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The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America

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Latin America had long been the one region in the world without major ethnic parties. In recent years, however, important parties that are based to varying degrees in the indigenous population have emerged in the region. The most successful of these movements have been ethnopopulist parties, inclusive ethnically based parties that adopt classical populist electoral strategies.1 Whereas exclusionary ethnic parties have registered little electoral success, ethnopopulist parties have won significant legislative or presidential victories in the Andean nations. In Bolivia, Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) won a resounding victory in the 2005 presidential elections, after coming in second in the 2002 elections. In Ecuador another ethnopopulist party, the Movimiento Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik (MUPP), has maintained a significant presence in the legislature since 1996 and helped elect Lucio Gutiérrez president in 2002 and Rafael Correa in 2006.

What accounts for the success of these new ethnically based parties in Latin America?2 Why have they been more successful than traditional ethnic parties? And why have they combined populist and ethnic appeals?

Understanding the causes of the success of these new ethnically based parties is important from a practical standpoint because these movements are already having important effects. The election of Evo

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1 I define an inclusive party as one that recruits members of various ethnic groups for the top leadership positions of the party, forms alliances with organizations that represent a diversity of ethnic groups, eschews exclusionary rhetoric, and emphasizes that it seeks to represent all members of the nation.

2 In social science parlance, the dependent variable of this study is the performance of ethnically based parties in Latin America.

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Morales in Bolivia, for example, has led to state intervention in the country’s natural gas industry, the passage of land reform, the expansion of education in indigenous languages, and the convening of a constituent assembly to redesign the country’s political institutions. Similarly dramatic changes may well occur if ethnopopulist leaders take power elsewhere in the region.

The rise of the new ethnically based parties is puzzling from a theoretical perspective because it contradicts some of the expectations of the scholarly literatures on populism and ethnic parties. Whereas the literature on ethnic parties would not expect such parties to make ethnically inclusive appeals, the literature on populism would not expect populist parties to make ethnic appeals at all. Thus, neither the scholarly literature on ethnic parties nor the literature on populism can easily account for the emergence and success of ethnopopulist parties.

Another scholarly literature, the indigenous politics literature, has generated important insights into why powerful indigenous movements have arisen in some Latin American countries in recent years, but this literature has not typically sought to explain why some of these movements have transformed themselves into parties or achieved electoral success.3 One exception is Van Cott, who argues that institutional reforms, among other factors, helped foster the rise of indigenous-based parties in Latin America.4 As we shall see, however, institutional reforms did not play an important role in the rise of the most important ethnopopulist party to date, although some of the other variables that Van Cott and others have discussed, especially the strength of the in-

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digienous movement, have played a role in the success of the MAS and other ethnopopulist parties.5

This study argues that ethnopopulist parties have succeeded in Latin America (and traditional ethnic parties have failed) in large part because of the nature of ethnicity and ethnic relations in the region. Specifically, the low levels of ethnic polarization and the ambiguity and fluidity of ethnic identification in the region have meant that indigenous-based parties can win votes not only from self-identified indigenous people but also from people from other ethnic categories who share some identification with indigenous cultures or who support the parties based on their positions on other issues. To win the support of people from other ethnic categories, ethnopopulist parties have avoided exclusionary rhetoric, reached out to members of different ethnic groups, and employed traditional populist appeals.

This study differs from most previous studies of indigenous politics in Latin America not only in the arguments it develops but also in the data and methods it employs. Previous studies of indigenous politics in Latin America have typically used qualitative methods and have relied mostly on elite interviews, secondary accounts, and, in some cases, highly aggregated electoral data to support their arguments.6 This study makes use of all of those sources of data, but also employs individual-level survey data and provincial-level census and electoral data to test the claims being made.

The article is divided into six main sections. The first section sets forth an explanation for the appeal of ethnopopulism in the region and discusses why existing theories of ethnic parties and populism cannot explain the rise of ethnopopulist parties. The second section examines existing explanations for the rise of Bolivia’s MAS. The third section discusses how the MAS’s inclusive ethnic appeal made it possible for the party to win votes across a range of different ethnic groups in Bolivia. The fourth section explores how the MAS also used populist strategies to earn votes. The fifth section tests some of the previous arguments


with a multinomial logit analysis of public opinion data on the 2005 Bolivian elections. The sixth section accounts for why ethnopopulist parties succeed in some countries and elections but not in others, and it distinguishes the ethnopopulist parties from other populist and leftist parties that have achieved important electoral victories in recent years. The conclusion discusses the implications of these arguments for theories of populism and for the literatures on ethnic parties and voting.

**Explaining the Rise of Ethnopopulist Parties**

The literature on populism would not predict the rise of ethnopopulist parties. Populist movements in Latin America have not traditionally had an important ethnic component, and Weyland goes so far as to suggest that ethnic appeals might not marry well with populism because populists tend to appeal to “undifferentiated ‘people.’” Studies of populism have typically stressed how populist movements emerge in the cities and rely on the urban working class as their main base of support, although they usually incorporate other classes and sectors as well. Some of the literature on populism has also located it within a particular historical epoch in Latin America, namely, the 1930s through the 1960s, when socioeconomic modernization, import-substitution industrialization, and political liberalization made feasible the construction of populist coalitions.

The literature on ethnic parties cannot easily account for the rise of ethnopopulist parties either. This literature would not expect leaders of ethnic parties to be inclusive—indeed, much of the literature on ethnic parties defines them as parties that draw their support from a single ethnic group. Nor would this literature expect such inclusive appeals to be successful if they were tried. Much of this literature suggests that the leaders of ethnic parties will concentrate on mobilizing members of

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7 Kurt Weyland, “Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe,” *Comparative Politics* 31 (July 1999), 383.
9 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Guillermo O’Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979); Drake (fn. 8); and Weyland (fn. 8).
their own ethnic group on the assumption that reaching out to members of other ethnic groups would be futile. Horowitz, for example, writes that an ethnic party, “recognizing that it cannot count on defections from members of the other ethnic group, has the incentive to solidify the support of its own group.” Leaders of ethnic parties mobilize members of their own group by exaggerating the threat posed by members of other ethnic groups and adopting exclusionary rhetoric and platforms. This leads to elections that are increasingly polarized along ethnic lines in a process known as “outbidding.”

The literature on ethnic parties focuses on societies that are ethnically polarized and where politics, in the words of Horowitz, are “unidimensional—along an ethnic axis.” In societies that are not ethnically polarized, however, we would expect party competition to be multidimensional and ethnic issues to be of lesser salience. Thus, a party based in one ethnic group would presumably be able to attract support from members of other ethnic groups. As a result, ethnically based parties in nonpolarized societies would have greater incentives to eschew exclusionary appeals and instead reach out to members of other ethnic groups, as ethnopopulist parties have done.

The arguments of Horowitz and others also assume that individuals have a single ethnic identity and that the boundaries dividing ethnic groups are clear and relatively stable. Constructivists, however, have shown that ethnic identification is often fluid and that individuals frequently have multiple ethnic identities. Where ethnic identification is multiple and fluid, an exclusionary strategy would be counterproductive because it would alienate those people whose ethnic identities comprise the excluded as well as the included group. By contrast, an ethnically based party that adopts an inclusive strategy might appeal

12 Horowitz (fn. 10), 318.
13 Ibid., 526–30.
14 Ibid., 304.
15 I define ethnic polarization as the existence of widespread hostilities between members of different ethnic groups, resulting in relatively frequent incidents of ethnically related violence.
16 See Kanchan Chandra, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics,” APSA-CP 12 (Winter 2001); and Kanchan Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” Perspectives on Politics 3 (June 2005), 235–52. The assumption that ethnic identities are clear, singular, and fixed may be realistic in ethnically polarized societies since ethnic conflict can harden ethnic identities and elevate certain identities to the exclusion of others, but it is less realistic in societies where ethnic polarization is low. See Stephen Van Evera, “Primordialism Lives!” APSA-CP 12 (Winter 2001).
to all people who share a given ethnic identity without alienating those who also have other ethnic identities.

In Latin America ethnic polarization has tended to be relatively low. Indeed, Latin America has seen many fewer incidents of ethnic conflict than have most other regions of the world. Moreover, ethnicity in the region is characterized by a great deal of fluidity, and people often identify, at least partially, with multiple, intersecting ethnic groups. Some of this fluidity and multiplicity is the result of widespread *mestizaje*, or miscegenation, which has blurred the lines between different ethnic or racial groups and ensured that most Latin Americans have mixed lineage. Prejudice and discrimination have also led many individuals to identify, at least some of the time, with ethnic groups that are accorded higher social status, regardless of their own ethnic lineage. Many Latin Americans who are mostly or entirely of indigenous descent, for example, do not typically identify as indigenous, preferring to identify themselves as mestizos. Many of these people nevertheless have indigenous features, speak indigenous languages, respect certain indigenous traditions, and sympathize with some of the demands of the indigenous movement, leading some scholars to refer to them as “indigenous mestizos.”

Indigenous-based parties that adopt exclusionary rhetoric are likely to alienate nonindigenous people as well as those indigenous people who also identify as mestizo. Even some people who identify exclusively as indigenous may find these parties’ exclusionary rhetoric and platforms unpalatable, given the traditionally low levels of ethnic polarization in Latin American society. Moreover, in many Latin American countries, the indigenous population is itself divided along regional or ethnolinguistic lines, and exclusionary indigenous parties may end up alienating members of some of these indigenous communities. Inclusive indigenous-based parties, by contrast, have a much broader potential base of support. They have the potential to win support not only from those people who self-identify exclusively as indigenous but also from those people who have divided ethnic loyalties. Moreover, given the low levels of ethnic polarization prevailing in Latin America, inclusive indigenous-based parties may also attract some votes from people

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who do not self-identify as indigenous but who nevertheless symp-
thize with some aspects of their platforms. In Latin America, then, it is
not just feasible for an indigenous party or movement to be inclusive, it
is also the most rational electoral strategy to pursue.

In order to win votes from members of a variety of different eth-
nic groups, inclusive indigenous-based parties have had to develop
an appeal that extends beyond indigenous issues. The most successful
indigenous-based parties, the ethnopopulist parties, have used classi-
cal populist strategies to attract votes. The ethnopopulist parties, like
classical populist parties, have attracted politically disenchanted voters
by denouncing the traditional parties and the existing elites. They have
also won support by adopting a highly redistributive, nationalist, and
state interventionist agenda just as the classical populist parties once
did. They have, for example, opposed neoliberal reforms and other pol-
ics promoted by the U.S. government, advocating the nationalization
of natural resources and the redistribution of wealth. Finally, ethno-
populist leaders, like traditional populist caudillos, have attracted voters
by dint of their charismatic personalities. These strategies have enabled
the ethnopopulist parties to fuse traditional populist constituencies—
politically disenchanted urban mestizos with nationalist and statist
views—to their rural, largely indigenous base.

As Table 1 indicates, ethnopopulist parties combine elements of tra-
ditional ethnic and populist parties, but they are distinct from neolib-
eral populist parties in most ways. Ethnopopulist parties are like ethnic
parties in that they typically originate in a single ethnic group and de-
rive many of their leaders and supporters from that group. Moreover,
ethnopopulist parties, like traditional ethnic parties, make ethnic ap-
peals. They often portray themselves as the legitimate representative
of a particular ethnic group, they frequently prioritize the demands of
that group, and they typically use cultural and political symbols associ-
ated with it. However, unlike ethnic parties, ethnopopulist parties are
inclusive. Whereas ethnic parties use exclusionary rhetoric and plat-
forms to mobilize members of a single ethnic group, ethnopopulist
parties have sought to appeal to a variety of different ethnic groups.
Thus, they have eschewed exclusionary rhetoric, developed broad-
based platforms, and recruited leaders and candidates from a range of
different ethnic groups. Just as traditional populist movements reached
out to the middle classes, the peasantry, and the industrial bourgeoi-
isie to supplement their main base of support among the urban work-
ing class, ethnopopulist movements have sought to recruit supporters
among urban whites and mestizos, while still relying to a large extent
on their rural indigenous core. As noted above, ethnopopulist parties are also similar to populist parties in that they use classical populist appeals to win votes.

Some studies have sought to define populism according to strictly political criteria, specifically an uninstitutionalized, personalistic, and plebiscitarian leadership style.20 Other studies have defined it according to economic criteria, in particular, the implementation of redistributive programs, deficit spending, and widespread state intervention in the economy.21 Both of these types of studies have focused on populism as a style of governance—that is, as a means of governing the economy (economic populism) or the polity more generally (political populism). By contrast, this article classifies populist parties according to their electoral appeals because the focus of this study is explaining why ethnopopulism has been a successful electoral strategy. I use both economic and political criteria to define populism, since ethnopopulist leaders have used populist economic strategies (such as calls for redistribution of income and nationalization of natural resource companies) as well as populist political strategies (for example, antiestablishment and antisystem appeals) to win votes.

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20 Weyland (fn. 8).
RISE OF ETHNOPOPULISM

INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RISE OF THE MAS

The remainder of this article examines the causes of the rise of the most successful ethnopopulist party to date: the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia. Some studies have attributed the rapid growth of the MAS in part to the institutional reforms that Bolivia carried out in the 1990s. Van Cott, for example, maintains that Bolivia’s PR system, which used large multimember districts, “made it difficult for geographically concentrated indigenous movements to win enough votes nationwide to gain national office.” She and others have argued that Bolivia’s constitutional reform of 1994 facilitated the rise of the MAS by creating smaller single-member districts for elections to one tier of the lower chamber of the legislature. This explanation is unconvincing, however, because the MAS or its predecessor would have won approximately the same number of seats in 1997 and 2002 if Bolivia had retained the previous proportional representation system. For example, the vote that the MAS earned in the 1997 elections would have gained it three legislative seats under the old system, as opposed to the four seats it won under the new system. Indeed, the German-style mixed system that Bolivia adopted was designed to achieve proportionality by using the PR tier to offset any disproportionality created by the outcomes of the races in the single-member districts.

Another institutional explanation for the rise of the MAS has focused on the decentralization process Bolivia underwent in the mid-1990s. The 1994 Law of Popular Participation created 311 municipalities nationwide and called for elections to be held for mayoral and council member positions throughout the country. The MAS was formed in the wake of the passage of this law, and some scholars have argued that the municipal elections enabled the MAS to gain a foothold at the local level, which its members used as a stepping-stone to national office. This explanation for the rise of the MAS is also problematic, however. To begin with, the municipal electoral victories of the MAS and its predecessor in 1995 and 1999 were confined largely to the department of

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24 Andolina (fn. 5); Van Cott (fn. 4, 2003); Miguel Urioste, “Ninguno de los Indígenas que Está en el Parlamento Hoy en Día Hubiera Llegado a ese Nivel si no Era a Través del Proceso de la Participación Popular,” in Diego Ayo, ed., *Voices Críticas de la Descentralización* [Critical Voices on Decentralization] (La Paz: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004); author interview with Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, La Paz, July 16, 2004; and author interview with Gustavo Torrico, La Paz, July 22, 2004.
Cochabamba. It therefore seems unlikely that the MAS’s strong electoral performance outside of Cochabamba in the 2002 elections could be explained by the resources, experience, or reputations won by the party’s mayors. Moreover, there is no evidence that the MAS has performed better in those municipalities where it has elected mayors or council members. To the contrary, between 1997 and 2002 the MAS increased its share of the total vote by a much smaller margin in those municipalities where it had elected mayors in 1995 than in those municipalities where it did not control the mayoralty—the MAS boosted its vote by 13 percentage points in the former municipalities and 19 points in the latter. Thus, it does not appear that either the decentralization law or the shift to a mixed electoral system can explain the rapid rise of the MAS.

**The Inclusive Ethnic Appeal of the MAS**

This article, by contrast, argues that one of the main factors behind the success of the MAS was the party’s inclusive ethnopopulist appeal. To be sure, other factors, such as the strengthening of indigenous consciousness and organization and growing disenchantment with the traditional parties and their record of governance, played a role in the rise of the MAS, but as the following discussion shows, the MAS’s ethnopolitical rhetoric and platform helped the party take advantage of these developments.

Several features of the ethnic landscape in Bolivia helped make this appeal successful. To begin with, a large proportion of the Bolivian population is of indigenous ancestry, and, as a result, parties that seek to appeal to the indigenous population in Bolivia have an important potential pool of voters to attract. According to the 2001 census, roughly half of the Bolivian population speaks an indigenous language and almost two-thirds of the population identifies with some indigenous ethnolinguistic category. The indigenous population in Bolivia is fragmented, however, most notably between the Quechua-speaking and Aymara-speaking populations. According to the census, 27.6 percent of the total population speaks Quechua, 18.4 percent speaks Aymara, and 1.2 percent of the population speaks a variety of different lowlands indigenous dialects. To win support from these disparate groups, indigenous leaders and parties have needed to be inclusive.

The low level of ethnic polarization and the fluidity of ethnic identification in Bolivia also favor an inclusive approach. Although discrimination against indigenous people is commonplace in Bolivia, ethnic violence is rare, and relations between members of different ethnic groups are relatively harmonious. In Bolivia, as elsewhere in Latin America, the state has actively promoted mestizaje and suppressed indigenous identities. Partly as a result, most Bolivians self-identify as mestizo rather than as indigenous. Surveys by the Ministry of Human Development, the United Nations Development Program, and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) have found that between 60 and 70 percent of the Bolivian population self-identifies as mestizo, whereas less than 20 percent of the population self-identifies as indigenous. Nevertheless, many of these self-identified mestizos speak indigenous languages and identify to some degree with indigenous culture. Indeed, in a recent survey by LAPOP, 55 percent of the people who self-identified as mestizo spoke an indigenous language and 70 percent of the people who so self-identified stated that they belonged to an indigenous ethnolinguistic category, mostly Quechua or Aymara. As we shall see, the MAS’s inclusive indigenous profile appealed not only to self-identified indigenous people but also to the numerically much larger group of indigenous mestizos. It even won the support of some whites and mestizos who did not identify as indigenous at all.


28 The 2006 LAPOP survey included a question about indigenous identity that was modeled on a question from the 2001 census. It asked: “Do you consider yourself to belong to one of the following native or indigenous peoples? Quechua; Aymara; Guaraní; Chiquitano; Mojeño; other native; none of the above.” In the 2001 census 62 percent of the population chose one of these indigenous ethnolinguistic categories, and in the 2006 LAPOP survey 71 percent of the population selected one of the indigenous categories. This question was criticized widely, however, in part because it did not include the option of self-identifying as mestizo.
The MAS’s appeal to people with indigenous backgrounds had a number of different components. First, in contrast to the parties that traditionally dominated Bolivian politics, most of the MAS’s leadership and candidates were indigenous, at least initially, and these candidates attracted indigenous voters. According to a 2006 LAPOP survey, 29 percent of people who self-identified as indigenous felt better represented in the government and legislature by leaders of their same ethnic background. Second, the MAS had strong ties to indigenous organizations throughout the country. Indeed, the predecessor of the MAS, the IU/ASP, had been founded by indigenous organizations. These organizational ties provided the MAS with legitimacy in many indigenous areas as well as a network of activists and supporters. Third, the MAS styled itself as the representative of the indigenous population and made numerous rhetorical and symbolic appeals to it. The leaders of the MAS, for example, invoked indigenous sayings, used indigenous clothing and banners, and trumpeted the achievements of indigenous civilizations. Fourth and finally, the MAS developed a platform that had broad appeal within the indigenous population. The MAS embraced many traditional indigenous demands, from agrarian reform to bilingual education. Moreover, many of its positions on nonethnic issues, such as the nationalization of natural resource industries, also appealed to most indigenous people.

Previous indigenous-based parties, commonly known as the Katarista parties, had also made ethnic appeals, but these parties failed to reach out beyond their narrow base in the Aymara population. With their incendiary rhetoric, the more radical Katarista parties, such as the Movimiento Indio Tupak Katari (MITKA) and the Movimiento Indígena Pachacuti (MIP), alienated voters, especially whites and mestizos but also many indigenous people. For example, the leader of the MIP, Felipe Quispe, has become well known for his ethnonationalist rhetoric. In an interview with Canessa, Quispe denounced whites and spoke of creating an Aymara homeland:

Those lying q’aras [a pejorative term for whites]. When the Pachamama walks again in Quillasuyu, when her laws reign, then we will be able to judge them.

29 Conciencia de Patria (CONDEPA) formulated a somewhat successful ethnopopulist appeal in the 1990s, but CONDEPA, like the Katarista parties, never developed a following or an organizational base outside of Aymara areas. Moreover, the party, like the traditional parties, was led by mestizos, and that ultimately undermined its appeal in indigenous areas. It fell apart in the wake of leadership disputes caused by the death of its charismatic founder, Carlos Palenque.

30 These parties have frequently been referred to as Indianista parties.

31 Quispe has frequently denounced whites, saying, for example, that “they want to bathe themselves in indigenous blood”; author interview with Felipe Quispe, La Paz, July 29, 2004.
Those who want to leave can go; but those who stay will eat what we eat; they will work the way we work, dripping with sweat; they will have blisters on their hands; they will suffer like we do. Then truly the Aymara nation, what people call the indigenous [nation], what we call Qullasuyu, will come forth.

Other Katarista parties, such as the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupak Katari de Liberación (MRTKL) and the Frente Único de Liberación Katarista (FULKA), adopted more moderate and inclusive stances, and their leaders typically avoided exclusionary rhetoric. Even these parties, however, failed to take many steps to win non-Aymara voters. The Katarista parties did not recruit many white, mestizo, and Quechua leaders to their organizations. Nor did they establish ties to many organizations outside of the Aymara heartland. As a result, these parties fared quite poorly outside of Aymara areas, never winning more than 3.3 percent of the vote in majority Quechua-speaking provinces or more than 1.8 percent of the vote in majority Spanish-speaking provinces. The most successful Katarista party, Quispe’s MIP, won 26 percent of the vote in 2002 in provinces that had an Aymara-speaking majority, but it won less than 2 percent of the vote in other provinces, which added up to a mere 6 percent of the national vote.

The leaders of the MAS, by contrast, have avoided exclusionary rhetoric and have emphasized the welcoming nature of the party. Indeed, in his inaugural speech, Morales stated that “we all have the right to live in this land” and emphasized that “the indigenous movement is not exclusionary; it’s inclusive.” Initially, however, Quechua speakers dominated the MAS. The party sprang from the largely Quechua-speaking coca growers’ unions based in rural Cochabamba, and at the outset these unions provided most of the party’s supporters as well as its candidates. As a result, the party fared poorly outside of these unions’ base. In 1997, for example, the predecessor of the MAS, the IU/ASP, won 30 percent of the vote in rural Cochabamba and less than 1.4 percent.

33 There were some exceptions. The MRTKL, for example, recruited Filemón Escobar, a mestizo union leader, as its vice presidential candidate in 1985, and it elected Walter Reinaga, a Quechua leader, as a deputy from Potosí that same year.
34 In a few cases, the Katarista parties did establish alliances with traditional parties, such as the UDP and the MNR, but these were unequal alliances, which typically resulted in the subordination and co-optation of the indigenous parties and leaders. See Javier Hurtado, El Katarismo (La Paz: Hisbol, 1986), 112–18; Esteban Ticona, Gonzalo Rojas, and Xavier Albó, Votos y Wiphalas: Campesinos y Pueblos Originares en Democracia [Votes and Wiphalas: Peasants and Native Peoples under Democracy] (La Paz: CIFCA, 1995), 121–56.
elsewhere. In the early 2000s, however, the MAS sought to diversify its base. The party forged ties to Quechua groups outside of Cocha-bamba, and that helped it significantly increase its share of the vote in Quechua-speaking areas throughout the country. It struck an alliance, for example, with Félix Vázquez, the powerful head of a peasant federation in northern Potosí, who helped deliver substantial votes to the party in this department. Even more importantly, the MAS forged ties to many Aymara groups and recruited numerous Aymara leaders as candidates, including Evo Morales, who was the party’s presidential candidate in 2002 and 2005. As a result, the party’s share of the vote in majority Aymara-speaking provinces rose from only 3.3 percent in 1997 to 32.4 percent in 2002 and 75.2 percent in 2005.

The MAS also reached out to whites and mestizos. In a 2004 interview with the author, Dionisio Nuñez, an Aymara legislator from the MAS, explained that initially the party was dominated by indigenous people, but

in the end we came to understand that we didn’t want to go from being excluded to excluding others, that we had to include more people, business people, the middle classes. . . . Originally, there were three peasant organizations that founded the MAS. Two years ago, the reformulation of the MAS began. . . . The MAS ceased to be solely indigenous and peasant.

Similarly, in a 2007 interview with the author, Ricardo Díaz, a senator from the MAS, acknowledged that the MAS “has moderated in the sense of greater inclusion. Before I saw it as very biased toward the indigenous. Now we are taking into account professionals, urbanites.” In an effort to win white and mestizo votes, the party nominated a prominent white/mestizo leftist intellectual as its vice presidential candidate in 2002 (Antonio Peredo) and again in 2005 (Álvaro García Linera). It also recruited numerous whites and mestizos as candidates for the legislature. Whereas in 1997 the MAS’s legislative contingent was entirely indigenous, in 2002 more than one-third of the party’s legislators were white or mestizo and by 2005 whites and mestizos represented at least half of the contingent.

36 Although Evo Morales is Aymara, he migrated to a Quechua-speaking area as a young man, learned Quechua, and became a leader of the Quechua-dominated coca grower unions. He thus has a certain panindigenous appeal. See Canessa (fn. 32), 250.

37 The MAS also forged alliances with indigenous groups in the Amazon. For example, it struck an alliance with the Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC) and allowed it to help select candidates in the department of Santa Cruz in 2002. See Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005), 91.


39 Author interview with Ricardo Díaz, La Paz, August 17, 2007.
The MAS’s candidate strategies and ethnic appeals varied somewhat from constituency to constituency and election to election. In national or departmental elections, the MAS’s discourse tended to be very inclusive and in these elections the party recruited numerous white and mestizo candidates.\(^{40}\) In municipal races and in the legislative elections for the uninominal districts, the MAS would recruit candidates that reflected the social composition of the municipality or district. Thus, in rural indigenous districts and municipalities the candidates typically came from indigenous backgrounds and oriented much of their discourse toward indigenous people. By and large, however, the MAS sought to maintain a balance between rural indigenous and urban mestizo candidates, and it sought to include as many groups as possible.\(^{41}\)

The MAS also tried to boost its standing among whites and mestizos by establishing ties to a variety of unions and other organizations composed mostly of mestizos and centered for the most part in urban areas. These included organizations of teachers, pensioners, small businessmen, adjudicators, artisans, truck drivers, and the self-employed. In addition, the MAS forged ties to some smaller, mestizo-dominated left-of-center political parties. For example, in the 2005 elections, the MAS allied with the Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM) of Juan del Granado, the mayor of La Paz.\(^{42}\) These allied organizations provided the MAS with human and material resources from activists to transportation and food, and they gave the party an organizational base outside of the indigenous movement, outside of rural areas, and outside of the Department of Cochabamba and the highlands more generally.

The MAS’s efforts to reach out to white and mestizo voters have been largely successful and over time the MAS made important inroads among both groups. As Table 2 indicates, the MAS won 32 percent of the vote of people who self-identify as white in the 2005 elections, up from 6 percent in 2002, according to the 2006 LAPOP survey.\(^{43}\) It was the large mestizo vote, especially the indigenous mestizo vote, that was crucial to the MAS’s victory in 2005, however. The MAS won 51 percent of the vote of people who self-identified as mestizo in 2005, up from 20 percent in 2002. Moreover, mestizos represented 62 percent of the

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\(^{40}\) In Bolivia, senators, prefects, and 60 of the 130 deputies are elected at the departmental level. The remaining 70 deputies are elected from uninominal districts.

\(^{41}\) Author interview with Leonilda Zurita, La Paz, August 20, 2007; author interview with Ricardo Díaz (fn. 39).

\(^{42}\) The MAS has eschewed alliances with the traditional parties, however, on the grounds that those sorts of alliances might compromise its autonomy or political project.

\(^{43}\) According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, the MAS also substantially increased its share of the urban vote, winning the support of almost half of urban voters in 2005, as opposed to less than 20 percent in 2002.
More than two-thirds of the mestizos who reported voting for the mas had grown up speaking an indigenous language. Indeed, as Figure 1 indicates, these so-called indigenous mestizos accounted for 43 percent of the mas’s total vote, more than any other ethnic group. Had the mas adopted a more exclusionary platform, it likely would have alienated many of the indigenous mestizos. A more exclusionary approach presumably would also have alienated the mas’s white supporters as well as the nonindigenous mestizos, who together accounted for more than a quarter of the mas’s total vote. Many of these nonindigenous people (as well as many of the mas’s indigenous supporters) were drawn to the party by its populist rhetoric and platform, but the mas’s inclusive approach helped make them feel comfortable with the party.

The mas’s inclusive approach has caused tensions within the party, however, particularly with respect to candidates for the legislature and bureaucratic and ministerial posts. Some indigenous leaders have complained that middle-class whites and mestizos have seized many of the key positions within the government and the party. In a 2007 interview with the author, Lino Villca, an indigenous senator and longtime mas leader, complained that “the indigenous movement is isolated. We have the president and the Ministry of Foreign Relations, but the middle class has the rest of the ministers. . . . Now the middle class defines the strategy of Evo Morales. The indigenous class is only for mobilizations.” Nonetheless, as Villca acknowledged, the inclusive strategy

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**Table 2**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MAS’s Share of the Self-Reported Vote of People from Various Ethnic Categories in 2002 and 2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002 Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-identified indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-identified mestizos who speak indigenous languages</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-identified mestizos who speak only Spanish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-identified whites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All self-reported voters</td>
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</table>

Source: lapop 2006 Bolivia survey.

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44 According to the 2006 lapop survey, whites represented 7 percent of the mas’s total vote in 2005, although this represented an increase from only 3 percent in 2002. By contrast, self-identified indigenous people represented 28 percent of the mas’s total vote in 2005, down slightly from 33 percent in 2002.

45 Author interview with Lino Villca, La Paz, August 15, 2007.
of the MAS has yielded results, and the party is unlikely to abandon it anytime soon in spite of any tensions it might cause.

The MAS’s Populist Appeal

Equally crucial to the success of the MAS was its embrace of traditional populist electoral strategies. The MAS used three principal populist approaches to attract supporters. First, it adopted an antiestablishment message, taking advantage of widespread disenchantment with the traditional parties and elites. Second, the MAS espoused redistributive, nationalist, and state interventionist policies, feeding on growing unrest with neoliberal policies and U.S. intervention. Third and finally, the MAS relied heavily on the charismatic appeal of Evo Morales. These populist strategies helped the party win the support of people of all different ethnic backgrounds.

Like many populist parties, the MAS has relied in part on personalistic linkages with voters. Evo Morales is a polarizing figure, but his down-to-earth grassroots style has appealed to many voters, particularly poor and indigenous people. Morales has proved to be a tireless campaigner who carried his campaign to areas of Bolivia long neglected by national-level politicians. During the 2002 campaign Antonio Peredo, the MAS’s vice presidential candidate in 2002, observed that many people would come to the party’s rallies simply to see Morales.46 Morales’s

46 Author interview with Antonio Peredo, La Paz, July 22, 2004.
personal popularity has grown so much in recent years that some analysts now speak of the cult of Evismo, similar to that surrounding some other populist leaders like Juan Perón. Not surprisingly, Morales has consistently fared better than the party as a whole in general elections. In the 1997 elections, when he ran as a candidate for the legislature, he earned more votes than any other candidate in the country, and in the 2005 elections, he performed better in every department than did the MAS’s prefectural candidates. Unlike some populist parties, however, the MAS also has a strong organizational base because of its links to social movements. Indeed, according to the LAPOP surveys, many of the MAS’s supporters in the 2002 and 2005 elections participated in unions or trade associations.

Populist parties have traditionally taken advantage of disenchantment with existing parties, and political leaders and the MAS is no exception. Between 1985 and 2003 Bolivia maintained what has become known as a system of pacted democracy in which the three traditional parties—the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN), and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MNR)—took turns governing the country, usually in alliance with each other and younger parties. These parties carried out many important reforms and attracted considerable support for a time, but a stalling economy, repeated corruption scandals, and a growing number of protests gradually undermined their support. By late 2001 almost half of the population said that parties were not necessary for democracy, as opposed to only 17 percent holding that opinion in 1993. In the 2002 elections the MNR managed to finish first, but with a mere 22.4 percent of the vote, which put it less than two percentage points ahead of the MAS. The popularity of the MNR government, moreover, steadily deteriorated as it failed to get the economy back on track or resolve the widening protests. Support for the government of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada hit rock bottom in October 2003, when it violently repressed protests in the city of El Alto, leading to the deaths of more than fifty people. Abandoned by most of his former allies, Sánchez de Lozada resigned and fled the country, leaving the reputation of his party and the parties that had supported him in tatters.  


48 Fernando Calderón and Eduardo Gamarra, Crisis y Reforma de los Partidos en Bolivia (La Paz: PNUD, 2004), 17.

49 A survey carried out in 2004 found that parties were the least trusted institution in Bolivia that year. See Seligson, Moreno, and Blum (fn. 27), 102.
So poor was the reputation of the traditional parties that only the MNR opted to compete in the 2005 presidential elections, and it won a mere 6.5 percent of the vote.

The MAS was in a good position to take advantage of disenchantment with the traditional parties because of its outsider status. Unlike the main parties, the MAS never participated in the various coalition governments that ruled Bolivia between 1985 and 2003. To the contrary, the MAS consistently criticized the ruling parties and their policies, and it participated in numerous social protests against them, ranging from marches and demonstrations to roadblocks. The MAS also differed from the traditional parties in that it had no party bureaucracy to speak of, and its candidates were typically social movement leaders rather than career politicians. Indeed, the MAS was hardly a political party at all, but rather was a collection of numerous social organizations. Thus, the MAS had strong outsider credentials, which helped it to capture the support of those voters who were fed up with the traditional parties and political elites.

In 2002 the MAS faced strong competition for politically disenfranchised voters from a new party, the Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR), which ran an antiestablishment campaign. In the 2005 elections, however, the MAS was the only one of the main contenders that had a clear antiestablishment profile. Podemos, the MAS’s main rival in 2005, was made up almost entirely of politicians who had recently left the traditional parties, especially the ADN. Indeed, Jorge Quiroga, the presidential candidate of Podemos in 2005, was a former leader of the ADN who had served as president of Bolivia in 2001 and 2002. Thus, Podemos did not hold much appeal for antiestablishment voters. According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, in the 2005 elections the MAS won 54.7 percent of the votes of people who expressed no trust in parties, whereas Podemos won only 19.5 percent. The MAS’s appeal to politically disenfranchised voters was even more apparent from the high levels of support it won from voters who participated in protests against previous governments. The MAS won 77 percent of the vote of people who participated in protests against the administration of Carlos Mesa, whereas Podemos earned the support of less than 10 percent of these voters.


51 Unidad Nacional (UN), which finished third in the 2005 elections, was also composed principally of former members of the traditional parties, especially the MIR.
The MAS has attracted voters not only because of its antiestablish-
ment rhetoric, but also because of its populist economic policy positions. 
The market-oriented policies Bolivian governments implemented be-
inning in the mid-1980s stabilized the economy and generated some 
initial growth, but by the late 1990s the Bolivian economy had be-
gun to stagnate. In 2005 gross domestic product per capita in Bolivia 
was actually lower than it had been in 1998, leading to widespread 
disenchantment with the neoliberal economic model. The MAS capi-
talized on this disenchantment by denouncing neoliberal policies and 
proposing state interventionist measures, including the recuperation of 
privatized companies, in order to redistribute income and generate an 
economic recovery. In opposing neoliberal policies, the MAS often ap-
pealed to nationalist sentiments. For example, in its 2002 governing 
program, the MAS declared:

The neoliberal parties such as the MNR, ADN, MIR, MBL, UCS, NFR, CONDEPA and 
other small groupings of their corrupt circle, are characterized by the submis-
sion and betrayal of the country, by the handing over of the national patrimony 
almost without charge to the voraciousness of international capital and its di-
rectors, who impose conditions of poverty on the legitimate owners of natural 
resources.52

The MAS made control of Bolivia’s considerable natural gas depos-
its a centerpiece of its platform, particularly in the 2005 campaign. It 
helped block Sánchez de Lozada’s plan to export gas through Chile 
and then pressed the ensuing government of Carlos Mesa to renegoti-
ate its contracts with the foreign firms that exported the gas. After 
being elected president, Morales went so far as to seize control of the 
natural gas fields and demand that the foreign firms pay a higher share 
of their profits to the state. These moves proved quite popular. Indeed, 
Morales’s public approval rating soared by 13 points to 81 percent in 
the wake of his takeover of the gas fields.53

The MAS also successfully appealed to nationalist sentiments in op-
posing the coca eradication program that the Bolivian government ex-
panded in the late 1990s under pressure from the U.S. government. 
The MAS’s opposition to coca eradication programs provoked the inter-
vention of the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, who gave a 
speech shortly before the 2002 election warning Bolivians not to vote 
for Morales. In the wake of this speech, which many Bolivians viewed

52 Movimiento al Socialismo, Programa de Gobierno: Territorio, Soberanía, Vida [Program of Gov-
53 “Bolivians Love Evo: Want Closer Ties with the U.S.,” Latin American Weekly Report, May 23, 
2006, 16.
as inappropriate interference in their internal affairs, Morales’s support went up by five points in surveys taken in the principal cities of the country.\footnote{Romero Ballivián (fn. 50), 251.}

Left-of-center voters have been particularly attracted by the MAS’s statist and nationalist agenda.\footnote{Salvador Romero Ballivián, “La Elección Presidencial 2002: Una Visión de Conjunto,” Opiniones y Análisis 57 (September 2002), 191; Seligson et al. (fn. 27, 2006), 89–90.} According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, the MAS won 75.3 percent of the vote of people who identified with the left in the 2005 election, whereas Podemos won only 12.0 percent of these voters.\footnote{The survey asked people to place themselves on a left–right scale of 1–10. Here, I classify people who place themselves at 1–4 as leftists, 5–6 as centrists, and 7–10 as rightists. In the 2006 LAPOP survey, 31 percent of the people who answered this question identified themselves as being on the left, 46.5 percent on the center, and 22.5 percent on the right. However, a significant percentage of the interviewees (24.5 percent) failed to respond.} Nearly half of the people who reported voting for the MAS in 2005, as in 2002, identified with the left, with most of the remainder self-identifying as centrists. Many of these left-wing voters felt abandoned by the traditional parties’ embrace of the United States and neoliberal policies. The MAS, moreover, aggressively courted this left-of-center constituency by recruiting well-known leftists to serve as candidates for the vice presidency and the legislature and by developing a traditional left-wing platform in many areas.\footnote{Maria Teresa Zegada Claure, “Sorpresas de la Elección: MNR, MAS, NFR y ADN,” Opiniones y Análisis 57 (September 2002), 51; Félix Patrí Paco, “De Movimiento Indígena al Fracaso en la Escena del Parlamento,” Temas Sociales 25 (2004); Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005).}

The MAS’s nationalist and state-interventionist agenda appealed to some centrist and right-wing voters as well, however. Bolivians who self-identified as being on the right or in the center were almost as likely to support the nationalization of the gas industry as people on the left, and many of these nationalistic centrists and rightists voted for the MAS.\footnote{According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, 62 percent of people who self-identified as being on the left strongly approved (8–10 on a 10 point scale) of the nationalization of the gas industry, as did 60 percent of centrists and/or rightists.} According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, 53.8 percent of centrists who strongly supported the nationalization of the gas industry reported voting for the MAS, as opposed to only 41 percent of those who mildly supported it and 29.6 percent of those who disapproved of it. Overall, the MAS won 48.2 percent of the vote of people who self-identified as centrists and 32.3 percent of the vote of people who self-identified as being on the right—an impressive performance for a left-of-center party.\footnote{Ethnic ties also help explain why many people on the center and the right supported the MAS. According to the 2006 LAPOP survey, 61.4 percent of centrists and 56.8 percent of rightists who grew up speaking an indigenous language supported the MAS in 2005, as opposed to only 30.0 percent of those centrists and 14.3 percent of those rightists who did not grow up speaking an indigenous language.}
Table 3 presents the results of a multinomial logit analysis of the characteristics of voters for the MAS in the 2005 elections. For simplicity, I report only the results of a comparison of the likelihood of voting for one of the two main parties—the MAS and Podemos—which together won 82 percent of the valid vote. Each parameter estimate in the first column represents the predicted marginal effect of the variable on the log-odds ratio of voting for the MAS versus Podemos. The data for this analysis come from the 2006 LAPOP survey. As with most postelection surveys, this survey slightly overestimated the percentage of the population that reported voting for the winner of the election, the MAS in this case, and slightly underestimated the percentage of the population that reported voting for the other parties. In addition, the survey overestimated voter turnout in the election: 90.9 percent of registered voters reported voting in the survey, whereas only 84.5 percent of registered voters actually voted in the election.

The analysis generated a number of noteworthy findings. First, the MAS’s populist appeal—that is, its antiestablishment, nationalist, state interventionist, and redistributive message—was clearly successful in winning support. Left-wing voters, people who favored the nationalization of the gas industry, and people who had participated in protests against the administration of Carlos Mesa (2003–5) were all significantly more likely to report having voted for the MAS, according to the analysis. In order to estimate precisely what effect these variables had on the probability of voting for the MAS, I carried out a series of

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60 Dow and Endersby argue that multinomial logit is superior in some aspects to multinomial probit, particularly for applications such as this, where “a voter casts a ballot for a candidate or party selected from a fixed, stable pool of alternatives”; see Jay K. Dow and James W. Endersby, “Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit: A Comparison of Choice Models for Voting Research,” Electoral Studies 23 (March 2004), 108. For a contrasting view, see Michael R. Alvarez and Jonathan Nagler, “When Politics and Models Collide: Estimating Models of Multiparty Competition,” American Journal of Political Science 42 (January 1998).

61 None of the six other parties that competed in this election earned more than 7 percent of the vote.

62 For more information on the survey and the wording of the questions, see Seligson et al. (fn. 27, 2006).

63 In the 2006 LAPOP survey, 53 percent of voters reported casting their ballots for the MAS and 25 percent reported voting for Podemos. According to the official returns, the MAS received 50 percent of the total vote and Podemos earned 26 percent.

64 There is little evidence to suggest that the increase in votes for the MAS in 2005 is due to increased voter turnout. Voter turnout as a percentage of the estimated voting-age population actually declined between 2002 and 2005, both nationwide and in majority indigenous provinces. This decline in turnout was largely a result of the purging of the voter rolls as required by a change in Bolivian electoral laws. Data on turnout are from Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE), Resultados Elecciones Generales y de Prefectos 2005 (La Paz: CNE, 2006).
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Table 3
Predictors of Voting for the MAS (over PODEMOS) in the 2005 Bolivian Election (multinomial logit model)

| Predictor                                                                 | Coefficient | Standard Error | P > |z|
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|-----|
| Constant                                                                  | 3.722       | .949           | .000|
| Self-identifies as indigenous                                            | .561        | .273           | .040|
| Self-identifies as white                                                  | -.676       | .247           | .006|
| Aymara maternal language                                                  | 1.434       | .285           | .000|
| Quechua maternal language                                                | .637        | .199           | .001|
| Other indigenous maternal language                                       | .413        | .548           | .452|
| Prefers ethnic representation                                            | .299        | .207           | .149|
| Supports indigenous language education (1–7 scale)                       | .129        | .056           | .023|
| Trust in political parties (1–7 scale)                                   | -.042       | .055           | .448|
| Protested against Mesa administration                                    | .835        | .283           | .003|
| Left–right ideological self-placement (left–right 1–10 scale)            | -.298       | .041           | .000|
| Support for nationalization of gas industry (1–10 scale)                 | .106        | .037           | .004|
| Participation in trade associations (1–4 scale)                          | .268        | .100           | .007|
| Resides in media luna (southern and eastern departments)                  | -.1030      | .193           | .000|
| Urbanization level (1–4 scale)                                           | -.013       | .078           | .864|
| Monthly income (0–8 scale)                                               | -.142       | .069           | .038|
| Female                                                                    | -.016       | .166           | .921|
| Age (in years)                                                           | .015        | .006           | .013|
| Pseudo R²                                                                 | .184        |                |     |
| N                                                                        | 1162        |                |     |

simulations using Clarify. The sloping lines in the figures represent the predicted probabilities of voting for the MAS (over PODEMOS) and the horizontal lines represent the 95 percent confidence intervals of these estimates. The simulation in Figure 2 shows that someone who strongly favored the nationalization of the gas industry had a 63 percent likelihood of voting for the MAS when other variables are held at their means, whereas someone who strongly opposed it had only a 36 percent probability of doing so. The effects of ideological self-placement were even stronger, as Figure 3 indicates. Someone who identified strongly with the left had a 78 percent likelihood of voting for the

Figure 2
The Effect of Support for Nationalization of the Gas Industry on Probability of Voting for the MAS

Figure 3
The Effect of Ideology on the Predicted Probability of Voting for the MAS
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MAS, whereas someone who identified strongly with the right had only a 27 percent probability of doing so. Meanwhile, voters who participated in protests against the administration of Carlos Mesa (2003–5) had a 70 percent probability of voting for the MAS when all other variables are held at their means, as opposed to only a 53 percent probability for those voters who did not participate in any protests against the Mesa administration. Somewhat surprisingly, voters who had little trust in political parties were not more likely to vote for the MAS, but this may be because by 2006 the MAS had established itself as the most important political party in the country, causing the level of trust in political parties among supporters of the MAS to increase.\textsuperscript{66}

Self-identifying as indigenous also increases the likelihood of voting for the MAS, even after controlling for ideology, dissatisfaction with parties, participation in protests, support for nationalization of the gas industry, and a host of other variables.\textsuperscript{67} This suggests that people did not vote for the MAS just because of the party’s populist platform, but did so also because the party’s ethnic demands and profile presumably appealed to them as indigenous people. The dual ethnic and populist appeal of the MAS helps explain why it fared significantly better in the 2005 elections than traditional populist parties have fared in recent elections. Indeed, while populist parties such as the NFR and UCS managed to win approximately 20 percent of the vote in some elections during the 1990s and early 2000s, none of them approached the 53 percent of the vote that the MAS captured in 2005.

The analysis also found that people who self-identify as white were less likely to vote for the MAS, even controlling for other variables. However, the probability that a self-identified white person would vote for the MAS was still relatively high, other things being equal. A simulation, depicted in Figure 4, found that when all other variables are held at their means people who self-identify as white had a 42 percent probability of voting for the MAS, people who self-identify as mestizo had a 57 percent probability of doing so, and people who self-identify as indigenous had a 63 percent probability of voting for the MAS.\textsuperscript{68} This

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{66} According to the 2002 LAPOP survey, MAS supporters in 2002 were more likely to express low levels of confidence in parties, presumably because in 2002 MAS had not yet established itself as one of the country’s main parties. In 2002, 38.8 percent of MAS supporters reported having no trust in parties, as opposed to 29.2 percent of all voters.
  \item\textsuperscript{67} The modest level of statistical significance of the indigenous identification variable is presumably the result of the fact that indigenous self-identification is correlated with other variables in the analysis, such as the Aymara and Quechua linguistic variables. The vast majority (84 percent) of people who self-identify as indigenous grew up speaking an indigenous language.
  \item\textsuperscript{68} As the figure shows, the 95 percent confidence intervals of the estimates for self-identified indigenous people overlap with those of mestizos, so we do not have a high level of certainty that someone
\end{itemize}
suggests that the MAS’s ethnopolitist appeals resonated particularly strongly among self-identified indigenous people but that they were inclusive enough to attract many mestizos and whites.

Speaking an indigenous language also increased the likelihood of voting for the MAS, even controlling for indigenous self-identification and other variables. The variables measuring whether the respondent grew up speaking Aymara or Quechua were both positive and highly statistically significant, although the variable for a lowlands indigenous language was not. As Figure 5 shows, with all other variables held at their means, people who grew up speaking Aymara had a 69 percent probability of voting for the MAS, people who grew up speaking Quechua had a 60 percent probability of doing so, and people who did not grow up speaking an indigenous language had only a 45 percent probability of supporting the MAS. Why does speaking an indigenous language have such a strong effect on the likelihood of voting for the

who self-identifies as indigenous is more likely to vote for the MAS than is someone who self-identifies as mestizo.

69 Speakers of lowlands indigenous languages may not have been significantly more likely to vote for the MAS because it may have been perceived as a party that principally represented highlands indigenous populations, reflecting ongoing Amazonian–highlands indigenous divides.
mas even after controlling for indigenous self-identification. The main reason is that the mas’s inclusive ethnic appeal managed to win the support not only of people who self-identified as indigenous but also of many people who grew up speaking an indigenous language but do not self-identify as indigenous. These indigenous mestizos may not self-identify as indigenous, but their indigenous roots, their cultural attachments, and their experiences with socioeconomic disadvantage and discrimination made them receptive to the inclusive ethnic profile and agenda of the mas.

The analysis also found that views on ethnic issues had only a modest effect on the likelihood of voting for the mas, presumably because the mas’s inclusive appeal attracted many people who did not have a strong position on these issues. The ethnic representation variable had the expected sign but it was not statistically significant, suggesting that people who felt better represented by members of their own ethnic group were not significantly more likely to vote for the mas. The support for teaching indigenous languages variable, meanwhile, was

70 I view growing up speaking an indigenous language as a reasonable proxy for having indigenous roots and the cultural attachments and life experiences that go with them. It is these cultural attachments and life experiences, I assume, that draw indigenous language speakers to the mas.
positive and statistically significant, but a simulation revealed that we cannot be sure (at the 95 percent confidence level) that someone who strongly advocated that schools teach indigenous languages was more likely to support the MAS than someone who did not support education in indigenous languages at all.

Taken as a whole, these findings provide support for the argument that the MAS’s inclusive ethnopopulist appeal played a crucial role in its electoral victory, attracting the support of a broad variety of voters with indigenous backgrounds as well as of politically disenchanted voters and of voters with leftist and nationalist views. The statistical analysis, however, also showed that a number of other variables, not directly related to the MAS’s ethnopopulist appeal, influenced the likelihood that a voter would support the MAS. Other things being equal, voters from the eastern and southern departments known as the media luna were much less likely to support the MAS. By contrast, older voters, people with lower incomes, and people who participated in trade associations (that is, organizations of professionals, merchants, peasants, or producers) were significantly more likely to support the MAS. Surprisingly, however, neither urbanization level nor gender had a statistically significant relationship with voting for the MAS, once other variables were controlled for.

**Ethnopopulism in Comparative Perspective**

The MAS is only one of the many left-leaning governments that have come to power in Latin America in recent years. In nearly a dozen countries, from Central America to the Southern Cone, leftist leaders have won important electoral victories. The causes of this resurgence are many of the same ones that propelled the MAS to victory in Bolivia: disenchantment with the existing parties and their policies, especially their market-oriented economic policies. Market-oriented policies have succeeded in reducing inflation and restoring foreign financial flows, but they have typically failed to generate strong and stable economic growth and they have not resolved pressing problems of inequality, crime, and, unemployment. Moreover, recurring problems with corruption, legislative gridlock, and poor leadership have led to growing disaffection with the existing political elites in many countries, which leftist candidates have used to their advantage.

71 Matthew R. Cleary, “Explaining the Left’s Resurgence,” *Journal of Democracy* 17 (October 2006).
As many scholars have observed, however, the leftist leaders that have come to power in recent years are not all alike. Some of them, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, have taken on a populist bent, developing strong antiestablishment agendas and seeking a radical overhaul of the existing economic and political order. Others, like Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet in Chile and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, have embraced the existing economic and political institutions. These latter leaders have sought increased income redistribution but they have advocated only modest changes in the market-oriented economic model. The ethnically based left-leaning parties, such as the MAS in Bolivia and Pachakutik in Ecuador, have fallen clearly on the populist side. These parties represent the most marginalized and disadvantaged sectors of the population and, as a result, they have the lowest stake in the existing system. The leaders of these parties, moreover, are typically political outsiders with few links to the political and economic establishment and thus they have been more disposed to make classically populist antisystem appeals.

Nevertheless, the ethnopopulist parties differ from classical populist and leftist parties in that their ethnic linkages to voters provide them with certain advantages. First, these linkages have enabled them to win overwhelming support from a constituency that traditional leftist and populist movements have had a difficult time penetrating: the rural, mostly indigenous peasantry. This has enabled the ethnopopulist parties to make dramatic gains in short periods of time. In Ecuador, Pachakutik won 20.6 percent of the valid vote in 1996, the first time it competed in presidential elections. The rise of the MAS in Bolivia was even more spectacular. The precursor of the MAS, Izquierda Unida, won only 3.5 percent of the valid vote in 1997, the first time it competed in presidential elections, but the MAS won 20.9 percent of the valid vote in 2002 and 50.3 percent in 2005. By contrast, most other leftist parties that have registered important victories in recent years, such as the Workers’ Party in Brazil, the Broad Front in Uruguay, the Socialist Party in Chile, and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, have built themselves up only gradually.

73 It is true that some populist and leftist parties, such as Izquierda Democrática in Ecuador, Izquierda Unida in Peru, and the Unión Democrática y Popular in Bolivia, have won significant levels of support among rural, indigenous voters in the past, but they have not captured this constituency to the same degree as the ethnopopulist parties. In Bolivia, only the MNR of the 1950s and 1960s rivaled the MAS in terms of its share of the vote among the rural, indigenous population.
Second, the ethnopopulist parties may also prove to be more stable than classical populist parties. Traditional populist leaders often failed to build organizations, relying instead on unmediated, personalistic linkages to voters that have proved fragile, particularly in the event of the death of the leaders. Support for populist leaders has often depended in large part on their ability to deliver economic and social goods, and when they have failed to do so, volatile urban constituencies have been quick to abandon them. The identity-based linkages that ethnopopulist parties enjoy with some portions of the electorate should be more enduring than these personalistic or performance-based linkages. Indeed, numerous studies have found that ethnic diversity tends to dampen electoral volatility in part because of the resilience of ties between ethnic parties and the people whom they were established to represent. Ethnopopulist parties may also benefit from their close ties to the indigenous organizations, which have deep roots in many rural communities and should provide the parties with some organizational stability. For the ethnopopulist parties to endure, however, they will need to avoid ethnonationalist appeals and reconcile the interests of their rural indigenous core and the urban mestizo sectors that have also supported the parties. To date, the MAS has demonstrated a good deal of electoral stability, successfully maintaining its rural indigenous base while making important inroads in other sectors of the population. During its first decade, Pachakutik also demonstrated a remarkable degree of stability for an Ecuadorian party, but, as we shall see, it has recently begun to disintegrate.

Ethnopopulist parties have fared well in recent years in part because the sociopolitical climate has been conducive to ethnic as well as populist appeals. Rising levels of indigenous mobilization and heightened ethnic consciousness have politicized many indigenous voters in Latin America.

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74 Weyland (fn. 8), 13.
76 The stability of ethnic ties should not be exaggerated, however, particularly in regions such as Latin America, where ethnic identification is fluid. As the Ecuadorian case illustrates, indigenous voters may abandon an indigenous-based party for other parties if its appeals become exclusionary or if they believe that other populist or leftist parties have better electoral possibilities.
77 Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885–1985 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Jóhanna Kristín Birnir (fn. 4, 2001). In an earlier study, I found that indigenous areas in Latin America have traditionally been more electorally volatile than nonindigenous areas, but I argued that this volatility stemmed from the failure of existing parties to represent the indigenous population adequately. Indeed, the emergence of indigenous-based parties has reduced electoral volatility to date. See Raúl Madrid, “Ethnic Cleavages and Electoral Volatility in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 38 (October 2005).
America at the same time that economic stagnation and inequality have led many voters of all ethnic backgrounds to embrace populist policies and leaders. Indeed, it is quite likely that ethnopopulist parties would not have been nearly as successful as the MAS or Pachakutik had they emerged in Bolivia or Ecuador during earlier periods.

Nevertheless, even in the last decade, the level of success enjoyed by ethnopopulist parties in Latin America has varied considerably from country to country. Not surprisingly, the ethnopopulist parties have tended to fare better in those countries with substantial indigenous populations in large part because indigenous people tend to vote for these parties at higher rates. Bolivia, which by most accounts has the largest proportion of indigenous people in the Americas, has had by far the most successful ethnopopulist party to date. An ethnopopulist party also fared well for a time in Ecuador, which has a reasonably large indigenous population, although the exact size of this population is the subject of great debate. By contrast, ethnopopulist parties have not fared particularly well in Colombia and Venezuela, in large part because these nations have only small indigenous populations.

The strength of a country’s indigenous movement has also affected the performance of the ethnopopulist parties. Strong indigenous movements have provided useful resources to ethnopopulist parties in Bolivia and Ecuador, including candidates, activists, and organizational legitimacy. Where the indigenous movement is relatively weak or highly fragmented, ethnopopulist parties have had a harder time taking root. According to the Guatemalan anthropologist Ricardo Falla, the most important reason that the 2007 presidential candidacy of indigenous activist Rigoberta Menchú failed to catch on in Guatemala was that “unlike Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rigoberta is not backed by a mass organization or social movement. Nor can she count on a party structure that covers the country’s many indigenous regions, much less...”


79 Some scholars have claimed the indigenous population in Ecuador represents 30 percent or more of the population, but the 2001 census found that only 6.1 percent of the population self-identified as indigenous and only 4.6 percent reported speaking an indigenous language. The 2000 Emedinho survey found that 14.3 percent of the population either self-identified as indigenous, spoke an indigenous language, or had parents who spoke an indigenous language. See Mauricio León Guzmán, “Étnicidad y exclusión en el Ecuador: Una mirada a partir del Censo de Población de 2001,” Iconos (February 2003).

80 Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005); and Marenghi and Alcántara (fn. 5).

81 Van Cott (fn. 4, 2005).
the country as a whole.782 Menchú also did not articulate a clear leftist or populist agenda and chose as her running mate a wealthy businessman and former president of the country’s most important business organization.

The absence of a strong indigenous movement in Peru has also hamstrung ethnopopulist parties in that country.83 A number of candidates and parties seeking to represent the indigenous population have emerged in Peru, but these candidates have fared poorly in part because they have not had the legitimacy or organizational resources that a strong indigenous movement might provide them. Ollanta Humala of the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP) did fare quite well in the 2006 Peruvian presidential elections, particularly in indigenous areas, but Peru’s weak and divided indigenous movement played no significant role in his campaign. Moreover, although Humala may have benefited from his Quechua name and the ethnic organizing of some of his family members, he made only limited ethnic appeals, so it is more accurate to describe his movement as populist, rather than ethnopopulist.

Finally, as we have seen, those ethnically based parties that have developed inclusive appeals have been much more successful than those parties that have been more exclusionary. Indeed, the MAS’s electoral performance improved considerably over time as it became more inclusive. By contrast, the main ethnically based party in Ecuador, Pachakutik, became less inclusive over time, with negative effects on the party’s fortunes. The Ecuadoran indigenous movement played the lead role in the founding of Pachakutik, but at the outset Pachakutik had numerous white and mestizo as well as indigenous leaders.84 Pachakutik also initially established close ties to various mestizo-dominated organizations. In the elections of 1996 and 1998, for example, Pachakutik formed an alliance with the urban-based Movimiento Ciudadano Nuevo País and supported this movement’s mestizo leader, Freddy Ehlers, for president. In 2002 Pachakutik allied with Lucio Gutiérrez, a mestizo army colonel, and his party, the Partido Sociedad Patriótica. This inclusive approach attracted many white and mestizo voters, as well as indigenous people.85 As a result, the candidates Pachakutik supported won more than 20 percent of the vote on average in the first round of presidential elections between 1996 and 2002, and the party helped deliver the presidency to Gutiérrez in 2002.

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783 See Yashar (fn. 3) for an illuminating analysis of why Peru has failed to develop a strong indigenous movement.
784 Andolina (fn. 5); and Collins (fn. 4).
785 Mijeski and Beck (fn. 6); Beck and Mijeski (fn. 6); and Madrid (fn. 78).
In 2006, however, the party shifted in a more ethnonationalist direction in large part because many of its indigenous leaders grew tired of ceding important candidatures to whites and mestizos. Pachakutik declined to form alliances with other parties and opted to run its own candidate for president, the indigenous leader Luis Macas. The party also put forth fewer mestizo candidates for other positions than it had in the past, and some prominent mestizo leaders, such as Augusto Barra and Virgilio Hernández, left the party because of their concerns about its growing ethnocentrism. Many of the mestizo-dominated unions and organizations that had supported Pachakutik in past elections—such as the Urban Forum, and the unions of teachers, oil workers, and electrical workers—also abandoned it in 2006 in part because of concerns about the growing dominance of the indigenista faction within Pachakutik. Thus, Pachakutik increasingly resembled a traditional ethnic party rather than an ethnopopulist party. Partly as a result, it fared poorly in the 2006 presidential elections, winning a mere 2 percent of the vote. Not only did white and mestizo voters abandon it en masse, but so did many indigenous voters. To be sure, Pachakutik’s ethnonationalist turn was not the only factor in its decline—stiff competition from other populist parties also played an important role—but its increasingly exclusionary policies hurt the party considerably.

Conclusion

The existing literature on ethnic parties has maintained that such parties succeed by mobilizing their base through exclusionary appeals. This article has shown that such exclusionary appeals are unlikely to be successful in areas where ethnic polarization is low and ethnic identities are fluid and multiple. In these areas, ethnically based parties may win support from members of a variety of different ethnic groups by develop-


88 Pachakutik fared even worse in the September 2007 elections for the constituent assembly, winning less than 1 percent of the national vote.

89 Sara Báez Rivera and Víctor Bretón Solo de Zaldívar, “El Enigma del Voto Étnico o las Tribulaciones del Movimiento Indígena,” *Ecuador Debate* 69 (December 2006).
ing inclusive appeals. Indeed, this is exactly the approach that the MAS and, initially, Pachakutik used successfully in Bolivia and Ecuador.

These findings suggest that the literature on ethnic parties needs to consider how ethnic identities and relations are constructed in theorizing about the electoral behavior of such parties. For example, the literature needs to recognize not only that ethnic identification is often fluid and multiple but also that the degree of fluidity and multiplicity often varies considerably over time and space and that this has important electoral implications. It may well be that ethnic parties have incentives to adopt exclusionary appeals where ethnic identities are singular and relatively fixed, but ethnically based parties have greater incentives to be inclusive in societies where ethnic identification is fluid and multiple. This study thus aims to bring the complexity of ethnic identity back into the study of ethnic parties.

This article also aims to bring ethnicity into the study of populism. The literature on populism has largely failed to recognize the potential compatibility between populist and ethnic appeals. In ethnically homogeneous countries, populist parties may not need to make ethnic appeals to win votes among the subaltern sectors, but in countries with large indigenous populations or other socioeconomically disadvantaged ethnic groups, populist parties may more effectively win lower-class votes through a combination of populist and inclusive ethnic appeals. Ethnic appeals, moreover, may create more enduring ties to voters than personalistic or performance-based appeals, thus enabling ethnopopulist parties to achieve a degree of electoral stability that traditional populist parties have found elusive.