

Political culture of democracy in Colombia, 2009

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VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY



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Bogotá, April 2010

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PRESENTATION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is honored to present this new edition of *AmericasBarometer*. The United States government, through USAID, has been supporting this Project since 2005 and, with the passing of time, it has become a compulsory reference point for academics, political leaders and ordinary citizens who wish to understand what the Colombian people are thinking on matters of democracy and about their country's institutions. Each year the study measures the strengths and weaknesses of democracy in Colombia.

AmericasBarometer carries out this study in most countries on the American continent, and in Colombia it is carried out annually. This has facilitated a comparative analysis and the compiling of invaluable historical information on perceptions and attitudes towards democracy in the continent as a whole. In Colombia, USAID also supports the first Democracy Observatory, an institution charged with analyzing and disseminating the study, while also training people within the country to carry out technical studies.

The present study retains the same structure as former ones, thus enabling us to measure the evolution of indicators over the course of time. The report is a fundamental contribution at the country's present political moment in that it enables one to analyze the importance which citizens give to the functions of institutions, and shows how this affects their perception of democracy, the level of their trust in institutions, their behavior vis-à-vis democracy, their perception of the conflict, political party membership and of the electoral process.

For the first time since these studies began, Colombians feel that the economic situation is more important than the question of security in their country. This underlines a fundamental difference between this study and previous ones, and that will be analyzed in depth in the 2010 report, which will place its emphasis on the economic crisis.

We hope that the study will become a useful tool for building public policies at the local and national level. Thus both political parties and the authorities may come to better understand the needs of the population and respond in the most appropriate manner. Additionally, Colombians will find here a source of information and reference which will enable them to become involved in decision-making on social and political affairs in their municipalities and in the country as a whole.

Very best wishes

Ken Yamashita
Director USAID/Colombia

PROLOGUE: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Mitchell A. Seligson
Centennial Professor of Political Science
and Director of the Latin American Public Opinión Project
Vanderbilt University

The present study is part of **AmericasBarometer**, one of the many, and ever more numerous, activities of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). That project, initiated over two decades ago, is hosted by Vanderbilt University. LAPOP began with the study of democratic values in one country, Costa Rica, at a time when much of the rest of Latin America was caught in the grip of repressive regimes that widely prohibited studies of public opinion (and systematically violated human rights and civil liberties). Today, fortunately, such studies can be carried out openly and freely in virtually all countries in the region. **AmericasBarometer** is an effort by LAPOP to measure democratic values and behaviors in the Americas using national probability samples of voting-age adults. In 2004, the first round of surveys was implemented with eleven participating countries; the second took place in 2006 and incorporated 22 countries throughout the hemisphere. In 2008, which marks the latest round of surveys, 22 countries throughout the Americas were again included. All reports and respective data sets are available on the **AmericasBarometer** website www.AmericasBarometer.org. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided the greater part of funding for the realization of this study. Also, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Development Bank (IDB) provided very important assistance.

We embarked on **AmericasBarometer** in the hope that the results would be of interest and of political relevance to citizens, NGOs, academics, governments and the international donor community. Our hope is that the study can not only be used to help advance the democratization agenda, but that it will also serve the academic community which has been engaged in a quest to determine which values are the ones most likely to promote stable democracy. For that reason, we agreed on a common core of questions to include in our survey. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Development Bank (IDB) provided LAPOP with generous financial support, enabling us to bring together, on several occasions, the leading scholars in the field of public opinion surveys, in order to help determine the best questions to incorporate into the questionnaire. The scholars who attended these meetings prepared papers that were presented and critiqued at the Vanderbilt University workshop, and helped provide both a theoretical and empirical justification for the decisions taken. All of those papers are available on the LAPOP web site.

A common sample design was crucial for the success of this effort. We used a common design for the construction of a multi-staged, stratified probabilistic sample (with household level quotas) of approximately 1,500 individuals.¹ Detailed descriptions of the sample are contained in appendices of each country publication.

¹ With the exception of Bolivia (N=3,000), Ecuador (N=3,000), Paraguay (N=1,200) and Canada (N=2,000).

The prior meetings also provided an occasion for the national teams to agree on a common framework for analysis. We did not want to impose rigidities on each team, since we recognized from the outset that each country had its own unique circumstances, and what was very important for one country (e.g., crime, voting abstention) might be largely irrelevant for another. But, we did want each of the teams to be able to make direct comparisons with the results in the other countries. For that reason, we agreed on a common method for index construction. We used the standard of an Alpha reliability coefficient of greater than .6, with a preference for .7, as the minimum level needed for a set of items to be called a scale. The only variation in that rule was when we were using “count variables,” to construct an *index* (as opposed to a *scale*) in which we merely wanted to know, for example, how many times an individual participated in a certain form of activity. In fact, most of our reliabilities were well above .7, many reaching above .8. We also encouraged all teams to use factor analysis to establish the dimensionality of their scales. Another common rule, applied to all of the data sets, was in the treatment of missing data. In order to maximize sample N without unreasonably distorting the response patterns, we substituted the mean score of the individual respondent’s choice for any scale or index in which there were missing data, but only when the missing data comprised less than half of all the responses for that individual. For example, for a scale of five items, if the respondent answered three or more items, we assign the average of those three items to that individual for the scale. If less than three of the five items were answered, the case was considered lost and not included in the index.

LAPOP’s goal is that the studies be accessible to the non technical reader. For this reason it was decided to use bivariate graphics. But we also agreed that these graphics should follow a multivariate analysis (linear or logistic regression) in such a way that the technically informed reader could be assured that the individual variables in the graphics were truly significant predictors of the dependent variable under study.

We also agreed on a common format for the graphic format, using STATA 10/11. Our project coordinator and data analyst, Dominique Zéphyr, created programs using STATA to generate graphics which presented reliability levels that take into account the sample’s “design effect”. This represents a major advance in the presentation of the results of our surveys, since it enables the viewer to gain a higher level of precision in the analysis of the data. In fact, both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, as well as the regression analyses in the study, now take into account the design effect of the sample. Furthermore, regression coefficients are presented in graphic form with their respective confidence intervals. The implementation of this methodology enables us to assert a higher degree of certainty if the differences between variables averages are statistically significant.

The design effect arises out of the use of stratification, clustering and weighting² in complex samples. It can increase or decrease the standard error of a variable, which will then make the confidence intervals either increase or decrease. Because of this, it was necessary to take into account the complex nature of our surveys to have better precision and not assume, as is generally done, that the data had been collected using simple random samples. While the use of stratification within the sample tends to decrease the standard error, the rate of homogeneity within the clusters and the use of weighting tend to increase it. Although the importance of taking into account the design effect has been demonstrated, this practice has not become common in public opinion studies, primarily because of the technical requirements that it implies. In this sense, LAPOP has

² *AmericasBarometer* samples are auto-weighted, except for those from Bolivia and Ecuador..













achieved yet another level in its mission of producing high quality research by incorporating the design effect in the analysis of the results of its surveys.

Finally, a common “informed consent” letter was prepared, and approval for the research with human subjects was conceded by the Institutional Review Committee (IRB) at Vanderbilt University. All researchers engaged in this project studied the materials under the protection of human subjects used by Vanderbilt and passed the corresponding exam to obtain a certificate. All data gathered in the project protect the anonymity of those interviewed. The “informed consent” letter appears as an appendix to the questionnaire in each study.








A technological addition for the 2009 round is the expanded use of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in Colombia (and in other countries). Our partners at the University of Costa Rica developed a program called EQCollector and formatted it to be used as from the 2008 round of surveys. This new method for collecting data has turned out to be extremely efficient, thus improving the quality of the data thanks to a minimization of error, compared with the pencil and paper method. Additionally, the time and costs involved in entering data have been totally eliminated.

Field work for the surveys was carried out only after an extensive process of pilot testing in each country. We began by testing among students at Vanderbilt in the fall of 2008, and followed up with more extensive tests with the population at Nashville.

The following tables list the academic institutions that have contributed to the Project.

COUNTRY	INSTITUTIONS	
MEXICO Y CENTRAL AMERICA		
Mexico	 <p>Opinión Pública y Mercados</p>	
Guatemala		
El Salvador		
Honduras	 <p>FOPRIDEH Federación de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo de Honduras</p>	
Nicaragua		
Costa Rica		
Panama		

ANDES/SOUTHERN CONE			
Colombia			
Ecuador			
Peru	<i>IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos</i>		
Bolivia			
Paraguay			
Chile			
Uruguay			
Brazil			
Venezuela			

THE CARIBBEAN	
Dominican Republic	 <i>Gallup República Dominicana, S.A.</i> 
Guyana	
Haiti	
Jamaica	 THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES AT MONA, JAMAICA
CANADÁ Y ESTADOS UNIDOS	
Canada	
USA	VANDERBILT  UNIVERSITY

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The study was made possible by the generous support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Vanessa Reilly and Eric Kite, at USAID Washington, and Lucy Malo and Jene Thomas, at USAID Bogotá, assisted us in all aspects of the project. At Vanderbilt University, the study would not have been possible without the generous collaboration and hard work of many individuals. Vanderbilt's Provost, Richard MacCarty provided financial support for many critical aspects of the research. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor, generously offered LAPOP a suite of offices and conference space, and had these areas entirely reconditioned and equipped for the project. Neal Tate, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt was a strong supporter of the project since its inception at Vanderbilt. We lament his death in 2009. Tonya Mills, Grants Administrator, and Patrick D. Green, Associate Director, Division of Sponsored Research, performed heroically in managing the countless contract and financial details of the project. In a study as complex as this, literally dozens of contracts had to be signed and hundreds of invoices paid. They deserve special thanks for their efforts.

Critical to the project's success was the cooperation of the many individuals and institutions in the countries studied. Their names, countries and affiliations are listed below.

Country	Researchers
Mexico, Central America, North America	
Mexico	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Pablo Parás García, Presidente, DATA Opinión Pública y Mercados ● Alejandro Moreno, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
Guatemala	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dra. Dinorah Azpuru, Profesora de Ciencia Política, Wichita State University y Asociada de ASIES, Guatemala ● Sample design: Lic. Juan Pablo Pira, ASIES
El Salvador	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Ricardo Córdova, Presidente, FundaUngo, El Salvador ● Prof. Miguel Cruz, Director de IUDOP, Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)
Honduras	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Kenneth M. Coleman, Investigador y Analista Senior, Director de Estudios, Market Strategies, Inc. ● José Rene Argueta, candidato doctoral, University of Pittsburgh
Nicaragua	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Profesor Asociado de Ciencia Política, Central Michigan University
Costa Rica	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Luís Rosero, Director del Centro Centroamericano de Población (CCP), y Profesor, Universidad de Costa Rica. ● Dr. Jorge Vargas, Sub-director, Proyecto Estado de la Nación
Panamá	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Orlando Pérez, Profesor Asociado de Ciencia Política, Central Michigan University
Estados Unidos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Mitchell A., Seligson, Vanderbilt University
Canadá	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Dr. Simone Bohn, York University

Country	Researchers
South America	
Colombia	- Prof. Juan Carlos Rodríguez-Raga, Professor, Universidad de los Andes
Ecuador	- Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director de LAPOP, y Profesor "Centennial" de Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Vanderbilt - Abby Córdova, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University - Margarita Corral, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University - Juan Carlos Donoso, doctoral candidate, Vanderbilt University - Brian Faughnan, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University - Daniel Montalvo, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University - Diana Orcés, doctoral student, Vanderbilt University
Peru	- Dr. Julio Carrión, Asóciate Professor Asociado, Universidad de Delaware en Estados Unidos, and researcher at Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. - Patricia Zárate Ardele, researcher, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Bolivia	- Dr. Mitchell Seligson, Director de LAPOP, and Centennial Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University - Dr. Daniel Moreno, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública - Eduardo Córdova Eguívar, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública - Vivian Schwarz-Blum, candidata doctoral, Vanderbilt University - Gonzalo Vargas Villazón, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública - Miguel Villarroel Nikitenko, Ciudadanía, Comunidad de Estudios Sociales y Acción Pública
Paraguay	- Manuel Orrego, CIRD, Paraguay
Chile	- Dr. Juan Pablo Luna, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Uruguay	- María Fernanda Boidi, candidata doctoral, Vanderbilt University - Dr. María del Rosario Queirolo, Profesora de Ciencias Políticas, Universidad de Montevideo
Brazil	- Dr. Lucio Renno, Universidad de Brasilia
Venezuela	- María Fernanda Boidi, candidata doctoral, Vanderbilt University - Dr. Damarys Canache, CISOR y University of Illinois - Dr. Kirk Hawkins, Brigham Young University

Country	Researchers
The Caribbean	
Dominican Republic	- Dra. Jana Morgan Kelly, Profesora Asistente de Ciencia Política, University of Tennessee - Dra. Rosario Espinal, Profesora de Sociología, Temple University
Haiti	- Dominique Zéphyr, Coordinador de investigación de LAPOP, Vanderbilt University
Jamaica	- Dr. Lawrence Powell, Profesor de metodología y director de encuestas, Centre for Leadership and Governance, departamento de ciencia política, University of the West Indies - Balford Lewis, Profesor de Métodos de Investigación, Departamento de sociología, psicología y trabajo social, UWI, Mona.

Finally, we wish to thank the more than 1,500 residents of Colombia who took time away from their busy lives to answer our questions. Without their cooperation, this study would have been impossible.

Nashville, Tennessee
April, 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This year's study is the sixth in the series carried out by *AmericasBarometer*, which forms part of LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project). As is usual in odd-number years, the 2009 study has been carried out exclusively in Colombia, and therefore the present report does not present results that are compared with other countries. By way of contrast, the report shows annual variations, since 2004, in all scales and indicators, placing special emphasis on changes which have occurred since the previous year.

This report, on the other hand, follows the thematic structure adopted in the 2008 comparative report. It describes particularly, in Part I, the five items identified as key components of stable democracy (support for democracy as such, support for the right to participate, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust) and analyzes in what way dimensions of governance, such as corruption, crime, participation in local affairs and in civil society, and the perception of the economic situation, affect the above-mentioned components.

Part II follows the perhaps more familiar sequence of analysis of perceptions by Colombians of their institutions, as well as certain attitudes that run counter to liberal democratic principles. Likewise, this part examines the relation of citizens with political parties and elections. Finally it explores people's experiences and perceptions as regards the armed conflict which the country is undergoing.

The first chapter of Part I briefly describes the sample and presents, for the six years of this study of Colombia, the main distributions related to basic sociodemographic characteristics such as region, area of residence (rural-urban), sex and education levels, age and social class.

Then, coming to grips with the subject, Chapter 2 shows the average values for the five components of support for stable democracy already mentioned. In the first place, we see that support for the Churchillian notion of democracy (that is, support for that particular system as an end in itself) has been maintained at high levels (71 points on a scale from 0 to 100), without significant variations over time. Something similar occurs, in second place, with the index of support for the right to exercise different forms of participation, including licit demonstrations, communal groups and election campaigns. This index gives an average of 70 points, with a slight increase between 2008 and 2009. The panorama is not so encouraging when it comes to political tolerance. Not only have we seen, in previous studies, that Colombians are, by comparison with others, particularly intolerant; the present analysis shows that the average degree of tolerance decreased from 2008 and reached its lowest level in 2009 (49 points in a scale of 0 to 100).

Also, Colombians have low levels of trust in the key institutions of the political system. In 2009, this index of legitimacy, which includes trust in national government, the justice system, the Supreme Court, Congress and political parties, reached an average of 52 points, slightly, but significantly, inferior to the 2008 level. If we leave aside trust in government, with an eye to obtaining a more conservative measure which is not conditioned by conjunctural support for a president in office, legitimacy goes down to 49 points, almost three points under the previous year's level. Finally, interpersonal trust has been maintained at a relatively high level, showing 62 points in 2009, without major variations over time.

Chapter 3 deals with the phenomenon of corruption and its impact on support for stable democracy. On the one hand, the report shows that, although Colombia at the level of corruption victimization had previously shown itself to be comparatively low, there has been a considerable increase between 2008 and 2009; in this past year, 13% of those surveyed reported having been victims of some form of corruption on the part of officials or State agents, including the police or member of mayoral offices, as well as in the workplace, judicial offices, health services or in the education system. Even more worrying, those who have been direct victims of some form of corruption express a significantly lower level of institutional legitimacy than those who have not had such experiences, although it is worth noting that victimization does not have an impact on other dimensions of stable democracy.

The Colombians' perception of corruption also increased since the previous year, reaching 77 points on a scale of one hundred. Likewise, this perception negatively affects democracy as such. Finally, Colombians demonstrate clear attitudes against corrupt relationships involving bribes offered to members of Congress by business enterprises, or in the case of traffic police receiving bribes from common citizens. Nonetheless, attitudes are fairly permissive in situations in which citizens tend to justify, to a greater extent, certain behavior that is technically corrupt, such as a distressed mother offering a bribe in order to facilitate complicated paperwork, or the use of influence in high places, or even trafficking in influence on the part of politicians, in order to obtain employment for a friend.

Chapter 4, which analyzes delinquency and its impact on support for stable democracy, shows that the percentage of people who say they have been victims of some criminal act over the past year has slightly increased (which coincides with other sources that suggest a growing problem of citizen insecurity), with thefts – whether accompanied by physical aggression or not – being the kind of crime most frequently reported by those we interviewed. This pattern corresponds to a considerable increase in the perception of insecurity, especially in the Atlantic, Pacific and Central regions. At a national level, the percentage of those who feel somewhat (or very) insecure rose from 34% to 42% from 2008 to 2009.

The perception of insecurity has a negative effect on the level of people's interpersonal trust. Likewise, the victims of some form of crime have a significantly lower level of personal trust than those who have not been victims, although they show slightly higher levels of support for the democratic system as such, and of political tolerance.

Chapter 5 starts by showing that confidence in municipal authorities, mayors and city councillors, has gone down significantly between the years 2008 to 2009, reaching levels similar to those of previous years. Colombians are relatively satisfied with the public services they receive, with no major variations over time. The level of satisfaction, which has a positive influence on the level of legitimacy which Colombians attribute to their institutions, is less in rural areas than in the cities, and the inhabitants of the Atlantic region are the most critical of their public services. Among the different services studied, the one that fared worst was public health. As in previous years, only slightly less than one out of every ten Colombians takes part in municipal affairs, although there was an increase in the percentage of those who had presented some request from local authorities.

As for the participation of Colombians in organizations of civil society, this chapter undertakes an analysis by gender. This way of seeing things shows that women participate more than men in meetings of a religious nature, in parents' meetings and, naturally, in meetings of women's groups. The opposite is the case with regard to assistance at meetings of professional, commercial

or producers' associations, which are mainly masculine. The analysis of the relations between the participation of different groups of civil society and the pillars of stable democracy show that (i) assistance at religious meetings has a positive influence on interpersonal trust, (ii) participation in professional associations increases support for democracy as such, (iii) assistance at trade union meetings is positively related to institutional legitimacy, (iv) participation in committees and boards for improving community conditions favors support for the right to participate in politics and (v) assistance at parents' meetings or women's groups makes no impact at all.

Part I of this report ends with Chapter 6, analyzing citizen perception of the economy and its impact on support for stable democracy. One of this study's most important findings consists in pointing out that, for the first time in the six years of this study, in 2009 the most serious problem for the majority of Colombians is not related to security or to the conflict, but rather to the economy. 46% of people interviewed mentioned economic matters as the country's most serious problem, as against 35% who spoke about security matters. In fact, an immense majority (more than four in every five people interviewed) considered that the country is going through one of its most severe economic crises. Likewise, the evaluation of the country's economic situation deteriorated considerably from 2008 to 2009.

It is precisely in economic matters (the handling of the economy, poverty and unemployment) where citizens are most critical of government's performance. This assessment of the government's economic performance has a very important impact on the pillars of support for stable democracy. Those who provide a more positive evaluation of the government's performance in this regard also tend to show a higher measure of support for democracy as such, as well as for the right to participate, confidence in institutions and interpersonal trust. This chapter ends by showing that Colombians tend to support a more active role by the State in economic affairs, especially in offering health services, fomenting employment and in the fight against inequality.

Chapter 7, the first in Part II, contains the traditional detailed study of the Colombians' attitudes and perceptions regarding political institutions. The first part analyzes the dimensions of legitimacy and political tolerance and demonstrates how, on the one hand, legitimacy has maintained constant levels during the years of this study, with relatively high levels (60 points on a scale from 0 to 100), while tolerance went down between 2007 and 2008 and did not recover in 2009 (49 points on the same scale). The combination of these two dimensions leads to the classic typology of democratic stability the results of which, in 2009, show that the category *authoritarian stability* (high level of system support and low tolerance) is the most numerous (38% in the survey), with no changes since 2008.

Political parties are the institutions which enjoy the poorest degree of confidence among citizens, lower even than that of trade unions, while the Catholic Church, the Armed Forces and the People's Defense Office enjoy the highest levels of trust. Although confidence in the president was slightly (but significantly) reduced over the past year, it is still high compared with that of other institutions. Confidence in the government and the evaluation of its performance has remained high, with no major variations in recent years. Confidence in Congress, on the other hand, has fallen off a little between 2008 and 2009, a period in which there was an increase in the perception that Congress interfered with the president's work and that members of Congress waste time in their deliberations. Finally, confidence in the justice system in general has remained constant, comparatively high, as also confidence in the Constitutional Court, while confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice suffered a slight fall off.

More than one in every three Colombians believes that there could be good reasons for the president to close Congress and the Constitutional Court, an undoubtedly high proportion. Attitudes counter to liberal democracy have maintained a constant level (comparatively high), although the perception that minorities are a threat to the country has lowered considerably between 2008 and 2009. Detailed analysis found that less educated and younger people, as also those who sympathize with the Polo Democrático Alternativo, are the ones with less attitudes counter to liberal democracy, whilst those who show higher levels of support for the president's performance also express attitudes counter to the said principles.

Chapter 8 analyzes the relationship between citizens and political parties and elections. A first result shows that the percentage of Colombians who feel certain affinity with a particular political party has decreased from 29% in 2008 to 23.5% in 2009, the lowest level reached since this question was first posed in its present form in the 2006 survey. This falling off is significant in the Atlantic and Pacific regions. Among those who express their affinity for a particular party, the Partido de la U, for the first time since we began to study this matter, occupies first place, with 31%, followed by the Liberal Party with 28%, the Conservative Party with 20% and the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) with 12.5%. From 2008 to 2009 there was a significant increase in the percentage of those who feel close to the Partido de la U and the Conservative Party, to the disadvantage of the Liberal Party and, to a lesser degree, of the PDA.

The people who experience most intensely this affinity for a political party are those close to the Partido de la U and the PDA, not to mention those who feel sympathy with other parties apart from those already mentioned, and with Cambio Radical. For the rest, Colombians place themselves to the right of the ideological spectrum; on a scale of 1 to 100, from left to right, the average citizen registers 6.2, similar to what was observed in 2008. In relation to party affinities, those close to PDA are located to the left (3.6%) while the rest tend to lean to the right, without distinguishing much among themselves.

In 2009, Colombians expressed a very low degree of confidence in political parties, significantly less than before (37 points on a scale from 1 to 100), whereas in 2008 the reading gave 41 points on the same scale. This decrease seems to be associated with a greater perception of corruption among political parties. On the other hand, only 15% of Colombians say they have assisted at a party meeting at least once or twice in a year, and those whose sympathies lie with Cambio Radical are the ones who have assisted most frequently.

This chapter closes with a study of the Colombians' experiences at election time. On the one hand, the confidence in elections reached its lowest level since this study was begun in 2004, with 49 points. On the other hand, little more than 3% say they have been under pressure of violent methods to vote for a particular candidate, whilst around 2% report that they have been put under pressure not to vote. Likewise, about 18% of those interviewed said that (either frequently or rarely) they have been offered some material benefit in exchange for supporting a particular party or candidate. Of these, 31% said they had felt more inclined to vote for the said candidate or party after the offer had been made, although 47% said they had felt less inclined to do so. Finally, only 3% said they had been threatened with the cutting off of some service or with being deprived of a specific good, if they refused to vote for a particular candidate or party.

The report's final chapter, Chapter 9, deals with the painful armed conflict that the country is undergoing. As was said above, there has been a considerable decrease over the past year in the percentage of people who think that matters of security represent the most serious problem for the country at the present time. From 70% in 2008, the number fell to 35% in 2009. In fact, 23% say

they have lost a family member in the conflict, and 4% say that some family member had been forced to leave the country as a result of the conflict. In short, three out of every ten Colombians say they have been victimized in one way or another. These were asked to identify the perpetrator (or perpetrators) of such acts. The FARC are the group most often mentioned, followed by the so-called Self Defense groups (38%). 16% blamed some other unidentified culprit (different from those already mentioned and from re-armed paramilitary groups, the army or the police), whilst 10% did would not (or could not) name the author of their victimization.

Finally, confidence in illegal armed groups – FARC, ELN and AUC – which has traditionally been very low decreased even further between 2008 and 2009, reaching the lowest levels recorded in the years of this study. In any case, the majority of people believe that the best solution to the conflict would be to negotiate with the armed groups, whether guerrillas or paramilitaries, although those less inclined to that opinion are people who have been victims of the conflict.

PART I

Chapter 1. Description of the Data¹

In 2009, the sixth annual public opinion study of *AmericasBarometer* – LAPOP (*Latin American Public Opinion Project*) was carried out in Colombia. The first of these studies, the samples of which were gathered during the first semestre of 2004, was carried out simultaneously with 7 other countries, including Mexico and six Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama).

In 2005, when the LAPOP study was carried out only in Colombia, we used a questionnaire which was for the most part identical with the one which had been used the year before, although some aspects were brought up to date and certain new issues were added that were more appropriate to the contemporary situation in the country and in the region. Concretely, as a result of a critical look at the conditions of democracy in Colombia and in the region, we included the first attempts (added to in later studies) which sought to measure the attitudes of citizens towards certain principles of liberal democracy, especially the principle of the separation of powers. Furthermore we included certain indicators which sought to deepen the analysis of experiences and the impact of the armed conflict in the country.

In 2006 we were able to contrast the results of the study in Colombia with those of Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti and Guyana, as well as with the countries included in the 2004 report. By means of this study we could establish unprecedented comparisons between neighboring countries which undoubtedly enabled us to place in perspective our findings on the state of democracy in Colombia.

In 2007 the study was carried out once again exclusively in Colombia. As in previous studies, the questionnaire was largely unaltered, with an eye to completing a time series for a total complex of indices in the country. Furthermore, we included certain questions designed to evaluate the experiences of citizens in electoral processes, especially in those related to the buying and selling of votes, and with the impact of illegal actors on the free exercise of the right to vote.

The 2008 study was carried out in a number of countries without precedents. Besides those analyzed in 2006, we looked at Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Jamaica, United States and Canada. Comparisons with such a wide gamut of cases naturally made it possible, as never before, to place in a comparative perspective the situation of democracy in Colombia as seen by that country's citizens.

Finally, the present study completes a series of 6 years of data on perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and experiences of Colombian citizens in relation to their political institutions. This is the longest series with such information that is available on Colombia. The follow up of these data in time has been possible thanks to the fact that, in the course of those six years, the questionnaire being used

¹ The preparation of this report counted on the valuable assistance of Gabriel Camargo, Ana María Montoya and Camilo Vargas, of the *Observatorio de la Democracia* (Democracy Observatory) at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá.

included an important nucleus of questions which has not varied and which represent about 80% of the questions asked. In other words, during the past six years we have been asking the Colombians fundamentally the same questions. The fact that this nucleus of questions has been identical represents an indispensable requisite for making the comparisons which are presented here.

Naturally each study for each year also includes a number of new questions, either because they are related to the political conditions of a particular moment – for example, in an election year – or as a result of a theoretical development undertaken by the *AmericasBarometer* team on a continental level, introducing a new series of questions which will later form part of the questionnaires's central nucleus. In the 2009 questionnaire you will find an example of this latter case in the chapter which analyzes in depth the subject of racial discrimination and the perceptions of citizens in relation to this phenomenon.

As is usual in LAPOP studies, the results presented here are representative of all non institutionalized citizens (that is, those not in prisons, hospitals, military establishments, schools, etc.) at voting age (that is, over 18 years). By contrast, therefore, with many other opinion studies which are carried out normally in Colombia and in Latin America, our sample is not limited to urban areas or to the country's five largest cities. Furthermore, the surveys are carried out face to face, house by house, thus avoiding a certain bias which is inevitable when a survey is done through telephone conversations, or by other means.

As in the previous studies, the sample design was carried out with the participation of the Nacional Consulting Center (*Centro Nacional de Consultoría/CNC*), one of the companies which has the very highest track record and prestige in Colombia. The field work, plus the capture and initial verification of data, were likewise carried out by the CNC.

A random sample was taken, stratified by clusters, in multi-stage form, which included 1,493 respondents. The margin of error established is $\pm 2.53\%$, with a 95% level of reliability. That means that if we were to take multiple samples in Colombia, 95% of them would reflect the opinions of the population with a precision no less than $\pm 2.53\%$.

Basic distributions of the sample

The sample is also representative of each of the country’s five regions. As is explained in detail, 21% of the population inhabits the Atlantic region, 17% are in the Pacific region, 25% in the Central region, 18% in the Eastern region, 3% in the former National Territories and 16% live in Bogotá, according to 2009 proyections of the 2005 census. For the studies carried out between 2004 and 2009, this distribution is reflected in the sample, as can be seen in Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1 - Distribution of the sample by region, 2004-2009

In the course of the six years which this study has taken, besides the regional stratification shown in the above Figure, the sample has been stratified in accordance with the size of each municipality and divided into rural and urban areas, bearing in mind the real distribution of the country's population, as can be seen in Figure 1.2.




Figure 1.2 - Distribution of the sample according to size of place, 2004-2009

The sample's design identifies households in which the interviews are to be conducted. The selection of the respondent within the household is carried out with quotas according to sex which reflect the distribution practically into equal parts, as shown in Figure 1.3.




Figure 1.3 - Distribution of the sample by gender, 2004-2009

The sample also reflects the distribution of the population in relation to the education level of the respondents. The index of education level is a continuous measure of the number of years of education completed satisfactorily, which go from 0 to 18. The average, during the five years of the study, is around 9 years². By grouping the index into three categories – primary education (0 to 5 years), secondary education (6 to 11 years) and higher education (12 years or more) – we obtain the distribution which appears in Figure 1.4.




Figure 1.4 - Distribution of the sample according to education level, 2004-2009

² In 2009, the average number of years of education was 9.1.

By combining the above characteristics, in Figure 1.5, we see the number of years of education completed by men (H, for *hombres*) and by women (M, for *mujeres*) in the samples of each one of the six studies carried out up until now. Although men seem to have, on average, a higher level of education than women, this difference is not statistically significant in any of the studies, as can be inferred from the 95% confidence intervals shown in the Figure.




Figure 1.5 - Number of years of education by sex, 2004-2009

The sample's distribution by range of age³ has also remained stable in the course of the six years of *AmericasBarometer* studies, as is shown in Figure 1.6. The average age of the respondents oscillates around 37⁴ and is distributed in etareous ranges, as shown in the Figure below.




Figure 1.6 - Distribution of the sample by range of age, 2004-2009

³ The ranges of age are obtained by grouping the original variable, a continuous measure of the number of years completed by the respondent.

⁴ In 2009 the average age was 36.6 años.

Finally, as from the 2007 study a question was included on self-identification of social class, using the following categories: low, lower middle, middle, higher middle and high. In the course of the three years in which this question has been included there have been no variations in the distribution, as is shown in Figure 1.7 below.




Figure 1.7 - Distribution of the sample by social class, 2007-2009

Chapter 2. Support for Stable Democracy

In accordance with the theory presented in detail in the report **Political culture of democracy in Colombia, 2008**, the 2009 study examines again the impact of citizens' perception of governance and their experiences with the instances charged with providing it, detailing the support they express for five key elements of stable democracy.

- 1) *Support of democracy as the best possible system.*
- 2) *Support for the right to participate.*
- 3) *Tolerance towards the rights of the opposition.*
- 4) *Belief in the legitimacy of democracy's key institutions* (the Executive, the Legislative Branch, the justice system and political parties).
- 5) *Interpersonal trust.*

I. Support for the idea of the democratic system as such (ING4).

The following *AmericasBarometer* question encapsulates the "Churchillian" concept of democracy as the best form of government:

ING4. Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree with this opinion?

This question was measured originally on a scale of 1 to 7. However, in order to make the reading more intuitive, it was converted back onto a scale of 0 to 100. Figure 2.1 shows how average support for democracy as such has been relatively high and has maintained a stable level in the course of the six years during which this study has been carried out.




Figure 2.1 - Support for democracy in Colombia, 2004-2009

II. Support for the right to participate

Respect for the right to participate in political life, which for classical theorists on democracy constitutes a prerequisite for democracy's capacity to function, is captured on *AmericasBarometer* by means of the following questions.

E5. That people should take part in demonstrations allowed by law. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

E8. That people should participate in an organization or group to try and resolve community problems. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

E11. That people should work in political campaigns in favor of a political party or candidate. To what extent do you agree or disagree?

The answers to these questions are also given on a scale of 1 to 7. Once converted to the familiar scale of 0 to 100, they combine to build an index of support for participation¹.

Results of the 2008 comparative study show Colombia's average for this index to be merely in the middle of the ranking of the rest of the hemisphere's countries. In Colombia, average support for the right to participate has not varied significantly since 2004, as we can see in Figure 2.2.




Figure 2.2 - Support for the right to participate in Colombia, 2004-2009

¹ This index is built by averaging the answers to these three questions, recoded to the scale of 0 to 100. The analysis of reliability of this scale, for six years of data, gives a Cronbach's alpha of .67.

III. Tolerance of the right of the opposition and of minorities

Likewise, *AmericasBarometer* measures political tolerance by a combination of the following questions:

D1. Some people in Colombia always speak against the government, not just the government which happens to be in office, but against the type of government itself. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of these people being given the **right to vote**?

D2. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of these people being allowed to hold **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their viewpoint?

D3. Still bearing in mind those people who speak against Colombia's form of government, to what extent do you approve or disapprove of allowing such people to be **candidates for public positions**?

D4. To what extent do you approve or disapprove of these people being allowed to appear on television **to make speeches**?

The 2008 comparative study showed that Colombia appears among the group of countries with the lowest average levels of tolerance.² The results between 2004 and 2009 appear in Figure 2.3. This shows that the descent indicated in 2008 has been maintained as regards the Colombians' degree of political tolerance. This kind of attitude, which we could call authoritarian, or better still, anti-liberal, will be studied in greater depth in the chapter which follows.




Figure 2.3 - Political tolerance in Colombia, 2004-2009

² This scale is extremely reliable, with a Cronbach's alpha of .85 of the six years of the study.

IV. Belief in the political legitimacy of the political system's fundamental institutions

For the proper functioning of democracy, it is important that citizens place their confidence in the country's key political institutions. To measure the level of political legitimacy we use an index³ based on five questions in the survey:

B14. To what extent do you have confidence in the national government?

B10A. To what extent do you have confidence in the justice system?

B31. To what extent do you have confidence in the Supreme Court of Justice?

B13. To what extent do you have confidence in the National Congress?

B21. To what extent do you have confidence in the political parties?





Figure 2.4 - Legitimacy of political institutions in Colombia, 2004-2009

³ This series forms a very reliable scale, with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.81 in the combined samples of the past six years.

In the 2008 comparative study, Colombia occupied one of the highest levels on the scale of political legitimacy, although the results in general for the majority of countries were relatively low (under 50 on a scale of 0 to 100). Averages for the six years of study are shown in Figure 2.4.

As can be seen in this Figure (above), despite a slight increase in 2008, the level of legitimacy accorded to political institutions fell in 2009 to the levels it had in previous years. Furthermore, as has been shown in earlier studies, this scale of institutional trust is inflated in Colombia's case, due to President Uribe's great popularity. In fact, if we eliminate question B14 on the scale, the average level falls by about 2 points in each year, leaving us with 49.2 in 2009, as shown in Figure 2.5.



**Figure 2.5 - Legitimacy of political institutions in Colombia
(without trust in the national government)**

V. Interpersonal trust

A fundamental part of what is called social capital is the trust which citizens have in those around them. *AmericasBarometer* captures this perception by means of the following question:

IT1. Now, talking of people here, would you say that people in your community are very trustworthy? Somewhat trustworthy? Not very trustworthy? Or not trustworthy at all?

AmericasBarometer results for 2008 showed that Colombia occupied sixth place among the countries studied. Figure 2.6 shows that this level has been consistent over the past six years.




Figure 2.6 - Interpersonal trust in Colombia, 2004-2009

Conclusion

This chapter has shown which five factors we consider fundamental for maintaining democratic stability. In the following chapters we will analyze how these factors are affected by the perceptions and experiences of Colombian citizens with relation to governance.

Chapter 3. The Phenomenon of Corruption and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy

Corruption victimization

Since *AmericasBarometer* began these studies in 2004, we have developed the following complex of indicators to measure corruption victimization.

	INAP Did not try or make contact	No	Yes	NS/NR
Now we want to talk of your personal experience of things which occur in life...				
EXC2. Has a police officer asked for a bribe over the past year?		0	1	8
EXC6. Has a public official asked you for a bribe over the past year?		0	1	8
EXC11. Have you had to do paperwork in a municipal office over the past year? No → Mark 9 Yes → Ask: To facilitate paperwork in a municipal office over the past year, have you had to pay any sum of money over and above what was stipulated by law?	9	0	1	8
EXC13. Are you working? No → Mark 9 Yes → Ask: At your workplace, have you been asked to pay a bribe over the past year?	9	0	1	8
EXC14. Have you had any dealings with a judicial office over the past year? No → Mark 9 Yes → Ask: Have you had to pay a bribe in a judicial office over the past year?	9	0	1	8
EXC15. Have you used public medical services over the past year? No → Mark 9 Yes → Ask: To be attended at a hospital or health center over the past year, have you had to pay a bribe?	9	0	1	8
EXC16. Have you had a son or daughter at school (or college) over the past year? No → Mark 9 Yes → Ask: In your school or college have you had to pay a bribe over the past year?	9	0	1	8

Bearing in mind all those instances in which the phenomenon of corruption can be manifested, we can determine the percentage of citizens who have been victims of at least one of the forms of corruption. The 2008 comparative study showed that Colombia is one of the countries with the lowest incidence of corruption victimization, along with Panama, the United States and Uruguay. However, Figure 3.1 shows that the percentage of corruption victims grew considerably between 2008 and 2009.¹ Over the past year, slightly more than 13% of citizens were victims of at least one of the forms of corruption mentioned.




Figure 3.1 - Corruption victimization in Colombia, 2004-2009

¹ A *t* test of difference of means shows that difference to be statistically significant ($p < .001$).

In 2009, almost four out of every one hundred citizens were victims of two or more forms of corruption, as shown in Figure 3.2. This proportion practically doubles that of the previous year.




Figure 3.2 - Number of forms of corruption victimization in Colombia, 2004-2009

Figure 3.3 shows that between 2008 and 2009 the percentage of victims of corruption increased in all regions. The increase in these two years is statistically significant ($p < .05$) in the Central and Eastern regions, where, in 2008, lower indices were recorded. Bogotá is where the greatest incidence of corruption victimization was recorded in 2009.




Figure 3.3 - Corruption victimization by region, 2008-2009

To determine the characteristics of those who have been victims of corruption over the past year –in other words, the individual factors which lead to a greater probability of being victimized– a statistical model of logistic regression was created. Among other factors, we included education level, gender, age, wealth, perception of family economy,² number of children, the region and ethnic self-identification.

For all statistical models included in this report, once again we used a system of displaying the results in graphics which show the standard coefficients (in such a way that the metric differences used do not complicate the reading of the results) which correspond to each one of the factors included in the model, along with the 95% confidence interval. When the confidence interval does not cross with zero line, we consider that the factor has a significant impact, an impact that may be either negative (when the extremes of the confidence interval are to the left of the vertical line) or positive (when both extremes are to the right)³.

Figure 3.4 shows that the factors which influence the probability of being a victim of corruption are the education level, the sex and the wealth of the person interviewed. These results are consistent with those of previous years.




Figure 3.4 - Factors which influence the probability of being a victim of corruption, 2009

²This perception is based on the question “Is the salary or wage you receive, plus the total family income, enough to live on and allows you to save? Is just enough, but with difficulties? Is not enough and you have difficulties? Or is simply not sufficient and you have serious problems?”

³ The model’s detailed results appear in Table 3.1 of the Appendix to this chapter.

People with a higher level of education tend to be victimized more frequently than those with less education. Whilst only 7% of those who have completed five years of schooling, or less, have been victims of corruption, the percentage of victims among those whose studies have gone beyond secondary level rises to 20%.

Likewise, men are more likely to be victimized than women. This is due perhaps to the fact that men normally have more contact with the sort of situations which produce this type of corruption activity. Figure 3.5 shows levels of victimization by gender and education level.




Figure 3.5 - Corruption victimization by gender and education level

Level of wealth represents a measure of the possession of goods such as motor vehicles, electric appliances and home services ⁴. The added index ranges from 0 to 9. As shown in Figure 3.6, people with more resources have a greater probability of being victimized by corrupt acts than the less well off. As was already mentioned, to the extent that we have consistently found this in previous studies, there does exist a robust relationship, the explanation of which should be further examined.




Figure 3.6 - Corruption victimization according to wealth

⁴ This is a better indicator of a household's economic situation than the household's income, since many of those interviewed do not want to reveal the amount of income they receive.

Perception of corruption

Besides the analysis of victimization by corruption, one of *AmericasBarometer's* significant contributions also includes a measurement of the perception of corruption, based on the following question:

EXC7. Bearing in mind your own experience and what you have heard others mention, corruption on the part of public officials is; (1) very widespread (2) fairly widespread (3) not very widespread (4) not widespread at all.

The 2008 comparative study showed Colombia to have a middle level of perception of corruption. Figure 3.7, however, shows a significant increase from 2008 to 2009⁵. On a scale of 0 to 100, to which this index has been converted, the increase is of almost five points.




Figure 3.7 - Perception of corruption in Colombia, 2004-2009

⁵ A *t* test shows that in fact this difference is significant ($p < .001$).

When an analysis is made by regions, one concludes that the increase was statistically significant in Bogotá, in the Central and Eastern regions, and in the former National Territories, as is shown in Figure 3.8.




Figure 3.8 - Perception of corruption by region, 2008-2009

What relation is there between victimization and perception? This question requires a greater in-depth study than we can provide in this chapter. However, as can be seen in Figure 3.9, those who have been victims of a corrupt act have a significantly greater perception of corruption than those who have not been victims of this phenomenon.




Figure 3.9 - Perception of corruption for victims and non-victims

Impact of corruption on support for stable democracy

As well as the description we have given of phenomena associated with corruption – namely, victimization and perception – we had also to examine to what extent these affect the pillars of stable democracy. To do this we used multivariate statistic models for analyzing the impact of both victimization by corruption and the perception of it, by controlling a series of sociodemographic and perceptive factors.

Impact of corruption victimization

Firstly we examine the impact of corruption victimization on support for democracy, support for the right to participate, political tolerance, the legitimacy of institutions and interpersonal trust.⁶

To do so, we had recourse to five models of linear regression, for each one of the components of support for stable democracy. The central factor of all these models is the dichotomous measurement of victimization by corruption (this is the variable whose value is 1 if the person interviewed has been a victim of one of the acts described, and 0 if the contrary is the case.)

Additionally we include sociodemographic factors such as gender, level of education, age⁷, degree of wealth and size of the place⁸, as well as factors like the perception of family economy and a measure of the interest which the respondent takes in politics. Finally, to the extent that support for each of the components described above may be significantly influenced by the level of approval of the government which happens to be in office, we include, as a control, the degree of approval of the president's performance.

As can be seen in Table 3.2, in the Appendix to this chapter, corruption victimization has a negative impact on the legitimacy which citizens accord to the political system's central institutions. The statistical analysis finds no evidence that victimization affects any of the other key components of support for stable democracy.

⁶ These five variables were described and analyzed in Chapter 2.

⁷ We also include age to the fourth degree to model possible non linear effects.

⁸ This variable tells us whether the person lives in a rural area, in a small or medium-size town, or in a large city or in the capital.

Figure 3.10 shows how those victimized exhibit a level of belief in institutional legitimacy six points less than that of those who were not subjected to acts of corruption, and considerably below the national average.




Figure 3.10 - Impact of corruption victimization on institutional legitimacy

Impact of the perception of corruption

It may be that the perception of corruption makes an impact on support for stable democracy in a way that is different from the victimization we have been looking at. In order to examine this, we built similar statistical models, including as central factor the index of perception of corruption.

Table 3.3, which shows in detail the results of this analysis, indicates that the perception of corruption also has a negative effect on belief in the legitimacy of the political system's central institutions, as can be discerned in Figure 3.11.




Figure 3.11 - Impact of the perception of corruption on institutional legitimacy

Additionally, as was found in the 2008 study, the perception of corruption has a positive effect on support for democracy as such. This relationship can be appreciated in Figure 3.12.




Figure 3.12 - Impact of the perception of corruption on support for democracy

Attitudes towards corruption

Besides studying the perceptions and experiences of Colombians as regards corruption, *AmericasBarometer* has examined attitudes towards this phenomenon. Particularly we wanted to examine which acts could be considered corrupt, and which acts are not, and to what extent such corrupt acts can be justified according to the circumstances. To do this end, we asked the following series of questions:

I would like you to tell me if you consider the following actions as: 1) corrupt and should be punished; 2) corrupt but justified under the circumstances; 3) not corrupt.

DC1. For example: A member of Congress accepts a bribe of ten thousand dollars paid by a business firm. Do you think that what the Congress member did is **[Read the alternatives]**:

Corrupt and should be punished.....1

Corrupt but justified.....2

Not corrupt.....3

COLDC1A. And the firm that paid the ten thousand dollar bribe? Do you think this was ... **[Read the alternatives]**:

Corrupt and should be punished.....1

Corrupt but justified.....2

Not corrupt.....3

DC10. A mother of several children has to get a birth certificate for one of them. In order to save time, she gives ten thousand pesos to a public municipal official. Do you think what she did is ... **[Read the alternatives]**:

Corrupt and she should be punished.....1

Corrupt but justified2

Not corrupt3

DC13. Someone out of work has a brother-in-law who is an important politician, and he uses this influence to get a job as a public official. Do you think that what the politician did is ... **[Read the alternatives]**:

Corrupt and he should be punished.....1

Corrupt but justified.....2

Not corrupt.....3

COLDC14. A traffic cop stops a driver for making a wrong turn, and the driver offers the policeman 50,000 pesos to avoid getting a fine. Do you think that what the driver did is ... **[Read the alternatives]**:

Corrupt and he should be punished.....1

Corrupt but justified.....2

Not corrupt.....3

COLDC15. The traffic cop receives the 50,000 pesos and lets the driver go without a fine. Do you think that what the traffic cop did is **[Read the alternatives]**:

Corrupt and he should be punished.....1

Corrupt but justified.....2

Not corrupt.....3

Figure 3.13 shows the percentage of respondents who, in each of the above situations, considered that the action was corrupt and ought to be punished. The results, which have not varied noticeably since the year when we first started using this series of questions, shows that for the vast majority of Colombians a business firm that tries to bribe a member of Congress, and likewise a Congress member who accepts the bribe, have both committed punishable actions. The same is true of the traffic cop who accepts a bribe and, to a lesser degree, of the driver who has offered it.

This is not the case, however, when it comes to the politician who, through his network of influences, is able to place a member of his family in an illegal manner. Such an action is considered to be punishable by only two out of every five Colombians⁹. In a “clientelist” notion of politics, perhaps an important section of the Colombian population supposes this to be the function of a politician: namely, to serve his electorate, his “clients”.

Finally, the case of a woman with several children receives the greatest number of expressions of sympathy and justification. Whereas only 37% consider offering money to facilitate paperwork as a corrupt and punishable action, 54% look upon it as corrupt but justifiable.




Figure 3.13 - Attitudes towards corruption, 2009

⁹ Also, on this question, 41% considered that this use of influence is corrupt but justified by the circumstances, whereas 18% thought it was not a corrupt action.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored three dimensions of the relationship between the ordinary citizen and the phenomenon of corruption. On the one hand, this year's survey found that the incidence of corrupt actions in the everyday life of the Colombians has seen a significant increase since 2008. We will have to await further waves of *AmericasBarometer* to know whether or not this is a sustained tendency or simply a change due to a particular moment, which will not become a permanent feature of Colombian life.

Secondly, the study deals with the traditional index of perception of corruption. The results of the descriptive analysis show that, for this dimension too, a significant increase can be observed from 2008 to 2009, very clearly in four of the six regions into which our sample has been divided.

Finally, we examine the Colombians' attitudes towards corrupt actions. Not only do we observe differences as regards what is thought to be a punishable action, but also attitudes vary depending on the circumstances.

The analysis of the impact of corruption on stable democracy's key components shows that both victimization and perception have a negative effect on support for the legitimacy of the political system's central institutions. However, other levels of the perception of corruption are related to high levels of support for democracy as such. This somewhat paradoxical finding is consistent with what we found in previous studies and requires a more detailed examination.

Appendix

Table 3.1 - Factors impacting the probability of being a victim of corruption

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	0,082**	-0.02
Woman	-0,792***	-0.17
Age	-0,011	-0.01
Wealth	0,216***	-0.05
Size of place	-0,003	-0.1
Perception of family economy	-0,105	-0.1
Number of children	-0,012	-0.06
Atlantic	0,420	-0.4
Pacific	0,487	-0.39
Central	0,274	-0.37
Eastern	0,391	-0.48
Former National Territories	0,806	-0.52
Mestizo/a	-0,083	-0.17
Indigenous	-0,347	-0.58
Black	0,122	-0.51
Mulatto	-0,024	-0.49
Other ethnic group	0,218	-0.66
Constant	-2,906***	-0.66
F	4.732	
N	1433	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.2 - Impact of corruption victimization on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for right to participate		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Corruption victimization	2,443	-1.82	-0,107	-1.4	2,088	-2.08	-4,485**	-1.35	-2,709	-2.4
Presidential approval	0,109**	-0.04	-0,036	-0.02	-0,238***	-0.03	0,350***	-0.03	0,052	-0.03
Interest in politics	0,053*	-0.02	0,118***	-0.02	0,042	-0.02	0,135***	-0.02	0,058*	-0.02
Years of education	1,155***	-0.21	0,902***	-0.17	0,918***	-0.19	-0,176	-0.16	-0,003	-0.23
Woman	0,606	-1.42	0,076	-0.85	-3,652**	-1.06	1,516	-1.04	-0,622	-1.04
Age	0,572*	-0.25	-0,220	-0.17	-0,327	-0.21	0,169	-0.22	0,473	-0.26
Age squared	-0,003	0	0,003	0	0,003	0	-0,001	0	-0,003	0
Wealth	1,046	-0.64	0,537	-0.52	0,347	-0.55	0,425	-0.41	1,566*	-0.69
Perception of family economy	0,393	-1.01	-1,437	-0.9	0,077	-0.95	-0,072	-0.81	2,573*	-1.22
Size of lace	-1,178	-0.66	-1,514*	-0.68	-0,620	-0.55	-2,048**	-0.61	-3,164***	-0.74
Constant	31,290***	-6.96	65,813***	-3.85	62,259***	-6.37	21,692***	-4.96	37,367***	-6.35
R-squared	0.078		0.075		0.096		0.212		0.038	
N	1402		1447		1439		1422		1433	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3.3 - Impact of perception of corruption on support for stable democracy

	Support for democracy		Support for right to participate		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Perception of corruption	0,119***	-0.03	0,037	-0.02	0,030	-0.03	-0,070**	-0.02	0,000	-0.03
Presidential approval	0,113**	-0.04	-0,036	-0.02	-0,240***	-0.03	0,347***	-0.03	0,051	-0.03
Interest in politics	0,056*	-0.02	0,127***	-0.02	0,047	-0.03	0,127***	-0.02	0,052*	-0.02
Years of education	0,983***	-0.22	0,843***	-0.17	0,881***	-0.18	-0,109	-0.17	0,117	-0.23
woman	0,218	-1.43	0,518	-0.88	-4,033***	-1.05	2,221*	-1.05	-0,463	-1.05
Age	0,642**	-0.24	-0,176	-0.17	-0,273	-0.22	0,099	-0.22	0,360	-0.28
Age squared	-0,004	0	0,002	0	0,003	0	-0,000	0	-0,002	0
Wealth	1,139	-0.61	0,513	-0.5	0,297	-0.56	0,299	-0.41	1,404	-0.7
Perception of family economy	0,615	-0.88	-0,989	-0.87	0,075	-0.94	-0,035	-0.85	2,598*	-1.28
Size of place	-1,312*	-0.64	-1,594*	-0.66	-0,678	-0.55	-1,911**	-0.59	-2,979***	-0.73
Constant	22,578**	-7.08	61,507***	-4.22	60,163***	-6.4	27,329***	-5.65	38,440***	-7
R-squared	0.095		0.083		0.095		0.209		0.033	
N	1356		1391		1389		1373		1376	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 4.

The Impact of Crime on Support for Stable Democracy

Crime victimization

In order to gain an insight into the incidence of crime on the life of the Colombians, we included the following question:

VIC1. And now, changing the subject, have you been the victim of any criminal act over the past 12 months?

Also, as an innovation this year and with an eye to deepening our understanding of the phenomenon of common crime in the life of Colombian citizens, we included the following question in our questionnaire:

VIC1A. ¿Has any member of your household been the victim of a criminal act over the past 12 months?

The first of these questions has been included in the questionnaire of all six studies carried out in Colombia and has enabled us to explore tendencies over the course of a period of time. Besides, the same question was included in the questionnaire of the 2008 comparative study of the other countries also, and we saw that Colombia is one of the countries with a low incidence of delinquency, bettered, in that regard, only by Haiti, Canada, Honduras, Panama and Jamaica.

Figure 4.1 shows that 17% of Colombians say they have been victims of some form of criminal act over the twelve months prior to this year's study. This percentage, although slightly higher than that of 2008, does not represent a significant difference in this year's level compared with the previous one. However, one should remain alert and ready to examine whether or not this tendency increases in future studies.




Figure 4.1 - Crime victimization in Colombia, 2004-2009

Figure 4.2, in turn, shows that the phenomenon of delinquency is related to the size of the place of residence. We see also that the phenomenon is primarily an urban one. The inhabitants of large and medium-sized cities, as also those who live in the capital city, are significantly more likely to be victimized than those who live in small towns and rural areas.




Figure 4.2 - Crime victimization according to the size of the place, 2009

22.5% of respondents reported that some family member, or a member of their household, had fallen victim to some criminal act over the twelve month period prior to the survey carried out for the present study. The distribution of this index also shows higher levels of victimization in the larger cities, as shown in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3 - Crime victimization of friends or relatives according to size of the place, 2009

Those who said they had been victims of a criminal act, or that some member of their household had been, were asked what kind of crime they had been subjected to. The distribution, as can be seen in Table 4.1, shows that robbery, with or without aggression, represents about 84% of crimes reported.

We should underline the fact that eleven respondents (that is, a slightly over 3% of those whose near ones had been victimized) manifested that some member of their family had been assassinated in the course of the past twelve months, a figure that, although it may not seem to be so high comparatively, does represent an important proportion of those interviewed.

Table 4.1 - Crimes endured by respondents and their friends and relatives, 2009

Crime	Respondent		Relative/Friend	
Robbery without aggression or physical threat	128	51.0%	167	50.2%
Robbery with aggression or physical threat	83	33.1%	114	34.2%
Physical aggression without robbery	11	4.4%	11	3.3%
Home robbery	8	3.2%	4	1.2%
Forced Displacement	6	2.4%	7	2.1%
Damage to property	3	1.2%	5	1.5%
Extortion	2	0.8%	3	0.9%
Sexual violation or assault	1	0.4%	3	0.9%
Kidnapping	1	0.4%	3	0.9%
Assassination		0.0%	11	3.3%
Other	8	3.2%	5	1.5%
Total	251	100%	333	100%

To determine the characteristics of those who have been victims of crime, we had recourse to a logistic regression model with victimization as a dependent variable, and including as predictors the level of education, gender, age, wealth and the size of place of residence.

Figure 4.4 represents the standard coefficients of the statistical model, complete with 95% confidence intervals. Table 4.2 in the Appendix to this chapter shows the total results of this exercise¹. The results of the exercise show that the factors which significantly influence the probability of becoming a victim are education level, sex, age and the size of the place, a relationship which we have already mentioned, and which has been maintained, even when other factors are controlled.




Figure 4.4 - Factors which influence the probability of becoming a victim of crime

¹ This Table also includes a similar model in which we predict the likelihood that the respondent will have reported some member of his or her household having been victim of a crime. In this last case, education level and size of the place turned out to be significant factors.

As shown in Figure 4.5, the incidence of victimization by crime increases with education levels. On average, people with higher education are five times more likely to be victims of crime than those who have no education.




Figure 4.5 - Crime victimization according to education level

Young people tend to be victims of crime more frequently than older people. Also, men are more likely to be victimized than women. The relationship between sex and age, on the one hand, and crime victimization on the other, is shown in Figure 4.6.




Figure 4.6 - Crime victimization by age and sex

Perception of insecurity

In the course of the six years during which we have carried out this study, we have analyzed citizens' perception of insecurity. And we have done so by asking following question:

AOJ11. Speaking of the place or neighborhood where you live, and thinking about the possibility of your being victim of an assault or theft, do you feel very secure? fairly secure? fairly insecure? or very insecure?

This index, converted to the familiar scale of 0 to 100, shows a significant increase from 2008 to 2009. In fact, over this past year the perception of insecurity has reached its highest level since 2004 when *AmericasBarometer* studies first began, as can be seen in Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.7 - Perception of insecurity in Colombia, 2004-2009

This increase is statically significant (to the level $p < .05$) in the Atlantic, Central and Pacific regions, as shown in Figure 4.8.




Figure 4.8 - Perception of insecurity by region, 2008-2009

As would seem obvious, those who were victims of crime over the past year tend to have a higher perception of insecurity than those who were lucky enough not to have been subjected to episodes of this nature, as we can see in Figure 4.9.




Figure 4.9 - Perception of insecurity by crime victimization

Impact of crime on support for stable democracy

In accordance with the theoretical framework laid out in the 2008 study, we can advance the hypothesis that citizens' experiences and perceptions as regards delinquency have the potential to erode attitudes favorable to stable democracy. Which is why, in this section, we examine the impact of victimization by criminal acts and the perception of insecurity in so far as they relate to the five key factors of stable democracy.

Impact of victimization by delinquency

For each of these factors – namely, support for democracy as such, support for the right to participate, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust – we have built a lineal regresión model which includes the dichotomy measure of victimization by crime, as well as the other usual factors.

Results of the statistical models are shown in Table 4.3 of the Appendix to this chapter. The table shows that victimization by corruption has a significant effect on support for democracy as such, and on political tolerance and interpersonal trust.

In the first place, victims of crime also show higher levels of support for democracy as such, as can be seen in Figure 4.10. This phenomenon is similar to what happens in the case of corruption (see 0).




Figure 4.10 - Impact of crime victimization on political tolerance

The same occurs as regards political tolerance. Consistent with the studies of former years, victims of crime tend to be more tolerant of the exercise of other people’s basic rights than those who have not been submitted to criminal acts. This is shown in Figure 4.11.




Figure 4.11 - Impact of crime victimization on the legitimacy of institutions

By contrast, victimization by crime has a negative impact on interpersonal trust, as is shown in Figure 4.12.




Figure 4.12 - Impact of crime victimization on interpersonal trust

Impact of perception of insecurity

It is not enough to study the impact of citizens' experiences as regards crime. More important perhaps may be an analysis of to what extent the perception of insecurity affects the key elements of support for stable democracy. To this end we repeated the exercise of statistical models for each one of these elements, including a measurement of the perception of insecurity as a central factor, as well as the usual variables of control. The results of these models appear in Table 4.4 of the Appendix to this chapter.

The perception of insecurity turns out to be a less reliable way of predicting attitudes towards stable democracy than that of negative experiences as regards crime. The said perception only has a significant impact – a negative one – on interpersonal trust, as is shown in Figure 4.13.




Figure 4.13 - Impact of perception of insecurity on interpersonal trust

Appendix

Table 4.2 - Factors which influence the probability of becoming a victim of crime

	Respondent		Near ones	
	Coefficients	Err. est.	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	0,064**	-0.02	0,098***	-0.02
Woman	-0,271*	-0.12	-0,128	-0.12
Age	-0,015*	-0.01	-0,007	-0.01
Waelth	0,089	-0.05	0,066	-0.06
Size of place	0,269**	-0.09	0,390***	-0.06
Constant	-2,440***	-0.37	-2,877***	-0.36
F	10.47		27.865	
N	1499		1472	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4.3 - Impact of crime victimization on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for right to participate		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Crime victimization	4,097*	-1.96	0,578	-1.36	3,052*	-1.48	-2,289	-1.75	-5,419**	-1.98
Presidential approval	0,111**	-0.04	-0,036	-0.02	-0,237***	-0.03	0,351***	-0.03	0,049	-0.03
Interest in politics	0,052*	-0.02	0,117***	-0.02	0,042	-0.02	0,134***	-0.02	0,059**	-0.02
Education	1,140***	-0.22	0,897***	-0.17	0,908***	-0.19	-0,184	-0.17	0,019	-0.23
Woman	0,568	-1.38	0,107	-0.89	-3,696***	-1.04	1,797	-1.04	-0,616	-1.11
Age	0,606*	-0.24	-0,219	-0.17	-0,301	-0.21	0,124	-0.22	0,435	-0.26
Age squared	-0,003	0	0,003	0	0,003	0	-0,001	0	-0,003	0
Wealth	1,048	-0.65	0,524	-0.52	0,350	-0.56	0,340	-0.41	1,576*	-0.69
Perception of family economy	0,494	-1.02	-1,419	-0.9	0,156	-0.97	-0,121	-0.82	2,430	-1.23
Size of place	-1,368	-0.69	-1,533*	-0.68	-0,755	-0.56	-1,905**	-0.58	-2,932***	-0.72
Constant	30,290***	-6.86	65,699***	-3.86	61,561***	-6.44	22,400***	-4.84	38,663***	-6.3
R-squared	0.08		0.075		0.097		0.209		0.041	
N	1402		1447		1439		1422		1433	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4.4 - Impact of perception of insecurity on support for stable democracy

	Support for democracy		Support for right to participate		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Perception of insecurity	-0,043	-0.02	-0,027	-0.02	-0,040	-0.02	-0,031	-0.02	-0,219***	-0.03
Presidencial approval	0,104**	-0.04	-0,042	-0.02	-0,245***	-0.03	0,348***	-0.03	0,029	-0.03
Interest in politics	0,051*	-0.02	0,120***	-0.02	0,041	-0.02	0,133***	-0.02	0,048*	-0.02
Education	1,202***	-0.21	0,888***	-0.17	0,943***	-0.18	-0,203	-0.17	0,072	-0.21
Woman	0,421	-1.41	0,213	-0.87	-3,722***	-1.01	1,987	-1.05	0,301	-1.11
Age	0,600*	-0.25	-0,196	-0.16	-0,318	-0.21	0,146	-0.23	0,321	-0.25
Age squared	-0,003	0	0,003	0	0,003	0	-0,001	0	-0,002	0
Wealth	1,007	-0.64	0,472	-0.52	0,338	-0.57	0,250	-0.41	1,116	-0.65
Perception of family economy	0,224	-1.01	-1,440	-0.89	-0,092	-0.97	-0,129	-0.83	1,769	-1.14
Size of place	-0,951	-0.67	-1,384*	-0.69	-0,423	-0.55	-1,823**	-0.61	-1,941*	-0.75
Constant	33,506***	-7.14	67,070***	-4.14	64,695***	-6.71	23,570***	-5.2	52,595***	-6.32
R-squared	0.081		0.077		0.097		0.21		0.089	
N	1397		1441		1433		1416		1427	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 5. From the Local to the National Levels. Impact of Municipal Life on Support for Stable Democracy

Trust in local authorities

In the first place, we have enquired into two instances of municipal government. Concretely, we asked the respondents to tell us to what extent they trusted these two instances. We posed the following questions:

B32. To what extent do you trust the Mayor’s office?

COLB32A. To what extent do you trust the town Council?

The previous years study showed that not only was there a considerable increase in levels of trust from 2007 to 2008, but that trust in mayoral offices in Colombia was, on average, one of the highest on the continent. However, as shown in Figure 5.1, levels of trust fell off significantly between the years 2008 and 2009.




Figure 5.1 - Trust in Mayor’s office and Council, 2004-2009

Figure 5.2 shows that mayors in the Pacific and Eastern regions enjoy the highest levels of citizen trust. Also, as indicated in the footnote to the Figure, between 2008 and 2009 there has been a significant decrease in levels of trust in the Atlantic, Central and Eastern regions, and in Bogotá.

Municipal councils enjoy greater trust in the Central and Pacific regions, while a significant decrease was noted in the Atlantic, Eastern and Central regions, and in the former National Territories.

A falling off in many of the other regions left the Pacific as the one where the level of trust in local authorities remains among the highest.




Figure 5.2 - Trust in Mayor's office and Council by region, 2009

The general falling off of trust in mayoral offices widened the already existing gap between instances of municipal government and those at the departmental and national levels, as shown in Figure 5.3. It is paradoxical, and perhaps worrying, that citizens confide less in the political authority which is closest to their daily life than in authorities that are necessarily much further removed.




Figure 5.3 - Trust in municipal, departmental and national governments, 2004-2009

Satisfaction with public municipal services

The 2008 study showed that, comparatively, Colombia is among the countries whose citizens are most satisfied with their public services. In the list of countries in the region, only Brazil, Dominican Republic and Ecuador appear above Colombia. Figure 5.4 shows that the level of Colombians' satisfaction with public services has remained stable, and although there has been a slight decrease in the past year it is not statistically significant.




Figure 5.4 - Satisfaction with local services, 2004-2009

Over the years of our study, satisfaction in rural areas is less than in municipal urban centers, as shown in Figure 5.5. This difference has been significant ($p < .05$) in 2009.




Figure 5.5 - Satisfaction with municipal services by area of residence, 2004-2009

As distinct from previous years, when the former National Territories presented by far the lowest levels of satisfaction with municipal services, this year that area's level presented a significant increase of more than 12 points in a scale of 0 to 100, bettering the Atlantic and Pacific regions, as can be seen in Figure 5.6. As in past years, Bogotá presents the highest level of satisfaction.




Figure 5.6 - Satisfaction with municipal services by regions, 2009

As in previous years, besides making a general evaluation of municipal services, the study asked the respondents to qualify their satisfaction with specific services: health services, electric energy supply, drinking water, education and rubbish collecting. As shown in Figure 5.7, Colombians are less satisfied with their health services than with other municipal services.




Figure 5.7 - Satisfaction with different public services, 2009

Participation in municipal affairs and petitions to local authorities

As in previous years, *AmericasBarometer* has gone further that the perception of citizens as regards their local government's performance. In fact, the study explores to what extent people get involved in affairs which concern the municipality. This was done by asking the following two questions:

NP1. Have you attended an open meeting or a municipal session over the past 12 months?

NP2. Have you asked for help or presented a petition to any office, official or municipal councillor over the past 12 months?

The 2008 study revealed that Colombians, in comparative terms, take little part in municipal affairs. This year, almost one out of every ten citizens took part in some municipal session during the previous twelve months, a percentage that is far behind the almost 15% of attendance recorded in the Dominican Republic, Venezuela or the United States. Despite the relatively low levels of participation in municipal meetings, the tendency to a rise in 2008 has remained stable in 2009, as shown in Figure 5.8.




Figure 5.8 - Attendance at municipal meetings, 2005-2009

On the other hand, Figure 5.9 shows that, despite the fact that no considerable change was recorded between the years 2008 and 2009 on a national level, there were certain variations by region and as regards relative location. We accord special importance to the falling off of participation in the former National Territories. Whereas in 2008 this region showed the highest level of participation in Colombia, in 2009 levels fell to occupy the lowest place of all Colombian regions. The explanation for this variation, which is the only statistically significant change recorded between one year and the next, is something which certainly requires further study.




Figure 5.9 - Attendance at municipal meetings by region, 2008-2009

On the other hand, the 2008 study showed that the percentage of citizens who presented a petition to local government in Colombia was one of the lowest on the continent. Figure 5.10, however, shows that there was an increase (a statistically significant one) between 2008 and 2009, returning to levels reported in 2004 and 2005.




Figure 5.10 - Presentation of petitions to municipal governments, 2004-2009

As shown in Figure 5.11, the increase in the percentage of Colombians who presented petitions to local government over the past twelve months was recorded specifically in the Central, Eastern and Pacific regions.




Figure 5.11 - Presentation of petitions to municipal governments by regions, 2008-2009

Figure 5.12, in turn, shows that the increase occurred fundamentally in small cities. Likewise we see that, the larger the place – that is, where population density has grown – the lower is the percentage of citizens who have recourse to some local authority to make a petition.





Figure 5.12 - Presentation of petitions to municipal governments according to size of place, 2008-2009

Impact of the satisfaction with municipal services on support for stable democracy

As stated in the theoretical framework of the 2008 report, *AmericasBarometer* seeks to make an empirical assessment of the hypothesis that stable democracy is built up from the grass roots, in other words that it begins at the local level. That is why we attempt to assess the relationship that exists between the satisfaction of municipal services and the five pillars of stable democracy: support for democracy as such, support for the right to participate, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust. Besides the level of satisfaction with public services, we naturally include sociodemographic factors – such as education level, sex, age (and age squared) and the level of wealth of the person interviewed – not to mention the size of his or her place of residence and certain perceptions of other items, such as the person’s evaluation of the president’s performance, plus his or her interest in politics and perception of the family economy. The results of the models appear in Table 5.1 of the Appendix to this chapter.

The Table shows that satisfaction with municipal services only produces a significant effect – a positive one – on institutional legitimacy, as can be seen in Figure 5.13. This result is similar to that found in the previous year’s study.



**Figure 5.13 - Legitimacy of political institutions
according to satisfaction with municipal services, 2009**

Participation in organizations of civil society

As well as the relationship between the citizen and instances of government, this study considers participation in organizations of civil society to be one of the key aspects of democratic political culture. *AmericasBarometer*, over recent years, has analyzed the participation of Colombians in religious organizations, parents' associations, and committees for improvement of local conditions, professional associations, unions and women's groups. We ask the following questions:

I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me how frequently you attend meetings of these organizations: once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. **[Repeat "once a week", "once or twice a month", "once or twice a year", or "never" to assist the respondent]**

	Once a week	Once or twice a month	Once or twice a year	Never	NS/NR
CP6. Meetings of a religious organization? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8
CP7. Meetings of parents' association at school or collage? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8
CP8. Meetings of committee or board for community improvements? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8
CP9. Meetings of professional, commercial, producers' associations or farmers' organizations? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8
CP10. Union meetings? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8
CP13. Meetings of party or political movement? Attendance	1	2	3	4	8
CP20. Meetings of associations or groups of women or housewives? Attendance ...	1	2	3	4	8

One way to analyze levels of participation in these organizations consists in observing gender differences. The figures which appear below show, for all years studied, the percentage of men (columns marked H –*hombres*– in the graphs) and women (marked M, for *mujeres*) who attended at least once or twice a year in each of the instances of civil society organizations.

Firstly, women’s attendance at meetings of a religious nature is significantly more frequent than men’s, although the participation by men is not negligible, as shown in Figure 5.14. There has been a significant increase in attendance by Colombians at these kinds of meetings between 2008 and 2009 (a rise from 58% to 67%). This increase includes the attendance of both men and women.




Figure 5.14 - Attendance at meetings of religious organizations by sex, 2004-2009

There is a more notable difference between the attendance of men and that of women at school parents' meetings. This task, related to the education of the children, appears to be predominantly that of women, as shown in Figure 5.15. In general terms there has been no variation in the attendance at this kind of meeting between 2008 and 2009.




Figure 5.15 - Attendance at parent's meetings by sex, 2004-2009

Tasks seem to be more evenly distributed as regards attendance at committees or boards for community improvements, although there does exist a slight difference, though not a statistically significant one, in favor of men, as shown in Figure 5.16. Between 2008 and 2009, the percentage of Colombians who said they attended meetings of this sort at least once or twice a year increased from 22% to 26%.¹




Figure 5.16 - Attendance at meetings of committees for improvements, by sex, 2005-2009

¹ This difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$).

The opposite is true as regards meetings of professional, commercial or producers’ associations. This activity appears to be predominantly masculine, as shown in Figure 5.17.




Figure 5.17 - Attendance at meetings of professional associations, by sex, 2004-2009

The 2008 study showed that the rate of union membership in Colombia is one of the lowest on the continent. In 2009 only 4.2% of Colombians said they attended a union meeting at least once or twice a year. Furthermore, participation in union meetings is much more frequent among men than among women, as shown in Figure 5.18.




Figure 5.18 - Attendance at union meetings, by sex, 2005-2009

Finally, the 2008 study showed that Colombia occupies the last place in attendance at women's groups. Between 2008 and 2009, the percentage of those who said they had attended a meeting of this sort at least once or twice a year increased from 7% to 11%, a significant difference. Naturally the great majority of those who attend this kind of meeting are women, as shown in Figure 5.19.




Figure 5.19 - Attendance at women's groups meetings, by sex, 2006-2009

Impact of participation in local groups of civil society on support for stable democracy

In order to continue with our examination of the hypothesis posed in the theoretical framework of the 2008 report, related to the impact of participation in groups of civil society on support for stable democracy, we built statistical models for each of the pillars (support for democracy as such, support for the right to participate, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust), including as key factors attendance at religious meetings, parents' associations, committees or boards for community improvements, professional associations, union meetings and women's groups.² We also included the usual control variables. The results of these exercises are shown in Table 5.2.

In the first place, the only instance of participation which influences support for democracy as such is attendance at meetings of professional associations. As shown in Figure 5.20, those who attended at least once or twice a year at this kind of association expressed significantly greater support for democracy than those who never attended at all.




Figure 5.20 - Impact of participation in professional associations on support for democracy as such

² For each of the instances of participation in civil society, coded dichotomous variables are included, with 1 when the respondent reported having attended at least once or twice a year in each kind of organization, and 0 if he or she said they never attended any such meeting.

Support for the right to participate, on the other hand, only appears to be related to attendance at meetings of some committee for community improvement. This relationship was shown in the expected direction (Figure 5.21).




Figure 5.21 - Impact of participation in committees for improvements on support for the right to participate

None of the instantes of participation in civil society influence political tolerance to a significant degree. Curiously, this key attitude in citizens' political culture does not seem to be related to participation in groups of civil society.

On the other hand, those who attend union meetings at least once or twice a year tend to express a level of institutional legitimacy significantly higher than those who do not attend at all, as shown Figure 5.22.




Figure 5.22 - Impact of participation in union activities on institucional legitimacy

Finally, as we found in earlier studies, interpersonal trust is related to attendance at meetings of a religious nature. Figure 5.23 shows that interpersonal trust is significantly greater in those who attend meetings of some religious organization at least once or twice a year.




Figure 5.23 - Impact of participation in religious groups on interpersonal trust

Appendix

Table 5.1 - Impact of satisfaction with municipal services on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for right to participate		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Satisfaction with municipal services	0,010	-0.05	0,037	-0.03	0,016	-0.04	0,125***	-0.03	0,075	-0.05
Presidencal approval	0,106**	-0.04	-0,038	-0.02	-0,247***	-0.03	0,341***	-0.03	0,044	-0.03
Interest in politics	0,051*	-0.02	0,115***	-0.02	0,039	-0.02	0,130***	-0.02	0,054*	-0.02
Education	1,172***	-0.21	0,928***	-0.17	0,912***	-0.18	-0,159	-0.17	-0,013	-0.24
Woman	0,195	-1.41	-0,102	-0.85	-4,051***	-1.02	1,659	-1.02	-0,444	-1.08
Age	0,605*	-0.25	-0,186	-0.17	-0,302	-0.21	0,174	-0.23	0,478	-0.27
Age squared	-0,003	0	0,003	0	0,003	0	-0,001	0	-0,003	0
Wealth	1,056	-0.63	0,455	-0.52	0,351	-0.56	0,084	-0.4	1,463*	-0.7
Perception of family economy	0,322	-1.01	-1,526	-0.9	0,240	-1	-0,125	-0.85	2,499*	-1.22
Size of place	-1,115	-0.68	-1,436*	-0.7	-0,545	-0.58	-2,039**	-0.61	-3,163***	-0.76
Constant	30,951***	-7.69	63,602***	-4.37	61,732***	-5.98	16,030**	-5.44	34,032***	-7.01
R-squared	0.076		0.074		0.096		0.219		0.038	
N	1385		1427		1420		1402		1411	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5.2 - Impact of citizen participation on support for stable democracy

Independent variables	Support for democracy		Support for right to participate		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Religious organization	0,787	-1.53	0,633	-1.36	-0,514	-1.66	1,194	-1.3	3,080*	-1.51
Parent's association	-0,184	-1.73	-0,825	-1.52	-0,648	-1.41	1,361	-1.41	-1,214	-1.72
Comités for improvements	-0,121	-1.51	2,923*	-1.37	0,987	-1.31	-0,311	-1.08	0,509	-1.92
Professional associations	5,859***	-1.52	1,676	-1.36	1,264	-1.78	2,146	-1.3	-1,654	-2.13
Unions	1,948	-3.16	2,160	-2.03	4,030	-2.81	8,068***	-2.1	-2,829	-3.72
Women's group	-0,462	-2.54	0,133	-1.76	0,547	-1.61	1,600	-1.74	-0,990	-3.05
Presidential approval	0,112**	-0.04	-0,030	-0.02	-0,236***	-0.03	0,358***	-0.03	0,049	-0.03
Interest in politics	0,044	-0.02	0,107***	-0.02	0,044	-0.02	0,127***	-0.02	0,055*	-0.02
Education	1,058***	-0.21	0,836***	-0.18	0,841***	-0.18	-0,299	-0.17	0,001	-0.23
Woman	0,800	-1.47	0,354	-0.91	-3,709**	-1.13	1,467	-1.17	-0,382	-1.36
Age	0,541*	-0.24	-0,221	-0.17	-0,274	-0.23	0,052	-0.2	0,508	-0.3
Age squared	-0,003	0	0,003	0	0,003	0	-0,000	0	-0,004	0
Wealth	1,214	-0.68	0,633	-0.51	0,365	-0.56	0,378	-0.42	1,553*	-0.66
Perception of family economy	0,320	-0.99	-1,435	-0.9	0,077	-0.95	0,016	-0.83	2,417*	-1.17
Size of place	-0,937	-0.69	-1,274	-0.68	-0,525	-0.58	-1,860**	-0.62	-3,041***	-0.66
Constant	31,338***	-6.71	64,668***	-3.59	62,005***	-6.76	22,010***	-4.77	35,696***	-6.77
R-squared	0.083		0.08		0.096		0.219		0.039	
N	1393		1435		1427		1410		1421	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 6.

Citizen Perception of Government's Economic Performance and its Impact on Support for Stable Democracy

One of the most robust theories in political science states that the attitudes and political behavior of citizens are strongly influenced by citizens' perception of the economy – whether it be of the country's economy as a whole or their own economic situation – and of their assessment of the government's economic performance. In keeping with the theoretical framework sketched out in the 2008 report, this chapter explores those perceptions and their impact on the political culture of the Colombians, especially as regards their support for stable democracy.

The importance of the economy for Colombians

Before analyzing citizens' perceptions as regards the economic situation, a first step consists of examining how important economic matters are for the citizens. For this reason the questionnaire includes a half-open question on what our respondents consider to be the most serious problem the country is facing. The responses can be grouped in accordance with categories shown here in Table 6.1¹.

Table 6.1 - Country's main problem according to citizens (A4) recoded in categories

Economy	Security	Basic Services	Politics	Others
Credit/lack of (09)	Armed conflict (30)	Water, lack of (19)	Conflict with neighboring countries (62)	Inequality(58)
Unemployment/lack of employment (03)	Delinquency, crime (05)	Road/ roads in bad repair (18)	Corruption (13)	Torced displacement (32)
Economy, problems with, crisis of (01)	Human rights, violation of (56)	Education, lack of, bad quality (21)	Politicians (59)	Discrimination (25)
Inflation, high prices (02)	Impunity (61)	Electricity, lack of(24)	Bad government (15)	Drug addiction (11)
Poverty (04)	Drug traffic(12)	Health, lack of services (22)		Demographic explosion (20)
Land to grow crops/ lack of, falta de (07)	Gangs (14)	Transport, problems with (60)		Environment (10)
External Debt (26)	Kidnapping (31)	Dwelling (55)		Migration (16)
	Security/ lack of (27)	Desnutrition (23)		Popular protests (strikes, blocking highways, etc.) (06)
	War against terrorism (17)			Other (70)
	Terrorism (33)			
	Violence (57)			

¹ The Table shows the corresponding responses for each category, with the original code in brackets.

Figure 6.1 shows that almost fifty percent of Colombians think that, at the present moment, the country's economy is its most serious problem. Only just over one out of every three Colombians think that security is (still) the most serious problem.




Figure 6.1 - The country's main problem, 2009

The 2008 study showed how, in that year, Colombia was one of the countries where a rather small percentage of citizens were particularly concerned about the economy. Although the 2009 study does not have comparative data, it is a fact that the proportional number of Colombians who consider the economy to be the country’s main problem has increased to an important degree. In fact, as shown in Figure 6.2, for the first time the economy occupies first place among matters mentioned by respondents, over and above security, which was the problem that had occupied first place over the five previous years. This might be explained by citizens’ perception as regards advances made in matters of security thanks to the Colombian government and to its less successful performance as far as the economy goes, as was found in earlier studies, and as we will see later in this chapter.




Figure 6.2 - The economy and security as the most serious problem, 2004-2009

On the other hand, the results shown above may also demonstrate that, finally, the effects of the world economic crisis are reflected in the perceptions of Colombians. Since we suspect this to be so, we included in our 2009 questionnaire the following questions:

CRISIS1. Some people say our country is going through one of its most serious economic crises. What do you think?

We are going through one of the country's most serious economic crises ... 1 **[Continue]**

We are not going through such a crisis ...2 **[Go to DER1]**

NS/NR.....8 **[Go to DER1]**

The great majority of people think the country is going through one of its most serious economic crises, as shown in Figure 6.3.




Figure 6.3 - Perception of economic crisis in Colombia, 2009

Those who expressed the perception that the country was in a serious economic crisis were asked who, in their opinión, were the persons or organizations most responsible for this situation. The answers to this open-and-shut question, which appear in Table 6.2, show that 40% of respondents systematically adopted a rather abstract perspective in assigning responsibility for the crisis: they included capitalism, democracy and the international system. On the other hand, almost one out of every five Colombians (a considerably high proportion) blamed the present government for the critical situation, whereas a lesser proportion assigned responsibility retrospectively to the former president. Finally, one out of every six considered that the reason for the crisis is shared among many; that is, it is due to the behavior of all the Colombians.

Table 6.2 – Who is responsible for the economic crisis

Responsible	Frequency	%
Capitalism	233	19.75%
Incumbent government	232	19.66%
Us Colombians	183	15.51%
The former president	164	13.90%
The wealthy countries	135	11.44%
Problems of democracy	102	8.64%
Other	33	2.80%
DK/NR	98	8.31%

Perception of government's economic performance

AmericasBarometer includes a series of questions oriented to examine how citizens assess government's performance in a variety of areas. All these questions appear in what follows. Those marked in grey are the ones related to economic management.

On a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 means NOTHING and 7 means MUCH,,,	Note 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
N1. To what extent to you think the present government is combatting poverty?	
N3. To what extent do you think the present government promotes and protects democratic principles?	
N9. To what extent do you think the present government combats corruption in government?	
N10. To what extent do you think the present government protects human rights?	
COLN11. To what extent is the present government solving the problem of the armed conflict?	
COLN12. To what extent is the present government solving the problem of State finances?	
N11. To what extent do you think the present government has improved citizens' security?	
N12. To what extent would you say the present government is fighting against unemployment?	
N15. To what extent would you say the present government is handling the economy well?	
COLN13. To what extent would you say the present government is combatting the reorganization of paramilitary groups?	

The 2008 study showed that, comparatively speaking, Colombia occupies a relatively high place as regards citizens' assessment of the government's handling of the economy. Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 6.4, economic matters are the ones which, in 2009, get the worst qualifications on the part of the respondents². This result is consistent with that of previous years.




Figure 6.4 - Evaluation of the government's performance, 2009

² The original scale of 1 to 7 was converted to the more intuitive scale of 0 to 100.

As shown in Figure 6.5, despite a rise in 2008, Colombians' qualification of the government's efforts to combat poverty and unemployment again went down considerably in 2009³. Over the two past years, this descent has been statistically significant.




Figure 6.5 - Perception of the government's economic performance, 2004-2009

³ Question N15, mentioned above, was not asked in previous studies and consequently is not included in the longitudinal assessment of the government's performance in economic matters.

If we take an average on responses to the questions related to the fight against poverty and unemployment, we could construct a first indicator of the government’s economic performance⁴ the evolution of which, from 2008 to 2009, for each of the country’s regions, appears in Figure 6.6. There we see that a falling off in a high qualification was recorded in Bogotá and in the Central and Pacific regions. By way of contrast, the former National Territories gave the government’s performance a better approval rate, although the increase is not statistically significant.




Figure 6.6 - Evaluation of the government’s economic performance by region, 2008-2009

⁴ This indicator is highly reliable ($\alpha = .77$).

As in previous years, we wished to explore factors which might explain, at least in part, why some citizens give a higher approval rate to the government's economic performance than others. To do so, we included variables related to sociotropic perceptions (perception of the economic situation of the nation as a whole) and the egotropic (perception of personal economy):

SOCT1. Now speaking of the economy ... How do you see the **country's** economic situation? Would you say it is very good? Good? Neither good nor bad? Bad? Or very bad?

IDIO1. ¿How do you see your own economic situation in general? Would you say it is very good? Good? Neither good nor bad? Bad? Or very bad?

Once these scales are converted to the usual scale of 1 to 100, we see in Figure 6.7 that the assessment of the national economic situation (sociotropic) has fallen between the years 2008 and 2009, after a significant rise the preceding year. On the other hand, the egotropic assessment, which is higher, has remained constant over the past two years⁵.




Figure 6.7 - Sociotropic and egotropic evaluation of the economy, 2004-2009

⁵ The question about egotropic assessment of the economy was not asked during the first two years of this series.

In order to assess the impact which perceptions of the economic situation have on citizens' evaluation of the government's economic performance, we specified a linear regression model, taking as a dependent variable a new index to qualify the said performance, based on three questions mentioned above (handling of the fight against poverty, unemployment, and of the economy). As independent variables we included sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the economic situation, as well as the usual control variables (sex, level of education, age, wealth and size of place of residence), together with a measurement of ideology on a scale of 1 to 10, from the Left to the Right; this last variable controls, to some extent, a particular citizen's affinity with the government.

The results of this model appear in Table 6.3 in the Appendix to this chapter. A graph shows normalized coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals. As always, this representation should be examined to discover which factors determine whether the confidence interval is to the right of the vertical line (the zero line) or to the left. As shown in Figure 6.8, the factors which significantly influence assessment of the government's economic performance are level of education, gender, ideological position and the sociotropic and egotropic evaluations of the economy.




Figure 6.8 - Factors which influence perception of the government's economic performance

Besides the sociodemographic characteristics, it is interesting to note that those who are placed to the right tend to give a more positive assessment of the government, especially as regards its handling of economic matters. Going further (that is, in order to control this effect), those who make a more positive assessment of the national economy (Figure 6.9) and their own personal economic situation (Figure 6.10) tend to applaud the government’s economic performance.




Figure 6.9 - Evaluation of government’s economic performance according to the perception of the national economy




Figure 6.10 - Evaluation of government’s economic performance according to perception of personal economy

Impact of perception of government's economic performance on support for stable democracy

To bring to a close this analysis of factors of governance which have an influence on the pillars of stable democracy (see previous chapters), in this section we explore the impact citizens' qualification of the government's handling of the economy has on the above-mentioned five pillars (support for democracy as such, support for the right to participate, political tolerance, institutional legitimacy and interpersonal trust). As always, we included control variables related to the sociodemographic characteristics and to perceptions of politics.

The results of this analysis, which appear in detail in Table 6.4 of the Appendix to this chapter, show that the qualification of the government's economic performance has an influence on all the pillars of stable democracy, except that of political tolerance, with which it seems not to be related.

In the first place, those who give highest marks to the government's handling of economic affairs tend to give greater support to the idea of democracy as such, as shown in Figure 6.11.




Figure 6.11 - Effect of the evaluation of government's economic performance on support for democracy

The same is true as regards support for the right to participate (Figure 6.12). This is an important finding (which did not exist in the 2008 study) to the extent that it shows how the economy not only affects citizens' attitudes vis-à-vis the political system in general, but also how perception of the economy influences the exercise of individual rights.




Figure 6.12 - Impact of evaluation of government's economic performance on support for the right to participate

Thirdly, the Colombians' qualification of the government's economic performance also has a positive influence on the legitimacy of the key institutions of the political system (the system of justice, national government, Congress, political parties and the Supreme Court of Justice), as shown in Figure 6.13. As inferred in the vertical line scale, this has a strong impact on that particular dimension of stable democracy. In fact, those who give the highest qualification to the government's economic performance consider those institutions to have more than twice the legitimacy afforded to them by those who are more critical of the government's handling of economic affairs.




Figure 6.13 - Impact of the evaluation of government's economic performance on legitimacy of institutions

Finally, those who most highly praise the government's economic performance tend to show higher levels of interpersonal trust, as shown in Figure 6.14.




Figure 6.14 - Impact of the evaluation of government's economic performance on interpersonal trust

The role of the State in the economy

To complete the economic dimension of the Colombians' perceptions, *AmericasBarometer* included a series of questions designed to explore the positions of the respondents regarding the role of the State in the handling of the economy. The first four questions which appear below were asked in earlier studies. The last two appear for the first time in *AmericasBarometer* study for this year.

<p>Now I am going to read to you some sentences on the role of the State. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with them. We continue to use the same scale of 1 to 7.</p> <p>NS/NR = 8</p>	<p>Note 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</p>
<p>ROS1. The Colombian State, instead of the private sector, ought to own the country's most important enterprises and industries. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this?</p>	
<p>ROS2. The Colombian State, rather than individuals, should be the one mainly responsible for ensuring people's well being. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>ROS3. The Colombian State, rather than private enterprise, ought to be the one mainly responsible for creating employment. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>ROS4. The Colombian State should implement strong policies to reduce the inequality of incomes which exists between rich and poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>ROS5. The Colombian State, rather than the private sector, ought to be mainly responsible for pensions. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>ROS6. The Colombian State, rather than the private sector, ought to be mainly responsible for health care? To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	

After converting the answers to a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents those who favor no role (or only a minimum role) for the State in economic affairs, and where 100 represents those who believe the State should play a preponderant role, the results appear in Figure 6.15. What is noted first of all is that Colombians in general tend to favor an active role on the part of the State in the economy; for all items, the average is over 50, the middle point on the scale. Having said that, however, what respondents least support is that the State should own the key industries. Also, in the opinion of Colombians, the State ought to handle the health care system and solve the question of unemployment.




Figure 6.15 - Support for an active role of the State in the economy, 2009

With these six ítems we built an index of support for an active role by the State in the economy⁶. The 2008 study shows that, for a similar index⁷, Colombia appears as one of the four countries in which the citizens most agree that the State should play an active role in the economy. In 2009, the average of this index, on a scale of 0 to 100, is slightly above 79 points, a level which clearly confirms these attitudes regarding the State’s role in the economy. Figure 6.16 shows a histogram with the distribution of this index.




Figure 6.16 - Distribution of support for a more active role of the State in the economy, 2009

⁶ This index is considerably reliable ($\alpha = .77$)

⁷ In the 2008 study, the index only included the first four ítems.

We also included an analysis of the factors which influence support for an active role by the State in the economy. As well as the usual sociodemographic characteristics, we included the sociotropic and egotropic assessment of the economic situation, the ideological position (right or left), approval of the president’s performance, and dychotomous variables related to affiliation to political parties such as the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the Polo Democrático Alternativo, the Partido de la U, Cambio Radical and others⁸. The results of this model appear in Table 6.5 in the Appendix to this chapter and are represented, in standardized fashion, in Figure 6.17.




Figure 6.17 - Factors which influence support for a more active role of the State in the economy

⁸ The size and significance of the coefficients of party affiliation should be compared with the answers of those respondents who expressed no party affiliation.

From the previous Figure we conclude, firstly that women and older people tend to favor more State intervention in the economy. Figure 6.18 depicts this relationship.




Figure 6.18 - Support for a more active role of the State in the economy, by sex and age

As regards the more “political” factors, it is important to underline the fact that evaluation of the economy, whether sociotropic or egotropic, does not have an influence on a Colombian citizen’s opinion with regard to the State’s role in the economy. The same is true of ideological position or approval of the president’s performance. In relation to party affiliation, however, the results of the analysis does demonstrate that those who identify themselves with Polo Democrático Alternativo show a greater support for State intervention, over and above that of those who do not express sympathy for any party, as is seen in Figure 6.19.




Figure 6.19 - Support for a more active role of the State in the economy according to political party affiliation

Appendix

Table 6.3 - Factors which influence perception of government's economic performance

	Coefficient	Err. est.
Education level	-0,849***	-0.21
Woman	4,214***	-1.07
Age	-0,012	-0.04
Wealth	-0,750	-0.52
Size of place	-1,045	-0.69
Ideological position	1,993***	-0.35
National economic situation	0,335***	-0.03
Personal economic situation	0,094*	-0.04
Constant	28,293***	-3.92
R-squared	0.179	
N	1250	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 6.4 - Impact of perception of government's economic performance on support for stable democracy

	Support for democracy		Support for right to participate		Political tolerance		Legitimacy of institutions		Interpersonal trust	
	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.	Coef.	Err. est.
Government's economic performance	0,113**	-0.04	0,131***	-0.03	-0,013	-0.04	0,404***	-0.02	0,128**	-0.04
Presidential approval	0,042	-0.04	-0,113***	-0.03	-0,235***	-0.04	0,124***	-0.02	-0,017	-0.04
Interest in politics	0,047*	-0.02	0,103***	-0.02	0,045	-0.02	0,099***	-0.02	0,044*	-0.02
Education	1,264***	-0.23	1,015***	-0.18	0,926***	-0.19	0,132	-0.14	0,099	-0.24
Woman	0,151	-1.41	-0,254	-0.88	-3,939***	-1	1,042	-0.97	-0,709	-1.11
Age	0,558*	-0.24	-0,253	-0.17	-0,279	-0.2	0,027	-0.21	0,431	-0.26
Age squared	-0,003	0	0,004	0	0,003	0	0,001	0	-0,003	0
Wealth	1,114	-0.64	0,671	-0.5	0,379	-0.56	0,589	-0.35	1,527*	-0.71
Perception of family economy	0,170	-1	-1,687	-0.92	0,007	-0.94	-0,902	-0.76	2,465*	-1.18
Size of place	-1,029	-0.65	-1,322*	-0.64	-0,605	-0.57	-1,623***	-0.45	-2,998***	-0.72
Constant	30,406***	-7	64,739***	-3.8	62,008***	-6.52	18,899***	-4.23	36,078***	-6.57
R-squared	0.085		0.091		0.096		0.36		0.045	
N	1392		1433		1428		1414		1421	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 6.5 - Factors which influence support for a more active role of the State in the economy

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	0,090	-0.19
Woman	2,268*	-0.87
Age	0,077*	-0.04
Wealth	-0,559	-0.44
Size of place	0,167	-0.51
National economic situation	-0,050	-0.03
Personal economic situation	-0,030	-0.03
Ideological position	-0,373	-0.34
Presidential approval	0,002	-0.03
Liberal	-0,469	-2.87
Conservative	0,258	-2.06
Polo	6,069**	-1.96
La U	2,752	-2.15
Cambio Radical	1,682	-4.32
Other	-4,514	-5.32
Constant	81,468***	-4.16
R-squared	0.03	
N	1249	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

PART II

Chapter 7. Attitudes Towards Democracy

Legitimacy and tolerance

One of the classical forms of analysis used by *AmericasBarometer* consists of exploring two dimensions central to stable democracy: support for the political system (as a measure of the system's legitimacy) and political tolerance. The combination of these two dimensions leads to a typology of attitudes vis-à-vis stable democracy, as we shall see later.

The following questions were used to create an index of system support¹:

- B1.** To what extent do you think justice tribunals in Colombia guarantee a fair outcome?
- B2.** To what extent do you respect Colombia's political institutions?
- B3.** To what extent do you think citizens' basic rights are protected by Colombia's political system?
- B4.** How proud are you to be living under Colombia's political system?
- B6.** To what extent do you think you should support Colombia's political system?

¹ Over the six years of the series, this index of system support has maintained a high level of reliability ($\alpha = .77$).

Figure 7.1 shows the average of this index of system support over the six years of the study. As one can see, the level, which previous comparative studies had found relatively high, has remained fairly constant over the period of this series of studies.




Figure 7.1 - System support, 2004-2009

As mentioned in an earlier chapter, the items used to create the index of political tolerance were the following²:

The following questions are aimed at ascertaining your opinion on the different ideas of people living in Colombia. We always use the scale of 10 points.

D1. Some people always speak against Colombia's government, not only against the government in office, but against the form of government itself. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the fact that such people have a **right to vote**?

D2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of allowing such people to hold **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their viewpoints? Please read me the number.

D3. Still talking about people who are always against Colombia's form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being allowed to present themselves as candidates **for public posts**?

D4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of allowing such people to **make speeches** on televisión?

² The political tolerance index has enjoyed a high level of reliability over the six years of this study ($\alpha = .85$).

Earlier studies have shown that, in the case of Colombia, the level of tolerance is comparatively low. Figure 7.2 shows that it went even further down between the years 2007 and 2008, a descent which has remained constant into 2009.




Figure 7.2 - Political tolerance, 2004-2009

As in previous years, we analyzed the relation between these two dimensions. Theoretically they lead to the typology shown in Table 7.1, which combines the dichotomization of the two indexes into low and high³.

Table 7.1 - Theoretical relation between system support and tolerance

System support (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy	Authoritarian stability
Low	Unstable Democracy	Democracy at risk

Table 7.2 shows the distribution of Colombian in 2009 with relation to the four cells of the typology. Once again, the predominant category is the one we call *authoritarian stability*, that is, the combination of high system support and a tolerance level below 50 points on a scale of 100.

Table 7.2 - System support and tolerance, 2009

System support (legitimacy)	Tolerance	
	High	Low
High	Stable Democracy 29.8%	Authoritarian stability 38.2%
Low	Unstable Democracy 13.5%	Democracy at risk 18.5%

³ The scales of 0 to 100 are converted into “low” (0-50) and “high” (50-100).

Figure 7.3 shows how precisely this category of *authoritarian stability* is the one that has predominated since 2008, displacing the much more desirable category of *stable democracy*. These levels have placed Colombia as one of the countries with the greatest percentage of citizens who strongly support the system but have a low tolerance level, as was seen in the 2008 study.




Figure 7.3 - Democratic stability, 2004-2009

Trust in institutions

Figure 7.4 shows our usual list of institutions ordered according to the level of trust that citizens place in them. As in previous years, trust in the president occupies one of the highest places (67.8 on a scale from 0 to 100), whereas trust in the political parties, at 36.7, occupies an even lower place than that of unions (41.6). We will now analyze the performance over time of certain key institutions.




Figure 7.4 - Trust in institutions, 2009

In the first place it is worth noting that, despite maintaining very high levels, trust in the president⁴ was slightly (but significantly) less from 2008 to 2009, as shown in Figure 7.5.




Figure 7.5 - Trust in the president, 2008-2009

⁴ The question about trust in the president (as distinct from trust in the government) was asked for the first time in 2008.

This same descent, however, is not shown in levels of trust in the national government, as we can see in Figure 7.6. In fact, over the past two years the government has enjoyed the very highest levels of trust.




Figure 7.6 - Trust in government, 2004-2009

Further to the questions mentioned in an earlier chapter as regards citizens’ assessment of government’s performance in specific areas, we included the following question in the questionnaire as an overall assessment of the government’s performance.

M1. Speaking generally about the present government, would you say the job being done by President Alvaro Uribe is ...? **[Read alternatives]**

- Very good.....1
- Good.....2
- Neither good nor bad.....3
- Bad.....4
- Very bad.....5
- DK/NR.....8

Figure 7.7 shows that, over the past six years, the Colombians have maintained a high general level of approval of the work being done by the government and by the president.




Figure 7.7 - Approval of the president’s performance, 2004-2009

Secondly, previous studies showed that trust in the Colombian Congress, despite discrediting comments, is by no means the lowest in approval level, in comparative terms. In South America, in 2008, only the Uruguayan Congress bettered the Colombian one in this regard. Figure 7.8, however, shows a slight (but significant) descent in Colombians' levels of trust in the nation's legislative body.




Figure 7.8 - Trust in Congress, 2004-2009

As in the case of government, we posed a question related to citizens' assessment of the performance of Congress⁵. The question was as follows:

M2. Speaking of Congress and of the members of Congress as a whole, of whatever party, do you think that members of Congress in Colombia are doing a very good job, a good job, a job that is neither good nor bad, or bad, or very bad?

Figure 7.9 shows that this assessment is only half-way up the scale of 0 to 100, without notable modifications from 2008 to 2009.




Figure 7.9 - Evaluation of the performance of Congress, 2008-2009

⁵ This question was first posed in 2008.

Resides this concrete question, we posed questions related to citizens' attitudes vis-à-vis the performance of Congress. The following questions were asked:

Now I am going to read a series of sentences about political parties in Colombia and I want you to give me your opinion. We continue to use the same scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is nothing and 7 is a lot.

EC1. And now, thinking about Congress, to what extent does Congress interfere with the president's job?

EC2. And how much time do Congress members waste on discussion and debate?

EC3. How important for the country are the laws passed by Congress?

EC4. To what extent does Congress come up to your expectations?

Figure 7.10 shows that, despite an increase in negative perceptions of Congress (interference with the president and waste of time in debate), from 2008 to 2009 there was also an increase in the perception that laws passed by Congress are important.




Figure 7.10 - Attitudes towards the performance of Congress, 2008-2009

This look at the three powers ends with an examination of the justice system. First, trust in the justice system had appeared among those that occupied first place among countries included in the 2008 comparative study. Figure 7.11 shows that this level is above the midway line of 50 points on a scale of 0 to 100. Furthermore, one can see that the level of trust in the justice system has remained stable.




Figure 7.11 - Trust in the judiciary, 2004-2009

Likewise, trust in the high courts has been amongst the highest in the list of countries studied in 2008. Figure 7.12 shows that these levels of trust have remained above the midway mark of 50 in a scale of 1 to 100. The Figure shows that, whereas trust in the Constitutional Court has remained constant, with a slight increase over the past two years, trust in the Supreme Court of Justice has suffered a slight (but significant) descent from 2008 to 2009.




Figure 7.12 - Trust in the High Courts, 2004-2009

Figure 7.13 shows the level of trust in the three branches of power (national government⁶, Congress and the Supreme Court) over a period of time. Here we see that, after a considerable increase in trust in these institutions (especially in the Court and in Congress) from 2007 to 2008, these last two branches of power are precisely the ones that have suffered a clear descent, as far as levels of trust are concerned, from 2008 to 2009.




Figure 7.13 - Trust in Government, Congreso and the Supreme Court of Justice, 2004-2009

⁶ The question on trust in the president only began to be asked from 2008.

Attitudes counter to liberal democracy

We already saw, in an earlier chapter, that Colombians combine high system support with low political tolerance. That is, they fall into the category we call *authoritarian stability*. In this section we want to take a closer look at these attitudes, which we could consider to be counter to liberal democracy.

Despite what occurred recently in Honduras, threats of military coups seem to be a thing of the past. However, there does exist in the region a risk of excessive concentration of power in the hands of a strong executive. One of the most serious expressions of this phenomenon would be the unilateral closing down by the government of key institutions, such as Congress or the high courts. That is why we have included the following two questions:

JC15. Do you think a sufficient reason could ever exist for the president to close Congress? Or do you think that such a reason could never exist?

JC16. Do you think a sufficient reason could exist for the president to dissolve the Constitutional Court? Or do you think such a reason could never exist?

Naturally, such attitudes on the part of citizens are not necessarily going to bring about self-coups orchestrated by presidents. However, we could conclude that a country with a high proportion of citizens who believe that sufficient reasons could exist to justify a president shutting down Congress or dissolving the Constitutional Court, is a country where an attempt by the executive to do either of these things would not meet with a reaction on the part of the citizens in defense of the institutions, and could therefore lead to a breakdown in the separation of powers.

Figure 7.14 shows that, despite a slight decrease in the proportion of people who would justify the closing down of the legislative body, the numbers are still worrying. Almost three out of every ten Colombians think that in certain circumstances the president could close down Congress, while almost one in every four would justify closing down the Constitutional Court. These proportions, in comparative studies of recent years, show Colombia to occupy one of the highest places on the continent in this regard.




Figure 7.14 - Support for shutting down Congress and the Constitucional Court, 2005-2009

Figure 7.15 shows that one in every three Colombians says he or she is adverse to the separation of powers; that is to say, a great number of Colombians answered “yes” to one of the two questions mentioned above (or to both). We note a decrease in this proportion from 2007 to 2008, but the proportion remained stable over the past year.




Figure 7.15 - Aversion to separation of powers, 2005-2009

In order to examine the characteristics of those who express attitudes adverse to the separation of powers, we built a statistical model whose dichotomous dependent variable was coded in the following way: the number 1 represented the respondent saying “yes” to any one of the two questions, and 0 if he or she said “no”. We included as predictors the sociodemographic characteristics, the ideological position, the rate of approval of the president’s performance, satisfaction with public municipal services, sociotropic and egotropic perceptions of the economy, and the indexes of victimization by crime, corruption and the armed conflict.

Table 7.3 in the Appendix to this chapter shows the results of the model. In Figure 7.16 (below) we see that older people are more prone to justify the closing down of Congress and/or of the Constitutional Court. Likewise, those who have been victims, in one way or another, of the country’s armed conflict are more likely to express attitudes against the separation of powers.




Figure 7.16 - Factors which influence the probability of being adverse to separation of powers

As from the 2008 study we included in the questionnaire a series of items that helped in examining citizens' attitudes regarding basic principles of liberal democracy. The questions, which were posed again in 2009, were the following:

<p>Bearing in mind the country's present situation, I want you to tell me, using the card, to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.</p>	<p>Note 1-7, 8 = NS/NR</p>
<p>POP101. For the country to progress, the president should place limits on the right of opposition political parties to express themselves or to have a vote. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>POP102. If Congress interferes with the government's performance, our presidents ought to close down Congress. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>POP103. If the Constitutional Court interferes with the government's performance, our presidents should ignore it. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>POP107. The people should govern directly, and not through elected representatives. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	
<p>POP113. People who do not agree with the majority represent a threat to the country. To what extent do you agree or disagree?</p>	

Figure 7.17 shows the average answers for 2008 and 2009, converted into a scale of 0 to 100. As can be seen in the Figure, the average level for all these attitudes is slightly below the midway mark of 50. It is important (and encouraging) to note that the level of agreement with the statement that those who were not in the majority represent a threat to the country has decreased significantly over the past year.




Figure 7.17 - Attitudes counter to liberal democracy, 2008-2009

By combining the questions asked in POP101, POP102, POP103, POP107 and POP113, we can create an index of attitudes counter to liberal democracy⁷. According to this index, on a scale of 0 to 100, attitudes counter to liberal democracy went down two points from 2008 to 2009. As shown in Figure 7.18, this decrease has been significant in the Atlantic and Pacific regions.




Figure 7.18 - Index of attitudes counter to liberal democracy, 2008-2009

⁷ This scale has a reliability of $\alpha = .70$.

As usual, we explored the characteristics which influence attitudes counter to liberal democracy. The model includes the usual sociodemographic factors, as well as perceptions of the national and personal economies, the ideological position, the approval rate for the president’s performance and party affiliation.

In Table 7.4 of the Appendix to this chapter we show the results of this statistical model. As seen on the table, and is illustrated in Figure 7.19, among sociodemographic factors only education level has an influence on attitudes counter to liberal democracy. On the other hand, both approval of the president’s performance and political party affiliation have significant effects on these attitudes, as will be seen in what follows.




Figure 7.19 - Factors which influence attitudes counter to liberal democracy

In the first place Figure 7.20 shows that less well educated people tend to have attitudes that give less importance to the principles of liberal democracy.




Figure 7.20 - Attitudes counter to liberal democracy according to education level

On the other hand, those who are satisfied with the president’s performance tend to have more liberal attitudes (Figure 7.21).




Figure 7.21 - Attitudes counter to liberal democracy according to presidential approval

Finally, as we found in previous years studies, those who are close to the Polo Democrático Alternativo tend to show more respect for the principles of liberal democracy. The same can be said of those who identify with any party apart from the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the Partido de la U, Cambio Radical or PDA, as shown in Figure 7.22.




Figure 7.22 - Attitudes counter to liberal democracy according to party affiliation, 2009

Appendix

Table 7.3 - Factors which influence the probability of being adverse to the separation of powers

	Coefficient	Err. est.
Woman	-0,101	-0.14
Age	0,018***	0
Education level	0,018	-0.02
Wealth	-0,072	-0.05
Size of lace	0,007	-0.05
Ideological position	-0,007	-0.03
Presidential approval	0,004	0
Satisfaction with services	-0,000	0
Situation of national economy	-0,002	0
Situation of personal economy	0,004	0
Victim of crime	0,001	0
Victim of corruption	0,128	-0.15
Victim of the conflict	0,259*	-0.12
Constant	-1,583**	-0.48
F	1.868	
N	1112	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 7.4 - Factors which influence attitudes counter to liberal democracy

	Coefficients	Err. est.
Education level	-1,413***	-0.16
Woman	0,963	-1.62
Age	-0,133**	-0.04
Wealth	0,028	-0.4
Size of place	0,348	-0.49
National economic situation	-0,017	-0.03
Personal economic situation	0,036	-0.03
Ideological position	-0,022	-0.3
Presidential approval	0,164***	-0.03
Liberal	-2,523	-2.26
Conservative	-3,599	-2.51
Polo	-12,288***	-2.98
La U	-1,375	-2.16
Cambio Radical	6,933	-5.55
Other	-13,344*	-5.7
Constant	52,096***	-3.34
R-squared	0.146	
N	1248	

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 8. Political Parties and Electoral Behavior

In this chapter we analyze the relationship between citizens and the political parties. First we examine what proportion of Colombians feels close to a particular party and we inquire about which parties are the ones the respondents feel a certain identity with, and to what degree. Also, the chapter studies Colombians' experiences with practices such as clientelism and the buying of votes.

Party affiliation

We begin our analysis of party affiliation with the following question:

VB10. At the present time, do you identify with a particular party? (Yes/No)

In 2008 the proportion of Colombians who identified with a particular party is low in comparison with that of many other countries on the continent. From 2008 to 2009 this proportion became significantly less, as can be seen in Figure 8.1. A little less than one out of every four Colombians felt some identity with a particular political party.




Figure 8.1 - Identification with a political party, 2006-2009

The previous year, the inhabitants of the Atlantic coastal region were the ones who expressed the highest levels of identity with particular parties. In this region the proportion of those who felt close to a particular party was now significantly less than before. The same is true of the Pacific region, as one can see in Figure 8.2.




Figure 8.2 - Identification with a political party by region, 2008-2009

Now then, those who expressed feelings of identity with a particular party were asked which one. This question was left half-open (that is, it allowed for a spontaneous response, with no interpretation of the options), and it gave the distribution which appears in Figure 8.3 (below). As can be seen in that Figure, the Partido de la U (31%) is the party with which the greatest number of Colombians identified, confirming a tendency that was announced as from the 2008 study. In second place was the Liberal Party (28%), followed by the Conservative Party (20%). The Polo Democrático Alternativo (13%) occupied fourth place.




Figure 8.3 - Party affiliation, 2009

If we compare party affinities from 2008 to 2009 (Figure 8.4), we see a notable increase on the part of the Partido de la U as a result of President Uribe’s great popularity seven years after taking office. One can observe, too, a notable comeback by the Conservative Party, which also belongs to the government’s coalition. The rise of these two parties has been to the detriment of Polo Democrático Alternativo and, especially, of the Liberal Party, which is the most adversely affected by this fluidity in party identities.




Figure 8.4 - Party affiliation, 2008-2009

Figure 8.5 shows that the Partido de la U is particularly strong in the Atlantic region, in the former Nacional Territorios and in the Central region. The Liberal Party still maintains an important presence in the coastal regions (Pacific and Atlantic), while the Conservative Party dominates in the former National Territories. As we found in earlier studies, the stronghold of Polo Democrático is Bogotá, the capital of the Republic.




Figure 8.5 - Party affiliation by region, 2009

Figure 8.6, in turn, shows that Partido de la U is relatively strong, whatever the respondent's place of residence, although this party predominates in rural areas (where the traditional parties used to predominate) and in the large cities. By way of contrast, as mentioned earlier, those whose affinities are with Polo Democrático are concentrated mainly in the capital. Finally, the Liberal party maintains its dominion only in middle-sized cities.




Figure 8.6 - Party affiliation according to size of the place, 2009

Finally, Figure 8.7 shows that the proportion of those who identify with the traditional parties is inversely proportional to the education level of the respondent. Exactly the opposite is true in the case of the Polo Democrático, a mainly urban party with adherents from the more educated stratas of the population (especially those with higher education).




Figure 8.7 - Party affiliation according to education level, 2009

When we examine the average number of years of education received by those who identify with each one of the parties (and those who do not identify with any party), we see that those who feel affinity with a party different from the large parties are generally the better educated, followed by those who are closest to the Polo Democrático Alternativo. At the other extreme, the less well educated, on average, tend to identify with the traditional parties (Figure 8.8).




Figure 8.8 - Education level according to party affiliation, 2009

We also asked the following question of those who expressed a sense of identity with a particular political party:

VB12. Would you say that your feelings of identity with that party are very weak? weak? neither weak nor strong? strong? or very strong?

The responses were converted to a scale of 0 to 100, and the average for 2009 was 65.3, practically identical with the previous year’s result. In fact, when we analyze this index for each one of the parties, we see that, on the one hand, those who identify with parties different from the large ones (“Other party”) express themselves with greater intensity, followed by those who identify with the Partido de la U. On the other hand, we see that intensity only increases significantly in the case of those who are close to the Polo Democrático, as shown in Figure 8.9.





Figure 8.9 - Intensity of party affiliation, by party identification, 2008-2009

Ideology and party affiliation

As has been customary in these studies, *AmericasBarometer* captures the ideological position of the respondents by means of the following question:

L1. On this page there is a scale of 1 to 10, going from left to right, where the number 1 represents the Left and 10 represents the Right. A lot of people today, when talking of political tendencies, speak of one’s sympathies being with the Left, or conversely, with the Right. In accordance with what the words “Left” and “Right” mean for you when you are thinking about political views, where would you place yourself on this scale? Indicate the box which you think is closest to your own position.



Comparative studies in recent years show Colombians to be to the right of the general consensus over the continent as a whole. However, the mean political position has been moving slightly to the Left, as shown in Figure 8.10.




Figure 8.10 - Ideological position, 2004-2009

Figure 8.11, in turn, indicates that those who identify with the Polo Democrático are clearly to the left of the ideological spectrum, whereas sympathizers with the remaining parties seem to be indistinguishable from one another in terms of their position on this scale.




Figure 8.11 - Ideological position according to party affiliation, 2009

Perceptions of political parties

As was shown in Figure 7.4 of the preceding chapter, the institution which receives the least level of trust in this year's study is that which embraces the political parties. The 2008 comparative study showed, however, that Colombian parties are very far from being the ones most lacking in people's confidence among political parties on the continent taken as a whole. In any case, as shown in Figure 8.12, Colombians' trust in parties diminished significantly from 2008 to 2009, which undoubtedly is related to a falling off in party affiliation, something which was demonstrated above in this same chapter.




Figure 8.12 - Trust in political parties, 2004-2009

Likewise, as can be seen in Figure 8.13, trust in the elections has gone down considerably from 2008 to 2009, reaching its lowest level since this series of studies began in 2004.




Figure 8.13 - Trust in elections, 2004-2009

Apart from the question of trust, as from the 2008 study *AmericasBarometer* has included a series of questions aimed at exploring a little more in depth the perception of citizens as regards political parties. Our questions are the following:

EPP1. Thinking of political parties in general, to what extent do you think the political parties in Colombia are a good representation of voters?

EPP3. Do you think the political parties take heed of people like us?

EPP2. How corrupt do you think the political parties are?

As regards these indexes, Colombian parties made a relatively good showing in the 2008 study by comparison with those of other countries in the region. As shown in Figure 8.14, the loss of trust can be explained, at least partly, by a significant increase in the perception that political parties are corrupt.




Figure 8.14 - Perceptions of political parties, 2008-2009

The 2008 study showed that Colombians take little part in the life of the parties. As shown in Figure 8.15, only one out of every six respondents said he or she had attended a political party meeting at least once or twice during the preceding year. Also, this percentage has been decreasing over the past two years.




Figure 8.15 - Attendance at political party meetings, 2004-2009

When we examine behavior broken down according to party affiliation, we realize that, as is evident in Figure 8.16, people who are close to Cambio Radical are the ones who most attend party meetings, especially in 2009 when two out of every three such people said they had attended meetings at least once or twice over the past year. On the other hand, it is worth noting that those whose affinities are with the Polo Democrático have participated considerably less than before in meetings of a political nature.




Figure 8.16 - Attendance at political party meetings according to party affiliation, 2008-2009

Electoral processes

As from 2007, *AmericasBarometer* has included the following questions in the Colombian questionnaire in order to explore empirically a number of phenomena related to armed proseletism carried out by illegal armed groups around the country:

COLVB25A. Have you ever been pressured under threat to vote for a particular candidate or party? (Yes/No)

COLVB25B. Has any member of your family or close friend ever been pressured under threat to vote for a particular candidate or party? (Yes/No)

COLVB25C. Have you ever been pressured under threat to vote NO? (Yes/No)

COLVB25D. Has any member of your family or close friend ever been pressured under threat to note No (Yes/No)

Analysts tend to associate threats to vote for a particular candidate with paramilitary groups, whereas sabotage against voting is more associated with the *modus operandi* of the guerrillas. Since these questions imply distrust and a certain risk, we included in each case, as well as the question related to the direct experience of the respondent, another reference to some family member or close friend.

Figure 8.17 shows that from 2008 to 2009 there has been an increase in the percentage of Colombians who report having been threatened to vote for a particular candidate. (Note: when the question includes family members or close friends, no significant change in the percentage is recorded). On the other hand, Figure 8.18 shows the levels of threat not to vote, which did not undergo any statistically significant change between 2008 and 2009.




Figure 8.17 - Threats to respondents and their relatives to vote for a particular candidate, 2007-2009




Figure 8.18 - Threats to respondents and their relatives NOT to vote, 2007-2009

This 2009 study also included a range of questions related to clientelist practices. The first of these questions was the following:

CLIEN1. In recent years, and thinking of election campaigns, has any candidate or anyone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, a meal, or some other benefit in exchange for your vote or support for that candidate or party? Does this occur frequently? rarely? or never?

- Frequently1 [CONTINUE]
- Rarely2 [CONTINUE]
- Never3 [GO ON TO CLIEN3]
- DK/NR8 [GO ON TO CLIEN3]

Figure 8.19 shows that almost one out of every five Colombians says he or she has received (either frequently or rarely) an offer of money or material benefits in exchange for his or her vote.




Figure 8.19 - Offer to buy vote, 2009

Those who answered “Frequently” or “Rarely” to the previous question were then asked:

CLIEN2 Did that offer incline you more or less to vote for the particular candidate or party who made the offer of some material benefit?

- More inclined.....1
- Less inclined.....2
- Neither more nor less inclined.....3 **[Don't read]**
- DK/NR.....8
- INAP.....9 (answered 3 or 8 to CLIEN1)

Although almost half of the respondents (47%) reported a counterproductive effect of the offer to buy a vote, almost one out of every three Colombians said the offer of money or material benefits to vote for somebody seemed attractive to them, as shown in Figure 8.20. This percentage is undoubtedly at least noteworthy, if not worrying.




Figure 8.20 - Efficacy of the buying of votes, 2009

Finally, all respondents were asked the following question:

CLIEN3. In election campaigns, did any candidate or someone from a political party threaten you or your community with depriving you of some service or benefit which you are enjoying at present if you refused to vote for that particular candidate or party? Did this occur frequently? rarely? or never?

- Frequently.....1
- Rarely.....2
- Never.....3
- DK/NR.....8

Figure 8.21 shows there is a minimal incidence of this type of practice, at least according to our respondents.




Figure 8.21 - Electoral blackmail, 2009

Chapter 9. The Armed Conflict

We already saw how the *AmeritasBarometer* questionnaire opens with a question on what respondents consider to be the country’s most serious problem at the present time. The responses we could relate to problems of security, along with the frequency of the responses (in absolute or in relative terms) are those that appear in Table 9.1:

Table 9.1 - Problems related to security, 2009

Problem	Frequency	%
Violence	265	17.89%
Armed conflict	63	4.25%
War on terrorism	55	3.71%
Kidnapping	34	2.30%
Delinquency, crime	31	2.09%
Security (lack of)	25	1.69%
Drug traffic	21	1.42%
Terrorism	15	1.01%
Human rights, violations of	8	0.54%
Gangs	2	0.14%
Impunity	1	0.07%
Total	520	35.11%

As we already mentioned, the percentage of Colombians who think security is the country’s most serious problem has gone down over the past year, as shown in Figure 9.1.




Figure 9.1 - Security as the country’s most serious problem, 2004-2009

This falling off of the percentage of people worried about problems of security has occurred in all of the country's regions, especially in the Eastern region, as shown in Figure 9.2.




Figure 9.2 - Security as the country's most serious problem, by region, 2008-2009

There appears to be a relation between pointing to security as the main problem, on the one hand, and the rate of approval of the government’s performance on the other. In fact, as shown in Figure 9.3, those who think this is Colombia’s main problem at the present time are people who give higher marks to the president on his performance than those who believe there are other more pressing problems.




Figure 9.3 - Presidential approval according to whether the most serious problem is security, 2009

Victimization due to the conflict

As in previous studies, *AmericasBarometer* includes a range of questions related to different circumstances in which the families of respondents may have been victims of the armed conflict. The questions are as follows:

	Yes	No	NS/ NR
WC1. Have you lost a member of your family or a close relative as a consequence of the country's armed conflict? Or has some member of your family disappeared due to the conflict?	1	2	8
WC2. Has any member of your family become a refugee or had to abandon his or her normal dwelling place as a result of the country's conflict?	1	2	8
WC3. Has any member of your family had to leave the country as a result of the conflict?	1	2	8

Figure 9.4 shows that the percentage of victimization has remained relatively stable over the years of this study.




Figure 9.4 - Different forms of victimization due to the conflict, 2004-2009

Figure 9.5 shows that about one out of every three Colombians has come into contact, directly and painfully, with the armed conflict. It is worth noting that this is a measure of victimization *over the past year*. And since the question does not include any limitation of time, the index does not constitute a dynamic measurement of the conflict’s impact, but is rather a way of examining to what extent the political violence typical of the country’s recent history has left its mark on the citizens. In this sense, it is even more worthwhile noting that the percentage has not increased over the past few years.




Figure 9.5 - Victimization due to the conflict, 2004-2009

As in previous years, we also explored who the victims think are the perpetrators of these acts. That is why we included in the questionnaire the following question with responses that are not mutually exclusive (that is, a victim may point to more than one of possible persons or organizations responsible for the act):

ASK ONLY IF THE ANSWER TO QUESTIONS A WC1, WC2 o WC3 WAS "YES". IF NOT, GO TO COLPAZ1A. What group or groups were responsible for these acts? [DO NOT READ THE ALTERNATIVES. THE RESPONDENT CAN CHOOSE MORE THAN ONE OPTION. NOTE ALL THE OPTIONS MENTIONED O (8) NS/NR]	Yes	No	NS/NR	Inap. (was not victim)
COLWC4A. Guerrillas	1	2	8	9
COLWC4B. Paramilitaries	1	2	8	9
COLWC4C. Exparamilitaries who have regrouped	1	2	8	9
COLWC4D. The army	1	2	8	9
COLWC4E. The police	1	2	8	9
COLWC4F. Other	1	2	8	9

As in previous studies, the guerrillas are the group with the highest percentage mentioned by victims of the conflict (52%), followed by paramilitary groups (38%), as shown in Figure 9.6.




Figure 9.6 - Perpetrators of acts of victimization, 2009

Figure 9.7 shows that the percentage of mentions of the guerrillas as perpetrators of acts of victimization due to the conflict went down considerably between 2005 and 2006, since when the percentage has remained relatively stable. Likewise, the percentage of mentions of paramilitary groups as responsible has remained stable over the five years during which we included these questions in the *AmericasBarometer* questionnaire.




Figure 9.7 - Guerrillas and paramilitaries as perpetrators, 2005-2009

We have seen no apparent important change in indexes measuring the effects of the conflict on citizens. Figure 9.8, however, shows that the percentage of victims of the conflict who are unable (or do not wish) to identify the perpetrator of acts has decreased over recent years. This could mean that the perpetrators are more clearly present in the awareness of the victimized population. A more convincing explanation, however, could be that this index shows how conditions of security have improved, particularly for victims of the conflict, to the extent that this decrease shows that less people than before are afraid to mention the particular group they believe to be responsible for the acts of which they were victims.




Figure 9.8 - Victims who do not identify the perpetrator, 2005-2009

Perceptions of the conflict

As usual, we began this section by examining the level of citizens’ trust in illegal armed groups (FARC, ELN and paramilitaries). As in previous years, trust in these groups is far less than that placed even in the most discredited political institutions (which this year are the political parties; see Figure 7.4 in a preceding chapter). Also, as shown in Figure 9.9, this trust has decreased even further, reaching its lowest level of the five years during which the question has been asked. Trust in paramilitary groups particularly has been reduced to at least half its incredibly high level in 2005.




Figure 9.9 - Trust in illegal armed actors, 2005-2009

As in previous years, the great majority of Colombians believe that the best solution to the conflict with both paramilitaries and guerrillas would be a negotiated one (Figure 9.10). However, this percentage has decreased slightly from 2008 to 2009 – a decrease which is significant in the case of possible negotiations with the paramilitaries.




Figure 9.10 - Support for a negotiated solution with guerrillas and paramilitaries, 2004-2009

Finally, Figure 9.11 shows that those who have been victims of some form of violence related to the conflict tend to have more negative attitudes vis-à-vis a negotiated solution with either guerrillas or paramilitaries.




Figure 9.11 - Support for a negotiated solution according to victimization, 2009

APPENDICES

Appendix A. Technical Description of the Sample

Sample design¹

The sample designed for Colombia included all non-institutionalized adults; that is, it excluded people in jail, schools, hospitals and military bases. It was a stratified random sample. Stratification ensured the inclusion of all the country's most important geographic regions: the Pacific, Atlantic, Central and Eastern regions and the former National Territories. The sample was sub-stratified to include cities with more, or with less, than 300,000 inhabitants. Finally the sample was also sub-stratified into urban and rural areas.

We used projections to 2009 of the 2005 Population Census, Colombia's most recent census. According to this census, 21% of the population lives in the Atlantic region, 17% in the Pacific region, 25% in the Central region, 18% in the Eastern region, 3% in the former National Territories and 16% in Bogotá.

The sample's selection was by multiple stages. The first stage was the municipality, then the census sector, then the section and finally the block, the dwelling and the household. We used a system of quotas per sex and age to select the respondent within each household.

1,493 people were interviewed. Technically our margin of error was $\pm 2.53\%$. This means that if one were to take multiple samples in Colombia, 95% of them would reflect the opinions of the population with a precision of no less than $\pm 2.53\%$. Nonetheless, our sample was stratified and done by clusters. This means that, while stratification increased the sample's precision, to some extent the use of clusters, which we included to control the costs of field work, contributed to reducing the sample's precision. Of course other factors, apart from the sample, can reduce the sample's precision, such as the rate of non-responses, errors in selecting respondents, misunderstanding of questions, among others. However, in terms of our sample's technique, an error margin of $\pm 2.53\%$ is still very good.

Table A.1 is a summary of the standard errors and design effects for variables of age and education level. The design effects (DEF) indicate the efficiency of the design by clusters in comparison with a simple random design. A DEF of 1 indicates that the same variations are obtained in both designs; that is, that the design by clusters was as efficient as a simple random design. If the DEF is over 1, this means that the design by clusters produced a more varied result than that produced by a simple random design. If DEF is under 1, this means there is even less variation in the cluster design than in the simple random design.

¹ This section and the one that follows were adapted from the 2004 Costa Rica report, "Cultura democrática, seguridad ciudadana y capital social en Costa Rica", by Luis Rosero-Bixby and Jorge Vargas-Cullell.

Table A.1 - Standard errors and design effects for certain variables

Mean	Estimated	Standard error	95% confidence interval		DEF
q2 (age)	36.5981	0.21724	36.17	37.02	0.32864
ed (education)	9.3034	0.26538	8.78	9.82	2.8988

In accordance with the above Table, the design by clusters for this survey was efficient, with the exception of education, where DEF was under 1. Standard errors were very moderate. Table A.2 shows the standard errors and DEF per variable q2 (age) by cluster (region). The DEFs, as well as the standard errors, indicate that the design by clusters for the regions was more efficient than a simple random design.

Table A.2 - Standard errors and design effects by age, by region

Mean Subpopul.	Estimated	Standard error	95% confidence interval		DEF
q2 (age)					
Atlantic	36.2810	0.47150	35.36	37.21	0.38679
Bogotá	36.5240	0.54570	35.45	37.59	0.31672
Central	36.3352	0.39189	35.57	37.10	0.26849
Eastern	36.9925	0.61511	35.79	38.20	0.41553
Pacific	36.9084	0.52155	35.89	37.93	0.29978
Former Territ.	Nat. 37.1111	1.11807	34.92	39.30	0.32106

Results of our sample and description of respondents

The probabilistic sample design, as well as the availability of a good sampling frame, are fair conditions to expect that the interviewed group is representative of the Colombian population. However, due to the effects of random errors and inevitable distortions of the sample design, the sample could deviate from the characteristics of the population it represents. It could include biases that should be reported. Table A.3 allows us to answer the question: how representative is the sample of the population? Below we compare some characteristics of the sample with the 2005 census.

Table A.3 - Sample vs. 2005 Population Census (over 18 years)

Characteristics	Census of 2005	Survey in Colombia
N	27,184,228	1,493
% of men	48	49
% over 30	68	60
% unmarried	30	36
% married or in civil union	56	55
% primary education	38	25
% secondary education	37	48
% post secondary education	25	23
% in Atlantic region	21	22
% in Bogotá	16	15
% in Central Region	25	24
% in Eastern Region	18	18
% in Pacific region	17	18
% in former National Territories	3	4

We observe that there is congruity between the sample of this survey and the 1993 Census. Some characteristics such as age, gender, and regional residence are virtually identical. There is a slight deviation in the percentages of married and single people. And finally, there is a gap in the three education variables, where the widest is for people with secondary education, rising from 37 percent in the 2005 census to 48 percent in the 2008 survey.

Because in general, the sample is representative of the population, there is no need to use weights. Therefore, the sample is self-weighted.

Table A.4 - Sample characteristics by gender

compares the characteristics by gender.

Table A.4 - Sample characteristics by gender

Characteristics	Total	Men	Women
N	1,493 (100%)	50%	50%
Average age	36,60	36,93	36,28
% married or in civil union	55,06	52,57	57,48

We used gender and age quotas to select respondents. Therefore, our percentages of men and women are very similar to each other. Their ages are also very similar, differing by only one year. There is a slight difference with respect to the percentage of married or legal partners (“*union libre*”), where women have a slightly higher percentage (57.48%) than men.

Technical Description of the Sample Design

Universe

The survey universe has national coverage of adults living in all the country’s six regions: Bogota, Atlantic, Pacific, Central, and Eastern regions, and the former National Territories. The universe is also comprised of adults living in urban and rural areas.

The universe was divided in two sectors: one of cities with greater than 300,000 inhabitants, and the other of cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants.

Population

The sample was circumscribed to all non-institutionalized adults; in other words, it excludes people living in jails, schools, hospitals, and military bases. Private households in these areas were contemplated.

Final Selection Unit

Because the questionnaire included questions not limited to the respondent but also to other household members, the statistical unit of observation was the household. The respondent could only live in one household.

Because each household belongs to a housing unit, sometimes shared by more than one household (often relatively stable over time), each housing unit was selected as the final selection unit.

Sampling Method

We chose the probabilistic, stratified, multistage method with randomized selection of units at each stage. First, the sample is stratified by city [municipal] size (cities with more and less than 300,000 inhabitants), then by region and area (rural and urban).

It is multistage sampling because within each municipal area, it starts with primary sampling units (sectors), followed by secondary units (sections), then third units (blocks) and final sampling units (clusters of housing units) of 6 to 8 in urban areas and 10 to 12 in rural areas. In each housing unit, the surveyor selected only one household as an Observation Unit.

The respondent was selected according to the age and gender quotas. In each block, the surveyor had to include at least one man and one woman in the following age groups:

- 18 to 27 years old
- 28 to 40 years old
- Over 40 years old

Each surveyor was assigned one specific block. Once in the area, interviewers listed the first 20 housing units they encountered. They had instructions to do a minimum of 8 surveys of the 20 housing units listed, balancing the gender and age quotas. The selection method was chosen according to the following considerations:

We needed representative samples at the following levels:

- Nationally
- First Stage Strata:
 - o Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants
 - o Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants
- Second Stage Strata:
 - o Bogotá
 - o Atlantic Region
 - o Pacific Region
 - o Eastern Region
 - o Central Region
 - o Former National Territories
- Third Stage Strata:
 - o Urban Area
 - o Rural Area
- Domains:
 - o Cities with more than 300,000 inhabitants (obliged selection)
 - o Cities with less than 300,000 inhabitants

On top of this, the following criteria were followed

- For each stage, we calculated margins of error that corresponded to minimum quality standards
- We sought to facilitate the operability of the interviews
- We worked with the best and most up-to-date sampling frame available for each municipality (population census, cartography, current housing unit listings, among others)

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame is constituted by the updated cartographic inventory and housing unit lists obtained from the 1993 census. The *Centro Nacional de Consultoría* obtained the 2003 versions from the *Departamento Nacional de Estadística* (DANE; National Statistics Department).

Calculations by Strata

The sample is composed of 193 sampling points: 160 urban and 33 rural, distributed over 53 municipalities in 26 out of the 32 departments of Colombia.

Sample Sizes, Confidence Level, and Margins of Error

The confidence levels anticipated for the national sample was 95 percent, with a margin of error of 2.5 percent, assuming a 50/50 proportion in the dichotomous variables.

The margins of error for a 95% confidence level appear in Table A.5:

Table A.5 - Sample size and margins of error – Level of confidence 95%

Strata Regions	Sample size	Margin of error M.A.S.	% M.P.C.
Atlantic	324	5,44	5,96
Bogotá	229	6,48	7,09
Central	358	5,18	5,67
Easternl	266	6,01	6,58
Pacific	262	6,05	6,63
Nat. territories	54	13,34	14,61
Areas			
Urban	1098	2,96	3,24
Rural	395	4,93	5,40
Total country	1493	2,54	2,78

Survey Team

The CNC involved its five branches (Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga) to ensure a high quality survey in the least possible time. Due to the country's current security situation, we were advised to remain as little time as possible in most areas visited, which complicated the operations.

Due to the complexity of the questionnaire, we used our most experienced surveyors, many of which have more than 15 years of field experience.

The CNC involved a total of 101 staff members, distributed as follows:

Table A.6 - Personnel involved in the project

Activity	Total personnel
Field Coordinators	15
Supervisors	8
Interviewers	45
Supervisors of field work quality	12
Codifiers	7
Digitators	7
Data verifiers	7
Subtotal field and digitation	101
Directive y professional staff	5
Administrative personnel	3
Total team personnel	109

Additional information on the sample

Table A.7 - Universe, total population by region and urban and rural areas

Colombia: total population, projection year 2008			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	7.013.089	2.599.149	9.612.238
Bogotá	7.243.698	15.899	7.259.597
Central	8.311.480	3.014.337	11.325.817
Eastern	5.768.645	2.637.920	8.406.565
Pacific	5.276.055	2.461.009	7.737.064
Nacional territories	285.130	351.347	636.477
Total	33.898.097	11.079.661	44.977.758

Percentage distribution (%)			
Region	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	73,0	27,0	100
Bogotá	99,8	0,2	100
Central	73,4	26,6	100
Eastern	68,6	31,4	100
Pacific	68,2	31,8	100
Nacional territories	44,8	55,2	100
Total	75,4	24,6	100

Table A.8 - Size and distribution of the sample by strata

	Urban	Rural	Total
Atlantic	241	83	324
- de 300,000 inhabitants	111	83	194
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	130	0	130
Bogotá	229	0	229
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	229	0	229
Central	262	96	358
- de 300,000 inhabitants	112	96	208
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	150	0	150
Eastern	170	96	266
- de 300,000 inhabitants	110	96	206
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	60	0	60
Pacific	178	84	262
- de 300,000 inhabitants	88	84	172
+ de 300,000 inhabitants	90	0	90
National territories	18	36	54
- de 300,000 inhabitants	18	36	54
Total	1098	395	1493

Geographic location of the sample




Figure A.1 - Distribution of the country by strata (regions)

Final comments on the survey fieldwork

About the questionnaire

The questionnaire was long, 55 minutes on average, but in general the respondents were willing to answer the questions and we had very few uncompleted interviews.

About the fieldwork

The team met with no serious problems of disruption to law and order, so that we were able to complete the gathering of all interviews from every municipality we had contemplated as part of our sample.

As in previous years, the CNC would like to extend its gratitude to all staff members involved in this study, especially to the brave men and women who defied security warnings and assumed great risk to accomplish very good work.

Appendix B. Letter of Informed Consent

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been chosen at random to participate in a public opinion survey financed by the Vanderbilt University. I am here on behalf of the National consultancy Center to request an interview with you which will take 30 or 40 minutes of your time.

The principal aim of this study is to learn about people's opinion regarding different aspects of the country's situation.

Your participation in the study is voluntary. You may refrain from answering some of the questions or you may terminate the interview at any time. Your responses to our questions will be totally confidential and anonymous.

If you have any queries regarding this study, please contact Cristina Querubín at Centro Nacional de Consultoría (telephone +571-13394888), who is the person responsible for this project.

Do you wish to participate?

Appendix C. Questionnaire in Spanish

Colombia 2009 Versión #19 IRB Approval: #090103

 <p>USAID DEL PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA</p>	 <p>observatorio de la democracia</p>	 <p>Universidad de los Andes Facultad de Ciencias Sociales</p>  <p>Centro Nacional de Consultoría.com</p>
 <p>Latin American Public Opinion Project LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina</p>	 <p>AmericasBarometer Barómetro de las Américas by LAPOP www.AmericasBarometer.org</p>	 <p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p>

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: COLOMBIA, 2009

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País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	PAIS	8
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	
YEAR. Año de la entrevista 2009	YEAR	2009
DOMINIO. Muestra nacional1 Muestra especial.....2		
ESTRATOPRI [COESTRA]: Estrato primario de la muestra Región Atlántica.....811 Bogotá.....812 Central.....813 Oriental.....814 Pacífica.....815 Territorios Nal.....816	ESTRATOPRI	8 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
PROV [COLDEPA]. Departamento: _____	PROV	8 <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM [ESTRASEC] [MUNICIPIO] _____	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UR [ESTRATER]. [Usar definición censal del país]	UR	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

Urbano.....1 Rural.....2		
COLCENTRO. Lugar: Corregimiento/Inspección....1 _____ Vereda.....2 _____ Cabecera municipal.....3 _____	COLCENTRO	
COLCENPOB. [=PSU rural] Centro poblado _____	COLCENPOB.	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
COLESTSOC. Estrato Socioeconómico: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rural sin estratificación.....7	COLESTSOC	
COLSECT. Sector: _____ Inap (rural, no hay sectores).... 9999	COLSECT	
COLSECC. Sección: _____ Inap (rural, no hay secciones).... 9999	COLSECC	
CLUSTER [COLMANZ]. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales] Manzana: _____ Inap (rural, no hay manzanas)...9999	CLUSTER	
TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar: Capital nacional (área metropolitana)...1 Ciudad grande.....2 Ciudad mediana.....3 Ciudad pequeña.....4 Área rural..... 5	TAMANO	<input type="checkbox"/>
IDIOMA. Idioma del cuestionario: Español.....1	IDIOMAQ	1
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		-----
Fecha de la entrevista día: ____ mes:____ año: 2009	FECHA	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR		

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): Hombre.....1 Mujer.....2	Q1	
COLFEN. Usando la Tarjeta de Fotos (de hombres o mujeres, según el caso), marque (sin preguntar ni mostrar la tarjeta) a cuál de las fotos se asemeja más el entrevistado 1.....2.....3.....4.....5 (mujeres) 6.....7.....8.....9.....10 (hombres)	COLFEN	

Anexo A.

LS3. Para comenzar, ¿en general, hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: **[Leer alternativas]**

Muy satisfecho.....1
 Algo satisfecho.....2
 Algo **insatisfecho**.....3
 Muy **insatisfecho**.....4
 NS/NR.....8

A4 [COA4]. Cambiando de tema, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país? [NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]			A4	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Agua, falta de	19	Impunidad	61	
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Inflación, altos precios	02	
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15	
Conflicto con países vecinos	62	Medio ambiente	10	
Corrupción	13	Migración	16	
Crédito, falta de	09	Narcotráfico	12	
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Pandillas	14	
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pobreza	04	
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Políticos, los	59	
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06	
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22	
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31	
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27	
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33	
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07	
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60	
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57	
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55	
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70	
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88	

[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días o casi todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

<p>SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?</p> <p>Muy buena.....1 Buena.....2 Ni buena, ni mala....3 Mala.....4 Muy mala.....5 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>SOCT1</p>	
<p>SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?</p> <p>Mejor.....1 Igual.....2 Peor.....3 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>SOCT2</p>	
<p>SOCT3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses la situación económica de Colombia será mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?</p> <p>Mejor.....1 Igual.....2 Peor.....3 NS...8</p>	<p>SOCT3</p>	
<p>IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala?</p> <p>Muy buena.....1 Buena.....2 Ni buena, ni mala....3 Mala.....4 Muy mala.....5 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>IDIO1</p>	
<p>IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?</p> <p>Mejor.....1 Igual.....2 Peor.....3 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>IDIO2</p>	
<p>IDIO3. ¿Considera usted que dentro de 12 meses su situación económica sería mejor, igual o peor que la de ahora?</p> <p>Mejor.....1 Igual.....2 Peor.....3</p>	<p>IDIO3</p>	

NS/NR.....8		
-------------	--	--

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.

¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No	NS/NR		
CP2. ¿A algún Congresista?	1	2	8	CP2	
CP4A. ¿Al Alcalde de su municipio?	1	2	8	CP4A	
CP4. ¿A algún ministerio, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	CP4	

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio...

NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? Sí...1 No....2 NS/NR...8	NP1	
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario o concejal del municipio durante los últimos 12 meses? Sí.....1 No.....2 [PASAR A SGL1] NS/NR.....8 [PASAR A SGL1]	NP2	
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? Sí.....1 No...2 NS/NR...8 Inap....9		

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS/NR	Inap., no hay servicio	
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que el municipio está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8		SGL1
SGL1A y hablando del servicio municipal de agua potable ¿Diría que el servicio es...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	SGL1A
COLSGL1B. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Salud que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLSGL1B

	Muy buenos	Buenos	Ni buenos, ni malos	Malos	Muy malos	NS/ NR	Inap., no hay servicio	
COLSGL1C. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Energía Eléctrica que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLSGL1C
SGL1D. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Recolección de Basura que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	SGL1D
COLSGL1E. ¿Diría usted que los servicios de Educación que el municipio le está dando a la gente son...? [leer las alternativas]	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	COLSGL1E

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/ NR		
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.	1	2	3	4	8	CP5	

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame qué tan frecuentemente asiste a reuniones de estas organizaciones: una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. **[Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/ NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores u organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13
CP20. ¿Reuniones de asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP20

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta A]

LS6. En esta tarjeta hay una escalera con sus escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón más bajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted. ...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?

00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	88	
Peor vida posible						Mejor vida posible					NS/NR	

LS6A. ¿En qué escalón diría usted que se encontraba dos años atrás?

LS6A

[RECOGER Tarjeta A]

COLSISBEN. ¿Está usted afiliado al SISBEN? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8		COLSISBEN
COLFAMACC. ¿Está usted inscrito en el programa "Familias en Acción"? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8		COLFAMACC
COLCONCOM. ¿Alguna vez ha participado en un Consejo Comunitario organizado por el presidente Uribe en su municipio? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8		COLCONCOM

IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] Muy confiable.....1 Algo confiable.....2 Poco confiable.....3 Nada confiable.....4 NS/NR.....8	IT1
--	------------

IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas.....1 Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás.....2 NS/NR.....8	IT1B
--	-------------

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta B]

L1. En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha donde 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1	
Izquierda										Derecha	(NS/NR=88)

[RECOGER Tarjeta B]

	Algunas veces	Casi nunca	Nunca	NS/NR	Inap.	
--	---------------	------------	-------	-------	-------	--

PROT2. ¿En los últimos doce meses , ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	1	2	3	8	9	PROT2
---	---	---	---	---	---	--------------

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias...? **[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]:**

	Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	NS/NR	
JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	1	2	8	JC1
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	1	2	8	JC4
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	1	2	8	JC10
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	1	2	8	JC12
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	1	2	8	JC13

	Sí podría haber	Nunca habría razón	NS/NR	
JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	1	2	8	JC15
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Constitucional o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	1	2	8	JC16

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Sí.....1 [sigua] No.....2 [Pasar a VIC1A] NS/NR..... 8 [Pasar a VIC1A]	VIC1
VIC2. ¿Qué tipo de acto delincencial sufrió? [Leer las alternativas] Robo sin agresión o amenaza física.....01 Robo con agresión o amenaza física.....02 Agresión física sin robo.....03	VIC2

Violación o asalto sexual.....04 Secuestro.....05 Daño a la propiedad.....06 Robo de la casa.....07 Desplazamiento forzado.....09 Extorsión.....10 Otro.....11 NS.....88 Inap (no víctima).....99		
VIC1A. ¿Ha sido otra persona que vive en su hogar víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? Sí.....1 [siguiente] No.....2 [Pasar a AOJ8] NS/NR..... 8 [Pasar a AOJ8]	VIC1A	
VIC2A. ¿Qué tipo de acto delictual sufrió esa persona? [Leer las alternativas] Robo sin agresión o amenaza física.....01 Robo con agresión o amenaza física.....02 Agresión física sin robo.....03 Violación o asalto sexual.....04 Secuestro.....05 Daño a la propiedad.....06 Robo de la casa.....07 Asesinato.....08 Desplazamiento forzado.....09 Extorsión.....10 Otro.....11 NS.....88 Inap (no víctima).....99	VIC2A	
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? Deben respetar las leyes siempre.....1 En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley.....2 NS/NR.....8	AOJ8	
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? Muy seguro.....1 Algo seguro.....2 Algo inseguro3 Muy inseguro4 NS/NR.....8	AOJ11	

	Mucho	Algo	Poco	Nada	NS/ NR		
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿Qué tanto cree Ud. que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	4	8	AOJ11A	
AOJ12. Si fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿Cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	4	8	AOJ12	
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por pandillas? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada?	1	2	3	4	8	AOJ17	

	Sí	No	NS/ NR		
WC1. ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufre el país? ¿o tiene un familiar desaparecido por el conflicto?	1	2	8	WC1	
WC2. ¿Y algún miembro de su familia tuvo que refugiarse o abandonar su lugar de vivienda por razones del conflicto que sufre el país?	1	2	8	WC2	
WC3. ¿Por razones del conflicto algún miembro de su familia tuvo que irse del país?	1	2	8	WC3	

PREGUNTAR SÓLO SI LA RESPUESTA A WC1, WC2 o WC3 FUE "SÍ". DE LO CONTRARIO, SALTAR A COLPAZ1A.

¿Qué grupo, o grupos fueron responsables de estos hechos? **[NO LEER LAS ALTERNATIVAS. EL ENCUESTADO PUEDE ELEGIR MAS DE UNA OPCION. ANOTAR TODAS LAS OPCIONES MENCIONADAS O (8) NS/NR]**

	Sí	No	NS/ NR	Inap. (no fue víctima)	
COLWC4A. La guerrilla	1	2	8	9	COLWC4A
COLWC4B. Los paramilitares	1	2	8	9	COLWC4B
COLWC4C. Exparamilitares que se han reagrupado	1	2	8	9	COLWC4C
COLWC4D. El ejército	1	2	8	9	COLWC4D
COLWC4E. La policía	1	2	8	9	COLWC4E
COLWC4F. Otro	1	2	8	9	COLWC4F

	Negociación	Uso de la fuerza militar	[No leer] Ambas	NS/NR	
COLPAZ1A. De las siguientes opciones para solucionar el conflicto con la guerrilla, ¿cuál cree que es la mejor? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	COLPAZ1A
COLPAZ1B. Y con los grupos paramilitares , ¿cuál cree que es la mejor solución? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	COLPAZ1B

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta C]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	NS/NR

	Anotar1-7, 8 = NS/NR, 9=Inap	
B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de Colombia garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)		B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de Colombia?		B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político colombiano?		B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político colombiano?		B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político colombiano?		B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?		B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Consejo Nacional Electoral?		B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las Fuerzas Armadas?		B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?		B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?		B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación?		B15
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General de la		B16

	Anotar1-7, 8 = NS/NR, 9=Inap	
Nación?		
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?		B17
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Policía?		B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?		B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?		B21
B21A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente?		B21A
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Corte Suprema de Justicia?		B31
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Constitucional?		B50
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su alcaldía?		B32
COLB32A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Concejo de su municipio?		COLB32A
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser colombiano?		B43
B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Gobernación de su departamento? [No aplica para Bogotá]		B33
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?		B37
B23. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?		B23
B47. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?		B47
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?		B48
COLB60. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las FARC?		COLB60
COLB61. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el ELN?		COLB61
COLB62. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en las Autodefensas o paramilitares?		COLB62
Usando la misma escala de 1 a 7 donde 1 es nada y 7 es mucho [NADA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 MUCHO]		
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?		N1
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?		N3
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?		N9
N10. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos?		N10
COLN11. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual resuelve el conflicto armado?		COLN11

	Anotar1-7, 8 = NS/NR, 9=Inap	
COLN12. ¿Hasta qué punto el gobierno actual sana las finanzas estatales?		COLN1 2
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?		N11
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?		N12
N15. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual está manejando bien la economía?		N15
COLN13. ¿Hasta qué punto diría usted que el Gobierno actual combate la reorganización de los grupos paramilitares?		COLN1 3
EPP1. Pensando en los partidos políticos en general ¿Hasta qué punto los partidos políticos colombianos representan bien a sus votantes?		EPP1
EPP2. ¿Hasta qué punto hay corrupción en los partidos políticos colombianos?		EPP2
EPP3. ¿Qué tanto los partidos políticos escuchan a la gente como uno?		EPP3
EC1. Y ahora, pensando en el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso estorba la labor del presidente?		EC1
EC2. ¿Y qué tanto tiempo pierden los congresistas discutiendo y debatiendo?		EC2
EC3. ¿Qué tan importantes son para el país las leyes que aprueba el Congreso?		EC3
EC4. ¿Hasta qué punto el Congreso cumple con lo que usted espera de él?		EC4

[RECOGER Tarjeta C]

Ahora, en una escala diferente...

M1. Hablando en general del actual gobierno, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Álvaro Uribe es...? [Leer alternativas]	M1	
Muy bueno.....1		
Bueno.....2		
Ni bueno, ni malo.....3		
Malo.....4		
Muy malo.....5		
NS/NR.....8		

<p>M2. Hablando del Congreso y pensando en todos los senadores y representantes en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los senadores y representantes del Congreso colombiano están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal?</p> <p>Muy bien.....1 Bien.....2 Ni bien ni mal.....3 Mal.....4 Muy mal.....5 NS/NR.....8</p>	M2
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[ENTREGAR Tarjeta D]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			NS/NR

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa "muy en desacuerdo" y el punto 7 representa "muy de acuerdo". Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio.

[Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR]

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me dijera, usando la tarjeta, hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones.. POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP101	
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP102	
POP103. Cuando la Corte Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP103	
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP107	
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		POP113	

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
Continuamos usando la misma escala. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes frases		EFF1	
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como usted. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?			
EFF2. Usted siente que entiende bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		EFF2	

Continuamos usando la misma escala. Le voy a leer una serie de afirmaciones y quiero que me diga hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas.

ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ING4	
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los colombianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		PN2	
COLCONST1. La Constitución expresa los valores y las aspiraciones de los colombianos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		COLCONST1	
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		DEM23	
Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre el rol del Estado. Por favor dígame hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7			
ROS1. El Estado colombiano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS1	
ROS2. El Estado colombiano, más que los individuos, debería ser el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS2	
ROS3. El Estado colombiano, más que la empresa privada, debería ser el principal responsable de crear empleos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS3	
ROS4. El Estado colombiano debe implementar políticas firμες para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS4	
ROS5. El estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el responsable principal de las pensiones de jubilación. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS5	

	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR		
ROS6. El estado colombiano, más que el sector privado, debería ser el responsable principal de los servicios de salud. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?		ROS6	

[RECOGER Tarjeta D]

<p>PN4. En general, ¿usted diría que está muy satisfecho(a), satisfecho(a), insatisfecho(a) o muy insatisfecho(a) con la forma en que la democracia funciona en Colombia?</p> <p>Muy satisfecho.....1 Satisfecho.....2 Insatisfecho.....3 Muy insatisfecho.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>		PN4	
<p>PN5. En su opinión, ¿Colombia es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático?</p> <p>Muy democrático.....1 Algo democrático.....2 Poco democrático.....3 Nada democrático.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>		PN5	

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta E]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			NS/NR

	Anotar 1-10, 88 NS/NR		
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen (invadan) fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba?		E16	
[SEGUIR CON LA Tarjeta E]			
Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en Colombia. Siempre usaremos la escala de 10 puntos.			
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia, no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho a votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]		D1	
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2	
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de Colombia ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3	
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?		D4	
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D5	

[RECOGER Tarjeta E]

Pasando a otro tema...Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre medidas que se pueden tomar cuando la economía anda mal, la	Muy de acuerdo	Algo de acuerdo	Poco de acuerdo	Nada de acuerdo	NS/ NR		
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gente está perdiendo su empleo y las empresas están perdiendo su dinero. Quisiera que me dijera si usted está muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes frases. La primera frase dice...		o	o	o		
SCB2. Se debería restringir el poder del Congreso si éste bloquea los esfuerzos para solucionar los problemas de la economía. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	8	SCB2
SCB3. Se debería restringir el poder del Poder Judicial si éste bloquea los esfuerzos para solucionar los problemas de la economía. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	8	SCB3
SCB4. Se debería restringir el poder del Presidente si éste bloquea los esfuerzos para solucionar los problemas de la economía. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	8	SCB4
SCB6. Se debería restringir el derecho a postular candidatos para cargos públicos de cualquier partido que bloquee los esfuerzos para solucionar los problemas de la economía. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	8	SCB6

Ahora le voy a leer unas frases sobre medidas que se pueden tomar cuando más y más personas son víctimas de crímenes violentos...	Muy de acuerdo o	Algo de acuerdo o	Poco de acuerdo o	Nada de acuerdo o	NS / NR	
SCB7. Se debería restringir el poder del Congreso si éste bloquea los esfuerzos para reducir los crímenes violentos. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	8	SCB7
SCB8. Se debería restringir el poder del Poder Judicial si éste bloquea los esfuerzos para reducir los crímenes violentos. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	8	SCB8
SCB9. Se debería restringir el poder del Presidente si éste bloquea los esfuerzos	1	2	3	4	8	SCB9

para reducir los crímenes violentos. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?							
SCB11. Se debería restringir el derecho a postular candidatos para cargos públicos de cualquier partido político que bloquee los esfuerzos para reducir los crímenes violentos. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con esa frase: muy, algo, poco, o nada de acuerdo?	1	2	3	4	8	SCB1 1	

Ahora cambiando de tema...

<p>DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo:</p> <p>A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático.....1</p> <p>o</p> <p>La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno.....2</p> <p>o</p> <p>En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático.....3</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	DEM2	
<p>DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos?</p> <p>Mano dura.....1</p> <p>Participación de todos.....2</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	DEM1 1	
<p>AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido.....1</p> <p>La democracia electoral (voto popular) es lo mejor.....2</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	AUT1	

<p>COLDH1. ¿Qué tan eficiente ha sido el Estado Colombiano en prevenir las violaciones masivas a los Derechos Humanos (como masacres o desplazamiento forzado)? [leer alternativas]</p> <p>Muy eficiente.....1</p> <p>Eficiente.....2</p> <p>Ineficiente.....3</p> <p>Muy ineficiente.....4</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	COLDH1	
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<p>PP1. Durante las elecciones, alguna gente trata de convencer a otras para que voten por algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Frecuentemente.....1 De vez en cuando.....2 Rara vez.....3 Nunca.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>PP1</p>	
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<p>PP2. Hay personas que trabajan para algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales. ¿Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2006?</p> <p>Sí trabajó.....1 No trabajó.....2 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>PP2</p>	
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<p>Me gustaría que me indicara si usted considera que las siguientes actuaciones son: 1) corruptas y deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.</p>		
<p>DC1. Por ejemplo: Un congresista acepta un soborno de diez mil dólares pagado por una empresa. ¿Considera usted que lo que hizo el congresista es [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>DC1</p>	
<p>COLD1A. ¿Y lo que hizo la empresa que pagó los diez mil dólares? ¿Considera usted que es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>COLD1A</p>	
<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella le paga diez mil pesos de más al empleado público municipal. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo la señora es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y ella debe ser castigada.....1 Corrupto pero se justifica2 No es corrupto3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>DC10</p>	
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. ¿Cree usted que lo que hizo el político es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y él debe ser castigado.....1 Corrupto pero justificado.....2 No corrupto.....3 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	<p>DC13</p>	

<p>COLDC14. Un policía de tránsito detiene a un conductor por hacer un cruce indebido, y éste le ofrece 50.000 pesos al policía para que no le ponga el parte y lo deje ir. ¿Usted cree que lo que hizo el conductor es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1</p> <p>Corrupto pero justificado.....2</p> <p>No corrupto.....3</p> <p>NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	COLDC14	
<p>COLDC15. El policía recibe los 50.000 pesos y deja ir al conductor sin ponerle el parte. ¿Usted cree que el policía de tránsito es... [Leer alternativas]:</p> <p>Corrupto y debe ser castigado.....1</p> <p>Corrupto pero justificado.....2</p> <p>No corrupto.....3</p> <p>NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	COLDC15	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/ NR		
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...						
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió un soborno en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC2	
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado un soborno en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC6	
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	EXC11	
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado algún soborno en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC13	
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar un soborno en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC14	

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/ NR		
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos (del Estado) en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar algún soborno?	9	0	1	8	EXC15	
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar algún soborno?	9	0	1	8	EXC16	
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió un soborno para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?	9 [no hay servicio]	0	1	8	EXC17	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar un soborno o mordida?		0	1	8	EXC18	

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está...? Muy generalizada.....1 Algo generalizada.....2 Poco generalizada.....3 Nada generalizada.....4 NS/NR.....8	EXC7	
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[ENTREGAR DE NUEVO Tarjeta D] Ahora, voy a leerle una serie de rasgos de personalidad que podrían aplicarse o no aplicarse a usted. Por favor use la misma escala de 1 a 7 para indicar en qué medida está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo en que estas frases se aplican a su persona. Usted debe calificar en qué medida se aplican a usted estos rasgos de personalidad, aun cuando alguna característica se aplique en mayor medida que otra.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo				Muy de acuerdo			NS/NR

Se considera Ud. una persona que es:	Anotar 1-7 8=NS/NR		
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PER1. Sociable y activa		PER1	
PER2. Criticona y peleadora		PER2	
PER3. Confiable y disciplinada		PER3	
PER4. Ansiosa y fácil de molestar		PER4	
PER5. Abierta a nuevas experiencias e intelectual		PER5	
PER6. Callada y tímida		PER6	
PER7. Generosa y cariñosa		PER7	
PER8. Desorganizada y descuidada		PER8	
PER9. Calmada y emocionalmente estable		PER9	
PER10. Poco creativa y con poca imaginación		PER10	

[RECOGER Tarjeta D]

<p>CRISIS1. Algunos dicen que nuestro país está sufriendo una de las crisis económicas más graves, mientras otros dicen que no estamos sufriendo tal crisis. ¿Qué piensa Ud.?</p> <p>Estamos sufriendo una de las crisis económicas más graves.....1 [Siga]</p> <p>No estamos sufriendo tal crisis.....2 [Pase a DER1]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8 [Pase a DER1]</p>	CRISIS1	
<p>CRISIS2. ¿Quién de los siguientes es el más culpable de la crisis económica actual en nuestro país?: [LEER LISTA, MARCAR SOLO UNA RESPUESTA]</p> <p>El presidente anterior.....1</p> <p>El gobierno actual.....2</p> <p>Nosotros, los colombianos.....3</p> <p>Los problemas de la democracia.....4</p> <p>Los países ricos.....5</p> <p>El capitalismo.....6</p> <p>Otro [NO LEER].....7</p> <p>NS/NR [No LEER].....8</p> <p>Inap [NO LEER].....9</p>	CRISIS2	

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS/ NR	
DER1. Participar para resolver problemas de su comunidad, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER1
DER2. Votar en una elección política, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER2

Si usted decidiera participar en algunas de las actividades que le voy a mencionar, ¿lo haría usted sin temor, con un poco de temor, o con mucho temor? [VAYA LEYENDO LA LISTA, REPITIENDO LA PREGUNTA SI ES NECESARIO]	SIN TEMOR	UN POCO DE TEMOR	MUCHO TEMOR	NS/NR	
DER3. Participar en una manifestación pacífica, ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER3
DER4. Postularse para un cargo de elección popular ¿lo haría...? [leer alternativas]	1	2	3	8	DER4

VB1. ¿Tiene su cédula inscrita para votar? Sí.....1 No.....2 [No leer] En trámite3 [No leer] No tiene cédula.....4 NS/NR.....8		VB1	
VB2. ¿Votó en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2006? Sí.....1 [SIGA] No.....2 [Pase a VB10] NS/NR.....8 [Pase a VB10]		VB2	
VB3. ¿Por quién votó para presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales? [NO LEER LISTA] Votó en blanco o anuló el voto.....00 Carlos Arturo Rincón Barreto.....801 Enrique Parejo González.....802 Álvaro Uribe Vélez.....803 Carlos Gaviria Díaz.....804 Horacio Serpa Uribe.....805 Álvaro Leyva Durán.....806 Antanas Mockus.....807 Otro.....77 NS/NR.....88 Inap. (no votó).....99		VB3	

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? Sí.....1 [Siga] No.....2 [Pase a COLVB25A] NS/NR.....8 [Pase a COLVB25A]		VB10	
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VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].	VB11
Partido Liberal.....801	
Partido Conservador.....802	
Polo Democrático Alternativo.....803	
Partido de la U.....804	
Cambio Radical.....805	
Convergencia Ciudadana.....806	
Alas-Equipo Colombia.....807	
Colombia Democrática.....808	
Colombia Viva.....809	
Movimiento MIRA.....810	
Por el País que soñamos (Peñalosa).....811	
Dejen Jugar al Moreno.....812	
C4.....813	
Visionarios con Antanas Mockus.....814	
Otro.....815	
NS/NR.....888 [pase a COLVB25A]	
Inap.....999 [pase a COLVB25A]	

VB12. ¿Y usted diría que su simpatía por ese partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?	VB12
Muy débil.....1	
Débil.....2	
Ni débil ni fuerte.....3	
Fuerte.....4	
Muy fuerte.....5	
NS/NR.....8	
Inap.....9	

COLVB25A. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?	COLVB2 5A
Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8	
COLVB25B. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que vote a favor de algún candidato o partido?	COLVB2 5B
Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8	
COLVB25C. ¿Alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?	COLVB2 5C
Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8	
COLVB25D. ¿A algún familiar o amigo cercano alguna vez lo han presionado con amenazas para que NO vote?	COLVB2 5D
Sí1 No2 NS/NR.....8	

<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>Mucho.....1 Algo.....2 Poco.....3 Nada.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>		<p>POL1</p>
<p>POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>A diario.....1 Algunas veces por semana.....2 Algunas veces por mes.....3 Rara vez.....4 Nunca.....5 NS/NR.....8</p>		<p>POL2</p>

<p>VB20. ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? [leer alternativas]</p> <p>No votaría.....1 Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente.....2 Votaría por algún candidato o partido opositor al actual gobierno.....3 Iría a votar pero votaría en blanco o anularía el voto.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>VB20</p>
<p>VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición.....1 Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente.....2 Influir de otras maneras.....3 No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>VB21</p>

<p>CLIEN1. En los últimos años, y pensando en campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político le ofreció algo, como un favor, comida o alguna otra cosa o beneficio, a cambio de que usted votara o apoyara a ese candidato o partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca?</p> <p>Frecuentemente1 [SIGA] Rara vez2 [SIGA] Nunca3 [PASE A CLIEN3] NS/NR8 [PASE A CLIEN3]</p>		<p>CLIEN1</p>
<p>CLIEN2 ¿Lo que le ofrecieron lo hizo estar más inclinado o menos inclinado a votar por el candidato o partido que le ofreció ese bien?</p>		<p>CLIEN2</p>

Más inclinado.....1 Menos inclinado.....2 Ni más ni menos inclinado.....3 [No leer] NS/NR.....8 INAP.....9 (contestó 3 u 8 a CLIEN1)			
CLIEN3. En campañas electorales, ¿algún candidato o alguien de un partido político lo amenazó a usted o a su comunidad con quitarle el acceso a algún servicio o algún beneficio que actualmente recibe si usted no votaba por él o su partido? ¿Esto pasó frecuentemente, rara vez, o nunca? Frecuentemente.....1 Rara vez.....2 Nunca.....3 NS/NR.....8		CLIEN3	

Y ahora, cambiando de tema...

RAC1A. ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su color de piel? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8		RAC1A	
RAC1B. ¿Ha vivido o presenciado situaciones en las que otra persona ha sido tratada mal por su color de piel? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8		RAC1B	
RAC1C. Según los datos del Censo de Población del 2005, la gente negra es más pobre. ¿Usted cuál cree que es la principal razón de esto? [Leer opciones] [Permitir sólo una respuesta] Porque son menos inteligentes.....1 Porque tienen bajo nivel educativo.....2 Porque no trabajan lo suficiente.....3 Porque son discriminados.....4 Otra [no leer]5 NS/NR.....8		RAC1C	

<p>COLMOV1. ¿Usted se describiría a sí mismo como perteneciente a la clase...? [LEER OPCIONES]</p> <p>Alta.....1 Media alta.....2 Media.....3 Media baja.....4 Baja.....5 NS/NR.....8</p>		COLMOV1	
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Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su condición económica, su apariencia física o su forma de hablar, en alguno de los siguientes lugares:	Sí	No	NS/NR	
DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)	1	2	8	DIS2
DIS3. Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio	1	2	8	DIS3
DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales	1	2	8	DIS4
DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)	1	2	8	DIS5

[ENTREGAR Tarjeta D]

Ahora le voy a leer unas afirmaciones y quisiera que me contestara hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con ellas, usando esta escala de 7 puntos, donde 1 significa *muy en desacuerdo* y 7 significa *muy de acuerdo*.

	Anotar 1-7 8=NS/NR		
TD1. Siempre ha habido ricos y pobres y eso no se puede cambiar. ¿Hasta qué punto está usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?		TD1	
TD2. Es bueno que exista desigualdad para que las personas más pobres se esfuercen más. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		TD2	
TD3. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho <i>más</i> dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		TD3	
TD4. Estar muy cerca de alguien que tiene mucho <i>menos</i> dinero que usted (por ejemplo en la calle o en un espectáculo) lo/a hace sentir incómodo/a. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		TD4	
TD5. Estaría dispuesto/a a pagar más impuestos si éstos se usaran para darle más a quien tiene menos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?		TD5	

	Anotar 1-7 8=NS/NR		
RAC2A. En Colombia no hay racismo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?		RAC2A	
RAC2B. La mezcla de razas es buena para Colombia. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?		RAC2B	
RAC4. No le molestaria que un hijo suyo u otro familiar cercano se casara con una persona negra. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?		RAC4	
COLPIEL1A. Desearía que su piel fuera más clara. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta afirmación?		COLPIEL 1A	

[RECOGER Tarjeta D]

	Mejor	Igual	Peor	NS/NR		
RAC3A. ¿Usted piensa que en Colombia las personas negras son tratadas mejor , igual o peor que otras en las escuelas, colegios y universidades?	1	2	3	8	RAC3A	
RAC3B. ¿Usted piensa que en Colombia las personas negras son tratadas mejor , igual o peor que otras al buscar empleo o en el trabajo?	1	2	3	8	RAC3B	
RAC3C. ¿Usted piensa que en Colombia las personas negras son tratadas mejor , igual o peor que otras por la policía?	1	2	3	8	RAC3C	

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que aprobó?

[Encuestador: llenar:] _____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar Table abajo para código y poner un circulo alrededor del número que corresponde]

Ninguno = 00	Primer año de...	Segundo año de...	Tercer año de...	Cuarto año de..	Quinto año de...	Sexto año de...	Séptimo año de	
Primaria	01	02	03	04	05	--	--	ED
Secundaria	06	07	08	09	10	11	--	
Universitaria	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
Superior no universitaria	12	13	14	15				
NS/NR	88							

<p>EDPADRE. ¿Hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su padre? [no leer opciones]</p> <p>Ninguno.....00 Primaria incompleta.....01 Primaria completa.....02 Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto.....03 Secundaria o bachillerato completo.....04 Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta.....05 Técnica/Tecnológica completa.....06 Universitaria incompleta.....07 Universitaria completa.....08 NS/NR.....88</p>	EDPADRE	
<p>EDMADRE. ¿Y hasta qué nivel educativo llegó su madre? [no leer opciones]</p> <p>Ninguno.....00 Primaria incompleta.....01 Primaria completa.....02 Secundaria o bachillerato incompleto.....03 Secundaria o bachillerato completo.....04 Técnica/Tecnológica incompleta.....05 Técnica/Tecnológica completa.....06 Universitaria incompleta.....07 Universitaria completa.....08 NS/NR.....88</p>	EDMADRE	

Anexo B.

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (888= NS/NR)	Q2	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
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<p>Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? [No leer alternativas]</p> <p>Católica.....1</p> <p>Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).....2</p> <p>Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas).....3</p> <p>Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).....5</p> <p>Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día.....6</p> <p>Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).....7</p> <p>Ninguna.....4</p> <p>Ateo/a.....10</p> <p>NS/NR.....88</p>	<p>Q3</p>
<p>Q5A. ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Más de una vez por semana.....1</p> <p>Una vez por semana.....2</p> <p>Una vez al mes.....3</p> <p>Una o dos veces al año.....4</p> <p>Nunca o casi nunca.....5</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>Q5A</p>

<p>[ENTREGAR Tarjeta F]</p> <p>Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?</p> <p>[Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]</p> <p>Ningún ingreso.....00</p> <p>Menos de \$90.000.....01</p> <p>Entre \$91.000-\$180.000.....02</p> <p>\$181.000 - \$360.000.....03</p> <p>\$361.000 - \$720.000.....04</p> <p>\$721.000 - \$1.000.000.....05</p> <p>\$1.000.001 - \$1.500.000.....06</p> <p>\$1.500.001 - \$2.000.000.....07</p> <p>\$2.000.001 - \$3'000.000.....08</p> <p>\$3.000.001 - \$4.000.000.....09</p> <p>\$4.000.001 – o más.....10</p> <p>NS/NR88</p> <p>[RECOGER Tarjeta F]</p>	<p>Q10</p>
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<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? Sí.....1 No2 [Pase a Q10C] NS/NR.....8 [Pase a Q10C]</p>		
<p>Q10A1. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿En qué utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer] Consumo (alimento, vestido).....1 Vivienda (construcción, reparación).....2 Gastos en educación.....3 Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias).....4 Gastos médicos.....5 Ahorro/Inversión.....6 Otro.....7 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>		
<p>Q10B. [Sólo si recibe remesas] ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? [Leer alternativas] Mucho...1 Algo...2 Poco...3 Nada...4 NS/NR...8 Inap...9</p>		
<p>Q10C. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar ¿dónde?] [No leer opciones] Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente.....1 Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países.....2 Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos).....3 No.....4 [pase a Q14] NS/NR.....8 [pase a Q14]</p>	<p>Q10C</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] ¿Con que frecuencia se comunica con ellos? [leer opciones] Todos los días.....1 Una o dos veces por semana.....2 Una o dos veces por mes.....3 Rara vez.....4 Nunca.....5 NS/NR.....8 Inap.....9</p>	<p>Q16</p>	
<p>Q14. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? Sí.....1 No.....2 NS/NR.....8</p>	<p>Q14</p>	
<p>Q10D. [Preguntar a todos] El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas] Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar.....1 Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades.....2 No les alcanza, tienen dificultades.....3</p>	<p>Q10D</p>	

No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades.....4 NS/NR [no leer]8		
Q10E. En los últimos dos años, el ingreso de su hogar: [Leer opciones] Aumentó1 [Pase a Q11] Permaneció igual?2 [Pase a Q11] Disminuyó?3 [Siga a Q10F] NS/NR [no leer]8 [Pase a Q11]		
Q10F. ¿Cuál fue la principal razón por la que el ingreso de su hogar disminuyó en los últimos dos años? [NO LEER] Disminuyó la cantidad de horas de trabajo o salario....1 Un miembro de la familia perdió su trabajo.....2 Bajaron las ventas/ El negocio no anduvo bien.....3 Negocio familiar quebró.....4 Todo está más caro, el ingreso alcanza menos.....5 Remesas (dinero del exterior) disminuyeron o dejaron de recibirse.....6 Un miembro de la familia que recibía ingreso se enfermó , murió, o se fue del hogar.....7 Destastre natural/ pérdida de cultivo.....8 Otra razón.....9 NS/NR.....88 INAP (contestó 1, 2 u 8 en 10E).....99		
Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas] Soltero.....1 Casado.....2 Unión libre (acompañado).....3 Divorciado.....4 Separado.....5 Viudo.....6 NS/NR.....8	Q11	
Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR (88)	Q12	_ _
Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, (99) INAP (no tiene hijos)	Q12A	_ _
ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? Blanca.....1 Mestiza.....2 Indígena.....3 Negra.....4	ETID	

<p>Mulata.....5 Otra.....7 NS/NR.....8</p>		
<p>COLETIDA. ¿Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata? Blanca.....1 Mestiza.....2 Indígena.....3 Negra.....4 Mulata.....5 Otra.....7 NS/NR.....8</p>	COLETIDA	
<p>LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que habló de pequeño en su casa? [no leer] [acepte una alternativa] Español/Castellano.....801 Nativo indígena802 Otro (nativo).....804 Otro extranjero.....805 NS/NR.....888</p>	LENG1	
<p>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted Internet? [Leer alternativas] Todos los días o casi todos los días.....1 Por lo menos una vez por semana.....2 Por lo menos una vez al mes.....3 Rara vez.....4 Nunca.....5 NS/NR [no leer].....8</p>	WWW1	
<p>Por propósitos estadísticos, ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...</p> <p>G10. ¿Con qué frecuencia sigue las noticias, ya sea en la televisión, la radio, los periódicos, o el internet? [Leer opciones]: Casi todos los días.....1 Algunas veces a la semana.....2 Algunas veces al mes.....3 Raras veces.....4 NS/NR.....8</p>	G10	

	Correcto	Incorrecto	No sabe	No responde		
G11. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? <i>[No leer, Barack Obama, aceptar Obama]</i>	1	2	8	9	G11	
G12. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso de Colombia? <i>[No leer, Javier Cáceres; aceptar también Hernán Andrade]</i>	1	2	8	9	G12	
G13 [G12]. ¿Cuántos departamentos tiene Colombia? <i>[No leer, 32]</i>	1	2	8	9	G13	
G14 [G13]. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en Colombia? <i>[No leer, cuatro años]</i>	1	2	8	9	G14	
G15 [G14]. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? <i>[No leer, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva; aceptar también Lula]</i>	1	2	8	9	G15	

Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R1	
R3. Nevera	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R3	
R4. Teléfono convencional/fijo (no celular)	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R4	
R4A. Teléfono celular	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R4A	
R5. Vehículo (no moto). Cuántos?	No...0	Uno...1	Dos...2	Tres o más...3	NS/NR...8	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R6	
R7. Microondas	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R7	
R8. Motocicleta	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R8	
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R12	
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R14	
R15. Computador	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R15	
R16. Televisor de pantalla plana	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R16	
R18. Internet de alta velocidad (banda ancha)	No...0			Sí...1	NS/NR...8	R18	

<p>OCUP4A. ¿A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Trabajando?.....1 [Siga]</p> <p>No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo?.....2 [Siga]</p> <p>Está buscando trabajo activamente?.....3 [Pase a OCUP1ANC]</p> <p>Es estudiante?.....4 [Pase a OCUP1ANC]</p> <p>Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar?.....5 [Pase a OCUP1ANC]</p> <p>Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar?.....6 [Pase a OCUP1ANC]</p> <p>No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo?.....7 [Pase a OCUP1ANC]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8 [Pase a OCUP1ANC]</p>	<p>OCUP4A</p>	
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OCUPI. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? (Sondear: ¿En qué consiste su trabajo?) [No leer alternativas]	OCUPI	_ _
Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.).....01		
Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor).....02		
Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.).....03		
Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.).....04		
Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública).....05		
Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.).....06		
Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.).....07		
Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados.....08		
Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.).....09		
Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra).....10		
Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros).....11		
Artesano.....12		
Servicio doméstico.....13		
Obrero.....14		
Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.).....15		
NS/NR.....88		
Inap.....99		

OCUPIA. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]	OCUPIA	
Asalariado del gobierno?.....1		
Asalariado en el sector privado?....2		
Patrono o socio de empresa?.....3		
Trabajador por cuenta propia?.....4		
Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago?.....5		
NS/NR.....8		
INAP.....9		

OCUPIANC. ¿Cuál era la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realizaba su padre o madre (quien fuera el jefe de su hogar) cuando usted tenía 10 años? [No leer alternativas]	OCUPIANC
Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogado, profesor universitario, médico, contador, arquitecto, ingeniero, etc.).....01	
Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor).....02	
Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnico en computación, maestro de primaria y secundaria, artista, deportista, etc.).....03	
Trabajador especializado (operador de maquinaria, albañil, mecánico, carpintero, electricista, etc.).....04	
Funcionario del gobierno (miembro de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública).....05	
Oficinista (secretaria, operador de máquina de oficina, cajero, recepcionista, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.).....06	
Comerciante (vendedor ambulante, propietario de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.).....07	
Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados.....08	
Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajador en hoteles, restaurantes, taxista, etc.).....09	
Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra).....10	
Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros).....11	
Artesano.....12	
Servicio doméstico.....13	
Obrero.....14	
Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bombero, vigilante, etc.).....15	
NS/NR.....88	
No trabajaba.....99	

<p>PEN1. ¿Se encuentra usted afiliado a un sistema de pensiones?</p> <p>Sí.....1 [Siga]</p> <p>No.....2 [Pase a SAL1]</p> <p>NS/NR.....8 [Pase a SAL1]</p>	PEN1
<p>PEN3. ¿A qué sistema de pensiones está usted afiliado? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>Fondo Privado de Pensiones1</p> <p>Seguro social (Instituto de Seguros Sociales).....2</p> <p>Otro.....7</p> <p>NS/NR.....8</p> <p>Inap.....9</p>	PEN3

PEN4. En los últimos 12 meses, usted cotizó a su fondo de pensión [Leer alternativas]	PEN4
Todos los meses1	
Por lo menos una o dos veces al año....2	
No cotizó.....3	
NS/NR.....8	
Inap.....9	

[Preguntar a todos]

SAL1. ¿Está usted afiliado al POS (Plan Obligatorio de Salud)?	SAL1
Sí.....1 [Siga]	
No.....2 [Pase a MIG2]	
NS/NR.....8 [Pase a MIG2]	
SAL1A. ¿Tiene usted algún servicio de salud adicional al POS? [Leer opciones; aceptar sólo una opción]	SAL1A
No tiene.....0	
Plan complementario.....1	
Póliza de hospitalización y cirugía2	
Medicina prepagada.....3	
Emergencia médica.....4	
NS/NR.....8	
Inap (no tiene seguro médico).....9	
SAL4. ¿En su POS, es usted cotizante o beneficiario?	SAL4
Cotizante (titular).....1	
Beneficiario.....2	
NS/NR.....8	
Inap.....9	

MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas]	MIG2
En este mismo municipio.....1	
En otro municipio en el país.....2	
En otro país.....3	
NS/NR.....8	

¿Dónde nació usted? [Anotar municipio y departamento]	
DEPNAC. Departamento (o País si nació en el extranjero; "DC" si es Bogotá): _____	DEPNAC
NS/NR.....88888 [Si NS/NR o nació en el extranjero, pasar a COLORR]	
MUNNAC. Municipio (Otro: 99999):	MUNNAC

_____ NS/NR.....88888 [pasar a COLORR]		
AREANAC. ¿Nació en área urbana o rural? Urbana.....1 Rural.....2 NS/NR.....8	AREANAC	


Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

COLORR. [Una vez salga de la entrevista, SIN PREGUNTAR, por favor use la Paleta de Colores, e indique el número que más se acerca al color de piel del entrevistado]	COLORR	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11		
Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____		
INTID. Número de identificación del entrevistador _____	INTID	


Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ___ / ___ / ___ Firma del supervisor de campo _____ Comentarios: _____ _____ Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____ Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____
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Tarjeta A


¿En qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?




Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C




Tarjeta D



Anexo C.

Tarjeta E



Anexo D.

Tarjeta F

0	Ningún ingreso
1	Menos de \$90.000
2	Entre \$91.000 - \$180000
3	\$181.000 - \$360.000
4	\$361.000 - \$720.000
5	\$721.000 - \$1.000.000
6	\$1'000.001 - \$1'500.000
7	\$1'500.001 - \$2'000.000
8	\$2'000.001 - \$3'000.000
9	\$3'000.001 - \$4'000.000
10	\$4'000.001 o más