as a form of government and for the political system. Education, meanwhile, has a positive effect on support for democracy, but a negative effect on system support. Finally, individuals who reported being victims of discrimination in the workplace or in public places express less support for democracy.

Special Report Box 7: Political Knowledge and the Urban-Rural Divide


This box reviews findings from the AmericasBarometer Insights Report Number 68, by Frederico Batista Pereira. This and all other reports may be accessed at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights.php>.

Across Latin America and the Caribbean there are important differences between urban and rural areas in levels of political knowledge, as measured by a series of factual questions about the country's political system by the AmericasBarometer in 2010. What accounts for these differences?¹


The second figure illustrates that both individuals' opportunity to become involved in politics—measured here using socioeconomic factors and educational variables—and individuals' motivation to learn about politics—measured here using questions about an individual's personal interest in politics and exposure to media—are important to predicting an individual's level of political knowledge. However, measures of opportunity are of greater importance in explaining the knowledge

Two variables in particular stand out: access to media at home, and an individual's level of education. When these opportunity variables are controlled for in the analysis, the difference in predicted levels of political knowledge across urban and rural areas shrinks substantially. This indicates that most of the gap in political knowledge observed across the urban/rural divide is, in fact, due to differential opportunities in urban versus rural areas, particularly in access

Urban/Rural Knowledge and Motivational Versus Opportunity Explanations



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010

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to education and in access to media at home.

¹ For this report, political knowledge questions related to national level politics—G11, G13, and G14—are used.

Special Report Box 8: Discrimination and System Support

This box reviews findings from the paper "The Social Determinants and Political Consequences of Discrimination in Latin America," by Daniel Moreno Morales. This paper was presented at the AmericasBarometer Conference on Marginalization and Discrimination in the Americas, at the University of Miami, October 28, 2011.

Who is most likely to be a victim of discrimination in Latin America and the Caribbean? Using data from 8 countries from the 2006 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer, the author finds that economic, ethnic, and gender-based discrimination are all prevalent in the countries under study.¹ The figures at the right indicate that discrimination is prevalent across these eight countries, and that individuals are more likely to report witnessing than experiencing discrimination.


Further analysis indicates that those who identify as black or indigenous, as well as those who have darker skin tones, are more likely to report having experienced discrimination. However, wealthier respondents report less experience with discrimination.

Last, experiencing discrimination either as a victim or as a witness lowers support for democracy and interpersonal trust, and increases protest behavior.² Thus, discrimination can have pernicious effects on democracy.


¹ The countries included in these analyses are: Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Peru, Mexico and Bolivia. The questions used to measure various types of discrimination, both victimization and observation, are: **DIS11**, **DIS12**, **DIS13**, **RAC1A**, **RAC1D**, **RAC1E** from the 2010 questionnaire.

² The questions used to measure these dependent variables are: system support, **B1**, **B2**, **B4**, and **B6**; protest, **PROT3**; interpersonal trust, **IT1**.

Experiences of Discrimination in Eight Countries



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010



Fuente: Barómetro de las Américas por LAPOP, 2010

Special Report Box 9: Support for Democracy and Electoral Information


This box reviews findings from the 2012 report "Follow-up and Baseline Surveys of the Democracia Activa-Peru Program: Descriptive and Comparative Results," by Arturo Maldonado and Mitchell A. Seligson.

The Democracia Activa-Peru (DAP) program, sponsored by USAID/Peru and FHI 360, was designed to promote positive attitudes toward democratic processes and to encourage a more informed vote among Peruvian citizens in seven targeted regions. This report analyzes a 2010 baseline and a 2012 follow-up survey, comparing results to those of AmericasBarometer.


The most salient point of the program results was the impact on support for democracy, a question asked in DAP and the AmericasBarometer surveys.¹ As the green bars in the first figure show, an increase of 15 points on a 1-100 scale was found between the baseline and follow-up surveys. This change is attributable to the DAP program because a similar increase was not found in support for democracy in the AmericasBarometer survey (BA) for the same time period, as the grey bars display.

The impact of the program among women is especially significant. As the second figure indicates, before the program intervention in 2010, it was observed that men more often reported having information about electoral candidates than women did. However, after the program intervention, women reported similar levels to the men in

Average Support for Democracy, by Year and Survey



Percentage who Have Received Information About Candidates by Gender and Year



Fuente: Encuesta de Línea de Base y de Seguimiento por LAPOP, 2010-2012

¹ This question asks to what extent respondents agree or disagree with the statement: "Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government."

having access to election information; this percentage rose to almost 50% for both groups in 2012. Importantly, this study shows that well-targeted interventions can help to reduce gender gaps in political engagement.

Part II: Governance, Political Engagement, and Civil Society in the Americas

Chapter Four: Corruption, Crime, and Democracy

With Mollie Cohen and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

Two of the greatest challenges currently facing many countries of the Americas are high levels of crime and persistent corruption in the public sector. Since the 1990s, after the Cold War and the global movement toward democracy, scholarship on corruption and on measures designed to fight corruption has increased.¹ Corruption, commonly defined as the use of public resources for private gain, was a common feature of the old authoritarian regimes in the Americas. But media censorship and the grave danger run by those willing to denounce corruption meant it was impossible to determine the exact magnitude of corruption and where it was most prevalent.

Studies by economists have shown corruption's harmful affects on growth rates and wealth distribution. Since corruption transfers public sector funds into private hands, it produces both inefficient spending and a deterioration of public services. Indeed, scholars have reached increasing consensus on the pernicious effects of corruption on national economies along with the challenges it poses for democratic governance, especially for the egalitarian administration of justice.²

Ample evidence has shown that, in terms of public opinion, victims of corruption are less likely to trust institutions and government officials in their countries—an evident pattern throughout the region.³ Other authors, however, have suggested that opinions on corruption do not necessarily impact broader attitudes about democracy. Some scholars claim that corruption sometimes simply leads citizens to withdraw from politics altogether or that it can even *help* some governments maintain political support.⁴ Still others suggest corruption erodes social capital, leading those who experience corruption to lose trust in their fellow citizens.

¹ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

² Pharr, Susan J. 2000. "Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies". In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume and Khalid Sekkat. 2005. "Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?" *Public Choice* (122): 69-97; Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico". *Bulletin of Latin American Research* (28) 2: 388-409; Fried, Brian J., Paul Lagunes, and Atheender Venkataramani. 2010. "Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America". *Latin American Research Review* (45) 1: 76-97.

³ Seligson, Mitchell A. 2002. "The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries". *Journal of Politics* (64) 2: 408-33; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2006. "The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America". *World Development* (34) 2: 381-404; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285-308.

⁴ Davis, Charles L, Roderic Ai Camp, and Kenneth M Coleman. 2004. "The Influence of Party Systems on Citizens' Perceptions of Corruption and Electoral Response in Latin America". *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (6): 677-703; Manzetti, Luigi, and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*; McCann, James A, and Jorge I Domínguez. 1998. "Mexicans React to Electoral Fraud and Political Corruption: An Assessment of Public Opinion and Voting Behavior". *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 483-503.

More recently, scholars have paid greater attention to perceptions of corruption. Two recent studies using AmericasBarometer data show that a high perception of corruption is related to decreasing levels of trust in institutions, regardless of an individual's direct personal experiences with corruption.⁵ In fact, direct experience with corruption does not have a particularly strong relationship with high perceptions of corruption, so LAPOP usually collects data on both—that is, on victimization by corruption and on perceptions of corruption.

Crime is another serious problem on the rise in many countries of the Americas. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the homicide rate in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 was 15.5 per 100,000 inhabitants, more than double the global average of 6.9 per 100,000 inhabitants, and almost five times more than Europe's rate of 3.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.⁶ While South America has followed the global trend of falling rates, in Central America and the Caribbean rates are rising.

With such high crime rates, it is imperative for political scientists and policymakers to understand the affects of crime, insecurity, and fear on governance and democratic stability. Given that victims of crime are likely to blame the system for not protecting them, it is easy to see how victimization can negatively affect system support and, even more, support for democracy.⁷ Moreover, victimization or fear of crime can lead individuals to lose trust in and perhaps even tolerance of their fellow citizens, thereby sapping social capital and reducing support for civil liberties and democratic institutions. Victimization by crime can even drive individuals to emigrate from their countries.⁸ Crime can also induce dwindling support for and trust in key political institutions, particularly in the police but also in the judicial system.

As with corruption, it is not clear what bears greater significance for attitudes on the democratic system: individual perceptions of crime or direct experiences with crime. In fact, in places where crime rates are high in comparison to global averages, the probability of an individual being killed or falling victim to a violent crime is low in most countries—this is in no way to downplay the very alarming crime rates in Central America. The point is that everyone reads about violent crimes in the newspapers, sees footage on television, and knows people who have been victims of criminal acts. In other words, fear of being a victim, which can happen to anyone regardless of their previous experience with crime, can have a greater impact on attitudes towards democracy than actually being a victim.

This chapter analyzes levels of corruption and crime in the Americas and tries to clarify the affects these have on opinions about democracy and the rule of law in the region.

⁵ Morris, Stephen D. 2008. "Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with a Focus on Mexico". *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, (28) 2: 388-409; Salinas, Eduardo and John A. Booth. 2011. "Micro-social and Contextual Sources of Democratic Attitudes in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* (3) 1: 29-64.

⁶ Global Study on Homicide. 2011. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/global-study-on-homicide-2011.html>

⁷ Bateson, Regina. 2010. "The Criminal Threat to Democratic Consolidation in Latin America". Presented at the annual American Political Science Association conference. Washington, D.C; Carreras, Miguel. Forthcoming. "The Impact of Criminal Violence on System Support in Latin America". *Latin American Research Review*.

⁸ Arnold, Alex, Paul Hamilton, and Jimmy Moore. 2011. "Who Seeks to Exit? Security, Connections, and Happiness as Predictors of Migration Intentions in the Americas". *AmericasBarometer Insights* (64). Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Corruption

LAPOP has developed a series of questions measuring corruption victimization for the AmericasBarometer. After first testing them in Nicaragua in 1996, the questions were refined and improved.⁹ Because definitions of corruption can vary across different country contexts, we avoid ambiguity by directly asking questions such as: "Within the past year, have you had to pay a bribe to a government official?" We ask similar questions about demands for bribes at the level of local government, from police officers, from military officials, in public schools, at work, in the courts, in public health facilities, and other settings.¹⁰ The series has two particular strengths. First, we are able to determine the social contexts in which corruption occurs most frequently. Second, we are able to develop a scale of corruption, ranging from those who have only experienced corruption in a single context to those who have experienced it in multiple settings. As with crime, being victimized on more than one occasion can have altogether different implications.

⁹ Seligson, Mitchell A. 1997. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Study of Public Opinion*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates, and Seligson, Mitchell A. 1999. *Nicaraguans Talk About Corruption: A Follow-Up Study*. Washington, D C., Casals and Associates

¹⁰ Question **EXC20**, which is about bribes paid to military officials, was first used in 2012.

	N/A Did not try or did not have contact	No	Yes	DK	DA
Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life...					
EXC2. Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?		0	1	88	98
EXC6. In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
[DO NOT ASK IN COSTA RICA AND HAITI; IN PANAMA, USE "FUERZA PÚBLICA"] EXC20. In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe?		0	1	88	98
EXC11. In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC13. Do you work? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC14. In the last twelve months, have you had any dealings with the courts? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC15. Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe?	99	0	1	88	98
EXC16. Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months? If the answer is No → mark 99 If it is Yes→ ask the following: Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?	99	0	1	88	98


Another question tapping perceptions of corruption rather than personal experiences is as follows:

EXC7. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public officials is [Read] (1) Very common (2) Common (3) Uncommon or (4) Very uncommon? (88) DK (98) DA

This variable was recoded onto the 0 to 100 scale in which 0 was the perception that corruption is not very common and 100 that it was very common.

Perception of Corruption

Figure 74 shows respondents tend to hold the perception that corruption is high in their respective countries. This year Colombia had the highest perception of corruption with an average of 82 points on a scale from 0 to 100. The rise is substantial if we consider that the last time the comparative study was conducted in 2010 Colombia was significantly below Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica.¹¹



**Figure 74. Perception of Corruption
in the Countries of the Americas**

Corruption in Colombia has changed over time (in this report we show how indicators have changed over time when data is available). Figure 75 showing perceptions of corruption over the nine years this question has been asked in the country by LAPOP reveals a clear pattern: an almost uninterrupted rise in perceived corruption since 2008.

Although high levels of perceived corruption are worrisome, it is worth pointing out that they do not always correspond to high (or rising) levels of corruption. For instance, it is possible that with increased media coverage and the media's role in uncovering high-level government corruption in recent years, citizen perceptions may have increased amid this heightened public attention. In other

¹¹ See Rodríguez-Raga, Juan Carlos, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. *Cultura política de la democracia en Colombia, 2010. Consolidación democrática en las Américas en tiempos difíciles*. Bogotá: USAID-Vanderbilt.

words, perceptions of corruption can be high, while victimization by corruption is low. The next section analyzes respondents' actual experiences with corruption.




Figure 75. Perception of Corruption in Colombia, 2004-2012

Victimization by Corruption

We now analyze the extent to which citizens of the Americas actually report being victims of corruption. Figure 76 shows the percentage of respondents who reported having been asked for a bribe at least once last year. The countries of the region show wide variation in victimization rates. Colombia is no longer at the top of the list, but in the middle, and far from the rates of Haiti, Bolivia, Ecuador, and even Mexico. Colombia's relative position, however, has changed considerably since the 2010 AmericasBarometer, the last comparative study. Countries such as Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, show falling rates of victimization over the last two years. As we show below, this is not been the case for Colombia.




Figure 76. Victimization by Corruption in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 77 shows that the percentage of people who report being victims of an act of corruption described by the questions effectively increased by 50% in a single year. In fact, this year's percentage is the highest since the AmericasBarometer began its yearly studies in Colombia. The rise in rates of victimization in combination with high levels of perceived corruption is an alarming trend, indicating a real increase in corruption.




Figure 77. Victimization by Corruption Over Time in Colombia

Bribes were demanded from some citizens in more than one place, while for others it only happened in one place or in none. Figure 78 illustrates the number of instances citizens reported being victims of corruption in Colombia in 2012. Eighty-four percent of Colombians said they had not been victims of corruption in the last 12 months, while 11% only experienced it once, and 4% reported two instances.




Figure 78. Number of Instances of Victimization by Corruption in Colombia

Table 1 shows the increase in victimization for 2012 is mainly among people who report having been a victim of corruption in two separate instances—the percentage almost doubles in two years.

Table 1. Number of Instances of Victimization by Corruption in Colombia, 2004-2012

# Instances	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
None	87.3%	87.0%	90.3%	88.9%	90.5%	86.6%	89.6%	88.8%	83.9%
One	9.1%	8.8%	7.0%	8.4%	7.4%	9.7%	7.4%	8.9%	10.8%
Two	2.6%	3.1%	1.8%	2.0%	1.4%	3.1%	2.1%	1.5%	4.2%
More than two	1.0%	1.1%	0.9%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	1.0%	0.7%	1.1%

Who is Most Likely to be a Victim of Corruption?

In trying to gain a clearer picture of victimization by corruption, we ran a logistic regression model to identify the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that are positively and negatively associated with corruption. Figure 79 shows the results of the regression (see Table 28 of Appendix D for more details).




Figure 79. Determinants of Victimization by Corruption in Colombia

For a closer look at the impact of a given independent variable on the probability of a person being the victim of corruption, Figure 80 shows the bivariate results.




Figure 80. Sociodemographic Factors and Victimization by Corruption in Colombia

The regression model indicates that the size of the respondent's location of residence has a direct impact on the probability of being victimized. The bivariate figure shows that instances of victimization are much more common in Bogotá. And there is an inverse relationship between age and probability of being victimized. Victimization peaks at the 36 to 45 age cohort, presumably the most economically active bracket, meaning they are the most exposed to scenarios of corruption. The same reasoning would also help explain why women are victimized with less frequency than men.

III. Perception of Insecurity

The AmericasBarometer sought to tap perceptions of insecurity with the following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?
 (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe
 (4) Very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA

Given that a majority of criminal acts take place in urban areas—particularly in capital cities—we decided to present data on crime for the capitals of the 24 countries in the study (not including United States and Canada because of sample issues).

As is the convention with the AmericasBarometer, the responses were recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale in which higher values signify higher insecurity. Figure 81 shows the results for the capitals of the 24 countries of the 2012 survey. Mexico City and Lima are where people feel most insecure, closely followed by Guatemala City and Caracas. In Bogotá, perceptions of insecurity are relatively moderate, significantly below those just mentioned, and at the same level as Santiago and Brasília.




Figure 81. Perception of Insecurity in the Capitals of the Countries of the Americas

Figure 82 shows changes over time on the perception of insecurity in Colombia, using data from previous AmericasBarometer surveys in which respondents were asked the same question. This trend deserves much more attention than we are able to give it in this study. But it is nonetheless surprising that before 2010, during the Álvaro Uribe administration, which put so much emphasis on security, perception of insecurity did not decline and, in fact, peaked in 2009. Despite security critiques from the media and from former president Uribe and his followers against Juan Manuel Santos' administration, perception of insecurity has not changed with the change in government and, in fact, declined slightly over the last year.




Figure 82. Perception of Insecurity Over Time in Colombia

In what regions of the country are perceptions of insecurity highest? Figure 83 shows that no region of Colombia has a perception of insecurity that is significantly higher than any other. In fact, as the figure illustrates, no region has a perception of insecurity that is statistically different from the national average.




Figure 83. Perception of Insecurity in the Regions of Colombia

Once again, as was discussed in the case of corruption, it is important to remember that high levels of perceptions of insecurity do not necessarily correspond to high levels of crime. In other words, perceptions of insecurity can be high while levels of victimization are relatively low (or vice versa). The next section explores actual victimization by crime.

IV. Victimization by Crime

How do perceptions of insecurity compare with citizens' experiences with insecurity? Since the 2010 AmericasBarometer, we updated a series of questions to measure victimization by crime:

VIC1EXT. Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]** (88) DK **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]**
(98) DA **[Skip to VIC1HOGAR]**

VIC2AA. Could you tell me, in what place that last crime occurred? **[Read options]**

(1) In your home
(2) In this neighborhood
(3) In this municipality
(4) In another municipality
(5) In another country (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A

VIC1HOGAR. Has any other person living in your household been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, has any other person living in your household been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?

(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A (Lives alone)

Figure 84 presents the percentage of responses answering “yes” to questions **VIC1EXT** and **VIC1HOGAR** in the capital cities of the 24 countries included. The figure confirms what was already mentioned: perceptions of insecurity do not always correspond to self-reported victimization. Caracas is an example where feelings of insecurity—one of the highest in the region—contrast with its relative position in terms of personal or household-member victimization. In Quito, by contrast, incidences of victimization, the highest for the capitals of the region, do not correspond to perceptions of insecurity.

The case of victimization in Bogotá shows a less auspicious landscape than perceptions of insecurity would indicate. Three out of ten people report having personally been a victim of a crime (left panel) and four out of 10 claim a household member having been victimized—one of the highest rates in the region (right panel).




Figure 84. Personal and Household-Member Victimization by Crime in the Capital Cities of the Americas

In fact, when looking at indicators on the percentage of households in which at least one member has been victimized by crime, we can see that more than half of Bogotá households (53%) report some kind of victimization by crime—a percentage statistically equivalent to Quito’s and well-above Brasilia’s (31%) or Santiago’s (24%), as shown in Figure 85.




Figure 85. Percentage of Households Victimized by Crime in the Capitals of the Americas

In any case, it is important to point out that our survey is only administered to adults, so it is possible that the victimization of minors is underreported since they might not share information about those incidents with adults in their families. We also have to remember that the crimes are being self-reported by respondents, so in certain contexts some criminal acts—particularly those perpetrated almost exclusively against vulnerable groups—may be so normalized that they are also underreported.

Figure 86 shows the places where crimes are most frequently perpetrated in Colombia, according to respondents from our three most recent studies. One-fifth of crimes occur inside the respondents home (somewhat less in 2011); about one out of four occur within their own neighborhood; and two-fifths occur within the respondent's municipality.




Figure 86. Location of Most Recent Criminal Act in Colombia, 2010-2012

In what regions do the majority of crimes occur? Figure 87 shows regional patterns.




Figure 87. Victimization by Crime in the Regions of Colombia

We have already mentioned that Bogotá has the highest rates. More than half of Bogotá households report someone being victimized by crime; this percentage has stayed more or less steady over the last three years.

Since knowing how experiences with crime have changed over time might be revealing, Figure 88 shows how trends on self-reported crime victimization have changed in Colombia between 2004 and 2012. We have to point out, however, that the wording of the question measuring crime victimization changed in 2010. Between 2004 and 2009, LAPOP used question **VIC1**, which asked: *Have you been victim of a criminal act in the last 12 months?* Beginning in 2010, the question was replaced with **VIC1EXT**, which is more detailed about the kinds of criminal acts that could have occurred. Although the change was made with the hope of improving the validity of the responses, it could possibly explain the increase in the rate of victimization reported between 2009 and 2010.




Figure 88. Personal Victimization by Crime Over Time in Colombia

Who is Most Likely to be a Victim of Crime?

Figure 89 illustrates the results of a logistic regression analysis model to assess who is most likely to be a victim of crime in Colombia.¹² In this figure, as in all regression charts, the variables have been standardized and the coefficients that measure the effect of each variable are shown as a data point along with a confidence interval, expressed in terms of a range surrounding that point. If the confidence interval does not cross the centerline at 0.0, then the variable has a statistically significant effect (at level $p < 0.05$). A coefficient with a confidence interval falling to the right of the zero line indicates a positive effect on the dependent variable. On the other hand, if the confidence interval of a coefficient falls to the left of the zero line, then it indicates a statistically significant negative effect.

¹² Detailed results of the model are in Table 29 of Appendix D.




Figure 89. Determinants of Victimization by Crime in Colombia

Among the factors included in this model, only age and the size of the location of residence are significant predictors of crime victimization. For a better understanding of the relationships between each independent variable and crime victimization in Colombia, Figure 90 displays the bivariate relationships for each one of the independent variables identified as significant in the logistical regression and the dependent variable, crime victimization.

The model suggests that younger individuals are more likely to be victims of crime than are older ones, as shown on the left panel of the figure. In fact, a person who is 18 to 25 years old is twice as likely to be victimized by crime as a person between 46 and 55 years old. The likelihood for younger individuals is probably tied to their level of street activity in everyday life and, related, perhaps to their willingness to take more risks.

As already mentioned, crime is a particularly urban phenomenon. As we can see in the right panel of the figure below, rates of victimization are greater in big cities and capitals.




Figure 90. Sociodemographic Factors and Victimization by Crime in Colombia

V. The Impact of Crime, Insecurity, and Corruption on System Support

What are the effects of high levels of victimization by crime and corruption as well as generalized perceptions of insecurity and corruption on legitimacy in Colombia? In answering this question, we used a multivariate linear regression to gauge the impact that victimization and perceptions of crime and corruption have on the legitimacy of the political system. Figure 91 shows the impact of perception and experience with crime on system support.¹³ The model indicates that, even when controlling for other factors, perceptions of insecurity and corruption undermine the legitimacy of the political system. Furthermore, individuals who were victims of crime in the last year also express significantly less support for the system than those who were not victimized by crime. As for sociodemographic factors, the model suggests that older individuals and those in rural areas or small cities afford more legitimacy to the system.

¹³ Support for the system is calculated as the average of five responses by the respondent: **B1**, the perception that courts guarantee a fair trial; **B2**, respect for the institutions of the country; **B3**, belief that citizens' fundamental rights are protected; **B4**, proud to live under the political system of the country; and **B6**, belief that individuals should support the country's political system. The variable associated with these questions is recodified into a 0 to 100 scale. For more information, see Chapter Five. The details for the model appear in Table 30 of Appendix D.




Figure 91. Determinants of System Support in Colombia

Figure 92 delves deeper into the effects of the independent variables on system support and displays the bivariate relationships between system support and perceptions of and experiences with crime and corruption.

The figures show an estimated value of system support for the different values of the predictors related to perceptions of and victimization by crime and corruption, holding other factors constant. This way of graphically displaying the results shows the impact of those variables under consideration with more precision given that it goes beyond a simple bivariate approach and allows for controlling for other factors. It thus avoids highlighting misleading, spurious relationships.

The figure shows the negative impact that crime and corruption have on the legitimacy of the system—confirming the hypothesis about their corrosive effects—and brings attention to the pernicious effects crime and corruption also have on Colombians attitudes towards democracy.




Figure 92. Crime, Corruption, and System Support

VI. Support for the Rule of Law and the Impact of Crime and Insecurity

This section discusses support for the rule of law in the Americas. The rule of law is normally conceptualized as the universal and uniform application of the laws of a state or the supposition that no one is above the law.¹⁴ Previous LAPOP studies found striking variation in citizens' opinions in the Americas related to whether the police should break the law in trying to capture criminals. A simplistic threat hypothesis would tell us that individuals with perceptions that crime is high and those who have been victims of crime would be more likely to accept violations to the rule of law.¹⁵ In measuring support for the rule of law, we tried to capture the extent to which respondent's believe authorities should respect the law in their crime-fighting efforts.

¹⁴ See, O'Donnell, Guillermo A. 2004. "Why the Rule of Law Matters". *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 32-46.

¹⁵ Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime? *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

AOJ8. In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?


(1) Should always abide by the law

(2) Occasionally can cross the line

(88) DK

(98) DA

Figure 93 shows the percentage of citizens in 2012 from across the Americas that expressed support for the rule of law—that is, those who rejected the notion that police and other authorities should sometimes act above the law. The highest level of support for the rule of law was in Jamaica (75%), while the lowest levels were in Bolivia (53%) and Ecuador (55%). In Colombia, the percentage of people who supported unconditional adherence to the law (72%) was among the highest in the region.



**Figure 93. Support for the Rule of Law
in the Countries of the Americas**

After an extended decrease in support for the rule of law, Figure 94 shows that in 2012 the percentage of people supporting authorities' unconditional adherence to the law finally took a jump, reaching points not seen since 2004 and 2005.




Figure 94. Support for the rule of Law Over Time in Colombia

Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the determinants of support for the rule of law in Colombia. Figure 95 shows the results of logistic regression analysis used to identify determinant factors (detailed results appear in Table 31 of Appendix D).




Figure 95. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law in Colombia

Interestingly, when sociodemographic, ideology, and interpersonal factors are controlled, neither delinquency nor corruption—whether in terms of perceptions or direct experiences—have a significant impact on attitudes towards authorities' respect for the rule of law.

The model's most important finding is that wealthier Colombians express the least amount of respect for the rule of law. This finding confirms the results of other studies that include further contextual effects on the rule of law (Espinosa and Rodríguez-Raga 2011).¹⁶ The relationship is illustrated in Figure 96, showing the estimated percentages of responses in favor of the rule of law by respondents' respective wealth quintile, controlling for other factors in the model.




Figure 96. Wealth Quintiles and Support for the Rule of Law in Colombia

VII. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the magnitude of crime and corruption victimization as well as perceptions of insecurity and corruption and their impact on support for the political system and the rule of law in Colombia.

We must underscore that in 2012 Colombia tops the list in perception of corruption among the countries of the region. Just two years ago, Colombia was significantly below countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. Victimization by corruption has also increased considerably in the

¹⁶ Espinosa, José Rafael and Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga. 2011. "Cultura política e instituciones: Una mirada exploratoria a los municipios de Colombia". In Mauricio García Villegas, Juan Carlos Rodríguez Raga, Miguel García, José Rafael Espinosa and Javier Revelo (eds.), *Los estados del país. Instituciones municipales y realidades locales*. Bogotá: DeJusticia – Open Society Institute.

last year. Meanwhile, despite critiques from some quarters about deteriorating security, data from the AmericasBarometer shows that perceptions of insecurity have not increased with the change in administrations and, in fact, have slightly decreased in the last year.

Perceptions of insecurity and corruption, as well as crime victimization, are negatively affecting system support. And as for respect for the rule of law, only wealth has a significant impact: wealthier respondents in Colombia expressed less respect for the rule of law.

Chapter Five: Political Legitimacy and Tolerance

With Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

At least since the times of Plato, philosophers and political scientists have asked what makes democracy tick. The concept of legitimacy has been central. Although some political scientists have defined democracy in terms of procedures,¹ others have argued that the attitudes and values of citizens are critically important, highlighting the critical importance of legitimacy for the consolidation of democracy.² Political legitimacy is an indicator of the relationship between citizens and state institutions as well as a key component of democratic stability; it also plays a defining role in the study of political culture.³

In LAPOP studies that use AmericasBarometer data, we define political legitimacy in terms of citizen support for the political system and tolerance for the political rights and participation of others. Political legitimacy or “system support” has two central dimensions: diffuse and specific support.⁴ While specific support concerns citizen evaluations of incumbent authorities, diffuse system support refers to generalized attachments to the more abstract notions of the political system and the political institutions themselves. Though many existing measures of system support confuse these two dimensions, LAPOP’s measure of system support (operationalized through the AmericasBarometer survey data) captures the diffuse dimensions of support that are central for democratic survival.⁵ This chapter analyzes the depth of political legitimacy in the Americas with the goal of determining and understanding the factors that explain the variation expressed by citizens of the Americas in embracing these attitudes on an individual level.

Although some scholars defend the idea that certain cultures naturally have higher levels of political legitimacy, others propose that economic development and politicians’ proximity to citizens’ policy preferences influence citizens’ attitudes about the political system.⁶ Some studies have found,

¹ Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942 *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd ed. New York: Harper Perennial, ; Przeworski Adam. 1999. “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense,” in Robert A. Dahl, Ian Shapiro, and Jose Antonio Cheibub. eds. *The Democracy Sourcebook*. Cambridge: The MIT Press; Huntington, Samuel P. 1991., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

² Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America”. *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29; Booth, John A. and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³ See also, Almond, Gabriel Abraham and Sidney Verba. 1963 *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.

⁴ Easton, David. 1975. “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4: 435-457; Seligson, Mitchell A. 2000. “Toward a Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America.” *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, no. 2: 5-29.

⁵ Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America*.

⁶ Almond and Verba *The Civic Culture*; Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1): 1203-1230. Przeworski, Adam et al., 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Acemoglu, Daron et al., 2008 “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98, no. 3: 808-842; Kotzian, Peter, 2011 “Public support for liberal democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 1: 23 -41. Evans, Geoffrey and Stephen Whitefield. 1995. “The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies,” *British Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 4: 485-514.

for instance, that systems able to make electoral defeat more palatable—e.g. making legislative representation more proportional—can further bolster system support, especially among election losers.⁷

Previous research by LAPOP has shown that system support is associated with factors such as citizens' trust and participation in political parties as well as how represented they feel by those parties.⁸ Research also indicates support for the political system support tied to local and national political participation as well as support for the rule of law.⁹

Political tolerance is a second major component of political culture and a central pillar of democratic survival. In line with previous LAPOP research, we define political tolerance as "the respect by citizens for the political rights of others, especially those with whom they may disagree."¹⁰ Gibson and other authors have pointed out the nefarious affects of intolerance on the quality of democracy. Intolerance among the mass public and elites is associated with support for policies that seek to constrain individual freedoms; the perception of constraints being imposed on group freedoms also breeds intolerance.¹¹ Indeed, Gibson has found that racism within communities is associated with feelings of their freedom of expression being constrained and that racial intolerance negatively impacts the political liberty of both light- and dark-skinned individuals.

Why are some citizens intolerant? Scholars believe many micro-level factors affect tolerance including perceptions of high levels of threat,¹² authoritarian personality,¹³ and religion.¹⁴ At the

⁷ Anderson, Christopher. 2007. *Losers' consent: elections and democratic legitimacy*, [Reprinted]. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Anderson, Christopher J. y Christine A. Guillory. 1997. "Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems," *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1: 66-81.

⁸ Corral, Margarita. 2009. Participation in Meetings of Political Parties, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 20. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2008. Mis(trust) in Political Parties in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 2. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Corral, Margarita. 2010. Political Parties and Representation in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 36. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

⁹ Montalvo, Daniel. 2008. Citizen Participation in Municipal Meetings, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 4: Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Cruz, José Miguel. 2009. Should Authorities Respect the Law When Fighting Crime?, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 19. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP); Maldonado, Arturo. 2011. Compulsory Voting and the Decision to Vote, *AmericasBarometer Insights Series*, 63. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

¹⁰ Seligson, Mitchell. 2000. "Toward A Model of Democratic Stability Political Culture in Central America," *Estudios interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 11, 2.

¹¹ Gibson, James L. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L. 2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L. 1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3: 819-850; Gibson, James L. 1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

¹² Gibson, James L. 1988. "Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2: 511-529; Gibson, James L. 2008. , "Intolerance and Political Repression in the United States: A Half Century after McCarthyism," *American Journal of Political Science* 52 : 96-108; Gibson, James L. 1998. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 3: 819-850; Gibson, James L. 1995. , "The political freedom of African-Americans: a contextual analysis of racial attitudes, political tolerance, and individual liberty," *Political Geography* 14, no. 6-7 : 571-599.

¹³ Altemeyer Bob. 2007. *The Authoritarians*.

¹⁴ Postic, Robert K. 2007, *Political tolerance: The effects of religion and religiosity* (ProQuest, 2007); Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties* (John Wiley & Sons Inc,).

macro level, social identity and social dominance theorists view intolerance as a function of in-group and out-group dynamics and positions in the social hierarchy.¹⁵ External threats and security crisis as well as levels of democratization are also related to tolerance.¹⁶ LAPOP-affiliated researchers using AmericasBarometer data have found that support (or lack thereof) for the right to same-sex marriage is linked not only to their religious denomination, but also to the centrality of religion in their daily lives. Moreover, support for this right is more prevalent in more developed countries.¹⁷

Golebiowska's research shows that an individual's gender has a direct impact on tolerance: women are more tolerant than men.¹⁸ A person's gender also has strong indirect effects because women are more religious, perceive more threats, and are less likely to tolerate uncertainty; they are also more inclined toward moral traditionalism, have less political experience, and show less support for democratic norms than men.

System support and political tolerance have important effects for the consolidation of democracy. Stable democracies need legitimate institutions and citizens who tolerate and respect the rights of others. Table 2 summarizes how tolerance and political legitimacy can affect a stable democracy, according to previous AmericasBarometer research. If the majority of people show high system support as well as high tolerance, it is expected that the democracy will be stable and consolidated. On the contrary, if the majority is intolerant and not supportive of their institutions, the democratic regime may be at risk. A third possibility is high instability if the majority shows high tolerance toward other citizens but accords political institutions low legitimacy. Finally, if the society has high system support but low tolerance, the conditions do not bode well for democracy and, at the extreme, are ripe for the regime to drift toward a more authoritarian model.

Table 2. Relationship Between System Support and Political Tolerance

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian Stability
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at Risk

Empirical evidence supports this conceptualization. With data from the 2008 AmericasBarometer, Booth and Seligson found serious warning signs of political instability in Honduras shortly before the military forces unconstitutionally exiled then-president Zelaya to Costa Rica.¹⁹

¹⁵ Sidanius, Jim and Felicia Pratto. 1999. *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*, 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁶ Peffley, Mark y Robert Rohrschneider. 2003 "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning," *Political Research Quarterly* 56, no. 3 : 243 -257.

¹⁷ Lodola, Germán and Margarita Corral. 2010. Support for Same-Sex Marriage in Latin America. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 44. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

¹⁸ Golebiowska, Ewa. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance", *Political Behavior*, 21 (3): 443-464; Golebiowska, Ewa. 2006. "Gender and Tolerance" in Gerson Moreno-Riano Ed. *Tolerance in the 21st Century*. Lanham, MD; Lexington Books.

¹⁹ Booth and Seligson. 2009. *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Latin American Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. See also, Perez, Orlando J., John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2010. The Honduran Catharsis. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 48. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Support for the Political System

The index of system support developed by LAPOP for the AmericasBarometer is calculated through an average of the responses to the following questions from the survey:

I am going to ask you a series of questions. I am going to ask that you use the numbers provided in the ladder to answer. Remember, you can use any number.

B1. To what extent do you think the courts in Colombia guarantee a fair trial? (**Read:** If you think the courts do not ensure justice at all, choose number 1; if you think the courts ensure justice a lot, choose number 7 or choose a point in between the two.)

B2. To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Colombia?


B3. To what extent do you think that citizens' basic rights are well protected by the political system of Colombia?

B4. To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Colombia?

B6. To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Colombia?

Following AmericasBarometer's standard practice, the index is recoded onto a scale from 0 to 100 in which 0 means "not at all" and 100 means "a lot."

How does support for the political system vary in the countries of the Americas? Figure 97 shows levels of political support from the 2012 study. Colombia is not very well ranked compared to comparative AmericasBarometer results from previous years. As we will see in what follows, average support for the system has slightly decreased in Colombia. Today, countries such as Belize, Surinam, Nicaragua, Canada, Uruguay, and Guyana show significantly greater system support than Colombia, while Panama and Honduras are where levels are comparatively lowest.



**Figure 97. Support for the Political System
in the Countries of the Americas**

Average support for the political system is normally higher for some individual dimensions of the index than for others. Figure 98 shows levels of agreement in Colombia with each of the five components used to measure system support. The country shows comparatively less confidence in respect for basic rights and the functioning of the courts than it does in support for the more abstract notion of institutions.




Figure 98. Components of Support for the Political System in Colombia

Figure 99 shows the evolution of system support over the nine years in which the AmericasBarometer has been done in Colombia. We can see how a slight but significant decrease in average system support has occurred in the last two years. The decline could be due to the change in government in 2010 when Juan Manuel Santos took over from Uribe. We could interpret the decline as a general loss in confidence by Colombians in their institutions as a result of the change in administration. Another interpretation is that perhaps the measure of diffuse support designed by LAPOP might have picked up elements of specific support, meaning that Uribe's high popularity during his two terms contributed to the high system support recorded in data from those years. The decline in this indicator may also reflect the decline in president Santos' approval ratings.




Figure 99. Political System Support Over Time in Colombia

III. Political Tolerance

The second component used to measure legitimacy is political tolerance. The index is composed of responses to the following four questions of the survey:

- D1.** There are people who only say bad things about the Colombia form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: *[Probe: To what degree?]*
- D2.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed **to conduct peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number.
- D3.** Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the Colombia form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**?
- D4.** How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?

As with all LAPOP indices, we calculate each person's mean (average) reported response to these four questions. We then rescale the resulting variable to run from 0 to 100, so that 0 represents very low tolerance, and 100 represents very high tolerance. Figure 100 shows tolerance averages for all the countries included in the study. As in previous years, Colombia appears in the lower half of the list, only significantly higher than Haiti, Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador, Ecuador, and Honduras.




Figure 100. Political Tolerance in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 101 shows citizens’ levels of support for each one of the four components of political tolerance in Colombia with substantial differences on tolerance towards citizens from non-traditional backgrounds running for public office, which has the lowest support, and tolerance towards other’s right to publicly protest, the component with highest support.




Figure 101. Components of Political Tolerance Colombia

How has political tolerance evolved over time in Colombia? Figure 102 shows average levels of political tolerance for each round of the AmericasBarometer since 2004; the rates of support have been relatively stable over time, with a small jump between 2009 and 2010, but then slipping again in subsequent years.




Figure 102. Political Tolerance Over Time in Colombia

What factors affect levels of political tolerance in Colombia? Figure 103 uses a linear regression model to answer this question.²⁰

²⁰ Detailed results of the model are in Table 32 of Appendix D.




Figure 103. Determinants of Political Tolerance in Colombia

Figure 104 explores the results of the model.²¹ The two best predictors of political tolerance are education and religion. More educated people appear more tolerant (left panel), while a greater importance of religion in the daily life of the respondent has a negative impact on tolerance (right panel).




Figure 104. Tolerance by Education Level and Religiousness

²¹ The figure shows an estimate of tolerance for the different values of the factors chosen while controlling others.

IV. Democratic Stability

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, system support and political tolerance are vital components of democratic stability and can be combined into the typology outlined in Table 2. Table 3 shows the same typology but includes the percentage of respondents in Colombia that fall into each category. Just over a fourth of Colombians harbor attitudes conducive to a stable democracy, while a third display low tolerance with high system support, meaning that they have attitudes more conducive to a situation of authoritarian stability. This pattern is not new in Colombia; in fact, the combination of high legitimacy and low tolerance for other's rights has long characterized the country's political culture.

Table 3. Combination of System Support and Political Tolerance in Colombia

	High Tolerance	Low Tolerance
High System Support	Stable Democracy 27.1%	Authoritarian Stability 34.0%
Low System Support	Unstable Democracy 19.4%	Democracy at Risk 19.4%

Another way of looking at this combination of attitudes is through a comparative lens by plotting all the countries on a grid using the averages from the 2012 survey for each element of the typology, as shown in Figure 105.

The figure reveals that the country with the most problematic attitudes for democratic stability is, by far, Honduras. Among the countries with the best democratic attitudes are the United States, Canada, Uruguay, Belize, and Guyana..

Compared with the last comparative study in 2010, it is striking how both system support and tolerance have considerably decreased in Costa Rica, which has always been a model country for Latin America—a result worth further analysis elsewhere. In Venezuela, meanwhile, system support has remained stable while tolerance has slightly decreased. Colombia does not show such clear changes in the last two years, but perhaps what stands out the most is the decline in system support, as shown in previous figures.²²

²² See Rodríguez-Raga and Seligson, *ibid.*




Figure 105. Democratic Stability in the Americas




Figure 106. High System Support and High Political Tolerance in the Americas

Figure 106 shows the percentage of people in each country that fall into the “stable democracy” category, corroborating the results just discussed for the grid.

How has the percentage of Colombian citizens with attitudes conducive to democratic stability changed over time? Figure 107 shows the percentage of respondents that expressed high system support and high tolerance between 2004 and 2012. As already mentioned, the percentage of citizens who showed favorable attitudes toward stable democracy has been declining since its peak in 2010. The 2012 percentage marks the lowest point since LAPOP began measuring the phenomenon eight years ago., This trend deserves deeper research and analysis than what it is afforded in the pages of this report.




Figure 107. High System Support and High Tolerance Over Time in Colombia

Which factors influence attitudes conducive to democratic stability in Colombia? Figure 108 shows the results of a logistic regression (detailed result appear in Table 33 of Appendix D). None of the usual sociodemographic factors are significant predictors of attitudes conducive to democratic stability.

The model indicates that crime, both in terms of victimization and perceptions of insecurity, have a negative impact on democratic attitudes. Victimization by corruption also has a negative impact, while interest in politics increases the chances of harboring high levels of system support and high political tolerance.




Figure 108. Determinants of Democratic Stability in Colombia

Delving deeper into the determinants for democratic stability, Figure 109 shows bivariate relationships between system support and the most important variables identified by the regression analysis.

The figure shows the estimated probability of an individual having high system support and high tolerance as a function of being victimized by crime (top-left panel), being victimized by corruption (top-right panel), perceptions of insecurity (bottom-left panel), and interest in political issues (bottom-right panel), holding other factors constant.

In other words, the model suggests, that if we hold sociodemographic and other factors (interest in politics, ideology, etc.) constant, the probability of a citizen who was the victim of a crime in the last 12 months of having attitudes that are conducive to democratic stability is 0.23; that probability increases to 0.31 for a Colombian who was not a victim of a crime.




Figure 109. Factors Associated with Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability in Colombia

V. The Legitimacy of Democratic Institutions

To what extent do citizens in the Americas support major political and social institutions? Similar to other survey rounds, the 2012 AmericasBarometer asked about trust in a number of specific institutions, in addition to more general questions about support for the political system. Using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents “not at all,” and 7 represents “a lot,” citizens responded to the following questions:

B10A. To what extent do you trust the justice system?
B11. To what extent do you trust the National Electoral Council?
B12. To what extent do you trust the Armed Forces?
B13. To what extent do you trust the National Congress?
B14. To what extent do you trust the National Government?
B18. To what extent do you trust the Police?
B20. To what extent do you trust the Catholic Church?
B20A. To what extent do you trust the Protestant Church?
B21. To what extent do you trust the political parties?

B21A. To what extent do you trust the President?
B31. To what extent do you trust the Supreme Court?
B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor's Office?
COLB32A To what extent do you trust the Municipal Council?
B37. To what extent do you trust the mass media?
B47A. To what extent do you trust elections in this country?
B50. To what extent do you trust the Constitutional Court?

Figure 110 shows trust levels for each of these institutions (in our standard recoded onto 0 to 100 scale). The results show that political parties are the most distrusted institutions, even below the Protestant Church, which was at the bottom of the list in 2011. At the other extreme, trust in the Armed Forces is slightly above the Catholic Church—inverting their positions from 2011. As in previous years, the mass media enjoys widespread trust among citizens.




Figure 110. Trust in Institutions in Colombia

How do these results compare with those of previous years? Figure 111 contains results from 2004 to 2012.




Figure 111. Trust in Institutions Over Time in Colombia

VI. Support for Democracy

Support for democracy in the abstract is also considered a requirement for democratic consolidation. In the AmericasBarometer, one way we measure support for democracy is by asking citizens to respond to a statement that is a modification of a quote from Churchill,²³ and a question inspired by the work of Rose and Mishler.²⁴ Question **ING4** again uses a 7-point response scale, this time running from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly agree”):

ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Figure 112 shows average levels of support with this statement in the countries of the Americas. The countries with strongest support for democracy are Uruguay, Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, all with more than 80 points on a 0 to 100 scale. The average in Colombia is comparatively low, only above Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia in South America.




Figure 112. Support for Democracy in the Countries of the Americas

How has support for democracy evolved in Colombia in recent years? Figure 113 gives a perspective on changing support for democracy since 2004. We can detect a slight decline in 2012, but the change is not significant.

²³ Churchill actually referred to democracy as “the worst form of government except for all the others.”

²⁴ Rose, Richard and William Mishler 1996. Testing the Churchill Hypothesis: Popular Support for Democracy and Its Alternatives. *Journal of Public Policy* 16 (1): 29-58.




Figure 113. Support for Democracy Over Time in Colombia

In trying to identify the factors associated with support for democracy as the best form of government, we used a linear regression model with the same predictors used to explain favorable attitudes for democratic stability. The results of the model are shown in Figure 114 with more detail in Table 34 of Appendix D.




Figure 114. Determinants of Support for Democracy in Colombia

As Figure 115 shows, the model indicates that if we control for other factors, especially specific support for the administration in power, older respondents (top-left panel) and better-educated individuals (top-right panel)—particularly those with a post-secondary education—tend to express more support for democracy as a form of government. Those who reported having been a victim of a crime or of corruption in the last 12 months showed less support for democracy than those who had not been victims.²⁵ Moreover, those who expressed more interest in politics (bottom-left panel) showed firmer support for democracy. Respondents on the right-end of the political spectrum (bottom-right panel) showed higher support for democracy in Colombia than those on the left.




Figure 115. Factors Associated with Support for Democracy in Colombia

²⁵ This relationship is not included in the figure.

VII. Conclusion

One of the findings that stand out in this chapter is the decline in average support for the political system in Colombia. Not only has the country slipped from the top of the list during the nine years the AmericasBarometer has surveyed the country; the current average for system support puts Colombia at the very bottom of the list. The trend is reflected in a decrease in the percentage of people who harbor attitudes conducive to democratic stability—that is, high support for the political system and high tolerance for the rights of others. We can see that perceptions of insecurity and corruption as well as actual victimization by crime negatively affect these attitudes.

As for the country's political institutions, political parties have the lowest levels of trust, even below the Protestant Church, which was at the bottom of the list in 2011. At the other extreme, the Armed Forces are slightly more trusted than the Catholic Church—flipping positions in the last year. And, as in previous years, the mass media enjoy widespread trust among citizens.

The countries with the most support for democracy are Uruguay, Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Argentina, while the average in Colombia is comparatively low, only above Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia in South America.

In sum, skepticism toward the democratic system has increased in Colombia. This could be due to falling confidence in the government or because of a slightly more critical assessment of the new administration in comparison to the very high popularity levels reached and maintained by former president Uribe during his eight years in office.

Chapter Six: Local Government

With Frederico Batista Pereira and Amy Erica Smith

I. Introduction

This chapter explores the relationships between citizens' opinions about local governments, their experiences with local governments, and their views on democracy. To what extent do citizens interact with local authorities in Latin America and Caribbean? How well do they evaluate those interactions? Does local level politics affect political legitimacy at the national level?

The power of local governments varies from country to country and functions differently depending on the political system. In some places, citizens' interactions with the state are almost entirely limited to interactions with local authorities. Local authorities in some places have little fiscal and administrative autonomy while others have much more. Moreover, local governments may be more or less democratic. In short, local governments can effectively shape citizens' attitudes towards the broader political system and democracy as a whole.

While decentralization has occurred in many developing countries it is especially pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean.¹ It occurred alongside the "third wave" of democratization in the hemisphere.² Citizens across Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced not only the strengthening of local governments, but also the widespread adoption of democratic procedures for representation at the local level.

Research on local politics provides both enthusiastic and skeptical views of its influence on democratic consolidation. Some authors argue increased decentralization has generally created positive outcomes for governance and democracy. Faguet's study on Bolivia's 1994 decentralization process shows it changed the local and national investment patterns in ways that benefited the municipalities with the greatest need in education, sanitation, and agriculture.³ Akai and Sakata's findings also show that fiscal decentralization in the United States had a positive impact on economic growth.⁴ Moreover, Fisman and Gatti's cross-country research finds, contrary to conclusions of previous studies, that fiscal decentralization in government expenditures leads to lower corruption, as measured by different indicators.⁵

However, others argue local politics does not always produce efficient and democratic results and can be problematic when local governments and communities are ill prepared. Bardhan warns

¹ Rondinelli, Dennis, John Nellis and Shabbir Cheema. 1983. *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience*. World Bank Staff Working Paper 581, Management and Development Series (8): 1-99; p. 9.

² Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

³ Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2004. Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia [online]. London: LSE Research Online.

⁴ Akai, Nobuo and Masayo Sakata. 2002. "Fiscal Decentralization Contributes to Economic Growth: Evidence from State-Level Cross-Section data for the United States." *Journal of Urban Development* 52: 93-108.

⁵ Fisman, Raymond and Roberta Gatti. 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence across Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 83: 325-345.

that local governments in developing countries are often controlled by elites taking advantage of institutions and frustrating service delivery and development more broadly.⁶ Willis et al. show that in Mexico decentralizing administrative power and expanding sub-national taxing capacity led to the deterioration of services and to increasing inequality in poorer states.⁷ Galiani et al. find that while decentralization improved Argentine secondary student performance overall, performance declined in schools from poor areas and in provinces with weak technical capabilities.⁸

How does local government performance affect citizens' attitudes towards the political system more generally? Since some citizens only interact with government at the local level, those experiences are often central in shaping their view of democracy. Thus, a significant proportion of citizens may rely on experiences with local government when evaluating democracy and democratic institutions. In a study of Bolivia, Hiskey and Seligson show that decentralization can improve system support; however, relying on local government performance as a basis of evaluation of the system in general can become a problem when local institutions do not perform well.⁹ Weitz-Shapiro also finds that Argentine citizens rely on evaluations of local government to evaluate democracy as a whole.¹⁰ According to her, citizens distinguish between different dimensions of local government performance; while perception of local corruption affects satisfaction with democracy, perception of bureaucratic efficiency does not. And using 2010 AmericasBarometer data, West finds that citizens who have more contact with and who are more satisfied with local government are more likely to hold democratic values. Moreover, this relationship is especially strong for minorities.¹¹ Local politics can clearly be vital source of democratization.

The relationship between local politics and minority inclusion is another crucial issue. A central question is whether decentralization can improve the representation of groups that are historically marginalized, such as women and racial or ethnic minorities. Scholarship on this topic usually views local institutions as channels through which minorities can express their interests.¹² Moreover, local public officials may be better than national-level officials at aggregating and articulating minority preferences, effectively enhancing minority representation.¹³ If decentralization contributes to minority representation, it may also lead to increased levels of systems support and satisfaction with democracy, especially among minority groups.¹⁴

⁶ Bardhan, Pranab. 2002. "Decentralization of Governance and Development." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 16 (4): 185–205.

⁷ Willis, Eliza, Christopher Garman, and Stephen Haggard. 1999. "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America." *Latin American Research Review* 34 (1): 7–56.

⁸ Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler and Ernesto Schargrotsky. 2005. "School Decentralization: Helping the Good Get Better, but Leaving the Poor Behind", *Working Paper*. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés.

⁹ Hiskey, Jonathan and Mitchell Seligson. 2003. "Pitfalls of Power to the People: Decentralization, Local Government Performance, and System Support in Bolivia". *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37 (4): 64–88.

¹⁰ Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2008. "The Local Connection: Local Government Performance and Satisfaction with Democracy in Argentina". *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (3): 285–308.

¹¹ West, Karleen. 2011. The Effects of Decentralization on Minority Inclusion and Democratic Values in Latin America. *Papers from the AmericasBarometer*. Vanderbilt University.

¹² Hirschmann, Albert. 1970. *Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

¹³ Hayek, Friedrich. 1945. "The Use of Knowledge in Society". *American Economic Review* 35(4): 519–530.

¹⁴ West, *ibid*; p. 4.

Nonetheless, existing research has produced mixed conclusions.¹⁵ Patterson finds that the decentralization of electoral laws in Senegal in 1996 led to an increase in the proportion of women participating in local politics, but not to more women-friendly policies.¹⁶ West uses the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey data to show that recent decentralization in Latin America does not increase minority inclusion or access to local government.¹⁷ In this chapter we seek to develop additional systematic evidence at the regional level.

In the next section of this chapter we examine the extent to which citizens in the Americas participate in local politics, and how they evaluate local political institutions. We focus on indicators of two types of participation: *attending town meetings* and *petitioning local offices*. We compare the extent to which citizens from different countries participate in local politics through these formal channels and we compare the cross-national results from 2012 with the ones from previous years (2004, 2006, 2008, 2010). We also seek to understand the main determinants of those two types of participation, with an emphasis on racial, ethnic, and gender inequality. This is followed by an assessment of the extent to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local governments and local services. Finally, we assess the degree to which citizens across the Americas are satisfied with their local government, focusing on the relationship between satisfaction and support for the political system.

Previous work using the AmericasBarometer surveys has examined in detail some of these phenomena. For instance, Montalvo shows that the determinants of citizens' petitioning municipal governments include not only individual-level factors such education and age, but also decentralization of public spending.¹⁸ Thus, fiscal decentralization strengthens the connection between governments and citizens' demands.¹⁹ In a different study, Montalvo finds that crime and corruption victimization are negatively associated with citizens' satisfaction with municipal services, showing perceptions of poor performance at this level are probably due to such problems.²⁰ Finally, he also shows that satisfaction with municipal services, participation in community services, and interpersonal trust are among the best predictors of trust in municipal governments.²¹

¹⁵ West, *ibid*; Pape, I.R.S. 2008. "This is Not a Meeting for Women': The Sociocultural Dynamics of Rural Women's Political Participation in the Bolivian Andes". *Latin American Perspectives* 35 (6): 41-62. Pape, I.R.S. (2009). "Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class: Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands". *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4): 101-125

¹⁶ Patterson, Amy. 2002. "The Impact of Senegal's Decentralization on Women in Local Governance". *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 36 (3): 490-529.

¹⁷ West, *ibid*.

¹⁸ Montalvo, Daniel. 2009a. "Demand-Making on Local Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 10. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)

¹⁹ Montalvo, *ibid*; p. 4.

²⁰ Montalvo, Daniel 2009b. "Citizen Satisfaction with Municipal Services." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 14. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

²¹ Montalvo, Daniel. 2010. "Understanding Trust in Municipal Governments." *AmericasBarometer Insights* 35. Vanderbilt University: Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

II. Local Level Participation

The 2012 AmericasBarometer included a series of questions to measure citizens' engagement with the local political system:

Now let's talk about your local municipality...				
NP1. Have you attended a town meeting, municipal council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months? (1) Yes (2) No (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer				
NP2. Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months? (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [Go to SGL1] (88) Doesn't know [Go to SGL1] (98) Doesn't answer [Go to SGL1]				
MUNI10. Did they resolve your issue or request? (1) Yes (0) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) N/A				

Local Meeting Attendance

Figure 116 displays the percentage of citizens in each country of the Americas who report having attended a local meeting in the past year. We see that one in five citizens say they attended local meetings in countries such as Haiti—perhaps due to the recovery and reconstruction of the country as a result of the 2010 earthquake—and the United States, a country with a long tradition of community participation. On the other hand, less than one in ten Colombians reported attending local meetings in the last 12 months, a comparatively low proportion—about the same as Uruguay. Still, the participation rate in Colombia is significantly greater than that of countries such as Costa Rica, Argentina, and Chile.




Figure 116. Participation in Municipal Meetings in the Countries of the Americas

How has citizen participation in municipal meetings changed in recent years? Figure 117 shows local participation levels in Colombia since 2004. Meeting participation has fluctuated over time, but not by much and not in any statistically significant way. Participation levels in 2012 have returned to peak levels not seen since 2008.




Figure 117. Participation in Municipal Meetings Over Time Colombia

Petitioning Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer allows us to examine not only who attends meetings, but also who petitions local government—that is, who makes requests or demands on local authorities. Figure 118 analyzes the results to question **NP2** and shows the percentage of citizens in the Americas who have petitioned a government official or agency in the last year.

Once again, Haiti sits atop the list for the proportion of citizens who have petitioned local government. Uruguay also shows a high proportion of demand-making—an interesting contrast to the low percentage of Uruguayans who attend municipal meetings. In any case, the majority of countries in the region do not show significant differences, with averages largely hovering between 10% and 16%. For Colombia, the percentage of citizens who have petitioned local authorities is close to 12%, significantly greater than in Ecuador and Panama.




Figure 118. Petitioning Local Government in the Countries of the Americas

How has the magnitude of petitions on local government changed over time? Figure 119 examines the percentage of citizens in Colombia who have petitioned the local government since 2004. The figure shows that, despite some apparent fluctuations, the differences are generally not statistically significant (i.e. confidence intervals overlap).




Figure 119. Petitioning the Local Government Over Time in Colombia

In addition to asking about demand-making, the AmericasBarometer also asked whether citizens' petitions were resolved. Note that this question was only asked of those citizens who first said they had made a government demand or request—174 individuals, in the case of Colombia. These responses provide an important window into citizens' perspectives on the quality of services provided by their municipalities. Figure 120 shows that, over time, local authorities in Colombia resolved between 33% and 40% of petitions.




Figure 120. Petition Resolutions by Local Governments Over Time in Colombia

What are the factors that lead a citizen to petition the local government? Figure 121 shows a logistic regression analysis used to examine which factors affect citizens' petitioning of local government in Colombia.²² Respondents who express an interest in politics more frequently petition local authorities, while the size of the location of residence and local meeting attendance are also significant factors, as discussed below.

²² Detailed results of the model appears in Table 35 of Appendix D.




Figure 121. Determinants of Petitioning Local Governments in Colombia

Figure 122 reveals in more detail how the estimated probability of local petition-making varies as a function of factors included as independent variables in the logisitic regression. The figure shows estimated probabilities, while holding other factors constant, thus eliminating spurious relationships.

The left-hand panel shows that petitions are more frequent in rural areas and in small municipalities than in larger cities and capitals. The right-hand panel demonstrates that one of the key predictors for petitioning local government is attendance of municipal meetings: the probability of petitioning local authorities rises from 9% to 43% when the respondent reports having attended local meetings.




Figure 122. Probability of Petitioning the Local Government by Size of Place and Municipal Meeting Attendance in Colombia

III. Satisfaction With and Trust in Local Government

The 2012 AmericasBarometer also included a number of questions to assess the extent to which citizens are satisfied with and trust their local governments. The first question has appeared in a number of previous surveys.

SGL1. Would you say that the services the municipality is providing to the people are...? **[Read options]**
 (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad
 (88) Doesn't know (98) Doesn't answer

In addition, the 2012 survey featured three new questions designed to tap satisfaction with particular services typically delivered by local governments.

SD2NEW2. And thinking about this city/area where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, **dissatisfied**, or very dissatisfied with the condition of the streets, roads, and highways?

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD3NEW2. And the quality of public schools? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

SD6NEW2. And the quality of public medical and health services? **[Probe: are you very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?]**

(1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied
 (4) Very dissatisfied (99) N/A (Does not use) (88) DK (98) DA

Finally, the last question, which measures trust, has also appeared in previous AmericasBarometer surveys. It asks citizens to respond to the following question using a 7-point scale, where 1 means “not at all” and 7 means “a lot.”

B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor's office?

Satisfaction with Local Services

Figure 123 shows citizens' average satisfaction levels with local government services in the Americas from the responses to question **SGL1**. Following standard AmericasBarometer practice, the responses were recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale in which 0 was the lowest level of satisfaction and 100 was the highest. Canada and Argentina show the highest levels of satisfaction with local governments—Argentina's rise from 51 to 59 on the 100-point scale since the last survey is a striking rise. Colombia, meanwhile, is no longer in first place in satisfaction levels with local services as it was in 2010.




Figure 123. Satisfaction with Local Government Services in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 124 shows that more than a third of Colombians describe their municipal services as good or very good, while more than a quarter describe them as bad or very bad. Figure 125, however, shows that, even if Colombia is not in first place on the comparative list, citizen satisfaction with local government services has not exhibited much variation over time. Indeed, Colombia's drop in ranking is due more to improvements in other countries than in a drastic fall in Colombians' own satisfaction levels.




Figure 124. Evaluation of Local Government Services in Colombia





Figure 125. Evaluation of Local Government Services Over Time in Colombia

Since it is possible for citizens have different levels of satisfaction with different kinds of local services, the following three figures show individual satisfaction levels for roads, schools, and health services in the Americas.²³ Figure 126 shows satisfaction levels with roads and highways, according to


²³ We recognize that responsibility for providing these services can fall on different scales of government among the various countries of the Americas.

responses to question **SD2NEW2**. Once again, the responses are recoded onto a 0 to 100 scale, where 0 represents very low satisfaction and 100 represents very high satisfaction. Ecuador, Panama, and to a lesser extent Mexico and Argentina have the highest satisfaction rates with roads and highways. Colombians, on the other hand, have a very low opinion of their country's road system—at least, comparatively (Colombia is almost 20 points below Ecuador!). Only in Jamaica are citizens significantly less satisfied with their roads and highways. Unfortunately, we do not have information on previous years, since this is a new question for the AmericasBarometer. Nonetheless, the indicator suggests just how far behind Colombia has lagged in terms of road infrastructure—a responsibility in the shared charge of local, departmental, and national authorities.




**Figure 126. Satisfaction with Roads
in the Countries of the Americas**

Figure 127 shows satisfaction levels with public schools from responses to question **SD3NEW2**. Costa Rica shows the highest satisfaction, while Chileans are the most dissatisfied with the state of public schools in their country. Colombia just barely breaks the mid-point on the scale; it is more than 10 points behind Costa Rica and Ecuador, but on par with Uruguay. This last point is surprising given Uruguay's tradition of exemplary public education—despite an evident deterioration in recent years, according to local opinion—while Colombia has never had a strong tradition of quality public education though coverage has increased in recent decades.



**Figure 127. Satisfaction with Public Schools
in the Countries of the Americas**

Finally, Figure 128 assesses satisfaction levels with public health services from question **SD6NEW2**. Costa Rica and Ecuador again top the list along with Panama; all of them are more than 15 points ahead of Colombia, which is only ahead of Chile, Haiti, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago.




**Figure 128. Satisfaction with Public Health Services
in the Countries of the Americas**

Trust in Local Governments

The 2012 AmericasBarometer asked individuals not only whether they were satisfied with local government, but also whether they trusted local government. This question aims to tap more long-standing, abstract attitudes towards local government.


Figure 129 shows average levels of trust in local governments in the countries of the Americas. Local governments are more trusted in El Salvador, Venezuela, and Chile, while Haiti, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago showed the lowest levels. Trust in local government is at an intermediate level in Colombia, putting it at the middle of both the list and the 100-point scale—on par with Ecuador and Guyana.



**Figure 129. Trust in Local Government
in the Countries of the Americas**


IV. Impact of Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support

As we have already pointed out in this chapter, for many citizens the bulk of their contact with the state is actually with the local government. For this reason, perceptions of local government can have broad implications for attitudes towards the political system in general. Figure 130 presents a linear regression model to evaluate the factors that affect support for the political system, for detailed results see Table 36 of Appendix D. The figure shows that satisfaction with local services positively affects system support, even when other factors are controlled for (in particular presidential job approval).



**Figure 130. Satisfaction with Local Services
as Determinant of Support for the Political System in Colombia**

Figure 131 shows estimated values (along with 95% confidence intervals) for system support as a result of the different responses on local public service satisfaction, while holding all other factors in the model constant.



**Figure 131. Satisfaction with Local Services and System Support in Colombia
(Controlling for Other Factors)**

With values similar to factors such as ideology, presidential approval, and sociodemographics, those who characterize municipal services as very good, hold, on average, values in excess of 20 points higher—on the usual 100-point scale—for system support than those who consider public services to be very bad. In line with previous AmericasBarometer findings in Colombia, we again see the importance of local government performance, since its entities are closest to average citizens on attitudes towards the political system in its most abstract form.

V. Conclusion

Participation in municipal meetings and petitioning the local government in Colombia remain comparatively low, with little variation over time. Local authorities' response to petitions, however, has increased from 33% to 40% between 2011 and 2012.

Although Colombia has dropped from first place it has increased in average levels of satisfaction with local government services since the 2010 survey. These over time difference, however, are not significant. The decline in placement is due more to improvements in other countries than in a drastic fall in Colombians' own satisfaction levels. However, dissatisfaction with the state of the country's road infrastructure and with the provision of education and health services is comparatively high.

As in previous years, we found evidence indicating that support for the political system, as an abstract concept, is in part determined by citizens' perceptions about how well local government entities function in their everyday lives. In short, those who are most satisfied with local government services tend to show higher levels of system support. The construction of a democratic political culture must clearly begin at the local level.

Part III: Beyond the Equality of Opportunities

Chapter Seven: Party Affiliation and Ideology: Characteristics and Tendencies

I. Affinity with Political Parties

We begin with an analysis of responses to a question aimed at gauging to what extent citizens feel close to the political parties of their country. The question is as follows:

VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?

(1) Yes **[Continue]** (2) No **[Go to POL1]** (88) DK **[Skip to POL1]** (98) DA **[Skip to POL1]**

Figure 132 shows the percentage of respondents in the countries of the Americas who say they identify with a particular political party. The list is headed by the Dominican Republic and the United States, where three in five people say they identify with a particular party. Colombia appears at the bottom-end of the list, with only about one in four respondents claiming identification with a party, a proportion superior only to those of Peru, Bolivia, Chile, and Guatemala.




Figure 132. Identification with a Political Party in the Americas

As Figure 133 shows, percentages of partisan identification have remained more or less constant over time in Colombia. Besides a partisan effervescence in 2010, during the most recent presidential election, the percentage of people who identify with a particular party has remained stable in recent years.




Figure 133. Identification with a Political Party Over Time in Colombia

Low levels of identification with a party could be related to the high level of distrust towards political parties. Figure 134 shows levels of trust towards parties in the countries of the Americas by recoding the original 1 to 7 trust-scale onto the standard 0 to 100 scale.




Figure 134. Trust in Parties in the Countries of the Americas

Levels of trust in parties are generally low in the region; only two countries (Guyana and Belize) exceed the 50-point mark. Although cases such as the United States and Dominican Republic

would indicate no direct correlation between trust in parties and identification with them, both indicators are comparatively low in Colombia.

When compared to other institutions, political parties have consistently ranked among the least trusted institutions in Colombia and this trust only worsened over the last year. As Figure 135 shows, after a significant drop from 2011 to 2012, trust in political parties reached the lowest point ever recorded in the nine years the AmericasBarometer has surveyed the country.




Figure 135. Trust in Political Parties Over Time in Colombia

Respondents who sympathized with a particular party were then asked to identify the party through the following semi-structured question:

<p>VB11. With which party do you identify? [DO NOT READ LIST]</p> <p>(801) Partido Liberal</p> <p>(802) Partido Conservador</p> <p>(803) Polo Democrático Alternativo</p> <p>(804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional)</p> <p>(805) Cambio Radical</p> <p>(806) Convergencia Ciudadana</p> <p>(808) Colombia Democrática</p> <p>(809) Colombia Viva</p> <p>(810) Movimiento MIRA</p> <p>(817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI)</p> <p>(819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA)</p>	<p>(821) Partido Verde</p> <p>(822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS)</p> <p>(823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN)</p> <p>(826) Movimiento Afrovides – La Esperanza de un Pueblo</p> <p>(827) Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Participativa “Mio”</p> <p>(77) Otro</p> <p>(88) DK</p> <p>(98) DA</p> <p>(99) N/A</p>
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Figure 136 shows a comparison between the 2012 percentages with those from previous years, beginning in 2008 when the question was first introduced in a comparable format.




Figure 136. Party Affinity Over Time in Colombia

The results from 2012 confirmed some tendencies that had started cropping up in earlier years. The percentage of people identifying with the Liberal Party has been climbing since 2010; in 2012, the Liberals became a majority among those claiming identification with a particular political party. The increase came mainly at the expense of identification rates with the *Partido de la U* (Party of la U). Widely known as simply “La U,” the party’s sympathizers fell from 42% in 2010 to 27% in 2012; the decline may be due to a change in the government’s orientation and the end of the eight-year administration of Álvaro Uribe. Besides the shrinking percentage of citizens who identify with the *Polo Democrático Alternativo* (Alternative Democratic Pole or “Polo”), affinities with parties remained relatively stable between 2011 and 2012.




Figure 137. Sociodemographic Characteristics and Party Identification in Colombia

Figure 137 illustrates the relationships between some sociodemographic characteristics and party identification. It shows that followers of “traditional” parties, such as the Liberal and Conservative parties, as well as sympathizers of *La U* are mainly from less educated and rural sectors of the population. The *Polo* and the Green Party, on the other hand, are more rooted among more educated and urban sectors. Liberals and Conservatives, meanwhile, come from older age groups,

of the republic. Followers of the Green Party are mainly concentrated among younger and wealthier respondents in comparison to the other parties.

II. Ideological Position

As in previous years, we included a question asking interviewees to position themselves on a 1 to 10 ideological spectrum, going from left to right.




Figure 138. Average Ideological Position in the Countries of the Americas

Figure 138 shows that Colombia is, on average, one of the most right-wing countries in the region, along with Suriname, Jamaica, and Paraguay, while Uruguay, Guatemala, and Haiti are at the other extreme of the spectrum—the same pattern from previous studies.

In fact, despite a slight shift to the left in Colombia in 2011, the trend did not last and averages reverted to the right in 2012, as we can see in Figure 139.




Figure 139. Ideological Position Over Time in Colombia

Finally, ideological positions are relatively consistent with party affinities. On the left are those who identify with the Alternative Democratic Pole, while the right side of the spectrum is shared by followers of the Party of La U, the Conservative Party, Radical Change, and the Liberal Party, as shown in Figure 140. Table 4 shows relative ideological stability over time, particularly among followers of the Liberal Party and the Party of la U, despite some notable fluctuations, including leftward and rightward shifts among followers of the *Polo* and somewhat erratic movements among followers of Radical Change.




Figure 140. Ideological Position by Party Affinity in Colombia

Table 4. Ideological Position by Party Affinity Over Time in Colombia

Party/Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Liberal	7.1	6.7	7.1	7.1	6.7
Conservative	6.7	6.6	6.9	7.3	7.2
La U	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.0	7.5
Radical Change	7.7	7.4	6.8	5.5	7.1
Polo	3.6	3.7	3.0	4.4	4.5
Green	N/A	N/A	5.6	6.4	5.9
Other	7.6	6.8	6.1	5.8	5.4

III. Substantive Content of Ideology

With the goal of exploring the content of ideological positions cited in the previous section, we included measures on attitudes pertaining to two substantive issues often associated with ideology. The first dimension is economic and pertains to the spectrum between State interventionism in the economy and liberal *laissez-faire*. The questions tapping this ideological dimension are the following:

Now I am going to read some items about the role of the national government. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements. We will continue using the same ladder from 1 to 7. **(88) DK (98)DA**

ROS1. The Colombian government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important enterprises and industries of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS2. The Colombian government, more than individuals, should be primarily responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS3. The Colombian government, more than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for creating jobs. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS4. The Colombian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

ROS6. The Colombian government, more than the private sector should be primarily responsible for providing health care services. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?

By combining these responses and recoding them onto a 0 to 100 scale, we created an indicator of support for State intervention in the economy.¹ As we saw in the 2010 comparative study, the majority of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have favorable attitudes towards State intervention. Figure 141, however, reveals a stark contrast in the region with the libertarian culture of the United States; despite this exception, the list shows relative uniformity, with Colombia at an intermediate position.




Figure 141. Support for an Active State Role in the Countries of the Americas

¹ Cronbach's alpha in these items is .71 for the Colombian case in 2012.

The second issue taps attitudes related to social or moral issues with the following questions:

Now, again using the 1 to 10 scale, please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with the following situations. In this case, 1 means you strongly disapprove with the situation and 10 means you strongly approve with the situation. So,...	Write 1 a 10 DK=88 DA=98
COLIDEOL4A. Abortion	
COLIDEOL4B Homosexuality	
COLIDEOL4C Euthanasia	
COLIDEOL4D Divorce	
COLIDEOL4E Same-sex marriage	
COLIDEOL4F Smoking Marijuana	
COLIDEOL4G Pre-marital sex	

With the responses recoded onto a scale from 0 to 100, we created an indicator on social/moral liberalism.² Figure 142 shows averages trending toward more progressive and tolerant positions in recent years.




Figure 142. Progressive Attitudes on Social/Moral Issues Over Time in Colombia

² Cronbach's alpha for these items is .81 in 2012.

Liberal views are more prominent among attitudes toward euthanasia, homosexuality, and abortion (see Figure 143), but in general Colombia remains rather conservative.³




Figure 143. Evolution of Attitudes on Moral/Social issues in Colombia

Figure 144, meanwhile, plots the followers of each political party according to their average position on these two dimensions (economic and moral/social). The vertical axis shows the economic dimension and goes from more interventionist responses at the bottom towards more economically laissez-faire at the top. Opinions on social/moral issues are plotted on the horizontal axis, going from more progressive or liberal on the left toward more conservative on the right. The figure helps illustrate that Colombian parties—at least, in terms of their supporters—are relatively close together on state intervention, even if followers of the *Polo* and the Green Party appear much further to the left than those who identify with the Liberal Party.

Social/moral issues produce clearer differences. Followers of the *Polo* and the Green Party display much more progressive positions, while those who identify with *La U* and Radical Change exhibit much more conservative attitudes.

³ These questions were only asked in Colombia, so comparative results are not available.




Figure 144. Ideological Dimensions by Party Affinity in Colombia

With the hope of a finer-grained analysis of left-right ideological positions, we created a linear regression model with ideological position as the dependent variable (on a 1 to 10 scale, left-wing to right-wing). As for potentially significant explanatory factors, we included sociodemographic characteristics as well as the economic and moral/social dimension (i.e. an interventionist State and progressive attitudes, respectively). The results of the model appear in Figure 145 (detailed results available in Table 37 of Appendix D).




Figure 145. Determinants of Ideological Position in Colombia

Sociodemographic factors such as age, education level, and size/location of residence are associated with ideological position. Younger, more educated, and urban-based respondents tend to position themselves on the left of the ideological spectrum. On the other hand, only the social/moral dimension is a significant predictor of an ideology further to the right. These relationships, while controlling for other factors, are shown in Figure 146.




Figure 146. Factors Influencing Ideological Position in Colombia

IV. Conclusion

The waters of Colombia's political system have yet to settle from the political shakeup of Álvaro Uribe's eight years in office. Although the data do not show wide variation in political affinities during the last year, some important fluctuations are evident, including how the Liberal Party has managed to win back supporters from the "fatal attraction" Uribe exercised over its ranks.

Besides the changes brought on by the new government and its different governing style, the relative volatility among the parties may also be due to how discredited Colombian parties have become. Three out of four Colombians express no affinity with any political party. In fact, trust in political parties has reached its lowest point in the nine-year history of the AmericasBarometer in Colombia. The situation poses a great challenge for party leaders in the country since a broad swath of the population is "up for grabs." But it will not be easy; trust is lost in an instance, but winning it back can take a lifetime.

This chapter presents an exploratory look into the sociodemographic characteristics that characterize partisan affinities in the country. The results show that followers of the "traditional" Liberal and Conservative parties, along with sympathizers of *La U*, tend to come from less educated and rural or smaller urban backgrounds. The Green Party and the *Polo*, however, draw their support from urban and better-educated sectors. As for age, Liberals and Conservatives are on average older than those who support other parties, such as the Greens. Still, this initial sociological foray into political party support in Colombia should be rigorously extended with deeper research and analysis than this report is able to offer.

Finally, the chapter shows that the slight shift toward the left that began two years ago seems to have reversed in 2012. As in prior years, Colombians are generally on the right end of the ideological spectrum in comparison with other countries. An additional contribution of the chapter is the exploration of the substantive content of citizens' ideological positions. If we control for other sociodemographic factors, then the data shows that social/moral issues—abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, and others—weigh more heavily in determining whether someone positions themselves on the right or left of the political spectrum, than does the role of the State in the economy. A more detailed understanding of how these positions emerge and what impact they have on political values and behaviors is a pending subject for the future research agendas of political scientists in the country.

Chapter Eight: Anti-Democratic Attitudes

I. Attitudes Against Basic Liberal Democratic Principles

Since our 2008 study, the AmericasBarometer has included a battery of questions on the extent to which citizens in the Americas express respect for basic liberal democratic principles. The wording of the questions is intentionally provocative with the hope of eliciting genuine responses that help study attitudes against democratic principles. The Colombian questionnaire includes the following series of questions:

Taking into account the current situation of this country, and using that card, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements
POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our president limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA
POP102. When Congress hinders the work of the government, our presidents should govern without Congress, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA
COLPOP103A. When the Supreme Court hinders the work of the government, the Supreme Court should be ignored by our presidents, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA
POP107. The people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA
POP113. Those who do not agree with the majority represent a threat for the country, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? (88) DK (98) DA

Figure 147 shows the extent of attitudes in favor of the possibility that presidents should limit the voice and vote of opposition parties in their respective countries throughout the Americas. The responses were converted from their original 7-point scale onto the usual 0 to 100 scale. The figure shows that Haiti and El Salvador are where people are least inclined to defend the rights of opposition parties and movements. Colombia, for its part, is in the middle range of the list of countries with 38 points on 100-point scale regarding attitudes towards political opponents.




Figure 147. Attitudes in Favor of Limiting the Opposition in the Americas

As the last study showed, illiberal attitudes in Colombia have started to ebb. Figure 148 shows that since 2010 and most clearly since 2011, the average level of attitudes against the opposition has significantly declined in comparison to 2008 and 2009 levels.




Figure 148. Attitudes in Favor of Limiting the Opposition Over Time in Colombia

Figure 149 shows that Colombia is ranked low in terms of support for a system of direct democratic governance by citizens. Uruguay is the least inclined toward this personalistic and populist style of government, while El Salvador and Suriname are where this attitude is highest.




Figure 149. Attitude in Favor of Direct Rule by the People in the Americas

In keeping with the tendency displayed the year before and in consonance with the above results, Figure 150 shows that attitudes in favor of direct rule by the people have been declining since 2010 in Colombia.




Figure 150. Attitude in Favor of Direct Rule by the People Over Time in Colombia

The intensity of the belief that those not in the majority pose a threat is highest in Haiti and, to a lesser extent, in El Salvador, as Figure 151 shows. It is lowest in Uruguay and Argentina. Colombia is in an intermediate position with a score of 38 out of 100 on attitudes towards political minorities.




Figure 151. Belief that Those Not in the Majority Pose a Threat in the Americas

But the tendency of hostility toward political minorities in Colombia has been falling over time, as we can see in Figure 152.




Figure 152. Belief that Those Not in the Majority Pose a Threat Over Time in Colombia

Questions related to attitudes against the separation of powers were only administered in Colombia, so comparative data is not available. But Figure 153 shows that Colombians increasingly agree with the separation and mutual respect between the executive and legislative branches. As detailed in a previous study, the transition from ex-president Uribe to current president Santos was accompanied with weakening support for the concentration of power in the executive branch.




Figure 153. Attitudes in Favor of Governing without Congress Over Time in Colombia

Finally, Figure 154 illustrates a growing respect for the separation of power between the executive and the judicial branches—another sign of growing democratic values.¹




Figure 154. Attitudes in Favor of Ignoring the High Courts Over Time in Colombia

¹ In some years, the question asked about the Constitutional Court and in other asked about the Supreme Court, and in other years it asked about both. The figure only shows attitudes against the independence and jurisdiction of the "High Courts."

For all the countries, the survey includes a pair of questions aimed at gaining a comparative perspective on attitudes towards the separation of powers by asking interviewees about their opinions on a hypothetical closure of the courts or of congress.

JC15A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to close the Congress and govern without Congress ?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC16A. Do you believe that when the country is facing very difficult times it is justifiable for the president of the country to dissolve the Constitutional Court and govern without the Constitutional Court?	(1) Yes, it is justified	(2) No, it is not justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

Figure 155 shows that 14% of Colombians justified the closure of congress and 11% justified the closure of the courts. The rate is half that of Ecuador's, but it is double that of countries like Panama and Venezuela, where we find the highest support for the separation of powers.




Figure 155. Justification of Closing Congress and High Courts in the Countries of the Americas

II. Factors Explaining Illiberal Attitudes

For a deeper exploration of illiberal attitudes, we combined the **POP101**, **POP102**, **COLPOP203A**, **POP107**, and **POP113** variables into an index of attitudes against liberal democracy

by calculating an average of the variables and converting it into the usual 0 to 100 scale.² Based on this index we used a linear regression model that included aggregate data from the five studies done between 2008 and 2012.

The model included sociodemographic characteristics (size of location of residence, sex, age, educational level, wealth, and skin tone); ideological position; method of news consumption; experiences of discrimination (whether in government offices or elsewhere); presidential approval; socio- and ego-tropic analyses of the economy; partisan affinity, including dichotomous variables for those who support the parties that made up ex-president Uribe's coalition during most of his two terms, the Party of La U, the Conservative Party, and Radical Change; a measure on the respondent's personal attachment to the current president (we will come back to this); and a variable indicating whether the person was interviewed during Uribe's term (2008 and 2009) or during that of his successor (2010, 2011, and 2012). The results of the model are shown in Figure 156 (detailed results appear in Table 38 of Appendix D).




Figure 156. Determinants of Illiberal Attitudes in Colombia, 2008-2012

The bivariate relationships corresponding to sociodemographic characteristics with a significant impact on illiberal attitudes are shown in Figure 157. We can see that older people (not in the figure) along with more educated and wealthier individuals (left and right panels, respectively)

² Cronbach's alpha in this scale for the years between 2008 and 2012 is $\alpha = .74$

tend to show greater respect for liberal democratic principles such as respect for the opposition, political minorities, representative channels, and the separation of powers.




Figure 157. Sociodemographic Factors that Affect Illiberal Attitudes in Colombia, 2008-2012

Notably, news consumption via the Internet has a negative impact on illiberal attitudes. As the left panel in Figure 158 shows, those who read news online with more frequency tend to have more respect for basic democratic principles. On the other hand, those who hold a more favorable opinion on a current president's job performance tend to have less respectful attitudes toward democratic principles, as shown in the right panel of the same figure. In fact, those with strong approval for a current president appear 20 points higher on the scale of illiberal attitudes than those who think a current president is doing a bad job.




Figure 158. Illiberal Attitudes by News Consumption via Internet and by Presidential Approval, 2008-2012

The link between party affinity and illiberal attitudes deserves special mention. Figure 156 makes clear that followers of the Party de la U tend to have more anti-democratic attitudes—even controlling for other factors such as ideological position and presidential approval—in comparison to followers of the Liberal Party, the *Polo*, the Green Party, or other parties (excluding the Conservative Party and Radical Change). Figure 159 illustrates this relationship. Sympathizers of *La U* are, on average, 20 points higher than followers of the *Polo* or Green Party when it comes to illiberal attitudes.




Figure 159. Illiberal Attitudes by Party Affinity, 2008-2012

As signaled in the previous section, illiberal attitudes are clearly trending downward since Uribe left the presidency. Indeed, the variable that distinguishes between the two administrations in the regression model is ultimately a statistically significant predictor for attitudes against basic liberal democratic principles. The evolution of the combined indicator as an aggregate measure of these attitudes is shown in Figure 160.




Figure 160. Illiberal Attitudes Over Time in Colombia

Personalistic Attachment to the Figure of the President

In the 2011 survey, we introduced a measure on the personalistic attachment of citizens to the figure of the president; in other words, the personalistic relationship between the head of government and the governed and the cult of personality that typifies the governing style of many leaders in the region. The measure is based on the following two questions:

- | |
|--|
| B14. To what extent do you trust the National Government? |
| B21A. To what extent do you trust the president? |

The first question taps a citizen's trust in the abstract institution of the presidency, while the second question is aimed at trust in the president as a concrete person. The difference between the second and the first question is our measure of personal attachment to the president; the reasoning being that personal attachment will be greater among those who express considerably more trust in the president as a person than those who favor the presidency itself as an institution.

The results on this indicator are interesting in the Colombian case.³ Figure 161 shows how the cult of personality has been declining since a peak in 2008, during Uribe's second term.

³ Unfortunately, only Colombia and three other countries included both questions in the 2012 survey. For this reason, we do not show comparative results here. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that, as discussed in the 2011 report, Colombia ranked at the top of the list in 2008 on this measure of personalistic attachment to the president among all the countries of the Americas (see, Rodríguez Raga, Juan Carlos and Mitchell A. Seligson. 2011. *Cultura política de la democracia en Colombia, 2011. Actitudes democráticas en la sucesión*. Bogotá: USAID-Vanderbilt University).




Figure 161. Personalistic Attachment to the President Over Time in Colombia

Figure 156 presented above—on the determinants of illiberal attitudes—indicates that personalistic attachment has a negative effect on democratic values. Indeed, as Figure 162 illustrates below, those who feel greater attachment to the president tend to show greater hostility toward basic democratic principles. The result confirms a finding from last year’s AmericasBarometer report, and it gives us a better theoretical understanding on the negative effects of charismatic leaders. Note how the impact is sustained even when we control for other factors, including ideology, party affinity, and presidential approval among others.




Figure 162. Impact of Personal Attachment to the President on Illiberal Attitudes, 2008-2012

III. Justification of a Military Coup

A power grab by the military seems like a thing of the past in the Americas, but the events of June 2009 in Honduras, when the Armed Forces deposed president Manuel Zelaya in favor of interim president Roberto Micheletti, shows that risks of democratic instability remain. For this reason, the AmericasBarometer almost always includes the following questions:⁴

Now, changing the subject. Some people say that under some circumstances it would be justified for the military of this country to take power by a coup d'état (military coup). In your opinion would a military coup be justified under the following circumstances? [Read the options after each question]:				
JC1. When there is high unemployment.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC10. When there is a lot of crime.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA
JC13. When there is a lot of corruption.	(1) A military take-over of the state would be justified	(2) A military take-over of the state would not be justified	(88) DK	(98) DA

The justifications differ noticeably depending on each hypothetical scenario of the question. Figure 163 shows the extent to which Colombians are willing to justify a military coup as a response to each scenario—high corruption, crime, or unemployment.

Some 16% of respondents answered that high unemployment could justify a military take-over. Among South American countries, Colombia's rate is considerably lower than what we found for Paraguay and Peru, but it is about 10 percentage points higher than what we found in Chile and Uruguay. Over time, however, justification levels have declined from the highs reached in 2004 and 2006. The comparative results over time are shown in Figure 164.

⁴ The questions on justifications for a military coup were only omitted in 2008.






Figure 163. Justification for a Military Coup in Colombia




**Figure 164. Justification for a Military Coup Due to High Unemployment
A Comparative Perspective and Over Time**

Four out of ten Colombians justified a military coup in a scenario of rampant crime. On principle, of course, the percentage is alarmingly high, but in a comparative perspective the country ranks in the middle. And despite little variation over the last three years, the justification of a military coup due to crime in Colombia is now much lower than it was in 2009 (see Figure 165).



**Figure 165. Justification of a Military Coup Due to High Crime
A Comparative Perspective and Over Time in Colombia**

Finally, the percentage of respondents in Colombia that justified a military coup in response to rampant corruption is the highest out of the three scenarios, but it is well below Peru's and the trend is downward, as we can see in Figure 166.



**Figure 166. Justification of Military Coup Due to High Corruption
A Comparative Perspective and Over Time in Colombia**

Despite the downward trend, the overall proportion of Colombians willing to justify a military coup is still worrisome. Indeed, as we can see in Figure 167, more than half of respondents in Colombia expressed support for a military coup in at least one of the three extreme circumstances.⁵




Figure 167. Justification for a Military Coup in Comparative Regional Perspective and Over Time in Colombia

What explains this attitude? For answers to this question, we used a logistic regression model with 2012 data, including the same factors used in the model on attitudes against basic democratic principles.⁶ The results appear in Figure 168 (and with more details in Table 39 of Appendix D). In contrast to what we saw with illiberal attitudes, personalistic attachment to the president is not significantly related to the probability of justifying a military coup and neither is party affinity.

Beyond sociodemographic factors such as age and education—older and more educated people are less likely to support a military coup—those who position themselves on the right side of the ideological spectrum show more support for coups than people on the left. Similarly, all things being equal, those who consume their news via television are also more likely to justify a coup—perhaps due to the frequent television coverage of crime and corruption.

In any case, even if these results do not show the likelihood of a military coup in Colombia, they do suggest that in the hypothetical case of a coup, most people would probably not adamantly oppose a break in the democratic order.

⁵ We made a new indicator on justifying a military coup by codifying 1 if the respondent affirmatively answered one of the question (justification because of unemployment, crime, and corruption) and 0 in case of a negative response to all the circumstances.

⁶ Given that this model only includes data from 2012, it obviously does not include a variable indicating if it is post-Urbe.




Figure 168. Determinants of Justification for a Military Coup in Colombia

IV. Conclusion

In previous AmericasBarometer studies, we discovered with grave concern that Colombians' political culture in comparison to that of other countries exhibited particularly authoritarian traits—or, at least, traits against basic democratic principles. The comparative surveys in 2008 and, somewhat again, in 2010 did not offer convincing explanations about this authoritarian streak.

The 2011 report, which exclusively focused on Colombia, set out to analyze possible changes in the political climate as a result of the change in government after the eight-year administration of Álvaro Uribe. Amid the presidential succession, illiberal attitudes ebbed. Moreover, we found that personalistic attachment to the president over-and-above the institution of the presidency itself—a subject rarely discussed in the literature—has a negative impact on citizens' democratic values. The results offered a rare chance of analyzing how differences between Uribe and Santos are reflected in citizen attitudes.

This year's study, on the other hand, brings to light other worrisome signs, particularly those related to latent support for a military seizure of power in response to sharp rises in unemployment, corruption, or crime. Colombian citizens seem to hold the belief that democratic politics would be incapable of dealing with those crises and that a military regime, with its consequences for rights and civil liberties, would be better equipped. Although military coups seem like a thing of the past in the region, future AmericasBarometer should continue to heed these signs.

Chapter Nine: Perceptions and Attitudes on the Conflict and Post-Conflict

With Gabriel Camargo, Santiago de Zubiría, Alejandra Ortiz, and Natalia Garbiras

I. Introduction

Since the start of AmericasBarometer studies in Colombia, the nation's decades-long armed conflict has formed an important part of our analyses on the country's political culture. Beginning with our first report on Colombia, our publications have always included a chapter examining respondents' experiences with the conflict, including their perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs on the evolution of the war as well as their views on the resolution of the conflict and potential post-conflict situations.

For several reasons, the theme has particular salience this year. To begin with, after eight years of the Uribe administration—with its emphasis on security, its all-out battle against guerrillas, and its negotiation with paramilitary groups—the 2012 study comes mid-way through the Santos administration, providing an opportune moment to examine how experiences, attitudes, and beliefs on the conflict have changed.

Along the same lines, despite the expectation that Santos would be the standard-bearer of the Uribe administration, the new government has backed a series of initiatives and policies that indicate a reorientation in how the conflict is being managed. The change in focus is evident with legislative efforts such as the victims' reparations and land restitution law.

Furthermore, the recent announcement of negotiations between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) not only presents a glimmer of hope for ending the conflict—faint as it is—it also offers an ideal moment for analyzing citizens' opinions on potential resolutions of the conflict.

The first section of this chapter examines citizens' experiences as victims of the conflict through a series of questions ranging from those that can be traced back to the 2004 AmericasBarometer to a new battery of questions complimenting the old ones from the standpoint of today.

The main section of the chapter analyzes Colombians perceptions on the best possible solution the conflict. This section tries to both describe and understand those perceptions. Unlike past studies, this year's report is the first time explanations of perceptions on ending the conflict go beyond respondent's individual characteristics by including more contextual factors. The new approach recognizes that individuals do not form their opinions on national issues in isolation from each other; individuals live in groups with the municipality as their immediate environment. The hypothesis is, therefore, that the impact of individual factors on perceptions of the conflict will be mediated by contextual factors. In considering this possibility, we are trying to gain a more fulsome

understanding of the phenomenon by using a multi-level analysis approach that combines both individual and contextual determinants.

The chapter ends with a look into Colombians attitudes on transitional justice initiatives, victims' reparations, and a post-conflict situation.

II. Experiences of Victimization by the Conflict

Since 2004, the AmericasBarometer in Colombia has included the following questions related to respondents' experiences with the conflict.

	Yes	No	DK	DA
WC1. Have you lost a family member or close relative because of the country's armed conflict? Or has someone from your family been disappeared by the conflict?	1	2	88	98
WC2. Has a member of your family had to take refuge or abandon their home because of the country's armed conflict?	1	2	88	98
WC3. Has a member of your family had to leave the country because of the armed conflict?	1	2	88	98

Figure 169 shows that between 20% and 25% of respondents to the surveys over the years report having lost a family member to the armed conflict.




Figure 169. Loss of a Family Member to the Armed Conflict Over Time

The rate is both relatively stable and staggering: about a quarter of adult Colombians have lost a family member to the conflict. Still, it is important to point out that the wording of the question does not put a temporal limit on reporting victimization.¹

¹ Further below we analyze what percentage of these occurred in the 12 months prior to the study.

Similarly, a fifth of respondents report having a family member who was forced to abandon their home under pressure from the conflict (see Figure 170), indicating the sheer magnitude of forced displacement in Colombia over the years.




Figure 170. Displacement of Relatives by the Armed Conflict Over Time

Finally, around 5% of respondents claim a family member had to flee the country as a consequence of the conflict, as Figure 171 shows.




Figure 171. Relative Forced to Leave the Country Due to the Armed Conflict Over Time

We also included questions in 2012 aimed at exploring other forms of victimization not mentioned in previous studies:

	Yes	No	DK	DA
COLWC5. Was a member of your family forcibly recruited because of the armed conflict?	1	2	88	98
COLWC6 Was a member of your family the victim of sexual violence because of the armed conflict?	1	2	88	98
COLWC7 Was a member of your family the victim of torture because of the armed conflict?	1	2	88	98

Figure 172 shows how two out of ten respondents say a family member has been the victim of sexual violence due to the conflict. Close to 4% report the forcible recruitment of a relative, while one in 20 claim armed actors tortured a family member. Although these figures represent one of the few measures of victimization by the conflict, we must remain cautious about the conclusions we draw: as a representative sample of adult Colombians and being forms of victimization with relatively low levels of incidence among the general population, the indicators have considerable margins of error as represented by the shaded areas in the figure.




Figure 172. Other Forms of Victimization by the Armed Conflict

Although the percentages for some forms of victimization might seem meager, the fact that 35% of respondents report at least one of the six forms of victimization described in the survey indicates the extent of the decades-long tragedy facing the country.

In 2012, we also included a question aimed at gaining more precise timing on the incident of victimization. The question, administered only to people claiming some form of victimization, is as follows:

COLWCTIEMPO. Did the incident or incidents happen within the last 12 months?				
(1) Yes	(0) No	(88) DK	(98) DA	(99) N/A (WAS NOT VICTIMIZED)

Figure 173 shows that just over 10% of those reporting the victimization of a relative say the incident happened within the last 12 months. This translates into almost 4% of the overall adult population in the country—an approximation of the violence still facing Colombians.




Figure 173. Victimization of the Conflict in the Last 12 Months

Table 5 shows the distribution of those who reported victimization in the last 12 months and those falling victim before then, according to each individual form of victimization described in the survey. The results indicate that the most “current” forms of victimization are sexual violence, displacement, and being forced to flee the country. It stands out that one in five people who reported sexual violence against a family member say the incident occurred during the 12 months before the study.

Table 5. Ideological Position by Party Affinity Over Time in Colombia

Relative's victimization	Last 12 months	Before the last year	Total
Death	9.3%	90.7%	100%
Displacement	12.5%	87.5%	100%
Fled the country	11.4%	88.6%	100%
Sexual violence	18.5%	81.5%	100%
Forced recruitment	4.2%	95.8%	100%
Torture	8.6%	91.4%	100%
Total	10.8%	89.2%	100%

If respondents reported an act of violence against a relative, then they were asked about the identity of the perpetrators with the following question:

What group or groups were responsible for these incidents? [DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES] RESPONDENTS CAN CHOOSE MORE THAN ONE OPTION. RECORD ALL OPTIONS MENTIONED OR (88) NS (98) NR	Yes	No	DK	DA	N/A (not a victim)
COLWC4A. Guerrillas	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4B. Paramilitaries	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4C. Ex-paramilitaries who reorganized	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4D. Army	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4E. Police	1	2	88	98	99
COLWC4F. Other	1	2	88	98	99

As the survey suggests, each victim can report more than one actor as the perpetrator of the violent incident against the family member. Respondents' answers are shown in Figure 174, indicating that in 2012 almost half attributed the crime to the left-wing guerrillas, while about a fourth blamed paramilitaries and the same for some "other" group. Ten percent of the victims did not identify any perpetrator, either because they did not know or because they preferred not to say.




Figure 174. Perpetrators of Victimizing Acts in the Armed Conflict

Table 6 shows the distribution of each form of victimization cited by the survey, according to the individual group signaled as responsible by the victim. Across all forms of victimization (except forced recruitment), the guerrillas are blamed most frequently—particularly, in cases of sexual

violence—followed by paramilitaries. Worth pointing out is that 16% of respondents who say a relative was the victim of sexual violence blame the incident on the Army, a considerable percentage considering that only 3% of the overall victims mention the Army.

Table 6. Forms of Victimization by the Conflict by Perpetrator

Relative's victimization	Guerrillas	Paramilitaries	Ex-paramilitaries	Army	Police	Other	Unidentified
Death	45.4%	30.3%	2.1%	3.0%	2.7%	28.6%	11.0%
Displacement	51.4%	34.1%	2.2%	3.9%	2.5%	19.9%	7.2%
Fled the country	40.0%	40.0%	1.3%	4.0%	5.3%	24.7%	2.5%
Sexual violence	58.8%	40.8%	2.0%	16.0%	4.1%	10.6%	6.0%
Forced recruitment	36.4%	36.4%	4.6%	0.0%	4.6%	38.1%	10.0%
Torture	46.8%	41.3%	0.0%	9.2%	9.2%	23.0%	5.2%
Total	46.9%	28.0%	2.2%	3.3%	2.6%	26.7%	10.3%

Finally, Table 7 shows the proportion of violent acts within the last 12 months, according to the perpetrating party. Although the proportion of victims who blame paramilitaries, the army, and police is proportionately small, their violent acts occurred at a considerable rate within the last year.

Table 7. Timing of Victimization by Perpetrator

Perpetrator	Last 12 months	Before the last year	Total
Guerrillas	9.9%	90.1%	100%
Paramilitaries	9.4%	90.6%	100%
Ex-paramilitaries	20.0%	80.0%	100%
Army	13.3%	86.7%	100%
Police	25.0%	75.0%	100%
Other	11.0%	89.0%	100%
Unidentified	15.4%	84.6%	100%
Total	10.8%	89.2%	100%

III. Perceptions on Solutions to the Conflict

Among questions included in previous AmericasBarometers that stand out in this round is the one asking interviewees about their perceptions on the best possible solution to the conflict. The question is as follows:

	Negotiation	Use of military force	[Do not read] Both	DK	DA
COLPAZ1A. Of the following options for solving the conflict with the guerrillas, which one do you think is the best? [read alternatives]	1	2	3	88	98

Figure 175 shows the percentage of people between 2004 and 2012 who opted for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas. We can see that for all the years of the AmericasBarometer surveys in Colombia—even during the height of support for Uribe’s security policies—a majority of the population has consistently preferred negotiation over a military solution to the conflict or a combination of the two.




Figure 175. Preference for a Negotiated Solution with the Guerrillas Over Time

Which factors explain a person’s support for a negotiated solution to the conflict with the guerrillas? We go step-by-step in this section in trying to answer this question.

First, we use a logistic regression analysis with the individual characteristics of respondents as predictors. A first group of predictors is composed of sociodemographic features, including sex, age, education level, number of children, wealth quintile, area of residence (urban or rural), and if the respondent self-identifies with a particular ethnic minority (i.e. non-white, non-mestizo).

A second group of predictors is associated with news consumption via different form of media, including radio, television, newspapers, and Internet. The variables measure the frequency with which a respondent is exposed to news through each of these media.

A third group of predictors is related to political attitudes and ideological positions, including self-positioning on the ideological spectrum from left to right, interest in politics, presidential approval, and party affinity.

With the hope of simplifying and capturing the hypothetical position of the respondent on the conflict, party affinity is measured through a dichotomous variable codified as 1 if the respondent identifies with the Party of la U or the Conservative Party, since these two parties were central to former president Uribe's coalition. Given his opposition to negotiation with the guerrillas, we would expect those who follow those two parties to prefer a military solution or, at least, a combination of military force and negotiation.

Finally, a batch of predictors is associated with citizens' own perceptions on and experiences with the conflict itself. The group includes a measure on perceptions of insecurity. It also includes a variable indicating whether the respondent has a relative who has been a victim of the guerrillas. We would expect victims of the guerrillas to harbor more resentment and thus oppose negotiations.

We also added a variable measuring if the respondent mentions something related to the conflict when asked about the most serious problem currently facing the country. We would expect those more concerned about the conflict to be more inclined toward a negotiated solution.

Figure 176, using our standard method of visual presentation, shows the findings of the logistical regression.²

² Detailed results from the model are presented in Table 40 of Appendix D.




Figure 176. Individual Determinants of Preference for Negotiation with the Guerrillas

Among sociodemographic factors, we found that wealthier people (measured by wealth quintile) and those living in urban areas did not favor a negotiation with the guerrillas. It could be that these sectors of the population are relatively more protected from the conflict than are poorer individuals and those in rural areas. In this sense, “distance” from the conflict might explain their intransigence on negotiations. The same logic would explain why respondents from ethnic minorities show a greater preference for negotiation than those from dominant groups.

As for the way Colombians consume news, only the Internet approaches the established minimum level of significance.³ “Political” variables, however, show much more power for predicting preferences on ending the conflict. As we had expected, those on the right of the ideological spectrum tend to be against negotiating with the guerrillas (see left panel of Figure 177). Similarly, those who claim support for the parties associated with Uribe (the Party of la U and the Conservative Party) also tend to be opposed to negotiation—in line with Uribe’s own vocal opposition—than supporters of other parties or than those who do not identify with any party (see right panel of Figure 177). On the other hand, those who claim a greater interest in politics are more supportive of a negotiated settlement.

³ For this variable, the value p is the same as .077; that is, it went beyond the 5% significance to 10%. At this level of significance, we could say that those who get their news on the Internet with more frequency tend to be more against negotiation, than those who do not get their news on the Internet.




Figure 177. Preference for Negotiation by Ideology and Party

Finally, as we had anticipated, victims of the guerrillas are less likely to accept negotiations as a solution to the conflict.

In trying to understand preferences on solutions to the conflict, the analysis in this chapter recognizes that individuals are not lone islands, but rather social beings that live in groups and in contexts that can possibly condition their preferences. For this reason, we added a second level to our analysis of individual factors: the municipal level. We thus created a multilevel model in which the lower level includes the already mentioned variables and the upper level includes factors that describes respondents' local municipalities. Two upper level variables are of interest to us. The first is the municipality's human development index, which gives us a sense of the respondent's surrounding socio-economic context.⁴ The second is the local homicide rate (number of murders per 100,000 inhabitants), which helps us gauge local levels of violence in their municipality.⁵ Table 8 summarizes the results of the model.⁶ Among the factors included in the model, only the human development index (HDI) is statistically significant, while those who live in more socio-economically developed municipalities are more frequently opposed to negotiations with the guerrillas.

⁴ The data on human development indices were kindly provided upon request by the UNDP.

⁵ Homicides rates come from data provided by the National Police and processed by the Vice President's office. The data are from the year 2009.

⁶ The multi-level models developed for this chapter were estimated using the HLM statistical packet, specialized for these kinds of econometric models. The detailed results for the model appear in Table 41 of Appendix D, in the column marked "Modelo 1 (no interactivo)."

Table 8. Individual and Contextual Determinants for Preferences on Negotiations with the Guerrillas

Variable	Impact⁷
Level 1	
HDI	–
Homicides	
Level 2	
Woman	
Age	+
Education	
Number of children	
Wealth quintile	–
Urban	
Ethnic minority	+
Radio news	
TV news	
Newspaper	
Internet news	–
Ideology	–
Interest in politics	+
Presidential approval	
Affinity with Uribe	–
Perception of insecurity	
Victim of the guerrillas	–
Conflict a major problem	

The majority of individual factors that proved significant in the model continue to show impact even when controlling for contextual factors. Although location of residence no longer has statistical significance, wealthier individuals (measured by wealth quintiles) are more frequently opposed to negotiation.

Meanwhile, respondents who self-identify as part of an ethnic minority have more favorable attitudes towards negotiation, even when controlling for contextual factors. Among sociodemographics, age has a significant impact in this contextual model: older respondents are more receptive to the idea of negotiation.

The frequency of consuming news on the Internet has a negative impact on preferences towards a negotiation. Among “political” factors, ideology and political party affinity with former president Uribe also have a negative impact on preferences for a negotiated solution. Interest in politics, however, encourages preferences in favor of negotiating with the guerrillas, even when we control for contextual factors. Finally, those who report being victims of the guerrillas are more frequently opposed to negotiations—same as the individual model.

⁷ Factors with a significant positive impact are marked “+” and those with a significant negative impact are marked “–”—the minimum level of significance is 5%.

We then took the analysis a step further. As our point of departure, we hypothesized that perhaps contextual factors in a given municipality not only acted upon the probability of preferences in favor of a negotiated end to the conflict, but that they also shaped and conditioned individual factors.

We were particularly interested in the conditioning effect that violence in the municipality could have upon the relationship between individual predictors and preferences for negotiation. For instance, although right-wing ideology might, on average, reduce the probability of supporting negotiations, the tendency might be more intense when violence is more intense—that is, when the municipal homicide rate is higher.

We modeled this hypothesis by adding interactions between each one of the individual variables and the municipal homicide rate (number of murders per 100,000 inhabitants). The results are summarized in Table 9.⁸

In contrast with contextual factors, the human development potential of the municipality disappears in this model. But most of the individual factors continue to have an impact on the probability of an individual supporting a negotiation over other options. However, contrary to our hypothesis, we found no apparent contextual conditioning effect on the impact of individual factors.

⁸ The detailed results of this model appear in Table 41 of Appendix D in the column marked “Modelo 2 (interactivo)”.

Table 9. Individual and Contextual Determinants on Preferences for Negotiating with the Guerrillas (Interactive Model)

Variable	Impact ⁹
Level 1	
HDI	
Homicides	
Level 2	
Woman	
x homicides	+
Age	+
x homicides	
Education	
x homicides	
Number of children	
x homicides	
Wealth quintile	–
x homicides	
Urban	
x homicides	
Ethnic minority	+
x homicides	
Radio news	
x homicides	
TV news	
x homicides	
Newspapers	
x homicides	
Internet news	
x homicides	
Ideology	–
x homicides	
Political interest	+
x homicides	
Presidential approval	
x homicides	
Affinity with Uribe	–
x homicides	
Perception of insecurity	
x homicides	
Victim of the guerrillas	–
x homicides	
Conflict a major problem	
x homicides	

⁹ Factors with a significant positive impact are marked “+” and those with a significant negative impact are marked “–”—the minimum level of significance is 5%.

In exploring the results, we calculated the probabilities predicted by the model as a result of individual factors conditioned by the homicide rate. For example, Figure 178 shows the negative impact of a right-wing ideology on the probability of preferring negotiation with the guerrillas in a context not marked by violence (i.e. low homicide rates), but the impact does not increase in municipalities with more violence.¹⁰ In any case, the conditioning effect of the homicide rate is not significant, as we can see by looking at the overlap between confidence intervals surrounding the predicted probabilities.




Figure 178. Impact of Ideology on Preferences for Negotiation, Conditioned by the Homicide Rate

Similarly, the difference between supporters and detractors of Uribe in terms of preferences on the negotiation is sharper in more violent municipalities, but the conditioning effect of the murder rate is not significant for the relationship, as we can see in Figure 179.

¹⁰ In estimating the probability we established two values for the homicide rate: low homicide rate (average minus a standard deviation) and high homicide rate (average plus a standard deviation).




Figure 179. Impact of Affinity with Uribe on Preference for Negotiation, Conditioned by the Homicide Rate

In sum, the models presented in this section show the impact of political and ideological factors as well as personal experiences with the conflict on preferences for a negotiated solution with the guerrillas. The inclusion of contextual factors gives us much more confidence about the robustness of the findings.

IV. Attitudes on the Post-Conflict

Beginning with the 2011 study, we started including questions in the survey geared toward attitudes on the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and their participation in transitional justice initiatives.

The 2012 questionnaire includes the following question:

	Does not want them as neighbors	Has no problem with them as neighbors	DK	DA
COLDIS35F. Demobilized combatants from the armed groups, would you not want them as neighbors?	1	0	88	98

Figure 180 shows that 40% of Colombians would prefer to not have demobilized combatants as neighbors, a significant indicator highlighting the difficulty of sustaining post-conflict policies introduced during negotiations.




Figure 180. Attitudes on Having Demobilized Combatants as Neighbors

Figure 181 illustrates the results of a logistic regression model on the probability of not wanting demobilized combatants as neighbors (detailed results are available in Table 42 of Appendix D). Controlling for other factors, including preferences on negotiating with guerrillas, the model shows older and more educated respondents are much more reluctant towards having demobilized combatants in their neighborhoods.




Figure 181. Factors Explaining Not Wanting Demobilized Combatants as Neighbors

This relationship, illustrated in Figure 182, perhaps reflects more structural phenomena related to classism and segregation in the country, providing further evidence on the challenges of reintegrating combatants into civilian life.




Figure 182. Reluctance Toward Having Demobilized Combatants as Neighbors by Age and Educational Level

As for citizens' knowledge about some of the policies designed to address the conflict, we asked about perceptions and attitudes on the Land Law, a legislative initiative of the Santos administration aimed at victims' reparations as well as land restitution for those displaced from their farms. The questions are as follows:

COLLT1. Do you know what the Land Law is?
 (1) Yes [Continue] (2) No [SKIP TO COLLT5]
 (88) DK [SKIP TO COLLT5]
 (98) DA [SKIP TO COLLT5]

COLLT2 To what extent do you think the Land Law will improve life for Colombians?

COLLT3 To what extent do you think the Land Law will help the victims of violence recover their lands?

COLLT4. To what extent do you think the Land Law will help improve conditions for the rural population of this country?

Figure 183 shows that less than one in five respondents expressed knowledge of the law.




Figure 183. Knowledge of the Land Law

Knowledge of the law varies significantly by region, as Figure 184 shows. Inhabitants of the Former National Territories and Bogotá expressed significantly more knowledge than those living in the Eastern and Pacific regions of the country.




Figure 184. Knowledge of the Land Law by Region

Among those with knowledge of the Land Law, opinions are moderately optimistic about its future, as we can see in Figure 185, which shows responses to questions **COLLT2**, **COLLT3**, and **COLLT4**, recodified on a 0 to 100 scale.




Figure 185. Perceptions Toward the Effects of the Land Law

V. Conclusion

The country has embarked on new negotiations with the FARC. The announcement of talks made by both government and guerrilla representatives generated a wave of expectation and hope—albeit, tempered by the memories of past failed talks. Amid this context, this chapter set out to highlight some of the most important findings from the AmericasBarometer in Colombia on attitudes about and experiences with the armed conflict that has long afflicted the country.

The chapter inquires into the extent to which Colombians have fallen victim to this prolonged war. Close to 35% of respondents claim having a family member who has—in some way and at one time or another—been victimized by the conflict. Ten percent of these respondents say the violent incident occurred within the past 12 months, meaning that 4% of voting-age adults in the country have a relative who has been directly victimized by the conflict between 2011 and 2012.

The massive scope of the violence might help explain why a large majority of Colombians favors a negotiated solution to the conflict with guerrillas. This broad sentiment even held sway during the height of Álvaro Uribe's security policies. We found that political-ideological factors help explain an individual's position on how to resolve the conflict: polarization is stark between right and left and between those who support Uribe (a stiff critic of negotiations) and those who do not. These differences persist even when controlling for the contextual effects of a respondent's municipality.

The fact that a majority of people supports negotiating with the guerrillas does not mean the road will be easy. The potential obstacles are not limited to the negotiating table, where there are indeed many; obstacles are also inherent in national attitudes and in the citizenry's tolerance for what a post-conflict situation practically implies. On this front, it is promising that a majority of the population does not express any concern with having former combatants of the armed groups as neighbors. But segregationist dynamics are still apparent, particularly among more educated Colombians, further complicating the reintegration of these men and women who were lost for so long in the fog of war.

Appendices

Appendix A. Informed Consent Form

Dear Sir/Madam:

You have been selected at random to participate in a public opinion study, financed by the University of Vanderbilt. I come on behalf of the National Consultancy Center to request an interview that should take a little under an hour.

The main objective of the study is to learn the opinions of individuals around different aspects of the social and political situation in the country.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you can decide not to respond to questions and/or end the interview at any time. Your responses will be kept completely confidential and anonymous.

If you have any questions about the study, you can get in touch with the National Consultancy Center by telephone 339-4888 in Bogotá and ask for Cristina Querubín or with the University of Los Andes by telephone 339-4949 ext. 2612 and ask for Miguel García. They are in charge of this project.

Would you like to participate?

Appendix B. Sample Design

I. Sample Design¹

The sample designed for Colombia included all non-institutionalized adults; that is, it excluded people in jail, schools, hospitals, and military bases. It was a stratified random sample. Stratification ensured that the country's most important geographical areas were included: Pacific, Caribbean, Central, Eastern, the Former National Territories, and Bogotá. The sample was substratified to include cities with more and with less than 300,000 inhabitants. Finally, the sample was also substratified into urban and rural areas.

We used projections for 2012 from the 2005 census, Colombia's most recent. According to this census, 20% of the population lives in the Caribbean region, 17% in the Pacific region, 25% in the Central region, 18% in the Eastern region, 3% in the Former National Territories, and 17% in Bogotá.

The sample's selection was multi-staged. The first stage was the municipality, then the census sector, then the section, and finally the block, dwelling, and the household. We used a system of quotas by sex and age to select the respondent within each household

In all, we interviewed 1,512 people. Technically, our margin of error was $\pm 2.5\%$. This means that if we were to take multiple samples in Colombia, 95% of them would reflect the opinions of the population with a precision of no less than $\pm 2.5\%$. However, our sample was stratified and clustered. Thus, while stratification has the effect of increasing the sample's precision, the use of clusters, which we included to control the costs of field work, somewhat reduced its precision. Of course, factors beyond the sample itself can reduce its precision, such as the rate of non-replies, errors in selecting respondents, misunderstanding the questions, among others. In terms of our sample's technique, however, a confidence interval of $\pm 2.5\%$ is very good.

Table 10 summarizes the standard errors and the design effects for the variables of age and the evaluation of the national economic situation. The design effects (DEF) indicate the efficiency of the design by clusters compared to a simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the same variances are obtained in both designs. If the DEF is greater than 1, this means that the design by clusters produced a result with greater variance than that produced by a simple random design. If the DEF is less than 1, this means that there is even less variance in the cluster design than in a simple random design.

¹ This section and the one that follows were adapted from the 2004 Costa Rica report, "Cultura democrática, seguridad ciudadana y capital social en Costa Rica," authored by Luis Rosero Bixby and Jorge Vargas Cullell.

Table 10. Standard Error and Design Effects for Some Variables

Variable	Estimación	Error típico	Intervalo de confianza al 95%		Coeficiente de variación	Efecto de diseño	Raíz cuadrada del efecto de diseño	Acumulado
			Inferior	Superior				
Edad (q2)	36.86	.181	36.51	37.22	.005	.221	.470	
Evaluación de la economía (soct1)								
Muy buena	1.3%	.3%	.8%	2.1%	.241	1.172	1.083	1.3%
Buena	14.1%	.9%	12.4%	16.1%	.065	1.049	1.024	15.5%
Ni buena ni mala	53.3%	1.3%	50.7%	55.9%	.024	1.022	1.011	68.8%
Mala	24.0%	1.1%	21.8%	26.4%	.048	1.083	1.041	92.8%
Muy mala	7.2%	.7%	5.9%	8.8%	.100	1.164	1.079	100.0%

The above table shows that the design by clusters for this survey was efficient: the DEF was less than 1, except in the case of how a respondent would evaluate the country's economic situation, in which the DEF was higher. The standard errors were also very moderate. Table 11 shows the standard errors and DEF for the q2 variable (age) by cluster (region). The **DEF's**, as well as the standard errors, indicate that the design by clusters for the regions was more efficient than a simple random design.

Table 11. Standard Errors and Design Effects for Age by Region

Región (estratopri)	Estimación	Error típico	Intervalo de confianza al 95%		Coeficiente de variación	Efecto de diseño	Raíz cuadrada del efecto de diseño
			Inferior	Superior			
Caribe	36.69	.353	35.99	37.38	.010	.183	.428
Bogotá	36.98	.417	36.16	37.80	.011	.216	.465
Central	37.62	.515	36.60	38.63	.014	.351	.593
Oriental	36.91	.382	36.16	37.67	.010	.179	.423
Pacífica	36.03	.376	35.29	36.77	.010	.180	.424
ATN	36.79	.565	35.68	37.90	.015	.072	.269

Results of the Sample and Description of Survey Respondents

The probabilistic design of the sample, as well as the availability of a good sampling frame, are sufficient conditions to expect that the group of people interviewed are representative of the Colombian population. However, due to the effects of random errors and inevitable distortions of sample design, the sample could deviate from the population it represents in some characteristics. The possible biases should be specified. Table 12 allows us to answer the question: how representative is the sample of the population? Below we compare some characteristics of the sample to the 2005 census.

Table 12. Sample vs. 2005 Population Census (People Over Age 18)

Características	Censo de 2005	Encuesta en Colombia
N	27,184,228	1,512
% de hombres	48	50
% > 30 años	68	55
% soltero	30	35
% casado o en unión libre	56	56
% con primaria	38	28
% con secundaria	37	55
% con educación post-secundaria	25	25
% en Región Atlántica	21	20
% en Bogotá	16	17
% en Región Central	25	25
% en Región Oriental	18	18
% en Región Pacífica	17	17
% en Antiguos Territorios Nacionales	3	3

We can see that there is congruity between the survey's sample and the 2005 census. Some characteristics, such as age, sex, and regional residence are practically identical. There is a slight deviation in the percentages of married and unmarried people. And finally, there is a gap in the three education variables. The widest is for the percentage of people with secondary education: from 37% in the 2005 census it jumps to 55% in the 2012 survey. With primary education, the figure in the 2005 census is 38% compared to 28% in the 2012 survey.

Given that the sample is generally representative of the population, there is no need to use weights. This study's sample is, therefore, self-weighted.

Table 13 compares the characteristics of the sample between men and women.

Table 13. Sample Characteristics by Sex

	Género del entrevistado establecido en la cuota			
	Hombre		Mujer	
	Media	%	Media	%
N - %				
Años	36,97	50	36,74	50
¿Cuál es su estado civil? Casado o Unión libre (acompañado)		48		52

We used gender and age quotas to select respondents. Therefore, our percentages of men and women are very close. Their ages are also very similar. There is a small difference with respect to the percentage of respondents married or part of a civil union, where women have a slightly higher percentage (52%) than men.

Technical Description of the Sample Design

Universe

The universe of the survey has national coverage of all adults living in the six regions of the country: Bogotá, the Caribbean, Pacific, Central, and Eastern regions, and the Former National Territories. The universe is also comprised of all adults living in urban and rural areas.

The universe is divided in two sectors: one of cities with greater than 300,000 inhabitants, and the other of cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sample was circumscribed to all non-institutionalized adults; that is, it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals, and military bases. Private households in these areas were contemplated.

Final Selection Unit

Because the questionnaire included questions not were not limited to the respondent but also referred to other household members, the statistical unit of observation was the household. Each respondent could only live in one household.

Because each household belongs to one housing unit, which is sometimes shared with other households in a relatively stable manner over time, each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

Sampling Method

We chose a probabilistic, stratified, multistage method with randomized selection of units at each stage. First, the sample was stratified by the size of the municipality (cities with more and with less than 300,000 inhabitants), then by region, and then by area (rural and urban).

It is a multistage sampling because within each urban area, we started with primary sampling units (sectors), followed by secondary units (sections), then tertiary units (blocks), and then final sampling units (clusters of housing units) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and from 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the surveyor selected a single household as the observation unit.

The respondent was selected according to age and gender quotas. In each block, the surveyor had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age groups:

18 to 27 year-olds
28 to 40 year-olds
Over 40 year-olds

Each surveyor was assigned one specific block. Once in the area, surveyors listed the first 20 housing units they encountered. They had instructions to do a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 housing units listed, balancing the gender and age quotas. The selection method was chosen according to the following considerations:

We needed representative samples at the following levels:

- National
- First Stage Strata:
 - o Cities with more than 300.000 inhabitants
 - o Cities with less than de 300.000 inhabitants
- Second Stage Strata:
 - o Bogotá
 - o Caribbean Region
 - o Pacific Region
 - o Eastern Region
 - o Central Region
 - o Former National Territories
- Third Stage Strata:
 - o Urban area
 - o Rural Area
- Study Domains:
 - o Cities with more than 300.000 inhabitants (obliged selection)
 - o Cities with less than de 300.000 inhabitants

The following criteria were also satisfied:

- For each stage, we calculated margins of error that correspond to minimum quality standards.

- We sought to facilitate the operability of the fieldwork.
- We worked with the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available for each municipality (population census, cartography, current housing unit listings, among others).

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame is constituted by the updated cartographic inventory and housing unit lists obtained from the 2005 census. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) obtained the 2005 versions from the Departamento Nacional de Estadística (DANE, National Statistics Department).

Calculations by Strata

The sample is composed of 252 sampling points: 198 urban and 54 rural, distributed over 47 municipalities in 22 out of the 32 departments of Colombia.

Sample Size, Confidence Interval, and Margins of Error

The anticipated confidence interval for the national survey was 95%, with a margin of error of 2.5%, assuming a 50/50 proportion in the dichotomous variables.

The margins of error for a confidence interval of 95% appear in Table 14:

Table 14. Sample Size and Margins of Error – Confidence Interval of 95%

Estratos Regiones	Tamaño de muestra	Margen de error M.A.S.	% M.P.C.
Atlántica	288	5,77	6,33
Bogotá	264	6,03	6,61
Central	360	5,17	5,66
Oriental	288	5,77	6,33
Pacífica	264	6,03	6,61
Territorios nacionales	48	14,15	15,50
Áreas			
Urbana	1.188	2,84	3,11
Rural	324	5,44	5,96
Total país	1.512	2,52	2,76

II. Other Aspects of the Sample and Fieldwork Team

Survey Team

The CNC involved its five branches (Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, and Bucaramanga) to ensure a high quality survey in the least possible time. Due to the country's current security situation, we were advised to remain as little time as possible in most areas visited, which complicated the operations.

Due to the complexities of the questionnaire, we used our most experienced surveyors, many of whom have more than 15 years of field experience.

The CNC involved a total of 113 staff members, distributed as shown in Table 15:

Table 15. Staff Involved in the Project

Actividad	Total de personal
Coordinadores de campo	5
Supervisores	15
Encuestadores	60
Supervisores de calidad en campo	10
Codificadores	3
Digitadores	3
Subtotal campo y digitación	96
Personal directivo y profesional	4
Personal administrativo	3
Total personal del equipo	103

Additional Information on the Sample

Table 16. Universe, Total Population by Region and by Rural and Urban Areas

Colombia: población total, proyección año 2011

Región	Urbano	Rural	Total
ATLANTICA	7.373.200	2.649.872	10.023.072
BOGOTA	7.555.165	16.180	7.571.345
CENTRAL	8.626.045	3.037.225	11.663.270
ORIENTAL	6.038.624	2.639.940	8.678.564
PACIFICA	5.481.003	2.502.354	7.983.357
TERRITORIOS NACIONALES	303.101	359.114	662.215
Total general	35.377.138	11.204.685	46.581.823

Distribución Porcentual (%)

Región	Urbano	Rural	Total
ATLANTICA	74%	26%	100%
BOGOTA	100%	0%	100%
CENTRAL	74%	26%	100%
ORIENTAL	70%	30%	100%
PACIFICA	69%	31%	100%
TERRITORIOS NACIONALES	46%	54%	100%
Total general	76%	24%	100%

Table 17. Size and Distribution of the Sample by Sampling Strata

	Urbano	Rural	Total
Atlántica	222	66	288
- de 300,000 habitantes	84	66	150
+ de 300,000 habitantes	138	0	138
Bogotá	264	0	264
+ de 300,000 habitantes	264	0	264
Central	288	72	360
- de 300,000 habitantes	120	72	192
+ de 300,000 habitantes	168	0	168
Oriental	198	90	288
- de 300,000 habitantes	126	90	216
+ de 300,000 habitantes	72		72
Pacífica	180	84	264
- de 300,000 habitantes	66	84	150
+ de 300,000 habitantes	114	0	114
Territorios nacionales	36	12	48
- de 300,000 habitantes	36	12	48
Total	1188	324	1512

Geographic Location of the Sample




Figure 186. Distribution in Country by Strata (Regions)

Final Comments on the Survey Work

About the Questionnaire

The questionnaire was long, 60 minutes on average. But in general the respondents were willing to answer the questions and we had very few uncompleted interviews.

About the Fieldwork

The team met with no serious problems related to public order, so that we were able to complete all the interviews from every municipality originally included in the survey.

As in previous years, the CNC would like to extend its gratitude to the entire team involved in this study, especially the brave men and women who defied security warnings and assumed great risk to accomplish very good work.

Appendix C. Questionnaire

Colombia 2012, Version # 10.0.3.0 IRB Approval:110627

 USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE	 Centro Nacional de Consultoría.com
 Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina	 AmericasBarometer Barómetro de las Américas www.AmericasBarometer.org
 VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY	

El Barómetro de las Américas: Colombia, 2012

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PAIS. País: <table border="1"> <tr> <td>01. México</td> <td>02. Guatemala</td> <td>03. El Salvador</td> <td>04. Honduras</td> <td>05. Nicaragua</td> </tr> <tr> <td>06. Costa Rica</td> <td>07. Panamá</td> <td>08. Colombia</td> <td>09. Ecuador</td> <td>10. Bolivia</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11. Perú</td> <td>12. Paraguay</td> <td>13. Chile</td> <td>14. Uruguay</td> <td>15. Brasil</td> </tr> <tr> <td>16. Venezuela</td> <td>17. Argentina</td> <td>21. Rep. Dom.</td> <td>22. Haití</td> <td>23. Jamaica</td> </tr> <tr> <td>24. Guyana</td> <td>25. Trinidad y Tobago</td> <td>26. Belice</td> <td>40. Estados Unidos</td> <td>41. Canadá</td> </tr> <tr> <td>27. Surinam</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>					01. México	02. Guatemala	03. El Salvador	04. Honduras	05. Nicaragua	06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia	11. Perú	12. Paraguay	13. Chile	14. Uruguay	15. Brasil	16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica	24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá	27. Surinam					08
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06. Costa Rica	07. Panamá	08. Colombia	09. Ecuador	10. Bolivia																															
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16. Venezuela	17. Argentina	21. Rep. Dom.	22. Haití	23. Jamaica																															
24. Guyana	25. Trinidad y Tobago	26. Belice	40. Estados Unidos	41. Canadá																															
27. Surinam																																			
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina]					_ _ _ _																														
YEAR. Año de la entrevista 2012					2012																														
DOMINIO. (1) Muestra nacional (2) Muestra especial					_																														
ESTRATOPRI. [COESTRA]: Estrato primario de la muestra [Si DOMINIO = 1 (Muestra nacional), elija una de las siguientes regiones] (811) Atlántica (812) Bogotá (813) Central (814) Oriental (815) Pacífica (816) Antiguos Territorios nacionales					_ _ _																														
ESTRATOSEC. Tamaño de la municipalidad: (1) Grande (más de 100,000) (2) Mediana (Entre 25,000 y 100,000) (3) Pequeña (menos de 25,000)					_																														
UPM. (Unidad Primaria de Muestreo) _____					_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _																														
PROV. [COLDEPA]. Departamento:					8 _ _																														
MUNICIPIO. Municipio: _____					8 _ _ _ _																														
COLSEGMENTO. SEGMENTO CENSAL:					_ _ _																														

COLSEC. _____	Sector:	_ _ _
Inap (rural, no hay sectores).... 9999		
COLSECC. Sección: _____		_ _ _
Inap (rural, no hay secciones).... 9999		
CLUSTER [COLMANZ]. Manzana. (Unidad Final de Muestreo o Punto Muestral): _____ [El cluster debe de tener 6 entrevistas]		_
Manzana: _____ Inap (rural, no hay manzanas)....9999		
UR [ESTRATER].. (1) Urbano (2) Rural [Usar definición censal del país]		_
COLCENTRO. Lugar:		
(1) Corregimiento/Inspección _____		_
(2) Vereda _____		
(3) Cabecera municipal		
COLCENPOB. [=PSU rural] Centro poblado _____		_
COLESTSOC. Estrato Socioeconómico: 1 2 3 4 5 6		_
Rural sin estratificación.....7		
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:		
(1) Capital nacional (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural		_
IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español		_
Hora de inicio: ____:____		_ _ _
FECHA. Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ Mes: ____ año: 2012		_ _ _
¿Vive usted en esta casa? Si → continúe No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista ¿Es usted ciudadano colombiano o residente permanente de Colombia? Si → continúe No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista ¿Tiene por lo menos 18 años? Si → continúe No → Agradezca y termine la entrevista ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR LA ENTREVISTA		

Q1. [Anotar, no preguntar] Género:	(1) Hombre	(2) Mujer	
LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, qué tan satisfecho está con su vida? ¿Usted diría que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Algo satisfecho(a) (3) Algo insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (88) NS (98) NR			

CUESTIONARIOS PARES			
[LA SIGUIENTE PREGUNTA SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]			
A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02
Conflicto armado	30	Los políticos	59
Corrupción	13	Mal gobierno	15
Crédito, falta de	09	Medio ambiente	10
Delincuencia, crimen,	05	Migración	16
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Narcotráfico	12
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pandillas	14
Desigualdad	58	Pobreza	04
Desnutrición	23	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Deuda Externa	26	Secuestro	31
Discriminación	25	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Drogadicción	11	Terrorismo	33
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Electricidad, falta de	24	Violencia	57
Explosión demográfica	20	Vivienda	55
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	Otro	70
NS	88	NR	98
INAP	99		

[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días o casi todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	NR
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	88	98
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	88	98
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	88	98
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	88	98

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?			
(1) Muy buena	(2) Buena	(3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular)	(4) Mala
(5) Muy mala (pésima)	(88) NS	(98) NR	

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses ?	
(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica del país será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?	
(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?	
(1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?	
(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	
IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?	
(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (88) NS (98) NR	

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ... [Lea cada opción y anote la respuesta]	Sí	No	NS	NR
CP2. ¿A algún Congresista?	1	2	88	98
CP4A. ¿A alguna autoridad local como el alcalde, funcionario de la alcaldía, concejal o edil?	1	2	88	98
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública u oficina del Estado?	1	2	88	98

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses?	
(1) Sí (2) No (88) No Sabe (98) No Responde	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses?	
(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a SGL1] (88) NS [Pase a SGL1] (98) No responde [Pase a SGL1]	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición?	
(1) Sí (0) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas]	
(1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (88) NS (98) NR	

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS	NR	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿en los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para ayudar a solucionar algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca en los últimos 12 meses.	1	2	3	4	88	98	

Voy a leerle una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si usted asiste a las reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	Asistente/ Miembro	Líder/ Directivo	NS	NR	INAP	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP7]			88	98		
CP6L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99	
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP8]			88	98		
CP7L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple, o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99	
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4 [ir a CP9]			88	98		
CP8L. ¿Y solo asiste como miembro simple o participa en la dirección del grupo? [Si dice “ambos”, marcar “líder”]					1	2	88	98	99	
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4			88	98		

	Una vez a la semana o una vez al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	Asistente/ Miembro	Líder/ Directivo	NS	NR	INAP
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4		88	98	
CP20. [SOLO A MUJERES] ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4		88	98	99
CP21. ¿Reuniones de grupos deportivos o recreativos?	1	2	3	4		88	98	

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de por aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (88) NS (98) NR	
MIL6. Ahora, cambiando de tema, ¿qué tan orgulloso(a) está de las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia? [Leer las opciones] (1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a) (4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR	
MIL5. ¿Qué tan orgulloso(a) se siente de ser Colombiano cuando escucha el himno nacional? [Leer las opciones] (1) Extremadamente orgulloso(a) (2) Muy orgulloso(a) (3) Algo orgulloso(a) (4) Nada orgulloso(a) (5) O no le importa? (88) NS (98) NR	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "A"]

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.												
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS 88	NR 98	
Izquierda										Derecha		

[RECOGER TARJETA "A"]

PROT3. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? (1) Sí ha participado [Siga] (2) No ha participado [Pase a PROT6] (88) NS [Pase a PROT6] (98) NR [Pase a PROT6]	
PROT4. ¿Cuántas veces ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses? _____ (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

Y4. ¿Cuál era el motivo de la manifestación o protesta? [NO LEER. MARCAR SOLO UNA. Si participó en más de una, preguntar por la más reciente. Si había más de un motivo, preguntar por el más importante] (1) Asuntos económicos (trabajo, precios, inflación, falta de oportunidades) (2) Educación (falta de oportunidades, matrículas altas, mala calidad, política educativa) (3) Asuntos políticos (protesta contra leyes, partidos o candidatos políticos, exclusión, corrupción) (4) Problemas de seguridad (crimen, milicias, pandillas) (5) Derechos humanos (6) Temas ambientales (7) Falta de Servicios públicos (8) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) Inap (No ha participado en protesta pública)		
PROT7. Y ¿en los últimos doce meses, ha participado en el bloqueo de alguna calle o espacio público como forma de protesta? (1) Sí, ha participado (2) No ha participado (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP		
PROT6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses ha firmado alguna petición? (1) Sí ha firmado (2) No ha firmado (88) NS (98) NR		
PROT8. En los últimos doce meses, usted leyó o compartió información política por alguna red social de la web como Twitter, Facebook u Orkut? (1) Sí, ha hecho (2) No ha hecho (88) NS (98) NR		

Ahora hablemos de otro tema. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares de este país tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Lea las alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de Estado	NS (88)	NR (98)	

JC15A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles, se justifica que el presidente del país cierre el Congreso y gobierne sin Congreso?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR
JC16A. ¿Cree usted que cuando el país enfrenta momentos muy difíciles se justifica que el presidente del país disuelva la Corte Constitucional y gobierne sin ella?	(1) Sí se justifica	(2) No se justifica	(88) NS	(98) NR

VIC1EXT. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿ha sido usted víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (88) NS [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR] (98) NR [Pasar a VIC1HOGAR]	
VIC1EXTA. ¿Cuántas veces ha sido usted víctima de un acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? [Marcar el número] (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC2. Pensando en el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima, de la lista que le voy a leer, ¿qué tipo de acto delincuencia sufrió? [Leer alternativas] (01) Robo sin arma sin agresión o amenaza física (02) Robo sin arma con agresión o amenaza física (03) Robo con arma (04) Agresión física sin robo (05) Violación o asalto sexual (06) Secuestro (07) Daño a la propiedad (08) Robo de la casa, ladrones se metieron a la casa mientras no había nadie (10) Extorsión (11) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no fue víctima)	
VIC2AA. ¿Podría decirme en qué lugar ocurrió el último acto delincuencia del cual usted fue víctima? [Leer alternativas] (1) En su hogar (2) En este barrio (3) En este municipio (4) En otro municipio (5) En otro país (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
VIC1HOGAR. ¿Alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Es decir, ¿alguna otra persona que vive en su hogar ha sido víctima de un robo, hurto, agresión, fraude, chantaje, extorsión, amenazas o algún otro tipo de acto delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (Vive solo)	

ARM2. Si usted pudiera, ¿tendría un arma de fuego para su protección? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
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Por temor a ser víctima de la delincuencia, en los últimos doce meses usted...						
	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP	
VIC40. ¿Ha limitado los lugares donde va de compras?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC41. ¿Ha limitado los lugares de recreación?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC43. ¿Ha sentido la necesidad de cambiar de barrio por temor a la delincuencia? [en zona rural utilizar “caserío” o “vereda”]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC44. Por temor a la delincuencia, ¿se ha organizado con los vecinos de la comunidad?	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR		
VIC45. En los últimos doce meses, ¿ha cambiado de trabajo o de empleo por temor a la delincuencia? [Si no trabaja marque 99]	(1) Sí	(0) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	

COER3. Y pensando en lo que ha pasado en su barrio/vereda en el último año ¿Usted ha sabido de alguien que haya buscado hacer justicia por mano propia?	
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

Voy a leerle una serie de frases que se oyen en la calle o en los medios de comunicación cuando se habla de formas para combatir la delincuencia. Me gustaría que usted me dijera si está muy de acuerdo, algo de acuerdo, algo en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con cada una de ellas. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia...							
	Muy de acuerdo	Algo de acuerdo	Algo en desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NR	
VIC101. es crear programas de prevención. Está usted: [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC102. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es hacer leyes más duras	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	
VIC103. La mejor medida para enfrentar la delincuencia es contratar seguridad privada	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(88)	(98)	

A continuación, le voy a leer una serie de situaciones que usted podría presenciar en cualquier momento. Quisiera que me indicara para cada una de las reacciones, si usted la aprobaría, no la aprobaría pero la entendería o no la aprobaría ni la entendería.

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	NS	NR	
VOL207. Suponga que para corregirlo y educarlo un padre le pega a su hijo cada vez que este le desobedece. ¿Usted aprobaría que el padre le pegue a su hijo, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

	Aprobaría	No aprobaría pero entendería	No aprobaría ni entendería	NS	NR	
entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?						
VOL206. Suponga que un hombre le pega a su esposa porque ésta le ha sido infiel con otro hombre. ¿Usted aprobaría que el hombre le pegue a su esposa, ó no aprobaría que le pegue pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL202. Suponga que una persona mata a alguien que le ha violado a un/a hija/o. ¿Usted aprobaría que mate al violador, ó no aprobaría que lo mate pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL203. Si hay una persona que mantiene asustada a su comunidad y alguien lo mata. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a esa persona que mantiene asustada a la comunidad, ó no aprobaría que lo maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL204. Si un grupo de personas comienzan a hacer limpiezas sociales, es decir, matar gente que algunos consideran indeseable. ¿Usted aprobaría que maten a gente considerada indeseable, ó no aprobaría que la maten pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	
VOL205. Si la policía tortura a un delincuente para conseguir información sobre un grupo de crimen organizado muy peligroso. ¿Usted aprobaría que la policía torture a un delincuente, ó no lo aprobaría pero lo entendería, ó no lo aprobaría ni lo entendería?	(3)	(2)	(1)	(88)	(98)	

AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley (88) NS (98) NR	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o el barrio donde usted vive y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿usted se siente muy seguro(a), algo seguro(a), algo inseguro(a) o muy inseguro(a)? (1) Muy seguro(a) (2) Algo seguro(a) (3) Algo inseguro(a) (4) Muy	

inseguro(a) (88) NS	(98) NR	
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR		
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR		
AOJ18. [Para ciudades medianas o más, decir “barrio”. Para ciudades pequeñas, decir “municipio”.] Algunas personas dicen que la policía en este barrio/municipio protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) La policía protege a la gente frente a la delincuencia, o (2) La policía está involucrada en la delincuencia (3) [No leer] Ninguna, o ambas (88) NS (98) NR		
AOJ20. Y pensando en su seguridad y la de su familia, ¿usted se siente más seguro(a), igual de seguro(a), o menos seguro(a) que hace cinco años? (1) Más seguro(a) (2) Igual de seguro(a) (3) Menos seguro(a) (88) NS (98)NR		
AOJ21. Voy a mencionarle algunos grupos y le voy a pedir que me indique cuál de ellos representa la amenaza más grande para su seguridad? [Leer alternativas. Marcar sólo una respuesta] (1) Vecinos de su barrio o comunidad (2) Pandillas (3) Policía o militares (4) Crimen organizado y narcotraficantes (5) Personas pertenecientes a su familia (6) Delincuentes comunes (7) [NO LEER] Otros (8) [NO LEER] Ninguno (88) NS (98) NR		
AOJ22. ¿En su opinión, qué hay que hacer para reducir la criminalidad en un país como el nuestro: implementar medidas de prevención o aumentar los castigos a los delincuentes? (1) Implementar medidas de prevención (2) Aumentar los castigos en contra de los delincuentes (3) [No leer] Ambas (88) NS (98) NR		

	Siempre/ casi siempre	Alguna s veces	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS	NR
COER1. Cuando hace las compras en la tienda de su	1	2	3	4	88	98

barrio/vereda, ¿y aunque usted no lo pida, le dan recibo? [Leer alternativas]						
COER2. Suponga que a alguien de este barrio le roban un aparato de televisión de su casa y que un vecino presencia el robo. ¿Cree que su vecino hará la denuncia a la policía? [Leer alternativas]	1	2	3	4	88	98

	SÍ	No	NS	NR	
WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? ¿o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?	1	2	88	98	
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2	88	98	
WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2	88	98	
COLWC5. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia fue reclutado forzosamente?	1	2	88	98	
COLWC6 ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de violencia sexual?	1	2	88	98	
COLWC7 ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia fue víctima de una tortura?	1	2	88	98	

PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2, WC3, COLWC5, COLWC6 o COLWC7 FUE “SÍ”. DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.

COLWCTIEMPO. ¿Este o estos hechos ocurrieron en los últimos 12 meses?	
(1) Sí (0) No (88) No sabe (98) No responde (99) No aplica (NO FUE VÍCTIMA)	

¿Qué grupo o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? [NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS]. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (88) NS (98) NR]

	SÍ	No	NS	NR	Inap. (no fue víctima)	
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4C. Exparamilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	88	98	99	
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	88	98	99	

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	NS	NR	
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	88	98	

COLPAZ1B. Y con los grupos paramilitares , ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	88	98	
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[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con escalones numerados del uno al siete, en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta ver nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1. Si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elegiría un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Nada				Mucho			No sabe	No responde

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
Voy a hacerle una serie de preguntas, y le voy a pedir que para darme su respuesta utilice los números de esta escalera. Recuerde que puede usar cualquier número.	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? (<i>Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan para <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia, escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio</i>)	
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?	
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?	
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?	
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?	
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto usted tiene confianza en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?	
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?	
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?	
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	
B20A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Protestante?	
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?	
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?	
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?	
COLB32A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?	
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser colombiano(a)?	
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	
B47A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones en este país?	
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?	
COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?	
COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?	
COLB65. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las bandas criminales o bandas	

Anotar el número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR	
emergentes?	
Ahora, usando la misma escalera <i>[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]</i> NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?	
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	
COLN11. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual resuelve el conflicto armado?	
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES	
[LAS PREGUNTAS EPP1 Y EPP3 SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR 99 = INAP
Y siempre usando la misma tarjeta, NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general, ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos colombianos representan bien a sus votantes? (99) INAP	
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como usted? (99) INAP	

Ahora, usando la misma escalera <i>[continúe con la tarjeta B: escala 1-7]</i> NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO	Anotar 1-7, 88 = NS, 98 = NR
MIL1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas colombianas están bien entrenadas y organizadas?	
MIL2. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia han hecho un buen trabajo cuando han ayudado a enfrentar desastres naturales?	
B3MILX. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas colombianas respetan los derechos humanos de los colombianos hoy en día?	
MIL3. Cambiando un poco de tema, ¿hasta qué punto confía en las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América?	
MIL4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que las Fuerzas Armadas de los Estados Unidos de América deberían trabajar juntos con las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia para mejorar la seguridad nacional?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

M1. Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Juan Manuel Santos es...?: [Leer alternativas]	
(1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (88) NS (98) NR	

M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los congresistas en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen; ¿usted cree que los congresistas del Congreso colombiano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy Mal (88) NS (98)NR		
SD2NEW2. Y pensando en esta ciudad/este municipio donde usted vive, ¿está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a) con el estado de las vías, carreteras y autopistas? (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR		
SD3NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de las escuelas públicas? [Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR		
SD6NEW2. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios médicos y de salud públicos? [Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR		
COLSD6NEW. ¿Y la calidad de los servicios de energía eléctrica? [Sondee: está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a), o muy insatisfecho(a)?] (1) Muy satisfecho(a) (2) Satisfecho(a) (3) Insatisfecho(a) (4) Muy insatisfecho(a) (99) INAP (No utiliza) (88) NS (98) NR		

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “C”]

Ahora, vamos a usar una escalera similar, pero el número 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el número 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR								
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	88	98
Muy en desacuerdo							Muy de	
acuerdo							NS	NR

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, usando esa tarjeta quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones		
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR		
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR		
COLPOP103A. Cuando la Corte Suprema de Justicia estorba el trabajo del gobierno, la Corte Suprema debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR		
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR		
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza		

para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR	
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Continuamos usando la misma escalera. Por favor, dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases

EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Anotar un número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR

ING4. Cambiando de nuevo el tema, puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
DEM23. La democracia puede existir sin partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escalera de 1 a 7.

NS = 88, NR = 98

ROS1. El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS2. El Estado colombiano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS3. El Estado colombiano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS4. El Estado colombiano debe implementar políticas firmes para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	
ROS6. El Estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el principal responsable de proveer los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	

MIL7. Las fuerzas militares deben participar en el combate del crimen y de la violencia en Colombia. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	
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CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS CCT3 – RAC2A SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

CCT3. Cambiando de tema... Algunas personas dicen que la gente que recibe ayuda de los programas sociales del gobierno es floja. ¿Hasta qué punto usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

GEN1. Cambiando de tema de nuevo, se dice que cuando no hay suficientes trabajos, los hombres deben tener más derecho a los trabajos que las mujeres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

Ahora quisiera saber hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con algunas medidas que le voy a mencionar. Quisiera que usted responda pensando en lo que cree que se debería hacer sin importar si se están aplicando o no actualmente. **[Anotar Número 1-7, 88 para los que NS y 98 para los NR]**

GEN6. El Estado debe exigir que los partidos políticos reserven algunos espacios para mujeres en sus listas de candidatos, aunque tengan que dejar afuera a algunos hombres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

RAC3A. La mezcla de razas es buena para Colombia. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación? (99) INAP

RAC3B. Estaría de acuerdo que una hija o hijo suyo se casara con una persona negra. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación? (99) INAP

RAC3C. A Ud. le gustaría que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación? (99) INAP

RAC2A. Las universidades deberían reservar cupos para los alumnos de piel más oscura, aunque tengan que excluir a otros alumnos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (99) INAP

[Encuestador: piel más oscura refiere a negros, indígenas, no blancos en general]

[RECOGER TARJETA “C”]

RAC4. ¿Ud. cree que las personas negras son tratadas mucho mejor, mejor, igual, peor o mucho peor que las personas blancas?

(1) Mucho mejor (2) Mejor (3) Igual (4) Peor
(5) Mucho peor (88) NS (98)NR

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES			
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (W14A-PN5) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR ("1" "3" "5" "7" ó "9")]			
W14A. Y ahora, pensando en otros temas. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, cuando pelagra la salud de la madre?			
(1) Sí, se justificaría	(2) No, no se justificaría	(88) NS	(98) NR (99) INAP
W14B. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, en caso de incesto o violación sexual?			
(1) Sí, se justificaría	(2) No, no se justificaría	(88) NS	(98) NR (99) INAP
W14C. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, en cualquier caso por opción de la mujer, siempre que esté en los primeros meses del embarazo?			
(1) Sí, se justificaría	(2) No, no se justificaría	(88) NS	(98) NR (99) INAP
W14D. ¿Cree usted que se justificaría la interrupción del embarazo, o sea, un aborto, en cualquier caso por opción de la mujer, siempre cuando exista malformación del Feto?			
(1) Sí, se justificaría	(2) No, no se justificaría	(88) NS	(98) NR (99) INAP
PN4. Cambiando de tema, en general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia?			
(1) Muy satisfecho(a)	(2) Satisfecho(a)	(3) Insatisfecho(a)	(4) Muy insatisfecho(a)
(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	
PN5. En su opinión, ¿Colombia es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?			
(1) Muy democrático	(2) Algo democrático	(3) Poco democrático	(4) Nada democrático
(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA "D"]

<p>Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escalera del 1 a 10, el 1 indica que usted <i>desaprueba firmemente</i> y el 10 indica que usted <i>aprueba firmemente</i>. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para alcanzar sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.</p>											
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88 NS	98 NR
Desaprueba firmemente										Aprueba firmemente	
										1-10, 88=NS , 98=NR	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?											

E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras como forma de protesta. Usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados como forma de protesta. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno electo. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia cuenta cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Por favor continúe usando la escalera de 10 puntos.

	1-10, 88=NS , 98=NR
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino del sistema de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta qué punto?]	
D2. Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?	
D5 Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?	

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (D6-D8) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

D6. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que las parejas del mismo sexo puedan tener el derecho a casarse? (99) INAP

D7. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que se permita que las personas con discapacidad física se postulen para cargos públicos? (99) INAP

D8. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que el Estado tenga el derecho de prohibir que los periódicos publiquen noticias que le puedan producir **daño político**? (99) INAP

[Recoger tarjeta “D”]

Voy a leerle una lista de varios grupos de personas. ¿Podría decirme si hay algunos de ellos que no le gustaría tener como vecinos?						
	No los quiere de vecinos	No tiene problema con tenerlos de vecinos	NS	NR		
DIS35A. Homosexuales. ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98		
DIS35B. Pobres ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98		
DIS35C. Gente de otros países ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98		
DIS35D. Afro-colombianos/negros ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98		
DIS35E. Indígenas ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98		
COLDIS35F. Desmovilizados de los grupos armados ¿No los quisiera tener de vecinos?	1	0	88	98		

DEM2. Ahora cambiando de tema, con cuál de las siguientes tres frases está usted más de acuerdo:		
(1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (88) NS (98) NR		
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (88) NS (98) NR		
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser electo a través del voto popular. Otros dicen, que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral o sea, el voto popular es siempre lo mejor. ¿Usted qué piensa? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (88) NS (98) NR		

Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.	
DC1. Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1	
Corrupto pero justificado.....2	
No corrupto.....3	
NS [no leer]88	
NR [no leer]98	
COLD1A. ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1	
Corrupto pero justificado.....2	
No corrupto.....3	
NS [no leer]88	
NR [no leer]98	
DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada.....1	
Corrupto pero se justifica2	
No es corrupto3	
NS [no leer]88	
NR [no leer]98	
DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y él debe ser castigado.....1	
Corrupto pero justificado.....2	
No corrupto.....3	
NS [no leer]88	
NR [no leer]98	
COLD14. Un policía de tránsito detiene a un conductor por hacer un cruce indebido, y éste le ofrece 50.000 pesos al policía para que no le ponga el parte y lo deje ir. ¿Usted cree que lo que hizo el conductor es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1	
Corrupto pero justificado.....2	
No corrupto.....3	
NS [no leer]88	
NR [no leer]98	
COLD15. El policía recibe los 50.000 pesos y deja ir al conductor sin ponerle el parte. ¿Usted cree que el policía de tránsito es... [Leer alternativas] :	
Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1	
Corrupto pero justificado.....2	
No corrupto.....3	
NS [no leer]88	
NR [no leer]98	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS	NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida diaria...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en los últimos 12 meses?		0	1	88	98	
EXC6. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, algún empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
EXC20. ¿En los últimos doce meses, algún soldado u oficial militar le ha solicitado un soborno?		0	1	88	98	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Si la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio, como un permiso, por ejemplo, durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en los últimos 12 meses?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC14. ¿En los últimos 12 meses, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en este último año?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en los últimos 12 meses? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? Si la respuesta es No → Marcar 99 Sí la respuesta es Si → Preguntar: En los últimos 12 meses, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno en la escuela o colegio?	99	0	1	88	98	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno?		0	1	88	98	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los **funcionarios públicos** en el país está: **[LEER]**

(1) Muy generalizada generalizada (4) Nada generalizada	(2) Algo generalizada (88) NS	(3) Poco (98) NR	
EXC7MIL. Teniendo en cuenta su propia experiencia o lo que ha escuchado, la corrupción en las Fuerzas Armadas está... [Leer opciones]			
(1) Muy generalizada (4) Nada generalizada?	(2) Algo generalizada (88) NS	(3) Poco generalizada (98) NR	

[Entregar Tarjeta “C”]

Ahora me gustaría conocer su opinión acerca de algunos asuntos más específicos. ¿Cómo ubicaría su propia posición en la siguiente escala dónde 1 indica que usted se encuentra ‘muy en desacuerdo’ con la afirmación y 7 qué usted se encuentra ‘muy de acuerdo’ con la afirmación?

[LEER]

	Anotar 1 a 7 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL3A. Los ingresos de las personas deberían hacerse más iguales	
COLIDEOL3C. Es necesario aumentar los impuestos para mejorar los planes sociales del gobierno	
COLIDEOL3D. Debería incrementarse la propiedad estatal de las empresas	
COLIDEOL3E. El estado debería ocuparse de que todas las personas tengan sus necesidades básicas satisfechas	

[Recoger Tarjeta “C”]**[Entregar Tarjeta “D”]**

Ahora, utilizando también una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba las siguientes situaciones. En este caso, 1 indica que usted desaprueba firmemente la situación, y 10 indica que usted aprueba firmemente la situación. Entonces,...

	Anotar 1 a 10 NS=88 NR=98
COLIDEOL4A. El Aborto	
COLIDEOL4B La Homosexualidad	
COLIDEOL4C La Eutanasia	
COLIDEOL4D El Divorcio	
COLIDEOL4E El Matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo	
COLIDEOL4F Fumar Marihuana	
COLIDEOL4G El Sexo antes del matrimonio	

[Recoger Tarjeta “D”]

Y ahora, cambiando de tema y pensando en sus experiencias en el último año , ¿alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado/a, o sea, tratado peor que a otras personas, en los siguientes lugares?						
	Sí	No	NS	NR	INAP	
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno [juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías]	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS3. En el trabajo o la escuela o cuando ha buscado trabajo	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales	1	2	88	98	99	
DIS5. En lugares públicos, como en la calle, la plaza, tiendas o el mercado?	1	2	88	98		

INF1. ¿Tiene usted cédula de ciudadanía? (1) Sí (2) No [Pasar a VB2] (3) En trámite (88) NS [Pasar a VB2] (98) NR [Pasar a VB2]	
VB1. ¿Está su cédula inscrita para votar? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
VB2. ¿Votó usted en la primera vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10] (88) NS [Pasar a VB10] (98) NR [Pasar a VB10]	
VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en la primera vuelta de las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? [NO LEER LISTA] (00) Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó la boleta en blanco, arruinó o anuló su voto) (801) Rafael Pardo (802) Germán Vargas Lleras (803) Gustavo Petro (804) Juan Manuel Santos (805) Noemí Sanín (806) Antanas Mockus (807) Jaime Araújo Rentería (808) Jairo Calderón (809) Robinson Alexander Devia (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No votó)	
VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (88) NS [Pase a POL1] (98) NR [Pase a POL1]	
VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA] (801) Partido Liberal (802) Partido Conservador (803) Polo Democrático Alternativo (804) Partido de la U (Partido Social de Unidad Nacional) (805) Cambio Radical (806) Convergencia Ciudadana (808) Colombia Democrática (809) Colombia Viva (810) Movimiento MIRA (817) Alianza Social Indígena (ASI) (819) Movimiento Alianza Social Afrocolombiana (ASA) (821) Partido Verde (822) Partido de Integración Social (PAIS) (823) Partido de Integración Nacional (PIN) (826) Movimiento Afrovides –La Esperanza de un Pueblo (827) Movimiento Interétnico de Opción Participativa “Mio” (77) Otro (88) NS (98) NR	

(99) INAP	
POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (88) NS (98) NR	
VB20. ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? [Leer opciones] (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía (88) NS (98) NR	
PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otros para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR	
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2010? (1) Sí trabajó (2) No trabajó (88) NS (98) NR	
VB50. Algunos dicen que en general, los hombres son mejores líderes políticos que las mujeres. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo? (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25A. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25B. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25C. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
COLVB25D. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
CLIEN1. En los últimos cuatro años y pensando en las campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? (1) Frecuentemente [SIGA con CLIEN2] (2) Rara vez [SIGA con CLIEN2] (3) Nunca [Pase a VB51 o SNW1A, según corresponda] (88) NS [Pase a VB51 o SNW1A, según corresponda] (98) NR [Pase a VB51 o SNW1A, según corresponda]	
CLIEN2 Y pensando en la última vez que esto pasó, ¿lo que le ofrecieron le hizo estar	

más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?

- (1) Más inclinado
 (2) Menos inclinado
 (3) Ni más ni menos inclinado
 (88) NS
 (98) NR
 (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS VB51 - RAC1CA SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

VB51. ¿Quién cree usted que sería más corrupto como político: un hombre, una mujer, o ambos por igual?

- (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer
 (3) Ambos por igual (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

VB52. Y si le toca a un político o a una política manejar la economía nacional, ¿quién va a hacer el mejor trabajo; un hombre, una mujer o no importa?

- (1) Un hombre (2) Una mujer
 (3) No importa (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

Ahora vamos a hablar sobre la raza o color de piel de los políticos.

VB53. Algunos dicen que, en general, las personas de piel oscura **no son buenos líderes** políticos. ¿Está usted muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, en desacuerdo, o muy en desacuerdo?

[Encuestador: “piel oscura” refiere a negros, indígenas, “no blancos” en general]

- (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) De acuerdo
 (3) En desacuerdo (4) Muy en desacuerdo (88) NS
 (98) NR (99) INAP

RAC1CA. Según varios estudios, las personas de piel oscura son más pobres que el resto de la población. ¿Cuál cree usted que es la principal razón de esto? **[LEER ALTERNATIVAS, SÓLO UNA RESPUESTA]**

- (1) Por su cultura, o (2) Porque han sido tratadas de manera injusta
 (3) **[No leer]** Otra respuesta
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (AB1 - AB5) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

Cambiando de tema y hablando de las cualidades que los niños deben tener, le voy a mencionar varias características y quisiera que me diga cuál es más importante para un niño o niña:

AB1. (1) Independencia; o (3) [No leer] Ambos INAP	(88) NS	(2) Respeto a los mayores (98) NR	(99)
AB2. (1) Obediencia, o (3) [No leer] Ambos INAP	(88) NS	(2) Autosuficiencia (valerse por sí mismo) (98) NR	(99) INAP
AB5. (1) Creatividad; o (3) [No leer] Ambos INAP	(88) NS	(2) Disciplina (98) NR	(99)

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (SOC1 – SOC12B) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

SOC1. Por cada 100 pesos que gana una persona rica y 100 que gana una persona pobre, en su opinión, cuánto debería pagar cada una en impuestos? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

- (1) La persona rica debería pagar 50 pesos y la persona pobre 20, o
 (2) La persona rica debería pagar 40 y la persona pobre 30, o
 (3) La persona rica debería pagar 30 y la persona pobre 30 también
 (4) **[NO LEER]** Otra combinación
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC2A. Dígame, por favor, ¿en cuál de las siguientes áreas debe invertir más dinero el gobierno? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

- (1) Educación
 (2) Infraestructura, obras (carreteras, agua, desagüe /alcantarillado/saneamiento)
 (3) Vivienda (4) Jubilación
 (5) Ayuda a los pobres (6) Medio ambiente
 (7) Salud (8) Seguridad
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC2B. Y en segundo lugar? **[LEER OPCIONES SOLO SI LA PERSONA ENTREVISTADA NO RECUERDA LAS OPCIONES DE LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR]**

- (1) Educación
 (2) Infraestructura, obras (carreteras, agua, desagüe /alcantarillado/saneamiento)
 (3) Vivienda (4) Jubilación
 (5) Ayuda a los pobres (6) Medio ambiente
 (7) Salud (8) Seguridad
 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC3. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre algunas de las formas en que el gobierno gasta el dinero de los impuestos. Vamos a comenzar con educación. ¿Qué piensa usted acerca de la calidad de la educación pública primaria y secundaria en Colombia? Es **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC4. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de la educación primaria y secundaria en Colombia, ¿qué debe hacer el gobierno? **[Leer opciones]**

- (1) Usar mejor el dinero que gasta actualmente en educación, o
 (2) Destinar más dinero a la educación, aún si se tiene que subir los impuestos, o
 (3) Las dos cosas (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC5. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en educación primaria y secundaria?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC6. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de las escuelas, ¿quién debe decidir cómo gastar el dinero que va para las escuelas? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

(1) Las escuelas (2) Los gobiernos municipales
(3) Los gobiernos departamentales (4) El gobierno central
(5) **[No leer]** Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC7. Ahora vamos a hablar de los servicios de salud. ¿Qué piensa usted de la calidad del servicio público de salud en Colombia? Es **[Leer opciones]**

(1) Buena (2) Regular (3) Mala (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC8. En su opinión, para mejorar la calidad de los servicios de salud públicos en Colombia, ¿qué debería hacer el gobierno? **[Leer opciones]**

(1) Usar mejor el dinero que gasta actualmente en salud, **o**
(2) Invertir más dinero en salud, aún si se tiene que subir los impuestos, **o**
(3) Las dos cosas (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

SOC9. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda gastar más en el servicio público de salud?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC10. En su opinión, ¿qué tienen que hacer los gobiernos para reducir la pobreza y desigualdad en Colombia? **[No leer]**

(1) Crear empleos/mejorar la economía
(2) Promover la reforma agraria
(3) Mejorar los servicios de educación pública
(4) Ofrecer ayuda pública a los pobres
(5) Incrementar los impuestos a los ricos
(6) Mejorar la infraestructura (carreteras, agua, desagüe /alcantarillado/saneamiento)
(9) Otros (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

SOC11. ¿Estaría dispuesto(a) a pagar más impuestos de los que actualmente paga para que el gobierno pueda invertir más en el Programa Familias en Acción?

(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “E”]

SOC12A. En esta escala de 1 a10, donde 1 significa que defiende a los ricos y 10 que defiende a los pobres, dónde **se ubican** los políticos colombianos? **[Anotar un número de 1 a 10, 88 para aquellos que no saben y 98 para aquellos que no responden]**

(99) INAP

SOC12B. Y usando la misma escala, donde 1 significa que defiende a los ricos y 10 que defiende a los pobres, dónde **le gustaría** a usted que se ubicaran los políticos colombianos? **[Anotar un número de 1 a 10, 88 para aquellos que no saben y 98 para aquellos que no responden]**

(99) INAP

[RECOGER TARJETA “E”]

CUESTIONARIOS PARES	
[LAS PREGUNTAS SNW1A – SNW1B SE DEBEN PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]	
SNW1A. ¿Usted conoce personalmente a algún funcionario electo o a alguna persona que fue candidato en las últimas elecciones nacionales, departamentales o locales? (1) Sí (2) No [Pasar a FOR1] (88) NS [Pasar a FOR1] (98) NR [Pasar a FOR1] (99) INAP	
SNW1B. ¿Y ese cargo es a nivel local, a nivel departamental, o a nivel nacional? (1) Local (2) Departamental (3) Nacional (4) Candidatos en más de un nivel (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES	
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR1 - FOR8) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]	
FOR1. Ahora vamos a hablar sobre sus opiniones respecto de algunos países. Cuando hablamos de “China” en esta entrevista, estamos hablando de China continental, la República Popular de China, y no de la isla Taiwán. ¿Cuál de los siguientes países es el que tiene más influencia en América Latina ? [Leer opciones] (1) China (2) Japón (3) India (4) Estados Unidos (5) Brasil (6) Venezuela (7) México (10) España (11) [No leer] Otro país (12) [No leer] Ninguno [Pasa a FOR4] (88) [No leer] NS [Pasa a FOR4] (98) [No leer] NR [Pasa a FOR4] (99) INAP	
FOR2. Y pensando en [país mencionado en FOR1] , ¿Cree usted que su influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa? (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR (99) INAP	
FOR3. [Preguntar SOLO si país mencionado en FOR1 NO fue China] Y pensando en China y la influencia que tiene en América Latina . ¿Cree usted que esa influencia es muy positiva, positiva, negativa o muy negativa? (1) Muy positiva (2) Positiva (3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa (4) Negativa (5) Muy negativa (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna influencia (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	

FOR4. Y dentro de 10 años, en su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países tendrá más influencia en América Latina? [Leer opciones]

- | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| (1) China | (2) Japón |
| (3) India | (4) Estados Unidos |
| (5) Brasil | (6) Venezuela |
| (7) México | (10) España |
| (11) [No leer] Otro país | (12) [No leer] Ninguno |
| (88) [No leer] NS | (98) [No leer] NR |
| | (99) INAP |

FOR5. En su opinión, ¿cuál de los siguientes países debería ser un modelo para el desarrollo futuro de nuestro país? [Leer opciones]

- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| (1) China | (2) Japón |
| (3) India | (4) Estados Unidos |
| (5) Singapur | (6) Rusia |
| (7) Corea del Sur | (10) Brasil |
| (11) Venezuela, o | (12) México |
| (13) [No leer] Ninguno/Debemos seguir nuestro propio modelo | |
| (14) [No leer] Otro | (88) NS |
| | (98) NR |
| | (99) INAP |

FOR6. Y pensando ahora sólo en nuestro país, ¿qué tanta influencia cree usted que tiene China en nuestro país? [Leer alternativas]

- | | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| (1) Mucha | (2) Algo |
| (3) Poca | (4) Nada [Pasar a FOR8] |
| (88) NS [Pasar a FOR8] | (98) NR [Pasar a FOR8] |
| (99) INAP | |

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

FOR7. En general, la influencia que tiene China sobre nuestro país es [leer alternativas]

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| (1) Muy positiva | (2) Positiva |
| (3) [No leer] Ni positiva ni negativa | (4) Negativa |
| (5) Muy negativa | (6) [No leer] No tiene ninguna |
| influencia | |
| (88) NS | (98) NR |
| | (99) INAP |

FOR8. Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con la siguiente afirmación: “Los negocios chinos contribuyen al desarrollo económico de Colombia”? ¿Está usted [leer alternativas]...

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|
| (1) Muy de acuerdo | (2) De acuerdo |
| (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo | (4) En desacuerdo |
| (5) Muy en desacuerdo | (88) NS |
| | (98) NR |
| | (99) INAP |

CUESTIONARIOS PARES

[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (FOR9A – FOR9D) DEBE PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]

¿Según lo que usted sabe o ha oído, los negocios chinos que están instalados en Colombia sufren algunos de los siguientes problemas? **[Leer alternativas]**

	Es problema	No es problema	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	INAP
FOR9A. Relaciones laborales, tales como disputas con los empleados o con los sindicatos ¿Cree usted que	1	2	88	98	99

es un problema o que no lo es, o no tiene opinión al respecto?					
FOR9B. Problemas que surgen de la falta de entendimiento de la cultura o de las costumbres de Colombia. ¿Cree usted que es un problema o que no lo es, o no tiene opinión al respecto?	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9C. Falta de conocimiento de las normas políticas, legales o reglas y valores sociales de Colombia. ¿Cree usted que es un problema o que no lo es, o no tiene opinión al respecto?	1	2	88	98	99
FOR9D. Falta de comunicación con los medios de comunicación locales y con los residentes de Colombia. ¿Cree usted que es un problema o que no lo es, o no tiene opinión al respecto?	1	2	88	98	99

CUESTIONARIOS PARES								
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL10A – MIL10E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]								
Ahora, quisiera preguntarle cuánta confianza tiene en los gobiernos de varios países. Para cada país por favor dígame si en su opinión, es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o si no tiene opinión.								
	Muy confiable	Algo confiable	Poco confiable	Nada confiable	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	INAP	
MIL10A. El gobierno de China. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10B. El de Rusia. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10C. Irán. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	

confiable, o no tiene opinión?								
MIL10D. Israel. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	
MIL10E. Estados Unidos. En su opinión, ¿es muy confiable, algo confiable, poco confiable, nada confiable, o no tiene opinión?	1	2	3	4	88	98	99	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES							
[EL SIGUIENTE MÓDULO (MIL11A – MIL11E) SE DEBE PREGUNTAR SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]							
Ahora me gustaría preguntarle sobre las relaciones en general de nuestro país con otras naciones del mundo. Cuando usted piensa en las relaciones de nuestro país con China , ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?							
	Más cercana	Más o menos igual	Más lejana	No sabe/ no tiene opinión	NR	INAP	
MIL11A. China	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11B. Y la relación de nuestro país con Rusia, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11C. Y con Irán. ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	
MIL11D. Con Israel, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99	

MIL11E. Finalmente, con Estados Unidos, ¿diría que en los últimos 5 años nuestra relación se ha hecho más cercana, más lejana, ha permanecido más o menos igual, o no tiene una opinión?	1	2	3	88	98	99
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Pasando a otro tema...

CCT1NEW. ¿Usted o alguien en su casa recibe ayuda mensual en dinero o en productos por parte del gobierno?	
(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	

<p align="center">CUESTIONARIOS PARES</p> <p>[PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]</p> <p>CCT1B. Ahora, hablando específicamente sobre el Programa Familias en Acción, ¿usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario de ese programa?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP</p>

COLLT1. ¿Sabe usted que es la Ley de Tierras?	
(1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [PASE A COLLT5] (88) NS [PASE A COLLT5] (98) NR [PASE A COLLT5]	

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “B”]

Ahora me gustaría conocer su opinión acerca de algunos asuntos más específicos. ¿Cómo ubicaría su propia posición en la siguiente escala en la cual el 1 es la grada más baja y significa NADA y el 7 es la grada más alta y significa MUCHO?

	Anotar 1 a 7 NS=88 NR=98 INAP=99
COLLT2 ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la Ley de tierras del gobierno mejorará las condiciones de vida de los colombianos?	
COLLT3 ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la Ley de Tierras contribuirá a que las víctimas de la violencia puedan recuperar sus tierras?	
COLLT4. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la Ley de Tierras contribuirá a mejorar las condiciones de la población rural del país?	

[RECOGER TARJETA “B”]

Pasando a otro tema...

COLLT5. ¿Hace parte usted del registro del Gobierno Nacional de víctimas del conflicto armado?	
(1) Sí (2) No [Siga a ED] (88) NS [Siga a ED] (98) NR [Siga a ED]	
COLLT6. ¿Ha recibido algún tipo de reparación por parte del Gobierno Nacional?	
(1) Sí (2) No [Siga a ED] (88) NS [Siga a ED] (98) NR [Siga a ED] (99) INAP	

COLLT7A. ¿Ha recibido reparación en dinero?				
(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP
COLLT7B. ¿Le han adjudicado tierras como forma de reparación?				
(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP
COLLT7C. ¿Ha recibido reparación de alguna otra forma?				
(1) Sí	(2) No	(88) NS	(98) NR	(99) INAP

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?
 _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla a continuación para el código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	7 ^o
Ninguno	0						
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5		
Secundaria	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15			
NS	88						
NR	98						

CUESTIONARIOS IMPARES

[LAS PREGUNTAS ED2 Y MOV1 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO IMPAR (“1” “3” “5” “7” ó “9”)]

ED2. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? **[NO LEER OPCIONES]**

- (00) Ninguno
- (01) Primaria incompleta
- (02) Primaria completa
- (03) Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto
- (04) Secundaria o bachillerato completo
- (05) Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta
- (06) Técnica/Tecnológica completa
- (07) Universitaria incompleta
- (08) Universitaria completa
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

MOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? **[LEER OPCIONES]**

- (1) Alta
- (2) Media alta
- (3) Media
- (4) Media baja
- (5) Baja
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta “C”]

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa muy en desacuerdo y 7 significa muy de acuerdo.

INF5a. Aunque usted no tenga ninguna razón para ir allí, suponga que tiene que ir a la escuela pública más próxima a su hogar. ¿Cuánto se demoraría en llegar a esa escuela caminando? **[Aunque la persona no vaya caminando o no utilice la escuela pública, solicitar que calcule aproximadamente cuánto tiempo le consumiría llegar por esa vía a la escuela]**

- (1) Menos de 10 minutos (2) Entre 10 y 30 minutos
(3) Más de 30 minutos – 1 hora (4) Más de una 1 y hasta 3
(5) Más de 3 horas (88) NS (98) NR

COLCONF. Cuando usted tiene un conflicto con un vecino, el cual no puede resolver amigablemente, ¿a quién busca usted para que le ayude a resolverlo? **[No leer alternativas]**

- (1) Al sistema judicial formal (juez).
- (2) La casa de justicia
- (3) El alcalde
- (4) Un líder comunitario
- (5) Un líder religioso
- (6) A las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado (Policía, Ejército)
- (7) Actores armados ilegales. (BACRIM o FARC)
- (8) Otro tipo de representante gubernamental
- (9) Otro _____
- (88) NS
- (98) NR

Q2D-Y. ¿En qué día, mes y año nació usted? [Si se niega a decir el día y mes, pedir solo el año o preguntar edad y calcular luego el año.]

Día: _____ Mes (01 = Enero): _____ Año: _____
(Para Q2D y Q2M: 88 = NS y 98 = NR)
(Para Q2Y: 8888 = NS y 9888 = NR)

|_|_|_| Q2D
 Día
 |_|_|_| Q2M
 Mes
 |_|_|_|_|_| Q2Y
 año

<p>Q3C. Si usted es de alguna religión, ¿podría decirme cuál es su religión? [No leer opciones]</p> <p>[Si el entrevistado dice que no tiene ninguna religión, sondee más para ubicar si pertenece a la alternativa 4 u 11]</p> <p>(01) Católico</p> <p>(02) Protestante, Protestante Tradicional o Protestante no Evangélico (Cristiano, Calvinista; Luterano; Metodista; Presbiteriano; Discípulo de Cristo; Anglicano; Episcopaliano; Iglesia Morava).</p> <p>(03) Religiones Orientales no Cristianas (Islam; Budista; Hinduista; Taoísta; Confucianismo; Baha'i).</p> <p>(04) Ninguna (Cree en un Ser Superior pero no pertenece a ninguna religión)</p> <p>(05) Evangélica y Pentecostal (Evangélico, Pentecostal; Iglesia de Dios; Asambleas de Dios; Iglesia Universal del Reino de Dios; Iglesia Cuadrangular; Iglesia de Cristo; Congregación Cristiana; Menonita; Hermanos de Cristo; Iglesia Cristiana Reformada; Carismático no Católico; Luz del Mundo; Bautista; Iglesia del Nazareno; Ejército de Salvación; Adventista; Adventista del Séptimo Día, Sara Nossa Terra).</p> <p>(06) Iglesia de los Santos de los Últimos Días (Mormones).</p> <p>(07) Religiones Tradicionales (Candomblé, Vudú, Rastafari, Religiones Mayas, Umbanda; María Lonza; Inti, Kardecista, Santo Daime, Esoterica).</p> <p>(10) Judío (Ortodoxo, Conservador o Reformado)</p> <p>(11) Agnóstico o ateo (no cree en Dios)</p> <p>(12) Testigos de Jehová. (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Más de una vez por semana (2) Una vez por semana (3) Una vez al mes</p> <p>(4) Una o dos veces al año (5) Nunca o casi nunca (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q5B. Por favor, ¿podría decirme, qué tan importante es la religión en su vida? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Muy importante (2) Algo importante (3) Poco importante o (4) Nada importante</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>MIL8. ¿Usted o su pareja o algún hijo suyo actualmente está en servicio o hace parte de las Fuerzas Armadas, o ha servido alguna vez en las Fuerzas Armadas? [Si no entiende preguntar: “¿Usted o su pareja o algún hijo suyo prestan o han prestado servicio militar?”.]</p> <p>(1) Sí, actualmente sirviendo (2) Servía en el pasado (3) Nunca ha servido</p> <p>(88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Trabajando? [Siga]</p> <p>(2) No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga]</p> <p>(3) Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(4) Es estudiante? [Pase a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(5) Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(6) Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(7) No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a Q10NEW]</p> <p>(88) NS [Pase a Q10NEW] (98) NR [Pase a Q10NEW]</p>	

OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Asalariado del gobierno o empresa estatal?
- (2) Asalariado en el sector privado?
- (3) Patrono o socio de empresa?
- (4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?
- (5) Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?
- (88) NS
- (98) NR
- (99) INAP

[ENTRÉGUELE AL ENTREVISTADO LA TARJETA “F”]

Q10NEW. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 90.000
- (02) Entre 90.000 – 180.000
- (03) Entre 180.000 – 270.000
- (04) Entre 270.000 – 360.000
- (05) Entre 360.000 – 450.000
- (06) Entre 450.000 - 540.000
- (07) Entre 540.000 – 630.000
- (08) Entre 630.000 – 710.000
- (09) Entre 710.000 – 800.000
- (10) Entre 800.000 – 940.000
- (11) Entre 940.000 – 1.100.000
- (12) Entre 1.100.000 – 1.600.000
- (13) Entre 1.600.000 – 2.100.000
- (14) Entre 2.100.000 – 3.200.000
- (15) Entre 3.200.000 – 4.300.000
- (16) Más de 4.300.000
- (88) NS (98) NR

[PREGUNTAR SOLO SI TRABAJA O ESTÁ JUBILADO/PENSIONADO/INCAPACITADO (VERIFICAR OCUP4A)]	
<p>Q10G. ¿Y cuánto dinero usted personalmente gana al mes por su trabajo o pensión? [Si no entiende: ¿Cuánto gana usted solo, por concepto de salario o pensión, sin contar los ingresos de los demás miembros de su hogar ni las remesas u otros ingresos?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 90.000 (02) Entre 90.000 – 180.000 (03) Entre 180.000 – 270.000 (04) Entre 270.000 – 360.000 (05) Entre 360.000 – 450.000 (06) Entre 450.000 - 540.000 (07) Entre 540.000 – 630.000 (08) Entre 630.000 – 710.000 (09) Entre 710.000 – 800.000 (10) Entre 800.000 – 940.000 (11) Entre 940.000 – 1.100.000 (12) Entre 1.100.000 – 1.600.000 (13) Entre 1.600.000 – 2.100.000 (14) Entre 2.100.000 – 3.200.000 (15) Entre 3.200.000 – 4.300.000 (16) Más de 4.300.000 (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (No trabaja ni está jubilado)</p>	

[RECOGER TARJETA “F”]

<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso de su hogar: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Les alcanza bien y pueden ahorrar (2) Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades (3) No les alcanza y tienen dificultades (4) No les alcanza y tienen grandes dificultades (88) [No leer] NS (98) [No leer] NR</p>	
<p>Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones]</p> <p>(1) ¿Aumentó? (2) ¿Permaneció igual? (3) ¿Disminuyó? (88) NS (98) NR</p>	

CUESTIONARIOS PARES					
[FS2 Y FS8 DEBEN PREGUNTARSE SOLO A LOS ENTREVISTADOS CUYO NÚMERO DE CUESTIONARIO TERMINE CON NÚMERO PAR (“0” “2” “4” “6” ú “8”)]					
Ahora le voy a hacer unas preguntas relacionadas con la alimentación.					
	No	Sí	NS	NR	INAP
FS2. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez ¿en su hogar se quedaron sin alimentos?	0	1	88	98	99
FS8. En los últimos 3 meses, por falta de dinero u otros recursos, alguna vez, ¿usted o algún adulto en su hogar solo comió una vez al día o dejó de comer todo un día?	0	1	88	98	99

Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [Leer alternativas] (1) Soltero [Pasar a Q12C] (2) Casado [Siga] (3) Unión libre (acompañado) [Siga] (4) Divorciado [Pasar a Q12C] (5) Separado [Pasar a Q12C] (6) Viudo [Pasar a Q12C] (88) NS [Pasar a Q12C] (98) NR [Pasar a Q12C]	
GEN10. Pensando solo en usted y su pareja y en los salarios que ganan, ¿cuál de las siguientes frases describe mejor sus salarios? [Leer opciones] (1) Usted no gana nada y su pareja gana todo; (2) Usted gana menos que su pareja; (3) Usted gana más o menos lo mismo que su pareja; (4) Usted gana más que su pareja; (5) Usted gana todos los ingresos y su pareja no gana nada. (6) [NO LEER] Ningún ingreso salarial (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
Q12C. ¿Cuántas personas en total viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00 = ninguno → Pasar a ETID) (88) NS (98) NR	
Q12B. ¿Cuántos hijos menores de 13 años viven en este hogar? _____ 00 = ninguno, (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)	
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-colombiano, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NR	
LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa, no más] [No leer alternativas] (801) Castellano/Español (802) Wayú (803) Paez (804) Embera (805) Otro extranjero (88) NS (98) NR	

WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? **[Leer alternativas]**

- (1) Diariamente
 (2) Algunas veces a la semana
 (3) Algunas veces al mes
 (4) Rara vez
 (5) Nunca
 (88) **[No leer]** NS

(98) **[No leer]** NR

Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y el país tiene la gente...

GI0. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos o el Internet? **[Leer opciones]** (1) Diariamente (2) Algunas veces a la semana (3) Algunas veces al mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (88) NS (98) NR

	Correcto	Incorrecto	No Sabe	No Responde
GI1. ¿Cómo se llama el actual presidente de los Estados Unidos de América? [NO LEER: Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]	1	2	88	98
GI4. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? [NO LEER: 4 años]	1	2	88	98
GI7. ¿Cuántos representantes tiene la Cámara de Representantes? [ANOTAR NÚMERO EXACTO. REPETIR SOLO UNA VEZ SI EL ENTREVISTADO NO RESPONDE.]	Número: _____		88	98

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4. Teléfono convencional /fijo/residencial (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí
R5. Vehículo. ¿Cuántos? [Si no dice cuántos, marcar "uno".]	(0) No (1) Uno (2) Dos (3) Tres o más	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí
R15. Computadora	(0) No [Ir a R16]	(1) Sí
R18. Servicio de internet	(0) No (1) Sí	(99) INAP
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	(0) No	(1) Sí
R26. ¿Está conectada a la red de saneamiento/desagüe/drenaje?	(0) No	(1) Sí

OCUP1B1. ¿Ha perdido usted su trabajo en los últimos dos años? [Leer alternativas] (1) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo pero ha encontrado uno nuevo. (2) Sí, usted perdió su trabajo y no ha encontrado uno nuevo. (3) No, no perdió su trabajo (4) Por decisión propia o incapacidad no ha tenido trabajo (88) NS (98) NR	
OCUP1B2. ¿Además de usted, alguien que vive en este hogar ha perdido su trabajo en los últimos dos años? (1) Sí (2) No (88) NS (98) NR	
OCUP1ANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba el jefe de su hogar cuando usted tenía 15 años? [No leer alternativas] (1) Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.) (2) Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) (3) Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.) (4) Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.) (5) Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) (6) Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) (7) Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) (8) Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados (9) Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) (10) Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) (11) Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) (12) Artesano (13) Servicio doméstico (14) Obrero (15) Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.) (88) NS (98) NR (99) INAP	
¿Dónde nació usted? [Anotar municipio y departamento] [Si tiene dudas sobre el lugar que menciona el informante, pregunte en qué departamento está el municipio donde nació]	
DEPNAC. Departamento (o País si nació en el extranjero; "DC" si es Bogotá): _____ NS.....88888 [Si NS o nació en el extranjero, pasar a COLORR] NR.....98888 [Si NR o nació en el extranjero, pasar a COLORR]	
MUNNAC. Municipio (99999 si nació en el extranjero): _____ NS.....88888 [pasar a COLORR] NR.....98888 [pasar a COLORR]	

AREANAC. ¿Nació en área urbana o rural?

Urbana.....1
 Rural.....2
 NS.....88
 NR.....98

Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel de la cara del entrevistado] _____
 (97) No se pudo clasificar [Marcar (97) únicamente, si por alguna razón, no se pudo ver la cara de la persona entrevistada]

|_|_|

Hora en la cual terminó la entrevista _____ : _____

|_|_|_|_|

TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____

INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador: _____

|_|_|_|_|

SEXI. Anotar el sexo suyo: (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

COLORI. Usando la Paleta de Colores, anote el color de piel suyo _____

|_|_|

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada.

Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____

Firma del supervisor de campo _____

Comentarios:


[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que digitó los datos

[No usar para PDA] Firma de la persona que verificó los datos


Tarjeta A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				


Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D



Tarjeta E

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Defiende a los ricos					Defiende a los pobres				

Tarjeta F

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de 90.000
- (02) Entre 90.000 – 180.000
- (03) Entre 180.000 – 270.000
- (04) Entre 270.000 – 360.000
- (05) Entre 360.000 – 450.000
- (06) Entre 450.000 - 540.000
- (07) Entre 540.000 – 630.000
- (08) Entre 630.000 – 710.000
- (09) Entre 710.000 – 800.000
- (10) Entre 800.000 – 940.000
- (11) Entre 940.000 – 1.100.000
- (12) Entre 1.100.000 – 1.600.000
- (13) Entre 1.600.000 – 2.100.000
- (14) Entre 2.100.000 – 3.200.000
- (15) Entre 3.200.000 – 4.300.000
- (16) Más de 4.300.000

Paleta de Colores



Appendix D. Regression Tables

Chapter 1

Table 18. Determinants of Education Level

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Urbano	0.239	-6.84	*
Mujer	-0.037	-1.81	
Color de piel	-0.083	-3.03	*
26-35 años	0.015	-0.67	
36-45 años	-0.055	-2.19	*
46-55 años	-0.188	-6.55	*
56-65 años	-0.289	-8.68	*
66 años o más	-0.299	-10.92	*
Constante	0.003	-0.06	
R-cuadrado	0.225		
N =859			

Sig. * $p < .05$,

Table 19. Determinants of Personal Income

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Urbano	0.226	-6.63	*
Mujer	-0.203	-8.24	*
Color de piel	-0.090	-2.66	*
26-35 años	0.178	-4.8	*
36-45 años	0.150	-4.37	*
46-55 años	0.158	-4.61	*
56-65 años	0.031	-0.85	
66 años o más	0.014	-0.4	
Constante	-0.016	-0.31	
R-cuadrado	0.086		
N =704			

Sig. * $p < .05$,

Table 20. Determinants of Food Insecurity

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Urbano/rural	0.067	-1.49	
Nivel educativo	-0.279	-6.36	*
Mujer	0.047	-1.45	
Color de piel	0.098	-2.04	*
26-35 años	0.023	-0.62	
36-45 años	0.024	-0.5	
46-55 años	0.004	-0.11	
56-65 años	-0.012	-0.28	
66 años o más	-0.004	-0.07	
Constante	0.022	-0.47	
R-cuadrado	0.086		
N = 704			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 21. Determinants of Discrimination at the Workplace, School, or Seeking Employment

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Urbano	0.158	-1.96	
Mujer	0.052	-0.68	
Color de piel	-0.049	-0.6	
26-35 años	0.17	-1.94	
36-45 años	0.089	-1.08	
46-55 años	0.034	-0.4	
56-65 años	-0.105	-1.31	
66 años o más	-0.298*	-2.3	*
Constante	-1.682*	-18.72	*
F	2.49		
N = 1398			

Sig. * p<.05,

Chapter 3

Table 22. Determinants of Internal Efficacy

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	-0.076	-2.17	*
Mujer	-0.130	-4.19	*
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.002	-0.06	
Edad	0.102	-2.97	*
Nivel educativo	0.215	-6.21	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.016	-0.5	
Interés político	0.263	-8.43	*
Color de piel	-0.007	-0.19	
Minoría étnica	-0.04	-1.07	
Se ha sentido discriminado	0.02	-0.7	
Radio	0.121	-4.07	*
TV	0.029	-0.82	
Periódicos	0.074	-2.07	*
Internet	-0.002	-0.08	
Índice de conocimiento político	0.059	-1.91	
Constante	0.053	-1.47	
R-cuadrado	0.217		
N =1030			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 23. Determinants of External Efficacy

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.007	-0.18	
Mujer	-0.041	-1.06	
Mujer que es ama de casa	0.005	-0.17	
Edad	-0.086	-2.48	*
Nivel educativo	-0.062	-1.47	
Quintiles de riqueza	0.008	-0.22	
Región Caribe	0.109	-2.45	*
Región Pacífica	0.033	-0.98	
Región Central	0.007	-0.16	
Ant. Territ. Nales.	-0.028	-0.82	
Interés político	0.095	-2.38	*
Apoyo al sistema	0.283	-9.63	*
Minoría étnica	-0.002	-0.06	
Se ha sentido discriminado	0.025	-0.81	
Índice de conocimiento político	-0.025	-0.68	
Constante	-0.028	-0.73	
R-cuadrado	0.119		
N =1018			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 24. Determinants of Political System Support

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	-0.171	-3.48	*
Género	0.007	-0.15	
Mujer que es ama de casa	0.015	-0.29	
Edad	-0.017	-0.38	
Nivel educativo	-0.009	-0.18	
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.039	-0.9	
Interés político	0.193	-4.67	*
Minoría étnica	-0.137	-3.18	*
Oficinas del gobierno	-0.099	-2.48	*
Constante	0.054	-1.09	
R-cuadrado	0.084		
N =635			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 25. Determinants of Political System Support

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	-0.116	-2.44	*
Mujer	0.02	-0.67	
Mujer que es ama de casa	0.044	-1.43	
Edad	0.06	-2.39	*
Nivel educativo	-0.094	-2.86	*
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.022	-0.69	
Región Caribe	0.083	-1.75	
Región Pacífica	-0.001	-0.02	
Región Central	0.094	-1.81	
Región Oriental	0.071	-1.31	
Ant. Territ. Nales.	-0.019	-0.95	
Interés político	0.157	-4.4	*
Minoría étnica	-0.041	-1.8	
Discriminado por el gobierno	-0.063	-1.58	
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.062	-1.37	
Constante	0.031	-0.84	
R-cuadrado	0.092		
N =1300			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 26. Determinants of Support for Democracy

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	-0.025	-0.65	
Mujer	-0.04	-1.48	
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.005	-0.14	
Edad	0.178	-6.48	*
Nivel educativo	0.121	-3.36	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.029	-0.9	
Región Caribe	0.016	-0.38	
Región Pacífica	-0.013	-0.33	
Región Central	0.1	-1.86	
Región Oriental	0.036	-0.67	
Ant. Territ. Nales.	-0.025	-0.67	
Interés político	0.094	-3.55	*
Minoría étnica	-0.016	-0.46	
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.044	-1.01	
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.077	-2.04	*
Constante	0.082	-2.31	*
R-cuadrado	0.068		
N =1257			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 27. Determinants of Protest Participation

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar de residencia	0.025	-0.22	
Mujer	-0.06	-0.47	
Mujer que es ama de casa	-0.18	-0.87	
Edad	-0.302	-1.72	
Nivel educativo	0.587	-2.74	*
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.006	-0.04	
Interés político	0.466	-3.67	*
Color de piel	-0.115	-0.7	
Minoría étnica	0.242	-1.54	
Oficinas del gobierno	-0.076	-0.54	
Índice de conocimiento político	0.158	-0.94	
Se ha sentido discriminado	0.244	-1.69	
Ideología	-0.339	-2.52	*
Constante	-2.88	-13.15	*
F	4.05		
N =852			

Sig. * p<.05,

Chapter 4

Table 28. Determinants of Victimization by Corruption

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	0.183	-2.22	*
Nivel educativo	0.252	-1.99	
Edad	-0.198	-2.19	*
Mujer	-0.356	-5.21	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.237	-1.78	
Color de piel	-0.072	-0.84	
Perc. economía familiar	-0.102	-0.93	
Constante	-1.954	-20.94	*
F	10.37		
N =1408			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 29. Determinants of Victimization by Crime

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	0.381	-4.48	*
Nivel educativo	0.101	-1.35	
Edad	-0.272	-3.83	*
Mujer	-0.094	-1.33	
Quintiles de riqueza	0.085	-1.16	
Color de piel	-0.08	-1.12	
Perc. economía familiar	-1.391	-20.08	*
Constante	0.381	-4.48	*
F	8.84		
N =1415			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 30. Corruption and Delinquency as Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	-0.097	-2.51	*
Nivel educativo	-0.059	-1.71	
Edad	0.068	-2.82	*
Mujer	0.024	-0.92	
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.019	-0.56	
Color de piel	-0.036	-1.35	
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.126	-4.07	*
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.054	-2.03	*
Percepción de corrupción	-0.109	-4	*
Victimización por corrupción	-0.063	-1.89	
Constante	0.008	-0.23	
R-cuadrado	0.076		
N = 1327			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 31. Determinants of Support for the Rule of Law

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	0.063	-0.71	
Nivel educativo	0.156	-1.59	
Edad	0.127	-1.63	
Mujer	0.068	-1.03	
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.241	-2.74	*
Color de piel	0.019	-0.27	
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.073	-1.01	
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.118	-1.71	
Percepción de corrupción	-0.031	-0.41	
Victimización por corrupción	-0.07	-1.05	
Confianza interpersonal	0.106	-1.33	
Ideología	-0.009	-0.12	
Constante	0.952	-11.21	*
F	1.84		
N = 1064			

Sig. * p<.05,

Chapter 5

Table 32. Determinants of Political Tolerance

Factores determinantes	Tolerancia política	
	Coef.	T
Tamaño del lugar	0.06	-1.55
Mujer	-0.034	-1.36
Nivel educativo	0.155	-4.11 *
Edad	-0.033	-1.05
Quintiles de riqueza	0.061	-1.97
Color de piel	0.027	-0.94
Evaluación sociotrópica	-0.005	-0.18
Evaluación egotrópica	0.017	-0.59
Percepción de inseguridad	0.007	-0.27
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.043	-2.07 *
Frecuencia de asistencia a la iglesia	-0.023	-0.9
Importancia de la religión	-0.079	-2.69 *
Constante	0.039	-1.29
R-cuadrado	0.71	
N =1356		

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 33. Determinants of Attitudes Conducive to Democratic Stability
(High System Support and High Tolerance)

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T
Tamaño del lugar	0.046	-0.58
Mujer	0.03	-0.37
Nivel educativo	0.07	-0.77
Edad	-0.105	-1.2
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.002	-0.02
Color de piel	-0.012	-0.17
Victimización por delincuencia	-0.159	-2.38 *
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.148	-2.00 *
Victimización por corrupción	-0.115	-1.40
Percepción de corrupción	-0.147	-2.23 *
Perc. economía familiar	0.141	-1.48
Aprobación presidencial	0.154	-1.58
Interés político	0.174	-2.23 *
Ideología	0.139	-1.76
Constante	-0.97	-13.00 *
F	2.8	
N =1051		

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 34. Corruption and Crime as Determinants of Support for Democracy

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	-0.013	-0.37	
Mujer	-0.035	-1.31	
Nivel educativo	0.089	-2.32	*
Edad	0.161	-5.39	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.027	-0.78	
Color de piel	-0.02	-0.63	
Victimización por delincuencia	0.041	-1.52	
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.026	-0.94	
Victimización por corrupción	-0.061	-2.11	*
Percepción de corrupción	0.05	-1.45	
Perc. economía familiar	0.05	-1.51	
Aprobación presidencial	0.037	-1.15	
Interés político	0.092	-2.95	*
Ideología	0.094	-3.01	*
Constante	0.046	-1.36	
R-cuadrado	0.08		
N =1034			

Sig. * p<.05,

Chapter 6

Table 35. Determinants of Petitioning Local Government

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Confianza en el gobierno local	0.081	-0.76	
Asistió a una reunión municipal	0.585	-7.91	*
Percepción de la situación económica familiar	-0.16	-1.5	
Nivel de educación	0.08	-0.63	
Mujer	-0.033	-0.32	
Edad	0.13	-1.38	
Interes en la política	-0.252	-2.31	*
Ideología	-0.021	-0.2	
Constante	-2.198	-19.38	*
F	13.05		
N =1090			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 36. Satisfaction with Local Public Services as Determinant for System Support

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	-0.131	-3.65	*
Mujer	0.041	-1.46	
Edad	0.067	-2.64	*
Nivel educativo	-0.105	-3.09	*
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.058	-1.6	
Aprobación presidencial	0.195	-5.19	*
Ideología	0.079	-2.14	*
Interés político	0.075	-2.19	*
Perc. economía familiar	0.058	-1.43	
Evaluación de los servicios municipales	0.146	-5.17	*
Constante	0.043	-1.15	
R-cuadrado	0.146		
N =1077			

Sig. * p<.05,

Chapter 7

Table 37. Determinants of Ideological Position

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	-0.078	-2.39	*
Mujer	-0.035	-1.36	
Edad	0.188	-5.21	*
Nivel educativo	-0.084	-2.03	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.026	-0.59	
Minoría étnica	-0.045	-1.71	
Apoyo a un Estado más activo	0.015	-0.43	
Actitudes progresistas en materia social/moral	-0.075	-2.38	*
Constante	0.017	-0.52	
R-cuadrado	0.079		
N =1073			

Sig. * p<.05,

Chapter 8

Table 38. Determinants of Attitudes Against Liberal Democracy

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Tamaño del lugar	0.006	-0.34	
Mujer	0.016	-1.01	
Edad	-0.072	-5.06	*
Nivel de educación	-0.224	-10.78	*
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.053	-2.92	*
Color de piel	-0.001	-0.07	
Ideología	-0.023	-1.5	
Noticias en radio	0.014	-1.02	
Noticias en TV	0.014	-1.01	
Noticias en periódicos	-0.005	-0.29	
Noticias en internet	-0.079	-5.65	*
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.006	-0.21	
Discriminado en otro lugar	-0.006	-0.24	
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.129	-6.12	*
Evaluación sociotrópica	-0.022	-1.21	
Evaluación egotrópica	0.022	-1.26	
Partido de la U	0.028	-2.51	*
Partido Conservador	-0.009	-0.71	
Cambio Radical	0.015	-1.2	
Apego personal al presidente	0.053	-3.01	*
Post-Uribe	-0.174	-10.63	*
Constante	0.16	-7.18	*
R-cuadrado	0.147		
N =4334			

Sig. * p<.05,

Table 39. Determinants of Justifications for a Military Coup

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Tamaño del lugar	0.173	-1.88	
Mujer	-0.04	-0.54	
Edad	-0.327	-4.67	*
Nivel educativo	-0.189	-2.32	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.044	-0.55	
Color de piel	0.005	-0.08	
Ideología	0.149	-2.00	*
Noticias en radio	-0.058	-0.85	
Noticias en TV	0.179	-2.07	*
Noticias en periódicos	0.007	-0.12	
Noticias en internet	-0.108	-1.47	
Discriminado por el gobierno	0.037	-0.28	
Discriminado en otro lugar	0.032	-0.22	
Aprobación presidencial	0.019	-0.26	
Evaluación sociotrópica	-0.097	-1.44	
Evaluación egotrópica	-0.079	-1.28	
Partido de la U	0.048	-0.74	
Partido Conservador	-0.067	-0.84	
Cambio Radical	-0.077	-1.53	
Apego personal al presidente	-0.022	-0.34	
Constante	0.074	-0.86	
F	2.45		
N =1009			

Sig. * p<.05,

Chapter 9

Table 40. Determinants of Preferences for a Negotiated Solution with the Guerrillas

Factores determinantes	Coef.	T	
Mujer	0.026	-0.38	
Edad	0.171	-1.7	
Nivel educativo	0.127	-1.38	
hijos	-0.081	-1.16	
Quintiles de riqueza	-0.308	-3.2	*
Urbano	-0.169	-2.05	*
Minoría étnica	0.19	-2.82	*
Noticias en radio	-0.03	-0.49	
Noticias en TV	-0.012	-0.19	
Noticias en periódicos	-0.021	-0.28	
Noticias en internet	-0.149	-1.8	
Ideología	-0.151	-2.06	*
Interés político	0.221	-2.84	*
Aprobación del trabajo del Presidente	0.081	-1.11	
Afinidad partidista con Uribe	-0.155	-2.31	*
Percepción de inseguridad	-0.113	-1.42	
Víctima de la guerrilla	-0.137	-2.15	*
Conflicto como el mayor problema	0.105	-1.73	
Constante	0.423	-4.49	*
F	2.67		
N =978			

Sig. * $p < .05$,

Table 41. Multilevel Models – Preferences for Negotiation with the Guerrillas

	Modelo 0 (no condicional)			Modelo 1 (no interactivo)			Modelo 2 (interactivo)		
	B	(error est.)		B	(error est.)		B	(error est.)	
Constante	0.387	0.114	***	0.743	0.213	***	0.728	0.225	**
Nivel 2									
IDH				-2.779	1.377	*	-2.654	1.372	‡
Homicidios				-0.001	0.004		-0.002	0.009	
Nivel 1									
Mujer				0.082	0.111		0.141	0.115	
x homicidios							0.008	0.004	*
Edad				0.014	0.007	*	0.014	0.007	*
x homicidios							0.000	0.000	
Educación				0.025	0.026		0.020	0.027	
x homicidios							-0.000	0.001	
Número de hijos				-0.063	0.044		-0.074	0.049	
x homicidios							-0.003	0.002	
Quintil de riqueza				-0.168	0.065	**	-0.176	0.071	*
x homicidios							-0.003	0.003	
Urbano				-0.313	0.212		-0.324	0.212	
x homicidios							-0.006	0.007	
Minoría étnica				0.477	0.154	**	0.485	0.167	**
x homicidios							0.000	0.004	
Noticias en radio				-0.036	0.038		-0.040	0.041	
x homicidios							-0.001	0.002	
Noticias en TV				-0.019	0.075		0.010	0.090	
x homicidios							0.004	0.004	
Noticias en periódicos				-0.035	0.062		-0.032	0.063	
x homicidios							-0.001	0.002	
Noticias en internet				-0.144	0.068	*	-0.129	0.075	‡
x homicidios							0.001	0.003	
Ideología				-0.071	0.027	**	-0.065	0.027	*
x homicidios							0.001	0.001	
Interés político				0.006	0.002	**	0.007	0.002	**
x homicidios							0.000	0.000	
Aprobación presidencial				0.003	0.004		0.004	0.004	
x homicidios							0.000	0.000	
Afinidad con Uribe				-0.506	0.192	**	-0.494	0.189	**
x homicidios							0.007	0.007	
Percepción de inseguridad				-0.003	0.002		-0.003	0.002	
x homicidios							0.000	0.000	
Víctima de a guerrilla				-0.347	0.167	*	-0.352	0.177	*
x homicidios							0.007	0.007	
Conflicto como mayor problema				-0.000	0.002		-0.000	0.002	
x homicidios							-0.000	0.000	
Efecto a nivel de municipio				0.353		***	0.346		***
Efecto a nivel individual				0.594			0.588		
Confiabilidad del intercepto	0.693			0.545			0.545		
N individual=978, N municipal=46									

Sig. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, ‡ p<.1

Table 42. Factors explaining respondents' not wanting to have demobilized people as neighbors

Factores determinantes	Coef.	t	
Tamaño del lugar	0.072	-0.92	
Mujer	0.094	-1.68	
Edad	0.189	-2.62	*
Nivel educativo	0.207	-2.42	*
Quintiles de riqueza	0.081	-1.18	
Color de piel	0.105	-1.44	
Ideología	0.08	-1.27	
Familiar víctima del conflicto	0.047	-0.78	
Víctima de la guerrilla	-0.135	-2.31	*
Constante	-0.247	-2.71	*
F	2.92		
N =1060			

Sig. * p<.05,

The AmericasBarometer

This study forms part of a research program that the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) has been carrying out for more than two decades. LAPOP is a consortium of academic and research institutions spread throughout the Americas, with its headquarters at Vanderbilt University, in the United States. More than 30 institutions throughout the region participate in LAPOP, whose efforts are directed at producing objective, nonpartisan, and scientifically sound studies of public opinion. Those studies focus primarily on the measurement of political attitudes and behavior related to democracy and quality of life. The project has received generous support from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the College of Arts and Science at Vanderbilt University, the Tinker Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United States National Science Foundation, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Embassy in Bolivia, as well as Duke University, Florida International University, University of Miami, Princeton University, the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, the National Center for Research in Brazil (CNPq), and the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame University. LAPOP also maintains linkages with entities such as the Organization of American States.

The current surveys, whose results are analyzed and discussed in this publication, were carried out in face-to-face interviews in 2012, using nationally representative stratified and clustered probability samples in both urban and rural areas. Interviews were in the national language or in the major indigenous/creole languages of each country. The 2012 round of studies included 26 countries in the Americas and more than 41,000 interviews, which allows for comparison of the results of each individual country with other countries in the region.

LAPOP offers its AmericasBarometer datasets free to the public via its webpage: www.lapopsurveys.org. In addition to the datasets, the reports, articles, and books that the Latin American Public Opinion Project produces are free to the public. This research and the data can also be accessed at our "data repositories" and subscribers in major universities in the United States and Latin America. With these initiatives, LAPOP continues to collaborate with the development of academic and policy excellence throughout the Americas.

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